CASE DIGEST

Constitutional Law 2

Name: Course:

Vonn Rhoel A. Bondad LLB I

ID No. 12-000593 Instructor: Atty. Domitilo G. Pineda, Jr.

3/1/2013

01- ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS V. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, G.R. NO. L-24693 OCTOBER 23, 1967 ...................................................... 3 02- TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTAION GR L-59234, 30 SEPTEMBER 1982, EN BANC, MELENCIO .................................................... 3 03- REPUBLIC VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY G.R. NO. 141314. NOVEMBER 15, 2002 ...................................................................................................... 4 04- LIM VS. PACQUING G.R. 115044, JANUARY 27, 1995 ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 05- LUTZ VS. ARANETA G.R. NO. L-7859, 22 DECEMBER 1955 ................................................................................................................................................. 6 06- MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION G.R. NO. 111097 ................................................................................................... 7 07- VALENTIN TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD G.R. NO. L-75697 ......................................................................................................................... 7 08- RESTITUTO YNOT VS.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. NO. 74457 ......................................................................................................................... 8 09- CRISTINA DE KNECHT VS.HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA G.R. NO. L-51078............................................................................................................................. 9 10- PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. L-119694 ................................................................................................ 9 11- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION G.R. NO. 137569............................................................................................ 10 12- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 146587. JULY 2, 2002 ................................................................... 11 13- THE CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL G.R. NO. L-14355 OCTOBER 31, 1919 ..................................................... 12 JUNE 16, 1965 ................................................................ 13 14- LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE CASE DIGEST G.R. NO. L-19201

15- PHILEX MINING CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. G.R. NO. 125704 AUGUST 28, 1998...................................................... 13 16- G.R. NO. 130716 CHAVEZ VS.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) ...................................................................................... 14 17- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION G.R. NO. 139465 JANUARY 18, 2000 .............................................................................................................. 15 18- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 25, AND MARK B. JIMENEZ, RESPONDENTS. G.R. NO. 139465 JANUARY 18, 2000 ............................................................................................................... 16 19- GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, VS. HON. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, MORALES, AND MARK . JIMENEZ A.K.A . MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, [G.R .NO. 148571. SEPTEMBER 24, 2002] ............................................................................................................................. 17 20- ESRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 148560, NOVEMBER 19, 2001............................................................................................................................. 18 21- PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. L-52245 ............................................................................................. 19 22- ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GR NO. 46496, FEBRUARY 27, 19450/ 69 PHIL. 635 ........................................................................ 20 23- PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. VS. PETE PRADO GR NO. 105371, NOVEMBER 11, 1993/ 227 SCRA 703 ....................................................... 20 24- GONZALES VS . COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. NO. L-28196; 9 NOV 1967] ...................................................................................................................... 21 25- ORMOC SUGAR VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY GR L-23794, 17 FEBRUARY 1968 ........................................................................................................ 21 26- PEOPLE V. CAYAT G.R. NO. L-45987 MAY 5, 1939 ................................................................................................................................................. 22 27- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS G.R. NOS. 132875-76. FEBRUARY 3, 2000 .................................................................................. 22 28- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JIMMY MIJANO Y TAMORA G.R. NO. 129112. JULY 23, 1999 .................................................................................... 23 29- SOLIVEN V. MAKASAIR G.R. NO. 82585 NOVEMBER 14, 1988 ......................................................................................................................................... 23 30- ALLADO V. DIOCNO G.R. NO. 113630 MAY 5, 1994 ......................................................................................................................................................... 24 31- BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF G.R. NO. L-64261 DECEMBER 26, 1984 ............................................................................................................................... 25 32- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FLORENCIO B. DORIA G.R. NO. 125299 JANUARY 22, 1999......................................................................................... 26 33- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO MENGOTE Y TEJAS, G.R. NO. 87059 JUNE 22, 1992 .............................................................................. 28 34- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, G.R. NO. 91107 JUNE 19, 1991 ........................................................................................ 29 35- SAMMY M. MALACAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 123595 DECEMBER 12, 1997 .................................................................................................. 30 36- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN AND ROBERTO DELOS REYES, G.R. NO. 125754 DECEMBER 22,1999. ...................... 31 37- COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ET AL. VS. ALFREDO C. FLORES G.R. NO. 78631 JUNE 29, 1993 .......................................................................................... 33 38- RICARDO C. VALMONTE VS. RENATO DE VILLA G.R. NO. 83988 SEPTEMBER 29, 1989................................................................................................... 34 39- HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PEDRO PACIS, AND MARTIN ALAGAO, VS. REMEDIOS MAGO AND HILARION U. JARENCIO39 G.R. NO. L-27360 FEBRUARY 28, 1968............................................................................................................................................. 35 40- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI G.R. NO. 81561 JANUARY 18, 1991 ...................................................................................................... 37 41- GENEROSO ESMEÑA VS. JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY G.R. NO. L-54110 FEBRUARY 20, 1981 ............................................................................................. 38 42- ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, ET AL. VS. APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ET AL, G.R. NO. 117565 NOVEMBER 18, 1997 ..................................................................... 39 43- CLEMENTE MAGTOTO VS.MIGUEL M. MANGUERA G.R. NOS. L-37201-02 MARCH 3, 1975 ........................................................................................... 40 44- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOHN GABRIEL GAMBOA G.R. NO. 91374 FEBRUARY 25, 1991 ................................................................................... 40 45- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAIME AGUSTIN, ET AL. G.R. NO. 110290 JANUARY 25, 1995 ...................................................................................... 41 46- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERNESTO BASE G.R. NO. 109773 MARCH 30, 2000 .......................................................................................... 41 FEBRUARY 20, 2001....................................................... 42 47- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. EDWARD ENDINO&GERRY GALGARIN G.R. NO. 133026

48- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DAVID S. LOVERIA G.R. NO. 79138 JULY 2, 1990 ......................................................................................................... 43 49- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, G.R. NO. 122485 FEBRUARY 1, 1999....................................................................... 44 50- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT G.R. NO. 109775 NOVEMBER 14, 1996 ...................................................................... 47

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51- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DINDO MOJELLO G.R. NO. 145566

MARCH 9, 2004.......................................................................................... 48

52- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANACLETO Q. OLVIS G.R. NO. 71092 SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 ........................................................................................ 49 53- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RONILO L. PINLAC G.R. NOS. 74123-24 SEPTEMBER 26, 1988...................................................................................... 51 54- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. WILFREDO ROJAS, TEODORO VILLARIN, SOLOMON TOTOY, GREGORIO TUNDAG AND SINFROSO MASONG, DEFENDANTS G.R. NOS. L-46960-62 JANUARY 8, 1987 ................................................................................................................................... 52 55- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA. G.R. NO. 122142 MAY 17, 2000 .................................................................................. 53 56- GENEROSO ESMEÑA VS. JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY G.R. NO. L-54110 FEBRUARY 20, 1981 ............................................................................................. 54 57- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AURELIO BALISACAN G.R. NO. L-26376 AUGUST 31, 1966 ............................................................................... 55 58- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEO P. ECHEGARAY G.R. NO. 117472 FEBRUARY 7, 1997 ............................................................................................. 56 59- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN RELOVA G.R. NO. L-45129 MARCH 6, 1987................................................................................................ 57 60- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH VI, ET AL. G.R. NO. L-36528 SEPTEMBER 24, 1987 ............................................... 59 61- JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR VS. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, ETC. AND EVANGELINE PONCE CARPIO, G.R. NO. 172716 NOVEMBER 17, 2010 .............................................................................................................................................................................. 60 62- VALERIO TACAS VS. FLORENTINO C. CARIASO G.R. NO. L-37406 AUGUST 31, 1976 ....................................................................................................... 61 63- GARCES VS. ESTENZO GR. NO. L-53487, MAY 25, 1981 ................................................................................................................................................... 62 64- ERNESTO G. GONZALES VS.CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION G.R. NO. L-38178 OCTOBER 3, 1985........................................................ 62 65- MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989 .................................................................................................................................. 63 66- YAP VS. CA GR. NO. 141529 JUNE 6, 2001............................................................................................................................................................. 64 67- IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.)VS.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 119673 JULY 26, 1996 ............................................................................. 64 68- PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA VS.HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS G.R. NO. 124382............................................................................................... 65 69- PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.VS. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON G.R. NO. 81958 ...................................................................... 66 70- RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., VS.THE COURT OF APPEALS FERNAN G.R. NO. L-62100 ...................................................................................................... 67 71- BLO UMPAR ADIONG VS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 103956 ....................................................................................................................... 68 72- AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG AND JUAN PONCE ENRILE G.R. NO. 82380 ............................................................................... 69 73- CHAVEZ VS.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) G.R. NO. 130716 ....................................................................................... 70 74- MANUEL LAGUNZAD VS. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-32066 AUGUST 6, 1979 .................................... 71 75- AMELITO R. MUTUC VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS75 G.R. NO. L-32717 NOVEMBER 26, 1970 ................................................................................ 72 76- NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 102653 MARCH 5, 1992 ......................................................................................... 73 77- CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS VS.VALERIANO E. FUGOSO G.R. NO. L-1800............................................................................................................................... 73 78- JOSE B.L. REYES VS. RAMON BAGATSING, AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA G.R. NO. L-65366 .................................................................................. 74 79- ABELARDO SUBIDO, VS.ROMAN OZAETA G.R. NO. L-1631 FEBRUARY 27, 1948 .................................................................................................. 75 80- LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ GR L-63419, 18 DECEMBER 1986 ............................................................................................................................................... 76 81- ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS.FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., G.R. NO. L-24670 DECEMBER 14, 1979. ........................................................ 76 82- ENEDINA PRESLEY VS. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 86774 AUGUST 21, 1991 .......................... 77 83- TERRY LYN MAGNO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 101148, AUGUST 05, 1992 .......................................................................................................... 78 84- LT. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AFP, MAJ. GENERAL ARTURO ENRILE VS.HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 105597 ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 78 85- BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN .G.R. NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984 .............................................................................................................. 80 86- CRISTOPHER GAMBOA VS. J. ALFREDO CRUZ G.R. NO. L-56291 JUNE 27, 1988 ............................................................................................................. 80 87- ISABELA SUGAR VS. MACADAEG 98 PHIL. 995 ................................................................................................................................................................. 81 88- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MALIMIT GR NO. 190775, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 ......................................................................................................... 81 89- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GALLARDE GR NO. 13302, FEBRUARY 17, 2000 ............................................................................................................ 82 90- CATALINO N. SARMIENTO V.S THE HON. JUDGE ORLANDO R. TUICO G.R. NO. 75271-73 JUNE 27, 1988. ..................................................................... 82 91- THE UNITED STATES VS. J. VALENTINE KARELSEN, G.R. NO. 1376 JANUARY 21, 1904 .......................................................................................... 83 92- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE LEGASPI Y RAMIREZ G.R. NOS. 92167-68 ............................................................................................................ 84 93- EFREN C. MONCUPAVS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE 93. G.R. NO. L-63345................................................................................................................................ 85 94- MANUEL Q. CABALLERO AND LELITA A. CABALLERO,-VERSUS- HON. FEDERICO B. ALFONSO, JR., HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, FERNANDO ESCONDE, GREGORIO BAKEREL, CESAR NAVARRO, AND FRANK RODRIGUEZ, G.R. NO. L-45647 AUGUST 21, 1987 ....................................................... 86 95- EMETERIA VILLAFLOR VS. RICARDO SUMMERS G.R. NO. 16444 ...................................................................................................................................... 87 96- PEOPLE V. DUERO G.R. NO. L-52016 MAY 13, 1981 ....................................................................................................................................................... 87 97- STONEHILL V. DIOKNO, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) .................................................................................................................................................................... 88 98- ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [GR 107383, 20 FEBRUARY 1996] ............................................................................................................................... 89 99- QUA CHEE GAN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD G.R. NO. L-10280 SEPTEMBER 30, 1963 ................................................................................................... 90

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ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly.01- ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS V. the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ordinance No. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. It may also regulate 3|Page . The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate. good order. as public contend it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation. Furthermore. Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order". morals. 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. MELEN CIO FACTS: To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA. L-24693 OCTOBER 23. 1967 Facts: On 13 June 1963. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive. Inc.5k/yr). and even graft and corruption. the requirement of due process has been met. HELD: On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they were deprived of procedural due process. On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being enforced in Metro Manila only and was directed solely towards the taxi industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for the traffic conditions are not the same in every city. which is given wide discretionary authority. The due process contention is likewise untenable. THE BOARD OF TRANS PORTATION GR L-59234. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness. convenience. 30 SEPTEMBER 1982. Further. ISSUES: Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law. 02- TAXICAB OPERATORS VS . the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. peace. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. safety and welfare of society. the presumption stays. their cost recovered. fairly. possible collusion.R. and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT and Memorandum Circular of the BLT. (2) Substantive due process. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated. G. arbitrary and against due process. EN BANC. It classified them into 1stclass (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2ndclass (taxed at 4. the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague. the Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. and safety. respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari. not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards. In this case. Pursuant to OT circular. of its police power. and a fair return on investment obtained. and justly. a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.. plan or program. As in this case. can prescribe regulations to promote the health. due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected. It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. This is to minimize prostitution. there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. in the exercise. NO. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars for the Board gave a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. safety and general welfare of the people. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The State. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort. this being only one of the options open to the Board.

The regulation is to promote the common good.017/kwh. and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. NO. In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned. the petition before the Supreme Court.184/kwh granted under the Board‘s Order dated 28 January 1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of P0. the ERB adopted the recommendation of COA that in computing the rate base.R. determined in accordance with the number of months the same was actually used in service during the test year.‖ The ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be ―borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business‖ hence. HELD: In third world countries like the Philippines. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. the infringement of constitutional right must be clear. only the proportionate value of the property should be included. The application reflected an average increase of P0.property rights. The cases at bar are of utmost significance for they concern the right of our people to electricity and to be reasonably charged for their consumption. The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. On appeal (CA GR SP 46888). ISSUE: Whether or not the public interest should prevail over private profits.21/kwh in its distribution charge. the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0. categorical and undeniable. it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. equal justice will have a synthetic ring unless the economic rights of the people. Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals. To declare a law unconstitutional. in applying the net average investment method.167/kwh starting with MERALCO‘s billing cycles begi nning February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998. should not be passed on to the consumers. effective with respect to MERALCO‘s billing cycles beginning February 1994. 141314. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use. especially the poor. Subsequent to an audit by the Commission on Audit (COA). the ERB rendered its decision adopting COA‘s recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the average amount of P0. 4|Page . but as long as use of the property is continued. 2002 FACTS: On 23 December 1993. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest. Hence. On 28 January 1994.184/kwh. The application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order 172. be refunded to MERALCO‘s customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption. which make for real differences. subject to the condition that in the event that the Board finds that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates.167/ kwh and the refund of such amount to MERALCO‘s customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle beginning Februar y 1998. Hence. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. the same is subject to public regulation. a giant public utility and a monopoly. it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. In configuring the contours of this economic right to a basic necessity of life. are protected with the same resoluteness as their right to liberty. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". MANILA ELECT RIC COMPANY G. The ERB further ordered that ―the provisional relief in the amount of P0. all excess amounts collected from the applicant‘s customers as a result of this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future consumptions. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision of its rate schedules. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. 03- REPUBLIC VS. NOVEMBER 15. to charge our people for their electric consumption. Further. the Court shall define the limits of the power of respondent MERALCO. the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0. Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the State‘s police powers. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction. the Writs prayed for are denied and was dismissed.

petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. 7065. safety and welfare of society. c. there is need to consolidate all the efforts of the government to eradicate and minimize vices and other forms of social ills in pursuance of the social and economic development program under the new society. The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in Manila. WHEREAS. Justice George A. the following orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila. Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. In Magtajas v. a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994. in said G. Pryce Properties Corporation (20 July 1994. It is. On 13 September 1994. Sumulong. It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals and welfare. No.R. In the matter of PD No. jai-alai and other forms of gambling there is a necessity to transfer the issuance of permit and/or franchise from local government to the National Government. the legislative power may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries. 660). order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Alfredo S. 115044: a. as ADC argues. Thus. under Manila Ordinance No.R. this Court stated thru Mr. or 2. which this Court has no authority to review. the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion. as very aptly stated by PD No. It is based on the ancient doctrine — salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law. and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity. Hon. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to Associated Development Corporation (ADC). is a power co-extensive with self-protection. much less lack of or excess of jurisdiction. on the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]". Congress has consulted its own wisdom. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 1995 Facts: The petition in G. PACQUING G. 115044. Whether or not PD No. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. honest and hard work. WHEREAS.) In the early case ofRubi v. this Court through Mr. as the government contends. Issue: 1. provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.R. No. the purpose of the law is clearly stated in the "whereas clause" as follows: WHEREAS. Lim to issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC). Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. Cruz: In the exercise of its own discretion.04- LIM VS. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good. much less reverse. these social ills are still prevalent in many areas of the country. Whether or not PD No. jr. 1. . Held: 1. Whether P. b. That is the prerogative of the political departments. 111097). it has been reported that in spite of the current drive of our law enforcement agencies against vices and illegal gambling. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State. Justice Isagani A. Malcolm stated thus: The police power of the State ." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort. cockfighting and horse-racing. Lim. JANUARY 27. Carried onward by the current of legislation. 771. 88-45660. to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. in order to effectively control and regulate wagers or betting by the public on horse and dog races. resolve the legal question. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional. In making such choices. to withdraw such grant of authority. It is settled 5|Page . Branch 40. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a finding that there was "no abuse of discretion. or if any had been issued. RTC of Manila. G.R. No. in issuing the questioned orders. 771. 771 is unconstitutional for being Violative of the equal protection and nonimpairment provisions of the Constitution. .D. Police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. inter alia.

169 revoking PD No. and accepted by every authority since . when played for bets. we held that: A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative. otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes. to give to the national government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises." This definition was given by Finch. That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a ground 6|Page . Today. being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively. 771 which had revoked all franchises to operate jai-alais issued by local governments. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern. 771 provides that the national government can subsequently 2. There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere privilege because jai-alai. (Emphasis supplied) It should also be remembered that PD No. In other words. 567.e. to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power. and yet. it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly.R..grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of the qualifications of the applicant. that questions regarding wisdom. to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. it is noteworthy that while then president Aquino issued Executive Order No. 771. 05FACTS: Lutz vs. and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the United States market". No. 567 is primarily an exercise of the police power. Thus. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid. As earlier noted. On the other hand. morality and practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the executive and legislative departments. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. 22 December 1955 Due to the threat to industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act. in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma challenged the legality of the taxes imposed by the said Act. Besides. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA No. However. ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. subsisting in the hands of a subject. Here. a franchise being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant. ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. i. Araneta G. Thus. thus. the act is primarily an exercise of the police power." Plaintiff. There was no violation by PD No. it follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. The action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance. . HELD: The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in the said Act is a pure exercise of the taxing power. subject only to the test of reasonableness. adopted by Blackstone. To analogize a gambling franchise for the operation of a public utility. the National Assembly promulgated Commonwealth Act No. the plaintiff appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court. is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies. it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as early as 1975. is pure and simple gambling. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree. all franchises then existing were revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements. she did not scrap or repeal PD No. which is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. NTC (150 SCRA 450). and it is not contended that the means provided of the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. L-7859. is to trivialize the great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege. . a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. almost twenty 920) years ago. Walter Lutz." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with the national government subsequent to the enactment of PD No. a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare. the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose. On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 771 is quite clear from its provisions. 771. the purpose of PD No. no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court. for as correctly pointed out by the government. In plaintiff's opinion such tax is unconstitutional and void. the allegations abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on conjectures. the legislative discretion must be allowed fully play. such as public transportation company. In RCPI v. 810 (which granted a franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jai-alai). thereby re-affirming the government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national government (not local governments) to consider and approve.

D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance. even mentioning it at all. it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 1992. L-75697 Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. On December 7. for its casino. Provided. with costs against appellant. PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. 06Facts: MAYOR PABLO P. as the case may be. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor.of complaint. lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Video Tapes. Lease or Disposition of Videograms. NO. the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. 458 of the Local Government Code. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA. this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid. Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people. the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate. including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. The decision appealed from is affirmed. In the exercise of its own discretion. 1993. 07- VALENTIN TIO VS. In Basco v. ready for playback. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation.R. A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree. prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore. an annual tax of five pesos. On January 4. 111097 The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P. NO. PRYCE PROPER TIES CORPORATION G. 1987. indeed. Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution." "Section 10. 6) It must not be unreasonable. 134. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY B OARD G. Under Sec. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. regardless of length. local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress. there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or. Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353. an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. Held: No.‖ Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.R. for every sale.‖ 7|Page . ―gambling and other prohibited games of chance. Gambling is not illegal per se. MAGTAJAS VS. it enacted Ordinance 3375-93. ―An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. Tax on Sale. for that matter. among others. prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of a casino. the amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that: "SEC. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette.

Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales.R. have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. 8|Page . Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. PROVIDED. there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry. is unduly oppressive. and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes.IN TERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process." 08- RESTITUTO YNOT VS. sales and disposition of videograms. Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals. Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. Issues: 1. thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. particularly because of the rampant film piracy. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry. Issue: Whether or not the law is valid. Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences. thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and. NO. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. worse. also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry. Held: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry. the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission. To strengthen the law. Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo.‖ The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including. 2. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. There is. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy. videotapes. contractor's specific. That in Metropolitan Manila. not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business. amusement and other taxes. the tax remains a valid imposition.―Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province. and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected. On 13 Jan 1984. among others. discs. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. and these earnings have not been subjected to tax. Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional. 74457 Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights. cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof. finally.

contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2). the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan. 10- PHILIPPINE PRESS INS TITUTE. Because of the protests of residents of the latter. the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory. BAUTISTA G. Section 2 of Resolution No. COM MISSION ON ELECTIONS G. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void. non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers. Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. Finally. justiciable case or controversy. Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. PEDRO JL. • the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidates utilization of the Comelec space • procured. it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people. in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives. and progress and development. Held: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. and any of its agencies. but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.HON. Article III of the 1987 Constitution.R. originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City.R. however. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people. and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. purports to require print media enterprises to donate free print space to Comelec. while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. Later on. PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. NO. On the other hand. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free Comelec Space • and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair. No pronouncement as to costs. the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. on the other. among whom was petitioner. 2772.09- CRISTINA DE KNECHT VS. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for noncompliance with that Resolution. L-119694 Facts: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. 9|Page . the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. of the press and of expression. At the same time. Issue: Is the choice of Fernando Rein and del Pan Streets valid? Held: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. on one hand. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech. a non-stock. VS. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets. asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. L-51078 Facts: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project. PPI. against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of Comelec space. impartial and credible election. The Petition is DISMISSED in part. the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual. NO. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. however. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government. As such. constitute impositions of involuntary servitude. INC. According to the Solicitor General. 2772. 2772. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No.

350. 1988. Guerrero filed an Omnibus Motions praying that the just compensation for the land be deposited in . Pasay City.As his motion for intervention and omnibus motion had not yet been resolved. 1994 and the further sum of P1.00 per square meter for the taking of 920 square meters out of the 1.P.380 square meters.P.00 on January 11. he has the right to receive the just compensation over the said property. petitioners still owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Blg. This contract was executed on December 14.075 square meters. Guerrero filed in the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City a complaint for specific performance to compel the De la Ramas to proceed with the sale. In its order dated October 7. Lot 834 was conveyed in 1994 to Guerrero by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. 1994 as full payment for the balance of the purchase price under the contract to sell of December 14. 1988 executed by the parties is a valid document that authorizes the plaintiff to step into the shoes of the defendants in relation to the property covered by TCT No. NO. De la Ramas filed on March 17. It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to Guerrero the subject parcel of land described therein. Lot 834.00 representing 10 percent of the approximate market value of the subject lands. As a result.Evidently. Pasay City Regional Trial Court. the trial court upheld the validity of the contract to sell and ordering the De la Ramas to execute the corresponding deed of sale covering the subject property in favor of Guerrero. 137569 The De la Ramas and Guerrero entered into a contract to sell for an amount of P11. Guerrero filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus.000.900. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writ of mandamus.380 square meters. While this case for specific performance was pending. the Republic of the Philippines filed the present case for expropriation. 16213.976.00 as partial payment of the purchase price. 1993. Therefore.The trial court denied the motion of the De la Ramas. subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive conditions therein stated. after B. certiorari. Among the defendants named in the complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama as registered owners of Lot 834. l988 and that a case for specific performance had been filed by him against the De la Ramas. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the land. this petition. a deed of absolute sale was executed by the Branch Clerk of Court in favor of Guerrero upon payment by him of the sum of P8. declared Guerrero the rightful owner of the 920square meter expropriated property and ordered payment to him of just compensation for the taking of the land. of the De la Ramas. is/are entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the land in question? Held: Guerrerois entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the land in question. the balance thereof to be paid upon release of the title by the Philippine Veterans Bank. a portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated property. Guerrero filed a motion for intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had agreed to sell to him the entire Lot 834 on December 14. The declaration of this contract's validity. Branch 113.000.00 . it created an obligation on the part of the De la Ramas to convey the land. between the De la Ramas and Guerrero. Branch 111. 1993 a Motion for Authority to withdraw the deposit made by the Republic in 1991. and injunction with temporary restraining order to enjoin the Republic from releasing or paying to the De la Ramas any amount corresponding to the payment of the expropriated property and to compel the trial court to resolve his two motions.This decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals Hence. Guerrero was buying the entire property free from all claims of third persons except those of the government. This lot has an area of 4.380 square meters to be expropriated Meanwhile. Issues: Who.200. However. Stated in another way. 1990 in favor of the government. As a result of which. 1988. The De la Ramas received the sum of P2.000. as payment of just compensation was yet to be made before ownership of the land was transferred to the government. SALEM IN VESTMENT CORPORATION G.808. Blg. including the 920 square meters expropriated by the government. a writ of possession was issued on August 29. and that the transfer shall be free from all liens and encumbrances except for the expropriated portion of 1. consisting of 1. which paved the way for the subsequent execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 8. since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot 834. Upon the deposit of P12. the trial court clarified that the area of land covered by the contract to sell included the portion expropriated by the Republic and that the Contract to Sell dated December 14. by the Clerk of Court. 1994. The entire amount was withdrawn and duly received by the De la Ramas.608. The title to the expropriated portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass to the government upon the enactment of B.11Facts: REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL IPPINES VS. following the order of the Regional Trial Court for its execution.00 on February 1.970. 340 in 1983. 10 | P a g e .800. effectively conveyed ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero. The trial court approved payment to the De la Ramas at the rate of P23.R.

55 by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan. 3840-M. granted the motion. In the meantime. within five years after it had become final and executory.980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway. The trial court. or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings. corresponding to their share of the deposit.00) per square meter. 2002 Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6. the Santos heirs. In opposing the petition. The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76. Malolos. respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6. dated 26 February 1979. Rule 39.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5. No.‖ had ceased its operations thereat. petitioner here posited that a motion which respondents had filed on 17 February 1984.683.80. Petitioner made a deposit of P517. with legal rate of interest from September 19. rendered it unenforceable by mere motion.058. through the Philippine Information Agency (―PIA‖). 3841-M and No. the ―Voice of America. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G. 12Facts: REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL IPPINES. of the Rules of Court.589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos. dated 09 May 1984. a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969. which forms part of the expropriated area. Respondents maintained that the P72. to them of the value of the expropriated portion would unjustly enrich them. until fully paid. was made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979 judgment.683. therefore. submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6. in the alternative. On 01 March 2000. VS. to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the ―Voice of the Philippines‖ project. This time. predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents. When the order was not complied with. could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period.655. Santos heirs remained unpaid. in this case by petitioner. issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff. and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4. It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision.55 paid to them by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial payment. President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. No. The payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally settled. De Villaroya.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court.00 per square meter or. the Bulacan RTC. or on 09 May 1984. respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. petitioner claimed. of the Rules of Court. should instead be made by the prevailing party.683. in its order of 10 July 1984. took over the premises after the previous lessee. 22. after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1.558. such that a little over five years later.The fact that the De la Ramas have withdrawn and appropriated for themselves the amount paid by Guerrero.05. Rule 39. Petitioner. 3839-M. Bulacan. 146587. 1969. On 07 June 1984. docketed Civil Cases No. the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment. This amount represented the purchase price of the entire 4. NO. Vda. as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72. which was the subject of their agreement.55. covering a total of 544.R. computed at the rate of six pesos (P6. opposing the manifestation and motion. to be considered otherwise.075 square meters of land. Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court. The motion for payment. 11 | P a g e . the trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned.000. through the Office of the Solicitor General. 3842-M. the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents ordering the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs. respondents again filed a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. for the implementation thereof. the receipt by respondents of partial compensation in the sum of P72. JU LY 2. the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property.000. followed up by other motions subsequent thereto.664. On 26 February 1979. including the expropriated portion. Furthermore.683. to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. since a motion. WHEREFORE.

1916. the petition of the plaintiff must be denied. or neighborhood. or a small portion of the community or neighborhood. would be the measure of damages at law.. 13Facts: . 400. the extension of Rizal Avenue. and not denied. Cemetery Co. Verily. the only authority left to it being to order its execution. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose WHEREFORE.) In the present case. in an order creating the same. The petitioner. i. The record shows 12 | P a g e .. while the latter is used only by a family.e.R. vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance. be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. 132 Iowa. in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA. 43 Conn. even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question. Beatty vs. 19 September 1969.00 per square meter. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living.. except in cases of necessity. dated 01 March 2000. therein particularly described. alleged: That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. Held: It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese. The City of New Haven. If that is true. of course. in consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands its internal administration. sec. 434. until the due amount shall have been fully paid.. it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. the sanctity of the grave. In such an appropriation. then. (Lewis on Eminent Domain. or church. dated 01 March 2000 Held: The trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order. It is alleged. what. private respondents. 116 Tenn. 1919 On the 11th day of December. namely. the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city. Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. we may ask. and cases cited. or for laudable purposes. 744. used the following language: The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been founded and maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector. and within the jurisdiction of this court. Manila.) The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority. 566. the petition is GRANTED. for the wounded sensibilities of the living. 234. (11 C. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. government and regime must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born and educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the founders may be perpetually effectuated. J. 2 Peters. merchants and industrials. THE CITY OF MANILA VS. in the second paragraph of the petition. would make the cemetery in question public property. praying that certain lands. deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6. the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property.) Where a cemetery is open to public. in having the graves of kindred and loved ones blotted out and desecrated by a common highway or street for public travel? The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a remedy at law is too apparent to admit of argument. should be maintained. 50. The former is a cemetery used by the general community. it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district. Anderson vs. L-14355 OCTOBER 31. ET AL G. The Spanish Governor-General. and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object.Issue: Whether or not the trial court of Bulacan erred in issuing its order. which fact. NO.. benefactors of mankind. but. (Railroad Company vs. the last resting place of our friends. for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. Acheson. Issue: Whether or not the Cemetery being the subject of the expropriation proceedings by the City of Manila is public or private property and whether or not such expropriation necessary by standards of exercise of the power of eminent domain. although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property. Kurtz.

Commission on Audit.668. Negros Occidental. 14- LLADOC VS. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt." hence. —A gift tax is not a property tax.B. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. exempts from taxation cemeteries. 4872 dated March 16. filed the donor‘s gift tax return.000.821. the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities for the 2nd. 1960. Crispin Ruiz. On March 3.R. The facts show that on August 5. as property taxes. which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff. G. The tax amounted to P1. does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.B. —Section 22(3). The collection of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government. and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes.that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge.982. NO. off-set its excise tax liabilities since both had already become "due and demandable. as contra-distinguished from excise taxes. Fr. Held: We see no merit in this contention. L-19201 JU NE 16. Art. in Francia v. Inc. but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. then parish priest of Victorias. . 1965 FACTS: Sometime in 1957. of Bacolod City. 3rd and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1992 in the total amount of P123. of which petitioner was the priest. churches and parsonages or convents.677. Intermediate Appellate Court. Under date of April 29. while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity. which reiterated that: .. buildings. 1958 to June 15. In several instances prior to the instant case. legal compensation can properly take place. as well as fully liquidated. Inc. a taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the claims that he may have against the government. we have already made the pronouncement that taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines. COMMISSION ER OF INTERNAL REVEN UE. Inc.00 in cash to Rev. 1960.R. the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes. the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee‘s gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias. ipso jure. Estate. . 1995 ordering it to pay the amount of P110. interests of 1% monthly from May 15.R. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE CASE DIGEST G. SP No. Prescinding from this premise.52 as excise tax liability for the period from the 2nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from August 6. The ruling in Francia has been applied to the subsequent case of Caltex Philippines. v.52 Issue: Whether or not the contention of Philex that In view of the grant of its VAT input credit/refund. for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. and predecessor of herein petitioner. Taxes cannot be the subject of compensation because the government and taxpayer are not mutually 13 | P a g e . assails the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 8.370. the donor M. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the aforementioned distinction. 1958. 1996 in CA-G. and the compromise for the late filing of the return.00 including surcharges. NO. the M. we categorically held that taxes cannot be subject to set-off or compensation. the same should. thus: We have consistently ruled that there can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the taxpayer may have against the government. 15Facts: PHILEX MINING CORPOR ATION VS. 1992.. 36975 affirming the Court of Tax Appeals decision in CTA Case No. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated. 1994 until fully paid pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. Negros Occidental. Imposition of gift tax on property used for religious purposes not violation of Constitution. 1998 Petitioner Philex Mining Corp. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to a religious organization is subject to donor‘s tax? HELD: Constitutional exemption for religious purpose refers only to property taxes. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity. appurtenant thereto. Estate. donated P10. 125704 AUGUST 28. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended. and all lands.

The payment of the surcharge is mandatory and the BIR is not vested with any authority to waive the collection thereof. do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs. when the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted. Too simplistic. Marcos. Further. Hence. is no longer without any support in statutory law. to countenance Philex's whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection system. Moreover. and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein. Heirs of Ferdinand E. the fact that Philex has pending claims for VAT input claim/refund with the government is immaterial for the imposition of charges and penalties prescribed under Section 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. Chavez.. Accordingly. wherein we ruled that a pending refund may be set off against an existing tax liability even though the refund has not yet been approved by the Commissioner. pursuant to Item No. since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding. NO. it asserts that the imposition of surcharge and interest for the non-payment of the excise taxes within the time prescribed was unjustified. However. The Republic also cited an April 11. a tax does not depend upon the consent of the taxpayer. 130716 CHAVEZ VS. 8 of the General Agreement. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth. the doctrine enunciated in Itogon-Suyoc cannot be invoked by Philex. depriving the government of authority over the manner by which taxpayers credit and offset their tax liabilities. it still has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund with BIR. A taxpayer cannot refuse to pay his taxes when they fall due simply because he has a claim against the government or that the collection of the tax is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the government. Philex posits the theory that it had no obligation to pay the excise tax liabilities within the prescribed period since. Philex's theory that would automatically apply its VAT input credit/refund against its tax liabilities can easily give rise to confusion and abuse. it finds no support in law or in jurisprudence. and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval. in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact.R. as "taxpayer. we cannot allow Philex to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that it has a pending tax claim for refund or credit against the government which has not yet been granted. 16Facts: G. citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy. the same provision upon which the Itogon-Suyoc pronouncement was based was omitted. Corollarily. similar to the one advanced by Philex in justifying its non-payment of its tax liabilities. demand. particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off. that the premise of our ruling in the aforementioned case was anchored on Section 51 (d) of the National Revenue Code of 1939. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks. 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure. 0165. To be sure. Despite the foregoing rulings clearly adverse to Philex's position. entitled Republic v. The same cannot be condoned for flimsy reasons. after all. 141. He also claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest. Evidently. Philex's reliance on our holding in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v." 14 | P a g e . this would adversely affect the government revenue system. It must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain." alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. They claim.Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. Respondents. their agents and/or representatives from "entering into. that petitioner's action is premature. And even if he has. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) Petitioner Francisco I. on the other hand. and (2) the reported execution of a compromise." since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. though. It is important to note. If any taxpayer can defer the payment of taxes by raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or credit. Itogon-Suyoc Mines Inc. because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. We fail to see the logic of Philex's claim for this is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance.creditors and debtors of each other and a claim for taxes is not such a debt. on how to split or share these assets.

a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. (4) future support.Issue: 1.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. whether citizen or alien . Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers. explains that as a taxpayer and citizen. The human rights of person. 2000 Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon. good customs. on the one hand. intimidation or undue influence — or when there is forgery. the Agreements would still not be valid. he has the legal personality to file the instant petition. On June 18. the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. Nevertheless. General and Supplemental Agreements. petitioner. (5) the jurisdiction of courts. as detailed above. Mark Jiminez through counsel. fraud. public policy or public order. in truth hand in fact. both dated December 28. We believe that criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state. both dated December 28. Whether the General and Supplemental Agreements. wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U. On the second issue.S Note Verbale No. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. the agreement may be invalidated by the courts." any compromise in relation to it would constitute a diminution of the public funds. 17- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to theUnited States. and (6) future legitimate. 1993. NO. defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case. LANTION G. In the latter instances. and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs. 15 | P a g e . the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent.S. except with regard to the following matters: (1) the civil status of persons. FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen‘s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation. (3) any ground for legal separation. signed in Manila the ―extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U. renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable.A. an express condition therein. Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs. 139465 JANUARY 18. violence. which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs. 2. and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.In general. who are the principal defendants in the spate of illgotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandigan bayan. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents. which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full. On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. are violative of the Constitution. are violative of the Constitution Held: On the first issue. if not substantial. the law encourages compromises in civil cases. part of the public treasury. morals. As stated earlier. unless the consent of a party is vitiated — such as by mistake. 1999. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to bring the action. recovery of such assets. The absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth "belongs to the Filipino people and [is]. even if such approval were obtained.R. RULING: Petition dismissed. the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law. And like any other contract. 1993. A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties. representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law. decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2. HON. Respondent then claims his procedural right to due notice and hearing of his case which is indispensable of the right to due process. adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision. The rule of pacta sunt servanda. PETITIONER. justice. Based on the papers submitted. Southern District of Florida. 2000 Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. PRESIDING JUDGE. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land. private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of provisions of the United States Code. is there any conflict between the due process clause in the Constitution and the RP-US Extradition Treaty? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent. freedom. however. as applied in most countries. jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. ―The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. however. and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Note Verbale No. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. LANTION. such as the Republic of the Philippines. District Court. In response to private respondent. JIMENEZ. and adheres to the policy of peace.S. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. 139465 JANUARY 18. the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In a situation. Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy. AND MARK B. for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them. equality.R." Under the doctrine of incorporation. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country" which was founded upon the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution. ―The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. petitioner. RALPH C. RESPONDENTS. Private respondent addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U. VS.S. national legislative enactments. denied the foregoing requests. both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution 18- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE . cooperation and amity with all nations. The doctrine of incorporation. Government. the warrant of arrest issued by the U. Accordingly. NO. where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to RP-US extradition treaty and Presidential Decree No. G. jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should 16 | P a g e . ―Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them. FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach. one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law. but are not superior to. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment. BRANCH 25. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.S. so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision. requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. ―In a situation.―Under the Doctrine of Incorporation. and other supporting documents for said extradition.

GUILLERMO G.be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. 148571. both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution. 2002] The United States Government sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. Similarly. No. as applied in most countries. Accordingly. national legislative enactments. which prayed that petitioner‘s application for a n arrest warrant be set for hearing. It does not applyto extradition proceedings. However. The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality. These two components law of the land. Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. AND MARK . Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. 1999. 0720 and 0809 requesting the extradition of Mark B.R . the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue. Thereafter. also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Reference to the U. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land. From the procedures earlier abstracted.The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. and if he does. are not pitted against each other. Before the RTC could act on the Petition. therefore it is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. Branch 25. 1069. Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued. FACTS: ISSUES: 1. and 2. No. in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above. after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition.NO. JIMENEZ A. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5. the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In fact. supplemented by Note Nos. In his Memorandum. decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with.After the hearing. directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. [G. American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. The TRO prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. 2001 Order. the law is silent as to these rights. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond. SEPTEMBER 24. 2001. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised. Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion. The case under consideration is an extradition and not acriminal action. Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4. we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right. the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. Instead. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100. because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. HELD: 1. the court below issued its questioned July 3. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law.0522 dated June 16. as implemented by PD No. but are not superior to. prior thereto." since private respondent's due process rights. Upon learning of the request for his extradition. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO. 0597. the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state. Jimenez. 17 | P a g e . Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. VS. we must apply the rules of fair play. international law and municipal or national law. as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. MORALES. The doctrine of incorporation.K. The constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has beenarrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws.S. 19- GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AME RICA. 2001. such as the Republic of the Philippines. PURGANAN. HON. 2001.A . are protected by constitutional guarantees. although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty. In the absence of a law or principle of law. 000.

can be gathered from the whole act. overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. directly or indirectly. is CONSTITUTIONAL. 148560.Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will. not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.17). the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. it violates the due process clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence by lowering the quantum of evidence necessary for proving the component elements of plunder 4. who are members of his family. On the other hand. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Issue: Whether or not R. by himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. 1 as amended by RA 7659. from the Belle corporation which became part of the deposit in the equitable bank under the account name 'jose velarde'. NOVEMBER 19. the president of the republic of the Philippines. which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the 18 | P a g e .700. wherein arification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked.R. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1. Furthermore. it violates the due process clause for its vagueness 2. unlawfully and criminally amass. 1998 to January 2001. commissions r percentages by reason of said purchases of shares of stock in the amount of one hundred eighty nine million seven hundred thousand pesos (p189. Respectively or a total of more or less one billion eight hundred forty seven million five hundred seventy eight thousand fifty seven pesos and fifty centavos (p1. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld. in the area of criminal law.000. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner‘s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.578.20Facts: ESRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN G. and by collecting or receiving.173. relationship. as amended by RA 7659. business associates. according to him. it is beyond the constitutional power of the legislature to delimit the reasonable doubt standard and to abolish the element of mens rea in mala in se crimes by converting these to mala prohibita.847. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.097. Consequently. authority.A. (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness. did then and therewillfully. That during the period from June. in the Philippines. (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions. NO. the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit Ratio: In view of vagueness and ambiguity .50). by taking undue advantage of his official position. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. by himself and/or in connivance with john does jane does. the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). illgotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three and seventeen centavos (p4. connection. in violation of the due process concept of criminal responsibility. 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. or influence. or similar schemes or means. this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face. 2001 Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada. No. or at least. Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED. it violates the constitutional right of the accused to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him 3.00) more or less. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because. accumulate and acquire by himself directly or indirectly. and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear. and. relatives by affinity or consanguinity. subordinates and/or other persons. The petitioner‘s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued.804. thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the republic of Philippines through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts. more or less.057.

Thus. is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. Petitioner. Dumlao alleges is directed insidiously against him.gotten wealth. 1980. To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of R. In view of estoppels . he says.Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R. is a taxpayer.R.A. 7080. is hereby declared null and void. is also a taxpayer. the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein.Whether or not the section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is unconstitutional 2. therefore. Alfredo Salapantan. Igot. No. the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. as such. No." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. a qualified voter. the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact". petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. In view of plunder as a malum in se The legislative declaration in R. who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30. and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies. .. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully. In view of due process . Issue: 1. estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. NO. 19 | P a g e . Romeo B. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.As regards the third issue. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and. accumulate or acquire ill. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. not of law. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass. Iloilo.A. With respect to such statue.On the second issue. COMMISSION ON EL ECTIONS G.. in his Concurring Opinion — . for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. In view of mens rea . a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who. class legislation. Whether or not the petitioners have loci standi to seek judicial redress Held: The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid and the portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that ". the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be nconstitutional. again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. 21Facts: PATRICIO DUMLAO. In a criminal prosecution for plunder. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. Petitioner. . For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong. No. and a resident of San Miguel. they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law.. Jr. IGOT VS.A. as in all other crimes. but to all others who may be held liable under this statute. especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. unlawfully and criminally. Moreover. L-52245 Patricio Dumlao. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. ROMEO B.most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. COA. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing. that of having something to support its decision. a place when directly attached. HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right. it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded. NLU averred that Toribio‘s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. Upon the last reading of a bill. and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage. Yet. upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds. they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. 105371. and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Due to alleged shortage of leather. therefore. FEBRUA RY 27. 46496. 19450/ 69 PHIL. 635 FACTS: TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army." . namely. and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter. must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers. 20 | P a g e . That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. They are." which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law. MTC. RTCs. 1993/ 227 SCRA 703 Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary.The petitioners have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. PETE PRADO GR NO. NOVEM BER 11. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documentsthat they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR. 22- ANG TIBAY VS COURT O F INDUSTRIAL RELATIO NS GR NO. except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether or not RA 7354 is unconstitutional being . It is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. In addition. In the absence of any litigate interest.Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.92-28. VS. laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. no amendment thereto shall be allowed. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should. ET AL. by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved. and other government offices were withdrawn from them. Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. MTCC. in all controversial questions. NLU and National Worker‘s Brotherhood. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. 23Facts: PHILIPPINE JUDGES AS SOCIATION. and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be ―substantial.‖ Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges.

COMELEC [21 SCRA 774. as provided in the present Constitution. to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants. without special pronouncement as to costs. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. as they are hereby. be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention. 1971. RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 9 NOV 1967] Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition. . 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators. without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. although each province shall have. Article VI. insofar as the public is concerned. and (2) the acts of a de facto officer. . H. Nos. Therefore.R. The distinction made by the law is superficial. 1967. B. of the Constitution of the Philippines. Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. R. at the general elections which shall be held on November 14. upon approval by the President. acting as a constituent assembly. violates The Constitution. 1967. G. 1967. H. one (1)member. the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:1. B. 3. at least. the petitions in these two (2) cases must be. if within the competence of his office. of the same Constitution. As a consequence. It may not be contested except directly. to a maximum of 180. No. Municipal Board and Mayor. alleging said ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress.2. the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district. with preliminary injunction. R. Said company also filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc.became Republic Act No. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time. NO. It is so ordered. R. proposing that Section 5. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office. providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. among other things. No. by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately. Article VI. one percent per export sale to the US and other foreign countries. No. Subsequently. may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. On March 16. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 4913. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY GR L-23794. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid. on June 17. Congress passed a bill. From our viewpoint. are valid. L-28196. H. Issue: 1. The Congress in joint session assembled. B. However. the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. its Treasurer. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. by quo warranto proceedings."The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. It subsequently filed a case seeking to invalidate the ordinance for being unconstitutional. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention. or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. 1 and 3 be submitted. H.H. 2. The company paid the said tax under protest. be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120. The main facts are not disputed.Violative of the Equal protection clause Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act."Article XV of the Constitution provides:. dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied.. Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November. which. 17 FEBRUARY 1968 Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution. 1. 24- GONZALES VS . Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause. for approval by the people. 21 | P a g e . 25- ORMOC SUGAR VS. B. proposing that Section 16." and3.

R. In (1). Non Christian refers not to religious belief but to geographical area. it applies for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co. and none other. 1939 Cayat is a native of a non Christian tribe in Baguio. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. of the same class as the present company. (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. Issue: Held: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. 132875-76. 27- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. 22 | P a g e . HELD: Equal protection not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. inspite of its importance. the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. to be reasonable. It may not be extended by intendment. At the time of the taxing ordinance‘s enacted. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central. The classification. Held: Yes. from the coverage of the tax. Romeo Jalosjos. The government raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress with the ultimate view of placing them with Christians on the basis of true equality. FEBRUARY 3. In (4). Yes. it‘s not an argument here. CAYAT G. (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present. not based on accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law. implication or equitable considerations. J ALOSJOS G. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences. NO. unquestionable because it is designed to insure peace and order in and among Non Christian tribes. ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed act violates the constitutional provision on equal protection. In (3). due process. Whether the constitutional limits on the power of taxation. the company was the only sugar central in Ormoc City. should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. L-45987 MAY 5. In (2). 2000 Facts: The accused-appellant. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. 26FACTS: PEOPLE V. were infringed. and whether or not it is an improper exercise of police power. it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to the company as the entity to be levied upon.R.2. NOS. However. He was found guilty of act 1639 which prohibits natives of non Christian tribes from acquiring wines and liquors other than those native wines which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to. even if later a similar company is set up. Inc. is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. Equal Protection Clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn‘t bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation. ROMEO G. As it is now. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman. specifically the EPC and uniformity of taxation. Classification to be reasonable (1) must rest on substantial distinctions (2) germane to the purpose of the law (3) not limited to existing conditions only (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

deserve no serious preoccupation of the mind. JIMMY MIJ ANO Y TAMORA G. by means of force and intimidation. NO. educated or uneducated. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. The accused-appellant denied the charges. the equality of all persons before the law. Under this guarantee. Held: The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law. as it should be. NO. The witnesses for the prosecution were Hazel‘s mother.R. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. VI of the Constitution. Hence. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. JU LY 23. Sec. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant‘s status to that of a special class. 7659 specifically provides: xxx The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: xxx 4. Republic Act No. houses. if any.The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. It applies to all persons and to all classes of persons – rich or poor. the death penalty law makes no distinction. calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. as it is usually put. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Dina Ramirez. then and there wilfully. religious or non-religious. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 28- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. 82585 NOVEMBER 14. Nor yet can his claim that he was too drunk to know what transpired at the time when the rape was committed. the instant review and appeal. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old. against her will and consent. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law. unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one HAZEL RAMIREZ Y ABING. the uneducated. 1996. in the Municipality of Las Piñas. The pertinent provision reads: Art. 1999 FACTS: That on or about the 10th day of May. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. be given weight to disprove the charge against him. xxx Apparently. and the jobless. HELD: The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or. the poor. 11. it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. No particular person or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be exclusively imposed. III. it has constitutional foundations. did. Jimmy Milano. Arnulfo Valiente and Hazel Ramirez herself. pointing out that the defense of denial and accused-appellant‘s alibi. Art. 1988 Facts/Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses. ISSUE: Is the death penalty law violative of the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution because it punishes only people like him. Metro Manila. 129112. The trial court did not accord credence to the testimony of accused-appellant. MAKASAIR G. who is a child below seven (7) years old.R. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law. which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he possesses. 2." has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the 23 | P a g e . 29- SOLIVEN V. to determine probable cause Beltran.

after Van Twest's reported abduction on 16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation. and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard. In this regard. i.R. Thus. In the case of Van Twest. Art. Efren Madolid.e. if not awkwardly. setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. For. strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he was lawful grounds for arresting the accused. 113630 MAY 5. a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession. 24 | P a g e . respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution. Instead. the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 7 Sangley Street. DIOCNO G. Held: Section 2. in Buchanan v. he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. alumni of the College of Law. with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest. under arrest. 1987. armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Roberto A. University of the Philippines. Also arrested later that day were Antonio and Bato who were found to have in their possession several firearms and ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses. along Amalingan Street. And as a protection against false prosecution and arrest. we restate the procedure we outlined in various cases we have already decided. otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. of the 1987 Constitution. This is not an accurate interpretation." This definition is still relevant today as we continue to cite it in recent cases. or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause. Br. separately raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago. Sound policy dictates this procedure. there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established. issue a warrant of arrest. As early as 1915. Mendoza. the operatives of the PACC. he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. nor have his remains been recovered. Parañaque. in a reasonable mind. otherwise. lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. III. actual or apparent. 12. defined probable cause as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief. he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. Following established doctrine and procedure. 1994 Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. The raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and ammunition and placed Santiago and his trusted aide. On June 30. there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were exerted to recover traces of his remains from the scene of the alleged cremationStrangely. A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. it is the knowledge of facts. both in Green Heights Subdivision. Issue: Whether or not there was truly a probable cause in the issuance of the assailed warrant. 11. Barrios of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and.. the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. 30Facts: ALLADO V. and the other. Viuda de Esteban. acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor. on the basis thereof. are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge. a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement dated 16 September 1993 of Security Guard Escolastico Umbal. Verily. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. one located at No. NO.judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. For one. his counsel continued to represent him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Hence.

their discretion. But. Quezon City. they should have armed themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that belief. L-64261 DECEMBER 26. As such. if upon the filing of the information in court the trial judge. the probable cause test is an objective one. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists. NO. Good faith is not enough. as well as numerous papers. and office and printing machines. (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. if not abused. Hence. Umbal's sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. If they really believed that petitioners were probably guilty. Quezon Avenue. Quezon City. and 784 Units C & D. therefore. he should do so. Inting. but that justice shall be done. publication and distribution of the said newspapers. the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest of the government cannot be ignored. and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause. or. Cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action. Makasiar. it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. The PACC which gathered the evidence appears to have had a hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the undated resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for approval by the head of the PACC Task Force.R. were seized. whether or not he should be subjected to the expense. there should be no confusion about their objectives. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding. and. in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case. RMS Building. after reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto. Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City]. From the gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary investigation. on the basis thereof. By itself. If subjective good faith alone were the test. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed. while he may strike hard blows. he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. The preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore. and whose interest. documents. we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing. (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause. issue a warrant of arrest. business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers. the affidavits. the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani CruzPano. For the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy. it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention. Then petitioners were given the runaround in securing a copy of the resolution and the information against them. CHIEF OF S TAFF G. under which the premises known as No. paraphernalia. Issue: 25 | P a g e . were searched. equipment. for mere belief is not enough. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one" In the case at bench. Project 6. we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and. the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be "secure in their persons. Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question. for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law. the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable cause. papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the judge. Bato's counter-affidavit was considered without giving petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. as we said. but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern all. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated.In Soliven v. houses. the transcript of stenographic notes (if any). 1 984 Two [2] search warrants were issued on December 7. Road 3. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination. It is the report. This. On the contrary. may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause. finds that no probable cause exists must either call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper. rigors and embarrassment of trial — is a function of the prosecutor. respectively. books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. 31Facts: BURGOS V. Jr. (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. is the standard. But then. 19. In People v.

and [c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. Sr. Quezon City. Issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria.D. alone.R. Personal Property to be seized. Project 6.e. 1999 On December 7. Project 6. i. two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. and since it was Col. to wit: Sec. therefore. Whether or not these search warrants are valid considering the fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos. Necessarily. FLORENCIO B.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law. NO. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Held: (1) . 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3. Quezon City basing on that portion of Search Warrant No. articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation. and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom. Whether or not the execution of Search Warrant No. and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized. And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched. RMS Building. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein. Quezon Avenue. as petitioner Jose Burgos. administer. stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants. enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant. one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. The information reads: That on or about the 5th day of December.641. conspiring. the search of her person and house. 20. the police are not only authorized but dutybound to arrest him even without a warrant. Ownership. DORIA G. No. Jr. and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao. Besides.82[b] which states: ―Which have been used. the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application.‖ 2. In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 125299 JANUA RY 22. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. In fact.. 19. Burgos Media Services. Quezon City. It may or may not be owned by him. Jr. Precisely.Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. 2." 2. Jr. Road 3. under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2. unlawfully and feloniously sell.1. were seized. Bayani Soriano and the J. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property: [a] Property subject of the offense. 20. then and there willfully. is of no consequence. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants. did. 1995. Section 2. 20-82 [b]. and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit. Held: 1. Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed.82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D. 26 | P a g e 32Facts: . which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P. [b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense. Inc. 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong. accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4. confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law. Philippines. the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real.. the above-named accused.

contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. however. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. Contrary to the finding of the trial court. Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. (3) search in violation of customs laws. The rule is. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. It is claimed. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. In the course of such lawful intrusion." In fact. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit. (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. is based an actual facts. (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent. It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. if the package proclaims its contents." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. whether by its distinctive configuration. Where the object seized was inside a closed package. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. then the article is deemed in plain view. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. with or without any conspiracy. contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime. PO3 Manlangit. testified on cross-examination as follows: 27 | P a g e . However. he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word. In other words. She was not committing any crime. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. with or without her knowledge. however. i. knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area. Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and maybe introduced in evidence. and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.107 (2) search of a moving motor vehicle. or if its contents are obvious to an observer. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had. the search of her person and residence. it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.(2) The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao. the arrest is legally objectionable. but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. however. its transparency. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal. PO3 Manlangit. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit. the arresting officer. (4) seizure of evidence in plain view. then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. the Narcom agent who found the box. not absolute.e. To be lawful. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house. however shows otherwise: Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. in his own right. making its warrantless seizure valid. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container.. (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime. if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article. the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest.

had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. had been committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. or was at least being attempted in their presence. It was only later. however. indicating the articles stolen from him. who turned out to be the accused-appellant. For his part. let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house. later identified as Nicanor Morellos. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. 1987. At the time of the arrest in question. the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen. As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person. whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it. they there saw two men "looking from side to side. Manila. This simply cannot be done in a free society. G. after the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo. On cross-examination. if at all. and about a crime that had yet to be committed. 87059 JUNE 22. if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags — white. The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. or was actually being committed. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers.38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan. This 28 | P a g e ." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. He had duly reported the robbery to the police. The suspects were then searched.R. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. NO. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. Before these events. The truth is that they did not know then what offense. 33- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The weapons were taken from them. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan. after Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters. His companion. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the accused is lawful? HELD: The requirements of Rule 113 Section 5 have not been established in the case at bar. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on crossexamination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana." one of whom was holding his abdomen. even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache. that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity. pink or blue in color. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division. he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana. including the revolver. 1992 ROGELIO MENGOTE Y TEJAS. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. 1987. indeed. One of them. PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. Besides the police officers. Par. was found with a . who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13. or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it.In his direct examination." according to the arresting officers themselves. FACTS: The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8. It would be a sad day.

Section 7. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. As it happened. the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. During the inspection. In the chemistry report. NO. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Acop. the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus. 29 | P a g e . or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Mountain Province. 91107 JUNE 19. 1991 NARCOM set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14. La Trinidad. and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. When accused failed to comply. the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law. the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail. A teddy bear was found in each bag. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. However. which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. G. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish. There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. Benguet for further investigation. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him. the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security. arrest a person: (a) When. (6a 17a). when lawful. it was established that the objects examined were hashish. houses. The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized. in his presence. they allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them.R. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. Thus. At the investigation room. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. without a warrant. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest. a derivative of marijuana. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa. worse.is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or. prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. Upon stepping out of the bus. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not the search of the accused personal effects was legal? HELD: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons. an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Feeling the teddy bears. as ordered. there is no need to obtain a search warrant. CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest. the officers got the bags and opened them. the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing. VS. Tublay. the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. –– A peace officer or a private person may. 34- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun. for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT. But before he alighted from the bus. accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Thereafter. 5 Arrest without warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances: Sec. or is attempting to commit an offense.

however. however. that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was "planted" by the police officers.. COURT OF APPEALS G. In this instance.D." while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. arrest a person: (a) When. entered a plea of not guilty. MALACAT VS. subject to certain exceptions. the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court." In a search incidental to a lawful arrest. 123595 DECEMBER 12.While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused. No. 1990. hence to require probable cause would have been "premature. without a warrant. . and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ." Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed. — Arrest. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto. where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused. the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. first. searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant. petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following errors: Issue: Whether or no the respondent court was correct in affirming the finding of the Trial Court that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner Legal. . In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994. assuming a valid arrest. 1997 In an Information filed on 30 August 1990. validating it as ―stop -and-frisk‖ and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Philippines. when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may. or is attempting to commit an offense. in Criminal Case No. and attempted to flee. The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to it a "stop and frisk. At bottom." where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. in his presence. is actually committing. as follows: That on or about August 27. because of existence of probable cause. the said accused did then and there willfully. in part: Sec. possess and/or acquire a hand grenade. they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches. unlawfully and knowingly keep. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P. The general rule as regards arrests. NO. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid. without warrant. the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases. (2) search of moving vehicles. 35Facts: SAMMY M. under the circumstances of the case. the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within 30 | P a g e . e. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. (4) consent searches. without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities. the person to be arrested has committed. which reads. 5. petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. As regards valid warrantless arrests. noting. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests.R. Held: Granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade. in the City of Manila. the situation called for an investigation.g. as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. and (6) a "stop and frisk. Branch 5. these are found in Section 5. as will be discussed below. and second. At arraignment on 9 October 1990. the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid. petitioner. or where the accused was acting suspiciously. 1866. assisted by counsel de oficio. there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. Turning to valid warrantless searches. searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession was not raised as an issue Unable to accept his conviction. (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. 186 Then in its decision of 24 January 1996.

" They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug 31 | P a g e . plainly. a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. indicating that a crime had just been committed. assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade.which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy. None was visible to Yu. as noted by the trial court: When the policemen approached the accused and his companions. G. we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. i. Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case. there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p. thus presumably dusk. on the part of petitioner." it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk. Valenzuela. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment ." as laid down in Terry. They walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer. In fact. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness. They did not see any bulging object in [ sic] his person. to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. "A") expressly declares otherwise. and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety." A genuine reason must exist. as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination: Third. was being committed or was going to be committed. Here. the affidavit of arrest (Exh. . or an overt physical act.. could not have been visible to Yu. where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries. Here. or that which may be used as evidence. 125754 DECEMBER 22. or the fruit of the crime. there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid: First.R. contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended. or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta. to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. 36Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS." Second. When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and . the arresting officer. Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk.. . ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN AND ROBERTO DELOS REYES. under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner. and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner. and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. any telltale bulge. We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. Karuhatan. approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause. What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution. petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared.m. saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony. and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime. for as he admitted. probable or otherwise. NO. the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. upon arrival of five (5) other police officers. thus: We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous. Brigida St. . he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner. they were not yet aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. Metro Manila. which underlies the recognition that a police officer may. there was at all no ground.e. there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu. Finally. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. .1999. this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner.

2. Second. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence). 6." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties. and. papers and effects. and. or a stop and frisk. (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are. was not inadvertently discovered. the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accusedappellants inside the room. First. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories.000. Exigent and emergency circumstances. a customs search. The trial court upon finding the version of the prosecution to be more plausible convicted both accused Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes of the crime charged and sentenced each of them not only to reclusion perpetua but also to pay a fine of P500. Stop and Frisk. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent. there was no valid intrusion. the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest. their arrest is illegal. Both accused appealed. or is about to commit an offense in his presence. this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously operates only against searches and seizures that are "unreasonable. First. Search of evidence in "plain view. They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes. Second. 12. accused-appellants had just committed. Consented warrantless search.. and prevents him from being irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.00. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. i. each one represented by a separate counsel. the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Highly regulated by the government. Perforce. a consented warrantless search. of RA 6425 otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. the evidence. Art. the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing. (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it. the marijuana seized from her could not be properly used as evidence against her correct.paraphernalia. 5.. and 7. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were thus charged with violation of Sec." Thus. Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be arrested has committed. Third. accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment. 4. they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest 32 | P a g e ." For sure. is actually committing. although separately. On the contrary. Customs search. or were about to commit a crime. the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. were committing.e. (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 3. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. Issue: Whether or not Zenaida Bolasa‘s assertions that the search in her residence was illegal as her arrest preceding it was illegal. Both however denied on the witness stand ownership over the confiscated tea bags and drug implements. As already discussed. it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances. arrests and seizures in the following instances are not deemed "unreasonable" and are thus allowed even in the absence of a warrant — 1. 8. Consequently. In like manner. Search of a moving vehicle. (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. Held: The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses. accused-appellants were illegally arrested. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants. Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana. II.

reproduced or retaped in video format. Inc. Judge Alfredo C. list of copyrighted MPAA member company titles (Exh. the MPAA. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz. as amended by Presidential Decree No. E). 5. their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law. which should be seized and brought to the Undersigned. FLORES G. video cassettes containing the film "The Ten Commandments" (Exhs. Upon the offer of these pieces of evidence.00 (p. C). ET AL. On May 5. equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale. that there is a probable cause to believe that Violation of Section 56 P. went to the office of FGT to have the copyrighted motion pictures "Cleopatra" owned by Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. affidavit of Rebecca Benitez-Cruz (Exh. 78631 JUNE 29. (p. You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day between 8:00 A. B-1-D). duly served Search Warrant No.. Domingo. 3842 (Exh. 1988 (otherwise known as the Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property) has been committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that FGT Video Network. flyers. 45 which reads: TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: GREETINGS: It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining under oath NBI Senior Agent Lauro C.D. D). or otherwise used in the reproduction/repating business of the defendants. 1987. Ongyanco. tape head cleaners. 3482 dated April 20. 30-31. with the assistance of the personnel of the Videogram Regulatory Board headed by Elmer San Pascual. ledgers. No. Inc. 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property). of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the aboveenumerated personal properties. lodged a complaint before then Director Antonio Carpio of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against certain video establishments for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1988.a. the MPAA sought the NBI's "urgent assistance in the conduct of search and seizure operations in Metro Manila and elsewhere". hence. Alfredo C. (c) Television sets. and affidavit of Danilo Manalang (Exh. on April 20. 37Facts: COLUMBIA PICTURES. accessories. B-2). Ronaldo Lim. special power of attorney designating Ms. Consequently.R. Manuel Mendoza. jon (sic) order slips. Danilo Manalang and Ms. and "The Ten Commandments" owned by Paramount Pictures. FGT's Order Slip No. 3923 dated May 5. issued Search Warrant No. Danilo Manalang. No. Reyes. on May 14. NO. For the reproduction services. VS. distribution. lease. invoices. 1987 (Exh.and seizure. Inc. 49 as amended by P. in connection with its anti-piracy campaign. WITNESS MY HAND this 14th day of May 1987. 1987.M. led by Lauro C. Manalang also had MGM's copyrighted film "Walk Like a Man" reproduced or retaped by FGT for P15. with Manalang and Rebecca Benitez-Cruz as witnesses. (pp. video cassette recorders. G). applied for a search warrant with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig. 1987. advertising leaflets. through counsel Rico V. F to F-8). San Juan. circulation or public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes which they are keeping and concealing in the premises above-described. sketch of location of FGT's office or premises (Exh. Greenhills. video cassette containing the film "Walk Like a Man" (Exh. In the course of the search of the premises of FGT. for which services Danilo Manalang paid P45. A) FGT's Order Slip No. B-3).) At or about high noon of the same day. delivery slips and books of accounts bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list). the accompanying search was likewise illegal. 45 on the operators or representatives of FGT. B).D. 118667 dated April 22. Flores of the aforesaid court. Also seized were 33 | P a g e . Rollo. Reyes and his witnesses Mr. B-1-B). or possession for purpose of sale. Rollo). Specifically complaining of the "unauthorized sale. The arrest being illegal ab initio. distribution. journals.) On the basis of said letter. FGT's Delivery Slip No. 123321 dated May 6. 1987. at Pasig. 4 Epifanio de los Santos corner Connecticut. and bring said properties to the undersigned immediately upon implementation to be dealt with as the law directs. a. 118667 (Exh. lists of titles being reproduced or retaped. 1993 In a letter dated April 20. NBI Agent III Lauro C. 1987. I NC. 1987 and Delivery Slip No. Emphasis supplied. allegedly an NBI agent. Introduced as evidence in support of the application were the following: the letter dated April 20. brochures. rental. NBI and private agents conducted discreet surveillance operations on certain video establishments. Thus. B-1-C). Susan Yang and Eduardo Yotoko are responsible and have in control/possession at No. agents from the NBI. B-1).00.M. reproduction and/or disposition of copyrighted film". 1987 of the MPAA through Rico V. rewinders. (FGT). 1987 (Exh. to 5:00 P. among them private respondent FGT Video Network. Domingo (Exh. FGT's Delivery Slip No.k. 29. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants. the NBI agents found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures or films owned and exclusively distributed by petitioners. Benitez-Cruz as petitioners' attorney-in. Reyes and Mamerto Espartero. FGT issued Order Slip No.. Metro Manila (per attached sketch and list of MPAA member Company Titles) the following properties to wit: (a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in the attached list. ALFREDO C. lease.fact (Exh. Metro Manila. Rollo. Eric Apolonio. B-1-A. (b) Posters. video cassette containing the film "Cleopatra" (Exh.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed. it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action. while not killed. because of the installation of said checkpoints. paraphernalia. Benjamin Parpon. Valenzuela. Bulacan. on several occasions. capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints. as real parties in interest. NO. or threatened to be infringed. Court of Appeals. maintaining peace and order. the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela. statements of order. video prints. at dawn of 9 July 1988. Metro Manila. production manager of FGT. flyers. Rollo). Issue: Whether or not Search Warrant No. AFP. return slips. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. television sets. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that. accessories.machines and equipment. the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters. Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides: Sec. Integrated National Police. it is constitutionally objectionable (Corro vs. 191 SCRA 429 [1990]). Held: The right to security against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Section 2. and. Sections 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites in the issuance of search warrants: Sec. economic and political development of the National Capital Region. Inventories of these seized articles were then prepared and copies thereof were furnished Jess Ayson. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Thus. the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary. he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 2. and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social. 32. 3. 38Facts: RICARDO C. production orders. with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas. for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. rewinders. 1987. The search warrant must contain a specific description of the place to be searched and the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity (Pendon vs. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that. without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order. in the course of their routine checks. Petitioners aver that. VALMONTE VS.R. What constitutes a 34 | P a g e . 45 is thus too all-embracing as to include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. Held: Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. Issue: Whether or not the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. 1989 On 20 January 1987. for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. As the search warrant is in the nature of a general one. tape head cleaners. 45 is valid. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. On May 18. 137 SCRA 541 [1985]). Lising. a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela. especially at night or at dawn. Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. the NBI agents filed a return of the search warrant with a motion to retain custody of the seized items (p. and posters. houses. materials. Requisites for issuing search warrant. had been harassed. In a case filed by the same petitioner organization. considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups. 83988 SEPTEMBER 29. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. instances have occurred where a citizen. was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta. RENATO DE VILLA G. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when.

Hence. Upon investigation. that the goods. or their agents. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities. respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. On November 10. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo. Sampaloc. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from opening the nine bales in question. is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa. AND MARTIN ALAGAO. In this connection. moral and exemplary damages in their favor. Ermita. or flashes a light therein. from opening the bales and examining the goods.reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question. Pampanga. Monica Grocery in San Fernando. Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order. Remedios Mago and Valentin B. L-27360 FEBRUARY 28. and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary 35 | P a g e . Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted. the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. these do not constitute unreasonable search. ex parte. at the very least. and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks. Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints. 1966. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government. would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks. Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs. in the interest of public security. even assuming them to have been misdeclared and. 39- HON. without more. or simply looks into a vehicle. the checkpoints during these abnormal times. 147-5501". the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds. acting upon a reliable information received to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects. as abnormal times. are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. at the cost of occasional inconvenience. conducted surveillance at gate No. discomfort and even irritation to the citizen. issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. when conducted within reasonable limits. the former should prevail. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. RICARDO G. JUAN PONCE EN RILE. Manila. determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. that Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined. most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider. VS. that the bales had not yet been opened. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. JARENCIO 39 G. the goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St. as well as a judgment for actual. that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized.e. although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods. without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure. not all of which are reported in media. in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. REMEDIOS MAGO AND HILARION U. alleging. that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs. PAPA. When the trucks left gate No. the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement. allegedly misdeclared and undervalued. so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units. undervalued. and that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. 1 of the customs zone. True.. Where. PEDRO PACIS. that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court. 1968 FACTS: Petitioner Martin Alagao.. that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport. NO." not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers. HON. Manila. for example. 1 elements of the counterintelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle. a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. having purchased them from the Sta.R. i. were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. among others. were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally. and the two trucks. But. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction.

arguendo. when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners. The record shows. subject to forfeiture under Section 2530. taxes and other charges upon the articles. 67496. a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed. And so. and alleging special and affirmative defenses. Under date of November 15. 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department. said respondent filed the corresponding bond. charges. and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. The goods in question were imported from Hongkong. denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations. from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control. (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs. that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods. therefore. by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General wherein it is stated that the estimated duties. The Court of First Instance of Manila. Even if it be granted. However. taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to P95. nevertheless. (1). and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1966. the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40. even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.The articles contained in the nine bales in question. as respondents contend. on November 24. 1967. 67496. was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs. And this Court has held that merchandise. acting under directions and orders of their Chief. their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction". or secured to be paid. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties. who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs. that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same. and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code.00. On March 7. Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. Papa. powers and jurisdiction. and to dispose of the same according to law. 1967. The goods in question. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties. that the duties. the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. fees. as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory. (4). 1966. pars. and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it. (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles. as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 1966.000. accruing under the tariff and customs laws. therefore. HELD: The Bureau of Customs has the duties. 1967. As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. fines and penalties. some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department. The payment of the duties. therefore. e and m. that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus. the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4. docketed as Civil Case No. taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. taxes. and 36 | P a g e . 1967 releasing the goods in question. to the exclusion of the regular courts. an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago. were. taxes. 1966. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12. Ricardo C. the importation of which is effected contrary to law. it cannot be said. therefore. (3). and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws. 1966. the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7. ISSUE: Whether or not. and on March 13. among others. shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared.injunction on November 16.772. and all other dues. when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4. for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws. presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. In the present case. including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. It is the settled rule. Furthermore. could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs. fees and other charges must be in full. at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. is subject to forfeiture. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed.

40- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES JANUARY 18. Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers. Corolarilly. in the presence of the NBI agents. 1967 releasing said goods. Thus. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as 37 | P a g e . was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. HELD: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. as amended. is involved. Switzerland. Ermita. NO. Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods. The appellant and his common-law wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex. Article IV in relation to Section 4. and without the intervention of police authorities. Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. ISSUE: The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched and seized objects contained in the four parcels. a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. "WALTER FIERZ. Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts. In sum. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. However. assuring her that the packages simply contained books. refused. 8052 Zurich. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office. Appellant. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office. Switzerland. thus making the box ready for shipment. 81561 FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court. Manila. opened the top flaps. removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. not the law enforcers. When he opened appellant's box. Mattacketr II. cigars. the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich. Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i). Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. 1987. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. writing therein his name. the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. spouses Reyes following standard operating procedure. namely. the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. On August 27. the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape. it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. opened the boxes for final inspection. Opening one of the bundles. as in the case at bar. and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves.so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Article 1 of Republic Act 6425. 1991 VS. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars. ANDRE MARTI G. Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b). passport number. Thereupon. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents. His curiousity aroused. however. appellant.R. In view of appellant's representation. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual.

Genaro Alipio. would place the accused in double jeopardy. Its revival would place them in double jeopardy. he should ask. moved for the dismissal of the case and. They pointed out that they did not consent to the provisional dismissal of the case. the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. The court noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that the complainant was really sick. Hence. the case could be revived without the filing of a new information (Lauchengco vs. 1979." This is complemented by Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: SEC. Issue: Whether the revival of a grave coercion case. Alejandro. On the ground of invoking (sic) the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial of the case particularly accused Alberto Alba and Generoso Esmeña. and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge. or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant. 1979. The accused did not oppose the motion. L-54110 Petitioners Generoso Esmeña and Alberto Alba and their co-accused. 1979. January 31. 134. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is 38 | P a g e . In order that legal jeopardy may exist. p. Gandicela vs. 1980 Ed. considering their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. therefore. JUDGE JULIAN B. 66 Phil. 299). If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial. upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. not for the dismissal. the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. or on September 12. He attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16. which was provisionally dismissed after the accused had been arraigned because of complainant's failure to appear at the trial. 1981 G.. after invoking their right to a speedy trial. there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. —When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. by a court of competent jurisdiction. De la Costa. Respondent judge granted it in his order of October 8. 240). Even if the petitioners. 9. consented to it. 1979. therefore. Hence. the provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal which placed them in jeopardy. Iloilo City to withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a game of cards. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. the acquittal or conviction of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. Twenty-seven days later. On October 24. Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira were charged with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro Cathedral. the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case. Held: The rule on double jeopardy (non bis in Idem or not twice for the same) is found in section 22. 41Facts: GENEROSO ESMEÑA VS.an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution. Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with his witness. 88 SCRA 175). 88 Phil. Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court. 1979. The fiscal cited the ruling that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks the impress of finality and. but for the trial of the case. L-49034. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. When these three conditions are present. POGOY FEBRUARY 20. NO. Lutero. Article IV Bill of Rights) of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.R.

is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members. the right to security of tenure is not absolute. without such representation. and efficiency. The assistance of lawyers. and another receipt for P660. 1997 Arsenio P. the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. 299. In this case. 52 dated May 12. In the early case of Cornejo v. integrity. APOLONIO G. not solely by verbal presentation but also. Diaz. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform — Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. consequently. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office. NO. Nonetheless. One may be heard. the Court said: . making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday. the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. 94 Phil.. as follows: Sec. This jurisprudential pronouncement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI. this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. questioning such order. loyalty. he shall not be bound by such proceedings. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and. With the use of falsified receipts. integrity. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people. Public office is a public trust. his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus. LUMIQUED. The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. In administrative proceedings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. From May to September 1989. In Nera v. loyalty and efficiency. 714-717). however. G. 1980 Ed. citing Gandicela vs. Auditor General. 39 | P a g e . EXEVEA. public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense.R. Section 1. 307 and People vs. liberty and property. it has been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept. such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court. Lutero. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19. p.00 for gasoline bought from the shop. fails to prove the defendant's guilt.00 for a single vulcanizing job.46. and lead modest lives. Of equal weight is the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility. he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law. 1993. When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. VS. Issue: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? Held: The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public trust or agency. through pleadings. The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense 42Facts: ARSENIO P. on accountability of public officers. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. . 117565 NOVE MBER 18. ET AL.172. Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44. and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments. act with patriotism and justice. . 1. the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case. while desirable. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course. Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee. hence. Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. ET AL. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that. 1989. for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life. charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official documents. 1994. Moreover. serve them with utmost responsibility. 88 Phil. the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. 202. The first affidavitcomplaint dated November 16.

Article IV of the New Constitution granted.000. who has not been informed of his right to silence and to counsel. for the first time. Thereafter. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. means that any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence.R. the case against Celdran was dismissed. L-37201-02 MARCH 3. it would be worthless because of the undeniable fact that the appellant was not only arrested without a warrant and entry into his house was effected without a search warrant. The inadmissibility of the alleged verbal confession of the appellant is raised on the ground that he was maltreated as a result of which he suffered twenty-seven injuries in the form of contusions. to a person under investigation for the commission of an offense. lacerations and abrasions. but worse. is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17. and to be informed of such right. MIGUEL M. and specifically. such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused.00. or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. No.R. Held: 1. or that the trial court considered the same at all in the resolution of the case. No force. The fatal weapon. 1975 Petitioner assailed the orders of the respondent Judges in G. a shotgun. As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question. violence. The police investigators responsible for this manhandling should be investigated and held to account. a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense. JOHN GABRIEL GAMBOA G. that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. MANGUERA G. 1973. with costs against him. 2. which reads: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 1991 John Gabriel Gamboa was charged with the crime of murder together with Miguel Celdran in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. 91374 FEBRUARY 25. Article IV of the New Constitution.R. since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel. L-37201-02 declaring admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions. This right is afforded to any 40 | P a g e . Such involuntary confession cannot help the case of the prosecution. 1989. even if presented after January 17. Issue: The defendant-appellant interposed the appeal from said judgment alleging that the trial court committed inter alia the following errors: 1. It is a stain in the record of the law enforcement agents who handled the case. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.43Facts: CLEMENTE MAGTOTO VS. the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which. in effect. was ordered forfeited in favor of the government. 44Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. under the sixth assigned error. NO. If it were to be considered at all. because they were given before the effectivity of the New Constitution. 1973. he was maltreated since his arrest so much so that he suffered multiple injuries. After arraignment but during the trial. can and should be given effect only when the right already existed and had been violated. that the prosecution proposed to rely on this alleged confession of the appellant. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAD CONFESSED TO OR ADMITTED THE KILLING. if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution. Section 20. NOS. Held: This specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Conversely. a decision was rendered on August 30. Consequently. the portion thereof which declares inadmissible a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense who has not been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. threat. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THE PARAFFIN TEST RESULTS AS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. Issue: The present cases involve an interpretation of Section 20. 2. finding Gamboa guilty of the crime of murder as penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. however. intimidation. It does not appear. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P30.

and that Atty. in Barangay Namunga.R.38 revolver and . Atty. the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun. While he was giving his statement at the fical's office. knowing.R. Issue: Whether or not the accused has been informed of his rights. and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing the investigation. The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain. and in language the subject fairly understands. if it was made without the assistance off counsel. to assist him. and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed. NO. Baguio City. one Julianito Luna y Tagle known to them to be an elected Barangay 41 | P a g e Facts: . and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." It is not enough for the investigator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20.person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. a group of men arrived at the residence of Julianito Luna y Tagle. must be made with the assistance of counsel. he. Branch 3.45 caliber pistol. 110290 JANUARY 25. nevertheless. such waiver. Province of Batangas. Philippines. 45Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. the former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. Frederick Lazaro and Eduardo Patrocinio. e. ERNESTO BASE G. Consequently. Held: The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth. and intelligent. Rosario. the armed men stayed with him and their presence deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being threatened. and without justifiable cause. 109773 MARCH 30. 46- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS.. One of the two men who introduced themselves as policemen allegedly looking for a certain Hernandez suddenly shot Julianito in the head with a . armed with a caliber . and Danny Ancheta. G. they sped away in an owner-type jeep. The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary. asked for his uncle who is a lawyer. 4647-R and 4648-R. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer. it is not enough that the subject is informed of such right. Again. together with Conrado Guno. the above named accused. it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. the dialect he understands. acting in common accord and mutually helping one another. what the person under investigation may or may not do. Batangas. Accused-appellant Elberto Base was among those identified on board the jeep and. If he decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and. Dominic Bayquen. unlawfully and feloniously attack. The crimes were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 in Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of Dr.45 caliber pistol. the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education. 1990. were indicted for Murder with Direct Assault Upon a Person in Authority in a Second Amended Information 1 alleging that — That on or about the 8th day of February 1990. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. therefore. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained. Oliver Tabin. this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution. to be valid and effective. and with attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos. That counsel must be a lawyer. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano. did then and there wilfully. chooses to waive his right to counsel. Municipality of Rosario. the accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. intelligence. 2000 In the early morning of February 8. 1995 In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he can ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning.45 caliber pistol and immediately after. with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. Indeed. Reynaldo Cajucom. UV-CFU-178. Article III of the present Constitution. with treachery and evident premeditation and by means of a motor vehicle which is a top down owner type jeep colored green with Plate No. suddenly and without warning. assault and shoot with the said . NO. ET AL. JAIME AGUS TIN. In further ensuring the right to counsel. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12. Atty. 4650R and 4651-R. Barangay Captain of Namunga. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the wounding of Anthony Bayquen. conspiring and confederating together. 4649-R.g.

he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love they once shared. 36 Verily. was waiting. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.R. rather. the word "preferably" under Section 12 [1]. 31 The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion. during the martial law period. They took the boat for Batangas. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but. NO. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter. EDWARD ENDINO& GERRY GALGARIN G. If the rule were otherwise. where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother. While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators. physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. 37 The counsel. On 18 October 1991. the trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension. 1 x 1 cm. Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. they left for Roxas. with him heading for 42 | P a g e . inwards. Antipolo. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. 33 It must be remembered in this regard that while the right to counsel is immutable. or in connection therewith. they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. with exit at right occipital region and with avulsion of brain. the option to secure the services of counsel de parte is not absolute. entry with contusion collar. 12. however. 2001 YIELDING to man's brutish instinct for revenge. upwards and backwards. Issue: Whether or not the Sworn Statement dated February 8. and proceeded to Manila where they separated. According to Galgarin. 34 Indeed — The phrase "competent and independent" and "preferably of his own choice" were explicit details which were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases where. where they stayed for a few days. 2 cm. as both accused remained at large. with the aid of Gerry Galgarin alias Toto. the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede. 133026 FEBRUARY 20.Captain (Punong Barangay) of the said Municipality while in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion thereof. the lawyers made available to the detainee would be one appointed by the military and therefore beholden to the military. left temporal region. the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. above the left ear. On their way to the airport. should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 47Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES . Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. firstly his right to counsel of his own choice. nay. Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. which directly caused his death. Niño. thereby inflicting upon the latter [a] gun shot wound. VS. On 19 November 1992. to bean effective counsel "[a] lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. 32 However. Article III covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody. 1990 was executed in violation of the accused constitutional rights. then. after attacking Aquino. the rule is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue..35 xxx xxx xxx Withal. obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another. it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Edward Endino. Early in the evening of the following day. However. Palawan. Facts: The mantle of protection afforded by the constitutional provision of Sec. is not available to protect his interest. complete fracture of skull.

Issue: Whether or not the videotaped confession which the accused made over TV Patrol was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec. Contrary to law. Held: Such admission proper. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized.12.nêt We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. However. the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw.) After trial. did.R. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. L OVERIA G. Philippines. in all likelihood. that on the occasion of said robbery. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly. DAVID S. (Rollo. would have been symphatetic with him. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. unlawfully and feloniously attack. Besides. There is no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his will. We agree. violence and intimidation. Richard Bales y Andres of his Seiko Wrist Watch worth P300. freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino. NXG-150-Pil. the trial court found the appellant guilty as charged. H). with intent of gain and by means of force. the appellant entered a plea of not guilty (Record. Art. conspiring and confederating together with three (3) John Does whose true name. 43 | P a g e . there is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein. that is. hold-up a passenger jeepney with Plate No. III. 3). Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. 1987 reads: From this judgment of conviction. Loveria was charged before the Regional Trial Court. armed with a knife. Branch CLIX (159) with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide under the following information: That on or about the 21st day of February. identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another. Hence. in the Municipality of Marikina. accused. he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who. if he had indeed been forced into confessing. and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). 1985. For in all probability. on the vital parts of his body. 1990 The accused-appellant David S.Antipolo.1âwphi1. Indeed. assault and stab with the said knife one Ricardo Yamson y Malanon. due to the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion which prevented his death. As the trial court stated in its Decision Furthermore. may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Metro Manila. 18. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. p. particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases. 48Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. then and there willfully.00. then and there willfully. '84. and one Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion the driver of the said passenger jeepney. because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt. 79138 JULY 2. the above-named accused. did. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount of P350. but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause independent of the will of the accused. thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. the police. of the Constitution. with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners. unlawfully and feloniously. said accused. in his TV interview (Exh. thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which directly caused his death. Upon being arraigned on July 3. the appellant filed the present appeal. The dispositive portion of the decision dated May 26.00 and a colored brown wallet containing P50.00. with intent to kill. one of the passengers. thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which ordinarily would have caused his death. A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. p. NO. 1985. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.

1981. the accused was arrested for vagrancy and taken to the police station. No force. pp. Restituto Viernes. would not be affected. Antipolo. claiming violation of his constitutional right to counsel.R. taken together with the other evidence on record. 20. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. upon learning that certain hold-up men were being detained at the 225th PC Company. 20. The court must emphasize that the so-called Miranda rights contained in the abovequoted constitutional provisions may be invoked by a person only while he is under custodial investigation [People v. which ruled that the right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation cannot be invoked until such time that the police investigators start questioning. While on trial. No. 1988. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in the evidence. 49- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES G. G. would be excluded for being inadmissible in evidence.1995. Ayun. On July 7. 1980. appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. p.R. and to be informed of such right. when appellant came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt. 9 citing Miranda v. Rizal. "B"]. 162 SCRA 642]. 122485 FEBR UARY 1. 1989] because he is no longer under custodial investigation. 12(1).R. the appellant was not investigated when Manzanero was in the process of identifying him. 13-21). the accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court. No. G. he cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because at that stage. December 8. Facts: Appellant was arrested in Barangay Obario Matala. threat. 52016. Hence. 104 SCRA 379]. "B" [TSN. he was not entitled to the constitutional guarantee invoked. 436]. The testimony of Manzanero made in open court positively identifying the appellant.] Since. Thus. Pat. 12(1). III of the 1987 Constitution provides similar guarantees by stating: Sec. during the line-up. Thereafter. Bill Ayun accompanied Manzanero back to the PC headquarters in Antipolo where Manzanero identified to Pat. G. would be sufficient to sustain the trial court's judgment of conviction. Caguioa. 56291. Ayun then took the sworn statement of Manzanero which was presented in court as Exh. Art. Art. Antipolo. as in the Gamboa case. Batangas. among others. 384 U. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPA RADO. 95 SCRA 2. Duero. These testimonies. July 7. Pat. Held: Sec. The ruling enunciated in Gamboa v. the accused filed a motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence on the ground. January 17. the Court concluded that the latter could not. 85215. Arizona. NO. June 27. Ayun the appellant as one of the persons involved in the incident. Rizal in connection with another robbery. 1995. he must be provided with one. 1999 VS. which was in force at the time the events under review occurred reads: Sec.Issue: The appellant assails the manner in which he was identified by Manzanero at the headquarters of the 225th Philippine Constabulary (PC) in Cogeo. he reported the matter to the Marikina police [See Exh. 44 | P a g e . Also. May 13. Ibaan. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN.R. No. 3. Cruz. for instance. or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. these constitutional rights may no longer be claimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court [People v. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Cogeo.R. concerning the right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation finds application in the instant case.S. that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel at the time the complainant was in the process of accusing or identifying him for allegedly committing a crime. Having identified the appellant among the detainees. In the case at bar. August 14. went there to check. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. intimidation. violence. with the assistance of Atty. In that case. as well as those of Richard Bales and Betty Apolinario. [G. it was the complainant who was being investigated and who gave a statement to the police while the accused was not questioned at all. L-38975. But even assuming that the process of identification of the appellant by Manzanero at the PC headquarters was attended by constitutional infirmities. 1986. which has been defined as the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" [People v. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. No person shall be compelled to be witness against himself. No. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. interrogating or exacting a confession from the person under investigation. The Court held that in the police line-up conducted in that particular case. "B") where he identified appellant and which was taken by Pat. only Manzanero's sworn statement (Exh. Sec. Ayson. Manzanero. IV of the 1973 Constitution. The motion having been denied by the trial court. The following day he was placed on a line-up and a female complainant pointed to him as one of the persons who robbed her. invoke his right to counsel because he was not under custodial interrogation.

Issue: Whether or not the accused claims that his extra-judicial confession was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel is tenable. Held: This contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting lawyer: Q — Will you please inform the Court what was that call about? A — We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were told by Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime of, I think, rape with homicide. Q — And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the other person present? A — Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside the investigation room and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped. Q — And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the accused already there? A — The accused was already there. Q — Was he alone? A — He was alone, sir. Q — So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP Officers, what did they tell you, if any? A — They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime charged, sir. Q — By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta? A — Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorney's Office. Q — Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the accused? A — No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone. Q — But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay? A — Yes, sir. Q — Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period start? A — If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir. Q — And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing that you did as assisting lawyer to the accused? A — First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution. Q — What are those right? A — That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his own choice and that if he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and that he has the right to refuse to answer any question that would incriminate him. Q — Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay, do you recall whether this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in writing? A — Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer Alabastro. Q — I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing, will you be able to recognize the same? A — Yes, sir. Q — Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same document you mentioned? A — Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing. ATTY. PRINCIPE: May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A. proper. Q — Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused whether you asked him to sign to acknowledge or to conform? A — I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro. Q — But you were present? A — I was then present when he signed. Q — There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before and after there are two (2) signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) signatures? A — These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir. Q — The signature of whom? A — The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir. ATTY. PRINCIPE:
45 | P a g e

May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my compañero be encircled and marked as Exhibit A-1 and A-2. Q — After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right explaining to him in Filipino, in local dialect, what was the respond of the accused? A — Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement. Q — What was the reply? A — He said "Opo". Q — Did you ask him of his educational attainment? A — It was the Police Officer who asked him. Q — In your presence? A — In my presence, sir. Q — And when he said or when he replied "Opo" so the question started? A — Yes, sir. Q — I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present also when he signed this waiver? A — Yes, sir, I was also present. Q — Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver? A — I had also explained to him, sir. Q — In Filipino? A — In Tagalog, sir. Q — And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten name Larry Mahinay, "Nagsasalaysay", whose signature is that? A — This is also signed in my presence. Q — Why are you sure that this is his signature? A — He signed in my presence, sir. Q — And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry Mahinay subscribed and sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize this signature? A — This is my signature, sir. Q — And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have personally examined the accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary executed the Extra Judicial Confession, do you recognize the signature? A — This is also my signature, sir. (emphasis supplied). Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments: 1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person; 2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that anystatement he makes may be used as evidence against him; 3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice; 4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf; 5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made; 6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished; 7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
46 | P a g e

8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak; 9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun; 10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements; 11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

50Facts:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT G.R. NO. 109775 NOVE MBER 14, 1996 Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, was meted by the trial court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store (TSN, June 19, 199 ( sic), p. 14). Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Rondon was to purchase chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon came from his house, approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from Malaki's store ( Ibid., p. 24). Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life" (hovering between life and death) (Ibid.). Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit (or "Manolo") rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp ("petromax") inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit (Ibid., p. 22). Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met Rondon (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket (Ibid., pp. 16-17).

Issue: Whether or not the admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet together with its contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; (2) his identification card; and (3) bunch of keys, violates his right against self-incrimination, and because during the custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights. Held: The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . " It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said: If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial

compulsion

47 | P a g e

appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Held: The Philippine law on custodial investigation has evolved to provide for more stringent standards than what was originally laid out in Miranda v. is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco. However. On January 21. The identification card. Barangay Talisay. 51Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. 2004 On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo. he must be provided with one. The main focus is the suspect. Municipality of Santa Fe. The purpose of the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as the process shifts from the investigatory to the accusatory seems to be to accord even the lowliest and most despicable criminal suspects a measure of dignity and respect. it appears that the appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound for Cadiz City. 48 | P a g e . under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Appellant was assisted by Atty. 1997. viz: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. moved by lewd design and by means of force. are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. attack. finding appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Branch 61. residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. 1999. shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. 7 Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Cornelio T. Fe-Bantayan. Concededly. did then and there willfully. identification card. at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening. Nevertheless. provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules. against her will and consent. On an investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos. His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo Landao. on the other hand. DINDO MOJELLO G." Trial followed. and the underlying mission of custodial investigation – to elicit a confession. treacherously and employing personal violence. the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. he admitted that he was the perpetrator of the dastardly deed. (2) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. (Emphasis ours. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. NO. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. Furthermore. unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years of age and with mental deficiency. as follows:2 That on the 15th day of December 1996. Section 12. 17 hereof. the above-named accused.R. 7659. as amended by Republic Act No. Issues: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is inadmissible in evidence. alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in an Information dated May 22. the same will not detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged. the contents of the document were read to appellant who later on voluntarily signed it. the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of evidence pursuant to the provision of the Constitution under Article III. Arizona. 145566 MARCH 9. Batobalanos testified that after it was executed.) These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. entering a plea of "not guilty. and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death. Thus. Appellant was arraigned on July 24. violence and intimidation. and by reason and/or on the occasion thereof. these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet. Cebu. at Sitio Kota. Province of Cebu. thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on the different parts of her body which caused her death. The admissibility of other evidence. residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet. infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible. unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill. From the facts found by the court a quo. did then and there willfully. 1997. the above-named accused. purposely to conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance of his criminal design.1 Appellant Dindo Mojello.

and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as far as he was concerned. the three accused reiterated the same confessions before the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. 52- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep.The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23. notably Cebuano. thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession. Sec. 33 Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption.20 Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. the court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the three accused on the one hand. 21 Atty. Moreover. applying Art. In their confessions of September 18. III. 1975. 1975. NO. 12. 1987 Facts: While in custody. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session. Adaro daughter of Olvis. 2. 71092 SEPTEMBER 30. It observed. voluntarily and intelligently entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under Art. The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely. 1975. prior to conducting his investigation. He further claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect. Diolinda O. In their confessions of September 9. and September 25.18 The court a quo observed that the confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights. sworn before agents of the National Bureau of Investigation. par. Giduquio represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case. the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence. Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the questions he understood freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer.00 each. On September 18. 1975 in the local Philippine Constabulary headquarters. Fe to assist appellant. with the latter categorically stating that before the investigation was conducted and appellant's statement taken. Giduquio as his counsel. 7438. The second were made before the Polanco police. Atty. It dismissed insinuations that his children had a score to settle with the victim. the trial court rejected the three accused's earlier confessions pointing to him as the mastermind. appellant manifested for the record that Atty. Act No. they executed two confessions more. 7438. yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse. par. the three executed five separate written confessions each. September 21. explained to appellant his constitutional rights in the Visayan dialect. In acquitting Olvis. compulsion or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. Atty. No evidence was presented to negate his competence and independence in representing appellant during the custodial investigation. III. while the three were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder. 1975 by Mrs. Based on these subsequent statements. the case in fact having reached the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform.19 As further proof of the same. and upon complaint by her of harassment against her father by his supposed political enemies. OLVIS G. Sec. that he was not questioned by the police after the killing. 1975.R. he was requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. and Anacleto Olvis on the other. As earlier stated Olvis was acquitted. 12. who allegedly promised them a reward of P3. The first confessions were taken on September 9. again before the Philippine Constabulary and the police of Polanco. SPO2 Wilfredo Abello Giducos. Sec. who had earlier brought a physical injuries suit against the former. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the contemplation of the Constitution. obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who. Atty. On cross-examination. ANACLETO Q. The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress. however. Act No. The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. notwithstanding efforts by the three herein accused-appellants to implicate him. We note that the three were transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office following a request on September 10. he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. 1975. is not available to protect his interest. 1996. yet he neither filed any case against the person who threatened him. 1975. Sec. furthermore. In other words. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings. that case having been dismissed. It 49 | P a g e .The court repudiated claims that Olvis had motives to do away with the deceased arising from alleged attempts on his (Olvis') part to eject the deceased from his landholding (the deceased having been a tenant of his). the said accused again pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as principal by inducement. On September 21. 1975. nay. The appellant was undoubtedly apprised of his Miranda rights under the Constitution. nor he report this to his counsel. 1975 and September 25. September 14. otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede. they categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the knowing. 2 complies with the strict constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. for one reason or another.000.

Navarro was summoned by the NBI. parenthetically. Department of Justice. Forced re-enactments. technically. there can be no questioning. the three accused-appellants' extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence. that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. for which he acted in selfdefense. the Charter prevailing at the time of the proceedings below. and 21. whether testimonial or passive." With reset to the confessions of September 18. may waive effectuation of indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking. that he had a "clean bill of health" in connection with the murder case. Decierdo. The 1973 Constitution. the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of competing a person. In their supposed statements dated September 9. it is clear therefrom that Atty. we are left with the murder cases against the three accusedappellants. 1975. Prior to any questioning. We refer to the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their apprehension.11 In that decision. Likewise. the accused does not speak his guilt.relied." This was the lesson learned from the ancient days of the inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt. for the same reason. the lack of counsel "makes [those] statement[s].incrimination. 1987 that we promulgated People v. the police may not question him The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has converted with an attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned. With the acquittal of Olvis. But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. applies with like force here: No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested. or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth or making her submit to a pregnancy test or a footprinting test.' even if it were otherwise voluntary. absolving Olvis of any liability. NARVARO VELAR NAVARRO of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office. or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases. either retained or appointed. The accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in open court alleging threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if they refused to "cooperate" in the solution of the case. on the retraction of the accused themselves. The acused Romulo Villarojo averred. overall. 197 5. As we said in Decierdo. It was satisfied. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his body. It was on May 7. an act. the confessions of September 25. but twice. The confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity. Here. but this has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature" acquired under circumstances of duress. The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once. NAVARRO to handle your case. in a criminal or any other case. Dipolog District Office. Held: Based on the recorded evidence. finally. 1975. Issue: whether or not these statements can stand up in court. the same nonetheless call for a similar rejection. he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his will. that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him. This should be distinguished. the appellant Romulo Villarojo who admitted therein having been the bolo-wielder)." In each case. On the contrary. They likewise alleged that they were instructed by the Polanco police investigators to implicate Anacieto Olvis in the case. the accused-appellants were not assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. We cast aside. specifically. from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion. the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice (specifically. are you wining to accept the legal assistance of Atty. Essentially. The police of Polanco had but the three accused-appellants' statements to support its claiming.. He cannot therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused-appellants when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self. while it is stated therein that this Office had just requested the services of Atty. and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney. we laid down the rule with respect to extrajudicial confessions: . 14. What we said in People v. by any person on his behalf. the accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics. There is nothing there that would show that Atty. They insisted on their innocence. in contemplation of law. if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated. Galit. says: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. that it was the deceased who had sought to kill him. to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. 'involuntary. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with the guiding hand of counsel. The defendant. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the dead 16 trainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.. by and large. Thus. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession. 50 | P a g e .

R. Metro Manila. the accused. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. For if the authorities truly had a case in their hands. Philippines. took. It is under such circumstances that the Constitution holds a strict application. After said accused entered a plea of not guilty. the three accused-appellants had languished in jail for one year and two months before the information was filed. 10476 That on or about the 8th day of April. 1975. by slashing the screen wall of his house and entered through the same. It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody when they took part in the re-enactment in question. robbed and carried away a Hitachi Casette tape recorder of undetermined value. we cannot accept the trial judge's finding that he acted "with unexpected spontaneity" when he allegedly "spilled the beans before the law enforcers on September 9. Re: Criminal Case No. RONILO PINLAC y LIBAO in order to insure the commission of the said Robbery. 1984. then and there wilfully. had to be made to suffer preventive imprisonment for quite an enormous length of time. did. is the extra-judicial confession of the accused. In such a case. 51 | P a g e . it may be the product of unintentional statements. an opening not intended for entrance or egress. under the circumstances. did. with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon things. 53- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. As for the accused Dominador Sorela. the cases proceeded to trial. 300. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. as follows: Re: Criminal Case No. We indeed doubt whether Sorela's admissions. What is to be borne in mind is that Sorela was himself under custody. did. we hold that all evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of the Constitution and hence. we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. in the Municipality of Makati. Indeed. torture. or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. belonging to the said SAEKI OSAMU. several times with a kitchen knife he was then provided with. Gold necklace with pendant of undetermined value. Metro Manila. to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof. RONILO PINLAC y LIBAO.00. robbed and carried away the following articles. Any statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to the Constitutional guaranty. incompetent evidence. Pressure which operates to overbear his will disable him from making a free and rational choice. unlawfully and feloniously attack. 74123-24 SEPTEMBER 26. Issue: Whether or not the conviction was proper under the circumstances that the accused (now petitioner) contends that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his extra-judicial confession. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.00. by detaching the four (4) pieces of window jalousies and destroying the aluminum screens of the servant's quarters and entered through the same. That on the occasion of the said Robbery. which was allegedly obtained thru force. NOS. thereby causing several mortal wounds on the person of the said SAEKI OSAMU. were truly his voluntary statements Chavez v. By custodial interrogation. took. in the amount of undetermined value. assault and stab one SAEKI OSAMU. 10477 That on or about the 8th day of April. he should have been provided with counsel. with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon things. we are puzzled why they. in the Municipality of Makati. the above named accused. the above named accused. and once inside.00 and a necklace of undetermined value. the above named accused RONILO PINLAC y LIBAO. Alba (Seiko) wrist watch. the trial court rendered its now assailed decision finding the accused guilty as charged. without having been apprised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel. in the aforesaid total amount of P480. to the damage and prejudice of the owner KOJI SATO. Court of Appeals tells us: Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence. which is now being assailed as violative of the Constitution. which directly caused his death. 1986. unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of KOJI SATO. and only after they had gone to court on an application for habeas corpus. to wit: Cash amount and/or cash money P180. The only evidence presented by the prosecution which could have been fatal. violence and intimidation. unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of SAEKI OSAMU. an opening not intended for entrance or egress and once inside.Accordingly. then and there willfully. then and there willfully. Philippines. RONILO L. PINLAC G. 1988 Facts: Accused Ronilo Pinlac y Libao was charged in two (2) separate information. On March 18. 1984. with deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable cause.

L-46960-62 JANUARY 8. the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. Solomon Totoy. Ponce Enrile. 21 years old. the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence. Every one of the remaining defendants was provided with counsel de oficio An 52 | P a g e . the youngest only five years old. so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. four bottles of oil and two human ears. stabbed once to death. five hunting knives with scabbards. (See People vs. We find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with these constitutional rights. on motion of the prosecution and over the objection of the other defendmurdants. 5 years old. TEOD ORO VILLARIN. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down. After investigation. Nicandro. to wit: Teodoro Villarin. Nicandro supra) Going to the instant case. 121 SCRA 538. VS. WILFREDO ROJAS. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. DEFENDANTS G. whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence. 95 SCRA 2). or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. an undershirt with Latin words arranged in a mystic design. 1987 On that tragic morning of May 23. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer. ears severed. (People vs. Later. (pp. supra. L-51770. also of Zamboanga del Sur. 139 SCRA) When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel. and Mona Carluman. Saturnino Totoy. Furthermore. it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest. The day following the massacre. this Court reiterated the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation. therefore. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled. in People vs. which cited the case of Morales vs.R. one . promulgated on March 20. a pair of trousers. The Fiscal has the duty to adduce evidence that there was compliance with the duties of an interrogating officer.38 caliber homemade pistol with two live bullets. 1973. all suspected of the killings. Sinfroso Masong. when three girls were slain. Short of this. the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain. ears severed. Canda Carluman. and turned over to the Margosatubig police. Therein. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested. that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession. In other words. stabbed twice to death. for the reason that the prosecution failed to show that those rights were explained to him. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. Thus. Gregorio Tundag. under the most mystifying and shocking circumstances. all the suspects were charged with the murder of the above-named victims in three separate informations to which they all pleaded not guilty. a joint PC-police posse arrested seven persons in Barrio Talanusa. Mohamod Esmael and Balbino Estrera. As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel.Held: In the case of People vs. 122 SCRA 312. NOS.R. by any person on his behalf. People vs. as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. (People vs. GREGO RIO TUNDAG AND SINFROSO MASONG. and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Wilfredo Rojas. SOLOMON TOTOY. or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Caguioa. As a rule. The record of the case is also replete with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution. a relative. Consider the carnage and the girls who fell before the bloodied knife: Zenaida Nastae. Absent such affirmative showing. hemorrhaging to death. Found in their possession and confiscated were two home-made shotguns. stabbed once. 141 SCRA 289). it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. 19-20. he must also explain their effects in practical terms. Ramos. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. was arrested later in Malangas. These were Nature's creatures still on the threshold of their lives. We said — At the time a person is arrested. such that it could not be said that "the apprisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood" by the accused. Ramos. 1985. although he had been apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. prodded perhaps by a sense not only of duty but also of outrage. the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the accused during custodial investigation was inadmissible. and yet they were cut down in the innocence of their youth without mercy and without reason. No. 7 years old. 54Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES. G. their alleged leader. Galit. Esmael and Estrera were discharged so they could be used as state witnesses. there is a denial of the right.

Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. 1975. G.000. unlawfully and feloniously. NO. was meted out the lesser penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years. 1989. The prosecution presented three witnesses. and neither was he offered the services of counsel de oficio. who. which was inadequate to begin with. of course.00 Philippine Currency. and the nature of the investigation.R. with intent to kill. JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA. thereby inflicting upon the said victims mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their death thereafter. would have needed the assistance of counsel under the ruling announced in People v. trial ensued. assaulted and used personal violence upon the person of NENA BERJUEGA and REMEDIOS HITTA. Ines of the Western Police District investigated the robbery with homicide. the waiver. It is therefore covered by Magtoto v. attacked.00. accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. In fine. That statement is.000.000. III. Galit. Issue: Solomon Totoy challenges his supposed confession on the ground that it was taken in violation of the Bill of Rights. rob and carry away the amount of P4. the said accused willfully. what we see here is a superficial observance of the requirements of the Bill of Rights through a mere recitation by rote of the sacramental advise. His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag has been at large. Dr. of the 1973 Constitution. force nor reward the affiant declared as follows: xxx xxx xxx This surely does not suggest compliance with the constitutional mandate. Pat. convicting all of them and sentencing them to death. The rights which Totoy was entitled to know were not specifically communicated to him. to wit: the said accused take. eight months and one day of reclusion temporal . in the City of Manila. 1973. and under the state of Martial Law. he could not have waived it. Section 20. and in any case.extended trial followed and decision was finally rendered on January 27. Held: Art. He was not told he did not have to answer if he did not feel like answering. All the accused were also held solidarily liable for the civil indemnity of P12. not admissible against him. Being informed of his "rights under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" did not mean he was informed particularly of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during his custodial investigation. whereupon. to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P4. Benjamin Ines. namely. identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another. there merely appears in the opening paragraph of the said confession the vague statement that: The affiant has been informed of his rights under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The said provision categorically states that "any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right. whose true name.00 cash belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his will. intimidation. because of the mitigating circumstance of minority. Philippines. When arraigned. 122142 MAY 17. and Atty. to be valid. He was not told he had a right to be assisted by counsel. the said accused conspiring and confederating with one. and without violence. There was no sincere effort or desire to apply the guarantees of Section 20 that could have protected the suspect from the rash and uncounseled statements he subsequently made. 55Facts: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. Marcial G. Cenido. by stabbing them to death. to be paid to the heirs of each of the three victims. knowing no better. that on the occasion thereof and by reason of the aforesaid robbery. Manguera and other subsequent cases holding that this section should be given only prospective operation from January 17. which is still the prevailing doctrine notwithstanding the reservations of some members of this Court. Pat. Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession which forms the basis of the accused conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is valid. Bienvenido De los Reyes. The lone exception was Saturnino Totoy. This statement was obtained from him on May 28." The record does not show that this requirement was observed. §12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. when the Constitution was ratified. 1973. Not knowing about his right to counsel. Held: The requirements of Article IV. violence and intimidation. 2000 On or about August 11. unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of force. On the contrary. preferably of his 53 | P a g e . did then and there willfully. He was not given a chance to retain counsel de parte if he wanted to.

Lawyers engaged by the police. the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case. accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with his witness. 18 Moreover. 1979. though presumably competent. Now. This kind of giving of warnings. The accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. 56Facts: GENEROSO ESMEÑA VS. §12(1) was derived. whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence. in several decisions of this Court. NO. There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation. Art. violence. his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. January 31. threat. we hold that accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. 1979. 88 SCRA 175). Respondent judge granted it in his order of October 8. Alejandro. Indeed. therefore. III. JUDGE JULIAN B. and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings. 1981 Petitioners Generoso Esmeña and Alberto Alba and their co-accused. §12(1) cannot be a special counsel. Genaro Alipio. In this case. Iloilo City to withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a game of cards. Twenty-seven days later. which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of §12. public or private prosecutor. as in many areas. intimidation. (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him. are generally suspect. under the first paragraph of this provision. cannot be considered an "independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court. whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. III. which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same §12. De los Reyes.own choice. L-49034. such as it is called in the United States from which Art. and that if he is indigent. The accused did not oppose the motion. and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel. care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. therefore. The court noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that the complainant was really sick. He attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16. if so. Under the Constitution. 22 For these reasons. 54 | P a g e . Here. The fiscal cited the ruling that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks the impress of finality and. As observed in People v. has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Atty. an uncounseled statement. 1979. POGOY G. Januario: 17 Ideally. III. 1979. or on September 12. is presumed to be psychologically coerced. who. Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira were charged with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro Cathedral. municipal attorney. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation. the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. as stated in People v. was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation. 21 the independent counsel required by Art. Bandula. §12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself). force. the case could be revived without the filing of a new information (Lauchengco vs. De los Reyes. On the ground of invoking (sic) the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial of the case particularly accused Alberto Alba and Generoso Esmeña. L-54110 FEBRUARY 20.R. or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent. There was only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and. Especially in this case.

Leonicio Bulaoat. Hence. 1980 Ed. citing Gandicela vs.. Issue: Whether the revival of a grave coercion case. In doing so. the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and. As stated. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. NO. If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial. the prosecution appealed therefrom. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. 1965. there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. 94 Phil. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. not for the dismissal." This is complemented by Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: SEC. Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. entered a plea of guilty. upon being arraigned. would place the accused in double jeopardy. the provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal which placed them in jeopardy. The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense 57Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. L-26376 AUGUST 31.R. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. Its revival would place them in double jeopardy. the court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused. Diaz. 55 | P a g e . De la Costa. upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. 88 Phil. consequently. 134. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court. after invoking their right to a speedy trial. the acquittal or conviction of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. Lutero. however. or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant. 1965. Philippines. Hence. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.. 299). 1964. Article IV Bill of Rights) of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. moved for the dismissal of the case and. consented to it. 240). on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the accused. To this charge the accused. p. and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge. Lutero.On October 24. 66 Phil. 88 Phil. In order that legal jeopardy may exist. the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case. 1979. inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his death. assault and stab one. p. but for the trial of the case. on March 6. province of Ilocos Norte. They pointed out that they did not consent to the provisional dismissal of the case. 9. AURELIO BALISACAN G. he was assisted by counsel. therefore. Even if the petitioners. Gandicela vs. did then and there willfully. the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court. Subsequently. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. 299. 307 and People vs. —When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted. he should ask. in the Municipality of Nueva Era. which was provisionally dismissed after the accused had been arraigned because of complainant's failure to appear at the trial. the herein accused. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. by a court of competent jurisdiction. Held: The rule on double jeopardy (non bis in Idem or not twice for the same) is found in section 22. he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. 1966 On February 1. considering their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. 202. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. with intent to kill. 1980 Ed. The information alleged: That on or about December 3. fails to prove the defendant's guilt. Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. unlawfully and feloniously attack. At his de oficio counsel's petition. 714-717). The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. When these three conditions are present.

No appellee's brief was filed. Issue: whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. entitled. McCleary v. Justice Santiago Kapunan. Jur.A. 1966. and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v. Ylagan. the death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III. for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. that he acted in complete self-defense. therefore — as the court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge." took effect.A. Issue: Whether or not R. Upon his conviction his case was elevated to us on automatic review. LEO P.R. atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just civilized and ordered society. 1965. 117472 FEBRUARY 7. On June 25. 7659. death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill. Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code. (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. Between December 31. Held: The detailed events leading to the enactment of R. 1964). . only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case. therefore. pursuant to said law. traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word. Article III. For crimes where no death results from the offense. Furthermore. we find the definition or description of heinous crimes. being a nullity for want of due process. Quimsing. No. the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. [No. 21 Am. herein accused-appellant has been. as involving questions purely of law (Sec. Said clause provides that: .This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals." In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R. in his dissenting opinion in People v. Appellant filed its brief on September 9. in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances. the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous. Hudspeth 124 Fed. No. 2d. Republic Act (R. 445). ECHEGARAY G. Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to reimpose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". he testified. 7659. 58Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article III. Cabero. 7659 took effect. and the present time. L19860. 851. necessarily provide the context for the following analysis. and for Other Purposes. In doing so. This was not done. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition. Alicando. is no acquittal at all.) No. 121. The acquittal. meaning hateful and 56 | P a g e . . criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law.A No. as afore-stated.A. there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. its action is perforce null and void." The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes. b. Other Special Penal Laws. "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes.A. "haineus". in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. however.] 7659. 1993. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v. when R. 17. as Amended. 235. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite. 11 of the 1987 Constitution. and (3) that Congress. 2d. meted out the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old daughter. 1996. the appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14. or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. NO. by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness. it clearly acted without due process of law. People v. 1993. viciousness. 61 Phil. Said testimony. December 23. Subsequently. Held: It is true. 58 Phil. we affirmed his conviction and the death sentence. After being submitted for decision without appellee's brief. reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se: a. Republic Act 296). It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal. the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. Sec. and one of them. odious and hateful offenses and which. 1997 On December 31. This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress.

instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has. atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just. NO. and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975. By Order dated 16 August 1976.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50. Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash. in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant. Branch II. On 2 February 1976. Fourteen (14) days later. its proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society. or inherently or manifestly wicked. on 20 April 1976. odious. of the Revised Penal Code. On 24 November 1975. L-45129 MARCH 6. or both. Series of 1974. No. and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" owned by the private respondent. paragraph (1).R. vicious. which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous. or hateful. was from the Greek prefix "haton".A.abominable. time. In other words. alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. 1. which shall not exceed thirty (30) days. the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. in appreciating the evidence proffered before it. but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in these crimes. Branch 11. Held: It must be examined. not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution. punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5. In an order dated 6 April 1976. dated 5 May 1976. or in any other matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society. No 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309. The police discovered that electric wiring. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim. The first sentence of Article IV 57 | P a g e . or in the person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim. without the necessary authority from the city government. the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas. 7659. The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime. it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof. members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System. found the attendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed. would only be relevant when the trial court. Under R. 59Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.A. A violation of this ordinance was. Batangas City.00) or imprisonment. the accused. at the discretion of the court. equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City." During the subsequent investigation. Before he could be arraigned thereon. civilized and ordered society. the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death: All the crimes mentioned therein are not capital crimes per se. the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. place. given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua. denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. which in turn. to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where R. an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. the manner of commission of crime. Issue: whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash. it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in each of the foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death." The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. another information against Manuel Opulencia. BENJAMIN RELOVA G. These electric devices and contraptions were. under its terms. Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. devices and contraptions had been installed. 1987 On 1 February 1975. the uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. 266 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas.

Lutero. and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. the "taking" of electric current was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices. Otherwise. During this period.(22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution. an unlawful act or omission may give use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission. for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available. 51 (1951): While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense. the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. by examining the location of such acts in time and space. (88 Phil. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate to the other — and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. or a continuing. intent or voluntary design or negligence. emphases supplied) 58 | P a g e . In other words. In the instant case. by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin. del Carmen et al. by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. 88 Phil. the crime of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. different from an offense under a statute. in the first instance. The immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs. as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same. at 53. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection. The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution. In contrast. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed. although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code. it seems elementary that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Under the theory of appellant. where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes. the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975. provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. The accused conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute). not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. by definition. The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged.. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. Thus. the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is. conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned in People vs. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. Put a little differently.

where the information allegedly contains the same allegations as the information in Criminal Case No. substituting or entering another plea. amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. should not be segmented and sliced. On the other hand. Act No. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability. F-147348. De Leon Building. was not arraigned as he was (and he still is) at large. before arraignment in the two (2) cases. for violation of Rep. also pending against him Criminal Case No. accused Gonzales moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. De Leon Building. examination and partnership.. Rep. 60Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. conspiring and confederating together and actually helping each other. F-147348. F147347. depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and obvious positions.00. L-36528 SEPTEMBER 24. 3060. size. in relation to Section 11. Rep. The Court granted the motion and reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972. Republic Act No. of the 8 mm. among other similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes. On 27 December 1972. to wit: at Room 309. together with Roberto Pangilinan. in an order. acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity." Under the Rules of Court. an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. however. without however. to wit: at Room 309. NO. as said allegations therein are not only similar but [sic] Identical facts. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. He was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600. size. On 31 May 1972. 3060. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the community. indecent and immoral motion picture scenes. and feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to be publicly exhibited . nor duly passed by said Board. compelled by the fundamental law to hold the protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private respondent in this case. It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case. unlawfully. We are. Petitioner opposed the motion to quash but the respondent City Court. 16 July 1971. ET AL. F-147347. to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed. in color forming visual moving images on the projection screen through the mechanical application of the projection equipment. by alleging that the accused. Considering that the allegations in the information of said cases are Identical the plea entered in one case by the accused herein can be reasonably seen as exposing him to double jeopardy in the other case.. the accused changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of Rep. 3060). 59 | P a g e . dismissed the case (Criminal Case No. After the dismissal of Criminal Case No. F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11. F-147348 (for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege that. on the same date. the accused Gonzales moved for permission to withdraw his plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case No. BRANCH VI. was accused of violating Section 7. or on 7 February 1973. F-147348) stating thus: In one case (F-147347). In the other case (F-147348). [Manila]. in a place open to public view. Act No. Act No. Act No. the basis of the same is the pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code. as it were. upon arraignment. did then and there wilfully. feloniously and publicly exhibit. unlawfully. in color. and confederating together. Roberto Pangilinan. On 15 November 1972. to wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. in two (2) separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila on 4 April 1972. in a public place. in Criminal Case No. On 7 April 1972. The other accused. the basis of the charge is a special law. Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue. which motion pictures have never been previously submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview. the City Fiscal amended the information in Criminal Case No. as there was according to him. and mutually helping each other did then and there wilfully. 3060. G. conspiring. accused Agapito Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges.R.By the same token. the information in Criminal Case No. [Manila]. 1987 Respondent Agapito Gonzales. completed composite prints of motion film. dated 20 January 1973. F-147348. the same accused. through the mechanical application of movie projection equipment and the use of projection screen. CITY COURT OF MANILA. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he should have known had already prescribed. F-147348 on the ground of double jeopardy. Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue.

In the case at bar. or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof All these requisites do not exist in this case. F-147348. the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and. Whether or not the conviction of respondent Gonzales in Criminal Case No. still that conviction cannot bar the prosecution for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. NO. or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. In other words. 2803 as a prejudicial question. A scrutiny of the two (2) laws involved would show that the two (2) offenses are different and distinct from each other. because. petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S. petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 2. No. or dismissal or termination of a first case is not necessary. and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.R. by pleading to the charge in Criminal Case No. Ponce (respondent Ponce). 2010 Following a vehicular collision in August 2004. Whether or not conviction or acquittal in. 82366. But even if conviction in Criminal Case No. in a petition for certiorari (S. On 7 September 2004. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. He. the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner‘s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. F-147348 without moving to quash the information. 3 After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration. ETC. including the arraignment on 17 May 2005. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. Relying on the arrest order against petitioner. the accused (now the respondent) Gonzales must be taken to have waived the defense of double jeopardy. 172716 NOVEMBER 17. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO.C. and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense. 60 | P a g e . 2803). three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. G.4 Seven days later.C. . the accused learns for the first time that the offense of which he is charged is an offense for which he has been in jeopardy that the court may in its discretion entertain at any time before judgment a motion to quash on that ground.A. HON. cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Issues: whether petitioner‘s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 105 Phil. Meanwhile. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. The MeTC refused quashal. after pleading or moving to quash on some other grounds. (Barot v. (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated. because of petitioner‘s absence. F147348. cannot claim ignorance of the existence of another charge against him for supposedly the same offense. 2803 for petitioner‘s loss of standing to maintain the suit. section 10. No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce‘s husband Nestor C. No. therefore. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. AND EVANGELINE PONCE CARPIO.C. Invoking this conviction. 82366. Without acting on petitioner‘s motion. 61Facts: JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR VS. 2. contrary to private respondent's allegations. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.00 can retroactively supply the ground for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. do not make out only one offense. invoking S. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce‘s vehicle. with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.. F-147347 by imposing on him a fine of P600. finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. Branch 71 (MeTC). Held: 1.Issue: 1. 263 [1959]) It is only in cases where. so long as he had been put in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted in the first case of the same offense. The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged. the offense defined in section 7 of Rep. pursuant to the provisions of Rule 117. the motion remained unresolved.A. Villamor. petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. however. 5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition.A. Branch 157 (RTC). 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion pictures. the fact is that the accused (now the respondent Gonzales) was arraigned in the same court. F-147347 preceded the dismissal of Criminal Case No. Petitioner contested the motion. Act No.. It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy.

had been dismissed earlier. as here. there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365. CARIASO G. resulting in the prosecution for less serious physical injuries." arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based. December 15. the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven.R. Hence. This is a case therefore of there Being a single act resulting in the complex crime of less serious physical injuries and assault upon a person in authority. accuses Valerio Tacas of the crime of Assault Upon a Person in Authority committed as follows: That on or about 4:30 o'clock p.55 Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. undergirded this Court‘s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v.. one Felipe Agdeppa. that is. He had. Held: From the commission of the act complained of. Zapat Sinait Ilocos Sur. Philippines and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. however. but after his release. to demonstrate the applicability of the Bonotan ruling. accuses Valerio Tacas of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries committed as follows: That on or about 4:30 o'clock p. The indictment. Hence this petition. a full Court.Held: Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime.1972. the alleged offense having been committed by the accused on the occasion of having inflicted a bolo wound on the offended party for which he had previously been charged and convicted of less serious physical injuries. The criminal complaint for less serious physical injuries dated January 2. With deliberate intent did then and there willfully and feloniously assault and attack Emiterio lbaan with a bolo inflicting upon the latter multiple hacking wounds and stab wounds on the different parts of his body which injuries shall incapacitate the said Emiterio lbaan from the performance of his customary labors for a period of at least 30 days and requires medical attendance for the same period of time. came on April 17.. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. speaking through Mr. 1973. NO. True. ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving. arising from the same facts. Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. there was no circumvening event or circumstance that could affect or change the nature if the act originally committed. L-37406 AUGUST 31. Sinait Ilocos Sur. solely for less serious physical injuries. after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law. moreover. Since then. the aforesaid criminal complaint. regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges. Issue: Whether or not constitutional provision on double jeopardy bars a prosecution for the crime of assault upon a person of authority. its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty The two charges against petitioner. namely. there being in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense. was. It Was pointed out by petitioner that on the very same day that he was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries. after having been convicted of the aforesaid offense. for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). in Bo. the above-named accused with deliberate intent. whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court. Sinait Ilocos Sur.m. 62Facts: VALERIO TACAS VS. unlawfully and feloniously assault and attacked one Emiterio lbaan. Zapat Sinait Ilocos Sur. 1972.m. but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or. did then and there willfully. fully served his sentence in jail. the other criminal complaint against him for assault upon a person in authority. this time for assault against a person in authority. a duly elected and incumbent barrio Captain of Bo. tile above-named accused. it is therefore now too late to hold him liable as 61 | P a g e . December 15. 1976 Two criminal complaints filed against petitioner by the same Chief of Police. He did object on jeopardy grounds. in Bo. Justice Montemayor. they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48. 1973. as amended. He did serve such sentence. 1973 was worded thus: 'The undersigned Chief of Police. This was the language used: "The undersigned Chief of Police. we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. but to no avail. In imposing penalties.25 decided in 1954. were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code. Diaz. Zapat Sinait Ilocos Sur by stabbing him three times with the use of a jungle bolo. and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. FL ORENTINO C. In short. he pleaded guilty and was immediately sentenced to a prison term of thirty days of arresto menor. regardless of its various resulting acts. whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense. There. after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law. Then came on April 17.

1962. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint. All. 3350. Issue: Is the holding of fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio. joined the defendant Labor Union on the date mentioned. 1981 The case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia. picketting. 64Facts: ERNESTO G. As noted in the first resolution. and to promote the general 62 | P a g e . stoppages or slowdown of work. Ormoc City. remains constitutional.well for the offense of assault against a person in authority. 1985 The plaintiffs are members of the Iglesia ni Kristo. 1976. 3350. 5.The Union agrees that there shall be no strikes. Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion. refusal to handle any merchandise. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses. boycotts. MAY 25. Is the dismissal proper? Held: On the first issue. through members of the Iglesia ni Kristo. All of its members have also been working with the Central Azucarera de Tarlac long before October 19. NO. and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. being ignorant of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1962. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. walkouts. except Jose Mercado and Victoriano Mercado. who in turn demanded from its co-defendant. the patron saint of Valencia". valid and constitutional? Held: Yes. The Central. the Tarlac Development Corporation and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union entered into an exclusive collective bargaining agreement.Republic Act No. The Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union is a labor organization represented by its president Pacifico Millo. GONZALES VS. so long as the procedure outlined in Article X hereof is followed by the Central and the Central abides by the result of the procedure therein provided. the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. L-53487. 63Facts: GARCES VS. shall discharge any employee or worker who shall fail to fulfill the conditions aforesaid or who resigns or is suspended from membership in the Union for disloyalty The plaintiffs. 3350. have been seasonal employees or laborers of the defendant Tarlac Development Corporation since prior to October 19. secondary boycotts. Is Republic Act No. upon the written request of the Union. L-38178 OCTOBER 3. The defendant Tarlac Development Corporation is a corporation that operates the Central Azucarera de Tarlac. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image. regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. San Vicente Ferrer. a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor organization.CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION G. Consequently. the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. On March 23. NO. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio. the Tarlac Development Corporation. or any other interference with any of the operations of the Central during the term of this agreement. ESTENZO GR. On the date mentioned. then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. sit-down strikes. 3350 which exempts members of any religious sect—prohibiting the affiliation of their members in any labor organization—from the operation of a union security provision constitutional? 2. Issues: 1. the dismissal of the plaintiffs from their work under the above-quoted provision of Section 4 of the bargaining agreement. "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer. The objection coming from the SolicitorGeneral that this is not one of those cam where the offense is Identical cannot be sustained in view of the well-settled interpretation embodied in the Rules of Court provision cited such constitutional requirement is satisfied if the subsequent indictment is "for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. by reason of Section 4 of the Exclusive Collective Bargaining Agreement. which exempts them from the effects of Section 4 of the Exclusive Collective Bargaining Agreement due to their religion the plaintiffs resigned from the defendant labor Union. which exempts plaintiffs-appellees from the operation of the union security clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement of October 19.R. and believing that it was the only way by which they could continue working for the Central Azucarera de Tarlac. 1962. Hence this petition. Upon being informed of the provisions of Republic Act No.

The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. FACTS: ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines (2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return HELD: Although the Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of the specific powers of the President. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in th e President‘s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Another question to determine is whether or no there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. the protection of life. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate. The armed threats to the government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Marcos. In his stead. Marcos. the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. 1964. stop bloody challenges to the government. There are also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Marcos. confirming thereby their natural. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. With these before her. SEPTEMBER 15. In other words. it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. as members of the Iglesia ni Kristo. the maintenance of peace and order. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. But President Aquino. WHEREFORE.welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions. police officers and civilian officials. 88211. this case calls for the exercise of the President‘s power as protector of the peace. Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. To the President. Regarding the second issue. the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people. 4017 DATED OCTOBER 29. has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order. Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic. statutory and constitutional right to work. 65- MARCOS VS. has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. The woes of the government are not purely political. in his deathbed. may not be dismissed from their employment by reason of their resignation from the defendant-appellant Labor Union. The Constitution declares among the guiding principles service and protection of the people. urban terrorism. The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency. the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. 63 | P a g e .R. a separatist movement in Mindanao. NO. More particularly. More than that. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency. liberty and property. IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO. considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward. did not however. executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. MANGLAPUS G. the Court finds that plaintiffs-appellees. Corollarily. It is a power borne by the President‘s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. and the murder with impunity of military men. the President is. under the Constitution. rightist conspiracies to grab power. This. 1989 In 1986. promote their welfare and advance the national interest. having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TARLAC IN CIVIL CASE NO. the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. The power involved is the President‘s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. and the promotion of the general welfare.

1992. NO. has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. (INC. Besides. the Office of the President reversed the decision of the respondent Board. Q-9214280.00. Issues: (1) whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo (2) assuming it has the power. a duly organized religious organization.000.000. 2001 The right against excessive bail. It succeeded in its appeal for on December 18. 121 and 128. doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional. Respondents are further prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 115. series Nos. 119. Hence this petition.‖ He filed a notice of appeal. Forthwith. Petitioner is however directed to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program.66Facts: YAP VS." Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board. to eight years of prision mayor as maximum. with the RTC. 115.R. he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.500. On November 28.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. In their Answer. 119. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and the trial court granted petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration whereby the portion directing petitioner to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program is hereby deleted and set aside. On December 14. CA GR.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. 119 and 121. 119673 JULY 26. 67Facts: IGLESIA NI CRISTO."Respondent Board appealed to the Court who reversed the trial court. 121 and 128. 64 | P a g e . 116. 1 Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them.)VS. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs. it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 1992.23 The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond. and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. contrary to law and good customs.500. ―in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10. The trial court rendered a Judgment ordering respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all the series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program.000. 141529 JUNE 6.000. a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program. 1996 Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo. Issue: Was the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals on accused‘s bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel? Held: The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. NO.00 in excess of P22. are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5. and the liberty of abode and travel. NCR Quezon City. for the reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5. 128. 128 to be publicly telecast. 1992.THE HONORABL E COURT OF APPEALS G. the Board allowed Series No. which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. as minimum. respondent Board invoked its power under PD No.

The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case. scattered the books in his office. AUSTRIA VS . and threw the phone. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time. Issues: 1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA. "Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pador you are talking tough). The contention of private respondents deserves scant consideration." The law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral. Pastor David Rodrigo but Pastor Buhat denied so the two exchanged heated arguments. Eufronio Ibesate. Prior restraint on speech. Subsequently. willful breach of trust. injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people. SO ORDERED. . . in his district which amounted to P15. 68Facts: PASTOR DIONISIO V. as grounds for the termination of his services. serious misconduct. and commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative. and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds. television programs . including religious speech.tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene the Executive Committee for the purpose of settling the dispute between him and the private respondent. . Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration then NLRC reversed its original decision. the recourse to this Court by petitioner. NO.Held: On the first issue.There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm.10.On various occasions he received several communications from Mr. He worked his way up the ladder and got promoted several times until he was transferred to Bacolod City where held the position of district pastor until his services were terminated on 31 October 1991. the president of the Negros Mission." and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. ." On the second issue. The NLRC. Sideño rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.Petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat. the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24. delete . cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. In his written explanation he reasoned out that he should not be made accountable for the unremitted collections since it was private respondents Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr. reversed itself once again. and/or prohibit the . On 17 October 1991.R. 1986 section provides that the Board has the power toreview and examine all "television programs. IN VIEW WHEREOF. . or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime. the Board has the power to "approve. the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule . . moral and exemplary damages and other labor law benefits. . Held: The first two issues were resolved jointly.he returned to the office of Pastor Buhat. 124382 Pastor Dionisio V. 1995 is affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or 65 | P a g e . and. The NLRC vacated the findings of the Labor Arbiter. 2) Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair. and tried to overturn the latter's table then banged the attaché case of Pastor Buhat on the table.HON.Irked. Mrs.Hence." By the clear terms of the law.078. and 121. PD No. No costs. contrary to law and/or good customs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS G. the treasurer of the Negros Mission asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife. Labor Arbiter Cesar D. involves the separation of church and state 3) Whether or not such termination is valid. gross and habitual neglect of duties. petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the Executive Committee meeting at the Negros Mission Conference Room. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate petitioner. without ruling on the merits of the case. Thelma Austria. Austria worked with the SDA for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991. The SDA appealed the decision to the National Labor Labor Relations Commission. 119.He began his work with the SDA as a literature evangelist. On his way out. 115. selling literature of the SDA over the island of Negros. as such. Petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with backwages and benefits. . indecent. exhibition and/or television broadcast of . petitioner overheard Pastor Buhat saying.

66 | P a g e . Hongkong. In its supplement to the petition. the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq." challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines. NO. It is already too late in the day for private respondents to question the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter since the SDA had fully participated in the trials and hearings of the case from start to finish. 1988. For this reason.purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. Philippine Association of Service Exporters. providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. of the Constitution. is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation. What is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. (PASEI. 69Facts: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATI ON OF SERVICE EXPORTERS. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. of Article XIII. the petitioner was terminated from service without just or lawful cause. After all. Inc." the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. petitioner cannot be made accountable for the alleged infraction committed by his wife. the matter of terminating an employee. the breach of trust must be willful. Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code further require the employer to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices. is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction. 1. was passed in the absence of prior consultations. The Court has already ruled that the active participation of a party against whom the action war brought. in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. The active participation of private respondents in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC mooted the question on jurisdiction. which private respondents failed to demonstrate. in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS. which is purely secular in nature. United States. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. and not executive."Department Order No. for overseas placement. of the Department of Labor and Employment." that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills. petitioner was not ex-communicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. Series of 1988. 81958 The petitioner. INC. Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated. male and female. Rule XXIII. It is claimed. but. Qatar. Having been illegally dismissed. finally.R. the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females. Private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. 1988. they still have separate and distinct personalities. Italy. HON. The petition for certiorari is GRANTED. We cannot sustain the validity of dismissal based on the ground of breach of trust. 1. FR ANKLIN M. Indeed. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith. in return. and Switzerland. coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending. The alleged grounds for the dismissal of petitioner from the service were only revealed to him when the actual letter of dismissal was finally issued. in character. it is contended. petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority right and the payment of full backwages without any deduction corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. DRILON G. Jordan. the Solicitor General. it cannot be said that petitioner was given enough opportunity to properly prepare for his defense. Austria. to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause." specifically. Norway. Canada. a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers. worship or doctrines of the church. In the absence of conspiracy and collusion. Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code and Section 2. Indeed. Issue: whether or not Department Order 1 is valid under the Constitution Held: The assailed order is valid. between petitioner and his wife. On the final issue. police power being legislative. he was rewarded with a dismissal from the service for a non-existent cause. In this case." and that it is violative of the right to travel. On May 25. for short). on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.VS. Private respondent failed to comply with the above requirements. PASEI invokes Section 3. he even labored hard for the SDA. filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8.

Inc. the greatest of all rights. among other things. It admits of classifications. assigned to respondent Judge Camilon..R. was suspected to be a fake. 45399 and 45400. is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms." but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. Having transferred the management of the latter into the hands of professional men. the petition is DISMISSED. Jr. Unquestionably. entitled. (3) they are not confined to existing conditions. The right to travel is subject. was granted and a management committee was organized and appointed. Inc. docketed as SEC Case No.. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions. filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management committee. it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. and Criminal Cases Nos. L-62100 Petitioner Ricardo L. (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law. Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction. it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. Ricardo Manotoc." stating as ground therefore his desire to go to the United States. Hence this petition. In due course. came home.. and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. Inc.. petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105. it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management. a stock brokerage house. NO. Rather. is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will.. Inc. Pending disposition of SEC Case No. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. 1982. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad. 67 | P a g e .000. the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. Inc. JR. provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions. finally. Manotoc. both trial judges denied the same... 001826. In the ordinary sequence of events. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. and together with his costockholders. WHEREFORE. 001826. a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities. MANOTOC. to the requirements of "public safety. In all cases. could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. "In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc Securities. There is no question that Department Order No. Issue: Whether or not having been admitted to bail as a matter of right. and the Manotoc Securities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing. petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled. The Court finds. raffled off to Judge Pronove. docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. not only for Manotoc Securities. Jr.. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. "relative to his business transactions and opportunities. 1 applies only to "female contract workers. "motion for permission to leave the country. Petitioners". The concern of the Government. Jr. respectively. 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division. Inc. VS.. but likewise for Trans-Insular Management. he holds no officer-position in said business. 70Facts: RICARDO L. however.Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself. but acts as president of the former corporation.00. Jr. Teodoro Kalaw.THE COURT OF APPEALS FERNAN G. neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty."as may be provided by law. as president and vice-president. When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities. corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. the Securities and Exchange Commission requested the then Commissioner of Immigration. Inc. 45542 to 45545. The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. On March 1. petitioner. who was then in the United States. of Manotoc Securities. Edmundo Reyes." It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza. with FGU Instance Corporation as surety. not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4. Inc.

If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. or when necessary in the interest of national security. Republic Acts Nos. The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Held: The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression. Section 5. the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him. Hence. Finally. is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles.R.Held: Petitioner's contention is untenable. Rule 114. 2347 Section 15a is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. Third. 1992. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws secretion 15 of which states that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof. therefore. television and print political advertisements. WHEREFORE. more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right. it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio. 68 | P a g e . Article IV of the 1973 . he. 6646. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Section 26 and Article XIII. any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance. to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer. mandated by Article II. In addition. Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law. pending the trial. pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. 1992 elections. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties. 6646 and is therefore unconstitutional.The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution. 103956 Facts: On January 13. Whether the candidate is rich and. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. the petition is hereby GRANTED. Article III). the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies. the petitioner states that as of February 22. the Omnibus Election Code. can afford to dole out more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G. the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. 4. and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong. the petition for review is hereby dismissed. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution. a senatorial candidate in the May 11. First it infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. WHEREFORE. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. public safety or public health. 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas. calesas. and at the same time. tricycles." Issue: Whether Resolution No. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars. being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. he is expressing more than the name. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper. Second. NO. he is espousing ideas. 71- BLO UMPAR ADIONG VS. that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No.

the Senate of the Philippines." like the right of free expression. a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. is not an absolute right. CAPUL ONG AND JUAN PONCE ENRILE G. or picture.R. if it is to be historical. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. Hence this petition. McElroy filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed. Respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners. appropriation. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.Hal McElroy informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a synopsis of it." The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone. 69 | P a g e . Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986. radio and television. much less to any matter purely personal to them. and the train of events which led up to that denouncement. who had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed. and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. of international interest. Clearly. HON. (Ayer Productions) for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release. Succinctly put. nor is it focused upon. reproduction and/or exhibition of his name. no reference whatsoever (whether written. The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People Power a unique event in modern history that-made possible the Peaceful revolution in the Philippines in 1986. in the circumstances of this case. Issue: Whether or not the production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not.IGNACIO M. or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production. "The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about. he sits in a very public place. petitioners' argue. of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in February 1986. Indeed. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile. distribution or exhibition of said or similar film. NO. inter alia. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity. film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production. it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play. The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enactment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution. to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986. it is. the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. verbal or visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family. constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy. and his movie production company." After a successful political campaign during which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press. 82380 Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker. the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled. Juban who suggested that they consult with the appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V." Held: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not. such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events. showing. in the circumstances of this case. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of a public character. constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because. Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. Private respondent filed a Complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Petition with the Regional Trial Court of to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution and the trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for preliminary injunction. he continues to be a "public figure.72Facts: AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. presented in a "docu-drama" style. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other government agencies consulted. Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer Lope V. the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue). airing. Because his participation therein was major in character.

73Facts:

CHAVEZ VS.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVER NMENT (PCGG) G.R. NO. 130716 Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. He also claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from "entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth."

Issue: 1. Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to bring the action. 2. Whether the General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution Held: On the first issue, petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to file the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth "belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth hand in fact, part of the public treasury," any compromise in relation to it would constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets. On the second issue, General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution.In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitimate. 45 And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order. A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties, 47 unless the consent of a party is vitiated — such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence — or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts. 48 Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. We believe that criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of illgotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandigan bayan. As stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case. The absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

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74Facts:

MANUEL LAGUNZAD VS. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-32066 AUGUST 6, 1979 Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his own business outfit, the "MML Productions."The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla. Padilla was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party (then the minority party) for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder in People vs. Lacson, et al. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. 4 On October 3, 1961, petitioner received a telephone call from one Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, objecting to the filming of the movie and the "exploitation" of his life.On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Amante, for and in behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. 5 Petitioner contends that he acceded to the demands because he had already invested heavily in the picture. On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining as to the amount to be paid, which was P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to P20,000.00, 7 petitioner and private respondent, represented by her daughters and Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, at the law office of Jalandoni and Jamir, executed a "Licensing Agreement" Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement because of private respondent's demand, through Mrs. Amante, for payment for the "exploitation" of the life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press conference declaring the whole picture as a fake, fraud and a hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio, television and that they were going to Court to stop the picture." On October 10, 1961, petitioner paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 but contends that he did so not pursuant to their Agreement but just to placate private respondent. 9Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for judgment in

her favor

Traversing the Complaint, petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public figure. By way of counterclaim, petitioner demanded that the Licensing Agreement be declared null and void for being without any valid cause. Private respondent duly filed her Answer to Counterclaim alleging that the transaction between her and petitioner was entered into freely and voluntarily. On June 30, 1964, the trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter Court affirmed the judgment. Reconsideration having been denied by the Court, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. Initially, or on June 16, 1970, this Court denied the Petition for lack of merit, but resolved subsequently to give it due course after petitioner moved for reconsideration on the additional argument that the movie production was in exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of expression, and that the Licensing cement is a form of restraint on the freedom of speech and of the press. Issues: In his Brief, petitioner assigns the following errors to the appellate Court: a. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXERCISING JURISDICTION IN THE CASE BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM WAS INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE AND CHARACTER; b. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO MAKE COMPLETE FINDINGS OF FACTS ON ALL ISSUES BEFORE IT; c. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE LICENSING AGREEMENT, NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF, OR FOR HAVING AN ILLEGAL CAUSE OR CONSIDERATION OF CONTRACT, d. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LICENSING AGREEMENT, IS NULL AND VOID; RESPONDENT NOT HAVING HAD ANY PROPERTY NIGHTS OVER THE INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF MOISES PADILLA WHO WAS A PUBLIC FIGURE. e. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LICENSING AGREEMENT, WAS NULL AND VOID, PETITIONER'S CONSENT HAVING BEEN PROCURED BY MEANS OF DURESS, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE INFLUENCE; f. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN UPHOLDING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF RESPONDENT AS DEFINED IN ART. 26 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OVER THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FILM THE PUBLIC LIFE OF A PUBLIC FIGURE, INFRINGED UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS.

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Held: Petitioner's contention that respondent Court failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues raised before it is without basis. respondent Court has substantially and sufficiently complied with the injunction that a decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Neither do the court agree with petitioner's submission that the Licensing Agreement is null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family.Petitioner's averment that private respondent did not have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy.In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioner's contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. It is not, however, without limitations. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is denied and the judgment appealed from hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

75Facts:

AMELITO R. MUTUC VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS75 G.R. NO. L-32717 NOVEMBER 26, 1970

On October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech." There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like , whether of domestic or foreign origin." It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. Issue: The validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes. Held: It has been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.
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and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. Or they may directly or indirectly own or control the stations or channels themselves. not so much to inform and educate as to condition and manipulate. only publications of a particular content. November 16. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting.76Facts: NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. in a very real sense. NO. 77Facts: CIPRIANO P. Issue: Does section 1119 which was enacted through delegation of power confer right to the mayor to refuse the permit sought by permit being sought by the petitioner? Held: The Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse. to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others. are commonly intended and crafted. not so much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience.R. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections. because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions. Issue: Validity of section 11 oof R.R. as Mayor of the City of Manila. Cipriano Primicias. especially electronic media. or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila. For the candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in many. with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping. to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon. 102653 MARC H 5. in issuing the permit. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role. to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates. 73 | P a g e . namely. and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor. listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience. a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso. Held: The nature and characteristics of modern mass media. cannot be totally disregarded. The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of "packaged" candidates. NO. We must adopt the second construction. subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose. that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit. 1992 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements.VALERIANO E. L-1800 This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship . But it is rarely that simple. function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. but only the discretion. PRIMICIAS VS. Frequently. It might be supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of television set. 6646. FU GOSO G." The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with minddeadening frequency. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that. parade. G. the major stations or channels. 1947. if not all. for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the ground that the respondent refused to grant such permit. such repetitive political commercials when fed into the electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. Realistically.A. the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the right of candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass media ad nauseam. Further.

L-65366 Petitioner. retired Justice JB L. In view of all the foregoing. to the gates of the United States Embassy. in accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities. that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government. and in an open space of public property." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is." Respondent Mayor suggested. a public park. however. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26. which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order. absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil. a short program would be held. a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disbarment. would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting. REYES VS. on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive. the petition for mandamus is granted 78Facts: JOSE B." Issue: Is the denial of a permit to hold the rally. It turned out that on October 19. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. remains bitter and high. or declared ultra vires.L." Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. RAMON BAGATSING. a part of the Charter of the City of Manila.Section 2434 of the Administrative Code. "that there is a reasonable ground to believe. Respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No." and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage. hardly two blockaway at the Roxas Article 22 reads. reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. There can be no legal objection. violative to exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly? Held: The denial of a permit to hold the rally violates the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly." The petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. Unless the ordinance is nullified. hardly two blocks away. The reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for. Montenegro. starting from the Luneta. to the gates of the US Embassy." and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage. and in the duly constituted authorities. for the simple reason that said general power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor. cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner. NO. AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA G. such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. in consideration of Ordinance 7295. the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. Reyes. all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. specially on the part of the losing groups. On October 25. it was stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches. Once there. the answer of respondent Mayor was filed on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo G. which provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes. During the course of the oral argument. such permit was denied. in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights 74 | P a g e . that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. 1983. World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila. basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions." To be more specific. the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration.R. or of the press.

Newspapers publish information for the benefit of the public while abstracters do so for the benefit of a limited class of investors and purchasers of real estate only. Mandamus is the appropriate remedy. we shall confine our discussion to the second part of the prayer. 1948 This is a petition for mandamus. on appeal. and that the Secretary of Justice has reasonably ruled. The petitioner. under the constitution. have been registered in violation of the constitution. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil. gives to understand that not even this would the petitioner or his representatives be allowed to do if they tried. The newspaper proprietor can demand access to public records on the basis of his special pecuniary interest. 128 or to allow the petitioner or his duly accredited representatives (to) examine all records in the respondents' custody relative to the (said) transactions. a morning daily.R. the applicants must be heard on the matter. The publication of these matters is certainly not only legitimate and lawful but necessary in a country where. that records may not be disclosed for publication. By being denied access to the records the newspaper is cut off from a source of income and profit. by the Secretary of Justice. NO. as editor of a newspaper. that the petitioner be allowed to examine all the records in the respondents' custody to gather the material he wants." Issues: Whether or not the petitioner should not be allowed to examine all the records in the respondents' custody to gather the material he wants on the ground of liberty of the press. correctly or erroneously. It is through the medium of newspapers that the public is informed of how public servants conduct their business. In this connection.of free speech and peaceable assembly that is why application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. No request to inspect the records seems to have ever been made. Independently of statutes the petitioner. but the Solicitor General. newspapers perform a mission which does not enter into the calculation of the business of abstracting titles conducted purely for private gain. answering for the respondents. the people should rule. VS. That the newspaper's prospective business from the sale of copies containing information gathered from the records was a sufficient pecuniary interest to entitle the proprietor or employee to access to the documents was finally established in two cases. L-1631 FEBRUARY 27." Facts: The first alternative of the petition was denied by the Register of Deeds and later. editor of the Manila Post. As the petitioner appears not to insist on his request for a list of sales of real estate to aliens. The public through newspapers have the legitimate right to know the transaction in real estate which they believe. 79- ABELARDO SUBIDO. to safeguard the public interest and the interest of those directly concerned in the records. The interest of the newspaper man in public records is the interest of the manufacturer in his raw materials. 75 | P a g e . Whether by design or otherwise. has the requisite interest in land records even under the common law theory entitling him to the writ of mandamus. the Solicitor General contends that "the examination or inspection of the records in the office of the register of deeds may be made only by those having special interest therein and subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. and the petition will be granted commanding the respondents to allow the petitioner or his accredited representatives to examine. prays that an order issue "commanding the respondents to furnish (petitioner) the list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila since the promulgation of the Department of Justice Circular No. extract. Is a petition for mandamus the proper remedy for the petitioner? Held: Newspapers have a better-established right of access to records of titles by reason of their relations to the public than abstracters or insurers of title. abstract or make memoranda of the records of sales of real properties to aliens subject to such restriction and limitation as may be deemed necessary not incompatible with his decision. ROMAN OZAETA G. namely. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.

defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. Nitafan). BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless. Mandaluyong. The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint.. wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. as vendor. contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations On the basis of the foregoing facts. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business. 1962. entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land. Lobaton vs. 1963. but which defendantappellee claims could also be devoted to. 18 DECEMBER 1 986 Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22. It predicated its conclusion on the exercise of police power of the said municipality. The motions were denied by the trial courts. Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Lozano. Luis M. the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. RTC Judge Nicolad A. considering that there is no issue raised by either of the parties as to whether the same is null and void. RTC Judge Ernani C. Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979.. the statute being unconstitutional. Civil Case No. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. residential purposes. On or about May 5. Lobaton. The thrust of the law is to prohibit. known as Lots Nos. and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. 1 On March 4. Further. Abad.R. Luzviminda F. The parties adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief. The trial court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid. the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Hojas vs. Cruz [Lemery Batangas. Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25. plaintiff. On July 19. Lozano vs.e. as vendees.FEATI BANK AND TR UST CO. Branch XX] in GR 72565-67. Branch V] in GR L-66839-42. 1979. NO. Pano [Quezon City. which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. not malum in se. the Court should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily on the offending statute. HELD: Yes. 5 and 6. to be devoted to banking purposes. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812-13. was submitted in the lower court for decision. Rizal. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price. Branch 139] in GR 75122-49. particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community. Datuin. 81Facts: ORTIGAS & CO. under pain of penal sanctions. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police power. [Makati. MARTINEZ GR L-63419. L-24670 DECEMBER 14. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong. nor is it intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. RTC Judge Ernani C. 76 | P a g e . Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. G. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila. a statute is presumed to be valid. 5 and 6. (Florentina A. Rizal. Block 31. The latter refused to comply with the demand. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. Branch XX] in GR L-63419. the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. situated at Mandaluyong. Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654. Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense. hence.. Gerochi Jr. Aguiluz. Pano [Quezon City. except in one case. Restrictions were later annotated and issued in the name of Emma Chavez. developing and selling lots to the public. Violago. RTC Judge Antonio M. of the Highway Hills Subdivision. RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L. Martinez [Manila. and People vs. it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. ISSUE: Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act. is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. and stressed that private interest should "bow down to general interest and welfare.80FACTS: LOZANO VS. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro. i. The following day. Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas. and used exclusively for. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property. but an offense against public order. The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. Oscar Violago vs. Elinor Abad vs. Madrigal y Cia") is a limited partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS. 1952. 7706. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the commerical building on the said lots.

"without pronouncement as to costs. 82Facts: ENEDINA PRESLEY VS. dismissing the complaint.On March 2. When it failed to consider whether or not the Municipal Council had the power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee and when it did not make a finding that the building was erected along the property line. peace. 77 | P a g e . Bel-Air Village Association. when it should have been erected two meters away from said property line.R. 27 as an exercise of police power is without merit. 2. 1965. particularly Jupiter Road which is owned by and registered in the name of BAVA. cannot be enforced. Rizal declaring Lots Nos. Bel-Air Village. since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed. 1965. As such registered owners. Issues: (1) whether Resolution No. the Deed Restrictions was already annotated in their title providing (among others) 'that the lot must be used only for residential purpose' When BAVA came to know of the existence of the 'Pan de sal' store. On April 2. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26. since only questions of law are raised.803. they were members of plaintiff BAVA pursuant to the Deed Restrictions annotated in their title (TCT No. as part of the commercial and industrial zone. Under the existing Deed Restrictions aforesaid. "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power (2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee. AND THE H ON. the appeal was given due course and the records of the case were elevated directly to this Court. among others. On April 14. education. of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision dismissing the complaint and from the order of March 26. 1988 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in toto. is AFFIRMED. Inc. INC. as lessee of the property. i. 27. 86774 AUGUS T 21. Makati. plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. 101613 and 106092.e. is valid because it did so in the exercise of its police power. the validity of the said resolution was never questioned before it. therefore. A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction was filed by plaintiff-appellee. 5 and 6. 27. At the time the Almendrases bought their property in question from Makati Development Corporation. clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. is the owner and operator of 'Hot Pan de Sal Store' located in the same address. in the corresponding deeds of sale. which declare Lots Nos. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee – referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee – it should be stressed.. 5 and 6 as residential. and are within the issues framed by the parties. 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration. When it sustained the view that Resolution No. the building restrictions. which has validly exercised its police power through the said resolution. series of 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. Accordingly. Held: 1. It is.55.. The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. The rule is that the question of law or of fact which may be included in the appellant's assignment of errors must be those which have been raised in the court below. the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. the rule is not absolute. 1991 This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 28. The Almendrases were at the time of the filing of the action the registered owners of a house and lot located at 102 Jupiter Street. morals. G. NO. the entire Bel-Air Subdivision is classified as a purely residential area. (BAVA for short) against Teofilo Almendras and Rollo Almendras (now both deceased and substituted by defendant-appellant Enedina Presley) for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision that the subject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial purposes and for non-payment of association dues to plaintiff BAVA amounting to P3. Metro Manila. good order or safety and general welfare of the people. 73616) over the property in question and defendant Presley. COURT OF APPEALS. and later. in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION. 5 and 6. Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court erred — 1. it sent a letter to the defendants asking them to desist from operating the store. and 2. In the first place. The decision appealed from.

802. Murder and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman. However. COURT OF APPEALS G. GENERAL ARTURO ENRILE VS. Likewise. she is found to be an undesirable alien. a charge sheet was filed against private respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate General alleging violations of the 67th. With respect to the demand for payment of association dues in the sum of P3. Her subsequent commitment to the custody of the CID. Issues: 1.R.803. the records reveal that this issue is now moot and academic after petitioner Presley purchased the property subject of lease from the Almendrases and settled all association dues. the respondent court's decision has to be reversed.55 as of November 3. the trial court rendered the decision in favor of BAVA which was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the private respondent with the Court 78 | P a g e . 30-31) After due hearing on the merits. 3.It has likewise been established that the Almendrases had not paid the BAVA membership dues and assessments which amounted to P3. respectively. the demand for payment of attorney's fees is now without legal or factual basis. the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration. THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDGING PETITIONER SOLIDARILY LIABLE TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AFP. 1980.R. He was brought to the ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio. No.R. On January 30. THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDGING PETITIONER SOLIDARILY LIABLE TOGETHER WITH THE ALMENDRASES TO PAY THE ALLEGED UNPAID ASSOCIATION DUES IS PATENTLY CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND FACTS. FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not Writ for Habeas Corpus should be granted.55. MAJ." (Rule 102. 1991. Only a consensual contract existed between the parties whereby Almendras regularly pays his dues and assessments to BAVA for such services as security. 25442) wherein petitioner challenged as illegal and violative of constitutional due process her arrest without a warrant by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) and her resultant detention at the CID Detention Center. Petitioner's claim to Filipino citizenship cannot be settled before this Court at this instance. 1. there are factual issues that make petitioner's citizenship controversial. 1990 in connection with the December 1989 coup attempt. 1992 Appealed to this Court by way of petition for certiorari.HON. Teofilo Almendras contended that there was no written contract between him and appellee BAVA. the factual controversies must first be resolved before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. there was no more reason for the latter to demand payment of such dues and assessments. RULING: Petitioner's release from detention has rendered this petition moot and academic insofar as it questions the legality of her arrest and detention. Col. COURT OF APPEALS G. (Rollo. THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECENT CONSOLIDATED DECISION EN BANC OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT PROMULGATED DECEMBER 22. will have no more connection with the questioned warrantless arrest and subsequent detention on the night of 17 July 1991. 105597 Private respondent Lt. AUG UST 05. A habeas corpus proceeding shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. after the proceedings before the proper forum. 1989. prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of a restraining or status quo order is the denial by the Court of Appeals of a petition for habeas corpus (CA-G. if. NO. 2. Sec. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. SP. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested on April 27. NO. 83- TERRY LYN MAGNO VS. 94th and 97th Articles of War for Mutiny. when the services were withdrawn by appellee BAVA. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General's rejoinder to petitioner's reply. Held: In accordance with the ruling in the Sangalang case. Revised Rules of Court)Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an issue especially because a decision in the deportation proceeding will not result in petitioner's permanent or prolonged detention but exclusion or departure from this country. garbage collection and maintenance and repair of Jupiter Street. Makati where he was detained for nine months without charges. 101148. On January 20. 84Facts: LT.1988 WHICH CONSOLIDATED DECISION APPLIES ON ALL FOURS IN THE CASE AT BAR IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. pp.

for that matter — a judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Marcelino Q. and. 2 Does the Resolution of June 3. dismissed by the said court's Fourth Division in a decision promulgated on June 28. petitioners cannot seek shelter in the absence of specific rules relating to review of cases dismissed by military tribunals in violating the right of the accused to a speedy trial and in justifying his continued confinement. the Court of Appeal's Fourth Division which earlier denied the same which the court found to be untenable. the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals which on September 27. 1992 contravene a previous decision by a co-equal body. a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was filed in his behalf on the basis of respondent's averment that his arrest and continued detention without charges violated his constitutional rights. the Court of Appeals' decided that they cannot at this time order the release of petitioner on a writ of habeas corpus without giving the military from here on a reasonable time within which to finish the investigation of his case and determine whether he should be formally charged before the court martial or released for insufficiency of evidence thus the instant petition was DISMISSED. The Fourth Division found adequate support upholding military jurisdiction over the case of the private respondent under the Articles of War. however. consistent with his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. The factual circumstances surrounding both decisions are different. Col." Second. 1991 which was. Issues: 1. These finding obviously militate against petitioners' contention that the appellate court's Twelfth Division abused its discretion in issuing an order allegedly in contravention to the Fourth Division's earlier orders. It also noted that the case against the private respondent was ongoing and that it would be difficult to order respondent's release on a writ of habeas corpuswithout giving military authorities reasonable time within which to investigate and try the case. General Lisandro Abadia. issuing a writ of habeas corpus in favor of the private respondent contravenes a previous decision of a co-equal body. 1992.of Appeals on March 7. Because of his confinement without charges. by the time the subsequent petition for habeas corpus was before the court's Twelfth Division (herein respondent court). under these changed circumstances could be hardly faulted for issuing the writ of habeas corpus in favor of the private respondent. The Court nonetheless urged the Chief of Staff to act on the petitioner's case "with all deliberate speed. The mantle of protection accorded by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus "extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person is deprived of his liberty. He contended that his continued confinement under the circumstances amounted to an "illegal restraint of liberty" correctable only by the court's "issuance of the high prerogative writ of habeas corpus. 1991 dismissed respondent's petition for habeas corpus. Held: In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial. the private respondent was being held in the detention center for eleven months without charges being filed against him. Were we to uphold the proposition that our courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction because the law itself provides no time frame for the proper military authorities to review the general court martial's dismissal of the respondent's case would mean 79 | P a g e ." 6 In a Resolution dated May 29. 1992 respondent filed a second petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals where he assailed his continued detention at the ISG Detention Center in spite of the dismissal of all the charges against him. at the time of the first petition. or by which the rightful custody any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. 1991 on the ground that pre-trial investigation for the charges against the respondent was already ongoing before a Pre-Trial and Investigative (PTI) Panel of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO). Petitioner next contends that the Decision of the respondent court dated June 3. the court cannot accept petitioners' submission that the absence of any specific provision limiting the time within which records of general courts martial should be forwarded to the appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the case would deny private respondent — or any military personnel facing charges before the General Courts Martial." As we emphasized hereinbefore. On May 27. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Maj. 1992. Malajacan" and to show lawful cause for the latter's continued detention. Commanding General of the Philippine Army "to produce the person of Lt. May the respondent court not impose a time frame for the Chief of Staff to act on the respondent's case where the law itself provides none. General Arturo Enrile. the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals ordered petitioners Lt. The pre-trial investigative panel had not yet been constituted. The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights. The respondent court. and we repeat it once more. The factual circumstances are hardly similar. First. the JAGO's Pre-trial Investigative Panel had dismissed all cases against the petitioner and endorsed the filing of charges (under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code) with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

At such point or stage. 47622. 23 MAR 1984 Reynaldo R. Manila. the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation. entitled "People of the Philippines. NO. Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. be assisted by counsel. The following day. The abovecited provisions of the Constitution are clear. 85Facts: BAYOT VS. without a warrant of arrest. an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner. They leave no room for equivocation. complainant Erlinda B. Plaintiff vs. at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law. for the commission of an offense. On Mach 16. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator. this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it 80 | P a g e . Thereafter. Accordingly. On 23 July 1979.G. "that one is a companion.R. among other things. L-56291 JUNE 27. Issue: Whether or not the conduct of the line-up. According to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said. 1988 In Criminal Case No. while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980 but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them. including petitioner. The bureau of treasury and the teacher‘s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the no-existent obligations of the teacher‘s camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. without notice to. i. petitioner was told to sit down in front of her. is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law.L -61861. The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable.that we would be sanctioning the suggestion implicit in petitioner's argument that the Constitution's guarantees are guarantees available not to all of the people but only to most of them. petitioner was brought to Precinct 2. The use of the word ―office‖ applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged." After the Identification. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. Issue: Whether or not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law. NO. if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.R. 1987. during the lineup of five (5) detainees. he was arrested for vagrancy. Held: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation. Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner‘s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195. by Patrolman Arturo Palencia.e. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture. ALFREDO CRUZ G. 20 July 1979. Any person under investigation must. where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others. J. Cristopher Gamboa y Gonzales Petitioner alleges that: On 19 July 1979. 86Facts: CRISTOPHER GAMBOA VS . when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused.L-61776 TO NO. with some other employees from the said ministry. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court. In fact. and in the absence of counsel violated constitutional rights to counsel and to due process of the Petitioner. SANDIGANBAYAN . in several cases. 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.

while Entila was not given proper hearing even if he was called before a lawyer of the union for investigation. charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Since petitioner in the course of his Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense. he was. In fact. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of OnofreMalaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50. while the right may be waived. was meted by the trial court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However. the BISCOM entered into a two-year collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop clause with said union wherein it was stipulated that the agreement may be extended for a period of one year unless either party notifies the other in writing not less than 60 days prior to its expiry date of its intention to terminate the same.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. hence. did not undergo an impeachment proceeding as provided in its by-laws relative to the action to be taken against an officer of the union. therefore. This is also a question of fact which we cannot now look into being supported by substantial evidence. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being investigated" (par.be in the presence of counsel. NOVEM BER 14. not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of centrifugal sugar at Binalbagan. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. 88- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. On March 6. . but the request was denied. In fact. MA CADAEG 98 PHIL. MALIMIT GR NO. This right.03. (2) his identification card. or by any person in his behalf. at such stage. Illinois of the United States Federal Supreme Court. Far from what he professes. Negros Occidental.. We are not persuaded. For it was not he but the complainant who was being investigated at that time. He was.. or by anyone in his behalf. 1996 FACTS: Appellant Jose EncarnacionMalimit. at that stage. Likewise.. he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. hence. the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. RULING: Appellant asseverates that the admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet together with its contents. Entila and Tenazas joined the Fraternal Labor Organization (FLO). exact a confession to be used against him. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself. RULING: The court a quo likewise found that Tenazas. which is a labor union composed of employees and laborers of the BISCOM. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest. Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued. viz. ". (1) Malaki's residence certificate. petitioner was not yet entitled. 87- ISABELA SUGAR VS. FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not the corporation was denied the right to due process.000. not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. the police line-up (at least. The court found that during the alleged hearing not a single witness was presented as Entila was merely questioned regarding the contents of certain affidavits. Thus. the son of Entila who was a law student asked for postponement of the hearing so that he could prepare the defense of his father. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. appellant sought for their exclusion because during the custodial investigation. to counsel. wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki's wallet. . 995 The Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co. Entila and Victoriano Tenazas. and that. BISCOM for short. 1957. as put by Mr. it was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. violates his right against self-incrimination. 378 US 478. the police did not. When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up. 1964). Among its employees were Enrique C. when he was Identified in the police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. United States. in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest. 190775. therefore. Inc. engaged by the person arrested. 1952. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant‘s right to self incrimination was violated. and (3) bunch of keys. he was not informed of his constitutional rights. he was not yet entitled to counsel. 3. being a member of the Board of Directors of the FLO. Petition). and to pay the cost. is a 81 | P a g e . On May 3.

was for coercion. 4 Noting that the impending strike would prejudice the national interest as well as the welfare of some 350 workers and their families. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an objectevidence. 6 Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC. the BATU filed a notice of strike on claiming that the ATC had committed an unfair labor practice. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. Laguna. Acting on Criminal Case No. . . 2000 On 24 June 1997. 1987."11 The third. two by the personnel administrative officer of the ATC and the third by the Philippine Constabulary. 5 At the same time. the defendants were charged with staging an illegal strike. the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. 3 The conciliatory conference failed to settle the dispute. JUDGE ORLANDO R. The first issue was submitted to the Court in G. filed. The ATC then filed a petition asking the Ministry of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the matter or certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape. Laguna. Although it is true that the term ―homicide‖ as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense. 8 This order was itself set aside upon motion of both the BATU and the ATC in view of the appointment of new commissioners in the NLRC. 1 The case arose when later petitioner Asian Transmission Corporation terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento. The MOLE then returned the case to the respondent NLRC and directed it to expeditiously resolve all issues relating to the dispute. it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. RULING: A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. which was given due course on July 1.R. set aside the orders of NLRC and directly assumed jurisdiction of the dispute. Nos. The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction. later. 15973 and 15981 on the 82 | P a g e FACTS: . 75271-73 which is consolidated with the firstmentioned petition because of the Identity of their factual antecedents. the MOLE issued an order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. Judge Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and committed 72 of them to jail although he later ordered the release of 61 of them to the custody of the municipal mayor of Calamba. 12 In all three complaints.R.S THE HON. 77567. No. for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises. barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the workers through intimidation. at the same time enjoining the company to accept all returning workers. 7 For this reason. In rape with homicide.R. for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. This issue was provoked by three criminal complaints filed against the petitioning workers in the municipal trial court of Calamba. leaving only the vice-chairman in office.prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion. it enjoined the management from locking out its employees and the union from declaring a strike or similar concerted action. FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant was denied the right to due process. to extort communications from him . 89- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. NO. 2 As a result. 75271-73 JUNE 27. This order was reiterated upon the representation of the ATC that some 40 workers had declared a strike and were picketing the company premises. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. GALLARDE GR NO. harassment and force from reporting for work. 15984. FEBRUA RY 17. "adding that the union and the striking workers are ordered to return to work immediately. 13302. The first two complaints. admission of his guilt. par. were for "Violation of Article 265. TUICO G. in relation to Article 273 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. SARMIENT O V. because of the acceptance by President Aquino of the resignations of eight of its members. against his will. however. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. the accused can be convicted of the other." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips." The second issue was raised in G. and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape it is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense. GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide of a minor. Otherwise. the MOLE. the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability. 1988 . 90- CATALINO N. 13 The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest and the referral of the coercion charge to the NLRC and. vice-president of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU). 1.

ground that they came under the primary jurisdiction of the NLRC. the criminal prosecution of certain persons involved in the said strike may be validly restrained. conformably to the procedure laid down "to attain the industrial peace which is the primordial objectives of this law. 1376 JANUARY 21. 227. 265. NO. Laguna." and the third complaint relates to the alleged acts of coercion committed by the defendants in blocking access to the premises of the ATC. G.These circulars. require fiscals and other government prosecutors to first secure the clearance of the Ministry of Labor and/or the Office of the President "before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and the filing in court of the corresponding informations of cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute. on the ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in activities inimical to their employer's interest. J. of the Labor Code of the Philippines. those workers who refused to obey the said order and instead waged the restrained strike are not entitled to be paid for work not done or to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by their refusal to return thereto as ordered. 273. par. is justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the acts complained of are connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still pending in the NLRC. I. for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made. in relation to Art. 16 ISSUE: 1. whilst acting as postmaster at Calamba. The suspension of proceedings in the criminal complaints filed before the municipal court of Calamba. perpetual absolute disqualification. Worse. 15 This order was reiterated on September 21. P. indemnification to the Government in the sum of $1. who had succeeded Judge Tuico. the property of the Post-Office Department of the Government of the Philippine Islands. series of 1982. Otherwise. Several days after the case was presented. 9.000.. The Court holds that the return-to-work order should benefit only those workers who complied therewith and. conformably to the policy embodied in Circular No. series of 1986. gold. The court found the defendant to be guilty of the crime of embezzlement of public funds. as a general rule the prosecution of criminal offenses is not subject to injunction." including "allegations of violence. In view of this. It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal." before the three criminal cases were filed. 1904 The defendant was accused of the crime of embezzlement. and sentenced him to be imprisoned for the period of ten years and one day of presidio mayor. the accused presented a demurrer to the said complaint. and Circular No. the workers who contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. gold currency of the United States.000. Then issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Judge Tuico from enforcing the warrant of arrest and further proceeding with the case. contrary to the statutes made and provided in such cases. 91- THE UNITED STATES VS . pending such determination. issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the implementation of B. 1987. the sum of $1. or the employer's premises. of the Province of Laguna. The first two complaints. 14 As the judge had not ruled on these motions. and having in his charge public funds belonging to the postoffice." It does not appear from the record that such clearance was obtained. VALENTINE KARELSEN. withdrew. HELD: It must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. 15." and made to apply to Judge Paterno Lustre. physical injuries. coercion. Valentine Karelsen. briefly stated. That the said J.R. 2. which must be 83 | P a g e FACTS: . they win also claim payment for work not done. 1903. Two of the criminal complaints were filed by the personnel administrative officer of the ATC although he vigorously if not convincingly insists that he was acting in his personal capacity. are entitled to be paid for work they have actually performed. the exception must apply in the case at bar. On the second issue. "to relieve tensions that might prevent an amicable settlement of the dispute between the parties in the compulsory arbitration proceedings now going on in the Department of Labor. are for "violation of Art.P. the three criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC. assault upon a person in authority and other similar acts of intimidation obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of operation of the machines of such factory. the petitioners came to this Court in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Conversely. regardless of the outcome of the compulsory arbitration proceedings. Whether or not a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the National Labor Relations Commission pending determination of the legality of the strike. on the 2nd day of April. for his own use and benefit. 2. Blg. The defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The cause thereupon proceeded to trial on the same date. as expressly captioned. Whether or not.

etc. He is charged with embezzling "$1. Cohen) said: "It is true. the court says. In all criminal prosecutions the accused has an absolute right to be personally present during the entire proceeding from arraignment to sentence if he so desires.046. or his counsel to dispense with the provisions of General Orders. 2. who is daily receiving and disbursing large sums of money. United States currency. 84 | P a g e Facts: . 92167-68 On January 7. that he was not brought into open court and informed by the judge there of the sentence.R. Jose Abales started a search for him. (Hopt vs. At that time. Green (15 Cal. General Orders. and we fail to see how he can in any way misunderstand the allegation or be confused in making his defense under it." In the present case the books of the accused showed that he had the sum of $1. a patrol of the San Jose City police noticed a jeepney parked along the shoulder of the road. from the arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court. The defendant appealed from said sentence. Appellants were then placed under arrest. 574. 1987. appellant Teody Pamela approached Ronaldo and offered to hire said jeepney. rode the jeepney. Suddenly. belonging to the Post-Officce Department on the 1st day of April. 512). NOS. 110 U. HELD: Judge Baldwin. provides that "the defendant must be personally present at the time of pronouncing judgment. a friend of Ronaldo. JOSE LEGASPI Y RAMIREZ G. While the jeepney was waiting for passengers. the jeepney started and sped away. and by the seventh and eight George IV. ISSUE: 1. Section 41 of General Orders. together with accused Manuel Torres and Cresencio Palacio. there were about seven other passengers. 1903. the only description which can be made is by a general statement of the amount which his books disclose. The police then radioed their headquarters for assistance. and is of the value of twenty dollars of our money. No. No." The offense here was a felony. But in the case of larceny the property was in the possession of the owner.) It is not within the power of the court. of the following day. the jeepney refused to stop. The record must also show that the accused was present at every stage of the prosecution. as conductor. Ronaldo drove the jeepney to service the Novaliches-Bagong Silang route in Kalookan City. Notwithstanding the warning shots fired by the police. and to the payment of costs. appellant Pamela. Ronaldo was accompanied by Ariel Heloma. the accused. 58. and not by the judge but by the clerk. section 48. Is it to be argued that a cashier. 58 (sec. including appellants. if the conviction is for a felony. and the cause remanded with direction to the court below to pronounce the judgment in accordance with the provisions of section 41. in commenting upon this case (People vs. forcing it to stop. S. without disturbing the verdict. In such a case. Dominico Mirasol. gold. in the case of People vs. if his accounts are correctly kept. as to the personal presence of the accused at the trial.. Utah. a description of the pieces of denominations of the money is absolutely impossible. for example. Thereafter. The evidence adduced at the trial does not prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. chapter 29. enacted that "it shall be sufficient to allege embezzlement to be of money without specifying any particular coin or valuable security. We are of the opinion that for this error the sentence of the court below should be reversed. The court erred in pronouncing judgment against the accused for a "delito grave" in the absence of the accused." A complaint for the crime of embezzlement ought to state the description of the property embezzled with the same particularity as is required in a complaint for larceny. continuous employment as a clerk. No. while in embezzlement where the offense is committed by a person in the course of a long. but we think we may well infer that a twenty-dollar piece of the gold coin of the United States is current coin of the United States. At about 2:30 a." This allegation is in substance in the terms of his own accounts. gold. 92- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS.made effective by the bond given by the accused. boarded the jeepney. money should be described as so many pieces of the current gold or silver coin of the country.m. We mean by the phrase "at the trial" to include everything that is done in the course of the trial. legal money of the United States. and he is presumed to know its particular description.64. 41). Torres and Palacio. When Ronaldo failed to go home that night. Mirasol alighted before the jeepney reached its terminal.000. who daily embezzles sums of money for months is to be discharged from liability simply because the prosecution can not give a minute description by piece or denomination of all the money so misappropriated? England has taken advanced ground upon this question. It is admitted that the sentence of the court below was announced to the accused in the jail. cashier. 58. or postmaster. A road block was placed along the route of the jeepney.. In cases of felony he can not waive this right. The court in case of felony must insist upon the presence of the accused in court during every step in the trial.

33. Art.R.D. MONCUPA VS. the petitioner filed the instant petition. the accused were deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them (1987 Constitution. Hence. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. was arrested on April 22. No. Street and Quezon Avenue. Abales had a single stab wound while Heloma suffered multiple stab wounds. 2.Upon arraignment. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay. and taking into consideration [the] presence of one aggravating circumstance without the attendance of any mitigating circumstance. on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member. NO. the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. Issues: whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. Were the accused deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them? Did the trial court err in finding a conspiracy to commit the complex crime of robbery with double homicide and in convicting them merely on the basis of circumstantial evidence? While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision. Thus.A. it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. On April 23. 1982. Temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of the actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents. 14[2]). Moncupa D. this appeal. in the light of subsequent developments. at the corner of D. whose evaluation of the evidence is accorded respect. G. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons. JUAN PONCE ENRILE 93. where there is present a denial of due process. The circumstantial evidence found by the trial court is sufficient to convict appellants. L-63345 Petitioner Efren C. it is significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has. III. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. Quezon City. become arbitrary. whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release Held: The release of the petitioners being merely 'temporary'. Kalookan City. two separate informations were filed against the petitioner. Both their hands were tied behind them. it cannot convict the accused of a complex crime constitutive of the various crimes alleged in the two information. Consequently.M. We see no reason to depart from the findings of fact of the trial court. the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. 6539. And yet. Moncupa. 1982 at about 10:50 P.. The requisites provided for in Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence regarding the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence have been complied with. Hence. where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary. 93Facts: EFREN C. Held: 1. together with others. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms. Sec. Issue: 1. The accused were charged with double murder charging and violation of R. 85 | P a g e . 2. one. as amended. the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court. hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The cases were jointly tried and the court rendered that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with double homicide as defined and penalized under paragraph 1.The bodies of Ronaldo Abales and Ariel Heloma were found that morning in Camarin. it was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. After two separate investigations. for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P. During the pendency of this petition. 33. Quezon City where he was detained.

A close look at the law in question will show that no such power has been granted the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. NO. G. consequently. and Gregorio Bakerel are the tenants on the land. which invades and impairs constitutionally protected personal or property rights.R. In the case at bar. the private respondents admitted that the petitioners are the lawful owners of the parcels of land described in the petition. FERNANDO ESCONDE. -VERSUS.The same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the ―speedy disposition of cases‖ guarantee. HON. They also contended that the court has no jurisdiction over the case. CONRADO ESTRELLA. ordered the respondents to cease and desist from gathering fruits from the coconut trees in the land until the petition for injunction shall have been heard and resolved. In the first paragraph of Section 2 of the law in question. confirm. perhaps.the respondent judge issued the controversial order suspending hearings on the case pending the comment and/or certification thereon by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. to the prejudice of said petitioners. or his authorized representative. more opportunities for corrupt practices. FEDERICO B. CABALL ERO. reverse or modify said preliminary determination as the evidence and substantial merits of the case may warrant. and not merely its administration. is not binding upon the court. ALFONSO. or its operation. 1987 Petitioners claiming to be the absolute owners of several contiguous parcels of land planted with coconut trees. reason for the delay.‖ However. Gingoog City. After hearing. L-45647 AUGUST 21. San Isidro. which is purely agrarian in nature and cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. the second paragraph of the same section provides that ―the preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. while the rest. situated in Salubsub. This Court has categorically declared that there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative powers on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of judicial review is expressly given by statute.94- MANUEL Q. and prejudice caused by the delay. judge or hearing officer may. This is a matter left for Congress to re-examine in the exercise of its legislative authority. The challenge must be based on a clear showing that it is the law. it is stated that a case which seeks the ejectment. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. AND FRANK RODRIG UEZ. FACTS: ISSUE: 1. CESAR NAVARRO.‖ HELD: It is an erroneous assumption that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not an ejectment case (or a case designed to harass or remove a tenant) filed against a tenant.HON. however. there is no diminution of judicial power involved in the operation of the law nor an encroachment on the independence of the judiciary by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. after due hearing. are the harvesters of the coconut lands. JR. judge or hearing officer to whom the case is certified. Answering. These are length of delay. may be tried by the courts. Besides. The defects in the bureaucratic system do not. harassment or ouster of a tenant from the landholding should be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform ―for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties. Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction over the case 2. In the determination of whether or not the right to a ―speedy trial‖ has been violated. that the respondents Fernando Esconde. Cesar Navarro. assertion of the right or failure to assert it. constitute valid arguments against the merits of legislative policy intended to protect the legitimate tenant-tiller. in accordance with PD 1038. it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of PD 1038. certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. filed a petition for injunction with restraining order and damages against the herein private respondents for having allegedly entered the aforementioned parcels of land and illegally harvested the fruits of the coconut trees planted therein without petitioners‘ knowledge and consent. but their motion was denied. 86 | P a g e . however. They claimed. Whether or not PD 1038 violates the constitutional provision on the right to a ―speedy disposition of cases. Hence. the respondent judge found that the issuance of a temporary restraining order would be proper in the interest of justice and.‖ and that ―said court. except Francisco (Frank) Rodriguez who is allegedly an investigator designated by the Land Reform Farmers‘ Association to organize the tenants into an association to put up a solid front in a program to help the New Society and to secure the success of the land reform program. the present recourse. it is true that the referral of cases to the Department of Agrarian Reform opens the door to more bureaucratic red tape and. CABALLERO AND LELITA A. The petitioners moved for reconsideration of this order. GR EGORIO BAKEREL.‖ Since the r eferral of ejectment and other cases against a tenant to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is only for the preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties and the findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform are not binding on the courts.. To strike down a law on the ground that it violates the guarantee of ―speedy disposition of cases‖ requires more than a citation of what may be a misfeasance or malfeasance of a public officer whose duty and responsibility it is to apply and administer the law.

Tormon and Hudieras and others were the basis of the criminal complaint for robbery with homicide filed by Lieutenant Lujan an in the municipal court against Severino Duero. or any other means which vitiates the 87 | P a g e . The trouble is that at the trial Severino repudiated his alleged oral confession and even claimed that he was maltreated by the police. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations. convicting Severino Duero of robbery with homicide. and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure.R. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Montaño and Tranquilino Duero. No force. Issue: whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant. NO. The sworn statements of Alag. Severino Duero‘s counsel DE OFICIO in this Court contends that the trial court erred in admitting the oral testimony on Severino Duero‘s oral confession. 1981 FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dated April 17. DUERO G. between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy. which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities. Alag said that Severino Duero made his confession in the course of their conversation on the way to the police station and not by reason of a formal investigation. violence. Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense. the chief of police of Cabatuan. Lujan. Patrolman Rolando N. violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure Held: Compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians does not violate that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. intimidation. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. The Solicitor General agrees with the counsel DE OFICIO ‗s contention that Severino‘s oral confession is inadmissible in evidence by reason of Article IV of the Constitution which provides: SEC.Hence this petition. stated in his sworn statement before the mayor that Duero admitted that he took part in the robbery with homicide. 1979. law and justice cannot hesitate. Patrolman Rufino Tormon. NO. Cenizal. The facts of the case are as follows: Fausta Condino Vda. Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision. 16444 Petitioners. sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs of Fausta Duero an indemnity of fifteen thousand pesos and the sum of two thousand pesos which he took from her (Criminal Case No. L-52016 MAY 13. The court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflorto submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. 8860). the representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional provision. and to be informed of such right. was feloniously killed in her house located at Barrio Banguit. Unfortunately. De Duero. we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof. in finding that robbery with homicide was committed. Iloilo. The principal evidence of the prosecution is the testimony of Lieutenant Tomas C. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. Lujan was not the only police officer who heard Severino Duero‘s confession. undeterred by merely sentimental influences. No eyewitness testified as to the commission of the offense. threat. RICARDO SUMMERS G. in giving credence to the testimonies of Lujan. 96- PEOPLE V. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. all too frequently the modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer. questions which are put to them. Cabatuan. 20.95Facts: EMETERIA VILLAFLOR VS. Alag. corroborated in his sworn statement Alag‘s declaration as to Severino Duero‘s confession. Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. another member of the arresting team. Lujan declared that Severino voluntarily confessed to him that he (Severino) committed the robbery with homicide but Severino refused to sign a confession.R. a member of the arresting team that picked up Duero and brought him at Lujan. without any mental evasion.

HELD: Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. receipts. to be disposed of in accordance with law — Respondents-prosecutors contentions (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law. and things seized from the officers of the corporations. correspondence. not mentioned in the warrants. a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations of which they were officers. (2) cash money. ledgers. Severino Duero‘s oral confession is inadmissible in evidence. insofar as the papers. warehouses. DIOKNO. regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. Without that confession. documents. and (3) that. and to seize several personal property. portfolios. issued on different dated." or "used or intended to be used as the means ofcommitting the offense. Petitioners contentions are: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents. but the injunction was maintained as regards those found & seized in the residences of petitioners. in any event. were cured by petitioners' consent. Tariff and Customs Laws. were actually seized. IV of the 1973 Constitution . WHEREFORE. directed to any peace officer. stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense. his confession is inadmissible in evidence. (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner. ISSUE: Did the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of his oral confession during the custodial interrogation when the accused was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel. whether or not petitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants. Petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig. action for certiorari. ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations.free will shall be used against him. balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as required by Sec. books and things to be seized. Art. The accused is acquitted. Hence. journals. The writ was partially lifted or dissolved. to search the perons named and/ or the premises of their offices. and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactionsincluding disbursements receipts. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be admissible in evidence. if any." which is described in the applicationsadverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws. the death penalty is set aside. Arizona which specifies the following procedural safeguards for in-custody interrogation of accused persons: The above procedure was not followed by the police in this case. papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants. mandamus & injunction. 97- STONEHILL V. the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners. typewriters. credit journals. as "the subject of the offense. and (5) the documents. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution were adopted from the ruling in Miranda vs. the prosecution‘s other evidence is not sufficient to establish Duero‘s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. financial records. 88 | P a g e . (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them. The new provisions in section 20. several judges (respondent-judges). (2) that the defects of said warrants. 20. vouchers. and/ or residences. 20 SCRA 383 (1967) Upon application of the officers of the government herein referred to as RespondentsProsecutors. Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." FACTS: The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. to wit: Books of accounts. prohibition.

000. diaries. a doctor of medicine. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws. a driver and Martin‘s secretary. 2 is no. Martin‘s passport. P5. HELD: (1) The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof. Sec. On appeal. to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws. On 26 March 1982. After trial. and in the presence of her mother. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities. A person. Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.(2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in 89 | P a g e . and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party. declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin‘s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Alfredo Martin. as nominal damages. papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Dr. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a ―lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise. it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause. Indeed. Martin and his alleged paramours. & b. Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband‘s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. (3) If the answer in no. Branch X.‖ The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Dr. It would be the legal heresy. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. by contracting marriage. greetings cards. Tariff and Customs Laws." In other words.000.‖ Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible ―for any purpose in any proceeding." — as alleged in the aforementionedapplications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or 98- ZULUETA VS. or committed specific omissions. as prescribed by law. with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 2 of the Consti: a. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth therein. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin. no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. w/n said documents. 20 FEBRUARY 1996] Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Tariff and Customs Laws. The constitutional injunction declaring ―the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable‖ is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her hus band‘s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. and photographs. of the highest order. As a consequence. (2) No. for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts. and to pay the costs of the suit. it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. whether or not search warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof are valid. regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations. As a matter of fact.00. Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. Two points must be stressed in connection w/ Art. as moral damages and attorney‘s fees. COURT OF APPEALS [GR 107383.00. separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners. the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. III. violating a given provision of our criminal laws. Martin and to pay him P5. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. Indeed. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta. cancelled checks. Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband.

confidence by one from the other during the marriage. with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: . Held: The President has the power to carry out order of deportation but may not order arrest during investigation.· Re: the extent of the Pres‘ power to investigate does it include authority to arrest? May it be delegated? Here‘s the history…· Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 provided for filing of a bond to secure appearance of alien under investigation· Pres Quirino (EO 398) in January 1951 reorganized the deportation board to issue the warrant of arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release <this is incompatible with….· Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security. Act No. 398. series of 1951. therefore. under EO 398 of Pres Quirino which authorized the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest of aliens during investigation (on the ground that such power is vested in the legislature and that there must be a legislation authorizing the same) Whether or not Executive Order No. under Commonwealth Act No. or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own ountry by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation.· Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code SEC.>3. of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. houses. The right of the People to be secure in their persons. 1963 In May 1952 petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board with having purchased US Dollars in the total sum of $130. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. and inferentially a ratification.613. and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. by the Commissioner of Immigration.· Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held to be essential to and complement the power to deport aliens under sec 69 of the revised administrative code. 613)." While it did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens and merely lays down the procedure. by order of the President. pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. 99- QUA CHEE GAN VS. quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. 52.. DEP ORTATION BOARD G. to produce witnesses in his own behalf. FACTS: ISSUE: 1. deportation of an undesirable alien maybe effected in two ways: 1. and 2. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien is a clear indication of the recognition. 000withoutthe necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines and having remitted the money to Hong Kong and to themselves. to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and 90 | P a g e . by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. is valid/legal 2. L-10280 SEPTEMBER 30. And no. and repatriation wherefrom. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. save for specified exceptions. and their exclusion. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power.. Under the present and existing laws. expelled.SEC.· Warrants were issued but upon filing for a surety and cash bond they were released. Whether or not the President has the power to deport aliens and delegate those powers. power may not be delegated. after due investigation. upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners. deportation. NO. conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent." (Comm. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported.R. But one thing is freedom of communication. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines. welfare and interest of the State.

" (Sec 1. of course. 398. under their provisions. and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Hence. any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination. the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. the same is declared a popular right of the people and. As a consequence. The extent of the curtailment of liberty dependent upon conditions determined by the discretion of the person issuing a warrant. as already stated. But. 91 | P a g e . certainly.· Justice Laurel said that this constitutional provision is not among the rights of the accused. there is already an order of deportation. This requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause.· The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when. series of 1951. and particularly describing the place to be searched. decreed cancelled. Philippine Constitution). the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens. Art. Bill of Rights.the witnesses he may produce. the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest. Executive Order No. III. during the investigation. is declared illegal. Under our Constitution. and the persons or things to be seized. To carry out the order of deportation. In other words. indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country.

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