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Salvador Hernandez-Garcia, A097 472 829 (BIA Sept. 20, 2013)

Salvador Hernandez-Garcia, A097 472 829 (BIA Sept. 20, 2013)

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In this unpublished decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) terminated proceedings upon finding that resisting arrest under Cal. Penal Code 69 is not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude and that the statute is not divisible under Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), because neither the threat of use of deadly force nor injury to the victim is an element of the offense. The decision was written by Member Roger Pauley and joined by Member Anne Greer. Member Garry Malphrus dissented without opinion.
In this unpublished decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) terminated proceedings upon finding that resisting arrest under Cal. Penal Code 69 is not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude and that the statute is not divisible under Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), because neither the threat of use of deadly force nor injury to the victim is an element of the offense. The decision was written by Member Roger Pauley and joined by Member Anne Greer. Member Garry Malphrus dissented without opinion.

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HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, SALVADOR

A097-72-829
ETOWAH DETENTION FACILITY
827 FORREST AVENUE
GADSDEN, AL 35901
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Ofce fr Imigation Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
Ofce of the Clerk
5107 Leeburg Pike, Suite 2000
Fals Church, Vrginia 22041
OHS
/
ICE Ofice of Chief Counsel - SND
880 Front St., Room 1234
San Diego, CA 92101-8834
Name: HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, SALVAD ... A 097-472-829
Date of this notice:
9
/
20
/
2013
Enclosed is a copy of the Boad's decision and order in the above-refrenced case.
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Greer, Anne J.
Malphrus, Garr D.
Pauley, Roger
Sincerely,
DO cO
Donna Car
Chief Clerk
lucasd
Userteam: Docket
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Cite as: Salvador Hernandez-Garcia, A097 472 829 (BIA Sept. 20, 2013)
For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit www.irac.net/unpublished
, U.S. Deparment of Justice.
Executive Ofce fr Immigation Review
Falls Church, Virginia 22041
File: A097 4 72 829 - Sa Diego, CA
In re: SALVADOR HERADEZ-GARCIA
IN RMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RSPONDENT: Pro se
ON BEHALF OF DHS:
CHARGE:
Kathryn Stuever
Senior Atorey
Decision ofte Boad of Immigation Appeals
Date:
SEP 2 v /ÛlJ
Notice: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(i), l&N Act [8 U.S
.
C. § 1227(a)(2){
A)(i)] -
Convicted of crime involving moral turpitde (withdraw)
Lodged: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), I&N Act [8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] -
Convicted of two or more crimes involving moral tupitude
APPLICATION: Termination of proceedings
The respondent appeals the Immigation Judge's April 5, 2013, decision fnding him
removable as chaged and orderng him removed fom te United States. 1 The appeal will be
sustained, ad te proceedings will be terinated.
In her decision, te Immigration Judge fund te respondent removable uder section
237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Imigation and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), baed on
his October 12, 2004, conviction fr the ofense of petty thef in violation of Califria Penal
Code section 484( a), and his August 14, 2012, conviction fr te ofense of obstucting or
resisting e xecutive ofcers in perforace of duties in violation of Califria Penal Code secton
69 (I.J. at 8). On appeal, the respondent contends that his 2012 conviction fr resisting arest in
violation of Califra Pena Code section 69 is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
2
The
respondent contends that te Depaent of Homeland Security ("DHS") has not met its buden
in establishing his removability as chaged. We agee. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii) (2013)
(de novo review).
1 The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, was previously ganted cacellation of removal
by a Immigration Judge on August 24, 2010. Tat decision was afrmed by te Boad on
December 30, 2010 (l.J. at 3).
2
The respondent fled a moton to terinate in lieu of a brief The motion was initially rejected
by the Board as untimely. The respondent resubmitted te motion to terinate along wit his
motion to accept the late fling. We have considered the respondent's motion to terminate in
rendering our decision.
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Cite as: Salvador Hernandez-Garcia, A097 472 829 (BIA Sept. 20, 2013)
.
. A097 4 72 829
It is undisputed that Califra Penal Code section 69 is not a categorical crime involving
moral titude (I.J. at 5-6). However, the Imigation Judge fud that, under the modifed
categorcal approach, the record of conviction establishes te respondent's ofense as one
involving moral titude because the respondent pied to Count I chaging him with resisting
arest toug te use of "frce ad violence" (1.J. at 6; Exh. 4). According to the Immigation
Judge, the use of "frce ad violence" raises te respondent's ofense to the level of moral
tpitude (l.J. at 7). Alteratively, the Immigaton Judge utilized the third step of te analysis
set frt Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 l&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), and looked to te police repors
to deterine tat the respondent's ofense involves moral turpitude (I.J. at 8). I this regad, te
Imigaton Judge noted tat the police repors show both the respondent ad the ofcers were
injured during the incident (1.J. at 8).
The Boad has held that the ofense of resisting ares is a crime involving moral titude
only when it results in bodily ha to the victm, or involved the treat of the use of deadly frce.
See Matter of Logan, 17 I&N Dec. 367 (BIA 1980); Matter of Danesh, 19 l&N Dec. 669 (BIA
1988). Section 69 of the Califra Penal Code provides, in pertinent par, "[ e ]very person who
attempts, by meas of ay threat or violence, to deter or prevent a executive ofcer fom
perforing any duty imposed upon such ofcer by law, or who kowingly resists, by te use of
force or violence, such ofcer, in the performance of his duties . . . " See CPC § 69 (emphasis
added). However, we note that the portion of the statute punishing resistance by "frce or
violence" is not divisible as to whether a injur occured. Indeed, resultant injur is not a
element of the ofense. In this regard, subsequent to te Immigation Judge's decision, the
Unted States Supreme Cour decided Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), holding
that te modifed categorical approach may not be applied when the crime has a single,
indivisible set of elements. Because neither te theat of use of deadly frce nor injury is an
element of te respondent's ofense, under Descamps, we canot apply the modifed categorical
approach to fnd that the ofense involved such conduct or results.
Furher, subsequent to the Immigration Judge's decision, the United States Cou of Appeals
fr the Nint Circuit, where tis case aises, invalidated the third step of te Silva-Trevino
analysis. See Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 716 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that evidence
outside te record of conviction canot be used to deterine whether a alien has been
"convicted of' a crime involving moral tuitude). Under tese circumstaces, we canot fnd
the conviction documents in the record sufciently establish tat te respondent's 2012
conviction involves moral tupitude such tat te chage under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the
Act ca be sustained. As there ae no additional chages lodged in this case, we fnd it
appropriate to terinate the proceedings.
Accordingly, te appeal will be sustained, ad te proceedings will be terminated.
ORER: The appeal is sustined, and the proceedings ae terminated.


-

f
,
F0 THEBOAD c: _
Board Member Garry D. Malphrus respectfully dissents without separate opinion.
2
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Cite as: Salvador Hernandez-Garcia, A097 472 829 (BIA Sept. 20, 2013)
·-

4
IMIGRATION COURT
446 ALTA ROA
SA DIEGO, CA 92158
In the Matter of
Case No.: A097-472-829
HERNADEZ-GARCIA, SALVAOR
Respondent IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
ORDER OF THE IMMIGRTION JUGE
This is a summary of the oral decision entered on April 5, 2013.
This memorandum is solely for the convenience of the parties. If the
proceedings should be appealed or reopened, the oral decision will become
the official opinion in the case.
J
[ ]
The respondent was ordered removed from the United States to
MEXICO.
] Respondent's application for vo���eparture was denied and
respondent was ordered removed �·
Respondent's application for voluntary departure was granted until
upon posting a bond in the amount of $
with an alternate order of removal to MEXICO.
Respondent's application for:
[ J Asylum was ( )granted )denied( )withdraw.
[ ]
Withholding of removal was
[ ] A Waiver under Section
) granted ( } denied ) withdrawn.
was ( ) granted ( ) denied ) withdrawn.
( ] Cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) was { )granted )denied
( )withdrawn.
Respondent1s application for:
[ ] Cancellation under section 240A(b) (1) was ( ) granted ) denied
]
M
( ) withdrawn. If granted, it is ordered that the respondent be issued
all appropriate documents necessary to give effect to this order.
Cancellation under section 240A(b) (2) was { )granted ( )denied
( )withdrawn. If granted it is ordered that the respondent be issued
all appropriated documents necessary to give effect to this order.
Adjustment of Status under Section was ( )granted { )denied
( )withdrawn. If granted it is ordered that the respondent be issued
all appropriated documents necessary to give effect to this order.
Respondent's application of ( ) withholding of removal { ) deferral of
removal under Article III of the Convention Against Torture was
( ) granted ( ) denied { ) withdrawn.
Respondent's status was rescinded under section 246.
Respondent is admitted to the United States as a
As a condition of admission, respondent is to post a $
ut-H·
bond.
Respondent knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application after proper
notice.
Respondent was advised of the limitation on discretionary relief for
faiiure to appear as

rd

red in the Immigrati Judge's oral decision�
Proce . r� were ter,:
.
. .
J
"
r I .
other: , � I t- O . /C � H Ó
Date: 2013
Appeal: Due By:
.. ,·.
.. \",, ' __ ;�
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
File: A097-472-829
In the Mater of
April 5, 2013
SALVADOR HERNANDEZ-GARCIA
)
)
)
)
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
RESPONDENT
CHARGES: Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i).
APPLICATIONS: Voluntar deparure.
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: TINA MALEK
ON BEHALF OF DHS: JEFF LINDBLAD
DECISION AND ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE
Procedural Facts
The respondent, Salvador Hernandez-Garcia, is a 25-year-old native and citizen
of Mexico. Respondent has been a lawful peranent resident in the United States
since March 3, 2004. Respondent came to the attention of Immigration ofcers in
connection with this removal proceeding on October 11, 2012. Respondent had been
arrested by Immigration oficers at his home and sered with a Notice to Appear, the
Form 1-862, charging him with a violation of Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, as an alien having been convicted of a crime involving moral
1
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turitude within five years afer admission for which a sentence of one year or longer
could be imposed. The Notice to Appear was fifed with the United States Immigration
Cour on October 12, 2012; this Cour has jurisdiction over these removal prceedings
pursuant to 8 C. F.R. 1003.14 (2012). Respondent has been maintained within the
custody of Immigration and Customs Enfrcement since his arrest on October 11, 2012.
Respondent appeared before this Cour for his initial Master Calendar hearing on
October 25, 2012. Durng that hearing, respondent was provided a copy of his Notice to
Appear and a copy of the San Diego area legal serices list by the Cour. Respondent
was also given a complete explanation of all of his rights and remedies in removal
proceedings as well as an explanation of the legal charge contained on the Notice to
Appear (Exhibit 1 ).
Respondent invoked his right to be represented by counsel; his case was
continued for that reason. This Cour received a notice of appearance from counsel on
October 29, 2012. Respondent has been represented by counsel throughout these
removal proceedings.
It is undisputed that the respondent has been subjected to removal proceedings
in the past. Respondent had been placed into proceedings on January 11, 2010 with a
filing of a Notice to Appear befre the United States Immigration Court in El Centro,
Califrnia. In the adjudication of removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge in
L| Centro, fllowing a fnding by Immigration Judge Staton, respondent was found to be
subject to removal puruant to Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) as that charge relates to a
conviction relating to a controlled substance (Exhibit 3). Judge Staton fund that
respondent was eligible fr cancellation of removal pursuant to Section 240A(a)(1 )-(3)
of the Act; finding that respondent's transporation offense pursuant to Califrnia Penal
Code Section 11360 was not a "drug traficking ofense" or an "aggravated felony."
A097-4 72-829 2 April 5, 201 3
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Following the adjudication of respondent's application fr cancellation of removal, he
was granted that relief on August 24, 201 0.
Counsel for the Deparment of Homeland Security appealed the order granting
cancellation of removal. A decision afirming the Immigration Judge's grant of
cancellation was issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals on December 30, 2010.
It is undisputed that fllowing the grant of cancellation of removal that respondent
was arrested and convicted for a violation of Califoria Penal Code Section 69, relating
to the resisting or obstrcting of a police oficer in the perormance of lawful police
action (Exhibit 2). It is as a consequence of respondent's conviction for a violation of
Califoria Penal Code Section 69 that the issues in these removal proceedings arise.
During early consideration of the Notice to Appear, the Government withdrew the
violation of Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act. As a consequence, an 1-261 was sered
on respondent (Exhibit 1 , 5). Pursuant to the 1-261, the Goverment filed an alternate
charge of removal pursuant to Section 237( a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act, alleging that
respondent had been convicted fr two or more crimes involving moral turpitude not
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The 1-261 also contained
additional allegations of fact.
Respondent has entered a plea in these proceedings. Respondent has admitted
that he is a native and a citizen of Mexico and that he is not a citizen or a national of the
United States. Respondent admits that he has been a lawful permanent resident in the
United States since at least March 3, 2004. With respect to criminal ofenses,
respondent has admitted that he was convicted on October 1 2, 2004 in San Diego
County fr petty thef in violation of Califria Penal Code Section 484(a). Respondent
has also admitted that he was convicted on July 7, 2009 for the transporation of
mariuana, in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 1 1 360. Finally, respondent
A097-4 72-829 3 April 5, 2013
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has also admitted that he was convicted on August 1 4, 2012 fr obstructing or resisting
executive ofcers in the performance of their duties in violation of Califria Penal Code
Section 69. Conviction documents relating to the petty thef offense can be fund at
Exhibit No. 4. Conviction documents relating to the transporation offense can be fund
at Exhibit No. 3; and documents relating to the resisting arrest are in the record at
Exhibit No. 2. In addition to Exhibit No. 2, police repors relevant to respondent's arrest
fr resisting and obstructing have been made par of the record at Exhibit No. 1 2.
The issue befre the Court in these proceedings involves whether or not
respondent is subject to removal afer having been convicted of two crimes involving
moral turpitude at any time afer admission pursuant to Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the
Act.
Substantive Facts. Findings and Conclusions
For purposes of making a determination whether or not respondent is subject to
removal fr having been convicted fr two crimes involving moral turpitude, the Cour
has taken into consideration respondent's conviction in San Diego County fr pety
thef. The conviction record at Exhibit No. 4 is not disputed by the paries. Respondent
entered a guilty plea to count one, admitting that he "took and carried away personal
propery of another with intent to permanently deprive." Respondent's plea of no
contest to each of the elements of the thef ofense set forh in count one of the
complaint in case M-939422 provides the factual basis upon which the Court finds that
thef is a crime involving moral turpitude. The issue ref evant to these removal
prceedings involves whether or not respondent's guilty plea to a violation of Califria
Penal Code Section 69 can also be found to be a crime involving moral turpitude. As
respondent points out in his motion to terinate, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that a crime involves moral turpitude if it falls into one of two categores; that it
A097-4 72-829 4 April 5, 201 3
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involves fraud or is a crime that is morally ofensive, see Navarr-Lopez v. Gonzales,
503 F. 3d 1063, 1 074-75 (Ninth Cir. 2007). It is undisputed that crimes involving moral
turpitude have been defned by conduct that base, vile or depraved and violates
accepted moral standards. k 1 068. In light of the fact that respondent's conviction fr
resisting or obstructing arrest does not involve faud, the determination is whether or not
his conduct can be determined to be so ofensive that it meets the definition of a crime
involving moral turpitude relating to specific conduct that is deemed base, vile or
ofensive.
It also undisputed that in reviewing the record of conviction, this Cour utilizes the
"categorical" and "modified" review of the record recognized by the United States
Supreme Cour in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575 (1 990), and Shepard v. United
States, 544 U.S. 1 3 (2005). This Cour has also considered the decision of the United
States Atorney General in Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino, 24 l&N Dec. 687 (2008).
The Atorey's decision in Silva-Trevino provides a framework within which Immigration
Judges assess what parts of the record are permissible for review in a determination as
to whether or not crimes do or do not involve "moral turpitude."
As this Cour has advised the paries, she has done a review of the language of
Califria Penal Code Section 69. That statute reads:
"Every person who attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to deter or
prevent an executive ofcer from performing any duty imposed upon such oficer by law,
or who knowingly resists, by the use of frce or violence, such oficer, in the
perormance of his duty, is punishable by a fine not exceeding $1 0, 000 or by
imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1 1 70, or in a county jail not
exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. "
The Cour is persuaded that utilizing the categorical apprach, the California
A097-472-829 5 April 5, 201 3
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statute with respect to resisting or obstructing an oficer is over-inclusive. The statute
by its nature includes behavior that may or may not be defined as a crime involving
moral turpitude. Obviously a person who attempted to threaten a police oficer in the
course of an arrest would not be fund to have committed a crime involving moral
turpitude were that threat not taken seriously and involved no impediment to the
performance of law enforcement in their arrest. Likewise, a batter offense under
California law is defned by the unlawful use of frce. Since not all use of force rises to
the level of conduct that would involve moral turpitude, and ofensive touching during an
arrest would not involve a crime involving moral turpitude. In light of the divisible nature
of California Penal Code Section 69, this Cour has the authority to review judicially
noticeable documents in the record that may include the criminal complaint, minute
orders, plea of guilty, and judgment. The conviction record that is contained at Exhibit
No. 2 charges respondent in the fllowing language:
"On or about June 1 6, 201 2, Salvador Herandez did unlawfully attempt by
means of threats and violence to deter and prevent another who was then and there an
executive oficer from performing a duty imposed upon such officer by Jaw, and did
knowingly resist by the use of frce and violence said executive oficer in the
perormance of his/her duty, in violation of Penal Code Section 69."
In response to count one of the felony complaint, CD241 473, respondent entered
the fllowing guilty plea:
"Unlawfully resisted with frce and violence a police ofcer who was in the
performance of his duties."
As this Cour has explained to the paries, although count one is written in the
conjunctive, the statute itself is in the disjunctive. Nonetheless, respondent's guilty plea
admits the use of "frce and violence." This Court concludes that where Penal Code
A097-472-829 6 Aprl 5, 201 3
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Section 69 is written in the disjunctive; that it is relevant that respondent's guilty plea is
written in the conjunctive. Respondent has admitted both the use of frce and violence
during his arrest. As this Cour has noted to the paries, she is satisfied that had
respondent's guilty plea been limited to the use of frce; which under Califoria law
would be defined as an ofensive touching or a batery, that respondent's guilty plea
elevates his crime fom the use of force to the use of violence; rendering his behavior in
resisting and obstructing police ofcers in the perorance of their duties from what may
have been a battery to a more egregious level of conduct that can be defined as a crime
involving moral turpitude. The Court has made this assessment of the recor while
attempting to use the narrowest assessment of available evidence. This Court is
persuaded, however, that the Attorey General's decision in Silva-Trevino could be
used by the Cour to dispel any unanswered concers regarding whether or not
respondent's use of frce and violence was a crime involving moral turpitude by a
review of the police repors. This Court has reviewed the police repors in respondent's
case. The Cour is persuaded that despite the fact that respondent's violation of
Califrnia Penal Code Section 69 does involve a level of force that raises the stakes
from a batter to more egregious conduct; that the police repors clearly set out a factual
basis for the resisting conviction that leaves no question in this Cour's mind that
respondent has been convicted for a crime involving moral turpitude.
This Court wants to make clear, however, that she is satisfied that the guilty plea,
written in the conjunctive, is sufficient to establish the resisting ofense as a crime
involving moral turpitude. There is no question that police oficers in the perormance of
their duties place themselves at risk when they respond to circumstances that require
the arrest of citizens. In respondent's paricular case, as this Cour has noted, it was
the fact that respondent provided police officers with a false name and birhdate that
A097-4 72-829 7 April 5, 201 3
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began the spiral of events wherein respondent used frce and violence to avoid contact
with police oficer who were attempting to verify his identity and date of birh.
Respondent's use of violence put at risk not only the safety of the police oficers
attempting to arrest him but his own safety. It is all .too ofen that police oficers are shot
and killed in the line of duty. Although this Court is aware that the circumstances of
respondent's interacion with police cerainly did not involve that type of risk, the use of
violence to obstruct or resist arrest is ver high-risk behavior in light of the fct that it
can lead to physical injuries to the police oficers and civilians involved in the altercation,
as well as destruction of property or injur to other individuals who may be at the scene
of an arrest. It is perhaps the circumstances under which police oficers function that
cautions an assessment of conduct in light of potential risk. As this Cour has already
noted, that risk is not only a risk to police
. ofcers but also a risk to respondent himself.
Although the Cour fund that respondent's guilty plea is suficient to establish a crime
involving moral turpitude, there is no question that the police repor indicates that police
oficers had to use a Taser on a number of occasions to subdue the respondent. His
arrest involved not only his flight from police oficers and minimal physical injury to those
oficers but injury to himself with a Taser and destruction of property of a motor vehicle
at the scene of respondent's arrest.
Having found that respondent in violation of Califria Penal Code 69 has been
convicted fr a crime involving moral turpitude, the Court finds that in conjunction with
the pety thef ofense, that respondent has been convicted for two crimes involving
moral turpitude at any time afer admission. This Cour has clear, cogent and
convincing evidence that respondent is subject to removal as charged, see Woodby v.
INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
Respondent has made a request fr ref ief frm his deporation pursuant to the
A097-4 72-829 8 April 5, 201 3
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voluntar deparure provisions of Section 2408 of the Act. Goverment counsel has
taken exception to respondent's request for voluntar deparure on a number of
grounds. Government counsel argues that respondenf s arrest and conviction record in
the United States does not justif a grant of voluntar deparure. Goverment counsel
also argues that where respondent has been convicted for a crime involving moral
turpitude, that he cannot establish the good moral character required fr voluntary
departure. The rules regarding voluntar departure at the conclusion of proceedings
can be fund at Section 240B(b)(1 )(A-0). Section 240B(b)(1 )(8) requires that
respondent establish that he has been a person of good moral character for at least fve
years immediately pending his request fr voluntar deparure. Respondent's criminal
ofenses within the last fve years include his transporation of more than 28. 5 grams of
marijuana pursuant to the guilty plea of July 17, 2009 and the resisting and obstructing
offense on August 14, 2012. The Court is satisfied that respondent cannot establish
that he is a person of good moral character in light of the most recent conviction relating
to resisting arrest. Moreover, it is of no small consequence that respondent committed
the act of resisting or obstructing a police officer fllowing a grant of cancellation of
removal by an Immigration Judge. Respondent has been on notice since the granting
of that application that he was given only one opporunity to avoid his deportation.
Respondent has been on notice since the granting of his application that any additional
criminal behavior would result in his deporation. Respondent has not only been
arrested and convicted fr resisting, he has failed to appreciate the admonitions
regarding the consequences to him if his behavior resulted in his being placed into
removal proceedings and fund to be subject to removal. This Cour is persuaded that
respondent is not entitled to voluntary departure both because he has been convicted
fr a crime involving moral turpitude and because he is not eligible as a mater of the
A097-4 72-829 9 April 5,2013
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Cour's discretion.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's motion to terminate fled on Februar 6, 2013
is denied;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent's request fr voluntar departure is
denied;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent be removed from the United States
to Mexico pursuant to the designation relevant to the Court's having sustained a Section
237(a}(2)(A}(ii) of the Act.
April 5, 2013
A097-472-829
ZSAZSA DE PAOLO
Immigration Judge
10 April 5, 2013
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CERTIFICATE PAGE
I hereby cerif that the atached proceeding before JUDGE ZSA ZSA DE
PAOLO, in the mater of:
SALVADOR HERNANDEZ-GARCIA
A097-72-829
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
was held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof fr the file of
the Executive Ofice for Immigration Review.
DEBORAH DULIN (Transcriber)
FREE STATE REPORTING, lnc.-2
MAY 26, 2013
(Completion Date)
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