Emotivism NC 1 Presume neg because 1) we should default to assuming statements are false to avoid believing in conspiracies and alternate

realities, and 2) statements are more often false then true: to prove that a pen is red, there is only one way to prove it true but an infinite number of ways to prove it false. And, permissibility negates because 1) negate means “deny the validity of”1 thus; the negative burden is to prove a lack of an obligation, 2) there is a trichotomy between obligation, prohibition and permissibility: proving one disproves the other two, 3) Ought implies proactive justification since we don‟t take actions unless we have a reason to take the action. Thus, if we don‟t have any reasons to do anything, we do not take any actions, and 4) to value above, the aff must show that rehabilitation is more important than retribution. However, permissibility implies both options are equal. First, morality cant be truth apt: A) Moral relativism is true because there is no absolute conception of what is moral. Any sense of absolute truth will always be arbitrary insofar as you would have to assume others would agree to it. Additionally morality would always be based on an arbitrarily pre-determined end because everyone has different conceptions of what is right based off of their inclinations. B) All moral statements regress to assertions. Macyntire an agent can only justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derided, and can only [be] justif[ied]y that rule in turn by deriving it from some more general rule or principle; but on this view since every chain of reasoning must be finite, such a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given. „Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects together with a complete acco unt of the
Yet the most influential account of moral reasoning that emerged in response to this critique of emotivism was one according to which principles which it observed, and the effect of observing those principles... if the e nquirer still goes on asking “But why should I live like that?” then there is no further answer to

The terminus of justification is thus always, on this view, a not further to be justified choice, a choice unguided by criteria. Each individual implicitly or explicitly has to adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice. The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will and for that will its principles have and can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them. Thus emotivism has not been left very behind after all. Therefore expressivism is going to be precluding because all ethics were originally based in some
give him, because we have already, ex hypothesis, said everything that could be included in the further answer‟ (Hare 1952, p . 69). expression of human emotion.

C) The terms of moral philosophy are empty and cannot provide meaning or obligation to agents. Stevenson2 meaning cannot happen without words, and words all work the same, namely by referring outside of themselves to what we can’t know except through words. Self-Centered Language. Derrida noticed that western philosophy in general since Plato has been involved in a search for presence, for reliable meaning that is not simply a written trace left over when an intended meaning has dissolved into other possible meanings. He calls this tendency to believe in a special meaning that is not dependent on the workings of
This language logo-centrism. Logo-centrism. Logo-Centrism is the tendency in philosophy to assume that it can refer to a self-combined meaning that is free of the problems affecting language in general. At the heart of logo-centrism, argued Derrida, is an attempt to separate writing and speech so that philosophy can be associated only with speech. Philosophers since plate have regarded speech as an immediate source of meaning, and writing as a medium that is only capable of capturing mere traces of meaning. The tendencies of writing to wander off the subject, to mislead up, to change its meaning depending on why reads it and in what context, are inescapable. Vive la Difference Derrida invented the word


“Ought” and “Negate” from The American Heritage Dictionary 4 th Ed. (2007)
Jay Stevenson PHD philosophy. Alpha books. The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Philosophy 1998 page 223 -224

contradict me. But. not even a statement about my own state of mind. The meaning of a word is [empty and] different from the word itself. Ayer3 We begin by admitting that the fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable. which infinitely regress as they presuppose other words. Language. expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. that you have to trace all the places where the words point to other words not in the sentence.” This means ethical terms like ought. The term refers to the idea [But] the meaning of a word depends not so much on what it refers to but how it relates to. the words for “differ (to be different from) and defer (to defer to) are spelled the same. unlike the absolutists. and differs from. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association. they defer their ability to have meaning to other words in the language. 83. 'You stole that money. and bad are empty of meaning since they rely upon concepts outside of themselves to what we can‟t know except for other words. If now I generalize my previous statement and say. Notice Derrida‟s word is spelled with an “a” unlike the ordinary word. Vol. that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling [One] may disagree with me about the wrongness in the sense that he may not have the same feelings about stealing as I have. until the original sentence dissolves itself. So that there is which is being expressed. is that they are mere pseudo-concepts. Explanations of truth claims must be simplified in order to eliminate arbitrary information that is false. This means that moral claims are merely emotive responses that can't be propositional because they aren't factual.' in a particular tone of horror.Emotivism NC 2 “differance” to refer to these problems inherent in the written word. Thus if I say to someone. I contend that retribution is more consistent with an emotivist theory. 4 Kevin M. It [only] merely serves to show[s] that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker. This leads to another meaning of the term Words do not simply contain meaning. strictly speaking. I am [He and I are] merely expressing certain moral sentiments. the standard is consistency with emotions. 'You stole that money. inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgments in which they occur. or the exclamation marks. other words. [which] adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. This means that if you want to go on a quest for the true. good. The tone. Paul H. A. Darley. complete meaning of a sentence. Thus. and he may quarrel with me on account of my moral sentiments. meaning is always slipping away. Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishmen. or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. John M. 2002.J (British logical positivist). by a suitable convention. Why Do We Punish?. plainly no sense in asking which of us is in the right. This has implies that morality can never be truth apt.' In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. As a result. difference.' I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning . It is as if I they are unanalysable. Next. 'Stealing money is wrong. For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong. Carlsmith. And the man who is ostensibly contradicting me is merely expressing his moral sentiments. No. We say that the reason why The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Carlsmith4 3 Ayer. 284–299 . For neither of us is asserting a genuine proposition. (1936): p. It is as if I had said. But he cannot.. and Logic. had written 'Stealing money!!' . I am not making any factual statement. 1) Studies have shown how individual motives for punishment are rooted in their emotions about just desert. 2. and both concepts are suggested by “difference. Arbitrary information grants the explainer the license to make up false data. 109. the only thing that solves these skeptical arguments is emotivism. 'You acted wrongly in stealing th6I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said. Inc. It is clear that there is nothing said here which can be true or false.where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show. we are able to give an explanation of this fact about ethical concepts.that is. Another man of stealing. Robinson. Truth. “differance” in French. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. so far we are in agreement with the absolutists. It is thus impossible to deduce morality.

” Ratio Juris. (But note Peter French‟s. however.crime punishment she assigns to it . The magnitude of these punishments and the sense of offense seriousness are both labile. about to does not imply an eye-for-an-eye equivalence of punishment to crime. in another era. Recently. remark that “why [retribution] is barbaric or why being barbaric is a sufficient reason to dismiss it. this just deserts perspective is the one they generally use. punishing for an offense is a way of censuring or blaming the person who committed that offense. 207. The idea is that 5 Manuel Escamilla-Castillo [University of Granada. Morris. restores the lost equilibrium.” ecological theory of punishment. then she will elevate that offense in her hierarchy of seriousness and correspondingly increase the severity of . We do so not because we think that we have definitively demonstrated that people do hold this conceptualization but because a clearly specified account of the theory may facilitate further research. a number of writers have outlined the core of just deserts thinking and suggested that it is consistent with what we can observe of everyday. including research that disproves the theory. is firmly rooted in public opinion: We find it in expressions such as “I have paid my debt to society. it is important that the degree of blame and censure be proportionate to the degree of blameworthiness of the offender. p. Because penalty assignment is a blaming activity. We can call this the retribution must be directed towards restoring the previous situation of equilibrium. Lerner.Emotivism NC 3 The current research begins to provide the outlines of the naive (a) theory of punishment assigned to individual perpetrators. in the sense that they can be rapidly modified by the holder on the basis of many kinds of information. or “The criminal must pay his due. and then generates a punishment commensurate with the blame. we suggest. 1974. Faculty of Law]. The ordinary person is persuadable on these sorts of issues but arranges what he or she is persuaded maintain the general notion that punishment must be proportional to the blameworthiness of the offense. This idea of retribution. that punishment. 1999. & Tetlock. which must be ancestral. 1997. If Mary is suddenly convinced that a specific prison is a country club in which offenders serve comfortable time. that has been overturned by the delinquent‟s action in causing injury to the victim of the crime. which is built around a just deserts orientation in generating punishments.What we Faced with a description of an offense that . Briefly. moral thinking (Finkel.) 2) Retribution is most firmly rooted in societies sensibilities about morality. EscamillaCastillo5 The retributive theory establishes that the harm caused by the crime must be compensated by harm suffered by the person responsible for the initial harm.” said by the criminal who has served his sentence. 2001. is seldom explained ”. purposefully committed. When a punishment is imposed on the criminal. triggers that prototype culturally conversant individual has an idea of a hierarchy of offenses. Thus. 4 December 201 0 (460–78) . Intentional harms call forth sanctions such as prison terms or. it is time to be clearer on just what sort of theory of just deserts we suggest that our respondents hold. ordered by their normal blameworthiness. the observer experiences some degree of moral outrage. everyperson. This is normally closely correlated with the degree of harm that the offense causes. “The Purposes of Legal Punishment. von Hirsch. and this blameworthiness is generally indexed by the moral severity of the harm that the offender committed. is able to assign a degree of blame for that act. then she will increase sentences for all offenders who will be sent to that priso n If she becomes convinced that some offense she previously thought minor really inflicted much more harm than she thought and that its perpetrator was significantly more blameworthy. and has a coupled ascending scale of the corresponding penalties to attach to each offense. 1998). lex talionis stance that demands the death or torture of the offender in appropriate cases. 1968. by “compensating” the initial illegal harm. 23 No. It is often assumed that what we tactfully have been calling a just deserts punishment stance is in fact a barbaric retributionist. We think we have demonstrated that when people are considering the punishment that should be assigned to an individual wrong doer. What this suggests is that a(n) suggest is that there is a prototype of an intentional wrong. Vol. is the core of the just deserts perspective. the infliction of physical pain. Strawson. and returns the situation to balance . Goldberg. or payment. This notion of moral proportionality.

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