CIVIL CODE Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMEN¶S COMPENSATION COMMISSION 99 PHIL 48 BENGZON; June 30, 1956 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC FACTS - A truck driven by Procopio Macunat, belonging to Marinduque, turned over and hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other laborers. - Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. He has paid nothing, however, to the latter. - Deceased¶s wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque as the employer. ISSUE 1. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque 2. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated the employer¶s prohibition to ride haulage trucks HELD 1. YES - Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was a suit for damages against a third person, thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from liability. - The criminal case, however, was not a suit for damages against third persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the indemnity ordered by the court. - At any rate, even if the case was against a third person, the court already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti that criminal prosection of the "other person" does not affect the liability of the employer. - Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against the employer because she has already elected one of the remedies. - This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was the offender's criminal proscution and not all civil action for damages. 2. NO - Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn't be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. - Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks, its violation does not constitute negligence per se, but it may be an evidence of negligence. - Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be declared negligence because the proibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders. - Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies "conscious indifferenece to consequences", "pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury". Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed

RULES OF COURT RULE 131 Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Section 1. Burden of proof. ² Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1a, 2a) Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. ² The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led to another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it: (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (3a) Section 3. D isputable presumptions. ² The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong; (b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent; (c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced; (f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter; (g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter; (h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid; (i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced; (j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him; (k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly; (l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it; (m) That official duty has been regularly performed; (n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction; (o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; (p) That private transactions have been fair and regular; (q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed; (r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract; (s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration; (t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated; (u) That a writing is truly dated; (v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail; (w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;



(jj) That except for purposes of succession. (2) Act of the public enemy in war. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances. or conflagration. the former is deemed to have survived. where there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove provided. lightning. If both be over fifteen and under sixty. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. (ff) That the law has been obeyed. 4. (hh) That a printed or published book. except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. the owner is solidarily liable with his driver. (dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty. If both were under the age of fifteen years. contains correct reports of such cases. Unless there is proof to the contrary. (cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money. shall prove the same. purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published. 1734. when two persons perish in the same calamity. However. the older. the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. battle. the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. destruction. 2184. who was in the vehicle. if the former. before marrying again. in the absence of proof. (3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods. 2. if the goods are lost. such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal. (ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the nature. even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (5a) Section 4. an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. such as wreck. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle. according to the following rules: 1. property or industry. or other natural disaster or calamity. (6) 2. In case of disappearance. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. and 5 of the preceding article. (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage. has been obtained by their joint efforts. ( Art. was so printed or published. the older is deemed to have survived. 1735. or deterioration of the goods. purporting to be printed or published by public authority. these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage. and the other between those ages. such as firearms and poison. earthquake. 1. 2. (kk) That if there is a doubt. the male is deemed to have survived. and the sex be different. (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers. could have. Art. as to which of them died first. In motor vehicle mishaps. (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four years. (n) Art. PRESUMPTION CIVIL CODE Art. even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap. (aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other. and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred. in any case. (x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact. (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Common carriers are responsible for the loss. if the sex be the same. (ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his successor in interest. if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes. the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already death. whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other. the younger is deemed to have survived. 4. whether international or civil. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent. and has been missing for four years. destroyed or deteriorated. work or industry. without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. the latter is deemed to have survived. 5. ² There is no presumption of legitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. and it is not shown who died first. by the use of the due diligence. (y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. 2185. (4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years. If one be under fifteen or over sixty. they shall be considered to have died at the same time. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. prevented the misfortune. If both were above the age sixty. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation.(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities. 3. storm. (z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartneship. 3. unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood. (n) Art. Page 2 . (bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under void marriage. he was violating any traffic regulation. 2188. (gg) That a printed or published book.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. 3) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. ³Res ipsa loquitur. he checked the truck. or where there¶s direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. . But despite this warning. Daniel Serrano.´ [2] In our jurisdiction. his left leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk. who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck. From the evidence presented. the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano.Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. while the same was at a stop position. which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control. and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. defendant driver. 1968 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision FACTS . And once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy. said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver.3. it would. 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken. He bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan.This is a question of fact. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent 2. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. plaintiff. the petitioner herein. . evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper. no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made. and (b) According to Black¶s Law dictionary. ³When I was a few meters away.Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent. and its relevant to the main issue on negligence: ³At this juncture. it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. Due to said injuries. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. Nueva Vizcaya. it affords reasonable evidence. This is what the Court actually said in the case to prove its just obiter.´ . surmise. plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. RES IPSA LOQUITUR LAYUGAN V IAC 167 SCRA 363 SARMIENTO. or conjecture. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case HELD 1 NO . guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device. whatever the source of the evidence. Page Reasoning [1] Negligence defined. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not function with my many attempts. Reasoning . ISSUES 1. under the circumstances involved.Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag. he and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway. NO Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in this case. . I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent. Nueva Vizcaya. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function. 4) CA findings are contrary to those of the trial court. that before leaving. Defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff. particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. Serrano also testified that. and 6) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record. Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do [2] Applying the definition and the test. and says that absent such proof of care. Whether cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck.(Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. SC entertained review of the factual question. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer. that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked. and the way we apply it in cases. So. I formulated it in an issue-type. would do.Daniel Serrano. November 14. 5) the said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. Hence. that the accident arose from want of care. under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. then he is guilty of negligence. 2.(Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court unless it falls down under the exceptions provided by the Court to merit review of the facts. As a direct consequence of such accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. ³ Obiter [1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? 2 ways to put it: (a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. But this case is an exception since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely on speculation. But as far as we¶re concerned and relevant to our discussion in the outline. right after the curve. occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano. it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. direct evidence is absent and not readily available. it is inapplicable where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury. not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck. it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver. that as a result. 3 .

She then heard Dr. Atty. she has been staying in their residence.The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly addressed as ³Atty. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable 3. assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. the appellate court still denied the motion to admit the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution. The patient¶s nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. Atty. Perfecta Gutierrez. The petition was filed on 9 May 1996. she saw the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). who was inside the operating room with the patient. Sillano filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. heard somebody say that ³Dr. on June 10.00. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during 4 . ISSUES 1.´ No copy of the decision. Hosaka. After being discharged from the hospital. She and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995. Atty. December 29. asked Dr. Ligsay. 17).During the trial.000. Court of Appeals reversed. . Eduardo Jamora. both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of Erlinda¶s injury. Sillano. one of the defendants in this case. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from ³diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage´. filed with the appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. a pulmonologist. Gutierrez was doing. then counsel on record of petitioners. . Herminda Cruz.. Atty. primarily on the ground that the fifteenday (15) period for filing a motion for reconsideration had already expired. . in turn. Ligsay.A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. She was admitted in the hospital and was with her sister-in-law. who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center. Although not a member of the hospital staff. The next day.Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder she was as normal as any other woman. to replace Atty. The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm. dated 29 March 1996. and she told Rogelio E. to them. Sillano on 11 April 1996. to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda¶s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.In the case at bar. and saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. ³ang hirap ma-intubate nito. Calderon.Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. Calderon arrived at the operating room. Erlinda Ramos stayed for about four months in the hospital. At almost 3:00 P.Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back. . Rogelio referred the decision of the appellate court to a new lawyer. Atty. The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave petitioners additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day (15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to submit the petition. she sought professional advice.M.Hours later at about 12:15 P. Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr.Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the Page hospital to explain what happened to the patient. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than allowable 15 day period for the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration 2. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr.M.. would be on June 17. Herminda was allowed to stay inside the operating room. . On the other hand. doing this and that. She has been in a comatose condition. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. Dr. only on 20 June 1995. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient.M. Hosaka approached her. the other defendant. They agreed that their date at the operating table at the De Los Santos Medical Center. Meanwhile petitioners engaged the services of another counsel. Rogelio E. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a series of examinations which included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery. Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against private respondents. Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide moral support to the patient. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient. Gutierrez say. Hosaka is already here. Rogelio Ramos. who was to administer anesthesia. another anesthesiologist. with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8.´ She then saw people inside the operating room ³moving. [and] preparing the patient for the operation´.25. . she focused her attention on what Dr. an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Mariano Gavino to prove that the damage sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. At the operating room. she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. Dr. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). After Dr. O lumalaki ang tiyan´ (id. she went out of the operating room. Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. 1985. well within the extended period given by the Court. She thereafter heard Dr. the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon. Ramos.. Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit the motion for reconsideration contending that the period to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed decision had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy thereof to the counsel on record. she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93. However. On the same day. RAMOS V CA 321 SCRA 584 KAPUNAN. Gutierrez. however. or on 12 April 1996. Despite this explanation.000. 1999 NATURE: Petition For Certiorari FACTS . Immediately thereafter. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. was sent nor received by the Coronel Law Office. After praying. As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a ³cholecystectomy´ operation after examining the documents presented to him. private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr.In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver. was also there for moral support. Because of the remarks of Dra. p. or four (4) days before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration.542.00 to P10. mali yata ang pagkakapasok. however. 1985 at 9:00 A. Ramos ³that something wrong was x x x happening´. the appellate court denied the motion for extension of time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995. . still needing constant medical attention. . she was given injections. she then saw Dr. . of that fateful day. Herminda Cruz. Ligsay.

The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone¶s negligence. we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. if negligence attended the management and care of the patient.Nonetheless.In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable. the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. and relieves a plaintiff of. It is simply a step in the process of such proof. Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say.A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of petitioners. there can be no sufficient notice to speak of. Moreover. Hence. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care. In the present case. we shall also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents 4. creating an inference or presumption of negligence. mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants. In other words. enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine. or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for. the fundamental element is the ³control of the instrumentality´ which caused the damage. since the Court of Appeals already issued a second Resolution.However. 2. the delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant¶s want of care.The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that. which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. under usual 5 . .Page the anesthesia phase of the operation and. . the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Thus.Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians. As will hereinafter be explained. in addition to proving injury or damage. Thus. a copy of the decision of the appellate court was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. all notices should be sent to the party¶s lawyer at his given address. not being a lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for filing a motion for reconsideration. a plaintiff.It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge. Based on this. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way. the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. it affords reasonable evidence. whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Erlinda¶s comatose condition. the Coronel Law Office. may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence. permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident. where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. . NO . Moreover. upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. When the doctrine is appropriate. negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. must show a situation where it is applicable. without the aid of expert testimony. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. before resort to the doctrine may be allowed. and 3. it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage. In order to have the benefit of the rule. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised. Instead. Hence. and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. or to any and all anesthesia cases. an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence. Still. What is the cost for the damages HELD 1. as such. and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. With a few exceptions. 2. Based on the other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos. In fact.Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means ³the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. since a copy of the decision of the appellate court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner.In the above requisites.´ The phrase ³res ipsa loquitur´ is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury. the petition before us was submitted on time. or make out a plaintiff¶s prima facie case. . . . all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. if in the affirmative. Petitioner. . the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia. which superseded the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995. . and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and. as a matter of common knowledge and experience. taken with the surrounding circumstances. the appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient. It is regarded as a mode of proof. Corollary thereto. notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no notice at all. and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Rogelio Ramos. we believe that the receipt of the former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of the present petition. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. dated 29 March 1996. no copy of the decision of the appellate court was furnished to the counsel on record. YES .We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability.

therefore. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlinda¶s coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic response to the drug. and was in fact over three hours late for the latter¶s operation. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself.It does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. as an expert would. either as a visiting or attending consultant. it does not escape us that respondent Dr.Dra. they presented Dr. is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations. We find the theory of private respondents unacceptable. Thus. their educational qualifications. depending upon the circumstances of each case. conduct bedside rounds for clerks. that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. could not have been capable. generally. The real question. . The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology.In the first place. on 17 June 1985. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. if he could. and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. It is the dominant. Respondent Dra. in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority. and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. moving or producing cause. no prior consultations with. he is not a pharmacologist and. a clear indicia of her negligence. In the case at bar. for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital. was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda¶s cholecystectomy. that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage.An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia. a Fellow of the Philippine College of Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of Internal Medicine. produces injury. res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. . If there was such extraneous interventions. and clinical pharmacology. therefore. Dr. Because of this. . On the basis of the foregoing transcript. Private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. . . This is particularly true with respondent hospital. evidence of fellowship in most cases. . Towards this end. Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal). Hosaka¶s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the ³captain´ of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. introduced into her system. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter. Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergicmediated processes. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. the difficulty is only more apparent than real. Jamora. presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases. or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. 6 . Moreover. . . Dr. who advanced private respondents' theory that the oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy. Doctors who apply for ³consultant´ slots. as such. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is. Gutierrez¶ act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was. Since Dr.Respondent Dr.We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. Thiopental Sodium. She was likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda¶s condition. respondent Dra. he is normally required to attend clinicopathological conferences. are required to submit proof of completion of residency. therefore. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician¶s centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. by evidence of exculpation. Thus. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results. or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.First of all. Jamora¶s testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting ³consultants. internal medicine-allergy. no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. interns and residents. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.´ who are allegedly not hospital employees. evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate). Before this date. and without which the result would not have occurred. In fact. moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. YES . 3.Page and ordinary conditions. visiting or attending. in natural and continuous sequence. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. Jamora is a pulmonologist. . . Furthermore. whenever it appears from the evidence in the case. he could not have been capable of properly enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications. of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the supposed culprit. as a matter of common knowledge and observation.Proximate cause has been defined as that which. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied. if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.After a physician is accepted. respondent Dra. and references. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. which.The CA commited a reversible error. Until the day of the operation. However.

private hospitals. respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda¶s condition. on the basis of the foregoing. While ³consultants´ are not. This being the case. 4.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8. temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. be made with certainty. teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. They. 4) P100. 2) P2.000.In the instant case.Meanwhile. . a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient¶s condition.Upon these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. technically employees.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney¶s fees. A consultant remiss in his duties.Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation.The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former¶s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Under the circumstances. once negligence is shown.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives.500. the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. by way of example. Having failed to do this. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.000. . In neglecting to offer such proof.000.Art. knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. 5) the costs of the suit.000. the actual physical.In other words. Given these considerations. the hiring. .00 are hereby awarded. while certain to occur.In the instant case. altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting ³consultant´ staff. and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not. the control test is determining. Accordingly. if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused. and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1. hire. up to the time of trial. DISPOSITION the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. . In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists. . no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. and. are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim.000.00 are likewise proper. while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs. . It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians.Page and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner. And because of the unique nature of such cases.for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded . petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade.000. For the foregoing reasons. . an award of P1.As it would not be equitable .000. the amount of damages which should be awarded. However. these provisions neglect to take into account those situations. apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians. In other words. 7 . . Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases. . should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved.500. 3) P1.00 as moral damages. is normally politely terminated. the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care.000. will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient¶s illness. The amount given as temperate damages. In other words.000.00 as temperate damages. . interns and residents. . or proof of a similar nature. where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury. nurses. not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. the question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner¶s condition. are difficult to predict. the physician¶s performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics.000. the burden shifts to the respondents (parent. .352. from the nature of the case. an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. for anything less would be grossly inadequate. emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify.000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable. 2199. should take into account the cost of proper care. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation.Finally. with the exception of the payment of wages. all petitioners in this case. as in this case. and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. guardian. exemplary damages in the amount of P100. failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. In addition to these.temperate damages are appropriate.Except as provided by law or by stipulation.and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice . the control exercised.00 in moral damages would be appropriate.In these cases. not the respondents. . respondent hospital. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner¶s condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney¶s fees valued at P100. or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee. and feedback from patients. though to a certain extent speculative.The husband and the children. an award of P2. The family¶s moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180.

The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court. CONSUNJI V CA 357 SCRA 249 KAPUNAN.When Dr. The trial court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform came loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core of the building under construction. which led to the different decision of the RTC and CA. the phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. Pasig City to his death. needless to say. The piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before September 21. Consunji. leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. Villegas submit to another surgery. the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. . embedded on the ovarian cyst. The petitioners. Kho to be a credible witness. Kho¶s testimony. save his 2 companions who luckily jumped out for safety. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. 1990. M. ISSUES Procedural: WON the court can review questions of fact Substantive: WON Dr. Batiquin. the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. which. Kho¶s testimony and did not consider it with other portions of Dr. Kho¶s testimony. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. dirt and pus behind the uterus. 1996 NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS . and Dr. a construction worker of D. and a Physician's Discharge Summary.There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber. Villegas . Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside. But the trial court failed to recognized that these were mere denials or negative testimonies. that the accident arose from want of care. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. it was not prepared to doubt Dr." . . . all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. . private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus. Jose Juego. however. She then consulted Dr. Kho as a credible witness. July 5. Ma. Dr. the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body. Dr Kho suggested that Mrs. April 20. 2001 NATURE Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering defendant D. Villegas and successfully delivered the latter¶s baby. as she asserted before the trial court. Villegas submitted to Dr. a Progress Record. As such. when suddenly. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. Kho's trustworthiness.The focal point of the appeal is Dr. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. Kho's credibility. Consunji. November 2. In this light. regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay. Aside from Dr. Batiquin is liable HELD Procedural: YES . .M. a Nurse's Record. 1991. Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination.On May 9. and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist. among which are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict.It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. since aside from the cesarean section. that there was neither any tear on Dr. . The CA reversed the decision.. and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus. an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus. Batiquin. it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by Dr. Mrs. Second. performed a caesarian operation on Mrs.Considering that we have assessed Dr. thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr. in this regard. 8 . 1988 Dr. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen. 1988.While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. After examining her. as 2 versions arose from Dr. There were inconsistencies within her own testimony. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof DISPOSITION Decision affirmed D. The trial court. a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr. Maria. Inc. Inc. Batiquin¶s testimony.Mrs. so she consulted Dr.m. along with other physicians and nurses. First. Consunji. to pay damages to plaintiff Maria J. the pains still kept recurring. Kho's testimony. filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.. This was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first hand knowledge for. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a steel platform with plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block. She also gradually lost her appetite. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin. Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. Kho. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower.While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Furthermore. However. her positive testimony prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.Page BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas) 258 SCRA 334 DAVIDE. Kho and (2) that Dr. failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In the morning of September 21. Batiquin. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Inc.At around 1:30 p. "there being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated .In the instant case. Also. Kho's testimony. The CA was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it isolated the disputed portion of Dr. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. Dr. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts Substantive . it affords reasonable evidence. the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate.This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant.M. Furthermore. Kho¶s testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. there are exceptions. an Anesthesia Record. Jose Juego¶s widow. when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record. .After leaving the hospital. Salud Kho. Kho handled the piece of rubber. Juego FACTS .M. does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence.

As explained earlier. PLAINTIFF¶S NEGLIGENCE Art. hid stepbrother. 2179. On the contrary.Regulations of the City required that ³all wires be kept three feet from the building. with an awareness of its consequences. . ISSUES 1. After trial. 1956 NATURE: Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.There was no insulation that could have rendered it safe. the first requisite is present. on Rodriguez Lanuza St. Regrettably. DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. or to establish any defense relating to the incident. But if his negligence was only contributory. private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. among other defenses. and in some measure by the too close proximity of the ³media agua´ to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the ³media 9 . with less tragic consequences. thus. NO Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmen¶s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code. the last requisite is also present. thus. causing his death by electrocution. the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. Respondent¶s Comment Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the ³media agua´. subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. th No worker is going to fall from the 14 floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent.The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence. Reasoning . A reasonable presumption or inference of appellant¶s negligence arises. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. .´ . but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. ISSUE WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence. . the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow. V REMONQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR.Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the construction of the ³media agua´ (17% more).his widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen¶s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. and this was not refuted). Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. In all other respects. to repair a leaking ³media agua. petitioner does not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur. It is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. HELD NO. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove petitioner¶s negligence 2. he cannot recover damages. Consunji. On appeal by D. D. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived.´ The ³media agua´ was just below the window of the third story. May 18. It was the victim who was guilty of negligence Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence. Manila.August 22. thus. nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Peñaloza. provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. WON respondent is precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code HELD 1.Page The employer raised. The lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua and 2 ½ feet from it. Petitioner¶s Claim . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. YES Ratio As a rule of evidence.The electric wire in question was an exposed. It was installed there some two years ago before Peñaloza¶s house was constructed. Magno received from his son thru the window a 3¶x6¶ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. 2. the plaintiff may recover damages. and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee¶s deceased husband. (n) MANILA ELECTRIC CO. the second requisite is also present. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. FACTS . the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace. M. uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles pm the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. but left the other end where it was. . DEFENSES 1. CC. The owner of the house complained to defendant about the danger which the wire presented. whereupon payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. During the construction of said house a similar incident took place.Standing on said ³media agua´. the widow¶s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence. There is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire (according to appellant.

such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother. . the distance from the wires to the edge of said ³media agua´ would have been 3ft and 11 3/8 inches.Even taking the finding that the defendant by its negligence helped to bring about the accident which resulted in the death of the child Purificacion Bernal.While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant. leaving a permanent scar on her cheek. the former filed an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by his car which he alleged were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in causing said collision.Judgment appealed from should be affirmed. He had training and experience for the job. and to change the installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. ISSUE WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs HELD: NO . the child died that same night. He nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. ([1907]. . House for the amount of P1. NO .000. an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. .There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.Where two automobiles. and for the costs of both instances.. if any.The lower court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering. the windshield of the jeep was shattered. an automobile appeared on which frightened the child.Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban. . . on the other hand.July 30.It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns. by negligence. but fell into the street gutter. and complaint against the Company dismissed. FACTS . Gulf and Pacific Co. on the evening when the religious procession was held.The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities. .The girl was taken to the provincial hospital.V.´ Had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his ³media agua´. . they found her face downward in the hot water. .The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. . January 30. In addition. but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. if at all. 1989 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals. .The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. contributed to that most regrettable result. . . Page 10 . BERNAL V HOUSE 54 PHIL 327 MALCOLM. neither can recover of the other for damages suffered. in its answer. is L. still rule. She turned to run. House. that the cause of death was other than the hot water. December 23.PLDT. accompanied by two other persons. Legaspi.V. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be reversed and in the court of origin another judgment was issued in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against J. 1968 ± Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench. PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN) 178 SCRA 94 REGALADO.When the mother and her companions reached the child. BERNARDO V LEGASPI 29 Phil 12 MORELAND. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.After the procession. after examination of the evidence presented by the defendants. Despite his efforts.´ . whole Body".The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban. He also asks for damages. 1930 FACTS . The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. 3rd Degree. an independent contractor which undertook the said construction work. however. Barte and Company. .R. does not operate as a bar to recovery.To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno. 359). Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. 7 Phil. . Atlantic.The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets. there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it . and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof. . filed a cross-complaint alleging it was Bernardo's fault. and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen. failed to sustain their theory of the case. legs and face. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs..agua.The company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction. Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday. It merely contributed to it.The violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. they. 1914 NATURE: Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries FACTS . ISSUE WON the parties may recover damages HELD 1.Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms. denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible. September 29. collide on turning a street corner. plaintiff. while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. going in opposite directions. . Ltd. Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is reversed. SEPARATE OPINION:ROMUALDEZ [dissent] . He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. except as to the last mentioned special defense. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so.The trial judge. Leyte.Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi.

the appellant's rig bumped the old woman. promulgated on September 25. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.. CA affirmed . as one of its determining factors. GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS) 178 SCRA 422 GRIÑO-AQUINO. the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. . the car canted and the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the car¶s side.However."The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence.On Dec 31. 1957 NATURE Petition for review of the CA¶s decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence. but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road.Petitioner had walked along the side of the car despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. 1990 and September 3.G. is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. March 29. 44 O. who fell at the middle of the road. . The old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her. October 22. No.Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Mckenna. a rig driven by Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing the street. 1947). there were no side guards on the cars to keep the rails from slipping off. but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him. 1980. the tie broke. does not exonerate the accused. In quasi-delicts. > Plaintiffs¶ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed. Its original decision. This was reported to the foreman. then plaintiff husband had not exercised the deligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. but a Page 11 . The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. but it had not been proven that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of inspection. Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was.Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death ISSUES WON contributory negligence can be used as defense by Genobiagon HELD: NO . If it had remained on that inside lane. . Overtaking the appellant. 2. Reasoning . does not operate as a bar to recovery. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. Also. But if his negligence was only contributory. although not as the primary cause. was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila. but only in reduction of his damages. The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars. The appellant continued to drive on. As Rakes was walking along the car¶s side when the accident occurred.The accident was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. 1719 (1907) NATURE: Action for damages FACTS ." (People vs.Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official directly responsible and that the employer be held only subsidiarily liable. Quiñones. Rakes. FACTS . 321.TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversed the ruling. . 2214. 1959. some behind or at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope.R. the plaintiff may recover damages. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. are hereby SET ASIDE. Atlantic.The plaintiff. the track sagged.The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident. and thereby precludes their right to recover damages.The plaintiff¶s witness alleged that a noticeable depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at the appellant to stop. dated March 11. he was found to have contributed in some degree to the injury inflicted. At that speed. breaking his leg. ISSUE WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from PLDT HELD: NO Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. > Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. . RAKES V ATLANTIC GR NO. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. at about 7:30 PM. . Disposition resolutions of respondent CA. -The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident. which was later amputated at the knee. She was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died 3 hours later. one of a group of 8 African-American laborers in the employment of defendant. Costs against petitioner.000. CA-G.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. > If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND. (n) Art. 2179. 1520) Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30. the company¶s officers and 3 of the workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of cars. he cannot recover damages. 'it was the old woman that bumped him. The old woman was unconscious. if any. Orbeta. he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE CIVIL CODE Art. ISSUE WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner HELD: YES . it would not have hit the accident mound > That plaintiffs¶ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDEN MOUND.The alleged contributory negligence of the victim. At one point. 1979.

and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Yabut to Ms. Such fault or negligence. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man. Mabayad on guard. 1976) that bank manager Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the practice of his teller Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips.Applying the above test. . would do. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy. if the latter. as insisted by the petitioners. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Reasoning . this is gross. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. Yabut. . while he ordered the investigation of the incident. then he is guilty of negligence. could have 12 . there being fault or negligence. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another.The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. Islands v. or bar a defense against liability sought by another. officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Romeo Bonifacio. . notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record. Azucena Mabayad. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. thru its teller Ms. guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. The rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of.Trial court assessed that damages to plaintiff amount to PhP5. and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. in validating the deposit slips. Azucena Mabayad. as testified to by Ms. both original and duplicate. March 14. there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent. . allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank. produces the injury. policy and precedent. . in natural and continuous sequence. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information ² that of the name of the account holder ² should have already put Ms. or some other person for whose acts he must respond. or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years counted from the period when the funds in question were deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May. SC deducted PhP2.It was in fact only when he testified in this case in February. SEPARATE OPINION: WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] . . The law considers what would be reckless. was negligent in validating. states that where both parties are negligent. Undoubtedly. suffered by the private respondent RMC ² petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's? HELD . 1975 to July. if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence. Mabayad. ISSUE What is the proximate cause of the loss.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with the bank but which were not credited.. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank.500.LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to. In the testimony of Mr. which. or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. is obliged to pay for the damage done. Mabayad herself. despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the Page proper validation of deposit slips. then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner. this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent. Unfortunately. . 1997 NATURE Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming the RTC decision in a civil case FACTS . line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). . Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity. . in essence.000.the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause the accident²it also required the negligence of the plaintiff. wanton. This doctrine. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip. absent the act of Ms. blameworthy. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook. to the effect that. Ms. Because of this. to the tune of P304. she would simply fill up the blank space later on. Azucena Mabayad. Court of Appeals.In the case at bench.Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not.Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms.Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. and without which the result would not have occurred. common sense.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff. it appears that the bank's teller. presented by Ms. 2176. and inexcusable negligence in the appellant bank's supervision of its employees. . he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures. and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas. . original or duplicate. or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident. 1983.It was this negligence of Ms. Bank of the Phil.979. petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller. Ms. 11 A "reasonable man of 12 ordinary prudence" would not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation." In this case. Ratio Art. .74. Mabayad. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.979.) 269 SCRA 695 HERMOSISIMA JR. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. plaintiff should not be afforded relief PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA (ROMMEL¶S MARKETING CORP.the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommel¶s Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of P304. 17 defines proximate cause as "that cause. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. who had the last fair chance.

is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury. her employer? . had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. it is not disputed that each time Yabut would transact business with PBC's tellers. she would accomplish two (2) copies of the current account deposit slip. it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly caused damage to RMC. as what the law presumes. at least. to avoid the accident or injury.It should be noted that the teller validated the depositor's stub in the upper portion and the bank copy on the lower portion on both the original and duplicate copies of the deposit slips presented by Yabut. have taken ordinary care of its concerns.Page avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Irene Yabut. But if his negligence was only contributory. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. SEPARATE OPINION: PADILLA [dissent] . Irene Yabut. when Yabut wrote the name of RMC on the blank account name on the validated duplicate copy of the deposit slip. Here. but with the account name purposely left blank by Yabut. assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. 13 . tampered with its account number. The teller. who should have been charged with estafa or estafa through falsification of private document.It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank statements sent to it monthly or regularly. Why is RMC insulating Ms. . Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors. to wit: . particularly Romeo Lipana. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. it was only after the transaction was posted in the ledger that the teller proceeded to machine validate the deposit slip and then affix his signature or initial to serve as proof of the completed transaction. who indicated therein the current account number to which the deposit was to be credited. when there is a clear evidence of tampering with any of the material entries in a deposit slip. It must have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself. there must be a last and a clear chance. the plaintiff may recover damages. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under A2179 CC. . it cannot be denied that. private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. Thus.It seems that an innocent bank teller is being unduly burdened with what should fall on Ms. then the teller proceeded to verify whether the current account number matched with the current account name as written in the deposit slip. had two parts. yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank. the usual bank procedure then was for the teller to count whether the cash deposit tallied with the amount written down by the depositor in the deposit slip. In view of this. thru its teller. Precisely. and the amount of the deposit either in cash or in checks. Stated otherwise. the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED. as advanced by the petitioner. the date of the deposit.000. we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. In all other respects. the genuineness and due execution of the document become an issue in resolving whether or not the transaction had been fair and regular and whether the ordinary course of business had been followed by the bank. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. or after the deposit slip was validated by the teller in favor of Yabut's husband. detached the validated depositor's stub on the original deposit slip and allowed Yabut to retain the whole validated duplicate deposit slip that bore the same account number as the original deposit slip. . had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client. Had it done so. Its negligence. Irene Yabut from liability when in fact she orchestrated the entire fraud on RMC. If it did. banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.In the case at bar.LAST CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last clear chance. Private respondent shall have recourse against Ms. deposited the money of RMC in her husband's name and account number instead of that of RMC. not the validation of the deposit slip by the teller as the deposit slip was made out by Yabut in her husband's name and to his account. . . Azucena Mabayad the amount they would pay the private respondent. except the award of P25. its employee. the rightful owner of such deposited funds. . . Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so. therefore. her employer. The upper part was called the depositor's stub and the lower part was called the bank copy. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC. a bank normally maintained a ledger which served as a repository of accounts to which debits and credits resulting from transactions with the bank were posted from books of original entry. he cannot recover damages. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company. not a last possible chance." it is my considered view that the doctrine assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. said act only served to cover-up the loss already caused by her to RMC. 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court. . Petitioners may recover from Ms. Thus.Since Yabut deposited money in cash. . as issued in 1975. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut. private respondent should. and superimposed RMC's account number. Both parts were detachable from each other.Thus. the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.The foregoing notwithstanding. The deposit slip was prepared and signed by the depositor or his representative.Going back to Yabut's modus operandi. the name of the depositor or current account holder. . shall be borne by private respondent RMC. . Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%.In the earlier days before the age of full computerization. indeed. PBC's deposit slip. RMC's own employee. . on the assumption that it would serve no other purpose but for a personal record to complement the original validated depositor's stub. In short.In the case of banks.The legal or proximate cause of RMC's loss was when Yabut.00 attorney's fees. but because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally check bank statements given by banks. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioner. however.

which reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. Banzon. v. injuries on his left arm. He went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the City Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to go to site of the accident to look for his watch but the watch was nowhere to be found. as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event HELD 1. 1985 NATURE: Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu FACTS . 2. . the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability.In the case at bar.´ This conclusion is based on a misapprehension of overall facts. who filed their answer. et al. .City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. or (2) take the money with him to his house in Marilao. For the purposes of this doctrine. or if it can be foreseen. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. When he came back to his senses. Page 14 . The petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat and 14 in the rear. Petitioner¶s MFR was denied. Co. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence.Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro. registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar.Petitioner then filed a civil case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu against Fontanar. or which. According to this theory. . or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. and Camoro. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. .The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Transportation Co. this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. not binding on this Court but they were also based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. ISSUES 1. it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. YES .Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects.. that ³a tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and should not have been used at all. The sudden blowing-up. Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. . no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen.3. et al. with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. FORTUITOUS EVENT Art. JUNTILLA V FONTANAR 136 SCRA 624 GUITERREZ JR.While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible. could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will. 1989 NATURE: A petition to reverse Commission on Audit¶s denial of relief FACTS . We held that. However. must be independent of the human will 2. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the following day. Bulacan. he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it. there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. though foreseen. and by entering into the said contract. hence this appeal. using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. that: ³The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer. The records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents. ³ not only are the rulings of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. alleging that the accident was beyond their control taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and slightly used at the time it blew up. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. he collected the cash value of the checks. Except in cases expressly specified by the law. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. the processing of the checks was completed only at 3pm. Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost consciousness upon landing on the ground.´ In the case at bar. therefore. In La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. He went to the main office in Manila to encash 2 checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. NO Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following essential characteristics: 1. right thigh and on his back and also found this ³Omega´ wrist watch was lost. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event 2. Decision of City Court is REINSTATED HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT 179 SCRA 39 CRUZ. we held in Necesito. The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu. It must be impossible to foresee the even which constitutes the caso fortuito. it must be impossible to avoid 3. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. 1174.It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage. et al. were inevitable. v De Jesus. May 31. CC. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner 4. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. November 6.Teodoro M. with a due regard for all the circumstances. the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier. He estimated that the money would be available by 10am and that he would be back in Ternate by about 2pm of the same day. And so. Paras. The petitioner had two choices: (1) return to Cavite that same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor Reasoning . but actually owned by Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire exploded causing it to turn turtle.

It is true that the petitioner miscalculated. that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was stronger in Ternate than in Marilao. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. as the respondent Court impliedly Page 1 Section 638. had made up for it with his efforts to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the robbers. the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been aborted. He avers he has done only what any reasonable man would have done and should not be held accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no control. especially on that busy highway. Louie University in Baguio City. but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that.spend the night there. 1982 Gloria E. . Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. or the provincial auditor.Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. Shocked and hurt. shall present his application for relief. ² When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire. or other casualty. invoking the foregoing facts. Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty ² Notice to Auditor. Brion. . "C") issued by Dr. denied the petitioner's request. and did. 2.Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness.COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved from his money accountability because it was his own negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had sought to take not to Ternate but to Marilao. all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might happen. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence. Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. That Mr. he says that the first course was more prudent as he saw it. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. if you will. his successor sided with the petitioner. But the hold-upper who escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took with him has not been recovered. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. It was while the vehicle was along EDSA that two persons with knives boarded and forcibly took the money he was carrying. thinking it the safer one. June 16.In the petition at bar. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts. . through then Chairman Francisco S. agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any negligence or. of God. In fine. ISSUES 1. Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office. who was eventually convicted. The memo concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it from the main office. observing inter alia: In the instant case. or our intuition. Lina Delza E. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated. admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed. Later. 15 . the petition is GRANTED. . For most of us. and her 15year old daughter.175. according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the other. and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor. the real reason why Mr. 1992 NATURE: Petition for Review FACTS . So it was with the petitioner. with the available evidence in support thereof.This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions.however. . Tantuico. jr. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater. . Jesus Lim Ong.The next day. and leave for Ternate the following morning. the ignorance of Mr. WON Jesus Lim Ong¶s investigation maybe given weight in the trial 2. or provincial auditor. immediately followed in desperate pursuit.the petitioner. . Hernandez claims that the respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen money. Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him.On his decision to take the money home that afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate. He is a graduate of architecture from the St. Ernesto G. as an act. He opted for the second. . something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. however. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. they transferred to the UST hospital. Chatto.00 under the accountability of Mr. Mr. NO . the Commission on Audit. Hernandez. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO 210 SCRA 18 DAVIDE JR. the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor General. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. To Our mind. based on common sense and our own experiences. ISSUE WON petitioner¶s acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money HELD NO .then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds. that what happened was a fortuitous event that could not have reasonably been foreseen. and without any mystic ability to peer into the future. It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following injuries: . if only because his home in Marilao was much nearer than his office in Ternate. Its contention is that the petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour was already late and he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. assuming he was guilty of contributory negligence. WON the collapse was due to force majeure HELD 1. the loss of the P10. the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed. owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. NO .there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of the 1 Revised Administrative Code. ACCORDINGLY. He took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan." Having interposed it as a defense. after the initial shock. theft. It could not have collapsed without a cause.In the afternoon of June 4. which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds. may in the particular case allow. Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer.

49). also in relation to contracts. Lawyer's Journal. are contracts not entirely prohibited. Court of Appeals.It is settled that . It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure. inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant.The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises. a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.Besides.' . 1962 Ed. . there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss. the cargoes were discharged. Jan. IV. promulgated June 29. p.. Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant petition with costs against petitioner. .This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that . ordering Philippine Steam to pay for damages. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. incompetent. 7354 and 7428. the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. shipwreck. 31." (Tolentino. pursuant to such demand. citing Mr. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. . and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised. it must be impossible to avoid. 1979. seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos.incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan.L. 462. originally brought to the Court of Appeals. What is significant is the finding of the trial court. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage. the loss is chargeable against the appellant.We sustain the validity of the above stipulation.In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a legal sense and. Thus.B. Examples of this are destruction of houses. violence of robbers. morals. war. but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. complete and in good order. 1951. must be independent of the human will. Reyes. destroying appellees' cargoes. in the morning of November 18. that the collapse was due to construction defects.. . Vol. . colored papers. however. 1963. public policy. the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code. 1982 NATURE This appeal. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion'. the lower court rendered a decision. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent.There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier . Before the fire. declaring appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan.On the bases of the foregoing facts. appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed.Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured. but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation. He is not an engineer. . fire . The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. especially as regards the ceiling." In the case at bar.Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction. SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO 117 SCRA 832 ESCOLIN.On November 6. Justice J. p. unexpected fire. The Partidas. and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance.. morals or public policy. In fact. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government. . Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. . Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day. Civil Code.held. The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736. Negros Occidental several cargoes (cavans of rice. FACTS . defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. he gives his consent. and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. ISSUE WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the shipowner in this case HELD YES Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so long as the stipulation is not contrary to law. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. and that they did not sign the same. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito'. if he adheres. 3 where the Court held that while it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket . Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said. Negros Occidental. it would be 16 . The stipulation which merely iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes valid. said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin. Verily. . appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant. Ong. the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code. Reasoning . 1963. toys etc) as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. public enemies. Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following: Clause 14. appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. or if it can be foreseen. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters. (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. . its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the Page goods to the appellees. consequently. affirmed by the respondent Court. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. The latter could not have foreseen the event. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment.

thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River causing the death of members of the household of the plaintiffs. . diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant . and carelessness.written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary Precautions . for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of God. had reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. ISSUES 1. which reduced the moral damages awarded below from P1. Southeastern College. YES . 2.the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property . and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in. imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam.From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the same day. This however caused the inundation of the banks of the Angat river which caused persons and animals to drown and properties to be washed away.NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees .R. (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable. 103442-45 DAVIDE JR. the obligor cannot escape liability. Servando and Clara Uy Bico. the latter having no control whatsoever over the same. negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways. When the effect.despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading."and that the 24 October 1978 'early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities.The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant).The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are. an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official. Pertinent aspects of the latter¶s Report dated October 18. NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL) GR NO. to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. Disposition Petition dismissed. Juan F. the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight. The court there declared that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein-who were similarly situated as the private respondents herein-was the negligence of the petitioners. or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. a powerful typhoon ³Saling´ hit Metro Manila. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost Page 17 . if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination. ." and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways.00 to P200. is found to be in part the result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention or neglect. Jesus L. (1 Corpus Juris. WON NPC was guilty of negligence 2. SEPARATE OPINION: AQUINO [concur] . Court of Appeals. together with their animals Respondents comments: . and Resolution dated September 12.´. et al." involving the very same incident subject of the instant petition. Reyna. . the cause of which is to be considered. negligence. there concurs a corresponding fraud. July 10. the consignees. 1996 of the Court of Appeals in ³Juanita de Jesus vda. slovenliness. Plaintiffs claim: . when the warehouse was burned. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. CV Nos. public respondent found as conclusively established that indeed. while petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road.NPC exercised due care. Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set aside. the roof of petitioner¶s building was partly ripped off and blown away. the defendants suddenly. Engr.000. WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. which results in loss or damage.When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond the allowable limit at the height of typhoon Kading NPC opened three of the dam¶s spillways to release the excess water in the dam. vs.00. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her. On October 11. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA 292 SCRA 422 PURISIMA.000. was insufficient. Nakipil & Sons vs. CA) NPC is liable given that the inundation was caused by force majeure HELD 1. they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted . or failure to act. the same notice involved in the case at bar. Pasay City.000. 1989 stated. FACTS . and the magnitude of the water released. Amparo C. until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them".In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code.given that NPC is guilty of negligence.in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised. are all but products of defendants-appellees headlessness. vs.unfair to impute negligence to the appellant. de Dimaano. the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the goods after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and stevedoring operator. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind. the whole occurrence is thereby humanized. YES .I concur. No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin. at about 6:30 in the morning. Buffeted by very strong winds.A similar case entitled National Power Corporation.when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon." they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam . 1998 NATURE Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision promulgated on July 31. landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents¶ house. (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. as it were.on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the evidence a dduced by the parties in the cases subject of CA-G. as follows: ³5. . .' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor. 1993 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court FACTS .Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road. et al. et al. Inc. Moreover. 1174-1175). 1996.NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River .. delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code. pp. 1989. The Resolution under attack denied petitioner¶s motion for reconsideration.the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. After the typhoon had passed. 27290-93. Thus. May 21.

private respondents alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable. epidemics. petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past.In the present case.´ . receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and specifications. the general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure. there are portions of the roofing. as commonly understood. Still. a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight. diligence or care. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. Thus. who has been in the city government service since 1974. without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet.There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event. Hence.00. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon ³Saling´ was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents¶ house. etc. P1. etc. As the term imparts. notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by the trial court. Page 18 . the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed. other than the said ocular inspection. This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care. governmental prohibitions. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. in establishing the culpability of petitioner. such that if it were not. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than ³Saling. it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss.Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the private respondents.00. which remained intact after the storm.In its Answer. it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court.Moreover.000. would do.At the outset. was. plus costs. specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective. faculty members. Thus. What is visual to the eye though. such as an armed invasion.000.116. admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown. and furthermore. thus. In other words. And so they sought to recover from petitioner P117. though foreseen. there are other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses. this Court believes otherwise. Private respondents. 6.It then recommended that ³to avoid any further loss and damage to lives. an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. for damages based on culpa aquiliana. were inevitable. If subject school building¶s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses.´ . . those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as ³an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. or failure to act ± the whole occurrence is hereby humanized. From these premises. and (2) by the act of man. Branch 117. we find exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered. .00.000.In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability. the damage caused to private respondents¶ house could have been avoided? . the city building official. guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs.In their Complaint i[6] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. . . the one situated along College Road. ISSUES WON the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building¶s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon ³Saling´.The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular inspection made by the city engineer. within legal contemplation. with the strong winds having a westerly direction. or neglect. that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building. this appeal. not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. . For instance. due to fortuitous event HELD YES .00. Escriche elaborates it as ³an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man ± whether it be from active intervention. which provides: ³Art 1174. attack by bandits. such as earthquakes.´ . The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. for and as attorney¶s fees. typhoon ³Saling´ was ³an act of God and therefore beyond human control´ such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby. as moral damages.´ the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a ³structural hazard.´ Civilist Arturo M. or which. After a careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted by the parties. is not always reflective of the real cause behind. is ³in tip-top condition´. which houses school children.In light of the foregoing. . we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent. are binding and conclusive upon this Court.. Tolentino adds that ³[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature. When a person¶s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another. especially when affirmed by the appellate court. . Negligence. P300. such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. fires. limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity. and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. absent any negligence on its part. floods. as exemplary damages and P100.U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. storms. merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner¶s school building after the typhoon. or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man. precaution.After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record. as actual damages. obviously.000. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim. those located on both ends of the building. robbery.´ . and employees. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. Except in cases expressly specified by the law. one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby. The 1/2´ diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner¶s school building. forcing them to stay temporarily in others¶ houses. Private respondents did not even show that the plans.

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