P. 1
Report on Operation Veritable, 08 February - 10 March 1945, Part 7

Report on Operation Veritable, 08 February - 10 March 1945, Part 7

|Views: 8|Likes:
Published by Hauke Krapf

More info:

Published by: Hauke Krapf on Aug 10, 2013
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less






APPENDIX iA ExtractOs from 30 Cor._opralion Inrstruction No.47 dl- teod 3 IFeb 43





Ow O


First Cdn Ar:my. is resuming- the offensive on the
Northern sector of thei Western Front. Initially, First Ctdn Army is attacking on a one corps front with '0 Brit Corps Subsequently, 2 Cdn Corps is
sector fronm 30 BrLit Corps a. rnd the at-tack will con.tinue on a two corps front... 2 Cdn Corps is cont-

to take over the LEFT

inuing to hold 1NJIJEGEN and the bridgehead across the 'R VWAALV **(b) Second Brit ArnAy will operate on the RIGHT flank at a later date.



undaPri es

PLI0E, wvith- 3

orps ( w e f 1000 hrs D minus 1 )

All inclusive 30 C.(- -ps road and railway crossing -755403 thence railway to road and railway crossing 71 74,85 R .MAAS at -722492 - thence exclusive R ILAS to 765477 iinclusive R NIERS to 821449 -all inc]lusive .iOM,,ERSUM: 823l4 - road to HASSUI 8504.37 cross roads 896428 - cross roads 907417. rNO'TE: This boundary will be modified as the battle progresseso (Operative. wef 1000 hrs D minus 1 )

LEFT vwith 2 Cdn Crs

All inclusive to 30 Coirps GUAVE bridge - inclusive C IVMAPLE IEAF route to road junction 690609 -cross roads 706608 road junction 707614 cross roads way to 1R HE,,'MER 733617 7 - then to R WA.L 717630 and EAST along that. river to EI\,iERICH. 53< 'Command a '(a) o

7156 4 - road junction 719608 - cross roads 732610 0 road. and' railway junction 734616 - thence along rail-

30 Corps is to assume responsibiilwty for sector CUIJK AA/L .and command of 2 Cdn Inf Div and 3 Cdn Inf Div wef 1000 hrs D minus 1.


2 Cdn Inf Div and 3 Cdn Inf Div are to revert to command 2 Cdn Corps at a later stage in the operation.

.. 72 INTIM NTION 30 Corps will destroy the enermy between the R iMAAS and R. RHINBEi and. brealk through in a Southerly direction between these two riverso Y', TIHOD 5. 30 Corps will attack with five divs up, as under From RIGHT to IEFT


51 (I) Inf Dii 53 (W) TInf Div.. 15 (S) Iif Div
2 Cdn Inf Div 3 Cdn Inf Div



Guards Armd Div 3 Iluf Div .




Under Co0ilrnaln(

In Supr

(a) (b)

^Guards iAnd Div 15j(S) Lnf Dr

Det 4 Svy Regt
2 HCR 6 Guards AriT Bdde 836 P d Regt '(SP) 14' Pld Regt 1 98/73 AntiLtank

64 M.[,ied Regt
22 DC-NS 141 PRAC less 'A' Sqn 6 Assault Regt RE less 82 Sqn I Cdn AFC Regt less one sqcn 49 AFC Regt 84 Med Regt

Bty (SP)

.. ,

234/73 Anti-tankr'

'.B y (SP)
Deot 4 Svy Regt Det 1 O0 Radar Bty 'B' FPl. 662 AOP Sqn Tp 356 SL Bty


431Inf Div

8 ... irmcad Bde less one "re St'plus ono sqn

121 Med Regt

13/18 H
73 Anti-tank RRoegt

less two btys
Det 4 Svy Regt 'C' Flt 662. AOP Sqn


51 (j

Inf Div

107 RAC

6 Fd Regt


14,6/63 Anti.-tank
Del 4 Svy Regt--

Bty (SP)

'C' Plt 652 A0OP Sqn Det 100 Radar Bty Tp 356 SL Bty

'B? Sqn 1 LOTHLtNS 1. FPP YEO less 'B' & I'C Sqns 42 Assault Regt RE less 16 and 617 Sqns

79 Med Regt

) (from -pEEPpEt 4/7 DG- ) RPOT ) (ii) 45 Inf Div:will t-tke m." Under Op Control 2 Cdn AtR 4. (iii)' G-ua.7 FPd ard. . less 26 Sqn ( 7 Cdn Med. Roegt (Towed. .hl coimiand 14.5 Assault Regt ..uring . FPt 660. RTR.. 5 AGCA 5 .:jqn 0One tp 'CI Sqn I LOTHIINIS One tp 617 Assault S qn RE L. . move for . A 9 GRAe 27 LAA ' ReL ./(iv) .tank. OP Sqn Tp 557 SL BPbty 13/1.eo R egtir d. 107 RAC P.Anti-l'-tank W DCIGNS less 'At Sqn 'A' Sqn 141 RAC 82 Assault Scqn RE 72 Moed Regt Bty.. *.. t 617 Assault Sqn RE less one tp 'C Sqn 1 LOTHIANS less tp : 'i '{TR less 'C' Scfn If required (. .(SP) 19 Cdn 56 Cdn.rds Armd D''v will take under conmmand 86 Pd Regt du. Regt 805 Pnr Smoke Coy Two pls 810 Pnr Smoke Coy 112 Pnr Smoke Coy 106 iA Bde (h) CC_-: 3 ACR+J.(SP) Dotl 4 t 'SvyRegt A ? Fit 662 AOP Sqn De t 100 Radar Bty t-y 6S Tp 356 (f) 2 Ccdn nf Div *One s qn -5/18H A' PFit 660 AOP .g .753 Undler C omloand . Inf Div) 8 MX (from PEPPEKR2' ' ] T-o Btys 73 An..ing thei:Lt move forwvard. Svy Regt ' oss dets' 556 SL. Cdn Moed Regt (g) 53Cl il-rf D iv H les s one sqn C.1 _ In S ortc (oe) 53jY Infj Di 3' Arimd Bdle less . 1 Cd:n Rocket less three -fits Unit NOTES (i) Following t-ps do not come under cormnand 43 1500 hrs D4Dayo Inf Div till NOTTS YES )(.B1y less thrlee tTps 557 SL Ity less one 4p 660 AOP Sqn less three fitsJ 662 AOP Sqn . Oom JL 9RPOT) One Sqni 153/18 H (fom 2 Cdn.

TERICH road up to the WEST bank of R RHINE EAST of railw-vay. the high ground which runs through the Northern part of the REICHSWALD. (i) (ii) Protect' the LEFT flank of 2 Cdn and 15 (S) Divs. DAL -to exclusive (e) 5'Cdn Inf Div-. Capture S1TO-FELTBEG f eatures 8553o Conceentrate operationso Div wYill . low.C. Despatch strong mobile columns to capture. . Destroy the enenmy between road MOOK NEIt:lENS .iRBORN feature.0K ENLEP . GENNEP (cl ) 2Cdn Inf Div w11 (i) (ii) 'Capture DEN. ground between the main road I.. will. . and clear.in mobile reserve for future (iii) (i-) (c) 5C) 1_ljm L (i) Captuwre. CLEVEo (iii) (iv) (v) (b) '53. (ii) Open the route L.74 (iv) 2 HCR will come under colmmLandd 15 (S) Inf Div on arrival in assembly area and revert Guards Alrmd Div at a later stage. EIRJTEL 7756 and AYLERo Open the main road BERGQEN . . if possible. Clear and holdL.. Breach bthe SIEGF2RIED defences NORTH of PEICHSWMAiLD and capture the NUTTEEPDEN feature.USEN 9-159. (iii) (iv) * Take over fromn 43 Inf Div the town of GOCH..KRANENBURGCo ..GOCH and R MJLS. clear and hold firmly the area EREUDEBERGCT 7852 .. () (i) (ii) Inf Div will Capture BPRAND:EIEBUG-G features 8053. HEqNS .YLER . . . U'DEM and CALCARi and to clear the El.IRANENBIRiGLCLEVTJ and R RHINE up to line of railway CLEVE CRELi':'. Capture the MAT. Inf Captur e and clear the. Advance along.M1. /43 IfnDiv .GOCH.RIETHORST 7450 -NI JERF CO:LONJIES 7553. 7 Tasks of Forinations (a) 15( (i) (ii) Inf -Div will Capture iJIWEJ1NBURG and the spur about 814545.

ancd 15 (S) Inf Divo formta 1 14E (v) (h) 2 (i) (ii:) cthat d Guards mrian.nder corm. UDEI.. object of capturin the intacto still T Capture XANEN C . Capture of the high ground. 2-1 2i8 RFiEURDT 1 21'3 (iv) e Phas haes (a) Phace (i) . Capture' of the area FIIEU¥. 'will de. Capture of the MLATETEBORN feature arad the opening of exits through wvhich 2 HCR can pass. of SOMNJSBECK 0535 .-75 {() ~345 I^n-j (i) Dilv will. menrt arise On being oQrder-ed forward by 1 5 (S) Inf Div.R 9632 arnd GEIDERND (ii) (iii) (g) Guards Armid Div will be. (i) Pass through the MATEPdBOiN area ijmnediately in rear of 43 Inf D ivo Advance.ploy on a wide front inra protective recce role boetween rivers IMAAS an!d RIIINE and push patrols oTERBROEK 9716 LE as far 30SUH as the road RHLIIBE:R.'J'TI' BERG 7852 RLTETURST1 7451 (b) Phase 2 ( i) (ii) NIJERF COLONIES 75553 . running through (ii) .prepared to . Div -when Pabs to comi.. -Capture of GOCH.will Operate ini tially .. (iv) .. o'.IFUBRUCH 0756 ' VIESEL ' Capture and holclfirnly the high ground NORTH (ii) (iii).M and CAILCARo Openiing of roacd M) OK - .5 to inclusive SIOPPELBERG 8553.. .. . Be prepare -to pass through 15 (S) Inf Div onr capture of iVLJTEiRBORNT feature by that f or aat iorn Capture C-GH o Be preparedj t-o hand over GOCI to 51 (H) Inf Div and exploit in a SE directiona by capturing in succession VJEEZE.iilP ... . (iiiL) ..JiJ:TFLA..805..ange.Northiern ' part of] the Ed'IC -3W..iii) Be prepared to operate under command HQ 50 Corps or 45 Inf Di'L should the nered for such an ar.GOCH.'LD from inclusive BRA'NDEIBERG.: . Push forward a strong mobile column with the bridge if it is uSEL.. . on athe axis UDEM':. .IIMI.and' tion passes through 15 (S) Inf Div. (.

.... R2 (a) ..-. See Append:hx AA attached. (b1!) NOTlE 2 Cdn Corps icary still require running rights on the secondary route CtROES3BEK T. 12o. 76 (c) Phase (i) .will revert to cormiaand 2 Cdn Corps afterG -the captureo ofG. CCH ..fire plans of formations during various phases of the operation.A will be allotted deployment areas by COCPi. I-) '.5 deals with this subject.tiono (J'-rdim~te-'-:fire .. RIEUR. CGELDERN. (b) (c) (d) CCRA will coordirnate'.'uring various phases of the oper. CCRA -Till a11lot arty to forma t'ions for support . The'"following area will be reserved for the deployment of ·an ACRLA:- (e) Squares 7952 1 3 OaEPLERPOTS p 8052 7951 8051 30 Cos Operation.. . and BOINING 16353 . T xlingj s (a) D-Day -intact.(W) Inf Div 15 (S) Eveninfg D-Day for attack by 10o.- The attack will oo in undcer a Corps' barrage controlled by CCORA Div artys and ALGP.and when EiAitT route from MOOIK to . 1 1..LA:LENieBUDR& DONSBRUGGEN C o 8657 CEE /.c Instruction No'. ' . exclusive 30 Corps road . Inf Div 2 Cdn Inf Div 3 Cdn Inf Div Inter Div Bou. Inter corps bouncdary will then probably run as under ' All. I 8 Feb. - '"r1 - -AEP o . 'Cacpture of V-ESEL bridge if Recce to line toESTE'PRBROE still ISSUM1 0927 (ii..) (iii) 9.RHEINBERG.jdaries: and Junct'icn Points. Co ua-mnd ' (a) 2 Cdn Inf Div an:d 3 Cdln Inf D iv .CALANSEEG 81 5. 53.OCH has been opened. .DT. NOT included. Capture of 7WAAL'ECK 9623.TYLER ie-.

INTERC OVTIUIJNICAT ION 16. 53 (') In. SNIJMEGEN.. 3 Cdn Inf Div.ASo (sb) ment lely - Resources will be provided for tasks as follows . (i) Div areas ancd g.6 Probably to CLEVE 8955 (when situation penmits) Guards Armd Div 15 (S) Inf Div Tac 43 Inf Div Iain 43 Inf Div 51 (H) Inf Div 255380 714. 15 (S) Inf Div. Separate acdinistration instruction is being issued.lyet Normal rules for engagement apply..(iii) Area MOMK bridge 109 H'A Reg-G will be deployed in a primary ground role by. (Nc) Ruless fOr Enga.91 43 cfzAEvIj 615517 CTENNEP 784.614 717622 I-ULMEN 4822 717523 .77 14. day.f Divo Two LA'A tps by Guards Arnmd Div.. Coimnander 106 A-A-Bde is responsible for AAI defence of area MOOK bridge and gunr areas SOUTH of R MA. 43 Inf Div. iA (a) GBneral . Location of H sq Main HQ 30 Corps Probable next location Rear HQ 30 Corps Probable next location C onmmander s R ecce - . 2 Cdn Inf' Div..ight. Guns not connected to targets. 4 ALR ad9 A Gum areas of 3 AC 71 LAA Regt.tu areas NORTH of R-I MMAS Three LAA' tps by each. -AA defence is being co-ordinated by C ormander 74 AA Bde. and a priinary--A:A -r ole -by n.. tAIiNISTRATION 'AAOR will not engage unseen 15.gt Existing.*/53 (W) Inf Div .HATERT 679583 GOCT . 27 LAA Re. defenc-es of 74 AA Bde in area *: (ii).es r enap.

WIJCBEN 6158 Wireless Res. Liaison Officers (a) - Liaison.tric-tions Owing.. to the large number of wireless stations working in the Corps sector.. . (b) 21. Times of transmissions Will be distributed through Signals-channels 20. :18.78 53 (W) I. Div 2 Cdn Inf'Div 5 Cdn Inf Div 2 Cdn Corps 17 0.737604 . fwd 2 HCR will send Liaison Officers to Guards Arimd Div and 45 Inf Div on D minus 1. Wireless silence until 0100 hrs D-Day. 717537 693594 . nets will open at this time. They will bring scout ' cars netted to their own bde ...nf.. control. Officers from 6 uards Be A rmd Bde and j4 Armd Bde wrill report to HQ 30 -"orps D minus 1. . Passwords Passwords will be uni-fonm throughout 30 Corps. Only essential Signal time vwill be. formations having adequate line coimunications and those not actively engaged in the operations will minimise their wireless vvorking. taken from BBC transmissions.

road junction 740607 thence SE down road to road junction 751594 thence inclusive 15 (S) Inf Div track. and track junction . Road. and railway crossing 7185'97 -road and . t. (W) Inf Div road junction 751544 track junction 792532-.cross roads 705542 cross r oads 71.H) 'Inf-'.road junction 756553 thence road to rc-d junction 790548 track junction 810543 t hence edge of wood to 81 6536 cross ro ads 819532 thence edge of wood 843539 thence . . junction 755569 and track EAST road and track junction 797566. 5 Inter Divoundar beteen 2 and 3 C Inf Divs All inclusive 3 Cdn Inf Div Road junction 717628 thence SE along read to road and track junction 764598 thence inclusive to 2 Cdn Inf Div SE down road to road.79 Appendix 'AA to 30 Corps · ^^^S^I^ ^.0252.Div track to cross tracks 2. ^i All lusive 5 jInf Div '' . .797567.. jcion 718538 thence exclusive 53 (Wt) Inf Div road junction 717534 thence inclusive 53.:55:d.ick crossing 864513 thence inclusive 51 (. Cross roads. . .and D 15 - Inf Div 3. Inter Div Bour r between 15 ID iv and2 CdnInf Div All inclusive 2 Cdn. Inte DivBouac an^c^ -: Jtween iv (H) In Div. 702539 .track junction 800527 cro ss trackS .854501 thence -road...edge of vood to 853549 thence SE to road junction 8'66543 .cross ' tr cks.corner of-wood 883526. . Inf D'iv Road junction 75}3609 . to ro-ad and.rrack junction 733570 track junction 743557 .over canal at 901562 thence inclusive 15 (S) Inf Div to 914573.. B I4n tor Div Botundar-ty between 15 (SlInf Div and 3 Cdn Inf Div AllJ inclusive 15 _S) Inf Div Road and tracl 797567 SE down road to road and railway crossing at 831552 thence all inclusive 3 Cdn Inf Div railway line to railvway bridg.

80 6.n .<() Inf Div. n Inf Div 881572 892567 901562. * Jx (a) 0 6tiorzPoinrts Betweo.- (. an 53 f Div : 791 532 anid cross roads 8235m4. .-s as. Track junctiOn 8515351 8553'550 866543.. (c) Btwe.15 '-IfDiv and 2 '..b) BQtween. 5i. . .D (S) Inf Cross rcd.825. 7:" Southern corner of wod 796546 810544: 818534.':.

the Forest.merits of these sets.in many cases up to several hundred'ydso . that. ones had been develo ed. of 53 (W) Inf Div. and to a very large exten't .'" . . In particular.. This Bde foughmt its way almost entirely through the REICHSVIALD Forest from the VT to. from CLEVE' and FASSEiL.tion in.ected :'systematically in rectangles by numerous :tracks and rides These beinc cut straight. PARTIC LAR TO TE REICHE A MIL 1 B.e ad runner.liberaluse of officers as Liaison: Officers. This must be taken into consideration therefore in assessing the .controls -tactics particularly within the Bn. :follow~ing notes are produced as a result of conversations with Commnanders and Staff Officers within 158 Inf Bcle. /ACKS -ANJD MT .. forest it is inters." 1 COMUMNICCT IOTS 53.a. proved the only really reliable means of conmiunication - (b)i (c) (d) . The.worko TFWithin Bns. unmetalled and became a good ft or more of heavy mud after the passage . e ~The. . it was fountd. There are two lmain concrete two way roacds through the Fores t -from NORTH to SOUTH. BEns found the.No. and :nany "of the clearings had be en extended or new ones cut:. These areas are covered with low scrub -.)o .000 yds behind the leading Bnso At this . backed by . T*-.' cabl-..various tracks were one way only.range the wireless 'sets worked well . this opera.ed bhem as a pleasant bonus if they wvorked. Being a .0 The REIC:HsVLAID Forest is ' mainly coniferous with an inner belt of deciduous growth. co-opeation with the tanks by this means did not .:st difficulty to be overcomie both on the Bdce and Bn levels.by any means fully trained. w~ere not . not more than 2. to establish its HQ.the SE corners.of a few vehicles.Map reacding was complicated by the fact that many tracks shown did not exist or were overgrovmw new. converging -EKCEaNSo Mat There are none from WEST to EAST.-81 APPENDIX BSEVATIONS T 'B ON OEST FIGHTING -W-lTH REFERENCE INTROCWT ION. (a) This presents probably the great.a . but did not rely on them in their Signal planso (Casualties within Bn Signal Sections had b6en heavy during the iARDEMTES fighting a few weeks earlier and reinforcements. gave visibility . in order adequately to control its B ns. (See paragraph 6 (a) below) T-his Bde found it essential. Large patches have been cut clear with little or no attempt at replanting. 18 set unsatisfactory in-this type of -country and regar. in. The same remarks as in (b) above' applied to the 38 set. 'Visibility--aries from a few yds to two to three hundred in the cleared areas.T. 2.Stat.

:. (b) Labour'for track mnaintenance is an acute problem. :then in a position to recce the tracks. It. matter oertain precautions. in this type of operation. business of fighting* PRE resources do not go very far. within a Bde when every man is required for his primary. For instance every single forward track was given a name and every single lateral track a number.' WRITING .improvised Bde HQ. therefore essential..advance and the. upon before the'operation started. tactical situation may well impose a complete reversal of decisions and . and to tape and sign the whole route. as was also the . In certain cases special diversions were taped for these vehicles alone. The irnf carrier drive±r cannot get the best use out of thqse highly specialised vehicles after a short fewv days course. To simplify . and he does not take the same interest in a vehicle which he knows is only on loan for a short : period.fowa:rd tps as they . embodying a very large nunber of code nanes. cannot usually be solved."82 i TR. is essential. . . : ' LOYD Carriers were successful in getting forward the ''anti-tank guns in this operation. G.vwas anticipated that Map Reading would. The latter converted a half track as a form of rather inadequate Commanand Vehicle o ..echelons were entirely'tracked us ingthe carriers -within -the Bns. jeeps. . on a wide distribution. cut. new tracks made to these areas etc.. . This ~ws due almost -entirely 'to the very careful route recce carrieda out by the MTOs recce partieso .'. very wisely as it turned out. In this operation the Bde. As the advance continues it is..cortain tracks for wheels -andd others 'for tracked vehicles.'o .'' (a) Bde HQ issued a trace of the Forest...' Within Bns the MICOs recce party should always be right forward. It is a most diffi-. (c) (d) (e) VMAP 5..'cult decision to make a ground recce. such as existed during .apidty. It... this. be a difficult problem and probably fur ther complicated by certain inevitable recent changes in the Forest due to fresh areas being.Q gWill ' de' .plans already issued.'his'"peration' 9 'they 'wiii' lisintegrate af ter the passage of only a few vwhe6elc1 vehicles and completely after even one heavy tank has run: Over' them. nd without fear of ... hehind the leading coy.CKS AND MT 40 (a) Forest tracks.. WfEASELS proved invaluable'e but all' concerned stress the necessity f or 'properly. ... This can only be done 'by the. A D IESSAG.blocking the route '' . ri atte .. and all necessary diversions. Once an objective is captured the necessaryx vehicles can then *be brought 'forward without delay .E D: _1ECTION FINDING.. banned all wheeled vehicles except. Careful planning on'the highest level 'is. bad 'eaether.. Bn F . ./All clearings . This factor makes it essential that staffs must give an early decision on the use of . in any weather' conditions. were insisted. trained and permanent drivers. ' In-.

.n account of the above precautions all movement . . the Bn Conmmander' can..e)".. (b)' (c) :(4) .by special training prior to this. 'runners can-quickly function without fear of being lost. ' Operating on the .'old on his' fighting sub-units..one axis bounds given to the leading coy.writing proved extremely s'iple and the inevitable delays prodduced by . .tape 'knotted every 1. to. cannot be re. on the map-. In forest. in other..axis only one main cable..lied upon in this sort of country. clearing. Cable or runners must us. .. one on each side of the axis.In this' way the Bn Cormmander retains -a tight . In an dvance -to. the best Lethod . must stay back at some track junction until another lateral has"been cleared. are strictly limited and are usually at most some -four to five hundred yds.' probably not exceeding fifty to sixty'yds.and . a Bn C~onmmander. Any variations between gr.olmmander to have a firm control of his sub-units than in any other type of operation ' Wireless. ' If a Bn Commander feels 'ueasy about a flank./as was .on one axis if this tail becomes too long. (.a.not exist.tail of a Bn .tion" was accurately maintainedo Messagev.. of sub-units and of vehicles..oughout' including pacee checkers. :Leap frogging the next coy through.. is then' "adopteled. words one coy up. :fighting it is probably more necessary for aBn C.Conmnander but probably to the actual loss.. whether by night or clay. 6. . himself be right forvward and he has his' sub-units· under his hando Flank protection.t.If frequent laterals do" *.Experience.the use of MAPLAY and 'SLIDEX were almost entirely eliminatecd.has to be laid. and . order 'to make There 'is a definite 'danger from enemy -striking at the. .. certain risks miust be accopted. By fighting on one.to deal with it has proved to be to detail :one coy'to provide a series of flank picquets on the NW Frontier principle These are seldom more than one hundred yds from the main axis. If he does this he tends to become out of touch v.When'fighting through. smoothly alnd direc. proved the absolute es'sential of' a Bn advncing on a' single axis.seize" d(ef'inite objectives.fighting leads not only t'o loss of' control by the Bn.ith his battle.. within' the Bn.83 All clearings shown on the map.'worked.the main axis'is a difficult. followed . '. and any other features . These pls are "deployed o'n a very narrow front..'. maybe for several hrs. and they maintained regular navigating parties thr. if he has deployed on two *axes.EICHSWALD Porest -_opera'tion .00 yds' O. on corimpass bearings..(2a)S 0. To attempt a "wider front in for:es. The wholeg again 9 being restricted: in certain of control.. -gained by this Bde inthe ADENNES.map were quickly spotted. Bns advancedoc TACTICS . . were also named..'forest to reach definite objectives.and the use of white . as opposed to. and :thetre Wrere manyo (b). problem.Leading coys usually move two pls up.eexist ing tracks. .

On one occasion an SP gun supported by a dcoy of inf was holding up the advance across a clearing in t he Forest.i fire coy.84 as was. and sav..keep If he has a cont'act once gained must' nPot: be los'to chance to stabilize hiA'n!elf he will be all the more As.used in . . in o)e Bn anyway. (c)) . the strike This .unit. on a long ad-.ed by one or . maybe a litutle more.if: necessary -sends in the second round..more SP The Hun showed shoot ..tps. arty this becomes all the more importanto. The carriage of amInmunition presents a "definite problem.T.~ or . or rear when :Every effort must its objective. difficult to dig out. '.. (:b) The 5 in .. two .ground.moving and a solid. a formation.. are fought in pairs dr threess. enemy will certainly.rgely man-. especially for snmoke.well foraiard in' order t. did not it seldom stayed. The enemy opposit-ion enco. will take every opportunity to attack the tail He of a . the usually damaoegd it : -ut even' if A hit on an SP gun it.. a further ri. -the axis. (a): . PsIAi::i. respect fo. fifty inf support. 'The enemy weree some two hundred yds After.ance such as during this operation. Twevlve bombs -per coywas found to'. be all that could be taken..PI..he whole acting as a (1Thae carriers themselves very useful.to down th tracks.ion as P 'echelon transport -.up to two Stens for this operation.All sectionsfwere miade . :To e "ect 1this a . -They.mmander concerned .-attack the unit frori. uring the advance the arty could give.mallyo The endeavour should be to have as tight. f The enmy. 7.sp-oport so that the mortar.posnsible when. (e) One Bn :improvi. prevent the'Bn straggling out alon.u. all ordinary methods away. essential o . the case. w. the.:arried on account of the" indifferent "b'racks... and It is../vehicles). guns .sed. lit-tle or no.eod usually consisted of some. as . pro 'vd its value many times. . the flank.o recoive a second shot. all-round watCh. One *-shoots and t-he second observes. · compact defensive layI out when halted. has.sited . . were also effectively used as mortars ir some instances. coy co. forty to..mortar was la. fighting.. must be stressed to an even greater degree than nor:. (f) e enemy on th.move.must in this respect even to 'the extent of pushing through the next coy before the first is finally consolidated. proved .o a adefinite. pera-t. be made thoef ore to.0 ' be'ing .d'cii not'wai't for it -to arrive and a PIAT finished off the SP gun. been seized.be takoi . ie.The Hun sti1 bayonet.this. There were five O led his whole coy in a bayonet charge across the open "casualties only tO' oiur o"wn . R'isks . support can seldor be used in forest.invaluable.Bn Commander must be .. eman with the will not face a dLtermined (d) . in that posit-on 'i.-. P1 Comianrcer.roUmcl def ence once the objective -is reached. must be maintained )throughout 'and al. The PsIAT. to6' shift hiam had failed.es any time "lag whils't the first weapon is being reloaded.fle p1 which was placed under the Carr.o leap frog his coys without delay. beleft uirvnopped--up on either flank. in the PEICHSWALD Forest.

The water problem was also a verv real one since there could bo no possibility of bringing fo:-ward unit water carts or trailers. Prior to the operation it was fully appreciated that normal supply during th:.-necessary weapons were found from the WASP Section of the Carrier P1. morale effect on our. weather. In spite of the fact that lights were not in direct support of this Bde. preparation and tying up so that it is ensured that tank crews are on the look out for them. and for this reason tank casualties should be'accepted. inf still remains a problem.tanks. (*:g) ' AD1MINIST RTION 8. (h) Searchlights proved of real value in this Forest fighting. This improvisation was possible' as the /Bn was well up to strength with reinforcements. view of ..ii.advance through the forest could not be expected. soups which were of inestimable value in the continuously wet. Th'e .26 Yellow' smoke generators were used oxtoefsively in this operation to stop tank fire when necessary. This precaution proved itself for it'was the only food many of th-e tps had for over two days. All wished that the issue could have be-en bigger. and the. This was done by "borrowing" water bottles from the men of the ITAA Regt and other Div Tps. NCOs and men were withdrawn from Rifle Coys to form it. there was no unreasonable delay in passing demandso IiMessages were acted on usually in approximately half an hr.the lack "of possible arty support. A system of Verey light signals requires considerable .. Everyone concerned had nothing but praise for the 2.esenc. (f)i ")'Arty: could seldom support the advance owing to lack of observation and danger to our own tp 0 Only when the situation.inf were.additional water bottle per man either on the person or in Bn F echelon transport. throughout. In consequence 24/hrs ration packs and' self heating soup were issued and carried in Bns F echelon transport. inevitably cause casualties to tankso'. The difficulty of manoeuvre in . No. objective was support possible anrid it then proved invaluable for holding or breakinrg up enemy./CONCLUSION ... Any such system. This arrangement proved an unqualified success.counter-attacks .: But particular· ly . In this operation the. 38 set did not work.85 vehicles). of tanks is considered of great value. Arrangements were made within th Div for all forward tps to carry one.·. however' makes changes of plan difficult to improvise rapidly. oWl-S inf cannot be over estimated.e. In one Bn all men in all sections carried one of these generators.face of SP guns sited to fire dowv the tracks i''and thb presence of some rmines.. Comxnunications between tank and. stabilised' on any.4 hrs' ration pack and even more particularly for the self heating. . particular . *supported by. the The pr.

their value when the operation began. pe:feoCted... ...werei carri-ed out at all levels... ... . ...really 'in the various poinits'[disc.'latter optration: proves . 8.86 - CONCLUSION ' There is.. . . . . study andpann'la in cOsideerable -detail ffor: this operation.rammed .. .he--slightest doubt but that this Bde learnt many invaluable lessons from their fighting. as always.s 'ad'equate. ' There 'is. and in tie 'REICHSWALDo0 -. ...nbt' t..rned in the past but so often forgotten.little that is new .... .NESo - the worSt possible cond. .The great-:success achi. and.It is mostly a reiteration of lessoont lea. under ARDDEI.. eved..how sound the training was. . is . .. practised. homo. during. in :the :These lessons were .l:oth mod~el rehearsals...itions of snow -and...~ proved. to. Many of th "points are very minor ones but it is to the attention of such ddetail that~~~~~U success is won..iceg. . during the training period p'ior to the operation There w. this . .tin also: apart from training. '.ussed above..

had been 'evacuatedd from both. 2.doors. Princiles It . are 'nectessary. d 'The de'gr'e.f .exactly which 'buildings it is to clear before crossing the. ideal'-is for each section to be able to see .gainst a: '"dete'rmined and.reserve must be kept to deal with the unexpected posts which' . The'. go. He does not hold. . to. most tiring operation which cannot' be hurried."Within the rifle coy. carry 'out his own recce. s '' ''': The noise and echoes of.. it has been 'proved that it is' '*unwise to have more than one sub-unit working at. 'but the other had not. . ' start line. of which the Commnander '-has made . a good'. organised enemy.and. . a liberal supply of grenadese stout'hearts and a very high standard of leadership are all "that' is .defence.the most difficult factor ofall. .. . It has indeed been learnt by bitter experience that tovwn clearing is a tedious.that thheC ommander of' the succeeding unit or: sub-unit must be right forward waith the attacking Comnminder to see the As always' toho. . 1.' A rifle and bayonet. ' ' Plannin g More than in any other' operation..hose from . onre time "and ..street clearing are disconcerting and menr must always be' on the "qui vive'" to try and looate'the enemy'.. particularly low obliques.or factory' but those from where he can obtain..t .. veryTcareful and detailed planning is necessary before launching any unit or subiunit a hps..is essential that each sub-unit starts from a very firm base. s as. Individuals and Sections must be kept'to their objeotives and not. usually a "key" building. . etc.field...is likely the -enemy 'will base his..e of control 'that leadovs mustC keep in' :these operations must '' be' great. allowred to chase the odd German. c'ivilians. . 'It is essential that they fight lightly clad and without the small pack and picl and shovel vwhich catch in win. GTNEP and . his 'rear.VIiI. has a small compact objective.:'require. .. . : -..' . suddenly come to life.' . : . One :town 'had been heavily bombed. cellar. * - /3. APPEDIX 'C' TO~1\ CL ITING -These notes a-e' vrittenr on the experiences of a Bn 'which has taken part in clearing two lar ge towns. o to determine the key buildings upon which i:t. the Bren.87 .dovrframes. every house.: are' so-und' as ar as: they. a results ..GOCH.where: -'he can st'op any encircling movement.of f'ire and part'iduJ!arly ". . into a defended towne *Large' scale 'enlarged air photographs -and. The lessons learnt 'show that the princ'iple'sa]sa laid ' dowve in Inf Training Part .a personal visual recce before starting.:and. a.

I .because of -their.fought from. it is kept small. Ve. reach the ground floor. to rush it immnediiately the arty concentrations lift in the darkness.. . it 'makes the dill of clearing through the back gardens impracticable.e'' evacuation of casualties even more difficult. "'..danger area.lt_'ons. proportion to. .well t-rained.:' * Before .. mostly paratroopers7.impossible niot' .rwrds it -shoi&d. "Homwever::.. .remains as important as ever.. however.their numbers. unless carried out "imnediately before the. on the .. key road junctions and' in csome gardens.rubble preclude the use of tanks.. then from th ground floors. : Urater and .· 2: · To"Bomb or'Not to Bomnb : v ' : .he enemy whilst he is still below ground.3n up a storey or two'. .clearing :to -hear 'explosions 'in-f:^ont of -them.. .. . there :. : . the 77 grenade has proved its .' only the odd Spanclau and snipers have be.as -he does not kill or even frighten the d efene-rs tho infan' tryman is' going to meet 6. va'lue and -the danger area for heavy bombs -precludes the ½idiediate .'ffeotf (f a 25 pr on a house is" not suf. are valuable as the bombs.- 88 - 3.:"' :Fcm./7.ing arnd camouflaging himiself many times easier.Fire and movement by the inf. one tha'.- . Eneo Methods . . . to. Suporting F ire . I/ 0 .CROCODBILLS or VWASS and make th. .-. .:o by-pass enemy a principle wh6 come to life with claylight and cause darmage and confusion out of. were usually marked.other hand. his .s but "ae :latt-!er.he f'ound' that the German -we :have met. It is perhaps the best way to get a footing in a defended area.numberz.natur... .ioient to arrant its -use in the close support 'of tps Clearing a toVwn. : · .zero "the grealtest w-eight of arty is required. and clearing houses from the top. as. they .our experiance in clea'ring a :own not bombed. and.toe 'town.ovwns -the :noise of· sni"pers if fiy .. . it is disconcertirg to tps.: ' . air photographs lose some of thei. 'lift f-rom the objectives . objective in a tovm and completely clear that area. 4. provided. From the irnfantryiran's poirn of iw heavy bombing has every disadvantage and no adivantageo..the fa:r outskirts of . `but :at-:zero and :afte. Night It has been proved that even in complete darkness inf can seize a limited..has been heavily bombed. shing of 'the objectives as the 'last 'bomb falls. Searchlights are not of an'y great assistance in a town 4. 5'.laid in and about a"'l' -he': t .2 in mortars. the key buildings.. mines were. have concentrated in axt. iampossible. and catch t.in close support.d . -in a streoot it is impossible to say with accuracy whose shell it was and the. particuilarly . Dy or. o!ll.vitih in any large .l]ly are best used 'on' the back end of the town.late in the operations.snipers always preclude the use of a bulldozer till very . Large scale'clearing operations are not possible in the dark as'it-s s-.to. Booby traps were not met. and.'s little doubt the infantryman would 'ask' the airman to go elsewhere.' It also makes the enemrys task of 'hid.grat itefulness to cover street crossings. italso d.assaulto Then.

for without the highest fighting spirit being present. Each man must know his particular role in the pl "Drill". (b) (c) (d) Keep your reserve ready. The immediate effect of "flame vwarfare"l this was no surprise. Limit your objectives severely and base your operations on the "key" buildings. never by-pass an enemy post -this does not apply to "cut-off" tps if sent wide round. Pray tlat the tps are in great heart. the best plans made by the leaders will be of no avail. use flame (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) . Don't overload the soldier. Never operate more than one pl at a time within a coy area. How slow an operation it get tired. The great additional difficulties which the after effect of heavy bombs makes for the infantryman. f or Tow Cearing (d) 8. The Results of Experience Thinking back on our experiences. the principles we will work on for the next German town we clear : (a) Always plan to the last detail and brief each soldier visually if possible. Fire and movement applies as much as ever wherever possible. we especially note are perhaps : (a) (b) (c). eager to destroy the enemy in yet another German stronghold. the points that and how quickly tps The smallness of the objective a pl can take for certainty. Never. but the speed with which the enemy reacted was. is. Once down they are sometimes difficult to got up again. the whole objective.89 7. but don't keep tps hanging about waiting their turn under fire. Printiles Lastly. Start each operation from a very firm base.


-RA 'B' Fit 658 AOP Sqn CBO 30 Corps ./9 AGLA . 3 dan Inf Div 8..2 in btys 3 AG. . 43 Inf Div 73 Anti-tank Regt less two bty. 2 Cdn Inf Div Det 2 Cdn Svy Regt 'A' Fit 660 AOP Sqn Det 2 Cdn Svy Regt 'C Fit 660 AOP Sqn Tp 557 SL Bty 3 AGRA "ith under command three sees 'B' Fit 4 Cdn Moed Regt 7 Cdn Meed Regt 7. - If Div 146/63 Anti-tank Bty (SP) Det 4 Svy R-egt Tp 356 SL Bty 'C' Flt 652 AOP Sqn Det 1 00 Radar Bty 79 Med Regt 5. I L (W)Inf Div 19 Cdn Fd Regt (SP) 56/6 Cdn Anti-tank B' ty (SP) Det 4 Svy Regt 'A' Fit 662 AOP Sqn Tp 356 SL Bty ·Det 100 Radar Bty 72 Med Regt 6.90 APIEENDIX 'D ' RA ORDER OF BATTLE Formation 1 Guards Armd Div G Undeer Command Dot 4 Svy Regt ein pSU-ort 64 Med Regt 84 Med Regt 2.(SP) 198/73 Anti-tank B ty (SP) 234/73 Anti-tank Bty (SP) IDot 4 Svy Re'gt Tp 356 SL Bty B' Filt 662 AOP Sqn Det 100 Radar Bty 3.s Det 4 Svy Regt 'C' Fit 662 AOP Sqn 6 Fd Rogt ". CCRA 74 AA Bde 660 AOP Sqn 4 AGRA with under conmand three secs 'B' Fit 106 AA Bdo 660 A0OP Sqn 5 AGRA iwith under command two 7. 1 21 Med Regt 4. 15 (S) Inf Div 86 Fcl Regt (SP) -147 Fd Regt.

.5 in guns 5.91 Formation 8.Ft 658 AOP Sqn CBOI-'12. oiu' tp 660 AOP Sqn less three fits 662 AOP-.4 -3.s7 240 rmn in HAA .Sqn less -three: flt.less.Cbops 27LAA Regt In support 4 Svy Regt less dets .o ) Under Command 9 AGRA with under comnmand 53 Heavy Regt 3 Super-heavy Regt 'A' . OCRn (Caont.2 in hovws 8 in . . 356 SL Bty less three tps 557.dn Rocket Unit TOTAL 'GUNS 576 32 248 40 - 25 prs- 4.I C..5 in hovos 155 rmm v~: 36 2 . 7. SL Bty .

rlao9prpL-*-·LIICZ1-C----·· -- 345.000 arr-·~·P~ __ c 528 52.5/D r 4 D 4/D- 3 14.·L·6*·-·-·---U··bi"i)·*l--- .600 D .600 14. 2 2.RA _U~L~"Dlzrculrrr~rrrr~rrrrrusr~·u~llrrrr DUMPING 2_e PROG-RAME - .3/D . 000 S-hy HAA D -14/D -13 33.400 119.200 18.600 14.200 4..200 D .92 - APPENDIX 'E' .12 D .400 D .000 21.7/D ._ . 72.10/D 9 7.700 pgabe·~ird~rr _ 8.13/0 .700 1 400 D ..7 D .800 _ _ __~C·I~pls~P~r --l----·-.400 3.6/D5 7. 000 155 mm 7.8 D .000 400 1.200 24.000 16.000 D .00 12.000 7. .600 3..9/D .6 D.12/D- 11 30. Fd. ROUNDS DUMPED NIGHT Preliminary .200 25.8/D .400 2.800 D .800 Med 28.800 800 800 288 240 21..11/D- 10 25.200 800 1.2 TOTAL olprr. s.600 16.

: . VOLUME OFFIRE With the exception of the operation in support 2 Cdn Inf Div on 8 Mar.0047' 4 Cdn Armd Div to advance along railway SOUTH of 28 Feb 8 2..400 8 FPeb Preliminary bombard: ment : 15 Feb 16 F'eb 18 Feb 26 Peb 43 I-nf Div to neutralise FORST CLEVE 9249. NATURE OF TARGETS (a) -*Targets on D-Day formed part of preliminary bombardment on enemy defensive positions. (c)Targets'engaged:"on 15. 3. 51 (H) Inf Div to capture ASPERDEN 8745: and EERVORST 8945 15 (S) Inf Div to capture CGOCH 9043 13 2 2. 18 and 26 Feb and 8 lar. SUl¢ARY 'OF' AC TI (a) TIES BLOCKBUSTER RA.VRITABLE (Source 1.b).500 2 Cdn Inf Div to capture high ground .000 1 2 '350 1. .-Targets on 28 Feb were chiefiy suspected enemy FUPs for counter-attack and. 00 2. /In the . 3 650 Attached to Diagram 3 is Trace ' S' showing -battery position and targets engaged..-93 APPENDIX 'F' ACTIVITIES OF I CANADIAN ROCKET AD BATTERY DURING OPERATIOS .. following sev"e"n operations n . . were in. HOCHWALD Forest 8 Mar 2 Cdn Inf Div to capt ure XANTEN 1141 (b) 2.. . 16.Date Operation Number of targets .Approx number of rounds fired!. all targets were engaged by simultaneous salvoes from all 12 projectors. can be considered to be in the nature of DFP. (..400. The numbers of salvoes on each target varied from 1 .3.Pirst Cdn Arimy) 1. The Rocket Battery fired from six different positions in support of the.each case inif objectives..

4. My general impression. a Coy Commander's report on the part played by rockets in the attack on "My Coy attacked the NORTH end of-ASPERDEN at night under an arty barrage with rockets timed to f ire during Owing to various circumstances we were the barrage. (e) 26 Feb. 28 Feb and 8 Mar Results not known. Typhoon attacks to which the village was subjected. (c) 16 Feb The following is ASPERDEN : an extract from. in their We took many prisoners all of which vrwere still My Coy wotld definitely like rocket support cellars. (b) i5 Feb The task was to neutralise the FORST CLEVE and prevent There was no any enemy counter-attack from it. . 5. as a report had been received that our own tps were already in the town. The results of the salvoes on ASPERDEN were inspected and the village was found to be closely pitted with rocket craters . 200 men. possible. however. and I am certain that it was one of the chief factors in keeping the enemy inf umderground -whilst we approached the objective. however. for any set piece attack they do. counter-attack delivered from this area and therefore the operation must be considered a success. is that it is a magnificent weapon for an area shoot. A ground check showed that rounds fell within the target area. to differentiate between damage caused by rockets and that by arty bombardment and. (d) 18 PFb The order to stop firing was received'after one salvo had been fired on GOCH. in assembling ammunition so as to ensure that the required number of rounds would be on the position before D-Day. in addition to the battery.and evidence everywrhere of heavy It was not fragmentation and rocket ammunition.s distance away. very late on to our objective and the rockets had fired possibly when we were one hr..- 94 - In the case of 8 Mar two salvoes from four projectors were fired on each target. PREPARATION OF AIltSMNITION Ammunition for D-Day expenditure was received unassembled It was necessary to employ less than a week before D-Day. RESULTS (a) 8 Feob Rockets formed only a small part of full bombardment programme~ but ground checks of three targets engaged showed MPsI to be in the target area.

inf close in on the objective as soon as possible after the fire has lifted. * It is not as accurate as field or medium arty. cumbersome in switching and lacks the flexibility of field arty. that an objective should. essential..95 6. . whenever possible. (b) Retaliatory Fire Danger of battery position being given away by smoke or flash is not great when projectors are well sited and si'ted in an area together with a large volume of active arty. It is. Use of single equipments in harassing fire role. Use of battery in decentralised role by tps of four to divs. .) It is unsuited to observed shooting.. CONCLUSIONS (a) Eloyment Neutralisation by rocket salvoes of an area containing enemy under light cover is only temporary. :'- (f) Bo. It is considered the following methods of employment be subject of further experience : (a) (b) (c) Use of whole battery on area neutralisation. (c) -Prepart of Ammunition Where large scale amun. a harassing fire role. (d) -(e. It supplements and cannot replace any existing arty weapons. It follows. that the: . (a) (b) (c) (By BRA First Cd-n Army) an area neutralising weapon.ition expenditure in a short time is envisaged. therefore. time must be -given for' assembly before fire plan : RECOMMNDATIONS A. Rocket is Rocket can be used in It is mobile and develops great fire power over short period of time. The comparatively large zone of dispersion of the rocket means that the inf are not able to approach as close as they can to a concentration of 25 pr. therefore. be neutralised by 25 prs in addition to rockets and the f ire of the former continued until the last possible moment.

You're Reading a Free Preview

/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->