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Hermeneutic approach
As is the case with many fields of study, Psychology has the foundational and critiquing contributions of Philosophy; specifically that of Hermeneutics. Susann Lavertys 2003 work Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Phenomenology: A Comparison of Historical and Methodological Considerations, identifies that over the past three decades, a rise in interest regarding qualitative methodologies in research has grown due to a disenchantment with the certainty of positivistic and logical-empirical inquiry (p.2). This paper aspires to briefly explore an alternative from a purely systematic reliance on clinical mental disorder classification. Such that risks over simplification, or even reduction of individuals through the process of Psychological diagnosis; an alternative residing in a perpetual re-examination of the social meaning, context and background of the practioner and the subject.
It must be identified early on, as Laverty highlights, conceptions and interpretations of both hermeneutics and phenomenology are not stationary or static and are logically subject to change and reinterpretation (2003, p.3). More specifically, phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology are often referred to interchangeably, without questioning any distinction between them (Laverty, 2003, p.3).
Allen (1995) argued that a clear distinction between phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology does not exist, he describes phenomenology as foundationalist, as it seeks a correct answer or valid interpretation of texts not dependent on the biographical, social or historical position of the interpreter. Hermeneutic phenomenology, in contrast, it is described as non-foundationalist,
as it focuses on meaning that arises from the interpretive interaction between historically produced texts and the reader.
There exists a significant overlap, at least in the lack of differentiation often given between phenomenology, and a hermeneutic phenomenology (Laverty, 2003, p3). In the work of Allen, we see the understanding and conception of phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology without a clear-cut differentiation (1995). However, in an attempt, Phenomenology is understood by D.G Allen to be a foundationalist, attempting to certify a legitimate interpretation of material, separated and unbiased by the socio-historical context. The hermeneutic phenomenological approach on the other hand differs as it is nonfoundationalist, and sees a synthesis between the readers interpretation and the context from with the material emerges.
A main proponent of mainstream phenomenology was Husserl who proposed that the duality of mind-body was eliminated by understanding consciousness through this field, that minds and objects occur within experience (Laverty, 2003, p.3). In this way, consciousness may be understood as dialogue between a person and the world. Ordered by intentionality and by grasping, Husserl put forward that when one could bracket out, or make separate both biases and the outer world, the process or methodology of Einklammerung, one may have experience of the essential nature of an object/s. (Laverty, 2003, p.5). From the perspective of Ontology, this position can be understood as a positivist one, a position that perceives reality as out there, something that can be truly apprehended (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). However, it is through the work of
Martin Heidegger, ex-student of Husserl, that we begin to see a Hermeneutical phenomenology. Acknowledging the undeniably situated reality of sociohistorical and cultural contexts of each individuals position, which are given from birth, Heidegger suggests that ones background cant be made explicit entirely (Munhall, 1989). Through his conception of Dasein, roughly understood as, that is, holds the connotation of existence, of understanding ones human existence as reflexive to the recognition of being a person or human (Heidegger 1927, trans. Macquarrie & Robinson, 1962).
The so-called father of contemporary hermeneutics, William Dilthey revived the hermeneutical enquiry, differentiating the natural sciences from the human (Martin & Sugarman, 2001, p195). His aim was to create a critical response to the trending compulsion of the nineteenth century to adhere to the physical sciences (Phillips, 1969, p61). This naturalistic approach can be understood as qualified or empowered research identifying and establishing objective facts about external phenomena. There are understandings that generalized to be reproducible; especially in regards to experimenting and observing (Guignon, 2012, p98). Dilthey opposed applying the same view on objects as of human beings, as to him they pertained an intentionality and subsequent arising background. Rather than attempting to frame the conversation of mind under the restrictions of an external and internal or Cartesian dualism of Mind and Body, Dilthey suggested an entrenched lived experience, one of interpretation and re-interpretation (1894). For Dilthey human phenomena is always to be loaded with meaning, if not intrinsically meaningful (Guigon, 2012, p98), however this is also known to be the limitation of Diltheyan hermeneutics
In the progression of Hermeneutic thought, Hans-Georg Gadamer, an essential member of Hermeneutical position who was influenced by Martin Heidegger, jests that it is artificial or flase to suggest that statements simply descend from heaven and could be studied without someone questioning the intention for their origination; this is the demand of Hermenuetics (1981, p107). Packer & Anderson propose that we are both constituted by the social and contribute to it; and there is no possibility of becoming dispassionate and neutral observers as the rationalist and empirical positions may inwardly desire (1989, p19-20)
If we accept human phenomena as holding meaning, at least for the perceiver and generator, the next position is to understand interpretation process. For Gadamer, interpretation is twofold; that of the intentional meaning and purpose of the text that is being examined, and that of the observation or observer. It requires one to get behind the face value or appearance of data or a text (1981, p100) and examine the mens auctoris, the intention of the text or author (p110).
Over Husserls career, he accused psychology of applying the methodology of the natural sciences onto subjects who are in actuality reflexively reacting to a perception of external stimuli rather than responding in a predictable and measurable manner to isolated, directly correlating phenomena (Jones, 1975). In a similar manner for Hermeneutics, it was Karl Jasper in the field of Psychiatry who first attempted an application of Diltheys Hermeneutics into the comprehension of some conditions in the psychiatric field (Phillips, 1969, p65).
What might be understood as the crux of the applying Hermeneutics into Psychology, Psychiatry and its related practices is the task of creating a dialogue to find a place for understanding of meaning, and where is the place for causal explanations in relation to disorders and inquiries (Phillips, 1969, p65). This might be understood by the quintessential phrase; that which human studies investigates is pre-interpreted (p66) and as Phillips highlights in the work of Taylor (1985), that we are self-interpreting animals. What does this mean for a practioner of Psychology who is to act as a secondary interpreter?
Phillips suggests that such a practice or therapy is assisting in generating a new narrative for the individual or subject. This is possible because the hermeneutical discussion allows a reflexivity upon the individuals already selfinterpreted narrative and creates a dialogue around this. Phillips also suggests that, in the case of Psychiatry, the construction of ones life-story or how a patient organizes [their] world meaningfully is equivocal to what makes the individual suffer (1969, p66).
Ian Hacking highlights the embeddedness of human psychology within the physical and social-cultural sphere through which, once a level of self-reflexivity is achieved, can exert influence over (1995). Jack Martin and Jeff Sugarman (2001) propose that the psychology of a human is an emergent phenomenon, and while situated within the contexts presented by Hacking, acknowledge the irreducibility of humans due to their contexts (p.194). Martin and Sugarman identify that Hackings understanding of the reflexivity of humans to adjust, and
influence the categories that influence them makes it difficult to accept two differing ends of psychological understandings. The first is that this conception of human psychology challenges a naturalisitic approach that is reductionist, essentializes, and attempts to see beyond the historical. The second position it challenges is in quite direct opposition to the first, which is a position of postmodernist critiques on traditional psychology, understood as a strong relativism (p.194).
Establishing a hermeneutical dialogue within the Psychological context cannot rely simply on attempting to comprehend external intention and motivation, or ones own background; it must arise or emerge as a process that incorporates the relational, between ourselves and the text, experience or other individual (Gadamer, p110, 1981). It is through language, or intrinsic linguistic qualities that Gadamer sees a dialogue occurring, and exploration of and through these.
What is later suggested by Gadamer, is known as the Horizontverschmelzung, commonly known as a fusion of horizions, or in even a more literal German understanding, the Smelting of horizons, connoting a sense of conjoined unity of two perspectives. This is a hermeneutic methodology of transformative dialogue, incorporating all possible views, leading to a new perspective or horizon.
a text, or any thing or event within the world we interpret, has its own horizon of meaning. Interpretation is sited within the mutual horizon of the interpreter and the things to be interpreted (2006, p2).
While the choice to use the term methodology has been made in this paper, Koch (1995) submits that it is not in actuality a methodological position, rather an ongoing conversation. An understanding will arise through applying a dialect between the data, the interpretation and the predunderstandings, resulting in a fusion of horizons (p835). Gadamer himself describes hermeneutics as more than just a method of the sciences, and actually proposed that it is a natural human capacity (1981, p114).
Once we have established the social, historical and cultural ground from which individuals emerges, according to Packer and Anderson we should not reverse this process apply a reduction the individual back to its origins. The current influence the individuals holds over these spheres, should also be understood as irreducible in the eyes of Packer and Anderson (1989). Following this line of thought, that human psychology is not subject to complete reductionism, or if that is found unacceptable, should not be subject to reduction, we can move towards to a Hermeneutical application in Psychology and Psychoanalysis. It must be established that, according to Packer and Anderson, psychological endeavours and inquiries are subject to interpretation, are not purely objective and detached and due to the nature of human psychology, true validation is difficult (Martin & Sugarman, 2001, p201). The Hermeneutical application, if avoiding the pitfalls of essentializing or resolving to pure relativism may result in
In many ways this unshackles the intentionality of the interaction between professional and client away from biological causality and subsequent prescription for an established psychological illness, towards a dialogue regarding life structures and meanings. This hermeneutic methodology assists the practioner to recognize the individual as such, rather than the illness. This forms a relationship of plurality with recognition of the limitations upon the professionals knowledge and the openness for revision (Phillips, 1969, p68). The author further observes that a psychological practioner who knows a diagnosis of the patient or subject is only part of the way towards treating the patient.
Naturally, there exists many challenges with this approach, Phillips himself noting the obstacle of addressing the proposed illness directly, which may be supported by the words of Social theorist Goffman regarding observers attempts to avoid addressing others stigmas (Goffman, 1968). Furthermore, an obvious objection arises when we are addressing such a field as Psychology, as research subjects and patients may be experiencing a life-world, or a background of experiences that could be far removed from that of the practioner. Phillips also suggests that each individual with a supposed illness will have a differing understanding and experience of such, and may be less able to distance oneself for such a reflective and introspective process. Richardson et al. (1999), further highlights the concern that the practice of Psychotherapy requires an established cultural understanding, and additionally potentially this Hermeneutical
methodology may disestablish the relative merits of modes of being that are held (p.273).
I propose that a fluid and changeable approach to addressing such differences is necessary, that of the practioner being willing to explore the inhibitions and resistances a client may have for such a dialogue. Furthermore, to question their own inhibitions to see a fusion of horizons within the context of Psychological practice may be essential to implementing such a Hermeneutical approach.
However, when we have two differing cultural, historical and social positions, where is the ground in which the practioner and client or subject stand. Gadamer suggests that this practice itself depends client of Psychology and Psychoanalysis professionals having a genuine experience of feeling in need of assistance and if the client has resistances then it will not be successful. Furthermore, if the underlying motivation of the Professional is to reinsert or correct an individual towards a functioning society into which they now do not fit, that can be seen as an unfair presupposing that Gadamer accused Psychoanalysis (1981, p79). This further emphasizes the necessity of implementing a methodology or dialogue into this that continues to be addressed throughout this current paper.
Paul Healy identifies the DSM, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual used in the Psychiatric for identifying disorders through shorthand, assisting Psychiatric practioners to communicate complex information and share and compare understandings of mental disorders (2011). Healy identifies that weaknesses in
the DSM lies in rendering the diagnostic system immune to criticism (p165), something that will obviously conflict with an ongoing Hermeneutical dialogue. More directly, he highlights the criticism regarding the DSM, such as its positivist clinical depersonalisation, focusing on the body (neurological) element of the Cartesian dualistic model which requires fixing and even its dehumanizing impersonality (p165-167). Furthermore, Healy suggests that it may possibly mislead an individual towards reifying, a psychological disturbance, when the issue may be more subtle.
Gadamer raises here an essential commentary upon Hermeneutics in this field, and proposes the questions the nature of its contribution to Psychology and Psychoanalysis:
Where does the art of understanding belong? Does hermenutics stand closer to rhetoric? Or should one bring it more in proximinity with logic and the methodology of the sciences? (1981, p114)
The contribution of Hermeneutic thought may lead us towards an understanding of an emergent subjectivity that is both socio-historically arising, and therefore, subject to change. This provides some breathing space, some room to move from the restraints of an ordering, atemporal system of judgement of conceptual laws that can only be comprehended objectivity, perhaps exemplified by the DSM. In other words, potentially objectifying the individual, especially in Psychological endeavours. According to the work of Gergen (1991), this is a position that
reinforces an independent reality of unchanging forms acting chaotically, is of benefit to prevailing and dominant existing positions.
Healy identifies that an alternative would be for practioners to develop the art of actually diagnosing, if necessary, the patient, without applying the reductionism this current paper is leaning away from. Both Crushman (1995) and Woolfolk (1998) also suggest that with a hermeneutical approach to Psychotherapy, it may should practically culminate as a knowledge of self and other, and in an applicable form, knowing what to do by understanding the broad cultural sources that may contribute to the individuals life (Martin & Sugarman, 2001, p198-99).
In many ways, it may be naively deducted that essentially Healy is calling for is an ability within practioners to identify the specificities of each situation they are in, to apply a somewhat intuitive judgement and to remain open to being challenged. Conclusively, he proposes that this is completely compatible with both the Hermeneutical process and the specification of practical guidelines (2011, p174).
If understood and applied correctly, both practioner and client are opened by the process of the Hermenutic enquiry; for rather approaching a perceived concern or inquest as an objectively measurable phenomena, the client can become re-
empowered in dialogue to examine the context from which the inquiry arises and the manner in which it is changeable; perpetually subject to re-examination, opened by interpretation and liberated by a fusion of horizons.
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