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Grid Disturbance Report

Grid Disturbance Report

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Grid disturbanc ereport
Grid disturbanc ereport

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Published by: Kartavya Bhagat on Aug 16, 2013
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The committee gratefully acknowledges the efforts put in by all assisting members to the enquiry committee namely : a. b. c. Shri R. N. Nayak, CMD, POWERGRID Shri S. K. Soonee, CEO, POSOCO Shri Balvinder Singh, IPS Retired.

The Committee places on record the efforts of Shri K. K. Agrawal, Member (GO&D), CEA for overall coordination in the whole exercise of grid disturbance enquiry.

The committee also gratefully acknowledges and places on record its appreciation towards the following members of various sub-groups, for their efforts of in-depth analysis and compilation of grid disturbance analysis: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) Shri Manjit Singh, Member (Thermal), CEA Shri P.K. Pahwa, Member Secretary, NRPC, Dr. Anil Kulkarni, IIT-B, Mumbai, Shri Ajit Singh, Ex-Addl. Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat Shri R.K. Verma, Chief Engineer I/c (DP&D), CEA Shri Dinesh Chandra, Chief Engineer (I/C), GM Div., CEA Shri Ajay Talegaonkar, SE (Operation), NRPC Shri S. Satyanarayan, SE (Operation), WRPC, Shri D. K. Srivastava, Director, GM Div., CEA

The committee expresses its appreciation of the cooperation extended by POWERGRID and POSOCO, for making the data available from various SubStations/RLDCs. Last but not the least Committee also acknowledges the efforts of all those persons who gave their valuable support directly or indirectly.


Page No. Executive Summary Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Overview of the regional grids Chapter 3: Analysis of the grid disturbance on 30th July 2012 Chapter 4: Analysis of grid disturbance on 31st July 2012 Chapter 5: Factors contributing to grid disturbances on 30th and 31st July 2012 Chapter 6: Review of islanding schemes Chapter7: Review of restoration of generation Chapter 8: Cyber security related aspects Chapter 9: Recommendations of the Committee iv-ix 1-4 5-7 8-20 21-32 33-39

40-44 45-58 59-62 63-70

Supplementary Volume: A separate volume containing the relevant DR outputs during the grid disturbances on 30th and 31st July, 2012.


GLOSSARY: ABT: ATC: AUFLS: BLU: BTPS: CB: CEA: CERC: CESC: CTU: D/C: DMRC: DR: df/dt: EL: ER: FGMO: FSC: GPS: GT: HVDC: MERC: Availability Based Tariff Available Transfer Capacity Automatic Under Frequency Load Shedding Boiler Light Up Badarpur Thermal Power Station Circuit Breaker Central Electricity Authority Central Electricity Regulatory Commission Calcutta Electric Supply Company Central Transmission Utility Double Circuit Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Disturbance Recorder Rate of change of frequency with time Event Logger Eastern Region Free Governor Mode of Operation Fixed Series Compensation Gas Power Station Gas Turbine High Voltage Direct Current Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission ii .

NAPS: NER: NR: PMU: PLCC: POSOCO: Narora Atomic Power Station North-Eastern Region Northern Region Phasor Measurement Unit Power Line Carrier Communication Power System Operation Corporation Ltd. POWERGRID Powergrid Corporation of India Ltd PPA: PSS: RAPP: RPC: RLDC: SCADA: SIL: SR: STOA: SVC: TTC: TCSC: UI: VAR: WAFMS: WR: Power Purchase Agreement Power System Stabilizer Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant Regional Power Committee Regional Load Despatch Centre Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System Surge Impedance Loading Southern Region Short Term Open Access Static VAR Compensator Total Transfer Capability Thyristor Controlled Series Compensation Unscheduled Interchange (under ABT) Volt Ampere Reactive Wide Area Frequency Measurement System Western Region iii .

000 MW was affected in this black out. PMUs. as given below: Factors that led to the initiation of the Grid Disturbance on 30th July. After careful analysis of these grid disturbances.00 hrs on 3107-2012 resulting in collapse of Northern.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY There was a major grid disturbance in Northern Region at 02. The Committee also interacted with POWERGRID and POSOCO on various aspects of these grid disturbances. few pockets survived from black out. NRLDC. Northern Regional Grid load was about 36. On both the days. iv . Weak Inter-regional Corridors due to multiple outages: The system was weakened by multiple outages of transmission lines in the WR-NR interface. Subsequently. to analyse the causes of these disturbances and to suggest measures to avoid recurrence of such disturbance in future. The total load of about 48.33 hrs on 30-072012. Ministry of Power constituted an Enquiry Committee. 400 kV Bina-Gwalior-Agra (one circuit) was the only main AC circuit available between WR-NR interface prior to the grid disturbance. Eastern and North-Eastern regional grids.000 MW at the time of disturbance. The Committee analysed the output of Disturbance Recorders (DR). The Committee is of the opinion that no single factor was responsible for grid disturbances on 30th and 31st July 2012. UPSLDC and Haryana SLDC. the Committee has identified several factors. Event loggers (EL). SCADA data and reports submitted by various SLDCs . Effectively. NLDC. 2012 and 31st July 2012. generating stations. there was another grid disturbance at 13. RLDCs /NLDC. POWERGRID and generation utilities to arrive at the sequence of events leading to the blackouts on 30th July. 2012 a. WAFMS. which led to the collapse of the power systems on both the days. Some teams also made field visits to sub-stations.

Loss of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior link: Since the interregional interface was very weak. On this day also. caused the NR system to separate from the WR system. there was no fault observed in the system. resulting in lower voltage at Bina end. the reactive power flow in the line was higher. 2012. (iv) Loss of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior link: Similar to the initiation of the disturbance on 30th July. contributed to high loading on this tie line. d. contributed to high loading on this tie line. (ii) High Loading on 400 kV Bina-Gwalior-Agra link: The overdrwal by NR utilities. tripping of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line on zone-3 protection of distance relay caused the NR system to separate from the WR. c. 2012. This happened due to load encroachment (high loading of line resulting in high line current and low bus voltage). effectively 400 kV Bina-Gwalior-Agra (one circuit) was the only main circuit available between WR-NR.b. Although real power flow in this line was relatively lower than on 30th July. utilizing Unscheduled Interchange (UI). (iii) Inadequate Response by SLDCs to RLDCs’ instructions on this day also to reduce overdrawl by the NR utilities and underdrawal by the WR utilities. v . utilizing Unscheduled Interchange (UI). due to load encroachment. High Loading on 400 kV Bina-Gwalior-Agra link: The overdrawal by some of the NR utilities. On this day also the DR records do not show occurrence of any fault in the system. tripping of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line on zone-3 protection of distance relay. However. 2012 (i) Weak Inter-regional Corridors due to multiple outages: The system was weakened by multiple outages of transmission lines in the NR-WR interface and the ER network near the ER-WR interface. Inadequate response by SLDCs to the instructions of RLDCs to reduce overdrawal by the NR utilities and underdrawal/excess generation by the WR utilities. Factors that led to the initiation of the Grid Disturbance on 31st July.

after NR got separated from WR due to tripping of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line.Brief Sequence of Events leading to the Grid Collapse on 30th and 31st July 2012 (i) On 30th July. Since the center of swing was in the NR-ER interface. (iii) The WR system. all the three grids collapsed due to multiple tripping attributed to the internal power swings. hence. which caused power swing in the system. the corresponding tie lines tripped. (v) On both the days. (iv) The Southern Region (SR). vi . isolating the NR system from the rest of the NEW grid system. survived due to tripping of few generators in this region on high frequency on both the days. 2012 with part loads remained fed from the WR and the operation of few defense mechanism. 2012. no evidence of any cyber attack has been found by the Committee. This caused power swing in the NRER interface and resulted in further separation of the NR from the ER+NER system. near ER-WR interface. the NR loads were met through WR-ER-NR route. which was getting power from ER and WR. along with WR. Subsequently. however. such as AUFLS and HVDC power ramping. also survived on 31st July. (ii) On 31st July. The NR grid system collapsed due to under frequency and further power swing within the region. the NR loads were met through WR-ER-NR route. after NR got separated from the WR due to tripping of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line. got isolated from the rest of the NEW grid. and. which caused power swing in the system. a small part of ER (Ranchi and Rourkela). under frequency and overvoltage at different places. after tripping of lines in the ER itself. 2012. On this day the center of swing was in the ER.

(viii) Deployment of adequate synchrophasor based Wide Area Monitoring System and System Protection Scheme. specifically under insecure operation of the system. specifically under depleted condition of the inter-regional power transfer corridors.Measures that could have saved the system from collapse: In an emergency system operating condition. (ii) Mandatory activation of primary frequency response of Governors i. (v) Adequate reactive power compensation. (iii) Under-frequency and df/dt based load shedding relief in the utilities’ networks. specifically Dynamic Compensation. (iv) Dynamic security assessment and faster state estimation of the system at load despatch centers for better visualization and planning of the corrective actions. such as on 30th and 31st July 2012.e. even some of the corrective measures out of the list given below might have saved the system from the collapse. (i) Better coordinated planning of outages of state and regional networks. (vi) Better regulation to limit overdrawal/underdrawl under UI mechanism. Restoration of the system The Committee observed that on both the days unduly long time was taken by some of the generating units in starting the units after start up power was made available. the generator’s automatic response to adjust its output with variation in the frequency. (vii) Measures to avoid mal-operation of protective relays. such as the operation of distance protection under the load encroachment on both the days. vii .

The present UI mechanism needs a review in view of its impact on recent disturbances. which are summarized below. i) An extensive review and audit of the Protection Systems should be carried out to avoid their undesirable operation. like Under Frequency & df/dt based load shedding and Special Protection Schemes. ii) Frequency Control through Generation reserves/Ancillary services should be adopted. v) Coordinated outage planning of transmission elements need to be carried out so that depletion of transmission system due to simultaneous outages of several transmission elements could be avoided. viii . 2003 need to be reviewed to ensure better compliance of instructions of Load Desptach Centres and directions of Central Commission. iii) Primary response from generators and operation of defense mechanisms. vi) In order to avoid frequent outages/opening of lines under over voltages and also providing voltage support under steady state and dynamic conditions. so that it can also be revised under any significant change in system conditions.Recommendations of the Committee Detailed recommendations of the committee are given in the main report. iv) A review of Total Transfer Capability (TTC) procedure should be carried out . should be ensured in accordance with provisions of the grid code so that grid can be saved in case of contingencies. as presently employed UI mechanism is sometimes endangering the grid security. such as forced outage. installation of adequate static and dynamic reactive power compensators should be planned. vii) Penal provisions of the Electricity Act. This will also allow congestion charges to be applied to relieve the real time congestion.

xiv) Proper telemetry and communication should be ensured to Load Despatch Centres from various transmission elements and generating stations. ix . xviii) It was also felt that a separate task force may be formed. xv) Start up time of generating stations need to be shortened to facilitate faster recovery in case of grid disruptions. xii) There is need to grant more autonomy to all the Load Despatch Centres so that they can take and implement decisions relating to operation and security of the grid xiii) To avoid congestion in intra-State transmission system. planning and investment at State level need to be improved. should be optimally utilized. xvii) System study groups must be strengthened in various power sector organizations. so that they provide necessary support in case of contingencies. The committee may identify medium and long term corrective measures as well as technological solutions to improve the health of the grid. x) Load Desptach Centres should be equipped with Dynamic Security Assessment and faster State Estimation tools. No new transmission element/generation should be commissioned without the requisite telemetry facilities. power utilities and system operators. TCSC. SVC controls. providing system security support such as HVDC. involving experts from academics. xi) There is need to plan islanding schemes to ensure supply to essential services and faster recovery in case of grid disruptions. ix) Synchrophasor based WAMS should be widely employed across the network to improve the visibility. to carry out a detailed analysis of the present grid conditions and anticipated scenarios which might lead to any such disturbances in future. real time monitoring.viii) Available assets. protection and control of the system. xvi) There is a need to review transmission planning criteria in view of the growing complexity of the system.

Eastern and NorthEastern regions respectively. K. The total load of about 48. Eastern Region and North Eastern Region affecting all states of Northern Region and also West Bengal.3 The second incident which was more severe than the previous one occurred at 13. Sikkim in Eastern region and Assam. Haryana.4 To look into the detailed causes of these disturbances and to suggest remedial measures. IIT Kanpur Sh. Arunachal Pradesh. 2012. POSOCO and CMD POWERGRID as members.S.2 The first disturbance which led to the collapse of Northern Regional Electricity grid occurred at 02. CEA and CEO. Member (GO&D). 1. in which all states of Northern Region viz. Mizoram. Rajasthan. Punjab. Small islands which comprised of three units of BTPS with the load of approximately 250 MW in Delhi. Himachal Pradesh. With the second major grid disturbance on 31-07-2012 involving three regions the Ministry of Power vide its OM No. Chairperson.). leading to loss of power supply in three regions of the country viz. 1. Velayutham. 03-08-2012 modified the constitution of the above enquiry committee with following members: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Shri A. Uttarakhand. Meghalaya.00 hrs on 31-07-2012 resulting in collapse of Northern. Manipur.33 hrs on 30th July. Odisha.000 MW was affected in this black out. 17/1/2012-OM Dt. 17/1/2012-OM Dt. It has been reported that major part of the system could be restored in about 5 hrs. NAPS on houseload. Member (retd. Islands comprising of NAPS. Agrawal.CHAPTER-1 INTRODUCTION 1.33 hrs on 30-07-2012 in Northern region and again at 13. MERC Dr. Nagaland and Tripura in North-Eastern region. Dadri GPS and Faridabad in Northern Region.00 hours on 31. CEA Chairman Member Member Member Secretary 1 . 3007-2012 constituted an Enquiry Committee headed by Chairperson. 1. C. Anta GPS.00 hrs. Jharkhand. 8hrs and 2 hrs in Northern. Bokaro steel and CESC survived in Eastern Region.7. Srivastava. Ministry of Power vide its OM No. Area around Bhinmal (Rajasthan) with approximate load of 100 MW connected with Western Region survived the blackout. S. North-Eastern regional grids barring a few pockets. Northern Region. K. Jammu & Kashmir.2012. Bihar.1 There was a major grid disturbance at 02.000 MW at the time of disturbance. Delhi and Union Territory of Chandigarh were affected. CEA Shri A. Northern Regional Grid’s load was about 36. Eastern. Bakshi. Uttar Pradesh. Ib TPS / Sterite. Restoration was completed by 16.

5 In addition. 1. SE (Operation). 1. POSOCO Shri Balvinder Singh. Bombay. 2 . RLDCs.8 First meeting of the initially constituted Enquiry Committee was held on 0108-2012.6 The Terms of Reference of the Committee are as under: a) b) c) d) To analyse the causes and circumstances leading to the grid disturbance affecting power supply in the affected region. K. (ii) ‘Islanding scheme for Railways & Delhi Metro’ under Shri K. Nayak. Srivastava. Satyanarayan. Shri Ajay Talegaonkar. POWERGRID Shri S. MERC and Prof. Member. To suggest remedial measures to avoid recurrence of such disturbance in future.1. Member (GO&D). Velayutham. Soonee. POSOCO and POWERGRID. SE (Operation). IPS Retired. S. To review the restoration of system following the disturbances and suggest measures for improvement in this regard. Agrawal.9 The Committee constituted five sub-groups to facilitate detailed and quick analysis of various aspects of grid disturbances viz.7 The Committee has been asked to submit its report by 16th August. Anil Kulkarni. A copy of MoP OM dated 3-8-2012 constituting the above Committee is given at Annexure-1.C. Pahwa. (iii) ‘Analysis of restoration process of thermal plants’ under Shri Manjit Singh. 1. if any Other relevant issues concerned with safe and secure operation of the Grid. NRPC. NRPC & Shri S.K. (iv) ‘Islanding schemes in Northern Region’ under Shri P. (i) ‘Analysis of grid collapse on 30th& 31st July 2012 and simulation of the event’ under Shri A. Second meeting of the Enquiry Committee was held on 03-08-2012 which was attended by the members of the Committee and representatives of NLDC. Ex. all RPCs.K. CEA. Member Secretary. IIT. following members assisted the Committee: (i) (ii) (iii) Shri R. Member (Thermal). 1.1. WRPC. N. CEO. 2012. Kanpur assisted by Dr. CMD. CEA. IIT.

RLDCs /NLDC. Secretary. CEA 1.11 For secure grid operation after two grid collapses. On 12-8-2012. Generating Stations and Sub-Stations for at least one week. a sub-group comprising Shri Dinesh Chandra. generating stations. CEA advised utilities that senior and experienced officials should be available in RLDCs. Grid Management Division was formed to compile and prepare the report based on the progress made by the five subgroups on day-to-day basis. following steps were taken immediately: a) NLDC reduced the TTC of the Inter-Regional lines and other critical lines limiting to its SIL thereby necessary restrictions imposed on STOA. The its findings in its meetings on 14th and 15th August. their view points on the causes of grid collapse. Srivastava. Some teams also made field visits to sub-stations. Event loggers (EL). The Committee also interacted with POWERGRID and POSOCO on various aspects of these grid disturbances. held its third meeting on 11-8-2012. NRLDC.K. b) c) 1. 3 .10 In addition. Cabinet Secretariat and Shri R.13 The Committee analysed the output of Disturbance Recorders (DR). PMUs. UPSLDC and Haryana SLDC. CEA also advised to all generating stations to be responsive and develop a mechanism for bringing Units at the earliest in case of contingencies. WAFMS. NLDC. Ex-Addl. 1. were held with POSOCO and POWERGRID at NLDC. SLDCs. POWERGRID and generation utilities to arrive at the sequence of events leading to the blackouts on 30th July. Chief Engineer I/c (DP&D). Chief Engineer I/c and Shri D.K.12 Enquiry Committee detailed discussions New Delhi to have Committee finalized 2012. Director. 2012 and 31st July 2012. 1.(v) ‘Cyber Security aspects’ under Shri Ajit Singh. Verma. SCADA data and reports submitted by various SLDCs .

Annexure 1.1 4 .

3 During the month of July.). 2012 the Peak demand of Northern Region was 41.4 EASTERN REGIONAL GRID The Eastern Grid has an installed capacity of 26838 MW (as on 30-06-2012) consisting of 22545 MW thermal. 2.1 Northern Region is the largest in geographical area amongst the five regions in the country covering approximately 31% of the area and having largest number of constituents.CHAPTER-2 OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL GRIDS 2.2 Major generating stations including Super Thermal Power Stations of NTPC at Rihand and Singrauli are located in the eastern part of the NR grid. The energy requirement of Northern Region was 29. 3882 MW hydro and 411 MW from 5 .06.2.330 MU (11.2 Northern Regional Grid 2. 2.2.111 MW indicating a shortage of 3.548 MW (8. The installed capacity of nuclear stations is 1620 MW.058 MW as on 30. 2. Southern. 2. Western.3%. To handle this bulk transmission of power.1 Power system in the country is divided into five regional grids namely Northern.5%).580 MU against availability of 26.95 MW from renewable energy sources. Eastern and North Eastern grids.250 MU indicating shortage of 3. It has largest sized hydro unit (250 MW at Tehri/ Nathpa Jhakri) in the country.2012 comprising 34608 MW of thermal and 19830 MW of Hydro generation The Thermal-Hydro (including renewable) mix is of the order of 64:36. Due to such concentration of generation in the eastern part of the grid and major load centers in the central and western part of the grid there is bulk power transmission from eastern to western part over long distances. HVDC Rihand-Dadri bipole with capacity of 1500 MW exists and operates in parallel with 400 kV AC transmission network besides under lying 220 kV network. a point to point high voltage DC line viz.2. 1. remaining four regional grid operate in synchronism.840 MW nuclear and 7909. 7448 MW hydro. Northern Grid has an installed generating capacity of about 56. Except for Southern grid. 2.3 WESTERN REGIONAL GRID The Western Grid has an installed capacity of 66757 MW (as on 30-06-2012) consisting of 49402 MW thermal.659 MW against the Demand Met of 38. Southern grid is connected to Eastern and Western grids through asynchronous links.

1200 MW hydro and 228.00 MW from renewable energy sources.5. 2.94 MW thermal. Northern and North-Eastern Regional grids.6 Inter-regional interconnections The interconnections between various regional grids is depicted in Exhibit 2. Eastern Grid and Western Grid.5. 2. The Eastern Regional grid operates in synchronism with Western.1The North-Eastern Grid has an installed capacity of 2454.5 NORTH-EASTERN REGIONAL GRID 2.94 MW as on 3103-2012 consisting of 1026. North Eastern Regional Grid is connected directly only to the Eastern Regional Grid and any export of power to the other Regions has to be wheeled through the Eastern Regional Grid.renewable energy sources.1 6 .2The power transfer from North-Eastern Region to Eastern Region is taking place over Bongaigaon – Malda 400 kV D/C lines and Birpara – Salakati 220 kV D/C lines. The North-Eastern Grid operated in synchronism with Northern Grid. 2.

1.1 2.1 Map indicating the IR links between NR. ER and NER 7 . WR.EXHIBIT – 2.

few Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) in the NR and WR at different stations and Wide Area Frequency Monitoring System (WAFMS) of IIT Bombay.1. The committee.2012 at 02:00 hrs are given below. sequence of events and analysis of the disturbance are described below. 2012 The committee studied the data provided by various SLDCs . 1 2 Region NR ER Generation 32636 MW 12452 MW Demand 38322MW 12213MW Import 5686MW (-)239MW Remarks Bhutan import 1127 MW 3 4 Total WR NER NEW Grid 33024 MW 1367 MW 79479 MW 28053MW 1314MW 79902MW (-)6229MW (-) 53MW A number EHV lines were out prior to the disturbance and the same are listed in the enclosed Annexure. established the sequence of events based on correlation of the data from various sources like Disturbance Recorders (DRs).3 Sequence of Events on 30th July. 2012 3. 2012 there was a grid disturbance in the NEW grid at 02:33:11 hrs that led to the separation of the NR grid from the rest of the NEW grid and eventually NR system collapsed. however.3. S.1. It may be noted that the NEW grid was operating in an insecure condition due to a large number of line outages particularly near the WR-NR interface.2 Pre-Disturbance Conditions The details of the generation-demand and power export/import scenario in the four regions of the NEW grid on 30. 3. 2012. POWERGRID and generation utilities to analyse the sequence of events leading to the blackouts in Northern grid on 30th July. Though an exhaustive list of lines under outage is given at Annexure-3.1 Introduction On 30th July. 3. was 49. The pre-disturbance conditions. just prior to the disturbance. Event Loggers (ELs).68 Hz.Chapter-3 Analysis of Grid Disturbance on 30th July. it 8 . The committee experienced some difficulty in analysing the available information because of the time synchronisation problems at various stations. RLDCs /NLDC . The grid frequency.07.No.

2012. 30/07/2012 400 kV Balia – Biharsharif-2 line tripped on power 02:33:15:491 swing.No. Main-II 220 kV Gwalior-Malanpur 1. 30/07/2012 02:33:11. 8. 30/07/2012 02:33:13. Line remained charged upto AM 3. 30/07/2012 400 kV Balia – Biharsharif-1 line tripped on Power 02:33:15:491 swing. 220 kV Badod(WR)-Modak(NR) 220 kV Badod (WR)-Kota (NR) 220 kV Gwalior-Mahalgaon ckt 2 (in WR but near WR-NR interface) 220 kV Gwalior(PG)-Gwalior(MP)(in WR but near WR-NR interface causing only 220 kV Gwalior-Malanpur as only 220 kV NR-WR interconnection.03 am at Muzaffarpur end. 30/07/2012 400 kV Jamshedpur – Rourkela line-1 tripped on Zone02:33:13:996 3 AM 6. 3. 1.may be noted that the following lines had tripped within an interval of a few hours prior to the grid disturbance. 30/07/2012 400 kV Gorakhpur-Muzaffarpur-1 tripped on Power 02:33:15:425 Swing at Gorakhpur end. 30/07/2012 400 kV Jamshedpur – Rourkela line-2 tripped on Zone02:33:13:927 3 AM 5. and 220 kV Bina-Gwalior was no longer in parallel with 400 kV Gwalior-Bina) Following are the sequence of the events.++ 3. (This line has tripped probably just prior to sl no 1 above causing Malanpur and Mehgaon loads to be fed from NR system. 4. 2. but is manual timing. Zone-1 Tripped on Power Swing. 4. Date & Time 1. 30/07/2012 400 kV Gorakhpur-Muzaffarpur-2 tripped on Power 02:33:15:400 Swing AM 7. leading to the Northern Grid blackout: Sl.) 220 kV Bhinmal-Sanchor line. practically all the AC links from the WR to the NR were lost.438 AM With the above events. which took place on 30th July. AM 9 . Zone 3 tripping. As per MP SLDC time is 02:34. AM 9.907 AM 2. 30/07/2012 02:34 Event 400kV Bina – Gwalior-1 Line Tripped.

The Surge Impedance Loading (SIL) of the 400 kV GwaliorAgra and also Gwalior-Bina lines. From WR-NR interface. coupled with high demand in the Northern Region.4 Analysis of the Disturbance on 30th July 2012 I. However. while 400 kV Gwalior-Bina was carrying about 1450 MW. Other equivalent terms are “Loss of Synchronism”. The loading on 400 kV GwaliorAgra was high. In a multi-machine system groups of machines may separate. restorative torques bring back the machines to synchronism (i. which. ++ Power Swings: The rotors of synchronous machines inter-connected by AC lines tend to run at the same electrical speed in steady state due to the underlying physics of this system. AM With the above events. resulted in an insecure state of the system operation. the behaviour is non-linear and the electrical torques may be unable to bring all the generators to the same electrical speed. 10 10. loss of critical transmission links). all the AC links from the ER to the NR were lost. which has led the NR system to practically total blackout except a few pockets.2. which are 765 kV lines charged at 400 kV. 3. Some of the subsequent events of cascaded tripping are listed in Annexure-3. This resulted in a depleted transmission network. is about 691 MW (uncompensated). although the latter two terms are typically used if only one machine loses synchronism. “Out of Step”. When this system experiences small disturbances. the same electrical speed).68 Hz) was near to its nominal value (50 Hz). but its thermal loading limit is much higher (for quad Bersimis conductor). a number of lines were not available due to either forced outages.g faults. which survived in islanded mode. III. This causes large variations in voltage and power flow in lines. If this happens the angular difference between the generators goes on increasing (Transient Instability or Angular Separation).e. NR was islanded from the rest of the NEW grid and ultimately collapsed on under frequency . “Pole slipping”. The oscillations are called “swings” and are seen in practically all parameters including line power flows. the quantum of load shedding undertaken by the NR constituents seems to be insignificant. The oscillations die down if damping is adequate. It is observed that even though the frequency of the NEW grid (49. For large disturbances (e. This response is characterized by an oscillatory behaviour since the underlying equations which determine the transient behaviour are like those of a spring-mass system. WRLDC also issued similar instructions to its constituents for reduction in generation. . such as Badarpur and NAPS (only household loads). ER-WR-NER survived as one system. 400 kV Gwalior-Agra line was carrying about 1055 MW and 400 kV Zerda-Bhinmal was carrying about 369MW. NR constituents were instructed by NRLDC to carry out load shedding to relieve the Gwalior-Agra line loading..30/07/2012 400 kV Patna – Balia (1 & 2) tripped on power 02:33:15:542 swing++. II. planned outages or kept out to control high voltages.

the supply to NR from 400 kV AgraGwalior was lost. the machines in the NR system had 11 IX. A small load at Bhinmal remained connected with WR system through the 400 kV Zerda-Bhinmal line. although few incidences of such operation of distance relays in Western Region are observed in prior disturbances. which is due to load encroachment (DR records do not show any evidence of fault or swing).3 Due to large power flows in the WR-ER-NR route. With the tripping of the above line. the 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line in WR tripped on Zone 3 protection. This resulted in loss of the WR-NR tie links. possibly. It was informed by POSOCO that this line had not tripped earlier due to zone3 operation under load encroachment. seen by the relay. Subsequently 220 kV Bhinmal–Sanchore line tripped on power swing. The power from WR to NR was now routed via WR-ER-NR interface. at this stage. 400 kV Zerda-Bhinmal-Bhinmal (220 kV)-Sanchore (220 kV) and Dhaurimanna (220 kV) was the only AC tie link left between WRNR. VII. was still connected to the ER system (which was connected to the WR).IV. and as per SLDC Rajasthan 220 kV Bhinmal-Dhaurimanna tripped on Zone 1distance protection. The 400 kV Agra-Gwalior line is fed from 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line in the WR. This may happen even if there is no fault in the nearby transmission system. the 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line experienced a lower voltage and higher load current (resulting in less impedance. was below the zone-3 reach setting of the relay) caused the relay operation under load encroachment. VIII. In some cases the impedance measured by a distance relay at one end of the line may reduce to a point where it is less than the tripping condition for that relay for back-up protection (Zone 3). XI. Generally. and may occur when the line carries a very heavy load. The simulation confirms that the systems may separate under such conditions. VI. It may be noted that at the time of disturbance. . V. 400 kV JamshedpurRourkela double circuit (in ER) tripped on Zone 3 (Exhibit 3. it is an unintended tripping for distance relays since no fault has actually occurred. The tripping of the 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line initiated a very large angular deviation between NR system on one side and ER+WR+NER system on the other side. Though the NR system. An illustrative simulation to understand angular separation of the WR and NR regions was carried out. At 02:33:11:907 hrs.1 shows the angular separation). Prior to tripping the voltage was 374 kV at Bina end and the line was carrying about 1450 MW approximately as per DR report of POWERGRID for this line. X. This phenomenon of the mal-operation of the distance relays is known as ‘Load Encroachment’. The simulation details are given at Annexure-3. which is a very long path. which.

not adequate load relief from the AUFLS and df/dt relays was observed and the NR system collapsed except for a few pockets at Badarpur and NAPS. Since 220 kV Pasauli-Sahupuri (ER-NR) line was operated in radial mode.6 Hz. XVI.92 Hz and stabilized at 50. also indicates inadequate primary response from generating stations. The reported loss of generation is of the order of 3340 MW. XVII. XV. This system had more generation and the frequency rose to 50. to improve the frequency and save the system under such emergency situations. and Sasaram-Balia) tripped. APL Mundra 2*660 MW.07. There was tripping of Korba (E) 2*250 MW. 12 . The primary response if enabled in NR could also have helped in curtailing the initial frequency dip in the Northern region. XIII. Muzzafarpur-Gorakhpur. which can shed about 6000MW of loads. XIV. It is well established that under such situations. This situation would eventually lead to angular instability (loss of synchronism).started to slow down as compared to those in rest of the NEW grid. Dhuvaran 80 MW. the ER+WR+NER grid had a surplus of about 5800 MW power exported to NR prior to the separation. the details of which are given in the next chapter. However. Accordingly 400 kV ties between ER and NR (BiharSharif-Balia. which can shed about 4000 MW of loads. Parli 210 MW and Nasik 210 MW units in WR and Mejia-B 400MW. During restoration. Sahupuri loads remained fed from the ER system and survived.2012 . at 03:39 hours. angular separation between NR and the rest of the grid continued to increase.07. XII.2012. close to 51Hz in the WR. NR System has Automatic Under Frequency Load Shedding Scheme (AUFLS). DSTPS 250 MW and MPL 450MW in ER took place. there was loss of about 5800 MW import and resulted in decline of frequency. Patna-Balia. several units and transmission lines at NTPC Vindhyachal STPS tripped in Western Region which also affected the start-up process. The sudden rise in frequency. With the separation of NR from the rest of the grid. The NR system was thereby isolated from the rest of the grid. another grid disturbance took place on 31. APL Mundra units tripped on Special Protection Scheme. After the grid was restored on 30. and df/dt relays scheme. Therefore. In the NR system. the distance relays near the electrical center of this separation are prone to pick up.

2012 Prior to Disturbance (400 kV and above and Inter-Region 220 kV and above) (as furnished by NLDC) Sl No Line Voltage (kV) Region Out From Date 27/07/12 28/07/12 28/07/12 28/07/12 28/07/12 26/07/12 23/07/12 29/07/12 29/07/12 29/07/12 15/07/12 20/07/12 20/07/12 28/07/12 28/07/12 30/07/12 30/07/12 Remarks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 NR Fatehpur-Gaya Agra-Bassi-3 Agra-Bassi-2 Agra-Gwalior 2 Zerda-Kankroli Agra-Fatehpur Bhiwadi-Neemrana Barh-Balia Bhinmal-Kankroli Badod-Kota ManesarNeemrana Bhilwara-Chhabra Neemrana-Sikar Barh-Balia 2 Akal-Barmer 1 Chhabbra-Hindaun 2 Jodhpur II – RajWest 2 WR Bina-Gwalior 2 Nagda-Shujalpur 1 Parli-Parli 2 Satna-Bina 2 Damoh-Birsingpur 2 NAgda-RAjgarh 1 Seoni-Bina 1 Seoni-Wardha 2 Bina – Indore Korba-Birsingpur Birsingpur-Balco Raigarh-Raipur 1 Raigarh-Raipur 2 765 400 400 400 400 765 400 400 400 220 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 NR NR NR WR-NR WR-NR NR NR ER-NR NR WR-NR NR NR NR ER-NR NR NR NR Planned Planned Planned Planned Planned Constr Work HV Trip HV Trip Forced Forced Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV 400 400 400 400 400 400 765 765 400 400 400 400 400 WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR 13 27/07/12 07/07/12 19/07/12 26/07/12 13/07/12 20/07/12 03/07/12 23/07/12 21/07/12 05.1 List of EHV Lines Out on 30.07.Annexure 3.12 22/06/12 20/07/12 21/07/12 Planned Forced Forced Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Possibly Bina-Nagda Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV .07.

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Jabalpur-Itarsi 2 Itarsi-Khandwa 2 Nagda-Dehgam 1 Wardha-Akola-1 Parl(PG)-Sholapur 1 Bhadrawati-Parli 1 AurangabadBhusawal AurangabadDeepnagar Karad-Kolhapur Birsingpur-Katni SSP-Rajgarh 2 ISP-Nagda Itarsi-Bhopal ER Ranchi-MPL D/c Binaguri-Purnea 1 SagardighiDurgapur Maithon-Durgapur 1 BaripadaMendhasal 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR 20/07/12 20/07/12 28/07/12 20/07/12 23/07/12 21/07/12 27/06/12 03/07/12 28/07/12 14/06/12 25/07/12 24/07/12 29/07/12 Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV 1 2 3 4 5 400 400 400 400 400 ER ER ER ER ER 27/07/12 18/07/12 25/07/12 28/07/12 14/07/12 Planned Planned Forced Forced Forced 14 .

12. 30/07/2012 Mandola-Bawana-II tripped 02:33:28:175 AM 30/07/2012 Dadri – Maharanibagh Fault initiated. Mandola – Bareilly Line-2 CB Operated PSB operated at 30/07/2012 02:33:15:142 AM and reset at 17. Biharshariff – Sasaram-4 tripped Kahalgaon – Biharshariff (3 & 4) tripped Ballabgarh – Kanpur-II line tripped due to over voltage protection and received direct trip from Kanpur. Ballabgarh – Kanpur-III line tripped due to over voltage protection and received direct trip from Kanpur. Tehri pooling – Meerut Line-1 tripped.Annexure 3. 14. 21.13-16. are the cascading events resulting into the complete blackout. 30/07/2012 Mandola-Bawana-I tripped at Mandola end due to over 02:33:28:172 AM voltage protection. listed below.2 Subsequent tripping of lines in ER and NR systems after separation on 30/07/2012 (only those given in the DRs are listed below) 11. 30/07/2012 02:33:16:251 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:16:261 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:17:221 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:17:231 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:18:508 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:20:667 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:19:830 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:20:830 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:20:714 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:22 AM Line1(RAPP-B to C tie line) and Line2 (to Kota) tripped Line6 (RAPS-B to Udaipur)tripped Line4(RAPS-B to Chittor-1) tripped Line5 (RAPS-B to Chittor-2) tripped As a result ofthe events Sl.116 AM was not opened.7 Hz 2. Biharshariff – Sasaram-3 tripped NAPS two units (150MW each) tripped by under frequency operation. 23. 15 . the Grid blackout started in some areas (as observed through the PMU frequency data ) and the remaining events.702 PSB operated at 30/07/2012 02:33:30:010 AM on Line-1. Frequency dipped to 47. 15. 19. No. 13. 30/07/2012 02:33:24:965 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:26:192 AM 22. 20. Appears Breaker 02:33:29. With the available information. 24. 1. 17. 16. 18. RAPS-B moved to house loading. The two units got isolated from grid and started operating in island mode supplying load to Simbholi and Khurja SSs.

25.083 AM 30/07/2012 02:43:33. 28. 27.617 AM Roorkee – Rishikesh and Roorkee-Muzaffarnagar lines tripped on SOTF Dadri – Rihand HVDC Pole-1 blocked Blocked from Rihand end Dadri – Rihand HVDC Pole-2 blocked Blocked from Rihand end Bassi – Agra-I CB652 Opened Bassi – Heerapura=II CB1252 Opened Tehri pooling – Koteshwar TOV1 Trip 16 .589 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:36. 30-07-2012 02:33:30. 30. 26.134 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:31.129 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:30. 29.123 AM 30/07/2012 02:33:30.

Fig S-1 clearly shows that both systems go out of phase (in about 2. Fig S-1 : Loss of Short Tie Line ( Shows angles increasing continuously and later NR and WR are out of phase ) 17 . one short and one long. In the simplified system. This simulation illustrates that angular separation between two systems followed by power swings is possible on loss of short tie. for specific answers to the collapse of the grids on 30th and 31st July 2012. NER and WR grids is required. With the tripping of the shorter tie. We can look upon this system as a simplified representation of a two area system (NR and ER-WR-NER). We consider two tie lines. ER. a simplified two machine system was simulated. approximately representing NR and WR systems.3 sec for this simplified Illustrative example). a detailed load flow and transient stability simulation of the NR. Fig S-2 shows severe power swings and oscillatory nature of voltage. However as it is a simplified system. MW and MVAR flows under this condition.3 An Illustrative Example to demonstrate angular separation of NR-WR System In order to illustrate that the angular separation can occur with the loss of a tie.Annexure-3. “NR” part draws 800MW on short tie and 400 MW on the longer tie.

Fig S-2 : Loss of Short Tie Line ( Shows power swings between the two systems) 18 .

Exhibit 3.1 Recording Showing Angular Separation between NR and Rest of NEW Grid on 30/07/2012 Fig 1: (source: Wide Area Frequency Measurement system developed by IITB. Mumbai.) 19 .

.Exhibit 3. 20 .1 (contd. ) Note: There was time mismatch in WR PMUS and required to be logically aligned.) Fig 2: (source: PMU Data from WR and NR. Arrow indicates events.

2012 It may be noted that the NEW grid was operating in an insecure condition even on 31st July 2012 due to a large number of line outages particularly near the WR-NR and ER-WR interfaces. No 1 2 Region NR ER Generation 29884MW 13524MW Demand 33945MW 13179MW Import 4061MW (-) 345MW Remarks Import from Bhutan 1114 MW. another major disturbance took place on 31st July 2012 in the NEW grid at 13:00:13 hrs that led to the separation of the NR.84 Hz.2 Pre-Disturbance Conditions on 31st July 2012 The details of the generation-demand as well as import/export of power in each of the four regions in the NEW grid on 31.1. Though an exhaustive list of lines under outage is given at Annexure 4. NER and ER from the WR and eventually led to the collapse of the NR. just prior to the disturbance.Chapter-4 Analysis of Grid Disturbance on 31stJuly. It may be noted that even after grid disturbance on the previous day. similar network operating conditions prevailed on this day as well. The pre-disturbance conditions.tripped a few minutes before the event 220 kV Badod-Kota. 2.1 Introduction While the grid recovered from the black out of 30th July 2011. 400 kV Zerda-Bhinmal 400 kV Zerda. 2012 4. was 49. sequence of events and analysis of the disturbance are described below. Sl.tripped a few mintutes before the event 21 .2012 at 12:30 hrs are given below. 4. ER and NER grids.07.1. 3. 4. 4.Kankroli 220 kV Badod-Modak. it may be mentioned that the following lines had tripped within an interval of a few hours prior to the grid disturbance. 3 4 Total WR NER NEW Grid 32612MW 1014MW 76934MW 28053MW 1226MW 76403MW (-)4559MW 212MW A number of EHV lines were out prior to the disturbance and the same are listed in Annexure 4. The frequency. 1.3 Sequence of Events on 31st July.

which took place on 31st July 2012 leading to the blackouts in the Northern. loading 1241 MVA) 400 kV Ranchi.Maithon-1 tripped due to Power Swing. * 31/07/2012 13:00:17:948 31/07/2012 13:00:19. 14.891 31/07/2012 13:00:19. 220 kV bus coupler tripped at Tarkera tripped (details not available) 400 kV Jamshedpur-Rourkela-1 tripped at Jamshedpur on Main-1 (RAZFEE) protection. * 7. Time 1. * 15. appears to be due to load encroachment.In addition Surat Garh unit-1 also tripped around this time The following are the sequence of events. 11.No. 400 kV Rourkela -Sterlite-2 tripped due to Over voltage (timings need to be confirmed) 400 kV Rourkela-Talcher-2 tripped due to Power Swing 400 kV Rourkela – Talcher-1 tripped due to Power Swing 400 kV Rourkela – Raigarh-3 tripped due to Power Swing and Over voltage 400 kV Rourkela-Ranchi-1 tripped due to Power Swing. 10. 12. 31/07/2012 13:00:13 Event 400kVBina – Gwalior-1 line tripped at Bina end on Zone 3 Protection due to load encroachment.925 31/07/2012 13:00:19:945 31/07/2012 13:00:19:948 22 . * 9. 220kV Bina – Gwalior-1 line tripped at Bina end due to R&B over current 220kV Bina – Gwalior-2 line tripped at Bina end due to R&B over current 220kV Shivpuri-Sabalgarh-1 tripped 132kV Pichhore-Shivpuri tripped 132kV Pichhore-Chanderi tripped Sequence of event nos 1-5 led to the isolation of the Gwalior region of MP from WR and formed part of the NR system. Sl.908 31/07/2012 13:00:19. 400kV Bina-Gwalior-2 was already out of service. 31/07/2012 13:00:13 2.98 kA (appx. 31/07/2012 13:00:13 31/07/2012 13:00:13 31/07/2012 13:00:13 6. * 31/07/2012 13:00:15:548 31/07/2012 13:00:13:600 8. D/T received 400 kV Ranchi-Sipat-2 tripped on Power Swing 400 kV Raigarh-Rourkela-3 tripped on Power Swing 3. 13.897 31/07/2012 13:00:19.605 31/07/2012 13:00:19. The L-L voltage before trip was about 362 kV and line current as 1. 5. North-Eastern and Eastern regions. 4.

20.823 frequency 23 16. * 31/07/2012 400 kV Talchar-Rourkela-2 tripped on Power Swing 13:00:19:981 18. 31/07/2012 400 kV Rourkela-Ranchi-2 tripped due to Power Swing 13:00:26.444 reactance relay operation.021 21.793 AC bus north: abnormal frequency trip because of Vidhyachal-Singrauli line tripping. 31/07/2012 400 kV Kankroli-Jodhpur tripped 13:01:26. 27. practically all the AC links from the WR to the rest of the grid were lost and WR got isolated along with Ranchi and Rourkela buses. EL or DR not available for Vindhyachal-Singrauli line.788 problem (timing to be confirmed) 26. tripped due to 13:00:30. 31/07/2012 400 kV Ballabgarh-Kanpur ckt3. * 31/07/2012 400 kV Talchar-Rourkela-1 tripped on Power Swing 13:00:19:986 19.091 22.786 frequency 33.633 frequency. 31. 31/07/2012 Nathta-Jhakri Powe Plant U1 tripped due to under 13:01:26. 31/07/2012 Vindhyachal HVDC B/B block-1 13:01:23. 32. tripped due to 13:00:32. 24.343 ICT differential relay pickup due to dip in voltage. which are based on the DR and EL reports. 31/07/2012 Suratgarh Unit-5 tripped due to Under frequency 13:01:25. 31/07/2012 Nathta-Jhakri Power Plant U2 tripped due to under 13:01:26. SOTF 30. *Events taken from the POSOCO & POWERGRID report submitted to CEA. 31/07/2012 Suratgarh Unit-6 tripped due to Under frequency 13:00:35. 31/07/2012 400 kV Ballabgarh-Kanpur ckt2.078 problem 28. 31/07/2012 Vindhyachal HVDC B/B block-2 13:01:26. 23. 31/07/2012 Nathta-Jhakri Power Plant U4 tripped due to under 13:01:26.003 AC bus north: abnormal frequency trip because of Vidhyachal-Singrauli line tripping 29. 31/07/2012 400 kV Rourkela-Raigarh-1 tripped on over voltage 13:00:25. * 31/07/2012 400 kV Ranchi-Raghunathpur tripped on Power Swing 13:00:20:017 With the above events. * . 31/07/2012 Suratgarh Unit-2 tripped due to under frequency 13:01:14.31/07/2012 400 kV Ranchi-Rourkela-1 tripped on Power Swing 13:00:19:974 17.779 frequency.625 reactance relay operation. 31/07/2012 Nathta-Jhakri Power Plant U3 tripped due to under 13:01:26.558 problem (timing to be confirmed) 25.

Z1 Operated 220kV Bassi-IG Nagar tripped. 46. 40. 53. Z1. 51. 31/07/2012 13:01:28. 45.228 31/07/2012 13:01:27.224 31/07/2012 13:01:28.726 31/07/2012 13:01:29.205 31/07/2012 13:01:27. Power swing Moga-Kishenpur-1 tripped. Meerat-Koteswar (1&2)tripped.762 31/07/2012 13:01:29. SOTF 400kV.816 31/07/2012 13:01:29. SOTF Wagoora-Kishenpur (1&2) tripped. 3Ph fault 220kV Bassi-Bhagru tripped. three phase fault Muzaffarpur-Gorakhpur-1 tripped. 38. 44. 47. 220kV tripped. Z2 operated 400kV. SOTF Kaithal-Kaithal-I tripped 24 . 36.920 31/07/2012 13:01:30. 49.226 31/07/2012 13:01:28.120 31/07/2012 13:01:30. 400kV. 400kV line tripped . Z3.191 Muzaffarpur-Gorakhpur-2. 39. Z1.363 31/07/2012 13:01:29.777 31/07/2012 13:01:29. Agra-Bhiwadi2 tripped. 41.940 31/07/2012 13:01:28. Three Phase Malerkotla-Patiala tripped. Z1. Ballabgarh-Maharanibagh Tripped. 52. Bassi-Dausa line tripped. 37.072 31/07/2012 13:01:29. Power swing Agra-Auraiya-I tripped. Agra-Bhiwadi1 tripped.780 31/07/2012 13:01:29. Three phase tripping.497 31/07/2012 13:01:27. 3Ph 54.34. 35. three phase fault 220kV. Power swing Moga-Jalandhar (1&2) triped.742 31/07/2012 13:01:29. 55. 3ph protection operated and tripped the line Bhiwadi-Bassi. Power swing detected Mandola-Dadri (1&2) tripped Kaithal-Patiala line-1 tripped Dadri-Malerkotla line tripped. 42.832 31/07/2012 13:01:29. Z1. 3Ph distance protection. 50.031 31/07/2012 13:01:28.497 31/07/2012 13:01:27.226 31/07/2012 13:01:27.686 31/07/2012 13:01:29. Bhiwadi end operated Bhiwadi-Rewari. Z3. 3Ph tripping. 43. 48. Power Swing 400kV. Power swing Malerkotla-Ludhiana Tripped. Power Swing Agra-Auraiya-II tripped.

Power Swing Meramundali-Jeypore tripped 400kV. resulted in insecure state of the system operation. 64.363 **After event 64. 62. Under voltage Agra-Bassi-I. a large number of lines were not available due to either forced outages. 63.219 31/07/2012 13:01:32. 66. coupled with high demand in the Northern Region. 57. 3phase Allahabad-Sasaram disturbance.4 ANALYSIS OF GRID DISTURBANCE ON 31st JULY.320 Ballabhgarh-Gr Noida tripped. 31/07/2012 13:01:30. 60. the NR got practically isolated from the ER+NER and frequency started dropping (observed in the NR system) after a gap of about 1 minutes from the previous major event. Kanpur-Panki-1 tripped. 59. Z1. NR constituents were instructed by NRLDC to carry out load shedding to reduce the over drawal. It is interesting to note that on 31st July 2012 also.368 31/07/2012 13:01:30. 25 . AC under voltage protection Balia-Biharshariff tripped. 220kV tripped.56. SOTF Kaithal-Kaithal-II tripped HVDC Balia-Bhiwadi tripped.702 31/07/2012 13:01:30.689 31/07/2012 13:01:30. 61. 3-ph fault Dadri-Rihand HVDC pole-2 blocked Dadri-Rihand HVDC pole-1 blocked Kankroli-Debari.684 31/07/2012 13:01:42.84 Hz) was near to its nominal value (50 Hz). Similarly the WR constituents were also instructed by WRLDC to reduce generation to bring down the over injection of power.867 31/07/2012 13:01:42. 31/07/2012 13:01:30. though the frequency of the NEW grid (49. Under voltage protection 58. Patna-Balia-2 tripped. 4. 2012: I. ** 65. Suspecting time synchronization problem. II. planned outages or kept out to control high voltages which. Another report is also available with different time stamping on the same event.871 31/07/2012 13:03:18. 67. PSB Operated. NER and ER system to practically total blackout.833 31/07/2012 13:01:31.630 31/07/2012 13:01:30. The subsequent events of cascaded tripping led the NR.276 31/07/2012 13:01:30.

This situation led to the isolation of the Gwalior region of MP from WR and formed part of the NR system. The power flow on 220kV Gwalior(PG)-Gwalior (MP) line-II was 188MW at 12:58:58pm and got reversed to -180MW. The power drawl of Auraiya from Mehalgaon resulted in the tripping of 220kV Bina-Gwalior. the quantum of load shedding/generation reduction undertaken by the two constituents seems to be insignificant. VIII. 2012 from V. 26 .I&II. Badod-Modak line flow reached 288MW at about 12:58pm on 31st July. which was earlier fed from the WR got routed through WR-ER-NR systems. III. On 31. which is also due to load encroachment (as DR records do not show any evidence of fault or swing).07. 132kV PichhoreChanderi and 132kV Pichhore-Shivpuri. IV. 220kV Shivpuri-Sabalgarh-I.2012. 220kV Gwalior-(PG) – Malanpur-II of MP were also under shut down since 29. The NR system was isolated from the WR system and the demand. VI. Just prior to the initiation of the major disturbance. IX. NR-WR was connected through AC tie links between 400 kV Agra-Gwalior (one circuit). As per DR report of PGCIL the loading on this line 1254 MVA and voltage was 362 kV at Bina end (Though the MW loading was less the previous tripping.However. due to lower voltage the MVAR flow was larger than previous incident). VII.07. This resulted in the reverse flow of power from Gwalior (MP) to Gwalior (PG) and pumped in to 400kV system. 220 kV Badod-Kota line also reached a flow of 298MW from its earlier flow of 113MW and tripped due to overload. The rise in flow of these lines are possibly due to tripping of the Suratgarh generating unit-1 of 250 MW at about 12:50 hours in Rajasthan. Similarly.12 400kV Bina-Gwalior II and 400kV Gwalior-Agra II lines of POWERGRID were under shut down and 220kV Gwalior (PG)-Mahalgaon (GWL) -I. The load on the 220kV Bina-Gwalior-I&II suddenly increased to 447MW from 330MW and increased further. 400kV Bina-Gwalior-I line tripped on distance relay zone-3 protection. At about 13:00:13 hrs. 220 kV Badod-Kota and 220 kV Badod-Modak lines. 103MW and got tripped due to overload.

However. Further the loss of import from about 3000 MW import from WR resulted in decline of frequency in the rest of the NEW grid. close to 51. The system is also smaller in size with small Power Number and ER+NER systems collapsed except for few islands. This resulted in tripping of lines connecting unlike Ranchi and Rourkela to the rest of the ER. not adequate load relief from the AUFLS and df/dt relays was observed on 31st July 2012 also. and df/dt relays scheme. to improve the frequency and save the system under such emergency situations.12 Hz.4 Hz in the WR.causing increase in the angular separation between the NR and WR systems. the FGMO operation in the rest of the NEW grid could have possibly recovered the frequency which stayed at 48. power swing or zone-3 protection and tripping of generators on under frequency.1). This cascaded tripping of lines was on overvoltage at few places. associated with tripping of Adani-Manindragarh HVDC and frequency stabilized at around 51 Hz. again indicates absence of FGMO controls being activated in several generating stations. unlike the pattern on 30th July 2012. that can shed about 5600 MW of loads. which can shed about 6020MW of loads. The frequency plots are available from PMUs and the WAFMS from the NR and WR only (see Exhibit 4. ER and NR-ER links. which has Automatic Under Frequency Load Shedding Scheme (AUFLS). which resulted in a large number of trippings in the NR.12 Hz for about a minute and probably avoided the further catastrophic failure. similar to the disturbance on 30th July 2012. XIII. 27 . DSPM 2*250 MW ESSAR 125 MW and KLTPS 69 MW generating units. APL 660 MW generating unit tripped on Special Protection Scheme.4 Hz and that in the rest of the NEW grid stabilized close to 48. which got separated from the rest of ER+NR+NER at about 13:00:20 hrs. NALCO and BSP. Subsequently. There is no PMU installed so far in ER+NER system. This shows that the frequency in the WR rose to 51. However. the electrical center of the angular separation appears to be slightly inside the ER system from the WR-ER interface. In fact. These buses formed part of the WR. The sudden rise in frequency. possibly due to some generator trip in the NR+NER+ER grid led large angular oscillations and drop in system frequency. The WR system survived with the tripping of Sipat 660MW. From PMU records NR systems has collapsed on under frequency. XII. XI. X. XIV. This initially separated NR from NER+ER. like CESC.

It was informed by the SRPC that there was AUFLS relief of about 984MW in the SR. System Protection scheme at Kolar did not operate. It may be mentioned that with the collapse ER. The frequency controller at HVDC Bhadrawati increased the flow of WR to SR from 880 MW to 1100 MW.XV. lot of tripping of lines were observed due to over voltage and also substantial under voltage at the tail end of the heavily loaded lines were observed.06 Hz to 48. 28 . dynamic compensators as well as synchronous generators. XVI. It may be noted that both on 30th and 31st July 2012. the Southern Region lost about 2000 MW in feed from Talchar-Kolar HVDC and frequency declined from 50. which caused operation of distance protection.88 Hz as per SRLDC SCADA. These extreme voltage situations could have been avoided with the proper reactive power absorption/support from reactors/capacitors.

07.2012 Prior to Disturbance (400 kV and above and Inter-Region 220 kV and above) (as furnished by NLDC) Sl No Line Voltage (kV) Region Out From Date 28/07/12 28/07/12 28/07/12 28/07/12 26/07/12 23/07/12 29/07/12 29/07/12 29/07/12 15/07/12 30/07/12 30/07/12 30/07/12 20/07/12 28/07/12 28/07/12 30/07/12 30/07/12 30/07/12 Remarks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NR Bassi-Jaipur 1 Agra-Bassi-2 Agra-Gwalior 2 Zerda-Kankroli Agra-Fatehpur Bhiwadi-Neemrana Barh-Balia Bhinmal-Kankroli Badod-Kota ManesarNeemrana Gorakhpur(PG)Lucknow 2 Kota-Merta 1 HeerapuraHindaun 2 Neemrana-Sikar Barh-Balia 2 Akal-Barmer 1 Chhabbra-Hindaun 2 Barmer-RajWest2 Jodhpur II – RajWest 2 WR Bina-Gwalior 2 Parli-Parli 2 Damoh-Birsingpur 2 Nagda-Rajgarh 1 Seoni-Bina 1 Seoni-Wardha 2 Bina – Indore Korba-Birsingpur Birsingpur-Balco 400 400 400 400 765 400 400 400 220 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 NR NR WR-NR WR-NR NR NR ER-NR NR WR-NR NR NR NR NR NR ER-NR NR NR NR NR Planned Planned Planned Planned Constr Work HV Trip HV Trip Forced Forced Control HV Forced and kept open Forced Forced Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV 400 400 400 400 765 765 400 400 400 WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR WR 29 27/07/12 19/07/12 13/07/12 20/07/12 03/07/12 23/07/12 21/07/12 05.1 List of EHV Lines Out on 31.12 22/06/12 Planned Forced Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Possibly Bina-Nagda Control HV Control HV .Annexure 4.07.

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4

Raigarh-Raipur 1 Itarsi-Khandwa 2 BachauRanchodpur Wardha-Akola-1 Parl(PG)-Sholapur 1 Bhadrawati-Parli 1 AurangabadBhusawal AurangabadDeepnagar 2 Karad-Kolhapur 2 Kolhapur-Mapusa 2 SSP-Rajgarh 2 ISP-Nagda Itarsi-Bhopal Adani-Sami 1 Amreli-Jetpur Asoj-Chorani 1 ER Ranchi-MPL D/c Binaguri-Purnea 1 SagardighiDurgapur BaripadaMendhasal

400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400


20/07/12 20/07/12 30/07/12 20/07/12 23/07/12 21/07/12 27/06/12 03/07/12 28/07/12 26/07/12 25/07/12 24/07/12 29/07/12 31/07/12 31/07/12 31/07/12 27/07/12 18/07/12 25/07/12 14/07/12

Control HV Control HV Forced Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Control HV Planned Planned Forced Forced


EXHIBIT 4.1 Recording Showing Angular Separation between NR and Rest of NEW Grid on 31/07/2012

Fig 1: (source: Wide Area Frequency Measurement system developed by IITB, Mumbai.)


Fig 2: (source: PMU Data from WR and NR. ) Note: There was time mismatch in WR PMUS and required to be logically aligned. Arrow indicates events.


ABT had a third component. The Committee has also identified factors which could have saved the grids from total collapse. namely Unscheduled Interchange (UI) charge.1 Depleted transmission network It is observed that one circuit of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior-Agra section was taken under planned outage by POWERGRID from 11. non availability of 400 kV Zerda-Kankroli and 400 kV Bhinmal-Kankroli due to insulator problems in particular weakened the NR-WR Interface. no single factor was responsible for grid disturbances on 30th and 31st July 2012. After careful analysis of these grid disturbances.2. being one of the parameter has to be maintained at 50 Hz or close to 50 Hz. Apart from fixed and variable charges.2012 for up gradation to 765 kV level.1 As is the case with most system failures. 5. ABT was first 33 .Chapter. the Committee has identified several factors. The availability of 400 kV Zerda-Bhinmal-Kankroli corridor requires to be improved by replacing porcelain insulators by polymer insulators at the earliest. A number of 400 kV lines were out prior to the incidence on both these days.47 AM of 28. System was subjected to operate in the range of 48-51.2.5 Hz. the Indian grid Systems experienced poor frequency profile. UI charge is payable if an utility is deviating from schedule (Generation/drawal) depending on the frequency. For historical reasons.2. Power quality and Grid security was compromised during this period. To enforce Grid discipline and to improve frequency profile. These factors are given below: 5. a new tariff mechanism was conceived in the early 1990s. In the 1990s.2.2 Factors that contributed to initiation of grid collapse 5. more loads were met with available generation at the cost of frequency.5 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO GRID DISTURBANCES ON 30TH AND 31ST JULY 2012 5.07. The frequency.2 Overdrawals attributable to frequency control through commercial signals 5. The outage of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior–Agra for up-gradation work.1 One of the objectives of load despatch is to maintain power system parameters within permissible limits. which initiated collapse of power systems on these days.The earlier PLF based tariff was replaced by Availability Based Tariff (ABT).

operates at 50 Hz± 0. The present range is 49. Further tightening of the frequency band by Central Commission has been challenged in the court. In the interest of power quality and grid security. which in turn would have led to relieving of loading of 400 kV BinaGwalior-Agra line. 5. If more number of utility players resort to such activity. It is further observed that Utilities resort to load shedding to earn revenue through UI to compensate their poor financial management.2.2.0-50.2. It is observed that NLDC is revising TTC in case of planned outage 34 .3. Initially the frequency band stipulated was 49. as has been observed in recent grid disturbances.2.2. there is a definite need to operate the system at and very close to 50 Hz. UI rate is nominal and utilities tend to over draw/under draw thereby completely deviating from the schedule. In Indian Grid.5 Hz and subsequently the range was tightened by Central Commission. There was positive improvement in the frequency profile. It was possible to implement it with the regulatory support. an association of transmission system operators in the Europe.3 Inability to control flow on 400 kV Bina-Gwalior-Agra line 5.02 Hz . In spite of records of load shedding in log book of SLDCs. One has to draw power only through long term .3 Just to give an example. 5. Intentional deviation is not being done as schedules are treated as binding contracts. it may even lead to load encroachment phenomena and grid disturbance. UI mechanism. it is possible to operate at the stipulated frequency as the participating systems takes care of their load–generation balance at the stipulated frequency. North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) ensures each balancing area to plan operation at 60 Hz. Though unintentional deviation take place. If the frequency profile is close to 50 HZ.2. 5. medium term or short term contracts. Utilities have to adopt such practice for healthy system operation. In the developed Systems.2.2 Electricity Act 2003 mandates that the operating frequency range defined in Grid standard(section73(d)) and Grid Code(section 79(1)(h)) has to be adopted by LDCs. which helped the system initially. they are addressed without compromising the stipulated frequency.July 2002. Similarly.1 It is clear from the messages issued by NRLDC to various SLDCs and recorded telephonic conversations that regional load dispatcher had made desperate efforts for reduction of overdrawals by various States.2 Hz. Utilities rushing to court to define frequency range may not be in the interest of secured grid operation and power quality.5-50. 5. it is evident that there was hardly any reduction in flow on this line.2.implemented in the WR on 1st. it may be pointed out that the "Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity" (UCTE). need to be reviewed now.

4 Non-compliance of directions of LDCs and Regulatory Commissions Non-compliance of instructions of RLDCs has been a problem since long. revision of TTC in real time would not serve any purpose. which can automatically restrict the tie-line flows to the scheduled limit and also frequency at the nominal value.2. in the opinion of NLDC. However. The Committee is of the view that maximum penalty that can be imposed by Regulatory Commissions in accordance with the Electricity Act. which is a specialized task and cannot be performed by operators in real time. NLDC pointed out that calculation of TTC requires elaborate studies. 5. Further. the Committee tend to agree that calculation of TTC is a specialized task. However. therefore. officials of NLDC had cited few reasons for not revising TTC on the day of disturbance.2. Secondly.3.2 The very fact that provision to apply congestion charge forms part of the regulations on the issue of "Measures to relieve congestion in real time" indicates that security of the grid is main objective of such provision.2. declaration of TTC is for the purpose of facilitating organized electricity trading contracts. States overdrawing from the grid often do not pay UI Charges which has contributed to infectiveness of ABT. 5. there is no Automatic Generation Control (AGC)//tie line bias control in the network. the procedure prepared under the provisions of a Regulation is not consistent with the Regulation. This aspect needs to be reviewed. ways and means can be found out to overcome this problem. para 5. 5. It is reported that in some cases. However. The Committee has gone through relevant regulations of Central Commission. During discussions. However.4 At present. NLDC stated that regulatory provisions restrains them from applying congestion charges in case congestion is attributable to forced outage of transmission line in the corridor. there is no provision which restrains NLDC from applying congestion charges.4 of the "Detailed procedure for relieving congestion in real time operation" prepared by NLDC and approved by Central Commission does restrain NLDC from applying congestion charges in such situation but requires curtailment of transactions followed by revision of TTC. Thirdly. Firstly.of transmission elements and not in case of forced outage. which are cleared on day ahead basis and. 35 . Thus. the penalty imposed by Central Commission has not been paid. 2003 is meager in comparison to damage that such non-compliance can cause to the grid. of late a disturbing trend of non compliance of directions of the Central Commission has been observed.3.

2012.2. As mentioned elsewhere.e.5. which ultimately led to collapse of grid.1.1 It is noted that on both days. though there were several other concurrent conditions. the issue of formation of electrical islands as last resort to maintain essential services and quick restoration has come to fore.5. there is still no evidence of governor action in Grid Disturbances on 30th and 31st July 2012.5 Protection System Issues 5.3..2 It may also be noted that during the disturbances on 30th and 31st July.e. This difficulty has also been addressed in the new IEGC issued in April 2010 by providing for restricting the governor action in such zone. the 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line was not thermally overloaded i. 5. However.. this was not getting implemented as generators pointed out few difficulties including wide frequency fluctuations. i.3. in recent years.1 Primary response from generators 5. current becomes very high and voltage goes down to very low levels). only Main-II protections operated and Main-I protection did not pick up. Another difficulty cited in implementation of governor action was that the free governor action tries to lower the generation when frequency rises from a frequency lower than 50 Hz. However.1. Central Commission has made concerted efforts to reduce the operating frequency band by periodically amending provisions in the IEGC and these regulatory provisions have been successful to large extent. the system was “insecure”. the current rating (quad Bersimis conductor) of the line was not exceeded.3. the grid disturbance was initiated by tripping of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line on zone-3 of Main-II protection. 5. In the wake of recent grid disturbances. There is no doubt that this tripping is attributable to load encroachment i. the current and voltage conditions were such that the protection system perceived it as fault (during fault. System security requires that the system should be able to withstand credible contingencies.2.5. in case of imminent grid disturbance.2 Another important aspect in relation to primary response is that it would be absolutely essential for survival of islands. Thereafter. However. there were several tripping on load encroachment and power swing. if such electrical islands are 36 . chances of survival of regional grid could have been more after isolation from NEW grid.e.1 The provision for putting all generating units on governor action has been part of Indian Electricity Grid Code (IEGC) for several years. It is also noted that on both days. 5. had governor action been put into action during these disturbances. In spite of the fact that impediments in implementation of governor action have been removed. the system was not stable for the loss of this line.3 Factors that could have saved the grid from collapse 5.2. However.

The Committee is of the opinion that after loss of about 5000-6000 MW to Northern Region. various devices/equipment available in power system such as HVDC. these PMUs have been of immense help to this Committee in analysis of grid failures on 30th and 31st July 2012. 5. nine number of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) have been put in place in Northern Region and 3 PMUs have been installed in Western Region. 5. it is matter of concern that on the days of disturbances.2.3. a significant number of lines are generally kept open to contain high voltages. had these relays operated. However.3 Presently. Similarly. Also. which need to be enabled. POWERGRID has plans to install PMUs in a big way. However. Similarly. 5. data from PMUs at Agra in Northern Region and Vindhyachal in Western Region is not available. It appears that the PMUs in Western Region are not time synchronized.2. However. where UFR based load shedding of 4000 MW (in 3 stages) and df/dt based load shedding of about 6000 MW has been agreed.3. However.2. 5. The Committee 37 .formed.3.3 Operation of defense mechanism Defense mechanisms like load shedding based on under frequency relays (UFRs) and Rate of change of frequency (df/dt) relays have been adopted in all Regional Power Committees (RPCs) in accordance with provisions of IEGC. This makes system weak and such system may not be able to cope contingency. the experience of the recent grid disturbances reveal that practically there was no load relief from these schemes.3. as they are bedrock requirement for development of smart transmission grids. increasing number of Special Protection Schemes are being employed to save system in case of contingencies. the grid could have been saved. There is no evidence that these devices had any stabilizing influence during grid disturbances on 30th and 31st July 2012. TCSC and SVC have stability features. The system requires a large of dynamic compensators. which need to be established through detailed study.2 Optimum utilization of available assets 5. there is need to tune PSS periodically.3.1 A large number of high capacity 400 kV lines have been added to the intraregional and inter-regional systems in the recent past. their chances of survival would be abysmally low if generating units included in these islands are not on governor action. Even these limited number of PMUs have been helpful in the past in understanding behavior of the system. The widespread prevalence of high voltages is pointer of insufficient reactive compensation. which can save the grid from several potential destabilizing conditions.2 Practically all generating units are equipped with Power System Stabilizers (PSS). The case in point is Northern Region.

In November 2007. Towards this end. matching strengthening in intra-State transmission system has not been carried out. 5.4 Autonomy to Load Despatch Centres 5.B. There is a need to arm the control centers with more advanced application functions and possibly perform the fast state estimation through synchrophasor measurements by deploying significant number of PMUs 38 .3. who clear the certification examination as also recommended by the Pradhan Committee. They utilize only static state estimation results. significant amount of efforts are required for implementation of recommendations of Pradhan Committee. One of the recommendations of the Pradhan Committee was to have qualified system operators. But there is a need to provide incentives to those operators.3. due to non availability of data from a large number of RTUs. Ministry of Power had constituted a Committee under Shri G. This not only limits ability of the States to draw power but also causes low voltage problems and unreliable supply to end consumers. 5. 5.3. Pradhan.3.has observed that so far violation of the various system security related provisions of IEGC issued by Central Commission and Grid Connectivity & Grid Standards issued by Authority has not been taken seriously and the attention has solely been on overdrawals from the grid. the then Additional Secretary in Ministry of Power. it has been observed that overloading and consequent tripping of 220 kV system had pushed the system to the edge.6 Dynamic security assessment and proper state estimation At present the control centers do not have any tool to periodically assess the security condition of the system. certification and incentives for the personnel employed on System Operation at various levels and also for ring-fencing the Load Despatch Centres to ensure their functional autonomy. a certification programme has been started.2 However.4. It also appears that though inter-State system is being strengthened continuously. 5.1 The issue of lack of autonomy to Load Despatch Centres is on the horizon of policy makers for quite some time.3. The state estimator results are not quite reliable. This Committee had submitted its report in August 2008.4.5 Intra-State transmission Planning and its implementation In recent grid disturbances. which are being performed at 400 kV network at quite slow interval. The mandate of this Committee was to examine issues relating to manpower.

although they can. b) Generation rescheduling may be attempted.The operators. If the system is insecure (in an alert condition). cannot readily determine whether the line loading will actually trip a relay. determine whether the system is secure or not. by doing an online contingency analysis. 39 . An available hydrogenerator may be called on to generate power. to re-route power flows. at present. The amount and effect of the rescheduling will have to be checked using online load flow/stability analysis. c) Load tripping may be attempted to reduce line loading. However. like HVDC and TCSC. If continuous capability limits have been reached short time overload capabilities may be used to buy some time for other actions. the following preventive actions can be taken: a) Use any controllable elements.

area of disturbance and system conditions prior to the disturbance. the load and generation of these islands should match and also it is necessary that generators within the island are operated with Governor action. 6.2 A meeting in this regard was held on 7th August 2012 wherein members from various state utilities participated. contingency based load shedding.6 REVIEW OF ISLANDING SCHEMES 6. All control areas should endeavor to operationalize under frequency based load shedding scheme as first defense. The Committee reviewed the existing schemes and explored possibility of formulation of more islanding schemes in the NR. salient features of which are given below: 6.1 To avoid total blackout following a grid disturbance.3 Guidelines for formation of islands a) For the success of the islanding scheme.Chapter. a number of defense mechanisms and System Protection Schemes mainly comprising of generation backing down. During the disturbance which took place on 30th and 31st July 2012 some of the generators which survived in NR due to islanding or on house load were NAPP. Faridabad Gas. 40 b) c) . The probability of survival of islands will be realistic only when all the generating units are on free governor or on restricted governor mode in accordance with provisions of Indian Electricity Grid Code. under frequency load shedding. formation of islands should be initiated as a last resort. Dadri Gas. There was agreement on the general philosophy on formation of islands. The success of these schemes in avoiding grid disturbances to a large extent depends upon the severity. Only if this defense mechanism fails and frequency continues its fall to dangerously low levels. After deliberations it was agreed that criteria for formation of islands should not be the geographical or electrical size but reliability of load-generation balance in the islands. BTPS . Also as a last resort some islanding schemes to save the generating stations are also in existence. The surviving generating units normally help in meeting essential loads and extending supply to other units within the same generating station and also to the nearby generators thereby helping in restoring the grid in reduced timeframe. df/dt load shedding etc already exist.

d) Islanding scheme could be a two-tier scheme.4. the trains were in operation. As far as possible. if this was not possible due to some reasons. signal for formation of islands comprising of more than one generating stations along with pre-identified load could be initiated. For survival of the Islands. during second disturbance at 13:00 hours. these islands could be further broken into smaller islands comprising of single generating station with pre-identified loads. in low hydro season. This problem could have been avoided if the metro network would have islanded with some generating station(s). efforts would be made to extend supply from these islands to essential loads on priority basis. generation will practically be negligible during off-peak hours and hence creation of island may not serve any purpose. However. 41 .4 Possibility of islanding of Delhi metro and Indian Railways 6.7 Hz. Delhi Metro services were affected in the morning to the extent that services were delayed as the disturbance had occurred at 2:35 hours when metro services were off. In case of hydro generators with limited pondage. major essential loads such as hospitals etc should be incorporated in the islands. This is because.1 During the grid disturbances which occurred on 30th & 31st July 2012. e) f) g) h) i) 6. However. if after the formation of island. islands should be created keeping peak generation in mind. the Committee held discussions with DMRC and Indian Railways on how islanding schemes could be developed for them.2 In view of the importance of Metro and other Rail network.4. 6. During the disturbance on 30th July 2012. they should be created in such a manner that the possibility of generation exceeding load is more.9 Hz. However. frequency continues to fall further to say 47. This did not trouble the passengers. Such review should also capture network changes taking place in the interim period. there would be need to review the scheme on seasonal basis. State load Dispatch Centers/ State Transmission Utilities along with the generating stations in their area should explore the possibility of formation of various islands. and the passengers faced difficulties because of sudden stoppage of services. At frequency level of say 47. Load-generation balance in pre-identified islands may change based on season. Railways and Delhi Metro services were also affected.

it is not possible. Dhaula Kuan and Narela. Thereafter. it is not possible to open the doors of the compartments too. fumes from the batteries start making the environment inside the tunnel suffocating.4 Indian Railways were having a supply point every 30 – 50 Km distance to feed a section. out of which one each was fed from UP and Haryana side and rest from DTL’s 220 kV network in Delhi. They also have supply from 2 locations in Delhi viz. they have arrangement of supply from Distribution Companies of the concerned states and had a very good communication system between their control room and concerned SLDCs. The peak load of Delhi Metro was 120 MW with 50 MW station load and 70 MW traction load. 6. ventilation and fire-fighting during main supply failures. The distance between two metro power stations was in the range of 15 to 17 Kms as higher distance resulted in voltage drop and poor traction.5. In case. DMRC had installed a DG set at each metro station to meet the load of lighting. this would result into low voltage at distant locations. except in the Eastern Region. In view of this.3 Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) have 200 trains running on 185 Kms metro rail network in Delhi fed from 13 nos. In case of requirement of reduced load by the SLDCs / RLDC due to any contingency. They have allocation of 100 MW from NTPC’s Dadri and Auraiya GPPs to meet the load of Delhi – Mughal Sarai section and their own dedicated transmission lines to draw power from the grid for the purpose. Batteries could provide backup supply for about half an hour only. then battery-backup is used to keep lights & fans running inside the compartments. They needed minimum 50 MW from at least 7 infeeds for traction purpose to keep their skeletal services running only for half an hour during contingencies like islanding of Delhi system from rest of the power grid for pulling the trains to the nearest station. it is essential to move the trains out of the tunnel and bring them to the nearest station within 15 minutes of supply-failure. 220 kV substations. Railways felt that this section could be considered for islanding during grid contingencies as this was one of the most important sections of Railways. In the event of power failure. 10 trains are running inside the tunnels. Though they could feed their entire network from a single point. then passengers needed to be evacuated from the train under the guidance of trained metro staff. During grid disturbances on 30th & 31st July 2012. DMRC was using its own 33 kV network for feeding stations and 25 kV network for meeting traction load. It was also noted that at any point of time. For other sections. Railways received full cooperation from SLDCs/RLDCs in restoration of supply to their network on priority.5. Railways requested to get this examined and improve the arrangement of extending start-up supply in that 42 . If the power supply fails and the train stops inside the tunnel. Load per train was about 2 MW. They do not have allocation of power from any other central sector station to meet the load in any other section of their network in the country. where supply was restored late reportedly due to non-availability of start-up power to the power stations in that region. they could manage to keep the trains running with availability of supply at each alternate section.6.

It was felt that this might have been caused due to sudden connection of large quantum of traction load. 6.6 The Committee also examined the possibility of islanding of states including Delhi in the Northern Region under a grid contingency and recommends creation of four islands in Delhi. Delhi Metro while availing supply from any source e. large fluctuations in the load were observed and the GTs tripped due to fall of frequency to the level of 47.4 Hz. In case of failure of formation of Auraiya island. should connect load in small steps in close coordination with Delhi SLDC and the generating station to avoid the possibility of tripping of the generating station. However. However. Railways would abide by the advice of the power station / SLDC / RLDC in the matter of connecting load on restoration of supply after grid disturbance. There being some possibility of malfunctioning of islanding of Delhi in case of grid disturbances and delayed extension of supply thereafter.5. which is envisaged to be islanded with a part of Delhi’s load. This could feed about half of Delhi-Mughal Sarai section. Power could be supplied to Delhi Metro from Rithala GT station of TPDDL (one of the Distribution Companies in Delhi) as well if this station had black-start facility. Railways while availing supply from Auraiya GPS after its black-start. within a few minutes of charging of DMRC feeders.8 As regards Indian Railways. two gas turbines (30 MW each) were started by Delhi and charged DMRC-I & II feeders after charging other important feeders. Remaining half could be fed from Dadri GPS.5. Delhi Metro’s emergency load and a part of Indian Railways load could continue to remain connected with these islands at its minimum four different sub-stations in case of grid contingencies. islanding scheme could be prepared for Auraiya GPS along with Railways’ and other loads. If the load was connected by DMRC gradually in close coordination with GT control room. etc. 6.7 In case of failure of formation of islands in Delhi. They also requested their services to be given priority at the time of restoration of grid. 6. Keeping in view the fluctuating nature of traction load. 6. the machines could have continued to operate.g. no unit should be started with such load. the supply should be extended to 43 .. DMRC might consider installation of DG set(s) of appropriate capacity to move the trains stuck in the tunnels so as to ensure safety of passengers. There should be reliable communication arrangement between DMRC and GT station at IP extension in Delhi.4. DMRC should also make necessary changes in the technical and communication arrangements in their system to ensure this.5 It was noted that subsequent to grid failure at 1300 hours on 31st July 2012. Dadri GPS.5. should connect load in small steps in close coordination with the power station to avoid the possibility of its collapse again. DMRC should re-distribute its load so as to make it balanced in all three phases for stable operation of connected power stations. IP GTs.region.

POWERGRID and RPCs.5 As per the resolution adopted in meeting taken by Hon’ble Minister of Power with Chief Ministers and Power Ministers of Northern State on 6th August 2012 the schemes prepared by States would be deliberated by them with CEA. 44 . 6. POWERGRID and NRPC. Indian Railway and DMRC may further firm up the islanding schemes in consultation with CEA.Railways / DMRC by the power station / SLDC on priority after starting the unit(s) with other types of balanced and more or less constant loads. Other islanding schemes should also be prepared on similar lines.

2 Observations i. NRLDC suggested that the load dispatch centres should be authorized to advise action to the concerned utilities for extending power supply immediately to the black-starting units through exchange of special emergency code between the concerned load dispatch centres. However. during the recent grid disturbances it has been observed that substantially longer time has been taken by certain generating stations to come on bars. certain delays were encountered on account of commercial issues in obtaining the start. This may require to be looked into by the concerned agencies. This process would facilitate quicker restoration by cutting down time required in taking administrative clearance which is otherwise obtained under normal grid operation conditions. discussions were held with the utilities to review the time taken in restoration of generation after the recent grid disturbances. NLDC and UPSLDC also participated. . In view of this. The facilities available with existing and upcoming IPPs should also form part of these procedures for the purpose of extending start up supply to black starting units in the vicinity. iii.up power supply from other outside agencies. iv. the required quantum of load commensurate with the generation build-up rate were not available despite close coordination and intimation given to the concerned load dispatch centres and personal contact with the counterpart distribution utilities. Existing Black start procedures should be frequently reviewed in line with the fast changing grid scenario and addition of generation capacity. 45 ii. Major observations and recommendations are given below: 7. Most of hydro stations were ready to provide the start-up power immediately after the grid disturbance. NRLDC.7 REVIEW OF RESTORATION OF THERMAL POWER STATIONS 7.1 Background The black start procedure has already been prepared by RLDCs and is available with all utilities.Chapter. However due to complete collapse of the entire grid. A predefined arrangement for availability of loads under such emergency conditions would have hastened the process of restoring the power supply. Some of the utilities expressed that to initiate start up process.

some of the units had taken longer time than others to synchronize with the grid. which are to implement the restoration operations in the real-time. Paricha and Panki stations. It was observed that after lighting up of the units. Unchahar. for which additional time was taken to rectify/replace the diaphragms. Paricha and Panki stations.3. substations and generating stations. Various load dispatch centres. Obra. Obra. Dadri(coal). viii.2. The observed time duration ranged from 2 to 23 hours for Singrauli STPS and 2 hrs to 7 hrs for units at Unchhar. which does not adequately exist at present and the agencies depend mainly on mobile phone facility. The utilities intimated that in case of some units LP diaphragms had burst during the occurrence. All utilities felt the need to strengthen and have a dedicated communication network between SLDCs and all power plants in the respective control areas. While examining the restoration data received from various utilities.7. At GGSSTP the time ranged from 2 to 9 hours.7. On 31. after start up supply was made available. The observed time duration ranged from 2 hours to 4 hours in case of various generating units at Singrauli. Availability of reliable and efficient communication facilities at all active installations connected to the grid is essential to ensure faster restoration.2. Utilities therefore expressed that the qualified operating personnel having undergone orientation courses under certification programme should be posted there.5 were restored during 0250 to 0430 hours ( generation of order of 80 MW) and later GT3 was synchronised at 0640 hours (30 MW) with STGs 1. On 30. Rihand.2012.v.2012. upon receiving instructions from the apex load dispatch centres are not adequately managed in terms of experienced manpower and also particularly during odd hours. Badarpur & Rihand TPSs and 2 hours to 9 hours for units at Anpara. in DTL system GTs 1. 46 . vii. it was observed that certain delays had occurred in lighting up the units. Tanda and 1 to 16 hours for various units at Anpara.3 resuming generation between 0810 to 0840 hours ( order 60 MW).2.5. Dadri and Faridabad for GTs and 3 to 7 hours for STGs. which is not completely reliable for such purposes. In case of gas based stations the time duration ranged between 1 to 6 hrs at Auraiya. in DTL system GTs 1.6 were restored during 1310-1445 hours ( vi.

3 resuming generation between 1615 to 1646 hours ( order 51 MW) Badarpur TPS had earlier survived and had operated in Island mode with units nos. over-voltages and under frequency and mismatch in generation with remote loads over long EHV lines. Chukha and Teesta. SLDC.7. UPRVUNL suggested that Pipri-Hydel should be synchronized with Western grid through Vindhyachal-ShaktinagarAnpara 400 kV line and 132 kV Anpara-Pipri line. In case of major hydro station. GGSSTP Ropar received start up power from Bhakra source at 0841 hours on 30th July 2012 and unit #2 boiler lighted up first at 1020 hours. Despite multi-attempts of black starts at Tala. 1.3 was first synchronized at 1025 hours.7. The unit was synchronized at 1218 hours via Bhakra (220KV)-Ganguwal (220/132KV)-132KV Ropar-GGSSTP route and on 31st July 2012 unit # 2 boiler lighted up at 1640 hrs and synchronised at 1740 hours via Nalagarh(PG)-220KV Mohali-GGSSTP route. The possibility of extending power to Singrauli from Pipri Hydro on 30th July in closer coordination between NRLDC. UPJVUNL. xi.2012 when the island collapsed and power was later extended to the station at 0710 hours from 220 kV DTL system at Sarita Vihar and unit no.2. x. Kahalgaon and Farakka STPS received start up power from WR through Sipat-Ranchi and could not receive power earlier from hydro due to tripping of Teesta HPS on 3rd harmonic. ix. It however tripped at 0658 hours with the collapse of Badarpur island.3 and 5 till 0658 hours on 30. Faridabad GPS was later synchronized at 0844 hours with grid. Faridabad GPS which had tripped at 0233 hours on 30. UPRVUNL and NTPC would have resulted time-saving in affecting quicker start-up power to NTPC generating units. This would ensure stability of voltage of Pipri machines and more machines of Pipri-Hydel could be started up.order 141 MW) and STGs 1. While extending the power to Singrauli TPS. through HVDC Vindhyachal by pass route there had been tripping at Vidhyachal resulting delay in making start up power available to the station. BBMB intimated that on 30th July 2012 the system was fully connected to grid by 0902 hours and on 31st July 2012 at 1553 hours. In ER.2012 was synchronized with grid at 0552 hours. 47 .

5 2. Analysis of Restoration Process of Thermal Power Stations Detailed analysis of start-up process for the grid disturbance of 30th July 2012 has been made so as to examine the restoration process and areas of possible improvements.0 5.5 1.0 to 3. It was also brought out that start-up power could be extended to number of stations simultaneously so that stations could use them for preparatory activities like CW pumps.0 Stations (Nos) Cumulative number of Stations 2 4 5 2 0 3 2 4 3 1 2 6 11 13 13 16 18 22 25 26 48 .5 to 5.0 3.3.3 7.5 to 3.0 to 6.0 to 2.0 to 4.5 to 2. and actual startup could be attempted after specific clearance from the source providing start-up power. compressors etc. This could considerably expedite the start-up as preparatory activities not needing much power could be taken up by number of stations simultaneously thus considerably reducing the startup times.1: Availability of start-up power in Northern Region 30th July 2012 Time Elapsed Before Start-up power Became Available after Disturbance (Hrs) <1 1 to 1.0 2.1 Availability of start-up power Salient abstracts of the receipt of start-up power in the region are as under:Table 7.0 4. xii. The salient observations are given in subsequent paras:- 7.5 to 4.the startup power could not be extended to Farakka / Kahalgaon from the hydro sources.5 4.5 3.

In the above context. 7. It was also brought out by the stations that sudden tripping of the unit at high load lead to bursting of LP Turbine diaphragms in many of the units requiring replacement before start-up could be taken up and involved about 4 hrs for replacement of diaphragms for each unit. compressed air system.3 Start-Up And Restoration Times With a view to analyze the restoration process of thermal stations. Maximum time taken for any station to receive start-up power was 6 hours for Ropar TPS.It may therefore be seen that more than 50 % of the affected stations in the region received start-up power after 3hrs.2. A fact that emerged during discussions was that since the present grid failure occurred after almost a decade. data regarding time of availability of start-up power.3. Only 2 stations in the region could receive start-up power within 1 hour. the preparedness and response was perhaps not upto the level expected.3. The status of receipt of data from the stations is furnished below in Table-7. More frequent need of having periodic mock exercises to ensure preparedness of all stakeholders involved as actual grid disturbances needs emphasis. Also start-up power is required to be provided to each unit and station auxiliary which involves charging up of number of transformers within the station sequentially and in turn is time consuming. 49 . Also 8 stations received start up power after 4 hours. suggestions made at Para B above that start-up power should be extended as soon as possible so that stations could initiate preparatory activities and actual start-up process could be attempted immediately upon receiving start-up power. A normative or bench mark time frame for extending start-up power to each of the TPS may be evolved by the RPCs in consultation with the constituents and RLDC so as to ensure that significant delays are not encountered in extending start-up power. time of taking up Boiler light up (BLU). The reasons for delay in receiving start-up power by most of the thermal power stations may require to be looked into from grid system point of view. 7.2 Restoration of Thermal Power Stations Coal fired thermal power stations involve considerable amount of preparatory actions before actual start-up like operationalizing major auxiliary systems like circulating water (CW) system. time till synchronization and time of achieving full load were sought from the stations.


A N.A N.A N.A N.A 25. could not be ascertained.A N.A N.A 04:52 N.A 02:35 N.A NA 03:09 07:53 N.A N.A N. the actual time taken for preparatory activities as also maintenance like replacement of diaphragms etc.00 15:34 22:51 Note:Timelines indicate total elapsed time before successive units were taken for start up and DO NOT refer to unit numbers 51 .A SD SD N.A 05:08 N.4 Initiation of Boiler Light Up As brought out above.A N. 7.A N.A 2nd 04:52 01:58 07:30 06:38 N.A SD SD SD 01:54 01:12 04:06 N.A 09:29 10:56 06:29 N.A N.A N.3. Table 7. As the time for BLU have not been received from number of stations.A N.A N.A 3rd 05:01 05:55 4th 06:08 07:23 5th 16:20 15:25 6th 7th N.3.A N. Details of BLU undertaken are furnished in Table-7.A SD N. From the data on BLU available it is seen that there are considerable variations between the time taken for BLU of the first unit after receipt of start-up power. initiation of start-up of a coal fired station takes considerable time after receipt of start-up power due to preparatory activities involved. The analysis for stations for which data for boiler light up was received have been made in respect of time of synchronization after BLU.A N.restoration pattern could not be analyzed.A N.3: Time elapsed (Hrs) before BLU was undertaken after receipt of Start up power Station Anapara Obra Paricha Panki Kota Suratgarh Chabra Giral RajWest Barsingsar Ropar Rajghat Singrauli Rihand Unchahar Tanda Dadri Coal Badarpur 1st 03:12 01:00 03:45 01:00 N.A N.A NA NA 01:39 SD 01:36 N.A NA 04:59 09:56 N.A 06:00 N.

From the table it may be seen that few Stations like Obra and Panki undertook first BLU after 1 hour of receipt of start-up power.A 3rd 00:09 03:57 4th 01:07 01:28 5th 10:12 08:02 6th 7th N.A N. The data of time elapsed before undertaking subsequent BLUs have also been analysed and presented in the Table-7.31 04:38 07:17 Note-Time for 1st unit indicates time taken after start-up power.A 04:30 01:00 00:29 N.A 02:35 N.A 00:52 N.4: Time interval between successive BLUs Station Anapara Obra Paricha Panki Kota Suratgarh Chabra Giral RajWest Barsingsar Ropar Rajghat Singrauli Rihand Unchahar Tanda Dadri Coal Badarpur 1st 03:12 01:00 03:45 01:00 N. Further discussions need to be undertaken in this regard.A N.4.A N.A N.A NA NA 01:39 SD 01:36 N. Table 7.A N.A N.A 14.A N.A 02:17 N.A SD SD N. From the table it may be seen that while for some of the units the BLU was taken up within very short interval of 10-20 minutes of BLU of previous unit. in most of the cases the BLU for subsequent unit was taken up 2 to 3 hours after the BLU of preceding unit and in many cases exceptionally large time of 8 to 10 hours have been taken.A N.A NA 01:15 03:47 N.A N.A N. Timelines for other units indicate time taken after BLU of previous unit.A 2nd 01:40 00:58 03:45 05:38 N.A N.A SD N.A N.A N.A N.A NA 01:50 02:03 N.A N.A SD SD SD 00:15 01:12 02:30 N. 52 . Ropar and Singrauli attempted first BLU after 01:40 hrs after receiving start-up power.A N. Also large variations are seen in undertaking further unit start-ups after taking BLU of first unit.A N. Several Stations could undertake first BLU only after 2. The utilities were asked for the reasons for delay in start up of the units.5 to 3 hrs of receiving start-up power.A N.A 00:16 N. however no reasons for delay have been furnished.

A 01:46 N.A As may be seen that the time for synchronization after BLU varies from a low of 1.A N. Table 7.A N. Many of the NTPC units took 3 to 4 hrs for synchronization after BLU.5.A NA NA 01:25 SD 01:21 N. it is seen that the time taken for synchronization after BLU varies considerably.A N.A 01:57 N.A SD SD SD 01:55 01:00 01:42 N.A SD N.A N. It may be mentioned that time taken from BLU to synchronization is expected to be fairly comparable for the units of similar design with similar start up regimes and thus such large differences in timelines are not understood.A N.A NA NA 01:58 02:55 04:15 05:50 02:08 N.A N. Even from the limited number of Stations where data of both BLU time and synchronization time is available.A N.A N.A 2nd 04:36 03:55 05:23 05:28 N.3.A N.A 03:03 03:51 N.A 02:10 02:28 03:21 03:51 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.7.A N.5: Time taken for synchronization after BLU Station Anapara Obra Paricha Panki Kota Suratgarh Chabra Giral RajWest Barsingsar Ropar Rajghat Singrauli Rihand Unchahar Tanda Dadri Coal Badarpur 1st 02:41 01:43 04:04 03:14 N.A N.5 Unit Synchronization after Boiler Light Up The details of time taken for synchronization after BLU are furnished in Table.7.A N.A SD SD N. 53 .A 3rd 4th 5th 6th 06:29 08:07 09:10 04:07 04:52 05:30 7th N.2 hrs to as high as 3 to 4 hrs and even exceptionally high at 8 to 10 hrs for some of the units.A N.A N.A 02:04 N. Details of problems/constraints encountered during start-up process and delays occurred may require to be looked into further in respect of constraints bottlenecks faced in this context.

Amongst the 210 MW units. Badarpur could achieve synchronization of its 210 MW unit in 8 hrs.44 hrs. 54 .U Power to Synchronization Station Anapara Obra Paricha Panki Kota Suratgarh Chabra Giral RajWest Barsingsar Ropar Rajghat Singrauli Rihand Unchahar Tanda Dadri Coal Badarpur 1st 05:53 03:41 07:49 04:14 02:55 06:26 SD 22:20 11:43 48. These timelines however would be indicative of combined impact of constraints/delays occurred in preparatory activities (before BLU) and during the start-up process. Rest of the Stations achieved first synchronization beyond 4 hrs and some Stations like Paricha and Anapara could achieve their first synchronization in 6 to 8 hrs.55 hrs from start-up power followed by Ropar achieving synchronization of one unit in 3. Kota was the first station to achieve synchronization within 2.50 27.32 03:19 SD 03:44 04:40 04:32 02:10 04:02 03:15 2nd 10:44 06:30 12:53 12:06 03:43 09:44 05:24 SD 13:08 SD 03:37 02:12 07:27 06:38 06:56 02:45 06:00 03:47 3rd 4th 5th 11:30 12:59 25.6 Time from start-up power to Unit Synchronization Since timeline for undertaking BLU were not made available by most Stations. Singrauli achieved synchronization of first unit in 3. an analysis of total time taken upto synchronization from receipt of start-up power has been made to understand the trend that emerged.6: Total Time S.30 09:50 11:30 20:17 6th 7th 03:48 05:34 07:08 11:05 12:39 39 11:28 SD SD 23:07 SD 08:59 09:14 11:24 09:14 11:54 07:46 04:09 07:24 04:19 12:06 12:38 SD 08:11 10:20 08:13 08:30 08:00 10.3. The details of time taken for synchronization after start-up power are furnished in Table-7.7.6 Table 7.19 Note: Timelines indicate order of synchronization of units and not unit numbers The variability seen here is similar to the variability seen in timelines from start-up power to BLU and BLU to synchronization – rather the variability seen here is much more prominent.55 19:25 25.19 hrs.

50 16. Here again similar large variability is seen. Tanda and Rajghat TPS achieved their first synchronization in 2. analysis of time taken for subsequent synchronizations have also been analysed and presented in the Table-7.7. Ropar and Kota TPS achieved most rapid successive synchronizations with second and fourth synchronization at Ropar in 18 and 15 minutes and second and third synchronization at Kota in 48 minutes and 05 minutes.26 SD 22:20 11:43 48. Tanda TPS achieved rapid second synchronization in 35 minutes.20 04:20 SD SD 09:59 SD 05:22 00:15 02:10 01:47 05:16 00:50 01:24 01:24 00:32 02:52 00:32 SD 00:25 02:09 00:49 00:17 03:41 02.34 04. Table 7.31 06:47 05:54 Note-Time for 1st unit indicates time taken after start-up power. Amongst the smaller size units.32 03:19 SD 03:44 04:40 04:32 02:10 04:02 03:15 2nd 04:51 02:49 05:04 07:52 00:48 3. Timelines for other units indicate time taken after synchronization of previous unit The large variations in synchronization times and successive synchronization times with many of the stations achieving timelines far 55 .Amongst the smaller size units.30 hrs though it was the second synchronization for the Station.10 hrs after start-up power whereas other Stations like Badarpur and Panki took 3 to 4 hrs to achieve first synchronization.21 01. The lignite fired Circulating Fluidized Bed Combustion (CFBC) units had taken exceedingly long time to achieve their first synchronization.7: Time taken for successive Synchronizations Station Anapara Obra Paricha Panki Kota Suratgarh Chabra Giral RajWest Barsingsar Ropar Rajghat Singrauli Rihand Unchahar Tanda Dadri Coal Badarpur 1st 05:53 03:41 07:49 04:14 02:55 06. however the subsequent synchronizations took longer.18 05:24 SD 01:25 SD 00:18 02:12 03:43 01:58 02:24 00:35 01:58 00:32 3rd 4th 5th 00:46 01:29 12:31 03:20 01:40 08:47 6th 7th 00:05 01:46 01:34 01. Obra achieved synchronization of 50 MW unit in 6. Further.

7 Gas Based Stations Gas fired stations are looked upon as rapid source of power after such grid disturbances as preparatory activities required are far less and start ups of Gas turbines (GTs) are fast. Table 7. The facilities available with existing and upcoming IPPs 56 .4 Conclusions and Suggestions Based on the discussions brought out in the foregoing paragraphs. Existing Black start procedures should be frequently reviewed in line with the fast changing grid scenario and addition of generation capacity. the Gas turbine units at most other stations and even the subsequent Gas turbine units at these stations took far longer time of 2 to 4 hours.Time taken from start-up power to Synchronization Station Unit#1 Unit#2 Unit#3 Unit#4 Unit#5 Unit#6 Dholpur 03:29 SD SD Ramgarh 09:08 08:28 SD Pragati CCPP 01:41 01:34 03:47 IP CCGT Islanded Islanded Islanded Islanded Islanded Islanded Anta 02:37 00:46 01:36 05:00 Auraiya 02:14 00:53 03:32 Dadri Gas 03:03 03:41 06:15 03:51 SD 08:00 Faridabad 02:52 04:10 06:38 Note: Cells coloured yellow indicate Steam Turbine unit It may thus be seen that even the Gas turbine units have taken unduly long time for start-up. While the first Gas turbine units could come up at Anta and Auraiya in about 50 minutes.8: Gas fired stations . A well coordinated and documented process for supply of start-up power may be put in place under the overall coordination of NLDC clearly bringing out the following: a. 7. 7. the suggestions for faster restoration of thermal power stations are as under:1. Details of time taken for synchronization of GT Stations a re given in Table-7.3.8.better to others is indicative of the potential improvements possible in most of the stations with better/faster preparation. Such large start-up times for Gas turbine units need to be looked into with a view to make Gas turbine units a dependable source of rapid restoration power.

There is a need to strengthen communication and have a dedicated communication network between SLDCs and all power plants in the respective control areas.should also form part of these procedures for the purpose of extending start up supply to black starting units in the vicinity. 4. Authorizing Load dispatch centres to advise action to the concerned utilities for extending power supply immediately to the black-starting units through exchange of special emergency code between the concerned load dispatch centres. c. 2. is not considered reliable for such communication. The actual start-up could be attempted after specific clearance from the source providing start-up power. Key installations/sub-stations should be managed by experienced manpower particularly during odd hours – like Qualified operating personnel having undergone orientation courses under certification programme. A system to extend start-up power to number of stations simultaneously for preparatory activities could be considered. A normative or bench mark time frame for extending start-up power to each of the TPS. This could expedite start-ups as preparatory activities not needing much power could be taken up by number of stations simultaneously. e. d. This may be evolved by the RPC in consultation with the constituents and RLDC so as to ensure that significant delays are not faced in extending start-up power. Micro level load management for lines and loads may be envisaged for extending start-up power through pre-defined arrangement for availability of loads under emergency conditions so as to avoid frequent tripping while extending start-up supply. 3. 57 . b. Explicit instructions to all stake holders to supply start-up power without any commercial considerations that could be settled later. The mobile phone facility presently used. Reliable and efficient communication facilities at all active installations connected to the grid is essential to ensure faster restoration.

in most cases the start-up times appear to be considerably higher than the manufacturers/OEM recommendations. Long start-up times taken by most Gas turbine units need to be investigated to develop Gas turbine units as reliable source of fast restoration power. Further. 6. A standard procedure for preparatory activities and sequence of start up may be put in place by the stations to restore units as early as possible. Reasons for the delays in attempting first start-up and subsequent startups may be examined by the utilities in consultation with CEA. 58 .5. 7. Large variations are observed in time taken for initiation of unit start up (Boiler light up) by the stations after availability of start-up power and also for start ups/light up of subsequent units. Optimal start-up/ restoration procedures by the stations in consultation with OEMs. The large variations in synchronization times and successive synchronization times achieved with many of the stations achieving timelines far better to others is indicative of the potential improvements possible in most of the stations with better/faster preparation. while subsequent start-ups were very fast (10-20 minutes) in some of the units. Large variations have also been observed in time taken by the stations for synchronization after Boiler light up which are normally not expected. Detailed analysis of times taken especially from BLU to synchronization may be made by the utilities in consultation with CEA so as to identify constraints/bottlenecks faced during unit start-up for remedial action. Also. 8. in other cases they took considerably longer – several hours.

there is an urgent need to provide dedicated network for this purpose. the Committee examined the apprehension that grid disturbances on 30th and 31st July 2012 could have been initiated by cyber attack. 8.Chapter.2.3 During the visit to NRLDC and 400 KV sub station.2 During the visit to the 400 kV Grid Sub-station at Agra. The commands are issued locally to carry out switching operations at the sub stations and there is no automated system of event recording on a continuous basis.2. visit to NRLDC. it was observed that the switching for operation is independent of computer networking. Similarly. and generating stations.8 CYBER SECURITY ASPECTS 8. If NRDLC observes any abnormality in the operation in the grid. each unit has its own control and is no way connected with the outside network and the performance logging of the station data is recorded & archived for each generating unit separately. Since public telephone network may not be reliable in many cases specially in remote/ rural areas and more so in case of grid disturbance and total power failure like the present one. as observed during the visit. 59 . 400 kV sub-station of POWERGRID at Agra and Rihand Super Thermal Power Station was undertaken to examine the present automation & communication arrangements at the Power Sub stations & Thermal Power Plants. it has been observed that there are no dedicated telecom facilities available between various control centres.2 Field Visit 8. In addition the Committee also examined following aspectsa) Status of IT intervention in the operation of Power Sector b) Measures taken by various stakeholders to counter any possible cyber attack in their system c) Communication facilities available between various stake holders 8. 8. in the case of generating plants.2. It has also been observed that there may be errors/ loss of data received from remote (RTUs) at the data center and there may be failure of data coming from a station in case of power breakdown because of UPS not working properly or batteries being weak. they inform the same to the concerned SLDC/ Station either through public telephone or on leased line network.1 To assess the situation.1 With regard to cyber security.

SCADA etc used in transmission sector is wide and may have potential impact on the synchronous operation of entire Power System leading to Grid collapse. CERT-Hydro and CERT-Transmission with nodal agencies as NTPC. 60 .4 The Committee in course of meeting with stakeholders. NHPC and POWERGRID respectively. the impact of cyber attack on centralized SCADA /DMS can lead to disruption of services to critical customers like hospitals.3 It was informed to all the stakeholders that CERT-In (Indian Computer Emergency Response Teams).India. The affect of vulnerabilities in centralized systems e. Ministry of Power has also constituted CERT-Thermal. The matter was also discussed with the officers of CERT-In to asses the present arrangement and preparedness of the stack holders to avoid any cyber attack on their system. In course of discussion. Government of India has prepared a Crisis Management Plan (CMP) for countering cyber attacks and cyber terrorism for preventing the large scale disruption in the functioning of critical information systems of Government. which is critical for the units involved but at the same time not global and widespread. 8.3 Discussion & findings 8. Public and Private sector resources and services. metro etc.2 It was pointed out during the discussion that the Cyber attacks can be perpetrated from any side either by outsiders or by insiders and may have far–reaching and detrimental effects on power systems controls. 8. that could lead to the destabilization of the supply capabilities of energy sector and may have a cascading effect on the national security /economy.3.3. reviewed existence of appropriate security policies and procedures as envisaged in the Crisis Management Plan prepared and circulated by CERT. NTPC.8. it emerged that no abnormal cyber event was observed by the stakeholders prior to and during grid disturbances on both occasions.g. where bulk of automation are visible.3.3. to take necessary action to prevent cyber attacks on the Utilities under their jurisdiction. Cyber security vulnerabilities in generation sector are localized and its impact can shut down one unit or plant. As far as distribution sector is concerned. 8. Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. The issue of cyber security was examined in detail to ensure that adequate mechanism is available with all the stakeholders to prevent any attack on the systems. Department of Information Technology. NHPC and POSCO.1 The matter was discussed with the representatives of POWERGRID.

61 .9 Vendors for cyber security systems should be developed as per International / National standards.4 A cyber audit specifically to detect malware targeting Industrial Control Systems (ICS) should be conducted at critical plants and sub-stations after any abnormal event.4. 8. 8. RTUs and communication equipments should have uninterrupted power supply with proper battery back up so that in case of total power failure.5 A dedicated team of IT Personnel for cyber security in all the Power Stations and Sub-stations should be developed and proper training for the team members should also be conducted regularly by the respective organizations to upgrade their skills. At present there is no wide area network at grid control level and there is no communication with power utilities using public domain. The Committee is of the opinion that that Grid Disturbance could NOT have been caused by a cyber attack.4. 8.3 Regular cyber vulnerability test/mock drills/cyber audit/and other measures as per the crisis management plan of CERT. 8.4.4. discussion & field visits.2 The existing communication network should be maintained properly.6 Mitigation strategies for countering physical attacks have to be drawn by all the power utilities. it is observed that the operation of grid is primarily manual and operations are done locally except in case of few 400 kV S/Ss which are controlled from remote locations through dedicated networks.8. 8.4.5 After going through the records.In should be carried out regularly by all the stakeholders.4. 8.3. 8. 8.4.7 Regulatory framework should be created for cyber security in the power sector.4. 8.8 An Office/ Body of Cyber Security Auditors should be created within Power Sector.4.1 During the discussions and according to the feed back provided by the stakeholders it emerged that Power Sector stack holders have taken adequate steps to prevent the cyber attack on their system and also have dedicated organisational polices in this regard. supervisory commands & control channels do not fail.4 Suggestions 8.

cost effective and reliable. ii) 62 .8. i) A proper network may be built up preferably using MPLS (Multi Protocol Label Switching) which is simple. practically covering all major nodes and power stations.4. the stations can use dedicated fibre cable from the nearest node Since POWERGRID has its own fibre optic cables. it is absolutely important that all the power generating and distributing stations are connected on a very reliable telecom network. In remote place where connectivity is a problem.10 For smooth operation of grid systems. a proper communication/IT network may be built using dedicated fibres to avoid any cyber attack on the power system.

CTU Time Frame: 1 year 9. This Committee concurs with recommendation of previous enquiry committees that a thorough third party protection audit need to be carried out in time bound manner. CTU.2 Frequency Control through Generation reserves/Ancillary services 9. STUs Time Frame: 1 month 9. POSOCO may file an urgency application in Supreme Court for early resolution of the issue in view of the recent grid disturbances. Action: POSOCO Time Frame: 1 month 63 . Action: RPCs.2. there is need to take immediate review of zone-3 philosophy in particular.4 A complete independent audit of time synchronization of DRs.Chapter. This exercise should be repeated periodically and monitored by RPCs.1. STUs Time Frame: Immediate 9. Action: Generators. There is also an urgent need to deploy Special Protection System (SPS) in critical transmission elements.1 Frequency band needs to be further tightened and brought close to 50 Hz.1 Review of Protection Systems 9.9 RECOMMENDATIONS 9. ELs and PMUs should be carried out.1 There is a need to review protection schemes.1.2 Till protection audit is taken up.3 The application of synchrophasor measurements from PMUs should be explored for protection systems. Action: RPCs.1. Also there is need to make already approved SPS operational. These techniques and other alternatives should be explored immediately. Techniques are available to modify characteristics of the relay so that it can distinguish between load encroachment and faults. CTU.1. Action: RPCs. CTU. STUs Time Frame: 1 year 9.

5 Revising Total Transfer Capability (TTC) based on change in system conditions 9. Appropriate regulatory mechanism needs to be put in place for this purpose.9. Action: POSOCO Time Frame: 3 months 9.3 Ensuring proper functioning of defense mechanism All STUs should immediately enable under frequency and df/dt based load shedding schemes. Action: POSOCO Time Frame: 1 month 64 . In case non-compliance persists.2. 2003. POSOCO Time Frame: Immediate 9.4 Ensuring primary frequency response from generators All out efforts should be made to implement provisions of IEGC with regard to governor action. POSOCO should approach Central Commission.1 POSOCO should take up with Central Commission the issue of inconsistency between Congestion regulation and the detailed procedure framed there under so that congestion due to forced outages and Unscheduled Interchange (UI) can be handled effectively.5. RPCs. Central Commission should explore ways and means for implementation of various regulations issued under the Electricity Act. Any violation of these regulations can prove to be costly as has been the case this time. POSOCO need to take up the matter with Central Commission. Action: POSOCO Time Frame: 3 months 9.2 A review of UI mechanism should be carried out in view of its impact on recent grid disturbances. Frequency control through UI may be phased out in a time bound manner and Generation reserves/Ancillary services may be used for frequency control. Central Commission needs to look into ways and means to hasten implementation of provisions of IEGC including that on governor action. Action: STUs. RPCs need to take up the matter for compliance. POSOCO should take up the matter with CERC.

Action: RPCs Time Frame: Immediate 9. Action: POSOCO Time Frame: 6 months 9.6 Coordinated outage planning of transmission elements Outage planning of inter-State and inter-regional transmission elements should be carried out in a coordinated manner at RPC fora (say Operation Co-ordination sub-committee of RPCs) in accordance with regulation 5 of Central Electricity Authority (Grid Standards) Regulation. Appropriate amendments need to be carried out in the Electricity Act. need review. STUs Time Frame: 6 months 9. Action: CEA. 2010 and Section 5. installation of adequate static and dynamic reactive power compensators should be planned. NLDC and RLDCs should allow such maintenance after carefully looking at prevailing system conditions under intimation to RPC Secretariat. Govt.9. manpower at NLDC and RLDCs need to be enhanced with regulatory support to take care of financial aspects. 2003 The powers of Load Despatch Centres and Regulatory Commissions related to non-compliance of statutory/regulatory provisions including that for non-compliance of directions and non-payment of UI charges. of India Time Frame: 6 months 65 . Till this arrangement can be firmed up.1 of Indian Electricity Grid Code.8 Review of penal provisions of the Electricity Act. 2003 after such review. In case need for emergency maintenance arises in between two meeting of Operation Co-ordination sub-committee. To facilitate this. Faster algorithm for calculation of TTC may be adopted by the load despatchers to update it in real time under outage conditions.7. various scenarios of outages could be built. which then can be used by despatcher in real time.2 NLDC and each RLDC should have one real-time security desk in all the shifts to be manned by engineer capable of carrying out TTC calculations.7 Reactive power planning In order to avoid frequent outages/opening of lines under over voltages and also providing voltage support under steady state and dynamic conditions. CTU. Action: Ministry of Power.5.

9. Action: RPCs Time Frame: 1 year 66 . Generators Time Frame: 6 months 9.10 Deployments of WAMS 9. Adequate number of PMUs should be installed to improve the visibility and real time monitoring of the system. Further the applications related to the synchrophasor based wide area monitoring.2 Possibility of voltage collapse prediction. SVC and PSS should be done immediately to ensure that their stability features are enabled. protection and control should be embedded in the system.2 An audit of devices such as HVDC.10. sensing global power system conditions derived from local measurements may be explored.9.3 Functioning of existing PMUs and availability of their output to RLDCs and accuracy of time synchronization should be monitored on daily basis and. exercise of PSS tuning should be planned and implemented. POSOCO Time Frame: Immediate 9. Settings of these dynamic stabilizing devices should be reviewed at appropriate intervals.9 Optimum utilization of available assets 9. Action: CTU Time Frame: 1 year 9. corrective actions should be taken on priority basis. Action: CTU. specially under the dynamic conditions. Action: POSOCO Time Frame: Immediate 9.1 The synchrophasor based WAMS employing PMUs offer a wide applications for real time monitoring and control of the system.10. Further.1 The regulatory provisions regarding absorption of reactive power by generating units needs to be implemented. if required. Action: CTU. TCSC.9.9. STUs.

Action: STUs Time Frame: 2 years 67 . SLDCs should be reinforced and ring fenced for ensuring functional autonomy. In addition. System operation needs to be entrusted to Independent System Operator (ISO).13.9. Time Frame: 1 year 9. POWERGRID.13 Autonomy to Load Despatch Centres 9. RPCs. SLDCs and Generators Time Frame: 6 months 9. electrical islands can be formed. dynamic security assessment need to be periodically carried out at the control centers.13.2 Training and certification of system operators need to be given focused attention.14 Development of Intra-State transmission system Intra-State transmission system needs to be planned and strengthened in a better way to avoid problems of frequent congestion.12 Implementation of islanding schemes Efforts should be made to design islanding scheme based on frequency sensing relays so that in case of imminent grid failure. STUs. A proper review and upgradation of the state estimation procedure is required to improve the visibility and situational awareness of the system. The present organizational set up of Load Despatch Centres need to be reviewed. Action: Govt. These electrical islands can not only help in maintaining supply to essential services but would also help in faster restoration of grid. State Govts. Action: Govt. of India. homogenization of system operation philosophy is need of the hour. State Govts. Sufficient financial incentives need to be given to certified system operators so that system operation gets recognized as specialized activity. Action: CEA. Action: POSOCO Time Frame: 6 months 9. Time Frame: 3 months 9.1 As National Grid is on the horizon. of India.11 Need of Dynamic Security Assessment and review of State Estimation In order to assess the system security in real time and assess the vulnerability condition of the system.

A standard procedure for preparatory activities and sequence of start up may be put in place by the stations to restore units as early as possible particularly in contingencies.9.15. the same should be put in place at the earliest. If prolonged operation without telemetry continues.4 In case of existing generating stations or transmission elements without telemetry facility. Time Frame: 6 months 9. Action: RPCs.15.15. supervisory control and data acquisition channels do not fail.3 RTUs and communication equipments should have uninterrupted power supply with proper battery backup so that in case of total power failure. Action: CTU and STUs Time Frame: One years 9.15 Network visualization 9.16 Reduction in Start-up time for Generators: Large variations are observed in time taken for initiation of unit start up (Boiler light up) by the stations after availability of start-up power and also for start ups/light up of subsequent units. While subsequent start-ups were very fast (10-20 minutes) in some of the units.1 Appropriate amendments should be carried out in Grid Connectivity Standards to restrain connectivity of a generating station or a transmission element without required communication and telemetry facilities. POSOCO should approach Central Commission. Action: CEA. the Communication network should be maintained properly to ensure reliability of data at Load Despatch Cenres. Generating Utilities and RLDCs Time Frame: one year 68 . Reasons for the delays in attempting first start-up and subsequent start-ups may be examined by the utilities in consultation with CEA. Further.2 The Communication network should be strengthened by putting fibre optic communication system. Action: CTU and STUs Time Frame: 3 months 9. in other cases they took considerably longer time – several hours. POSOCO Time Frame: 6 months 9. Action: CEA.15.

CEA Time Frame: 1 month 69 . these should be created.18 Strengthening of system study groups in various power sector organizations: There is need to reinforce system study groups in power sector organisations to analyse the system behaviour under different network status/ tripping of lines/outage of generators. Where these do not exist. Four out of the five regions have been integrated and formation of National Grid is on the horizon.9. Under such scenario. Action: CEA Time Frame: 3 months 9. With de-licensing of generation and provision of open access in Electricity Act. to carry out a detailed analysis of the present grid conditions and anticipated scenarios which might lead to any such disturbances in future. lot of generation is coming in the form of merchant generation. Action: CEA. involving experts from academics. 2003 and development of organized electricity markets. CTU and STU Time Span: one year 9.19 Formation of a task force to study the grid security issues: It was felt that a separate task force may be formed. Action: MOP. the entire landscape has changed over past few years. power utilities and system operators.17 Review of Transmission Planning Criteria At inter-State level. The committee may identify medium and long term corrective measures as well as technological solutions to improve the health of the grid. there is need review the Transmission Planning criteria.

70 .

"" * .f ei '.{ * ." ..?. ".. .i.if.' C .'. 2ar2 i ""."i..&.: .?"'...1 !' ..j' .' * ..' ..i.' * "..ie..i'i444 ."" .. .t ..1 .?.:! S U PPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR THE REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY COMMITTEE FORTHE GRID DISTURBANCES .i.%."' %' .' r ....' .i".....1 oN SCrH AND 31sr IULY.." ...%4...i4. ..%." .]i4"i4":."' ." .i"ir"." %..: "i ". 2A12 L6tn August.%..i.

."...8 2. 3.6 2. .? Details of Event Logger and Disturbance Recorder at Different Loiations on 31't luly..i. .%"i44.7 2..11 2." "..2 2. "".j* -jf j. .i EXHIBIT 2: Details of Event Logger and Disturbance Recorder at Different Locations on 30th July.. western.I at Patna :i EL at Patna S/s DR at Patna S/s :..I x Gwalior end DR of 400 kV Bina."" ..i.. .3: . ...16 DR of Sasaram - Balia at Sasaram EXHIBIT 2.15 2.id."?. DR of 400 kV Agra.Raurkela .9 2.1 at Bina end..Z.:.10 2.1 "..I 2.i.""-. . "': EXHIBIT .Gwalior ...i4"i.13 2.c .. Joo soo ..1 at Jamshedpur EI. .f. .%f.?. Eastern . .j ". %" . 1: Power Map Indicating Inter-Regional Lines Between Northern. * "...l "9.5 2..i4..""1""!"ini i.ri." .od "j. "..J { io.2012 4 I f.: DR of 400 kV Bina.: ': ': ": :l ...Gwalior DR of 220kV Bhinmal j..?.4 2.i4.%.. ". ". 2.2012 n "1.i.i. ooo ..i.. "* "t & North-Eastern Regions & . .| at Bina end.12EL at Biharshariff DR of Patna - Balia .14 .: a.'.at 400 kV Gorakhpur DR at 400 kV Muzaffarpur DR at Biharshariff o1 e .3 2. * .44.2.r" . - Sanchore at Bhinmal end Rajasthan SLDC event report DR of 400 kV Jamshedpur DR of 400 kV Jamshedpur DR of 400 kV Jamshedpur - Raurkela --2 at Raurkela Raurkela Raurkela & -2 at Jamshedpur . "1.I at Raurkela DR of 400 kV Jamshedpur . . 2.". %.:.." ": 2. .Gwalior ..1 .

. . v : & : j" 3.oo .Raurkela - i 1 at Jamshedpur .2 3.3 3." r. l "'i & : .i .7 3. "..i .% "i . Sipat DR of 400 kV Raigarh DR of 400 kV Ranchi .% :." .. %. : : "% & & : . ."o r. oso %.? .. ""..4 3. c. .5 3.. .i .? :.8 3.11 j. :r "% .% ..6 3." : EL at Ranchi Sub-Station DR of 400 kV Ranchi "?.'1 "..."" I -2 at Rourkela : - - I at Rourkela .9 3.Maithon Rourkela Rourkela 1 at Ranchi : : DRatNTPC. .. .. : f.i ... "t '.10 Statistical data at Gwalior Sub-Station DR of 400 kV Jamshedpur .": DR at Raukela Sub-Station DR at Ranchi Sub-Station I "'1 : : "": l j" : F j..

Eastern "i I .'1 ft : j. "." ." fg p. Between 1"" j" .i & & f..1" : : .i j.i . & j" . l .L . Western. & :" j. ) "i ". J. j' I "i 4 .".i :x & s..i d'i .% POWERMAP Indicating Inter-Regional Lines ".: "i Jx North-Eastern Regions : f" : :x '.. . i! ." & t"' 4 .:.i .".": : Northern. j" j.i EXHIBIT . 3i .

ER and NER EXHJBIT . wR.l.I Map indicating the IR rinks between NR.EI .2.

35 Hrs. This has resulted the over loading on x'mers at 220 KV Mehalgaon S/s (Gwalior) and at around 00.05hrs. Al2'l:00 Hrs on 29.44 Flow 166 135 190 2l:3O 22:OO 29. Date and Time of Event: 02.2012 the load on 220 KV BadodModak line was 144 MW which started increasing despite repeated persuasion by MP-SLDC to control within safe limits and at 00.00 hrs of 30.10 hrs resulting in tripping of 220 KV Badod-Modak line on Over Load condition.2012.46 Hz.00 00.1_0 279 272 252 273 292 301 0 Line tripped on O/L At around 00.Report on qrid disturbance in Northern reqion on 30th Julv 2012 1. d.12. rose to 50. ISP and .20 hrs 132 l<V Motizheel (Gwalior).92 Hz Prefault Conditions:On 30.07.68 Hz . Frequency: Pre-lncident MP MP MP MP Thermal Hydel Gen incl. Post-lncident 1633 MW Schedule 1190 MW Drawal Demand 3413 MW Generation 1597 MW OSP 723 MW . ll hand tripped to avoid X'mers al 220 KV Mehalgaon S/s (Gwalior). Badod. 160 MVA X'mer at 220 KV Sabalgarh tripped on over current. Antecedent Conditions (@ 02.35 hrs of 30th July 2012 3.30th July 2012) a.5 30.49. 160MVA X'mer at 220 KY . lncident: Grid Disturbance in Northern Region 2.2012 due to breaker problem at Kota-end.Banmore Ckt I & overloading of Sabalgarh charged at 01.09 00. The flow on this line at different timings is given hereunder: Date Time 21:00 'J.07. b.07. c.07.32 hrs.2012 22:1.2012 22:30 23:00 23:30 line was idle charged from badod end since 29. the line load on Badod-Modak reached 276 MW and increased to about 300 MW at 00.05 00.06 to 00. f. e.

The supply interruption occurred to all 132 KV substations connected with 220 Al Malanpur s/s and 220 KV Mehgaon s/s. At 01.12 hrs 400 KV Bina.and 220!<V Gwalior (PGCIL) Malanpur-ll were under S/D since 29. lt is expected that Auraiya has drawn more power from Malanpur and Mehgaon which caused tripping of 220 KV Gwalior (PG) - Malanpur- I line.132 KV S/s Porsa. At 01.132KV S/s Morena . 132 KV Sls Morar. 5.45 hrs 132 KV Motizheel -Banmore Ckt I & ll charged 220 $/ Malanpur and 220K1 Mehagaon s/s 3. At 05. No tripping was observed on 220 KV Malanpur-Auraiya. 132!o/ S/s Bhind J32KV S/s Ron. Areas Affected by disturbance: 220 KV Malanpur.07. 132 KV Ambah. At 03. The load of about 280 MW of 22O KV Malanpur. 22O KV Mehgaon. Occurrence / Tripping at around 02. At 05. @ 1* .2012.45 hrs 400 KV Gwalior - Agra-l charged.I tripped on over load. At 04. At 06.26 hrs 220 KV Badod-Modak Ckt charged 4. With this tripping 220!<V Mahalgaon S/s completely got isolated from 400 KV Gwalior (PG) S/s. 7. Prior to tripping load on this ckt was about 280 MW.Malanpur -l charged.38 hrs 220 KV Gwalior(PG)-Mehalgaon Ckt charged.Gwalior-ll and 400 KV Gwalior - Agra-ll was under shut down.35 hrs220 KV Gwalior(PG).220 KV Mehgaon s/s along with 100 MW export to Auraiya of NR was on 400 KV Gwalior (PG). 400 KV Bina.35 hrs 220 KV Gwalio(PGCIL) 220 KV Gwalio(PGCIL) - Mahalgaon (Gwalior) ckt -l - Mahalgaon Circuit -ll tripped on over load.42 hrs 400 KV lSP-Satpura charged. Prior to tripping. At 02.34 Hr220 KV Gwalior (PG) - Malanpur.04 hrs 220 KV Malanpur-Auraiya charged. The power flow on this circuit before tripping was about 270 MW. At 04.09 hrs 220 KV Mehgaon-Auraiya charged. At 03. . 2. & Supply extended to L 9. 132t('| S/s Seondha -20 Minutes 132|K\1S/s Banmore. however as remote end supply failed. Restoration Process 1. Malanpur-Mehgaon & 220 l<V Mehgaon-Auraiya.35 hrs 160 MVA X'mer a|220 KV Sabalgarh Charged.f 0 Minutes Total Load Loss : About 200 MW in MP area. the supply to 220 KV Mehgaon was also failed. At 05.Gwalior -l charged B.132 KV S/s Lahar. 6.

' ". dr" j." & : i & & . : """ . : : 1"" & 1i 4 EXHIBIT .2 j: & : : ". : "i ." : : 3" 9"" DETAILS OF : .i : "t "'1 "..". AND DIS TIJRBANCE RECORDER j" j. .?..i t : ." :o.:x :" 4 : : 1': "". : :'x 3OTH JIJLY .2012 & & & "i "i ."" EVENT LOGGER & : 1i l 4 . & : i & i +. AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS ON :i j. '". 1'" : : ".

hydel generation was again reduced (One machine of ISP & OSP stopped at02.50 Hrs. The ckt was normalized at 03. 8 & 10 also tripped. lndirasagar (2 machines). 3. At 03. Omkareshwar (2 m/c) were taken out before tripping from 00.15 Hrs and load shedding was completely lifted from 00. 132KV Vindhyachal.l l l Actions Taken : The hydel units at Bargi (1 m/c).4. a t"# .39 hrs VSTPS unit No.5.WaidhanMorwa ckt tripped from Morwa end.7.00 to 1.00 Hrs. After the occurrence at 02:34 Hrs.45 hrs) to curtailfrequency.

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2. recording time Recording in Test mode Type of time synchronization IED TEF.33:1 1 AM StationlBay: I (11) Template: C: .0 Hz 801 Unit name Line lenglh System Frequency Flecarding number Triqqer signal name Trig date and time Pre-trig recording time Post trig recording time Total recording time Max.I-STFIV 7J30/2012 2:33:1 1.Exhibit.947 AM 300 ms 1999 ms 2324 ms 3000 ms No $NTP FIELETO 1 gpe B IED version Sampling frequency Disturbance recorder Event recorder Fault locator Active seiting group during recording 1.000 1.Disturbance Report General data Hame Station name Object name Value 400KVAgra line Gwalior-Agral line FIEL E7O Not applicable 50.Z DQat Gwalior ABB .0 kHz lnsialled lnstalled Not lnstalled 1 Recordino file: ?01 20I30eS Dete: 7i3d/201 2 2.

Disturbance Report Value Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Recordinu file: 201 20730e8 Date: I/3dJ201? 2:33.11 AM Station/Bav: 40014/ Aflra line/1 Te m F I ?t11) F I ate : C lP C MD aIa E a s e s\D R\te m ate sld efe u lt.xm I .il ltil Itlttt Fault locafion Hame Fault loop type Fault location Status of fault calculation Fault Direction ABB .

S' 152.z\r /p) lu. 248.Il llll Itiltlt Analog channels ABB .4' \- \\.0 kq o s 20s./ \_--/ .7' 133.2 kA 0.4' 120.2.7 kV 20s. lv \- Dale: 7/3tl/201? 2:33:11 Station/Bav: 40014/ Aura line/1 Te m p I AM slD R\te m p I 3 (11) ate sld efault xm ate :'C lP C M D aTa B a s e r'c l .7 Faultangle s4.8 kV ?46.3.4' s1.8 kv 2.7 kA '1.3' -?8.0' 0.3 kV -11s. -141. \.Disturbance Report Ghannel Humber \L 1 name Prefault FMS Prefault angle Fault RMS 1.2' 2S.7' 14.6 kv 208. \.8 KA 1.0 lqA M 0.0 kv 246.0" ! 10 4S.2 kA 0.0 kV '1.2 kA 0.8" s.g' -21.3" L LINE_A-IL1 2 3 4 7 LINE-A-IL2 LINE-A-IL3 LINE-A-IN LINE-UL] LINE-UL2 LINE-UL3 LINE_UN -105.7" 0.4 kv -148.

t/13 FHS-STFWPE l 1 1 1 23 24 '| 1 1 1 25 26 27 ao 30 31 JL JJ FSD..\jL2 PHS-STF\. Ii3{r201 2 2:33:1 1 AM a. StationJBav: 40014/ Afl ra lihell Te m p ate : C lP C M D ala Ea seslD R\tem I Recordinfl file: ?01 20730e8 4{11} p I ete s\defa ultxm (9 I .tl ll ll Itillt Digital Eharurels ABB .Disturbance Report Channelname Trigger enabled Trig Humber level Channel Trigger*tatr* at value attrig trig time time 1 I 3 M-CE FPH OPEN M-CB YFH OPEN M-CB BPH OPEN 1 'I 1 1 1 1 1 4 5 B MAIN-] CF FEC MAIN-] TRIP M/TIE AR OPID 7 E MjO/VTFIIP STUE/TEF OPTD DT CHl/2 FECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 "l s 10 11 MAINIICF MAIN-IITFIF ZMO3-STAFT BFFI OPTD T-CB RPH OPEN T-CE YPH OPEN T.CE EPH OPEN SOTF-TRIP 12 13 14 '15 16 17 1E 1S 1 1 20 2'l 1L ZCOM-TFIP OV STG-I TFIP OV STG-Z TFIP ICAL_IREVEL PHS-STFWLl PHS-STF\.I-STAFT IEF-TEIP 'I 'I 'I 1 1 1 1 tocl-TFrP +FAIL M2DEF-TFIIP L1 FUSE FAIL AJF UNSUCC 34 ttr 36 37 38 3S DT-REC-CH1 DT-REC_CH2 DFIEO3JNPUTS6 BFF EUTF '| '1 1 40 41 42 43 44 47 48 4S EFPTRFET Z1-TRIP M2 PSB Z1-STAFT U 2-TFIP 'I 1 1 1 1 3PH-GF-A_TRIP 3FH-GF-E_TFIP TEF-Trip TEST MODE ON GFI B BC FAIL CB FEADY C '| 'I 1 1 1 1 1 1 50 52 54 55 CHl FAIL INC $2 DC FAI M2 C$ 'I Date.

ABB .START TIE AFI UNCE PFIE 3PH TFIP BFFI-OPTD 1 1 62 63 B6 E7 E€ 6S 'l '| 'I 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 'I 1 TOCl-TFIP ERC TEF.Disturbance Report Digital channels Number Channelname Trigger enabled Trig level Channel Trigger value attrig statu* attrig time time 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 56 57 58 5S Z2-STAHT Z3-TRIP 1 1 1 0 0 '| 1 1 1 Z4-TFIP Z4-STAFT 'I 1 1 1 I 0 0 0 60 61 Z5-TFIP ZS.I-START '| 1 1 'l 1 0 0 1 70 71 J'J IJ TEFl-STFW TEF'I-STFV TEF1-2NDHARMD EFCl -TFIIP EFCA-TFIWEI 'I 1 '| 1 '| 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D '| 'I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7E 1 1 76 '7'7 7B 7S EFC-IREVEL TUVl-TFIIP TUV]-START ZCAL-TFIWEI 'I 1 '| 1 1 80 81 TOV]-STABT ffMAIN2 DEFTR GMAIN2 TFIP GMAIN2 PSE GMAINZ CS GMAINZ CB GMAINZ CF GMAINZ TOV 82 83 oi 85 s6 87 oo s5 s6 'I 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 'I 1 0 0 0 0 0 '| 1 '| 1 TIE-EFF-OPTD SetGRl ACTIVE SetGFlZ ACTIVE 'I 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 Reisrdiffi fiiai?o1 2"0?30e-frDate: 7i30/201? 2:33:1 AM 1 *-* 5 iii) +ll|lfiiiP-1t lE Bff#?Jb I ! StJtD ':: R\te m p I ate s\d er? lirt xm 'f-' aD I.-\- .

*'1*i .94? AM -250 0 25rl 500 nE lcV ?50 1000 1250 1500 1?50 300 200 I00 0 ** LIHE_ULI (?) -I00 -200 -300 kv 300 200 I00 0 il} LIHE_ULZ (8) -100 -200 -300 LV 300 ?00 r00 0 -100 -200 -300 - LrHE_UL3 (F) kv 300 200 100 0 -100 -200 -300 KA - LINE_UN (r0) I.5 [.?5 0 €- LrHE_A rlr (r) -0.33:11 AM Station/Bav: 4001(.ri.i":j.Disturbance Report Total rrcording Triggertinre: ?/30.fi llrl ttltlt ABB .?5 -I .r*rtf*:if..J KA 1.*S5.?5 0 -*- LII{E_A IL3 (31 -0.:t'#ii!$ -{i- LI}IE-A ILz (2) -0.J KA 0.5 0.5 KA 1.\'/ Aura lineil et .?5 -1.?012 2:33:11 .?5 -1.5 Recordino file: 201 20I30eB 6 (11) iemplate: C:lPCMDaTaBases\DRttemplatestdefaultxmla Date: IJ3ft2012 ?.?5 0 itFrlTeSlS*.?5 - l.:lrtil..5 0.?5 0 -*- LrHE_n_rN(41 -0.

94? AM 500 ilri -250 250 ?50 1000 1250 1500 I?50 tuMS M-CE RPII OPEH (1) M-CE YPH OPEII (2) M-CB EPH OPEN [3) MrrH-r cRREC (41 MAIN-I TRIP (5) M/TIE AROPTD (6) M-r o/v TRIP (?J STUE/TEF OPTD (8) DT cHlr? RECD (9) MAIN-II CR(IO) MAIH-II TRIP (I1) ZM03-START (I?) BrR OFTD (r3) T-CB RFH OPEH t14) T-CB YPH OPEH (I5] T.ll lt 0 ABB .TRIF (3I) Ll FrrsE FAIL (32) A/R UHSUCC (33J DT_REC_CHI (341 DT_REC_CH2 (3s) DRB03-INFUT36 (36) BFP BUTR.z TRIF (zUl UCAL IREITEL (zIJ FHS-STFWLl (2?) PHS-STFWL2 (23) PHS-STFFTL3 {24) PHS-STFWPE (2s) PSDI-START (26J IEF-TRrF (2?) rocr-TRIP (28) c-FArL t3D) MzDEF. (3?) EFF TRRET (38) zr_rRrP (39) M2 PSB {40) zl_srART (41) Z2-TRIF (42) 3PH_GR_A_TRIP (43) 3PH_GR_B_TRIP (44) TEF-Trip (4?) TEST MODE OH (48) FAIL T49) cB READT (50) c cHl FAIL {52) rHc s2 Dc rAr (54) M2 CS (55i z2-srART (s6] z3-TRrP (5?) Z4-TRIF (s8l Z4-START {5el zs-TRrP (60) GR E DC Z5-START (6r) TrE AR UHC5 (62) FRE 3FHTRIP (63) gn-PIIt(96l ii Dete: 7i3lI/?01 2 2:33:1 1 AM StationiEav: 400K'i Aqra lineil rii Fi Recordinu file: 201 20730e8 aGl c :tp C M DaTa Ea s r p I {11) es\D R\te m ate s\d efau ltxm I a4 .Disturbance Report Total recording Tr:gger tirne: ?/30#0I2 2:33: I 1.CB BPH OPEH (16) soTF-TRIF (r?) zcoM-TRiP (18) ovsTGr rRiP (I9) oYsTG.

. (11) Template: ClPCMDaTaBaseslDR\templateslddfar"ijtJ linel1 *r@ .: i l' .l no*ni 300i -300 t.{:} LINE_A_!L2 (2) -0.' "..i ri. u i..5 0. !\. . i.i tsol li iii ii. i.i ii it li i-r '1 '|: ' 'i . Trigser ABB ."'i \r \i i ii iiI \i i.?5 -I.finil rtttt. il ...I iiiii i i lii i i. i .ll*t-.iii ii l\ liii itiiiJil ii i\ii ii ii ='u.?5 -l. :..*." 1. i -300 iii kv *o:ooi 300 -300ir t.5 I."i ii .?5 0 -fr.5 1...l 1. file: 201 20730e8 Date: 7i3fi201? ?:33:1 1 AM Slalion/Bav: 400}<1/ Aora I ar^.5 0. i .1 oi\ -rsoiiJ ri \t ij ij lrl lj ii ir \: ::: \l \j ii ii ii lj li ii -rool'r 'ii.LIHE-A IL3 (3) -0. i.?5 -1.l (r) -0..94? AlrI l rtoi oi -rtol i ri !.?5 0 i i i ! i i i + LrHE_{ rl.Disturbance Report Disturbance I r?5 I89 ms I(V ir kvi :noi '15 100 M I50 25 25 50 ?5 ' L.5 0.l ti il i ri rsni I o |*_**__a.?J 0 .'.r ri ri ii l\ ii l\i .i t! t. rl !j .-u. =* i\ ii ii ri ir 1 .i I ' i.l# i !j li -rooi ll \i ii !i \l ti ri !i 1i \i -50 -50 -25 fl -25 0 5rl tim : ?/30/20 1 2 2 :33 : I 1 . i ! i .i iri i.-i.l i..?5 -L5 0.=1. .rr-ur*r: . i i i I I i I i i j t i i i il-.... .?5 0 -&- Lr$E_A_IN(4) -0.-5 trii+iivrir: TEFI-2NDHARMD (?2) Recordinf._*** uf -tso i I.-"'.

8 11 8.Disturbance RePoil Disturbance 1 (Voltages) Calculation interval: -10 to I ms Numher 1 2 3 4 RMSftVI ry--lD 353.8' LINE-UL3 ?13..l'.4 bateL il:dlzot 2 2:33:11 AM +llllf ii'. $$5n5#ft( tu) lv .tFBffd?Jal[E'J'DRnemprates\f.6 223.ABB .7' t-ttle-ult 227 '3 LINE-UL2 185.7' 81 9' LINE-UN 21 .

S" 4 tL3 tN 0.2' 10t11] .ABB .1 0.1 fkAl Anqle 1s.4 RMS lD 353.5.2 13.7' 22S.8 2t.Disturbance Repoft Dislurbance 1 (Voltages) Disturbance (Currents) Calculation interval: -10 to I ms Calculstion interval: Anqle Number 1 -1 0 to I ms RMS Nurnher ![ 1 2 3 4 LINE-UL1 LINE-ULz LINE-UL3 LINE UN tkvl 227.6 213.3 185.7' 81 .1" 132.t1 . '.4 0.4 0.6' 1 2 J L|NE_A_|L1 L|NE_A_IL2 L|NE_A L|NE_A 18.

S47 AM 7/30J2012 2:33:11.S71 AM 7/30J2012 2:33:11.D .S71 AM Ir L & f / J Date: 7/3{I/2012 ?:33:11 Stalion/Bav: 4U0K.^s*iqr '':r:tl m I . r r I v r Y P fi tlll 'TITil Event list ABB .Disturbance Report Hame TEFI-STFV TEFI-STRV TEFI-ZNDHARMD TEFI-2NDHARMD Humber 71 72 71 72 Statu* On 0n Off Off Time 7/30J2012 2:33:11.S47 AM 7/30J2012 2:33:11.t.xm r./ Aora lineil Te mp late :'C IP C M D aIa Ea se s\DRltem AM 11 t11} p I ates\default./-\ (.

Disturbance Report General data Name Station name Object name Unit name Line length System Frequency Recording number Trigger signal name Trig date and time Pre-trig recording time Post trig recording time Total recording time Max.0 Hz 37 PSB-OPTD 7 13012012 2:33: 1 3. 1 67 AM 100 ms 1999 ms 2925 ms 6000 ms No SNTP L67t11 01 1.3 DR at Bhinmal Value bhinmal 220kv sanchore REL67O Not applicable 50.101 1. recording time Recording in Test mode Type of time synchronization IED type IED version Sampling frequency Disturbance recorder Event recorder Fault locator Active setting group during recording Exhibilg.fi rnil t*ilil ABB .0 kHz lnstalled lnstalled Not lnstalled 1 1(11) ftp :ii .

Disturbance Report Fault location Name Fault loop Fault Status of fault Fault type location calculation Direction Value Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 2 (11) "=*@ .ftil|r FIFTI ABB .

Disturbance Report Analog channels Number Channel name Prefault RMS 0.@ .7" angle Faull RMS 0.0' Recordino fi le: 201 2073000 D ale: 7 I 3O I 20 1 2 2:33: 1 3 AM Station/Bav: bhinmal/1 Tempiate: C:\PeMDataBases\DR\templates\default.ABB .1 kV Prefault -128.6 kV 102.8 kA 0.5' -8.8 kA 0.IN LINE-UL1 LINE-UL2 -84.5" -1 19.1" 0.6" 109.8 kA 0.7" -84.5" 1 L|NEI_|L3 LINE-A.xml 3(11) .5' LINE UL3 120.0 kA 102.6' 109.0 kA 102.8 kA 0.1 kV Fault angle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 LINE-A-IL1 LINE-A-IL2 -128.1 kV 102-6 kV 102.8 kA 0.1 kV 102.0" 120.1' 0.8 kA 0.5" 't9..5' -8.

xml 4 (11) Itr .Disturbance Report Number Digital channels Channel name Trigger enabled 1 1 1 1 Trig level value at time 1 1 1 Ghannel trig Trigger status at trig time 1 TRIP TRIP-R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 TRIP-Y TRIP-B BROKEN-COND 0 0 0 4 6 7 8 10 11 1 1 1 0 1 1 I ZMOl-TRIP ZMOl-START ZMO2-TRIP ZMO2-START ZMO3-TRIP ZMO3-START ZM04-TRIP ZMO4-START ZMO5-TRIP ZMO5-START SOTF-TRIP ZCOM-TRIP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 'l 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 1 13 14 15 16 17 18 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .ABB .1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 23 24 25 26 30 32 41 PHS-STFWLl PHS-STFWL2 PHS-STFWL3 PHS-STFWPE PSB. 2O 1 207 30OO Dale: 7 13O12012 2:33:1 3 AM Station/Bav: bhinmal/1 Template: C:\PCMDataBases\DR\templates\default.OPTD 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 'l 1 1 AR-UNSUC FUSE FAIL 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 45 46 47 49 50 51 DC1-FAIL MAIN-CB_OPN-R MAIN_CB-OPN-Y MAIN-CB_OPN-B SOTF_INI 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 M2_CARR-OT CARRIER_REC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 63 64 65 66 81 CARR-CH_FAIL DT-TRIP_REC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 TUVl-TRIP M2_CAR*OT CARR-REC-CH1 TR-R_MAIN-CB TR-Y-MAIN_CB TR_B_MAIN_CB CARR_SEND TR_R_TBC_CB 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 0 'l 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TR_Y_TBC-CB TR_B-TBC-CB AR_CLOSE-MAIN AR_CLOSE_TBC TRIP_3P_MAIN 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 TRIP_3P-TBC TRrIP OV STG-1 TRIP OV STG-2 TRIP 92 93 94 i ov 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 Record nq file'.

I 1 Dale: 7 I 3O 12012 2 :33: 1 3 AM Station/Bav: bhinmal/1 Tempiate: C:\PCMDataBases\DR\templates\default.Disturbance Report Digital channels Number 95 Channel name Trigger enabled Trig level Channel value at trig time 0 Trigger status at trig time 0 OV START .ABB .xml Recordino fi le: 201 2073000 5 (11) #@ .

xml 8 (ait .ltl Ett ABB .167 ms -25 O AM 25 7s 100 125 150 PSB-OPTD (26) Recordino fi le: 201 2073000 D ale: 7 I 3D I 2O1 2 2:33: 1 3 AM Station/Bav: bhinmal/1 Template: C :\PC MDataBases\DR\templates\default.Disturbance Report Disturbance I Trigger time: 7/30/2012 2:33:13.

Disturbance Report Disturbance 1 (Voltages) Calculation interval: 2 to 20 ms Number D 1 L|NE_UL1 2 L|NE_UL2 LINE_UL3 3 RMS (kV) 100.0 Anole 101.5 102.ABB .6' 288.8' Station/Bav: bhinmal/1 Template: C:\PCMDataBases\DR\templates\default.t?e* @ .6 48.xml fi le: 201 2073000 Dale: 7 l3Ol2O12 2:33: 1 3 AM Recordino e (11) irs.5' 167.

O Anqle 38.6 1 2 3 4 Number lD L|NE_A_|L1 L|NE_A_|L2 L|NE_A_|L3 LINE A IN RMS (kA) 0.Disturbance Report Disturbance 1 (Voltages) Disturbance 1 (Currents) Calculation interval: 2 to 20 ms Calculation interval: 2 to 20 ms Anole 48.9' 277.8 0.8" 1 59.5" 167.0' 10 (1 1) €@ .102.8 O.0 UL3 101.8 0.6" 288.8" 1 2 3 Number lD L|NE_UL1 L|NE_UL2 LINE RMS (kV) 100.1' 85.tt tlNt t*IItl ABB .5 '.

476 AM 2:33: 1 3.474 AM 2:33'.476 AM 2:33: 1 3.47 4 AM 2:33:1 3.1 3.476 AM 2:33: 1 3.1 67 7 13012012 2:33: 7 13012012 7 13012012 7 13012012 7 I 30 I 20 1 1 AM PHS-STFWLl PHS-STFWL3 PHS.Disturbance Report Event list Number 26 22 24 23 45 46 47 22 24 23 26 Name PSB-OPTD Status On On On On On On On Time 7 13012012 2:33:13.xml 11 (11) ffi .40'l AM 2:33:1 3.401 AM 2:33:1 3.ABB .992 AM Recordino file: 201 2073000 Dale: 713O12012 2:33:13 AM Station/Bav: bhinmal/1 Template: C:\PCMDataBases\DR\templates\default.476 AM 2:33: 1 3.STFWL2 MAIN_CB-OPN-R MAIN-CB-OPN-Y MAIN-CB-OPN-B PHS-STFWLl PHS-STFWL3 PHS-STFWL2 PSB-OPTD 2 7 13012012 7 13012012 7 13012012 7 13012012 7 13012012 off off off off 3.41 6 AM 2:33:'l 3.

SSTPS # 6 DCCPP GT #1 DCCPP GT #2 Chhabra # 1 248 243 248 143 0 Alreadv under S/D due to less oas. Wind Power Plants(WPP) 4. Rajwest Power Pvt. KSTPS # 5 KSTPS # 6 KSTPS # 7 195 SSTPS # 1 SSTPS # 2 SSTPS # 3 SSTPS # 4 SSTPS # 5 192 238 244 0 Already under S/D for over-hauling work.Ramgarh GTPS . Antecedent condition (at 2. Location: 1. Date of Event: 30. Plant and/or equipment directlv involved: SSTPS. # 1 36 135 135 0 #3 #4 #2 Already under S/D due to annual maintenance.'12 Northern Region (Rajasthan) 3. Description and cause of event: Northern Grid Failure. RAPP# 2.34 Hrs. ClUssU&bhhtd.CTPP.07.Ltd.l2at02. Chhabra#2 Ramoarh GT # 1 Ramoarh GT # 2 Ramqarh STG RAPP A 247 214 28 31 10 192 48 0 Giral# 1 Giral # 2 Raiwest Raiwest Raiwest Rajwest Already under S/D due to leakage in seal pot 2. KSTPS.Exhibit 2'{ nalasthan SLDC Event Report EVENT REPORT (From Rajasthan) Event: 2.DCCPP.NLDC'SNAMSIMNeshqNewfoler(2)Uved aalysis 30Jull2M SYSEMDISruBANCE30. Giral TPS.30 hrs. 5. Time of 02.34Bs..dd .07.Barsinsar.) A).Generation Unit KSTPS KSTPS KSTPS KSTPS MW Remarks # 1 96 #2 #3 #4 98 199 0 197 Already under S/D to attend feed water leakaqe.

07 197 195 # 1 #2 SSTPS # 3 SSTPS # 4 SSTPS # 5 SSTPS # 6 DCCPP GT #1 DCCPP GT #2 192 238 244 0 12.33 Loss of generation (in MWh) 364.27 09. v) 6.34 02. 5 (B) Load loss Rajasthan demand 6302 MW.55 13.34 09.29 16.Enclosed at i) Annexure -2.35 11.34 02. Generation interrupted.00 ctu*Bu&inkrato.NlDc-sN&stMNeskopNwfold€r(2)Evd bdysis 30Juil2w sYsEMDISrureNcE30. (Block ending at 2.8 1126 Giral# 1 02.34 02.24 23.4 3867.34 02.6 2308. a) Own generation 1718 MW.34 - Normal.34 02.52 10.05 780.34 02.54 3117112 248 143 0 18.34 02.34 15.34 09.8 1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 07.55 09.34 02.13 06. b) NR schedule c) Overdrawl 31 MW ii) Frequency 49.22 10.39 4. 07.12ar02. Unit Weather condition prior to the event (Rajasthan) Time of tripping 02.53 6.07.8 805.) \U .34 02.13 3.48 8.46 59.21 S/D Due to problem oone in S/D 1469.23 772.34 02.55 14.35 001 Chhabra # 1 247 Chhabra# 2 Ramoarh GT # 1 Ramoarh GT # 2 Ramqarh STG RAPP A 214 28 31 10 192 48 02.26 12.34 02.6 3172 S/D 10490.47 Duration KSTPS # KSTPS KSTPS KSTPS KSTPS KSTPS KSTPS SSTPS SSTPS 1 96 98 199 0 3.16 15.85 S/D 11404. MW Time of synch.26 280 289.78 S/D 1310.34 02. 4531 MW.O1 248 243 20.00 12.34 02.Barsinqhsar # 1 Barsinghsar # 2 114 0 Already under S/D due to boiler tube leakaqe.20 15.34 02.42 13.34Es.30 AM) iii) Voltage of important GSS.de t6 6.34 02.00 18.34 02.84 Hz.7 3558.58 118112 6.00 2409. iv) Flow in the tie line prior to the grid disturbance .Enclosed at Annexure -1.01 9.21 7.34 02.

79 1687.33 02. 86GT 81 B.Z1. 86GY.386 RYB 2 220 kV Modak-Badod 00.d@ . 86G.05 5 6 7 8 KSTPS KSTPS KSTPS KSTPS # 1 #2 #3 #5 02.21 CG. 86GBY. 86G.A B C phase.Prot.28 23.. Sequence of trippinq with time & relav flaqs' S. topNewror&r(2)\Event d r""T*""rr_Wat02.RYB phase.07.34 02.dist.8.34 Raiwest # 3 Raiwest # 4 Rajwest # 2 2. 86GX. 86G8.121 Time of closino 16. 86GBY.dist..54 S/D 259.27 09.1 3 I KSTPS # 6 06.25 kM Dhorimanna End: No Trippino 81 B. 81B. Kota STPS.carrier send.prot.47 07.29 13.45 Relay indications 29.34 Bhinmal End: OA/ Sanchore End: No Trippino Bhinmal End: Dist. 1 Name of Feeder/Transformer 220 kV Kota-Badod Time of triooinq 15.12 15.C phase.22 10.53 12.34 02.10 03.34 03.trip.3 kM.dist.6.25 03. B6G.34 02.5 S/D 5806. Relevant svstem data(copies to be attached) S. Ramgarh Gas Station as received are enclosed at Annexure -3.27 31.3117112 Giral#2 Rajwest # 1 0 36 135 135 0 1 02.12 Kota End: M-l.STFW triP o/c 3 4 22OkV Bhinmal(PG)Sanchore 220 kV BhinmalDhorimanna 02.TOC 1.4 S/D Barsinghsar # 114 0 5.03 16. 86GBX. 8.86G8.86GT. 86GBX.Gen.N. 86GT 81B.34h. GiralTPS.56 1t8t12 Barsinohsar # 2 7.78 kM Badod end : Dist.Z1. 86GX.30 50.35 Kota End: No tripping Badod end:O/L.286 RYB. 86G8.34 02.C phase.34 02. Barsinghsar TPS.34 07.34 02. 86GY.7.5 1876. 1 Descriotion 2 3 4 Disturbance Recorder Event loqqer Data acquisition svstem Any other The individual data / report received from Suratgarh -STPS.34 02.86.286 RYB.&9.No.Z1. 81 B.Mll.

1tgt12 10.30 Yet to receive.00 02.05 Relay indications Bhinmal End: Dist.34 02. Manually triooed. Manually triooed.33 Manually triooed. 03.26 12. 86GBX.55 09.34 02. Under frequency.34 Time of closinq 03.34 02. 25 26 27 Raiwest # 3 Raiwest # 4 Barsinghsar # 1 02.20 03.27t 31... (pa9e.27 03.Prot.34 02. 81 B.34 02.34 02. Manually triooed.Enclosed at Annexure4. Over voltaoe/ Under freq.34 02.07 12 13 14 15 16 17 '18 SSTPS # 1 SSTPS # 2 SSTPS # 4 SSTPS # 5 SSTPS # 6 DCCPP GT #1 Chhabra # 1 12. 1 Details of under frequency and df/dt realy operation :.27 Bhinmal End: OA/ Sanchore End: No Tripoino 5 6 7 . freouencv. Chhabra#2 Ramoarh GT # 1 Ramqarh Gf # 2 Ramoarh STG RAPP A 19 20 21 1. Yet to receive.34 02.27 03.20 03. 86GBY.34 02. Yet to receive.35 09.58 1lBl12 02. frequencv.1 2 Under frequencv.34 02. 86GY.34 02.54 3117112 86GX.34 02.34 15.29 16.34 02.55 22 23 24 Giral# 1 1 Rajwest # 13.34 02. 02.34 02.A B C phase.35 1 Over voltaoe/ Under freo.10 11 KSTPS # 7 02. freouencv. Yet to receive. 18.34 15.16 15. Yet to Under Under Under receive.Z1.N. 11.03 16.dist.07..25 kM Dhorimanna End: No Triooino 2 3 4 220 kV DhorimannaRaiwest Power 220 kV RajwestBarmer-l 220 kV Bhinmal(PG)Sanchore 132kV JaisalmerAmarsaoar 132kV JaisalmerRamoarh GTPS 220 kV Amarsagar-Mada I Manually triooed. Under freouencv Under frequencv Over voltage/ Under freq.25 03.28 5..). S..34 20. Sequence of restoration with time Name of Feeder/Transformer 220 kV BhinmalDhorimanna Time of triooino 02.34 02.

35 Modak End: No tripping Badod end:O/L.38 04.11 04. Manually triooed.:' . Manually triooed. Manually triooed. Manually triooed. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Manually 132kV Kota-Railway 220 kV Kota-KTPS 220 kV Kota-Anta 220kV Modak-Jhalawar 220 kV Jhalawar-CTPP 220 kV KTPS-Heerapura 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 220kV Barmer-Giral TPS-I 132kV HeerapuraChambal 22OkV Barmer-Giral TPS.50 03.40 triooed.48 03.38 04.55 04.STFW triP o/c 11 132kV Modak-Railway 22OkV Barmer-Giral TPS-I 220 kV Modak-KTPS 220 kV AmarsagarPhalodi 132kV RPS-Kota Manually 03.286 RYB. Manually triooed. 00.22 04. Manually trioped. Manually trioped. Manually triooed. Manually triooed. Manually triooed. Manually triooed.I 9 10 220 kV AmarsagarAkal Manually 03.52 03..53 04.49 03.TOC 1.27 03.10 03.29 04.o2 04.23 04.58 ClUsdsUMlhtatd.III 132kV Kota-RAPP A 220 kV RajwestBarmer-l 132kV AmarsagarTeiwa-l 22OkV KTPS-KoIa(PG) 22OkV Kota(PG)-RAPP c 22OkV GiralTPS-Akal 220 kV Phalodi-Barsinsar triooed. Manually triooed.22 04.86.23 04. Manually triooed.. Manually trioped. Manually triooed. Manually tripped.27 220 kV Barmer-Mada 220 kV Modak-Badod triooed.40 03.NLDC-SNAMSIMNeskoPNw foldq (2)Smt-a!dvds]0jdl2M SYSEM . 03.35 04. Manually trioped. Manually triooed.35 03.02 04. Manually triooed. Manually triooed.

Any other relevant information and observation. A) Supply Restoration time at various Power Plants ctuwFutu'bratorNlDc-sNARAslMrueskopNw lorder (2)\Event Mlysi3J0Jdi2MI.22 05.01 06. Manually triooed.42 05.3 kM.01 06.Gen.59 05.78 kM Badod end : Dist.C phase.36 07. Manually triooed. Manually tripped. Manually tripped.41 07. Manually tripped._SYSTEM2IttBT*Nq l0 e(7v/ */-) \_:--/ 0? l2 /r 02 14 Bs de .RYB phase. Manually tripped.07.05 06.Zl.55 06.B.12t 29. Manually triooed. Manually tripped.05 16.6.386 RYB 12.42 05. 15.40 05.dist.13 05. Manually triooed. Manually triooed.12 04.24 07.45 Kota End: M-l.c phase.08 05.trip.32 132kV Kota-RAPP B 220 kV Phalodi-Tinwari 220 kV Heerapu ra-Khetri 220 kV Anta-Dausa 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 220 kV Dausa-Hindaun 220 kV Khetri-J hu njh un u 220 kV JhunjhunuRatanqarh 220 kV RatangarhSSTPS 220 kV Hindaun-Dholpur 220 kV RatangarhRatnqarh(400kV GSS) 220 kV Ratngarh(4OOkV GSS)-Bikaner 220 kV Dholpur-DCPP 220 kV Bikaner-Barsi nsar 220 kV Barmer-Balotra 220 kV KTPS-Beawar 42 43 44 45 46 47 22OkV Beawar-RAS 48 49 132kV AmarsagarTeiwa-ll 220 kV Kota-Badod Manually tripped.41 11.43 05. Manually triooed. Manually tripped..Zl.2BG RYB. Manually triooed. Manually triooed.21CG. carrier send.dist. Manually triooed. Manually tripped. prot.M-ll.

s.ll1 .39 Hrs.No. 06.NlDc-sNAMslm6kqwwfortu(2)Evedbdysi.20 Hrs.27 Hrs.59 Hrs.02 Hrs. 04. 03.50 Hrs.-*-'ailat0234Bsd& .55 Hrs. 03. 03.27 Hrs. Rajwest Power 2 3 GiralTPS Ramgarh GTPS Wind Power SSTPS KSTPS DCCPP 4 5 6 7 I 9 10 11 CTPP RAPP A RAPP B Barsingsar Anta 12 . 03. 04.hilsrsid.40 Hrs. 05.06 Hrs. 1 Name of Generating Stations Time 03.3y. 04. 03.S.*g: cruffisu. 04.58 Hrs.23 Hrs.

59 Hrs. 03. 04.& ciri dS lzu Yl_-/ I \ ) .55 Hrs. 03. 04.20 Hrs.No.50 Hrs. 03. 03. 05.34tu.39 Hrs. Rajwest Power 2 3 GiralTPS Ramgarh GTPS Wind Power SSTPS KSTPS DCCPP CTPP RAPP A RAPP B 4 5 6 7 8 I 10 11 Barsingsar Anta 12 Ir# for&rr2ruwm_aaarydsjorur:m_svsnuors)lT\2dm.06 Hrs.27 Hrs.27 Hrs. 04.02 Hrs.40 Hrs. 03. 1 Name of Generating Stations Time 03.23 Hrs.S. 04. 06.58 Hrs.


DR at Rourkela

!He: Monday 30 July 2012O2.33.13.001.DAT - 3On7nO12 - 02:33:13-887 - Secondary - (Peek Type) * file Information: . '

Station: JAUS'IEDPUR-II Device: 8 file Name: D:\DOCUMENTS eNo Sttt tNes \sEBvER\My Docut'tsNTs\s 1 sruDro\ pGcrI" FiIe Size: 244801 Bytes Prefault Tiroe: 30/07l2012 02:33:13.671000 Fault Tins: 3A/07 12012 02:33:13.85?000 Save Time: 07/30/?OLZ 15:10:0{
Process Tirqe: 07l30/2O12 l5ztOt27

start Dace 6a Tlme: 3O/O7/20L2 02:33:13.5?1000 End Date s& Tltne: 30/07/20L2 02:33:15.18165? FiIe Duratlon3 1 Sec(s) - 510 MiIs {s) - 65? t'licg(3) Santrling Frcquency: 1191.895113, 839.000 Microsecond Rate Line ErGquency:' 50.000000 * Maximunr/!,linimum Analog SrrEnary:

> Max-Inst

298172.500 -298550.600

40062f.600 -422244.000 {23099.900 -425984.500

330631.000 -308282.500


1615.770 t13t-174 1903.018 2035.594


-Lg9'1.494 -2019.022

Max-RUS Min-RMS On€-Bit InBt*Diff RES-Diff 180744.688 31.?000 22348.500 100592.094 28{285.594 L'72663.969 31.7000 21619.400 rL162L.625 22L.900 180365.359 21 9381. 406 39016.04? 31. ?000 295720.L88 513,1.650 31.7000 2884-700 290585.538 2."t62 1{38.?20 14,10.830 2.110 2.'1620 2,162 15?0.121 4-2L9 2.7620 1s?4.340 5.524 1262.531 1354.016 91.485 2.'1620 16.572 13'17,371 L444.291 96-926 2.1620





_. ::-_,:: . :r r ..

v v


* Events/Sensors Activity

* --------->FEt



changes Lst-Chang€ Irst Flt-chaage N 02:33:14.354322 02:33:L4.425369 002 N 02:33:13.91?665 xx:xx3xx.xxxxxx 001 N 02:33: 13.861326 02:33: 13.948155 002 N 02:33:13.91?666 xx:xx:xx'xxxx:<x 001 N 02:33:13.882428 02:33:13.960264 002 N 02r33:t3.921A22 xxrxx:xx'xxxxxx 001 02:33:13.9f?666 xx3xx:xx'xxxxxx 001 u N 02:33: 13.867326 02:33:13. 904242 002 N 02:33:11.L72574 02:33rL4.3744L4 0O2 N O2:33:!3.927734 xx:xx:lo(.xtxxxx 001








Monday 30 July 2012 02,33.08.000.DAT -3010712012 - 02;33:08.713 - Secondary. (Peak Type)








DR at Jamshedpur



















300 1276.942











02:33:08.7'12936 02:33:08.780056 002

2 3 4 5 6 7




A AA 02:33:09.'!97097









02:33:09.1 75257 02:33:09.255804 002



14 15 16



ROURKELA-2 DT: 30/07/2012 02:33:08.545136



67800 microsec



Cyc 1191.8951


File: Monday 30 July 2012 - 3010712012 - 02:33:08,713 - $econdary - (Peak Type)
* File Information:: Station: Device: Fi-lc NAMC: F1le Size: Prefault'tLmet Fault Time: Save Time: Process Time: Start Date && Time: End Date && Time: File Duration: Sampling Frequency: Line Frequency:








/2012 02:33:08.713000 07/29/20L2 20213:42 08/01/2012 AI:20:06 30/01/20L2 02:33:08.525000 30/01/20L2 02:33:10.034931 1 Sec(s) - 509 Mils(s) - 937 Mics(s) 1191.895113, 839.000 Microsecond Rate

244801 Bytes 30/0'7 /2012 02:33 :08.525000


* Maximum/Minimum Analog

> Max-Inst
328691 319028

.300 -347875.800 263363 .594 L58249 .688 .800 -312688.800 237634.625 10746 .300 31-2530.300 -323181.500 219835 .094 1583. 996 1809.110 -7877.8'72 7'707.2'75 108.877 1864.350 -1867 .112 7345 .094 94.874 1.516 1985. 878 -1994.164 1470 .110 21-15.692 -2718.454 1498.163 4.36'/ * Events/Sensors Activity Sumary:
>Fst Lst N N A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A N N N N N N N N

31491!.200 -310628.300 295881.781 L93102.150 31.7000


Max-RMS Min-RMS One-Bit Inst-Diff

4342.900 31. 7000 19178.500 31. ?000 6340.000 31.7000 10651.200

2.1620 2.1620 2.'7620 2.'7620

2.162 2.162 8.286 2.762

RMS-Diff pUnits 102179.031 v 105113.906 v 226888.325 v 2L825r.098 v 1598.398 A 1250 .280 A 1409 .254 A 7493.'796 A

1-vA 2-vB


6-18 7-rC 8-rN

Fst-change Lst-Change Changes 02:33:08.172936 02:33:08.780056 002 000 xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx 000 001 02;33:09.19709'/ xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx 02:33 :09 .715251 02:33:09 .255804 402 xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx 000 000 xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx,xxxxxx 001 02:33:09.202131 xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx 000 xx;xx:xx.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx 02:33:09.7651"'77 02:33:09.7954\1 002 02:33:09.003897 02:33:09 .163497 002 02:33:08 .9'70297 02:33:09 .195471 402 02:33:09.165111 02:33:09.245760 002




28-Any Start 30-Any Trip


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477" 142903.Secondary-(peakrypsy Title RNiIS Exhibit2'8 9R at Jamshedpur lnstval lnstPeak Phase Refval -290562.33.054 1759.156619 182063 microsec - 9.415" -303686.4 .4AIN2/BUOPTD N DIRECTTRIPRECV N B/B N N N 'II 12 PROTOPTD N LBB I.796.974 472. -8ss.000 326..499.726 1811.339.500 115197.616 1280.940 -1883.906 2101.4-CBYPHCLOSE IVIAIN-1 CARR RECV N 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 6 7 IVAIN-1 I.600 vc 213153j23 '303147.1O.Monday30July201202.DAT-g}t}7l2012-02:33:10. 159926.182' -1 135.4AINYTIE OPT N 000 000 000 tJ 14 15 16 17 '18 A A A N TIECBYPHCLOSE A A TIECBBPHCLOSE A TIECBRPHCLOSE PREPARE3PHTRIP lN>1 Trip Any lnt.391.424 24.m ra\ .016 156.182 35.goo €625.0@ 315668.600 168739.I NN A A N 02:33:10.1 99 1845.O00.100 306570.600 222536.882 8 14.430' 24.10 Cyc 1 191 .*4 -303686.4AINYTIE OPTD NN I'lR OPT N N N N N N N N I 10 O/VSTAGE.A5A r566.684 280.000 210.100 326.394 1 N N4A|N-2CARR RECV I\.200 l\4dPeak vA 207737.CB RPH CLOSE A A 4 5 N N N N N A ]\.402671 m2 000 000 000 2 .4fi 2563.700 vN 3889.300 82293.014 2!02.92 2673.872 4{}.045" 1787. -626.8951 AS: ON ti'@ .177 5072.858 51.338682 02:33:'10.'136 1389.940 302418.r't1 VA 1258.800 326763. Trip Any Trip A Any Trip B Any Trip C VTS Fast A A A N @0 000 000 N N N N N N N N N NN B N 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 19 20 21 22 23 NN NN NN NN N Zl NotFiltered N 24 25 26 N N N N F<4 Trip F>l Start V<3 Start C PAP Start C l2>4 Start 21 28 29 N N N VN>'l Start NN NN NN NN NN NN NN 000 000 000 @ ROURKELA-I DT: 301071201202:33:10.000 89.CB BPH CLOSE A [.I/2OPTD I\.

182 35.906 2t 01.4fi 2563.499.136 1389.500 115197.4-CBYPHCLOSE IVIAIN-1 CARR IVIAIN-1 RECV N 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 6 7 I.Monday30July201202.014 M2.4 .1O.054 r759.8951 AS: ON ii.600 168739.600 222536.DAT-g}tl7l2012-02.goo €625.424 24.1 99 1845.100 306570.700 vN 3889.000 89.882 I '1 14.I NN A A N 02:33:10.338682 02:33:'10.616 1280.182' -1 135.402671 m2 000 000 000 2 3 .800 326763.477" 142903.92 2673.415" -303686.$econdary-(peakrypsy Title RNiIS Exhibit2'8 9R at Jamshedpur lnslval lnstPeak Phase Refval -290562.045" 1787.0@.A5A r566.872 43.300 82ry3.4AINUTIE F'lR OPTD NN OPT N N N N N N N I 9 10 '1 1 O/VSTAGEI/2OPTD N I\.000 210.940 -1883.156619 182063 microsec - 9. Trip Any Trip A Any Trip B Any Trip C VTS Fast A A A N 16 17 '18 N N N N N N N N N N NN B N 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 19 20 21 22 23 NN NN NN NN N Zl NotFiltered N 24 25 26 N N N N N F<4 Trip F>1 Start V<3 Start C PAP Start C l2>4Start z'l VN>'l Start 29 30 N N NN NN NN NN NN NN NN 000 000 000 & ROURKELA-I DT: 301071201202:33:10.m lc<- .0@ 315668.10 Cyc 1 191 .100 326.000 326. -8ss.858 51. 159926.684 280.@ . -626.33.940 302418.y4 -303686.974 472.016 155.200 l\4dPeak vA 207737.394 N l\4AlN-2CARR RECV I\.339.600 vo 213153j23 '303147.4AIN2/BUOPTD N DIRECTTRIPRECV N B/B N N N PROTOPTD N 12 IJ LBB [.4AINI/TIE OPT N 000 000 000 000 000 000 A A A 14 '15 TIECBYPHCLOSE A A TIECBBPHCLOSE A TIECBRPHCLOSE PREPARE3PHTRIP lN>1 Trip Any lnt.33:10.726 1A11.796.391.177 5072.430' 24.CB RPH CLOSE A A A A N N N N N 4 5 A ]\.CB BPH CLOSE A I\.r'-1 VA 1258.

762Q 22.136 -2560 .000 54698.895113.339 .xxxxxx xx:xx:xx-xxxxxx Changes Lst-Change 02:33:10.402671 002 000 xx:xx:xx.]AMSHEDPUR\ROURKELA_I\1\DR\MONdAY 30 r]UlY 2 File Size: 244801 Bytes Prefault Time: 30/07 /2072 02:33:10.7620 2.945 7839.391 31.434 3271'7 .xx:xx.cB RPH CLOSE 3-M .8r3 1"81579 .000000 * Maximum/Minimum Anatog Sumary: > Max-Inst 315668.37 4 .C NAMC: C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CONTROLROOM\MY Page: 1 DOCUMENTS\S1 STUDIO\.xxxxxx 000 xx:xx:xx.600 109397.3010712012 .546 2s63 2613 L827.162 1172.7t2 ?101.509 Mils(s) .338682 xx.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx. .578 v 306570. 839.000 Microsecond Rate Line Frequency: 50.xxxxxx 000 xx:xx:xx./Sensors Activity Sumary: * ______ ____ >Fst Lst N N A A A A A A A A A A A A Fst-Change 02:33:10.096 7865 . 7000 3423.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx.611 48.02:33:10.xxxxxx 000 Description 1-MAIN-2 CARR RECV 2-M .848 135.234 Min-Inst Max-RMS Min-RMS One-Bj-t lnst-Diff RMS-Diff punits Description ]--vA 2-vB 3-vC 4-vN 82293.600 -313449.609 v 326763.983 4'7.033 A 2.5'75 1914.700 -303147.200 -115071.702 A 2.500 24Ls38.000 133738.ibif.889 Mics(s) Sampllng Frequency: 1191.941 31.000 91648.CB YPH CLOSE 4-M .882 -2096.873 48.900 172654.0AT .Secondary .xxxxxx xx:xx:xx.(Peak Type) * File Information:: Station: ROURKELA-1 Device:2 Fi].10.358 1759.xxxxxx 000 xx:xx:xx.CB BPH CLOSE 13-TIE CB RPH CLOSE 14-TIE CB YPH CLOSE 15-TIE CB BPH CLOSE .616 -2695 .492 739.1620 1115.1620 5.243 A 5-rA 6-18 7-rC B-rN * Events.418 2848.445 v 31.339000 Save Time: 08/0L/20]-2 07:2'7:06 Process rime: 08/01/2012 0-7 :28:17 Start Date && Time: 30/01/20L2 02:33:10.139000 End Date && Time: 30/01/20L2 02:33:l-1.648889 FiIe Duration: 1 Sec(s) .600 -345054.524 L192.41r v 2.File: Monday 30 July 2012 02.7000 2219. 7000 . 7000 18290.33.800 5L849 .547 68884.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx.100 296976 .xxxxxx 000 xx:xx:xx.600 225387.394 -643.459 4.139000 Fault Time: 30/07 /2012 02:33:10.962 A 2.000.702 31.

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Exhibit-,?1..3 On at Patna



DT: 30/0712012 02:33:15.551280


1680 microsec




fi9A.4762 AS: ON

400 1961.372 Descriptlon 1-01Maln CB52a Rph 2-02Main CB52a yph 3-03Main CB52a Bph pUnits V Description 1-VA 2-vB 3_VC 4 A 5_ -\.675 21 3I .350 386r.680 95.?00 -683388.xxxxxx 001 02 :33:15.da1 * File Information:: Station: 3OtO7l2O12 .550440 xx: xx: xx .6B0 36358. A39 31.r23 64 41038. 369000 Fault Time: 30 /0'1 /2012 02 :33: 15.556 5.416190.xxxxxx 001 xx:xx:xx.256 3.915 39t1 .200 -4L26'70. 600 -3834 . 648 5.575640 02:33: 15. 550000 Save Time: 01 /30/2AI2 03:20:52 Process Time: 01 /30/20L2 L2:52:02 Start Date && Time: 30 / 01 /2012 02 : 33: 15. 525 21 6L .898 31. 840.505 Mlls (s) .000000 * Maximum/Minimum Analog Sumary: > Max-Inst 532'7 384742.900 326889. xxxxxx 02:33: 15.868 5.7000 7252L5.766 38182.51'7320 02:33:15.8'1 4076 File Duration: 1 Sec (s) .600 245260 .5250 5.31 5 269118.xxxxxx 000 02:33:15.808 34 .File: BAL-1 Monday 30 July 2012 02.7000 20t92.15.57 9000 02:33:15.100 -3911.52s0 1547.656 2'7 2'7 2121.5250 21 .xxxxxx 001 xx:xx:xx.075 -414 .500 210380.6t8 5.190 2 .90.984 6'7 6 One-Bit Inst-Diff RMS-Diff 31.33.550 .'li IA A A A 6.A00 2321 59 .900 -413661.225 3845.600 50.rB 8_TN * Events/Sensors Activity >Fst Lst NN NN NN NN NN AA NN Fst-Change Summary: 02:33:L5.625 2124.5250 38.Secondary . 369000 End Date && Time: Device: PATNA S/SIN 1 DocUMENTs\S1 STUDIO\ERTS_1 (PATNA SS) \PATNA SS\4OO KV\P442_BALTA Line Frequency: s0.575640 02 :33: 15.700 -3884.000 Microsecond Rate File Name: C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\ADMINISTRATOR\MY Fife Size: 241537 Bytes frerault Iame: 30 / 01 /2012 02 : 33 : 15.400 39862"7.16 Mics (s) Sampling Frequency: 11.63I .831 2.000. 64 9560 002 xx:xx:xx.31 5 .2L9 283442.000 61 7 .453 31.7000 120079.7000 88918.02:33:15.1L9 326984 .(peak Type) Page: 1 30 / 0'7 / 2072 02 : 33 z t6 .500 -523842.500 Min-Tnst 25t4\9.597480 Lst-Change Changes xx:xx:xx.518 Max-RMS Min-RMS 663195.xxxxxx 001 xx:xx:xx. 607560 A02 23*V>1 Start 13-14Tie CB RYB ope 14-05 M2 optd 18-11 carr Healthy .







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Patna S/Stn DT:30/0712012 02:33:15.557840 E}t: 1680 micro{ec Ih)t \Jf -/-\ /-)\ /'nl I 0.4762 AS: ON .08 Cvc 1190.

202 Name: Filename: Fauft start: Scanning frequency: PGCIL PATNA / 400KV FEEDERS BALIA 3010712012 02:33:15 AM.Exhibit_ SIGRA4.3 PGCIL PATNA .ifon at patna / 400Kv FEEDERS BALIA .2O2 1 | BALIAI FINAL C:\SIEMENS\D|GS|4\D4PROJ\PGCIL_-1\P7Dl\G\ SD\0000001E\SAMPLES\FAULT\FR000046 000 Hz 1: Gursor 2: Cursor 62 ms 223 ms secondary Representation: *'@ .r BALTA1 FrNAL 02:33:l-5 p$.

301 I K1:iL3/A 1.0 0.202 Trigger 3010712012 02:33:15 AM.05 0.20 0.SIGRA 4.3 PGCIL PATNA / 4OOKV FEEDERS BALIA1 FINAL 02:33:15 AjtI.0 / -0.5 0.05 0 0 0.15 0.35 vs K1 :uL1A/ 50 25 0 K1:uL2N 50 25 0 K1:uL3A/ 50 25 0 K2:iEplA .10 0.25 0.

41 5 -38 67.s?s -3850.'769 A 3516.118 r'773.800 36759.Secondary .900 291659.8'75 421341.368000 30/0'7 /2012 02:33:15.874816 1 Sec(s) .593120 02:33: 15.300 -4221.525 -1547.5250 Description RMS-Diff punits 240623.xxxxxx 001 N N 02 :33: 15.xxxxxx 001 N N 02:33:15.5250 5.xxxxxx 000 A N N 02133tL5. 840.368000 3A/0'7 /20L2 02:33:16.596480 002 14-1. 000000 / 30 30/0'1 * Maximum.44 8 3912.300 200131.300 282L46.000.02:33r15.5250 1745.324 V 215363.753 3994.5'7632Q xx:xx:xx.91 5 5.34.984 5.500 2.144 A ?80.7000 r259r2.7000 11633.(Peak ?ype) * File Information:: Station: Device: File Name: File Size: Prefault ri.5250 226.516320 xx:xx:xx.st Fst-Change Lst-change N N 02:33215.200 31.550 3060 .468 A Description 1-VA 2-vB 3-vC 4-VN 5-rA 7-TC 6-18 8-rN * ___________ changes >Fst T.File: BAL_2 Monday 30 July 201"2 02.r00 -408486.816 Mics(s) Sampling Frequency: 7L9Q.ine Frequency: 50.638766 002 A xx:xx:xx.578000 xx:xx:xx.900 31.756 29'76.7000 70564.30/07/20t2 .556 .7000 6409'7.33.900 L04.596480 002 N N 02:33:15.4'76L90.304 4.2L9 42L1.400 31.15.906 486246.xxxxxx xx:xx:xx.xxxxxx 001 N N 02:33:15.539 v L9962'7.000 * Events/Sensors Activity Sumary: Min-RMS 37515.925 3582.1'12 3900.506 Mirs(s) .48.500 -3505?0.650 -5646.656 V 29'73.525 2.647 A 3058 .556000 O'7/30/2012 03222:38 0'7 /2012 L2 254: 08 /20L2 02:33:15.6s0 5.400 143.556160 02:332L5.dat .L06 v 254900.579680 02:33:15.me: Fault Time: Save Time: Process Iimet Start Date && Time: End Date && Time: File Duration: Patna S/Stn 1 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\ADMINISTRATOR\MY DOCUMENTS\51 STUDIO\ERTS-l (PATNA SS)\PATNA SS\400 KV\P442-BAIIA2- 241537 Bytes 30/0'1 /2012 02133:15.525 5.200 2'78139.100 -301435.xxxxxx 001 N N 02:33:15.895 6783.578000 xx:xx:xx.336 1109.650 One-Bit Inst-Diff 31.000 Microsecond Rate l.500 785./Minimum Analog Sumary: > Max-Inst Min-fnst Max-RMS 420120.4 TIE RYB 28-V>1 Start 4-Any Start 5-05 M2 optd 11-11 carr Healthy OPEN 1-01Main 1652a Rph 2-02Main1652a Yph 3-03Main 1652a Bph ffi .

Exhibit)rf 91On at patna SIGRA 4.200 II BALIA .2 FINAL c:\SIEMENS\DlGSl4\D4PRoJ\PGclL_-1\P7DI\G\ASD\00000021\SAMpLES\FAULT\FR000012 30107 12012 02:33: 1 Scanning frequency:1 000 Hz Cursor 1: Gursor 2: 66 ms 232ms secondary Representation: .3 Name: Filename: Fault start: PGCIL PATNA / 4OOKV FEEDERS BALIA I] BALIA 2 FINAL 02:33 :15 AM.200 PGCIL PATNA / 4OOKV FEEDERS BALIA 5 AM.

05 0 0 0.5 0.0 0.0 - -0.15 0.5 0.05 0 0 0.35 vs K1:iL2lA -____/ 1.20 oz5 \ I 0.15 0.0 0.:.0 0.5 0.0 / -0.t SIGRA 4.05 0.os o 0 0. 0.10 I 0.25 0.200 Trigger 30107t2012 02:33:15 AM.15 0.05 0.20 o..25 0.10 0.5 0.10 0.300 I K1:iL1/A 1.0 0.3 PGCIL PATNA / AOOKV FEEDERS BALIA _ TI 02:33:15 AM.05 0.35 us K1:iL3/A 1.0 \ \ \ \ 0 / -o.0 .35 vs K1:uL1A/ 50 25 0 K1:uL2N 50 25 0 K1:uL3A/ 50 25 0 K2:iEplA 1.20 0.

reverse EF Pickup EF 3l0p TRIP Relay PICKUP Relay PICKUP Ll Relay PICKUP L2 Relay PICKUP L3 Relay PICKUP E Relay TRIP Ll Relay TRIP L2 Relay TRIP L3 Relay TRIP >Manual Close FltRecSta Uph-e>(>) TRIP >Dis. Swing TRIP PGCIL PATNA / AOOKV FEEDERS BAI.Wave.Pickup E Dis.:.\-.Pickup L'1 Dis. Flag Lost SOF O/CtripL123 Pow.Cap.200 >DisTel Rec.-{".Ch2 Dis.Rec.Chl >Dis.RecFail Definitive TRIP E/F Trip Ll EIF Trip L2 E/F Trip L3 E/F Trip 3p Line closure l pole open Ll l pole open L2 l pole open L3 868 OPTD Rph OPEN Yph OPEN Bph OPEN .3 >Trig.Pickup L3 Dis.- SIGRA 4.T.TA II BALIA 2 FINAL 02 :33 :15 AM.Pickup L2 Dis. fonluard Dis.

L67t11 'I.Disturbance Repori Value SASAFAM fxhibi{-M& DR at Sasaram l_ t_ t_ t_ t_ SASAFIAM-BALLIA MAIN-2 Not applicable 50.0 kHa 01 IED version a Sampling frequenry Disturbance recorder Event recorder Fault locator Active setting group during recording lnstalled lnstalled Not lnstalled 1 a t_ a a L L a L L L L L L L L L I t .0 Ha t_ Fecording number Trigger signal name Trig date and time Pretrig recording time Post trig recording time Total recording iime Max. recording time Flecording in Test mode Type ol time synchronizotion IED type 522 PSB-OFTD 7J3B/201 2 3:3'l :24.rta Name $tation name 0bject name Unit name Line length System Frequenqrr ABB .tt_ t_ t_ t_ t_ fi rltl tlltlt Geneml d.101 1. t_.367 AM 200 ms 224 ms 1899 ms 1500 ms No NONE L I.

Ilnil Itltlt Fault lucafion Name Fault loop type Fault location Status ol fault calculation Fault Direc'tion ABts .Dlsturbance Report Value Not applicable Not applicable Nat applicable Not applicable 2 tE) .

8.xml @ . -120.J 0.4" -0.7 kA 0.8.0 kA Prefault angle -1 01 .2' 4 5 E 128.2 kV '172.8. LINE-A-IL3 LINE-A_IN LINE_UL] LINE-UL? LINE-UL3 .4.S kV 120.6' I t.4' 17.0 kA .1 176.2 kV 178.7 kA Fault angle -101 ? J 134.8 kV 174.7 kA 0.3 kV '176.7 M 0.3" :073000 1:24 AM Template: latesldefault.0' 't73.7l(A 0. 120.7 kA 0. -1 20. FaultFMS 0.Dieturbance Report Channel name LINE-A-IL1 LINE_A-IL2 PrelauhFMS 0.ttl rtt Analog nbamrels Humber 1 ABB .8 kV 7 120.5' 0.7' 134.

Disturbance Report Channel Number name Trigger enabled Trig level Channel value Triggerstatu* at attrig trig time 0 time 1 lMol-TFilP 1 2IM0I-STAFTI100 3lMnZ-TRtP1100 4ZM0Z-START1|0u 5 ZM[3-TR|P 1 6ZMo3-STARTI|00 -t7. t#8fiHlHl. r rto Rue m = ate srd era u *xm r G9 r- .I 'r1 zcoM-TFtP 1 IzCARE|EFI_REC110[ 13 FHS-STFWLI 1 '14 PHS-STF\A/L2 I 15 PHS-STF\A/L3 1 16 FHS-STF'V/PE 1 '17 soTF-TFrP I 18 PSE-OPTD 1 1S TOCt-TFllP 1 2ATOCI-STAFT1100 21 TEF.ft nil ttIttt Digttal channek qBB .M04-TR|PI100 BZMO4-STABTllOl] SZMBS-TFIIPlltlO .IO ZMOS-STAFT .I.I 1 .I 1 1 .I t] 0 0 0 0 O 0 1 0 0 (1 0 t) O O 0 0 0 0 O 0 1 0 0 O rl O 1 O 1 1 | 0 O I 0 O 0 4 t8) F r +:llltiIt'*1t.TFIPllOl] 22TEFI-STAFTllOl] 23 TUVI-TF|P 1 24 TUV] -STAFT 1 25 TOVI-TF|P 1 1 26 TOV1 -START 28STUB-TFIPOlDO 2STOC]-TR|P0100 30TOCI-FTAFT0100 O 31 FUSEFAIL 32CTSU-FAIL|]lOO 33TF_B_MA|N_CB0100 34TF_Y_MA|N_CB0100 35TF_B_MA|N_CE0100 36TF_F_T|E_CB0I00 37TF_Y_T|E_CB0I00 38TF_B_T|E_CB0100 3STF|P-R0|00 40TR|P-Y0100 41 TR|P-E0100 42AR_UNSUC0100 44PREP_3PH_TFIPOl1O 45AR_CLOSE_MA|N0100 46AF_CLOSE_TBC0100 47 3PHTFITP 0 48 TIESPHTRIP tl 4SSOTF_IN| 0100 SOSTUE_TFIPOlOtl SlCAFFIER-FECEItllOO 0 53 CAFR CH FAIL Recordinu lile: 201 2073000 Date: Ii30'i201 ? 3:31:24 AM r 1 0 r] 0 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 .

xm s t8) I tu .nlln tltrtlr Digihl ehannels ABB .Dlsturbance Report Channelname Trigger enabled Trig Number level Channel Trigger value attrig *tatu* attrig time time 57 oo TEF-TFIIP STUE_FELEASE EROKEN-COND MAIN CB F-OPE MAIN CE Y-OPE MAIN CB B.OPE CFI CH-z FAIL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 s2 s3 s4 s5 9E Recordinu file: 201 2073000 Daie: 7/3dJ201 2 3:31:24 AM StationlBav: SASARAMII Te mplate :'CiP C M D ata Ea s e s\DFtltemplates\d efault.

Disturbance Report Total re cotdiug ffi TrissErtirru: 7'E0/2ff12 0 3:31 :24.36? 250 AII 500 ?50 1000 I25D 1499 zMol-TRIP (r) zMor-START (2) zM0z-TRrF (31 zhr0z-START (4) zM03-TRiP (5) ZM03-START (6) ZM04-TRIP (?) zM04-srART (8) zM0s-TRrP (e) ZM05-START (r0) zcoM-TRrP (1r) CARRTER_RXC {r2) PHS-STFWLT (13) PHS-STFWL2 (14) PHS-STFWL3 (15) PHS-STFWPE {r6) S0TF-TRIP (1?) FSB-OPTD (r8) TOCI-TRrP(19) TOCI-START (20) TEn-TRIP(2i) TEF1-START (22) ruYr-TRrF (23) TUYI-START (24) TOVI-TRIP (25) TOVr-START (26) STUE_TRIF (28) TOCI-TRrP(29) TOCr-START (30) FIJSE FAIL (3I) cTsu_FAIL (32) TR_R_MArN_CB (33) TR_Y_MAI}I_CB (34) TR_B_MAIN_CE (35) TR_R_TIE_CB (36) TR_Y_TrE_CE (3?) TR_E_TIE_CB (38) TRrF-R (39) TRiF-Y (40) TRrP-B (41) *R_UNSUC (42) FREP_3FH_TRrP (44) {R_CLoSE_MAIN (45) AR_CLOSE_TBC (46) 3 Pfl TRrP (4?) TIE 3 PH TRIP (48) soTF_rNr (49) STUB_TRIP (50) CARRTER_RECET (5r) CARR_CH_FArL (53) TEF-TRIP (5?) STUE_REIEASE (88) BROKEIT-COND (92) MAIN CB R-OPE (93) MArH CE T-OPE t94) MAIH CB B-OPE {95) cRcH-z FAIL (96) Recordinfl file: 201 20I3000 Date: 7/3[I?01 2 3:31:24 AM Station/Eav: SASAFAMJ1 Te m F late : C lPC M Data B a se sID Rlte rn F ate s\d efa I F TB\ u ltxm[E) \_.ABB.1/ .

36? AM 25 7 (E) .fi tlll Itttilt rns -50 -25 0 ABB .Disturbance Report TriesErtiffE: ?E0I20l? 3:3I :24.

1 23 AM 7J30/2111 2 3:31 :25.087 AM 0n On 0n On On On On On On On On On On On Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off 35 t6 37 38 s5 s4 s3 1 ? '13 '15 14 39 40 41 ta J+ 35 3E JO 18 TR_R_TIE_CE TF_Y_TIE_CB TF_B_TIE_CE MAIN CB E-OPE MAIN CB Y-0PE MAIN CE F-OPE zM0l-TFtP ZMOI-STAFT PHS-STFWLI PHS-STFWLS PHS-STF\.1 23 AM 7/30/201 2 3:31:25.243 Alvl 7/30/201 2 3:31 :25.lzll 2 3:31 :24.087 AM 7/30J201 2 3:31 :25.167 AM 7I30J201 2 3:31 :24.243 AM 7/30/201 2 3:31 :25.1 23 AM 7i30/201 2 3:31:25.1 23 AM 7I30/201 2 3:31 :25.087 Atvl 7J30I201 2 3:31 :25.243 AM 7i30/201 2 3:31:25.31 :25.090 AM 7I30/201 2 3:31 :25.122 AM 7/30/201 2 3:31 :25.1 23 . 201 ?073000 R /R] u)/ .1 23 AM 7/30J?01 2 3:31:25.240 AM 7/301201 2 3:31 :25.243 AM 7/30/201 ? 3:31 :25.'ClFE'rrtdiTiiaasesroRtemptatesldet1grrf}) Date: Ii3tlJ2012 3:31:24 AM StationlEav: SASARAM/1 Recordinf.090 AM 7J30/201 2 3:31:25.1 23 Ahd 7/30/201 2 3:31:25.642 AM i.243 AM 7/30/201 2 3:31:25.240 AM 7/30/201 2 3:31 :25. flle.090 AM 7i30/201 2 3:31 :25.087 Ah/ 7/30/2012 3:31 :25.G.090 AM 7/30i2012 3:31 :25.riiii.090 AM 7/30/201 2 3:31 :25.240 AM 7J30/201 2 3:31 :25.243 AM 7/30/201 2 3:31 :25.Itl ^ilIrlt ttl Evpnt list ABB .895 AM 7 0n On 7/30i201 2 3:31 :24.'JL2 TFIP-F TRIP-Y TFIP-B TF-R-MAIN-CB TF-Y-MAIN-CB TF-B-MAIN_CE TFI-R-TIE_CB TF-Y-TIE-CB TR-B-TIE-CE PSB-OPTD 7i30/201 2 3:31:25.AM 7/30/2012 3.895 AM 7/301201 2 3:31 :24 91 E Al'rl 7J30/201 2 3:31 :25.Disturbance Report Hame Statu* On On Humber 1S '13 '14 '15 1 Time 2 3S 40 41 ta an PSB-OPID PHS-STFWLI FHS-BTFWL2 PHS-STFWL3 ZM01-TFIF ZM0l -STAFIT TRIP-F TRIP-Y THIP-B TF_F_MAIN_CB TF_Y_MAIN_CB TR_B_MAIN_CB ti0.087 AM 7/30/201 2 3:31 :25.090 AM 7/30i2012 3:3'l :25.

": ""9 is .i bi & I € . gi : .x EXHIBIT . :: ". I i 1\ + & j.2OT2 : 3t l J.% : : : . l1 i : i EVENT LOGGER 9i . t7 "i 3i 31ST JULY. : : :x j .t AND DISTIJRBANCE RECORDER :" : i ". i DETAILS OF 1"" : : & ti : : . & s. :.3 : : & . : f.i.c" : j." : .i : j.i . ".. l ON 1"" i "9.RENT LOCATIONS '& .i : & : . ..% . :x I .: : .: : i & j." i & AT DIFFE.% j..: .

0 Hz 2BS LINE-A-IL3 7i31i201 2 I 3:00:1 1.Disturbance Report Value BINA GWALIOFI LINE-.000 1.475 300 ms 2500 ms 2980 ms 3000 ms No SNTP FEL67O 1 B 1.I Station name Object name Unit name Line length System Frequenry Flecording number Trigger signal name Trig date and time Pre-trig recording time Post trig recording time Total recording time Max. recording time Fecording in Test mode Type ol time synchronization IED type IED version FEL 670 Not aFplicable 50.tl il tl It It ilI General datn Name EXIIIBIT-$..f: :DR at Bina ABB . .0 kHz Sampling lrequency Disiurbance recorder Event recorder Fault locator Active setting group during recording lnstalled lnstalled Not lnstalled 1 Recordinu file: 201 20731 ?8 Date: 7i3fi201 ? 13:00:1 1 StationiBav: EINAJI Te m p I ate : C :lP C MD ata Ba se s\D Rlte mF I atesld ef.

Dlsturbance Report Fault locaffon Name Fault looF type Fault location Status of lault calculation Fault Direction Value Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Recordinq file.i @ .. 20120731 2B Date: li3Ti201 ? 13:00:11 StatianJEav: EINAJ1 Te m p I 2 (11) s\D Elte m p I ate : C :lP C M D ata Ea se ate sld efg${m I .v' ABB ..

2' s7. 0.0 t{.2 kV 20s.0' -1 34 -134.1 kv 14.A Faultangle -142.9 kv -11S0' 1?2.0 t(A 0.0' 2t8.0 kA Prefault angle -142.8.Dlsturbance Report Ghannelname LINE-A-IL] LINE_A_ILz Numher . -11S.0 0.2 kV 209.0.te:'CrPctitbataEases\DFlltemplatestoeraun.xfi StationlBav: BINAJ1 .3" 114.0' 1aa a+ LINE-A-IL3 LINE-A-IN LINE-ULI LINE_UL? LINE_UL3 LINE-UN 114.0 kA 2.6' -22.3" FaultFMS 2.1 kV 14.0 kv 213.S kV 0.0 kV 213.0 M 2.3'.I 2 3 4 7 € S 1t] PrelauhRMS 2.0 kA 2.4 tr.0" 218.2" s7.tl tlill ttiltt Analog ehannel* ABB .0 M 2. -22.8' 8- Fecordino lile: 201 20I31 2E Date: I13fi201 2 13:00:11 3{11} Tiriipi.

tl nn Itrttt Digitrl ehannek ABB .'C:lPCMDataEases\DRltemplatesldefault.I TFIP AJR OTTD OV STAGE] /2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '1 4 5 E 7 I s 10 11 STUB TFIP DT REC CHlJ2 M2 CFI M2 TFIP 1 1 1 't2 13 14 CAFF AID TFIP LEE OPID TIE R OPEN TIE Y OPEN TIE E OPEN ZONE1 ZONEZ ZONE3 ZONE4 STAFT 'I 'I 1 1 1 1 1 't5 16 17 18 1S $TAFT STAFT STAFT 20 21 LI LJ ZONES STAFT 0 1 1 SOTFTFIP FUSE-FAIL BFOKEN COND TRIP RPH 24 26 'J-l 'I 1 1 2E 2S TFIPYPH TFIP BFH ZONE] TFIP ZONE2 TFIF ZONES TRIP 'I 'I 'I 1 30 31 a1 JJ ZONE4 TFIP ZONEs TFIP START HFH STARTYPH STAFT BPH STAFT N 'I 1 1 34 35 3E 'I 'l 'I 1 37 38 3S POWEF SU/ING DT FIEC CHl DT REC CH2 .Disturbance Report Channelname Trigger enabled Trig Numher level Channel value attrig Trigger *tatu* at trig time time 1 2 LINE R OPEN LINE Y OPEN LINE B OFEN M] CF M.xml StationiEav: BINAJ1 4 (11) rn w h1) ui/ .l 40 1 1 4l 42 43 44 45 4E 3PH-GF-A-TRIP 3PH-GF-B-TFIF M]-AJR OPID AJFI 'I 'I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 UNSUCCE$S PFEP 3PH TRIP TIE-AF-OPID TIE-AF-UNEUCC EB-OPID M2 TFIP M2 DEFTRIP M2 P$B 47 4E 4S 50 52 Recordinq file: 201?0731 28 Date: 7i3Ti2012 13:00:1 1 Template.

I CAFIR SEND 60 E1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 E3 E5 6E ZCALjFEV ZCAL-TFWEI ZCAL-TFIWEILl ZCAL. Date: 7i3fi2012 13:00:1 Station/Bav: BINAJ1 rii pi 5 (11) p I 1 liei'C Ii d ilt b ata e a s e s\D R\tE m ate-stt -tril"1fi .TFIWEIL2 ZCAL-TFl\aiElL3 ZCAL-ECHO DIR E/FTRIP DIFI E/F STAFT DlFl E/F STF\'/ OIFI E/F STFIV DIFI E/F zHAFIM O/V STL] O/V BTL2 OIV STL3 0 0 0 0 0 67 6E ES 0 0 0 0 0 0 7D 71 0 1 1 1 1 1 72 73 -t4 0 0 0 0 1 '| 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 7E '| 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 77 78 81 0 0 D MAIN_TBIF-FI B2 MAIN-TFIP-Y MAIN-TFIIP_E 0 0 0 0 0 83 s4 85 8E TIE-TFIIP-FI TIE-TFIIP_Y TIE-TFIIP_E 0 0 0 1 Recordinq file: 201 2073128 i.rl illNl trtilLt Dtgital channel* ABB .Disturbance Report Ghannelname Trigger enabled Trig Humber level Channel Trigger value attrig *tatu* attrig time time 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 53 54 55 56 57 5S 5S M2 CS M2 CF M2 CF OUT sEH OV-SG1-OPTD 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 'l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ov_sG2_oPTD GCHl-FAIL MAIN AFI BLKD TIE AR ELKD DT SEND CH.

75 -1.5 -*- LrHE_A rL3 (3) kt ??{ t.5 0 0.?5 -I.xml .?. IJ + LIHE_A ILI {I) -i.?5 0 '*.5 0.F LIHE_UL2 (8) -200 -400 -600 LV 600 400 200 0 -200 -400 -600 LV 600 400 200 0 - LrNE_uL3 (9) -2[0 -400 -d00 KA 2.5 0.25 Recordino file: 201 2013128 Date: 7i3f/201 2 1 3:00:1 1 Station/Bay: BINAJl 6 (11) I Template: C :1P CMtrataEaseslDRttemF atesldefau lt.?5 -0.5 -j'J( hA ?1{ I. LrHE_A_IL2 (2) -0.?5 1a{ -I.@ .?5 0 -&" LrHE_A Ilr (4) -0.5 1.5 -2.Disturbanee Repofr Total rcnortling Trigger tine: ?EI/2012 l3:00:1 I.5 LA - -I.4?5 0 400 800 1200 l6B0 2000 ?00 0 -200 -400 + LIHE_ULI (?) -6nl kv 600 400 20n 0 .U.il lltl t|llttt rni kv 600 400 ABB .?5 0 .5 - LrHE_UH{tB) E.

rEs START (2rl soTF TRrP {22) rusE-rArl (23) BROKXH COND {24) TRIP RFH 126) TRrF YPH {27) TRIF BPH (28] zoNEl TRrF (29) ZOIIE2 TRIP zolrffi TRIF zoNE4 TRrF zoNEs TRIP (3rl] {3r) (32) (33) START RPH [34) START YPH (35) START EFH (36) START I'T (3?) FOITIER SWIHG (38) DT REC cHr (39) DT REC Crrz (40) 3FH_GR_A_TRrP {41) 3PH_GR_B_TRIP (42) M1_AiROPTD {43) A/R UHSUCCESS (44) PRXF 3FH TRrP (45) TrE_AR_OFTD(46) TIE_AR_UNSUCC (4?) BE_0PTD (48) M2 TRrP (49) M2 DEF TRrF (50) M2 PsB (52) M2 CS {53) M2 CR(54) M2 CF OUT SER (55) ov_sGI_oPTD {56) ov_sGz_oFTD (5?) c-cfil-FArL (58) MAIH ARBLKD (59) TIE AR BLKD (60) DT SEI.TD CHI (61) 7 {11} .Disturbance Report Total reeordiug Triger tiru: ?/3112012 I3:00: I 1.tl lt ll Itiltt ms 0 ABB .4?5 400 800 1200 1608 2800 2400 2680 LIIIE R OPEN (1) LIHE Y OPEil (?) LrNE B OFEH (3] Ml CR(4) MI TRIF (5) A/ROPTD (6) ov sTAGEltz {?) sTuB rRrF (8) DT FXC CHlrz (9) M2 CR {r0) M2 TRIP (II) CARR ArD TRIP (12) LEB OPTD (I3) TIE R OPEH (I4) TrE Y OFEH (15) TrE B OPEH (1d) zoNEr START (1?J zoHEz START (r8) uoHE3 START (r9) zoNE4 START (20) zor.

5 0 .5 0 -I.r TIE Y ir5) TrE B OFEN (16) FRf.4?5 1600 1625 1650 l5?5 I?00 r?25 --: -400 i" 400 0 * I I rrue_urzq$ -4UU I{V 4uui" Uf -+oo 400 -i i I i I '1.5 1._ LINE_A rl.3(i) -I..r'-]" LrHE_A IL2 [2] -1. rlr.5 0 .^' - LIHE uL3 r+r nl* I t .Disturbance Report Dfurhu'bnnce I 17501?66 t tttF TTr ! ( /-ft LrrlL_u!1 /il t5?5 1550 15?5 I3:00:1 I .ft IilII Tfmlt ru Trigertiru: ?l3Il20l? 400 0 ABE .P 3FH TRIF (45) M2 rRrP [4e) i MAIN ARELKD (S9) TrE ARELKI (601 DrR E/F STRY (?41 DIR E/F 2HARM (?5) (--- Recordinq file.5 t.1 .1'.ir1.5 B + LrNE_I_ILIll) -L5 1.i . 201 28731 ?0 Template:'C:tPcMDataBaseslDRltemrrlates Date: Ii3Ti?01? 13:00:1 StationlEav: BINAJI I (11] 1 -ItZO a2 .- LrHE_UH (rql -400 1..J -e- LrNE_A rU (p) LI$E R oPE$ (1) i i LIHE Y OPEH (?) LrNE B OFErr (3) M2 TRrF i i i i i (1r) (14) TIE R OPEH OPEr.

8' 122.Disturbanee Report Dislurbance 1 (Voltages) Calculation interval: 1 567 to 1585 ms RMS 1 2 3 4 Numher lD L|NE_UL1 LINE_UL2 LINE_UL3 ftV) AnolE 214.3' s (11) .8 191 .3 15.6" LINE-UN 206.5" 2.1 223.tl ll tl rtrltl AEB .4 237.

4 Anqle 237.il lllt Itlttt ABB .3' 151 1 2 3 4 L|NE_A L|NE_A L|NE_A L|NE_A tL1 tL2 rL3 rN fkA) 2j 1.6' Number lD 206.6" 103.0' Date: 7i3Ti201 2 1 3:00:1 1 Statisn/Eav: EINAJl iimptate :'C rp C M D ata Ba s e s\D Rtte mp ate I Recordinq file: 20120731 28 10(11) std***rZ?) lry .1' S4.0 RMS Anqle 216.6' ?23.8 1S1 .S 1.4' 340.S 't22.Disturbance Report Disturbance 1 (Currents) Dislurbance 1 (Voltages) Calculalion inlerval: 1567 to 1585 ns Calculation intervel: 1 587 to 1585 ms Number 1 2 3 4 lD RMS fKV) LINE-UL1 LINE-UL2 LINE-UL3 LINE-UN 214.S 0.5' 2.

041 49 11 4S 11 0n otf otf On On On On On On On On On On On 7/31/201 2 1 3:00:1 3.041 7/31/201 2 1 3:00:1 3.141 7/311201 2 1 DIF E/F 2HAFM LINE FI OPEN TIE Y OPEN TIE F OPEN MAIN AF BLKD LINE E OPEN TIE AR BLKD TIE E OPEN DIFI E/F 2HAFM 15 't4 5S ! 60 't6 75 2 off On 45 74 11 LINE Y OPEN PFEP 3PH TFIP DIF E/F STFIV M2 TRIF M2 TRIP 4S 0n off off 0ff 3:00:1 3.040 7/31i201 2 1 3:00:1 3.1 0l 7/31/201 ? 1 3:00:1 3.xm I 'sl.fi lltl Ittttt Event ABB . mp I r1 1) late : C IP C M D ata Ea s es\DFlte atesldefa ult.0S7 7/31i201 2 'l 3:00:1 3.l' @ .084 7I3'l/2U1 2 1 3:U0:1 3.054 4S 7/31/2n1213:00:13.054 74 75 '| 7/31i201213:IU:13 077 7/31/201 2 1 3:00:l 3.1 03 7/31/201 2 1 3:00:1 3.083 7/31/201 2 I 3:00:'l 3.087 7/31 /201 2 1 3:00:1 3.1 02 7/31/20'l 2 1 3:00:1 3.Disturbance Report Hame M2 TFIP M2 TFIF M2 TRIF M2 TFIF M2 TFIF M2 TFIF DIFI E/F BTRV ll*t Statu* On Humber '11 Time 7131/201 2 1 3:00:1 3.1 07 7/31 i201 2 1 3:00:1 3.0S5 7/31/201 2 1 3:00:1 3.0S8 7/31/201 2 1 3:00:1 3.093 7/31i201 2 1 3:00:1 3.049 7/31/201 2 1 3:00:l 3.095 71311201 2 1 3:00:1 3.141 nffioinu ntl: irii'iollt ie Date: 7i3fi201 2 1 3:00:1 Station/Bav: BINAJl Te m p 1 i.

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$econdary .4 .225198 A N 13:00:13.TripB AnyTripA AnyTripB AnyTripc WSFast 21 Not Filtered F<4Trip F>lstart V<3StartC PAPStarlC l2>4starl 21 VN>lstart NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN 13i00:13.156.223540 TIE CB YPH CLOSE A N 13:00:'13. DAT .223540 TIE CB BPH CLOSE A N 13i00:'13. 90 120 60 vN 3437.027896 Dt: 8.000.300 126.cB BPH 001 OOO 002 OOO OOO OOO OOO OOO OOO 001 @1 001 PREPARESPHTRIP lN>1 Trip Anylnt.688.00:13.207 .225'198 001 001 4 5 6 7 N N N N N N N N '13 8 9 10 11 A 14 '15 '16 A N N N N N N AN13:00:13.Tuesday 31 Juty 201213.618 270. 1972.341215 002 000 000 000 000 000 Ooo 17 18 '19 20 2'l 22 23 N N N N N N 000 000 24 25 26 000 000 000 000 000 000 28 29 30 N N N ROURKELA-I DT: 31/07/2012 13:00:13.(peak Typey Tifle RMS Exhibit phase 3'3 ' DR .100 67.238 -293415.255042 13:00:'13.221882 I\.2q 150.668 2795.95 Cyc 1206. 26.3110712012 . 3B 240 270 300 \ 1989.668 283.369 -2731.144 28.147 -292654.13.400 307.173 2817.374 4405.221882 M-CBYPHCLOSE l\.4AIN-1 CABR RECV N N lVlAlN-1 OPTD N N 13:00:13.345 295856.200 188.774' 1929.14'1. Cll Instpeak vA 2't1042.2726 AS: ON .00.t Jahshedpur.875" 20a913.CB RPH N OOO 2 A CLOSE CLOSE A N '13:00:'13.13.O32.206960 '13:00:13.758" vc 209968.251726 MAINUTIE I'lR OPT N N OA/STAGEI/2OPTD N N MAIN2/BUOPTD NN DIRECTTRIPRECV N N B/BPROTOPTD N N LBB MAINUTIE OPT N N TIECBRPHCLOSE AN13:00:13.792" 1 N MAIN-2CARRRECV N M .044 -38.

631 2458.256 293225.225L98 13:00: l-3 .000000 * Maximum/Minimum Analog Sumary: Page: 1 DOCUI"ENTS\51 STUD]O\.008000 Fault Tlme: 3I/01 /2012 13:00:13.xxxxxx 001 xx:xx:xx.900 377166.850 Lst A A A N A A A N -302101.91.100 138556 .000 r70431.xxxxxx 13:00:13.916 0.844 201\.'AMSHEDPUR\ROURKELA_I\1\DR\TUCSdAY 31 .xxxxxx 001 xx:xx:xx.000.223540 13:00:13 .1620 2.800 96305.22L882 13:00:13.781 2614.206960 13:00: l-3 .800 151365.207000 Save Time: 07/3I/2012 0l:12222 Process Trmez 08/02/2012 04:00:00 Start Date && Time: 37/0'7/2012 13:00:13.]UlY > Max-Inst 304795.DAT-3110712012-13:00:13.3:00: l-3 .500 260845.7000 91105.444 2.221882 13 :00:13.524 245'7 .207-Secondary-(PeakType) * File Information:: Station: ROURKELA-1 Device: 2 F1IE NAME: C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CONTROLROOM\MY File Size: 248065 Bytes Prefault Itme.7000 143062.483 2.008000 End Date && Time: 31/0'7/2012 13:00:14.00.223540 13:00:13 .518955 File Duration: 1 Sec(s) .000 -364803.800 309613.240 -2820.955 Mics(s) Sampling Frequency: 1-206.'7 620 1118 .xxxxxx 001 13:00:L3.'766 141r55.231 2 . 3I/01 /2012 L3:00:13.949 1.400 1.700 122193.380 2871 .762 26'77.225198 xx:xx:xx.240 -1r"73. 6 10 446 .600 -234104.906 -2'792.xxxxxx 001 xx:xx:xx.382 55.500 393206.272618.7000 5515.871 Inst-Diff One-Bit RMS-Diff 31.120 2.'7620 5.13.CB YPH CLOSE 4_M _ CB BPH CLOSE 6-MAIN-1 OPTD 13_T1E CB RPH CLOSE 14_T1E CB YPH CLOSE 15_TIE CB BPH CLOSE 16_PREPARE 3PH TRTP .600 Min-fnst -31031-1.251126 002 xx:xx:xx.File: Tuesday31July201213.002 2797 .180 44"7 .xxxxxx 001 13:00:13.7000 55189.234 31.0 Sumary: 2599.255042 xx:xx:xx.300 232270.328 31.705 0.34L2!5 002 Descript ion 2_M _ CB RPH CLOSE 3-M .856 -2'734. 829.328 Min-RMS 2128.109 31.524 2069.656 Max-RMS '70905.'7620 5.510 Ml1s(s) .375 764540.000 Microsecond Rate Line Frequency: 50.0 40 punits Description 1_VA 2-vB 3-vc 4_VN A A 5_ IA IN 6_IB 8_ A A * Events/Sensors Actj-vity >Fst A A A N A A A N Lst-Change Changes Fst-Change 001 1.

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After tripping of the CB at remote end. lt seems that distance Zl tripped at other end and all three roles tripped.07.2012 12.59. PSB is detected at Sipat end and load flow has become Zero and rermissive carrier is received from Ranchi end.59.43 hrs 14.Ranchi-2 31.2012 t:6: DR at SIPAT SIPAT 31. -oad flow before triooino uw lJIVAR uw MVAR LANCO -406 70 Ranchi-2 380 -260 Raipur-1 -100 -62 Seoni-1 827 -236 Raipur-2 Raipur-3 Ranchi-1 0 0 102 -oJ Seoni-2 811 -323 406 -70 .EXHIBIT NTPC Feeder Description Date and time Date and time of Charoino Sioat .59. line voltage has increased to about 450KV and Sipat end rreaker tripped on Over Voltaqe Staqe-1 protection at 12.16 hrs ndications lelavs at Sipat End Mainl PSB Over Voltaoe St-1 864 Ooerated lelavs at Other End Main2 PSB Mainl Main2 LEDs at Sipat End PSB PSB LEDs at Other End Distance from Sipat KM NA Fault Voltaqe at Sipat end 45OKV Seouence of events Distance from Other end NA Fault current at ot 1er end Sequence of events lemote CB trio larrier Received Jver Voltaqe Staqe-'l trip )irect Trip Sent PLCC DATA SIPAT cHl lode-1 lode-1 lode-2 lode-2 lode-3 lode-3 TX RX 0 1 cH2 0 0 1 1 OTHER END cH1 Sode-1 TX lode-1 RX cH2 TX RX TX RX 0 0 3 1 lode-2 TX lode-2 RX lode-3 TX 4 3 lode-3 RX lVheter AR took olace SIPAT Main NA Tie NA )THER END Main NA Tie NA 3rief descriotion of the event t is observed from DR that at 12.43hrs.47.07.

34€4r/.3IlO7l2OL2 12t"9t43.468" NN NN N N NN N N NN N N NN H A u A N A NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN N A NN NN NN NN NN NH NN NH NN N N NN 110.{2000 8.976 ms (1.539624 r[Elta X! 38.659155 l2:59:47.481 4.rk Aa/8212O12'12:50:17 FM FMS Ph.62184€ l2 14 16 '15 17 'lB 19 20 21 l253:42€21848 22 lr 24 27 2A 30 31 il 12:53:47.2187.825 2 3 4 12:59:47578ftr0 12:534763151 12:53:47.676S T6 .243' 235.1-ft ./:\ .578000 12:59:47.fur\.53:43.$l llx .236" .S51 45A575 12E.'4 ft / \ fi. R El ++4+ lB Fibs q EA.100 I 261 253422.771' ?s2.950 306.621948 12:53:47.UF * {5 :8.rk 4s iflPha!6 lhr$/C 2 3 4 5 6 7 I N N N N N N cH1 N N N N N N I PH OPEN PH OPEN PH OPEN N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 1?.rl \/1#'l.^' I 1 vA vB vL vtt la l8 lc lN N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 252774.1848 5 6 7 I '13 t25S{7.530 -417.fi 7:l\r^r'1-4\.400 39.r'rt''\.625 162.631S 12:59:47.223211 Delta Xr 218./: rr: \ t V\n"t\.448 .3151 r25*4262'.s ln$/!l 'vtv 2 3 { 6 7 l"AoqYttt\-/\:.27.300 t5t484' 83149.442 .400 2?e.50S' 34.073" -2028.**\la.r..) fsr 1209 Hz A5i ON DellE Yr No Ears Files Data channels View values W'ndow Help Exitsystem E m t #Back E} D6rs: CH I |iP' &| I El B I ++ F Files "e \-4 'tr l+l 'llrl^l i+l Titb .384 362933.361443.1 ?69224.oz2O12 1246:57 4F lh*P.}t f 'w{\\./.430.525 247.503 383028.532 -27.Files Data channals viow Value! Window Help - 81 s PM Exitsystem E fE * $Back EL Data: cH 1 E#.825 2s8.440537 12:59:43.152 rs (10.912 cy.800 312.500 .3rl0?I2012 12159:{7.3 .621' .700 2t .6.95(] cyc] fs: l23lH? A5ION D€ltrvr NdBel @ . lnstP.536351 N N N N N N lue .3@ 106.60 2021.5/8000 12:5S:47.

53615 N Tue .696 ms (20.t2O12 12i48:07 PM "+ FMS tF lrcF.. BEck EF Fles + + E} -r11F nAilJ2.496 cyc) fsr 1210 Hz A5r ON Delta Vr No 8ar5 .tem El rII t Ddtd: d.ak #il5 Phase w N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 12:59:43 440537 1 2:55:43.31/O7l2012 12159:43.Files Data ChEnnels View Values Wlndow EBil HelF Sy.851059 Delta Xr 409.{a R B i.

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