UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________________________________________ DANNY DONOHUE, as President of the Civil Service

Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; JOHN DELLIO, MICHAEL BOULERIS, MAUREEN ALONZO, MARCOS DIAMANTATOS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly-situated, Plaintiffs, -againstTHOMAS J. MADISON, JR., individually and in his official capacity as Executive Director of the New York State Thruway Authority and the New York State Canal Corporation; CARLOS MILLAN, individually and in his official capacity as Director of Employee Relations and Employee Safety, New York State Thruway Authority and New York State Canal Corporation; HOWARD P. MILSTEIN, individually and in his official capacity as Chairman of New York State Thruway/ Canal Corporation Board of Directors; DONNA J. LUH, individually and in her official capacity as Vice-Chairman of New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; E. VIRGIL CONWAY, individually and in his official capacity as Board Member of New York State Thruway/ Canal Corporation Board of Directors; RICHARD N. SIMBERG, individually and in his official capacity as Board Member of New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; BRANDON R. SALL, individually and in his official capacity as Board Member of New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; J. DONALD RICE, JR., individually and in his official capacity as Board Member of New York State Thruway/ Canal Corporation Board of Directors; JOSE HOLGUIN-VERAS, individually and in his official capacity as Board Member of New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; JOSEPH BRESS, individually and in his official capacity as Chief Negotiator of New York State Thruway/ Canal Corporation; NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY, Defendants. _____________________________________________________

COMPLAINT Demand for Jury Trial Civil Action No.:

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Plaintiffs, DANNY DONOHUE, as President of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; the CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (hereinafter “CSEA”); JOHN DELLIO; MICHAEL BOULERIS; MAUREEN ALONZO, and MARCOS DIAMANTATOS, by their attorneys, Steven A. Crain and Daren J. Rylewicz (Aaron E. Kaplan, Miguel G. Ortiz and Jennifer C. Zegarelli of counsel), as and for a Complaint, respectfully set forth as follows: NATURE OF PROCEEDING 1. This is a civil rights class action, brought by Plaintiffs Danny Donohue, CSEA,

John Dellio, Michael Bouleris, Maureen Alonzo and Marcos Diamantatos on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated New York State Thruway Authority (“Thruway Authority”) CSEA represented employees, arising from Defendants’ termination of employment, demotion and forced retirement of approximately 60 CSEA represented Thruway Authority employees. This action seeks declaratory relief and damages brought pursuant to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983 to redress Defendants’ intentional violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, due process and equal protection of the law under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, along with violations of Article I, §17 of the New York State Constitution. JURISDICTION 2. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 (federal

question jurisdiction) and 1343(a) (civil rights jurisdiction) because this action is filed to obtain relief for the deprivation, under color of state law, of the rights of citizens of the United States secured by the United States Constitution and federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. This

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Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367. 3. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because Defendants have their

principal places of business within this District and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred within this District. 4. Plaintiffs demand a jury trial of this action. PARTIES 5. Plaintiff Danny Donohue is the duly elected Statewide President of CSEA, and

sues herein pursuant to and within the scope of his authority as an elected statewide officer of CSEA. 6. Plaintiff CSEA is a not-for-profit corporation duly organized and existing under

the laws of the State of New York, is an employee organization under the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act, New York Civil Service Law Article 14, representing approximately 265,000 employees and retirees throughout the State of New York. CSEA is a duly recognized collective negotiating representative, for approximately 550 employees of Defendant Thruway Authority, hereinafter referred to as the “CSEA bargaining unit.” 7. 8. Plaintiff John Dellio (“Plaintiff Dellio”) is a resident of Schenectady, New York. On April 3, 2013, Defendant Thruway Authority terminated Plaintiff Dellio from

his permanent position as an Information Technology Specialist I. 9. 10. York. At the time of his termination, Plaintiff Dellio was a member of CSEA. Plaintiff Michael Bouleris (“Plaintiff Bouleris”) is a resident of Ballston Spa, New

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11.

On April 3, 2013, Defendant Thruway Authority terminated Plaintiff Bouleris

from his permanent position as an Assistant Purchasing Agent. 12. 13. York. 14. On April 3, 2013, Defendant Thruway Authority terminated Plaintiff Alonzo from At the time of his termination, Plaintiff Bouleris was a member of CSEA. Plaintiff Maureen Alonzo (“Plaintiff Alonzo”) is a resident of Voorheesville, New

her permanent position as a Senior Budgeting Analyst. 15. 16. New York. 17. On April 3, 2013, Defendant Thruway Authority terminated Plaintiff Diamantatos At the time of her termination, Plaintiff Alonzo was a member of CSEA. Plaintiff Marcos Diamantatos (“Plaintiff Diamantatos”) is a resident of Albany,

from his permanent position as an Information Technology Specialist I. 18. 19. At the time of his termination, Plaintiff Diamantatos was a member of CSEA. Defendant Thomas J. Madison, Jr. (“Defendant Madison”) is, upon information

and belief, a resident of the State of New York and is, upon information and belief, the Executive Director of Defendant New York State Thruway Authority and the New York State Canal Corporation. This action is brought against Defendant Madison in his individual and official capacities. 20. Defendant Carlos Millan (“Defendant Millan”) is, upon information and belief, a

resident of the State of New York and is, upon information and belief, the Director of Employee Relations and Employee Safety, of Defendant Thruway Authority and New York State Canal Corporation. This action is brought against Defendant Millan in his individual and official capacities.

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21.

Defendant Howard P. Milstein (“Defendant Milstein”) is, upon information and

belief, a resident of the State of New York and is, upon information and belief, the Chairman of the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors. This action is brought against Defendant Milstein in his individual and official capacities. 22. Defendant Donna J. Luh (“Defendant Luh”) is, upon information and belief, a

resident of the State of New York and is, upon information and belief, the Vice-Chairman of the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors. This action is brought against Defendant Luh in her individual and official capacities. 23. Defendant E. Virgil Conway (“Defendant Conway”) is, upon information and

belief, a resident of the State of New York and is, upon information and belief, a Board Member of the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors. This action is brought against Defendant Conway in his individual and official capacities. 24. Defendant Richard N. Simberg (“Defendant Simberg”) is, upon information and

belief, a resident of the State of New York and is, upon information and belief, a Board Member of the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors. This action is brought against Defendant Simberg in his individual and official capacities. 25. Defendant Brandon R. Sall (“Defendant Sall”) is, upon information and belief, a

resident of the State of New York and is, upon information and belief, a Board Member of the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors. This action is brought against Defendant Sall in his individual and official capacities. 26. Defendant J. Donald Rice, Jr. (“Defendant Rice”) is, upon information and belief,

a resident of the State of New York and is, upon information and belief, a Board Member of the

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New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors. This action is brought against Defendant Rice in his individual and official capacities. 27. Defendant Jose Holguin-Veras (“Defendant Holguin-Veras”) is, upon information

and belief, a resident of the State of New York and is, upon information and belief, a Board Member of the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors. This action is brought against Defendant Holguin-Veras in his individual and official capacities. 28. Defendant Joseph Bress (“Defendant Bress”) is, upon information and belief, a

resident of Washington, D.C. and is, upon information and belief, the chief negotiator for the collective bargaining agreements between Defendant Thruway Authority and Plaintiff CSEA. This action is brought against Defendant Bress in his individual and official capacities. 29. Defendant New York State Thruway Authority (“Thruway Authority”) is a public

authority created under and by virtue of Title 9 of New York Public Authorities Law. 30. The principal place of business of Defendant Thruway Authority is located at

Albany, New York. 31. Defendant Thruway Authority is not an arm of the State and does not enjoy

immunity from suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, it is subject to declaratory relief for violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and is liable for attorneys’ fees in the same manner as a private party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 32. Plaintiffs Dellio, Bouleris, Alonzo and Diamantatos (“Named Plaintiffs”) bring

this action individually and on behalf of all other similarly-situated CSEA represented employees of Defendant Thruway Authority subjected to termination, demotion, forced retirement or other

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adverse employment action as a result of Defendants’ conduct. The class consists of all individuals who: a. were employees of Defendant Thruway Authority on or about April 3, 2013; b. were and continue to be members of the bargaining unit represented by CSEA or were members of the bargaining unit represented by CSEA at the time of their termination in early April, 2013; and, c. were terminated from their permanent positions as part of the course of illegal conduct at issue herein and, in some situations, re-hired in a lower graded position earning less, forced into early retirement or who have been otherwise adversely affected by the terminations implemented by Defendants as alleged herein. 33. The class that the Named Plaintiffs seek to represent (“Affected Employees

Class”) is so numerous that the joinder of all members is impracticable. Defendants’ actions have impacted approximately 60 Thruway Authority employees who were or remain members of CSEA. 34. There are questions of law or fact common to the class. Class members were all

CSEA represented employees of Defendant Thruway Authority who have been subjected to termination or other adverse action as a result of Defendants’ conduct. Defendants’ actions have been generally applicable to the class. 35. The Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class members and

the Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 36. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate

over any questions affecting only individual members and a class action is superior to other methods of adjudicating the controversy. The prosecution of separate actions by the individual

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class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to the individual members which would be dispositive of the interests of the other members. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 37. Pursuant to New York State Civil Service Law §200, et seq., commonly referred

to as the “Taylor Law,” Plaintiff CSEA is a certified exclusive representative for purposes of collective negotiations and contract administration for approximately 550 Defendant Thruway Authority employees. 38. Pursuant to the Taylor Law, since approximately 1980, Defendant Thruway

Authority and Plaintiff CSEA have been parties to numerous successive collective bargaining agreements detailing wages, hours, health insurance and other terms and conditions of employment of CSEA-represented Thruway Authority employees. 39. In 2009, Plaintiff CSEA and Defendant Thruway Authority entered into a

collective bargaining agreement with a term of March 20, 2009 to June 30, 2012 (the “Agreement”), which included, among other things, negotiated wages, health insurance benefits, longevity payments, increment wage increases and other terms and conditions of employment. 40. In accordance with New York State Civil Service Law §209-a.1(e) (sometimes

referred to as the “Triborough Amendment”), the terms and provisions of the Agreement continued after expiration of said agreement and until a new agreement is negotiated. 41. Since on or about October 11, 2012, contract negotiations have been conducted

between Plaintiff CSEA and Defendant Thruway Authority. 42. To date, no new agreement has been negotiated between Plaintiff CSEA and

Defendant Thruway Authority.

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43.

During one of the contract negotiation sessions held on or about December 19,

2012, Defendant Thruway Authority through Defendant Bress stated to Plaintiff CSEA that if Defendant Thruway Authority and the New York State Canal Corporation did not achieve savings of 20 million dollars quickly, then Defendant Thruway Authority and the Canal Corporation would need to look at other options, such as layoffs and to expect that employees would be receiving letters verifying seniority in the next few weeks. 44. On or about December 28, 2012, Defendant Madison sent an agency-wide email

to all Thruway Authority CSEA negotiating unit members, which stated, among other things, that layoffs are “a real possibility” and that every employee of the Thruway Authority and Canal Corporation would soon be receiving a letter from the Thruway Authority Personnel Bureau requesting verification of the employee’s employment seniority date. 45. By letter dated January 29, 2013, Defendant Madison advised all CSEA

negotiating unit employees, among other things, that Defendant Thruway Authority needed to implement cost savings through the collective bargaining process, and that it was now implementing a workforce reduction plan that included the elimination of 234 positions from Defendant Thruway Authority and the New York State Canal Corporation. 46. By letter dated March 8, 2013, Defendant Madison notified all CSEA negotiating

unit employees, among other things, that layoffs are scheduled to become effective the first week in April. The letter also specifically stated “Beginning in 2011, the Authority has reached out frequently to your union representatives and urged them to partner with us to address these fiscal issues.” The letter also states: “If we are not able to reach an agreement by April 3rd, the layoffs will occur and we will manage any impacts to ensure safe and reliable Thruway and Canal operations.” The letter closes with: “I understand the impact layoffs will have on affected

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individuals, their families, and our entire organization and I sincerely hope we can partner with union representatives to avoid them.” 47. By email dated March 20, 2013, to all CSEA negotiating unit employees,

Defendant Madison again advised that layoffs were scheduled to become effective at the close of business on April 3, 2013, and that management was continuing to meet with union representatives at the bargaining table, and that he remained hopeful that essential work force savings could be achieved through collective bargaining. 48. On or about March 27, 2013, and just seven days before the implementation of the

layoffs, Defendant Thruway Authority and the New York State Canal Corporation held a Board Meeting wherein Defendant Thruway Authority and Canal Corporation were described as being “in solid shape financially” and “doing very well this year.” 49. On or about April 3, 2013, approximately 60 CSEA members of the CSEA

negotiating unit were impacted by the layoffs conducted by Defendant Thruway Authority. Impact of Layoffs on Plaintiffs 50. Those 60 CSEA members who were impacted by Defendant Thruway Authority’s

layoffs included Plaintiffs Dellio, Bouleris, Alonzo and Diamantatos. 51. Due to the layoffs that occurred on or about April 3, 2013, CSEA negotiating unit

employees were unlawfully terminated, re-hired in a lower graded position earning less, forced into early retirement or have been otherwise adversely affected. 52. At the time of the layoff, Plaintiff Dellio was earning approximately $50,000 in a

permanent appointment as an Information Technology Specialist I. 53. Due to the layoff, Plaintiff Dellio is now unemployed and earning unemployment

compensation at a gross, weekly rate of approximately $405.00.

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54.

Upon information and belief, as a result of the layoffs, Plaintiff Dellio has also

lost retirement, health insurance and other benefits. 55. At the time of the layoff, Plaintiff Bouleris was earning an annual salary of

approximately $45,300 in a permanent appointment as an Assistant Purchasing Agent. 56. Due to the layoff, Plaintiff Bouleris bumped into a lower graded position as a

Calculation Clerk II with the Office of Toll Audit, earning a lower salary. Subsequently, Plaintiff Bouleris transferred to a position with the Office of Mental Health as an Assistant Purchasing Agent where his current salary is less than what he was earning at the time of the layoffs. 57. Upon information and belief, as a result of the layoffs, Plaintiff Bouleris has also

lost retirement, health insurance and other benefits. 58. At the time of the layoff, Plaintiff Alonzo was earning an annual salary of

approximately $95,000 in a permanent appointment as a Senior Budgeting Analyst. 59. Due to the layoff, Plaintiff Alonzo was forced into early retirement and is

receiving a lower pension than what she would have received but for the layoffs. 60. At the time of the layoff, Plaintiff Diamantatos was earning an annual salary of

approximately $57,808 in a permanent appointment as an Information Technology Specialist I. 61. Due to the layoff, Plaintiff Diamantatos became unemployed and earned

unemployment compensation at a gross weekly rate of approximately $405.00. 62. On or about August 1, 2013, Plaintiff Diamantatos was re-hired by the New York

State Comptroller’s Office as an Information Technology Specialist I, earning an annual salary of approximately $52,500.

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63.

Upon information and belief, only unionized employees employed by Defendant

Thruway Authority were laid off or are slated for layoff and no encumbered non-union positions are scheduled to be abolished. 64. Upon information and belief, union members, including those represented by

Plaintiff CSEA, receive the same health insurance, retirement and leave benefits as the nonunion employees. 65. Upon information and belief, the layoffs of the Named Plaintiffs and Affected

Employees Class did not result in a significant savings to Defendant Thruway Authority. 66. Defendant Madison’s communications to Plaintiff CSEA represented employees

were sent for the purpose of coercing CSEA unit employees with the threat of layoff, and to persuade CSEA negotiators to succumb to Defendant Thruway Authority’s demands. 67. Defendant Madison’s letters and emails in effect informs unionized Defendant

Thruway Authority employees, including those represented by CSEA, that because they exercised their legal, associational and contractual right to negotiate, they are being singled out among Defendant Thruway Authority workers for significant layoffs. 68. In addition, the discussions at the Defendant Thruway Authority and Canal

Corporation Board meeting just a week before the layoffs, indicates that Defendant Thruway Authority was in “solid shape financially” and layoffs were not fiscally necessary. 69. Therefore, CSEA Unit employees’ fundamental constitutional rights were

violated when Defendants intentionally targeted them for layoffs when Plaintiff CSEA refused to agree to certain concessions sought by Defendants during contract negotiations.

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AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 70. herein. 71. At all times mentioned herein, CSEA is a duly recognized and certified Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the previous allegations as if fully set forth

negotiating representative for a negotiating unit of employees of Defendant Thruway Authority. 72. At all times mentioned herein, CSEA has been a party to collective bargaining

agreements negotiated and entered into with Defendant Thruway Authority. 73. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association free from reprisal. 74. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution makes the First

Amendment applicable to the states, including New York. 75. Pursuant to Article 14 of the New York State Civil Service Law (New York’s

Public Employees Fair Employment Act, commonly referred to as the “Taylor Law”), Plaintiff CSEA is not required to grant any concessions of their members’ rights under their collective bargaining agreements. 76. In order to coerce Plaintiff CSEA into giving up their members’ Taylor Law

rights to negotiate, Defendants threatened that if Plaintiff CSEA did not agree to the concessions demanded, Defendants would terminate the employment of CSEA represented Thruway Authority workers. 77. When Plaintiff CSEA declined to grant the contract concessions demanded by

Defendants, Defendants carried out their threats of terminations. Those terminations took effect in early April, 2013 and resulted in approximately 60 CSEA union employees being terminated, demoted, forced into early retirement or otherwise adversely affected.

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78.

Although the Thruway Authority work force has both union and non-union

members, Defendants intentionally directed their demands for concessions, and their corresponding threats of termination if their concessions were not granted, solely to union employees. 79. Although Defendant Thruway Authority has both union and non-union members,

Defendants intentionally singled out union members for termination. 80. The terminations ordered by Defendants have been intentionally directed against

Thruway Authority union members because of their union membership. 81. Defendants’ action in terminating various positions within Defendant Thruway

Authority effectively deprived the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class of their right to associate with their union in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 82. Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ right to free speech, including the right to

associate, while acting under color of law of the State of New York. 83. Defendants Madison, Millan, Milstein, Luh, Conway, Simberg, Sall, Rice,

Holguin-Veras and Bress have been the decision-makers for the Defendant Thruway Authority with respect to the collective bargaining agreement demands involving Defendant Thruway Authority and Plaintiff CSEA and employee terminations. 84. Defendants Madison, Millan, Milstein, Luh, Conway, Simberg, Sall, Rice,

Holguin-Veras and Bress are also responsible for the Thruway Authority’s work force. 85. Upon information and belief, Defendant Bress is the representative for negotiating

collective bargaining agreements between Defendant Thruway Authority and Plaintiff CSEA.

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86.

Defendants’ conduct was intended to interfere with the Named Plaintiffs’ and

Affected Employees Class’ exercise of their rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 87. Defendants’ conduct violated the rights of the Named Plaintiffs and Affected

Employees Class to seek union representation, to join their respective unions and to participate in union activities, without reprisal, as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. 88. Defendants’ conduct has caused impermissible penalty to the Named Plaintiffs

and the Affected Employees Class’ for exercising their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to seek union representation and to join, support and participate in a union. 89. Defendants’ conduct was taken under color of state law and deprived the Named

Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class of their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association, as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. 90. Defendants intended to violate the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees

Class’ constitutional rights, knew their actions violated the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class’ constitutional rights and/or acted with reckless disregard for whether their actions violated the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class. 91. The Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class have suffered and will in

the future suffer economic loss as a result of Defendants’ impermissible conduct. 92. The Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class have suffered and will in

the future suffer emotional distress as a result of Defendants’ impermissible conduct.

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93.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees

Class are entitled to reinstatement to their permanent positions. 94. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, Defendants, in their individual capacities, are jointly

and severally liable to the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class for damages representing any financial losses they may suffer from being wrongfully terminated, including but not limited to back pay, as well as compensatory damages for the emotional harm they have suffered in being denied the right to associate. 95. Since Defendants acted intentionally and in wanton and reckless disregard of the

Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class’ constitutional rights, the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class are further entitled to punitive damages against Defendants, jointly and severally. 96. Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and disbursements

incurred in the prosecution of this action. AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 97. herein. 98. Defendants violated the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class’ Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth

right of association by treating them differently than other similarly situated non-union public employees. 99. Defendants’ decision to terminate only employees who are members of unions

was arbitrary, irrational and/or undertaken in violation of the Constitution.

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100.

There was no basis for the decision to target Named Plaintiffs and the Affected

Employees Class for termination from other similarly situated public employees except for union status. 101. Defendants acted in their official capacities in ordering the terminations and

forcing demotions and early retirement of the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class for arbitrary, irrational and/or constitutionally impermissible reasons. 102. The actions of Defendants were taken under color of state law and deprived the

Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class of their rights to substantive due process and equal protection under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. 103. The Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class have suffered and will in

the future suffer irreparable harm as a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 104. Defendants’ actions were taken for an improper purpose and, being without a

rational basis, violated the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class’ right to equal protection of the laws and substantive due process of law guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 105. herein. 106. In 2009, Plaintiff CSEA entered into a collective bargaining agreement Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth

(“Agreement”) on behalf of its members with Defendant Thruway Authority which covered various terms of employment.

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107.

At all times mentioned herein, Defendants have been aware that the Agreement is

a binding contractual obligation of the State of New York. 108. At all times mentioned herein, Defendants have been aware that the members of

Plaintiff CSEA have rights pursuant to the Agreement. 109. Upon information and belief, from on or about December 2012 and continuing to

the present time, Defendants have demanded that Plaintiff CSEA agree to certain concessions under the Agreement and threatened to terminate the employment of Plaintiff CSEA’s members if certain rights were not relinquished. 110. Due to Plaintiff CSEA’s refusal to relinquish member’s rights under the

Agreement, Defendants have directed the terminations of CSEA represented Thruway Authority employees. The Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class have been terminated, and/or have been bumped, demoted or otherwise have suffered adverse employment action. 111. Defendants have wrongfully penalized the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected

Employees Class by depriving them of their right to continued public employment and/or to benefits arising out of their public employment as set forth under the Agreement and as protected by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. 112. The official actions of Defendants, in their official capacities, and by intentionally

penalizing and intentionally seeking to penalize the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class for asserting their rights under the Agreement, as guaranteed by the Contract Clause and by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, have been taken under color of state law and impair the contractual rights of Plaintiff CSEA and its members including the rights of the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class under the Contract Clause

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and to substantive due process and equal protection of the law guaranteed by the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. 113. The Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class have suffered and will in

the future suffer irreparable harm as a result of Defendants’ conduct. AS AND FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 114. herein. 115. Defendants have ordered terminations of the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth

Employees Class and have subjected the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class to adverse employment action. 116. Since Defendants have failed to set forth a rational basis for their actions, were

acting without foundation under New York State law and in violation of the right to organize and to bargain collectively as set forth under Article I, §17 of the New York State Constitution, Plaintiffs are entitled to an order declaring their termination of employment by Defendants as unlawful. 117. The Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class have suffered and will in

the future suffer irreparable harm as a result of Defendants’ conduct. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants as follows: A. That the Court certify the Named Plaintiff’s claims in this action as a class action on behalf of the Named Plaintiffs and all individuals similarly-situated; B. On Count I and II, declaring and adjudging that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association and equal protection of laws;

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C. On Count III, declaring and adjudging that Defendants violated the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution; D. On Count IV, declaring and adjudging that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ right to organize and to bargain collectively under Article I, §17 of the New York State Constitution; E. On Counts I, II, III and IV against Defendants for reinstatement of the Named Plaintiffs and Affected Employees Class to their previous positions; F. On Counts I, II, III and IV, against Defendants for all economic and emotional damages suffered by the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class, as well as punitive damages for violating the Named Plaintiffs and the Affected Employees Class’ constitutional rights; G. Against all Defendants for the attorneys’ fees, costs and disbursements incurred in the prosecution of this action; and, H. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just, proper and equitable. Dated: August 2, 2013 Albany, New York Respectfully submitted, STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ Attorneys for Plaintiffs s/ Aaron E. Kaplan ________________________________________ Aaron E. Kaplan (Bar Roll #517548), of counsel Miguel G. Ortiz (Bar Roll #102310), of counsel Jennifer C. Zegarelli (Bar Roll #512549), of counsel Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. Box 7125, Capitol Station 143 Washington Avenue Albany, New York 12224 Tel. (518) 257-1443 aaron.kaplan@cseainc.org mike.ortiz@cseainc.org jennifer.zegarelli@cseainc.org
PL/13-0976/JCZ/ks/Complaint/#306950

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