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COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against petitioner. H e n c e , the petitioner

filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful. 2. Whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation. HELD: The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and

that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder. GIAN PAULO VILLAFLOR, vs. DINDO VIVAR y GOZON. FACTS: On February 7, 1997, a crime of slight physical injuries was filed against Respondent Dindo Vivar stemmed from the alleged mauling of Petitioner Gian Paulo Villaflor by respondent around

1:00 a.m. on January 27, 1997 outside the Fat Tuesday Bar at the Ayala Alabang Town Center, Muntinlupa City. After the beating incident, petitioner together with a friend on their way out, they met respondent and he told to Villaflor that next time he will use his gun on him. The injuries inflicted to petitioner became more serious. He withdrew the first case and filed a new case of serious physical injuries. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as required by the trial court, he filed on April 21, 1997, a Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case for grave threats asserting that serious physical injuries absorbed it because it was made in connection to it and logically, the case should be dismissed because trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. On April 28, 1997 MTC denied Motion to Quash because motion to quash is a prohibited pleading under the rule on summary procedure. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent was denied by the MTC on June 17, 1997. He was duly arraigned for grave threats, and he pleaded not guilty. On July 18, 1997, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Muntinlupa City ant the court mentioned that The Judicial Officer appears to have acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring and denying the MOTION TO QUASH as a prohibitive motion. The same should have been treated and should have proceeded under the regular rules of procedure. The MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONS filed without preliminary investigation is therefore granted and these cases should have been dismissed. The petition was returned back to MTC. ISSUES: 1. Can the court motu propio order the dismissal of the two (2) criminal cases for serious physical injuries and grave threats on the ground that the public prosecutor failed to conduct a preliminary investigation? 2. Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation be considered a ground to quash the criminal informations for serious physical injuries and grave threats filed against the accused-respondent? HELD: 1. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. A preliminary investigation for slight physical injuries was made by

the assistant city prosecutor of Muntinlupa City but the information was amended when the injuries did not heal. A new preliminary investigation cannot be demanded because the right of respondent to be protected from a hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution; an open and public accusation of a crime; or from the trouble, the expenses and the anxiety of a public trial was not violated. 2. Such motion is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure did not mention that lack of a preliminary investigation is a ground for a motion to quash. Larranaga vs CA Facts: Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must be released and be subject to a preliminary investigation. However, pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction

filedby the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation. HELD: Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a p l e a a t arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively and consistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he was charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the arraignment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of p e t i t i o n e r a n d h i s c o u n s e l a r e inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed. ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN vs.

FACTS: Erlinda Fadri filed an Affidavit-Complaint in the Office of the Ombudsman and on September 19, 1995, the office issued an order requiring Benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City to submit counter-affidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence. On January 15, 1998 they were prosecuted for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Yusop was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted but the prior order does not included his name. On April 16, 1998, Sandiganbayan issued an order of arrest but petitioner posted bail on May 20 in the RTC of Dipolos City and he also filed a Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation. Unfortunately, Sandiganbayan denied the petition. Subsequently, he asked for dismissal of the case for lack of preliminary investigation but in an Order dated September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. During the arraignment, Yusop informed the court that he was not notified with respect to one of the cases on an identical set of facts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied of his right to preliminary investigation. HELD: The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. The Court explained that the rationale of preliminary investigation is to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. The Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019 against petitioner. BARTOLOME F. MERCADO vs. The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION, The Honorable CESAR C. PERALEJO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City and the Honorable CITY PROSECUTOR of Quezon City FACTS: A case was filed against petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Check Law) before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City. Petitioner moved to defer his arraignment on the ground that he was not notified of the preliminary

investigation but the trial court only directed the prosecution to comment on the motion. Petitioner moved to cancel his arraignment scheduled on July 30, 1991 and upon his refusal to enter a plea, respondent judge entered for him a plea of "not guilty". Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to prevent respondent judge from proceeding with the trial but the appellate court dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) the remedy of prohibition was not proper in the case; (2) there was an actual preliminary investigation conducted, where the prosecution sufficiently established probable cause against petitioner notwithstanding his lack of notice; and (3) the presence of the accused was not a requisite to the validity of the preliminary investigation. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied. ISSUE: Is a preliminary investigation conducted exparte by reason of the lack of notice to the respondent valid, where such omission is due to the deliberate misinformation of the complainant regarding the address of the respondent? HELD: Preliminary investigations can be conducted ex-parte if the respondent can not be subpoenaed or

does not appear after due notice - New Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 112, Section 3(d). The purpose of a preliminary investigation is for the investigating prosecutor to determine if a crime has been committed. It was established by the complainant that petitioner issued a check which was dishonored because the account had been closed. The evidence satisfies the finding of probable cause. It must be borne in mind that the preliminary investigation is not the proper forum for an exhaustive production of evidence.

RENATO CUDIA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA FACTS: On June 28,1989, petitioner was arrested for possession of unlicensed 38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence without having the necessary authority and permit to carry the same in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, by members of the then 174th PC Company. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition after conducting preliminary investigation. On October 31, 1989 similar case was filed by the provincial

prosecutor of Angeles, Pamapanga. The City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss or Withdrawal of Information stating that thru inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga and that the Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which two separate informations for the same offense had been filed against petitioner. The Court granted the motion. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the case subsequently filed on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. ISSUE: Is there a double jeopardy? HELD: Requisites in order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy/ substantiate an claim

of jeopardy are the following: a. first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; b. first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; c. second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit of frustration thereof. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. There is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE ALFREDO GUSTILO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ESAM GADI y ABDULLAH FACTS: Esam Gadi, a national of Saudi Arabia, was apprehended at the Manila International Airport and subsequently detained for possession of marijuana on December 31, 1993. A case was filed against him on January 3, 1994 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City in violation of section 81

Article 11, of the Dangerous Drugs Act. After 3 days, Esam Gadi filed an "Ex Parte Motion to Reduce Bail," from P90,000.00 to P30,000.00 but it was denied so he posted bail of P90,000. Esam Gadi filed a motion for "reinvestigation," claiming that the seriousness of the offense charged warranted the grant of his motion and admitting that it was beyond 5-day period to prescribed in Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The motion was denied. During the arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and challenged the court for the denial of his motion before the CA. The decision stated that the five-day period for asking reinvestigation was only permissive, considering the use of the word "may and held that a motion for preliminary investigation may be granted even if trial on the merits had begun, provided that the motion was filed before arraignment. A Petition for Review was filed. ISSUE: Whether or not posting bail tantamount to waiving his right to preliminary investigation. HELD: Esam Gadi effectively waived his right to a preliminary investigation. The denial of Esam Gadi's motion for preliminary investigation is also

warranted: by his posting of a cash bail bond without previously or simultaneously demanding a preliminary investigation. In People vs. Hubilo, an accused who had posted bail was deemed to have foregone his right to preliminary investigation. In the present case, Esam Gadi asked for and was granted bail on January 10, 1994, or one month before he asked for a preliminary investigation on February 9, 1994. Once more Esam Gadi in fact waived his right to preliminary investigation. JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS FACTS: Petitioner was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City and was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center. Petitioner posted cash bond. The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public

prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. RTC allowed the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest and set an arraignment. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court. The appellate court dismissed petitioners petition. ISSUE: Whether or not posted bail tantamount to a waiver of a right to preliminary investigation. HELD: A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to fine. As an exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant

involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been conducted. By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to

challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended Information, as he

vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment. FILADAMS vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO FERIA FACTS: Filadams was a corporation engaged in the business of selling medicines to wholesalers and Feria was its sales representative from November 3, 1993 until his dismissal on March 9, 1994. After an audit, Feria was found accountable for P41,733.01 representing unsold but unreturned stocks and samples, unremitted collections and unliquidated cash advances. Filadams alleged that these shortages and accountabilities were admitted by PHARMA, INC.

respondent through his wife and counsel in a conference held at its office but despite repeated demands, respondent failed to settle them to its damage and prejudice. Respondent denied the charges and he said that the cash advances were spent, as intended, for promoting the products of the company and it was only the unexpended amount that was supposed to be returned by way of liquidation. The cash rebates were properly given to the customers concerned although the same were given in kind, as requested by the customers. In a spot check conducted in his area in January and February of 1994, the stock overages in his possession were segregated and returned to the company but he was not given the returned goods slip (RGS). He also returned various items or medicines on March 14, 1994 amounting to P19,615.49 but what was reflected in the inventory report was only P8,185.30. He maintained that he neither misappropriated nor converted the subject sums of money for his personal use or benefit. If ever, his obligation was purely civil in nature and the company in fact accepted his partial payment of P3,000 through his wife in a conference held at petitioners office on September 13, 1994. The internal auditor in a reply-affidavit of Filadams asserted that respondent occupied a position of trust and confidence. He was not given a new cash

advance but merely a replenishment of the used revolving fund. The cash rebates were never received by the customer as confirmed by the customer himself. Respondent signed the physical inventory report so he could not claim that he made returns that were not recorded. Paying back the amount of P3,000 to the company was an acknowledgment of his stock shortages and proof of his breach of trust and confidence resulting in the company's damage and prejudice but Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaintaffidavit for lack of cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not preliminary investigation can provide probable cause. HELD: The power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is

not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. LAILA G. DE OCAMPO vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B. DACARRA, and ERLINDA P. ORAYAN FACTS: Magdalena B. Dacarra executed a sworn statement before the Womens Desk of the CPD Police Station in Batasan Hills, Quezon City on 10 December 1999. She stated that on December 4, 1999, her nine-year-old son Ronald complained of dizziness upon arriving home at about six in the evening. Ronald then vomited and told her that his teacher banged his head against that of his classmate Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo"). Magdalena inspected Ronalds head and saw a woundless contusion. She brought her son to a quack doctor when he continued vomiting then the following morning she brought him to the East Avenue Medical Center where he underwent an x-ray. The attending physician informed Magdalena that Ronalds head

had a fracture. Blood oozed out of Ronalds nose before he died on December 9, 1999. Lorendo also executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner banged his head against Ronalds. During the inquest, Assistant Quezon City Prosecutor Maria Lelibet Sampaga ruled that evidence warrants the release of the respondent for further investigation of the charges against her because the evidence is insufficient to support the charge for homicide against the respondent. There is no concrete evidence to show proof that the alleged banging of the heads of the two minor victims could be the actual and proximate cause of the death of minor Ronald Dacarra y Baluton. Subsequently, the case was referred to Assistant Quezon City Prosecutor Lorna F. CatrisChua Cheng ("investigating prosecutor") for preliminary investigation. On the first hearing, respondent Erlinda P. Orayan ("Erlinda"), Lorendos mother attended alleging that Magdalena offered her P100,000 for her and her sons non-appearance at the preliminary investigation. Erlinda presented the money to the investigating prosecutor. Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales witnessed the head-banging incident and claimed to be another victim of petitioners alleged cruel deeds but

Petitioner alleged that Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales have immature perception and she asserted that the causes of death stated in Ronalds Death Certificate are hearsay and inadmissible in the preliminary investigation. The investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for the offenses charged. Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ. The DOJ Secretary denied the petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process during the preliminary investigation. HELD: Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether the respondent is probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence. The Court rejects petitioners contention that she was denied due process when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule 112.Petitioner was not deprived of due

process since both parties were accorded equal rights in arguing their case and presenting their respective evidence during the preliminary investigation. REMBERTO C. KARA-AN vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, HON. ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., HON. RAUL ARNAU, HON. ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE, as approving recommending officers and author of the ORDER assailed herein; ROBERTO F. DE OCAMPO, ALFREDO C. ANTONIO, FAROUK A. CARPIZO, BERNICE SYQUIA, IBRAHIM MAMAO, REYNALDO PALMIERY, and GERARDO TARUC as former Chairman and incumbent members, respectively, of the Philippine Amanah Bank (now the Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines and briefly referred to herein as Islamic Bank) FACTS: Petitioner wrote then Senator Ernesto Maceda imputing certain criminal acts to the present number and membership or the clique of six in the Board of Directors of the Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines (Islamic Bank) on 14 February 1994. Petitioner claimed that the clique of six granted a loan of P250,000 to Compressed Air Machineries & Equipment Corporation (CAMEC) without a valid collateral. Petitioner also claimed that the clique of six

approved the real estate mortgage on CAMECs loan without requiring the cancellation of a prior subsisting mortgage and without securing the written consent of the first mortgagee in violation of law. Petitioner asserted that it was a violation of RA 3019. Maceda endorsed the letter to Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate investigation. Raul R. Arnau (Arnau), Head of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), required respondents required BOD of the bank to comment on the assailed complaint. Petitioner alleged that respondents concealed the names and terms of the directors before them and it was a violation under The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770) but the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint. ISSUES: WHETHER THE OMBUDSMAN OFFICIALS CONDUCTED APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATES, REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR SWORN DUTIES AS REQUESTED AND ENDORSED BY SENATOR MACEDA OF THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE. HELD: Under Section 27 of RA 6770, a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary action is appealable to this Court by petition for review under Rule 45. However, this does not include decisions of the Ombudsman in preliminary

investigations of criminal cases. Neither does it include orders resolving incidents in preliminary investigations of criminal cases. In other words, the right to appeal under Rule 45 does not apply to orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. Such right is granted only from orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. Even in administrative cases, appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman is first taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43. Teresita Fabian vs. Honorable Aniano Desierto & Nestor Agustin FACTS: Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually led an appeal

to the Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to the deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective November 17, 1989.] pertinently provides that -In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid. HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional

provision was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. AMADO G. PEREZ (DECEASED) REPRESENTED BY HIS WIDOW GUILLERMA T. PEREZ, MARIO S. FRANCISCO, RAFAEL P. ARGAME, MIRASOL V. MENDOZA, GLORIA S. GONZALVO AND MARIA FE V. BOMBASE vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, MAYOR IGNACIO R. BUNYE, CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ, ROGELIO P. MADRIAGA, RECTO CORONADO, TEODORA A. DIANG, TOMAS M. OSIAS, REYNALDO CAMILON AND BENJAMIN BULOS FACTS: 2 complaints were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman by members of the Kilusang Bayan ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) against Mayor Ignacio R. Bunye and others for violation of RA 3019 (also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Respondents allegedly destroyed the doors of the KBMBPM office while serving on petitioners the Take-Over Order of the KBMBPM management dated October 28, 1998 issued by then Agriculture Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez. Ombudsman excluded respondent Bunye from the criminal indictment. The petitioners assailed the exclusion in

the CA by a petition for certiorari and mandamus but the CA dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman dismissed the investigation proceeding with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: The Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. It was not shown with certainty by complainant that the alleged presence of respondent Mayor Bunye at the scene of the incident was an active participation thereof by the latter. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESSIE B. CASTILLO and FELICITO R. MEJIA FACTS: Complainant Cesar Sarino is one of the registered owners of a piece of land covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-450278 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, located in front of SM Bacoor, Cavite. The property is leased to Pepito B. Aquino and Adriano G. Samoy who are in turn subleasing it to several stallholders. Respondent Felicito R. Mejia issued to stallholders Notices of Violation of the National Building Code on the grounds that the structures they were occupying were erected without building permits and occupied by them without the necessary certificates of occupancy having been first secured. Afterwards, as their repeated failure to comply, respondent issued an order to close down their stalls and the task force from the Bacoor Municipal Hall effected the closure of the stalls through the installation of galvanized iron fences. Lessees Aquino and Samoy thereafter filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against respondent Jessie B. Castillo, in his capacity as Bacoor Municipal Mayor, respondent Mejia and two other municipal officials for violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. The ombudsman dismissed the complaint ruling that the respondent local officials acted in good faith in effecting the closure of the stalls.

Sarino filed another complaint against Castillo and Mejia to the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Rep. Act No. 6713, and administratively for oppression, grave misconduct and for committing acts contrary to law because the construction of galvanized fence tantamount to an unlawful taking of their property. Again, the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative complaint for being moot and academic. But on May 7, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an Informationagainst respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan alleging that respondents took advantage of their positions and committed the offense in relation to office with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to one CESAR SARINO by blocking and fencing off the latters property. Sandiganbayan declared that probable cause exists against respondents for violation of Section 3(e) and immediately issued a warrants of arrest and hold departure order against respondents. Respondents voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and posted their respective bonds for their provisional liberty and ask for reinvestigation. Reinvestigation was made by Special Prosecutor and

filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Amended Information. Respondents then filed a Comment thereon with Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause. Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and denied the respondents Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause. In their Motion for Reconsideration, Sandiganbayan dismissed their case and the motion filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor was dismissed. ISSUE: whether or not the honorable sandiganbayan gravely erred and decided a question of substance in a manner not in accord with law and jurisprudence in conducting a second judicial determination of probable cause in criminal case no. 27789, long after it issued the warrants of arrest against the respondents. HELD: There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not

a criminal case must be filed in court. The Ombudsman took pains to mention each element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and then one by one adequately explained how and why those elements were satisfied. Hence, as the amended Information was valid on its face and there is no manifest error or arbitrariness on the part of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan erred in making an executive determination of probable cause when it overturned the Ombudsmans own determination. Ilagan v. Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister of National Defense) (1985), Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos (Acting Chief of Staff AFP), Brig. Gen.Dionisio Tan-Gatue (PC-INP Regional Commander)Melencio-Herrera, J.This is a petition for Habeas Corpus filed the the IBP, FLAG, and the Movement of Attys for Brotherhood, Integrity, and Nationalismon behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, Jr. FACTS: Atty. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP and detained in Camp Catitipan on the basis of a mission order allegedly issued by Ministry of National Defense. On the same day, 1 of the attorneys who visited Atty. Ilagan (Atty. Arellano) was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission Order. Thereafter, military told IBP Davao that Atty Risonar was to be

arrested, too. Atty Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to veify his arrest papers. Atty Risonar was detained on the basis of a Mission Order signed by the Regional Unified Commander. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on the ground of illegal arrest, violative of the Constitution (since no arrest can be made on the basis of Mission Orders). They also claim that there is a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases, Enrile et al. and said that: Attorneys were arrested on the basis of a PDA issued by the President. Writ of habeas corpus is suspended by Proc No. 2045-A. According to Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al., Courts do not have the authority to inquire into validity of detention of persons because of Proc No. 2045-A. There is a state of rebellion in Davao City and the attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the CPP and NDF. During hearing, Enrile et al. presented evidence of subversive activities in Davao. Due to lack of evidence linking the attorneys to the subversion, court ordered their temporary release. The next day, the petitioners filed a Motion stating that the attorneys were still not released. Also, they wanted the attorneys to be released to the custody of the principal counsel of petitioners at the Supreme Court (Chief Justice Concepcion). Enrile et al opposed this saying that there is a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The

attorneys were not arrested for lawyer acts but for their subversive acts. Enrile et al. filed an information for rebellion against the attorneys in the RTC-Davao. Petitioners say that the Welgang Bayans were in legitimate exercise of right of expression and assembly to petition government for redress of grievances. Enrile et al. answered saying that petition for habeas corpus has been rendered moot and academic because of the filing of an information against the attorneys for rebellion and the issuance of a warrant of arrest against them. The proper remedy is a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of detention. Now that the attorneys detention is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases filed against them, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. Petitioners say that since there was no preliminary investigation, information for rebellion is void. Enrile et al countered by saying that a preliminary investigation was not necessary since the attorneys were lawfully arrested without a warrant. Issue: Was the petition for habeas corpus proper?

Held: No. Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: SEC. 7.When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. - When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer or person. However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the

manner prescribed in this Rule. Section 5, Rule 113 enumerates the instances when an arrest without warrant is lawful. SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person or member (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs [al and [b] hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (Rule 113)


FACTS: Accused was found in possession of Pistol Caliber 7.65 Walther PPK with serial number 527353 and four (4) rounds of live ammunition, without first

securing the necessary license and/or permit from competent authority to possess the same. He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution presented SPO1 Arnel Cuevas, a police officer stationed at the Noveleta Police Station. The police testified that accused wad listed as one of the suspected drug pushers in their Cavite City. SPO1 Arnel Cuevas spotted Danilo de Guzman at the Villamar Beach Resort and he learned that De Guzman was engaged in a drug sale that day and reported the same to headquarters.7 Pursuant to his report, the Chief of Intelligence of their station, SPO2 Rowell Tendero, instructed him to continue his surveillance of said beach resort with the hope of catching Danilo de Guzman. The next time he observed the accused, he saw Danilo and Edsel seated face to face while using shabu in the Resort. He also saw on top of the table three plastic bags of shabu, a weighing scale and other drug related paraphernalia. SPO1 Cuevas hurriedly descended the ladder and hailed a tricycle and instructed the driver to inform SPO2 Tendero to proceed to Villamar Beach Resort immediately. Police officers arrived at the resort immediately and they waited them to come out from the cottage. They waited the whole night and on the next day, the accused went out. SPO2 Tendero nabbed him upon seeing that his waist was bulging with a gun. While police Officer Vedar

held De Guzman, SPO2 Tendero went up the cottage to check on Martin. SPO2 Alfaro and SPO3 Benavise, accompanied by a chambermaid and a boy from the resort, also went up with him. Inside the cottage they found 3 plastic bags of shabu, a plastic scoop, a burner, a lighter, several empty rolled aluminum foils, 3 pieces of tooter, rubber band, several pieces of paper, a black clutch bag containing a disposable lighter, 2 forceps, a pair of scissors, a knife and a key holder with a knife, filter, sandpaper, electric plug, pocket electronic weighing scale. Police officers brought the offenders to the police station even without warrant of arrest and the evidence were proven after forensic examination that they are methampetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 299.5 grams. The accused defense was they were there because his car was flat tire and it was dangerous for them to stay on the street at night. But after all, the accused was found guilty by the trial court of violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest requires preliminary investigation for it to be valid. HELD: The accused is GUILTY. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto, possessing an unlicensed firearm. The search conducted thereafter was valid. It was within the immediate control of the arrested

person. Likewise, the drugs and paraphernalia obtained where in plain view of the police when the accused was arrested. Quoting PEOPLE v. Khor, the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: 1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified as a prohibited drug; 2) such possession is not authorized by law; and 3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. All elements concurring, the accused is thus guilty. Lastly, the accused failed to quash the information against him before arraignment thus he is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant wassought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). Firearms, explosive materialsand subversive documents were seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence. However, the court denied the quashal of the search warrant and the validity of

which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines which provides that search warrants can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court. ISSUE: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction. HELD: A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. A judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to

an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal action, no legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. Moreover, in our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case: 1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction there over. 2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to

quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quash of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court. 4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not

otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefore. 5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case. YOLLY TEODOSIO y BLANCAFLOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Blancaflor was accused of selling ad delivering shabu in Pasay City, Metro Manila. During his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. The evidence of the prosecution presented that team from the PNP Regional Office Intelligence Unit conducted buy-bust operation after the four-days surveillance on his house because he was suspected of peddling regulated drugs known as shabu. The former walked into the apartment of the accused and introduced Inciong as a shabu buyer. Appellant told them that a

gram of shabu cost P600. Inciong bought 1 pack and he handed to appellant P600 or six pieces of P100 bills earlier treated with ultraviolet powder. He verified that it was indeed a shabu. He gave signal to the police outside and introduced himself to the accused that he is a police. Appellant was arrested and the shabu were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination by forensic chemists Julita de Villa and Marita Sioson and they confirmed that it was methamphetamine hydrochloride. Appellant claimed that police officers raided his house without a search or arrest warrant. When they found no drugs, they took a bag containing a large sum of money. He presented his neighbor, wife and his son as witnesses. They testified that on the night of the alleged buy-vast, they were inside the apartment sleeping and when they heard a noise downstairs, they found out that three policemen were searching all over the house and pointed a gun on them when they did not found any shabu. They also said that the police took a bag of money which was supposedly for the operation of their niece. After appellant was arrested by six police officers, he was dragged, slapped and punched in the stomach. He was forcibly taken out of the apartment and SPO3 Samoy fired a gun near his ear. On their way to his detention cell in Bicutan, Taguig appellant felt and saw the police officers rubbing P100 bills on his

hands. RTC decided that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Art. III of RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to life imprisonment. CA affirmed the decision of trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court and the court of appeals overlooked certain material and undisputed facts in erroneously concluding that the alleged buybust operation conducted without a search warrant or warrant of arrest took place outside the residence of the petitioner. HELD: Appellant failed to show any motive why the police officers would illegally raid his house. There was strong evidence gathered from the entrapment certainly beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was engaged in drug-dealing. No warrant was needed considering that the mission was not a search but an entrapment. An arrest made after an entrapment does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. Any search resulting from a lawful warrantless arrest is valid because the accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the person arrested (appellant in this case) committed a crime in the presence of the arresting officers.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONIDA MERIS y PADILLA FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. She contends that her conviction was erroneous because the court never acquired jurisdiction over her person, as her arrest was illegal, and that the prosecution failed to establish estafa. She was accused of a crime of estafa by feloniously defrauded Napoleon Ramos y Espejo and others through misrepresentation that they have power and capacity to recruit and employ them as Factory Worker in Hongkong. There were seven consolidated cases filed against her. She introduced the complainants to Julie Micua and promised an employment to complainants. They collected money from them. She denied the charges against her and she described herself as a public school teacher living in Pangasinan with her four children and unemployed husband. Like the other complainants, she claimed she was a victim of Julie Micua. The Court ruled that the accused took a direct and active participation in the recruitment of the private complainants by referring and persuading them to apply for deployment abroad, accompanying them all the way from Urdaneta, Pangasinan, to Manila to refer them to Micua, who presented herself as a recruiter of worker(s) for overseas employment,

personally collecting and receiving from them various amounts for their placement fees, and preparing the receipts therefor. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in not dismissing this case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on its part over the person of the accused-appellant by reason of the fact that the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was illegal.

Held: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or voluntary appearance in court. Hence, granting arguendo that accusedappellants arrest was defective, such is deemed cured upon her voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It should be stressed that the question of legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all

the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused. Estafa is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damages.