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HEIRS OF CABATINGAN 4. AUSTRIA- MAGAT VS. CA 5. BONSATO VS. CA 6. REYES VS. MOSQUEDA CONTRACTUAL SUCCESSION 7. VITUG VS. CA TRANSMISSION/ ACQUISITION THROUGH DEATH 8. PASCO VS. HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN 9. BALUS VS. BALUS 10. DELA MERCED VS. DELA MERCED 11. OPULENCIA VS. CA 12. CORONEL VS. CA 13. PAULMITAN VS. CA 14. RIOFERO VS. CA 15. EMNACE VS. CA OBJECT OF SUCCESSION 16. LIMJOCO VS. FRAGRANTE 17. ARAYATA VS. JOYA 18.ALVAREZ VS. IAC 19. LIM VS. CA 20. ESTATE OF LLENADO VS. LLENADO 21. DKC HOLDINGS VS. CA 22. SAN AGUSTIN VS. CA 23. AGGABAO VS. RTC 24. RIOFERO VS. CA FORCED SUCCESSION/ LEGITIME 25. MANONGSONG VS. ESTIMO 26. SPS. JOAQUIN VS. CA INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO THE LEGITIME 27. JLT AGRO VS. BALANSANG 28. BLAS VS. SANTOS 29. FERRER VS. SPS. DIAZ NO IMPAIRMENT 30. IMPERIAL VS. CA 31. DOROTHEO VS. CA 32. FRANCISCO VS. FRANCISCO 33. RAMIREZ VS. RAMIREZ 34. CONCEPCION VS. STA. ANA PRIMARY FORCED HEIRS 35. SPS. TUMBOKON VS. LEGASPI 36. VIZCONDE VS. CA EFFECT OF ADOPTIVE RELATIONS
37. RIVERA VS. RAMIREZ SHARES/ LEGITIME 38. SPS. BOLANOS VS. BERNARTE 39. CONCEPCION VS. CA 40. JOAQUIN VS. REYES 41. BENITEZ- BADUA VS. CA 42. BABRIERA VS. CATOTAL ADOPTIVE CHILDREN 43. RIVERA VS. RAMIREZ 44. IMPERIAL VS. CA 45. SAYSON VS. CA 46. IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA 47. LIM VS. IAC 48. TEOTICO VS. DEL VAL LEGITIMATE PARENTS AND ASCENDANTS 49. NUGUID VS. NUGUID SURVIVING SPOUSE 50. ENRICO VS. HEIRS 51. CATALAN VS. CA 52. QUITA VS. CA ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN 53. ARUEGO JR. VS. CA 54. ESTATE OF JUAN DIZON VS. CA 55. GUY VS. CA 56. CRUZ VS. CRISTOBAL 57.HEIRS OF MARAMAG VS. MARAMAG 58. IMPERIAL VS. CA 59. RIVERA VS. HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA 60. MALOLES VS. CA RESERVA TRONCAL 61. GONZALES VS. LEGARDA 62. AGLIBOT VS. MANALAC 63. SOLIVIO VS. CA 64. NIEVA VS. ALCALA 65. TIOCO VS. CAMACHO 66. SUMAYA VS. IAC 67. GONZALES VS. CFI 68. EDROSO VS. SABLAN 69. SIENES VS. ESPARCIA 70. CHUA VS. CFI TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION 71. RABADILLA VS. CA 72. REYES VS. CA 73. CASTANEDA VS. ALEMANY 74. DACANAY VS. FLORENDO 75.DELA CERNA VS. REBACA
RULES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF WILLS 76. REYES VS. CA GOVERNING LAW 77. PALAGANAS VS. PALAGANAS 78. ALSUA- BETTS VS. CA 79. LLORENTE VS. CA 80. VDA DE PEREZ VS. TOLETES 81.SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY 82. AZNAR VS. GARCIA 83. BELLIS VS. BELLIS 84. PCIB VS. ESCOLIN TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 85. ORTEGA VS. VALMONTE 86. BAGTAS VS. PAGUIO 87. ABQUILAN VS. ABQUILAN 88. BUGNO VS. UBAG 89. TORRES VS. LOPEZ 90. SANCHO VS. ABELLA 91. BETTS VS. CA 92. RAMIREZ VS. RAMIREZ 93. HEIRS OF MONTINOLA VS. CA FORMS OF WILL 94. ABANGAN VS. ABANGAN 95. ACOP VS. PIRASO 96. GONZALES VS. LAUREL 97. SUROZ VS. HONRADO 98. NOBLE VS. ABAJA NOTARIAL WILLS 99. MACAPINLAC VS. ALIMURUNG 100. GUISON VS. CONCEPCION 101. LEANO VS. LEANO 102. GARCIA VS. LA CUESTA 103. YAP TUA VS. YAP CA 104. DE GALA VS. GONZALES 105. CANEDA VS. CA 106. PERRY VS. ELIO 107. JABONETA VS. GUSTILO 108. NEYRA VS. NEYRA 109. AVERA VS. GARCIA 110. ICASIANO VS. ICASIANO 111. FERNANDEZ VS. VERGEL 112. LOPEZ VS. LIBORO 113. LOPEZ VS. LOPEZ 114. AZUELA VS. CA 115. TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA 116. NOBLE VS. ABAJA 117. CANEDA VS. CA
118. TABOADA VS. ROSAL 119. MARAVILLA VS. MARAVILLA 120. VDA DE RAMOS VS. CA 121. ALDABA VS. ROQUE 122. FERNANDEZ VS. VERGEL 123. GUERRERO VS. BIHIS 124. ORTEGA VS. VALMONTE 125. CRUZ VS. VILLASOR 126. GARCIA VS. VASQUEZ 127. ALVARADO VS. GAVIOLA WITNESSES TO WILL 128. CRUZ VS. VILLASOR 129. GONZALES VS. CA 130. MOLO VS. TANCHUCO HOLOGRAPHIC WILL 131. LABRADOR VS. CA 132. DE JESUS VS. DE JESUS 133. IN RE ESTATE OF CALDERON 134. KALAW VS. RELOVA 135. AJERO VS. CA 136. CODOY VS. CALUGAY 137. RIVERA VS. IAC 138. GAN VS. YAP 139. RODELAS VS. ARANZA REVOCATION OF WILLS 140. MOLO VS. MOLO 141. SAMSON VS. NAVAL 142. GAGO VS. MAMUYAC 143. UNSON VS. ABELLA 144. YAP TUA VS. YAP CA KUAN 145. KALAW VS. RELOVA 146. GAGO VS. MAMUYAC 147. TRILLANA VS. CRISOSTOMO ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS 148. LASAM VS. UMENGAN 149. PASCUAL VS. CA 150. REYES VS. CA 151. BALUYOT VS. PANO 152. CUENCO VS. CA 153. VENTURA VS. VENTURA 154. GUEVARA VS. GUEVARA 155. 156. 157. IN RE PILAPIL DOROTHEO VS. CA NUFABLE VS. NUFABLE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE: EXTRINSIC VALIDITY
IAC TEOTICO VS. CA AZNAR VS. 161. 177. 173. ENRIQUEZ GABRIEL VS. DEL VAL GAN VS. BPI NABLE JOSE VS. TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE INSTITUTION OF HEIRS PRETERITION FIDEICOMMISSARY TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO . 176. 169. BORJA VDA DE. PRISCILLA VS. 185. 162. 175. GALLANOSA VS. 174. AKUTIN NUGUID VS. CA RIVERA VS. REYES JLT AGRO VS. 172. REYES BARRIOS VS. 159. ARCANGEL PALACIOS VS. 168. CA IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND ORENDAIN VS. NARCISO CUYUGAN VS. YAP RODELAS VS. ARANSA CODOY VS. USON AUSTRIA VS. 184. CALUGAY RODRIGUEZ VS. 164. NUGUID MANINAN VS. 160. 183.158. 181. 182. 171. DEZA BELEN VS. BARON COSO VS. 178. PALACIOS SANCHEZ VS. 166. 165. IAC NERI VS. BALANSANG ACAIN VS. 167. DUNCAN SOLANO VS. 179. DIZON SEANGIO VS. 180. MATEO DIZON VS. 163. 170.
DELA SANTA ARELLANO VS. CA IMPERIAL VS. SINGSON ARANAS VS. 187. CLIMACO VERA VS. 194. 200. 192. 210. 197. 207. JUICO MICIANO VS. PEREZ VS. REYES LAHOM VS. ARANAS RAMIREZ VS. 193. CA ZARAGOZA VS. NAVARRO FERNANDEZ VS. 189. 196. GARCHITORENA CRISOLOGO VS. 188. 199. 203. 190. 191. DIMAGIBA BELEN VS. SANTIBANEZ NAZARENO VS. 204. CA VISCONDE VS.186. BRIMO SANTOS VS. 205. SANTIAGO DEBUQUE VS. MEDIAVILLO MANINANG VS. CA PECSON VS. 195. BUENAVENTURA MORENTE VS. RAMIREZ RABADILLA VS. 202. SIBULO BARITUA VS. 206. 208. CA VDA DE VILLANUEVA VS. PASCUAL UNION BANK VS. CA ROBLES VS. BPI TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION COLLATION AS COMPUTATION DISINHERITANCE LEGACIES AND DEVISES INEFFECTUAL LEGACIES RULES ON INTERPRETATION LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION . 198. 201. CA SEANGIO VS. 209.
226. 213. DE GUZMAN ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION CAPACITY TO SUCCEED ACCEPTANCE AND REPUDIATION . 216. 218. CA SAYSON VS. 214. FERRARIS. PABELLON BARANDA VS. 233. 228.BACAYO VS. 217. FERRER RAMIREZ VS. CA TEOTICO VS. CA RESURRECTION VS. CALISTERIO ABELLANO.BACAYO VS. BAUTISTA SANTILLON VS. 232. 230. ALMANZA SALAO VS.BORROMEO TIOCO VS. 224. ROSALES HALILI VS. MIRANDA PISUENA VS. CA MANUEL VS. 223. 212. BAGUNU VS. 235.211.BORROMEO GONZALES VS. SALAO ABELLANO. 239. 222. 220. CA BICOMONG VS. CA PORTEO VS. 229. CINCO IN RE: CHANLIONGCO CRISOLOGO VS. 227. FERRARIS. 237. 225. PIEDAD PASCUAL VS. 215. JAVIER NEPOMUCENO VS. HEIRS OF UNATING ARCENAS VS. DEL VAL LANDAYAN VS. CAMACHO ROSALES VS. 219. 236. CA REPUBLIC VS. 238. BACANI VDA DE CRISOLOGO VS. CA GUY VS. 231. PASCUAL LEONARDO VS. 221. 234. BARANDA ARMAS VS.
CA EFFECTS OF PARTITION NULLITY AND RESCISSION OF PARTITION .JUDICIAL PARTITION JUDICIAL PARTITION WHEN PARTITION PROHIBITED SALE BY CO-HEIR OF UNDIVIDED INTEREST 251. 262. 258. 245. 242. BALUS NON VS. 263. CA KILARIO VS. CA HEIRS OF VELASQUEZ VS. CANOZA BALUS VS. CA GARCIA VS. DIZON FAVOR VS. CFI FELICIANO VS.240. CA CHAVEZ VS. IAC HEIRS OF TEVES VS. CASILI CARANDANG VS. 255. 249. 244. 247. 256. CASTILLO HERNANDEZ VS. 246. DE JESUS VS. 259. CA QUIZON VS. SUNTAY VS. VDA DE FIGURACION COLLATION/ PARIFICATION EXTRA. 261. SUNTAY VIZCONDE VS. 248. LAGUA JLT AGRO VS. 243. 260. CAPUNO MATEO VS. CALALIMAN MAESTRADO VS. 253. CA ADAN VS. 250. CA ALEJANDRINO VS. MANGLAPUZ VERDAD VS. 257. 241. ANDAL DIZON VS. 252. CA FIGURACION VS. 254. BALANSANG ZARAGOZA VS.
ARELLANO. even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. however. secondary. after finding the legitime. Respondents. represented by her duly appointed guardians. AGNES P. The probate court found the Deed of Donation as valid and went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads: Every compulsory heir.R. inter alia. vs. are not entitled to any legitime. 189776 December 15. and alleged. assuming that it was valid.There being no compulsory heir. If there is no compulsory heir. 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings. which was. 1 G. The records do not show that the decedent left any primary. must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent. Petitioner. ARELLANO and NONA P. namely: petitioner Amelia P. is deemed as donation made to a "stranger. who are his collateral relatives and.Case No. No. His donation to petitioner. one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion." on April 28. FACTS: Angel N. or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. . The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible. "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner. by way of donation." chargeable against the free portion of the estate. he was at liberty to donate all his properties. 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. Pascual Jr. during the lifetime of the latter. so that inofficious donations may be reduced. there is no legitime to be safeguarded. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property donated by decedent to Amelia is subject to collation? HELD: Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs. who succeeds with other compulsory heirs. by Deed of Donation. FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL. and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. or concurring compulsory heirs. Pascual. 2010 AMELIA P. Respondents filed a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration. transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed. ARELLANO. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. died intestate on January 2. and to determine the free portion. therefore. He was only survived by his siblings. that a parcel of land located in Teresa Village. and in the account of the partition. Makati. Arellano. the donated property is not subject to collation.
where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. Court of Appeals. FERRER GR NO. . or. 187056 SEPTEMBER 20. It is our will that J and E will continue to occupy the portions now occupied by them. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: 1. or actually a donation inter vivos (effective during the lifetime of the Donors)? HELD: IT IS A DONATION INTER VIVOS. this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. In Austria-Magat v. That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. possession and administration of this property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death of the DONORS. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. 2010 FACTS: Case No.DEL ROSARIO VS. It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate and where ever situated. if a donation by its terms is inter vivos. as in fact designated. This Court has held that. It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right. the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa. ISSUE: Whether the disposition of the property is a donation mortis causa (effective upon death). 2 Spouses G executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" the terms of which are as follows: It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse. ownership.
the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. ad nutum. 3 MAGLASANG vs. the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse. The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. That before his death. in case of doubt. ownership. which acceptance the deed required. CABATINGAN June 5. possession. since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations.what amounts to the same thing. 2002 FACTS: Conchita Cabatingan executed deed of donation over a house and lot in favor of his brother. L. . need not be accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime. the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation. Case No. The deeds provided that it shall take effect upon the donor’s death. the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos. Conchita died. in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. The donors in this case of course reserved the "right. Consequently. Finally. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed. and administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. B." Here. maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived. Notably. Donations mortis causa. Also. she executed 4 other deeds of donation in favor of the petitioners. being in the form of a will. and 3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. 2. Peñaflorida. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos. that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive. as Justice J. Respondents filed an action to annul the 4 deeds on the ground that it is void for failure to comply with the formalities of a will. Reyes said in Puig v. the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title.
4 MAGAT VS. meter controlled. . On September 25.620. radio controlled. in Olongapo. Subic Bay. a single proprietorship. As highest bidder. thus it is void. Guerrero was President and Chairman of "Guerrero Transport Services". FOB Yokohoma. COURT OF APPEALS 337 SCRA 298 FACTS: Private respondent Santiago A. 1972. Victorino was to deliver the transceivers within 60 to 90 days after receiving notice from Guerrero of the assigned radio frequency. Guerrero Transport Services won a bid for the operation of a fleet of taxicabs within the Subic Naval Base. President Ferdinand E. " On September 22. a single proprietorship. executed a letter-contract for the purchase of transceivers at a quoted price of US$77. not more than one year . Donations mortis causa must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments. the Radio Control Office issued Administrative Circular No. they were not executed in the manner provided for under Article 805-806 of the Civil Code. On September 25.” The .59. 160 operational taxis consisting of four wheel. Case No. 4: Subject: Suspending the acceptance and processing of applications for radio station construction permits and for permits to own and/or possess radio transmitters or transceivers. four-door. pursuant to the aforequoted Letter of Instruction. Though the deeds were acknowledge before a notary public. "taking note of Government Regulations. Magat. . with the advent of martial law. The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Conchita’s death. four passenger. Guerrero was to "provide radio-controlled taxi service within the U. as General Manager of Spectrum Electronic Laboratories.S. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 1972. . utilizing as demand requires . 1. HELD: Yes. Sometime in 1972. Guerrero and Victorino D. Naval Base. 1972.ISSUE: WON the deed is a donation mortis causa. it is. sedans. .
Inc." On January 10. Victorino died on February 18. and placed an order for the transceivers. the Japanese firm would forfeit 30% of the deposit and charge a cancellation fee in an amount not yet known. Ltd.. 1983. Sinesio S. Aligada informed Magat of the assigned frequency number." On October 7.contract was signed and Victorino contacted his Japanese supplier. 1991. Guerrero applied for a letter of credit with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Victorino. Unable to get a letter of credit from the Central Bank due to the refusal of the Philippine government to issue a permit to import the transceivers. Koide & Co. 1985. 1973. 1973. Apparently. the Supreme Court ruled that the complaint sufficiently averred a cause of action. moral and exemplary damages. informing him that a radio frequency was not yet assigned to Guerrero and that government regulations might complicate the importation of the transceivers." Victorino was also assured of Guerrero's financial capability to comply with the contract. Guerrero moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. G. 1985. Olivia. Vergara. 1972. Aligada of Reliance Group Engineers. However. Guerrero commenced operation of the taxicabs within Subic Naval Base. On . the trial court ordered that the case be archived for failure of Victorino to prosecute. the trial court decided in favor of the heirs of Victorino and ordered Guerrero to pay temperate. A. Ma. Mason confirmed that Guerrero won the bid for the commercial transportation contract. Aligada also advised Victorino to "proceed with the order upon receipt of letter of credit. On October 4. 1972. On April 20. wrote Victorino. 1973. Makati a complaint for damages arising from breach of contract against Guerrero. Victorino filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing the dismissal of the complaint.S. should the contract be canceled. Guerrero informed Aligada of the frequency number assigned by Subic Naval Base authorities. On July 12. 1972. On March 27. Ronald and Dennis Magat. the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Navy Exchange Officer. the trial court granted the motion. moved to reinstate the case and to substitute Victorino in its prosecution. On May 22. using radio units borrowed from the U. Victorino would demand an additional amount equivalent to 10% of the contract price. On November 27. Magnolia. middle man and broker Isidro Q. The Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. . Victorino was advised to advise his supplier "to proceed (with) production pending frequency information. and attorney's fees. On September 29. in the same letter. On October 6. 1973. On March 11. 1973. Should the contract be canceled. Aligada was instructed to "proceed with the order thru Spectrum Electronics Laboratories. On June 7. petitioners. 1985. represented by his lawyer. 1984. On April 29. On July 11. Guerrero to bear the loss. On June 16. Victorino filed with the Regional Trial Court. Dulce. Victorino thus canceled his order with his Japanese supplier. informed Guererro that the order with the Japanese supplier has not been canceled. government. Atty. This application was not pursued. 1973. Further. 1972.
the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Province of Pangasinan. No. Anent the 2nd issue. ISSUES: 1. transferring to them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 12049. respectively. On October 26. They were valid objects of the contract. However it was dismissed. The contract was not void ab initio. the obligor may also be released there from in whole or in parts. On March 12. own. situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos. July 30. damages cannot be awarded. then already a widower. purchase and sell radio transmitters and transceivers… therefore. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the . NO. Domingo Bonsato. 5 Heirs of Juan and Felipe Bonsato vs. and 12052. Case No. 5652. 95 Phil 481) FACTS: On the first day of December. transfer. possession and importation of the radio transmitters and transceivers was legal provided one had the necessary license for it. Damnum absque injuria comes into the fore. Even if the Court assumes that there was a breach of contract. Whether or not the contract was breached. he cannot be faulted. The Administrative Circular merely ordered the Radio Control Office to suspend the acceptance and processing… of application… for per mits to possess. both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. 2. L-6600. The LOI and Administrative Circular did not render the transceivers outside the commerce of man. Guerrero appealed to the Court of Appeals. 1996. the law provides that when the service (required by the contract) has become so manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. RULING: Anent the 1st issue. the heirs of Victorino filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration. The contract was not breached. The LOI and Administrative Circular did not render “radios and transceivers” illegally per se. Court of Appeals (G. 1991. Whether or not the transceivers were contraband items prohibited by the LOI and Administrative Circular to import. had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato.R. For this. 1949. NO. Nowhere in the LOI and Administrative Circular is there an express ban on the importation of transceivers. Guerrero’s inability to secure a letter of credit and to comply with his obligation was a direct consequence of the denial of the permit to import. Here. 1995. Affirming the validity of the contract. the contract is void.August 21. 1954. hence.
and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2. Guzman vs. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations inter vivos. misrepresentation or intimidation. Sabiniano. 620. 108. HELD: Strictly speaking. or else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal. Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter. 1952). 620. by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions. The lower court ruled that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind. . November 18. ad nutum.000. Posadas. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions." it is well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889. 67 Phil. what amounts to the same thing. Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato. R. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. The defendants.. ART. 58 Phil. Ibea. L-4326. dissented.. the donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein. without pressure or intimidation. that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor. and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. in its Art. because they were donations mortis causa and were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law. having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario. the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations. that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. 633). (2) That before his death. or. Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa. majority of the justices declared that the aforesaid donations to be null and void. In the Court of Appeals. however. thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept. then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence. answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato. G. and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut").requisite formalities. Two justices. broke away from the Roman Law tradition.
SAN JUAN. On February 12. LORENZO R. 1990 RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. 1976. to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code. in his capacity as Special Administrator. Pampanga (Branch VII). during his lifetime. Art. 1973. the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable". 1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr. Benito Reyes. executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. Pascual filed a special proceeding for the administration of his estate. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. Judge of CFI. Reyes. L-45262 July 23. ISSUE: Was the donation valid? RULING: . Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations. and Manna Reyes Manalastas. 828). (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. PASCUAL. Exhibits 1 and 2. 73-30-M) and therefore should be excluded from the inventory. (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes. Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. He was survived by his sister.Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes. 737. the heirs of Dr. 6 G. Ursula alleged that Dr. Art. None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation. New Civil Code. The donor only reserved for himself. HON. a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. and URSULA D. On December 3. Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes.R. respondents. Facts: Dr. petitioners. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18. on the contrary. and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half. Case No. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2. a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act. MOSQUEDA.(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. the owner's share of the fruits or produce.blood Pedro Dalusong.1972. No. vs.
RULING: Because the account was a joint account and they made a will while they were married. Since the wife predeceased her husband. et al. deceased. (44 Phil. ISSUES: WON the survivorship agreement is a will. 7 VITUG vs. during her lifetime together with her husband Romarico Vitug. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other. 668 ) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donationwhether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. the fund shall belong exclusively to the survivor. executed a survivorship agreement with the bank. There is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. CASE NO. CA 183 SCRA 755 FACTS: Dolores Vitug. WON it is valid.. so naturally the cash would be their absolute community or conjugal property. When the spouses opened savings account. It provides that after the death of either of them. the . Manta.The title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. The donation was executed by Dr. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The cash is owned in-common by them. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee to the donor. they merely put what rightly belonged to them in a money-making venture. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.
2000 by respondents. Bulacan.000. represented by Cresencia deGuzman-Principe. Cresencia was merely performing her duty as attorney-in-fact of her co-heirs pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney given to her. 1995. Despite numerous demands. designating the former as their attorney-in-fact and empowering her to file cases for collection of all the accounts due to Filomena or her estate. petitioners obtained a loan inthe amount of ₱140. against petitioners Lauro Pasco and Lazaro Pasco.R. respondents wereconstrained to file the collection case to compel the petitioners to pay the principal amount of ₱140. petitioners refused to either paythe balance of the loan or surrender the Isuzu Jeep to the respondents. ISSUES: WON the Special Power of Attorney did not validly authorize Cresencia to enter into theCompromise Agreement on behalf of her co-heirs. Upon her death.00 from Filomena (now deceased). RULING: No. Consequently. represented by CRESENCIA DE GUZMAN-PRINCIPE FACTS: The present petition began with a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages filed onDecember 13. Lauro executed a chattel mortgage on his Isuzu Jeep in favor of Filomena. The case was filed before theMunicipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue. and docketed as Civil Case No.000. 25% attorney’s fees. Cresencia entered into the subject Compromise Agreement in order to collect the overdue loan obtained by Pasco from Filomena. exemplary damages and expenses of litigation.latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the amount under the savings account. HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN. MM-3191. dated April6.00 plus damages in the amount of 5% monthly interest from February 7. 2010LAZARO PASCO and LAURO PASCO vs. In so doing. 165554 : July 26. Thus. 1997. . To secure the petitioners’ loan. Case No. 1999. her heirs sought tocollect from the petitioners. to no avail. herein respondents alleged that on February 7. 8 G. it is undisputed that Cresencia’s co -heirs executed a Special Power of Attorney.In their Complaint. No. the heirs of Filomena de Guzman.
Case No. Meanwhile. More than two years after the auction. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time. Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land. the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC. 168970 January 15. which he owns. 1984. respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner. their coownership was extinguished. J. 1992. Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement.: Facts: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. SATURNINO BALUS G. Lanao del Norte. a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. or on January 25.R. 1979. a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. Subsequently. Thereafter. the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. On January 3.No. herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12. 1995. 1989. 9 CELESTINO BALUS vs. the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Issue: Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject . As a result. herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. On October 10.246 square meters. which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank. Rufo failed to pay his loan. herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific onethird portion of the subject property consisting of 10. The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property. 2010 Peralta. On June 27. a TCT was issued in the name of respondents. as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank. Hence.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. Rufo. Furthermore. In addition. without issue and left (5) parcels of land. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25. DELA MERCED February 25. petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father. the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father. the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death. an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case. there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. 1984. since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime. . Held: The court is not persuaded. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner. vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. 1984. the purpose of partition is to put an end to coownership. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6. In other words. CASE NO. Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs. at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. it only follows that at the time of his death. 1996. 1999 FACTS: Evarista M. At the time of her death. 10 DELA MERCED vs. petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. after the period of redemption expired. In the present case. Hence. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28. and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. dela Merced died intestate. At the outset. Stated differently.property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name.
it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father. Rosa Laguna wherein a downpayment of P300. adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them. Petitioner admits these but claims that the subject property formed part of the estate of her father in respect of which a petition for probate was filed in the RTC. As opined by the Court of Appeals. the appeal. Article 992 of the NCC is not applicable because involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father. the law in point in the present case is Article 777 of the NCC. 1989. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco. It further stated that where the administratrix realizes the nullity of the transaction entered into. which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. she is not estopped from interposing the contracts nullity. Petitioner claims that the same should be approved by the probate court and upon realization of the nullity of the contract. which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Dela Merced. what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister. filed a "Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial and prayed that he be included to share in the (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of corresponding to the heirs of Francisco. she wanted to have the contract rescinded and was willing to give back the downpayment. HELD: No. The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court’s decision. his heirs inherited his (Francisco's) share in the estate of Evarista. Case No. Subsequently. ISSUE: WON Joselito as an illegitimate child is barred from inherit ing from Evarista’s estate. This was allegedly known by the Respondents. Rather. the latter's share in or portion of. illegitimate son of the late Francisco. Joselito P.On April 20. Evarista. the three sets of heirs of the decedent. each set with a share of (1/3) pro-indiviso.000 was received by the Petitioner. ISSUE: Whether a contract to sell a real property involved in an estate proceeding valid and binding without the approval of the probate court? HELD: YES Contract to Sell Valid . 11 OPULENCIA VS CA FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for Specific Performance against Petitioner on the basis of a Contract to Sell of a lot in Sta. Trial Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner citing Rule 89 Section 7 which allows the sale of properties subject of a probate proceeding provided that it is beneficial to the estate and complies with the requirements of the law. Hence. when Francisco died. the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. executed an extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioner. 12 CORONEL V. from whom she had already received P300. consummated the sale of his property located in Quezon City to respondent Alcaraz. Notwithstanding this fact. because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father. she represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of land. Administration of the Estate not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father. Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable. and thereafter an absolute deed of sale will be executed. the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. 1996) FACTS: Coronel et al. became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. The Supreme Court emphasized that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death. In the contract. Since the title of the property was still in the name of the deceased father of the Coronels. there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. therefore. Therefore. Coronel made the transfer of title to their name. Alcaraz’s mother paid the down payment in behalf of her daughter and as such.000 as initial payment of the purchase price. to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on them. not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell. because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress. Estoppel Petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to Sell with private respondents. Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of its consequences. Coronel sold the property to petitioner Mabanag and rescinded its prior contract with Alcaraz. CA (October 07. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations. they agreed to transfer its title to their name upon payment of the down payment of 50K. ISSUE: . Case No. Thus. although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings." 19 Consequently.
CO-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other co-owners. Anito) are the respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners. FACTS: The dispute covers 2 lots. Juliana was able to redeem the property. the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against petitioners to partition the land plus damages. 13 PAULMITAN V. He executed a deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter. Pascual’s (7) children (Alicio. she cannot be a buyer in good faith. stronger in right should apply.WON the rescission of the first contract between Coronel and Alcaraz is valid. Lot 757 and Lot 1091. Baking. without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold. She had 2 children. Thus. CA. With regard to double sale. The ruling should be in favor of Alcaraz because Mabanag registered the property two months after the notice of lis pendens was annotated in the title and hence. HELD: The case is a contract of sale subject to a suspensive condition in which consummation is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners' father. however. the contract of sale became obligatory. to their names. Juliana. Elena. CASE NO. that is. only his pro indiviso share on the property is transferred to the buyer. Anita. which were owned by Agatona Paulmitan. Upon learning these. adjudicating to himself Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name. For non-payment of taxes. Petitioners’ defense was that the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has acquired exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said property. Abelino. Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship. The contention of the petitioner that she was a buyer in good faith because the notice of lis pendens in the title was annotated after she bought the property is of no merit. the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Gov’t of Negros Occidental. the rule that the first in time. Pascual and Donato. . what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith. Adelina. In case of double sale.
14 and 24 RIOFERIO vs. 1612. before its partition. But she may compel them to reimburse her for half of the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the preservation of the thing and to taxes. CA January 13. whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents. 493 states that “each co -owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto.” Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer (Juliana) a coowner. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the petitioners were ordered to pay the respondents their share of the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the redemption of the land. assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Pascual’s children and Donato and Juliana were co-owners of their mother’s lot (2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the property HELD: (1) YES: When Agatona died. shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the property. Since Pascual and Donato were still alive when she died. 1078 states that “Where there are 2 or more heirs. subject to the payment of debts of the deceased”. They are entitled to ½ of Lot 1091. he was only a co-owner of the same thus he can only sell his undivided portion of the property. The CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar. The redemption did not in anyway prejudice their rights. owned in common by such heirs. it did not end the co-ownership. Case No. When Donato sold to his daughter the lot. they are co -owners of the estate. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. Art.The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. Orfinada. He also left a widow. respondent Esperanza P. 2004 FACTS: Alfonso P. With respect to Lot 1091. Art. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage. Orfinada. her estate was still unpartitioned. with respect to the co-owners. the whole estate of the decedent is. pro indiviso. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in Art. (2) NO: When she redeemed the property. the court decided in favor of respondents. . Jr. When Pascual died. except when personal rights are involved. and he may therefore alienate.
in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. Case No. . Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate. Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property. Alberto and Rowena. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero and co-petitioners Veronica. 2001 FACTS: Emilio Emnace. Nelma Fishing Industry. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-ininterest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.Also. the decedent also left his paramour and their children. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced. Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator. CA November 23. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation. Jr. HELD: Pending the filing of administration proceedings. the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Orfinada. 15 EMNACE vs. Sometime in January of 1986. the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed.
Petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership. 9. 17 Limjuco vs. his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs. division of assets and damages. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the . more particularly by succession. Tabanao's filed against petitioner an action for accounting. Case No. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. HELD: No. rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death. which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property.they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them. p. and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. The Estate of Pedro Fragante CITATION: 45 OG No.397 FACTS: Pedro Fragante. ISSUE: WON the heirs of Vicente Tabanao Lacks the capacity to sue the petitioner. a Filipino citizen at the time of his death. Moreover. applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. payment of shares. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law. for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
18 ALVAREZ vs. Estelita. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death.deceased. to maintain and operate the said plant. Felipe and Teodora. Iluminado and Jesus. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law. Teodora was survived by her child. Antonio and Rosario Yanes. appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion. both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. as amended. from the "Japanese time up to peace time". ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality. are children of Felipe. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission. when her brother went there . IAC May 7. “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties”. Fragrante must be deemed extended. are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents. authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator. It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. Herein private respondents. HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code. 1990 FACTS: Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation". within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act. Case No. Jovita (Jovito) Albib. in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed”. Rufino. According to Estelita. Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children.
"Petitioners . . Alvarez sold the Lots for P25. . The rule is a consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person. 1960. During the pendency of said case. in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. . Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago. ISSUE: WON the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. Arsenia Vda. The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees. with the persons occupying only a representative position. "Under our law. On May 26. Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. RULING: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process. the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony. CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89).000. he was informed that Fortunato Santiago. Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. Arsenia Vda.to get their share of the sugar produced therein. therefore.00 to Dr. After Fuentebella's death.000. Rodolfo Siason. de Fuentebella. barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal.
RAMIREZ 111 SCRA 82 FACTS: Jose Ramirez a Filipino. which gave rise to the present claim for damages. died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez. an Austrian. and 2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. In the project partition. the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow. Case No. a French. as to the usufruct of the 2nd part. 33 RAMIREZ vs. they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction. Furthermore.being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void . 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski.
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner. HELD: No. 2000 FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right.because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens. until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies. (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar. The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. it is not correct. . Rabadilla. ISSUE: WON the ground for the opposition is correct. it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution. CA June 29. Johnny S. 71 RABADILLA vs. every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza. Case No.
HELD: Under Article 776 of the NCC. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent. inheritance includes all the property. the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. CASE NO. citing Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code. 2005 FACTS: Abada executed his will in 1932. rights and obligations of a person. Abada died in 1940. ABAJA January 31. at the time of his death. Conformably. Jorge Rabadilla died. to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. ISSUE: What law shall govern the validity of the will? . Jorge Rabadilla. 115 TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. corollarily. not extinguished by his death. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs.Dr. Private respondent brought a complaint. It was asserted that the will of Abada does not indicate that it was written in a language or dialect known to the testator and that the will was not acknowledged before a notary public. whatever rights Dr. ISSUE: WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure. the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. 1993 FACTS: The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. private respondent. and by that time. Under Article 795. Although the laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 and Act No. Case No. Abada’s will does not require acknowledgement before a notary public. Said will was admitted to probate. GAVIOLA September 14. the testator was already suffering from glaucoma. Later on. the 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. as the lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document. read the same aloud in the presence of the testator. a codicil was executed. the validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made. Instead.HELD: The law that governs the validity of the will of Abada is the Code of Civil Procedure. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure (which governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code). the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will. 127 ALVARADO vs. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them. But the disinheritance and .
there was substantial compliance. . private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator. and the notary public. it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies. the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. his three instrumental witnesses. the testator affirmed. In this case. are incapable of reading their wills. but also to those who. Instead. the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil.revocatory clauses were unchanged. for one reason or another. Hence. In this case. that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. As in the case of the notarial will. Prior and subsequent thereto. However. upon being asked. the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. ISSUE: Was there substantial compliance to the reading of the will? HELD: Article 808 not only applies to blind testators. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied. the will should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness.
CASE NO. 166 RODRIGUEZ vs. ISSUE: . But subsequently. First was an intestate proceeding instituted meaning. testate proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that person has left a will. this time. there were 2 proceedings. BORJA 17 SCRA 41 FACTS: In this case. We are confronted here of 2 proceedings. one was instituted ahead of the other. a proceeding to settle the estate of a deceased person who died without a will. a will was found and again another proceeding was instituted.
whether or not the will was executed in observance with the formalities required by law and whether or not the testator executed it with a sound mind. that should be preferred. But first you go to testate. and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings. then you go to intestate proceeding. 1987 FACTS: Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. the will is found not to have validly executed. The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). 178 ACAIN vs. The will should be probated. a legally adopted daughter of the deceased. Case No. In case Segundo dies. IAC October 27. all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children. The will should be given effect as much as possible in order to give effect to the wishes of the testator. Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed valid. even if that will is found later and even if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed later. The wishes of the testator must be given such preference first. The oppositors Virginia. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.Which proceeding should be preferred? RULING: As long as there is a will. If later on in the probate proceeding. (2) he is merely a universal heir and .
It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. or in the property to be affected by it. neither a devisee or a legatee there being no . except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected. or in the will. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs . Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. Insofar as the widow is concerned. ISSUE: Was there preterition? HELD: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. though mentioned. Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner.amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. for she is not in the direct line. or. there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance.(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited. although she is a compulsory heir.without any other testamentary disposition in the will . Petitioner is not the appointed executor.
However. CASE NO. Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the widow’s death. Dona Faustina ½ of all his real and personal properties giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto. 191 VDA. At the outset. he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir.mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. JUICO 4 SCRA 550 FACTS: Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting. DE VILLANUEVA vs. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased. intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs. ISSUE: . petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. she became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its 8th clause of the will. devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife.
HELD: The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doňa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doňa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property.WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona Faustina. Those properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator. BRIMO 50 PHIL 867 FACTS: A will of an American testator provided that his estate should be disposed of in accordance with the Philippine law. The testator further provided that whoever would oppose his wishes that his estate should be distributed in accordance with Philippine laws would forfeit their inheritance ISSUE: Will there be forfeiture? . because she never acquired ownership over the property. Otherwise. if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doňa Fausta then he should ha ve specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doňa Fausta without mentioning any condition. MICIANO vs. Case no. the said properties are not included in her estate. Upon her death. 192.
The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his adopted son. left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be inherited by Dra. then that provision in a will should not be given effect. Case No. so his right is not absolute. A person’s will is merely an instrument which is PERMITTED. ISSUE: Was Bernardo preterited? . if the wishes of the testator contravene a specific provision of law. as the adopted son. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for the last 30 years. The estate of a decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his national law. Bernardo. 205 MANINANG vs. CA June 19. instituted intestate proceedings.HELD: Even if the testator’s wishes must be given paramount importance. 1982 FACTS: Clemencia. He cannot provide otherwise. The SC held that those who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance because that provision is not legal. It should be subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws. claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta.
whether it was a valid disinheritance. Delia Viado. and if the latter. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has been preterited. a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister. CA February 15. Such preterition is still questionable. private respondent had been preterited or disinherited. the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. 2000 FACTS: Petitioners contended that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation. Case No. ISSUE: . The SC is of opinion. however. either because they are not mentioned therein. or. in the extrajudicial settlement. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them. they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. though mentioned. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.HELD: In the instant case. By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case. Petitioner Rebecca averred that her brother Nilo employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. that conclusion is not indubitable. 263 NON vs. that from the face of the will. resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
her part of the conjugal property. alleged to be a retardate. in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith. from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. however. remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. the Isarog property included. Petitioners are vague on how and in what manner fraud. The inheritance. the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado. which vested from the moment of death of the decedent. This kind of preterition. does not justify a collateral attack on the TCT issued. The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado.Was preterition present that would warrant annulment? HELD: When Virginia died intestate. Again. . forgery and undue influence occurred. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud. was transmitted to her heirs — her husband Julian and their children. the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
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