PD 8010-3:2009

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BSI British Standards
PUBLISHED DOCUMENT Code of practice for pipelines –
Part 3: Steel pipelines on land – Guide to the application of pipeline risk assessment to proposed developments in the vicinity of major accident hazard pipelines containing flammables – Supplement to PD 8010‑1:2004

This publication is not to be regarded as a British Standard. See Foreword for further information.

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PD 8010-3:2009
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© BSI 2008 ISBN 978 0 580 61732 4 ICS 23.040.10, 75.200 The following BSI references relate to the work on this standard: Committee reference PSE/17/2 Draft for comment 07/30138021 DC

Publication history
First published December 2008

Amendments issued since publication
Date Text affected

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PD 8010-3:2009

Contents Licensed Copy: x x, Mott Macdonald, 10/06/2010 06:22, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI
Foreword  iii Introduction  1 1 Scope  3 2 Normative references  3 3 Abbreviations  3 4 Risk assessment of buried pipelines – Overview  4 5 Failure of hazardous gas or liquid pipelines  5 6 Individual risk assessment  13 7 Societal risk assessment  15 8 Factors affecting risk levels   19 Annexes Annex A (informative)  Summary of HSE methodology for provision of advice on planning developments in the vicinity of major accident hazard pipelines in the UK  28 Annex B (informative)  Failure frequencies for UK pipelines  33 Annex C (informative) Example of a site-specific risk assessment  47 Bibliography  53 List of figures Figure 1 – Overview of PD 8010-3  2 Figure 2 – Event tree for the failure of a hazardous pipeline  6 Figure 3 – Risk calculation flowchart for flammable substances  8 Figure 4 – Calculation of pipeline length affecting an individual in the vicinity of a pipeline  14 Figure 5 – Framework for the tolerability of individual risk  15 Figure 6 – Societal risk FN criterion line applicable to 1 km of pipeline  17 Figure 7 – Site-specific pipeline interaction distance  18 Figure 8 – Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to design factor  22 Figure 9 – Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to wall thickness  23 Figure 10 – Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to depth of cover  24 Figure 11 – Indicative reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to surveillance frequency (dependent on frequency and duration of unauthorized excavations)  24 Figure A.1 – Planning application process and need for site-specific risk assessment  30 Figure B.1 – Generic predicted pipeline failure frequencies for third‑party interference  35 Figure B.2 – FFREQ predictions of total external interference failure frequency for UKOPA pipe cases  39 Figure B.3 – FFREQ predictions of external interference rupture frequency for UKOPA pipe cases  40 Figure B.4 – FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture and leak frequencies for specific diameter and wall thickness cases (per 1 000 km·y)  41 Figure C.1 – Proposed development  47 Figure C.2 – Risk for outside exposure  50 Figure C.3  Societal risk FN curves and PD 8010-3 FN criterion line – proposed development before and after slabbing  50

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7 (per 1 000 km·y)  41 Table B. diameter  34 Table B. wall thickness  45 Table B.1 – Failure rates for UK pipelines based on UKOPA data  33 Table B.2 – Failure frequency due to external interference vs.8 – FFREQ predictions for total external interference failure frequency for pipe cases defined in Table B. Rwt  23 Table 2 – Failure frequency reduction factors.12 – Critical defect lengths and equivalent hole diameters for UKOPA pipeline cases operating at a design factor of 0. ii  •  © BSI 2008 .3 – Failure frequency due to external interference vs. wall thickness  34 Table B.13 – Failure frequency due to external corrosion  44 Table B. 10/06/2010 06:22.3 × 10−6) risk distances for ethylene. spiked crude and natural gas liquids (NGLs)  31 Table B.1 – Typical (1 × 10−6) and (0.11 – Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 5 with FFREQ predictions  43 Table B. Rdf.7 (per 1 000 km·y)  39 Table B.9 – FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture frequency for pipe cases defined in Table B.7 – UKOPA pipe cases  38 Table B. Rp. Uncontrolled Copy. Mott Macdonald. pages 1 to 56. an inside back cover and a back cover.5 – Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 2 with FFREQ predictions  37 Table B.15 – Pipeline rupture failure frequency due to due to ground movement caused by natural landsliding  46 Licensed Copy: x x.72  44 Table B. pages i to iv.7 (per 1 000 km·y)  40 Table B.10 – FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture and leak frequencies for pipe cases defined in Table B.14 – Material and construction failure frequency vs.PD 8010-3:2009 published document List of tables Table 1 – Range of applicability of reduction factor for design factor.6 – Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 3 with FFREQ predictions   37 Table B. for pipeline protection   25 Table A. (c) BSI Summary of pages This document comprises a front cover. and reduction factor due to wall thickness.4 – Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 1 with FFREQ predictions  36 Table B. an inside front cover.

under the authority of Technical Committee PSE/17.e. and does not constitute a normative element. Part 2: Subsea pipelines. Materials and equipment for petroleum. A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on request to its secretary. Its recommendations are expressed in sentences in which the principal auxiliary verb is “should”.published document PD 8010-3:2009 Foreword Publishing information This part of PD 8010 was published by BSI and came into effect on 1 January 2009. judgement has to be employed by the risk assessor at all stages of the assessment. Licensed Copy: x x. The final responsibility for the risk assessment lies with the assessor. upright) type. © BSI 2008  •  iii . and should be read in conjunction with PD 8010‑1. The series comprises: • • • Part 1: Steel pipelines on land. explanation and general informative material is presented in smaller italic type. Use of this document As a code of practice. and it is essential that the assessor is able to justify every key assumption made in the assessment and that these assumptions are documented as part of the assessment. This part of PD 8010 is intended to support the application of expert judgement. As with any risk assessment. Mott Macdonald. It was prepared by Subcommittee PSE/17/2. Any user claiming compliance with this part of PD 8010 is expected to be able to justify any course of action that deviates from its recommendations. Presentational conventions The provisions in this Published Document are presented in roman (i. 10/06/2010 06:22. Information about this document This part of PD 8010 includes worked examples and benchmark solutions that can be used as a basis for specific studies. Pipeline transportation systems. Commentary. Part 3: Steel pipelines on land – Guide to the application of pipeline risk assessment to proposed developments in the vicinity of major accident hazard pipelines containing flammables – Supplement to PD 8010‑1:2004. this part of PD 8010 takes the form of guidance and recommendations. Uncontrolled Copy. (c) BSI Relationship with other publications PD 8010‑3 is a new part of the PD 8010 series. It should not be quoted as if it were a specification and particular care should be taken to ensure that claims of compliance are not misleading.

iv  •  © BSI 2008 .PD 8010-3:2009 published document Contractual and legal considerations This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisions of a contract. Attention is particularly drawn to the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 [1] and to the requirements for risk assessments in UK health and safety legislation. Users are responsible for its correct application. Uncontrolled Copy. in particular: • • the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 [2]. the Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1992. (c) BSI Compliance with a Published Document cannot confer immunity from legal obligations. 10/06/2010 06:22. amended 1999 [3]. Licensed Copy: x x. Mott Macdonald.

and includes a recommended FN criterion line. The present part of PD 8010 includes recommendations for: • • • • • • determining failure frequencies. Uncontrolled Copy. The use of such risk assessments to determine the acceptability of developments in accordance with land use planning applied in Great Britain is discussed in Annex A. This part of PD 8010 provides guidance for the risk assessment of developments in the vicinity of major hazard pipelines containing flammable substances notified under the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 [1]. and is intended to be applied by competent risk assessment practitioners. The guidance does not cover environmental risks. © BSI 2008  •  1 . Clause 5 and Annex F provide guidance on the route selection and location of new pipelines in populated areas in terms of the acceptable proximity to significant inhabited areas. 10/06/2010 06:22. The general approach to the risk assessment process follows the stages outlined in PD 8010‑1:2004. It does not cover toxic substances which are also notified under these Regulations. risk reduction factors to be applied for mitigation methods. consequence modelling. conducting site‑specific risk assessments. An overview of the document content is given in Figure 1. (c) BSI PD 8010‑1:2004.published document PD 8010-3:2009 Introduction Licensed Copy: x x. Clause 5 classifies locations adjacent to pipelines into location classes 1. standard assumptions to be applied in the risk assessment methodology for land use planning zones. 2 and 3 according to population density and/or nature of the immediate surrounding area. The guidance is specific to the calculation of safety risks posed to developments in the vicinity of UK major accident hazard pipelines. The guidance in this part of PD 8010 is provided for the benefit of pipeline operators. Clause 7 describes the application of societal risk. Annex E. but the principles of the risk calculation are generally applicable. local planning authorities. For significant developments or infringements the pipeline operator might wish to carry out risk assessment using societal risk analysis for comparison with suitable risk criteria to allow the operator to assess whether the risks remain within acceptable limits. benchmark results for individual and societal risk levels. developers and any person involved in the risk assessment of developments in the vicinity of existing major accident hazard pipelines. It is based on the established best practice methodology for pipeline risk assessment. Mott Macdonald.

PD 8010-3:2009
Figure 1  Overview of PD 8010-3
Scope Safety risks caused by flammable substances only Clause 1

published document

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Risk assessment of buried pipelines

Clause 4

Consequences: Prediction Probability of ignition Thermal radiation and effects

5.3 5.4

Failure of a gas or liquid pipeline Event tree Prediction of failure frequency

5.1 5.2, 8.2 Annex B

5.5

Calculation of risk and risk criteria Individual Societal

Clause 6 Clause 7

Factors affecting risk levels Failure frequency Failure frequency reduction factors Implementation of risk mitigation measures

Clause 8 8.1 8.2, Annex B

8.3

Supporting annexes: Summary of HSE methodology for the provision of land use planning advice in the vicinity of UK MAHPs Failure frequencies for UK pipelines Example of a site-specific risk assessment

Annex A

Annex B Annex C

2  •  © BSI 2008

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PD 8010-3:2009

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1 Scope
This part of PD 8010 provides a recommended framework for carrying out an assessment of the acute safety risks associated with a major accident hazard pipeline (MAHP) containing flammable substances. It provides guidance on the selection of pipeline failure frequencies and the modelling of failure consequences for the prediction of individual and societal risks. The principles of this part of PD 8010 are based on best practice for the quantified risk analysis of new pipelines and existing pipelines. It is not intended to replace or duplicate existing risk analysis methodology, but is intended to support the application of the methodology and provide recommendations for its use. This part of PD 8010 is applicable to buried pipelines on land that can be used to carry category D and category E substances that are hazardous by nature, being flammable and therefore liable to cause harm to persons. The guidance does not cover environmental risks.

2 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. PD 8010-1:2004, Code of practice for pipelines – Part 1: Steel pipelines on land IGE/TD/1 Edition 4:2001, Steel pipelines for high pressure gas transmission1)

3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of this part of PD 8010, the following abbreviations apply. ALARP as low as reasonably practicable FFREQ  methodology recommended by UKOPA for prediction of pipeline failure frequencies due to external interference HSE Health and Safety Executive LFG  liquefied flammable gases, including liquefied petroleum gases (LPG), liquefied natural gas (LNG), and natural gas liquids (NGL) MAHP major accident hazard pipeline MAOP maximum allowable operating pressure MDOB minimum distance to occupied building PoF SMYS probability of failure specified minimum yield strength

1) Institution

of Gas Engineers and Managers (formerly Institution of Gas Engineers) (IGE) standards are available from the Institution of Gas Engineers and Managers, Charnwood Wing, Holywell Park, Ashby Road, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE11 3GH. © BSI 2008  • 

3

PD 8010-3:2009
Tdu TS VCE thermal dose units tensile strength vapour cloud explosion

published document

UKOPA United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators Association

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4 Risk assessment of buried pipelines – Overview
The failure of a pipeline containing a flammable substance (which can be a gas, a liquid, a dense-phase supercritical fluid or a two- or three-phase fluid) has the potential to cause serious damage to the surrounding population, property and the environment. Failure can occur due to a range of potential causes, including accidental damage, corrosion, fatigue and ground movement. The acute safety consequences of such a failure are primarily due to the thermal radiation from an ignited release, whether directly (from the main release) or indirectly (from secondary fires). Quantified risk assessment applied to a pipeline involves the numerical estimation of risk by calculation resulting from the frequencies and consequences of a complete and representative set of credible accident scenarios. In general terms, a quantified risk assessment of a hazardous gas or liquid pipeline consists of the following stages: a) gathering data (pipeline and its location, meteorological conditions, physical properties of the substance, population) (5.1); b) prediction of the frequency of the failures to be considered in the assessment (5.2); c) prediction of the consequences for the various failure scenarios (5.3), including: • • • • • calculation of release flow rate; estimation of dispersion of flammable vapours; determination of ignition probability; calculation of the thermal radiation emitted by fire in an ignited release; quantification of the effects of thermal radiation on the surrounding population; estimation of individual risk (Clause 6); estimation of societal risk (Clause 7);

d) calculation of risks and assessment against criteria: • •

e) identification of site-specific risk reduction measures (Clause 8). Pipeline failure frequency is usually expressed in failures per kilometre year or per 1 000 kilometre years (km·y). Failure frequency should be predicted using verified failure models and predictive methodologies [4, 5, 6, 7], or otherwise derived from historical incidents that have occurred in large populations of existing pipelines that are representative of the population under consideration, as recorded in recognized, published pipeline data. Various factors may then be taken

4  •  © BSI 2008

failure frequency due to other damage types is derived using historical data [8. In general. Where a length of pipeline over which a location-specific accident scenario could affect the population is associated with a specific development. 7]. and predictive models based on operational data are available [4. This should take into account people both outdoors and indoors. This can be caused directly. as well as comparison of model predictions with the recorded consequences of real incidents. corrosion. Mott Macdonald. Illustrative event trees for the failure of a hazardous pipeline are shown in Figure 2. NOTE 2  Spray fire is equivalent to a jet fire from a liquid line. property and the environment. NOTE  Predictive models can be generated for all damage types and failure modes depending on the data available. or indirectly by igniting secondary fires. Licensed Copy: x x. Uncontrolled Copy. 10/06/2010 06:22. In the UK. third-party interference is the dominant mode. 5 Failure of hazardous gas or liquid pipelines 5. see [11] to [14]. The results of a consequence analysis should take into account all feasible events. 10]. crater fire or jet fire which generates thermal radiation. Typical event trees for the failure of gas and liquid pipelines are shown in Figure 2. Fireballs are technically not possible but vapour cloud explosions (VCEs) can occur where the liquid in the pipeline produces heavier-than-air vapour. (c) BSI The consequences of pipeline failures should be predicted using verified mathematical models. resulting in a fireball. The consequences of failure are primarily due to the thermal radiation that is produced if the release ignites. © BSI 2008  •  5 . The escaping fluid can ignite. ruptures are defined as fluid loss through an unstable defect which extends during failure. Failure can occur due to a range of potential causes. 6. Leaks are defined as fluid loss through a stable defect. 9. in terms of the effect distance (radius) over which people are likely to become casualties.published document PD 8010-3:2009 into account for the specific pipeline design and operating conditions to obtain the failure rate to be applied. 5. NOTE 1  For detailed explanation of some of the consequence models which have been applied by HSE to derive existing Land Use Planning zones. and can pose a risk to developments at different locations along their route. This length is known as the interaction distance (see Clause 6 and Clause 7). Pipelines present an extended source of hazard. Failure of a high pressure pipeline can occur as a leak or rupture. the results validated using experimental data at various scales up to full or comparison with recognized solutions.1 General Failure of a hazardous gas or liquid pipeline has the potential to cause damage to the surrounding population. so the release area is normally equivalent to two open ends. including accidental damage. fatigue and ground movement. the full length over which a pipeline failure could affect the population or part of the population should be taken into account in the risk assessment.

E) F) Only credible for heavier than air gases. F) Flash fires B). D) If the vapour cloud could engulf any confined or congested region. E) + jet fires No ignition Impacted jet (crater) fire Impacted jet (crater) fire D) No ignition N N Puncture Y Y N Jet fire Jet fire No ignition N N b) Event tree for a gas pipeline failure A) B) Ground/water pollution is also likely to occur. Extent/distance will depend on ground permeability. (c) BSI Y Rupture N Pipe failure Y Puncture N Y Y N N Y Y N N Fireball + spray + pool fire Pool fire A) B) VCE or flash fire Running fires C) VCE B) or flash fire Ground/water pollution C) Spray + pool fire Pool fire A) Running fire C) Ground/water pollutionC) a) Event tree for a liquid pipeline failure Release obstructed Immediate ignition Y Y Y N Rupture Y N N Y Y N Pipe failure Y Y Y N Y N N Delayed local ignition Delayed remote ignition Fireball + crater fire Crater fire D) Flash fire B). Uncontrolled Copy. There will be a limited flash fire which is not normally considered separately.PD 8010-3:2009 Figure 2  Event tree for the failure of a hazardous pipeline Immediate ignition Delayed local ignition Delayed remote ignition published document Licensed Copy: x x. 10/06/2010 06:22. C) It is also possible for the release from one pipe end is obstructed and the other unobstructed. 6  •  © BSI 2008 . E) + crater fire No ignition Fireball + jet fires F) Jet fires D). the possibility of a VCE should be considered. Mott Macdonald.

and areas of congestion or confinement. the possibility of a flash fire or VCE should be taken into account. as the release has a large momentum flux at the source and this normally has a significant vertical component. the transition to a low momentum (passive) release does not occur until the released natural gas has dispersed (is diluted) below the lower flammability limit. A more detailed assessment might then be required which would go beyond the standard methodology described in this part of PD 8010. If ignition is delayed by 30 s or more. calculation of thermal radiation emitted by fire in an ignited release. population). c) prediction of consequences: • • • • calculation of release flow rate. the location of possible sources of ignition. it is normally assumed that the ends of the failed pipe remain aligned in the crater and the jets of fluid interact. NOTE 4  In the case of natural gas. it is assumed that only a crater fire (jet obstructed) or a jet fire (jet unobstructed) will occur. a fireball can be produced which lasts for up to 30 s and is followed by a crater fire. Such releases can produce directional effects. d) calculation of risks. this scenario is not usually considered. 10/06/2010 06:22. meteorological conditions. © BSI 2008  •  7 . quantification of the effects of thermal radiation on the surrounding population. NOTE 3  For large diameter pipelines (i. then the sensitivity of the location to directional releases reviewed. In general terms. Where such a location or pipe is being assessed. The extent of such gas clouds depends on prevailing weather conditions at the time of release. For the duration of the release relevant to the risk analysis.e. e. The modelling of the consequences and effects of VCEs are not discussed in detail in this part of PD 8010. making their assessment more complex. Mott Macdonald. For gases or vapours that are heavier than air. determination of ignition probability. at a location close to a bend or for a small diameter pipeline. the standard case would normally be assessed.published document PD 8010-3:2009 For the assessment of a rupture release of a gaseous fluid. Licensed Copy: x x. Uncontrolled Copy.g. b) prediction of failure mode and frequency. The stages of pipeline risk assessment are represented in Figure 3. >300 mm) this is a standard assumption. physical properties of the substance. a quantified risk assessment of a hazardous gas or liquid pipeline consists of four stages: a) input of data (pipeline and its location. for one or both pipe ends to become misaligned and produce one or two jets which are directed out of the crater and are unobstructed. It is possible. (c) BSI If immediate ignition of a fluid release occurs. or form cold heavier‑than-air gas clouds when released.

the pipeline operating limits in the pipeline notification and an examination of the pipeline surroundings. (c) BSI Input data Pipe geometry. protection etc) Population details Fluid properties Meteorological conditions Determine failure rate data for leaks and ruptures due to: External interference + Corrosion + construction + defects Material & Ground movement + Other Failure frequency Release rate Calculate failure frequency Determine consequences based on: + Dispersion + Ignition + Type of fire Consequences Thermal radiation Individual risk Risk calculations Effects of thermal radiation Societal risk The first stage of the risk assessment process is to gather the required data to characterize the pipeline. topographical information in any region of interest (e.g. TS). class 2). including: • • length and route of the pipeline to be assessed. Mott Macdonald. pipeline shutdown period. material properties. temperature.PD 8010-3:2009 Figure 3  Risk calculation flowchart for flammable substances published document Licensed Copy: x x. location details. pipeline material properties – e. its contents and the surrounding environment. and any other data required to apply a fracture mechanics model or to calculate the design factor. wall thickness.g. grade (SMYS. Uncontrolled Copy. The data should be obtained from engineering records. These data are used at various stages of the analysis. operational parameters Location details (area category. depth of cover. 10/06/2010 06:22. location of drainage channels and ditches). toughness (or Charpy impact value). The principal input data required for a pipeline quantified risk analysis are: • • pipeline geometry – outside diameter. location classification (class 1. operating data. pipeline operational parameters – maximum allowable operating pressure. ground slope direction. • • • 8  •  © BSI 2008 .

volume and temperature behaviour of the fluid throughout the range of conditions relevant to the analysis (e. from thermodynamic charts. development and building categories in the vicinity and their distance from the pipeline. e. site-specific depths should be taken into account. details of any above. ground movement. atmospheric humidity.and below-ground pipeline marking. other causes. A key parameter in setting the boundary between a leak of a stable size and a rupture is the critical defect length.g. Licensed Copy: x x. river crossings. In the case of depth of cover. concrete slabbing). including traffic density. 5. tables or rigorous equations of state). including: • • • atmospheric conditions. from vapour to liquid (or vice versa). details about ambient temperatures and pressures at the location of interest. information about the density and viscosity of the fluid as a function of pressure. information to characterize any phase change within the fluid. corrosion [internal and external. population and occupancy levels within the consequence range of the pipeline. material or construction defects. or to bound the dense phase region.published document • • • • • • • • • depth of cover. information about wind speeds and directions. including stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and alternating current (AC)/direct current (DC) induced corrosion]. temperature. such as fatigue. 10/06/2010 06:22. operational errors etc. © BSI 2008  •  9 . for example: • • • Any site-specific variations in the data should be assessed. road/rail crossing details.g. Where additional pipeline protection such as slabbing is to be taken into account. Mott Macdonald. (c) BSI physical properties of the material being transported. and direct contact should be maintained between the pipe coating and the surrounding soil.g. information to characterize the pressure. the design and installation should be assessed to ensure that additional loading is not imposed upon the pipeline. and justifications for any additional assumptions to be applied locally should be documented. Uncontrolled Copy. PD 8010-3:2009 additional protection measures for the pipeline (e. • • • The failure modes that should be assessed include leaks of various sizes (punctures) and line breaks (ruptures).2 Prediction of failure frequency Failure of a pipeline can occur due to a number of different causes such as: • • external interference.

In such cases. and above which a defect will continue to propagate along the pipeline until the defect size becomes equivalent to a rupture. In a risk assessment. the ignition probabilities. Outflow from holes is calculated using conventional sharp-edged orifice equations for gas or liquid using a suitable discharge coefficient [13]. and therefore thermal radiation effects which can be greater in the middle and far field distance.PD 8010-3:2009 published document The critical defect length is the axial length of a through-wall defect which becomes unstable at the specific pipeline conditions. narrow crack-like defects can occur. fluid properties (in particular the compressibility) and operating pressure. flash. thermal radiation from jet and crater fires. the radiation field produced and the effects of the radiation on people and buildings nearby. consequence models are needed to predict the transient gas or liquid release rate. depending on the release direction and degree • • 10  •  © BSI 2008 .e. crack-like defects can occur. fireball. NOTE 2  In most cases the risk will be dominated by the rupture scenario. resulting in a “lift-off” distance before the flame occurs. The following aspects should be taken into account: • outflow as a function of time (influenced by failure location. 10/06/2010 06:22. Typical critical hole sizes for high pressure gas pipelines are given in Annex B. NOTE 1  Critical defect length and equivalent hole diameter applies to external interference where axial. material properties. the likelihood of each failure scenario is evaluated and expressed in terms of failure frequency and pipeline unit length. these should be documented. for releases that ignite causing immediate hazards to people and property. the characteristics of the resulting fire (i. A rupture release is typically represented by a full bore. jet.3 Prediction of consequences In the context of pipelines carrying flammable substances. wall thickness. spray or pool fire). 16]. This is primarily dependent on the pipeline diameter. thermal radiation from the initial and reducing flow into the fireball if the release is ignited immediately. Mott Macdonald. Licensed Copy: x x. crater. and by any response to the failure). pipeline rupture outflow requires complex calculations involving pressure reduction in the pipeline or two-phase flow for flashing liquids [15. The critical defect length is significant for external interference. the equivalent hole sizes which relate to such defects do not apply to rounded punctures. upstream and downstream boundary conditions. 5. NOTE 3  The maximum possible hole size in high pressure gas pipelines is limited according to the critical defect size. the crack opening area through which the fluid release occurs is transposed into an equivalent hole size which can be used for release calculations. or stable holes due to corrosion or material and construction defects. The release is typically assumed to make a crater into which product is released from both ends of pipe. Uncontrolled Copy. Where other data sources are used. double-ended break. Typical failure frequencies for UK MAHPs are given in Annex B. where long. (c) BSI Leak sizes can range from pinholes up to a hole size equivalent to the critical defect size for the pipeline for external interference failures. Jet fires that are unobstructed can have considerable jet momentum.

because this affects the crater fire and jet fire tilt and extent of the flash fire and hence the resulting radiation effects downwind. • Other consequences that are generally found to have a negligible effect on risk compared to fire effects include: • • • release of pressure energy from the initial fractured section. Large releases of liquefied flammable gases. When modelling either crater fires or unobstructed jet fires following a rupture.published document PD 8010-3:2009 of wind tilt. The consequence model should also take into account: • • wind direction – required for a site-specific risk assessment where wind direction will affect the populated area non-symmetrically around the location of the fire. and possible ignition points in downwind areas. and flammable liquids containing LFGs such as spiked crude oil. middle and far distance. Crater fires can be modelled as large cylindrical flames starting at ground level having thermal radiation effects progressively reducing through near. release of flammable liquids into water courses and the potential for running fires. humidity – this affects the proportion of thermal radiation absorbed by the atmosphere. with pressure being maintained from the upstream compressor. This calculation requires an estimate of the initial and steady state release rates and an estimate of the inventory of the pipeline network which is discharging to the release point. Mott Macdonald. immediate and delayed ignition pool fires. • Licensed Copy: x x. and daytime as Category D and windspeed 5 m/s. Additional aspects to be taken into account for pressurized liquid releases include: • • • spray fires. 10/06/2010 06:22. as well as wind speed. (c) BSI extent of the area covered by a flammable gas cloud causing a possible flash fire downwind of the release. into which a liquid is released. Uncontrolled Copy. also affects gas dispersion for flash fire prediction. NOTE  Weather category. • • There is considerable evidence from actual events and research work that immediate ignition events involving sudden large releases of flammable gases can cause a fireball to occur. Typical fireball burn times are 10 s to 30 s depending on pipeline diameter and pressure. spillage rate and duration of release from a liquid pipeline affecting the local area and possibly causing a spray or pool fire. the conventional assumption is that night-time weather is modelled as Pasquill Category F and windspeed 2 m/s. pressure generated from combustion during the initial phase if the release is ignited immediately. the typical assumption made is that the break occurs half-way between compressor or pump stations (or pressure regulating station). the transient nature of the release should be modelled. pump or © BSI 2008  •  11 . the type of ground environment. In the UK. For generic calculations. wind speed. missiles generated from overlying soil or from pipe fragments. including topography where appropriate. can also cause a fireball to occur.

More elaborate models are possible with different angles of flame. 10/06/2010 06:22. urban. railways etc. roads. Probabilities used by HSE are discussed in Annex A. Licensed Copy: x x. Outside the flame envelope. Extensive references [12. Uncontrolled Copy. and delayed ignition occurs after 30 s. The ignition causes the fire to flash back to the source of release and then to cause a jet. which assumes a surface emissive power from the flame. being dependent on the release source and the distribution of ignition sources in the vicinity of a pipeline. class 2. which assumes that all the energy is emitted from one (or several) point sources within the flame. 5. and the point source method.). delayed and obstructed or unobstructed. Small to medium holes can cause sprays and the hazard distance from spray fires can be significant. The amount released from a liquid pipeline is a function of the time taken to stop pumping. Spray releases occur when a flammable liquid is released at high velocity through a punctured pipeline. The energy from the fireball pulse is usually calculated using the view factor method. The probability of flash fires is considered low.] are available for deriving probability of ignition for various situations (class 1.PD 8010-3:2009 published document pressure reduction station and no reverse flow (with depressurization) occurring at the downstream check valve or regulator. When modelling jet fires from punctures. crater or pool fire.5 Thermal radiation and effects Fatal injury effects are assumed for cases where people in the open air or in buildings are located within the flame envelope. depending on hole size. There are two main methods of calculation in use: the view factor method. depressurization of the pipeline. the release rate is often dictated by the pumping rate at the point of release. Flash fires occur when a plume of unignited heavier-than-air gas or vapour drifts downwind before finding a source of ignition. For non-flashing liquid releases from pipelines. The consequences predicted by such models are increased directionally. the effects are dependent on direct thermal radiation from the flame to the exposed person or building. Generic values for ignition probability can be obtained from data from historical incidents and these are product-specific. 12  •  © BSI 2008 . Thermal radiation is calculated from the energy of the burning material.4 Probability of ignition The risks from a pipeline containing a flammable fluid depend critically on whether a release is ignited. Large holes (>50 mm) in high pressure pipelines are likely to release the full pumping rate. 14. The various ignition possibilities such as immediate. (c) BSI 5. and drain-down of adjacent sections of the pipeline. Mott Macdonald. but the conditional probability is reduced. are drawn out logically on an event tree (see Figure 2) to obtain overall probabilities. The consequence model usually assumes a vertical wind-blown jet flame. the release can be considered to be steady state. A vapour cloud can drift further in night-time conditions (category F2) than daytime (category D5). so the consequences of large holes are similar to pipeline rupture. and whether ignition occurs immediately or is delayed. It is usually assumed that immediate ignition occurs within 30 s.

The cumulative thermal dose is then calculated. NOTE 1  W is not independent of time for a transient release. material properties and operating conditions form lines parallel to the pipeline axis. the escape distance for people out of doors. Licensed Copy: x x. NOTE 2  Due to the uncertainties in the effects of thermal radiation.published document PD 8010-3:2009 The thermal radiation effect at distances from the failure. is defined as: tdu = W 4/3t where: t is time. daytime or night-time. The thermal dose unit (tdu). 1 kW/m2 is reached. The prediction of the thermal radiation effects is required to be summed through the event. The variation of effects has been estimated from burn data for human beings which suggests that the radiation level causing a significant likelihood of fatal injury in an average population is 1 800 tdu. This level of thermal dose is often used in risk assessments. and the distance for which escape to safe shelter is possible. The progression of a fire through the different stages of the event can be complex. and the distance from the fire at which escape is possible without exceeding a threshold dose. the dose limit or a cut-off thermal radiation level of. 10/06/2010 06:22. for example. Mott Macdonald. a number of factors should be taken into account. frequency of failure and failure mode. calculated as the radiation dose. and is normally summed over exposure until safe shelter. try to escape. hence the event might need to be subdivided into its stages and the effects summed later. in seconds (s). including escape speed for people outside running away from the fire. 6 Individual risk assessment Individual risk is a measure of the frequency at which an individual at a specified distance from the pipeline is expected to sustain a specified level of harm from the realization of specific hazards. etc. W  is the intensity of thermal radiation. populations indoors and outdoors. The thermal radiation effect from crater fires and jet fires is generally calculated by assuming that all persons outdoors. in kilowatts per square metre (kW/m2). (c) BSI Experimental and other data indicate that thermal radiation dose levels can have differing effects on a population depending on individual tolerance to such effects. and indoors within the piloted ignition distance. a value of 1% lethality. location and types of buildings. This can prove difficult to achieve in a continuous way. Individual risk contours for pipelines of given geometry. operating pressure. The distance from the pipeline at which a particular level of risk occurs depends upon the pipeline diameter. In order to assess safe escape distance. Uncontrolled Copy. is sometimes associated with such predictions (see Annex A). From © BSI 2008  •  13 . The risks from the various failure scenarios should be collated and the individual risk profile at various distances plotted on a graph. equivalent to 1 000 tdu to 1 050 tdu as a threshold of dangerous dose or worse. is summed through the complete fire event to determine the effect on people and property in terms of the piloted ignition distance for buildings.

the interaction distance (see Clause 4) is calculated as shown in Figure 4. 10/06/2010 06:22. Mott Macdonald. fatality or dangerous dose) to an individual at a given distance from the pipeline.g.PD 8010-3:2009 published document this plot it is possible to identify the risk of a specified effect (e. the risk levels are known as the risk transect. the consequences are circular. The interaction distance shown can be multiplied by the pipeline failure frequency. the probability of ignition and the probability of effect to obtain the risk at any distance from the point of release. is shown in Figure 5. published by HSE [17]. HSE sets land use planning zones for major hazard sites. Uncontrolled Copy. including high-pressure pipelines transporting defined hazardous substances based on individual risk levels. Figure 4  Calculation of pipeline length affecting an individual in the vicinity of a pipeline 1 2 3 4 1 2 4 a) Interaction distance = 2 × radius of circle = length of pipeline that could affect observer R D R 4 b) Interaction distance = 2 × Key 1 2 3 4 Location of observer. Shown in cross-section perpendicular to the pipeline. Land use planning zones applied to major accident hazard pipelines in the UK defined by HSE are discussed in Annex A. at distance D from the pipeline Circular effect distance/consequence distance. Licensed Copy: x x. radius R Pipeline Interaction distance for observer at location 1 R2 − D2 Criteria for individual risk levels have been determined by the HSE in the UK. (c) BSI For a simple model where windspeed conditions are zero. 14  •  © BSI 2008 . The framework for the tolerability of risk which gives individual risk values for the defined regions.

hospitals and old people’s homes are classed as sensitive developments because of the increased vulnerability of the population groups involved to harm from thermal radiation hazards and the increased difficulty in achieving an effective response (e. workplaces such as call centres. Uncontrolled Copy. so the impact of multiple fatality accidents on people and society in general should be taken into account. Site-specific assessments are needed for housing developments. commercial and leisure developments.published document Figure 5  Framework for the tolerability of individual risk Unacceptable region PD 8010-3:2009 Licensed Copy: x x. rapid evacuation) to mitigate the consequences of an event such as a pipeline fire. The original routing of the pipeline is expected to have taken into account the population along the © BSI 2008  •  15 . and therefore it is more appropriate that societal risk is used to assess the acceptability of pipeline risk. and any developments involving sensitive populations. in which a constant distributed population in the vicinity of a pipeline is assumed. building layouts and population distributions are taken into account. 10/06/2010 06:22. Developments such as schools. Mott Macdonald. The calculation is carried out by assessing the frequency and consequences of all of the various accident scenarios which could occur along a specified length of pipeline. Societal risk is of particular significance to pipeline operators because the location of pipelines might be close to populated areas.g. Societal risk can be generic. (c) BSI Increasing individual risks and societal concerns 1 x 10 (Worker) 1 x 10 (Public) -4 -3 Tolerable if ALARP region 1 x 10 (All) -6 Broadly acceptable region 7 Societal risk assessment Societal risk is the relationship between the frequency of the realization of a hazard and the resultant number of casualties. in which the details of particular developments. or site-specific. The hazards associated with pipelines tend to be high consequence low frequency events. industrial premises.

The FN criterion line shown here is applicable to assessments carried out using 1 800 tdu. Reference [17] describes the derivation of a societal risk limit from a study of Canvey Island and subsequently endorsed by the HSC’s Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances in the context of major hazards transport. In the absence of product-specific risk curves. equivalent to a significant likelihood of causing fatality. HSE proposed that the risk of an accident causing the death of 50 people or more in a single event should be regarded as intolerable if the frequency is estimated to be more than one in five thousand per annum [17]. so the equivalent length of pipeline exposing the same risk to the public is 1 km.e. In the assessment of societal risk. For application to pipelines. Developing criteria for tolerability for hazards giving risk to societal concerns is not straightforward. Licensed Copy: x x. it is therefore suggested that the FN criterion line given in Figure 6 should be used to assess societal risk due to MAHPs. Subsequently HSE’s Hazardous Installations Directorate have proposed [18] criteria for major hazard sites in the context of the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 [19] (COMAH). showing the cumulative frequency F (usually per year) of accidents causing N or more casualties. This allows the assessment of the residual risk from a specific pipeline to be compared with the risk from the average class 1 pipeline population density (i. From this. Therefore the same FN risk curves could be applied to 1 km of pipeline. where the population is assumed to be located in a strip centred on the pipeline from the MDOB. (c) BSI 16  •  © BSI 2008 . Uncontrolled Copy. Mott Macdonald. The “tolerable if ALARP” region lies between these two lines. When the societal risk has increased significantly. The criterion for societal risk is expressed graphically as an FN criterion line. The unacceptable region is taken as the region above the line of slope −1 through the defined point on the logF v.5 persons per hectare. it is necessary to specify a length over which the frequency and consequences of all accident scenarios are collated. extending out to the hazard distance of the worst case event from the pipeline. but infill and incremental developments might increase the population in some sections of the route. A typical medium-sized COMAH site might typically have a perimeter exposing risk to the public outside the site of 2 km.5 persons per hectare) adjacent to each 1 km length of pipeline. In effect the FN criterion line represents the upper limit of the cumulative frequency of multiple fatality accidents in any 1 km section of a pipeline route assumed to be acceptable as implied by conformity to PD 8010-1. Societal risk assessment allows these developments to be assessed against the original routing criteria where a location class 1 area has a population density of up to 2. and the broadly acceptable region is taken as the region below a line two orders of magnitude below.PD 8010-3:2009 published document route. and parallel to. logN plot. up to 2. based on the following which enables criteria for case societal risk to be defined for the FN diagram. the pipeline operator might then need to consider justifiable mitigation measures to reduce the risk. the −1 slope line (see Figure 6). 10/06/2010 06:22. the methodology applied should be consistent with the risk limit in terms of the length of pipeline considered.

a product-specific criterion line might be available for assessing societal risk tolerability.2) Licensed Copy: x x. To carry out a site-specific societal risk assessment. the maximum distance over which the worst case event could affect the population in the vicinity should be determined. which is based on the application of previous editions of IGE/TD/1.published document PD 8010-3:2009 NOTE 1  The areas below the FN criterion line in Figure 6 represent broadly acceptable risk levels and therefore relevant good practice in both location classes 1 and 2. This is defined as the site interaction distance. © BSI 2008  •  17 .E-04 1.g. 2) Operators can apply this approach as part of demonstration of ongoing compliance with the recommendations given in PD 8010-1 for population density. the site length combined with the maximum hazard range within which the population is to be assessed (see Figure 7).E-03 1. e. This envelope curve represents the boundary for a series of curves applying to numerous different pipeline cases which are acceptable in accordance with IGE/TD/1.E-06 1. failure cases.E-09 1. Figure 20 for natural gas. Assessment of the societal risk in accordance with the FN criterion line might still allow such variations to be classified as an acceptable situation not requiring any upgrading of the pipeline to reduce the risk.E-02 Frequency (per year) of N or more casualties 1. Uncontrolled Copy. failure frequencies and consequences is similar to that used to obtain individual risk levels. 10/06/2010 06:22.E-10 1 10 Number of casualties B A 100 1 000 Key A Broadly acceptable B Tolerable if ALARP Population density tends to vary along a pipeline route.E-08 1. Figure 6  Societal risk FN criterion line applicable to 1 km of pipeline 1.E-07 1. Mott Macdonald. An example of this is the FN envelope presented in IGE/TD/1:2001. with clusters of population at some locations.E-05 1. The methodology for assessing risk scenarios. location classification and/or demonstration of ALARP. (c) BSI NOTE 2  In some cases.

10/06/2010 06:22. the topography. If the calculated site-specific FN curve falls below the FN criterion line. then further mitigation might be required to reduce risks to acceptable/negligible levels if this is economically justifiable in terms of the requirement to demonstrate that the risks are ALARP. Mott Macdonald. F. the site-specific FN curve is obtained by factoring risk values by a factor equal to 1 km divided by the site interaction distance. f. This provides a number of fN pairs. As the FN criterion line relates to a 1 km length of pipeline. the risk levels to the adjacent population are considered broadly acceptable. The frequency. giving a site-specific FN curve. and the actual population density within the area defined by the pipeline section and the interaction distance (see Figure 7) determined.PD 8010-3:2009 published document The accident scenarios which are relevant for the pipeline section within the site interaction distance should be listed. which are then ordered with respect to increasing number of casualties. N. the proposed development might be deemed unacceptable in that the societal risk levels are too high. and the cumulative frequency. The site-specific FN curve should be compared with the FN criterion line in Figure 6. Licensed Copy: x x. Alternatively. and effect area for each accident scenario should then be assessed along the site interaction distance. of N or more people being affected is determined. and the number of people. the presence of directional effects and. The FN criterion line given in Figure 6 represents broadly acceptable risk levels for pipeline operation. 18  •  © BSI 2008 . If the site-specific FN curve is close to or above the FN criterion line. Uncontrolled Copy. who would be affected. N. (c) BSI Figure 7  Site-specific pipeline interaction distance 1 2 Key 1 2 3 3 Maximum hazard range within which population is to be assessed Pipeline Site interaction distance  Existing buildings  New buildings NOTE 3  The shape and dimensions of the site-specific hazard range is dependent upon the characteristics of the released fluid. is determined for each scenario at each specific location. for heavier-than-air gases and liquids.

design factor and material properties. c) mechanical failure. Typical causes classified in databases include: a) external interference. including material or weld defects created when the pipe was manufactured or constructed. due to overpressure. The failure rates due to other damage mechanisms can be managed and controlled by competent pipeline operators through testing. and these have the greatest effect on risk from pipelines. mining). The pipelines should be individually assessed and the risk from each summed to obtain overall individual risk transects and societal risk FN curves. (c) BSI the pipelines could interact such that a failure on one pipeline would lead to the failure of the other pipeline. When assessing multiple pipelines. either natural (e. Uncontrolled Copy. fatigue or operation outside design limits. Clause 13. Mott Macdonald. FN data should be obtained for each pipeline assessed. d) ground movement. inspection. the pipeline depth of cover and the local installation of pipeline protection such as slabbing. as well as the location class. The failure rate for natural ground movement and for artificial ground movement depends upon the susceptibility to landsliding or © BSI 2008  •  19 . either internal or external. Assessment of pipeline failure databases shows that external interference and ground movement dominate pipeline rupture rates.1 Individual factors influencing pipeline failure frequency All the key damage mechanisms should be taken into account when carrying out a risk assessment. This data should then be factored by a value equal to 1 km divided by the sum of the interaction lengths for each pipeline considered.published document PD 8010-3:2009 If the specified area of interest includes another pipeline. e) operational. the risk from this pipeline should be included in the assessment if it is considered that: • Licensed Copy: x x. maintenance and operational controls in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004. • If pipeline interaction is considered likely then expert opinion should be obtained on how to model the combined failure frequencies and product outflow.g. and compared to the FN criterion line. including the pipeline wall thickness. landslide) or artificial (excavation. When calculating the overall risk it is necessary to combine the individual FN pairs from each assessment. b) corrosion. the development site under consideration is within the interaction distances of more than one major accident pipeline in the specified area. 10/06/2010 06:22. 8 Factors affecting risk levels 8. The failure rate for external interference is influenced by a number of parameters.

Information is given in Annex B. including: • • • • • • pipeline diameter. Risk mitigation measures are identified and agreed as necessary by the statutory authority or relevant stakeholder. Examples of typical benchmark solutions are given in Annex B. In some cases other causes might need to be considered in specific locations. Generic failure data might not be applicable to specific cases. The determination of failure rate data requires several parameters to be taken into account. site-specific depths should be taken into account.1. and that cathodic protection is maintained. In determining the external interference failure frequency. location class (1 or 2). the potential for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) or alternating current (AC)/direct current (DC) induced corrosion.PD 8010-3:2009 published document subsidence at the specific location. Where additional pipeline protection such as slabbing is to be taken into account. Typical failure frequencies for UK MAHPs based on UKOPA data are given in Annex B. Data relating to class 1 and 2 incident rates for UK MAHPs is provided by UKOPA [9]. 9. 20  •  © BSI 2008 . In the case of depth of cover. such as the quality of girth welds. Licensed Copy: x x. design factor.e. i. Uncontrolled Copy. it is recommended that the damage incidence rate for location class 2 areas should be assumed to be higher than for class 1 areas. depth of cover. or predictive models validated using such data. Risk mitigation measures fall into two categories: physical and procedural. the factor applied is approximately four times that for location class 1 areas. and therefore might only be applicable for short‑term risk control. Any site-specific variations should be assessed. the failure frequency in a class 2 area is four times that in a class 1 area. Mott Macdonald. Typically. pipe wall thickness. the design and installation should be assessed to ensure that additional loading is not imposed upon the pipeline. steel type and properties. The risk analysis requires the principal input data described in 5. The failure rates obtained from database records or predictive models should be justified for application to a site-specific case. 10/06/2010 06:22. Procedural measures rely upon management systems and can be subject to change over time. 8. (c) BSI The failure frequency associated with each damage mechanism should be determined using published operational data sources [8. 10]. and justifications for any additional assumptions to be applied locally should be documented.2 Factors for reduction of the external interference failure frequency for use in site-specific risk assessments NOTE 1  An example of a site-specific risk assessment is given in Annex C. The primary residual risk for existing pipelines is that due to external interference. These should be installed prior to the completion and use of any new development within the pipeline consultation zone.

I/OE is the damage incidence rate. depth of cover. additional surveillance. Rwt – reduction factor for wall thickness. slabbing. Appropriate factors can be applied cumulatively to the base failure frequency for the particular pipe diameter as shown in Annex B. and should document justification of any assumptions applied following assessment of these details. not just the pipeline itself. additional high visibility pipeline marker posts. The pipeline failure frequency due to external interference is obtained as follows: F = (PoF × I) / OE where: F is the pipeline failure frequency. depth of cover. surveillance frequency and damage prevention measures (slabbing and marker tapes) are described in the present subclause. The influence of specific parameters on the predicted pipeline failure frequencies is given as reduction factors as follows: • • • • • Rdf – reduction factor for design factor. 10/06/2010 06:22. Mott Macdonald. NOTE 2  The number of external interference events causing damage . the parameters listed above should be taken into account. Rdc – reduction factor for depth of cover. A number of factors which describe the specific effects of wall thickness. These factors can be used to assess the effect of individual measures on a known or existing unadjusted pipeline failure frequency for a particular pipeline. additional liaison visits. or to obtain a failure frequency prediction for a given pipeline. given in Figure 10. Rs – reduction factor for surveillance frequency.published document Physical measures include: • • • • • • wall thickness and design factor. PD 8010-3:2009 Licensed Copy: x x. given in Figure 11. (c) BSI Procedural measures include: A site-specific risk assessment should take into account relevant details of the pipeline. in kilometre years (km·y). design factor. I  is the number of external interference events causing damage in a given pipeline population. © BSI 2008  •  21 . Uncontrolled Copy. and the operational exposure. relate to the population that the pipeline is part of. given in Figure 8 and Table 1. Pipeline failure frequencies derived from published operational data sources are given in Annex B. given in Figure 9 and Table 1. OE  is the operational exposure of the pipeline population. When predicting site-specific pipeline failure frequencies for external interference. given in Table 2. Rp – reduction factor for protection measures.

3 0.1 0. 24.0 Licensed Copy: x x. Mott Macdonald. or may be used more comprehensively to estimate the failure frequency in screening risk assessments. 25].8 Reduction factor 0. They may be applied separately to modify existing risk assessment results (i. 22] carried out using models which describe the failure of a pipeline due to gouge and dent-gouge damage [23. and can be used to assess the influence of design factor on failure frequencies due to external interference for pipelines with wall thickness equal to or greater than 5 mm.PD 8010-3:2009 published document Figure 8  Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to design factor 1.7 0. (c) BSI 0.5 0.97 (f -0.6 0. Figures 8 and 9 show simple reduction factors for design factor and wall thickness which can be used in estimating the failure frequency due to external interference.8 Design factor NOTE  Figure 8 relates to a pipe wall thickness of 5 mm.0 0.2 0.72) 0. to modify existing risk assessment results taking into account local changes in wall thickness). 22  •  © BSI 2008 .6 0. Further details are given in Annex B. and damage statistics for such damage derived from the UKOPA pipeline database [9]. 10/06/2010 06:22. Uncontrolled Copy. which are applied either to a predicted pipeline PoF or to a failure frequency predicted for a specific pipeline using a specific damage incidence rate. The reduction factors given in Figures 8 and 9 are based on a conservative interpretation of the parametric study results. 21. These two reduction factors have been derived from the results of comprehensive parametric studies [20. The reduction factors take the form of a factor for the design factor and a factor for wall thickness.2 = e 0.4 0. using both reduction factors in conjunction with the generic failure frequency curve in Annex B as an alternative to using more complex structural reliability based methods.e.4 0. The range of pipeline parameters over which the reduction factors are applicable is given in Table 1.

72 = e -0. Uncontrolled Copy.5 and 0. and reduction factor due to wall thickness.4).2 0. © BSI 2008  •  23 . Rdf.3. Use of this reduction factor places a requirement on the pipeline operator to carry out and document periodic checks to confirm that the depth of cover is being maintained (see 8. Rwt Parameter Design factor Wall thickness Material grade Diameter Charpy energy Range of applicability of Rdf and Rwt G0.72 H5. This reduction factor has been derived from the results of published studies [26].5 e -0.3 0.published document PD 8010-3:2009 Figure 9  Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to wall thickness 1. Table 1 Range of applicability of reduction factor for design factor.6 e -0.31 (t-5) f = 0. (c) BSI 0. Mott Macdonald.3 and can be used to assess the influence of wall thickness on failure frequency due to external interference for pipelines with design factor less than or equal to these values.4 mm H24 J (average) Figure 10 shows a simple reduction factor for depth of cover which can be used to assess the reduction in damage incidence rate in the estimation of the failure frequency due to external interference.0 Licensed Copy: x x.24 (t-5) f = 0. 10/06/2010 06:22.72.0 mm GX65 219.39 (t-5) f = 0.4 0.1 mm to 914. 0.0 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Wall thickness (mm) NOTE  Figure 9 relates to design factors of 0.8 Reduction factor 0.

(c) BSI 1.4 0.2 0 0 0.4 1.4 1.8 0.PD 8010-3:2009 published document Figure 10  Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to depth of cover 1.0 0.2 Risk reduction factor 1. 10/06/2010 06:22.0 1.2 0 0 5 10 15 Surveillance interval (days) 20 25 30 Table 2 gives reduction factors that apply to pipeline protection measures.8 0. which can be used to assess the reduction in damage incidence rate in the estimation of the failure frequency due to external interference.6 Licensed Copy: x x.5 3. These factors are based on expert studies [28].4 0.5 Depth of cover (m) Figure 11 shows a simple reduction factor for a surveillance interval which can be used to assess the reduction in damage incidence rate in the estimation of the failure frequency due to external interference.2 Reduction factor 1.6 0. Uncontrolled Copy.0 2.5 2. Figure 11  Indicative reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to surveillance frequency (dependent on frequency and duration of unauthorized excavations) 1.0 0. This reduction factor has been derived from the results of studies carried out by UKOPA relating infringement incidence data to damage incidence data [27].6 0.0 3.5 1. 24  •  © BSI 2008 . Mott Macdonald.

No recommendations are made here for values of Rlv and Rmp. Rwt (reduction factor for wall thickness). and Rwt is derived for a constant design factor of 0.05 PD 8010-3:2009 Licensed Copy: x x. for pipeline protection Measure Installation of concrete slab protection Reduction factor Rp 0.g.published document Table 2  Failure frequency reduction factors. e. the application of Rs . using reduction factors assessed by the risk analyst for specific situations: • • • Rs (reduction factor for surveillance frequency). NOTE 3  Rdf and Rwt have been derived from a parametric study in which Rdf is derived for a constant wall thickness of 5 mm. temporary construction sites etc. Rp [reduction factor for protection (slabbing and marking)]. RPoF. when used in conjunction with the base pipeline failure frequencies given in Annex B. For site-specific risk assessments.g.72. The reduction factors given in Figure 8 and Figure 9 affect the pipeline tolerance to defects and therefore the PoF. fairs.16 0. NOTE 4  With respect to control of risk to developments in the vicinity of pipelines. the main factors affecting failure frequency should be given careful consideration and the appropriate reduction factor applied as follows: a) probability of failure. RIR. 10/06/2010 06:22. determined using the recommended reduction factors given in this subclause for: • • Rdc (reduction factor for depth of cover). the physical barrier mitigation measures should apply to the whole pipeline interaction length for every failure that has to be considered. festivals. Assessment should be carried out for specific cases. Rlv might only be applicable for short term/temporary developments only (e. These reduction factors can be applied together within the limits of applicability given in Table 1.1 [28]. Factors for risk control measures along the pipeline route to reduce the number of incidents may be applied as follows for other mitigation measures. whereas the reduction factors given in Figure 10. Rlv (reduction factor for additional liaison visits). determined using the recommended reduction factors given in this subclause for: • • Rdf (reduction factor for design factor).). Uncontrolled Copy. Mott Macdonald. Rmp (reduction factor for additional high visibility marker posts). © BSI 2008  •  25 . NOTE 2  In order to use the reduction factor. I/OE. b) the factor reduction on number of incidents (or incident rate). Figure 11 and Table 2 affect the damage incident rate. (c) BSI Installation of concrete slab protection plus visible warning NOTE 1  Concrete slabbing with high visibility marker tapes has been shown to achieve significant risk reduction factors below 0. Rp.

: • • • • design factor specified as 0. Uncontrolled Copy.PD 8010-3:2009 8. Clause 9.1 published document Implementation of risk mitigation measures General The implementation of risk mitigation measures should be carried out in accordance with PD 8010-1 and the recommendations given in 8.3.3. 8. 6.4 Taking account of increased depth of cover Increased depth of cover at the location under consideration may be taken into account where this exceeds the recommendations given in PD 8010-1:2004.7 and in accordance with details specified in IGE/TD/1. constructed in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004. A justification of the permanence of the depth of cover should 26  •  © BSI 2008 . Licensed Copy: x x. The installation of concrete slabbing over the pipeline can restrict access to the pipeline in the event of coating deterioration or corrosion damage. Particular care is required where the consolidation of the pipeline trench bed is disturbed allowing settlement. (c) BSI 8. The rationale for the design of the new pipeline section should be specified and justified in relation to the need for risk reduction.2 Relaying the pipeline in increased wall thickness The pipeline should be designed in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004. It is therefore recommended that a coating survey is carried out prior to the installation of slabbing.3.3. selection of wall thickness in relation to risks to new planned development.8. 8.9. The structural loads imposed on the pipeline by the slabbing should be taken into account. Settlement at the tie-in points with the existing pipeline should be avoided.3. Clause 10.3. e. The function and integrity of pipeline corrosion protection across the new section and at the points of connection with the existing pipeline should be confirmed to be adequate and fit for purpose in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004. 6 and 8.3 Laying slabbing over the pipeline Installation of slabbing to provide impact protection to the pipeline should be carried out in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004. Clause 11.3 to reduce pipeline PoF at operating conditions. Clauses 5.2 to 8.3 8. selection of design factor and wall thickness based on ALARP calculations. Mott Macdonald.5. that the results of previous in-line inspection are assessed to determine whether there are any indications of corrosion in the length of pipeline to be slabbed that might need assessment and/or repair prior to slabbing. selection of the wall thickness to achieve an acceptable pipeline PoF. 10/06/2010 06:22.3. 6. and that the functionality and integrity of the cathodic protection system is confirmed before and after installation of the slabbing. and tested in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004. A full survey of the actual depth of cover over the full interaction distance at the location under consideration should be carried out in order to record the depth of cover.g.

10. © BSI 2008  •  27 . Uncontrolled Copy.3.2 recommends that pipeline route inspections should be carried out.3.published document PD 8010-3:2009 be prepared.6 Increasing surveillance frequency PD 8010-1:2004. high visibility pipeline markers. The depth of cover should be rechecked at specified locations during pipeline route inspections carried out in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004.2 to detect factors that could affect the safety and operation of the pipeline. 13.9. at all crossings and. providing further information on contacts and emergency telephone numbers. including the reason for the increased depth of cover. The surveillance frequency may be increased using walking or vantage point surveys at specific locations as a risk mitigation measure.3. can be installed as an additional risk mitigation measure.3. increasing the surveillance frequency will increase the likelihood of detection of activities that could damage the pipeline. In addition. Where route inspections are carried out at two‑weekly intervals. 13. 10/06/2010 06:22.3. the type of soil. (c) BSI 8. Licensed Copy: x x. at changes in pipeline direction.2 and E. (See PD 8010-1:2004. 13. Full details of any additional mitigation measures installed or implemented should be recorded in the pipeline records systems or included in the major accident prevention document (MAPD) for the pipeline. the susceptibility to land sliding and the current and future land use. Such checks should be carried out at intervals not exceeding 4 years. where practicable.) 8.14 recommends that pipeline markers be installed at field boundaries. Mott Macdonald.5 Installing additional pipeline markers PD 8010-1:2004.

including whether the pipeline has additional protection [e. which applies to significant development. thicker walled pipe or slabbing3)] 3) The risk reduction factors given in 8. Land use planning zones notified to local planning authorities by HSE are based on pipeline details provided in the operator’s pipeline notification. middle and outer zone distances to local planning authorities. Land use planning zones define three areas: • • • inner zone. and to pipelines that were notified under the Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations 1982 [29] before the enactment of the Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996. which applies to vulnerable or very large populations.2 are not currently used in the HSE methodology.1 The zone boundaries are determined by HSE using a process for calculating individual risk levels. so that it can provide advice to the local planning authorities on the risks posed by major hazards to people in the surrounding area. Mott Macdonald. Local planning authorities in Great Britain are responsible for land use planning decisions under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 [30]. Where local pipeline details differ from the notified conditions. to allow the planned development to proceed. middle zone. Uncontrolled Copy. (c) BSI Summary of HSE methodology for provision of advice on planning developments in the vicinity of major accident hazard pipelines in the UK Land use planning zones The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) sets land use planning zones for major hazard sites.g. Land use planning zones are used by HSE for MAHPs as defined by Regulation 18 and Schedule 2 of the Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 [1]. 28  •  © BSI 2008 . including high-pressure pipelines transporting defined hazardous substances. Risk reduction factors associated with slabbing are currently under review by HSE. and do not cover local variations. The outer zone distance is also called the consultation zone. A developer or local planning authority might wish to seek further information to see whether the risk at the specific development location is different from the generalized land use planning zone notified by HSE. 10/06/2010 06:22. based on information provided to HSE by the pipeline operator. within which the risk implications of proposed developments that significantly increase the population density have to be considered by the local authority. and HSE is a statutory consultee with responsibility to provide advice with respect to public safety for any developments planned within or which straddle the consultation zone. HSE then notifies the inner.PD 8010-3:2009 Annex A (informative) published document Licensed Copy: x x. which is immediately adjacent to the pipeline. Detailed guidance defining the HSE advice (“advise against” or “do not advise against”) for various types of development is contained in a comprehensive document available from the HSE website entitled Planning advice for developments near hazardous installations (PADHI+) [31]. A. or whether additional risk reduction measures (risk mitigation) can be applied at that location. outer zone.

especially if it involves an increase in population within 1 MDOB. 5. (c) BSI b) boundary between middle zone and outer zone – an individual risk of (1 × 10−6) per year of dangerous dose or worse to the average householder. before deciding whether to object to the proposed development. However. NOTE 2  In the past. It is based on the established best practice methodology for pipeline risk assessment. HSE has adopted a risk-based approach for calculating the distances to the zone boundaries from the pipeline.g. 10/06/2010 06:22.3 × 10−6) per year. schools. At the time when the pipeline operator becomes aware of the possibility of a development near a pipeline. It is recommended that the methodology be used for the prediction of site-specific risk levels for consideration in the reassessment of land use planning developments.1.published document PD 8010-3:2009 near the proposed development). c) boundary between outer zone and no restrictions – the lesser of: 1) an individual risk of (0. local planning authorities.3. or 2) the pipeline MDOB. HSE has used a consequence-based approach for calculating this distance. NOTE 3  In cases where the calculation of risks indicates risk levels are lower than (1 × 10−6) per year and therefore there is no middle zone.3). NOTE 4  The location of very large sensitive developments (e. In these cases. Uncontrolled Copy. they need to assess the population increase against the original routing parameters. developers and any person involved in the risk assessment of developments in the vicinity of existing MAHPs.5. middle and outer. 5. This distance is calculated using the equation and substance factors given in PD 8010-1:2004. old people’s homes) is restricted to the outer zone (see also Clause 7). the inner and middle zones are made equal to the MDOB. The guidance in this part of PD 8010 is provided for use by pipeline operators. all three zones. very large hospitals. NOTE 1  Because of the low levels of risk. Mott Macdonald. there is a need to reassess the impact of site-specific details on the risk levels within the interaction zone using an established risk assessment methodology. where risk calculations show levels lower than (0. some MAHPs will not have an inner zone based on an individual risk level of (1 × 10−5) per year. inner. In some cases they might decide to initiate a full societal risk assessment to define acceptability or otherwise of the development against the FN risk curve presented in Figure 6. The process is shown in Figure A. are made equal to the MDOB (PD 8010-1:2004. Licensed Copy: x x.5.3 × 10−6) per year of dangerous dose or worse to the average householder. a detailed risk assessment is carried out by HSE to assess any change to zone boundaries. defining the levels of risk at each boundary as follows: a) boundary between inner and middle zone – based on the greater of: 1) an individual risk of (1 × 10−5) per year of dangerous dose or worse to the average householder. 2) notified outer zone distance. an inner zone equivalent to the MDOB has been applied by HSE to MAHPs. so that specific local conditions can be taken into account. © BSI 2008  •  29 . Similarly.

30  •  © BSI 2008 . 10/06/2010 06:22. Mott Macdonald.1  Planning application process and need for site-specific risk assessment Application for Planning Permission submitted to Local Planning Authority Licensed Copy: x x. the pipeline operator might need to carry out a societal risk assessment to allow comparison with the societal risk criteria in Figure 6.PD 8010-3:2009 published document Figure A. the pipeline operator needs to consider the impact of increased population within the consultation zone and the effect on the original routing decisions made for the pipeline. (c) BSI PADHI + assessment applied by Local Planning Authority No safety or risk issues for LPA to consider with this Planning Application Do not Advise Against NOTE 1 Planning decision result? Advise Against HSE Advise Against letter may prompt developer to request further information from the pipeline operator on the pipeline design in the vicinity of the development Pipeline design different from notified details Pipeline details as notified HSE reassess risks which may revise LUP zone distances Developer may request Pipeline Operator to consider further risk reduction / mitigation measures in vicinity of proposed development NOTE 2 HSE reassess risks which may change advice Risk reduction / mitigation measures proposed and evaluated Cost effective risk reduction may not be possible. Results of risk assessment can be given to LPA for consideration Do not Advise Against NOTE 1 Planning decision result? Advise Against Improvements agreed and implementation planned Do not Advise Against NOTE 1 Planning decision result? Advise Against NOTE 1  In all cases where the PADHI+ decision is “do not advise against”. the land use planning individual risk assessment and the pipeline operator’s societal risk assessment need to be carried out in parallel. especially if the development is within 1 MDOB. If significant population increase is likely to occur if the planning development goes ahead. Uncontrolled Copy. If unfavourable results are obtained from the societal risk assessment. the pipeline operator might consider objecting to the proposed development. so that a common understanding using the same data and risk assessment assumptions allows the effectiveness of the mitigation to be agreed. NOTE 2  In cases where risk mitigation measures are being considered.

and therefore might differ from equivalent risk levels calculated using other methodologies.3.published document PD 8010-3:2009 MDOBs are given in PD 8010-1:2004. These criteria are based on the assumption that the exposed people are typical householders and indoors most of the time. Uncontrolled Copy.52 X42 X52 X52 X65 X52 −6 MaterialA) Distance to  (1 × 10−6) risk contour m 150 190 240 380 432 −6 Distance to (0. A. Table A. so that the effect can be quantified. A) As specified in ISO 3183‑2:1996. Zone distances based on these risk levels notified to the local planning authorities are as calculated by HSE. 10/06/2010 06:22. There are a number of aspects of the HSE land use planning and major hazards work that PADHI+ [31] does not deal with.3 × 10−6) risk distances for ethylene.3 × 10−6) risk contour m 200 230 320 435 485 bar Ethylene Ethylene Ethylene Spiked crude NGL 95 95 99 64 69 mm 219 273 273 914 508 NOTE  The land use planning zones defined in Table A. Normally.3 × 10−6) risk contours for ethylene.2 Distances to risk zones Current HSE land use planning distances to (1 × 10−6) and (0.09 5. spiked crude and natural gas liquids (NGLs) are given in Table A.03 7.1  Typical (1 × 10−6) and (0.5.56 9.3 × 10 ) risk distances were calculated by HSE using historical rupture frequency data. © BSI 2008  •  31 . spiked crude and natural gas liquids (NGLs) Content of pipeline Distances to risk zones MAOP Diameter Wall thickness mm 7. Licensed Copy: x x. specific assumptions made by HSE are given in this document.1.52 9. 5. the “dangerous dose” concept is used by HSE to define land use planning zones. then HSE risk assessors might be willing to reconsider the case using the details relevant to the pipeline near the development. PADHI+ uses the three zones set by HSE that are based on the details given in the pipeline notification. including developments near pipelines. requiring prolonged treatment. NOTE 5  Due to the uncertainties associated with such predictions. 3) some people being seriously injured.1 as (1 × 10 ) and (0. In the case of mixtures. Mott Macdonald. (c) BSI Dangerous dose is defined by HSE as a dose of thermal radiation that would cause: 1) severe distress to almost everyone in the area. it might be appropriate to take into account proportions when calculating this distance. 4) any highly susceptible/sensitive people being killed. 2) a substantial fraction of the exposed population requiring medical attention. Where possible. In cases where local pipeline details differ from notified details. where the pipelines have sections with additional protection measures. a dangerous dose for thermal radiation is defined as 1 050 tdu.

Licensed Copy: x x. People inside buildings outside the distance to the spontaneous ignition but within the distance to the piloted ignition of wood are assumed to survive the fireball. NOTE  Other probabilities are observed in historical data. The proportion of time the average householder spends indoors during the day is 90%. the building is assumed to provide full protection. but are then assumed to try to escape from the building and to be subject to the thermal radiation effects from the crater fire. A. HSE assumes that the average householder is present 100% of the time. Uncontrolled Copy.512.5 m/s and will find shelter at a distance of 75 m in a class 1 environment or at a distance of 50 m in a class 2 environment. delayed ignition resulting in a jet fire: 0. 5. People inside buildings engulfed by pool fires or spray fires are assumed not to escape. which is calculated using the formula and substance factors given in PD 8010-1:2004. 14. (c) BSI A.3. For people inside buildings that are beyond the distance to piloted ignition.3. other than natural gas. the largest fireball is obtained. delayed ignition resulting in a flash fire followed by a jet fire: 0. A.3 published document Specific HSE methods and assumptions NOTE  Specific methods applied and assumptions made by HSE are given in this Annex so that the impact on calculated risk values can be considered. 32.16. and the proportion at night is 99%. see [11.5. 33]. when the two times are equal. 15. If the cumulative thermal dose exceeds 1 050 tdu. used by HSE are: • • • • immediate ignition resulting in a fireball followed by jet fire: 0. Mott Macdonald. HSE calculates the reducing release rate with time and so obtains the cumulative amount released. 32  •  © BSI 2008 . then the typical person is deemed to have received a dangerous dose.2 Probability of ignition Typical overall probabilities for flammable gases.2.3 Thermal radiation and effects HSE assumes that the typical person will move away from the fire at a speed of 2. For further details of HSE’s consequence models.3.128.3. The methodology used by HSE calculates the distance to the spontaneous ignition of wood. and people inside buildings within this distance are assumed to become fatalities.1 Prediction of consequences In predicting consequences. NOTE  Uncertainties relating to the near field consequence analysis are accommodated through the application of an inner zone based on the MDOB.PD 8010-3:2009 A. provided that the thermal radiation dose they receive does not exceed 1 050 tdu. The time required to release the cumulative amount is then compared with the burn time of a fireball containing the cumulative amount released. no ignition: 0. 10/06/2010 06:22.

3 71. 10/06/2010 06:22.0 82. Uncontrolled Copy.011 0 0. Further information is available in the UKOPA pipeline fault database report [9]. It is presented to enable general comparison of the datasets only. account needs to be taken of pipeline-specific factors such as wall thickness.052 — HoleB) 0.04 0.006 0.0 — % rupture 19. Mott Macdonald.004 0.1 represents the overall averaged set of failure frequencies applied to the whole pipeline population included in the database.1.1 100.9 0 17.076 0.264 % pin 10. material properties.009 0.2 23.9 33.2 — % hole 70. Equivalent diameter greater than 6 mm but less than pipe diameter.003 0. Licensed Copy: x x.013 0. the data and examples given in B.046 0.035 0.011 0 0 0 0.019 — RuptureC) 0. (c) BSI B.1 44. and is not intended to be applied to specific pipelines.003 0. In order to apply the above data in a pipeline risk assessment.2 2.073 0. pressure.3 0 0 0 22. © BSI 2008  •  33 .1 PD 8010-3:2009 Failure frequencies for UK pipelines General In deriving the failure frequency for a specific pipeline.003 0.1  Failure rates for UK pipelines based on UKOPA data Units in failures per 1 000 km·y Damage mechanism External interference External corrosion Internal corrosion Material and construction Ground movement Other Total A) B) C) PinA) 0. diameter.published document Annex B (informative) B. Table B.4 26.8 for failure frequency for the different damage mechanisms apply to UK MAHPs.7 — Equivalent diameter up to 6 mm.2 All damage mechanisms Pipeline failure frequencies for the population of UK major accident hazard pipelines derived from UK data collated since 1962 and published by UKOPA are given in Table B. The data given in Table B. Equivalent diameter equal to or greater than pipe diameter.1. environment and pipeline operator management practices.3 to B.5 76. all credible damage mechanisms and location specific factors that can influence the frequency of failure due to each individual mechanism need to be assessed.002 — Total 0.063 0.057 0.002 0. location. NOTE  Application of pipeline failure rates in a site-specific risk assessment requires careful consideration of local details. Based on an analysis of the data given in Table B.

4.116 0.01 0.2 and B. wall thickness. B.028 0 0 RuptureA) 0.4 Generic pipeline failure frequency curve for external interference General A generic pipeline failure frequency curve for external interference which can be used with the failure frequency reduction factors for design factor and wall thickness given in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively is derived by predicting the failure frequency for pipelines B. material properties and pressure. and as operational failure data is sparse.PD 8010-3:2009 B.01 0 0 0 HoleA) 0. Uncontrolled Copy. These models allow the prediction of failure frequencies taking into account pipeline diameter. 10/06/2010 06:22.149 0. Licensed Copy: x x.079 0.031 0 See Table B.061 0.2 Failure frequency due to external interference vs.1 for definitions.1 for definitions.03 0. diameter Units in failure frequency per 1 000 km·y Diameter (mm) 100 250 400 560 700 860 1 200 A) PinA) 0 0. Mott Macdonald.028 0.006 0. Operational data relating to failure frequency due to external interference is presented in Tables B.072 0.022 0 0. recognized engineering practice requires that a predictive model is used to calculate failure frequencies for specific pipelines.031 0 Total 0.3 published document Prediction of pipeline failure frequency due to external interference Pipeline damage due to external (third-party) interference is random in nature.3. wall thickness Units in failure frequency per 1 000 km·y Wall thickness (mm) <5 5 to 10 >10 to 15 >15 A) PinA) 0 0.049 0. Table B.3 Failure frequency due to external interference vs.03 0.016 0 See Table B.022 0 0.067 0.223 0. (c) BSI Table B.162 0.079 0.01 0 0.004 0 Total 0.012 0 RuptureA) 0. NOTE  Failure frequency predictions based on assessment of current operational fault and failure data are published by UKOPA [9].012 0 0 HoleA) 0.119 0.1 34  •  © BSI 2008 .

published document PD 8010-3:2009 of varying diameter with a constant design factor of 0. for leaks and ruptures.2 0. This curve is shown in Figure B.0 Diameter (mm) Use of the generic failure frequency curve with a fixed proportion of ruptures of 0. 25].0 800.1).225 Total failure frequency per 1 000 km .4. Uncontrolled Copy. Example calculations of failure frequency using the generic failure frequency curve and the design factor and wall thickness failure frequency reduction factors are given in B.0 600.1. The failure model is two-dimensional.21 0.2. the leak/rupture failure mode is dependent upon the critical length of an axial defect. In cases where risk levels are critical.7.5. 24.7 needs to be treated as an upper bound. which is dependent upon both the diameter and the wall thickness. NOTE 1  Predicted failure frequencies due to external or third-party interference increase with material grade due to the consequent reduction in wall thickness. as recommended in 8.e. However.205 0. (c) BSI Figure B. i. so the proportion of ruptures of 0.22 0.1 Generic predicted pipeline failure frequencies for third-party interference 0.0 200. 10/06/2010 06:22.0 400. © BSI 2008  •  35 . The generic failure frequency curve has been generated using probabilities of failure produced using the original dent-gouge model [23.5 can be used to select a more representative value. The failure frequency prediction tool recommended by UKOPA is FFREQ (see B. a pipeline specific analysis needs to be carried out using a recognised failure frequency prediction tool. The data presented in B. Failure frequencies for pipelines in S areas can be derived by multiplying the R area failure frequency by a factor of 4.y 0.215 0.7 is conservative.195 0. Licensed Copy: x x.0 1 000. so the generic curve given in Figure B. A conservative assumption for the proportion of ruptures which can be applied to the generic failure frequency curve is 0. and the estimated values are compared with FFREQ predictions for the equivalent pipeline case.1 provides failure frequencies for pipelines in R areas. NOTE 2  The generic curve given in Figure B.1 can be conservatively applied to pipelines with material grades of X65 and lower. and predicts the total probability of through wall failure. a constant wall thickness of 5 mm and a material grade of X65.2. Mott Macdonald.72.

6 mm wall thickness pipeline operating at a design factor of 0.091 per 1 000 km·y The above estimates are compared with FFREQ predictions (per 1 000 km·y) in Table B. for a wall thickness of 7.1.81 The reduction factor. is 0.5 at wall thickness 5 mm.3 The reduction factor.5 = 0. RF.2.223 per 1 000 km·y.3 design factor B. (c) BSI Table B.013 × 0.67 × 0. for a design factor of 0.87 The total failure frequency (TFF) for a 219 mm diameter pipeline. Uncontrolled Copy. 10/06/2010 06:22.6 mm wall thickness × 0. is: Rdf = 0. is: Rwt = 0. for a wall thickness of 5.024 219 mm diameter × 5. estimated from the generic total failure frequency curve in Figure B. so the failure frequency for this pipeline is: TFF = 0. taken from Figure 8.2 published document Estimation of pipeline external interference failure frequency using the generic failure frequency curve Example 1: Estimation of external interference failure frequency for 219 mm diameter. taken from Figure 9. 5.4.208 per 1 000 km·y. so the failure frequency for this pipeline is: TFF = 0. 7. Rwt. B.208 × 0.4.72.6 mm at a design factor of 0.130 per 1 000 km·y The proportion of ruptures. Mott Macdonald.5 The total failure frequency (TFF) for a 609 mm diameter pipeline.1 Licensed Copy: x x.223 × 0.1.PD 8010-3:2009 B.2.81 × 0. taken from Figure 8. Rdf.4. Rdf.3 at wall thickness 5 mm. is: Rwt = 0.4.87 = 0. is assumed to be 0.9 mm at a design factor of 0. is 0.67 The reduction factor. estimated from the generic total failure frequency curve in Figure B.084 per 1 000 km·y 36  •  © BSI 2008 . taken from Figure 9.7. is: Rdf = 0. for a design factor of 0.2 Example 2: Estimation of external interference failure frequency for 609 mm diameter. so the rupture frequency is: 0.7 = 0.091 FFREQ prediction 0.4  Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 1 with FFREQ predictions Pipe case Estimated total failure frequency 0.9 mm wall thickness pipeline operating at a design factor of 0.13 FFREQ prediction 0.5 The reduction factor. Rwt.076 Estimated rupture frequency 0.72.

81 The reduction factor.6  Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 3 with FFREQ predictions Pipe case Estimated total failure frequency 0.008 914 mm diameter × 9.5 mm wall thickness × 0.34 The total failure frequency (TFF) for a 914 mm diameter pipeline.039 per 1 000 km·y The above estimates are compared with FFREQ predictions (per 1 000 km·y) in Table B.084 × 0. 10/06/2010 06:22. is assumed to be 0. taken from Figure 8.34 = 0.6.72. for a design factor of 0.059 per 1 000 km·y The above estimates are compared with FFREQ predictions (per 1 000 km·y) in Table B.published document PD 8010-3:2009 The proportion of ruptures.5 at wall thickness 5 mm. Table B. so the rupture frequency is: 0.7.5  Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 2 with FFREQ predictions Pipe case Estimated total failure frequency 0.5 The reduction factor. is: Rwt = 0. RF1. Mott Macdonald.020 609 mm diameter × 7.061 Estimated rupture frequency 0.039 FFREQ prediction 0. for a wall thickness of 9.9 mm wall thickness × 0.7 = 0. estimated from the generic total failure frequency curve in Figure B.084 FFREQ prediction 0.3 Example 3: Estimation of external interference failure frequency for 914 mm diameter.5 mm at a design factor of 0.5 design factor B. is: Rdf = 0.199 per 1 000 km·y. Licensed Copy: x x.199 × 0. is assumed to be 0.055 per 1 000 km·y The proportion of ruptures. (c) BSI Table B. 9.4.055 × 0.1. so the rupture frequency is: 0. Uncontrolled Copy.055 FFREQ prediction 0.81 × 0.7 = 0.059 FFREQ prediction 0. taken from Figure 9.7.5 mm wall thickness pipeline operating at a design factor of 0. Rwt. RF.5 design factor © BSI 2008  •  37 .2.5.043 Estimated rupture frequency 0. so the failure frequency for this pipeline is: TFF = 0. Rdf. is 0.

Uncontrolled Copy.7 UKOPA pipe cases Outside diameter mm 168.9 9. However.7 are given in this subclause for reference and application.6 7.6 5. (c) BSI B.3 219. These values are generally below the minimum recommended wall thicknesses given in IGE/TD/1.4 allows conservative failure frequency estimates for specific pipeline cases to be readily estimated. the approach is approximate.4 508 609 762 914 Wall thickness mm 5. 38  •  © BSI 2008 .3 and B.2. Failure frequency predictions generated using FFREQ for pipe cases selected to represent the range of pipe parameters in the UKOPA database given in Table B.5 published document Pipeline external interference failure frequency predictions for specific pipe cases FFREQ external interference failure frequency predictions for specific pipe cases The use of a generic failure frequency curve for external interference as described in B. and where possible.9 and B.5.5 X42 X46 X52 X52 X52 X52 X60 X60 X65 Material grade NOTE  The wall thickness values in Table B.6 5. Detailed predictions. B. The current tool for the prediction of pipeline failure frequency due to external interference recommended by UKOPA is FFREQ.4.1 273 323.8. Licensed Copy: x x.1 Table B.PD 8010-3:2009 B.10. are for pipelines located in R areas.9 406. Mott Macdonald. including results for pipelines located in S areas. B.9 7.7 represent a lower bound of pipeline wall thickness data in the UKOPA database. The FFREQ failure frequency predictions given in Tables B.9 7. predictions for the specific pipe case under consideration need to be carried out using a recognized failure frequency prediction model. are published on the UKOPA website.6 5. and Figures B. 10/06/2010 06:22.9 7.

031 914A) 0.200 Total failure frequency per 1 000 km .60 0.4A) 0.056 0.140 0.72 0.068 0.067 406.4 0.044 0.082 0.030 0.02 0.40 Design factor 0.037 0.022 508A) 0.112 0.061 0.180 0.189 0. (c) BSI Diameter.3 0.026 0.3A) 0.086 0.100 0. 10/06/2010 06:22.8  FFREQ predictions for total external interference failure frequency for pipe cases defined in Table B.040 0.059 0.103 0.5 0.054 0. Mott Macdonald.088 0.142 0.090 0.04 0.046 0.051 0.064 323.06 0.095 0.120 0.109 0.0 0.08 0.137 0.188 0. Uncontrolled Copy.071 0.056 219.138 0.082 0.185 0.044 0.073 0.076 0.061 0.100 0.6 0. y 168 219 273 323 406 508 609 762 914 0.029 762A) 0.020 Licensed Copy: x x.1A) 0.20 0.027 609A) 0.065 0.107 0. Figure B.2  FFREQ predictions of total external interference failure frequency for UKOPA pipe cases 0.059 273A) 0.097 0.160 0.143 0.042 0.103 0.063 0. in millimetres (mm).0 0.2 A) Total failure frequency 168.published document PD 8010-3:2009 Table B.039 0.068 0.7 (per 1 000 km·y) Design factor 0.050 0.186 0.115 0.80 © BSI 2008  •  39 .9A) 0.

004 0.065 0. 10/06/2010 06:22.4 Design factor 0.022 0.16 0. Uncontrolled Copy.6 0.139 0.021 0.011 273A) 0.001 914A) 0.12 0.130 0.010 0.024 0. Mott Macdonald.062 0.013 219.PD 8010-3:2009 published document Table B.010 323.017 0.027 0.8 168 219 273 323 406 508 609 762 914 40  •  © BSI 2008 .001 609A) 0.087 0.3  FFREQ predictions of external interference rupture frequency for UKOPA pipe cases Rupture failure frequency per 1 000 km .011 0.020 0.2 A) Rupture frequency 168. (c) BSI Diameter.064 0.1A) 0.041 0.089 0.06 0.064 0.042 0.011 0.04 0.004 0.006 0. in millimetres (mm).002 508A) 0.009 406.031 0.3 0.135 0.001 0.091 0.9  FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture frequency for pipe cases defined in Table B.001 762A) 0. Figure B.060 0.008 0.043 0.047 0.3A) 0.000 Licensed Copy: x x.004 0.02 0 0 0.014 0.060 0.5 0.1 0.022 0.093 0.y 0.9A) 0.7 (per 1 000 km·y) Design factor 0.039 0.049 0.005 0.026 0.72 0.023 0.029 0.012 0.2 0.030 0.08 0.6 0.028 0.14 0.4 0.138 0.4A) 0.

9 wt ruptures 406 dia x 7.5 wt leaks 219 dia x 5.027 0. Uncontrolled Copy.14 0.16 Failure frequency per 1 000 km .000 Diameter.019 0.7 0.048 0.1 0.published document Table B.138 0.8 406 dia x 7.006 0.004 0.04 0.1 0.042 0.091 0.6 wt ruptures 219 dia x 5.036 0. Mott Macdonald.4 Design factor 0. 10/06/2010 06:22.030 0.9 wt leaks 914 dia 9.10 PD 8010-3:2009 FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture and leak frequencies for pipe cases defined in Table B. (c) BSI 406.025 0.030 0.021 914A) 0.024 0.052 0.001 0.024 0.1 0.041 0.064 0.1A) 0.046 0.4 0.048 406.5 0. Figure B.7 (per 1 000 km·y) Design factor 0.002 A) 219.2 A) Rupture frequency 219.4 0.047 0.064 0.4A) 0.08 0.043 0.06 0.12 0.012 0.031 0.2 0.3 0.y 0.011 A) Leak frequency 914 A) Licensed Copy: x x.72 0.4  FFREQ predictions for external interference rupture and leak frequencies for specific diameter and wall thickness cases (per 1 000 km·y) 0.3 0.5 0.5 wt ruptures 914 dia 9.014 0.008 0.6 0.028 0.022 0.6 wt leaks © BSI 2008  •  41 .039 0.037 0.6 0.035 0.02 0 0 0. in millimetres (mm).

6 mm wall thickness is 0.4 is 0. the design factor reduction factor for a design factor of 0. to that for a pipeline of wall thickness of 7. for wall thickness to be applied in this case is therefore: Rwt = 0.88.2. From Figure 8.1 provide more realistic failure frequency predictions than the conservative estimates given in B. Licensed Copy: x x.10 and Figure B. operating at a design factor of 0. Mott Macdonald.6 is 0. Uncontrolled Copy.138 × 0.6 mm wall thickness operating at a design factor of 0.79.4 From Table B.5.073 × 0.PD 8010-3:2009 B.2 published document Estimation of external interference failure frequencies using FFREQ predictions and reduction factors for design factor and wall thickness General The FFREQ predictions in B.5.6 mm wall thickness.1 mm diameter pipeline of 5. From Figure 9. Rdf.138 per 1 000 km·y. the wall thickness reduction factor for a 5.5.3 Example 5: Modification of an existing external interference failure frequency for a 762 mm diameter pipeline of 5.3. the design factor reduction factor for a design factor of 0. Example calculations are given in B. (c) BSI B.5.6 mm wall thickness operating at a design factor of 0. From Figure 8. The reduction factor.5. the wall thickness reduction factor for a 7.72 is given as 0.6.89.2.9 mm and design factor of 0. operating at a design factor of 0.8.1 B.4 is 0.9 mm and design factor of 0.073 per 1 000 km·y From Table B. The revised rupture frequency is therefore: 0. Rwt. for design factor to be applied in this case is therefore: Rdf = 0. 42  •  © BSI 2008 .035 per 1 000 km·y B.9 mm wall thickness is 0. 10/06/2010 06:22.4.2. the existing failure frequency for a 219 mm diameter pipeline of 5.5.86 = 0.918 × 0.6 is 0.48 = 0.2.5. the proportion of ruptures for a 219.6 mm wall thickness.89 = 0.575 = 0.79/0.4 for specific pipe cases.48.72. to that for a pipeline of wall thickness 7.2.5.2 Example 4: Modification of an existing external interference failure frequency for a 219.2 and B. The FFREQ failure frequencies can be modified to produce estimates for further pipe cases using the reduction factors for design factor and wall thickness given in Figures 8 and 9 respectively.575 The revised total failure frequency (TFF) is therefore: TFF = 0.187 per 1 000 km·y. The reduction factor.4 The existing failure frequency for a 762 mm diameter pipeline of 5.5/0.1 mm diameter pipe operating at a design factor of 0.918 From Figure 9.

10/06/2010 06:22. Uncontrolled Copy.5/0. The revised rupture frequency is therefore: 0. the critical size of a crack-like defect at which the failure mode changes from leak to rupture.published document PD 8010-3:2009 From Figure 8.5.286 = 0.81 = 0.72 are given in Table B. the design factor reduction factor for a design factor of 0.75. Licensed Copy: x x.9 mm wall thickness pipe operating at a design factor of 0. The reduction factor.11  Comparison of external interference failure frequency estimates for example 5 with FFREQ predictions Pipe case Estimated total failure frequency 0.059 Estimated rupture frequency 0.4 design factor B. and are modelled as crack-like defects.9 mm is 0. (c) BSI From Figure 9.617 = 0.4 in Table B.3 Critical defect size Damage caused by external interference typically includes gouges. From Table B.5.4 is 0.e. the wall thickness reduction factor for a wall thickness of 5.01 762 mm diameter × 7. Rwt. From Figure 9.81. Table B. when the critical length is exceeded.087 per 1 000 km·y The proportion of ruptures reduces as the diameter and wall thickness increase.617 The revised total failure frequency (TFF) is therefore: TFF = 0.9 mm wall thickness pipe. for wall thickness to be applied in this case is therefore: Rwt = 0.4.6 mm is 0.286.4 is 0. which are of a narrow slot shape. The maximum area through which the high pressure gas escapes at the critical length is usually determined as an equivalent hole size in order to calculate the maximum leak release rate [34]. For high-pressure gas releases (in which the energy of the depressurizing gas does not decay immediately). so it is conservative to assume that the proportion of ruptures for a 762 mm diameter × 7.75 × 0. needs to be taken into account.025 FFREQ prediction 0.9 mm wall thickness × 0.025 per 1 000 km·y The above estimates are compared with FFREQ predictions for a 762 mm diameter × 7. Typical values of the equivalent hole diameter for critical defect lengths for pipelines operating at a design factor of 0. the wall thickness reduction factor for a wall thickness of 7.9 mm wall thickness pipe is equivalent to that for a 406 mm diameter × 7.087 FFREQ prediction 0. © BSI 2008  •  43 . i.10 and Figure B.187 × 0. Mott Macdonald.11.12. the proportion of ruptures for a 406 mm diameter pipe operating at a design factor of 0.087 × 0.

PD 8010-3:2009 published document Table B.1 273 323. Mott Macdonald.91 Critical hole diameter limit rupture/leak 2.38 12. (c) BSI 168.72 85.72 33.35 7.92 53. Table B.6 5.13.42 4.05 5.13 Failure frequency due to external corrosion Units in failure frequency per 1 000 km·y Wall thickness (mm) <5 5 to 10 >10 to 15 >15 A) PinA) 0.9 7. corrosion protection design standards and corrosion control procedures.5 X42 X46 X52 X52 X52 X52 X60 X60 X65 B. The data shows that to date there is no operational experience of rupture failure due to corrosion in the UK.97 31. it is expected that the corrosion rates in Table B.99 64.031 0 0 HoleA) 0. the corrosion failure frequency rate can be assumed to reduce by a factor of 10. For pipelines of any age with wall thicknesses 44  •  © BSI 2008 .6 7.262 0.1 for definitions.03 47.72 Dimensions in millimetres (mm) Diameter Wall thickness Material grade Critical defect length 28. 10/06/2010 06:22. The failure frequency due to external corrosion in the UK is dependent upon the year of construction and hence the age and applicable coating.9 406. Corrosion control procedures for external corrosion include: • • • monitored and controlled CP.09 6.13 will be applicable unless corrosion control procedures have been used.6 5.9 7.6 5.09 36.4 508 609 762 914 5.73 Licensed Copy: x x.41 2. Based on analysis of UKOPA pipeline fault and failure data [35]. For pipelines commissioned pre-1980.3 219. and defect assessment and remedial action.1 Pipeline failure frequency due to corrosion External corrosion UKOPA data for external corrosion is given in Table B.9 9.12  Critical defect lengths and equivalent hole diameters for UKOPA pipeline cases operating at a design factor of 0.6 B. regular in-line inspection.98 3.015 0 0 RuptureA) 0 0 0 0 Total 0.53 57.046 0 0 See Table B.6. for pipelines of wall thickness up to 15 mm commissioned after 1980 and with corrosion control procedures applied.52 9.9 7.04 0.302 0. Uncontrolled Copy.

wall thickness Wall thickness range mm <5   5 to 8 >8 to 10 >10 to 12 >12 to 15 >15 Wall thickness value assigned to range mm  5  8 10 12 15 17 Failure frequency per 1 000 km·y 0. and that no ruptures have been recorded to date. Mott Macdonald. and that no ruptures have been recorded to date in the UK. B. the material and construction failure frequency rate can be assumed to reduce by a factor of 5.8.14 Material and construction failure frequency vs.1 Pipeline failure frequency due to ground movement General There is insufficient historical data to establish a relationship between ground movement failure data and individual pipeline parameters. 10/06/2010 06:22. design and construction standards. Table B.004 Analysis of the UKOPA pipeline fault and failure data [35] shows that failure frequency due to material and construction defects in the UK is dependent upon the year of construction and hence the age. and needs to be assessed on a pipeline specific basis. The UKOPA data indicates that corrosion failures occur as leaks.007 0. The failure frequency of a specific pipeline due to ground movement is dependent upon the susceptibility to natural landsliding along the route. (c) BSI B. B. in particular the material selection controls and welding inspection standards applied. and the failure frequency needs to be assessed taking into account corrosion control procedures and use and frequency of in-line inspection.8 B. the corrosion failure frequency can be assumed to be negligible.031 0.7 Pipeline failure frequency due to material and construction defects UKOPA data for the failure frequency due to material and construction defects is given in Table B. Licensed Copy: x x. For pipelines commissioned after 1980.064 0. © BSI 2008  •  45 .046 0. Uncontrolled Copy. this shows that the failure frequency reduces as the wall thickness increases. The UKOPA data indicates that material and construction failures occur as leaks.6. The likelihood of occurrence of internal corrosion depends upon the fluid transported.14.505 0.2 Internal corrosion Review of UKOPA data confirms that the incidence of internal corrosion in MAHPs in the UK to date is low. and this needs to be assessed on a location specific basis.published document PD 8010-3:2009 greater than 15 mm and with corrosion control procedures in place.

8.1 × 10−4) per 1 000 km·y due to natural landsliding is applicable to all UK MAHPs. and are not relevant to pipelines designed. 46  •  © BSI 2008 . Mott Macdonald. NOTE  The UKOPA product loss data in Table B. The UKOPA pipeline fault data report [9] confirms that 62. but might be affected by slope movement on adjacent areas Slope instability might have occurred in the past or might occur in future.PD 8010-3:2009 B. (c) BSI Table B. or is present and might occur in future Slope instability is likely and site specific assessment is required Pipeline rupture rate per 1 000 km·y 0 to (9 × 10−5) (1 × 10−4) to (2..15 Pipeline rupture failure frequency due to due to ground movement caused by natural landsliding Description Slope instability is negligible or unlikely to occur.2 published document Natural landsliding Based on a detailed assessment of pipeline failure frequency due to natural landsliding in the UK. Such activities are location-specific and time-limited. B.9 Pipeline failure frequency due to other causes Pipeline failure rates due to causes other than those outlined in B. Licensed Copy: x x. and will vary according to the operating regime and/or location of the pipeline or pipeline section. UKOPA has concluded that the predicted background rupture failure rate of (2. the likelihood of failure of the pipeline needs to be assessed on a case‑specific basis. Where and when activities that might result in artificial ground movement occur in the vicinity of a pipeline. quarrying. adjacent construction work etc. Uncontrolled Copy. where the local susceptibility to landsliding and the associated likelihood of slope instability has been assessed. constructed and operated in accordance with current pipeline standards. fatigue etc.0 × 10−4) B.3 Artificial ground movement Artificial ground movement can be induced through activities such as mining.14 × 10−4) >(3. and procedures for safe working in the vicinity of pipelines. and the associated risks need to be assessed and managed by the pipeline operator through notification and surveillance activities.5% of the incidents recorded in this category relate to pre-1970 pipelines.1 to B.8. Derivation of a failure rate based on this data is therefore not recommended.15.8 need to be assessed on a pipeline-specific basis. However. Relevant causes can include overpressure. 10/06/2010 06:22. the rupture rate due to ground movement caused by natural landsliding can be obtained from Table B.1 indicates that other causes account for approximately 28% of the total failure rate.

2 Risk assessment The developer commissions a risk assessor to review the land use planning zones and possible mitigation that could be applied.03 mm. The following details are confirmed: • • • product: ethylene (dense phase).1. The closest house is 75 m from the pipeline. The planning authority therefore informs the developer that they will refuse planning permission on safety grounds. Uncontrolled Copy. HSE advises against allowing this development to proceed. The developer then contacts the pipeline operator to see whether there are any special conditions associated with the pipeline that could affect the planning application. if more than 10% of the development is in the middle zone. After discussion with the operator. On checking their records.published document Annex C (informative) C. C. the developer is able to confirm that the pipeline design conditions are as notified to HSE and therefore the only possibility would be to apply mitigating factors to reduce the risk zones. and discovers that for a larger development of more than 30 dwelling units. Mott Macdonald. pipeline diameter: 219 mm. © BSI 2008  •  47 . the planning authority finds that there is an ethylene pipeline located near the proposed site which has land use planning zones.1 PD 8010-3:2009 Example of a site-specific risk assessment Scenario A planning application for a housing estate consisting of 38 houses in a green field rural area near a village has been lodged with the local planning authority. 10/06/2010 06:22. Licensed Copy: x x. Details are shown in Figure C. wall thickness: 7.1  Proposed development Proposed housing development Outer zone 200 m Middle zone 150 m Inner zone 70 m Pipeline The planning authority checks pipeline risk zones against advice from HSE. (c) BSI Figure C.

223 1 per 1 000 km·y.03 mm = 0. rupture failure rate = 0.046 per 1 000 km·y. fireball spontaneous ignition distance: 67 m. the leak rate is 0. Licensed Copy: x x. reduction factor for wall thickness 7. the maximum leak hole size (see Table B.064 per 1 000 km·y.090 8. c) External corrosion: failure frequency due to leaks (Table B. fireball duration: 7.81 × 0.5 = 0.51.12)] is calculated as 6.201 per 1 000 km·y. d) Material and construction: failure frequency due to leaks (Table B.13) = 0.32 mm. published document maximum allowable operating pressure: 95 bar.063 8 per 1 000 km·y. For this pipeline. depth of cover: 1 100 mm.5 s.063 6 per 1 000 km·y.156 2 per 1 000 km·y.5. From a) to d) above. The total failure rate due to third-party interference is therefore: The rupture failure rate due to third-party interference is: b) The critical hole diameter for this pipeline to be used to determine the release rate for leaks [i. Applying reduction factors given in Figures 8 and 9: • • • • • reduction factor for design factor of 0. 48  •  © BSI 2008 . the total failure rate for a 219 mm diameter pipeline with 5 mm wall thickness at a design factor of 0.223 × 0.1 × 10−4 per 1 000 km·y. total failure frequency rate = 0.1. total failure rate = 0.e.7 × total failure rate = 0. The risk assessor is therefore able to simulate risks from the following main calculation steps: • • • • minimum distance to occupied buildings (MDOB): 45 m. e) Ground movement: failure frequency due to ruptures = 2. therefore. failure frequency due to ruptures = 0. fireball radius: 50 m. 10/06/2010 06:22. Uncontrolled Copy. the total failure frequency rate for this pipeline is therefore determined as follows: • • • failure frequency due to leaks = 0. Mott Macdonald.027 per 1 000 km·y.51 = 0.PD 8010-3:2009 • • • • steel: X42.72 is 0.137 2 per 1 000 km·y. area classification: class 1 (rural).14) = 0. The rupture rate assuming 70% ruptures is 0.81. the above assessment indicates that third-party interference accounts for 45% of failures. (c) BSI From this the design factor is calculated as 0. Obtaining failure rates from Annex B: a) Failure rate due to third-party interference: From Figure B.

3. middle zone: 150 m.1 × 10−4) = 0. rupture 30 s jet flame escape distance: 86 m. the distance to risk levels are calculated as follows: Licensed Copy: x x.006 6 per 1 000 km·y.1 + 2. 10/06/2010 06:22. which are: • • • inner zone: 70 m (as originally notified by HSE). outer zone: 200 m (as originally notified by HSE). PD 8010-3:2009 From this. if this was accepted. C. Uncontrolled Copy. Mott Macdonald. total failure rate: (0.064 + 2. (c) BSI These risk levels correspond well to HSE land use planning zones.3.1 in this case.1 × 10−4) = 0.3.3.2 Installing concrete slabbing and marker tape over the pipeline This is conservatively assumed to reduce the third-party failure frequency by a factor of 0. The distance adjacent to the proposed housing over which slabbing and marker tape is required is the interaction distance as shown in Figure C.119 per 1 000 km·y. The new failure rates are therefore: • • rupture failure rate: (0. 10−6 per year individual risk: 125 m. 10−6 per year individual risk: 80 m.090 8 × 0.3 C. subject to formal acceptance that concrete slabbing reduces the risk. b) re-lay pipeline in heavy-wall pipe. C. However.2. The re-calculated risk distances are: • • This can reduce the middle zone so that most of the new development is outside the middle zone. (3 × 10−7) per year individual risk: 275 m.2 and C. (3 × 10−7) per year individual risk: 120 m.published document • • • • fireball 1 000 tdu in open air distance: 95 m.1 Mitigation measures Possible measures The following possible mitigation measures are proposed for risk reduction: a) install concrete slabbing and marker tape over the pipeline. the concrete slabbing would be defined by the effect on the planning decision and an ALARP assessment.046 + 0.064 × 0.3 respectively. © BSI 2008  •  49 .1 + 0. These measures are discussed in C.

00E .04 B 1.3  Societal risk FN curves and PD 8010-3 FN criterion line – proposed development before and after slabbing 1.03 1. Mott Macdonald.00E . Uncontrolled Copy.00E .PD 8010-3:2009 Figure C.06 1. (c) BSI Fireball outdoor hazard distance 95 m Fireball outdoor hazard distance 95 m Closest house 75 m Pipeline Interaction distance 117 m The operator also requests a societal risk assessment for the situation before slabbing and after slabbing to be able to assess the risk reduction achieved.2  Risk for outside exposure published document Licensed Copy: x x. The resulting graph is shown in Figure C.05 D C 1.00E .3.00E .07 1 10 100 1 000 A Key A Number of casualties B C Frequency (per year) of N or more casualties Broadly acceptable   PD 8010-3 risk criterion line   Proposed development before slabbing   Proposed development after slabbing D Tolerable if ALARP 50  •  © BSI 2008 . Figure C. 10/06/2010 06:22.

Uncontrolled Copy.007 per 1 000 km·y. the total failure frequency rate for this pipeline is therefore determined as follows: • • • failure frequency due to leaks = 0.64 × 0. a) Failure rate due to third-party interference: From Figure B.031 per 1 000 km·y.7 × total failure rate = 0. and are therefore considered to be ALARP.91 mm thick pipe is assessed.published document PD 8010-3:2009 Measured against the 1 km societal risk criterion for an interaction distance of 450 m (the site interaction length. which in this case is equal to the length of the proposed development plus twice the maximum hazard range).91 mm and design factor 0. total failure rate = 0.3 = 0.3: • • • reduction factor for design factor of 0. © BSI 2008  •  51 .72 is 0.13) = 0. this indicates that the proposed development was above the “negligible/tolerable” risk criterion line. rupture failure rate = 0.068.67.156 per 1 000 km·y.001 0 per 1 000 km·y. the above assessment indicates that third-party interference accounts for 24% of failures. d) Ground movement: failure frequency due to ruptures = (2.14) = 0. Applying reduction factors given in Figures 8 and 9 for a wall thickness of 11.3.041 per 1 000 km·y. For this pipeline. However.067 = 0. thick wall pipe will have a lower proportion of ruptures. the total failure rate for a 219 mm diameter pipeline with 5 mm wall thickness at a design factor of 0.1 × 10−4) per 1 000 km·y.034 0 per 1 000 km·y.3 Re-laying the pipeline section in thick-wall pipe The effect on risk of re-laying the pipeline adjacent to the proposed new development in 11.007 2 per 1 000 km·y.223 × 0. reduction factor for wall thickness 11.1.223 per 1 000 km·y. therefore. total failure frequency rate = 0. failure frequency due to ruptures = 0. more detailed assessment methods need to be applied to obtain the proportion of ruptures. (c) BSI C. Mott Macdonald. From a) to d) above. whereas after slabbing the risk has reduced so that all risks are within the “broadly acceptable” region. The total failure rate due to third-party interference is therefore: The rupture failure rate due to third-party interference is: • • b) External corrosion: failure frequency due to leaks (Table B.0 per 1 000 km·y. Licensed Copy: x x.003 per 1 000 km·y. 10/06/2010 06:22.91 mm = 0. the leak rate is 0. and applying the thermal radiation level of 1 800 tdu for comparison with this criterion. The rupture rate assuming 70% ruptures is 0. c) Material and construction: failure frequency due to leaks (Table B.

52  •  © BSI 2008 . 10/06/2010 06:22. published document (3 × 10−7) per year individual risk: 100 m. criteria specific to the individual pipeline operating company. Mott Macdonald. (c) BSI This can reduce the middle zone so that all the new development is outside the middle zone.PD 8010-3:2009 The re-calculated risk distances are: • • 10−6 per year individual risk: 55 m. and would again need to be justified by ALARP considerations. societal concerns including aversion. ALARP considerations would include cost benefit considerations based on the reduction in total loss. Uncontrolled Copy. Licensed Copy: x x. or expectation value achieved by the mitigation measures [18]. The judgement based on the results needs to take account of: • • • the uncertainty in the data and models used in the assessment.

PP. C. 30 September – 3 October 2008.published document PD 8010-3:2009 Bibliography Licensed Copy: x x. Communication 1492. C502/016/95. R. International Pipeline Conference. Advantica Report 6957.. [6] LYONS. the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. London: HMSO.6) 4) 5) 6) Available from UKOPA. HOPKINS. October 1995. Brussels: CONCAWE. Canada. Western European cross country oil pipelines 30 year performance statistics. M. 29 September – 3 October 2002. © BSI 2008  •  53 . For undated references..N. [2] GREAT BRITAIN. Mott Macdonald. Paper No. London: HMSO. (c) BSI For dated references. Available for downloading at http://www. Eastbourne. and JACKSON. [3] GREAT BRITAIN.. 113-125. N. D. Canada. E.D.4) [7] ACTON.. and JAGER. R. May 1992. Pipeline design using risk based criteria. BALDWIN.5) [9] ARUNAKUMAR.V.concawe. A methodology for the prediction of pipeline failure frequency due to external interference. [5] CORDER. only the edition cited applies.uk/publications. Recent developments in the design and application of the PIPESAFE risk assessment package for gas transmission pipelines. The application of risk techniques to the design and operation of pipelines. 10/06/2010 06:22. Calgary. February 2002. G.org. Standards publications PD 8010-2. P. Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1992. G. Code of practice for pipelines – Part 2: Subsea pipelines ISO 3183-2:1996. Act 1974. [8] LYONS.. ELLIS. UKOPA PIPELINE FAULT DATABASE.ukopa. amended 1999. T. FEARNEHOUGH. HASWELL.co. Petroleum and natural gas industries – Steel pipe for pipelines – Technical delivery conditions – Part 2: Pipes of requirements class B Other publications [1] GREAT BRITAIN. August 2007. International Pipeline Conference. Calgary. Health and Safety at Work etc. I.. UK. Uncontrolled Copy. J. Report 1/02. Available for downloading at http://www. Pipeline product loss incidents 1962-2006 – 5th report of the UKOPA Fault Data Management Group. [4] CORDER. Proceedings of International Conference on Pressure Systems: Operation and Risk Management. Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996. Institute of Gas Engineers 129th Annual General Meeting and Spring Conference. I. and KNOTT. London: Institution of Mechanical Engineers. London: HMSO. Loughborough: Advantica.R.

U. Reduction factors for estimating the probability of failure of mechanical damage due to external interference. Pipes and Pipelines International. Ignition probability of flammable gases. [15] BILO. 10) Available 54  •  © BSI 2008 . F. PIE/07/TN051 V0. P.. P. P. J. P. Contract Research Report CRR203/1997. ISBN 0 7506 1547 8.. N.S. and HASWELL. Uncontrolled Copy. International Pipeline Conference. and REW. from UKOPA. Reducing risks. H. PP. HASWELL. London: Health and Safety Executive. H.0. Available for downloading at http://www. London: HSE Books.J. J. Atkins for the HSE. Gas pipeline incidents – 6th report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group 1970-2004. Mott Macdonald. Issue 1.V.. DAYCOCK. M. March-April 1998. C.J. M.html. 1997. and KINSMAN. Calgary. [16] MAHGEREFTEH.ac.8) [17] HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE. PIE/2005/R104.10) [23] ROOVERS. 7) 8) 9) Available for downloading at http://www.ucl.0002. M.. 1997.gov. London: W. STEINER.htm.uk/~ucecm01/pipe-tech. M. [14] BILO.uk/research/rrhtm/.9) [19] GREAT BRITAIN.. London: The Stationery Office. European Member States: EGIG. EGIG 05 R. Brugge. M. and JACKSON. J. J. 2000. PipeTech – Pipeline rupture computational fluid dynamics simulator.10) [22] COSHAM.S. A model for ignition probability of flammable gases. The influence of pipe design factor and geometry on the failure of pipelines subject to 3rd party damage. H. 14 September 2007. July‑August 1997. EPRG methods for assessing the tolerance and resistance of pipelines to external damage.7) Licensed Copy: x x. Belgium. Second edition. Denys).V. Failure frequency reduction factors for design factor and wall thickness. Atkins for the HSE.homepages. R. A.uk/comah/circular/perm09. 2007. MAREWSKI. and KINSMAN. GALLI. 30 September – 3 October 2008. and ZARÉA. Canada. [18] HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE. December 2005. R. London: W. [20] LYONS. ISBN 0 7176 2151 0. 1996. (c) BSI [11] SPENCER.gov. Pipeline technology.10) [21] HASWELL. HAZARDOUS INSTALLATIONS DIRECTORATE.. Details at http://www.PD 8010-3:2009 published document [10] EUROPEAN GAS PIPELINE INCIDENT DATA GROUP. and REW. October 2005. HID’s approach to ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP) decisions. 2001. [13] LEES. P. London: University College. MISHAP – HSE’s pipeline risk assessment methodology. Loss prevention in the process industries.7) [12] SPENCER. Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999. BOOD. London: Butterworths-Heinemann. protecting people – HSE’s decision-making process. Pipes and Pipelines International.P. 405-425. Contract Research Report CRR146/1997. 10/06/2010 06:22. Risk calculation for pipelines applied within the MISHAP HSE computer program. Volume II.hse.hse. Proceedings of the Third International Pipeline Technology Conference (Ed.

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