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BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN, @ "Benny" and FRED DE GUZMAN, accused. FACTS: • • • • The information was filed against accused-appellant and his co-accused. When arraigned with the assistance of counsel de oficio, Atty. Magsanoc, accused entered a plea of not guilty. At the scheduled hearing, new counsel de oficio for the accused manifested that the accused had expressed to him the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The court issued an order acknowledging the manifestation of the de oficio counsel and noted there are two mitigating circumstances that maybe applied. The Prosecuting Fiscal made no objection but also manifested that he has to look into the penalty applicable. The hearing was reset to another date. Upon motion of the prosecution and the defense in view of the projected settlement of the civil liability of this case, the hearing was reset again. However, counsel de oficio for the accused did not appear, hence "a report on the projected settlement of the civil aspect of the case cannot be made" and the hearing was reset again which schedule was later on cancelled due to the compulsory retirement of the presiding judge. In the meantime, Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr. presided over the trial court. The initial reception of evidence took place on 4/24/1987 with the accused-appellant represented by Atty. Benjamin Pozon. Thereafter, hearings were had until the parties completed the presentation of their evidence. TRIAL COURT: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide The accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. However, Judge Cipriano de Roma erroneously directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA. The CA transmitted to this Court on the records which were erroneously transmitted to it. The accused is thus deemed to be in complete agreement with the findings and conclusion of facts by the trial court. But that, the trial court erred in not applying the indeterminate sentence law. Accused-appellant argues that the imposition over him of the penalty of reclusion temporal by the trial court is "tantamount to deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law or is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment prohibited by the Constitution" and he submits that "the righteous and humane punishment that should have been meted out should be indeterminate sentence" with "all mitigating circumstances as well as the legal provisions favorable to the accused . . . appreciated or . . . taken advantage for constructive and humanitarian reasons."
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ISSUE: Whether or not due process was denied? RULING: There was no denial of due process. • REQUISITES: Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. People vs. Castillo: If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of the constitutional law, then he has had due process. All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The records further disclose that accused-appellant was given the fullest and unhampered opportunity not only to reflect dispassionately on his expressed desire to plead guilty to a lesser offense which prompted the court to cancel the hearing of 2/10/1987, but also to confront the witnesses presented against him and to present his own evidence. If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due process, he would have faulted the trial court not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, but definitely for more. Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. To make that claim is to assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC or of any other provisions therein and of special laws imposing the said penalty for specific crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot find any support. Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC has survived four Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution. All of these documents mention life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as a penalty which may be imposed in appropriate cases. The same paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua. Thus: Sec. 19(l). Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We agree with the Solicitor General that since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the RPC is now punishable by the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 63 of the RPC shall apply. Consequently, reclusion perpetua must be imposed in this case regardless of the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
though waived. JOSE. respondents. which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. However. The trial court dismissed the case and ordered for the striking off the records the testimonies of witnesses. the lack of cross-examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the general principle that an opportunity. Fulgado's witness. The private respondents moved that the trial court "include the case in any date of the August and September calendar of the Court. Where there was no such opportunity (to cross examine) and the want of it was caused by the party offering (plaintiff). L-61570 February 12. will suffice. During the PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE. if the failure to obtain cross-examination was imputable to the cross examiner's fault. 1976.R. Private respondents immediately filed a motion to lift the order of default on the same day that the order was issued. except as modified above in respect to the civil indemnity. Fulgado was then allowed to present his evidence ex parte. 1975. • . CA remanded the case to the court of origin for trial on the merits. Jose Fulgado? – NO HELD: • The right to cross-examination is a vital element of due process The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation. the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. The private respondents filed their answer to the complaint with special and affirmative defenses and a counterclaim. the instant petition for review. The TRIAL COURT DENIED the motion. However. on the ground that the defendants committed laches in their failure to cross-examine the witness. o If a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it. o The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to cross-examine may take various forms. FACTS: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Ruperto Fulgado filed an action in the CFI against private respondents for the annulment of certain contracts of sale and partition with accounting. Respondents then filed a petition for relief from the default order. Counsel for plaintiff opposed. petitioners. o RULE ON IMPLIED WAIVER is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. EFFECT OF DEATH OF WITNESS G. PACITA and SEVERO all surnamed FULGADO. is a fundamental right which is part of due process. When the case was heard on May 4. RUFINO CUSTODIO. ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to exclude the testimonies given by the deceased Rupert Fulgado and his witness. HON. private respondents and their counsel failed to appear on time and were subsequently declared as in default. MAXIMO. vs. Unfortunately. as well as their MR. because respondents were not able to cross-examine the witnesses. the same may however be waived as the private respondent have done when they allowed an unreasonable length of time to lapse from the inception of the opportunity to cross-examine before availing themselves of such right and likewise when they failed to exhaust other remedies to secure the exercise of such right." The case was set for hearing on September 16. but it was denied. had earlier migrated to the United States on September 16. In the meantime. 1976. substituted by his heirs. JULIANA. Jose Fulgado. COURT OF APPEALS. or in proceedings before administrative tribunals. PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: While the right to cross-examination is an essential part of due process. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION: Such testimonies are wholly inadmissible for being hearsay. 1975 and was substituted by his children as party plaintiffs. 1990. the presiding judge went on official leave and the hearing was postponed anew to January 15 and February 15. the testimony should be stricken out. with costs against accused-appellant. ISMAEL PORCIUNCULA and DOMINGA MACARULAY.• The trial court correctly imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua. WHEREFORE. CA affirmed the order. 1974. RUPERTO FULGADO. plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado died on November 25. Hence. No. SIMPLICIA CUSTODIO. the right is personal. o However. private respondents moved to strike out the testimonies off the record of the witnesses who testified on the ground that they were deprived of their right to cross-examine them. be it criminal or civil in nature. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff. ARSENIO PIGUING. the CA set aside the decision on the ground that private respondents were deprived of their day in court by the unjust denial of their motion to lift the order of default.
Khazie’s slippers were recovered from Alicando’s home along with a stained T-shirt and pillow. being personal and waivable. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof. • July 20. No. the court should ascertain that the accused voluntarily entered into the plea and fully comprehends the ramifications of such a plea and. 10256 and to allow the direct testimonies of plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado and his witness Jose Fulgado to remain in the record. Khazie’s corpse was found under the house of Santiago. The trial court is ordered to REINSTATE Civil Case No. • June 29. When the Court of Appeals set aside the default judgment and remanded the case to the court of origin for trial on the merits. the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. by gas poisoning. Rebada then told the Penecillas what she knew. 1994 – Alicando was arraigned and pleaded guilty. Khazie offered to buy yemas from Rebada but Alicando closed the window. one of Penecilla’s neighbors. accused-appellant. The information was written in English and it was unknown whether or not the accused could understand English well. Romeo’s friends left. ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES. 117487 December 12. the decision under review of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. plaintiff-appellee. • . 1994 – The trial court sentenced Alicando to death by electric chair or. the intention to utilize it must be expressed. Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be ascribed to the plaintiff or his witness. 3 provides that in a plea of guilt. Alicando eventually joined them. he choked her thus causing her death. o Khazie did not come home so Romeo and his wife looked for her. o In the morning. if the penal facilities would be available by then. The inaction on the part of private respondents cannot be easily dismissed by the argument that it is the duty of the plaintiff to always take the initiative in keeping the proceedings "alive. it should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move to cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses. o Alicando was arrested and her verbally confessed his guilt to PO3 Tan without the assistance of counsel.R. the private respondents should have proceeded with the cross-examination of the two Fulgados. a right previously withheld from them when they were considered in default. It is because the right. The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse because it prejudiced the party whose only fault during the entire proceedings was to die before he could be cross-examined. Rebada then heard Khazie crying so she approached the house and saw through an opening between the floor and the door that Khazie was being raped. vs. despite knowledge of Ruperto's failing health (then 89y/o) and Jose's imminent travel to the United States. The trial judge failed to follow the procedure outlined in Rule 116 of the RoC. another neighbor. However. Thus. The prudent alternative should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination could have been shown to be not in that instance a material loss. 1975 to set the already much delayed case for hearing "in any date of August and September." o The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is imposed on the party who wishes to exercise said right. Based on his confession and follow-up interrogations. Rebada did not tell them what she saw. They tarried for more than one year from the finality of the Appellate Court's decision to ask the trial court on July 3. the prosecution should also be required to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1994 in Iloilo City. WHAT IS SEARCHING INQUIRY? G. It could not be said with certainty that the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. After the plea of guilt. private respondents did not move swiftly and decisively. At around 4:30 PM. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was properly meted the sentence of death – NO HELD: • • • Arraignment of the accused was null and void During arraignment. spotted Khazie by the window of Alicando’s house. It was gross error for the lower courts to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was an alleged failure of crossexamination. Sec. The plea of guilt was null and void Rule 116. the complaint or the information should be read in a language or dialect which the accused understands. in addition. it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the direct examination. WHEREFORE. o Khazie’s father Romeo was having a drink with two friends in Romeo’s house. FACTS • Alicando was charged of rape with homicide for the death of Khazie Penecilla on June 12. Rebada. o At around 5:30 PM.• • • • • • Private respondents have impliedly waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses Private respondents had enough opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado before his death and Jose Fulgado before his migration to the United States. In the process of raping Khazie.
questions regarding the presence or absence of maltreatment of the accused are deemed insufficient when a record of events in the penal facility indicate that Alicando suffered a hematoma from being locked up in a cell with violent inmates upon his arrest. The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. o There was no testimony that the shirt in question was worn by the accused when he committed the crime. but the counsel manifested that De Luna was admitting to charge of Murder and that he does not want evidence to be presented.R. and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. plaintiff-appellee. Aside from the plea of Guilty. The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution." • • • • • • The Decision convicting accused of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act. socio-economic status and educational background of the accused were not examined. The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea. I am guilty but I have no intention to kill the child.” • The COURT convicted the defendant-appellant of the crime of Murder on the same day. defendant-appellant. the records is replete with evidence strongly and indubitably showing that on the 12/17/1986 at about 7:00pm. o The records do not clearly illustrate the personality profile of the accused. • During the arraignment. but it is equally inadmissible. o The alleged bloodstains on the pillow and shirt were never proven with laboratory tests. the accused waived his right that the prosecution present its evidence in order to determine for this court the degree of culpability of the accused under the present charge. 3. No. o The age. assault and use personal violence upon one little. vs. were inadmissible. Rule 116. Apduhan. with deliberate intent. The rule requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Tan of as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel. L-77969 June 22. 12 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel for the accused as well as provides for the right of the accused to remain silent and to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him and that these rights cannot be waived subject to exceptions. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree. accused De Luna stated that “Yes. small girl named Tricia by punching and kicking her on the different parts of her body thereby inflicting upon her the following physical injuries: Cardiorespiratory Arrest.• • • This rule is a restatement of the doctrine laid down in People vs. offered independently of the plea of guilt. The Court admitted as evidence the things seized in Alicando’s house. PATRICK DE LUNA. Sec. the trial court inadequately warned Alicando that a plea of guilt would result to a mandatory of penalty of death without explaining to him what mandatory meant. whether the accused may waive the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. the charge was read and the accused pleaded guilty with the qualification: “hindi ko sinasadya. Traumatic' and as a consequence of said injuries. they are still insufficient as evidence. with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation. The decision partly reads: o xxx Being informed of the charge and having understood the said accusation. Prosecution evidence. the accused. o With regard to comprehension. Secondary to Severe Multiple Injuries. FACTS: • The accused De Luna was charged with Murder before RTC Branch 10 of Cebu City and was arraigned on 12/23/1986. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. HELD: . PLEA MUST BE UNCONDITIONAL G. Tricia died the next day. A violation of this provision renders the evidence gathered inadmissible. This is in violation of Art. ISSUES: Whether or not –– (1) The defendant-appellant entered a valid plea of guilty to the offense as charged in the information. o With regard to voluntariness. In other words. When asked again by the Court. did then and there attack. whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence. Even if the evidence gathered were admissible. 1989 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. yet were considered by the trial court convicting the appellant “Fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine: once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained. any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. 3 modifies priorituis prudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof.” The Court asked the prosecution to present evidence in order to determine the culpability of the accused. It was not unnatural for him to have a shirt with bloodstains because he was a butcher. Sec. (2) Assuming that there was a valid plea of guilty.
the document does not indicate the municipality and the province where the municipal court is located. the information should first be amended or modified with the consent of the fiscal if the facts so warrant. In such cases. respondents. and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. RESPONDENTS: The alleged newly discovered evidence does not bear the seal of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties. FACTS: • • • • • • An INFORMATION for bigamy was filed against the petitioner Avelino C. While it is true that a plea of guilty admits all the allegations in the information including the aggravating and qualifying circumstances. the presentation of evidence should be required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court or the SC on review. COURT OF APPEALS. L-52728 January 17. unlawfully and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Andrea Suico. considering the gravity of the offense charged in the case at bar. • • • WHEREFORE. HON. No costs. On occasion. a copy of a marriage contract between Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire contracted on July 19. the accused filed a MOTION TO REOPEN THE TRIAL on the ground of newly discovered evidence . 3 things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: (1) The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. 1990 AVELINO C. petitioner. An accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt. The appellant's qualified plea of guilty is not a valid plea of guilt . before Andrea's marriage to the petitioner. CA denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. FRANCISCO Z. If the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is made without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party. The COURT denied the motion: It was filed too late because the accused.• • • • • • Plea of guilty is not valid plea The ESSENCE of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt. with due diligence. 1968. which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved. The case is remanded to said court for a new arraignment and further proceeding. The xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract is not properly certified and authenticated and on its face. The accused cannot waived the presentation of evidence for the prosecution After a plea of guilty in capital offenses. could have discovered the socalled newly-discovered evidence sooner and could have presented it during the trial. Notwithstanding the waiver made by the appellant. provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon him. The consent of the fiscal and the offended party is necessary. HON. or the accused must be considered as having entered a plea of not guilty. and with a full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information. (2) The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. 1972. the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former information. Moreover. After the trial was finished and the parties had rested. the Court ruled that it is permissible for an accused to enter a plea of guilty to the crime charged with the reservation to prove mitigating circumstances. wilfully. x x x the accused. this petition for review. NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION G. it appearing that he was appraised of the alleged marriage of Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire on October 17. thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law . the Court cannot sustain appellant's request for an immediate reduction of the penalty imposed. However. as to the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. voluntarily. CONSOLACION. the plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt and must be of such nature as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend himself from said charge.R. the decision of the trial court dated December 23. PETITIONER: The evidence was not available to petitioner at the time of the presentation of his evidence but only after the parties had rested their case. • . the repeated qualification stated by the accused as regards his plea of guilty should have drawn the attention of the trial court that the plea was made without a full knowledge of its consequences. To be valid. it is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of evidence for the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation and the degree of culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital offense charged. and (3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. freely. it is more prudent for the trial court reject the plea made by the appellant and direct the parties to submit their respective evidence. Even assuming that the plea was in fact to the lesser offense of Homicide and not Murder. Petitioner's MR was denied. No. AGULTO. Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Davao. vs. He filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. but before judgment was promulgated. Agulto: That on or about December 30. 1986 is hereby SET ASIDE. having been previously united in lawful marriage with Maria Pilar Gaspar. 1960. Hence. it appears that the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license.
a fine of P3. mentioned. The prosecution filed a MTDF the appeal for being filed 10 days late.8M and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as the fine. PERIOD TO APPEAL • • • G. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL: o May be filed after judgment but within the period for perfecting an appeal (§1. Respondents.R. applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes. well-defined grounds set forth respectively in Rules 37 (§1) and 121 (§2). Rule 37) o In civil or criminal actions. However. and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. natural or inherent right — it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and. Consequently. The respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for his guidance.ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely abused their discretion in refusing to reopen the trial –– NO HELD: • • A distinction should be made between a Motion for New Trial and a Motion to Reopen Trial. No. the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecution’s motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision. 2011 JUDITH YU. nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases. the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC. FACTS: • • • Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang. it is a recognized procedural recourse or devise. 14 days later. HON. and §6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. vs." the trial court's order denying his motion to reopen the trial was properly sustained by the CA. alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. thus: The "FRESH PERIOD • . but the Respondent Judge denied the motion. arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. §3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. by said Court in the exercise of that discretion will not be reviewed on appeal. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC. In Neypes. §6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. MOTION TO REOPEN TRIAL: o There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court for motions to reopen trial. o The reopening of a case for the reception of additional evidence after a case has been submitted for decision but before judgment is actually rendered is controlled by no other rule than that of the paramount interests of justice. 170979 February 9. she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from 11/3/2005. the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial. it may be applied for and granted only upon specific. The RTC convicted the petitioner and it imposed the penalty of 3 months of imprisonment. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law. or up to 11/18/2005. and its concession or denial. alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted. SPOUSES: Petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case. The reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence before judgment is not the granting of a new trial o May be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered and closed their evidence. Petitioner's motion to reopen the trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was not supported by evidence that marriage was still existing when Andrea Suico wed the petitioner. PETITIONER: The RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution’s motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. The RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution. available only if granted or as provided by statutes. unless a clear abuse thereof is shown. resting entirely in the sound judicial discretion of a Trial Court. deriving validity and acceptance from long established usage. The PERIOD TO APPEAL is specifically governed by §39 of BP 129. • • • • • • • • ISSUE: Whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases – YES HELD: • The right to appeal is not a constitutional. therefore. The Court set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal . but before judgment. The prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision. CA. within which to file a notice of appeal. an INFORMATION for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. OSG: Neypes applies to criminal actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided in the Rules. the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. Considering the defects of the xerox copied document which the accused Agulto claims to be his "newly-discovered evidence. Petitioner.
RULE 42 on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA. for the following reasons: (1) BP 129 makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under §6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same. the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake. judgments. (3) While the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under §6. It would be an absurd situation because a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. though differently worded. mean exactly the same. The 15-day period is counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under §3 of Rule 41 and §6 of Rule 122 of the should be treated differently. We hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16. awards. Rule 122 since it involved a purely civil case. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases. as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecution’s motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. . It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. as provided by §3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. it did include Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to this Court. judgment. resolution. §39 of BP 129 states that "the period for appeal from final orders. award. counted from November 3.• • • • • RULE" shall also apply to RULE 40 governing appeals from the MTC to the RTC. within the fresh period of 15 days. or decisions of any court in all cases shall be 15 days counted from the notice of the final order. WHEREFORE. RULE 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and RULE 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the SC. the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed. or decision appealed from. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration . 2005. resolutions. It is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases." (2) The provisions of §3 of Rule 41 and §6 of Rule 122. 2005.
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