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T7 B20 Timelines 9-11 2 of 2 Fdr- 1-25-04 Team 7 Presentation to Commissioners- 4 Flights and Airlines Situational Awareness

T7 B20 Timelines 9-11 2 of 2 Fdr- 1-25-04 Team 7 Presentation to Commissioners- 4 Flights and Airlines Situational Awareness

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05/11/2014

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TEAM 7 PRESENTATION TO COMMISSIONERS January 25, 2004 FOUR FLIGHTS AND AIRLINES' SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTE: The following is meant

for Commissioners' use in evaluating testimony and in formulating questions for Panels Six (the airlines) and Seven (Nydia Gonzalez). It is partial and preliminary. Furthermore, you will recall that a future Commission hearing has been set to focus specifically on the situational awareness of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) and national defense (especially NORAD) systems' 9/11 situational awareness. For the current hearing, it would be appropriate to question the airline personnel about their situational awareness. 1. American Airlines Flight 11 A. B. C. D. E. Takeoff at 7:59 Last routine ATC communication at 8:13 #11 unresponsive to ATC query at 8:14 Likely takeover between 8:14-8:18 Betty Ong call to AA began at 8:18, Gonzalez on by 8:20 (stabbing of two flight attendants and passenger; hijackers in cockpit; passengers moved out of First Class; plane flying erratically; knives; mace) F. AA HQ aware that Air Traffic Control trying to reach # 11 at 8:20 G. AA HQ aware of serious problem on #11 by 8:22 H. Cockpit communication transmitted from #11 at 8:24 ("We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you'll be okay. We are returning to the airport." Testimony from controller is that he did not initially understand first sentence - "we have some planes." He heard a suspicious "Arab voice" and put the frequency on for others to hear subsequent transmissions.) [NOTE: The spring hearing will consider this communication, and the question of when the ATC was fully aware of its contents.] I. ATC heard cockpit communication from #11 at 8:25 ("("Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.") [NOTE: The spring hearing will consider this communication] J. Madeline "Amy" Sweeney call to AA began at 8:25 (stabbing of two flight attendants and passenger; three hijackers of Middle Eastern origin in cockpit; knives; bomb; plane flying erratically) K. ATC heard cockpit communication from #11 at 8:34 ("Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't make any stupid moves.") [NOTE: The spring hearing will consider this communication.] L. AA HQ locked out #11 at 8:38 M. AA HQ made aware by ATC of some #11 cockpit communications at around 8:40 (but not reference to "planes") N. Crash into North Tower of WTC at 8:46 O. ATC aware of earlier #11 transmission "We have some planes" by not later than 9:05. P. AA confirmed #11 hit WTC not later than 9:30.

2. United Airlines Flight 175 A. Takeoff at 8:14 B. At 8:41 #175 reported to ATC overhearing earlier suspicious cockpit transmission from another flight (subsequently discovered to have been #11) C. Last routine ATC communication at 8:42 D. Likely Takeover between 8:42-8:46 E. #175 transponder code changed twice within a minute beginning at 8:46 F. Peter Hanson calls began around 8:52 (cockpit takeover; stabbing of FA; someone else may have been killed; erratic flying; knives; mace; bomb claim; intend to crash into building) G. Robert Fangman call to UAL began at approximately 8:55 (hijacking; pilots killed; flight attendant stabbed; hijackers flying plane) H. Brian Sweeney calls began at around 8:58 (hijacking; passengers thinking of storming cockpit) I. UAHQ aware of #175 hijacking at 9:00 J. Crash into South Tower of WTC at 9:03 K. UAHQ aware of #175 crash at 9:20 3. American Airlines Flight 77 A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. Takeoff at 8:20 Last routine ATC communication at 8:51 Likely takeover between 8:51-8:56 Slight deviation from course at 8:54 #77 didn't respond to ATC and had transponder signal lost at 8:56 AA HQ aware of communications problem with #77 at 8:58 AA HQ aware of #77 hijack by 9:05 (lockout of aircraft) AA HQ thought #77 hit WTC at 9:08 Rene May call began at 9:12 (hijacked by 6 individuals; passengers and/or crew moved to back) J. Barbara Olson calls began at 9:18 (hijacked; box-cutters; knives; passengers moved to back; "Captain" announced hijacking) K. AA HQ still thought #77 hit WTC at 9:34 L. Crash into Pentagon at 9:38 M. AA HQ aware #77 hit Pentagon by no later than 10:30.

4. United Airlines Flight 93 A. Takeoff at 8:42 B. UA HQ ACARS message to "beware cockpit intrusion" sent at 9:24 C. ATC heard cockpit transmission from #93 at 9:28 (possible screaming; "Get out of here.") D. Likely takeover at around 9:29 E. UA HQ aware of serious problem with #93 by 9:30

F. Todd Beamer call began around 9:32 (knives; bomb; two hijackers entered cockpit and took over, and one stayed behind in cabin with bomb; passengers planning to storm cockpit) G. UA HQ ACARS message to "secure cockpit" sent at 9:33 H. Sandy Bradshaw call to UA began at around 9:35 (knives; three hijackers wearing red headbands; passengers in back; passengers planning to storm cockpit) I. UA HQ aware of #93 hijacking at around 9:36 J. Crash in Pennsylvania at 10:03. 5. POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION A. Prior to #175 takeover (8:45) and #77 takeover (8:54), AA was informed of hijacker tactics (from Betty Ong around 8:20). B. Just after #77 takeover (8:51-8:56) and before #93 takeover (9:29), the above was still true and ATC was aware of several suspicious cockpit communications from #11 (including awareness of reference to "planes" by not later than 9:05). C. Prior to #93 takeover (9:29), all of the above was true as well as occurrence of two WTC crashes (8:46 and 9:03), three known hijackings (AA aware of #77 hijacking not later than 9:05), and United being aware of #175 hijacking and crash (9:20) 6. INHIBITIONS ON SITUATIONAL AWARENESS A. Mindset against domestic hijacking (AA HQ at time of Ong call around 8:20) B. Mindset against multiple hijackings (displayed by both airlines between AA lockout of #11 at 8:38 and UA awareness of #175 hijacking around 9:00) C. Mindset against suicide hijacking (AA HQ between awareness of first crash at 8:48 and confirmation of #11 as aircraft - sometime before 9:30) D. Lack of clear communications from ATC (neither airline was reportedly made aware of reference to "planes;" UA not made aware of 8:41 communication from #175 about #11) E. Lack of clear communication between airlines (lag in AA awareness that #77 had not hit the WTC) F. Confusion; large number of erroneous reports.

PARTIAL TIMELINE FOR 9/11 HIJACKINGS TIME FLIGHT 11 FLIGHT 175 07:45 Scheduled Departure 07:58 Push back from Gate 19 07:59 Departure on Runway 4R 08:00 Scheduled Departure 08:01 08:02 08:03 08:04 08:05 08:06 08:06 08:07 08:08 08:09 08:10 08:11 08:12 08:13 Last Routine ATC cornm. 08:14 LIKELY TAKEOVER Departure 08:15 LIKELY TAKEOVER 08:16 LIKELY TAKEOVER 08:17 LIKELY TAKEOVER 08:18 Betty Ong call begins 08:19 08:20 AA aware ate search for 1 1 08:21 08:22 AA HQ aware of 1 1 problem 08:23

FLIGHT 77

FLIGHT 93

Push back from Gate 17

Push back from Gate D-26 Scheduled Departure

Departure on Runway 30L

TIME 08:24 08:25 08:26 08:27 08:28 08:29 08:30 08:31 08:32 08:33 08:34 08:35 08:36 08:37 08:38 08:39 08:40 08:41 08:42 08:43 08:44 08:45 08:46 08:47 08:48 08:49 08:50 08:51 08:52

FLIGHT 11 "Just stay quiet..." Amy Sweeney calls begin

FLIGHT 175

FLIGHT 77

FLIGHT 93

"going back to airport. . ."

AA locks out Flight 1 1 AA aware of cockpit comms Amy Sweeney calls end Betty Ong call ends Reports #11 transmission Last routine ATC comrn. LIKELY TAKEOVER LIKELY TAKEOVER LIKELY TAKEOVER LIKELY TAKEOVER Departure

CRASH INTO N. WTC AA HQ aware of WTC crash

Peter Hanson calls begin

Last routine ATC comrn. LIKELY TAKEOVER

TIME 08:53 08:54 08:55 08:56 08:57 08:58 08:59 09:00 09:01 09:02 09:03 09:04 09:05 09:06 09:07 09:08 09:09 09:10 09:11 09:12 09:13 09:14 09:15 09:16 09:17 09:18 09:19 09:20 09:21

FLIGHT 1 1

FLIGHT 175

Robert Fangman call begins Robert Fangman call ends Brian Sweeney calls begin Tsen ACARS message UA HQ aware of 1 75 hijack

FLIGHT 77 LIKELY TAKEOVER LIKELY TAKEOVER LIKELY TAKEOVER No response to ATC AA HQ aware of 77 problem AA ACARS attempts begin AA stops NE takeoffs

FLIGHT 93

CRASH INTO S. WTC ATC aware of "planes" AA locks out Flight 77

AA HQ thinks 77 hit WTC

Rene May call begins

AA grounds all flights

Barbara Olson call UA HQ aware of 175 crash

TIME 09:22 09:23 09:24 09:25 09:26 09:27 09:28 09:29 09:30 09:31 09:32 09:33 09:34 09:35 09:36 09:37 09:38 09:39 09:40 09:41 09:42 09:43 09:44 09:45 09:46 09:47 09:48 09:49 09:50

FLIGHT 11

FLIGHT 175

FLIGHT 77

FLIGHT 93

"Beware cockpit intrusion" Last routine ATC comm.. "Get out of here..." LIKELY TAKEOVER UA HQ aware of 93 problem UA ACARS attempts Todd Beamer call begins? UA alert: "Secure cockpit." AA still has 77 into WTC Sandy Bradshaw call begins UA HQ aware of 93 hijack CRASH INTO PENTAGON

AA confirmed 1 1 hit WTC

UA: "Secure cockpit door." AA HQ aware Pentagon hit

UA grounds all flights.

TIME FLIGHT 11 09:51 _j 09:52 09:53 09:54 09:55 09:56 09:57 09:58 09:59 10:00 10:01 10:02 10:03 10:04 10:05 10:06 10:16 10:17 10:27 10:30

FLIGHT 175

FLIGHT 77

FLIGHT 93

CRASH IN PA.

AA aware 175 hit WTC

s

UA aware of 93 crash UA advises AA of 93 crash AA aware 77 hit Pentagon

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