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NOW COMES, Matthew Parr, to request of the court to proceed with an uncontested

adjudication and disposition in the above numbered cause following the plea hearing on June 10th, 2009

and to immediately return Chase Huson to his legal and physical custody. In support of this motion,

movant states the following:

1. I am the legal custodian of my son, Chase Huson and have presented the Court with proof in the

form of an exemplified and certified copy of a custody order.

2. I have cooperated with every request made of me by the Department of Human Services and

this Court and made myself available to all parties in person since June 1, 2009 and I have

personally met with Terry Holtz (GAL), Lena Parker (MDHS) and Gaelene Conley (CASA) and

answered all of their questions to the best of my ability and knowledge.

3. This case has already caused me financial hardship and I cannot afford to remain in Mississippi

nor am I able to return in the near future. I have exhausted all options with my school and will

not be granted any further leave of absence.

4. It is unfair to my son and not in his best interest to remain in the custody of the State of

Mississippi. There is no longer an emergency situation as I am willing and able to take him


5. In further support I submit the attached Memorandum of Law.

WHEREFORE, I pray for the following:

1. The Court immediately acts on the uncontested adjudication and proceed with final disposition

in the matter involving Chase Huson.

2. The court grant full faith and credit to the order of the 288th Judicial District Court of Bexar

County and order physical and legal custody of Chase Huson, a minor, be immediately returned

to Matthew Parr with any modifications to the order or stipulations this Court deems


Respectfully submitted on this 8th day of June, 2009.

Matthew Parr
2424 Gold Canyon Road, Apt 1617
San Antonio, TX 78259
Telephone: (210)519-8344
Matthew M. Parr
2424 Gold Canyon Road, Apt 1617
San Antonio, Texas 78259
Tel: (210)519-8344





Detention in Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

The Fourth Amendment is violated when an individual is unlawfully seized. Florida v. Bostick,

501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). It also requires judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to

extended restraint of liberty following seizure. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). The Fourth

Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,

142-143 (1979).

Chase Huson was detained on May 7, 2009 by order of this court and has been in the legal and

physical custody of the Department of Human Services since April 21, 2009. The custody order,

however, became invalid by statute on May 21, 2009. Mississippi law only authorizes more than

temporary custody for thirty days. Mississippi Code §§ 43-21-301, 307, 309. There is no case before any

court in Mississippi or elsewhere, in which cause has been shown for the continued detention of Chase


The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in relevant part: “No State

shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…” U.S. Const. Am. XIV.

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees parents cannot be separated from their children without due

process of law except in an emergency. Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d
1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001). The timeline in which the Department of Human Services’ social workers

acted in this case contradicts any claim of an emergency or any claim that continuing custody is

necessary. The importance of protecting minor children from abuse and neglect is recognized. Mincey

v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). However, the preservation of liberty and the rights of families must

be considered. Rogers v. San Joaquin County 487 F. 3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2007). The facts in this case are

similar to those of Rogers. Chase Huson has now been in the custody of the Mississippi Department of

Human Services without any charge or cause for fifty-two days and counting. It can easily be argued

that the latest removal and placement of Chase Huson into Foster Care could easily have been forseen

and avoided. The Department of Human Services was aware that another court had already found that

Chase’s maternal grandparents had previously created an inappropriate situation which required

emergency action by the court back in 2007.

Interference With Rights of Parents

The parent-child relationship between Chase Huson and Matthew Parr is established and

recognized by the orders of a Texas District Court on two occasions – October 23, 2007, in which

paternity was established and again on June 1, 2009. The United States Supreme Court has recognized

the rights of parents as far back as in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), closely followed by Pierce

v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). The Mississippi Department of Human Services, by

denying his access to the children and by assuming “legal and physical custody” of the children, has

effectively terminated Mr. Parr’s parental rights without due process and without any court having met

the constitutional standard of “clear and convincing” proof. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745. The

Mississippi Supreme Court established a “credible evidence test” to determine whether parental rights

should be terminated. Vance v. Lincoln County Dept. of Public Welfare by Weathers, 582 So. 2d 414, 417

(Miss. 1991). Nothing in the pleadings or petition before the Youth Court in Jackson County meets the

credible evidence test of Vance or the “clear and convincing” standard of Santosky.
Full Faith and Credit

Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states "Full faith and credit shall be given in each

State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state." 28 USC §1738 states that

“Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full

faith and credit in every court within the US and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or

usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.” The Supreme

Court has recognized a public policy exception to the full faith and credit clause and its pursuing statute.

Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657; Finney v. Guy, 189

U.S. 335; see also Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186; Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386; Hood v. McGehee,

237 U.S. 611; cf. Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U.S. 16. There is no information before this court which would

justify the claim of a public policy exemption.

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

Most actions involving custody of children are governed by a Uniform Act designed to provide

uniformity among states in custody decisions. Mississippi adopted this Act, the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in 2004. It governs jurisdiction in all actions which are

governed by separate jurisdictional grounds.

The UCCJEA applies to both initial custody actions and modifications, and to permanent as well

as temporary orders. In addition to custody orders in divorce and independent custody actions, the Act

applies to proceedings involving separation, guardianship, neglect, abuse and dependency, paternity,

termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence. The act does not apply to

proceedings involving juvenile delinquency, petitions for adoption, or authorization for a child’s

emergency medical care. Miss. Code Ann. §93-27-102 (2004).

In this case, the initial custody action began in the State of Texas in October 2007 and was

finalized June 1, 2009. The UCCJEA applies because this is an emergency custody modification request
brought by the petitioner of the original custody action due to allegations the child has become

neglected, while in Mississippi, as a result of the actions by the child’s mother.

Under the UCCJEA, a state in which the child is physically located can take jurisdiction on a

temporary basis over a child who has been abandoned or needs protection because of an emergency

related to mistreatment or abuse of the child. Miss Code Ann. §93-27-201, 204(1). The State of Texas

assumed emergency jurisdiction after hearing the evidence and reviewing the pleadings in the petition

filed in October, 2007 alleging that the child had been neglected and abused at the hands of his

maternal grandparents. In addition, the child was physically present in the State of Texas at the time of

the petition and issuance of the Temporary Order on October 23, 2007.

A Court can and should refuse to hear a case in which the home state or other jurisdiction is

based on a petitioner’s “unjustifiable conduct,” unless (1) all parties consent to jurisdiction, (2) the

proper court to have jurisdiction determines that the court is a more appropriate forum, or (3) no other

state has jurisdiction. Miss. Code Ann. §93-27-201 (2)(2004).

In most cases, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties, which requires that the

respondent have minimum contacts with the state. However, when a court adjudicates status rather

than rendering a personal judgment, minimum contacts with the forum state are not required. In these

actions, historically referred to as “in rem”, the parties need only be properly served. Adjudication of

custody are considered to be in rem actions. A court with subject matter jurisdiction may enter a

custody decree without personal jurisdiction over the respondent.

Jurisdiction over the original order was proper in the State of Texas. After hearing argument

and reviewing the evidence by the petitioner in person and through his attorney, the Court determined

that the proper jurisdiction was the State of Texas for the following reasons: 1) the petitioner and the

child were present in the State of Texas; 2) the Petitioner had no significant contact with any other

state; 3) all parties had submitted to the jurisdiction of Texas; 4) paternity was established in the State
of Texas; 5) an emergency situation existed; and 6) there was no misconduct involved in bringing the

child to Texas.

Under the UCCJEA, the court issuing an initial custody decree has continuing exclusive

jurisdiction to modify the order. Exclusive jurisdiction continues until both parties and the child move

from the state. Miss. Code Ann. §93-27-202(1) (2004). A court without home state jurisdiction may also

exercise jurisdiction to enter temporary modification orders in emergencies. A state may also modify

another state’s order that was not entered in compliance with the Act. For example, under the Act’s

predecessor, the UCCJA, a Texas order was not entitled to full faith and credit because the court did not

have jurisdiction to enter the order under the UCCJA. Mosley v Huffman, 481 So. 2d 231, 239 (Miss.

1985) (no jurisdiction because the child was wrongfully taken into state). In this case, the child was not

wrongfully removed from state.

A state may modify another state’s order even though one party remains in the issuing state if

the issuing court determines that the state has no continuing significant connection with the action and

that substantial evidence related to the child is not available in the state. This determination may only

be made by the state issuing the order. Miss. Code. Ann. §§ 93-27-202, 203 (2004).

In this case, Texas has continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order. The petitioner has

not moved from the State of Texas. Mississippi was within its right to exercise temporary emergency

jurisdiction when a petition was filed charging the child’s mother with neglect of the child. As the

original petitioner has now presented to the court an exemplified and certified copy of the a final order

from the original court of jurisdiction and has appeared to exercise the rights given him in the order, an

emergency no longer exists and temporary jurisdiction is no longer necessary. The Texas order is

entitled to full faith and credit.

The Mississippi Youth Court Act

The Mississippi Youth Court Act § 43-21-313 states that “A child held in custody under order of

the youth court shall be released upon a finding that a change of circumstances makes continued

custody unnecessary.” Continued custody is no longer necessary.

According to the petition filed on May 12, 2009, the Court ordered “physical and legal custody”

to the Department of Human Services on Tuesday, April 21, 2009. On April 20th, 2009, an agent of the

Department of Human Services spoke to Mr. Parr, and requested a copy of the custody order from Texas

and verified his contact information. At that time, prior to any proceeding before this Court, the

Department of Human Services was aware of a valid custody order, or the possibility thereof. In

addition, the school records of the child contain Mr. Parr’s contact information and a copy of the order

from Texas. There is also a letter authorizing the school and district to release to “any agency of the

State, County or City” this information. This has been in the file since August 4, 2008.

The aforementioned Temporary Order, which has since been finalized and was provided in an

exemplified certified form to the Court, granted “Joint Managing Conservatorship” (custody)(Texas

Family Code Sec. 101.016) to Mr. Parr with the exclusive right to determine the children’s place of

residence. Full faith and credit should be given this order pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1738A and Miss. Code

Ann. § 43-25-1.

On May 4, 2009, pursuant to § 43-21-309 a shelter hearing took place and a Shelter Order was

issued for for the child without the presence of either parent. The Court did not meet the statutory

requirement of reasonable notice, thus depriving Mr. Parr and other parties of the “right to present

evidence and to cross-examine witnesses produced by others” Miss.Code Ann. §§ 43-21-309(2),(3). The

Court presumably acted on what it considered an emergency situation based on the information

presented by the Mississippi Department of Human Services.

Shelter Orders must state that either “reasonable efforts” were made to keep the children in

their home or such an emergency situation existed that reasonable effort could not be made. In this
case, neither case can be made. “Reasonable effort” is defined in the Adoption and Safe Families Act.

These laws require that no child is placed in foster care who can be protected in his or her own home;

and when removal is necessary, reunification always be attempted unless the juvenile court has

determined that no reunification efforts need be made. The “emergency situation” argument is

invalidated by the timeline and actions of MDHS. See Rogers. After obtaining the order for legal and

physical custody on April 21, 2009, MDHS did not exercise the order and take physical custody of Chase

Huson until May 7, 2009 – sixteen days later.

Procedural Errors

In addition to the aforementioned arguments, there have been several procedural errors in this

cause. The petition seeking an adjudication that the child is a neglected child should have been filed

within five days of the shelter hearing Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-451. The shelter hearing took place on

May 4, 2009 and the petition was not filed until May 12, 2009 – eight (8) days later. Once the petition

was filed the statutory requirements for service of summons was not met which resulted in Mr. Parr

having to request a continuance. The requirement is that summons is sent by certified mail to out of

state parties at least ten days prior to the hearing date. The summons for the hearing scheduled on May

18, 2009 was mailed on May 13, 2009 and did not arrive until the day of the hearing. Further delay in

this matter would violate the requirements set forth in Miss. Code Ann. §43-21-551. Chase was taken

into custody on May 7, 2009. The last date for adjudication without his consent was June 6, 2009.

Release Required Upon Change of Circumstances

“A child held in custody under order of the Youth Court shall be released upon a finding that a

change in circumstances makes continued custody unnecessary.” Miss. Code Ann. §43-21-313(1). The

circumstances as the Court knew them have changed. “A written request for the release of the child

from custody, setting forth the changed circumstances, may be filed by the child; by the child’s parent,

guardian or custodian.” Miss. Code Ann. §43-21-313(2). Mr. Parr made such request to the Court on
May 31, 2009. There is no longer a need for continuation of custody by the State and there is nothing

which would meet the standard of Vance for the Court to conclude that the children should not be

returned to the custody of Mr. Parr. In fact, the only statements made which allege any wrongdoing by

Mr. Parr are hearsay statements by the children’s maternal grandparents which have already been

discredited by sworn affidavit.


The Youth Court of Jackson County Mississippi was right to exercise temporary emergency

jurisdiction in this case. Whether or not an emergency situation ever existed is not relevant. The

situation before the court has changed and there is no longer a valid argument for continuing

emergency jurisdiction or continued custody of the child. The court of exclusive continuing jurisdiction

is the 288th Judicial District Court of Texas. As Matthew Parr has presented to the court a lawful order of

the court with continuing exclusive jurisdiction, full faith and credit should be given to the order and

legal and physical custody of the Chase Huson should be returned to him immediately.

Dated: June 8, 2009

By: Matthew Parr