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[Francoise Dastur] Telling Time

[Francoise Dastur] Telling Time

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[Francoise Dastur] Telling Time
[Francoise Dastur] Telling Time

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Telling Time

1 ·
´¹´/-A5 NO:
\-^ w -A º ^ *
© ?OOOTheAthlonePress
ÒriginallypublishedasDire Ie Temps © £ncreMarine1991
Culture IoragranttowardsthecostoItranslation.
A catalogue record of this book is available
jom the British Librar
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Oata
[OireIetemps. £nglishj
p. cm.
1. Time. ?. Phenomenology. J. Ieidegger,Martin,--1889÷1976.
1. Title.
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·. ·
Jothcmcmory oI
³utbor'Notc x
Iru/oyuc Xl
G/ossaq XlV
I JhcIdcaofa!hcnomcnoIogicaIChrono-Iogy I
2 !hcnomcnoIogyandJcmporaIity I7
3 IogicandMctaphysics 37
Jhc voiccandthcvorId
4 JhcIogosofMortaIs 57
³¿¿cndix. Cbruno-/oyics
Byvay oIan cpigraph, aIIovmcto guotcIromIcIix
Kavaisson's `!cssin' in Zictionnairc dc Iéayoyic
¦Icrdinand Buisson, I 882) this scntcncc, apt aIso Ior
thc artoIvriting, Iromthc author oIZc/'babitudc,a
vork in vhich Ï havc aIvays sccn thc vcry modcI oI
uous /inc, itsycncratiuc axu as it ucrc, aduanccs
acrossits/cnytbandbrcadtb /i[cauaucbrca[inyu¿
and this rcmark oI !cidcggcr's rcportcd by Kogcr
Municr,inStè/c¿ourHcidcyycr¦!aris.ArIuycn, Iºº2),
p. I7.
³ ucry sim¿/c /anyuayc, bcrc¿/ics. Iincyanz
cinµcbcS¿racbc, uboscriyourui//consut/cssintbc
ucrbiayc (Gcrcdc) o¡ana¿¿arcnttccbnicity tbanin
- Intbc¡uturc,¿bi/oso¿bica/boo[sui//no/onycr
bcucry /mycboo[s. . .
Author' Note
Jhc IoIIoving tcxt rcproduccs vithout signiLcant
aItcrations ¦vith thc cxccption oIthc cpiIoguc, addcd
subscgucntIy) thc principaI argumcnt oIa thcsis sub-
Jo cIari| thc contcxt oIthis argumcnt, it sccmcd
ncvcr comc to thoughts. Jhcy comc to us,' vrotc
!cidcggcr in onc oIthc pagcs bcaring vitncss to thc
cxpcricnccoIthinking, broughttogcthcrin a vork oI
'Irom thcIxpcricnccoIJhinking'.
Ïtisthccominy initspurc nakcdncss, notthc com-
ingoIsomcthing oroIsomconc,but thc comingitscq
and its inapparcnt cvcn) vhich viII bc in gucstion
inyjéc/aircic|oIa thought thatcanprovidc,Iorbcings
capabIc oI dcath, thc spacc oI a habitabIc c/cariny
jc/airièrc|,thisis somcthingthatdidnotavaitthcbirth
Iorthought,as !cidcggcr rccaIIs atthc bcginning
oIthc "Icttcr on!umanism", is, in thc doubIc scnsc
is in thc grammaroIourIanguagcs thc vord "to bc"
samc timc taking carc oI it and giving thc rcsponsc
Buthov can thc vcrycucnt oIthought bc thought,
thissimu/tancity invhich tvo movcmcnts oIoppositc
dircctionarconc`!ovcanthe]asbo¡ /iybtninyvhich
at oncc unitcs and disjoints vorId and thought bc
Jhat synthcsis isaIvays aIso diacrcsis, thatgathcr-
said vithoutbccomingapparcntinthcdoubIcphonct-
icandscmanticarticuIationoIcvcrysayiny. º
Ior this fIash is tbc uct¸ cucnt o¡/anyuayc, vhich
docs notmcan thathuman bcings arc anachronicaIIy
thc mcasurc oIaII things but, on thc contrary, that
thcrc is no assignabIc origin oI thc diaIoguc that
Te EOn AOrOe Eau'ov au�rv:l it is propcr to
brcathctobcaAOrOe thatincrcascsoIitscII,!cracIitus
says, and cIscvhcrc adds that it is thc dcpth oIthis
AOrOe, rcgardcd by him as inscparabIc Irom thc vast-
ncss juastité| oIthc vorId, vhich rcndcrs thc Iimits oI
brcath unIocatabIc.´ AristotIc aIso undcrstands
as an E1t8octe Ete au'o,3 a grovth into itscII, thus
granting to vhat hc cIscvhcrc namcs crVT OE).lav­
nll4 ¦amcaningIuI sound) an intcrnaI transccndcncc
prcscncc. Jhis is thc Ioundation oIthc intrinsic his-
spccch, Iikc history, thc knovIcdgc and thc rcsuIt oI
itscIIand notthc monotonous itcration oIthc idcnti-
Jhis intcrnaI diaIcctic oIIanguagc, vhich aIvays
spcaks atthcsamctimcoIsomcthingcIscandoIitscII
and vhichis rcIatcd to thc structuraI intcr-subjcctivi-
takcsonitsIuII scnsconIy vhcnthoughton thc basis
is aIso homoIogy. And, abovc aII, it "produccs" onIy
thc "nibi/oriyinarium'' oIthc vorId. Ïtcrcatcs thcrc-
Iorc, according to thc otaKocl0< £OtK01a6 that
!armcnidcs aIrcady sav coming to pass in naming,
onIy this j cvcI oI nothing Ior vhich dcath is thc
JhcoriginaI thcsisuscd,and this transIationrctains,a
numbcr oI Iorcign vords takcn Irom Grcck and
Gcrman. Jhis shortgIossary is mcrcIy a guidc to thc
rcgion,opcndomain invhicha bcingcan
Ïn addition, anoriginaIIrcnch tcrm has on occasion
bccn guotcd by thc transIator in sguarc brackcts IoI-
The Idea of a Phenomenological
)udycmcnt is our oIdcstbcIicI, our most habituaI
hoIding-truc or hoIding-untruc. . . . ÏI Ï say.
an activity and asccondtimcas asubjcct.Ï havc
bcingthatisnotidcnticaI to thc cvcnt butrathcr
Can vc tcII timc` Jhis gucstion might initiaIIy sccm
pointIcss, iIvc considcr that cvcry Ianguagc, and a
¡ortiori thc Ianguagcs oI thc Ïndo-Iuropcan IamiIy,
vhosc morphoIogy rcsts on thc distinction bctvccn
noun and vcrb and vhich arc charactcriscd by thc
dcvcIopmcnt oIvcrbaI Iorms, is givcn notas a simpIc
`scmiotic' practicc that vouId cstabIish thc invcntory
oI aIrcady givcn `objccts' but as an `activity' oI thc
articuIationoIthc prcscncc in thc vorId oIa `subjcct'
vho can bc scparatcd Irom it onIy `in thc
• e .
YctthcgucstionoIthc tcmporaIity oIdiscourschas
not ccascd to hauntsccrctIythc cntircVcstcrn phiIo-
sophicaI tradition that can bc said to havc bccn born
oI thc rcûcction oI thc Grcck thinkcrs upon thcir
idiom. Vi¡houtundcrtakinghcrc an invcntoryoIthc
stcps that Icd to thc `nominaIist' ontoIogy oI thc
!Iatonic thcory oIidcas, vc mustncvcrthcIcss bricûy
rccaII thc part pIaycd by thc `grammaticaI'` avakcn-
ingin thc cIaboration oIthc modc oIthought tcrmcd
`phiIosophy' in Grcccc. Bruno SncII, in his coIIcction
oI`studics dcvotcd to thc birth oIIuropcan phiIoso-
phy', cntitIcd Zic Intdcc[uny dcs Gci·tcs (Tbc
Ziscouer¸o¡tbcMind),notcs thc dccisivc charactcr oI
thctransIormation oIthcdcmonstrativcpronouninto
thc dchnitc articIc Ior thc Iormation oIphiIosophicaI
thoughtand cmphasiscsCiccro'sdiIhcuIty intransIat-
ButoncmustaIso rccaIIthcacccntpIaccd inthcgcnc-
sis oIphiIosophicaI thought, Irom thc singuIarity oI
thc !armcnidian sov ¦bcing) to thc !Iatonic Je'e�t<
participIc.` Ior this grammaticaI `catcgory', vhich
attaincd thc highcst point oIits dcvcIopmcnt in thc
Grcck Ianguagc, is thc origin oIthc duaIity oIscnsc,
simuItancousIy cxistcntiaI and catcgoriaI, oIthc con-
ccptoIbcing. Ïtis thiscombinationoIcsscntiaI-bcing
andaccidcntaI-bcingthatonchndshypostasiscd inthc
1oov ¦bcing) studicdby AristotcIian rpo' ¢iLooo(io
¦Iirst!hiIosophy), and it vas thc sourcc oIthc duaI
`ontoIogicaI' and thcoIogicaI probIcm poscd by
AristotIcinrcsponscto thcgucstion' 1oov¦"Vhatis
bcing` ") and oI thc IundamcntaI structurc that thc
Jhcsc tvo cxampIcs shov thc importancc Icnt to
TbcIdca o¡aIbcnomcno/oyica/Cbruno-/oyy
naming and to thc noun in thc dcvcIopmcnt oIcon-
ccptuaI thought. As has oItcn bccn rcmarkcd, thc
!Iatonic gucstionoIcsscncc coincidcs vith thatoIthc
noun, and it is prcciscIy bccausc oI this priviIcgc
accordcd to thc noun ovcr thc vcrb that phiIosophy
vas to bc dravn Irom thc bcginning to oricnt itscII
tovards thc scarch Ior scparatc Iorms.º ÏI thc
AristotcIianrcsponsctothc!Iatonic¿o: pio¡to�¦scpara-
tion) consists in shoving that `bcingissaid in scvcraI
prctation', this docsnotmcan thatthcanaIysisoI Ian-
guagcundcrtakcn undcr thc titIc!1epiep]t¡|veio� (On
Intcr¿rctation)makcs thc vcrb thcccntrcoIthcpropo-
sition´ Cn thc contrary, Ior AristotIc `thcvcrb ¦peµo)
is aIvays thc sign ¦oµov) oIvhat is said oIanotbcr
thing, knovIcdgc oI things bcIonging to a subjcct
¦1xoxei¡tevov) or containcd in a subjcct',° vhich
impIics thatthc vcrb itscIIisonIy aprcdicatcand that
thcnoun¦ovoµo) isthc supportoIthcintcntionaIrcIa-
tion vith thc objcct. Jhis is vhy thc vcrb, takcn in
mcaningIuI, is in rcaIity a noun,¨ cvcn though, con-
trary to thc noun, vhich is `vithout rcIcrcncc to
timc',''itadds to its ovn mcaningthatoItimc. Ïtis
signihcant hcrc that this x poooe¡io¡ov¿povov, rcIcr-
cncc to timc, docs not comc to bc idcntihcd vith thc
signihcs thc prcscntassumption oIthcproposition by
thc spcakcr. Iov, this happcns onIy at thc syntbctic
IcvcI oI thc proposition as thc dchnition oI thc
ncgativccxprcssionas aoptO'ov PTa, indchnitcvcrb,
attcsts.'´ Jhus, vc can cIcarIy scc hcrc thc dchnition
oInounand vcrbaspurcIyIogicaIIorms vhoscintcr-
Iacing aIonc constitutcs thc AOYO� indcpcndcntIy oI
thcirrcIationto `rcaI'tcmporaIity.'`
Jhc rcIation to timc, hovcvcr, is cIIcctivcIy
inscribcd in thc vcry syntax oIGrcck vhich, bcing
Ïndo-Iuropcan, is an inûcctcd Ianguagc.'¹ Morcovcr,
this is hov it undcrstood itscII in thc trcatisc on thc
anaIysis oIIinguistic cxprcssion. Iept ePllveta� (On
Intcr¿rctation). AristotIc cmpIoys thc samc tcrm
1'om� to dcsignatc thc dccIcnsion oIthc noun as Ior
thc dccIcnsion oIthc vcrb,'` and this vord, Irom thc
vcrbm1'c, "toIaII",vas tobc transIatcd by thc Iatin
casus and rcscrvcd by thc grammarians oI thc
!cIIcnistic cpochIorthc dccIcnsion oIthcsubstantivc
aIonc, vhiIst thc vord eyAtm�, vhich mcans `in-
cI:ning', scrvcd to dcsignatc thc inûcctions oI thc
modaIitics oI thc vcrb. Ïn thc scction oI ³n
Introduction to Mcta¿bysics dcvotcd to `Jhc grammar
oI thc vord "bcing'' !cidcggcr rcmarks that thc
choicc oI thcsc tcrms vas duc to thc Iact that thc
Grccks undcrstood bcingonthcbasisoIabcingstood
up, rcmaining standing and so IrccIy achicving a
stabIc instaIIationinthcncccssityoIitsIimit.Ïtisvhat
hoIds itscII in this vay, in itscII, Irom its Iimit, and
thus oIIcrs itscIIto thc Iook vhich thcy tcrmcd etBo�
ortBw, onthc basisoIanungucstioncd qray/os) idcn-
tihcation oIbcing vith parousia or prcscncc.'º Irom
this vc undcrstand that AristotIc dcsignatcs proposi-
TbcIdca o¡aIbcnomcno/oyica/Cbrono-/oyy
T'(Oe< PTI'O<, as tcnscs oIvcrbs, bccausc in both
cascs non-prcscncc hnds itscIIrcIatcd to thc Iorm oI
`obIiguc', rctrospcctivc or anticipatory vicv. Jhc
`Iorm'oIprcscnccthus hnds itscIIprcscrvcdina¿riu-
Vhatvc arccngagcdvith hcrcisthus,on thc onc
hand, thc birth oI thc IogicaI Iorm oI j udgcmcnt
undcrstood as thc synthcsis oIconccpts and, on thc
othcr, thc impIicit undcrstanding oI discoursc as thc
prcscntation oI bcing j/'étant|. Vhat charactcriscs
AristotIc's thought is prcciscIy thatthc importancc hc
attributcs to IogicaI synthcsis divcrts his attcntion, so
to spcak, Irom thc propcrIy `discIosivc' charactcr oI
discoursc, yct vithout thc Iattcr having aIrcady bccn
rcduccd to thc status oIthcpurcand simpIc `proposi-
tion' . Ïtisthis singuIarpositionoIAristotIc's vhichis
anaIyscd atIcngth by !cidcggcr in his coursc oI
Iº?5÷ó cntitIcd Ioyi[. Zic Irayc nacb dcr ßabrbcit
¦"Iogic. Jhc QucstionoIJruth"). !cidcggcr's taskat
this pcriod, vhich sav thc compIction oIIciny and
icaI truth, vhich !usscrI had dchncd as idcntity and
`vaIidity'÷ rcprcscntinginthisrcspcctthccuImination
oIthc vhoIcIogicaI tradition through anintcrroga-
tion oIits historicaI Ioundations. Vhat cmcrgcs Irom
thcanaIysis to vhichhcsubmits thcAristotcIian dch-
nition oIthc AOYO< <TOca'KO< ¦apophantic) is that
thc dctcrmining and synthcsising charactcr oI thc
IogicaI proposition, though Ioundcd upon cxhibition
or prcscntation (³µfucuuny) constitutivc oI thc pri-
mary Iunction oI thc L oyoç, can ncvcrthcIcss bc
dctachcd Irom itand prcscnt itscIIas a purc rcIation
bctvccn tvo conccpts or a IormaI synthcsis.'° Iov,
vhatcharactcriscsAristotIc'spositionis that hc rccog-
niscs thc apophantic charactcr oIthc L oyoç, uncovcr-
ingandshoving, insynthcsisonIy,and itis thc Iattcr
that constitutcs Ior him thc structuraI scnsc oI thc
L oyoç in gcncraI. Jo thc cxtcnt that this synthcsis is
takcn as mcrcIy IormaI synthcsis, thc possibiIity oI
undcrstanding vhat mcaning, undcrstanding, intcr-
prctation and uItimatcIy Ianguagc itscII arc is Iorc-
cIoscd.'¨ !ovcvcr, in contrast, thc Ioundcr oI
propositionaIIogichimscIIinnovayvicvcdthcL oyoç
as a j udgcmcnt, i.c., thc conncction oI mcntaI rcprc-
scntationsundcrstoodas `imagcs' oIthings, butsavit
as a purc oxo¢ovmç that makcs ¦or `Icts') thc bcing
itscIIappcar. Ior synthcsis isIor AristotIc notsoIcIya
structurc oIthc L oyoç
but aIso a structurc oIbcings
thcmscIvcs, as scvcraI passagcs oIthcMcta¿bysics tcs-
As a Grcck, AristotIc couId grasp thc phcnomcna
thc apophantic IcvcI oIthc proposition Irom thc prop-
crIy cxistcntiaI IcvcI tcrmcd hcrmcncutic by
!cidcggcr.´' ÏnthcintcrprctationoIhis position givcn
cvcn iI AristotIc did not cxpIicitIy undcrstand truth
sistingbcings thcpropositionon thconchandandthc
thing on thc othcr, iIhc vas unabIc to pcrccivc itas a
rcIation oIan cxistcncc to a vorId, as thc ßc/to_cnbcit
oIa!ascin,ncvcrthcIcsshcvasabIctohoId hrmtothc
phcnomcna thcmscIvcs vithout obIitcrating thcm
through thcconstructionoIa`picturc'thcoryoItruth.´´
Jhis isvhy it is important to insiston thc signihcancc
oIthosc passagcs oIthc Mcta¿bysics vhcrc it bccomcs
apparcnt that itis bcings thcmscIvcs and not proposi-
tions about thcm vhich arc undcrstood as `synthctic'.
JhcconccptoI0V8e0<;¦synthcsis) conscgucntIyturns
outto bc bothaIogicaI and an ontoIogicaI onc, orpcr-
haps,as !cidcggcr suggcsts, onc vhich can bcIocatcd
in ncithcr onc domain nor thc othcr sincc it has thc
`hnction' oIuniting thcm. Jhisnon-scparation oIthc
IogicaI and ontoIogicaI charactcriscs thc AristotcIian
Ior, according to !cidcggcr, it is onc oI !Iato's
immortaI mcrits to havc acknovIcdgcd, contra
!armcnidcs, thc bcing oIcrror and IaIsity´` and soto
havc aIIovcd AristotIc to shov thatIaIsity, Iikc truth,
bcIongs to bcings thcmscIvcs and not simpIy to
thought. Jhrough thc anaIysis oI chaptcr 10 oIthc
Mcta¿bysics, book e, !cidcggcr shovs that, Ior
AristotIc, synthcsis is a condition oIIaIsity, not soIcIy
as thc structurc oIthc AOY0<;, but as thc structurc oI
bcings thcmscIvcs.´¹ ÏI thc apprchcnsion oI simpIc
bcings (aQV8e'a) prcscntsnopossibiIityoIIaIsity but
simpIy thc ignorancc ¦a¡Ola)´` that is thc IaiIurc to
grasp,grasping(8) itscIIbcingvhatdchncstruthat
this IcvcI, thcn this impIics that compIcx bcings onIy
can bc objccts oIcrror and givc risc to IaIsc proposi-
tions. JhcrcIorc, Iorcrror tobc possibIc thcrc mustbc
synthcsis botb in thc bcing itscII and in thc rcIatcd
proposition. But this rcIation itscI[ oI`ontoIogicaI' and
`IogicaI' synthcsis, rcsts on thc idcntihcation oIbcing
and truth such as AristotIc postuIatcd itatthc IcvcI oI
simpIcbcingsvhcrc Oi¡iv dchncsUA'9EC and vhcrca
comportmcnt÷ grasping÷ dchncs thc bcingoIsimpIc
IcvcI oIthc proposition, rathcr, as !cidcggcr aIhrms
!ovcvcr, vhat rcmains ungucstioncd in thc
AristotcIian thcoryoIontoIogicaI truth isthcpropcrIy
t¬¿om/scnsc oIthc idcntihcation oIbcingand prcs-
cncc. Jhis is vhat Icads !cidcggcr to `Jhc Ïdca oIa
!hcnomcnoIogicaIChronoIogy' .´' Ïtstaskistoinvcsti-
undcrstood not thcir bcing in timc, vhich stiII
rcmainsancxtrinsicdctcrmination, butvhatinthcir
vcry structurc ischaractcriscd by timc.´° Jhis invcsti-
gation oItcmporaIity and oItimcitscIIhas,oIcoursc,
namc and rcprcscnts, on thc contrary, a IundamcntaI
phiIosophicaI inguiry. Connccting it vith thc othcr
discipIincs oIphiIosophicaI scicncc, or cvcn skctching
thc outIinc oIa ncv systcmaticity oIthcm in rcIation
TbcIdca o¡aIbcnomcno/oyica/Cbrono-/oyy
to it, hovcvcr, is not !cidcggcr's task as `it couId bc
that thc cntrcnchmcnt oIthcsc traditionaI discipIincs
hndsitscIIshakcnby thischronoIogyandthat,on thc
basisoIit, itmight bccompIctcIyscnscIcss to proposc
a cIassihcation in thc traditionaI scnsc'.´¨ Jhis is vhy
upon this chronoIogy, vhosc domain is as yct undc-
Iimitcd, asisattcstcdbythcunccrtaintyrcigningovcr
thc phiIosophicaI usc oIdctcrminations oItimc and
thc crudc manncr vith vhich onc customariIy
opposcs thctcmporaItothca-tcmporaI,asiIthisvcrc
!cidcggcr vasncvcrthcIcssnot absoIutcIy vithout
prcdcccssors in this cntcrprisc. Kantvas Ior him `thc
onIy onc to havc advanccd into this obscurc domain,
vithout hovcvcr coming to pcrccivc thc principaI
mcaningoIhis attcmpt'.`' Ïtvas in thc Kantian thc-
approach to thc chronoIogicaI probIcm, namcIy thc
cxposition oIthc tcmporaIity oIthosc comportmcnts
oI!ascin that arc, in Kantian tcrms, transccndcntaI
appcrccption, actsoIundcrstandingandconsciousncss
takcn in thc broadcst scnsc.`' Jhc vhoIc oIthc hnaI
part oIthc coursc oI1 925-6 ¦comprisingovcr a third
oIit) vas to bc dcvotcd to an initiaI intcrprctation oI
thc roIc pIaycd by timc in thc JransccndcntaI
Acsthcticand AnaIytic oIthc Critiquco¡IurcIcason.
!cidcggcr did not considcr, in thc !cgcIian manncr,
that thc rcIationship bctvccn thc schcmatism oIthc
undcrstanding and scnsibiIity rcmains `cxtcrior' and
so not `diaIccticaI' cnough. Kathcr, in thc Iacc oIthc
diIhcuIty oIthis anaIysis oIthc sccrct j udgcmcnts oI
thccommonrcasoninvhichphiIosophyconsists,`´ hc
sought to rctain thc attitudc oIrcstraint bcIorc thc
phcnomcnaadoptcdbyKantandsoto advancc,inhis
vakc, into thc night oIthc souI and its `hiddcn art'
vithout attcmpting hastiIy to mastcr and subjcct to
thc vioIcncc oI thc conccpt ¦as docs !cgcI in his
`imposing systcm') thc probIcms prudcntIy IcIt un-
Jhc projcct oI a `phcnomcnoIogicaI chronoIogy' is
thcrcIorcinscribcd, inthcmanncroIakindoIrcguIa-
tivc idcaI, in thc cntcrprisc vhich !cidcggcr assigncd
Iogic vhich is to bc, at oncc, rcvivcd and shakcn by
bcing rcIcrrcd back to its phiIosophicaI sourcc.`¹ ÏI
thc injunction oIthc rcturn to thc things thcmscIvcs
and oIthc gucstioning back Irom thc scdimcntation
is thc cxtcrioriscd, dcracinatcd and thcrcIorc rigidihcd
contcnt oI an originary phiIosophicaI gucstioning
vhich vas aIivc in !Iato and AristotIc, a
gucstioning vhich vas compIctcIy suIIocatcd by thc
ossihcation propcr to thc schooI cxcrciscs'`` and its
can cvcn Icad, vhcn itbccomcs `purc rotcIcarningand
bIind crudition', to `an cmpty guibbIing' and `vran-
1 0
gIing'.`º Ït is hopcIcss to cxpcct a training in thinking
Irom traditionaI Iogic, Ior cvcn as scicntmcthought it
ciIabIc vith a truc rcspcct Ior thc tradition, it consists
not in a bIind attachmcnt to and thc stubborn rcpro-
duction oI thc past, but rathcr m `thc phiIosophicaI
appropriation oI thc authcntic phiIosophicaI contcnt
So,vhat!cidcggcr is aimingat is `transparcncy'in
scicntihc rcscarch, vhich can bc obtaincd onIy iI it
hrst undcrstands itscII as a Iorm oI cxistcncc and
agrccs to put thc gucstion `Vhat is truth` ' cxpIicitIy.
Jhis invoIvcs having thc couragc not simpIy to con-
Iront thc possibiIity oIcrror but aIso to admit it. Ior
this aspiration to thc transparcncy oI !ascin vith
rcspcct to itscIImust in no vay bc conIuscd vith thc
dcsirc Ior thc pIcnitudc oIa scII-prcscncc dcIivcrcd
stood as `thc couragc oIthc intcrior Iibcration vith
ityto Iistcn and to Icarn, thccouragcoIpositivccxpIi-
cation ¦vith othcrs) j³ucinandcr.ctzuny|'. ' Jhus, in
aIhrmingthatsuch atransparcncy ispossibIc onIy by
vay oIa phiIosophisingIogic,!cidcggcrsuggcststhc
ncccssariIy intcrsubjcctivc charactcr, not simpIy oI
phiIosophicaI gucstioningitscII, but aIsooIthc `thing'
oIvhich it trcats, vhich, bcing inscparabIc Irom thc
historicaIity oIIanguagc, can innovaybcassimiIatcd
to a prc-givcn objcctivity. Jhc `dc-tcmporaIisation' at
1 1
Tc//iny Timc
thcoriginoIthc `IormaI' charactcroItraditionaIIogic
aIsocntaiIsthc`naturaIisation'oIthc`objcct'and `con-
tcnts' oIthought, vhich, hovcvcr, arc `nothing' out-
Jhcrc isno tracc oIthis projcctcd `phcnomcnoIogicaI
chronoIogy' cithcr in Iciny and Timc or, it vouId
appcar, inthcMarburgorIrciburg courscs pubIishcd
to datc, vhich prcccdc thc timc oI thc `turn'.
IoIIoving thc Iattcr, thc pcrspcctivc oIthc dcvcIop-
mcntoIa `tcmporaIontoIogy' viII bc abandoncd and
vith it thc idca that thc tcmporaI horizon couId suI-
hcc to account Ior vhat vc tcrm bcing. Ïn this vay,
!cidcggcr turns tovards a thoughtoIthcGcynctand
oI thc unity oI thc Zcitraum ¦spacc-timc) to attain
acccss to vhat aIonc constitutcs thc opcnncss oI thc
tcrmcd `bcing' inIcinyandTimcisnothing othcr than
timc,¹´ aItcr thcIcbrc ¦turn) itisnot somuch a gucs-
tion oIthinking on thc basis oIspacc vhat is givcn
!ascinundcrstood Icss and Icss as subjcctivity, as itis
a gucstion oIdissociatingtimc itscIIIromits compIic-
ity vith `inncr' scnsc. Ït is no Iongcr a gucstion oI
rcIcrringspatiaIityto tcmporaIity butrathcroIthink-
ing thc spacing oI timc itscII. !cidcggcr attcmptcd
thisIrom thcIciträyczurIbi/oso¿bic (Contributionsto
Ibi/oso¿by) on, in Iorging thc cxprcssion Zcitraum'
dcsignating ¦as is apparcnt in thc scminar "Jim«and
Spacc" oI1962) not thc `spacc-timc' oIphysicists but
rathcr thc cIcaring opcncd by giving at a distancc ÷
thc rcciprocaI Icicbcn ¦giving to onc anothcr) oIthc
Iuturc, thc having-bccn and thc prcscnt ÷ on vhosc
bIc.¹¹ Jhis is vhy, vhcn !cidcggcr cmphasiscs that
thc gucstion oI thc mcaning oI bcing, aItcr having
Icbrc, hnaIIy took thc Iorm oI thc gucstion oI thc
IormuIation oIthc `topoIogy oIbcing' a dcniaI oIthc
prcvious projcctoIa `chronoIogy' buton thc contrary
its rc-actuaIisation, timc nov no Iongcr bcing dctcr-
mincd in a stiII mctaphysicaI ¦vhich mcans transccn-
dcntaI) vay as thc Ioundation oI bcing but as
ÏI!cidcggcr had thus, Ior his part, abandoncd thc
tcrm`chronoIogy',j ustashchadindccd `phcnomcnoI-
ogy',¹ºvithout,hovcvcr,cntircIyrcIusingto hintata
programmc vith thc ncv dcsignation `topoIogy oI
bcing', this docs notmcan thatthc task dcsignatcd by
thcsc rubrics had bccn j udgcd unaccompIishabIc but
that thc modc oIits accompIishmcntcouId no Iongcr
bcthatoIthcAOYOC mitstraditionaI scnsc.Ior,vhatis
rcaIIy vorthy oI gucstion in this `rubric' oIchronoI-
ogy, vhich Ï proposc to takc up again hcrc, is not so
much thc rcIcrcncc to timc as thc rcIcrcncc to Iogic it
oIIcinyandTimc³ Can onc cnvisagc thc constitution
thctcmporaImomcntcxiIcdin thcconstitutionoIthc
scicntihc objcct, and vhich couId givc its rightIuI
pIacc to vhat Gadamcr caIIs `thc inncr historicity oI
cxpcricncc' `¹'ÏtiscIcarthatvhcn !cidcggcr taIksoI
a`topoIogy'hcnoIongcrundcrstandsthcAO'O�, stiIIat
issuc hcrc, in thc traditionaI manncr. Jhc cxprcssion
`topoIogy oIbcing' is sccn Ior thc hrst timc in a not
vcry scicntihc-Iooking tcxt cntitIcd prcciscIy `Jhc
IxpcricnccoIJhinking'and inacontcxtvhcrcvhat
isatissuc isasmuchthcstiII vciIcdpocticcharactcroI
thinking as it isa thinkingpoctry. Morcovcr, itisthc
Iattcr thatis `in truth thc topoIogy oIbcing' and tcIIs
bcing `thc sitc vhcrc it dcpIoys itscIl.¹° Jhc AO'O� to
vhich !cidcggcr rcIcrs hcrc is considcrcd no Iongcr
in its scmantic-cpistcmic aspcct onIy but aIso in thc
syntactic and poctic aspcct that cguaIIy bcIongs to it
and that pcrmits him to scc in thought not onIy an
csscntiaI prcIiminary oIaction but `action j. . . that is]
thcsimpIcstandatthcsamc timcthchighcst', as thc
hrst pagc oIthc `Icttcr on !umanism' aIhrms.¹¨ At
thc cnd oI a tcxt dcvotcd to !cracIitus and to thc
morc originary csscnccoIaAO'O� in vhich thcGrccks
dvcIIcd, but vithout cvcr having thought it,
!cidcggcr dccIarcs that `thought transIorms thc
vorId' by rcndcringit morc cnigmatic, morc obscurc
and morc proIound, by tcaring it Irom its purc and
simpIcprcscncctobringitintothc`stormoIbcing'. `'
Aoyo� consequently forbid any programmatic presen­
tation of what could still present itself as a positive,
even if non-epistemic, discipline under the name of
chrono-logy? And should we not rather abandon that
which could not fail to present itself as an enterprise of
a more originary refounding of traditional logic and
abandon the still traditional form that such an enter­
prise would necessarily take? Were such a position to
be adopted, however, this abandonment could not be
silent and would doubtless require extensive argu­
mentation.51 However, another course will be fol­
lowed here. Not the programmatic presentation, in a
negative sense, of an impossible discipline, but the
s[ctcb of what could, in a novel sense, be a 'logic' of
temporality. For such a chronology does not permit
programming or projecting in a transcendental sense,
in no way does it consist in the inscription of deter­
mined limits. It is, on the contrary, destined in its
essence to the unfulflment and the inchoativity that
Merleau-Ponty recognised as inevitable for the 'move­
ment' , rather than doctrine or system, that was phe­
nomenology.52 This is why, as with the latter, only a
sketch [/' csquissc| is appropriate, which is to say, in its
literal sense, improvisation. 53 Improvising is letting
time 'happen', trusting the favour of the 'moment',
but also facing the unexpected and the risk of failure.
The task at hand is therefore to draw such a sketch
lightly, with the haste characteristic of all the enter­
prises of the mortals that humans are, and with a neg­
ligence applied to preserving the suppleness of the
ephemeral constructions that will shelter for a time
(that of the 'thesis') the movement that, ceaselessly
being reborn from its own interruptions, we call life
or thought.
It is true that 'precipitation' has been strongly criti­
cised in modern philosophy, inasmuch as the latter
understands itself as an enterprise of foundation. Kant
makes this point well in the introduction to the
Critiquc o¡Iurc Icason.`''It is, indeed, the common
fate of human reason to complete its speculative struc­
tures (Gcbaùdc) as speedily as may be, and only after­
wards to inquire whether the foundations (Grund)are
reliable.' The 'methodological' and 'architectonic' con­
cerns become, in effect, one with the philosophical
enterprise itself, which, as an eminently 'logical' enter­
prise, requires that 'patience of the concept' which
fnds its fnest illustration in Hegelian discourse as
absolute discourse. Haste and precipitation, like unfn­
ished and weak constructions, are, on the contrary,
rather the fate of a fnite thought, which, because it is
ceaselessly wending its way, must content itself with
ephemeral shelter and, as the poet says, can truly
dwell only in the lightning flash. ``
Phenomenology and
During the time that a motion is being perceived,
a grasping-as-now takes place moment by
moment; and in this grasping, the actually present
phase of the motion itself becomes constituted. But
this now apprehension is, as it were, the head
attached to the comet's tail of retentions relating to
the earlier now-points of the motion.! (Husserl)
In what sense, however, is the chrono-Iogy now to be
sketched 'phenomenological'? In the course given in
the winter semester of 1925-6 Heidegger specifies m
this regard: 'In adding the adjective "phenomeno­
logical" to chronology, we want to indicate that this
logos of time, this investigation of time has a philo­
sophical orientation and has nothing whatever to do
with the order of succession and the science of estab­
lishing dates.'2 Therefore, 'phenomenological' here has
the sense of 'philosophical' in contrast to the 'positive'
character of the science called 'chronology'. In this,
Heidegger is in perfect agreement with Husserl who
constantly emphasised the fact that the term
'phenomenology' designates 'a method and an attitude
of thought: the specifically ¿bi/oso¿bica/ attitudc o¡
tbouybt and the specifically ¿bi/oso¿bica/ mctbod' and
who afrmed that philosophy situates itself 'in a tom//y
ncu dimcnsion' relative to any natural knowledge and
thus relative to any positive science.3 It is with Husser!
that the term 'phenomenology' becomes the very name
of philosophy, as moreover he explicitly recognised in
that manifesto of phenomenology that is the 'Epilogue'
to his Idcas where it is emphasised that 'phenomeno­
logical science', 'the science of a new beginning', is in
reality the restitution of 'the most original idea of
philosophy' which found its first coherent expression
with Plato and is the basis of European philosophy and
science.4 This is the idea of a 'universal science' and of a
'rigorous science' that is its own final justifcation and
could fnd only a temporary and relative realisation in
an historical process that is itself endless.5 Nevertheless,
it remains to be explained why the term 'phenomen­
ology' became the very name of philosophy only in a
recent phase of a long history, which has been domi­
nated, since Plato, by the opposition between being and
appearance and, since Aristotle's Mcta¿bysics, by the
question of being qu being. The term 'phenomenology'
appeared for the frst time in 1764 in Johann Heinrich
Lambert's NcucsOryanonin which it was defned as the
science of appearances, but one must await the year 1 806
to see the term come to occupy a pre-eminent position in
the philosophical scene. Hegel had at frst given the title
'Science of the Experience of Consciousness' to the work
he was in the process of completing, but during its
actual publication renamed it 'Phenomenology of
1 8
Spirit'. However, it was nearly a century later, in 1901,
in the second volume of Husserl's Ioyica/Inucstiyatiom,
entitled 'Investigations in Phenomenology and the
. Theory of Knowledge' , that phenomenology defini­
tively left behind the subordinate status and the role of
propaedeutic science, which it had until then been
assigned, to take on the 'modern' name of phlosophy.
Philosophy, as an autonomous mode of thought,6
could have been born only of the withdrawal of the
divine - to which Sophocles's tragedies testif that
followed the decay of the Greek political world: it is
because the microcosm was no longer the image of the
macrocosm that the boundary between the divine and
the human became an enigma and the meaning of
'being' became aporetic? With Aristotle philosophy
determined itself as the 'precise science' that would
later, with Clauberg and Wolff, be called ontology.8
However, as Nietzsche vigorously emphasised in On
tbcGcnca/oyy o[Mora/s,philosophy would have to cast
off the priestly robes under which it had hidden and
cease to confuse itself, in its movement of 'evasive
transcendence'9 and in its promotion of the aesthetic
ideal, with theology, in order to become truly itself,
which involves access to the true freedom of the will.lO
This is what was already coming to pass, whatever
Nietzsche might say, when Kant turned his back on
the traditional solution of making human beings
participate in divine understanding: with Kant phil­
osophy has to become atheistic.ll That is to say, it has
to begin with the intuitusdcriuatiuu of the finite being,
implying that the science of the phenomenal, the
phenomenology of which Lambert spoke, no longer is a
simple negative propaedeutic to metaphysics but is an
essential moment of its elaboration. What was to be
constituted in 1781 was, in effect, an ontology of the
thing as phenomenon, for the knowledge of the
phenomenal was no longer that of an appearance but of
the thing such as it is for a non-productive intuition in
opposition to the thing in itself, which is the correlate of
an intuitus oriyinarius. Nevertheless, phenomenology
became the effective title only of a philosophy that had
exchanged its overly modest name for that of science
with Hegel, who thinks appearance as a trait of being
itself. None the less, it remains the case that here also
phenomenology constitutes, at best, a first division of
science - that of the knowledge of appearance in which
the opposition between being and appearance persists
while metaphysics proper, Tbe Science o¡ Ioyic, is
possible only from the point of view of absolute
knowledge, of the identity of object and subject, of
thinking and thought, of appearance and being. For
phenomenology to become, not merely the negative,
but the ¿ositiue name of philosophy, Husserl would
have to break with Kantian noumenology just as much
as with Hegelian absolute science. Phenomenological
consciousness could no longer be thought of as the rep­
resentational consciousness of an in-itself that would
pre-exist it but as consciousness constituting the mean­
ing of al being for us and there is no being other
than being for us. Husserl thus refuses the Kantian
distinction between two modes of intuition, not to
assume the point of view of God in the Hegelian
fashion, but on the contrary to generalise the intuitus
and attribute it to God himself, the only
way of not positing a being behind the phenomenon.
For Husserl, there are only interpreted beings, and it is
in this way that he doubtless joins Nietzsche in his
critique of the in-itself.13
However, since the discovery of the phenomenological
reduction,14 Husserlian phenomenology has borne a
transcendental countenance and the declared sense of
an idealism.15 But, as well as not confusing idealism
with the theory of the duality of worlds whose genesis
and decline Nietzsche recounts in the Tui/iybt o¡tbe
Ido/·, a theory which the philosophers who have been
mentioned in the course of this 'history of an error'
have all strongly criticised16 - one must emphasise the
very particular character of phenomenological idealism,
which, as Husserl emphasises, is transcendental ideal­
ism in a fundamentally novel sense since, being nothing
other than the laying out of the ego, it can do without
the limit concept of the thing in itself Never has the
aspiration to the ideal taken the form of a true posi­
tivism17 more decisively than in Husserl's thought; with
an explicitly anti-Copernican1s move, he seeks to ¡ound
the ideal on the real, and the categorial on the sensible,
thus confirming Heraclitus's afrmation according to
which 'the upward and downward paths are one and
the same'.19 The founded act comprising categorial
intuition demands that receptivity and spontaneity are
no longer opposed to one another but are instead in a
relation of reciprocal conditioning and implication, as
a sensible intuition must found the categorial elan,
but, attbcsamctimc,this primary receptivity must, in
some way, be 'neutralised' by the spontaneity of the
idea that for its part makes sensible perception itself
possible. In effect, categorial acts, as founded acts,
reveal in a new way only what is already given at the
level of 'simple' perception, whether they are acts of
synthesis making explicit the sensible given according
to its categorical moments, and thus allowing it to be
expressed in propositions, or acts of ideation constitut­
ing new ideal objectivities on the basis of sensible per­
ception. Though it is true that singular perception,
which serves as a foundation for eidetic intuition, does
not constitute the content of the idea in the case of
ideation, while in a synthetic act it is taken up as the
content of the new ideal objectivity, it is no less true
that the act of categorial ideation must also found
itself in a singular perception, which it neutralises.2o
Heidegger, in the interpretation given during the
summer semester of 1925 in his course on the funda­
mental discoveries of phenomenology, amongst which
he counts categorial intuition besides intentionality
and the original sense of the a priori, places emphasis
upon the thesis of the foundation of the categorial in
the sensible and sees in it a new formulation of the
Aristotelian proposition from Zc³nima21 according to
which 'the soul never thinks without an image' ,22 the
image taking the place of sensation, as Husserl himself
explicitly recognised.23 This bringing together of
Husserl and Aristotle, which is certainly not totally
arbitrary, aims to demonstrate the absurdity of an intel­
lect thought of as independent of sensibility in a broad
sense, which is to say of a yiucn that shows itself in its
perceptive presence or in its imaginative re-presence
and that aims at discrediting 'the old mythology'24 of a
pure intellect and of a form independent of matter, at
the origin of the 'formal' character attributed to logic,
and which has, since Boethius, spawned the quarrel
over Universals and given birth to nominalism. With
the discovery of categorial intuition, itself made possible
only by the discovery of intentionality, Husserl reopened
the way to ontology and gave it the scientific method of
an inquiry that remains within phenomenality itself,
since: 'There is no ontology a/onysidc a phenomenology.
Rather, scicntqconto/o¿yunotbinybut¿bcnomcno/o¿y.'25
Thus we can say of Husserlian idealism what we
are already in a position to affrm of Kantian idealism:
namely, that it consists in reopening at the level of the
sensible itself the difference open since the birth of
philosophy between the sensible and the intelligible.26
In both cases ontology and phenomenology are as one,
with the difference, however, that with the far from
Kantian notion of categorial intuition Husserl will be
drawn to put radically in question the schema upon
which the Critiquco¡IurcIcason was still constructed,
that of an opposition of form and matter, and to
criticise, from his On tbc Ibcnomcno/oyy o¡ tbc
Consciouncss o¡Intcr¬a/ Timc of 1 905, the distinction
between apprehension and content that still formed
the theoretical framework of the Ioyica/Inucstiyations.
Thus he embarked, perhaps with a certain immodesty,
into the depths of the by/c to extract the secret of the
'hidden art' recognised by Kant under the term
'transcendental schematism'. Husserl's desire not to
leave ideality hovering in a void a desire comparable
with Kant's concern to give Plato's dove a support on
which to take a stand (Wa/t), to orient and favour
its fight, i.e., the support of the sensible27 - will lead
him to consider that all idealities, whether free or
'bound' to the sensible world and to spatio-temporality,
are fnally 'mundane: by their historical and territorial
occurrence, their "being discovered," and so on'28
and that their a-temporality is in reality an omni­
temporality, which is to say, a mode of temporality.29
Phenomenological idealism is thus not a philo­
sophical taking of sides,3o but constitutes in some way
the very regime of the phenomenological mode of
thought in as much as the latter renews the philo­
sophical demand for a thought that does not renounce
giving an account of its own genesis. It is perhaps
already in this sense that Schelling dared to declare in
1797 that 'all philosophy is and remains idealism'.31 It
is undoubtedly what Heidegger meant in 1927 when
he acknowledged that idealism has a 'primacy of
principle' with respect to realism, so long as the
former is not understood as a 'psychological' idealism,
and declared: 'If what the term "idealism" says,
amounts to the understanding that being can never be
explained by beings but is already the "transcendental"
for every being, then idealism affords the only correct
possibility for a philosophical problematic.,32 Without
doubt Heidegger saw at work in the transcendentalism
of Husserl's 'turn' of 1907 another sense of idealism,
which he judged 'no less naive in its method than the
most grossly militant realism' and which involved
'tracing back every entity to a subject or consciousness
whose sole distinguishing features are that it remains
indctcrminatc in its being and is best characterised
negatively as "un-Thing-like"'.33 Nevertheless, he did
at this period acknowledge that the "transcendental"
thought of ontological difference34 founds the 'idealist'
regime of the authentic philosopher. Now, one cannot
straightaway refuse Husserl access to this 'authentic'
transcendentalism since through the method of the
reduction - which Heidegger himself does not hesitate
to borrow whilst, it is true, completing it with the
addition of 'destruction' and 'construction'35 he had
established the distinction between the given presence
(the character of Iorbandcnbcit) of things experienced
in the natural attitude36 and the pure phenomenality
of the world that reveals itself only in the phenomeno­
logical attitude. It becomes clear here that phenomen­
ology does not come to be identifed with a pure and
simple phenomenalism and that it is only possible as
'transcendental science' involving the 'transcendence' of
the immediately given and of the distinction between
this and the phenomenon-of-phenomenology. It is only
on this basis that one can afrm atonccthat phenomena
'are themselves the doctrine'37 and that, however,
'proximally and for the most part' they 'are not given'.38
There is therefore no phenomenology possible with­
out reduction, implying, as Heidegger recognises, that
'just because phenomena are proximally and for the
most part notgiven, there is need for phenomenology'.39
As Husserl declared in TbcIcao¡Ibcnomcno/o¿y, the
first presentation of the transcendental reduction, 'the
task of phenomenology, or rather the area of its tasks
and inquiries, is no such trivial things as merely looking,
merely opening one's eyes'40 since 'it is meaningless to
talk about things that are simply there and only need to
be seen,.41 The task of phenomenology as Husserl
understands it consists in showing how things present
themselves (drstc//cn) or 'constitute' themselves in a
consciousness that is no longer posited as the receptacle
of their images,42 though this Ionstituæn (con­
stituting) itself in no way has the sense of a making or
creating but uniquely, as Heidegger emphasises, that of
'/cttiny tbc cntity bc sccn in it ob¡cctiuity'.' What
"constitutive" phenomenology allows one to witness is
the birtb of the correlation of consciousness, and this is
why it is in itself always already a 'genetic' phenomen­
ology. There is only and could only be phenomenology
where, far from installing a gulf between the 'subject'
and 'object', the rcs coyimns and the rcs cxtcnsa, which
only divine veracity could fll, the 'surprising' and
`csscntiaI corrcIation bctvccn a¿¿cariny and ubat
visibIc is thc unity, not to bc torn apart, oI thc
<aVOJCVOV [phcnomcnon|, vhosc doubIc scnsc, at
oncc `subj cctivc' and `objcctivc', is thus rcvcaIcd and
vhich, Iikc thc aII-cmbracing <U0C [naturc|, that
!cracIitusspcaksoI, `IikcstohidcitscIlinthcIorgct-
ting oIthc scII vhich constitutcs, Ior thc !usscrIian
transccndcntaI subjcctasIor!cidcggcrian!ascin,thc
`naturaI attitudc', Icading it to posit thc prc-scncc oI
things and to undcrstand itscII `inauthcnticaIIy'
!usscrI is not contcnt to situatc himscIIonIy at thc
noctic IcvcI oItransccndcntaI phcnomcnoIogy vhcrc
thc corrcIation bctvccn appcaring and vhat appcars
bccomcs apparcnt, hc aIso vants to shov thc vcry
birthoIthiscorrcIation,vhichIcadshimto dcsccndto
thc most primitivc IcvcI oIhyIctic phcnomcnoIogy, to
thc `obscurc dcpths oI thc uItimatc consciousncss
vhich constitutcs thc vhoIc schcmc oI tcmporaI
cxistcncc'.¹º Jhc `transccndcntaI absoIutc' to vhich
thc phcnomcnoIogicaI rcduction givcs acccss, thc
`noctico-nocmatic' corrcIation vhichaIIovs thc dctcr-
mination oIthc `systcm oIbcing cIoscd on itscIl con-
stitutivcoIpurc consciousncss asa `systcm oIabsoIutc
bcing',¹'isinnovay thcIastvordoIphcnomcnoIogy
that undcrtakcs to bring into thc Iight oI day thc
`uItimatcIy and truIyabsoIutc' Iromvhcnccit`dravs
its radicaIsourcc' .¹°Andthistruc absoIutc, as!usscrl
indicatcsina notc,¹¨ isnoncothcrthanthc cnigmatic
`intimacy' oIconsciousncss and timc that thc IºO°`'
Iccturcs On tbc Ibcnomcno/o¿y o¡tbc Consciousncss o¡
Intcra/ Timc dcscribc. Ïn cIIcct, vhat !usscrl is
proposing is thc production oI `a dcscription oIthc
transccndcntaI', `a IormuIa in vhich thc maniIcst
naturc oI thc projcct appcars oI itscII' as Gcrard
GrancInotcs,`' bccauscitamountstonomorcandno
Icss than pcrmitting consciousncss to obscrvcits ovn
birthand to givcbirth to itscII, so to spcak, in vhat
!usscrl ÷ noting thc `shocking' (anstösiy) and cvcn
`absurd' (uidcrsinniy) charactcr oIthc tcrm docsnot
hcsitatcto tcrm `auto-constitution' .`´ `JhcûovoIthc
consciousncss that constitutcs immancnt timc not onIy
and thcrcIorc thcûov itscIImustncccssariIybcapprc-
docsnotrcguirca sccondûov, on thccontrary,itcon-
a Iorm oIbybri· in thc phcnomcnoIogy oItimc, vhich
cIaims, in contrast vith thc modcsty oI Kantian
Butat thc samctimc, thcphcnomcnoIogy oItimcis,
asGcrardGrancIcmphasiscs,a `phcnomcnoIogyvith-
out phcnomcnon',`` sincc thc IcvcI oI |r[onstitution
and thc originaI passivity oIthc |rim¿rcssion ¦primaI
imprcssion). Jhis originaI passivity can no Iongcr bc
undcrstood as that oI a scnsibIc yiucn, cithcr in a
thc Kantian idca, oIa mcrcIy scnsibIc rcccptivity, but
must bc undcrstood as thc vcry modc in vhich thc
originary cxists as aIIcctivity, that is to say, as thc
`passivc' prcscntation oI thc thing itscII in vhat can
thus no Iongcr bc undcrstood onIy as thc idcntity oI
intcntionaIityandby/c,oIIormandmattcr.`º Ïtisthcsc
`dcpths', vhcrc Iorm and mattcr arc in onc anothcr,
that!usscrItcrms thc `Iivingprcscnt'. ÏI!usscrIisIcd
to scc a `phcnomcnoIogicaI datum' in `thc unity oIthc
consciousncss that cncompasscs intcntionaIIy vhat is
prcscnt andvhatis past',`' it is prcciscIy bccausc this
act oI¿rcscntation (Gcycnuartiycn), vhich compriscs
pcrccption, rctains vithinitscIIthcpastas such,vhich
is to say abscncc, and bccausc it can¿rcscnt thc thing
itscII onIy by virtuc oI this rctcntion constitutivc oI
thc act oIpcrccption as 'asiny/c continuumtbatucon-
tinuous/y modqcd' and `is distinguishcd by thc
posscssion oI this idcaI Iimit', i.c., thc totaIity oIthc
tcmporaI objcct.`° Ït is this continuity vhich !usscrI
thinks oIas `!cracIitian ûux', as thc purc comctary`¨
movcmcnt oI a Iiving `nov' that takcs upon itscIIthc
diIIcrcncc bctvccn imprcssion and rctcntion and that
prcccdcs itscIIinitsvcryovnrctcntion.º'
Cnc must not thcrcIorc bc surpriscd to hnd that
this `mctaphysics oIthc Iiving prcscnt', Ior vhich, as
Ior Bcrgson, thcrc is `changc vithout a thing that
º' and inccssant modihcation oIa ûov soIcIy
constitutcdbya`continuityoIadumbrations',º´ Iacksa
ûov is somcthing vc spcak oIin con¡ot¬ity uitb
ubat u constitutcd, but it is not `somcthing in
objcctivc timc.' Ït is abso/utc sub¡cctiuity and has
thc absoIutc propcrtics oIsomcthing to bc dcsig-
natcd mcta¿boricahy as `ûov', oIsomcthing that
point, `thc nov,' and so on. Ïn thc actuaIity-
continuity oImomcnts oIrcvcrbcration. Ior aII
ÏIvc stiII vants to taIk at this IcvcI, vc mustchoosc
bctvccn a vorIdIy Iogic, vhich indircctIy namcs thc
constitucnt aItcr thc constitutcd, and a systcm oI
mctaphors Ior thc inapparcnt, vhich givcs it namcs
that arcnotpropcr oncs. Ior vhatis csscntiaIIy Iack-
ingatthis IcvcI oI|r[onstitution is thc transccndcncc
oI thc ob-jcct, oI thc `somcthing in gcncraI' that
bccomcs graspabIc itscIIonIy inand through naming.
Jhcrc is nothing to stop us undcrstanding vhat
!usscrI hcrc tcrms `absoIutcsubjcctivity' in thc man-
ncr oIvhatMcrIcau-!onty, in anothcrcontcxt, rcIcrs
to as `purctransccndcncc,vithoutan onticmask'º¹ or
oIbcingand timcinIrciyni·º'inthc`attcmpttothink
bcingvithoutbcings'vhich compriscs thc scminar oI
1962 cntitIcd `Jimc and Bcing' .ºº But, bcIorc taking
thc risk oI giving a namc, vhich vouId pcrhaps
aIvays rcmain mctaphoricaI, to thc un-objcctivc, onc
mustdoubtIcss hrstknovhov to dvcII in thc namc-
Icss,as!cidcggcrcnjoinsustodo.º'!usscrI's attcmpt
at transccndcntaI dcscription takcs thc Iorm oI thc
rcconciIiation in indiIIcrcncc oI thc cxtrcmcs oI
absoIutc idcaIism and matcriaIism, constitution and
imprcssion,º° and thc diaIcctic oI imprcssion and
rctcntionthroughvhichhc cndcavours torcconstruct
thc mcIodic movcmcnt oIthc rcaI hnaIIy dcIivcrs ÷
and thisisthcIatcto vhich aIIphiIosophy is, through
itscsscncc, dcstincd÷ onIy 'anonticmaqucttc oIonto-
IogicaI truth' .º¨ !crcin Iics, in thc hnaI anaIysis, thc
signaturc oI!usscrIian phcnomcnoIogy, vhich thus
brings intothcIightoIdayvhathadrcmaincdhiddcn
in thc `IogicaI'parousiaoIthc !cgcIianabsoIutc,that
`it stcaIs Irom bcing vhatno phiIosophy had cvcr yct
stoIcn Irom it, its vcry Iurtivcncss, its vithdravaI, its
modcsty, its Gc/icbtctbcit',´º by virtuc oI thc Iact
that, through a pcrIcct mimcticism, `it succccdcd in
rc¿rcscntinycvcnthcsiIcnccoIbcing' .''
AIthough hc sav in !Iatonic diaIcctic `a gcnuinc
phiIosophicaI cmbarrassmcnt',' !cidcggcr himscII
aIvays considcrcd thc rccoursc to diaIcctic as an
cvasion (³usucy), a manncr oI avoiding vhat IS In
gucstion, sincc gathcring into a grcatcr unity con-
tradictions that havc bccn IuIIy acccntuatcd in
advancc Icavcs ungucstioncd thc opposcd tcrms in
!cidcggcr sccks to dispIay prudcncc (Iorsicbt) vhcn
cngagingin thc gucstion oIthc rcIation oIbcing and
timc.'` Ït is this abscncc oI prccipitation and un-
criticiscd prcsuppositions that Icads him to posit
Itciynis `ncithcr as somcthing oppositc us nor as
somcthing aII-cncompassing
'¹ and thus to vicv in it
ncithcr anobjcctnor an aII-cmbracing absoIutc, sincc
'Irciynis ncithcr i·,noruIrciynutbcrc'Ior `to say thc
onc or to say thc othcr is cguaIIy a distortion oIthc
mattcr,j ustasiIvc vantcd todcrivcthc sourcc Irom
thcrivcr'.'` !crhapsitisnotby chanccthatthcimagc
rccurring hcrc is prcciscIy thc !cracIitian,
!öIdcrIinian and !usscrIian imagc oIthc rivcr and
its sourcc, and pcrhaps vc ought to scc in diaIcctics,
vhcn it is no Iongcr an cmbarrassmcnt (Icr1cycnbcit)
but rathcran cvasion (³uucy),just such a pcrvcrsion
oIthc mattcr (Icr[cbr«ny dcs Sacbucrba/ts) Icading to
rcconstructcd on thc basis oIits rcsuIt. IcvcrthcIcss,
such a mimctic rcconstruction is in no vay thc Iast
against vhich a `phcnomcnoIogy oI thc inapparcnt'
Vhat !cidcggcr undcrstands undcr this titIc,'º
vhichhasonIy an indicativcand nota programmatic
vaIuc, mayinitiaIIysccm just as dcnudcd oIscnscand
j ust as shocking as thc !usscrIian cxprcssion `auto-
constitution' sincc it conccrns nothing morc nor Icss
than making appcar vhat can maniIcst itscII, Iikc
virtuc oI a muItitudc oI ncgativc signs.'' But this
inapparcnt, vhichmustdoubtIcss aIso bc undcrstood
as a `non-signihcr' aItcr thc muItipIicity oImcanings
kind oI absoIutc invisibiIity or, as McrIcau-!onty
cmphasiscs,to`anothcr"possibIc"ui·ib/corto avisibIc
"possibIc" Ior anothcr' but to an `invisibIc vhich is
tbcrc' ,´' aIvays happcning uitb thc visibIc vhosc
sccrct countcrpart it is. Jhis thcrcIorc impIics that
prcscncc in an inapparcnt manncr, as morcovcr thc
participIc EOV ¦bcing) tcIIs us. Ior, as !cidcggcr
aIvays insistcd, UA18EtU ¦truth) must in no vay bc
thought oI as a prc-cxisting statc oI opcnncss, an
immobiIc opcning, but, on thc contrary, as a robbcry
(Iaub) through vhich a bcing is torn out oIhiddcn-
ncss,°' orasthcoccurrcncc(Gcscbcbnis)oIacIcaring.°'
Ït is thiscucnt thc cntryintoprcscnccoIvhatcntcrs
into prcscncc vhich a phcnomcnoIogy oI thc
inapparcnt such as this must cxaminc. Iov, this
inappcarancc is cguaIIy that oI thc thing that ncvcr
givcs itscIIinthc dimcnsionoIstandingoppositcand
is rcduccd to nothing (ucricbtct) in thc abscncc oI
proximity, vhich is aIso thc domination oI thc dis-
tanccIcss (³bstand/osc),vhichmaniIcststhccountIcss-
ncss oI ob-jccts as vcII as thc mcasurcIcss mass oI
humanbcings.°´ ÏIthcthing,contrarytothcindiIIcrcnt
objcct, is vhat touchcs us and conccrns us (Zas
³nycbcndc),³' making ¦or Ictting) its inappcarancc
appcar prcciscIy cannot rcsuIt Irom a mcrc changc oI
attitudc ÷ vhich is to say, Irom a mcthodoIogicaI
dccision÷ butcomcstopassonIyvhcn`suddcnIy(),
itsccms, vorId as vorId vorIds'.°¹ Jhchappcning oI
thcvorIdIromvhichthc thingisIovIy_criny) born°`
is thcrcIorcin no vay thc rcsuIt oIthc mcthodoIogicaI
prudcncc that rcmains vith thc phcnomcna and
abstains Irom giving a diaIccticaI rcprcscntation oI
thcm, cvcn though it couId doubtIcss not takc pIacc
vithout its intcrccssion. `Mcthod' has hcrc onIy thc
ncgativc virtuc oI prcparing Ior vhat cannot bc
prcparcd Ior, Ior vhat, though it cannot takc pIacc
uitboutus,docsnotspring¡on us.°ºVhatmustconsc-
gucntIy bc tcrmcd a vay rathcr than a mcthod takcs
thc Iorm oIthc `stcp back' (Scbrittzurùc[) thathas thc
vhich canIcad usbcIorc thc `phcnomcnon' onIytothc
cxtcnt that its mcrcIy `provisionaI' csscncc consists
Jhc backvard movcmcnt is thus vhatmakcs possibIc
thc onIy truc `advancc'. thc Icap into thc cucnt o¡
¿rcscncc vhich !cidcggcr somctimcs caIIs
³nucsuny³³ ÷ vhich docs no morc than Icad us,
through thc rcpctition oI thc samc accompIishcd by
tautoIogicaI thought, to vhcrc vc aIrcady arc, to thc
!armcnidian COY E��EVat invhich !cidcggcr sccs `thc
Jhis phcnomcnoIogy oIthc inapparcnt ¦vc havcyct
to dcmonstratc that its accompIishmcnt ncccssari/y
occurs in tautoIogy inasmuch as thc Iattcr `is thc onIy
vayoIthinkingvhatdiaIccticscanmcrcIyvciI'¨') ism
oItcmporaIity, sincc itmaniIcsts thc vcry intcrminabIc
naturc oIthcmoucmcnt or suddcn Icap (|mscb/ay)
Irom bcing to bcings, Irom vorId to thing. oI thc
mobiIity that AristotIc dchncd vith thc tcrm
µ fo�oLq¨' vithout,hovcvcr,aIrcadyimprisoningitin
Logic and
Jhc rcaI prcscncc oI thc synthcsis must rcvcaI
itscIIimmatcriahy,asitvcrc,in thcIanguagc,vc
mustbccomcavarcthat,Iikcaû ashoIIightning,
it iIIuminatcs thc Iattcr, and Iikc ahrcûashIrom
rcgions unknovn, has hscd thc cIcmcnts that
nccdcdcombination. ' ¦!umboIdt)
Jhc `construction' oIa phcnomcnoIogicaI chronoIogy,
vhichvas coupIcd in 1926 viththcprojcctoI`Icading
back' traditionaI Iogic to its phiIosophicaI sourccs and
vhich rcsuItcd, in thc Iast phasc oI !cidcggcr's
thought, in thc promotion oI thc `sigctic'´ Iorm oI
tautoIogicaI thought, itscII incIudcs thc task oI a
`dcconstruction'` oI thc domination oI Iogic in thc
thc phcnomcnoIogicaI `dcstruction' oI thc history oI
ontoIogy !cidcggcr assigncd himscII in 1927. Ït is
aIrcady cxpIicitIy indicatcd in §6 oIIciny and Timc
that'A'V isthcguidcIincIorarrivingatthcstructurc
oI bcing oI thc bcings vc cncountcr m spccch
(³ns¿rccbcn) and discussion (Ics¿rccbcn)', vhich
oI diaIcctic vith !Iato. Ït is truc that IoIIoving this
samc passagc Irom §6, !cidcggcr sccms to considcr
AristotIc's subscgucntcIaboration oIthc hcrmcncutic
dimcnsion oI Loyoç as a radicaIisation 4 oI diaIcctic
undcrstood Icss as OtaA)08at ¦thc povcr to convcrsc
vith his IcIIov man that charactcriscs man as �taov
Lo¡ov s¿ov, thc animaI posscssing Loyoç) than as thc
purc `prcscntation' oIsomcthing, vithoutncvcrthcIcss
thc tcmporaI structurc oI this Loyoç bcing cxpIicitIy
rccogniscd as such. Jhis cxpIains vhy thc rccognition
oIits diaIccticaI `virtuc' docs not rcmovc us Irom thc
oIPorbandcnbcit, oIprcscncc that has a/rcady comc to
pass, oIprcscnmcss (³nucscnheit) andnotthc cvcnt oI
coming to prcscncc (³nwesung). Jimc itscII is con-
in its ontoIogicaI hnction, as is attcstcd by AristotIc's
trcatisc on timc (Ibysics I, 10-14), put Iorvard by
Timc) as thc cxampIc aIIoving thc phcnomcnaI basis
and Iimits oIancicntontoIogy to bc disccrncd. Ancicnt
ontoIogy is a naivc` ontoIogy sincc it vas born oIthc
`IaIIcnncss' oI a bcing-in-thc-vorId that `proximaIIy'
and `Iorthcmostpart' is unavarc oIitscIIas such and
`naturaIIy' tcnds to undcrstand itscII in tcrms oI thc
vorId undcrstood as a totaIity oIprc-scnt things.º Jhc
dominationoItradition vas addcd tothcnarrovncssoI
ancicnt ontoIogy, vorscning thc initiaI naivcty by cut-
ting it oIIIrom its historicaI roots and rcducing it to
purc and simpIc historiographicaI `matcriaI'´
`!cconstruction', as !cidcggcr undcrstands it, is
composcd oIa doubIc task. hrstoIaII `togivc back to
thc ossihcd tradition its suppIcncss' and `to cIiminatc
thc succcssivc Iaycrs vith vhich it has bccn covcrcd
ovcrtimc'and sotorcturntothc`originaIcxpcricnccs'
Iromvhich itsprang,° butaIso, and this isthc¿ositiuc
aspcct oIZcstru[tion,to makcmaniIcst its Iimits vith
rcspcct to thc Tcm¿ora/ität ¦tcmporaIity) oIbcing. Ït is
in §7 oIScin und Zcit (Iciny and Timc), thc scction
dcvotcd to thc cxamination oI thc conccpt oI to{oç,
aims to rctricvcan originariIy apophanticscnsc oIthis
conccptthatprcciscIy docs notmakc oIitthcprimary
Iocus oItruth.¨VhatistobccxpIaincd onthisbasis is
hov thc to{oçoxoçofixoç¦apophanticto{oç) viII bc
abIcto bccomc'tbcnormativcdomainthatviII bccomc
doctrinc oIcatcgorics'.''Iov, onc cannot account Ior
this normativc status oIthc to{oç soIcIy on thc basis oI
thchistoric jbutoriquc| `scdimcntation'' ' oIthchistoriaI
jbi·toria/|, thc proccss !cidcggcr Ior his part caIIs
uprooting (Intuurzc/uny) in vhich thc rcsu/t oIan act
¦thc unvciIing oI bcing in thc Loyç) anachronicaIIy
bccomcs ungucstioncd (Sc/bstucrsmd/icb) matcriaI Ior
As historiaI anamncsis is thc onIy rcsponsc to
ncccssariIy adopts thc charactcr oI a rctrogrcssion
(Iùcgany) thattraccsback thc apophantic statcmcnt,
traditionaIIy considcrcd to bc thc constitutivc Iocus oI
thc occurrcncc and prcscrvation oI truth, to thc
cxistcntiaI, hcrmcncutic dimcnsion vhcrcin its origin
Iics. IcvcrthcIcss, it must bc cmphasiscd that this
rcturn Irom thc apophantic IcvcI to thc propcrIy
oItracingIanguagcback to discourscbccauscIanguagc
itscIIis stiII anachronicaIIyundcrstoodby!cidcggcras
thc sum oIvords (ßortyanzbcit) and as thc oraI cxtcri-
orisation oIdiscoursc (Hinausycs¿rocbcnbcitdcr Icdc) '`
say that `spccch is born Irom mcaning' to avoid con-
thccvcnt'¹ sinccthc antcriority oIa siIcnt articuIation
oI mcanings has aIso bccn assumcd, and Ianguagc,
vhichconstitutcs thc vorIdIycxprcssionoIdiscoursc,
thcn simpIy has thc Iunction oIcxprcssing it.'` Jhc
distinction dravn by !cidcggcr bctvccn thc cxistcn-
tiaI IcvcI oIdiscoursc and thc vorIdIy IcvcI oI Ian-
guagc is, in Iact, stiII ticd to thc samc conccption oI
Ianguagc hc proposcs to put in gucstion vhcn hc
rccaIIs that `thc Grcck did not havc a vord Ior
Ianguagc' sincc `thcy undcrstood this phcnomcnon
"initiaIIy' as discoursc''º Ït must bc cmphasiscd that
an cntirc probIcm oImcaningIuIncss (Icdcutsam[cit)
had bccn dcvcIopcd vithin thc Iramcvork oI thc
anaIysis oI vorIdhood,'' vhcrc thc Icdcutcn, vhich
mustbcundcrstood asan `activc' signi|ingoI!ascin
vith rcgard to itscII, '° constitutcs thc condition oI
possibiIity oI `mcanings' oI vhich !cidcggcr thcn
cxpIicitIy statcs that thcy `Iound, in turn, thc possibIc
bcing oI vords and Ianguagc' .'¨ Iar Irom adopting
that sccs in thc catcgorics oI traditionaI Iogic thc
rcûcction oIthc grammaticaI structurcs oIa spccihc
Ianguagc, Grcck, !cidcggcrproposcs,on thccontrary,
to `IrccgrammarIromIogic'andto rcconstructIinguis-
AyC ¦scmanticandphoncticarticuIationundcrstoodon
thc basis oIthcir rcIcrcntiaI unity) has bccn idcntihcd,
tic statcmcnt, and thc thcory oI Ianguagc that vas
subscgucntIy constitutcd vas constructcd on this
narrov `IogicaI' basis. Iov this `Iogic', as !cidcggcr
cmphasiscs, `is Ioundcd on thc ontoIogy oI thc
prc-scnt bcing
´' that had sc¿aratcd thc hcrmcncutic
cvcnt Irom thc apophantic statcmcnt rcsuIting Irom
it and providcd thc Iattcr vith thc indc¿cndcnt
cxistcncc oIa hxcd phonctic or grammaticaI scman-
tic structurc vhosc intcrnaI Iavs vcrc thcn to bc
dctcrmincd. Ït is on this basis that thc proposition
can bc undcrstood as thc `Iocus' oIa truth thatitscII
no Iongcr has thc scnsc oI thc `discIoscdncss' oI
rcady-to-hand bcings (Zubandcncn) but onIy oI thc
`prc-scnt conIormity oI a prc-scnt bcing, oI thc
cxprcsscd statcmcnt, to anothcr prc-scnt bcing, thc
bcing spokcn about', that is to say, `thc prc-scnt
Jo IibcratconcscIIIromthis`Iogicist'intcrprctation
oI thc bcing oI Ianguagc, vhich rcachcd its apogcc
vith thc thcory oIthc `mythicaI cntity' oIBoIzano's´`
`proposition in itscIl and vas at thc origin oI thc
modcrn thcory oItruth as vaIidity ¦Iotzc) and vaIuc
¦Kickcrt), itisncccssary÷ this atIcastisthcposition oI
!cidcggcrin1927 ÷toundcrtakcinthchrstinstanccan
anaIysis oIthc cxistcntiaI structurc at thc origin oIthis
unity oIthc doubIc phonctic and scmanticarticuIation,
vhich thc Grccks caIIcd A1C. Iov this anaIysis docs
not takc pIacc dircctIy in thc hcId oI discoursc, an
cxistcntiaI that docs not rcIcr to a particuIar tcmporaI
ccstasis,´¹ butinthchcId oIthchndamcntaI cxistcntiaI
discoursc is dchncd as `thc articuIation oIundcrstand-
ing',´` articuIationitscIIis dchncd as thc movcmcnt oI
undcrstandinginits propcrIyprojcctivccharactcr. Jhis
is vhat assurcs Ior !ascin its sight (Sicbt) oI bcings,
oI thc othcr !ascin and oI its ovn bcing vhich
charactcriscs this statc oIopcnncss oIthc thcrc that u
!ascin. Jhis is vhy sccing an |t¸bänomcn ¦primaI
phcnomcnon) in articuIation amounts to `taking avay
Irompurc intuitionitspriorityvhichcorrcspondsatthc
noctic IcvcI to thc traditionaI ontoIogicaI priority oIthc
prc-scntbcing'.´ºAs !cidcggcrcmphasiscs,thisimpIics
that thc ¦Kantian) distinction bctvccn intuition and
thought is itscIIdcrivcd Irom thc cxistcntiaI oIundcr-
standing and is mcaninghI onIy vithin thc Iimitcd
Iramcvork oIan ontoIogy oIIorbandcnbcit¯Ïtis truc
that thc phcnomcnon oI articuIation bccomcs visibIc
onIy m thc `dcvcIopmcnt' oI undcrstanding, i.c.,
³u/cyuny, thcintcrprctation vhich sctsout j/c¡/icim-
tion qui cx-¿osc] a bcing a this or that, but thc Iattcr
constitutcs onIy thc appropriation oI vhat is undcr-
ingbccomcs itscII.´° Iurthcrmorc, intcrprctationisonc
and thc samc as thc `simpIc prc-prcdicativc sccing oI
thc rcady-to-hand'.´¨ Sight thus aIrcady in itscII
invoIvcs undcrstanding sincc intcrprctation docs not
but, on thc contrary, has thc `spccihc discIosivc
Iunction'`º vhich impIics that thc articuIation it
institutcs oIthc rcady-to-hand bcing in its rcIation to
!ascin ncvcr has `a prcsuppositionIcss grasping oI
`' as its pointoIdcparturc.
JhisarticuIationoIbcingsinrcIationto thcirbcingIor
!ascin, subscgucntIy undcrstood by !cidcggcr as thc
ontoIogicaI diIIcrcncc, isvhathcdchncs asmcaniny in
§32: `Vhcn inncrvorIdIy bcings arc discovcrcd vith
!ovcvcr, strictIy spcaking vhat is undcrstood is not
thc mcaning but thc bcings or bcing. Mcaning is that
Vhat can bc articuIatcd in undcrstanding discIosurc
vc caII mcaning.'`´ Jhcrc is, thcrcIorc, mcaning Ior
!ascin onIy vhich docs not mcan that !ascin is its
oI Ianguagc, is unassignabIc`` bccausc it is nothing
othcr than thc `postuIation' ¦aIvays discovcrcd in a
rctrospcctivc manncr) oI an horizon on thc basis oI
possibIc. Vhat !cidcggcr hcrc caIIs ³rti[u/ation,
rcIcrs to nothing othcr than this `circuIation' vhich
Icads Irom a `horizontaI' Iuturc antcrior to thc `vcrti-
caIity' oIprcscncc, a circuIarity vhich aIso constitutcs
thc `tcmporaI' scnsc oIthc transccndcntal.`¹ Ïtis this
`circIc' oI undcrstanding vhich is modihcd in thc
dcriuatiuc modc oI intcrprctation oIthc statcmcnt in
such a vay that it constitutcs thc IormaI synthctic-
diacrctic structurc oI thc prcdicativc-dctcrminant
articuIation. Jo dctcrminc is to /imit undcrstanding
sightandtovciI (abb/cndcn)anaIrcadymaniIcstbcing
so as to posit itas a mcrcIy prc-scnt `subjcct' Ior it to
bc subscgucntIy unvciIcd (cntb/cndcn) in its dctcr-
minabIcdctcrminatcncssj/cdcuoi/cr. . . cncccnquoii/
cst manqcst| ' through thc positing oIa `prcdicatc'.
Jhrough this modihcation, thc ³/s-str«[tur ¦as-
structurc) is `cut oII Irom . . . its signihcancc vhich
constitutcs thc vorIdhood oIthc surrounding vorId'
and `Iorccd back to thc uniIorm IcvcI oIthc mcrcIy
prc-scnt bcing' .`º Iov, thc AO,OC itscIIin vhich thc
prcdicativc-apophanticarticuIation takcs pIacc iscon-
sidcrcd as aprc-scntbcingIrom aphiIosophicaIpoint
oIvicv. Jhis is vhy, vhiIst thc cxistcntiaI origin oI
articuIation rcmains vciIcd, thc synthctic-diacrctic
structurc oIthc statcmcnt is undcrstood in a IormaI
manncr as thc combination and/or scparation oIcon-
in Iogistic caIcuIus.`' `Iogic' is thus cntircIy dcrivcd
Irom thcontoIogy oIprc-scncc, and ithnds, ina vay,
its cuImination in !usscrI's `IormaI ontoIogy' Ior
vhich bcing mcans no morc than IormaI bcing-
IcarIy tvcnty ycars Iatcr, in thc `Icttcr on
!umanism', !cidcggcr sccs in `Iogic' morc prcciscIy
`thc sanction, bcginning vith thc Sophists and !Iato'
oI `thc tcchnicaI intcrprctation oI thinking vhosc
origins rcach back to !Iato and AristotIc' sincc `Ior
thcmthinkingitscIIhas thc vaIuc oI fe¿v¡|, a proccss
oI rcûcction in thc scrvicc oI doing and making'.`¨
Vhat !cidcggcr nov undcrstands by `Iogic' ¦thc
guotation marks arc his) is no Iongcr onIy thc
`invcntion oI schooItcachcrs and not phiIosophcrs
duc to !Iato's and AristotIc's studcnts and not to
AristotIc himscII but thc propcrIy phiIosophicaI
rcpIaccmcnt¹ ' oIthc `sacrihcc'oIbcingas`thccIcmcnt
oIthinking'¹´cnactcdbythcSophists. ÏtisnoIongcra
gucstion onIy oI`Irccinggrammar Irom Iogic' but oI
originary csscntiaI j ointurc oI its bcing' (in cin
urs¿rùny/icbcrcs ßcscnsyc¡ùyc), a task `rcscrvcd Ior
thought and poctry
.¹` As !cidcggcr vas Iatcr to
dccIarc in his coursc oI 1951-2, `Vhat is CaIIcd
Jhinkingr', `sincc thc coursc on "Iogic" givcn in thc
summcr oI1934' hchad bccnIcd to scc that `this titIc
"Iogic" conccaIs "thc transIormation oIIogic into thc
gucstionoIthcbcinyoIIanguagc", agucstionvhichis
somcthingothcrthanphiIosophyoIIanguagc'.¹¹ `Iogic'
and `grammar' arcnov,incIIcct, cxpIicitIy considcrcd
intcrprctation oIIanguagc vcry carIy in thc Vcst.¹` Ït
cmcrgcs Irom thcsc dccIarations that vhat !cidcggcr
caIIs `thcmctaphysicaI' can rcIcronIytothcoccurrcncc
oI an instrumcntaIisation oI thought and Ianguagc,
vhich is onc vith thcir `IaII' Irom out oIthc cIcmcnt
that cnabIcs thcm `propcrIy' to bc.¹º Iov, in 1929, at
thc timc vhcn !cidcggcr acknovIcdgcd vith Kant
that mctaphysics is constitutivc oI human naturc, hc
aIrcady distinguishcd this mctaphysics in thc gcnuinc
scnsc oI thc tcrm Irom traditionaI mctaphysics that
docs not think thc ontoIogicaI diIIcrcncc.¹' Jhis is thc
`inauthcntic' mctaphysics vhich, morc cIcarIy con-
ncctcd vith thc proccss oIthc bccoming schoIastic oI
thinkingbccomc 9crpux ¦thcory)
¹° aIonc rcccivcs thc
namc 'tbc mctaphysicaI'¹¨ in !cidcggcrian thinking
ÏI, in thc Iastphasc oIhis thought, !cidcggcr sccms
to Iocatc himscII`bcyond' Iogic and phiIosophy and to
caII Ior a diaIoguc bctvccn thinking and poctry, it is
bccauschcisdcvotinghis cIIorts`tomaintainingthink-
inginitscIcmcnt' .`'Iov,thiscIcmcntisbcingandnot
bcings, or morc prcciscIy bcing in its dfcc Irom
bcings, as thc doubIc scnsc oI thc participIc oI thc
!armcnidiancOy aIrcadysays,vhcrcasvhat!cidcggcr
caIIs `thc mctaphysicaI' can, on thc contrary, bc con-
oIbcingbythccuriosityaboutbcings', `thccvcrgrov-
ingscdimcntationoIthcnominaImcanings oIthcbasc
participIc' vhichhavcnot`ccascd toobscurcthcprimi-
this vay to vhat is propcr to it, Iar Irom cstabIishing
somc kind oIsccurity Ior itby attachingit to an ontic
ccrtitudc, consists, onthccontrary,incxposingitto thc
`storm oIbcing' and thc Iightningûash oIthc cvcnt.`´
Jhiscvcnt,vicvcd Irom and inthcIanguagc oImcta-
physics, isabovc aII thc cvcnt oIthcdy rcncc oIbcing
and bcings.`` Ior mctaphysics, bcing rcvcaIs itscII
`as thc ground that givcs itscII ground (sicb sc/bst
cryrùndcndc) and accounts Ior itscII(sicb sc/bst bcyrùn-
dcndc)', as `thc Loyoç in thc scnsc oIthc gathcring oI
bcings and Icttingthcm bc', as thc onc and aII, as Ev
I1ofo.`¹ Jhis is vhat !cidcggcr caIIs thc Ior¿p uny,
thc prc-marking or prc-imprinting oI bcin�` Irom
vhcncc comcs cach oI thc historicaI jbutoria/cs|
imprintsoutsidcoIvhosccpochaIcvcntitis nothing.`º
Ït is this Ior-¿p uny oIbcingby thc Loyoçvhich is at
thc origin oIthc di-morphism oImctaphysics, at oncc
ontoIogyandthcoIogy`' sincc itisathoughtoIbcingat
onccasa gcncraIity producingthc basis and travcrsing
cvcrythingandas thc unihcdtotaIityoIarationaI basis
othcr than thc discIosing oI bcing undcr thc doubIy
uni|ing imprint oI thc Loyoç, thc `Ioundation that
accountsIorground,is caIIcd to accountbythcground
Jhus, mctaphysics paradoxicaIIy takcs on thc
doubIcIormoIan onto-Iogy andoIathco-Iogy`'sincc
it is dominatcdby `Iogic' vhich is a thinking oIthc
thcbcingo¡bcings,inthc doubIc`objcctivc'and `sub-
jcctivc' scnsc oI thc gcnitivc ¦tcrms that thcmscIvcs
rcsuIt Irom thc IogicaI imprint oI bcingº'), vhich
mcans that itthinks thc diIIcrcnt (das Zy crcntc) and
not diIIcrcncc itscI[º´ thc Iattcr continuing to appcar
onIy as a distinction addcd by our rcprcscntation to
tcrms positcd as scparatc and notas thc `bctvccn' on
thc basis oIvhich bcing as vcII as bcings appcar.º`
Bcingandbcingsarcnotin scparatcpIaccs. Ït is bcing
itscII vhich transIorms itscII into bcings through a
movcmcntoItransccndcncc vhich is atthc samc timc
that oIthc arrivaI oIbcings in¿rcscncc. Jhis impIics
thatthcyarc thcsamc,in thc intimatcintcnsity oIthc
cvcnt oI a spIit through vhich thcy arc at oncc
scparatcd onc Irom thc othcr and rcIatcd onc to thc
othcr.º¹ Jhis is vhy vhcn bcing and bcings arc
thought on thc basis oIdiIIcrcncc thcy shov thcm-
scIvcs to us on thc basis oI thc di·tributiuc and
ycstationa/dimcnsion that!cidcggcrcaIIs³ustrayº`as
thc bcing apart and thc bcing tovard cach othcr oI
isthis `transvcrsaI' (durcbyänyiy) dimcnsioninrcIation
to aII thc `cpochs' oIbcingvhich aIIovs us to undcr-
stand that thc onto-thco-IogicaI constitution oImcta-
physics IoIIovs Irom thc rcign oI diIIcrcncc Irom
vhich thc tcrms `bcing' and `bcings', `ground' and
`groundcd' comc. Butthcscgovcrningtcrms oImcta-
physics do not thcmscIvcs attain thc trans-cpochaI
dimcnsion that appcars onIy vhcn, through `thc
ing', vc Ict vhat has bccn comc to Ianguagc in thc
sayingoIthc³ustray. ººÏtis prcciscIy this /cttinycomc
to /anyuayc, inopposition to thc domination cxcrciscd
grammar,º' vhich is thc vhoIc diIhcuIty. Jhis is
bccausc `our vcstcrn Ianguagcs, cachin its ovnvay,
arc Ianguagcs oI mctaphysicaI thinking', and thc
gucstion rcmains opcn as to vhcthcr this IogicaI
`imprint' oIthc bcingoIourIanguagcs isdchnitivcor
vhcthcr thcy aIIov `oIothcrpossibiIitics oIspcaking,
that is, at thc samc timc oI a non-spcaking that
spcaks',º° vhcthcr, in othcr tcrms, our Ianguagcs can
bccomcIanguagcs oIdycranccassucb,vhich isto say
Jhat thc IogicaI imprinton thc bcing oIthc Gcrman
Ianguagc is not dchnitivc and that it is possibIc to
rcturn it to a morc originaI httingncss oI its bcing,
!cidcggcr's cntircocuurcIromaItcrthcIcbrcinitscII
attcsts sincc his task vas constantIy, not simpIy to
`transIatc' into Gcrman thc govcrning vords oI
phiIosophy,'º but, in doing this, to prcparc Ior a
`mctamorphosis' oI Ianguagc that vouId not bc thc
product oIthc Iabrication oIncv tcrms, as vas stiII
but unigucIy by initiating a rcIation to Ianguagc'´
othcrthanthatvhich sccsinIanguagcthcinstrumcnt,
vith a doubIcconstitution,oIthc ambiguousbcingin
vhich thc �e:ovAOYOV EXOV ¦animaI posscssing AOYO�)
consists, i.c., Man in thc mctaphysicaI scnsc. Jhc
abcingconstitutcd bythcunionoIa scnsibIccIcmcnt,
thc phonctic, and a supra-scnsibIc cIcmcnt, mcaning
inasmuchasitcxcccdsthc mcrcIy scnsibIcIcvcI oIthc
phonctic cIcmcnt.'` Jhis mctaphysicaI rcprcscntation
oI thc csscncc oIIanguagc doubtIcss stiII constitutcs
thc Iramcvork oI thc !umboIdtian dchnition oI
Ianguagcas thc 'uor[, ctcrnaIIy rcpcatingitscII,o¡tbc
s¿irit torcndcrthcarticu/atcdsoundaptIorthccxprcs-
hnds thc idca oI a mctamorphosis oIIanguagc that
vouIdinvoIvc ncithcraphoncticnorasyntactictrans-
Iormation but vouId bc unigucIytbcina¿¿arcntuor[
o¡timc through vhich `anothcr mcaning is pIaccd in
thc samc abodc, undcr thc samc imprint (Gc¿pe)
somcthing diIIcrcnt is givcn, according to thc samc
Iavs oI agrccmcnt a diIIcrcntIy arrangcd coursc oI
idcasisindicatcd' .'`
!umboIdt vas thc h rst in thc Vcstcrn tradition'º
thc purposc oI mutuaI comprchcnsion', but `a rcaI
uor1d that thcs¿irit must ncccssariIy pIacc bctvccn it
and ob¡ccts through thc intcrnaI vork oI its Iorcc' .''
Vork, thc vcry csscncc oI spirit vhich is soIcIy
activity, is ccrtainIy,as!cidcggcr insists, dchncd hcrc
in conIormity vith thc pcrspcctivc oI Gcrman
ÏdcaIism as a vhoIc as a Sctzcn, a positing, a 8ec<,
vhich mcdiatcs and thus carrics out thc synthcsis oI
subjcct and objccts, i.c., thc vorId. !ovcvcr,
!umboIdt's modcrnity and his participation in thc
mctaphysics oI subjcctivity that charactcriscs this
cpochncvcrthcIcss docs not prcvcnthim Iromcasting
a pcnctratinggIancc into thc hcartoIthc dcpIoymcnt
oI thc bcing oI Ianguagc,'° as !cidcggcr himscII
rccogniscs, sincc hc ncvcr thinks oIthis mcdiation as
postcrior to thc prc-cxistcnt `rcaIitics' oIsubjcct and
objccts but, on thc contrary, as thc rcIation that itscII
constitutcs thc poIcs oI subjcctivc and objcctivc.
!umboIdt insists on thc IactthatIanguagc, Iar Irom
coming Irom a `considcrcd' act oIman,posscsscs, on
thc contrary, `a spontancity (Sc/bsttbätiy[cit) vhich is
visibIymaniIcsttouscvcnthough itisincxpIicabIcin
its bcing'. Sincc itsprings `Irom a dcpth oIhumanity
that Iorbids us Ior cvcr Irom considcring it as a
gcnuinc vork and crcation oIpcopIcs' onc must scc
it as `not a product oI activity but an invoIuntary
cmanation oIthcspirit, not a vork oInations butthc
` thcy usc it vithout knoving hov thcy havc Iormcd
' '¨ it .
Jhis vorId vhich is `positcd' bctvccn thc subjcct
gcnt singuIarity oIits `intcrsubjcctivc' crcation in thc
must, paradoxicaIIy, bc undcrstood as thc passivity oI
an `invoIuntary' outpouring.°º Vith this, thc Iunda-
mcntaItcm¿ora/ity oIvhatGcrmanidcaIismthinksoI
undcr thc tcrms `positing' and `synthcsis' can bc
gIimpscd. Iov, this `synthcsis', to thc cxtcnt that it
comcs to pass as Ianguagc ÷ that is to say, as spccch
yaru/c|, S¿racbc, sincc vhat in Ircnch, as in Grcck,
IatinandIngIishisnamcd on thc basis oIthc organ
oI spccch, thc tonguc j/anyuc|, yìæooo, /inyua,
Ianguagc, Gcrman namcs on thc basis oI thc vcrb
s¿rccbcn, to spcak°' ÷ is thc `synthcsis' oIsound and
thought vhosc `mutuaI accord' !umboIdt ccIcbratcs
in passagcs oI grcat bcauty.°´ !is conccption oI
S¿racbc is charactcriscd by thc cmphasis pIaccd upon
thc originariIy corporcaI charactcr oI articuIation
undcrstood asrcstingupon `thcpovcrcxcrciscdbythc
oIthcphoncticcIcmcntthatcorrcsponds tothcIormoI
its action'.°` S¿racbc is considcrcd by !umboIdt, Irom
thc pcrspcctivc oIKomanticism's spccuIativc principIc
oI Crganicism,°¹ as `thc organ that givcs Iorm to
thought', vhich is to say, as that vhich, through thc
intcrmcdiary oI thc phonctic cIcmcnt (Iaut), givcs
matcriaI cxtcriority and phcnomcnaI scnsibiIity to
spirituaI, compIctcIy intcrior and, so to say, vithout
Icavingatracc' .°` JhcarticuIationoIthcvoicc(Stimmc)
in Iinguistic sound (S¿racb/aut) thus cmbodics timc,
rcndcrs thc intcrior cxtcriorand thc spirituaI matcriaI.
ÏI it is truc that !umboIdt undcrstands Ianguagc at
oncconthcbasisoIthcmouthand thccar,sccingin it
thc movcmcnt oI ` thc spirituaI aspiration Iorcing its
vaypastthc Iips' and `rcturningto its ovn carinthc
Iorm oIvhat it had produccd',°º and iIhc ccIcbratcs
`thc happy organisation oIhcaring and thc organs oI
spccch',°' it rcmains thc casc that articuIation, as con-
stitutivc oI `thc propcr bcing oI Ianguagc', must bc
undcrstoodinitsbirthand not initsrcsuIt,°° vhich is
to say as a purc originary Iormativc activity that is as
onc vith intcntion and thccapacityoImcaning,°¨ dis-
conncctcd Irom its auditivc rcccption.¨º Scmantic
articuIationand phoncticarticuIationcanthcrcIorcbc
distinguishcd onIy in an abstract manncr sincc `thc
indissoIubIc aIIiancc that tics thinking, thc vocaI
organsandhcaringto IanguagcrcstsunchangingIyon
thc originary organisation (Iinricbtuny) oI human
Ït is thcrcIorc thc `Iiving rcsonancc' oI thc voicc,
springing Irom thc human Iungs, vhich `through
inccssantIy rcpcatcd actions, tics togcthcr in itscIIthc
vorId and man, or,inothcrtcrms, his spontancityand
rcccptivity'.¨´ Ït bccomcs cIcar hcrc that !umboIdt
schcmatism in thc articuIation oIthc <rvl OEa't 1
¦mcaningIuI sound) itscIl !ovcvcr, this synthcsis oI
thc intcrnaI Iinguistic Iorm and thc phonctic cIcmcnt
vhich so dccisivcIy aIIics Ianguagc vith an art¨` is
much rathcr `an aIvays transitory and instantancous
cIIcctivc action' vhich docs not rcvcaI itscII by any
particuIar sign,notcvcnvords.Jhisisvhy!umboIdt
comparcs itinits immatcriaIityto a ûash oIIightning
vhich iIIuminatcs Ianguagc and vhich, `Iikc a hrc
comc Irom unknovn rcgions has Iuscd togcthcr thc
matcriaIs to bc combincd'¨¹ . Jhis `act oI synthctic
positing' (³ctdcssyntbcti·cbcn Sctzcns), diIIcringIrom
Kantian cognitivc synthcsis vhich rcmainsdcpcndcnt
upon an cxtcrior objcctivity through thc bias oI thc
rcccptivity oI scnsibiIity, is an `act oI spontancous
positing through conccntration' (³ct dcs sc/bsttbätiycn
Sctzcns durcb Zusammcn[ssuny) vhich, constantIy
rcpcatingitscIIinIanguagc,produccsIor itscIIitsovn
objcctivity in thc matcriaIity oI articuIatcd sound.
`Spirit crcatcs, butin tbc ucry act stands ovcr against
(stc//tycycnùbcr) vhat it has crcatcd and Icts it, as an
objcct, vork on it in rcturn (zurùc[uir[cn). Ïn this
bctvccn onc and thc othcr, vhat attachcs onc to thc
othcr and cnrichcs onc by thc othcr. Ianguagc. '¨` Ïtis
thisactionuponitscIIoIa crcativc spontancity vhich
aIIovs !umboIdt to dchnc, in a morc authcnticaIIy
AristotcIian scnsc than !cidcggcr thinks,¨º Ianguagc
aseVep)ta, asactivitybcaringitsovn`product'vithin
itscII but capabIc at tbc samc timc oI standing ovcr
against it, as iIit vcrc its othcr, through an inhnitc
vordsoIinûcctcdIanguagcs.¨'Ior, `thcrc arcincIIcct
points, in thc grammaticaI structurc oIIanguagcs, in
vhichthissynthcsisand thcIorccthatproduccsitarc,
so to spcak, iIIuminatcd in a morc nakcd and morc
immcdiatc vay'¨° and, amongst thc thrcc `points' that
thc vcrb, thc conjunction and thc rcIativc pronoun,
`thc vcrb aIonc is thc ccntraI point that cncompasscs
and sprcads IiIc', vhiIst `aII thc othcr tcrms oI thc
scntcncc arc, soto spcak, dcad matcriaI, vaiting Iora
conncction' sincc vith thc vcrb thc synthcsis oI thc
prcdicatc vith thcsubjcctpasscs Irom simpIc thought
to thcactuaIity oIa rcaI proccss. `Vcdonotthink thc
ûash oIIightning onIy, it is thc Iightning itscIIvhich
strikcs hcrc, vc arc no Iongcr contcnt to bring
togcthcr spirit and thc impcrishabIc to unitc thcm,
rathcr spirit isthc impcrishabIc. Jhinking, iIvc may
cxprcss ourscIvcs in such hgurativc Iashion, Icavcs its
intcrior rcsting pIacc and makcs its cntry into thc
The Logos of Mortals
Jhc csscntiaI rcIation bctvccn dcath and Ian-
guagc, a Iightning ûash, Iights up, but it is stiII
unthought. ' ¦!cidcggcr)
Vcstcrn Mctaphysics, at its hcight, is a thinking oI
vork and oI thc ctcrnaI rcpctition oI spirit, and it
undcrstands itscII, vith !umboIdt, as thc cxpcricncc
oIthc undying ûov oItimc in thc inûcctcd moduIa-
tions oIsaying. Jhis thought oIthc |nucryäny/icbcn,
thc immortaI, docs not, hovcvcr, Iack thc anti-
rhythmic momcnt oIcacsura in vhich thc conIronta-
tion oIdcathatthc vcry intcrior oIIiIc consists sincc it
is thc vcry mcnacc oI mummi|ing objcctihcation´
vhichrcvivcsthcaIvays rccommcnccdvork oIspirit.
As !cgcI cmphasiscs, it is `thc trcmcndous povcr oI
thcncgativc',`thccncrgyoIthinking,oI¿urcr, vhich
aIIovs `thc accidcntaI' to bc givcn `an cxistcncc oIits
ovn and a scparatc Irccdom', as `vhat is ticd and is
actuaIonIy initscontcxtvith othcrs', sincc `thcIiIc oI
itscIIuntouchcdbydcvastation' but,onthccontrary,1t
cIIcct, spirit is `povcrIuI' onIy iI it has thc `magicaI
thatitisnot `a passivc subjcctincrtIy supporting acci-
dcnts', but `thc scII-moving conccpt vhich takcs its
dctcrminations back into itscIl.` Iov, in this movc-
mcntoIconvcrsionand oIrcncvaI, thc immobiIcsub-
jcct `coIIapscs',and itistbisin]cctionitscqtbatbccomcs
tbcob¡cct. ºÏn thisvay, vhathasthc IormoIthc prcdi-
catcinascntcnccisnoIongcr thc univcrsaIappIicabIc
to morc than onc thing bccausc it docs not cxist `by
itscIl and,as an attributc, isaIvaysinsomcthingcIsc.
Kathcr, it is substancc itscIIand so prcscnts itscIIas
scparatc´ KcprcscntationaI thought (das uorstc//cndc
Zcn[cn),vhich is nothingothcr than `IogicaI' thought
in its traditionaI dchnition, thus bccomcs `hindcrcd in
itundcrgocs and that transIorms itIrom a j udgcmcnt
containing thc diIIcrcncc bctvccn subjcct and prcdi-
proposition cannot stay vith this rcsuIt, vith idcntity
aIonc. itmustcontainthcpassagcitscIf,vhichistosay
thc `countcr-thrust' oIthc sccond proposition against
thc hrst, impIying that `thc idcntity oI subjcct and
prcdicatc is not mcant to dcstroy thc diIIcrcncc
bctvccn thcm, vhich thc Iorm oI thc proposition
cxprcsscs, thcir unity, rathcr, is mcant to cmcrgc as a
Vc arc hcrc, in cIIcct, at thc IcvcI oI `diaIccticaI
movcmcnt',inthc `cIcmcnt oIthcpurcconccpt¸and
thc Iattcr hnds its bcing-thcrc jêrc-/à| onIy in timc,'º
impIying that thc movcmcnt oIthinking cannot rcst
on any prc-cxisting contcnt. Jhcrc is thcrcIorc no
`undcrIying subjcct` vhich a prcdicatc might bcIaII,
sincc thc contcnt is hcrc `in its ovn scII, subjcct
through and through'.'' Cnc must not rcmain in
intcrior inhibition cxprcsscd by thought satis|ing
itscII vith a dcad idcntity and coming to a stop.
Kathcr, to prcvcnt thc Iorm oIthc proposition bcing
sublatcd jabo/ic] (au_cbobcn) in a mcrcIy immcdiatc
Iashion `this oppositc movcmcnt must bc cxprcsscd
(ausycs¿rocbcn)' and `thc rcturn oI thc conccpt into
vithoutvhichvc simpIy IaIIbackupon simpIc 'inncr
intuition' vithout attaining `thc spccuIativc in act'.'´
Jhc springing up oIthc harmonious unity oIsubjcct
³uss¿mcbc, and cxposition, IogicaI Zarstc//uny. Ït
dcmands thatthc rcturnoIcsscnccintoitscIItakc thc
Iorm oIbcing-thcrc,'` impIying that diIIcrcncc and
cxtcriority arc not immcdiatcIy absorbcd again into
idcntity. Jhis is vhat !cgcI himscIIcaIIs `thc imma-
ncntrhythmoIthcconccpt''¹ invhichthinkingmust
not arbitrariIy intcrvcnc but vhosc tcnsion it must
takcuponitscIIthrough a visc abstcntion.'` Jhcrc is
thc rhythm oI thc duaI Iorm oI thc proposition
dcstroycdby thcunityoIthcconccpt. !cgcIcomparcs
itto thatoImctrcand acccntinpocticrhythm,vhich
rcsuItsas muchIrom thcsuspcnscoIthc intcrvaI that
scparatcs thcm as Irom thcir rcunion.'º Jhis rhythm
vhich cxprcsscs thc IiIc oI thc conccpt is tcrmcd
ßidcrs¿rucb, contradiction, and, as !cidcggcr rccaIIs,
!cgcI says oIit in thc Ioyic that `it is thc root oIaII
movcmcnt and oIaII IiIc, itis onIy to thc cxtcnt that
somcthingcontainsacontradiction vithinitscIIthatit
movcs, that it posscsscs a Iorcc oIimpuIsion and an
activity'.Iov, this activity is constantIy thought oI
as thcpovcroIobjcctivisation,as thc capacity oIscII-
rcprcscntationthroughrcûcction,vhich cxpIains vhy
thcdiaIccticorthc spccuIativc'°arc dchncd by !cgcI
as `thc grasping oIop-positcs in thcir unity or oIthc
positivc in thc ncgativc'.'¨ Ït is thc production oI
op-positcs that!cgcIundcrstands prcciscIy as `vork'.
Jhc diaIccticaI proccss can thcrcIorc bccomc `thc
IundamcntaImovcmcntinthctotaIityoIthc objcctiv-
ity oIaII objccts, vhich is to say oIbcingsuch as itis
undcrstood by thcmodcrns',´' onIyto thccxtcntthat
spccuIativcidcntity canonIy cvcr bcrcaIiscdIromthc
point oIvicv oIa `productivc' subjcct. Ït is truc that
thc young !cgcI aIrcady sought in SchcIIing's phiI-
subjcct vhich vouId no Iongcr producc itscII soIcIy
Irom a subjcctivc point oIvicv, as vith Iichtc, but
aIso Irom an objcctivc pointoIvicv. Butthis inguiry
in itscIIimpIics that !cgcI continucd to conccivc oI
thc absoIutcas sucha subjcctcapabIc oI`hndingitscq
in absoIutc dircmption' bccausc, as hc cxpIicitIy says,
thc `magicIorcc' thatconvcrtsthcncgativcintobcing
Ïs thcrc dccp vithin diaIcctic, vhich !cidcggcr
himscIIj udgcs to bc `in ccrtain rcspccts thc highcst'
`dimcnsion' oIthinking,´´ thc possibiIity oIIcttingthc
thing itscqcomc to Ianguagc vithout rccoursc to thc
pcrmancncc oIa subjcct proving ncccssary` Cr, can
thc thought oI dia-chrony dcpIoy itscII onIy, as thc
!cgcIian cxampIc dcmonstratcs, in thc Iorm oI a
Scicncc o¡ Ioyic, that is to say as an `onto-Iogy oI
absoIutcsubjcctivity'´` vhosc/oyosrcmains,rightupto
itsspccuIativcprcscntation, markcd by thc prcdicativc
structurcand thc opposition oIobjcctand subjcct` Jo
pursucthisgucstion,oncvouIdhavcto intcrrogatcthc
hgurc vho, vcII bcIorc !cgcI and SchcIIing, undcr-
to a highcr unity, that ol 'Scin scb/ccbtbin', oI`simpIc
bcing' .´¨ Ïn a short cssay cntitIcd `Judgcmcnt and
Bcing',vrittcnatthc bcginning oI1795 vhcnhcvas
an auditor oIIichtc's in Jcna, !öIdcrIin cmphasiscs
that thc ordcr oIbcing that `cxprcsscs thc conncction
bctvccn subjcct and objcct' constitutcs thc ncccssary
prcsupposition oI aII rcûcction. Against Iichtc, vho
positingoIthcÏ,hcshovs that`thcÏ jmoi|isonIy pos-
sibIc thanks to thc scparation oIthc Ï ¸jc| Irom thc Ï
jmoi|', impIying that thc Ï is in no vay an absoIutc
idcntity but thc idcntity oIthc opposcd Ï-subjcctand
Ï-objcct onIy. Ior, idcntity is a conccpt oI rcûcction
onIy,and itisconscgucntIy impossibIc to sccthc truth
oI Spinozan substancc in thc Ï, as Iichtc vantcd to.
Cnc must thcrcIorc not conIusc bcing vith idcntity,
thc sphcrc oI thc rcûcxivc scission vith that oI thc
unihcation oI subjcct and objcct in bcing. AII oI
!öIdcrIin's subscgucnt rcûcctions vcrc to consist in
thinking thc union, in a gcnctic scnsc, oI thcsc tvo
sphcrcsvhich constitutcthc poIcs oIa dynamicunity,
oIa `IiIc' at oncc human and divinc that is onIy cvcr
rcaIiscd inahnitcconcrctchgurcsincc thcrc isncithcr
ing, nor a univcrsaI spirit.´` Ïn this vay, !öIdcrIin
cncountcrs, vith thc vhoIc oI Gcrman idcaIism, thc
gcnctic unity oI oppositcs aIrcady cxprcsscd in
!cracIitus's Iragmcnt 1 19 vhich spcaks oIthc opcning
oIhuman dvcIIing to thc maniIcstation oIthc divinc
and vhich, rcdiscovcrcd by Gcrman mysticism, Icd
IichoIas oICusa to thc idca oIacoincidcntia o¿¿osito-
rum. !ovcvcr, vhat constitutcs thc pccuIiarity oI
!öIdcrIin's thought is that this gcncsis is sccn in its
simu/tancity vith dccIinc, vhich is to say no Iongcr
against thc kinctic horizon oIthc pcrsistcncc oIa sub-
jcct capabIc oI `bcaring' jsu¿¿ortcr| thc accidcnt oIits
ovndcathvhichmakcsaIIgcncsisa'V8<\'\, agcnc-
sis oIsomcthing, but against thc mctaboIic horizon oI
thc'V8<\ anAr\, oIgcncsis undcrstood asbcinginits
most simpIc scnsc as thc purc `unmotivatcd' passagc
Irom non-bcing to bcing. Vhat !öIdcrIin vants to
thinkisnotthc dcvcIopmcntoIathingIromitsinitiaI
stagc to its hnaI stagc, cvcn via thc intcrmcdiary oIa
`guaIitativc Icap' vhich vouId introducc hcrc a rcIa-
pcaranccintoappcaranccand oIdcathintoIiIc.Vhat
and thc intcrvaI that scparatcs thc brcaks but thc
cpochaI brcak itscII and thc radicaI discontinuity oI
Ïnan cssay thathasIcgitimatcIybccngivcn thctitIc
`Bccoming in !issoIution',´º !öIdcrIin dcpIoys a
aIvays singuIarbirthoIthcabsoIutcandnotthatoIits
`CaIvary'onIy, as isthccasc Ior!cgcI vhosc diaIcctic,
to thc cxtcnt it raiscs Christianity to thc IcvcI oI a
`phiIosophcmc', has thc `sacrihciaI' structurc oI thc
inhnitc that, bccausc it cxists bcIorc thc hnitc, must
managc toh nditscIIagain through dcathand rcsur-
rcctionin thc Iattcr.´'Ior!öIdcrIin, pcrishingcomcs
¸rst IromanontoIogicaI pointoIvicv and `bccoming
in pcrishing' is thc ontoIogicaI Iorm oIthc `bcing' oI
thc inhnitc, to thc cxtcnt that thc Iattcr is `produccd'
(sicb bcrstc//t) onIy in dccIinc and passagc.´° Jhc
vorId or an cpoch to anothcr vhosc unIorcsccn
`springing up' authoriscs no gIobaIising Iogicisation.
Iach cpoch is thus in itscII thc most accompIishcd
prcscntation oI thc inhnitc, and thc Iattcr can bc
scizcd onIy in a ûash oI Iightning in thc `gcnctic
momcnt' oIthc coincidcncc oIthc dcathand thcbirth
oIa vorId, in thcj oyousmourningand thc IccIing oI
totaI IiIc that is thc cxpcricncc in pcrishing oI thc
structuraIunity oIthc inhnitc and thchnitc, oIactuaI
IiIc and oIthc supcrior IiIc and thus oIthc proccss oI
rcprcscntation [yuration| pcrpctuaIIy crcativc oIIiIc.
Jhis mcmoriaI intcriorisation oIthc rcaI dissoIution
caIIcd `idcaI dissoIution' by !öIdcrIin cnacts a rcturn
Irom thc prcscnt to thc past, Irom thc inhnitc to thc
vhy vhat is Iivcd as vcakcning or dcath is in itscq
¦and notonIy in itsrcsuIt) thc rcvivingandgrovth oI
vhat has bccn, not dcstructivc vioIcncc but Iovc that
cnhanccs, undcrstands, conscrvcs vhat has bccn.´¨
Jhis proccss oI cIcvation, in vhich thc prcscntgains
in spiritto thc cxtcnt thatitgivcs spiritto thc past, is
thc crcativc act in vhich thc `subjcct', ncithcr divinc
nor human, oI thc historicaI proccss consists.
is onIy in thc tragic union oIhnitc and inhnitc that
pcrpctuaIIy crcativc IiIc is conscrvcd. Ipochs con-
stitutc thcmscIvcs in opposition to onc anothcr such
say thcy can in no vay bc unihcd Irom a `rcconciIia-
tory'tcIcoIogicaIpointoIvicvbutonIyconscrvcd and
pIaccd in rcIation vith cach othcr in vhat !öIdcrIin
caIIs Icrciniyuny, thc union that rctains thc opposcd
cIcmcnts, turning thcm tovards onc anothcr and
maintaining thcm in a rcciprocaI tcnsion. Such a
thought, vhoscground isGundcr¡abruny, thc Iunda-
mcntaIcxpcricnccoIthc¿rcscncc oIthcinhnitcin thc
hnitc, is opposcd to mctaphysicaI Iogic vhich, onthc
contrary, conccivcs oI thc hnitc as containcd in thc
inhnitc. Butthis¿rcscncc,bccauscitispropcrIy cxpcri-
cnccd onIy in thc Iightningûash oIits disappcarancc,
opcnsthccIcaringoIits possibIc rc-productiononIyin
aIvaysncvhnitcIorms. Ïtisagainstthishorizonthat
Ianguagc can appcar as thc vcry paradigm oI thc
`gcnctic' phcnomcnon,`ºin thc scnscthatin it particu-
Iarity and totaIity, inhnitcand hnitc, sound and scnsc
Sincc it is a thought oIsinguIarity and discontinuity,
!öIdcrIin's rcstitutivc diaIcctic thus rcmains IaithIuI
to thc carIicst scnsc oI 8w.A'ceat, that oI pIuraI
spccchand thc actuaIity oIcngagingindiaIoguc vith
onc anothcr. !öIdcrIin spcaks in 'Iricdcn¸icr'
¦`CcIcbration oI!cacc') oIthisdiaIoguc (Gcs¿räcb) vc
Jhat thc Gcs¿räcb must bccomc Gcsan�
and that
diaIccticaI Iogic managcs to cxpcricncc itscII as thc
oIthc Icmar[s on³ntiyonc is pcrhaps constitutivc oI
thc most intimatc `dcstination' oIIanguagc vhich, by
actingcomponcnt,itsscmanticsand itssyntax,vouId
rcunitc vhat, sincc thc bcginning oIphiIosophy, has
bccnscparatcdintoEntc'1!l ¦knovIcdgc)and1Otlct<
¦making). Sincc, as !öIdcrIin cmphasiscs, vhiIc
phiIosophy, undcr thc namc Iogic, onIy cvcr trcats onc
IacuIty oIthcsou/, poctry trcats thc uarus IacuItics oI
man.`` Iov, thc Iattcr must bc undcrstood in thc
Kantianmanncr asconstitutingin itscntircty a `systcm
soning occur succcssivcIy.`¹ And, itis `thc cohcrcncc oI
thc most autonomous cIcmcnts oIthc divcrsc IacuItics'
oIthc humanbcing,incontrastvith `thcsimpIccohcr-
cncc oIthc articuIations' oIthc uniguc IacuIty oIthc
souI, i.c., thc undcrstanding, vhich `can bc caIIcd
tion oIrhythm that thc Iattcr constitutcs thc cohcsion
(Zuammcnbany) oIa succcssivc divcrsity, cach cIcmcnt
oI vhich maniIcsts a tcndcncy tovards autonomy,
tovards Schdiy[cit. Jhc compound rhythm oIthc
!cgcIian Iogic oIthc conccpt is dcpIoycd as thc movc-
rcgard to thcmscIvcs and as thc rcturn on thc basis oI
thcir bcing-thcrc to thc simpIicity oIauto-dctcrmina-
tion, a circuIarity vhich tcstihcs that thc contcnt oI
Scicncc `has not rcccivcd its dctcrmination Irom somc-
thing cIsc'.`º BcingitscIIhas thus rcabsorbcd into itscII
itsovnstrangcncsssinccitmakcsoIitscIIAOYC. Jo this
simpIicity (Iinµcbbcit) oIthc conccptuaI rhythm oIthc
Cdysscy oI spirit, !öIdcrIin opposcs thc haIting and
`unbound' (unycbundcnstc) ´ charactcr oI tragic
rhythmvhich÷ Iikc!ionysus,thc `IruitoIthcstorm'
born oI thc divinc Iightning ûash that rcduccd
ScmcIc`° to ashcs÷ iscngcndcrcd in thc `coupIing' oI
Godandmanthatcomcstopassinthc `diaIoguccon-
stantIy inconûict', i.c., human spccch.`¨ Jhc tragicis
born oIthc `monstrous' cxpcricncc oIthc cncountcr
vith thc vhoIIyothcr,vith vhatcan bc `harmoniscd'
that opcns bctvccn carth and sky bcIorc onc vho,
Ït is this `sccrct oI thc cncountcr'¹´ that, in an in-
apparcnt manncr, maniIcsts thc `music' oI human
spccch in thc DWA)tV that originaIIy dchncs it. Ior,
in thc doubIcscnsc [oIspcakingvithoncanothcrand
Iistcning to onc anothcr| is thc mothcr tonguc as
diaIcct. . . . JhcbcingoIIanguagc jdasS¿mcbuesen|is
rootcd in diaIcct. VhiIc thcmanncroIthcmouth (die
Mundmt) is thc mothcr tonguc, vhat constitutcs thc
IamiIiarity (dasHeimiscbe) oIonc's homc (die Heimat)
is aIso rootcd in it. !iaIcct is not simpIy thc mothcr
tonguc, but it is at thc samc timc and abovc aII thc
mothcr oIIanguagc.'¹` !cidcggcrrccogniscs hcrc that
diaIcctic dravs its primary scnsc Irom thc originaIIy
diaIccticaI charactcr oI Ianguagc vhich dchncs thc
intrinsic historicity and IocaIity oI thc Iattcr, to thc
point that thc vcry notion oI `pIacc oI birth', oI
Heimat, dravs its scnsc onIy Irom this charactcr oI
Ianguagc. thcIongtcxtoI1960, 'S¿racbe undHeimat'
¦"Ianguagc and !omc"), dcvotcd oncc again to thc
AIcmanicpoctJohann!ctcr!cbcI, cndsonthctrans-
Iormation oI thc titIc into `Sprachc a/ !cimat',
`Ianguagc as homc', sincc `poctic saying aIonc Icts
mortaIs dvcII on thc carth, under thc hcavcns and
bçore thc gods'.¹¹ Cn thc basis oIsuch a diaIccticaI
bcingoIIanguagcitis possibIctoundcrstandvhatthc
uoiceisbynoIongcrrcIatingitcithcrto thchorizonoI
a physioIogicaI cxpIanation oIphoncticism or to thc
mctaphysicaI horizon oIthc scII-prcscnccoIasubjcct.
S¿racb/aut, thc sound oIspccch, must bc undcrstood
slLi M ve SAN.AT V.'\ :>�I
onthc basis oIthc vcry intonation oIthc voicc,oIthc
rcsonancc oIits Stimmcn, vhich rctains vithin itscII
ayainst thc void oIthc hcavcns thc obscurity and thc
vithdravaIoIthccarth.¹`Ïtis this agrccmcntvhich
grants that vhich riscs up togcthcr vith its timc, thc
Iightning ûash oIthc G/cicb-zcitiy[cit, thc simuItanc-
Iightninggovcrns aIIthings.' ¦!cracIitus)
Chrono-logy intcrrupts itscII at thc vcry momcnt it
that makcs it possibIc sincc vith it, as phiIosophcrs´
j ust as much as pocts havc said, vhat vc caII thc
bcginning is oItcn thc cnd, thc cnd is vhcrc vc start
Irom.` Ïn this vay, thc trutb oItransccndcntaIism, at
oncc cvasivcand Iounding, oIthcarchco-tcIcoIogy oI
phiIosophy, rcsidcs Irom thc chrono-logicaI point oI
vicv in thc opcning oI thc spacc oI a possibIc
cncountcr that itscIIaIvaystakcs pIacc in thc instan-
tancousncss oI a `prcscnt' vhcrc vc arc to dvcII in
improvisation sincc it is, as !cidcggcr cmphasiscs,
vhat vc arc vaiting Ior in comingto our cncountcr
and vhat vc ordinariIy caII thc Iuturc.¹ Jhis rcgrcs-
sivc path, this Cdysscy oI phiIosophy, vhosc cntirc
virtucconsists inIcadingusback to vhcrc vc aIvays
aIrcady, though impropcrIy, arc, has, hovcvcr, onIy
thc circuIar Iorm oI absoIutc rcûcction bccausc it
ccstaticaIIy opcns us to thc outsidc oI thc vorId,
according to thc rcvcrsibiIity dcar to McrIcau-!onty,
Ior vhom `IcavingoncscIIis rcturning to oncscIIand
visa vcrsa'.` And itisthis circIc, vhichvc rightIy caII
`hcrmcncutic', thatparadoxicaIIy makcs us capabIc oI
vcIcomingthc surpriscoIthc cvcntvhoscunIorcscc-
abIcnaturctakcs oIIIromthcgroundoIouranticipa-
and thc vcry csscncc oIthc voicc. Sincc spccch is torn
Iromusinanabduction, itspringsuponIyIromus, in
spitc oIourscIvcs,andticsustoourscIvcsby takingthc
immcnsc dctour oIthc vorId, and thc voicc is initscII
onIy thc phcnomcnon oIthc auto-hctcro-aIIcction by
virtuc oI vhich, as AristotIcº aIrcady aurmcd, thc
humansouI opcnsitscIItothcstrangcncssoIbcingsand
thcIor-itscIIvcIcomcsaItcrity. Jhcvoicc viIIthcrcIorc
aIvays bcthc namc oIthis cIcmcnt in thc human that
dcccntrcs thc human' and opcns it to vhat it is not.
stitutcd docs not comc to pass Ior its ovn bcncht but,
onthc contrary, to transportusccstaticaIIyto thc point
vhcrc this happcns to us and, in happcning, IitcraIIy
pIaccsusinthcvorId. Jhisisvhytimcis prcscntcd to
us, in thc intcrrupting cxpcricncc oIthc cncountcr, at
oncgoandIikcaûash oIIightningandvhyitappcars
inthisvaynotonIy,as thc pocts cIcarIy pcrccivcd, in
itscntircty° butaIsointhcparadoxicaIimmobiIitythat
it.¨!ovcvcr, atthispointoIindiIIcrcnccvhcrcthcrc
comcs to pass thc Iightning ûash oI thc bcIonging
togcthcr oIthc human and oIbcing, caIIcd Irciynis
by !cidcggcr, thc impossibIc aIIiancc oI rcccptivity
and spontancity, oIactivity and passivity, takcs pIacc
or morc prcciscIy it yiucs risc to thc pIuraIity oI
rhythms and timcs, to thc muItipIicity oIbcings and
Icithcr Irom nor tovards, at thc stiII point, thcrc
Vhcrc pastandIuturcarcgathcrcd.Icithcrmovc-
Jhcrc vouId bc no dancc, and thcrc is onIy thc
Ïn ourVcstcrnIanguagcs,sostrongIymarkcd by thc
stamp oI mctaphysics and in vhich thc constraints
cxcrciscd by thc grammaticaI Iunctions givc such a
grcat importancc to prcdicationand thcnotion oIthc
subjcct,'´ is it possibIc to Ict thc siIcnt cvcnt oI thc
cncountcrcomctoIanguagc` Vhatcannotbcsaid can
pcrhaps bc rcad backvards on thc back oIa vriting
that tircIcssIy ccIcbratcs thc mourning oIprcscncc in
thc inhnitc disscmination oIsigns.'` But it is pcrhaps
aIso possibIc dircctIy toma[ca sign ÷ in thc scnsc oI
ßin[and not oIZcicbcn
'÷ tovards thccvcntin thc
siIcnccs oIa rcstraincd spccch and through thc gracc
comcto pass oIamctamorphosis,notoIIanguagc,but
oIourrcIationtoIanguagcvhcrc `thcrigouroIthink-
ing, carcIuIncss in saying and IrugaIity vith vords
hnd a vhoIIy othcr crcdit than that thcy havc so Iar
Atthis timc vhcn cvcryonc is instructcdto pubIish
thc most minor draIts, vhcn thcrc arc aIrcady morc
supposcd authors than gcnuinc rcadcrs, and vhcn
thinking, Iorgctting that its nocturnaI sourcc Iics in
thcassumptionoImortaIity, associatcsitscIIcvcrmorc
vith j ournaIism and succumbs to thc iIIusion oIthc
transccndcncc oI history, it is morc important than
cvcr to rccaII that thc thinkcr, just Iikc thc poct, `is
notabIc according to thc guantity oI insignitcant
pagcs that hc docs not vritc''º and that aII spccch, in
A Note on the Bibliography
Jradition dictatcs that a thcsis bc accompanicd by a
bibIiography. IcvcrthcIcss,Ïhavcnotj udgcditncccs-
doubtIcss cxccssivc oInotcs addcd to thc prcccding
tcxt. Yct, it has aIvays sccmcd cxtrcmcIy important,
and this appIics, in my vicv, to aII attcmpts at think-
ing,nottoIaiItocitconc'ssourccs. JhisdutyisaIIthc
morc prcssing thc Icss `povcrIuI' thc thought is and
thc Icss it cIaims to `Iound' thc cdihcc oIan `originaI'
oIa dctaiIcd bibIiography signihcs Icss ncgIigcncc or
insoIcncc than itattcsts, onthccontrary,that this bricI
advcrbiaItcxthasnoothcrprctcnsionthanto `dvcII'in
thc intcrsticcs oIa tradition vhich, Ior mc, it is not a
gucstion oI`rcIuting' orcvcn oI`rcncving' butsimpIy
in thc hopc oIsccing it opcn in itscqand by itsc[to
othcr traditions oItbin[ny,onthis basis. Ïnany casc, Ï
physics in dis pcrspcctivc, inasmuch as it rcmains
onIy bccausc, in its IivingtraditionaI naturc, it `is prc-
ccdcdbynotcstamcnt' .' Ior,tocndonanothcrIincoI
Kcnc Char's rightIy associatcd on morc than onc
occasion by Jcan BcauIrct vith !cidcggcrian
IinaIIy,i I youdcstroy,Icti tbcvithnuptiaItooIs.´
Can onc tcII thc Iightning ûash oIprcscncc` Such is
thc gucstion that had aIrcady Iormcd in mc at my
/ycée, vhiIc, IoIIoving thc advicc oI my tcachcr,
Moniguc !ixsaut, Ï pIungcd at thc samc timc into
rcading Bcrgson's Tbouybt and Mouement and
Iictzschc's Tbe ßi//toIouerinGcncvicvcBianguis's
transIation. Ït sccmcd to mc thcn that poctry aIonc
couId managc, through thc cxtrcmc condcnsation oI
saying vhich it accompIishcs, to cxprcss thc movc-
mcnt oI thc rcaI, thc `changc vithout a thing that
changcs' Bcrgson spcaks oI, sincc, as Iictzschc
shovcdcIcarIy, thc `mctaphysicaIgrammar'oIphiIos-
A cncountcrvithphcnomcnoIogy, tovhich Ï vas
initiatcd, variousIy, by !auI Kicocur and Jacgucs
!crrida, thcn tcaching at thc Sorbonnc, rcvivcd this
IictzschianmodcIvhich sccsinbcingonIya `vapour
oI a vord', than in thc !usscrIian and abovc aII
!cidcggcrian horizon oIa¿benomeno/oyica/onto/oyy
thatÏvasdravnto IormuIatcthc samc inguiryinthc
Mastcr's disscrtation Ï dcvotcd in 1966 to `Ianguagc
and CntoIcgy in !cidcggcr', undcr thc dircction oI
no Iongcr thc scicncc oI bcing idcntihcd vith vhat

!cidcggcr, IoIIoving!usscrI,caIIs Iorbandcnbcit, thc
subsistcncc or aIrcady accompIishcd prc-scncc oI a
substratc-bcing, that, as such, can inhabit onIy thc
bcyond oIa sccond vorId, butthccominyto /anyuayc
oIbcing in thc vcrbaI scnsc vhich is idcnticaI to thc
vcry occurrcncc oI timc and rcIcrs to no othcr ruIc
Ïn this vay Ï vas Icd, taking as my guiding thrcad
thc !cidcggcrian attcmptto `rcIorm' thcIanguagcoI
mctaphysics, to a Iasting intcrcst in thc status oIthc
discursivitypropcrto thcVcstcrnmodc oIthoughtas
it rcsts on thc prcdicativc proposition and is ticd to a
dctcrminatc conccption oI phiIosophicaI Iogic. Jhc
phcnomcnoIogicaI Iogic that vouId bc givcn ovcr to
thc`tcmporaIityoIbcing'hadthcnbccomc thcprinci-
paI axis oImy rcûcction. AItcrcntcringthcunivcrsity
as an assistant, it sccmcd ncccssary to givc this gucs-
tion thc acadcmic Iorm oIa subjcct oIa tbèsc d'état
that Ï cntitIcd, in a IairIy vaguc manncr, `!cidcggcr
and Ianguagc' and that !auI Kicocur, in spitc oIthc
imprccisc natur� oI thc projcct, agrccd to supcrvisc
cxactIy tvcnty ycars ago, at a timc vhcn his
`!hcnomcnoIogy and !crmcncutics' scminar in thc
Avcnuc !armcnticr in !aris vas thc pIacc vhcrc Ï
rcaIIy vorkcd. Ï must admit that Ï had at thc timc
IaIIcn victim to thc iIIusion that consists in bcIicving
oncscIIto bcthcovncroIathcmcandthcinvcntoroI
a gucstion, and it vas in this condition that Ï busicd
myscII, in thc IoIIoving ycars, amassing matcriaI Ior
vhat vas to havc takcn thc Iorm oI a Iongvindcd
ÏhadstiIInotatthispointrcaIiscd thccxtcntoIthc
irony thatgovcrnscvcry cntcrprisc oIthinkingand oI
thc immcnsc naivcty that pushcs us to imaginc our-
scIvcs thc mastcrs oIour ovn gucstions, vhcn it is
not vish to go. Many ycars and thc conjunction oI
Ï couId not accompIish thc projcct oI a thcsis on
!cidcggcr. Jhc anaIysis, pursucd throughout this
pcriod, oIvhat is oItcn dcscribcd, in thc contcxt oI
vhat Iictzschc vouId vith somc right caII `an
antiguc dcaIcr's historicism', as thc `corpus' oI an
author hadIcd mc ina morc and morc dccisivcman-
ncr to considcr !cidcggcr's vork Icss as constituting
an objcct oI study in itscII than as an invitation to
By scrupuIousIy IoIIoving !cidcggcr's indications Ï
Iound myscIIcngagcd in rcading notonIy thc Iunda-
mcntaItcxts,Grcckand Gcrman,oIVcstcrnthought
butaIso thc thinkcrs bcIonginginabroad scnsc tothc
`phcnomcnoIogicaI' movcmcnt. Irom thcn on, itvas
outoIthc gucstionto cnvisagc giving ahnishcd Iorm
Anyvay, thcinguiryvas its ovn j ustihcation sincc it
sic to that ccIcbration in vhich thc mcrc cxcrcisc oI
thinking consists, an activity vhich has no nccd oI
Ïtvas inthisIramcoImind÷ aIramcoImindthat
Ï Iikc to think oI as cmincntIy phiIosophicaI, phiI-
tcaching vith rcspcct to vhich !cidcggcr rightIy
cmphasiscdthatitisthctcachcrvhoIcarnsthcmost ÷
that Ï dccidcd to rcnouncc thc projcct oIthc monu-
mcntaI Ircnchtbèsc d'éat, aII thc vhiIc bcing acutcIy
consciousoIhavinginthisvayIaiIcdto IuIhI thctacit
contract thatticdmcto thc institution. !ovcvcr, this
dccision did aIIovmchcnccIorth to acccpt invitations
to givc Iccturcs and vritc articIcs in vhich Ï riskcd
prcscnting a bricI synthcsis oI thc rcadings Ï had
undcrtakcnand broughtoutthc nodaI pointsoIvhat
it is thc Iashion to caII phiIosophicaI `rcscarch',
aIthough it sccmcd to mc pcrsonaIIy to bc morc Iikc
mcditation and cvcn, morc prosaicaIIy, that `rumina-
IasttcnycarsoImy `vork' ¦anothcrIashionabIctcrm),
it is cIcar that, Iar Irom Iorming a disparatc misccI-
Iany,itsparts arcsocIoscIyintcrrcIatcd that,aIthough
trcatingdiIIcrcnttopics and authors, thcy arc cxposcd
to thc dangcr oI rcpctition. Ït vouId thcrcIorc bc
sophicaI itincrary Icading to a dcstination. Jhcy
spot in a IrcgucntIy rcpcatcd attcmpt to scizc in thc
ovcrIapping oIthcir various aspccts thc compIcx con-
Jhcscthcnarcthc `cxcrciscs'or`cssays'vhichÏam
nov going to cndcavour to `dcIcnd', sincc Jacgucs
Jaminiaux's gcncrousinvitationto bc yourgucsthcrc
and to givc a rcsumc oImy vork pcrsuadcd mc that
thc timc had comc Ior mc to scttIc, in my ovn vay,
thc dcbt Ï borcto thc institution caIIcdthc\nivcrsity.
Iovhcrc sccms to mc morc appropriatcIor this than
Iouvain vhosc namc is so cIoscIy associatcd vith
phcnomcnoIogy and vhcrc thc Iattcr has aIvays
rcmaincd aIivingIormoIthought,in particuIarinthc
Ccntrc Ior !hcnomcnoIogicaI Studics, prcsidcd ovcr
by Jacgucs Jaminiaux, vhosc vork Ï havc IoIIovcd
IromaIar. Ïtmustbc saidagain,IoIIoving!cidcggcr,
thatphcnomcnoIogy constitutcsnotmcrcIya `pointoI
vicv' or a `trcnd' in phiIosophy but thc onIy mcthod
appropriatc to it, a vicv pcrIcctIy cxprcsscd by thc
!usscrIianmaxim oIthc rcturn to thingsthcmscIvcs.
`!hcnomcnoIogy' is Ior mc ÷ this vouId bc my hrst
`thcsis',thconcundcrpinningaIIthcothcrs÷ thc`truc'
namc oIa phiIosophy conccrncd Icss vith scarching
Ior thc truth `bchind' appcaranccs than vith opcning
isoIating us undcr thc hgurc oIan absoIutc vithout
tics, is, on thc contrary, in its hnitudc nothing othcr
than thcrcIationithastous.Jhis`phcnomcnoIogyoI
hnitudc', in Jan !atoéka's cIcgant IormuIa, can, m
contrast vith !cgcIian phcnomcnoIogy, bc buiIt onIy
by brcaking vith thc idca oIan absoIutc mastcry oI
phcnomcnaIity. Ï sav this at vork,¿ar cxcchcncc, in
!cidcggcr'sthinking,vithoutthis cvcr distancingmc
Ïvasintroduccdina dccisivcmanncrj ustasmuchby
thc abundant notcs accompanying !auI Kicocur's
transIationIrom 1950 oIthcIcas,asbythcIongcom-
mcntary on Tbc Oriyin o¡ Gcomctry pubIishcd by
Jacgucs!crridain 1962.
JaIk oIa phcnomcnoIogicaI `movcmcnt' and not a
`schooI' is vcII Ioundcd, and Ï havc aIvays tricd to
stay in this movcmcnt, j oining rathcr than opposing
thc namcs !usscrI and !cidcggcr, by IoIIoving thc
cxampIcoIthoscvhohavcIound thcmscIvcs`caught'
bctvccn thc tvo thinkcrs and vho havc vorkcd,
admittcdIy not vithout diucuIty, to maintain thc
unity oIphcnomcnoIogy. Iugcn Iink, Jan !atoéka
and,inIrancc,McrIcau-!onty. Cnccan, asthcIastoI
thcsc cIcarIy shovcd, uniIatcraIIy scc in !usscrIian
phcnomcnoIogy a phiIosophy oIintcntionaIity vhich
vouId dispIay thc absoIutcmastcry oImcaningbythc
subjcctbutonc must aIso rccognisc thcmarks,inpar-
ticuIar undcr thc tcrms `opcrativc intcntionaIity' and
`passivcgcncsis',oIa discourscoIthc non-prcscncc oI
thc subjcct to itscII, dccisivcIy opcning thc Iattcr to
tcmporaI transccndcncc. Jhis is vhy rcading
!usscrI's tcxts constitutcs Ior mcnotonIy thc `schooI
oIrigour'itisrightIyagrccd tobcand throughvhich
it is a good thing to pass but aIso a pcrmancnt
dvcIIingpIacc. Ït sccmcd to mc csscntiaI, in thc short
cssays Ï havc dcvotcd to !usscrI, not onIy to cmpha-
sisc thc considcrabIc cnIargcmcnt thc notion oI
cruciaI point Ior !cidcggcr vho sav in catcgoriaI
intuition thc point oIdcparturc Ior his ovn gucstion
ncr, to pIacc cmphasis upon cvcrything that prcvcnts
onc Irom considcring transccndcntaI phcnomcnoIogy
to bc a simpIc rcpctition oI Cartcsianism. on thc
importancc and prccocity in !usscrI's thought oIthc
probIcm oI intcrsubjcctivity, on thc vhoIIy singuIar
naturcoIhisidcaIismvhichIinks himtoa `truc' posi-
and thcKantianthcory oIthctvomodcsoIintuition,
originaryand dcrivativc, vhichIcadhim, by rcIusing
to acccpt thc idca oIan actuaI inhnitc, to conIcr on
timc, in a strangc proximity to Iictzschc, a vhoIIy
ncv ontoIogicaI importancc sincc thc supposcd
onIy an omni-tcmporaIity, vhich is to say a modc oI
KcIusing to pIay oII!cidcggcr against !usscrI in
thisvay,myrcûcctions dcvcIopcdintvocompIcmcn-
tary dircctions at oncc. thc invcstigation oI thc
!usscrIianIoundationoIa `purcIogic' and thc thcory
oI mcaning undcrpinning it inasmuch as it is dc
coroIIaryoIagcncticprobIcminphcnomcnoIogy that
Icads at thc IcvcI oIthc Iruu to thc idca oIa para-
doxicaI historicity oI truth, and thc anaIysis oI thc
!cidcggcrian Zestruktion oI thc thcory oI Ianguagc
and traditionaIIogicthatshouId bcundcrstood Icss as
thc rcjcction oIIogic and thcpromotion oIirrationaI-
ity than as a Icading back oI traditionaI Iogic to its
oILo¡o�than that vhich conhncs itvithin thc struc-
Jo dothisrcguircdhrstoIaIIthccIarihcationoIthc
vcry Iramcvork oI!cidcggcr's thought, and this is
vhatÏ attcmptcd to sct outina short book pubIishcd
in 1990 on Heideyyer et /a question du tem¿s.
1927 !cidcggcr's projcct had in no vay bccn that oI
inscribinghis IundamcntaIgucstioninthcaIrcadycir-
gucstioning thc conditionoI possibiIity oIthc Iattcr
and oI cxposing thc roots oI Vcstcrn rationaIity.
!hiIosophy vas dctcrmincd vith !Iato and AristotIc
asthcIorm oIthoughtthatcIaims to accountIorvhat
is¿resent/y givcn, Ior bcings as such, vithout appcaI-
ing to an origin oI anothcr ordcr and, in this vay,
brcaking vith thc mythoIogicaI modc oI thought.
Irom that momcnt !cidcggcr's gucstion conccrncd
thc condition oI possibiIity oI thc undcrstanding oI
bcing as constant¿resence in thc Grcck phiIosophcrs
and thcir hcirs. Vhatmakcs possibIc thc undcrstand-
ing oIbcing on thc basis oIa spccihc dimcnsion oI
timc, thc prcscnt` Such, in its most rav scnsc, is thc
gucstion at thc origin oIIeiny and Time. !cidcggcr
did not scck to opposc timc and bccoming to bcing,
nor did hc scc in thc Iattcr thc `mcaningIcss hction'
that Iictzschc sav. Cn thc contrary, hc sought to
bringoutthcsccrctconncction oIvhatvc caII `bcing'
vith timc. Vhat makcs thc rationaI discoursc oI
Vcstcrn Iogic possibIc is a ccrtain undcrstanding oI
bcingagainstthc horizonoItimcgovcrningthc com-
portmcnt oI that bcing, opcn to itscII and to othcr
bcings, vhich !cidcggcr caIIs !ascin and vhosc
intrinsic tcmporaIity dchncs it as bcing csscntiaIIy
tovards dcath. Ït isthcrcIorc thchnitc tcmporaIity oI
cxistcncc vhich is thc sourcc oIthc idca oIbcing on
vhich Vcstcrn rationaIity is Ioundcd. Vhat is thus
broughtout is that phiIosophyisncvcra `purc' thcory
and that ontoIogy can ncvcr bc dctachcd Irom its
concrctc cxistcntiaI root. Jhc scicncc oI bcing is
conscgucntIy atem¿ora/scicnccthatcaninnovaybc
Ioundcd on thc a-tcmporaIity oI rcason nor on thc
ctcrnity oItruth, tvo IundamcntaI prcsuppositions oI
Irom this Iattcr pcrspcctivc oIan inguiry into thc
mcaning oI thc suprcmacy oI Iogic in Vcstcrn
thought, Ï thcn dircctcd my vork, abovc aII in thc
and, in particuIar, !cgcIian diaIccticaI Iogicsincc thc
Iattcr prcscnts itscIIas thc most povcrIuI attcmpt to
submit bcingto thcimpcrativcsoIrcason.Jhcidcnti-
hcation in !cgcI oIIogic and ontoIogy ncvcrthcIcss
takcs thc Iorm oIan ovcrcoming oItraditionaI Iogic
and oI its Iounding principIcs. thc principIcs oI
idcntityandnon-contradiction. ButthisrccognitionoI
contradiction as thc motor oIthc diaIccticaI modc oI
thought takcs pIacc in thc contcxt oIthc prcdicativc
proposition vhich, Iar Irom bcing brought into
gucstion, continucs to Io:m thc hndamcntaI structurc
oI thc spccuIativc proposition in vhich subjcct and
prcdicatcmcrcIysvap positions. Jhc!cgcIiandiaIcctic
thus maniIcsts thc cuImination oIthc thcsis oIthcIogi-
caI naturc oIbcing in vhich Iictzschc vas to scc thc
vcry csscnccoImctaphysics.
Ïs thcrc not, hovcvcr, anothcr modc oI thought
that, vhiIc givingapIacctocontradictionorrathcr to
conûict, ncvcrthcIcss docs not prcscnt itscII as thc
Icading back oI thc Loyoç anoqavnKoe [apophantic
Loyoç], on vhich thc cntirc cdihcc oItraditionaI Iogic
rcsts butconstitutcs rathcraradicaI gucstioningoIit`
Ït vas by posing this gucstion that Ï vas dravn to
intcrcst myscII in !öIdcrIin's thcorcticaI cssays morc
than inhis poctry, IoIIovingin this aIsoan indication
oI!cidcggcr's vho sav in !öIdcrIin onc vho had
pcnctratcdandbrokcnthcspccuIativc ÏdcaIism!cgcI
had vorkcd to constitutc. Jhc short vork vhich Ï
dcvotcd to !öIdcrIin's rcûcctions on tragcdy` and
vhich, Iikc aImost thc cntircty oIthc vritings prc-
scntcdhcrc,isthctcxtoIIccturcs,isrcaIIyonIy aIrag-
mcntoIamuch Iargcrprojcctthat attcmptcdtobring
out thc spccihcity oI !öIdcrIin's modc oI thought
inasmuch as itcomcs undcr a `Iogic'obcyingthcprin-
oIthc Bv �haqEpov EaUo, oIthc Cnc diIIcring Irom
itscII. Jhis `poctic Iogic', in !öIdcrIin's ovn tcrms, is
thc cxprcssion oI thc tcmporaI dynamic and oI thc
originaItcaringapart,oIthc |r-tei/unyoIatotaIitythat
prcscnts itscIIonIy in spccihc historicaI aspccts. Vhat
appcarcd to mc in rcading thc Iemar[s on So¿bocles is
thc coincidcncc oI thc anti-rhythmic momcnt oI
cacsura vith that oIspccch, thc concomitancc oIthc
suspcnsion oIthc succcssion oIrcprcscntations and thc
appcarancc oIthc cntircty oItimc undcr thc hgurc oI
thc divinc, vhich impIics that it is onIy in scparation
thatthc mostintcnscintimacyviththctotaIityj/etout]
comcs to pass and in human spccch aIonc that thc
`monstrous' and thc subIimc inhumanity oIthc vorId
Ïtvas thcn, by taking Irom !cidcggcr himscIIthc
cxprcssion and thc idca oI a `phcnomcnoIogicaI
chrono-Iogy', that Ï tricd to outIinc in broad strokcs
thc vhoIcoIthcprobIcm thathadIcdmcto gucstion
abovc aII thc tcxts oIthc phiIosophico-poctic trinity Ï
had particuIarIy choscn as my ovn. !usscrI,
in 1926 by chronoIogy is ccrtainIy not thc historicaI
scicnccoIthcsamcnamcbutadiscipIincvhosctask is
thc invcstigation oIthc tcmporaIity oIphcnomcna. Ït
oI traditionaI Iogic and a dcvcIopmcnt oIa propcrIy
phiIosophicaI Iogic vhich vouIdmanagcto rcinscrt m
proccss oI IormaIisation, that vouId givc back to
unO<<0C its truc scnscoIthc¿resenmtion oIphcnom-
cna. Ïn this scnsc chrono-Iogy mcans thcrcIorc thc
Te//iny Time
Iogic. ButbccauscthcLo¡oçingucstionhcrcnoIongcr
hasthcIormaIscnscitbcars inthcphiIosophicaItradi-
tion, such a chronoIogy can in no vay bc Ioundcd in
thc manncr oI an a priori scicncc nor bc assigncd
trans�cndcntaI conditions oIpossibiIity. Ïtcan onIy in
somc vay skctch itscII inchoatcIy in actu and cxist
Jhis is thc rcason vhy, no mcthodoIogicaI trcatisc
bcingpossibIc inthis rcgard, sucha `Iogic' oItcmporaI-
ity can bc improviscd onIy in a joyous `prccipitation'
opcningonto no ncv architcctonic, impIying that, in a
vay, it no Iongcr comcs undcr `phiIosophy' in a strict
scnsc.Ïtdcmandsthc/ea¿ intothccvcntoIprcscnccand
thc taking into vicv oI thc, in principIc, invisibIc or
inapparcnt coming into prcscncc oIthc prcscnt, vhiIc
phiIosophy, in its `cvasivc' transccndcntaIism, trics to
rcconstructitthc vrongvay round, bcginning vith its
rcsuIt instcad oIsctting itscIIup inbccoming. Ït is this
hndamcntaI anacbrni·m oI thc phiIosophicaI procc-
durc that Ï havc tricd to bring to Iight by cmphasising
tradition vhich, sincc it has dctachcd thc apophantic
statcmcnt Irom thc cxistcntiaI and hcrmcncutic cvcnt
vhosc rcsuIt it is, has rcihcd both spccch and vhat is
spokcn oI undcr thc dc-tcmporaIising hgurc oI
Iorbandenbeit, aIrcady accompIishcd prcscncc. Ïn this
vay,Iogic can bc sccn to bc cntircIy dcrivcd Irom thc
`ontoIogyoIprc-scncc' vhosccxistcntiaIscnscisconsti-

IinaIIy,Ï mustcmphasiscthat,onaII thcsccsscntiaI
gucstions, and in particuIar on that oI thc priviIcgc
givcn to prcscncc in thc Vcstcrn tradition, thc vork
oIJacgucs !crrida has bccn Ior mc, Irom thc bcgin-
othcrs,Ï havc rcmaincd,inIargc partmorcovcrvith-
out his knovIcdgc, constantIy in Ges¿räcb vith him.
!ovcvcr, Ï havc ncvcr IcIt myscIIticd by vhat hc
himscIIhas tcrmcd his `positions', andvhathas bccn
put Iorvard as his `thcsis' oI a Iogoccntrism and
phonoccntrism charactcrising thc vhoIc oIVcstcrn
thought has aIvays bccn Ior mc, to borrov thc cxact
vords uscd by !cidcggcr in conncction vith
!usscrIian intcntionaIity, not a `passvord' [mot de
¿asse] but`thc titIc oIa ccntraI ¿rob/cn'.¹ Iormy part,
Ïhavcbccn morc tcmptcd to sccinthcAOY0<, oncon-
ditionthatitis sccn initsnaissantmomcntandnotin
'K [thcpsychc|,toaII thatitisnot.Jhcimportancc
Icnt by thc Vcstcrn tradition, Irom its Ïndo-Iuropcan
roots, to thc vivacity oIspccch and thc brcath oIthc
voicchasnotsccmcd tomctobcincompatibIcviththc
`ck-ccntricity' !cidcggcr rccogniscd in !ascin,` torn
Iromthchrstbyits tcmporaIityIromscII-prcscncc.
Ïn this taking up oI !cidcggcrian gucstioning Ï
havc bccn conccrncd Icss to rcIutc thc Vcstcrn tradi-
tion than to iIIuminatc a gucstion, thatoItimc, sincc
this tradition transmits thcgiItoIitsunthoughtº tous
onIy to thc cxtcnt thatitrcmainsIorusaIivingtradi-
tion notrcduccd to dcad matcriaI or doctrinaI capitaI
Tehiny Time
vhosc managcmcnt vouId thcn bc thc issuc. Ït vas
such a re-animation oI thc tradition that !cidcggcr
caIIcd Zestru[tion,'and Ï must admit that this cntcr-
prisc oIshakingacadcmic cuIturchas aIvays Iound a
Ior, doubtIcssIikcaIIthoscvho,Iikcmc, vcrcnot
it thc hard vay, Ï do not aIvays IccI at casc in thc
\nivcrsity and amongst thosc vhom Jacgucs
Jaminiaux, inavcry!öIdcrIinianmanncr, caIIs `pro-
IcssionaI thinkcrs' dieIeru]den[er. Jhis is vhy thc
rcIations Ï havc maintaincd vith phiIosophy, vhich
sincc its !Iatonic bcginnings has bccn inscparabIc
Irom thc cducationaI institution, havc at timcs bccn
somcvhattcnsc andvhy,IarIromIccIingathomcin
phiIosophy, Ï havc aIvays bccn attractcd to vhat
mc thc Iorms oIpoctry, draving and oricntaIism. ÏI,
hovcvcr, Ïhavcrcmaincd`in'phiIosophy it is bccausc
Ï rcaIiscd IairIy carIy on that `truc' phiIosophy has no
nccd oIdcIcncc against contamination coming Irom
outsidc sincc it is in rcaIity, Iikc thc thcoIogy oIthc
samc namc, a `ncgativc' phiIosophy vhich docs not
promotc thc positivity oIany dchnitivc truth, oIany
absoIutc ordcr transccndcnt vith rcspcct to IiIc, and
tbe same time as its rcûcxivc taking up oI itscII, a
thinking vhich is not CIympian, but a thinking oI
chiasmus. Ior, as McrIcau-!onty vrotc in thc notcs
Ioronc oIhisIccturcsrightIy cntitIcd`!hiIosophyand
Ion-phiIosophy sincc!cgcI'andgivcnatthc CoIIcgc
dcIranccin IºóI, thcycaroIhisdcathandoImyhrst

Iriedricb Hö/der/in. essays and/etter. on tbe-
O1y, cd. and trans. Jhomas !Ian ¦AIbany,
IY.S\IY!rcss, Iº88)
Martin !cidcggcr, thc coIIcctcd vorks
W. von Humboldt, Uber die Verschiedenheiten des
mensch lichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einjus auf die
gezstzge Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts
(1830-5) from his collected works (Berlin: Behr,
1907), vol. 7
t !irc istransIatcdsomctimcsvithvariousIormsoI
thc vcrbs `totcII' and `to say'. Iorthc sakcoIcon-
sistcncy, Ï havc adoptcd thc practiccoImodi|ing
cxisting IngIish transIations oIvorks guotcd by
thc author, at timcs simpIy transIating thc Ircnch
transIation. AIthough rcIcrcnccs to IngIish trans-
Ïhavcnot aIvays guotcdthcmdircctIy.
I . !cracIitus, Iragmcnt I I5 in thc !icIs-Kranz
ordcring. Cnc must bcar in mind that thc vord
'UXT, vhich is rcIatcd to thc vcrb 'UXf ¦to
brcathc, rcspirc), originaIIy borc thc scnsc oI
brcath and subscgucntIy camc to mcan brcath oI
2. !cracIitus, Iragmcnt 15. Ï guotc Irom MarccI
Conchc's transIation, Hérac/ite, Irayments ¦!aris.
!!.!, Iº8ó), p. 357. `You viII nothnd thc Iimits
thcdcpthoIthc discoursc ithoIds.'ÏborrovIrom
him thc `archaic vord' uastité vhich hc mcntions
in his commcntary (ibid., p. 35º) in conncction
viththctcrm�oOu� ¦dccp).
3. AristotIc, Ze ³nima, 1I 7 b 5. Jhis passagc is
rcpcatcdIy citcd by !royscn to indicatc that, in
contrast vith thc uniIormIy rcpctitivc coursc oI
a continuity oI grovth. CI. !.-G. Gadamcr,
ßarbeit und Metbod ¦Jíibingcn. Mohr, IºóO), p.
Iº7, IngIish-Ianguagc cdn, Trutb and Metbod,
trans. J. Vcinshcimcr and !. G. MarshaII, 2nd
1. AristotIc,OnInter¸retation, Ióa2O.
5. CI. !cidcggcr, Gcsamtausgabc, Meta¸bysucbe
³n¡anysyrùnde derIoyi[ im ³usyany uon Ieibniz,
voI. 2ó ¦Gcsamtausgabc voIumcs viII hcnccIorth
bcindicatcdby GAIoIIovcdbythc voIumc num-
bcr) ¦IrankIurtam Main. KIostcrmann, Iº78, thc
Iccturc coursc givcn in thc summcr scmcstcr oI
Iº28), §I2, p. 272, IngIish-Ianguagc cdn, Tbe
Meta¸bysica/ Ioundations o¡Ioyic, trans. MichacI
!cim ¦BIoomington. Ïndiana \nivcrsity !rcss,
1984), p.21 0, vhcrcthcvorIdistcrmcdnibi/oriy-
inarium bccausc, though not a bcing, it is ncvcr-
thcIcss notanibi/neyatiuum, an absoIutcnothing,
cithcr but is rathcr thc nothing that tcmporaIiscs
6. Cí !armcnidcs, Ioem, VÏÏÏ, 60: `thc dcpIoymcnt
oIthat vhich appcars' IoIIoving Jcan BcauIrct's
transIation in Ie ¿oème de Iar¬énide, ¦!aris.
!\.!, 1955), p.89.
1 . Iictzschc, Tbe ßi// to Iouer, trans. VaItcr
KauImann ¦Iondon. VcidcnIcId and IicoIson,
1967); Nacbye/asseneImymente1885-1887, CriticaI
Idition, voI. 12, cd. G. CoIIi and M. Montinari
¦Munich, BcrIin and Icv York. dc Gruytcr,
DT 1988), p. 104: 'Zas |rtei/en ist unserä/tester
G/aube, unser yeuobntestes ¡ùr-ßabr-oder ¡ür-
|nuabrba/ten . . . ßenn icb saye "Zer I/itz
/eucbtet¨, so babe icb das Ieucbten einma/ a/s
Tbätiy[eit yesetzt und das andere Ma/ a/s Sub¡e[t
yesetzt. a/so zum Gescbeben ein Sein su¿¿oniert,
ue/cbes mit dem Gescbeben nicbt eins ut, uie/mebr
blibt, ist undnicbt"wird. '
2. Jhc tcrms `activity' and `articuIation' that appcar
hcrc rcIcr to thc !umboIdtian conccption oIIan-
guagc, vhich constitutcs not simpIy `a' but `thc'
major rcIcrcncc oIthis `skctch'. Ïn opposition to
thc dominant tcndcncy oI modcrn Iinguistics,
tory' charactcr oIIanguagc vhosc dchnition can
bc onIy `gcnctic', scc Introduction a /'oeuuresur /e
[aui(1 835; !aris.ScuiI, 1974), p. 1 8. Jhisis vhyhc
discovcrs thc truc `grammar' oIIanguagcs in thc
Iivingactivity oIspccch. 'Zie S¸racbe /ieyt nurin
der uerbundenen Iede, Crammati[ undßörterbucb
sind [aum ibren todten Ceri¸¸e uery/eicbbar', |ber
die Ierscbiedenbeiten des menscb/icben S¸racbbaues
(1 827-9), in Cesamme/te Scbrqen ¦CoIIcctcd
Vritings) ¦BcrIin. Bchr, 1907), voI. 6, 1, p. 147
¦'IanguagcisIoundonIy inthcconncctionoIdis-
coursc,grammaranddictionarics arcbarcIy com-
3. As M. IoucauIt rcmarks in his introduction to
ArnauId and IanccIot's Crammaire yééra/e et
mi·onnée, Grammairc dc !ort-KoyaI ¦!aris. Kcp.
!auIct, 1969): `Jhc scnsc oIthc vord grammar is
doubIc. thcrc is a grammar that is thc immancnt
ordcroIaIIspokcn discourscandagrammarthatis
dcscription, anaIysis and cxpIanation ÷ thc
syntax, that viII progrcssivcIy cmcrgc into `con-
sciousncss' ¦or, morc prcciscIy, bc at thc origin oI
vhat is sotcrmcd) and pcrmit thc dcvcIopmcntoI
thcscicnccoIIogic(c1t O'JT Lo¡x).Ïtistructhat
in thc !cIIcnistic cpoch, but it in no vay prcsup-
poscs,as itsnamcmightvrongIyIcad us tobcIicvc,
thchxingoIspokcnIanguagcinvriting. Cncnccd
omy, in this rcspcct, mcntion thc vork oI!anini
vho around thc hIth ccntury Be, at an cpoch in
vhich vriting vas not yct a common tooI Ior thc
notation oIspokcn Ianguagc and in a Iundamcn-
taIIy phonoccntric tradition ¦that oI thc Vcda),
dcvcIopcd a mcta-Iinguistic anaIysis oISanskrit so
pcrIcct thattoday itstiII constitutcs thcmostcom-
monIy uscd practicaImanuaIIor Icarning this Ian-
guagc. Vhat thc Grccks oI AIcxandria tcrmcd
'pa��a't K1eXVl, !aninitcrmcdvya
arana, avord
that mcans at oncc maniIcstation and distinction,
thatisto say, anaIysis thatrcndcrs visibIc and thus
makcs knovn thc morphoIogy and thc syntax oI
spokcn Ianguagc. Jhc projcct oI thc !ort-KoyaI
grammarians, that oIaycncra/grammar,has a Iar
Iargcr scopc, as itaims to construct vhat couId bc
tcrmcd a `mcta-grammar', an a ¿riori grammar
vhich rcscmbIcs thc `Iogic oImcaning' dcvcIopcd
by !usscrI in thc Iourth IogicaI Ïnvcstigation.
`!usscrI and thc !rojcct oI a !urc IogicaI
Grammar' (1994), in thc hrst issucoII¿rcuucs.)Ïn
sis on !uns Scotus, this `thcory oI thc Iorms oI
mcaning', brought back to promincnccby!usscrI,
is in no vay an invcntion oIscvcntccnth-ccntury
rationaIism. ÏtaIrcady constitutcd thc objcctoIthc
mcdicvaI tradition oIspccuIativc grammarborn in
thc tvcIIth ccntury, atthcmomcntvhcn an intcr-
and grammaticaI studics vcrc aiming to dcvcIopa
criticaI anaIysis oIthought Ioundcd on its gram-
maticaI cxprcssion and to construct a vcritabIc
`Iogic oI Ianguagc'. Jhc Iamous IormuIa oI thc
Meta/oyiconoIJohn oISaIisbury, ¦[vhichis| guotcd
by A.I. KcIkcI in I /éyende del être. Ianyaye et
¿oésie cbez Heideyyer ¦!aris. V rin, 1980), p. 40:
'Gmmmatica est totius ¿bi/oso¿bicae cunabu/um'
¦`Grammaristhc cradIcoIaIIphiIosophy'),charac-
tcristic oI this spccuIativc turn in thc scicncc oI
grammar, couId stiII scrvc as an cpigraph to thc
4. B. SncII,Zie Intdec[uny des Geistes ¦Vandcnhock
and Kuprccht, 1986), p. 205 Ií, IngIish-Ianguagc
cdn, Tbe Ziscouery o¡ Mind, trans. T G.
Koscnmcycr ¦CxIord. BIackvcII, 1956), p. 227 II.
ÏIB. SncII rccogniscs in Grcck cuIturc, as many
othcrs bcIorc him havc donc, thc sourcc oI thc
InIightcnmcnt and thc passagc Irom `µtOoç' to
`ìoyoç', myth to Iogos, this in no vay impIics that
hc considcrs Grcccc, as CIassicism did, to bc an
a-historic modcI. Cn thc contrary, hc constantIy
cmphasiscs thc `historicaI' aspcct oIthc dcvcIop-
mcntoIthcnotionsoIconsciousncssand thought,
and thc rcIativc charactcr oI`progrcss' impIicd by
his thcsis oI a `discovcry' oI thc human spirit
across thc succcssivc stagcs oI cpic, mythoIogy,
5. CI. Jcan BcauIrct, Ie¿oème de Iar¬énide, (!aris.
!!.!, 1955), p.34 . `Butvhatthcnis thc eov` Ïn
thc cnd,is itnotinthis¿artici¿/e (µfo¿¡|) thatvc
havctocxpcricncchovthosctraditionaI IricndsoI
and pcrhaps bccauscoIthis, truc]iendso¡[nou/-
edye (¢iLooo¢io) ` '
6. Ï rcIcr hcrc to a coursc givcn by !auI Kicocur in
1962-3 and circuIatcd as a photocopy undcr thc
titIc `ÏntroductionauprobIcmc dusignc,dcIasig-
nihcation ct du Iangagc' ("Ïntroduction to thc
7. AristotIc,OnInter¸retation.Jhatsuchan anaIysis,
priviIcging thc vcrb and not thc noun, is possibIc
in thc hcId oIÏndo-IuropcanIanguagcs isshovn
oIthc vcrbaI phrasc vhosc ccntrc is thc vcrband
to vhich aII thc othcr Iactors oI action (agcnt,
instrumcnt, objcct, ctc.) arc rcIatcd in an cguaI
manncr. CI. !S. IiIIiozat, `Ics structurcs pan-
inccnncs'inIesans[rit (!aris. !.!.!,Qucsais-j c` ,
1992), p. 37 II. SccaIsovhat!umboIdtsaysoIthc
vcrbingcncraI. `it aIonc is assigncd thcactoIsyn-
tbetic ¿ositiny as a grammaticaI Iunction. .. .
BctvccnitandthcothcrvordsoIthc simpIcscn-
tcncc thcrcis thcrcIorca diIIcrcnccvhichIorbids
us to count it aIong vith thcm in thc samc catc-
gory', and oISanskrit. `Ïn Sanskrit thc indication
oIthc vcrb's conjoining povcr rcsts soIcIy on thc
grammaticaI trcatmcntoIthis partoIspccch,and
sincc it IoIIovs thc naturc oIthc vcrb compIctcIy,
thcrc is absoIutcIy nothing to compIain oIhcrc.
Sincc, on thc point hcrc in gucstion, thc vcrb in
Sanskrit is by naturc distinct Irom aII othcr con-
stitucnts oIthc simpIc scntcncc, it has nothing at
aII in common vith thc noun, thc tvo rcmain
pcrIcctIy purc and scparatc'. !umboIdt, On
Ianyuaye.tbediuersity o¡buman/anyuayestr«cture
and its in]uence on tbe menta/ deue/o¿ment o¡
man[ind, trans. !ctcr !cath ¦Cambridgc.
Cambridgc \nivcrsity !rcss, 1988), pp. 1 85 and
1 86.
8. AristotIc, On Inter¸retation, ÏÏÏ, 16 b 10. My
9. Ibid.,ÏÏÏ, 16 b20.
10. Ibid.,ÏÏ, 16 a20.
1 1 . Ibid. , ÏÏÏ, 16 b6.
12. Ibid.,ÏÏÏ,16 b 12-19.
13. JhispointhasbccnparticuIarIyvcIIbroughtoutby
Johanncs Iohmann in Ibi/oso¿bie und
S¿racbui·senscba¡ ¦`!hiIosophy and Iinguistics')
¦BcrIin. !unkcrund!umbIot, 1965), p. 176 II. !c
spcaks onthissubjcct, andÏ thinkrightIy so, oIthc
bcginning vith AristotIc oIa `Iogicisation oItimc'
vhich rcachcs compIction in `InIightcnmcnt'
Iuropcviththc dc-tcmporaIisation (Intzeit/icbuny)
oIthcIatinmtiobccomc`rcason'(o¿.ct. ,p.252).
14. Ïmcction has, sincc thc pubIication in 1 808 oI
IricdrichSchIcgcl'sIamousbook, |berdieS¿racbe
und ßeisbeit der Indier ('On tbe Ianyuaye and
ßi.dom o[tbcIndians'),bccnacritcrionvhichhas
aIIovcd a cIassihcation oI Ianguagcs to bc
oI it a Iinc oI absoIutc dcmarcation bctvccn
Ianguagcs ('In [cincr S¿racbc ist ³//cs Icuyuny, in
I , o¿. cit. , p. 275: `Ïn no Ianguagc is cvcrything
inûcction, innoIanguagc iscvcrythingaggIutina-
tion'). IvcryIanguagc can thus bc undcrstood on
thcbasisoIthc idca oIinûcction,cvcn vhcnthis is
not markcd as in thc casc oIChincsc, vhich, as
opposcd to Sanskrit, a Ianguagc in vhich inûcc-
Jhis caIIs Ior `a high dcgrcc oIintcrnaI tcnsion'
and docs not thcrcIorc aIIov Chincsc to bc con-
sidcrcd an inIcrior Iorm oI Ianguagc (On
Ianyuayc,o¿. cit. , p.280). IcvcrthcIcss, onc must
notcthat!anini's`anaIysis'hadaIrcady, ataround
500 BC,distinguishcd thcradicaIIromthccnding
and had thus iIIuminatcd thc charactcristic oI
inûcction propcr to Ïndo-Iuropcan Ianguagcs.
Scmitic Ianguagcs arc distinct Irom thc Iattcr as
thcir inûcctionconccrns a root vhich÷ contrary
to thc Ïndo-Iuropcan radicaI vhich is mcrcIy a
product oI anaIysis and bccomcs apparcnt onIy
through ctymoIogicaI rcscarch ÷ is part oI thc
IivingIinguisticconsciousncssoIthcspcakcr vith-
out,hovcvcr,cvcrbcingcmbodicd othcrviscthan
in consonantaIscript.
Te//iny Time
15. AristotIc,OnIntet¸retation, ÏÏ, 16 b I andÏÏÏ, 16 b
17. SccaIsoAristotIc,Ioetics, 1457 a 1 8.
1 6. !cidcggcr, Iin¡ùbruny in die Meta¿bysi[
¦Jíibingcn. Iicmcycr, 1966), p. 46; IngIish-
Ianguagc cnd, ³n Intruduction to Meta¿bysics,
trans. KaIph Manhcim ¦Icv !avcn, CJ and
Iondon.YaIc\nivcrsity!rcss,1959), pp.59-60.
17. CI. J. Iohmann, `!as VcrhaItnis dcs abcndIandis-
chcnMcnschcnzurSprachc' ¦"JhcKcIationshipoI
Vcstcrn !copIcs to Ianguagc") inIexi·, voI. 3, 1,
1952, p. 39. Cnc must cmphasisc hcrc thc impor-
tanccoIthc conccptoIc'CPl0C (privation ornon-
Iorm) that AristotIc constructs m ordcr to aIIov
contrarics to mcctinthc third tcrm÷ thcsubstratc
(U1OKC!OV) (Meta¿bysics A, 10, 1075 a 30). Ivcry
itscIIcxpIaincd as thc movcmcnt bctvccn a Iorm
¦jtopç) and thc non-Iorm (c'cPl0C) corrcspond-
ingmasubstratc(UAl asU1OKC!OV).
1 8. !cidcggcr, Ioyi[. Zie Imye nacb der ßabrbeit
¦"Iogic. Jhc Qucstion oIJruth") ¦IrankIurt am
Main. KIostcrmann, 1976), GA21 , p. 1 60. A IittIc
carIicr¦p. 157) !cidcggcr mcntions ancxampIcoI
a proposition oItcn guotcd vithin thc hcId oI
traditionaI Iogic. `Jhc roscs arc bIooming'. As a
dctcrminatcj udgcmcnt,itmcans thatthoscthings
that arc thc roscs havc thc propcrty oIbIooming
and not that thc roscs arc bIooming ¿resent/y,
vhich,hovcvcr, isvhatanyoncvhouttcrcdsuch
Iº. Ibid.,p. I óI .
2O. Ibid. , p. Ió3 II. Jhc passagcs citcd by !cidcggcr
arc Meta¿bysics, r 7, I OI I b 2ó and E, 1, I O27 b
2I . Cí GA 2I , p. I12, vhcrc !cidcggcr cmphasiscs
that AristotIc `vas not abIc to Ircc himscIIIrom
thc oricntation by vay oIIanguagc ÷ an impossi-
biIity Ior thc Grccks'. Ït is hcrc in §I2 that
!cidcggcr dravs thc distinction Ior thc hrsttimc
bctvccn thc hcrmcncutic-comprchcnsivc `as' and
its apophantic-dctcrminatc modihcation vhich
Sein und Zeit, ¦Jíibingcn. Iicmcycr, Iº53),
IngIish-Ianguagc cdn, Ieiny and Time, trans. J.
Stambaugh ¦AIbany, IY. S\IY !rcss, Iººó).Scc
thc third chaptcr oI this skctch ¦`Iogic and
22. Ibid.,p. I ó1.
23. Ibid.,p. I ó8.
21. Ibid.,pp. I7O÷82. Ïn thcscpagcs !cidcggcr oIIcrs
25. Ït is important to cmphasisc, as !cidcggcr docs,
that AristotIc spccihcs that this o¡osw is not a
purc bIindncss, that is to say, a purc abscncc oI
thought (VOev), as thcrc is hcrc aIso a D¡iv, thc
grasping that pcrmits cnunciauon ¦¢oot�).
JhcrcIorc, vhat is unigucIy not possibIc hcrc is
ôuoisvandôioDyoOot, thoughtanddctcrmina-
tivc discoursc, vhich supposc thc rcciprocity oI
Te//iny Time
26. GA21 , p.135.
27. Ibid.,p.197: asthctitIcoI§1 5 announccs.
28. Ibid.,p. 199.
29. Ibid.,p.200.
30. Ibid.
. 31 . Ibid.,pp.204-5.
32. Jo bringthis into pIay, !cidcggcr guotcs hcrc in
§1 5 onc oI Kant's Içections, vhich says. 'Zer
Ibi/oso¿ben Gescbä] i·t nicbt, Ieye/n zu yeben,
sonder¬ dieyebeimen |rtei/ederyemeinen Ier¬un]
zu zery/ieder¬' ¦`Jhc busincss oIphiIosophy docs
not consist in giving ruIcs, but in anaIysing thc
sccrct j udgcmcnts oI thc common rcason').
!cidcggcr sccs in thc Iattcr `thosc vays oIcon-
ducting oncscII vhich, unIormuIatcd, unknovn
and not undcrstood, arc at thc basis oI !ascin's
cvcrydaycomportmcnts'(o¿. cit. ,p. 197).
33. Ibid. , p. 201 . Iotc that it is at this samc pcriod
(1926) that !cidcggcr rcccivcs Irom !usscrI thc
manuscript oI On tbe Ibenomeno/oyy o¡ tbe
Consciousness o¡ Intera/ Time, vhich is anothcr
attcmpt, bcsidcs Kant's,topIungcintothc`hyIctic'
dcpthsoIconsciousncssand tothink thisintimacy
vith timc. !cidcggcr, vho pubIishcd thc manu-
scripthchad rcccivcd onIy in 1928, hadncvcrthc-
Icss continucd to accord to Kant thc cxcIusivc
priviIcgc oI an approach to thc tcmporaIity oI
bcing,asthcIntboo[oI1929 attcsts.
34. Ibid. ,p. 1 1 .
35. Ibid. ,p. 13.
3ó. Ibid. ,p. I5.
37. Ibid. . 'Zen[en undyaruissenscba]/icbesZen[en ist
nurzu /er¬enim |myanymitdenSacben.'
38. Ibid. , pp. I 8÷Iº. Jhis rcIationship, itscII phiIo-
sophicaI, to thc phiIosophicaI contcntstiII aIivc in
thc historic scdimcnt rccaIIs thc !cgcIian con-
ccption oIthc rcIation oI phiIosophy to its ovn
history, as !cgcI cxprcsscd it in this Iamous
scntcncc Irom his hrst pubIication. 'Zer /ebendiye
Geist, der in einer Ibi/oso¿bie uobnt, uer1anyt, um
sicb zu entbùhen, durcb einen ueruandten Geist
yeborenzuuerden',Zy erenzscbrqinHeye/ßer[e,
)eaner Scbrqen 1801-1807, ¦IrankIurt am Main.
Suhrkamp, Iº7O),voI. 2,p. Ió¦`JorcvcaIitscII,thc
Iiving spirit that inhabits a phiIosophy dcmands
thc aIhnity oI a spirit that brings it into thc
3º. Ibid. ,p. I 8.
1O. Ït is !usscrI vho aIhrms in thc introduction to
thc Ioyica/ Inuestiyations, trans. J. I. IindIay
¦Iondon. KoutIcdgc, Iº7O), voI. 1 , Ïntroduction,
§2,p. 25O,thatthc `objccts vhich purc Iogic sccks
to cxaminc arc, in thc hrst instancc, thcrcIorc
givcn to it in grammaticaI cIothing (im ymm-
maticben Geuande)'.ÏtbccomcscIcarhcrcthatthc
!usscrIian conccpt oI thc `Iivcd cxpcricncc'
(Ir/ebnu),asvcIIas thcthcoryoIIogicaIsignihca-
tion thathc dcvcIops inthcInuestiyations, prcsup-
poscs thc `naturaIisation' at thc origin oI
psychoIogicaI scicncc. !cidcggcr dccIarcs that `it
I O3
vas thcir good Iortunc that thc Grccks had no
"Iivcd cxpcricnccs'' in Nietzscbe I ¦!IuIIingcn.
Icskc, IºóI), p. º5, IngIish-Ianguagc cdn,
Nietzscbe, trans. !.I. KrcII ¦Icv York. !arpcr
and Kov, Iº7º), p. 8O, vhcn hc docs so hc rcIcrs
thcy ncvcr diIIcrcntiatcd thcir `mcntaI proccsscs'
Irom thcir vcrbaI cxprcssions, thus maniIcsting
thc IundamcntaI historicaIity that !cidcggcr
tcrms no Iongcr `IiIc' but rathcr cxistcncc. Jhis
thcn is vhat is most propcr to human cxistcncc.
itcannoIongcrappcartoitscIIas`naturc' .
1I. Ï takc thc Iibcrty oIrcIcrringhcrctop. I O8 II. oI
my book Heideyyer et /a question de tem¿s
¦"!cidcggcr and thc Qucstion oIJimc") ¦!aris.
!\.I., IººO).
12. Jhis is vhat !cidcggcr himscIIsaid cxpIicitIy in
Iº1º. ' ''Sein'' ist in "Sein und Zeit
' nicbt etuas
anderes a/s "Zeit", inso]rn der "Zeit' a/s der
Iorabme¡ùrdie ßabrbeitdes Seinsyenannt uird,
ue/cbe ßabrbeit das ßesende des Seins undso das
Seinse/bstut. 'Scc `"Bcing" in"IeinyandTime"is
nothing othcr than "timc", insoIar as "timc" is
givcnasthcIorc-namcyré-nom, Iorabme]oIthc
truth oIbcing, vhich truth isthc csscnccoIbcing
and so bcing itscII.') (ßas ist Meta¿bysi[,
¦IrankIurtamMain.KIostcrmann, IºóO),p. I7.
I O1
13. CI. Ieiträye ZU1' Ibi/oso¿bie ¦"Contributions to
!hiIosophy") ¦IrankIurt am Main. KIostcrmann,
Iº8º), pp. I ºI÷2, vhcrc it is cIcarIy statcd that
timc, thought oI as tcmporaIisation (Zeituny),
ccstatic rapturc (Intrùc[uny) and opcnncss
(Irö_nuny), is at thc samc timc vhat institutcs
spacc (einräumend), crcating spacc, that `is not
as it ¦timc) bcIongs to spacc', scc aIso §238 and
§212 gathcrcd undcr thc titIc `!cr Zcitraum aIs
11. CI. On Time and Ieiny, trans. Joan Stambaugh
¦Icv York. !arpcr, Iº72) , p. I1 and thc Ircnch
transIator'snotcinQuestionsI ¦!aris. GaIIimard,
Iº7ó) p. 5O. `Jhc Ircc spacc oItimc (Zeit-Iaum)
has nothing to do vith thc physicist's spacc-timc.
Jhc Iattcr is a paramctcr Ior a stiII morc mathc-
othcr hand, is thc unity oI a statc oI opcnncss
vhichisthcpIaccnotonIy oItimc and itsccstatic
tcmporaIisation but aIso oIspacc and its spacing.
Zeit-Iaum couId aImost bc transIatcd as "spacing
oItimc". ' Scc, Questions I, p. I33, On Timeand
15. Scc, Ior cxampIc, thc Ic Jhor scminar ¦Iºóº) in
QuestionsI, o¿.cit.,p.278.
1ó. Scc `Mcin Vcg in dic !hanomcnoIogic' in Zur
Sacbe des Zen[ens ¦!IuIIingcn. Icskc, Iºóº),
p. ºO, IngIish-Ianguagc trans., `My Vay to
!hcnomcnoIogy' in On Time and Ieiny, o¿. cit. ,
I O5
p. 82, vhcrc!cidcggcrdchncsphcnomcnoIogyas
`thcpossibiIityoIthinking, attimcs changingand
thatiIitiscxpcricnccdandrctaincd inthisvay it
couId thcn disappcar as a dcsignation (Tite/) `in
IavouroIthcSacbedesZen[ens ¦task oIthinking)
vhosc maniIcstncss rcmains a mystcry'. Jhc dis-
appcarancc hcrc oI thc `dcsignation', vhich Iikc
any `rubric' rcIcrs to a possibIc `architcctonic' and
to thc schoIarIy cdihcc oIscicncc, in itscIImani-
Icsts thc pIacing oIthought at thc scrvicc oIthc
`thing itscIl, vhich is no Iongcr thought as bcing
abIctobcIuIIy cxhibitcdinknovIcdgcoIthcscII.
Scc in thc IoIIoving chaptcr vhat is said oIthc
17. CI. !.-G. Gadamcr, Tr«tb and Metbod, trans. J.
I Oó
Vcinshcimcr and !.G. MarshaII, 2nd rcv. cdn.
¦Iondon. ShccdandVard, Iº8º),p.31ó. `Jhcaim
oI scicncc is so to objcctiIy cxpcricncc that it no
Iongcr contains any historicaI _escbicbt/icb)
mcthodicaI proccdurc. Jhc historico-criticaI
mcthod, hovcvcr, docs somcthing simiIar in thc
human scicnccs. Jhrough thc objcctivity oIthcir
approach, both mcthods arc conccrncd to guaran-
tcc that thcsc basic cxpcricnccs can bc rcpcatcd by
anyonc. Just as in thc naturaI scicnccs cxpcrimcnts
must bc vcrihabIc, so aIso must thc vhoIc proccss
bc capabIc oIbcing chcckcd in thc human scicnccs
aIso.!cncc thcrc can bcno pIaccIor thc historicity
Johanncs Iohmann in Ibi/oso¿bie und
S¿racbui·senscba], o¿. cit. , p. I78, at thc momcnt
vhcn, having dchncd his ovn projcct as that oI
thc constitution oIa scmantic Iogic in opposition
tothcstructuraIist'sIogicoIdcsignation(o¿.cit., p.
I55), hc shovs that this projcct invoIvcs rc-
introducingthctcmporaImomcntinto traditionaI
mcta-Ianguagc issuingIrom thc gcncraI structurc
oIthc human `Ianguagc gamc' oIthc `somcthing
Iorm orzcropointoIthcscmanticrcIationisthat
oIthc `pIain' cguivaIcncc oIvords and things in
vhat couId bc caIIcd thc `picturc thcory' oI
Ianguagc,Irom vhich ismissingthc `tcnsion' that
ûovs Irom thc rcIation to thcactua/ity oIvhat is
spokcnaboutand to thc proccss oIa tcmporaIity
18. !cidcggcr,³usderIt¸brunydesZen[ens ¦"Irom
thc Ixpcricncc oI Jhinking"), 2nd cdn.
¦!IuIIingcn.Icskc, Iºó5),p.23.
1º. !cidcggcr, Iasic ßritinys, 2nd rcv. cdn, cd. !. !
KrcII¦IcvYork.!arpcrCoIIins,Iºº3), p.2I7.
5O. !cidcggcr, `Iogos'¦Iº5I)inIar1yGree[Tbin[iny,
trans. !. ! KrcII and I. A. Capuzzi ¦Icv York.
5I . Jhis, Ior ccrtainIy diIIcrcnt though not incom-
parabIc rcasons,vasaIrcadythcprobIcmIor vhat
I O7
couId onIy absurdIy caII itscII `grammatoIogy',
vhosc conditions oI impossibiIity vcrc dcmon-
stratcd÷ inastiIIncgativcIytransccndcntaIscnsc÷
inQGmmato/og vhoscvcryIastscntcncc,atthc
vcry Icast, must bc guotcd hcrc. `Grammato/og,
this thought vouId stiII rcmain cncIoscd in prcs-
cncc',J.!crrida,Zc/aymmmato/oyic ¦!aris.Id.dc
Minuit, Iºó7), p. I12, IngIish-Ianguagc cdn, Q
Gmmato/og, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
¦BaItimorc¸ M!: Johns !opkins \nivcrsity !rcss,
52. CI.McrIcau-!onty, Ibéoméo/oyicdc/a¿crcc¿tion
¦!aris. GaIIimard, Iº15), Avant-!ropos, p. xv
trans. CoIin Smith ¦Iondon. KoutIcdgc, Iºó2),
53. Jhc tcrm csquusc doubtIcss comcs through thc
ÏtaIianscbizzo IromthcIatinscbcdium ¦improviscd
pocm, impromptu) and rcIatcs in Grcck to thc
adjcctivc geôioç. "hastiIy donc, improviscd, oIthc
momcnt", to thc advcrbs geôiqv. `ncarby, in thc
hcId', and geôie:ç. `hastiIy, IightIy, ncgIigcntIy,
vainIy', and to thc substantivc sccdia, dcsignating
any Iight and hastiIy buiIt construction. Jhat
Iivingmight consist in prcparingoncscII, Irom thc
doubtIcss bc truIy undcrstood onIy in an cxpIicitIy
in vhich music and poctry havc rcmaincd cIoscIy
ticd and arc stiII considcrcd to bc tvo simiIar
modcs oIcxprcssion. Jhc musician, Iikc thc poct
rcguircd to vritc a sonnct or an odc, has imposcd
uponhimthcIormandstructurcoIthcraya vhich
hc is going to improvisc. Jhis aspcct oIthc tradi-
tion oI thc raya is no Icss important than thc
anccstraI thcory that dctcrmincs, in accordancc
vith thc timc oIday choscn Ior thc improvisation,
thc imposcd Iorm oI thc scgucncc oI notcs vith
prcdctcrmincd intcrrcIations that compriscs thc
mya,vhoscnamc, outsidcoIits tcchnicaI scnsc oIa
musicaI modc, mcans rcd, thc coIour oI passion,
and thc charm oI thc voicc. Ï rcIcr hcrc not to
vorks oImusicoIogybutto thc cnIightcncd j udgc-
mcnt cxprcsscd in his mcmoirs by Ychudi
Mcnuhin, onc oIthc rarc Vcstcrn intcrprctcrs to
attcmpt thc art oIimprovisation in vhich Ïndian
musicconsists. Scchis |n¸ni.bed)ourç ¦Iondon.
Iutura!ubIications, Iº78),p.33ºII.
51. Kant, Critique o¡ Iure Ieason, trans. Iorman
KcmpSmith ¦Iondon.MacmiIIan, Iº2º),p.17.
55. Scc Kcnc Char, `Ic !ocmc puIvcrisc', XI in
Oeuures com¿/ètes, ¦!aris. GaIIimard, !Iciadc,
Iº83),p.2óó. `ÏIvc dvcIIinaIightningnash,itis
thchcartoIthcctcrnaI. '
I. ' ßrend eine Ieueyuny uabryenommen uird,
¸ndet Moment[Momentein ³/s ¸etzt¨Ir¡assen
I Oº
statt, darin [onstituiert sicb die¡etzt a[tue//e Ibase
der Ieueyunyse/bst. ³berdiese)etzt-³u_ssuny ist
y/eicbsam der Ier¬ zu einem Iometenscbuequon
Ietentionen, au¡ die ]ùberen )etzt¿un[te der
Ieueyunybezoyen. ' Scc On TbeIbenomeno/oyy o¡
tbe Consciousness o¡ Inter¬a/ Time (1893-1917) ,
trans. John Barnctt Brough ¦!ordrccht. KIuvcr,
IººI),§ I I, p.32.
2. GA2I , p.2OO.
3. !usscrl, Tbe Idea o¡ Ibenomeno/oyy, trans. V. !
AIston and G. Iakhnikian ¦Jhc !aguc. IijhoII,
1. `IpiIoguc' in !usscrl, Ideas Iertaininy to a Iure
Ibenomeno/oyy and to Ibenomeno/oyica/
Ibi/oso¿by, book 2, trans. K. Kojccvicz and A.
Schuvcr¦!ordrccht.KIuvcr, Iº8º),p.1Oó.
5. Ibid. Iotc, oncc and Ior aII, that thc traditionaI
transIationoIthcGcrmanstrenyas `rigorous' rathcr
than `strict' has rcsuItcd, in this casc as in many
othcrs, in vhat Jacgucs !crrida has caIIcd `thc
cIIaccmcnt oI Ianguagc', ¦scc his Imayes ¦!aris.
GaIiIcc, Iº8ó), p. I3º II. Vhat Iatin Ianguagcs
undcrstand as rigidity, inûcxibiIity, hardncss÷ and
aII riyour is nothing Icss than a rigor mortis ÷
Gcrmanic Ianguagcs undcrstand rathcr as Iorcc
(streny, vhich is thc samc vord as thc IngIish
`strong', and vhich is rcIatcd to thc Grcck
('payc and to thcIatinstrinyere, bcars thcscnsc
oI `tightcncd', `tcnscd'). Jhc rigorous scicncc in
not by virtuc oI a rigid and Irozcn charactcr but
unigucIy bccausc it has thc strcngth to Iound
itscII, to bc, as Kant aIso said, thc 'Se/bstba/terin',
it itscII constitutcs thcir uniguc support, scc his
Gruunduor[ ¡or tbe Meta¿bysics o¡ Mora/s
¦ÏndianapoIis.!ackctt, Iº8I),p.31.
ó. !usscH, in cmphasising thc scII-IoundationaI
(ßi·senscba[au·/etzterI¿rùnduny) and uItimatcIy
scII-rcsponsibIc (aus /etzter Se/bst-uerantuortuny)
cit.,scc !usscrIiana, voI. 5, Iº52, p. I3º, trans. p.
1Oó), rcmaincd vithin thc Iincagc oI Gcrman
ÏdcaIism, vhich, sincc Kant, had vicvcd phiIo-
sophy as thc `scicncc' oI Irccdom. CI. !cgcI,
Incyc/o¿edia o¡ Ibi/oso¿bica/ Sciences, I 8I 7
Ïntroduction, §5, `!hiIosophy can bc considcrcd
thc scicncc oI Irccdom, bccausc in it thc aIicn
charactcroIob-jccts disappcars and,through this,
thc hnitudc oIconsciousncss, it is unigucIy in it
that contingcncy, naturaI ncccssity and thc
rcIation to cxtcriority in gcncraI disappcar and,
through this, dcpcndcncc, nostaIgia and Icar. itis
onIy in phiIosophy that rcason is absoIutcIy vith
itscIIjau¿résd' e//e-même]. '
7. Scc thc Iamous passagc Irom thc So¿bist ¦211a)
guotcd as an cpigraph to Sein und Zeit, vhich
spcaks oI thc conIusion that rcigncd Irom
!armcnidcs to !Iato ovcr thc mcaning, bccomc
8. Ior aII that conccrns thc constitution oI schooI
scc J.-! Courtinc's rcmarkabIc vork dcvotcd to
Suarezet/esystèmede/ameta ¿bysique¦"Suarczand
thc Systcm oIMctaphysics") ¦!aris. !\.!, I ººO),
º. CI. BcauIrct,Ie¿oèmedeIarménide¦!aris.!.\.!,
Iº55), p. 18, vho opposcs `thc cvasivc transccn-
dcnccvhich,sincc!Iato,ismctaphysicaIIy ours' to
`a Iounding transccndcncc' vhich is novhcrc
morc striking than in !armcnidcs's Ioem, vhosc
pIacc is that oI`bcing in thc grcatcst intimacy oI
Zyrence vhichhas carricd as Iar as us thc morc
and morc Iatcnt ambiguity oI thc vord sov', a
diIIcrcncc according to vhich `it isin thc grcatcst
intimacy oI sov [bcing| that ôoxotvfo [appcar-
anccs| arc "born", it is in thc grcatcst intimacy oI
cA9cta [truth| that thc origin and ncccssity oI
ôo�o [opinion| is Iocatcd'. Vhat Jcan BcauIrct
caIIs `bcing in thc grcatcst intimacy oIZy erence'
is tobcthoughthcrcasatransccndcnccthat,inits
Iightning ûash, bursts Iorth in immancncc itscII,
I O. CI. Iictzschc, On tbe Genea/oyy o¡Mora/s, third
cssay ¦Cambridgc. Cambridgc \nivcrsity !rcss,
Iºº1), vhcrc, having cmphasiscd that thc 'bêe
¿bi/oso¿bique' ¦phiIosophicaI crcaturc) sccks thc
conditions IavourabIc to indcpcndcncc in thc
ascctic idcaI ¦§7) and that vithout this ascctic
I I2
bccn possibIc on carth, Iictzschc poscs thc
gucstion. `Ïs thcrc cnough pridc, daring, couragc,
biIity,]eedom o¡ ui//, Ior "thc phiIosophcr" on
carth to bc rcaIIy ÷ ¿ossib/e³ ' ¦§I O). Cnc might
vcry vcII, vith !cidcggcr, think this truc Ircc-
domoIviII,notas `viII to povcr', vhich is to say
`viII to viII', butas Ge/assenbeit ¦rcIcascmcnt) and
I I . CI.G.GrancI,I'équiuoqueonto/oyiquede/a¿ensée
[antienne ¦"Jhc CntoIogicaI Iguivocation oI
KantianJhought") ¦!aris. GaIIimard, Iº7O),p.óO
I2. Jhis point, vhich Ior !usscrI amounts to shov-
ingthatKantvas,Iromthchrst,unIaithIuIto his
caII to hnitudc inIcavingintactvithin his criticaI
phiIosophy a corc oI cIassicaI inhnitism, vas
particuIarIyvcII sctoutinthcunpubIishcdcoursc
givcn by Jacgucs !crrida at thc Sorbonnc in
Iºó2÷3 ¦sccond scmcstcr) on `!hcnomcnoIogy,
thcoIogy and tcIcoIogy in !usscrI'. Ït is truc that
hc mcntioncd cguaIIy Kant's possibIc rcsponsc to
!usscrI, vhich vouId accusc him aIso oIIorgct-
I3. ÏnconncctionvithapossibIcpIacinginrcIationoI
Iictzschc and !usscrI, pcrmit mc to rcIcr to my
articIcs `Kcduction ct intcrsubjcctivitc' ¦"Kcduction
and Ïntcr-subjcctivity") inHuser7, coIIcction pub-
Iishcd undcr thc dircction oII. Iscoubas and M.
I I3
Kichir¦GrcnobIc.MiIIon,Iº88),p. 51and`!usscrI
ct Ia ncutraIitc dc I'art' ¦"!usscrI and thc
IcutraIity oIArt") pubIishcd inIa Iartde/'Oei/
¦BrusscIs. IººI),p. IºII.
I1. Scc, in this rcgard,myarticIc `Kcductionctintcr-
subjcctivitc',o¿.cit. ,p.13II.
I5. CI. Cartesian Meditations ¦Jhc !aguc. IijhoII,
Iº5O), §1I, p. 8ó. `CnIy somconc vho misundcr-
stands cithcr thc dccpcst scnsc oI intcntionaI
hapsboth,canattcmptto scparatcphcnomcnoIogy
Ió. Ict us mcrcIy aIIudc to thcm hcrc. Ior !Iato,
thc cavc, vhosc topoIogy rcIatcs to thc duaIity oI
scnsibIc and intcIIigibIc vorIds, thc criticisms that
hcaddrcsscstohimscIIinthcIar¬enides undcr thc
namc `thcthird manargumcnt'and thatarcappIic-
abIc, prcciscIy, to a topicaI and spatiaIisingundcr-
standing oI µ fs�i� [participation|, vhich is
doubtIcss that oIcommonopinion and notthatoI
thc phiIosophcr, Ior Kant, thcunitingoItransccn-
dcntaI idcaIism vith cmpiricaI rcaIism, procccding
Irom thc cxpIicit distinction bctvccn appcarancc
(Scbein) and phcnomcnon (Irscbeinuny), thc Iattcr
itscIIbcing, as onc oIthc rcûcctions oIthc O¿us
Iostumum attcsts, thc same objcct as thc thing in
itscII, though considcrcd Irom thc pcrspcctivc oI
anothcrintuitu, hnaIIy, Ior!cgcI,cvcnthoughhcis
not takcn into considcrationbyIictzschc, thc idca,
I I1
aIrcadyIorcchIIycxprcsscdinthc sccondchaptcroI
thc Ibenomeno/og o¡S¿irit, that thc supcr-scnsibIc
vorId,vhichismcrcIythc invcrsionoIthc scnsibIc
vorId, must bc thought as bcing substantiaIIy onc
I7. CI. !usscrI, Ideas, trans. V.K. Boycc Gibson
¦Iondon. AIIcn and \nvin, Iº3I), p. 8ó. `ÏI by
"Iositiui·m" vc arc to mcanthc absoIutc unbiascd
groundingoIaII scicncconvhatis"positivc",i.c.,
onvhatcanbcprimordiaIIyapprchcndcd,thcn it
I8. CI. thc manuscript Irom Iº31 bcaring thc titIc
`KcvcrsaI oIthc Copcrnican !octrinc' oIvhich a
Ircnch transIation by !idicr Iranck has bccn
pubIishcd in Ie terre nese meut¿as ¦"Jhc Iarth
!ocsIotMovc")¦!aris. Id. dcMinuit, Iº8º),pp.
I I÷2º. Jhis tcxt's anti-Copcrnican movc can bc
undcrstood as an obstinatchdcIity to thc scnsc oI
Iundieruny prcscntcd in thcIoyica/Inuestiyations
and as a rcIusaI oI thc pcrIccting oI thc Kantian
`Copcrnican rcvoIution' in vhich absoIutc idcaI-
ism consists, and vhich ccIcbratcs thctriumph oI
vhat !usscrI considcrs to bc thc myth oI thc
spontancity oI an undcrstanding compIctcIy
dctachcdIromthc rcccptivityoIscnsibiIity.
Iº. IragmcntóOinthc!icIs-Kranzordcring.
2O. CI. !usscrI, Ioyica/ Inuestiyations, trans. J.I.
IindIay¦Iondon.KoutIcdgc, Iº7O),book3, invcsti-
gation ó, §18 to §52. ÏI vc considcr an cxampIc
I I5
oûcn invokcd by !usscH, that oI thc catcgoriaI
pcrccptionoIthcs¿eciesrcd,itiscIcar thatitisthis
cidctic intuition that makcs possibIc thc pcr-
ccption oIthis singuIar rcd as rcd. !ovcvcr, it is
not aim at thc singuIar pcrccption itscII though
constructingitscIIon it,vhiIst,IorcxampIc,inthc
act oI conjunction, vhich is a synthctic act, a
singuIar pcrccption is takcn up as thc contcnt oI
thc ncv catcgoriaI objcctivity oIthc Iorm `S is !
and Q'.
2I . !cidcggcr, Iro/eyomena zur Gescbicbte des
Zeitbeyry, GA 2O ¦IrankIurt am Main.
KIostcrmann, Iº7º), p. 91, IngIish-Ianguagc cdn,
Histo¡ o¡ tbe Conce¿t o¡ Time, trans. Jhcodorc
KisicI ¦BIoomington. Ïndiana \nivcrsity !rcss,
22. AristotIc,Ze³nima,13I a.
23. CI. Ioyica/ Inuestiyations, book 3, o¿. cit. , §11,
p. 781. !usscH hcrc scts thc imagination on thc
samc pIanc as pcrccption in aIhrming that a
conccpt `can onIy "arisc", i.c., bccomcseq-yiuen to
us, iI bascd on an act vhich at Icast scts somc
individuaI instancc oI it bcIorc our cycs, çon/y
21. GA2O, p.ºó/7O.CI.Ioyica/Inuestiyations, book3,
o¿.cit. ,p.8OIII.
25. GA2O,p.º8/72.
2ó. CI. John SaIIis, Ze/imitations Ibenomeno/o¿y and
I Ió
tbe Ind o¡ Meta¿bysics, 2nd rcv. cdn.
¦BIoomington. Ïndiana\nivcrsity !rcss, Iºº5), p.
27. A notc rcIcrs to an carIicr book by thc samc
author, Tbe Gatberinyo¡Ieason ¦CoIumbus. Chio
\nivcrsity!rcss, Iº8O),cntircIydcvotcd to Kant's
phiIosophy, vhcrc thc samc idca is cxprcsscd.
`Jhis turning avay Irom thc traditionaI distinc-
tion bctvccn thc scnsibIc and thc intcIIigibIc has
thc charactcr oIan³u]ebuny [subIation], Ior thc
distinction is unsupprcssibIc, aIrcady rc-invokcd
vith thc vcry spccch that vouId banish it. Ïtis a
mattcr oI rcopcning that distinction vithin thc
ncvconccptionoIthc scnsibIc ÷ orrathcr, a mat-
thought to scnsibIc cxpcricncc, thc distinction has
aIrcady bccn brought back into pIay vithin this
ncvdimcnsion'(o¿.cit. ,p. I7I).
27. CI. Kant, Critique o¡IureIeason, trans. Iorman
Kcmp Smith ¦Iondon. MacmiIIan, Iº2º),
Ïntroduction,3, A5,p.17.
28. Cf !usscrI, Ix¿erience and )udyement, trans.
Jamcs S. ChurchiII and KarI Amcriks ¦Iondon.
KoutIcdgc, I º73), §ó5, p. 2ó7. Scc in this conncc-
tion, Jacgucs !crrida, I' oriyine de /a yéométrie
¦!aris. !\.!, Iºó2), p. ó3 II, IngIish-Ianguagc
cdn, TbeOriyino¡Geometr¸,trans. John !Icavcy
¦IincoIn. \nivcrsity oIIcbraska !rcss, Iº78), p.
2º. Ibid.,p.2óI.
3O. Muchhasbccnsaid,mrcIationto!usscrI,aboutan
I I7
Te//iny Time
`idcaIist turn' coinciding vith thc discovcry oIthc
phcnomcnoIogicaI rcduction and supcrscding thc
`ncutraIity',IromthcmctaphysicaI point oIvicv, or
cvcn thc `rcaIism' oI thc Ioyica/ Inuestiyations. ÏI
thcrc isa `turn',it sccms to mc thatthis couId onIy
bcuitbin an idcaIism indistinguishabIcIromphiIos-
ophy itscIIand that this tut couId havc onIy thc
scnsc oIthc rcndcring Iimiucss oIthc phcnomcnaI
LcId sincc it Icads to a subjcctivisation oI thc
phcnomcnon and to an idcntihcation oIcgoIogy
3I . CI. SchcIIing, Idées ¿our une ¿bi/oso¿bie de /a
natue ¦"Ïdcas Ior a !hiIosophy oI Iaturc")
¦Appcndix) in Issai· ¦!aris. Aubicr Montaignc,
I º1ó),p.º7.
32. Sein undZeit ¦Jiibingcn. Iicmcycr, Iº53),p.2O8,
IngIish-Ianguagc cdn, Ieiny and Time, trans. J.
Stambaugh¦AIbany,IY. S\IY!rcss,).
33. Ibid.
31. AmarginaInotcin thc 'Huttenexem¿/ar' ¦thc copy
oISein und Zeit annotatcd by !cidcggcr in his
`cabin' in Jodnaubcrg Irom Iº27) ncxt to thc
phrasc vhich says (o¿. cit. , p. 2O8) that `bcingcan
ncvcr bc cxpIaincd by bcings' rccogniscs hcrc thc
35. Cí !cidcggcr, Tbe Iasic Irub/ems o¡
Ibenomeno/og ¦thccourscgivcninthcsummcroI
I º27), trans. AIbcrt !oIstadtcr ¦BIoomington.
I I 8
Ïndiana \nivcrsity !rcss, Iº82), §5, p. IºII. Ior
his part !cidcggcr undcrstands thc rcduction as
Icading vision back Irom bcings to bcing (o¿. cit. ,
p. 2I).
3ó. CI. Ideas, o¿. cit. , §3I , p. I O7, thc paragraph in
vhich !usscrI dchncs thc `naturaI thcsis' on thc
basis oIthc charactcroIprcscncc ('Cbaracter "da¨,
"uorbanden¨') attributcd prc-prcdicativcIy to
37. CI. !cidcggcr, `Jhc Ind oI !hiIosophy and thc
JaskoIJhinking'inO TimeandIeiny,trans.Joan
Stambaugh ¦Icv York. !arpcr, Iº72), pp. ó5÷ó,
38. SeinundZeit,o¿.cit. ,p.3ó.
3º. Ibid.
1O. TbeIdeao[Ibenomeno/oyy,o¿.cit. ,p.I O.
1I. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. GA 2O, p. º7/7I . A passagc Irom a Icttcr oI
!usscrI's to !ocking oI25 January IºO3, guotcd
by V. BicmcI in `Ics phascs dccisivcs dc Ia
dcvcIoppcmcnt dc Ia pcnscc dc !usscrI' ¦`Jhc
!ccisivc !hascs oIthc !cvcIopmcnt oI!usscrI's
Jhought'), Husser, Cahicrs dc Koyaumont,
!hiIosophic3 ¦!aris.Id.dcMinuit, Iº5º),p.1ó,is
in thc samcvcin. `Jhccxprcssionvhichrcturnsso
many timcs, that "objccts" "constitutc" thcmscIvcs
inan act,aIvaysdcsignatcsthcproprictyoIthcact
11. Ibid., p. I Ió.Ïnthisvay,onccanrcbutthcsimpIih-
cation, too oItcn prcscntcd as `obvious',particuIarIy
I Iº
i Irancc, vhich consists in vicving !usscrI as a
Cartcsian, vhiIst phcnomcnoIogy, cvcn and abovc
coming oICartcsianism, vhich is to say, thc ovcr-
coming oI thc cncIosurc vithin thc subjcctivc
sphcrcoIthc `indubitabIcgivcn', Iorvhich!usscrI
cxpIicitIycaIIsinhiscourscoII ºI I . Scc!usscrI,Ies
¿rub/èes¡ondamentauxde/a¿benomeno/oyie ¦"Jhc
IundamcntaI !robIcms oI !hcnomcnoIogy")
¦!aris. !!.!, IººI),chaptcr1,p. I°ºII.
1°. CI.Sein undZeit,o¿.cit. ,p. I°. `JhckindoIbcing
vhich bcIongs to !ascin is rathcr such that, in
undcrstandingits ovn bcing, it has a tcndcncyto
ports itscII proximaIIy and in a vay vhich IS
csscntiaIIyconstant÷ intcrmsoIthc"vorId".'
1ó. IJeas, o¿.cit. ,§8°,p.21ó.
17. Ibid. ,§1º,p. I°3.
18. Ibid. , §8I, p. 23ó.
1º. Ibid. ,notctop.23ó.
°O. CI. Gcrard GrancI,Iesensdu tem¿setde/a¿erce¿-
tion cbez E Huser7 ¦"Jhc Scnsc oI Jimc and
!crccptioninI.!usscrI")¦!aris.GaIIimard, Iºó8),
p.1°II. Jhis`intimacy'oIatcmporaIityandacon-
sciousncss `vhich managc to rcmain incach othcr'
is undcrstood not as `psychoIogicaI intcriority' but
°I . Ibid. ,p.73.
°2. On tbe Ibenomeno/og o¡ tbe Consciousness o¡
Inter¬a/Time,o¿. cit. ,§3º,p.81II.
53. Ibid.,p. 88. AIIovmc to rcIcrin thisrcgard to my
articIc `Ic tcmps ct I'autrc chcz !usscrI ct
!cidcggcr' ¦`Jimc and thc Cthcr in !usscrI and
!cidcggcr")pubIishcdin³/ter, I, Iºº3,p.385II.
51. CI. Kant, Critique o¡Iure Ieason,o¸. cit. , BI8O÷I .
conccaIcd in thc dcpths oIthc human souI, vhosc
rcaI modcs oIactivity (an ) naturc is hardIy
IikcIy cvcr to aIIovus to discovcr, andto baueo¸en
to our yaze (sie unuemc[ uor ³uyen /eyen)' ¦my
itaIics). Scc in this rcgard thc anaIysis !auI Kicocur
dcvotcs to thc Kantian thcsis oIthc invisibiIity oI
timc in TimeandNartiue, voI. 3, trans. KathIccn
BIamcyand !avid !cIIaucr¦Chicago. \nivcrsity oI
55. CI. GrancI, Ie sens du tem¸, o¸. cit. , p. 17, Irom
vhich Ï am draving hcrc, in its broad outIincs,
on thc phcnomcnoIogy oI thc consciousncss oI
intcrnaItimc, oIIºO5,anintcrprctationthat, ashc
himscII cmphasiscs ¦p. I I3), consists in rcading
!usscrI to shov hov his uItimatc gucstions caII
Ior thc !cidcggcrian rcncvaI vithout, hovcvcr,
cstabIishingthcmscIvcsinthc!cidcggcrian `sitc'.
5ó. Ibid. ,p.73,vhcrcitisnotcdthat!usscrIrcturnsin
this vay `to thc IundamcntaI idca thatphiIosophy
in its Kantian momcnt had inhcritcd somcthing
I 2I
57. On tbe Ibenomeno/oyy o¡ tbe Consciousness o¡
Inter¬a/Time,o¿.cit. ,§ó,p.Ió.
58. Ibid., § Ió,p. 1O/12.JhispassagcisguotcdbyGrancI
(Iesensdutem¿,o¿. cit. ,p. 82)andiscomparcdvith
thcanaIysisin §I13 oIIdeas Ï vhcrc, atthc IcvcI oI
thc `provisionaI' absoIutc oInoctic phcnomcnoIogy,
`thcpcrIcctgivcnoIthcthingisstipuIatcda Idea ¦in
appcars as a stipuIatcd cxtcrnaI Iimit but as thc
intcrnaI"EAO� ¦cnd) vhich isaIso thc apXl ¦origin)
oI a Iiving continuum Irom vhich nothing
`dctachcs' itscIf
5º. GrancI (Iesensdu tem¿, o¿. cit. , p. 81) takcs thc
cxprcssion`comct'staiI', uscd by!usscrIin§ I I oI
On tbe Ibenomeno/oyy o¡ tbe Consciousness o¡
óO. Ibid. ,ÏrcIcrhcrctothcdazzIingdcscriptionsoIp.
óI. CI. !cnriBcrgson, `Iapcrccptionduchangcmcnt',
I ¿ensée et /emouuant, in Oeuures, ¦!aris. !\.I,
oI changc' in ³ Study in Meta¿bysics. tbe Creatiue
Mind¦Jotova,IJ.IittIchcId,Adams,Iºó5),p. I5O.
ó2. On tbe Ibenomeno/oyy o¡ tbe Consciouness o¡
ó3. Ibid. ,p.75/7º.
ó1. McrIcau-!onty, Ie uuib/e et /'inuuib/e ¦!aris.
I 22
GaIIimard, Iºó1), pp. 282÷3, IngIish-Ianguagc
cdn, Tbe Iuib/eandtbeInuuib/e, trans. AIphonso
Iingis ¦Ivanston, ÏI. Iorthvcstcrn \nivcrsity
!rcss, Iºó8), p. 22º. `JhcinvisibIcistbere vithout
bcing an ob¡ect, it is purc transccndcncc, vithout
ó5. `Jimc and Bcing' in On TimeandIeiny, o¿. cit. ,
p. Iº, `Vhat dctcrmincs both, timc and bcing, in
thcir ovn, that is, in thcirbcIongingtogcthcr, vc
shaII caII.Ireiynu. '
óó. Ibid.,p. 2.
ó7. CI. !cidcggcr, `Icttcr on !umanism' in Iasic
ßritinys,2ndrcv. cdn,cd. D. F. KrcII ¦IcvYork.
!arpcrCoIIins, Iºº3),p. 223, `ButiImanistohnd
his vay oncc again into thc ncarncss oIbcing hc
must hrst Icarn to cxist in thc namcIcss jim
Namen/osen]. '
ó8. GrancI,Iesensdutem¿, o¿.cit. ,p. ºº.
óº. Ibid. ,p. I I2.
7O. Ibid.
7I. Ibid. ,p. I2O.
72. Sein undZeit,o¿. cit. , p. 25. 'eineecbte¿bi/oso¿bu-
73. CI. OnTimeandIeiny,o¿. cit. , p.1 jZurSacbedes
Zen[ens ¦!IuIIingcn. Icskc, Iºóº), p. 1, IngIish-
Ianguagc trans., `My Vay to !hcnomcnoIogy' in
On TimeandIeiny].
71. Ibid. , p.23/23.
75. Ibid.,p. 21/21 . 'ZasIreiynis ist ueder nocb gibt es
das Ireiynis. Zas Iine uie das ³ndere sayen,
bedeutet eine Ier[ebrunydesSacbuerba/ts, y/eicba/s
uo//tenuirdenQuehausdemStrumber1eiten. '
7ó. CI. thc Zahringcn scminar ¦Iº73) inQuestions I
¦!aris.GaIIimard, Iº7ó),p.33º.
77. Ibid.,p.33óII.
78. |nscbeinbm can bc rcndcrcd in Ircnch not onIy
IitcraIIy by ina¿¿arent but aIso by insiynqant
[insignihcant| in thc scnsc oI `vhat passcs un-
noticcd' Ior vant oIbrightncss and conscgucntIy
7º. TbeIuib/eandTbeinui·ib/e,o¿.cit. ,p.22º.
8O. SeinundZeit,o¿.cit. ,p.222
8I . CI. `Jhc Crigin oI thc Vork oI Art' in Iasic
Pritinys, o¿.cit. , p. I7º. `Jhismcansthatthcopcn
pIacc in thc midst oIbcings, thc cIcaring, is ncvcr
a rigidstagcvithapcrmancntIy raiscdcurtainon
vhich thc pIay oIbcings runs its coursc. . . . Jhc
unconccaImcnt oI bcings (|nuerboryenbeit des
Seienden)÷ thisisncvcramcrcIycxistcntstatc(ein
82. CI. !cidcggcr, `Jhc Jhing' in Ioetry, Ianyuaye,
Tbouybt, trans. AIbcrt !oIstadtcr ¦Icv York.
!arpcrandKov, Iº7I), pp. I 8I÷2.
83. Ibid.,p.I71II.
81. Ibid.,p. I 82. CI. Iorträye und³u]ätze ¦!IuIIingcn.
Icskc, Iº5º), p. I 8O. Jhc adjcctivc/advcrb¡äb,
vhosc ctymoIogy is obscurc, carrics thc scnsc oI
85. Ibid.,p. I 82.
8ó. Ibid.,p. I 8I .
87. CI. Questionsr o¿. cit. ,pp.338÷º. Jhc `Icttcron
!umanism', o¿. cit. , p. 2ó5, is vhcrc !cidcggcr
addrcsscs thc 'uor/äu¸yes ßesen des Zen[ens' that
must bc undcrstood as thc conjunction oI thc
prcIiminary charactcr oIthought, it docs not rcst
upon itscIIsincc it is thcgiIt oIbcing in a vcrbaI
scnsc, vith its prc-cursory charactcr that comcs
88. Scc, Ior cxampIc, !cidcggcr, `Vom Vcscn und
BcgriIIdcr !hysis' ¦"Cn thc Isscncc and Conccpt
oI !hysis") in ßeymar[en ¦IrankIurt am Main.
KIostcrmann, 1967), p. 31 1 II., Ircnch trans. in
Questions I ¦!aris. GaIIimard, 1968), p. 2 1 1 ¦scc
89. Questionsr o¿.cit. ,p.338.
90. Ibid.,p.339.
91 . ße¿mm[en, o¿. cit. , p.319. Scc thc Iong transIator's
notcinQuestionsI, o¿.cit. ,p. 193 If.
92. Ibid., p. 339: `Ïn concciving thcrc is in cIIcct a
grasping gcsturc. Jhc Grcck opioµoç
on thc
contrary, tcndcrIy surrounds vhat thc Iook takcs
1. V. von !umboIdt, |bc die ¼iedenbeiten des
menscb/icben S¿racbbaues und ibren Iin[us au¡die
yei·tiyeIntuic[/unydesMenscbenyescb/ecbts(1 830-5)
inhiscoIIcctcdvorks,¦BcrIin. Bchr, 1907), voI.7, 1,
pp. 212-13 ¦hcnccIorth \VS). 'Zie uir[/icbe
dc S¿racbesicb o_enbaren
man muss inne uerden
y/eicb einemI/itze
diesuuerbindenSto_, uieeineG/utau.unbe[annten
ineinander umo/zen bat.' Scc
!umboIdt, O Ianyuaye. tbe diæ.ity o¡ buman
unyuaye strcture and it in]uence on tbe menm/
deue/o¿ment o¡ man[ind, trans. !ctcr !cath
¦Cambridgc. Cambridgc\nivcrsity !rcss, Iº88),p.
I 81.
2. Scc, in !cidcggcr, Ieitp e zut Ibi/oso¿bie
¦IrankIurt am Main. KIostcrmann, Iº8º), §37,
pp. 78ּ, thc paragraph cntitIcd `!as Scyn und
scinc Irschvcigung ¦dic Sigctik)
¦"Bcingand its
Kcticcncc ¦thc Sigctic)") oIvhichthcrc IoIIovs a
juie uest das Seyn] ³ IxpIicit rcticcncc jdie
Irscbueiyuny] is thcconsidcrcdIcgaIityoIbcing
siIcnt jItscbueiyens] (0). IxpIicit rcticcncc
is thc `Iogic' oI phiIosophy, thc IundamcntaI
gucstion. Ït sccks thc truth oItbe euent o¡tbe
occur+znce oI bcing [Wahrheit cer Wesung des
Seyns],and this truth isthc signaIIingandring-
ing conccaImcnt jdie uin[end-n[/inyende
Ierboryenbeit ] ¦thc sccrct) oI Ireiynis ¦thc
hcsitant rcIusaI) jdie zöyer¬de Iet:·ayuny]. Vc
cannot immcdiatcIy say bcing itscIIat thc vcry
momcnt it springs Iorth in thc Icap, as cvcry
saying comcs Irom bcing and spcaks Irom its
truth. AII spccch and thus aII Iogic arc undcr
thc domination oIbcing. Jhc csscncc oI`Iogic'
¦scc thc coursc Irom thc summcr scmcstcr oI
Iº31) is conscgucntIy thc `sigctic'. Ït is onIy in
thc `sigctic' that thc csscncc oI Ianguagc can
attain undcrstanding. But `sigctic' is a rubric
onIy Ior thosc vho stiII think in `discipIincs'
(er] and bcIicvc thcy posscss knovIcdgc
!cidcggcrrcIcrsinanotcto thccndoIthccoursc
Irom thc summcr scmcstcr oI Iº37 on Iictzschc
consists not simpIy in bcing siIcnt in thc saying
ovcr vhatispropcrIyto bc said,butinsayingitin
such a vay that itis namcd prcciscIy in thc non-
saying. Saying as bcing siIcnt jIrscbueiyen]' ¦GA
11, Iº8ó, p. 233). Ït IoIIovs Irom thcsc tvo tcxts
thatvhat isatissuc isnotbcing siIcnt, but rathcr
making siIcncc comc to pass inspccch. this is thc
`pcrIormativc'scnscoI Erscbueiyen.
3. AIIov mctorcIcr hcrc to myarticIc `Iogic and
CntoIogy. !cidcggcr's "!cstruction" oI Iogic',
Iesemcb in Ibenomeno/oyy, voI. I7, I º87, pp.
1. Sein undZeit ¦Jíibingcn. Iicmcycr, Iº53), p. 25,
IngIish-Ianguagc trans.,IeinyandTime, trans. J.
Stambaugh ¦AIbany, IY: S\IY !KISS, I ººó).
undcrstood diaIcctic bccauschcIocatcd itthrough
a movcmcnt oI³u]ebuny, subIation, on a morc
radicaI ground. 'uei/ er sie au¡einen radi[a/eren
Ioden ste//te und auob' ¦my itaIics). Jhc Iast
vord is rigorousIy untransIatabIc, sincc it can
mcan hcrc, j ust as vith !cgcI, onIy thc simuI-
cIcvation (tohere, conseruare, e/euare). Scc in this
conncction !cidcggcr, Heye/' Ibenomeno/oyy o¡
S¿irit, thc Iccturc coursc oI thc vintcr scmcstcr
Iº3O÷I, GA 32 ¦BIoomington. Ïndiana \nivcrsity
!rcss, Iº88),p.28,asvcIIas!cidcggcr,Hebe� der
Haus]eund¦!IuIIingcn.Icskc, Iºó5),p. I I .
5 . A tcrm associatcd by !cidcggcr vith `incxpIicit'
to charactcrisc thc tcmporaI oricntation oI thc
ó. By hyphcnating this vord Ï am attcmpting to
transIatc thc Gcrman vord uorbanden. Scc in this
conncction notcs 2 and 7 ¦p. I22 and I21) in
my book, Heideyyer et /a question du tem¿s
¦"!cidcggcr and thc Qucstion oI Jimc") ¦!aris.
!\.!, IººO).
7. CI.SeinundZeit,o¿.cit. ,pp.2I÷2.
8. Ibid.,p.22.
º. Ibid.,p.33.
I O. ³n Intruduction to Meta¿bysics, trans. KaIph
Manhcim ¦Icv !avcn, CJ and Iondon. YaIc
\nivcrsity!rcss, Iº5º),p. I 87.
I I . Cnccanuscthc!usscrIianvocabuIaryhcrcvithits
gcoIogicaI mctaphor sincc it is stiII a gucstion vith
!cidcggcr aIso ÷ at Icast bcIorc thc `turn' ÷ as it
aIrcadyvasvith!cgcI, oIaccountingIormaniIcs-
tations oI dcath in vhich thc `Iiving prcscnt',
ungraspabIc in itscII, is givcn to an aIvays aIrcady
vhatdcathis' (d Tote[stzuba/ten)and oIrcmain-
ing in it, oI `convcrting' it into bcing, as !cgcI
puts it in a Iamous passagc oIthc !rcIacc to thc
Ibenomeno/oyy o¡ S¿irit. Jo tcII thc truth, phiI-
osophy has ncvcr had, Irom !Iatonic anamncsis
to thc !usscrIian gucstioning back and to
!cidcggcrian `dc-construction', any othcr projcct
that!cidcggcraurms atthc cnd oIthc `Icttcron
!umanism' that `csscntiaI thinkcrs aIvays say thc
samc. But that docs notmcan. thcidcnticaI.' Butit
is .0 Icss truc that such a statcmcnt may sccm
arbitrary, atIcast to thosc vho havc notyctmadc
I2. SeinundZeit,o¿.cit. ,p.22.
I3. Ibid.,p. IóI. ÏnrcIationtothcstatusoIIanguagcin
!cidcggcr's thought aIIov mc to rcIcr to my
articIc `Ianguagc and Ireiynis' in Ieadiny
Heideyyer: Commemorations, cd. ]ohn SaIIis
¦BIoomington:Ïndiana\nivcrsity!rcss, I ºº2),pp.
I1. Ibid. 'Zen Iedeutunyen uacbsen ßorte zu. Nicbt
aberuerden ßörterdinyemitIedeutunyen uerseben'
¦`Vords accruc to mcanings. Butvord-things arc
not providcd subscgucntIy vith mcanings'). Vc
Te//iny Time
can aIrcady disccrn hcrc thc distinction bctvccn
ßorte ¦vordsinthc scnsc oIvhatis said yaru/es])
andßörter ¦'tcrms'), a distinctionsubscgucntIy oI
cardinaI importancc to !cidcggcr. Scc in this
conncction my articIc `Ia pcnscc commc tra-
duction. Autour dc !cidcggcr' ¦"Jhought as
JransIation. Cn !cidcggcr") Iorthcoming in thc
procccdings oIthc conIcrcncc `Ia traduction dcs
phiIosophcs' ¦"Jhc JransIation oI!hiIosophcrs")
I5. Vc h nd hcrc thc !usscrIian conccption oI
Ianguagc.SccinrcIation to thisJ. Icrrida, `Iorm
and Mcaning. A Iotc on thc !hcnomcnoIogy oI
Ianguagc' in Maryins o¡ Ibi/oso¿by ¦Chicago.
\nivcrsity oIChicago !rcss, Iº82), p. I55 II. Jhc
anachronism consists in rcgarding uttcranccs
yaro/es] as bcing born oI prc-cxisting mcanings
vhcrcas, as !umboIdt has shovn, it is Ianguagc
itscII as such that is at thc origin oI mcaning,
vhich can bc dctachcd Irom its `grammaticaI
I ó. SeinundZeit,o¿.cit. ,p. I ó5.
I 7. Ibid. , § I 8.
I 8. Ibid.,p. 87. Jhis signi¸care docsnotconsist onIy
in thc imposition oI mcanings on `things'. Ït is
abovcaIIa rcûcctivcscII-signihcation oIIascinto
itscII,and itisthis`rcûcction',this rcturn to scIIin
thc ` Ior thc sakc oIvhich' (ßorumui//en, vhich
corrcsponds to AristotIc's ou eVeKU and thc
Kantian Indzuec[) in thc totaIity oI rcIcrcntiaI
rcIations (Ieuandtnis) oIvhich thc vorIdhood oI
scc, thc `articuIation' oI thc undcrstanding in
Iº. Ibid. Jhc tcrm [undieren' [Iounding| cIcarIy rcIcrs
tothc!usscrIianprobIcm oIthcgroundingoIthc
`catcgoriaI' inthcscnsibIc.Ïtisunsurprisingthcnto
hndthc IoIIovingmarginaInotc tothis scntcnccin
thc'Hùttenexem¿ur' [scc abovc,chaptcr2, notc31|.
' |nuabr S¿racbeutnicbtau_estoc[t, sondc ist das
urs¿rùny/icbc ßesen der ßabrbeit a/Za.' ¦`IaIsc.
Ianguagc is not supportcd, but is thc originary
2O. Ibid.,p.I ó5.
2I . Ibid.`CntoIogyoIthcprc-scntbcing'transIatcsthc
cxprcssion'Onto/oyiedes Iorbandenen'.
22. Ibid.,p.221.
23. CI. !usscrI, Sborter ßor[s, cd. !ctcr McCormick
and Ircdcrick A. IIIiston ¦Brighton. !arvcstcr
!rcss, I º8I), p. I51. Ït vas !usscrI vho dchncd
BoIzano's `propositionsin thcmscIvcs' as`mythicaI
cntitics suspcndcd bctvccn bcing and non-bcing'
and vho cmphasiscd that it vas thc `proIound
assimiIation' oI Iotzc's rcûcctions on !Iato's
thcory oI Iorms that gavc him `thc kcy to thc
curious conccptions oI BoIzano's' . AIIov mc to
rcIcr in this conncction to my articIc `!usscrI,
Iotzc ct Ia Iogiguc dc Ia "vaIiditc'' ¦"!usscrI,
Iotzc and thc Iogic oI`vaIidity"),Iiros, 5, Iºº1,
pp. 3I÷18.
21. Ï havc bricûy discusscd this spcciaI status oIdis-
coursc in Heideyyer et /a question detem¿s ¦!aris.
!\.!, IººO),pp.7Oand77÷8.
25. SeinundZeit,o¿.cit. ,p. IóI.
2ó. Ibid.,p. I17. Vc arc stiII dcaIing vith phcnomcn-
oIogy hcrc bccausc thc rcIation to sight and sccing
continucs structuraIIy to dcnnc !ascin. Jhis
itscIIIoundcd on thc `circIc'inhcrcntto aII projcc-
tioninasmuchas it`articuIatcs' thcbcingsightcd in
rcIation to thc ontoIogicaI horizon that givcs it
27. Ibid. A marginaI notc in thc Hùttenexam¿/at· [scc
abovc, notc Iº| spccihcs that `thought' must bc
or Ierstand, but that onc must not undcrstand
Iersteben ¦thc cxistcntiaI) on thc basis oIIerstand
¦thc undcrstanding). !cidcggcrian Iersteben docs
notsimpIymcaninte//iyere, itmustbcundcrstood
on thc basis oI thc ctymoIogy oI thc tcrm
uor-steben ¦to vhich !cidcggcr makcs a bricI
aIIusion in Sein und Zeit, p. I13) vhich aIIics it
vith thc Grcck cmc'!l, as !cidcggcr rccaIIs in
thc Ic Jhor scminar oIIºóº, QuestionsI ¦!aris.
GaIIimard, Iº7ó), o¿. cit. , p. 2ó8. `\ndcrstanding,
Ierständnis, must in turn bc undcrstood in thc
primaryscnscoIIorsteben. bcingstoodupbcIorc,
bcing on a IcvcI vith, bcing at thc mcasurc oI
28. SeinundZeit,o¿.cit. ,p. I18.
29. Ibid.,p. I1º.
3O. Ibid.,p. I5O.
3I . Ibid. Jhis is a cardinaI point vhich onc cannot
strcss too much. thc intcrprctation oI`somcthing
as somcthing' (Ituas a/sItuas) in no vay trans-
Iorms aprc-scntbcingintoa rcady-to-hand bcing,
a purc `scnsibIc' givcn into a thing cndovcd vith
mcaning,but consists soIcIyinthcoriginary rcpcti-
oIits diIIcrcnccvithrcspcctto thcmcaninghIncss
projcctcd. As !cidcggcr cxpIiciuy cmphasiscs in
§32 (o¿. cit. , p. I5OII.), thc ³/·-stru[ur ¦thc `as'
structurc) oI intcrprctation is Ioundcd on thc
standing oIvhich, ncvcrthcIcss, it constitutcs onIy
thc dcvcIopmcnt. Jhc articuIation oI thcsc tvo
structurcs is at thc origin oI mcaning, and this
articuIation is as !cidcggcr viII subscgucnuy scc,
nothing othcr than thc opcning oI thc ontico-
32. Ibid.,p.I 5I .
33. As!cidcggcr cmphasiscs (o¿.cit. ,p. I52),i t ariscs
Iroma `ground' (Grund)thatitscIIbccomcsacccs-
31. Ïn thc !usscrIian notion oI `hmmcnt', itscIIthc
coroIIary oIthc anticipation oImcaning, vc fd
bccn sccn not onIy by Kant, but aIso by !usscrI.
!cidcggcraIIudcstothisviththcscntcncc(o¿.cit. ,
p.I5I). `CnIy!ascin"has"mcaninginthatthcdis-
cIoscdncss oIbcing-in-thc-voHd can bc "hIhIIcd"
35. Ibid., p. I55. [tn Joan Stambaugh transIatcs thc
scntcnccto vhich this passagc rcIcrsas. `"!ositing
thc subjcct" dims bcings dovn to Iocus on "thc
hammcr thcrc" in ordcr toIctvhatismaniIcstbc
3ó. Ibid.,p. I58.
37. Ibid.,p.I5º.
38. Ibid., p. I óO. A marginaI notc in thc
Hùttenexem¿/ar[sccabovc,notcIº| spccihcsthatit
3º. !cidcggcr, `Icttcr on !umanism' in Iasic
ßritinys,2ndrcv. cdn,cd.!. ! KrcII ¦IcvYork.
!arpcrCoIIins, Iºº3).
1O. ³n Introduction toMeta¿bysics, o¿. cit. , p. I 2I . Cn
`Iogicas suchrcmains gucstionabIc' itisncccssary
1I . `Icttcr on !umanism',o¿. cit. , p. 22I . !cidcggcr
uscs thcvcrbersetzen hcrc.
12. Ibid. ,p.2Iº.'ZasSeina/sI/ementdesZen[ensistin
KogcrMunicr'sIrcnchtransIationrcndcrsthis as.
¿rei·yeyeben that Ï prcIcr to transIatc hcrc by
`sacrihcc' rathcr than `abandon' is a transIation oI
thc Ircnch 'donner en ¿ri·e' and has thc strong
scnsc oI/iurer en ¿roie, `to bctray, to prostitutc'.
!ovcvcr, as is naturaI to a Gcrman car,
!cidcggcr pcrhaps undcrstands by this vord Icss
thcIrcnch ¸ri·e' than thc Gcrman Ireu, ¦`pricc'),
tcrms Mar[, ¦`markct') ¦p. 2Iº) and ßettbeuerbe,
¦`compctition') ¦p. 22I) that say a good dcaI about
!cidcggcr's `mcrcantiIc' conccptionoIthcSophists
as a IoundingmomcntoIthis tcchnicaI intcrprcta-
tion oIthinkingin rcIation to vhichphiIosophy is
onIy a rcaction. Scc in this conncction ßbat i·
Ibi/oso¿by? ¦Iondon. Vision !rcss, Iºó3), p. 5I ,
vhcrc `thc attack oI Sophist rcasoning vhich
aIvays hadrcadyIor cvcrythingan ansvcrvhich
vas comprchcnsibIc to cvcryonc and vhich thcy
putonthcmarkct' isonccagainatissuc.Jhatthc
Sophist scIIs his knovIcdgc as goods signaIs thc
taI `vaIuc', a statc oI aIIairs conhrmcd by thc
Jhis cxpIains vhy !cidcggcr can dccIarc that in
this vay `vc judgc thinking by an inappropriatc
mcasurc' as `this vay oIjudging is cguivaIcnt to
rcsourccs oIa hsh by sccing hov Iong it can Iivc
ondryIand'(o¿.cit. ,p.2Iº).
13. Ibid. ,p.2I 8.
11. !cidcggcr, ßbat is Ca//ed Tbin[iny?, trans. J.
Te//iny Time
GIcnn Gray ¦Icv York. !arpcr and Kov, Iºó8),
p. I51. Scc aIso, On tbe ßay to Ianyuaye, trans.
!ctcr !. !crtz ¦Icv York. !arpcr and Kov,
Iº7I), p. 8.
15. CI.`Icttcron!umanism',o¿.cit. ,p.2I 8 .

1ó. Ibid. ,p.22I .
17. AIIovmcto rcIcr on this point to my articIc `Ia
hn dc Ia phiIosophic ct lc commcnccmcnt dc Ia
pcnscc' ¦"Jhc cnd oIphiIosophy and thc bcgin-
ningoIthought") inHeideyyer. Questions ouuertes
¦"!cidcggcr. Cpcn Qucstions") ¦C.Ï.!, Csiris,
18. CI. `Icttcron!umanism',o¿.cit. ,p. 22III. vhcrc
is mcaningIuI onIy in thc contcxt oI a tcchnicaI
intcrprctation oIthinking, cvcry schooI bcing in
Introduction to Meta¿bysics (o¿. cit. , p. I2I),
`at thc momcnt vhcn Grcck phiIosophy rcachcd
its cnd and bccamc a schooI mattcr, oIorganisa-
1º. Scc in this conncction !auI Kicocur, Tbe Iu/e o¡
Meta¿bor, trans. Kobcrt Czcrny vith KathIccn
McIaughIin and John CostcIIo ¦Iondon.
KoutIcdgc, Iº78), p. 3 I I vho aItcr dcpIoring thc
`spirit oI vcngcIuIncss' that prcsidcs ovcr `thc
cncIosurc oI thc prcvious history oI Vcstcrn
thought vithin thc unity oI "thc" mctaphysicaI'
and rightIy considcring thc Iattcr to bc an `aItcr-
thc-Iact construction', dccIarcs that. `Ït sccms to
mc timc to dcny oncscII thc convcnicncc, vhich
hasbccomca Iazincss inthinking, oIIumpingthc
vhoIcoIVcstcrn thoughttogcthcrundcrasingIc
vord, mctaphysics.' Jhis is a criticism cchocd by
Jacgucs!crridavho,rcpIyingto!auI Kicocurand
rchsingto aIIovhisovnprobIcm to bc takcnas a
`radicaIisation oIthc !cidcggcrian movcmcnt that
is continuou· vith it', aurms that. `Ït is not a
gucstionIormcoItaking"mctaphysics" ['l' meta-
¿bysique] as thc homogcncous unity oIa totaIity. Ï
havcncvcrbcIicvcd inthccxistcnccoIsuchathing
as tbe "mctaphysicaI" [Ia mem¿bysique]' . Isycbe
¦!aris. GaIiIcc, Iº87), p. 72. Aconvcnicncc,atoncc
Iazy and vcngcIuI or an unvarrantcd proccss oI
homogcnisation, in both cascs thc vcry identity oI
thcVcstand oIitshistoryis putin gucstion to thc
cxtcnt thatitis rootcd ¦as!usscrl aIrcady saidand
sav |n this nothing Icss than a `rcvoIution vithin
historicity') in thc appcarancc oIthc phiIosophicaI
attitudcoI8ECpta, avayoIcharactcrisingthinking
that, Ior !cidcggcr, `aIrcady occurs vithin thc
"tcchnicaI" intcrprctation oIthinking'as`arcactivc
againstactingand doing'¦'Icttcron!umanism',
o¿. cit. , p.2I º). Vhatcannot,itappcars to mc, bc
dcnicd isIcss thc `idcntity' oIthcVcstitscIIthan
thcIactthatthcVcstcouId, asahistoricaIproccss,
One and o¡ Identity ¦not onIy Irom thc scicntihc,
butaIso IromthcrcIigious andpoIiticaI, points oI
vicv), as thcVcstcrnisationoIthcpIanctvhichis
aIso a `uni-Iormisation' bcars vitncss today.
!oubtIcss, this history is morc thc rcsuIt oIa sum
oIchancc occurrcnccs than thc dcvcIopmcnt oIa
programmc. itrcmains thc casc though thatIrom
thc retros¿ectiue point oIvicv oIuni-hcation (un
regard uni-cateur], vhich rcmains Vcstcrn
and phiIosophicaI ¦!cidcggcr vouId simpIy say
`Grcck'), it is possibIc prcciscIy to saIcguard thc
originaIity oI `grcat bcginnings' othcr than thc
Grcck and to initiatc a diaIoguc vith thcm that
idcntiIy, in thc modc oI thc Iuturc antcrior and
undcrthcassumednameoI`mctaphysics' , thcIong
and ]ee historicaI sequence vhosc provisionaI
tcction and by mcans oI namcs that arc at oncc
`posthumous' and `Iorc-runncrs' in thc `rcsponsibiI-
5O. `Icttcron!umanism',o¿.cit. ,p. 22O.
5I . J. BcauIrct, Ie¿oème de Iar¬énid, ¦!aris. !\.I,
Iº55),p. 35.
52. Ïn Tbe Irinci¡/e o¡ Ieason ¦Ïndiana. Ïndiana
\nivcrsity !rcss, IººI), p. I21, aItcr having
cmphasiscd that undcr thc constraint oI thc
dcmand IorthcrcndcringoIsuIhcicntrcasonsIor
aII things, `thc IundamcntaI charactcr oIcontcm-
porary human cxistcncc that cvcryvhcrc vorks
Ior ccrtainty is consoIidatcd', !cidcggcr rcmarks
that `Icibniz, thc discovcrcr oI thc IundamcntaI
oI"IiIcinsurancc" '.
53. CI.!cidcggcr,Identitãt undZqerenz ¦!IuIIingcn.
Icskc, I º57), IngIish-Ianguagc cdn, Identity and
Zy rence, trans. Joan Stambaugh ¦Icv York.
!arpcrand Kov, Iºóº), p.5O.!cidcggcr cmpha-
`stcp back' prcciscIy docs not havc thc rcsuIt oIa
oIthcpast,butconsists,on thccontrary, inIctting
tousinan `ovcragainst' jen¸ace] (Geyenùber)that
is not an objcctivc (Geyenstand) rcprcscntation.
o¡ Ieason (o¿. cit. , p. 87) vhcrc it is cxpIicitIy
cmphasiscd thatin thc Geyenùber, thc Geyen ¦thc
against) rcvcaIs itscIInotthroughthcobjcctivising
hrst oI aII in Gcrman, as !cidcggcr rccaIIs,
Geyenuur[, `throvagainst',onthcbasisoIaIitcraI
transIation oI thc Iatin ob¡ectum), but through
!crc coming aItcr thc cvcnt is thc modaIity oIa
thinking thatvants to bc,not thc Ioundationand
scizurc oIthc things oIthc past (Zas Ieryanyene),
but thc rcccption and dc-hnition oIa `prcscncc'
(³nuesen)oIvhathas bccnand comcs to us Irom
51. Ibid. ,p.57.
55. Ibid. SccIdentitätundZyerenz,o¿.cit. ,p. 51. Jhc
vcrb¿räyen, vhich bcars thc scnsc oIimprinting,
striking, Iorging, cngraving, is probabIy dcrivcd
Irom thc Ïndo-Iuropcan root*bbrey- vhichgavc
brecben ¦to brcak) in Gcrman and]anyere and
]·aymentuminIatin. Cncmustundcrstandbythis
is at thc samc timc thc possibiIity oI a brcak-
5ó. Ibid. ,p.óó.
57. Cf!cidcggcr, `IinIcitungzuVas istMctaphysik` '
¦`Ïntroduction to "Vhat is Mctaphysics` "') m
ßeymar[en, ¦Irankhrt am Main. KIostcrmann,
58. IdentitätundZyrenz,o¿. cit. ,p. 55 . 'Zaberutahe
Meta¿bysi[im G:tndeuom GundeaudasGùnden,
dasuom GundedieIecbenscba¡yibt,ibmIedestebt
und ibn scb/iesshcb zur Iede steht' ¦`JhcrcIorc aII
mctaphysics isatbottom, and Iromthcground up,
vhat grounds, vhat givcs account oIthc ground,
vhatiscaIIcdto accountbythcground,andhnaIIy
vhatcaIIsthcgroundtoaccount'. trans. p.58).Jhc
cxprcssions ¡emandem Iede steben' and ¡emanden
zur Iede ste//en' ccrtainIy mcan rcspcctivcIy `bc
caIIcd to accountby somconc' and `caIIsomconcto
account',butthctcrmIede musthcrc bctakcn in
thc scnsc oIdiscourscsincc, as !cidcggcr rcmarks
`inpassing' ('seinurbei/aù¸ybemeµ o¿.cit. ,p.ó7,
trans. p. óº) `thc samc AOyOC aIso contains vithin
itscII thc imprint (Iräyuny) oI thc bcing oI
5º. CI. Identity andZy rence, o¿. cit. , pp. 7O÷I . Jhc
CncdoubIcs upasapXl andas'EAOC, asgcncraIity
and unity, cxpIaining vhy bcing is thc ground oI
bcingsbutvhyasuprcmcbcing, in turn,grounds
bcinginrcason, cvcn iI, Irom thcpointoIvicvoI
diIIcrcncc, bcing and bcings gravitatc about onc
anothcr. Jhis is thc IundamcntaI structurc oI
mctaphysics, and it bccamc thc ex¿hcit schcma oI
in this conncction my short book Hömer/in.
Tmyéie et Moder¬ité, ¦"!öIdcrIin. Jragcdy and
Modcrnity") ¦Iougcrcs. Incrc Marinc, Iºº2), pp.
óO. Ibid. ,p.58.
óI. Ibid. ,pp.óI÷2.
ó2. Ibid. ,p.7I.
ó3. Ibid. ,pp.ó2andó5.
ó1. Ibid. , p. ó5. Ïn |nterueys zurS¿racbe ¦!IuIIingcn.
Icskc, Iº5º),p.21II.,IngIish-Ianguagctrans.,scc
`Ianguagc' in Ioetry, Ianyuaye, Tbouybt, trans.
AIbcrt !oIstadtcr ¦Icv York. !arpcr and Kov,
Iº7I), p. 2O2II. !cidcggcr uscs thc !öIdcrIinian
tcrm Inniy[eit ¦intimacy) to spcak oI thc samc
|nter-scbied¦diIIcrcncc)and oIthcsamc spIitthat
yicIds thc scparation on thc basis oIvhich vorId
andthing,bcingandbcings,arisc. Jhisscparation
vhich isattbesametime a joining, is thc scpara-
tion oIthc samc diIIcring `originariIy' Irom itscII
and not thc diIIcrcncc bctvccn tvo tcrms that
couId bc subscgucntIy unihcd. !cidcggcr's
thought is a thought oIthc samc and not oIthc
ó5. Ibid. , p. ó5. Jhc tcrm ³ustray ccrtainIy has thc
scnsc oI`scttIcmcnt', `arrangcmcnt', `conciIiation'
and `arbitration', vhich is vhy thc Ircnch trans-
Iator Andrc !rcau, IoIIoving a suggcstion oI
!cidcggcr's, transIatcs it as `conciIiation' aItcr
having rccaIIcd in Questions I ¦!aris. GaIIimard,
Iºó8), p. 23ó, that it is thc IitcraI Gcrman trans-
IationoIthcIatindi·¸ro (trayen,`todrav',stcms
Irom a root that is Iound onIy in Gcrmanic
Ianguagcs). But thc vcrb austrayen aIso mcans to
distributc, to havk, to carry to thc cnd and to
carry to tcrm. Ïn |nterueys Zur S¿racbe (o¿. cit. ,
p.22,IngIish-Ianguagctrans.,`Ianguagc' , o¿. cit. ,
p.2OO)!cidcggcr connccts this vcrb vith thc CId
Gcrman ber, bäen, `to bcar', Iound today m
yebãren, ¦togivcbirth)andGebãrde ¦gcsturc).

óó. Ibid. ,p.ó7.
ó7. `Icttcron!umanism',o¿.cit. ,p.2I 8.
ó8. IdentityandZy erence,o¿.cit. ,p.73 II.
óº. Ïamborrovinghcrc,inasomcvhatiIIicitIashion,
this vrittcn Iorm Irom Jacgucs !crrida, to
dcsignatcthceuentoIdiIIcrcnccthatmakcs oIdiI-
Icrcncc somcthing vhoIIy othcr thananaddcd-on
distinction. !cidcggcr, cmpIoying thc rcsourccs
vith thc tcrm |nter-scbied, a tcrm that is un-
7O. ÏshaIImcntiononIyasingIccxampIchcrc,admit-
tcdIy a paradigmatic onc, oI this `transIation'.
1100< rathcrthan thc Gcrman tcrm ßesen, taintcd
vith ambiguity ¦cI. Ideas, trans. V. K. Boycc
Gibson ¦Iondon. AIIcn and \nvin, Iº3I),p. 5ó),
vcry hcart oIthis poIyscmy oIthc Gcrman tcrm to
pIay on thc contrastbctvccn thc traditionaI mcan-
ing ¦rcsuIting Irom an historicaI scdimcntation) oI
ßesen asatcrmuscdto transIatcthcIatinessentia
and thc propcrIyhistoriaImcaning,vhichcan stiII
bc hcard in ordinary vords such as anuesend
¦prcscnt) and abuesend ¦abscnt), that rcIatcs to
bcingundcrstoodasduration anddcpIoymcnt(das
ßrende) and not to bcing undcrstood as
guiddity. Scc in this conncction On tbe ßay to
7I. Cnc might considcr thc contribution oISein und
Zeit/Ieiny and Time to this ncccssary mctamor-
phosis to bc csscntiaIIy IcxicaI ÷ scc Ior cxampIc
thc tcrms Geuot]nbeit, Içnd/icb[eit, Zeitiyuny,
ctc.,aIistoIthcvordsmadcupby!cidcggcris to
bc Iound in Irasmus SchöIcr's Zie S¿racbe
Heideyyers ¦"!cidcggcr's Ianguagc") ¦!IuIIingcn.
Icskc, Iºó2),p.ó7II. IcvcrthcIcss,oncmustbcar
in mind that at this timc !cidcggcr aIrcady
cmphasiscs that Ior thc task oI `rcpcating' thc
gucstion oIbcing, `vc Iack not onIy most oIthc
vords but, abovc aII, thc "grammar'' (Sein und
Zeit, o¿.cit. ,p.3º).
7. OntbeßaytoIanyuaye,o¿.cit. ,p. I3ó.
73. Ibid. ,p.35.
71. !umboIdt, |S, voI. 7, I, § I2, p. 1ó. Quotcd by
!cidcggcr in |nterueys zur S¿racbe, o¿. cit. , p.
217,sccOntbeßaytoIanyuaye,o¿.cit.,p. I IóI7.
75. Ibid. , p. º3. SignihcantIy, |nterueys zur S¿racbe
cndsvith thisguotation.
7ó. Ïn thc Vcdic tradition and, in particuIar, in
!atanjaIi ¦vho is thought to havc Iivcd bctvccn
thc 2nd ccntury Be and thc 5th ccntury A! and
vho continucd thc vork oI!anini) onc hnds thc
idca that thc csscncc oI spccch is ncithcr thc
matcriaI sound nor thc spiritbut thcindissociabIc
tcrm¸ota mcaningatonccvhatismaniIcstcdand
vhat maniIcsts. Jhis tcrm, bcsidcs its `phiIo-
sophicaI'scnsc,rightIymcans `cxpIosion',Iromthc
radicaIs¿but. to cxpIodc, to crack, totcar,to opcn
oncscII. Jhc divinc charactcr oI spccch is thus
thcrc aIso undcrstood on thc basis oIthc opcning
oIdiIIcrcncc.Vhatcharactcriscs Vcdicthoughtis
thc Iact that itapproachcd its ovn conccptoIthc
absoIutc (brabman) via thc intcrmcdiary oI thc
povcr ascribcd to spccch as thc principaI instru-
77. Ibid. , p. 32º. Quotcd by !cidcggcr in |nterueys
zur S¿racbe, o¿. cit. , p. 218, On tbe ßay to
Ianyuaye, o¿.cit. ,p. I I 8.
78. Cí |nterueys zurS¿racbe,o¿. cit. , p. 2ó8, On tbe
ßaytoIanyuaye,o¿.cit. ,p. I3ó.
7º. |IS,p. Ió÷I 7.
8O. !umboIdt cmpIoys thc tcrm Imanation hcrc,
8I . CI. |nterueyszurS¿racbe,o¿.cit. ,pp.2O3and211,
On tbe ßay to Ianyuaye, o¿. cit. , pp. ºó and I I1.
Jhc Ircnch transIator Irançois Icdicr con-
scgucntIy transIatcd S¿racbe as `paroIc' through-
out, vhiIst Ï havc optcd to rctain thc traditionaI
transIation oI `Iangagc' or `Ianguc' to avoid any
ambiguity, givcn thc Ircnch habit oIopposing, in
a Saussurianvcin, thc idcaI `systcm'oIa Ianguagc
to `discoursc' yaro/e]undcrstood as thc activity oI
a spcaking subjcct. Jhis distinction has no strict
cguivaIcnt in Gcrman. Ïn particuIar, onc mustbc
carcIuI not to conIusc it vith thc S¿racbe /Iede
opposition vhich originatcd vith !umboIdt,
soIcIy bccausc !umboIdt vouId ncvcr havc
acccptcdSaussurc's thcsisaccordingto vhich `thc
vocaIorgansarc justascxtcrnaItoIanguagcasthc
cIcctricaI apparatus that scrvc to transcribcMorsc
codc arc to that codc'. (Course in Genera/
Iinyuistics, trans. Vadc Baskin ¦Iondon. !ctcr
!avics, IºóO),p. I 8 ,sinccthisthcsis,incIudingthc
accompanying comparison oI Ianguagc to a
symphony, a `rcaIity'indcpcndcntoIitscxccution,
amounts to thinking oI Ianguagc as a scmiotic
ing history vith thc aid oIits cnd products ¦thc
conccivc oIthcgcncsis oIIanguagc (S¿racbe) as a
proccss that vouId bcgin vith thc dcsignation oI
objcct vith vords (ßötter) and thcn asscmbIc
thcm togcthcr. Ïn rcaIity, discoursc (Iede) is not
is discoursc as a vhoIc that givcs risc to vords'
(|S,p. 72).ÏIS¿racbemustbcundcrstood asthc
aIvayssinguIarunity oIan intrinsicaIIyhistoricaI
`Ianguagc' j/anyue] and `discoursc' yaru/e], thcn
Iede constitutcs its actuaIity that can bc rctaincd
82. |S, p. 53. `Jhc mutuaI accord oI thought and
sound, morcovcr, is vcry striking. As thought,
comparabIc to a ûash oIIightning or a thundcr
cIap, gathcrs thc IuII Iorcc oIrcprcscntation in a
thc samc vay sound rings out by dctaching itscII
83. |S,p.óó.
81. CI. CIc !anscn-Iovc,Ia reuo/ution co¿er¬icienne
du/anyaye dans/'oeuurede ßi/be/m uon Humbo/dt
¦"Jhc Copcrnican KcvoIution inIanguagc in thc
Vork oI ViIhcIm von !umboIdt") ¦!aris. Vrin,
Iº72), p. 58II., citing in this conncction Cassircr
vho rcmarks in thc Ibi/oso¿by o¡Symbo/ic Ior¬s
that thc conccpt oI Crganicism is not takcn in
Komanticismasthc cxprcssionoIaccrtaincIassoI
phcnomcna but as that oIa univcrsaI spccuIativc
principIc. As !icrrc Caussat rcmarks cIscvhcrc,
thc dchnition givcn by !umboIdt oIIanguagc as
thc conccpt oI"organism'' sincc such a dchnition
oI Ianguagc, cvcn though it is organicaIIy con-
ditioncd as !umboIdt himscII says, makcs it
appcar in `thc Irccdom oIan indchnitc transition'
vhich raiscs it `abovc Crganicism' sincc `nothing
in it is static, cvcrything dynamic' impIying that
`onc can onIy comparc itvith physioIogy and not
vith anatomy', ¦scc !umboIdt, On Ianyuaye tbe
diuersity o¡ buman /anyuaye structure and its
in]uence on tbe mom/ deue/o¿ment o¡ man[ind,
trans. !ctcr !cath ¦Cambridgc. Cambridgc
\nivcrsity!rcss,I º88),p.ºO.
85. |S,p.53.
8ó. |S,p. 55.AsJ.!crridacmphasiscsinS¿eecband
Ibenomena,trans.!avidB. AIIison¦Ivanston,ÏI.
Iorthvcstcrn \nivcrsity !rcss, Iº73), p. 77.
csscncc oIthis opcration that Ibear myseqattbe
same time that Ï spcak.' Jhis circuIarity oI thc
phonic cxtcriorisation oI spirit rcturning in its
ovn hcaring in thc Iorm oI its ovn product
(Irzeuynus) constitutcs thc vcry structurc oI an
ipscity dchncd as thc `abiIity-to-hcar-oncscII
87. |IS,p.óº.
88. CI. |ber die Ierscbiedenbeiten des Menscb/icben
S¿racbtbaues,in his coIIcctcdvorks,o¿. cit. ,voI.ó,
I,§3ó,p.I52. `Butvhatthought,strictIyspcaking,
nccds to Iorm conccpts in Ianguagc, is not
propcrIy vhat is cIIcctivcIy pcrccivcd by thc car,
or, in othcr tcrms, iI onc distinguishcs in thc
articuIatcd sound thc articuIation and thc
divuIging in sound (Gcräuscb), thought has nccd
89. |IS,p. óó. Ïn this passagc, !umboIdt, anaIysing
thc Ianguagc acguisitionoIthc dcaIand dumbby
Iookingatthc movcmcnt oIthc organs oIspccch
oIothcrs, cmphasiscs thatthcy aIso posscss a `Iac-
uIty oIarticuIation' and that thcy thus arrivc at
truc Ianguagc Icarning and not mcrcIy at thc
capacity to associatc rcprcscntations vith signs or
imagcs. !c considcrs thc dctour `against naturc'
thcy mustin this vay makc via vision in pIacc oI
hcaring ¦bccauscthcyarc dca[ to bc thcprooIoI
oIhcaring. Iar Irom opposing vriting to spccch,
!umboIdt considcrs both to bc thc transitory
`objcctivisations'oIspirit. JhcIivingtcmporaIityoI
Ianguagc hnds `novhcrc, not cvcn in vriting, a
stabIc rcsting pIacc', `its, so to spcak, dcad part'
bcIorc `aIvays bcing ncvIy produccd in thinking,
bcing ncvIy brought back to IiIc in discoursc or
undcrstanding'(o¿.cit. ,p.ó3).
ºO. |S,p.ó5.
ºI . |S,p.ó3.VchndhcrcasobrictycomparabIcto
vithout attcmpting to givc an cxpIanation, vhich
couId onIy bc `mythic', oI articuIation, Iikc thc
schcmatism, that `art hiddcn in thc dcpths oIthc
human souI'.Iov,this `humannaturc' mcntioncd
by !umboIdt rcIcrs Iorhim, bcIorcaII cIsc, to thc
upright posturc `dcnicd to animaIs', to thc cxtcnt
that it is `compatibIc' vith Iinguistic sound, sincc
`discoursc canonIybcdcaIcncdand cxpircbystay-
ing on thc ground, it nccds to bc accompanicd by
(o¿. cit. , p. 55). Jhis conncction bctvccn Ianguagc
andan uprightposturctraditionaIIydchncs vhatis
propcr to thc human. !umboIdt, vhiIst staying
vithinthc Iimits and Iramcvork oIhis `agc', givcs
us a `phcnomcnoIogicaI' ¦and not a thcoIogicaI)
undcrstanding that accords uncanniIy vith vhat
scicncc tcIIs us today. Jhc progrcss oI paIcont-
oIogy ¦Ï am summarising hcrc thc vicv put
Iorvard by Jcan-Iouis !cim, !roIcssor oI
!aIcontoIogy at thc Muscum oIMankind, !aris,
scc Iibération, 21 Junc Iºº2), tcachcs us that
human Ianguagc dcpcnds on many additionaI
Iactors. a biostatic Iactor, thcûcxibiIityoIthc basc
Te//iny Time
oI thc skuII pcrmitting thc Iov position oI thc
Iarynx aIIoving thc Iattcr to bc vcntiIatcd by thc
Iungs,vhich givcsIanguagcits gutturaI charactcr
and ncuroIogicaI Iactor, thc ûcxibiIity oIthc basc
oIthcskuIIbcingaccompanicd bya tippingoIthc
occipitaI and a moving Iorvard oI thc IrontaI
aIIoving thc skuII to givc grcatcr spacc to thc
arcas oI thc cortcx situatcd bctvccn thc IrontaI
Iobc and thc occipitaI, in particuIar to thc
Vcrnickc ccntrc vhich is thc principaI Ianguagc
ccntrc, and hnaIIy a socio-cuIturaI Iactor, thc
Iactor oIa tradition that in itscII dcmands com-
munication.JhcûcxibiIityoIthc bascoIthcskuII
vhich IoIIovs dircctIy Irom bcing a bipcd ¦vhcn
thc human stands up, thc hcad Icans Iorvard)
immcdiatcIy accompanics ccrcbraI dcvcIopmcnt.
º2. |IS,pp.51÷5.
º3. |IS,p.º5.
º1. |IS,p.2I3.
º5. Ibid. , ¦my itaIics). Scc thc intcrprctation oIthis
passagc in J. Iohmann, Ibi/oso¿bie und
S¿mcbuissenscba] ¦"!hiIosophy and Iinguistics")
¦BcrIin.Iunkcrund!umbIot, Iºó5),p. IºIII.
ºó. CI. |nterueys zur S¿racbe, o¿. cit. , p. 21º, On tbe
ßay to Ianyuaye, o¿. cit. , p. I Iº. Jhc rcading oI
!umboIdt oIIcrcd by !cidcggcr hcrc rcmains too
schcmaticand isvantinginthcgcncrosityIormcrIy
shovn to Kant's thought. Io morc than it is pos-
sibIc to aurmcatcgoricaIIy that !umboIdt undcr-
stands ene_cia `in a manncr vhoIIy Iorcign to thc
activity oIthc subjcct', onc cannot, in vicv oIthc
tcxts citcd hcrc, maintain that hc rccogniscd in
Ianguagc onIyoneoIthcIorms oIthcvisionoIthc
vorId dcvcIopcd by human subjcctivity. Ïnstcad,
onc ought to say that thc idca oIan originaI spon-
continucs to pIacc himscI[ thc Iramcvork oI
absoIutc subjcctivity positing itscII as bcing. Jhc
passagc vhcrc !umboIdt cxtcnds thc gcnctic
dchnition oIthc singuIar spccch act (das¡edesma/iye
S¿recben) to Ianguagc (S¿racbe) as a vhoIc bcars
vitncss to this, thc Iattcr bcingonIy `thc totaIity oI
vhat is said' ¦|S, p. 1ó), vhich impIics that it is
S¿racbe in its crcativc `intcrsubjcctivity' vhich
constitutcs thc vcry scmantico-poctic proccss oI
º7. |S, pp. 15÷ó. !crc, aIrcady, hnitudc, thc
can bcundcrstood as thc `capacity'to givc oncscII
º8. |S,p.2I 2.
ºº. |S,p.2 I1.
Te//iny Time
I . |nterueys zurS¿racbe¦!IuIIingcn.Icskc, I º°º)p.
2 I°, On tbe ßay to Ianyuaye, trans. !ctcr !.
!crtz¦IcvYork.!arpcrandKov, I º7I), p. I O7.
'Zas ßesensuerbä/tniszuisben TodundS¿racbeb/izt
au[utabernocbunyedacbt. '
2. CI. |S, p. 1ó. Jhc spatiaIising momcnt oI
vriting that providcs onIy an `incompIctc and
mummihcdconscrvation'oIS¿racbe [spccch|, docs
not on its ovn takc into account thc objcctivisa-
tion thataIrcady comcs aboutvith thc `tcmporaI'
3. !rcIacctoTbeIbenomeno/oyy o¡S¿irit,trans.J.I.
IindIay ¦CxIord. CxIord \nivcrsity !rcss, Iº77),
p. I º¦myitaIics).
1. Ibid.
°. Ibid. ,p.37.
ó. Ibid. 'Zer¡este Ioden, den das Iäsonieren an dem
rubenden Sub¡e[te bat, scbuan[ta/so, undnutdiese
Ieueyuny se/bst uird der Geyenstand' ¦`Jhc soIid
groundvhichargumcnthasinthcpassivc subjcct
bccomcs thc objcct'). Jhc vcrb!cgcI uscs hcrc is
not beuyen, a tcrm uscd by !umboIdt aIongsidc
I/e[tion, butscbuan[en, vhosc ordinary mcaning
is `to vavcr', `to vaciIIatc', but vhich, hovcvcr,
aIso rcIcrs to thc adjcctivc, IittIc uscd today,
7. Ibid. Ït is cIcar that!cgcIis hcrcpIacinghimscII
in opposition to AristotIc's `IogicaI' soIution to thc
probIcm oI thc !Iatonic XCP1(10� ¦scparation)
sincc it consists prcciscIy in vicving univcrsaIs as
simpIcattributcs. `Vc caII substancc ¦oumo) vhat
is not a prcdicatc oI a subjcct ( 11 Ka9'
U1OKClIEVOV). Iov, a univcrsaI ¦1o Ka90Aov) is
aIvays thc prcdicatc oI a subjcct ¦1o 11 Ka9'
U1OKElIEVOV)' (Meta¿bysics,Z, I3, I O38b I5).
8. Ibid. ,p.38.
º. Ibid. ,p. 1O .
I O. Ibid. ,p.27. `Jimc . . . isthccxistcntjétant-m]con-
ccptitscIl (dasdaseiendeIeyry.
I I . Ibid. ,p.1O.
I2. Ibid. , pp.3º÷1O. Jhcattainmcnt oI`phiIosophicaI
prool is vhatis atissuc hcrc, combininganaIytic
and diaIcctic and constituting thc vcry csscncc oI
I3. Ibid. ,p.1O.
I1. Ibid. ,p.3ó.
I5. Ibid. , pp. 35÷ó. Jhc tcrms Intba/tsam[eit ¦abstcn-
oI thc conccpt) caII to mind hcrc thc !usscrIian
styIc oI phiIosophy undcrstood as strenye
ßusenscba] ¦rigorous scicncc). !ovcvcr, it is not
hcrc but thc conccptitscIIvhich iscapabIcoIcon-
tcntioninasmuch as itis `purc scII-movcmcnt' that
I ó. Ibid. , p. 38. 'Zer Iytbmus resu/tiert aus der
scbuebenden Mitte und Iereininyuny beider. ' Jhis
comparison makcs scnsc onIy vhcn considcrcd
vithrcgardto thcGcrmanIanguagcvhich,asvc
knov, is charactcriscd by thc opposition oI thc
dcsccndingrhythmoIthcvord andthcasccnding
rhythm oIthc scntcncc. Jhc acccntuation oIthc
radicaI, most oItcn at thc bcginning oIthc vord,
that makcs Gcrman a `naturaIIy' ctymoIogicaI
Ianguagc, imposcs on thc vord a dcsccnding,
dcductivc rhythm vhcn atonaI suIhxcs arc addcd
to thc radicaI. JhisrhythmiscountcrbaIanccd by
thc middIc giving it an asccndant, inductivc
rhythm vcry diIIcrcnt Irom thc dcsccndant and
anaIyticrhythmoIIrcnchor IngIish. Ïntruth, it
givcn to thc importancc oIthc inûucncc not onIy
oIthc history oIIanguagc but aIso oIthc IormaI
structurc oI thc scntcncc on thc dcvcIopmcnt oI
thinking. Ïn this rcgard it shouId bc possibIc to
Icarn a grcat dcaI about thc diIIcrcnt conccptions
oI timc that cnsuc Irom thc opposition bctvccn
thc opcn `progrcssivc scgucncc', oI vhich thc
Ircnchscntcnccconsists, vhich progrcsscs accord-
ingtothcscgucntiaIordcroIIivcd timcandpIaccs
thcnoundcsignatingthcsubstratc bcIorc its dctcr-
minations, and thc cIoscd `anticipatory scgucncc'
cmpIoycd by thc Gcrman scntcncc vhich cnds
vith thc noun dcsignating thc substratc aIrcady
dcscribcd accordingtoitsdctcrminations.
I7. CI. `Grundsatzc dcs !cnkcn' ¦"Jhc Basic
!rincipIcs oI Jhought") in )abrbucb ¡ùr
Isycbo/oyieundIsycbotbera¿ie,voI.I/3, Iº58.
I 8. Vc mustbricûy rccaIIhcrcthatthc tcrms¿ecuutio,
vhich IitcraIIy mcans spying and comcs Irom
s¿ecto, I Iook [Iroms¿ectare, tocxaminc|,hasbornc
thc phiIosophicaI scnsc oI contcmpIation sincc it
But this scnsc vas Iorgottcn by Saint Augustinc
dcrivcd s¿ecu/atio Irom s¿ecu/um ¦mirror) and
rcIatcditto thcvorduscdbySaint!auIinhishrst
IcttcrtothcCorinthians,XIII, I?. `Iornovvcscc
knov inpart, but thcn shaII I knov cvcn as aIso I
am knovn.' KnovIcdgc through Iaith is, incIIcct,
Jhis isthcscnscvhichthcmystics rctaincd,and it
is Irom thcm that thc Gcrman tcrm S¿ieyu/ation
comcs ¦Irom S¿ieye/, mirror). Jhis undcrstanding
oIs¿ecu/atio asuuioZei,to bcIoundinIichoIasoI
Cusa, vas transmittcd to !cgcI by Jacob Böhmc
and Svabian pictism ¦BcngcI and Cctingcr). Jhis
vord vhich hc rcgards as dchning thc modc oI
thinking oISchoIastic mctaphysics. !cgcI, on thc
by rcIcrring it back to its `thcorcticaI' origin but
vithout cutting it oIIIrom its mysticaI mcaning,
vhich Icads him to scc inspccuIation thc idcntity
Tc//iny Timc
oIthc conccptand oIintuition. Ïtis in this scnsc
that hc aurms in thc Zyrcnzscbrç. 'Zas tmn-
sccndanta/c ßi·scn ucrciniyt bcidcs, Içcxion und
³nscbauuny, cs ut Iqy und Scin zuy/cicb'
`JransccndcntaI knovIcdgc unitcs thc tvo tcrms,
rcûcction and intuition, it is at oncc conccpt and
bcing'). scc Hcyc/ ßcr[c, )cnacr Scbrçcn
1801-1807 (IrankIurtamMain.Suhrkamp, Iº7O),
voI. 2,p. I2ó. Ïtis on thc basis oIthis spccuIativc
phiIosophy is dchncd Ior !cgcI as thc task oI
thcir idcntity, vhich hc caIIs, in a SchcIIingian
manncr, thc `construction' oI thc absoIutc in
consciousncss,o¿.cit. ,p. I º).Sccinthis conncction
V.C. ZimmcrIi, Zic Imyc nacb dcr Ibi/oso¿bic,
Intcr¸rctationcn zu Hcyc/s Tyrcnzscbrç' (Bonn.
Bouvicr, Iº71),p.ººII.
Iº. !cgcI, Scicncc o¡ Ioyic, trans. J.I. IindIay
(Iondon. AIIcn and \nvin, Iºóº), voI. I,
Ïntroduction,p. 5ó.
2O. `Grundsätzcdcs!cnkcns',o¿.cit. ,p.3ó.
2I . !rcIacc to thc Ibcnomcno/oyy o¡ S¿irit, o¿. cit. ,
p. Iº (myitaIics).
22. CI. `Grundsätzcdcs!cnkcns',o¿.cit. ,p.31.
23. ßbat i· Ca//cd Tbin[iny?, trans. J. GIcnn Gray
(IcvYork.!arpcrandKov, Iºó8),p.238.
21. CI.`\rtciIundScin', inHömcr1in ßcr[cundIriçc
(IrankIurt am Main. ÏnscI, Iºóº), voI. 2, p. 283,
IngIish-Ianguagc trans. Iricdticb Hömcr1in. cssays
and /etters on tbeory, cd. and trans. Jhomas !Iau
¦AIbany, IY. S\IY !rcss, I º88), p. 37 ¦hcncc-
Iorth, Issays). Cnc aIso hnds thc cxprcssion 'das
Sein, im einziyen Sinn des ßortc' ¦`bcing, in thc
singIc scnsc oI thc tcrm') in thc !rcIacc to thc
pcnuItimatc vcrsion oIHy¿erion, vrittcn at thc
cndoII 7º5.CI.Hömer/in ßer[eundIriçe,voI. I ,
p. I ó7.
25. Scc abovc aII thc cssay oI I 7ºó cntitIcd `Cn
KcIigion',Issays,pp.ºO÷5.AIIovmcto rcIcrhcrc
to my articIc `!öIdcrIin. !c Ia rcIigion'
¦"!öIdcrIin. Cn rcIigion") in thc Cabiers de
Iontenay and, vith rcgard to thc cntirc sub-
scgucnt dcvcIopmcnt, to vork in progrcss on
`!öIdcrIin and phiIosophy' that viII bc prcscntcd
as an attcmpt to articuIatc aII oI !öIdcrIin's
thcorcticaI cssays.
2ó. `!as Vcrdcn im Vcrgchcn', Issays, pp. ºó÷IOO.
Icss IaithIuIIy dcscribcs thc cssay's contcnt.
CcrtainIy, onc hnds, as Bcissncr indicatcs in his
commcntary on this cssay in thc Grund/aye der
yesamten ßissenscba]/ebre oI I 7º1 ¦!amburg.
Mcincr,I º5ó),p.I 7º,that!öIdcrIinhadrcadatthc
timc oIits pubIication thc IoIIovingscntcncc. 'Zie
cbara[teruticbeIor¬desßecbse/ind ßir[sam[eit
i·tein Entstehen durch ein Vergehen (ein ßerden durcb
ein Icbuinden)' ¦`Jhc charactcristic Iorm oI
changc in thc actuaI is birtb tbrouyb ¿ci·biny
¦bccoming through disappcarancc)'. !oubtIcss,
!öIdcrIin rcmcmbcrcd thc vcry tcrms cmpIoycd
hcrc by Iichtc but to continuc rcading Iichtc's
tcxtsuIhccs to sccthatthcthoughtdcpIoycd thcrc
rcmains ticd to an ontoIogy oI substancc sincc
it takcs carc to spcci| prcciscIy that to think
bccoming onc must `abstract cntircIy Irom sub-
stancc'asthcIattcr `docsnotcntcrintochangc'.
27. CI.thcIastIincsoIthcIbenomeno/oyy o¡S¿irit,o¿.
cit. . 'Ieidezusammen[Gescbicbteundßusenscba]),
die beyryne Gescbicbte, bi/den die Irinneruny und
die Scbäde/stätte des abso/uten Gei·tes, die
ßir[/icb[eit, ßabrbeitundGeuusbeitseinesTbrns,
obne den e das /eb/ose Iinsame uäre' ¦`Jhc tvo
togcthcr [!istory and Scicncc|, comprchcndcd
!istory, Iorm aIikc thc invardlzing and thc
CaIvaryoIabsoIutcSpirit,thcactuaIity, truth,and
ccrtainty oIhis thronc, vithout vhich hc vouId
bc IiIcIcss and aIonc', trans. A. V. MiIIcr ¦CxIord.
CxIord \nivcrsity !rcss, Iº77), p. 1º3). Ïn his
transIationoIIººI Jcan-!icrrcIcIcbvrctransIatcs
Scbäde/statte vith `GoIgotha' to rcvivc thc ctymo-
bccn vcakcncd in Ircnch by its usc to dcnotc
`stonc crosscs atcrossroads' vhiIstinGcrman thc
rcIcrcnccto thc `charncI-housc',orto `thchiIIand
thcscpuIchrcoIChrist's!assion', rcmains cIcar.
28. CI. `!as Vcrdcn im Vcrgchcn' §5, Hö/der/in
ßer[e, o¿. cit. , voI. 2, p. ó1I II., scc Issays, p. º8.
Jhc tcrm Herste//uny hashcrc both thc scnsc oI
`production' andthat oI` rcstitution'. Jhc Iamous
passagc Irom thc !rcIacc to thcIbenomeno/og o¡
attcsts to thc Iactthat!cgcIhad aIsothoughtthc
primacy oI `dcath' [dispara¡trc| . Ïn it, !cgcI
cxpIicitIy cmphasiscs that `thc cvancsccnt itscII
assomcthinghxcd, cutoIIIromthctruc, and IcIt
Iying vho knovs vhcrc outsidc oIit, any morc
othcr sidc, positivc and dcad' (o¿. cit. , p. 27). But,
ashasaIrcadybccnand viIIagainbccmphasiscd,
!cgcI undcrstands `this movcmcnt oIbcingborn
and dying' as thc `IiIc' oIthc conccpt and not as
thc tragic IiIc oI that `monstcr' in vhich thc
human bcing, as structuraIIy opcn to thc divinc,
2º. CI. §º oIthc cssay. `thc dissoIution oIthc idcaI-
individuaI appcars not as vcakcning and dcath
thc inhnitc-ncv notas dcstructivcvioIcncc butas
Iovc and both togcthcr as acrcativcact ¦transccn-
dcntaI) vhosccsscncc consistsinunitingthcidcaI-
3O. Scc § I oIthccssay vhcrc it is said that onIy thc
coincidcncc in thc `gcnctic movcmcnt' oIdccIinc
and bcginning is `Iikc Ianguagc, cxprcssion, sign,
prcscntation oI a Iiving yct particuIar vhoIc'.
3I . JhchnaI vcrsion oIthcpocm says prcciscIy. 'Iie/
batMoryenan,Seitein Ges¿muirsindundbören
uoneinandet, / It¸bren der Menscb, ba/dsind uir
aberGesany' ¦`Much,Iromthc morningonvards,/
Sincc vc havc bccn a diaIoguc and havc hcard
Irom onc anothcr, / !as human kind Icarnt, but
soon vc shaII bc song',Iriedricb Hö/der1in. Ioems
and ]ayments, trans. MichacI !amburgcr
¦Cambridgc. Cambridgc \nivcrsity !rcss, Iº8O),
p. 13º).
32. CI. Iictzschc, ³/so s¿racb Zaratbustru, ÏÏÏ ¦!as
Ja-und-Amcn-Iicd). 'So aber s¿ricbt Ioye/-
ßeisbeit. "Siebe, esyibt[ein Oben, [ein |ntenlßir]
dicb umbet,bir�aus, zurùc� duIeicbterlsinyels¿ricb
nicb mebrl- sinda//e ßorte nicbt¡ùrdie Scbueren
yemacbt? Iùyen dem Ieicbten nicbt ahe ßorte?
Sinyel s¿ricb nicbt mebrl'' ¦`BchoId, thcrc is no
abovc, no bcIov| IIing yourscIIabout, out, back,
vcightIcss bird| Sing| Spcak no morc| ÷ arc not
to thc Iight` Sing| Spcak no morc| ' , Irom Tbus
S¿o[e Zaratbustra, trans. K. J. !oIIingdaIc
¦!armondsvorth.!cnguin, IºóI)).
33. Issays,p. I Oº.
31. Ibid. ,p. I OI .
35. Ibid. ,p. IOº.
3ó. !rcIacc to thc Ibenomeno/oyy o¡ S¿irit, o¿. cit. , p.
37. Issays,p. I O2.
38. CI. `Vic vcnn amIcicrtagc'. 'So¸e/, uieZicbter
sayen, dasie sicbtbar/Zen Gott zuseben beyebrte,
sem I/itz au¡Seme/es Haus / |nd Bcbe tödt/icb
I óO
yetru_ne yebar / Zie Irucbt des Geuitters, den
bei/iyen Iaccbus'¦'Sooncc,thcpoctstcII,vhcnshc
dcsircd to scc/Jhcgod inpcrson, visibIc, did his
Iightning IaII on ScmcIc's housc / And, ash
mortaIIy struck,shcborc/JhcIruitoIthc storm,
thc hoIy Bacchus'). jtn Jhc author citcs MichcI
!cguy and Iran�ois Icdicr's transIation Irom
³¿¿rocbesdeHö/der1in,¦!aris. GaIIimard, Iº73),p.
óó, but scc aIso MichacI !amburgcr's transIation
oI a diIIcrcnt vcrsion oI thc pocm, in Iriedricb
Hö/der/in.Ioemsand ¡rayments,o¿.cit. ,p.375.|
3º. Issays,p. I O7.!öIdcrIinhimscIImcntionshcrcthc
'immer uiderstreitende Zia/oy' [cvcr-contcnding
diaIoguc| oI SophocIcs's Oedi¿us and thc
Ineinande_eqen ¦mutuaI invoIvcmcnt) oI thc
diIIcrcnt parts oIthc diaIoguc but aIso mcntions
that oI thc diaIoguc and thc chorus, thc vhoIc
hnishing `brutaIIy' qctucb) and not in a harmo-
diesicbyeyenseitiyau[ebt' ¦aII is discourscagainst
discoursc, cach aboIishing thc othcr). Such a
diaIoguc aims, in cIIcct, `to tcar apart thc souI',
vith its `irritatcd rcccptivity', oI thosc vho arc
Iistcningto it sincc itis `thc Ianguagc oIa vorId'
`vhcrc God and man', dcspitc thc `Iacuna' that
Iorm oI inhdcIity'. Jhis `tcaring' spccch, vhich
can bc rcccivcd onIy in thc angcr that givcs birth
to a countcr-discoursc, is thc discordant
poIyphony oI modcrnity vhcrc, hovcvcr, thcrc
cndurcs thc sharing oI a Ge-s¿räcb vhich tcsts
1O. !cracIitus, Iragmcnt 51. 'AplOV1Tl acavTl<
cavepTl< lpelaarv' vhich !cidcggcr transIatcs as
'Iuye, dieibrItscbeinenuersayt, istbörenen ßa/tens
a/s eine, die zum Iorscbein [ommt' ¦Jointurc that
rcIuscs to maniIcstitscIIis oIa highcr ordcr than
that vhich appcars), scc `!öIdcrIins Irdc und
!immcI' ¦`!öIdcrIin's Iarth and !cavcn') in
Irauterunyen zu Hö/derins Zicbtuny
¦"IIucidations oI !öIdcrIin's !octry"), 5th cdn.
¦IrankIurtamMain.KIostcrmann, Iº8I),p.I 7º.
1I . Ibid. , p. I55, vhcrc !cidcggcr guotcs thcvcrsion
oI thc hymn cntitIcd `GricschcnIand' ¦`Grcccc')
that contains thc IoIIoving Iincs aItcr thosc that
spcak oIthc cxistcncc oIGod (Zaseyn Gottes) as a
storm(Geuitter).' |ndIu[, uiebinausscbauen,zur
/|nsterb/ic[[eit undHe/den'¦And caIIs,IikcIook-
ing out, Ior/ ÏmmortaIity and hcrocs'). Jhc man
vho`gucstions'hcavcninthisvay(ibid. ,p. I óº)is,
¿ar exce//ence, thc Grcck, that is to say hc vho
undcrstands himscII on thc basis oI thc Iook
tovards thc divinc that aIIovs him his standing
upright, vho dchncs himscII as e1t -'alleVO<
¦`skiIIcd' or `knoving' bccausc oIhis proximity to
things) and vho sccs in `scicncc' (e1ta'lllTl), itscII
aIso namcd in this samc pocm (ibid. , p. I ó7), thc
12. Jhc sccrct namcd by !auI CcIan in `!cr
Mcridian' ¦`Jhc Mcridian'),³usyeuäb/te Gedicbte
I ó2
¦IrankIurtamMain.Suhrkamp, Iºó8),p. I11 in
thcIincsÏ guotchcrc,addingmyovnscansionto
his ÷ through combining thc soIitudc oIGedicbt
vith that to vhich it bcars vitncss, by standiny
thcrc. 'Zas Gedicbt ut cinsam. Is ut einsam und
untcrvcgs. ßeresscbreibtb/eibtibm migeyeben. /
³ber stcht das Gedicbt nicbt yerade dadurcb
scbon hicr, inderIeyeyuny im Gchcimnis dcr
Bcgcgnungr' ¦Jhc pocm is so/itar¸. Ït is soIitary
and underuay.Vho vritcs it rcmainsgoingaIong
uitb it. / But docs thc pocm not prcciscIy stand
through this, thcrcIorc aIrcady bere, in thc
cncountcr in tbesecet o¡tbeencounter³ ). Ïn thc
originaI, onIy thc Iast Iour vords arc undcrIincd.
!oubtIcss, it has ncvcr bccn morc impossibIc to
transIatc thc Gcrman Gedicbt by thc Grcck
101£01', itscIIaIatctcrmdcsignatingthcartoIthc
Muscs, thc )OU011 1£XVl. Such a Zicbtuny ¦thc
vord undcniabIycomcsIromthcIatindictare, `to
composc', but onc can aIso rcIatc it to dicbten, a
vord oIGcrmanic origin mcaning `to condcnsc')
maniIcsts thc mostcxtrcmc con-dcnsation oIsay-
ing, itscIIbornoIastanding-vith [con-tcntion| oI
thought to vhosc hcight thc ³nstrenyuny des
Ieyry oI vhich !cgcI spcaks docs not, pcrhaps,
13. CI.!cidcggcr, `Sprachcund !cimat' ¦"Ianguagc
and !omc") ¦IºóO) in Zen[e¸brnyen ¦"Jhc
Ixpcricncc oI Jhinking") ¦IrankIurt am Main.
KIostcrman,I º83),p.88.
11. Ibid. ,p. I I? ¦myitaIics).A carIicrtcxtdcvotcd to
`!cbcI, thcIricndoIthc!ousc'vaspubIishcdin
I º58.
15. |nterueys zurS¿racbe,o¿. cit. , p.?O8,Ontbe ßay
toIanyuaye,o¿. cit. , p. I OI . Jhc Gcrman Stimme,
vhoscprimaryscnsc is `agrccmcnt' ¦considcraIso
thcvcrbstimmen, `toagrcc'),cxprcsscsinavhoIIy
1ó. Ibid.,p.?I3IlI OóII.
I . Iragmcntó1.''a8e1av'aout�et Kepa'vo�'.
?. CI. !cgcI, !rcIacc to thcIbenomeno/og o¡S¿irit,
trans. J. I. IindIay ¦CxIord. CxIord \nivcrsity
!rcss, Iº77), p. I O. `Jhc truc is thc proccss oIits
ovnbccoming,thc circIc thatprcsupposcs its cnd
3. CI. T S. IIiot, `IittIc Gidding' in thc Iour
Quartets ¦Iondon. Iabcr and Iabcr, Iº8º), p. 17.
to makcancndisto makca bcginning./Jhccnd
1. !cidcggcr, |nterueys zur S¿racbe ¦!mIIingcn.
I ó1
Icskc, Iº5º) p. ?I3, IngIish-Ianguagc cdn, O tbe
!arpcrand Kov, Iº7I)p. IOó. 'die Geyen-uart, die
uns entyeyenuartet und sonst die Zu[un] beisst. '
thc Gcrman vord Ior thcprcscntbutvhich Iitcr-
aIIy mcans vhat, turncd tovards us, vaits Ior us
5. McrIcau-!onty, Ie uisib/e et /'inui·ib/e ¦!aris.
GaIIimard, Iºó1), p. 252, IngIish-Ianguagc cdn,
Tbe Iisib/e and tbe Inuisib/e, trans. AIphonso
Iingis ¦Ivanston, ÏI. Iorthvcstcrn \nivcrsity
!rcss, Iºó8),p. Iºº.
ó. Ït is in Jepz 'uXT< that AristotIc aIh rms, as
!cidcggcrcmphasiscsinSeinundZeit ¦Jiibingcn.
Iicmcycr, Iº53), p. I1, IngIish-Ianguagc cdn,
IeinyandTime,trans. J. Stambaugh¦AIbany,IY.
S\IY !rcss, Iººó), that `thc souI is in a vay aII
bcings' ¦AristotIc,Ze³nima,13I b 2I) bccausc in
it thcrc is an intcIIcct `capabIc oI bccoming aII
things'(Ibid. ,13Ob I1).
7. !cidcggcrvasaIrcadyspcakingin TbeIssenceo¡
Ieasons, trans. Jcrrcncc MaIick ¦Ivanston, ÏI.
Iorthvcstcrn \nivcrsity !rcss, Iºóº), p. ºº, notc
5º, oI thc `cc-static, or e[-centric csscncc oI
8. Jhis is thc casc,¿arexce//ence, vith !öIdcrIin ÷
aIIov mc to rcIcr hcrc to my book, Hö/der/in.
Trayéie et moder¬ité ¦"!öIdcrIin. Jragcdy and
Modcrnity") ¦Iougcrcs. Incrc Marinc, Iºº2)
p. 7ºII.) but aIso vith T S. IIiot Ior vhom thc
gathcring oItimc in thc pointoIthc prcscnt con-
stitutcs thc most constant thcmc oI thc Iour
Quartets, o¿.cit.
º. !cidcggcr, in aIhrming that `Jimc itscII in thc
cntircty oIits dcpIoymcnt docs not movc and is
immobiIc and atpcacc' (O tbe ßay to Ianyuaye,
p. I Oó),cchocs Kantand!usscrIvhobothsavin
thc intcrioroItcmporaI ûov itscIIthc prcscncc oI
a timc that rcmains and docs not changc. ¦AIIov
mc to rcIcr in this conncction to my articIc `Ic
tcmps ct I'autrc chcz !usscrI ct !cidcggcr'
in ³/ter, Ieuue de Ibénoméno/oyie, I, Iºº3, p.
I O. CI. !cidcggcr. IJentityandZy erence, trans. Joan
Stambaugh ¦Icv York. !arpcr and Kov, Iºóº),
in particuIar p. 1O, and `Jhc Jurning' in Tbe
Question ConcerinyTecbno/oyy andOtberßritinys
¦IcvYork.!arpcr, Iº77),p.1III.
I I . J. S. IIiot, `Burnt Iorton' in Iour Quartets, o¿.
cit. ,p.I5.
I2. Scc vhat !cidcggcr says oIVcstcrn Ianguagcs at
thccndoIIdentityandZy erence,o¿.cit. ,p. 73II.,a
passagc that cchocs §2O oIIçond GoodandIui/,
trans. VaItcr KauImann ¦Icv York. Vintagc
Books, Iºóó), p. 27, m vhich Iictzschc ¦cIosc hcrc
to !umboIdt)rccogniscd thc unitary grammaticaI
IoundationoIthc `strangcIamiIyrcscmbIanccoIaII
Ïndian, Grcck and Gcrman phiIosophising' and
raiscd thc gucstion oIthc doubtIcss vhoIIy diIIcr-
cnt intcrprctations oI thc vorId that thinkcrs
I óó
. . ". :.
I3. CI. J. !crrida, Tbe Iost Card, trans. AIan Bass
¦Chicago. \nivcrsity oIChicago !rcss, Iº87), pp.
I28, I 8º, Iº7.Vitha ccrtain distancc Iromsucha
conccption that sccs in vriting a uia neyatiua,
Iictzschc says this in §º3 oITbe Gay Science. 'Ï
am annoycd and ashamcd oImy vriting, vriting
is Ior mc a prcssing and cmbarrassing nccd ... Ï
havcnotdiscovcrcdanyothcrvayoI yettinyridoI
my thoughts', trans. VaItcr KauImann ¦Icv
York.Kandom!ousc, I º71),p.I1ó.
I1. CI. thcIrcnch transIator's notc to³cbeminement
uers /a ¿aro/e ¦!aris. GaIIimard, Iº7ó), p. I Oº,
IngIish-Ianguagc cdn, On tbe ßay to Ianyuaye,
o¿. cit. VhiIcZeicben ¦sign inthc scnsc oIa mark
orindcx) indircctIydcsignatcs athingnotactuaIIy
prcscnt, thc ßin[ ¦sign in thc scnsc oI gcsturc)
makcs somcthing immcdiatcIy cvidcnt, makcs
vhatis to bc thought appcar dircctIy. Ïtis inthis
scnsc that !cidcggcr Icts it bc undcrstood that
making a sign is thc IundamcntaI trait oI Ian-
I5. !cidcggcr,IcttcrtoJcanBcauIrctoI23Iovcmbcr
Iº15, in Iasic ßritinys, 2nd rcv. cdn, cd. !.!
Ió. Kcnc Char, 'A unc scrcnitc crispcc' ¦"A Jcnsc
Scrcnity") II his coIIcctcd vorks ¦!aris.
GaIIimard,!Iciadc, Iº83),p.753.
SILiM ve SANA' ·;.4KFI
KLnUPH..Ni: " .. l
I . Kcnc Char, `IcuiIIcts d'!ypnos' ¦"Jhc Icavcs oI
!ypnos"), m his coIIcctcd vorks ¦!aris.
2. Ibid.,`IcsMatinaux'¦"JhcMatinaIs"),p.335.
I. A papcrrcadatthctimcoIthc`dcIcncc'oIthcdoc-
toraIthcsis atthc\nivcrsityoIIouvain ¦BcIgium)
on Iº Junc Iºº3 bcIorc a jury prcsidcd ovcr by M.
JroisIontaincs, prcsidcnt oIthc Ïnstitut Supcricur
dc !hiIosophic, and composcd oI MM. !crrida,
Gcrard,Kicocurand Jaminiaux ¦`promotcr' oIthc
2. Io. 2ó oIthc scrics `!hiIosophics' ¦!aris. Ï\.!,
3. !astur, Hö/der1in. Trayéie et moderité,
¦"!öIdcrIin. Jragcdy and Modcrnity") ¦Iougcrcs.
IncrcMarinc, Iºº2).
1. Scc thc !rcIatory Kcmarks oIthc cditor, in this
casc Martin !cidcggcr, to thc `VorIcsungcn zur
!hanomcnoIogic dcs inncrcn Zcitbcvusstscins'
¦"Iccturcs on thc !hcnomcnoIogy oI thc
Consciousncss oI ÏntcrnaI Jimc"), )abrbucb ¡ùr
Ibi/oso¿bie und ¿bänomeno/oyiscbe Iorscbuny IX
(!aIIc.MaxIicmcycr, Iº28).
5. Scc notc 5º to Tbe Issence o¡ Ieasons, trans.
I ó8
Jcrrcncc MaIick ¦Ivanston, ÏI. Iorthvcstcrn
\nivcrsity!rcss, Iºóº).
ó. Cí !cidcggcr, ßbat u Cahed Tbin[ny?, trans. J.
GIcnnGray¦IcvYork.!arpcrandKov, Iºó8),p.
aIackinhcrcntinhisthought. Vhatisun-thought
is thcrc in cach casc onIy as thc un-tbouybt. Jhc
7. CI. Sein und Zeit ¦Jíibingcn. Iicmcycr, Iº53), p.
22II. IngIish-Ianguagc trans., Ieiny and Time,
trans. J. Stambaugh ¦AIbany, IY. S\IY !rcss,
8. CI. M. McrIcau-!onty, `!hiIosophic ct non
phiIosophic dcpuis !cgcI' ¦I), Iccturcnotcs, cditcd
and introduccdbyCIaudcIcIort,in Textures, 8ּ,
I º71, p. 88, IngIish-Ianguagc trans., `!hiIosophy
and Ion-!hiIosophy sincc !cgcI', trans. !ugh J.
SiIvcrman, inIbi/oso¿byandNon-Ibi/oso¿bysince
Mer1eau-Ionty ¦Ivanston, ÏI. Iorthvcstcrn
\nivcrsity !rcss, Iº88),p.º.
I óº
Aristotle, xii, 2-8, 1 0, 18, 23,
35, 38, 45, 54, 70, 82, 130
Bergson, Henri, 30, 75
Boethius, 23
Bolzano, Bernard, 42, l31
Cicero, 2
Celan, Paul, 162-3
Char, Rene, 72-4, 109, 167
Clauberg, 19
Courtine, Jean-Francois, 1 12
Derrida, Jacques, 15, 71, 75,
80, 87, 1 08, 1 10, 1 l3, l30,
137, 140, 147, 166-8
Eliot, T.S., x, 69, 71, 164-6
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb,
Fink, Eugen, 80
Foucault, Michel, 94
Gadamer, Hans-Gorg, 14,
Granel, Gerard, 28
Hebel, Johann Peter, 67
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich, 9-10, 16,
1 8-2 1, 31 , 57-61, 63, 66,
69, 80, 83-4, 1 14,129, 164;
Phenomenology ofSpirit,
1 8-19, 57-60, 63, 66, 69,
129, 164; The Science of
Logic, 20, 60-1
Heidegger, Martin, ix, xi,
4-15, 17, 22-7, 31-5,
37-55, 57, 61-8, 70-88;
The Basic Problems of
Phenomenology, 25; Being
and Time, 12, 14, 25-6,
31-3, 37-40, 49, 82, 85,
101; Contributions to
Philosophy, 12, 37, 1 05,
126-7; 'From the
Experience of Thinking',
14, 107; HistOlY ofthe
Concept ofTime, 22-3,
26-7; Identity and
Dif rence, 47-9, 70-1,
l39-41, 166; An
Introduction to
Metaphysics, 4-5, 39, l36;
'Language and Home',
67, 163; 'Letter on
Humanism', 14, 45-6, 72;
Logic. The Question of
Truth, 5-12, 1 7, 100;
'Logos', 14, 107; 'The
Origin of the Work of
Art', 124; 'The Thing',
34; On Time and Being,
26, 31-2, 105-6; On the
Way to Language, 49-54,
57, 70-1; What i Called
Thinking?, 45-6, 61, 87
Heraclitus, xii, 21-2, 27, 32,
62, 69
Holderlin, Friedrich, 32,
61-7, 84-5, 165
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 37,
50-5, 57, 67-8, 97
Husserl, Edmund, 17-33,
24-8, 45, 75-6, 79-81, 85,
87, 131; Cartesian
Meditations, 21 , 1 14; The
Idea ofPhenomenology, 26;
Ideas, 18, 25-8, 80; Logical
Investigations, 19, 24, 81,
95, 103, 1 16; On the
Phenomenology ofthe
Consciousness ofInternal
Time, 24, 28-30, 102
Kant, Immanuel, 9-10, 16,
19-21 , 23-4, 28-9, 42,
53-4, 65, 81, 102, 1 1 1,
1 14-5, 1 17, 130
Lambert, Johann Heinrich,
18, 20
Lotze, Rudolf Hermann, 42
Menuhin, Yehudi, 109
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 15,
30-1, 33, 69, 80, 88-9,
1 08
Munier, Roger, ix
Nicholas of eusa, 62, 155
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1,
19-21, 75, 77-8, 81 , 83,
1 14, 160, 166-7
Panini, 94, 97, 99, 144
Parmenides, xxi, 7, 33
Patanjali, 144
Patocka, Jan, 79-80
Plato, 2-3, 7, 10, 18, 24, 45,
82, 88
Ravaisson, Felix, ix
Rickert, Heinrich, 42
Ricoeur, Paul, 75-7, 80,
97-8, 121, 136-7, 168
Sallis, John, 1 16-17
Schelling, Wilhelm Joseph,
24, 60
Schlegel, Friedrich, 98-9
Snell, Bruno, 2
Spinoza, 61
Taminiaux, Jacques, 79, 88,
Wolff, Christian, 19
1 73
Aesthetic Theory
o 485 30069 9 HB
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Composing for the Films
Adorno & Eisler
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Freud and Nietzsche
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Criticism and Truth
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Sollers Writer
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On Nietzsche
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Nietzsche: The Body and
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Death: An Essay on Finitude
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Telling Time: Sketch of a
Phenomenological Chronology
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Proust and Signs
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Kant's Critical Philosophy
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Diference and Repetition
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The Fold: Leibniz and the
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Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and
De!euze & Guattari
Preface by Michel Foucault
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A Thousand Plateaus
Deleuze & Guattari
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Cinema 1: The Movement­
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Cinema 2: The Time-Image
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Deleuze & Parnet
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Logic of Sense
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Nietzsche and Philosophy
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The Memory of Thought: On
Heidegger and Adoro
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The Gi of Language:
Memory and Promise in
Adoro, Benjamin, Heidegger
and Rosenzweig
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Nietzsche's Philosophy
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Death and the Labyrinth: The
World of Raymond Roussel
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0 485 12059 3 PB
Three Ecologies
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pleroma Reading in Hegel
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Towards the Defnition of
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The Nature of Truth
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On the Essence of Human
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Phenomenology of Intuition
and Expression
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Speech is Never Neuter
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Democracy Between Two
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To Be Two
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The Forgetting of Air
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Elemental Passions
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An Ethics of Sexual Diference
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Nietzsche and te Vicious
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Explosion I
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Explosion I
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Camera Obscura: of Ideology
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Socrates: Fictions of a
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Nietzsche and Metaphor
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The Philosophical Imaginary
Le Doeuff
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Alterity & Transcendence
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Entre Nous: Essays on
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Proper Names
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In the Time of the Nations
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Beyond the Verse
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Outside the Subject
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Difcult Freedom: Essays on
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Redemption and Utopia
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Sex and Existence: Simone de
Beauvoir's The Second Sex
Preface by Tori! Moi
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0 485 12124 7 PB
Libidinal Economy
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The Confct of
Interpretations: Essays i
Hermeneutics I
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From Text to Action: Essays in
Hermeneutics I
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Hegel: Contra Sociology
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Clavis Universalis
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Friedrich Nietzsche: An
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