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MILITARYAIRPOWER

TheCADREDigestofAir
PowerOpinionsand
Thoughts

Compiledby
LtColCHARLESM.WESTENHOFF,USAF
AirpowerResearchInstitute

(TextscannedinbyAirWarCollege,NonresidentStudies)
AirUniversityPress
MaxwellAirForceBase,Alabama361125532

October1990
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData

Westenhoff,CharlesM.
MilitaryAirPower:TheCADREDigestofAirPowerOpinionsand
Thoughts/compiledbyCharlesM.Westenhoff.
p.cm.
"October1990."
Includesbibliographicalreferences.
1.Airwarfare.2.Airpower.3.Militaryartandscience.
1.AirUniversity(US).CenterforAerospaceDoctrine,Research,and Education.
II.Title.
UG630.W3961990
358.4dc20 9045674
CIP

DISCLAIMER

ThispublicationwasproducedintheDepartmentofDefenseschoolenvironmentin
theinterestofacademicfreedomandtheadvancementofnationaldefenserelated
concepts.Theviewsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthoranddo
notreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheDepartmentofDefenseortheUnited
Statesgovernment.

Thispublicationhasbeenreviewedbysecurityandpolicyreviewauthoritiesandis
clearedforpublicrelease.

ForSalebytheSuperintendentofDocuments
USGovernmentPrintingOffice
Washington,DC20402
Foreword

Thisisabookofquotationsandcommentsaboutairpower,war,andmilitary
matters.
But it would be a great mistake to simply read the quotes and take them
literally.Eachselectionpresentsapicturethatyoucanlookatagainandagain.
Taken together, different views of the same subject matter are like a drafter's
plans:theycanmakeeitheraninterestingmultipleviewdescriptionofthesubject
orapuzzle.
Evenahundredbookscouldn'tgiveacompletepictureofairpowerandwar.
Whatthisbookattemptstodoispresentamosaicabig,grainypictureofmilitary
airpowerthatgainsvalueasyoustepbackfromitandachieveperspective.And
likeamosaic,thispicturefillsinonlyasyoufiteachpiecewiththeothers.
Readerswhoarejustembarkingonaseriousstudyofthemilitaryprofession
willfindfoodforthoughthere;themoreadvancedstudentshouldfindafeast.You
are invited to read, reflect, enjoy, and appreciate, so you may apply your
understandingwhencalledtodoso.

DENNISM.DREW,Col,USAF
Director
AirpowerResearchInstitute
TheChallenge

Knowanduseallthecapabilitiesinyourairplane.Ifyoudon't,soonerorlater,
someguywhodoesusethemallwillkickyourass.
Dave("Preacher")Pace,quotedinRobertL.Shaw'sFighterCombat

Comparethisto:

Every art has its rules and maxims. One must study them: theory facilitates
practice. The lifetime of one man is not long enough to enable him to
acquireperfectknowledgeandexperience.Theoryhelpstosupplementit;it
providesayouthwithprematureexperienceandmakeshimskillfulalsothrough
the mistakes of others. In the profession of war the rules of the art are never
violatedwithoutdrawingpunishmentfromtheenemy,whoisdelightedtofindus
atfault.
FredericktheGreat

Frederickwaswritingforinfantrymenandfornationalmilitaryauthoritiesat
thesametime.Buthisprincipalideas willholdforthose whofly,support,and
commandtheaerospaceplane.Theselectionsinthisbookcompelmanyquestions
including:

Isaparticularlessonofwarequallyvalidatallscales,fromtheindividual
engagementtonationalpolicyandstrategy?

Whatcreatesuncertaintiesandfrictioninwar?Howbigorimportantarethey?

Arethererealconstantsinwar?

Whatdoesanypictureofwarlooklikefromanenemy'sviewpoint?Fromdifferent
levelsorscales?
INTRODUCTION
Orientation

MilitaryAirPowercontainsbriefstatementsonairpowerandwar.Becausethese
statementsareshort,theirfullmeaningisabsent.Thefulloriginaltextssupport,
qualify,andoftenmodifytheseshortselections.

WARNING

TheshortselectionsthatmakeupMilitaryAirPowerare
not intended to represent current doctrine or policy. In
fact,manywereincludedfortheirironyorbombast.

A selected bibliography of books concludes this volume. Professional magazines,


suchasthe AirpowerJournal, providecurrentandemergingideasforstudyand
growth,amplifyingthecontinuitiesofwarwithcontemporarymeanings.

RegardlessofAirForceSpecialtyCode,wemustunderstandtheoverallpurposes
of military air power and then see how our individual duties support those
purposes.
ColKeithW.GeigerinAirpowerJournal,Fall1987

Hebelieved,first,thatsupervisorsandassociatesmustrecognizetheimportanceof
eachman'sjobortask,aswellasofthemanhimself.
HarryR.BorowskionGenCurtisE.LeMay'sprinciplesofleadership
OnBrevity

The primary virtue of extracts is convenience; their primary hazard is


oversimplifyingcomplexthingsforexample,war.

AsoneveteranIsraelipilotsaidaftertheJune1982aircampaignoverLebanonin
responsetoAmericanquestionsabouthowmuchdoctrinetheIsraeliAirForcehad
writtendown,"Yes,wehavebooks.Buttheyareverythin."
BarryD.WattsandJames0.HaleinAirUniversityReview,1984

WARNING

Itisagoodthingforanuneducatedmantoreadbooksof
quotations.
SirWinstonChurchill

TheChecklistisnotasubstituteforthefulltextofthe
FlightManual.
StanEval("famousaviator")

Anotherproblemisthatshortstatementsbecomeslogans,whichareeasytorepeat
andmaygainahypnoticquality.

Adherencetodogmashasdestroyedmorearmiesandcostmorebattlesthan
anythinginwar.
J.F.C.Fuller
AboutFredericktheGreatandBrevity

SirCharlesNapierwrotehisbrotherfromthefield:

I have found Frederick of Prussia's Instructions very useful. I cannot tell how,
exceptthattheyarepractical...andtheyareinonelittlevolume,whereasIhave
tohuntthroughyoursixvolumes,andNapoleon'snine,whicharethereforeuseless
tome;forIcannotcarrythem,andwouldnothavetimetohuntoutpassages....
Jominiistoovoluminous,theArchdukeCharlesisbetter,butnotaltogetherwhatI
wantandmean;Fredistheman.
QuotedbyJayLuvaasinFredericktheGreatontheArtofWar

Itwouldfurtherhumanknowledgeif,insteadofwritingnewbooks,wewouldapply
ourselvestomakingdecentextractsfromthosethatarealreadyinexistence.Then
onewouldhopetoavoidwastinghistimebyreading.
FredericktheGreat

CAUTION

FredericktheGreat'swritingsfillthirtybooks.

NOTE:ThemostpertinentofFrederick'sbooksishisInstructionstoHisGenerals.
FrederickisfullofpracticaladvicethatechoestheideasofSunTzu,Clausewitz,
andtwentiethcenturyairmen.NapierwasreferringtoFrederick's Instructionsto
HisGeneralsintheletterabove.
Assumptions

Amodern,autonomous,andthoroughlytrainedAirForceinbeingatalltimeswill
notalonebesufficient,butwithoutittherecanbenonationalsecurity.
H.H.("Hap")Arnold

Knowledgeispower.
FrancisBacon

Fortunefavorsthepreparedmind.
LouisPasteur

Commanders and subordinates on the battlefield [need] a set of shared


assumptionsthatenablethemtoknowintuitivelywhatothersmightbedoingunder
theconfusedpressuresofcombat.
WilliamsonMurray

In other words, the more Air Force professionals share a common baseline of
knowledgeabouttheprofessionofwar,andthebetterthatbaselineis,themorewe
canworkeffectivelytoachievecommonobjectiveswithoutwastedeffort.
Purpose

Warisnotanaffairofchance.Agreatdealofknowledge,study,andmeditationis
necessarytoconductitwell.
FredericktheGreat

Nostudyispossibleonthebattlefield.
FerdinandFoch

Manycommandinggeneralsspendtheirtimeonthedayofbattleinmakingtheir
troopsmarchinastraightline,inseeingthattheykeeptheirproperdistances,in
answering questions which their aides de camp come to ask, in sending them
hither and thither, and in running about themselves. In short, they try to do
everythingand,asaresult,donothing.Howdoesthishappen?Itisbecausevery
fewmenoccupythemselveswiththehigherproblemsofwar.Theypasstheirlives
drillingtroopsand[cometo]believethatthisistheonlybranchofthemilitaryart.
When they arrive at the command of armies they are totally ignorant, and, in
defaultofknowingwhatshouldbedone,theydoonlywhattheyknow.
MauricedeSaxe

WarisamatterofvitalimportancetotheState,theprovinceoflifeordeath,the
roadtosurvivalorruin.Itisthereforemandatorythatitbethoroughlystudied.
SunTzu

Whenblowsareplanned,whoevercontrivesthemwiththegreatestappreciationof
theirconsequenceswillhaveagreatadvantage.
FredericktheGreat
Scope

Themilitarystudentdoesnotseektolearnfromhistorytheminutiaeofmethod
andtechnique.Ineveryagetheseareinfluencedbythecharacteristicsofweapons
currently available and the means at hand for maneuvering, supplying, and
controlling combat forces. But research does bring to light those fundamental
principles, and their combinations and applications, which, in the past, have
producedsuccess.
DouglasMacArthur

Officersnolongerlookuponhistoryasakindofdustheap....Theygotoitasa
mineofexperiencewherealonethegoldistobefound,fromwhichrightdoctrine
thesoulofwarcanbebuiltup.
JulianCorbett

Awisemanlearnsfromhisexperience;awisermanlearnsfromtheexperienceof
others.
Confucius

Itisrighttobetaught,evenbyanenemy.
Ovid

Thereisonlyonemethodoffittingourintellectstobereadyforwar,andthatisby
studyingthehistoryofairwarfare,andbynomeansshouldweneglectnavaland
landwarfare.
"SquadronLeader"

NOTE:"SquadronLeader"wasthepennameoftheauthorofBasicPrinciplesof
AirWarfare,a1927classicwiththesubtitleTheInfluenceofAirPoweronSeaand
LandStrategy.
SelectionofMaterials

ReadnottheTimes;readtheEternities.
HenryDavidThoreau

AsanationwewerenotpreparedforWorldWarII.Yes,wewonthewar,butata
terrificcostinlives,humansuffering,andmaterial,andattimesthemarginwas
narrow.Historyalonecanrevealhowmanyturningpointstherewere,howmany
timeswewerenearlosing,andhowourenemies'mistakesoftenpulledusthrough.
Intheflushofvictory,someliketoforgettheseunpalatabletruths.
"Hap"Arnold

Historyisnotkindtonationsthatgotosleep.PearlHarborwokeusupandwe
managedtowin,althoughwearealreadyforgettingthedarkdayswhenvictory
wasuncertain,whenitlookedasthoughthescalesmightbetippedtheotherway.
GeorgeC.Kenney,1950

While mankind's oldest histories are of wars, air power has added a
significantlydifferentelementtotheconductofwarinthiscentury.Thelargestuse
ofairpowerinwar,anditsmostvariedandcomplicatedapplication,occurredin
WorldWarII.Thepressureofsignificantenemysuccessesforcedaircommandersto
discardprewardogma,freeingairoperationsfromtheirprewarsubordinatestatus,
andforgingflexible,capableairforces.WorldWarIIwasfoughtagainststrong,
wellledandwellequippedairforces,anditiswelldocumented.Inevitably,this
volumeleansheavilyonWorldWarIIsources.
AirPower
AirPowerTheories..........................................................................17

TheNatureofAirPower...............................................................20

ElementsofAirPower....................................................................23

"Complete"UsesofAirPower.......................................................25

GeneralArnold'sFundamentalPrinciplesofAirPower.............28

ObjectivesofAirPowerEmployment...........................................31

EconomicandPoliticalObjectives.................................................32

PsychologicalEffects......................................................................35

ControloftheAir............................................................................38

AirPowerandManeuver...............................................................41

LordTedder'sPrinciplesofAirWarfare.......................................43

InterdictionandAttrition..............................................................46

Persistence......................................................................................50

AirPowerProphecy:ItsHazards.................................................51

AIRPOWER
Wehavetheenemysurrounded.Weareduginandhaveoverwhelmingnumbers.
Butenemyairpowerismaulingusbadly.Wewillhavetowithdraw.
Japaneseinfantrycommander,situationreporttoheadquarters,Burma,
WorldWarII.

AirPowerTheories

There has been a tendency to overemphasize longrange bombardment, and to


ignore the versatile application of air power. Our Air Forces were used for any
missionconsideredimportant,atanygivenmoment.Especiallymisleadingisthe
distinctionmadebetweenstrategicandtacticalairforces.Thatdistinctionisnot
validindescribingtheuseofairpowerasawhole,dayafterday.
Forinstance,theprimarymissionofthestrategicairforceswastodestroythe
enemy'swarindustries,todeprivehimofmeanstofight.Butthesesamebombers,
andtheirfighterescortsofthestrategicairforces,constitutedtheheavieststriking
poweratGeneralEisenhower'scommandtosweeptheLuftwaffefromtheair,to
isolateGermangroundforcesfromreinforcementsandsupplies,andtosparkthe
advanceofourgroundtroopsbyvisualandradarcooperation.
Carl("Tooey")Spaatz

GeneralSpaatzhada"complete"viewofairpower,freeofartificialconstraints,
mandatoryprescriptions,orabsolutes.Allusefulideasfromthemanytheoristsof
thedifferingschoolscontributetoapragmatic,unfettered,and"complete"viewor
theoryofairpower.

Ifweshouldhavetofight,weshouldbepreparedtodosofromtheneckupinstead
offromtheneckdown.
JimmyDoolittle

Airpowerisindivisible.Ifyousplititupintocompartments,youmerelypullitto
piecesanddestroyitsgreatestassetitsflexibility.
FieldMarshalBernardMontgomery

Airpoweristheabilitytodosomethingintheair.
BillyMitchell

Airpowerislikepoker.Asecondbesthandislikenoneatallitwillcostyoudough
andwinyounothing.
GeorgeKenney

AirpoweralonedoesnotguaranteeAmerica'ssecurity,butIbelieveitbestexploits
thenation'sgreatestasset
ourtechnicalskill.
HoytS.Vandenberg

ItmaybesaidthatDouhetwasthetheoristofairpower,Mitchellthepublicistand
catalyticagent,andTrenchardtheorganizationalgenius.
HarryH.Ransom
TheNatureofAirPower

Oncethecommandoftheairisobtainedbyoneofthecontendingarmies,thewar
mustbecomeaconflictbetweenaseeinghostandonethatisblind.
H.G.Wells

Intheairalldirectionsleadeverywhere.
H.G.Wells

NeithertheArmynortheNavyisofanyprotection,orofverylittleprotection,
againstaerialraids.
AlexanderGrahamBell

The first important difference between air forces and armies is that, within his
tactical range, the airman is independent of lines of communication and has no
flanks.Theonlyotherimportantdifferencebetweenarmiesandairforcesisthatan
airforceisnotcommittedtoanyonecourseofaction.
J.C.Slessor

Because of its independence of surface limitations and its superior speed the
airplaneistheoffensiveweaponparexcellence.
GiulioDouhet

Themeasureofairpoweristheabilityofanationtoexploitairspaceforitsown
purposesandinwartimetodenyittoanenemy.
AdmArthurRadford

Assumptionsregardingbasicfeaturesofwarinthemediumofairspaceare:the
primacyofairsuperiority;theunityofairpower;criteriafortheselectionoftargets
forattack;thefactorsofrange,basevulnerability,andselectionoffirepower;the
crucialrelationshipbetweenoffenseanddefense;andairforcesasadeterrentto
enemyinitiative.
EugeneM.Emme

Airpowercaneitherparalyzetheenemy'smilitaryactionorcompelhimtodevote
tothedefenseofhisbasesandcommunicationsashareofhisstraitenedresources
fargreaterthanwhatweneedintheattack.
WinstonChurchill

Aerialforcesmenacealltheterritorycomprisedintheirradiusofaction.Theycan
setofffromdifferentpointsandarrive"enmasse"onachosenpoint.Theylend
themselvestotheoffensivebecausetheyleavetheadversary,untilthelastmoment,
inuncertaintyastotheirobjective.
A.Vauthier,paraphraseofDouhet

Theairoceananditsendlessouterspaceextensionareoneandindivisible,and
shouldbecontrolledbyasinglehomogeneousforce.
AlexanderP.deSeversky

The very flexibility of air forces makes true cooperation essential. Air forces, at
shortnotice,canbeswitchedfromonesortoftargettoanotherand,withinlimits,
fromonetypeofoperationtoaquitedifferenttype.Thereis,therefore,aconstant
temptationtousethempiecemealtomeetanimmediaterequirement,ratherthan
tousethemonalongtermjointplan,andtoutilizetheirflexibilityinthemethodof
achievingaconsistentaimwhichisanintegralpartofourgovernment'spolicyand
ofourstrategytoimplementthatpolicy.
J.C.Slessor

Everysoldiergenerallythinksonlyasfarastheradiusofactionofhisbranchofthe
serviceandonlyasquicklyashecanmovewithhisweapons.
LuftwaffeGenKarlKoller

Ifwelosethewarintheairwelosethewarandloseitquickly.
FieldMarshalMontgomery
ElementsofAirPower

Airpoweristhetotalaviationactivitycivilianandmilitary,commercialand
private,potentialaswellasexisting.
"Hap"Arnold

Theairpowerofanationiswhatitactuallyhastoday.Thatwhichithasonthe
draftingboardcannotbecomeitsairpoweruntilfiveyearsfromnow.
FrankM.Andrews

Ihaveflowninjustabouteverything,withallkindsofpilotsinallpartsofthe
worldBritish,French,Pakistani,Iranian,Japanese,Chineseandtherewasn'ta
dime'sworthofdifferencebetweenanyofthemexceptforoneunchanging,certain
fact:thebest,mostskillfulpilothadthemostexperience.
CharlesE.("Chuck")Yeager

Whycan'ttheybuyjustoneairplaneandtaketurnsflyingit?
CalvinCoolidge

Airpowerisacomplexofatleastfifteendifferentelements,eachofwhichmustbe
consideredindispensable.Therelativeimportanceofeachmustbevariable,yetthe
absenceofanyonemustendangercontroloftheairorpreventitsexploitation....
Thefifteenelementsare:

Rawmaterialsandfuel
Industrialpotential,toolreserves,andhighrateoftechnologicalprogress
Basesandprotectiveforces
CommunicationsandElectronics
Logisticsandsupplies
Auxiliaryservices
Airborneforces
Guidedmissilesandatomicweapons
Aircraft
Manpower
Training
Morale
Intelligence
ResearchandInventiveness
TacticsStrategyPlanning
StefanT.Possony
"Complete"UsesofAirPower

While many air power theorists concentrated on specific applications of


aircraft to war, the weight of history appears to emphasize air power's flexible
applicationasmuchasthesuccessesofindividualmissions.

[WorldWarII]showedbeyondallcavilthatairpower,especiallywhenappliedas
widelyandinasmanydirectionsastheUnitedStatescould[applyit],dominated
surfacewarfare.
DavidMacIsaac

Therewasnolineofcleavagebetweenstrategicandtacticalairforces.Itwasover
alleffort,unitingalltypesofaircraft,coordinatedformaximumimpact.
'Tooey''Spaatz

ThefourprinciplesofairpowerthatIsetoutwere:

1. Toobtainmasteryoftheair,andtokeepit,whichmeanscontinuallyfightingfor
it.
2. Todestroytheenemy'smeansofproductionandhiscommunicationsbystrategic
bombing.
3. Tomaintainthebattlewithoutanyinterferencebytheenemy.
4. Topreventtheenemybeingabletomaintainthebattle.
AirMarshalHughTrenchard

Oncerealmasteryoftheairwasobtained,allsortsofenterpriseswouldbecome
easy.Allkindsofaeroplanescouldcomeintoplay.
WinstonChurchill

AirpowerhadamightyvindicationinWorldWarII.ButitwasMitchell's
conceptionofitanythingthatfliesratherthanDouhet'sthatwasvindicated.
BernardBrodie

ThesingleclearlessonofWorldWarIIwasthatthevisionarieswerecorrectthat
allfuturewarfarewouldbedominatedfromtheair.Theyagreedonthat.Whatthey
arguedaboutwasjusthowairpowerwoulddominatesurfacewarfare.
DavidMacIsaac

Itwasnotappreciated,andhasscarcelybeenappreciatedtoday,thatthefighting
powerofanarmyistheproductandnotthesumofthearmscomposingit.
J.F.C.Fuller

A nation may have every other element of air power but still lag behind if its
government hasnorealurgetoinsureitsfuturedevelopment.Theattitudeand
actions of government will fully determine the size of our military air
establishment,andgreatlyaffecttheefficiencyofourcivilairestablishment,our
aeronauticalindustryandfacilitieshenceourairpowerinbeing.
JohnC.Cooper

GENERALARNOLD'SFUNDAMENTALPRINCIPLES
OFAIRPOWER

Throughout the war, l tried to have the Air Force operate under
certainfundamentalprinciples:

1.ThemainjoboftheAirForceisbombardment:largeformations
ofbombardmentplanesmusthittheenemybeforetheenemyhitsus.
Inshort,thebestdefenseisattack.
2.Ourplanesmustbeabletofunctionunderallclimaticconditions
fromtheNorthPoletotheSouthPole.
3.Daylightoperations,includingdaylightbombing,areessentialto
success, for it is the only way to get precision bombing. We must
operatewithaprecisionbombsightandbydaylightrealizingfullwell
thatwewillhavetocometoadecisivecombatwiththeenemyAir
Force.
4. We must have highly developed, highly trained crews working
togetherasateamonthegroundformaintenanceandintheairfor
combat.
5.InordertobringthewarhometoGermanyandJapan,anddeprive
themofthethingsthatareessentialfortheirwaroperations,wemust
carryourstrategicprecisionbombingtokeytargets,deepintheenemy
territory, such as airplane factories, oil refineries, steel mills,
aluminumplants,submarinepens,Navyyards,etc.
6.Inadditiontoourstrategicbombing,wemustcarryouttactical
operations in cooperation with ground troops. For that purpose we
must have fighters, dive bombers, and light bombers for attacking
enemyairfields,communicationscenters,motorconvoys,andtroops.
7. All types of bombing operations must be protected by fighter
airplanes.ThiswasprovedtobeessentialintheBattleofBritain,and
priortothatourownexerciseswithbombersandfightersindicated
thatbombersalonecouldnoteludemodernpursuit,nomatterhowfast
thebomberstraveled.
8.OurAirForcemustbereadyforcombinedoperationswithground
forces,andwiththeNavy.
9.Wemustmaintainourresearchanddevelopmentprogramsin
ordertohavethelatestequipmentitwaspossibletoget,assoonasit
waspossibletogetit.
10. Air power is not made up of airplanes alone. Air power is a
composite of airplanes, air crews, maintenance crews, air bases, air
supply, and sufficient replacements in both planes and crews to
maintainaconstantfightingstrength,regardlessofwhatlossesmay
be inflicted by the enemy. In addition to that, we must have the
backingofalargeaircraftindustryintheUnitedStatestoprovideall
kinds of equipment, and a large training establishment that can
furnishthepersonnelwhencalledupon.
______
Source:ExtractedfromGeneralArnold'sGlobalMission,29091.
ObjectivesofAirPowerEmployment

Theearlytheoristsexploredthewaysinwhichairpowercouldcontributetoor
decidetheoutcomeofwar.Thevarioustheoriesfocusedonpolitical,economic,and
psychologicalobjectives,ontheatermaneuver,andonneutralizingopposingairand
surfaceforces.

Objectivesvaryconsiderablyinwar,andthechoiceofthemdependschieflyupon
theaimsought,whetherthecommandoftheair,paralyzingtheenemy'sarmyand
navy, or shattering the morale of civilians behind the lines. This choice may
thereforebeguidedbyagreatmanyconsiderationsmilitary,political,social,and
psychological.
Douhet
EconomicandPoliticalObjectives
Differencesbetweenairpowertheoriesrevealculturaldifferences.Forexamplea
writerconcernedwithdefendingthenationfromairattackwilltendtounderstand
thecountry'svulnerabilitiesandexpectthesamevulnerabilitiestoapplyinanother
nationeventhoughdifferentculturesmaynotsharethesamepriorities.

The Strategic Theory postulates that airattack on internal enemy vitals can so
depletespecificindustrialandeconomicresources,andonoccasionthewilltoresist,
astomakeacontinuedresistancebytheenemyimpossible.
Toaccomplishthestrategicpurpose,itisnecessarytodestroyonlyasmall
portion of industry, probably not more than a fraction of the total required to
conductmodernwarfareonalargescale.
Itisconceivablethattherewillalwaysbeoneindustry,suchastheoilindustry
inGermany,sonecessarytoallphasesofthenationalwarmakingabilitythatits
destructionwouldbefataltothenation.
"Hap"Arnold

[InWorldWarI]airraidsonbothsidescausedinterruptionstoproductionand
transportationoutofallproportiontotheweightofbombsdropped.
EdwardMeadeEarle

Theflexibilitywhichtherangeofaircraftgivestoairforcespermitsconcentrated
effortagainstaparticulartargetsystemorcomplexwithoutneedforconcentration
againstaparticulartargetofthesystem;hencetheenemyisunabletokeephis
defensesinonegeographicalarea.
AirUniversityManual1,1951

Amodernstateissuchacomplexandinterdependentfabricthatitoffersatarget
highlysensitivetoasuddenandoverwhelmingblowfromtheair.
B.H.LiddellHart

Targetsystemsforairattackmaybebroadlydividedintotwoclasses:pointtargets
andcommondenominators.

1.Keypointsarevulnerablepartsoftheindustrialormilitarystructure,the
destructionofwhichmightwreckthewhole.
2.Commondenominatortargets...railways,canals,powerplants,ironand
steelplants,oil:probablydispersedgeographically,butdestructionofwhichwould
collectivelyaffectthewholewareffort.
AirChiefMarshalSirArthurTedder
Strategic air assault is wasted if it is dissipated piecemeal in sporadic attacks
betweenwhichtheenemyhasanopportunitytoreadjustdefensesorrecuperate.
"Hap"Arnold

The advocates of allout airpower maintain that area destruction and mass
annihilationcaneffectivelydestroythewarpotentialoftheadversaryandlowerhis
strengthandwilltocontinuethestruggle.Itshouldberemembered,however,that
theobjectiveofwaristheexerciseofeffectivecontroloverthepoliticaleliteofthe
statetoenforceapoliticaldecision.
S.T.Das
PsychologicalEffects
Airpowerhashadenormouspsychologicalimpactonthebattlefieldandhasbeen
particularly influential when first introduced. In a war that is primarily
psychological, air power objectives can be selected for maximum impact on a
particulargroupofpeople.

Airpoweris,aboveall,apsychologicalweaponandonlyshortsightedsoldiers,too
battleminded,underratetheimportanceofpsychologicalfactorsinwar.
LiddellHart

Astherewasnodefence,thetwoairshipshoveredlowoverthecity,andonecould
seethegleamoflighteachtimeatrapdooropenedtodropabomb.Themoraleffect
ofthatundisturbedattackwassogreatthateverytimethesirenssounded,inthe
weeksthatfollowed,thousandsofthepopulationstreamedoutintothesurrounding
countryside.
PersonalaccountofaZeppelinraidbyLiddellHart

Everyreliablereportfromthosecapitalstellsofthemountingfearthatseizedupon
thepopulation:thefearofbeingbombedfromtheair.Thefearoftheunknownis
ever more potent than the fear of a known thing which may be weighed and
measuredandresolutelyfaced.
GeorgeFieldingEliot

It is not so much the existence of a military establishment that determines a


people'swilltoresistasitistheirconfidenceinit,aswitnessthecollapseofJapan
while still armed with effective ground forces numbering over three million. In
other words, the will of a nation to resist is not always dependent on armed
strength,butratheruponitsbeliefinitschancesforpoliticalsuccess.
Dale0.Smith

Lossofhope,ratherthanlossoflife,isthefactorthatreallydecideswars,battles,
andeventhesmallestcombats.Thealltimeexperienceofwarfareshowsthatwhen
menreachthepointwheretheysee,orfeel,thatfurthereffortandsacrificecando
nomorethandelaytheend,theycommonlylosethewilltospinitoutandbowto
theinevitable.
LiddellHart

It is improbable that any terrorization of the civil population which could be


achievedbyairattackwouldcompeltheGovernmentofagreatnationtosurrender.
Inourowncase,wehaveseenthecombativespiritofthepeopleroused,andnot
quelled,bytheGermanairraids.Therefore,ourairoffensiveshouldconsistentlybe
directed at striking the bases and communications upon whose structure the
fightingpowerofhisarmiesandfleetsoftheseaandairdepends.
WinstonChurchill,1917

[DuringtheSpanishCivilWar]boththeFascistsandRepublicanswerefightingfor
control of the country and, as a result, the destruction of cities and production
facilitiesbyeitherbelligerentwouldhaveproducedfortheattackeranimmediate
advantageandasubsequentliabilityintheeventofvictorydirectlyproportionalto
thesuccessoftheattack.
"Tooey"Spaatz
ControloftheAir

Withoutareasonabledegreeofairsuperiority,noairforcecaneffectivelyassist
landorseaforcesorstrikeattheenemy'swarpotential.
LordTedder

ThemajorthesisheldbyTrenchardandMitchell,aswellasSeversky,wasthat
commandoftheairisoffirstprioritytoanymilitarysuccessinwar.
Dale0.Smith

Aircontrolcanbeestablishedbysuperiorityinnumbers,bybetteremployment,by
betterequipment,orbyacombinationofthesefactors.
"Tooey"Spaatz

Afterall,thegreatdefenceagainstaerialmenaceistoattacktheenemy'saircraft
asnearaspossibletotheirpointofdeparture.
WinstonChurchill,memoof5September1914, proposingacombined
offensiveanddefensivecounteraircampaign

After Big Week, Spaatz, who commanded the United States strategic air forces,
sensedthatairsuperiorityhadbeenwrenchedfromtheenemy.Inthespaceofsix
days,massiveanddeeppenetrationshadbeenmadetofifteenlargeindustrialareas
bysomesixthousandbombers.Alliedlosseswerefarlessthanhadbeenexpected,
amountingtoaboutsixpercentforthesixdaybattle.Asaconsequence,Allied
moralesoaredwhileenemymoraleplummeted.
Dale0.Smith

Thefirstandabsoluterequirementofstrategicairpowerinthiswarwascontrolof
theairinordertocarryoutsustainedoperationswithoutprohibitivelosses.
"Tooey"Spaatz

Onegeneralinferencetobedrawnhasbeenthatintwentiethcenturywar,defeat
willalmostalwaysbeavoided(andoutrightvictorylikelygained)bythesidethat
hassecuredairsuperiority.Indeed,amorecomprehensiveperusalwouldprobably
showthatvirtuallytheonlyexceptionsconcerncounterinsurgencywarfare.
NevilleBrown

The future battle on the ground will bepreceded by battle in the air. This will
determine which of the contestants has to suffer operational and tactical
disadvantages and be forced throughout the battle into adopting compromise
solutions.
GermanGenErwinRommel
To use a fighter as a fighterbomber when the strength of the fighter arm is
inadequatetoachieveairsuperiorityisputtingthecartbeforethehorse.
AdolfGalland
AirPowerandManeuver

TheprimaryobjectiveofAlliedforcesintheSouthwestPacificistoadvanceourown
networkofairbasesdeepintotheJapaneseperimeter.
"Hap"Arnold

Movement is the essence of strategy. This is true even though strategy is not
confinedtothemilitaryart:theimplementationofeverypoliticaldecisionrequires
movement.Itmaybemessagesthatmove,ormen,ormoney,ormunitions.
StephenB.Jones

Airstrategybeginswithairplaneranges.Airplanerangesdeterminethelocationof
bases.Theproximitytothetargetofthebasesunderone'scontrolfixestheweight
andrhythmoftheattack.
"Tooey"Spaatz

TheAmericans,withminimumlosses,attackedandseizedarelativelyweakarea,
constructedairfields,andthenproceededtocutthesupplylinestotroopsinthat
area.TheJapaneseArmypreferreddirectassault,afterGermanfashion,butthe
Americansflowedintoourweakerpointsandsubmergedus,justaswaterseeksthe
weakestentrytosinkaship.Werespectedthistypeofstrategyforitsbrilliance
becauseitgainedthemostwhilelosingtheleast.
LtColMatsuichiIino,JapaneseEighthAreaArmy

Strangeasitmayseem,theAirForce,exceptintheair,istheleastmobileofallthe
Services.Asquadroncanreachitsdestinationinafewhours,butitsestablishment,
depots,fuel,spareparts,andworkshopstakemanyweeks,andevenmonths,to
develop.
WinstonChurchill

When the United States forces first landed in North Africa, there were nine
airdromesthatourplanescoulduse.Withinafewmonthstherewereahundred.
Mud,andlaterdust,weretheworstproblems.WiththeAxisontherun,airfields
werebuiltevenfaster.Onerequestwasreceivedtobuildseveralairfieldsinthe
Sbeitlasector;seventytwohourslater,allwereinuse.
"Hap"Arnold

Ihadocularproofoftheadvantagetobederivedfromsuchobservations....An
observerisdoubtlessmoreathiseaseinaclocktowerthaninafrailbasketfloating
inmidair,butsteeplesarenotalwaysathandinthevicinityofbattlefieldsand
theycannotbetransportedatpleasure.
HenriJomini
LORDTEDDER'SPRINCIPLESOFAIRWARFARE

InJune1942aftertheBritishvictoryatElAlamein,Air
MarshalLordTedderenunciatedteninviolablerulesofairpower.
TheseprinciplesbecamethefoundationuponwhichAlliedtactical
airdoctrinewouldevolveattheCasablancaConferenceinJanuary
1943.Thesetenprincipleswere
1.Airpowermustbeindependentoflandandseaforces.
2.TheArmyHeadquartersinthefieldandtheAirHeadquarters
mustbeadjacenttoeachother.Thiscloseproximitywillfacilitate
communicationandcooperationbetweenthetwoservices.
3.Everynighttheairandgroundcommandersmustholdajoint
staffmeetingtohashoverproblemsanddecidetomorrow'sprogram.
Theclose airsupport and airinterdictioncampaigns canthen be
integrated into the ground commander's overall concept of
operations.
4.Radar is very important to air and land forces. It should be
locatedonairfieldssothatfighterswillnotbecaughtontheground
anddestroyedbyasurpriseenemyattack.
5.Thefighterplaneisthebasicweaponofanairforce.Itshould
beusedforthefollowingmissionsinthispriority:
a.Fightersweepstocleartheenemyoutofthesky.
b.Escortforlightandmediumbombers.
c.Interceptionofenemyaircraft.
d.AsafighterbombertoprovideCASforgroundforces.
6. Always assure quick communications between the Air
Headquarters and the Unit Commander. Air power is based on
beingattherightspotatthepropertimetodestroytheenemyair
andlandforces.Quickcommunicationsareessentialtothisflexible
responsebyaircraft.
7.TheentireairforceshouldbecommandedfromanAdvanced
Headquarterslocatedclosetothefrontlines.
8. Air power must have a simplified chain of command.
Commanders should restrict the number of people who report to
them.Thesemenshouldbedirectlyresponsibleforairoperations.
DuringtheNorthAfricancampaigns,LordTedderhadonlysixmen
reportdirectlytohim.Thiswayhismindwasnotbotheredbytrivial
matters. These responsibilities he delegated to his key staff
members.
9.Intelligenceisveryimportanttoanairorgroundcampaign.He
hadtohavetheinformationcominginconstantly,rightwherehe
couldseeit.HisIntelligenceandOperationsofficerssatatadjoining
desksandsharedphonelinestotheunits.SincetheA2andA3sat
sidebyside,LordTeddercouldwalkinandgetanyinformationhe
wanted,rightonthespot.
10. Mobility is the key to successful air operations. He believed
unitsshouldbebrokendown,eventothesquadronlevel,ina50/50
ratioeachdividedintotwoparts,witheachpartselfmaintainingin
all departments. If independent operations were needed, he
employedaleapfrogtechnique.Thefirstelementwoulddeployto
thefront;whenthenextdeploymentoccurredthesecondunitwould
leap frog past the first unit to the front lines. The most forward
element would then become the command element to control the
battle.Healsobelievedthatunitsshouldbeabletomovewithin
fourhoursandshoulddeploytosupportitsoperationsinisolation
forthreetofourdays.

Theseprincipleswereincorporatedintothetraininganddoctrineof
eachNinthAirForceunitbyGeneralsBreretonandQuesada.The
BritishArmyandRoyalAirForcealsoincorporatedtheseideasinto
theirdoctrineafterElAlameinin1942.MuchoftheAlliedtactical
airforcesuccesssprangfromLordTedder'stencrucial airpower
principles.
InterdictionandAttrition
Airpowerhasconsistentlydemonstrateditsadvantagesinattackingsurface
forces at a time and place of choice. This has permitted disruption, attrition,
exhaustion,defeatindetail,demoralization,andoccasionallyannihilation.Equally
important,airpowerhascreatedconditionsthathelpedcooperatingsurfaceforcesto
fightbetter,magnifyingthepayofffortheoperationalinvestment,sotospeak.

Tohavecommandoftheairmeanstobeabletocutanenemy'sarmyandnavyoff
fromtheirbasesofoperationandnullifytheirchancesofwinningthewar.
Douhet

Itisinfrequentlyclaimedthatthemaintenanceofafavorablesituationintheairis
theprincipaltaskofbothbombersandfightersinthefield.Thisisdefinitelynotso.
Airsuperiorityisonlyameanstoanend.Theobjectofairsuperiorityisthecontrol
ofaircommunications,firstlyforourownuseandsecondlytodenyittotheenemy.
Andtheusewerequireisto"conductoperationsagainstanenemy";andthis,ina
landcampaign,meanstobreakdowntheresistanceoftheenemyarmy.
J.C.Slessor

Thegreatestsecretofwarandthemasterpieceofaskillfulgeneralistostarvehis
enemy.
FredericktheGreat

Theideathatsuperiorairpowercaninsomewaybeasubstituteforhardslogging
andprofessionalskillonthegroundisbeguilingbutillusory.Airsupportcanbeof
immense value to an army; it may sometimes be its salvation. But armies can
fightandnotonlydefensivelyinthefaceofalmosttotalairsuperiority.
J.C.Slessor

Forourairoffensivetoattainitsfulleffect,itisnecessarythatourgroundoffensive
shouldbeofacharactertothrowthegreatestpossiblestrainupontheenemy's
communications
WinstonChurchill,1917

Air interdiction and ground maneuver must be synchronized so that each


complementsandreinforcestheother.Synchronizationisimportantbecauseitcan
createadilemmafortheenemythathasnosatisfactoryanswer.Hisdilemmais
this: if he attempts to counter ground maneuver by moving rapidly, he exposes
himselftounacceptablelossesfromairinterdiction;yetifheemploysmeasuresthat
areeffectiveatreducinglossescausedbyairinterdiction,hethencannotmaneuver
fastenoughtocounterthegroundcomponentofthecampaign.
PriceT.Bingham

Iftheenemyhasairsupremacyandmakesfulluseofit,thenone'sowncommandis
forcedtosufferthefollowinglimitationsanddisadvantages:
Byusinghisstrategicairforce,theenemycanstrangleone'ssupplies,especially
iftheyhavetobecarriedacrossthesea.
Theenemycanwagethebattleofattritionfromtheair.
Intensive exploitation by the enemy of his air superiority gives rise to far
reachingtacticallimitationsforone'sowncommand.
ErwinRommel

TheargumenthasbeenadvancedthattheAirForceshouldbeconcernedwithland
objectives,andtheNavywithobjectivesonandoverthewater.Thatdistinctionis
to deny the peculiar quality of the air medium, the third dimension. The air is
indivisible;itcoverslandandsea.
"Tooey"Spaatz

Controloftheairwasessentialtoeverymajormilitaryoperation.Controloftheair
allowedsurfacevesselstosailtheseasasfarasthatcontrolextended,evenwithin
range of enemy landbased airplanes. Control of the air permitted amphibious
landings at any point where that control could be assured. Control of the air
permittedcloseairsupporttogroundforces,theeffectivenessofwhichwasdecisive
whereverfullyemployed.Controloftheairoverlinesofcommunications[blocked
enemyinterdictionofthem]andpreservedthemtoourselves.Controloftheairover
theJapanesehomeislandspermittedthedestructionbylongrangebombersofsuch
of her industries and cities as we chose to attack. The first objective of all
commanders in the Pacific war, whether ground, sea or air, whether American,
AlliedorJapanese,wastoassurecontroloftheair.
OrvilA.Anderson

Airpower has become predominant, both as a deterrent to war, andin the


eventualityofwarasthedevastatingforce todestroy an enemy's potential and
fatallyunderminehiswilltowagewar.
OmarBradley
Persistence

Theguidingprincipleofbombingactionsshouldbethis:theobjectivemustbe
destroyedcompletelyinoneattack,makingfurtherattackonthesametarget
unnecessary.
Douhet

Douhetexpressedanidealthathasrarelybeenpossible.

Airbattleisnotdecidedinafewgreatclashesbutoveralongperiodoftimewhen
attritionanddiscouragementeventuallycauseonesidetoavoidtheinvadingair
force.
Dale0.Smith

Thisprocessofimposingyourwillonanenemy,ofreducinghisabilitytoresistto
thebreakingpoint,israrelyinanywaragainstadeterminedfoeaquickorsimple
one. Against a tough foe, only the sustained application of military forces, not
sporadicandintermittentattack,iseffective.
HansonBaldwin
AirPowerProphecy:ItsHazards

Inordertoassureanadequatenationaldefense,itisnecessaryandsufficientto
beinapositionincaseofwartoconquerthecommandoftheair.
Douhet

Thebomberwillalwaysgetthrough.
StanleyBaldwin

Enginesofwarhavelongsincereachedtheirlimits,andIseenofurtherhopeofany
improvementintheart.
Frontinus,90A.D.

FewpeoplewhoknowtheworkofLangley,Lilienthal,Pilcher,MaximandChanute
butwillbeinclinedtobelievethatlongbeforetheyear2000A.D.,andveryprobably
before1950,asuccessfulaeroplanewillhavesoaredandcomehomesafeandsound.
H.G.Wells,1901

War

TheNatureofWar...................................................................................................55

ClausewitzonPolicyandWar................................................................................57

WarasArtandScience...........................................................................................59

TimeandSpace........................................................................................................62

Strategy.....................................................................................................................66

Deterrence................................................................................................................70

Friction!War'sResistantMedium..........................................................................75

OilsfortheFrictionofWar.....................................................................................77

UncertaintyandtheArtofCircumstances.............................................................80
TheNatureofWar

Wecangettoknowwarinthesamewaywecangettoknowthesurfaceofthe
earth:ifwarisconsideredasahugeexpanseofterrain,wecanseeonlysmallpieces
oftheterrainthroughpersonalexperience.Greatmilitarythinkerswhospenttheir
livesstudyingwaronlyprovideusmapsoftheterraintheycovered.Detailedmaps
ofspecificfeaturesforexample,aircombatcoveronlyportionsoftheterrain.The
broadmapsofwriterssuchasSunTzucanonlyshowuswar'sbigfeatures.It's
important,then,tokeepinmindthatwecanstudyothers'maps,buttheterrainof
wardefiesperfectrepresentation.

Fivegreatenemiestopeaceinhabitwithusavarice,ambition,envy,anger,and
pride.Ifthoseenemiesweretobebanished,weshouldinfalliblyenjoyperpetual
peace.
Petrarch

CAUTION

Itisapparentlynotpossibleforanotherrealwaramongthenationsof
Europetotakeplace.
DavidStarrJordan,1914

Weliveinaworldwhereemergenciesarealwayspossible,andoursurvivalmay
dependonourcapacitytomeetemergencies.Havingsaidthat,itisnecessaryalso
tosaythatemergencymeasureshowevergoodfortheemergencydonotmakegood
permanentpolicies.Emergencymeasuresarecostly,theyaresuperficial,andthey
implythattheenemyhastheinitiative.
JohnFosterDulles

Soldiersusuallyareclosestudentsoftactics,butrarelyaretheystudentsof
strategyandpracticallyneverofwar.
BernardBrodie

Warispartoftheintercourseofthehumanrace.
Waristheprovinceofdanger,andthereforecourageaboveallthingsisthefirst
qualityofthewarrior.
Waristheprovinceofphysicalexertionandsuffering.
Waristheprovinceofuncertainty.Waristheprovinceoffriction.
Wardemandsresolution,firmness,andstaunchness.
ChaptertitlestoErnestHemingway'sMenatWar,quotingClausewitz
ClausewitzonPolicyandWar

Nowthefirst,thegrandest,andmostdecisiveactofjudgmentwhichtheStatesman
andGeneralexercisesisrightlytounderstandinthisrespectthewarinwhichhe
engages,nottotakeitforsomething,orwishtomakeofitsomething,whichbythe
natureofitsrelationsitisimpossibleforittobe.

Theultimateobjectofourwars,thepoliticalone,isnotalwaysquiteasimpleone.

Thegreatpointistokeeptheoverrulingrelationsofbothpartiesinview.Outof
themacertaincenterofgravity,acenterofpowerandmovement,willformitself,
onwhichalldepends.

Truthaloneisbutaweakmotiveofactionwithmen,andhencethereisalwaysa
greatdifferencebetweenknowingandaction,betweenscienceandart.

Where no powerful motives press and drive, cabinets will not risk much in the
game. The more war becomes in this manner devitalized so much the more its
theorybecomesdestituteofthenecessaryfirmpivotsandbuttressesforreasoning.

Wherejudgmentbegins,thereartbegins.
Clausewitz
WarasArtandScience

Theterrainofwarisgenerallymappedusingoneoftwo"projections":thoseofart
andscience.Aswithothermaps,detailedstudyofbothprojectionsleadstomore
completeunderstandingoftheterrain.

Thescienceofwar(knowledge).

Theartofwar(applicationofknowledge).
WallaceP.FranzandHarryG.Summers,notesinArmyWarCollege,Artof
WarColloquiumText

Itisabsolutelytrueinwar,wereotherthingsequal,thatnumberswhethermen,
shells,bombs,etc.wouldbesupreme.Yetitisalsoabsolutelytruethatotherthings
areneverequalandcanneverbeequal.Thereisalwaysadifference,anditisthe
differenceswhichbybegging todiffersofrequentlythrowallcalculationstothe
winds.
J.F.C.Fuller

WarbelongsnottotheprovinceofArtsandSciences,buttotheprovinceofsocial
life.Itisaconflictofgreatinterests,whichissettledbybloodshed,andonlyinthat
isitdifferentfromothers.Itwouldbebetter,insteadofcomparingitwithanyArt,
tolikenittobusinesscompetition,whichisalsoaconflictofhumaninterestsand
activities;anditisstillmorelikeStatepolicy,which,again,canbelookeduponasa
kindofbusinesscompetitiononagreatscale.
Clausewitz

Allthenumerousapplicationsofphysics,chemistry,engineering,etc.,whichmake
upthemodernarsenalareinfactatthemercyofhumans,thesoldierswhouseor
directthem.
S.T.Das

War involves in its progress such a train of unforeseen and unsupposed


circumstancesthatnohumanwisdomcancalculatetheend.Ithasbutonething
certain,andthatistoincreasetaxes.
ThomasPaine

Warandtruthhaveafundamentalincompatibility.Thedevotiontosecrecyinthe
interests of the military machine largely explains why, throughout history, its
operationscommonlyappearinretrospectthemostuncertainandleastefficientof
humanactivities.
LiddellHart

IfIalwaysappearprepared,itisbecausebeforeenteringonanundertaking,Ihave
meditatedforlongandhaveforeseenwhatmayoccur.Itisnotgeniuswhichreveals
to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by
others;itisthoughtandpreparation.
Napoleon

Thereisnoothersciencewherejudgmentsaretestedinbloodandansweredinthe
servitudeofthedefeated,wheretheacknowledgedauthorityistheleaderwhohas
wonorwhoinstillsconfidencethathecanwin.
BernardBrodie

War,likemostthings,isasciencetobeacquiredandperfectedbydiligence,by
perseverance,bytime,andbypractice.
AlexanderHamilton

Inwar,situationsaretheproductsofmutuallyexclusiveandincompatiblewills.
Thus,theyarepracticallyalwaysfluid
S.B.Griffith
TimeandSpace

Timeisnecessarytobothbelligerents,...theonlyquestionis:whichofthetwo,
judgingbyhisposition,hasmostreasontoexpectspecialadvantagesfromtime?
Clausewitz

Whenyouengageinactualfighting,ifvictoryislongincoming,themen'sweapons
willgrowdullandtheirardourdampened.Again,ifthecampaignisprotractedthe
resourcesoftheStatewillnotbeequaltothestrain.Thus,thoughwehaveheardof
stupidhasteinwar,clevernesshasneverbeenassociatedwithlongdelays.Thereis
noinstanceofacountryhavingbenefittedfromprolongedwarfare.
SunTzu

Timeistheconditiontobewontodefeattheenemy.Timeranksfirstamongthe
threefactorsnecessaryforvictory,comingbeforeterrainandsupportofthepeople.
Onlywithtimecanwedefeattheenemy.
HoChiMinh

Spaceinwhichtomaneuverintheair,unlikefightingonlandorsea,ispractically
unlimited.
J.E.("Johnnie")Johnson

Attheoutsetofawar,timeisthesupremefactor.Donotletusforgetthatthe
aggressorisalsoconcernedwiththetimefactor;heisready,otherwisehewouldnot
haveprovokedarmedconflict;heinevitablyhopesandplansforaquickdecision,
sincenoonewouldwishforalongwarifitcouldbeavoided;moreoverhewantsa
decision before his opponent has had time to "turn his capacity into the new
activitieswhichwarcallsfor."
LordTedder

Gosir,gallop,anddon'tforgetthattheworldwasmadeinsixdays.Youcanaskme
foranythingyoulike,excepttime.
Napoleon

Agoodplanexecutednowisbetterthanaperfectplannextweek.
GeorgeS.Patton

Inpeacetime,differencesofopinionmaybeallowedtogobytheboardwithout
greatharmbeingdone....Inwarthecaseisdifferentchickensremorselesslyand
rapidlycomehometoroost,errorscanseldomberectified(theenemywillseeto
that)andmen'slivesareatstake.
FieldMarshalSirWilliamRobertson
Rapidityistheessenceofwar.
SunTzu

Thelastwarisnotmodern,itisoutofdate.
Atthesametimetherearefactorsthatdonotchange,oronlychangevery
slowly.Geographydoesnotchangethoughitseffectonmilitaryoperationsmaybe
modified by technical changes. Human nature does not change, and national
characteristicsandtemperamentschangebutslowly.Economicfactors,generally
speaking,changeslowly.
LordTedder

But there is one element in relation to the flying machine that we are not
producing,thatwecannotproduceinanemergency,andthatisthemen.Wecan
producemachinesbutnottheaviators.Thattakestime.
AlexanderGrahamBell

Strategyistheartofmakinguseoftimeandspace.Spacewecanrecover;losttime,
never.
Napoleon

He who can move twice as fast as his opponent doubles his operative time and
therebyhalvesthatofhisopponent.
J.F.C.Fuller

Timewashisconstantally;hecapitalizedeverymoment,neverponderedonit,and
therebyachievedhisendsbeforeothershadsettledontheirmeans.
J.F.C.FullerdescribingAlexandertheGreat
Strategy

Thecomplexitiesofwarcontinuetoincreasewithtechnicaldevelopments.Atthe
broadest levels of military thought, "ideal" solutions to military problems are
constrained by the realities of political checks and balances, alliances, popular
thought and feeling, and competing demands for resources. Detailed study of
strategyplansandalternativescreatestheabilitytoperceiveopportunitieswhere
othersseeonlyproblems.

Strategyistheemploymentofbattletogaintheendinwar;itmustthereforegive
anaimtothewholemilitaryaction,whichmustbeinaccordancewiththeobjectof
thewar;inotherwords,strategyformstheplanofthewar.
Clausewitz

Tactics are concerned with doing the job "right," higher levels of strategy are
concernedwithdoingthe"right"job.
DennisM.DrewandDonaldM.Snow

Whilethehorizonofstrategyisboundedbywar,grandstrategylooksbeyondthe
wartothesubsequentpeace.
LiddellHart

ThroughouthislifeAlexanderconsistentlysubordinatedstrategytopolicy,whichis
theessenceofgrandstrategy.
J.F.C.Fuller

Thestrategistishewhoalwayskeepstheobjectiveofthewarinsightandthe
objectiveofthewarisnevermilitaryandisalwayspolitical.
AlfredThayerMahan

Thetwinproblemsofmodernwarfare:
Howtopersuadetheadversarytocometotermswithoutinflictingonhimsuch
severedamageastoprejudiceallchancesofsubsequentstabilityandpeace?
Underwhatcircumstancescanarmedforcebeused,intheonlywayinwhichit
canbelegitimatetouseit,toensurealastingandstablepeace?
MichaelHoward

Thesoundeststrategyistopostponeoperationsuntilthemoraldisintegrationofthe
enemyrendersthedeliveryofthemortalblowbothpossibleandeasy.
VladimirI.Lenin
Trueeconomyofforceisusingtheindirectapproachtoeffectapsychologicaldefeat
withoutengaginginactualcombat.
LiddellHart

Inwarthevictoriousstrategistseeksbattleafterthevictoryhasbeenwon,whereas
hewhoisdestinedtodefeatfirstfightsandafterwardslookstovictory.
SunTzu

Wemustperceivethenecessityofeverywarbeinglookeduponasawholefromthe
veryoutset,andthatattheveryfirststepforwardthecommandershouldhavethe
endinviewtowhicheverylinemustconverge.
Clausewitz

InJapantherewasnothingthatcouldbecalledgrandormilitarystrategyuntila
shorttimebeforetheoutbreakofWorldWarII.Therewaslittlecorrelationbetween
hernationaldefensetheoryandthestrategicplansofthearmyandthenavy.In
[myopinionthis]eventuallyresultedinthecalamityofJapanenteringintoher
disastrouswar.
JapanesehistorianToshiyukiYokoi;itdeservesmentionthatJapan'sarmy
andnavalstrategieswerenotwellcoordinated

Generallyinwarthebestpolicyistotakeastateintact;toruinitisinferiortothis.
Tocapture the enemy's armyisbetter thantodestroy it.Tosubduethe enemy
withoutfightingistheacmeofskill.Thus,whatisofextremeimportanceinwaris
toattacktheenemy'sstrategy;nextbestistodisrupthisalliances,nextbestisto
attackhisforces.Theworstpolicyistoattackhiscities;dosoonlywhenthereisno
alternative.
SunTzu

Wherethestrategistisempoweredtoseekamilitarydecision,hisresponsibilityis
toseekitunderthemostadvantageouscircumstancesinordertoproducethemost
profitable result. Hence his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a
strategicsituationsoadvantageousthatifitdoesnotofitselfproducethedecision,
itscontinuationbybattleissuretoachievethis.
LiddellHart

1. Hewillwinwhoknowswhentofightandwhennottofight.
2. Hewillwinwhoknowshowtohandlebothsuperiorandinferiorforces.
3. Hewillwinwhosearmyisanimatedbythesamespiritthroughoutalltheranks.
4. Hewillwinwho,preparedhimself,waitstotaketheenemyunprepared.
5. He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the
sovereign.
Victoryliesintheknowledgeofthesefivepoints.
SunTzu
Deterrence

Tobepreparedforwarisoneofthemosteffectualmeansofpreservingpeace.
GeorgeWashington

Theexpensesrequiredtopreventawararemuchlighterthanthosethatwill,ifnot
prevented.beabsolutelynecessarytomaintainit.
BenjaminFranklin

It is customary in democratic countries to deplore expenditure on armament as


conflictingwiththerequirementsofthesocialservices.Thereisatendencytoforget
thatthemostimportantsocialservicethatagovernmentcandoforitspeopleisto
keepthemaliveandfree.
J.C.Slessor

Ifanationvaluesanythingmorethanfreedom,itwilllosethatfreedom;andthe
ironyofitisthatifitiscomfortormoneythatitvaluesmore,itwilllosethat,too.
SomersetMaugham

Theresponsibilitiesofanofficerarequiteanalogoustothoseofapolicemanora
fireman.Thebetterheperformshisdailytask,thelessfrequentlydoeshehaveto
takedirectaction.
GeorgePatton

ThegreatlessontobelearnedinthebatteredtownsofEnglandandtheruined
citiesofGermanyisthatthebestwaytowinawaristopreventitfromoccurring.
Thatmustbetheultimateendtowhichourbesteffortsaredevoted.Ithasbeen
suggestedandwiselysothatthisobjectiveiswellservedbyinsuringthestrength
andsecurityoftheUnitedStates.TheUnitedStateswasfoundedandhassince
lived upon principles of tolerance, freedom, and goodwill at home and abroad.
Strengthbasedontheseprinciplesisnothreattoworldpeace.Preventionofwar
willnotcomefromneglectofstrengthorlackofforesightoralertnessonourpart.
Those who contemplate evil and aggression find encouragement in such neglect.
Hitlerreliedheavilyuponit.
USStrategicBombingSurvey,SummaryReport(Europe)

Weretherea strategicexchange inwhich American forces respondedpoorly, for


whateverreason,Americawouldbedestroyedasacivilizationandsowouldthe
SovietUnion.Ifourforcesrespondedperfectly,thentheresultwouldbeAmerica
wouldbedestroyedasacivilizedsociety,andsowouldtheSovietUnion.Theresult
of a nuclear war, regardless of the inefficiency of either side in executing their
attack, is massive destruction of both societies. We must build a wider
understandingoftheimportanceofdeterrenceandthelogicofbuildingforcesthat
detereffectively...itisamajorundertaking.Itwilltakeyears.
LarryWelch

Ifwearelivinginaworldwhereeithersidecanmakeasurpriseattackuponthe
otherwhichdestroysthelatter'scapabilitytomakeameaningfulretaliation,thenit
makessensetobetriggerhappywithone'sstrategicairpower.Butif,ontheother
hand,thesituationissuchthatneithersidecanhopetoeliminatetheretaliatory
poweroftheother,thatrestraintwhichwassuicidalinonesituationnowbecomes
prudence,anditistriggerhappinessthatbecomessuicidal.
BernardBrodie

Americamustmaintainastateofreadinessfordefenseandcounterattack.Thisis
notjustforthesakeofbeingprepared.Ofequalorgreaterimportanceisthefact
thatthevisibilityofourpreparednesswilldeterattacksagainstus.
CurtisE.LeMay

Forcesthatcannotwinwillnotdeter.
NathanF.Twining

Theonlywaranationcanreallywinistheonethatneverstarts.
HoytVandenberg

Deterrenceisnotjustaircraftonalertandmissilesinthesilos.Itisnotdefinedby
thesizeofthedefensebudget.Itisaproductofbothcapabilityandcredibility.
JeromeF.O'Malley

Deterrence now means something as a strategic policy only when we are fairly
confident that theretaliatory instrument onwhich it relieswill not becalled to
functionatall.Nevertheless,thatinstrumenthastobemaintainedatahighpitch
ofefficiencyandreadinessandconstantlyimproved,whichcanbedoneonlyata
high cost to the community and great dedication on the part of the personnel
directlyinvolved.
BernardBrodie

WARNING

Anation,regardlessofitsprotestations,ifitfeelsthatits
national existence is threatened and that it is losing a
war,willturntoanyweaponthatitcanuse.
WalterBedellSmith

There will always be time enough to die; like a drowning man who will clutch
instinctivelyatastraw,itisthenaturallawofthemoralworldthatanationthat
findsitselfonthebrinkofanabysswilltrytosaveitselfbyanymeans.
Clausewitz

Whenyousurroundanarmy,leaveanoutletfree.Donotpressadesperatefoetoo
hard.
SunTzu
Friction,War'sResistantMedium

Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These
difficultiesaccumulateandproduceafrictionwhichnomancanimagineexactly
whohasnotseenwar.
Clausewitz

Ifonehasneverpersonallyexperiencedwar,onecannotunderstandinwhatthe
difficultiesconstantlymentionedreallyconsist,norwhyacommandershouldneed
anybrillianceandexceptionalability.
Clausewitz

Onlythestudyofmilitaryhistoryiscapableofgivingthosewhohavenoexperience
oftheirownaclearpictureofwhatIhavejustcalledthefrictionofthewhole
machine.
Clausewitz

Itisadoctrineofwarnottoassumetheenemywillnotcome,butrathertorelyon
one'sreadinesstomeethim;nottopresumethathewillnotattack,butratherto
makeone'sselfinvincible.
SunTzu

Thereisnosecurityonthisearth;thereisonlyopportunity.
DouglasMacArthur

Wariscomposedofnothingbutaccidents,andthoughholdingtogeneralprinciples,
ageneralshouldneverlosesightofeverythingtoenablehimtoprofitfromthese
accidents;thatisthemarkofgenius.
Napoleon

Waristherealmofuncertainty;threequartersofthefactorsonwhichactioninwar
is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and
discriminatingjudgmentiscalledfor:askilledintelligencetoscentoutthetruth.
Clausewitz

Clausewitzframedthenotionoffrictioninwarinchapter7,book1,ofOnWar.
Thisthreepagelongchapterisessentialreadingforanymilitaryprofessional.
OilsfortheFrictionofWar

Nowisthere,then,nokindofoilwhichiscapableofdiminishingthisfriction?Only
one,andthatoneisnotalwaysavailableatthewilloftheCommanderorhisArmy.
ItisthehabituationofanArmytoWar.
Clausewitz

Clausewitzcorrectedthenotionthathabituationwasthesoleremedyforthe
friction of war by prescribing leadership as a second remedy. Other remedies
include: understanding war's uncertainty, professional training, exercises that
include friction, war games and thought exercises, maintaining alternatives,
maintainingreserves,plansthatprovideroomforfrictionalresults,mentalagility,
organizational agility, clarity of purpose, judicious use of the initiative, and the
compoundlubricantsofmentalclarity,originality,discipline,anddoctrine.

Ifonecanincreasethefogandfrictionencounteredbytheenemy,themorelikelyit
is that the enemy will be defeated. Flexible plans with alternative objectives,
counterintelligence, disinformation deception, concealment, and campaigns to
disrupt theenemy...cannotonlyleadtoserious errors bytheenemyonthe
battlefield,butcanalsocauseconfusionanduncertaintythatlowersmorale,saps
aggressiveness,causestentativeness,andunderminesinitiative.
DennisDrewandDonaldSnow

The friction of war stems from the magnified results of fundamental


uncertainties.

Youwillusuallyfindthattheenemyhasthreecoursesopentohim,andofthesehe
willadoptthefourth.
Moltke,TheElder

Forwantofanail,theshoewaslost;
Forwantofashoe,thehorsewaslost;
Forwantofahorse,theriderwaslost;
Forwantofarider,thebattlewaslost.
BenjaminFranklin

Thetiniestdeviationsatthebeginningofamotioncanleadtohugedifferencesat
latertimesinotherwords,minisculecausescanproduceenormouseffectsaftera
certaintimeinterval.Ofcourseweknowfromeverydaylifethatthisisoccasionally
thecase;theinvestigationofdynamicalsystemshasshownusthatthisistypicalof
naturalprocesses.
GertEilenberger

Wars spring from unseen and generally insignificant causes, the first outbreak
beingoftenbutanexplosionofanger.
Thucydides

Inwar,importanteventsresultfromtrivialcauses.
JuliusCaesar

A battle sometimes decides everything; and sometimes the most trifling thing
decidesthefateofabattle.
Napoleon

In wars throughout history, events have generally proved the prehostilities


calculationsofbothsides,victoraswellasloser,tohavebeenseriouslywrong.
BernardBrodie

Allactioninwarisdirectedonprobable,notcertain,results.Whateveriswanting
incertaintymustalwaysbelefttofate,orchance,callitwhichyouwill.Wemay
demandthatwhatissoleftshouldbeaslittleaspossible,butonlyinrelationtothe
particularcasethatis,aslittleaspossibleinthisonecase,butnotthatthecasein
which the least is left to chance is always to be preferred. That would be an
enormous error. There are cases in which the greatest daring is the greatest
wisdom.
Clausewitz
UncertaintyandtheArtofCircumstances

Themostimportantthingistohaveaflexibleapproach....Thetruthisnoone
knowsexactlywhatairfightingwillbelikeinthefuture.Wecan'tsayanythingwill
stayasitis,butwealsocan'tbesurethefuturewillconformtoparticulartheories,
whichsooften,betweenthewars,haveprovedwrong.
RobinOlds

To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to


refrainfromattackinganarmydrawnupincalmandconfidentarraythisisthe
artofstudyingcircumstances.
SunTzu

Donotswallowabaitofferedbytheenemy.
SunTzu

Inhismanybattleshistacticalgeniusisapparentinthelightninglikespeedwith
whichheadaptedhisactionstonovelcircumstances.
J.F.C.FulleronAlexandertheGreat

Whetherornotairpower,despitebeingcastinanancillaryrole,shouldattemptto
pursueanindependentstrategyconformingtoitsownconceptionoftheneedofthe
forces it is supporting is a big question which ought to be left to specialists. It
involves theoldandmuchdebatedquestion ofclosesupport versus interdiction,
aboutwhichtherehasbeenmuchdoctrinaireargument.TheKoreanexperienceand
the campaigns of World War II suggest that the issue is affected most by the
circumstancesoftheoccasion.
BernardBrodie

Thecarryingoutofaplan,fromitsverybeginningtotheconclusionofanoperation,
is another process of knowing the situation; i.e., the process of putting it into
practice. In this process, there is need to examine anew whether the plan
correspondswiththeactualities.Iftheplandoesnotcorrespondordoesnotfully
correspond with them, then we must, according to fresh knowledge, form new
judgmentsandmakenewdecisionstomodifytheoriginalplaninordertomeetthe
newsituation.
MaoTsetung

Itisaboveallnecessarythatageneral shouldadoptaroleproportionatetohis
capacity, a plan that he feels himself able to follow out methodically amidst
dangers,surprise,friction,accidentsofallsorts.
JeanColin
Thetruthsofwarareabsolute,buttheprinciplesgoverningtheirapplicationhave
tobededucedoneachoccasionfromthecircumstances,whicharealwaysdifferent.
WinstonChurchill

One falls into a feeling of security by mental laziness and through lack of
calculationconcerningtheintentionsoftheenemy.
Toproceedproperlyitisnecessarytoputoneselfinhisplaceandsay:What
would I do if I were the enemy? What project would I form? Make as many as
possibleoftheseprojects,examinethemall,andaboveallreflectonthemeansto
avertthem.Butdonotletthesecalculationsmakeyoutimid.Circumspectionis
goodonlyuptoacertainpoint.
FredericktheGreat
Technology

Impact.......................................................................................................................85

EffectsofIntroducingTechnology.........................................................................89

CumulativeEffectsofTechnicalChanges..............................................................91

TechnologyandNumbers.......................................................................................93

ReactionstoTechnology.........................................................................................95
Impact

Victorysmilesuponthosewhoanticipatethechangesinthecharacterofwar,not
uponthosewhowaittoadaptthemselvesafterthechangesoccur.
Douhet

In this increasingly competitive, often hostile and rapidly changing world,


Americansseemtohaveonlyonerealchoice.Clearlyournationalwellbeingcannot
bebasedonunlimitedrawmaterialsoronunlimitedmanpowerandcheaplabor.
Ratheritmustbebasedonourabilitytomultiplyandenhancethelimitednatural
andhumanresourceswedohave.Technologythusappearstoofferusourplacein
thesunthemeanstoinsureoursecurityandeconomicvitality.
DrMalcolmCurrie

Yettherearedangersinallowingoneselftobecomemesmerizedbytechnological
promise.Itisoftenmucheasiertomaketechnologicaldecisionsthanitistomake
socialorpoliticaldecisions.
JonathanAlford

Itmaybesaidthatwarfarehasacquiredanewphasetechnologicalwar.Inthe
past,researchanddevelopment wereonly preparationforthefinalanddecisive
testingofnewsystemsinbattle.Todaythekindandqualityofsystemswhicha
nationdevelopscandecidethebattleinadvanceandmakethefinalconflictamere
formalityorcan
bypassconflictaltogether.
BernardSchriever

Inthedevelopmentofairpower,onehastolookaheadandnotbackwardandfigure
outwhatisgoingtohappen,nottoomuchwhathashappened.
BillyMitchell

Solongasthereremainsasubstantialperiod(oftenuptotenyears)betweenthe
inceptionofanewweaponsystemanditsdeployment,eventheverylatestweapons
areoutofdateintermsofwhattechnologycoulddeliver.
JonathanAlford

The first essential of the airpower necessary for our national security is
preeminenceinresearch.Theimaginationandinventivegeniusofourpeoplein
industry, inthe universities, in the armedservices, and throughout thenation
musthavefreeplay,incentive,andeveryencouragement.Americanairsuperiority
in this war has resulted in large measure from the mobilization and constant
applicationofourscientificresources.
"Hap"Arnold

Weshouldbaseoursecurityuponmilitaryformationswhichmakemaximumuseof
scienceandtechnologyinordertominimizenumbersofmen.
DwightD.Eisenhower

ThemostsignalcontributionmadebyAlfredThayerMahaninthefieldofmilitary
doctrine was his recognition that the conduct of war changes rapidly with
technological advance. Weapons, he said, advance faster than the tactics and
concepts of warfor employing those weapons. Thus military systems always lag
behindweaponcapabilities.
Dale0.Smith

Performancemeansinitiativethemostvaluablemoralandpracticalassetinany
formofwar.
SholtoDouglas

Anotherdebateconcernstheinteractionoftechnologyanddoctrine:Whichshould
beparamount?Shouldtechnologyservedoctrineandsoproduceweaponsthatfit
preconceptionsandprejudices?OrshouIddoctrinebeadaptedtomakebestuseof
whattechnologyhastooffer?
JonathanAlford

In England the great need in the earlier days of the war was for interceptors
designedformaximumclimb,maneuverabilityandspeed.Thesewereperfectfor
bringingdownGermanbombersoverEngland.Buthowdifferentisairwarin1943
when we are sending our bombers by the hundreds over Germany. The
requirementsarenowfocusedonthematteroflongerfightingrange.
"Hap"Arnold

New conditions require, for solutionand new weapons require, for maximum
applicationnewandimaginativemethods.Warsareneverwoninthepast.
DouglasMacArthur

Anairforceisalwaysvergingonobsolescenceand,intimeofpeace,itssizeand
replacement rate will always be inadequate to meet the full demands of war.
Militaryairpowershould,therefore,bemeasuredtoalargeextentbytheabilityof
theexistingairforcetoabsorbintimeofemergencytheincreaserequiredbywar
togetherwithnewideasandtechniques.
"HapArnold

Inmanyinstancestheinformationdisplayedforthecommander,whentracedback
toitsorigins,restsuponanassumption,anestimate,oranextrapolationofdata
derivedfromafieldtrialofsomeweaponoritemofequipment.Commanders,who
haveseldomparticipatedinderivingthealgorithmsbywhichtheinformationon
display before them was drawn, tend to accept the given data as reliable fact,
especiallywhenthedataarepresentedinnumericalform.Thesesoftlinksinthe
chainofremoteinputsarefatallyeasytooverlook.
I.B.Holley,Jr.
EffectsofIntroducingTechnology

Thedevelopmentofanewweaponisgenerallyhinderedbyakindofenthusiasm
that concentrates attention on maximum capabilities in performance. This
particularkindofviolationofthelawofdiminishingreturnincursthepenalties[of
two]mistakesprematureuseandfailuretoexploitinitialgains.
J.M.Cameron

Thebiastowardtheoffensivecreatesspecialproblemsinanytechnologicallynew
situationwherethereislittleornorelevantwarexperiencetohelponereacha
balancedjudgment.
BernardBrodie

Outofthe16,000V1slaunchedagainstEnglandandtheLowCountriesin19445,
nearly 7,000 were to be destroyed by fighters, antiaircraft guns, or barrage
balloons. Yet the first waves suffered only 2 per cent attrition. Within a week,
however,nearto50percentwasbeingregistered.Towardstheendoftheattacks
onEngland,antiaircraftbatterieswereshootingdownupto80percentofthoseV
1sthatcrossedtheirsights.
NevilleBrown

Weknowfromeventhemostcasualstudyofmilitaryhistoryhowfalliblemanisin
mattersconcerningwarandhowdifficultithasbeenforhimmostlybecauseofthe
discontinuityofwars,toadjusttonewweapons.Yetcomparedtothechangeswe
considernow,thoseofthepast,whenmeasuredfromonewartothenext,were
almosttrivial.Andalmostalwaysinthepasttherewastimeevenafterhostilities
beganforthesignificanceoftechnologicalchangestobelearnedandappreciated.
BernardBrodie
CumulativeEffectsofTechnicalChanges

Withinagivensector,theimprovementofoverallperformancewillstaygradualfor
quiteawhilebutthenbecomeevermorerapid.Thenitwillprogressivelyslowdown
again,asthesaidtechnologymatures.Boththeaccelerationandtheretardation
arelikelytostartquitesuddenly.
Progress in a particular direction, aircraft speed or whatever, is usually
registered via a diversity of increments (more exotic fuel, innovations in engine
design,improvedwingsandsoon).Nonetheless,thecumulativeresultislikelyto
approximateasigmoidcurve[ofsuddenaccelerationanddeceleration].
NevilleBrown

TheAlliesprovedthatexterminationraidsofstrategicalimportancewerepossible.
Thecomponentsoftheirsuccesswere:(1)Concentrationofraidingforcesonone
target.(2)Combinationofdayandnightraids.(3)Simultaneousapplicationofnew
meansandmethods:radarinterference,bomberstream,etc.
AdolfGalland

Using all four survivability strategiesfast reaction coupled with warning,


dispersal,hardening,andmobilitySACcanbecertainthatasufficientpercentage
ofitsstrikeforces,aswellastheircommandandcontrol,willsurviveunderany
circumstancestoretainsuperiorstrikecapability.
ThomasS.Power
TechnologyandNumbers

Wehaveneverbeenlikelytogetintotroublebyhavinganextrathousandortwoof
uptodateairplanesatourdisposal.Asthemanwhosemotherinlawhaddiedin
Brazil replied, when asked how the remains should be disposed of, "Embalm,
cremate,andbury.Takenorisks."
WinstonChurchill,April1938

Onecanneverhavetoomanyguns;oneneverhasenough.
Napoleon

Theburningwreckofoneaircraftoronewhiteparachutespillingoutagainstthe
skywereoftenglimpsedbymanypilotswhentheytwistedandturnedfivemiles
high.Therecanbenodoubtthatintheconfusedandintricateairfighting,manyof
ourclaimswereduplicated,but,wisely,thoseinauthoritywerenotconcernedwith
merenumbers,butwiththegreaterissuesofwhetherornottheLuftwaffewas
beingheldatbay.
"Johnnie"Johnson

Records previously thought to reveal that antiaircraft artillery was twice as


effective in coastal locations as when it was employed deeper inland were
persuasivelyreinterpretedtoshowthat[theresults]wereduetotheimpossibility
in that environment of checking gunners' claims against the number of crashed
enemyaircraftsubsequentlydiscovered.
NevilleBrown

Someoftheareaswhereourmodelingofaircombatgreatlyneedsimprovement:
Lethalitytoooftenoverestimated.
Commandcreativitytoooftenneglected.
Employmentstrategyoptionstoooftenignored.
WilfredL.Goodson

Thehopeofthewisdomessentialtothegeneraldirectionofmen'saffairsliesnotso
much inwealth ofspecialized knowledge as inthe habits andskills required to
handleproblemsinvolvingverydiverseviewpointswhichmustberelatedtonew
concretesituations.Wisdomisbasedonbroadunderstandinginperspective.Itis
nevertheproductofscientific,technological,orotherspecializations,thoughmenso
trainedmay,ofcourse,acquireit.
WallaceB.Donham

Itistruethat[inGermanyinWorldWarII]unheardofinventionsandprogress
weremadeinindividualfields,faraheadoftherestoftheworld,buttheyallcame
toolateand,...theycameinsuchsmallnumbersthattheycouldnolongerbe
decisive.
KarlKoller
ReactionstoTechnology

The great bomber can use weapons other than the hydrogen bomb, just as the
policemancandiscardhispistolforthetruncheon.
J.C.Slessor

Ifaman'strustisinarobotthatwillgoaroundtheearthofitsownvolitionand
utterlydestroyeventhelargestcitiesonimpact,heisstillpitiablyvulnerabletothe
enemywhoappearsonhisdoorstep,equippedandwillingtocuthisthroatwitha
penknife,orbeathimtodeathwithacobblestone.Itiswelltoremembertwothings:
noweaponisabsolute,andthesecondofevengreaterimportnoweapon,whose
potentialisoncerecognizedasofanydegreeofvalue,everbecomesobsolete.
J.M.Cameron

Noformoftransportationeverreallydiesout.Everynewformisanadditionto,and
notasubstitutionfor,anoldformoftransportation.
AirMarshalTrenchard

Whenoffensiveweaponsmakeasuddenadvanceinefficiency,thereactionofthe
sidewhichhasnoneistodisperse,tothinout,tofallbackonmedievalguerrilla
tacticswhichwouldappearchildishiftheydidnotrapidlyprovetohaveexcellent
results.
GenG.J.M.Chassin

Forthewealthynation,theprobabilityoflossexceedsthepossibilityofgainand
dictatesitsroleasthedefender.Theunburdenedopponent,enjoyingtheprospectof
gainforcomparativelyinsignificantloss,retainstheinitiative.Hemayendlessly
alternate threat of action with pretense of compromise and continue no wise in
dangerofdiminishment.Whentheutmostpossiblegainisachievedinthisway,he
maystillattackathisowndiscretion.
J.M.Cameron

Thehighlysophisticatedindustrialeconomyoftheadvancednationsoftheworld,
thedegreeofurbanizationoftheirdemographicdistribution,andthehighstandard
of living, make them very sensitive to weapons of mass annihilation and area
destruction.Ontheotherhand,theunderdevelopedareasoftheworlddisplaya
hardeningofconflictwhenfacedwithsuchweaponsandresorttoguerrillawarfare,
wheremanissuperiortomachine....Peopleusedtohighmaterialstandardsof
livingaremostunlikelytohardentheirwillinthefaceofmassannihilationand
areadestructionandresorttoguerrillawarfare.
S.T.Das
Itissufficientlyprovedinhistorythatrudeandsemibarbarousnations,illarmed
andwithlittleofwhatiscalleddiscipline,oftendiscomfitthesystematicarmiesof
scientifictechniciansandaccomplishedgenerals.
RobertJackson

Thescientificandtechnicaltalentsofthecontemporaryworldarespreadrather
evenlyamongallpotentialcontenders.Thismeansthatwhoeverinventswhatever
newdevicetosupplementhispower,theotherwillnotbelonginshapingithimself
forhisownuses.Whileheisdoingit,hisprimaryinterestwillbenotinbringing
thedevicetomaximumeffectiveness,butinthestudyofitfordeficiencies.
J.M.Cameron

For over a month after the V1s began to fall, interception was poor and most
missilesreachedLondon.Throughdesperateeffortsthedefensesystemeventually
attained a ninety per cent efficiency. Yet this improvement was gained more
through revised techniques and coordinated teamwork than through the
introductionofnewtechnology.
WeexpectedtheV1stobombardAntwerpafterwehadtakenthatcityforour
principalEuropeanportofsupply,andhencewesetupthemostformidableairraid
defensesystemeverdevised.Nothingwassparedtomakeitwork.Thebuzzbombs
cameaspredicted.Again,overamonthofoperationaldevelopmentwasnecessary
beforetheefficiencylevelwasraisedtothepointwheremostoftheV1sdispatched
againstusweredestroyed.
Allthis...illustratesthatwhatistechnicallyfeasibleisnotnecessarilytactically
possible.
Dale0.Smith
PrinciplesofWar

Foundation..............................................................................................101
Objective.................................................................................................104
UnityofCommand.................................................................................107

Offensive,Initiative,andSurprise........................................................110

TheOffensiveAim..................................................................................112
TheDefender'sDilemma........................................................................113
LimitsoftheOffensive...........................................................................114
UsingtheInitiative:Agitation.................................................................115
UsingtheInitiative:Alternatives............................................................116
TheOffensiveSpirit................................................................................117

Mass,Concentration,andEconomyofForce........................................119
EconomyofForce.....................................................................................122
ManeuverandMobility............................................................................125
Simplicity..................................................................................................127
Security....................................................................................................129

ConstantsIfNotPrinciplesofWar.....................................................133

Communications.....................................................................................133
PublicSupport.........................................................................................134
Logistics...................................................................................................136
Celerity....................................................................................................137
Time.........................................................................................................137
ThreeBritishPrinciples...........................................................................138
Foundation

IftherewereacollegedegreeinWar,therequired"foundation"coursesmightbe
thecommonlyacceptedprinciplesofwar.We'veincludedsomeuseful"electives"at
theend,aswell.

PrinciplesofWarareonlytheprinciplesofcommonsenseappliedtowar.
J.C.SlessorinalecturetoAirWarCollege,1957

Theideasaboutstrategywhichhaveevolvedfromtimetotimenosoonergained
acceptancethantheywerestrippedtotheirbarestessentialsandconvertedinto
maximsor,astheyhavelatterlycometobecalled,"principles."Thebaggagethat
was stripped normally contained the justifications, the qualifications, and the
instancesofhistoricalapplicationormisapplication.
BernardBrodie

Principlesofwar,thoughtheycanbesimplystated,arenoteasytolearn,andcan
neverbelearnedfrombooksalone.Theyaretheprinciplesofhumannature;and
whoeverlearnedfrombookshowtodealsuccessfullywithhisfellows?Warwhich
driveshumannaturetoitslastresourcesisagreatengineofeducation,teachingno
lessonswhichitdoesnotillustrate,andenforcingallitslessonsbybitterpenalties.
WalterRaleighinWarintheAir

Theprimaryelementsoftacticsaretobeseenintheirsimplestforminafight
betweentwounarmedmen.Theyare:tothink,toguard,tomove,andtohit.
Before a bout opens, each man must consider how best to knock out his
adversary,andthoughasthefightproceedshemaybecompelledtomodifyhis
means,hemustneverabandonhisaim.Atthestarthemustassumeadefensive
attitudeuntilhehasmeasureduphisopponent.Nexthemustmoveundercoverof
his defence, he must assume the offensive and attempt to knock him out. In
militaryterms,thefourprimarytacticalelementsare:theaimorobject,security,
mobilityandoffensivepower.
Ifthetwopugilistsareskilledintheirart,theywillrecognizethevalueofthree
accentuating elements. They will economize their physical force, so as not to
exhaust themselves prematurely; they will concentrate their blows against the
decisivepointselected,theleftorrightoftheiropponent'sjaw,orhissolarplexus,
and throughout will attempt to surprise himthat is, take him offguard, or do
somethingwhichhedoesnotexpectorcannotguardagainst.Inmilitaryterms
these accentuating elements are: economy of force, concentration of force, and
surprise.
J.F.C.Fuller
ItshouldberememberedthatthestatementsofthePrinciplesofWarwerederived
fromstudyofsurfaceoperationsandwrittenbysoldierswithgroundwarfarein
mind.They stem from periodsofhistorywhen theairplaneexistedonly inthe
mindsofmen.
NathanF.Twiningquotinga1947AirWarCollegeseminar

Toooftenweseetheprinciplesofwarregardedasinstrumentsapplicablebyman,
ratherthanaslimitstohischoiceofactions.Theconstantlycitednineprinciplesof
war are honored about equally among them by misapplication and
misunderstanding.Theirauthoritydarenotbechallenged,however,andtheyare
to be recognized as masters rather than servants. Like all good masters, their
bountymakesthemseemasservantswhenproperlyobeyed.Whentheirdemands
areignored,theirpunishmentsarejustlysevere.
J.M.Cameron
Objective

TheprincipleoftheObjectivemeans,foremost,thatmilitaryoperationsmustbe
consciouslyaimedatanunderstoodpurpose.Becausetheoperationsofeachechelon
ofcommandareaimedatdistinct,feasible,andnormallymeasurablegoals(take
thathill,destroythatbridge),thereisatendencytoconfusethetaskortargetwith
theactualobjectofanoperation.

The ordinary man is much more likely to do the right thing if he really
understands why he is doing it, and what will probably happen if he does
somethingelse;andthebestbasisforsoundjudgmentisaknowledgeofwhathas
beendoneinthepast,andwithwhatresults.
J.C.Slessor

GeneralMacArthurapproved[my]programandsaidtogoahead,thatIhadcarte
blanchetodoanythingthatIwantedtodo.Hesaidhedidn'tcarehowmygang
washandled,howtheylooked,howtheydressed,howtheybehaved,orwhatthey
did,solongastheywouldfight,shootdown[Japaneseairplanes],andputbombs
onthetarget.
GeorgeKenney

Themissionoftacticalfighterandfighterbomberunitsistoengageinoperational
missions,asdirectedbyhigherechelonswithinthetheaterairstructure.These
operationsmaybeindependentoforinconjunctionwithsurfaceaction,butinany
event are all directed toward the effective, efficient, and economical
accomplishmentofthetheatercommander'sassignedmission.
AirForceManual5144,1953

There were two extremely important points about him [Yamamoto] as a


commander.First,hemadetheobjectivesoftheoperationextremelyclear,andhe
expressed them with indomitable will. Second, although he did not permit any
criticismoftheobjectivesoftheoperation,heentrustedthedetailsofitsexecution
tothediscretionofhissubordinates.
LtGenMinoruGenda

This process of separating strategy into three compartments I believe to be


fundamentallyuneconomicalandadirectviolationoftheprincipleofeconomyof
forcesasappliedtoaunitedarmy,navy,andairforce,andhenceaweakeningof
theprincipleoftheobjective.
J.F.C.Fuller
Successfuloperationsdependontheentirewingorganizationworkingasateam
withbutonepurposeinmind.Thepurpose,ofcourse,istomakecertainofthe
destructionoftheselectedtargetatexactlytherighttimeandplace.Allofthe
years of planning and training, and the great financial and personal costs and
sacrifice,willbevindicatedbythesuccessfulexecutionofthemission;likewise,all
willbewastedbyfailure,regardlessofitscause.
AirForceManual5144,1953

Anirresolutegeneralwhoactswithoutprinciplesandwithoutplan,eventhough
heleadanarmynumericallysuperiortothatoftheenemy,almostalwaysfinds
himselfinferiortothelatteronthefieldofbattle.Fumblings,themiddlecourse,
loseallinwar.
Napoleon
CAUTION

Atthesametime,thenatureoftheenemyandthe
immediatethreatheposestonationalandfriendlyforces,
demandactionthatmaydistractfullcommitmenttoone's
ownobjectives.
S.T.Das
UnityofCommand

Thereisaweaknessinacouncilrunningawar.Thatistrueofanycouncil.Idon't
careifitiscomposedofthebestmenintheworld....Inwar,youmusthave
decision.Abumdecisionisbetterthannone.Andthetroubleisthatwhenyouget
three,youfinallygetnone.
DwightEisenhower

The compromise which forms the mean between several plans usually combines
theirfaultsratherthantheirmerits.
SirCharlesOman

TheAdmiralandGeneralappointedtocommandthehastilyorganized"conjunct
expedition" to Norway in April 1940 were given no clear indication of what the
government'spurposeswere,anddidnotevenknowwhichofthemwasinsupreme
command.Itisnotsurprisingthattheundertakingendedinafiasco.
S.W.Roskill

Nothingismoreimportantinwarthanunityincommand.
Napoleon

Myobservationis[that]whereonepersonisfoundadequatetothedischargeofa
dutybycloseapplication,itisworseexecutedbytwoandscarcelydoneatallby
three.
FriedrichvonSteuben

The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions and
councils of war will follow at all times. They will end in adoption of the worst
course,whichinwarisalwaysthemosttimid,or,ifyouwill,themostprudent.The
onlytruewisdominageneralisdeterminedcourage.
Napoleon

Aneducatedguessisjustasaccurateandfarfasterthancompilederrors.
GeorgePatton

Unityofcommandisnotalonesufficient.Unityofplanning,unityofcommonitem
procurement,andunityofdoctrineareequallynecessary.
"Hap"Arnold

It appears that,when Germany determined to go into Norway, thestaff ofthe


supremecommanddeterminedwhatproportionofair,ground,andseaelements
should comprise this expeditionary force. It then designated a commander and
thereafter there was complete unity of command, and no interference from the
threearmsoftheservicethuscombined.Hereisalessonwhichwemuststudy
well.
MajGen"Hap"ArnoldandColIraC.EakerinWingedWarfare,1941

Perhapstheclearestexampleoftheconsequencesofdividedcommandisgivenby
Thucydides describing the Athenian compromise plan to invade Syracuse. Three
competentgeneralsNicias,Lamachus,andAlcibiadesproposedthreedifferentbut
promising strategies. The Athenian government sent all three to take Syracuse
possiblyhopingtheywouldagreeona"best"plan.WhenAlcibiadeswasrecalledthe
othertwoadoptedaplanhalfwaybetweentheirtwooriginaldesigns.Itsfailureled
totheendoftheAthenianstate.

WeareseeminglystillintheperiodoftransitionDouhetdescribedin1928....He
saidthenthatthereweremencompetenttowagewaronland,otherstowagewar
atsea,andstillotherstowagewarintheair,butthattherewerenotyetmen
competenttowagewaringeneral.
LouisA.Sigaud,1941
Offensive,Initiative,andSurprise

Thepoweroftheinitiativemightberelatedtotheprincipleofsurprise.Without
initiative,thebestonecandoistoholdone'sown.Withthepoweroftheinitiative,
theoppositioncanbedestroyed.Itwouldthereforeseemaxiomaticthatthefirst
principle of our national security policy would be to seize and maintain the
initiativeinalldimensionsofmodernwar;toincludetheeconomic,psychological,
political,military,andthetechnological.
NathanTwining

Offenseistheessenceofairpower.
"Hap"Arnold

Trueoffensivedoctrineconsistsofcreatingfavorablesituationswhentheydonot
otherwiseexist,strikingattheenemywiththemaximumpoweratthedecisive
timeandplace,anddrivinghometheeffortdeterminedlyuntilthedesiredresults
havebeenaccomplished.
AirForceManual5144,1953

The offensive knows what it wants, whereas the defensive is in a state of


uncertainty.
S.T.DasparaphrasingMoltke,TheElder

Theadvantageoftheoffensiveinwarisobvious:itdisorganizestheenemy,upsets
his plans and combinations; the assailant, to some extent, imposes on him his
initiative,hiswill.
JeanColin

Militaryofficersaretrainednottobeobjective.Theyaretrainedtobebiasedin
favoroftheoffensive,muchasordinarypersonsaretrainedtobebiasedinfavorof
virtue.
Thebiastowardtheoffensivecreatesspecialproblemsinanytechnologically
newsituationwherethereislittleornorelevantwarexperiencetohelponeto
reachabalancedjudgment.
BernardBrodie

Inordertohaverestoneselfitisnecessarytokeeptheenemyoccupied.
FredericktheGreat

Air forces characteristically take the offensive. Even in defense, they defeat an
invadingenemybyattack.
AirUniversityManual1,1951
Successistobeobtainedonlybysimultaneousefforts,directeduponagivenpoint,
sustainedwithconstancy,andexecutedwithdecision.
ArchdukeCharlesofAustria

Staticanddynamicanalysesofthemilitarybalancearedeceptivebasesfordefense
planning if they are abstracted from the political, psychological, and doctrinal
uncertainties that would attend the outbreak of conflict. For hedging against
suddenattack,lesspromiseliesinsolutionsaimedatreducingtheprobabilityof
surprise than in those that make plans, strategies, and operational doctrines
effectiveifsurpriseoccurs.
RichardK.Betts
TheOffensiveAim

Tostrikewithstrongeffect,onemuststrikeatweakness.
LiddellHart

In place of hitting at a vital spot, however tough, they committed the deadly
tacticalsinoflookingforasoftspot.
J.F.C.FullerdescribingaWorldWarIbattle

Holdoutbaitstoenticetheenemy....Amidtheturmoilandtumultofbattle,
there may be seeming disorder and yet no disorder at all; amid confusion and
chaos,yourarraymaybewithoutheadortail,yetitwillbeproofagainstdefeat.
Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates
courage;simulatedweaknesspostulatesstrength.
SunTzu

TheDefender'sDilemma

Thespotwhereweintendtofightmustnotbemadeknown;forthentheenemywill
havetoprepareagainstapossibleattackatseveraldifferentpoints;andhisforces
beingthusdistributedinmanydifferentdirections,thenumbersweshallhaveto
faceatanygivenpointwillbeproportionatelyfew.
SunTzu

Pettygeniusesattempttoholdeverything;wisemenholdfasttothekeypoints.
Theyparrygreatblowsandscornlittleaccidents.Thereisanancientapothegm:he
whowouldpreserveeverything,preservesnothing.Therefore,alwayssacrificethe
bagatelleandpursuetheessential.
FredericktheGreat

[The French army in Vietnam] suffers from the considerable disadvantage


attachingtothosewhoseektoprotectandpreserveratherthansimplydestroy.Itis
mucheasiertocutarailwaylineorblowupabridgethantoprotectthemfrom
destruction.
GenG.J.M.Chassin,1952

Thegeneralisskillfulinattackwhoseopponentdoesnotknowwhattodefend;and
heisskillfulindefensewhoseopponentdoesnotknowwhattoattack.
SunTzu

LimitsoftheOffensive
Warisatwopartyaffair,soimposingtheneedthatwhilehittingonemustguard.
Itscorollaryisthat,inordertohitwitheffect,theenemymustbetakenoffhis
guard.Effectiveconcentrationcanonlybeobtainedwhentheopposingforcesare
dispersed;andusually,inordertoensurethis,one'sownforcesmustbewidely
distributed. Thus, by an outward paradox, true concentration is the product of
dispersion.
LiddellHart

Thebestmethodofdealingwiththeenemy'sbombersaswithhisfighterswill
normally be the maintenance of an active offensive. On the other hand, it is
dangeroustomakeafetishofanyprincipleortobecometheslaveofanytactical
doctrineastheFrenchdidin1914.Justasitmaysometimesbenecessarytodivert
temporarilyeventhewholeofourairforcestothestrategically defensiverolefor
reasonsofsecurity,soonoccasionswemaybecompelledforthesamereasonto
divertpartofourfighterstrengthtothetacticaldefensive.
J.C.Slessor,1936

Military organizations generally prefer offensive doctrines because they reduce


uncertainty and enhance military autonomy and resources. But . . . because
militaryorganizationsseekautonomy,theiroffensivedoctrinesareusuallypoorly
integratedwiththepoliticalaspectsofgrandstrategy.
DanielJ.Hughes,summarizingpointsfromBarryP.Posen'sTheSourcesof
MilitaryDoctrine

Theoffensive,however,isthemoreexhaustingformofaction.Nothingdoesmore
ruintoaforceoranationthanoffensiveswhichshownoprofitcommensuratewith
theircost.ThesandsofhistoryarelitteredwiththewrecksofStateswhichsettheir
compassonanoffensivecourseonly.
S.T.Das

UsingtheInitiative:Agitation

Offensiveactionhasoftenbeenusedtoprovokereactions,toforceanopponentto
make mistakes. Just as certainly, one's enemies are likely to try probing and
stirringinreturn.

Agitate the enemy and ascertain the pattern of his movement. Determine his
dispositionsandsoascertainthefieldofbattle.Probehimandlearnwherehis
strengthisabundantandwheredeficient.
SunTzu
Attacksonthedecisionelementofcommandarelimitedonlybytheimagination.
Theycanrangefromdirectstrikesatenemycommandpoststocomplexoperations
tomisleadtheenemyandinducehimtodosomethinginappropriate.
JohnA.WardenIIIinTheAirCampaign

IstartedshootingwhenIwasmuchtoofaraway.Thatwasmerelyatrickofmine.I
didnotmeansomuchtohithimastofrightenhim,andIsucceededincatching
him.Hebeganflyingincurvesandthisenabledmetodrawnear.
ManfredvonRichthofen

UsingtheInitiative:Alternatives

Maintainingsensiblealternativesisliketakingagoodstanceinsports;the
purposeistopreservethebenefitsoftheinitiative.

Iftheenemyiscertainastoyourpointofaimhehasthebestpossiblechanceof
guardinghimselfandbluntingyourweapon.If,ontheotherhand,youtakealine
thatthreatensalternativeobjectives,youdistracthismindandforces.
LiddellHart

The question "Where should the decisive point be sought?" does not arise; the
questionis, "How canapreponderance offorcebebrought against the enemy's
will?"
Therearetwoanswerstothisquestion:todosomethingwhichtheenemy
cannotprevent,andtodosomethingwhichhedoesnotsuspect.
J.F.C.Fuller

Placeyourcampinsuchamannerthatiftheenemypassesonyourrightoronyour
left,theterrainwillgiveyouanequaladvantage.
FredericktheGreat

TheOffensiveSpirit

Noguts,noglory.Ifyouaregoingtoshoothimdown,youhavetogetinthereand
mixitupwithhim.
FredC.("Boots")Blesse
Ialwaysthoughttogoaroundincircles,slowerandslower,wasaridiculousthing.
...It'snotthewaytofight.Thebesttacticistomakeapass,thenbreakoffand
comeback.Ifyoudon'tdothisyou'lllosepeople.Onecan'tbegreedy.
RobinOlds

Whenwestudythelivesofthegreatcaptains,andnotmerelytheirvictoriesand
defeats,whatdowediscover?Thatthemainspringwithinthemwas originality,
outwardlyexpressingitselfinunexpectedactions.
J.F.C.Fuller

Originalityisthemostvitalofallmilitaryvirtuesastwothousandyearsofhistory
attest.Inpeaceitisatadiscount,foritcausesthedisturbanceofcomfortableways
withoutproducingdividends,asincivillife.Butinwar,originalitybearsahigher
premiumthanitcaneverdoinacivilprofession.
LiddellHart

Neverforgetthatnomilitaryleaderhaseverbecomegreatwithoutaudacity.
Clausewitz

Iapproveofallmethodsofattackingprovidedtheyaredirectedatthepointwhere
theenemy'sarmyisweakestandwheretheterrainfavorsthemtheleast.
FredericktheGreat

Anaggressive act inthe initial phases of theattack will very often give you a
breather and a head start home. . . . Showing a willingness to fight often
discouragestheenemyevenwhenheoutnumbersus,whileontheotherhandI
have,byimmediatelybreakingforthedeckonotheroccasions,giventheenemya
"shotinthearm,"turninghishalfheartedattackintoanaggressiveone.
JohnC.Meyer
Mass,Concentration,andEconomyofForce

The alternative to massing forces is piecemeal employmenta practice
summarizedbythephrase"defeatindetail."

Wehadbeentaughtalesson,brutallyandunmistakably.Thefirstroundinmodern
wartakesplaceintheairthefightforairsuperiority;andtobesuccessfulone
musthavereasonablestrengthinquantityaswellasquality,andone'sairbases
must have securitythe security given by warning systems, by dispersal, by
protection and by guns. In Greece and Crete we had none of these things. The
lessonisclear.Itwasnousehavingavictoriousandpredominantsurfacefleetifit
wasnotfreetooperatebecausewehadlostcontroloftheair;itwasnousehavinga
strongarmyif,forthesamereason,itcouldnotbesuppliedandmaintained.
LordTedder

One of the best examples of Mass and Economy of Force is the Battle of the
Bismarck Sea. General Kenney's longrange aircraft were massed to attack the
Japanese convoy as it approached New Guinea. Kenney used his shortrange
aircraft,incapableofjoiningthemass,toattackJapaneseairfieldsinNewGuinea
andpreventairinterceptionjustbeforethemainattackbegan.Theuseofsmall
supportingforcestolenddisproportionateassistancetothemaineffortnotunwise
division of forcesis typical of the specialized support functions of diversion
deceptionscoutingandfeints.Supportingactionsthatactuallyaddweighttothe
main actiondemonstrate the positive applicationofthe principle ofEconomyof
Force.

The principles of war could, for brevity, be condensed into a single word:
concentration.
LiddellHart

One ofthe guiding principles offighting with anair forceis the assembling of
weight,bynumbers,ofanumericalconcentrationatdecisivespots.
AdolfGalland

TheprinciplesofMasswerebetterstated:"Massistheconcentrationofoptimum
combatpowerselectedfromtheavailablemaximum,tobeusedatacriticaltime
andplace."
J.M.Cameron

Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks;


numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations
againstus.
SunTzu

The effect of superior numbers in a decision to attack is small. The tactical


advantageofpositionaltitudesunanddirectionofattackaretheinfluencing
factors.
JohnC.Meyer

HistoryshowsagainandagainthatacombinationofResistanceandMobilityof
ShieldandSwordisthetrueanswertoMass.
J.F.C.Fuller

Whereastoshifttheweightofeffortonthegroundfromonepointtoanothertakes
time,theflexibilityinherentinAirForcespermitsthemwithoutchangeofbaseto
beswitchedfromoneobjectivetoanotherinthetheatreofoperations.Solongas
thisisrealisedthenthewholeweightoftheavailableairpowercanbeusedin
selectedareasinturn.Thisconcentrateduseoftheairstrikingforceisabattle
winningfactorofthefirstimportance.Itfollowsthatcontroloftheavailableair
power must be centralised and command must be exercised through Air Force
channels.Nothingcouldbemorefataltosuccessfulresultsthantodissipatetheair
resources into small packets placed under command of land formation
commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not
expectorwishtoexercisedirectcommandoverairstrikingforces.
FieldMarshalMontgomery
EconomyofForce

Theuseandexpenditureofforcesinallthetransactionsofnatureisgovernedby
the laws of parsimony. From the boundless reservoir attendant to her needs,
nature will apply the precise minimum of her resources that will effect her
purpose. Translated into human values the law of parsimony becomes a
constellationofprinciplesthemostconspicuousofwhichisthelawofdiminishing
return. It allows for human error in that it punishes infraction discriminately
accordingtothemagnitudeofthecrime.Itisanexcellentmodelforrulingthe
expenditureofmilitarystrength.
Therecaninallthingsbetoomuchofagoodthing.Beyondtheoptimumevery
addedincrementofeffortwillresultinacorrespondingdeclineofaccomplishment.
J.M.Cameron

TheprincipleofEconomyofForceissometimesmisunderstoodasholdingbacka
largebodyoftroopsandcommittingtheminimumforcetobattle.Thisisnotthe
trueinterpretationorapplicationofthelaw.Toholdbacktroopswhentheycanbe
gainfullyemployedisfalseeconomy.Theuseofreservesontheotherhandisa
tactical application of the same principle. When information is lacking or the
situationissuchthatonlyaftertheinitialengagementcantheenemy'sweakspot
bediscovered,insuchcasesreservesarenotreallyheldbackfromthebattlebutare
actuallykeptreadyforbattlewhenthedecisivetimeandplacehasbeenreached.
S.T.Das

Economy of Force rightly means, not a mere husbanding of one's resources of


manpower, but the employment of one's force, both men and weapons, in
accordancewiththeeconomiclaws,soastoyieldthehighestpossibledividendsof
successinproportiontostrength.
LiddellHart

Inplanning,neverauselessmove;instrategy,nosteptakeninvain.
ChenHao

Apartmustneverbeimprovedattheexpenseofthewhole.
J.M.Cameron

Economy of Force is the supreme law of successful war because in a trial of


strengthanation'scapacitytostandthestraindependsnotmerelyontheextentof
itsresources,butontheireconomicdistribution.
LiddellHart
Itwasthestrategyemployedbyraiderssincenavalwarbegan,tostrikeinone
areauntilthestrengthoftheenemywasdirectedthither,andthentoslipaway
andstartagaininafreshunguardedarea.
C.S.ForesterinTheAgeofFightingSail

The principles of mobility and concentration of force were considered to be


contradictoryelementsofprinciplesofwartillthearrivalofairpower.Todaythe
exponentsofairpowermaintainthattheprinciplesofoffensiveandeconomyofforce
canbeachievedeffectivelyonlybytheexploitationofairspace,whereaspriortothe
emergence of airpower the principle of offensive could only be applied by
maintaininga4to1ratioovertheenemyforces.
S.T.Das

Therearegenerallyinsufficientforcestoconductextensiveoperationsinallair
tasksatonetime;thustheselectionoftargetsandtheallocationofeffortmustbe
in terms of the needs of the theater. Enemy action may necessitate a major
revisionintaskpriorities.
AirForceManual13,1953

Tomeanunnecessaryaction,orshot,orcasualty,wasnotonlywastebutsin.
T.E.Lawrence
ManeuverandMobility

TheenemymustnotknowwhereIintendtogivebattle.Forifhedoesnotknow
whereIintendtogivebattle,hemustprepareinagreatmanyplaces....Forifhe
preparestothefronthisrearwillbeweak,andiftotherear,hisfrontwillbe
fragile.Ifhepreparestothelefthisrightwillbevulnerableandiftotheright,
therewillbefewontheleft.Andwhenheprepareseverywherehewillbeweak
everywhere.
SunTzu

Theultimateobjectofmobilityistoobtainsuperiorpowerinbattle.
MauricedeSaxe

Ibelievethat,moreorless,alloftheAlliedoperations[intheSouthwestPacific]
dependedondeceptionbylandinginplaceswherewethoughtalandingandthe
buildingofairfieldsimpossible.
LtColMasaruShinohara,JapaneseEighthAreaArmy

Modernwarisawarforairbases;thebulldozermustaccompanytheplane....One
oftheelementsofvictoryinNorthAfricawasthespeedwithwhichouraviation
engineersconstructedairfieldsbehindthefrontlinesandpressedtheattack.
"Hap"Arnold

Maximumtimeovertargetorextremedepthofpenetrationmaybenecessary.This
normallyrequiresthataircraftbebasedasclosetothetargetareasaspossible.
Since ground action is often fluid in nature, tactical air units must possess a
considerabledegreeofmobility.Itisessentialthatallcomponentsofthetactical
airorganization,includingsupportingorserviceunits,beabletomovefromsiteto
sitewithoutdisruptingthecombatmission.Equipmentshouldbedesignedwith
thisinmindand,wheneverpossible,beairtransportable.
AirForceManual5144,1953

Thegiantairbasesoftodaywillbecomethebombercemeteriesofafuturewar.
GenP.F.Zhigarev,SovietAirForces,1958

The strength of air forces lies in mobility and flexibility. These characteristics
permitconcentrationofmassedfirepowerattheplaceandtimedictatedbythe
situationwithmaximumsurprise.Mobilityandflexibilityarereducedwhen:
a.Airforcesarecompartmentedinseparateunitsunderseparatecommands,and
b.Areallottedtolowerechelons.
AirUniversityManual1,1951
Simplicity

Perhaps the most important principle when transitioning from peace to war,
when first employing forces, and when trying new tactics, procedures and
techniquesinharm'sway,isSimplicity.

The ability to distinguish essentials from nonessentials, to grasp quickly the


elementsofthechangingsituation,andtheintestinalfortitudetokeepcoolandto
continuefightingwhenthegoinggetstougharerequiredinthesuccessfulwar
commander.
AdmRaymondA.Spruance

Difficultiesalwaysarisefromattemptstoimprovetothepointofachievingwhatis
notpossible,therebyfailingtogainwhatiswellwithinreach.
J.M.Cameron

Theprincipalmessageoffog,frictionandchanceisthatstrategymustbeflexible.
Plansthatrelyonflawlessexecutionareoverlysusceptibletofailure.Plansthat
rely on rigid timetables and rigidly sequenced actions are overly susceptible to
failure.Ingeneral,themorecomplextheplan,themorelikelythatsomethingwill
goawry.
DennisDrewandDonaldSnow

Fewordersarebest,buttheyshouldbefollowedupwithcare.
MauricedeSaxe

Remember,gentlemen,anorderthatcanbemisunderstoodwillbemisunderstood.
Moltke,TheElder
Security

The whole art of war consists of a wellreasoned and extremely circumspect


defensivefollowedbyrapidandaudaciousattack.
Napoleon

Naturally, the combination of active and passive devices sometimes has proved
adequate and sometimes not, depending on circumstances and luck, but the
chancesforsurvivalwereusuallybetterforhavingadefensewhichincludedboth
kinds.
BernardBrodie

Skepticismisthemotherofsecurity.Eventhoughonlyfoolstrusttheirenemies,
prudentpersonsneverdo.Onefallsintoafeelingofsecurityafterbattles,when
one is drunk with success, and when one believes the enemy completely
disheartened.Onefallsintoafeelingofsecuritywhenaskillfulenemyamusesyou
with pretended peace proposals. One falls into a feeling of security by mental
laziness.
FredericktheGreat

Paradoxically,itistheveryattachmentofthemilitarytotheoffensivespiritthat
createsinthemastrongimpulsetodisregardthelikelihoodthattheenemymay
havecomparableattachmentsandmaythereforeattempttoinitiatehostileaction.
BernardBrodie

Alwayspresumethattheenemyhasdangerousdesignsandalwaysbeforehanded
withtheremedy.Butdonotletthesecalculationsmakeyoutimid.
FredericktheGreat

Ideasexaltingmilitaryaggressivenessderivefromanagewhenitwasthesame
forcewhichtooktheoffensiveorstayedonthedefensive.Ifanoffensivefailed,an
impromptu redeployment usually achieved a defensive posture. The accent was
thereforeappropriatelyonboldness.Evenwhenboldnessprovedimprovidentand
costly, it rarely sacrificed the life of the nation. Today, failure to meet the
requirementsofthedeterrentposturecanclearlyhavethatresult.
BernardBrodie

Threecankeepasecretiftwoofthemaredead.
BenjaminFranklin

Ourcontinuousairoffensivehadevidentlyannoyedthem,astheraidwasmadeby
twentyfourbombersescortedbyaboutthesamenumberoffighters.Welosteleven
aircraftonthegroundatSevenMileAirdrome.Inaddition,theoperationsbuilding
wasburneddown,severaltrucksdestroyed,twohundreddrumsofgasolinewent
upinsmoke,andtherunwaywashitinseveralplaces.TheJapaneselefteight
callingcards in the shape of longdelay timefuzed bombs which exploded at
intervalsallthewayuptofortyfourhours.Severalmenwerewoundedbybomb
fragments.Onceagainourwarningservicewasinadequate.
GeorgeKenney
When the fighting [World War I] was over, Maj Gen Mason M.
Patrick,ChiefofAirService,AmericanExpeditionaryForces,wanted
tofindoutwhatlessonshadbeenlearned,whatknowledgehadbeen
gainedbyAirServicepersonnelduringthewar.Hedirectedthatsuch
informationwastobesenttoColEdgarS.Gorrell,AssistantChiefof
Staff,whowascompilingthehistoryoftheAirService,AEF....No
onewastogohome,Patricksaid,untilhehad"furnishedinwritingto
Colonel Gorrell any information of value which he possess[es] and
whichhehasacquiredwhileintheAmericanAirService...."

Someoftheresultingreportswerewellwrittendocuments,carefully
and thoughtfully prepared. Others obviously were dashed off
hurriedlytoberidofadistastefulandseeminglynonsensicaltaskas
quicklyandeasilyaspossible.Oneunsympatheticsquadronadjutant
cameupwiththefollowingformletterresponse,dulycompletedand
submittedbytenfirstandsecondlieutenants:

Date__________________________1918
From:______________________________________
To:Col.Gorrell,OfficeChiefofAirService
Subject:Information.
1.InaccordancewithinstructionscontainedintelegramZ727TG,
from Chief Training Section, Headquarters Air Service, Tours, the
followingcertificateissubmitted.
2. I certify that I have acquired, while in the Air Service, no
informationofvalue.

(Signed)_____________________________

Source:AdaptedfromMaurerMaurer,TheU.S.AirServiceinWorld
WarI (Washington, D.C.:OfficeofAirForceHistory,Headquarters
USAF,1979),vol.IV,12.
ConstantsIfNotPrinciplesofWar

Communications

If intercommunications between events in front and ideas behind are not


maintained,thentwobattleswillbefoughtamythicalheadquartersbattleandan
actual frontline one, in which case the real enemy is to be found in our own
headquarters.
J.F.C.Fuller

ThetacticalskilloftheMongolhordehadbeendevelopedinthestressofwar.In
maneuverforbattle,theyhadlearntnottodependoncommandsgivenbyavoice
which very often could not be heard in the uproar of moving mounted men.
Regimentssignalledtheirmovementsbyraisingblackorwhiteflagsduringtheday
andbysimilaruseofcoloredlanternsatnight.Othersignalsweregivenbytheuse
ofwhistlingarrowswhichemittedsoundthroughahollowpiercedhead.Theyhid
theirformations,attimes,behinddriftingsmokescreens.
S.T.Das

Congress can make a general but only communications can make him a
commandinggeneral.
OmarBradley

PublicSupport

In our democracy, where thegovernment is truly an agent of the popular will,


militarypolicyisdependentonpublicopinion,andourorganizationforwarwillbe
goodorbadasthepubliciswellinformedorpoorlyinformed.
FewAmericanslearnthatweenrollednearlyfourhundredthousandmeninthe
Revolutionary War to defeat an enemy that numbered less than fortyfive
thousand,orthatweemployedhalfamillionin1812againstanopponentwhose
strengthneverexceededsixteenthousandatanyoneplace,andfewerstillhave
learnedwhytheseoverwhelmingnumbersweresoineffective.
GeorgeC.Marshall,"OurMostSeriousProblem"

Exceptforvalidsecurityreasons,anyactionthatcannotbesatisfactorilyexplained
tothetroops,theCongress,andthegeneralpublic,shouldberegardedassuspect
andthoroughlyexamined.
MatthewB.Ridgway
Byrapiditymanymeasuresoftheenemyarenippedinthebud,andpublicopinion
isgainedinourfavor.
Clausewitz

ItisstrangethatexceptbyClausewitzandtosomeextentbyMacklin,thePrinciple
of"PublicOpinion"hasnotbeenconsideredveryvitalevenbythemodernmilitary
theoreticians.
S.T.Das

Itisveryeasytofoolthepeopleatthestartofawarandrunitonaconfidential
basis.Butlaterthewoundedstartcomingbackandtheactualnewsspreads.Then,
finally,whenwehavewon,themenwhofoughtthewarcomehome.Therewillbe
millions of them who will come home knowing how things were. A government
whichwantstokeeptheconfidenceofitspeopleafterthewar,orduringthelast
stagesofit,shouldtakethepeopleintoitsconfidenceandtellthemeverythingthat
theycanknow,badaswellasgood,solongastheirknowingofitdoesnothelpthe
enemy.Coveringuptheerrorstosavethemenwhomakethemcanonlyleadtoa
lackofconfidencewhichcanbeoneofthegreatestdangersanationcanface.
ErnestHemingway

Logistics

Whentheenemyassessesourforces,hevaluesonlythoseforceswhichthelogistics
communityhasreadyforcombat,orcangetreadyintime,andthensustainfora
requisiteperiodoftime.
F.M.Rogers

MyDearGeneral,thisexpandingandpilingupofimpedimentia[sic]hasbeenso
faralmostourruin,andwillbeourfinalruinifitisnotabandoned
Letter,AbrahamLincolntoGenNathanielP.Banksontheinabilityofthe
UnionArmytomoveduetologisticexcesses

Logisticscontrolsallcampaignsandlimitsmany.
DwightEisenhower

The crews of a heavy bombardment group in China must ferry over their own
gasoline,bombs,replacementpartsandeverythingelseintheirownB24s.Before
thisbombardmentgroupcangoononecombatflight,itmustmakefourtripsover
theHump.Toperformoneextremelydangerousmission,thosecrewsmustmake
fourseparateflightsoverthemosthazardousterrainintheworld.
"Hap"Arnold
Celerity

Attacktheenemysuddenlywhenheisnotpreparedtoresist.Celerityisthesecret
ofsuccess.
DennisHartMahan

Thepolicyofcelerity...involvesallelementsofnationalpower:military,political,
economic,andpsychological....Celerityinthestrictlymilitarysensemeansswift,
powerful, integratedactions directedat vulnerable andunexpected points ofthe
enemywarmakingestablishment.
Dale0.Smith

Time

During the last great aerial raid on England, the German Air Force flew about
1,200 bombers over industrial targets which were critical to the survival of the
BritishEmpire.AtthesametimetheRoyalAirForceFighterCommandconsisted
oflittlemorethanahandfuloftrainedpilotsandfighterplanes.Theincredible
Germandecisiontostaggertheattack,andtousetwelvehoursforitscompletion,
actually multiplied the strength of the Royal Air Force Fighter Command by a
factoroffive.ThiswaspossiblebecauseonthatdayeachSpitfirepilothadthetime
toflyfivemissions.
NathanTwining

Whenyouseemtobemostprodigalofthesoldier'sblood,youspareit,bysupporting
yourattackswellandbypushingthemwiththegreatestvigortopreventtimefrom
augmentingyourlosses.
FredericktheGreat

Quickdecisionsareunsafedecisions.
Sophocles

Thegodofwarhatesthosewhohesitate.
Euripides

Taketimetodeliberate,butwhenthetimeforactionarrives,stopthinkingandgo
on.
AndrewJackson

ThreeBritishPrinciples
Morale: Success in war depends more on morale than on physical qualities.
Numbers,armament,resources orskill cannot compensateforlackofcourage,
energy,determinationandtheboldoffensivespiritwhichspringsfromanational
determinationtoconquer.

Flexibility:Modernwardemandsahighdegreeofflexibilitytoenableprearranged
planstobealteredtomeetchangingsituationsandunexpecteddevelopments.By
strategical and tactical flexibility, force can be concentrated rapidly and
economicallyatdecisiveplacesandtimes.Thisentailsgoodtraining,organization,
discipline,andstaffwork,andaboveall,thatrapidityofdecisiononthepartofthe
commanderwhichensuresthattimeisneverlost.

Administration: The administrative arrangements must be designed to give the


commanders the maximum freedom of action in carrying out the plan. Every
administrative organization must be simple. Every operational commander must
haveadegreeofcontrolovertheadministrativeplanwithinhissphereofcommand,
correspondingtothescopeofhisresponsibilitiesfortheoperationalplan.
QuotedbyNathanTwininginNeitherLibertynorSafety

AnotherPrinciple:Poise

AirForcesmorethansurfaceforcesmustconsciouslyanticipate,posture,and
ready their fighting forces to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. In the
vernacular, they must be springloaded without being overcommitted to one
anticipatedcourseofevents.Inthefighterpilotvernacular,commandelementsmust
"leadturn," or constantly stay ahead of, events; they must develop cues to guide
increasedsurveillanceandalertstatus;theymustbementallypreparedtoherdthe
enemyratherthansimplyreact.Theexperienceofwarindicatesthatcommanders
must also economize alertness by aggressively relaxing their forces when
opportunitiesforrecoveryandrestareachieved.Onlyruthlessreductionofsensor
andinformationdata,todistinguishessentialsfromalltheavailableinformation,
canpermitthementalclaritynecessaryforoptimumpoiseandperception.
SuggestedbytheideasofClausewitz,OnWar
Command
HumanFactorsinWar..........................................................................................143

ProfessionalGrowth..............................................................................................144

Command...............................................................................................................148

Advice.....................................................................................................................151

TheCommanderandtheStaff..............................................................................153

AdministrationandCombatSupport...................................................................157

InformationManagement......................................................................................159

TheOperationsOrder............................................................................................161

FieldOrderNo.2...................................................................................................162

CommandArrangements......................................................................................164

FieldManual10020..............................................................................................167
HumanFactorsinWar

Alltheseattemptsattheoryareonlytobeconsideredintheiranalyticalpartas
progressintheprovinceoftruth;butintheirsyntheticalpart,intheirpreceptsand
rules,theyarequiteunserviceable.
Theystriveafterdeterminatequantities,whilstinWarallisundetermined,and
thecalculationhasalwaystobemadewithvaryingquantities.
Theydirecttheattentiononlyuponmaterialforces,whilethewholeactionis
penetratedthroughoutbyintelligentforcesandtheireffects.
Theyonlypayattentiontoactivityononeside,whilstWarisaconstantstateof
reciprocalactionstheeffectsofwhicharemutual....
Everytheorybecomesinfinitelymoredifficultfromthemomentittouchesonthe
provinceofmoralquantities.
Clausewitz

Withequalorinferiorpowerofdestructionhewillwinwhohastheresolutionto
advance, who by his formations and maneuvers can continually threaten his
adversary with a new phase of material action, who, in a word, has the moral
ascendancy.
ArdantduPicq

ProfessionalGrowth

Every art has its rules and maxims. One must study them: theory facilitates
practice. The lifetime of one man is not long enough to enable him to acquire
perfect knowledge and experience. Theory helps to supplement it, it provides a
youthwithprematureexperienceandmakeshimskillfulthroughthemistakesof
others.
FredericktheGreat

In sum the leader has to achieve a balance between the essential need for
professionalcompetenceinhisowntechnicalfieldandthatbroaderunderstanding
of human problems which can only be achieved from a wide and largely self
acquirededucation.
S.W.Roskill

Ifwewishtothinkclearly,wemustceaseimitating;ifwewishtoceaseimitating,
wemustmakeuseofourimagination.Wemusttrainourselvesfortheunexpected
inplaceoftrainingothersforthecutanddried.Audacity,andnotcaution,mustbe
ourwatchword.
J.F.C.Fuller
Theessentialbasisofthemilitarylifeistheorderedapplicationofforceunderan
unlimitedliability.Itistheunlimitedliabilitywhichsetsthemanwhoembraces
thislifesomewhatapart.Hewillbe(orshouldbe)alwaysacitizen.Solongashe
serveshewillneverbeacivilian.
GeneralSirJohnW.Hackett

Trainingislightandlackoftrainingisdarkness.Theproblemfearstheexpert.A
trainedmanisworththreeuntrained:that'stoolittlesaysix;sixistoolittlesay
tentoone....
AlexanderSuvorov

Agreatcaptaincanbeformedonlybylongexperienceandintensestudy;neitheris
hisownexperienceenoughforwhoselifeistheresufficientlyfruitfulofeventsto
renderhisknowledgeuniversal?
ArchdukeCharlesofAustria

Itiscommontoseemenwhohaveusedalltheirlimbswithoutonceintheirlives
having utilized their minds. Thought, the faculty of combining ideas, is what
distinguishesmanfromabeastofburden.Amulewhohascarriedapackforten
campaignsunderPrinceEugenewillbenobetteratacticianforit,anditmustbe
confessed,tothedisgraceofhumanity,thatmanymengrowoldinanotherwise
respectableprofessionwithoutmakinganygreaterprogressthanthismule.
FredericktheGreat

Intheprofessionofwartherulesoftheartareneverviolatedwithoutdrawing
punishmentfromtheenemywhoisdelightedtofindusatfault.Anofficercan
sparehimselfmanymistakesbyimprovinghimself.
FredericktheGreat

Educationisatwoedgedsword.Ifitindoctrinateswithrigidprinciples,constantly
hammering home the fixed and immutable nature of those principles, and if it
offersneatsolutionstoeveryhumanproblemintermsofthesefixedprinciples,
thenchangeanddevelopmentcannottakeplace.
Dale0.Smith

Themanwhocan'tmakeamistakecan'tmakeanything.
AbrahamLincoln

Todaywemaintainourselves.Tomorrow,sciencewillhavemovedforwardyetone
more step and there will be no appeal from the judgment which will then be
pronouncedontheuneducated.
AlfredNorthWhitehead

Perhapsthemostvaluableresultofalleducationistheabilitytomakeyourselfdo
thethingyouhavetodo,whenitoughttobedone,whetheryoulikeitornot.
T.H.Huxley

Few men during their lifetime come anywhere near exhausting the resources
dwellingwithinthem.Therearedeepwellsofstrengththatareneverused.
AdmRichardE.Byrd

In essence, courage is the ability to react positively to the challenge of the


unknown.Theunknownisinthemainsynonymouswiththefuture,whoseevents
areanticipatedonlyinthelightofexperience,thesoleheritageofthepast.The
futureisthehomeoffear.Itisnotpossibletofearthepast.
J.M.Cameron
Command

Wewantcommandersnotcommitteestosendourtroopsintobattle.
W.G.Wyman

Thefirstqualityforacommanderinchiefisacoolhead,whichreceivesacorrect
impressionofthings.Heshouldnotallowhimselftobeconfusedbyeithergoodor
badnews.Theimpressionswhichhereceivessuccessivelyorsimultaneouslyinthe
courseofadayshouldclassifythemselvesinhismindinsuchawayastooccupy
theplaceswhichtheymerit,forreasonandjudgmentaretheresultofcomparison
ofvariousimpressionstakenintojustconsideration.
Napoleon

Thequalificationsofthecombatcommanderdeterminetoalargerextentthanany
othersingleelementtheeffectivenessofaunitincombat.
"Hap"Arnold

Thefirstrequirementtobeamilitaryleaderistoknowthoroughlyone'sspecialty,
andthesecondtobeloyaltoone'ssubordinates.Bothconditionswillsaveonefrom
mutualdisloyalty.
SimonBolivar

Rememberthis:thetrulygreatleaderovercomesalldifficulties,andcampaigns
andbattlesarenothingbutalongseriesofdifficultiestobeovercome.Thelackof
equipment,thelackoffood,thelackofthisorthatareonlyexcuses;therealleader
displayshisqualityinhistriumphsoveradversity,howevergreatitmaybe.
GeorgeC.Marshall

Idon'tmindbeingcalledtough,becauseinthisracketit'sthetoughguyswholead
thesurvivors.
CurtisLeMay

LeMayapproachedleadershipwiththreebasicprinciplesinmind....Hebelieved,
first,thatsupervisorsandassociatesmustrecognizetheimportanceofeachman's
jobortask,aswellasofthemanhimself.Second,someprogress,howeversmall,
mustbemadetowardanestablishedgoal;otherwiseseriousdissatisfactionwill
develop.Lastly,commandersandsupervisorsmustrecognizeanddemonstratereal
appreciationtothosewhohaveaccomplishedtheirassignedtasks.
HarryBorowski
ThenameofTrenchardspellsoutconfidenceintheRAFandwewouldnotloseit
byhearinghimdecried.Wethinkofhimasimmense,notbywhathesays,forheis
asnearascanbeinarticulate:hiswordsbarelyenoughtomakementhinkthey
divinehisdrift:andnotbywhathewrites,forhemakestheleastuseofwhatmust
betheworld'sworsthandwriting:butjustbywhatheis.Heknows;andbyvirtue
ofthispolestarofknowledgehesteersthroughalltheingenuityandcleverness
andhesitationsofthelittlemenwhohelporhinderhim.Trenchardinventedthe
touchstonebywhichtheAirCounciltryalltheirworks."Willthis,orwillthisnot,
promotetheconquestoftheair?"
T.E.Lawrence,whileenlistedasAircraftsmanRoss

No normal young man is likely to recognize in himself the qualities that will
persuadeotherstofollowhim.Ontheotherhand,anymanwhocancarryout
orders in a cheerful spirit, complete his work step by step, use imagination in
improvingit,andthenwhenthejobisdone,canfacetowardhisnextdutywith
anticipation,needhavenoreasontodoubthisowncapacityforleadership.
S.L.A..Marshall

Thecommandershouldpracticekindnessandseverity,shouldappearfriendlyto
thesoldiers,speaktothemonthemarch,visitthemwhiletheyarecooking,ask
themiftheyarewellcaredfor,andalleviatetheirneedsiftheyhaveany.Officers
withoutexperienceinwarshouldbetreatedkindly.Theirgoodactionsshouldbe
praised.Smallrequestsshouldbegrantedandtheyshouldnotbetreatedinan
overbearingmanner,butseverityismaintainedabouteverythingregardingduty.
FredericktheGreat
Advice

Nevertellpeoplehowtodothings.Tellthemwhattodoandtheywillsurpriseyou
withtheiringenuity.
GeorgePatton

Everygeneralinchiefwhoundertakestoexecuteaplanthatheknowstobebadis
culpable. He should communicate his reasons, insist on a change of plan, and
finally resign his commission rather than become the instrument of his army's
ruin.
Napoleon

When things go wrong in your command, start searching for the reason in
increasinglylargerconcentriccirclesaroundyourowndesk.
GenBruceC.Clarke

The principal task of the general is mental, involving large projects and major
arrangements. But since the best dispositions become useless if they are not
executed,itisessentialthatthegeneralshouldbeindustriousinseeingwhether
hisordersareexecutedornot.
FredericktheGreat

Beaseconomicalwithyourmen'sphysicalresourcesasyoumustbewithyour
own,andguardbothascarefullyasmaterial,munitionsorfuel.Aboveall,practice
inpeaceonyourselfandyourmen.Industriousnessistoooftenequated,falsely,to
efficiencyinapeacetimeforce;yetifitbecomesahabititcouldbe,inwar,aself
inflictedwound.
AirViceMarshalJohnR.Walker

Moralemakesupthreequartersofthegame,therelativebalanceofmanpower
accountsforonlytheremainingquarter.
Napoleon
TheCommanderandtheStaff

Orderordisorderdependsonorganization.
SunTzu

Ihad[thegeneral]assemblehiswholestaffandtriedtogivethemapictureof
whatwewereupagainstinNewGuinea.Thatwaswherethewarwasanditwas
not moving to Australia. Those youngsters up there were our customers and
customersarealwaysright.Ouronlyexcuseforlivingwastohelpthem.Wemight
work ourselves into having stomach ulcers or nervous breakdowns, but those
thingswerenotfatal.TheworkthosekidsinNewGuineaandatDarwinwere
doing,however,hadahighfatalityrate.Theydeservedalltheycouldget.Mostof
thecrowdappreciatedwhatIwastalkingabout.Theotherswouldgohome.
GeorgeKenney

Thefinaltestofcompletedstaffworkisthis:Ifyouyourselfwerethecommander,
wouldyoubewillingtosignthepaperyouhaveprepared?Wouldyoustakeyour
professionalreputationonitsbeingright?Ifyouranswerwouldbe"No,"takethe
paperbackandreworkit,becauseitisnotyetcompletedstaffwork.
Anonymousmonograph,quotedbyRobertD.Heinl,Jr.

The leader must know what he wants, think rapidly, andtell his subordinates
clearlyandsimplywhatisdesired.Theleadershouldalwaysseektheeasy,correct
waytoperformatask.Veryfrequentlythisisnotdone.Thebrightsubordinate
quicklydetectstheinefficiencyofhissuperiorwhenhedoesthingsthehardway.
MajGenCharlesH.Corlett

Thestaffissimplytheservant ofthegeneralforce;itexistsbuttofurtherthe
welfareofthefightingestablishment.Thosewithinitareremissiftheyfailtokeep
thisruleuppermost.
S.L.A..Marshall

MyLord,
IfIattemptedtoanswerthemassoffutilecorrespondencethatsurroundsmeI
shouldbedebarredfromallseriousbusinessofcampaigning.
I must remind your Lordshipfor the last timethat so long as I retain an
independent position, I shall see to it that no officer under my command is
debarred,bymerequilldrivinginyourLordship'soffice,fromattendingtohisfirst
duty, which is, and always has been, so to train the private men under his
commandthattheymay,
withoutquestion,bestanyforceopposedtotheminthefield.
Iam,myLord
Yourobedientservant,
Wellington
Possiblyapocryphalcorrespondence,supposedlywrittenin1810

In peacetime, absolute accountability is required because dollar economy in


operationsisamainobject.Thisentailsadherencetorigidforms,timeconsuming,
butstillnecessary.
S.L.A..Marshall

Abulkystaffimpliesadivisionofresponsibility,slownessofactionandindecision,
whereasasmallstaffimpliesactivityandconcentrationofpurpose.
WilliamTecumsehSherman

When service at sea was constant and battle more and more rare, there was a
natural inclination to devote more attention to seamanship than to warlike
exercises.Iftherewastimeleftoverfromseamanshipdrills(andattentiontothe
outwarddisplaywhichisalwayslikely,inadisciplinedserviceduringaperiodof
stagnation,tobeacceptedasamarkofefficiency)itcouldbeemployedingunnery
drillsdevotedtomaintainingahighrateoffire;theywereimpressivetobeholdand
did not have the disadvantages of actual target practice, in which the powder
consumedwaslikelytomakepaintworkdirtyandhadtobeaccountedfortoa
niggardlyandhardpressedgovernment.
C.S.ForesterexplainingthedeclineoftheRoyalNavy,leadingtotheir
stunningtacticaldefeatsintheWarof1812
AdministrationandCombatSupport

Whenadministrationandordersareinconsistent,themen'sspiritsarelow,and
theofficersexceedinglyangry.
ChangYucommentingonSunTzu

A battle sometimes decides everything, and sometimes the most trifling thing
decidesthefateofabattle.
Napoleon

Imusthaveassistantswhowillsolvetheirownproblemsandtellmelaterwhat
theyhavedone.
GeorgeC.Marshall

NobodyintheBritishArmyeverreadsaregulationoranorderasifitweretobea
guideforhisconduct,orinanyothermannerthanasanamusingnovel;andthe
consequence is, that when complicated arrangements are to be carried into
execution...everygentlemanproceedsaccordingtohisfancy,andthenwhenitis
foundthatthe[mission]fails(asitmustfailiftheorderisnotstrictlyobeyed)they
comeuponmetosetmattersrightandthusmylaborisincreasedtenfold.
Wellington

Itisnotrecognizedthattheobjectofregulationsandrulesistoproduceorderinthe
fightingmachine,andnottostranglethemindofthemanwhocontrolsit.
J.F.C.Fuller

Rules can certainly be burdensome and sometimes foolish; but if they are
misbegottentheyoughttobeabolishedcompletelyratherthanselectivelywaived.
Awiseruleshouldnotbeappliedselectivelyeither.
TheEconomist,28January1989

Therehasbeenaconstantstruggleonthepartofthemilitaryelementtokeepthe
endfighting,orreadinesstofightsuperiortomereadministrativeconsiderations.
Themilitaryman,havingtodothefighting,considersthatthechiefnecessity;the
administratorequallynaturallytendstothinkthesmoothrunningofthemachine
themostadmirablequality.
AlfredThayerMahan

Any commander who fails to exceed his authority is not of much use to his
subordinates.
ArleighBurke
InformationManagement

Unityofactiondevelopsfromfullnessofinformation.Incombat,allrankshaveto
knowwhatisbeingdone,andwhyitisbeingdone,ifconfusionistobekepttoa
minimum.Thisholdstrueinalltypesofoperation,whatevertheService.However,
asurfeitofinformationcloudsthemindandmaysometimesdepressthespirit.
S.L.A..Marshall

The central problem is not collecting and transmitting information, but


synthesizingforthedecisionmaker.
RichardBurt

Thereareno"battlemanagement"magicbulletsthatwillsubstitutefortheability
ofonscenecommanders,soldiers,andairmentomakeappropriatedecisionsbased
ontheebbandflowofevents.
RichardP.Hallion

Todoourworkweallhavetoreadamassofpapers.Nearlyallofthemarefartoo
long.Thiswastestime,whileenergyhastobespentinlookingforvitalpoints.
Iaskmycolleaguesandtheirstaffstoseetoitthattheirreportsareshorter.
Theaimshouldbeshortreportswhichsetoutthemainpointsinaseriesof
shortcrispparagraphs....
Letushaveanendofsuchphrasesasthese:"Itisalsoofimportancetobearin
mindthefollowingconsiderations..."or"Considerationshouldbegiventothe
possibility of carrying into effect. . . ." Most of these woolly phrases are mere
paddingwhichcanbeleftoutaltogether,orreplacedbyasingleword.
Let us not shrink from using the short expressive phrase, even if it is
conversational.
ReportsdrawnuponthelinesIproposemayatfirstseemroughascompared
with the flat officialese jargon. But the saving in time will be great, while the
discipline of setting out the real points concisely will prove an aid to clearer
thinking.
WinstonChurchillin1940
TheOperationsOrder

ThecurrentoperationsorderusedinAirForceandjointplansandoperations
predatestheestablishmentoftheAirForce.CurtisLeMaysaidthemostimportant
thinghelearnedattheAirCorpsTacticalSchoolwastheoperationsorderformat.
Knownasthefieldorder,thefiveparagraphfieldorder,andtheoperationsplan,
thisorderhasdirectedtheactionsofairmenincombatsinceWorldWarII.
Theprinciplevirtueoftheoperationsorderisthatitbrieflystatesthemissionsof
subordinatecommands,whileclearlystatingtheobjectivesofhigherechelons.
Forexample.considertheoperationsorderofanairdivision.
1. Situation. Depicts the overall enemy situation and the objective of the
numberedairforce.
2.Mission.Statestheobjectiveassignedtotheissuingheadquarters,inthiscase
theairdivision.
3. Execution. Assigns subordinate objectives to each wing that will lead to
accomplishingtheairdivision'soverallobjective.
4. AdministrationandLogistics (alsoknownas ServiceSupport).Assigns
necessarymeansforaccomplishingtheobjective.
5.CommandandSignal.Providesnonroutinecommunicationsinstructionsthat
subordinateechelonsneedfortheirmissions.
HEADQUARTERS
ALLIEDAIRFORCES
APO.929
September8,1942.
FIELDORDER)
:
NO. 2)

MAPS:NewGuineaArea
HydrographicchartsSeaapproachesNewGuinea.

1 . a.The enemy has concentrated large air, land andnaval forces inthe
RabaulFaisi Area. He has a small force at Milne Bay, which he supplies and
probablyreinforcesnightly.Heisattackinginconsiderablestrengthourtroopsin
theEfogiarea,withtheapparentintentionofalandapproachtoMoresby.Heis
slowly moving up to Bulolo Valley against our Kanga force on the left, as a
diversioninsupportofhismaineffortatEfogi.
ItisbelievedthattheenemymaysoonattempttoreinforcestronglyMilneBay
force,aswellashisgroundforcesintheBunaarea.Heisexpectedtoreinforce
heavilyhisairunitsatLae,SalamauaandBunabetweenSeptember10thand
14th, with the objective of furnishing strong air support to the land forces
operatingagainstMoresby.
b.OurAirForcesintheMoresbyareaarebeingreinforcedbytwofighter
squadronsandaBeaufighterSquadronatonce.NineB17'sandeightB26'swill
beheldatMoresbyforastrikingforce.
2. This Air Force will attack and destroy enemy convoys approaching New
Guinea,andwillprevent,thrubombingandstraffingraidsonhisairdromes,the
effectiveemploymentofhisairforcebytheenemy.
3.a.TheNineteenthBombardmentGroupwillmaintainaforceofnineB17's
atMoresby,andastrikingforceofallotheravailableB17'sandcrewsatMareeba.
The force at Moresby, acting under the direct orders of this headquarters, will
attack and destroy enemy convoys approaching New Guinea. The Commanding
General, Rear Echelon, Townsville, will employ the striking force at Mareeba
against suitable enemy convoy movements toward New Guinea, acting upon
informationreceivedfromreconnaissanceaircraftandcoastwatchers.
b.TheTwentySecondBombardmentGroupwillmaintainaforceofeightB
26's at Moresby, and a reserve of all other available aircraft and crews in the
Townsville area. The force at Moresby, acting under the direct orders of this
headquarters,willattackanddestroyenemyshippingapproachingthenorthcoast
of New Guinea, and will be employed also against enemy airdromes in New
Guinea.ThereserveintheTownsvilleareawillbeoncalltothisheadquarterson
onehoursnoticeeffective0000ZSeptember10th.
c.TheThirdBombardmentGroupwillmaintainaforceoftwentyfiveA20's
inthe89thSquadron(Reinforced)atMoresby.Itwillmaintainareserveofall
availableA20'sandB25'sintheTownsvilleareaoncalltothisheadquarterson
onehoursnoticeeffective0000ZSeptember10th.TheforceatMoresbywillattack
enemy airdromes on orders from this headquarters, destroying enemy aircraft,
materielandpersonnelwithmachinegunfireandparachutebombs.
d.TheFighterCommand(Provisional)willprotectlocalairdromesandvital
installationsfromgroundandairalertstatus.Itwillbepreparedtoescortlight
andmediumbombardmentonmissionswithintherangeofitsequipment.Itwill
assist bombardment in its mission of destroying enemy aircraft on the ground
whenlackofenemyairstrengthpermitsgroundstaffing.Itwillmaintainareserve
oftwelveP40'sandcrewsatMoresby,areserveofallavailableP30aircraftand
crews in the Townsville area, and a reserve of ten P400's and crews in the
Townsville area, all on call to this headquarters on one hours notice. Escort of
fighter replacements to Moresby will be performed by B 25 aircraft of the 3rd
Bomb.Group.
e.TheNinthOperationalGroup(RAAF),lessallbutoneflightofthe30th
Squadron,ischargedwiththelocaldefenseofMilneBay,operatingagainstenemy
convoysapproachingMilneBaywithintheeffectiverangeofitsequipment,and
preventingeffectiveenemyairattacksonairdromesandvitalinstallations.
The30thSquadron,lessoneflight,willattackanddestroyenemyaircrafton
New Guinea airdromes with cannon and machine gun fire on orders from this
headquarters.
No. 6 Squadron of the Ninth Operational Group will maintain a
reconnaissanceduringdaylighthoursoftheseawardapproachestoMilneBay,as
well as daily surveillance of the D'entre Casteau Islands and the Louisiade
archipelago. Detailed and specific coverages will be assigned daily by this
headquarters.
f.The435thReconnaissanceSquadronwillmaintainaclosesearchofthesea
approachestoNewGuineafromRabaul,FaisiandTruk.Specificcoverageswillbe
assigneddailybythisheadquarters.
g.The8thPhotoSquadronwillmaintainaclosesurveillanceduringdaylight
hours of the North Coast of New Guinea from Finschhafen to Tufi peninsula,
reportinganyenemyshippingimmediately,particularlyenemyairconcentrations
onairdromesatLae,SalamauaandBuna.
4.Nochange.
5.SeedailyAnnextoOperationsOrders.
BycommandofBrigadierGeneralWHITEHEAD:
F.H.SMITHJr.,
Colonel,AirCorps,
OFFICIAL: ChiefofStaff.
WILLIAMG.HIPPS,
Major,AirCorps,
ACofS.G3.
CommandArrangements

Itisastonishinghowobstinatealliesare,howparochiallyminded,howridiculously
sensitivetoprestigeandhowwrappedupinobsoletepoliticalideas.Itisequally
astonishinghowtheyfailtoseehowbroadmindedyouare,howclearyourpicture
is, howupto dateyouareandhow cooperative andbigheartedyou are. It is
extraordinary.
FieldMarshalSirWilliamSlim

Theproverbialweaknessofalliancesisduetoinferiorpowerofconcentration.
AlfredThayerMahan

This is notably less of a limitation for combined air forces, which can be
concentrated in space and time, can provide simultaneous supporting efforts if
differently equipped, can mutually support one another in many ways, and can
concentrateovertimeonparticulartargetsystems,objectives,andcampaigns.

Of all the lessons we learned about tactical air operations, perhaps the most
importantisthattheaircommander,hisgroupandsquadroncommandersmust
haveasinceredesiretobecomepartofthegroundteam.TheArmymust,ofcourse,
havethesamededicationtoreciprocate.Thiscloseliaisoncancomeonlyfromclose
daytoday contactespecially at command levels; there must be almost
instantaneouscommunicationbetweengroundandairandthroughallthechainof
command.
LtGenElwoodR.("Pete")Quesada

AtthestartofWorldWarII,servicecooperationandeventaskforcecooperation
wasoftencreaky,inadequate,downrightbad.Inrearareasandinoverallconcepts
andpoliciesandaboveallinresults,servicerivalriesandobsoleteorselfishand
arbitraryrestrictionsmarredthewareffortintheopeningmonths.
HansonBaldwin

Thegreatestlessonofthiswarhasbeentheextenttowhichair,land,andsea
operationscanandmustbecoordinatedbyjointplanningandunifiedcommand.
The attainment of better coordination and balance than now exists between
servicesisanessentialofnationalsecurity.
"Hap"Arnold

It[ajointcommittee]leadstoweakandfalteringdecisionsorratherindecisions.
Why,youmaytakethemostgallantsailor,themostintrepidairman,orthemost
audacioussoldier,putthematatabletogetherwhatdoyouget?Thesumoftheir
fears.
AttributedtoWinstonChurchill

It turned out to be another scrambled outfit . . . with so many lines of


responsibility,control, and coordination on the chart that itresembleda canof
wormsasyoulookedatit.ImadeanotetotellWalkertotakecharge,tearupthe
chart, and have no one issue orders around there except himself. After he got
thingsoperatingsimply,quickly,andefficientlyhecoulddrawupanewchartifhe
wantedto.
GeorgeKenney

Mutualsupportisthefundamentalbasisuponwhichtheairsurfacerelationshipis
founded.
AirForceManual13,1953
FM10020

FIELDSERVICEREGULATIONS

COMMANDANDEMPLOYMENT
OFAIRPOWER

SECTIONI
DOCTRINEOFCOMMAND
ANDEMPLOYMENT
1. RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES.LAND POWER
AND AIR POWER ARE COEQUAL AND
INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER IS AN
AUXILIARYOFTHEOTHER.
2. DOCTRINE OF EMPLOYMENT.THE GAINING
OF AIR SUPERIORITY IS THE FIRST
REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUCCESS OF ANY
MAJORLANDOPERATION.AIRFORCESMAYBE
PROPERLY AND PROFITABLY EMPLOYED
AGAINST ENEMY SEA POWER, LAND POWER,
AND AIR POWER. HOWEVER, LAND FORCES
OPERATING WITHOUT AIR SUPERIORITY MUST
TAKE SUCH EXTENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES
AGAINST HOSTILE AIR ATTACK THAT THEIR
MOBILITY AND. ABILITY TO DEFEAT THE
ENEMYLANDFORCESAREGREATLYREDUCED.
THEREFORE,AIRFORCESMUSTBEEMPLOYED
PRIMARILYAGAINSTTHEENEMY'SAIRFORCES
UNTILAIRSUPERIORITYISOBTAINED.INTHIS
WAY ONLY CAN DESTRUCTIVE AND
DEMORALIZING AIR ATTACKS AGAINST LAND
FORCES BE MINIMIZED AND THE INHERENT
MOBILITYOFMODERNLANDANDAIRFORCES
BEEXPLOITEDTOTHEFULLEST.
3. COMMAND OF AIR POWER.THE INHERENT
FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER, IS ITS GREATEST
ASSET.THISFLEXIBILITYMAKES
ITPOSSIBLE TO EMPLOY THE WHOLE WEIGHT
OF THE AVAILABLE AIR POWER AGAINST
SELECTED AREAS IN TURN; SUCH
CONCENTRATED USE OF THE AIR STRIKING
FORCEISABATTLEWINNINGFACTOROFTHE
FIRST IMPORTANCE. CONTROL OF AVAILABLE
AIR POWER MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND
COMMAND MUST BE EXERCISED THROUGH
THEAIR
FORCE COMMANDER IF THIS INHERENT
FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A
DECISIVEBLOWARETOBEFULLYEXPLOITED.
THEREFORE,THECOMMANDOFAIRAND
GROUND FORCES IN A THEATER OF
OPERATIONS WILL BE VESTED IN THE
SUPERIOR COMMANDER CHARGED WITH THE
ACTUAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN THE
THEATER,WHO
WILL EXERCISE COMMAND OF AIR FORCES
THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER AND
COMMANDOFGROUNDFORCESTHROUGHTHE
GROUND FORCE COMMANDER. THE SUPERIOR
COMMANDER WILL NOT ATTACH ARMY AIR
FORCES TO UNITS OF THE GROUND FORCES
UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT WHEN SUCH
GROUND FORCE UNITS ARE OPERATING
INDEPENDENTLY OR ARE ISOLATED BY
DISTANCEORLACKOFCOMMUNICATION.

JULY1943
Doctrine

Basics......................................................................................................................171
Terminology...........................................................................................................174
Basics

Those who are possessed of a definitive body of doctrine and of deeply rooted
convictionsuponitwillbeinamuchbetterpositiontodealwiththeshiftsand
surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking short views, and
indulgingtheirnaturalimpulsesastheyareevokedbywhattheyreadfromdayto
day.
WinstonChurchill

Theorganizationofmenandmachines intomilitaryforcesdoesnotnecessarily
meanthattheyareequippedandtrainedfortheaccomplishment,ifnecessary,of
decisive action in war. For this, the discipline of a coherent body of thought
appearstobeindispensable.
EugeneEmme

Inshort,doctrineiswhatisofficiallyapprovedtobetaught.Butitisfarmorethan
justthat.Doctrineisthedepartureforvirtuallyeveryactivityintheairarm.
I.B.Holley,Jr.

Onemightsaythatdoctrineistheschoolofthoughtonwarwhichisinvogueatany
onetime.
Dale0.Smith

Thestandardizationoftechniqueofoperationsisnotpossibleinthisglobalwar,for
90timesoutof100anideathatsucceedsinItalywillnotworkinNewGuinea.
Hence we must be versatileour tactics must be susceptible to changeour
commandingofficersmusthaveingenuityandimagination.
"Hap"Arnold

Doctrineislikeacompassbearing;itgivesusthegeneraldirectionofourcourse.
Wemaydeviatefromthatcourseonoccasion,buttheheadingprovidesacommon
purposetoallwhotravelalongtheway.Thisputsagraveburdenonthosewho
formulate doctrine, for a small error, even a minute deviation, in our compass
bearinguponsettingout,mayplaceusmanymilesawayfromthetargetattheend
oftheflight.Ifthosewhodistilldoctrinefromexperienceordeviseitfromlogical
inferenceintheabstractfailtoexercisetheutmostrigorintheirthinking,the
wholeservicesuffers.
I.B.Holley,Jr.

Thetraditionsamongallthearmedservicesaremucholderthananygovernment,
moreconservativethananydepartmentofgovernment,andmoresuretobuildon
afoundationthattheyarecertainof,ratherthantotakeanychanceofmakinga
mistake.
BillyMitchell

TherearetensofthousandsofindividualsintheAirForcewhosetrainingand
traditionsleadthemtoidentifywithoneoranotherofthemajorcommands,with
SACorTAC,orMAC.Andeachofthesebespeaksavestedinterest.Eachsuch
interestmustbeplacated,reconciled,accommodated.Thesenecessities,alongwith
theneverendingconfrontationswithotherservicesfightingforrolesandmissions,
keepthepresentdayguardiansofAirForcedoctrineeternallyontherun.They
aresobusyputtingoutfires,fewofthemfindtimeinwhichtothinkatleisure.
I.B.Holley,Jr.

Understanding requires theory; theory requires abstraction; and abstraction


requiresthesimplificationandorderingofreality....Obviously,therealworldis
oneofblends,irrationalities,andincongruities:actualpersonalities,institutions,
andbeliefsdonotfitintoneatlogicalcategories.Yetneatlogicalcategoriesare
necessaryifmanistothinkprofitablyabouttherealworldinwhichhelivesandto
derivefromitslessonsforbroaderapplicationanduse.
SamuelP.Huntington
Terminology

Theclarityandthereforetheutilityofdoctrineisadirectproductofhowwell
languageisusedinitswriting.

How many a dispute could have been deflated into a single paragraph if the
disputantshadjustdaredtodefinetheirterms.
Aristotle

Thebeginningofwisdomiscallingthingsbytheirrightnames.
Confucius

OnJuly26,1945,thePotsdamDeclarationurgedJapantosurrender.Thereupon
the Japanese Cabinet agreed that it was time to make peace, and on July 28
PremierSuzukiannouncedapolicyof"mokosatsu."Thisunfortunatewordhasno
exactcounterpartinEnglish.Itsapproximatemeaningis"towithholdcomment,"
butitalsomeans"toignore."TheDomeiNewsAgencyatoncebroadcastinEnglish
thattheCabinethaddecidedtoignorethePotsdamultimatum.Aftertheatomic
bombshadbeendropped,PresidentTrumancitedtheJapaneserejectionofthe
ultimatumasareason.Convincingevidenceavailablesincethenshowsthatthe
Premierhadindeedmeanttoconvey"nocomment,"withtheimplicationthata
significantannouncementwouldcomelater.Connoisseursoftheifsofhistorysay
that the right translation could have brought quick peace without atomic
explosions.
PeterT.White
PROFESSIONALREADING
OnAirPowerandWar

Emme,EugeneM.TheImpactofAirPower.Princeton,N.J.:D.VanNostrandCo.,
Inc.,1959.Thisgreatanthologyconsistsof118shortreadingsonairpowerbyover
100authoritiesontheirsubjects.

Frisbee,John L.,ed. MakersoftheUnitedStatesAirForce. Washington,D.C.:


Office of Air Force History, 1986. Twelve brief biographies that span military
aviationhistory.

TheHarmonMemorialLecturesinMilitaryHistory19591987.Washington,
D.C.:OfficeofAirForceHistory,1988.Thirtylecturesbyprominenthistorianson
leaders and leadership, tactics and strategy, history and military affairs.
Worthwhilealoneorasanintroductiontothelecturersandtheirworks.

Nye, Roger H. The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence.


Wayne,N.J.:AveryPublishingGroup Inc.,1986.Althoughthiswaswrittenforan
Army audience, Colonel Nye makes solid recommendations on reading for
professionalgrowth.
OnWar

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton


UniversityPress,1959.Ahighlyreadable and influential book on nuclear
deterrencetheory.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translated by Anatol Rapoport. New York:


PenguinBooks,1968.Theclassicon policy,strategyandwar,whichmanyquote
andafewsharppeopleactuallyread.

SunTzu. TheArt ofWar. Translated by Samuel B.Griffith. New York: Oxford


UniversityPress,1971.Unsurpassed for brevity, insight, and clarity for 2,400
years.ReadingSunTzutodayrevealshowmuchofwarhasneverchanged.

Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. New York:


PenguinBooks,1954.Don'tbemisled:thisisnotabookaboutoneancientwar,but
(astheauthorwrote)"wasdonetolastforever."Theoutbreakofwar,thealliances,
and the changes within the warring states of 400 B.C. are stunningly like
twentiethcenturywars.Agood"reader'sdigest"versionisRexWarner'sAthensat
War.

Weigley,Russell F. TheAmericanWayofWar.Bloomington:IndianaUniversity
Press,1973.Averyreadable survey of American military actions, policy, and
thinkingsincetheRevolution.
OnAirPower

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. Translated by Dino Ferrari.


Washington,D.C.:OfficeofAirForce History, 1983.Fourworks that express the
visionofstrategicairpowerbeforeWorldWarII.

Higham,Robin.AirPower:AConciseHistory.NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,1973.
Justwhatthetitleadvertises.

Slessor,J.C. AirPowerandArmies. London:OxfordUniversityPress,1936.A


brilliantforecastoftacticalair power'scapabilitieswrittenonthebasisofWorld
WarIexperience.

Stokesbury,JamesL.AShortHistoryofAirPower.NewYork:WilliamMorrow
andCo.,Inc.,1986.Anothergoodsurvey.

Warden, John A., III. The Air Campaign. Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1988. A modern look at air operations from the theater and
campaignperspective.
FirstPersonAccountsofAirPowerinWar

Johnson,J.E.WingLeader. NewYork:BallantineBooks,1957.Oneofthebest
featuresofJohnson'swellwritten storyisthevarietyofmissionshedescribes.

Kenney,GeorgeC.GeneralKenneyReports.Washington,D.C.:OfficeofAirForce
History,1987.Kenney's conversationalnarrationoftheairwarintheSouthwest
PacificinWorldWarIIisthebestbookyeton theater air command, fighting
at a disadvantage, organizing a disorganized air force to fight, and creating
operationalopportunities.

Tedder,Arthur. AirPowerinWar. London:HodderandStoughton,1948.Three


lecturesaboutlessonslearned, which clearly show the actual roles and
contributionsofairpowerinWorldWarII.
OnCommand

du Picq, Ardant. Battle Studies. Translated by John N. Greely and Robert C.


Cotton.Harrisburg,Pa.:StackpoleBooks,1987.(PrintedinRootsofStrategy,book
2.)Thiscouldbebettertitled"TheInfluenceofHumanFactorsinMilitaryHistory."

MacDonald, Charles B. Company Commander. New York: Bantam Books,


1978.Thisisanexcellentbookabout personalunitleadershipinthechaosofwar
andthestressoffighting.

Moran,CharlesM.W. The Anatomy of Courage. Boston: Houghton Mifflin


Co.,1967.Churchill'spersonal physiciandescribestheeffectsofcombatonairmen,
soldiers,andmilitaryunits.
SELECTEDBIBLIOGRAPHY
Someofthe sources usedinpreparing this workby nomeans a balanced
bibliographyofairpowerormilitarythought.Somepertinentbibliographies are
listedattheendofthissection.

Arnold,HenryH.("Hap"). ReportoftheCommandingGeneraloftheArmyAir
ForcestotheSecretaryofWar. Washington, D.C.: War Department Bureau of
PublicRelations,1944.Theimmensevarietyofmissionsand tasks covered in
thisreportshowsthecomplexityofglobalwar.

____________.Airmen and Aircraft. New York: Ronald PressCo.,1926. An


introductoryworkforanaviationmindedpublic.

Bingham,Colin.MenandAffairs.NewYork:Funk&Wagnalls,1967.

Bloch,Marc.StrangeDefeat.NewYork:W.W.Norton&Co.,1968.Anearlyand
penetratinganalysisofthefailureofFrenchdoctrinebeforeWorldWarII.

Borowski,HarryR. AHollowThreat. Westport,Conn.:GreenwoodPress,1982.


ThestoryoftheStrategicAirCommandbetweenWorldWarIIandKorea.

Brodie,Bernard.WarandPolitics.NewYork:Macmillan,1973.

____________. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University


Press,1959.

Brown,Neville.TheFutureofAirPower.NewYork:Holmes&MeierPublishers
Inc.,1986.Adetailedsurveyof manysignificantcurrentandemergingchallenges
toairpower.

Cameron,JamesM.TheAnatomyofMilitaryMerit.Philadelphia:Dorrance&Co.,
1960.Byamilitarydoctor, studdedwithworthwhileinsights.

Chase,Stuart. MenandMachines. NewYork:MacmillanCo.,1929.Thechapter


on"TheTwoHourWar"shows contemporaryfearsofairpower.

Churchill,WinstonS.StepbyStep:19361939.NewYork:G.P.Putnam'sSons,
1939.AseriesofmagazinearticleswrittenduringHitler'srisetopowerrevealsthe
tremendousuncertaintiesofeventsastheyhappen.
CondensedAnalysisoftheNinthAirForceintheEuropeanTheaterofOperations.
Washington,D.C.:OfficeofAirForceHistory,1984.

Das,S.T.AnIntroductiontotheArtofWar.NewDelhi:SagarPublications,1970.
WorthwhileforseeingWestern militarytheorythroughanoutsider'seyesplusa
fascinatingsurveyusingsourceslargelyunfamiliartoWesternwriters.

deSeversky, Alexander P. VictoryThrough Air Power. NewYork: Simonand


Schuster,1942.DeSeverskymakesDouhetseemmild.

Doughty, RobertAllan. TheSeedsofDisaster. Hamden,Conn.: ArchonBooks,


1985.AmodernanalysisofFrenchdoctrineproblemsbeforeWorldWarII.

Drew,DennisM.,and DonaldM.Snow. MakingStrategy:AnIntroductionto


National Security Processes and Problems. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University
Press,1988.

____________.TheEagle'sTalons:TheAmericanExperienceatWar.MaxwellAFB,
Ala.:AirUniversityPress,1988.

Eichelberger, Robert L. Our Jungle Roadto Tokyo. Washington, D.C.: Zenger


Publishing Co., Inc., 1982. Vivid depictions of air power from the ground
commander'sviewpoint:ausefulaccompanimenttoKenney.

Elting,JohnR.,DanGragg, and ErnestL.Deal, eds. A DictionaryofSoldier


Talk. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984.Contains such gems as Patton's
famousdrinkrecipe,andthisdefinition:"God(1950s1960s)isGen.CurtisLeMay,
commanderoftheStrategicAirForce."

Frisbee,John L.,ed. MakersoftheUnitedStatesAirForce. Washington,D.C.:


OfficeofAirForceHistory,1987.

Fuller,J.F.C.Generalship:ItsDiseasesandTheirCure.Harrisburg,Pa.:Military
ServicePublishingCo.,1936.

____________. The Generalship of Alexander the Great. New Brunswick, N.J.:


RutgersUniversityPress,1960.

Futrell,Robert F. Ideas,Concepts,Doctrine:AHistoryofBasicThinkinginthe
UnitedStatesAirForce1907 1964.MaxwellAFB,Ala.:AirUniversity,1971.
Galland,Adolf.TheFirstandtheLast.NewYork:HenryHoltandCo.,1954.

Gideon,FrancisC. "CommandoftheTacticalAirForce." MilitaryReview, May


1951.

Goodson,WilfredL.RemarksinPhalanx,June1985.

Gorrell, Edgar S. The Measure of America's World War Aeronautical Effort.


Northfield, Vt.: Norwich University Press, 1940. A brief history of American
aviationactivityinWorldWarI.

Hackett,SirJohnW. TheProfessionofArms. Washington,D.C.:Departmentof


theArmy,1986.

Hall,NorrisF."ScienceinWar,"in TheNextWar. Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard


AlumniBulletinPress,1925.Thislecturecontainsearlyforeshadowingsoffission
andfusionweapons,aswellaschemicalwarfareconcernsthatsoundverycurrent
today.

Heinl, Robert D., Jr. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1966. The most comprehensive book of military
quotationsavailable.

Hemingway,Ernest,ed.MenatWar.NewYork:CrownPublishers,1942.

Hughes,DanielJ."WhenceMilitaryDoctrine?"MilitaryReview,October1988.A
bookreviewessayondoctrinetoday.

Impact:TheArmyAirForce'sConfidentialPictureHistoryofWorldWarII.
8vols.NewYork:JamesPartonandCo.,Inc.,1980.

Johnston,EdwardS."AScienceofWar."TheCGSCQuarterly14,no.53(1934).

Jones,WilliamA.MaximsforMenatArms.Philadelphia:DorranceandCo.,1969.

Knox,DudleyW. "TheRoleofDoctrineinNavalWarfare."USNavalInstitute
Proceedings41,no.2(MarchApril1915).
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2d ed., enlarged.
Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1970.

Lawrence,T.E.,writingas352087AircraftsmanRoss. TheMint. NewYork:W.


W.NortonandCo.,1955.Interestingcommentsonleadershipandmotivation.

LiddellHart,Adrian,ed.TheSwordandthePen.PreparedbyB.H.LiddellHart.
NewYork:ThomasY.CrowellCo.,1976.Ananthologyofmilitarywriting.

LiddellHart, Basil H. Strategy. NewYork:NewAmericanLibrary, Inc.,1954.


Consists of a historical survey of strategy and concludes with a description of
strategictheory,including"TheConcentratedEssenceof Strategy."

____________.ThoughtsonWar.London:FaberandFaberLtd.,1944.

Lindbergh,CharlesA. OfFlightandLife. NewYork:CharlesScribner'sSons,


1948.Abrief(56page)narrationofthreekeyexperiencesduringWorldWarIIand
theauthor'sthoughtsonwar.

Luvaas,Jay.FredericktheGreatontheArtofWar.NewYork:FreePress,1966.

Maclsaac, David. "Master at Arms: Clausewitz in Full View." Air University


ReviewJanuaryFebruary1979.

____________. "Reflections on Airpower in World War II." Air Force Magazine,


September1980.

Marshall,S.L.A.TheOfficerasaLeader.Harrisburg,Pa.:StackpoleBooks,1966.

Mitchell,William. WingedDefense. PortWashington.N.Y.:G.P.Putnam'sSons,


1925.

____________.Skyways.Philadelphia:J.B.LippincottCo.,1930.

Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton


University Press,1986.Of particularinterestareDavidMaclsaac's"Voicesfrom
theCentralBlue:TheAirPowerTheorists"andthesuperiorbibliographyforthat
chapter.

Pike,Douglas.PAVN.Novato,Calif.:PresidioPress,1986.
Powers,BarryD.StrategywithoutSlideRule:BritishAirStrategy191439.New
York:Holmes&MeierPublishers,Inc.,1976.Afinesurveyofthedevelopmentof
Britishairpowerandstrategy.

RootsofStrategy.2vols.Harrisburg,Pa.:StackpoleBooks,1987.Book1contains
writingsbySunTzu,Vegetius, Saxe,Frederick,andNapoleon.Book2consistsof
writingsbyduPicq,Clausewitz,andJomini.

Roskill,S.W.TheArtofLeadership.London:Collins,1948.

Shaw, Robert L. Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering. Annapolis, Md.:


NavalInstitutePress,1985.Pureairtoair,verytechnical,anduptodate.

Slessor,J.C.AirPowerandArmies.London:OxfordUniversityPress,1936.Using
World War I as background, Slessor brilliantly explains tactical air operations,
muchasweknowthemtoday.

Smith,DaleO.U.S.MilitaryDoctrine:AStudyandAppraisal.ForewordbyCarl
Spaatz.NewYork:Duell,Sloan andPearce,1955.

____________.TheEagle'sTalons.Washington,D.C.:SpartanBooks,1966.

Spaatz,CarlA. "StrategicAirPower:FulfillmentofaConcept."ForeignAffairs,
April1946.

____________."IfWeShouldHavetoFightAgain."Life,5July1948.

Tedder,Arthur.AirPowerinWar.London:HodderandStoughton,1948.

Twining, Nathan F.Neither Liberty nor Safety. NewYork: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston,1966.

Walker,JohnR."Leadership."AirClues,October1987.

Watts, Barry D. The Foundations of U.S. Air Force Doctrine: The Problem of
FrictioninWar.MaxwellAFB, Ala.:AirUniversityPress,1984.

Watts,BarryD., and JamesO.Hale. "Doctrine:MereWords,oraKeytoWar


FightingCompetence?"AirUniversityReview,SeptemberOctober1984.
White,WilliamR.LeadershipAbridged.Boston:MeadorPublishingCo.,1956.
SomePertinentBibliographies

Berlin, Robert H. Military Classics. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies


Institute,USArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,1988.Generallygood,but
weakonairpower.

Miller,SamuelDuncan. AnAerospaceBibliography.Washington,D.C.:Officeof
Air Force History, 1978. Thorough but a bit dated. Contains a bibliography of
bibliographies.

Paret,Peter,ed.MakersofModernStrategy.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1986.Thisbookcontains someexcellentbibliographicalessays.

Pisano,DominickA.,and CathleenS.Lewis,eds. AirandSpaceHistory:An


AnnotatedBibliography.NewYork:GarlandPublishing,Inc.,1988.Morerecentbut
notascomprehensiveasMiller's.
CONTRIBUTORS
Alford, Jonathan. Deputy director of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies;authorofnumerousbooksonmodernarmaments;editorofTheImpactof
NewTechnology(1981).

Anderson,OrvilA., MajorGeneral,USAF.Deputydirectorforoperationsofthe
EighthAirForceinWorldWarII.

Andrews, Frank Maxwell, Lieutenant General, US Army Air Forces.


Commanding general of General Headquarters Air Force from 1935 to 1939;
commandinggeneral,USForcesintheEuropeanTheateruntilhisdeathin1943.

Aristotle. Athenianphilosopher,scientist,andphysician;tutortoAlexanderthe
Great.

Arnold, Henry Harley ("Hap"), General of the Air Force. Aviation pioneer;
learnedtoflywiththeWrightbrothers;commanderofArmyAirForcesinWorld
WarIIwhentheseforcesnumbered2,500,000peopleand75,000aircraft;author
ofAirmenandAircraft(1926)andGlobalMission(1949).

Bacon,Francis,ViscountSt.Albans.Elizabethanphilosopher,statesman,writer;
proponentofthescientificmethod.

Baldwin, Hanson. Pulitzer prizewinning military correspondent; renowned for


hiscombatreportingandmilitarythought.

Baldwin,Stanley, FirstEarlBaldwinofBewdley.TwiceprimeministerofGreat
Britain,192331and193537.

Bell,AlexanderGraham.Inventorofthetelephone;earlyaeronauticalscientist;
devotedhimselftoimprovingaircraftdesignduringWorldWarI.

Betts, Richard K. Military analyst; author of Nuclear Blackmail & Nuclear


Balance(1987);editorofCruiseMissiles:Technology,Strategy,Politics(1985).

Bingham,PriceT.,LieutenantColonel,USAF.MilitaryanalystattheAirpower
ResearchInstitute;prolificauthor;advocateofmilitaryhistoricalanalysis.

Blesse,FredC. ("Boots"), MajorGeneral,USAF.Doublejet aceintheKorean


War;advocateofrigorattheUSAFFighterWeaponsSchool;authoroftheclassic
pamphlet"NoGuts,NoGlory."
Bolivar,Simon.NineteenthcenturyliberatorofSouthAmerica.

Borowski, Harry R. Author of A Hollow Threat (1982), a description of the


StrategicAirCommandintheyears between World War II and Gen Curtis E.
LeMay'sreforms.

Bradley, Omar N., General of the Army. Commander of major ground force
echelonsinTunisia,Sicily,andEuropeduringWorldWarII;chairmanoftheJoint
ChiefsofStafffrom1949to1953.

Brodie, Bernard. Eminent strategic thinker; father of nuclear deterrence


theory; author of numerousbooks,includingtheclassics StrategyintheMissile
Age(1959)andWarandPolitics(1973).

Brown, Neville. Futurist; author of The Future of Air Power (1986) and The
FutureGlobalChallenge(1977).

Burke, Arleigh Albert ("ThirtyOne Knot"), Admiral, USN. Highly successful


commanderofDestroyerSquadron23inthePacificduringWorldWarII;major
figureinthe"Admiral'sRevolt";chiefofNavalOperationsfrom1955to1961.

Burt,Richard.Militaryanalyst;authorofNewWeaponsTechnologies (1976)and
ArmsControlandDefensePosturesinthe1980s(1982).

Byrd, Richard Evelyn, Admiral, USN. Pioneer airman and polar explorer;
authorofSkyward(1928),Discovery(1935),andAlone(1938).

Cameron,JamesM.,Colonel,USA.Medicaldoctorandproponentofapplicationof
naturallawtomilitaryscience;authorofTheAnatomyofMilitaryMerit(1960).

ChangYu.SungdynastyauthorofcommentaryonSunTzu.

Charles,ArchdukeofAustria. CommanderoftheAustrianArmyoftheRhein;
wonseveralbattlesagainstFrenchforcesintheNapoleonicera.

Chassin,G.J.M.,General,FrenchAirForce.CommanderofFrenchAirForcesin
Indochinafrom1951to1954.

ChenHao.TangdynastyauthorofcommentsonSunTzu.
Churchill, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer. Prime Minister of Great Britain
duringWorldWarII;militarytrainingatSandhurst;battleexperienceasasoldier
inIndia,Sudan,SouthAfrica,andBelgium;earlycabinetlevelresponsibilitiesfor
theRoyalNavyandRoyalAirForce;hisflairfortheEnglishlanguage wasthe
resultofeducatinghimself;prolificauthorofveryreadablemilitaryhistory.

Clarke,BruceC.,General,USA.CommanderofarmoreddivisionsinWorldWar
II;commanderinchiefofUSAREURandCENTAGfrom1960to1962;authorof
GuidelinesfortheLeaderandtheCommander(1964).

Clausewitz, Carl von, General of Prussia. Commander of large forces in the


NapoleonicWars;authoroftheuncompletedbookOnWar(1832).

Colin,Jean,GeneralofBrigade,FrenchArmy.LecturerattheEcoledeGuerre;
criticoftheoffensivedogmathatprovedsocostlyinWorldWarI;killedinbattle
in 1917; author of The Military Education of Napoleon (1900) and The
TransformationofWar(1912).

Confucius (Kung Futze, or "master Kung"). Fifthcentury B.C. philosopher,


moralist,andhistorian.

Coolidge,Calvin.ThirtiethPresidentoftheUnitedStates(19231929).

Cooper,JohnC.,Commander,USN.CommanderinWorldWarI;aviationscholar
andactivist;authorofTheRighttoFly(1948)andTheFundamentalsofAirPower
(1948).

Corbett,SirJulianS. Influentialnavalhistorianandtheorist;authorof Some


PrinciplesofMaritimeStrategy(1911)andNavalOperations(1920).

Corlett,Charles H.,MajorGeneral,USA.CommanderofTaskForceKiska,the
7thInfantryDivision(atKwajalein),andXIXCorps,inWorldWarII.

Currie, Dr Malcolm. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and


Engineering.

Das,S.T.Indian;authorofAnIntroductiontotheArtofWar(1970).

deSeversky,AlexanderProcofieff, Major,ImperialRussianAirForce.World
WarIcombatflyingboatpilot;designerofleadingsingleenginefighteraircraft,
includingtheP47;prominentairpoweradvocate;authorof VictoryThroughAir
Power(1942)andAirPower:KeytoSurvival(1950).

Donham,WallaceBrett.AuthorofAdministrationandBlindSpots(1952).

Doolittle,JamesHarold("Jimmy"), LieutenantGeneral,USAF.Leaderofthe
Doolittleraid;famousairracerandtestpilot;commanderoftheTwelfth,Fifteenth,
andEighthAirForcesinWorldWarII.

Douglas, William Sholto, Air Marshal, RAF. World War I fighter pilot;
commanderofRAFFighterCommandandCoastalCommandinWorldWarII.

Douhet,Giulio,General,ItalianAirForce.Earlyaviatorandairpoweradvocate;
authorof TheCommandoftheAir (1921)and ProbableAspectsofaFutureWar
(1928).

Drew, Dennis M., Colonel, USAF. Prominent strategic analyst and military
theorist;directoroftheAirpowerResearchInstitute.

Dulles,JohnFoster.SecretaryofStateintheEisenhoweradministration;author
ofWarorPeace(1950);strongsupporterofNATOandSEATO.

duPicq,CharlesArdant,Colonel,FrenchArmy.MilitaryleaderintheCrimean
andFrancoPrussianwars;authoroftheclassicBattleStudies(1870).

Eaker,IraC.,Colonel,andMajGen H.H. ("Hap")Arnold. Authorsof Winged


Warfare(1941).

Earle,EdwardMeade.Eminenthistorian;consultanttoGeneralArnoldontarget
selectioninWorldWarII;authorofTheInfluenceofAirPoweronHistory;editorof
MakersofModernStrategy(1943).

Eilenberger, Gert. Researcher in solidstate theory, superconductivity, and


nonlinearprocesses;professorattheUniversityofCologneintheFederalRepublic
ofGermany.

Eisenhower,DwightDavid,GeneraloftheArmy.ThirtyfourthPresidentofthe
UnitedStates;supremecommanderofAlliedforcesinEuropeinWorldWarII.
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BurstinginAir(1938)andHateHopeandHighExplosives(1948).

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Euripides.AthenianplaywrightandcontemporaryofThucydides.

Foch, Ferdinand, Marshal of France. Commander of the Allied offensive that


endedWorldWarI;authorofThePrinciplesofWar(1903).

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Frontinus(SextusJuliusFrontinus).TwiceconsulofRome;governorofBritainin
thefirstcenturyA.D.;authorofStratagematicon("onwar").

FrederickII("theGreat"),KingofPrussia.Brilliantmilitaryleaderanddomestic
reformer;rebelledagainstmilitarydisciplineasayouthandwascourtmartialed;in
theSevenYears'Warof17561763,heheldoffthearmiesofRussia,France,and
Austria(alllargerpowers)throughadroitmaneuvering,timing,andskill.

Fuller, John Frederick Charles, Major General, British Army. Leading


twentiethcentury military theorist; historian; advocate of mobile warfare;
proponentoftheprinciplesofwarasweknowthemtoday;authorofFoundationsof
theScienceofWar(1923).

Galland, Adolf, Lieutenant General, German Air Force. Inspector general of


fighteraviationandcommanderofthefirstjetfightersquadroninWorldWarII;
authorofTheFirstandtheLast(1954).

Geiger,KeithW.,Colonel,USAF.FormereditorofAirpowerJournal.

Genda, Minoru, Lieutenant General, Japanese Air SelfDefense Force. Air


operations officer and planner for the attack on Pearl Harbor; leader in the
formationofthepostwarJapaneseAirSelfDefenseForce.

Goodson, Wilfred L., Brigadier General, USAF. Fighter pilot (128 missions in
SoutheastAsia);astrophysicist;operationsresearchtheorist;assistantchiefofstaff
for studies and analysis; commander of the Air Force Center for Studies and
Analysis.

Griffith,SamuelB.,II, BrigadierGeneral,USMC.TranslatorofSunTzu(1963)
andMaoTsetung(1961);authorofTheBattleforGuadalcanal(1963).

Groves,PercyRobertClifford,BrigadierGeneral,BritishArmy.AirMinisterfor
BritaininWorldWarI;earlyairprophet;authorof OurFutureintheAir (1935)
andBehindtheSmokeScreen(1934).

Hackett,SirJohnWinthrop,General,BritishArmy.WorldWarIIleaderofelite
units;brigadecommanderduringtheairborneassaultofHolland;authorof The
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Hale,JamesO.,andBarryD.Watts.Authorsof"Doctrine:MereWords,oraKey
toWarFightingCompetence?"inAirUniversityReview.SeptemberOctober1984.

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weaponsinhis1925lecture"ScienceinWar."

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Pilots(1981), RiseoftheFighterAircraft (1984),andTheNavalAirWarinKorea
(1984).

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aide to General Washington; distinguished for bravery at Yorktown; first US
secretaryofthetreasury.

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andNavalQuotations(1966).

Hemingway,Ernest.Americanjournalist,novelist,andshortstorywriter;author
ofAFarewelltoArms(1929)andMenatWar(1942).

HoChiMinh.TwentiethcenturyVietnameserevolutionarytheoristandleader.

Holley,I.B.,Jr.,MajorGeneral,USAF.Eminenthistorianofideas;author
oftheclassicIdeasandWeapons(1953).
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OtherEssays(1984)andClausewitz(1983).

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FortLeavenworth.

Huntington,SamuelP.AuthorofTheSoldierandtheState(1956),thefirstmajor
lookattheUSmilitaryasaprofession.

Huxley, Thomas Henry. British biologist; foremost exponent of Darwinian


thinkingintheVictorianera.

Iino,Matsuichi.JapaneseArmyofficerinWorldWarII;interviewedinReportsof
GeneralMacArthur.

Jackson,Andrew.SeventhPresidentoftheUnitedStates;victorofseveralbattles
intheWarof1812.

Jackson, Robert. Militarysurgeon andfounder ofthemodernstudyof human


factors in war; author of A Systematic View of the Formation, Discipline, and
EconomyofArmies(1804).

Johnson,JamesEdgar("Johnnie"), AirViceMarshal,RAF.WorldWarIIace;
historianofaircombat;authorofWingLeader(1956)andFullCircle(1968).

Jomini,AntoineHenri,GeneralofBrigadeofFranceandLieutenantGeneralof
Russia.ServedasMarshalNey'schiefofstaff;directoroftheFrenchgeneralstaff's
historicalsectionintheNapoleonicWars;authorofTheArtofWar(1855).

Jones,StevenB. Politicalgeographer,professorofgeography;authorof"Global
StrategicViews"inTheImpactofAirPower,ed.EugeneM.Emme.

Jordan,DavidStarr.Californiaactivist,essayist,andpolitician;authorofWar&
Waste:ASeriesofDiscussionsofWarandWarAccessories(1913).

Kenney,GeorgeChurchill, General,USAF.WorldWarIfighterpilotwithtwo
victories; commander of Southwest Pacific Area Air Forces and Far Eastern Air
Forces in World War II; author of General Kenney Reports (1949) and three
biographies.
Koller,Karl, General,GermanAirForce.LastchiefofstaffoftheGermanAir
ForceinWorldWarII.

Lawrence, Thomas Edward, Colonel, British Army, Aircraftsman, Royal Air


Force.LeaderoftheArabrevoltagainsttheOttomanTurkishempireinWorldWar
I;linguist,scholar,archaeologist,andwriter.

Lay,Beirne,Jr.,Colonel,USAF.EighthAirForcestaffofchiefinWorldWarII;
authorandscreenwriterofO'ClockHigh(1948).

LeMay, Curtis Emerson, General, USAF. Commander of 3d Bomb Division in


EuropeandchiefofstaffoftheStrategicAirForcesinthePacificinWorldWarII;
commander of USAFE during the Berlin airlift; modernizer of the Strategic Air
Command;chiefofstafffrom1961to1965.

Lenin(formerlyUlyanov),VladimirIlyich. Russianrevolutionaryleaderand
theorist.

Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry, Captain, British Army. Military theorist and
historian;advocateofcombinedarmswarfareandtheindirectapproach;authorof
numerousbooks,includingParis,ortheFutureofWar(1925)andStrategy(1954).

Lincoln,Abraham.SixteenthPresidentoftheUnitedStates.

Luvaas,Jay.Distinguishedmilitaryhistorian;authorofFredericktheGreatonthe
ArtofWar(1966)andTheEducationofanArmy(1954).

MacArthur,Douglas,GeneraloftheArmy.DivisioncommanderinWorldWarI;
chiefofstafffrom1931to1935;commanderofAlliedforcesintheSouthwestPacific
inWorldWarII;commanderofUnitedNationsforcesinKoreauntilrelievedby
PresidentTruman.

MacIsaac,David,LieutenantColonel,USAF.Eminentairpowerhistorian;author
ofStrategicBombinginWorld WarII(1976);editorofTheUnitedStatesStrategic
BombingSurvey:SelectedReportsinTenVolumes(1976).

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Admiral, USN. Son of Dennis Hart Mahan; naval
historianandtheorist;authorof TheInfluenceofSeaPoweruponHistory (1890),
oneofthemostinfluentialvolumesofhistoricalanalysiseverwritten.
Mahan,DennisHart.ProfessorofmilitaryartandscienceatWestPoint;founder
of professional military study in the United States; influenced many Civil War
generals.

MaoTsetung.TwentiethcenturyChineserevolutionarytheoristandleader.

Marshall,GeorgeCatlett,GeneraloftheArmy.Chiefofstafffrom1939to1945;
chiefstrategistandorganizerofmilitaryoperationsandlogisticsinWorldWarII;
awardedtheNobelPrizeforhiscontributionstothepostwarrecoveryofEurope.

Marshall,SamuelLymanAtwood, BrigadierGeneral,USA.Militaryhistorian
andanalyst;advocatedinterviewinglargenumbersofsoldiersimmediatelyafter
battle;authorofBlitzkrieg(1940),thecontroversialMenAgainstFire(1947),and
manyotherbooks.

Maugham,WilliamSomerset.Britishshortstorywriter;adventurer;intelligence
operativeinWorldWarI.

Meyer,JohnC.,General,USAF.WorldWarIIacewith24victories;KoreanWar
wing commander with two victories; commander in chief of the Strategic Air
Command.

Mitchell, William ("Billy"), Major General, US Army Air Service. Outspoken


advocateofairpower;chiefofairservicesfortheUSGroupofArmiesinWorldWar
I;authorofOurAirForce(1921),WingedDefense(1925),andSkyways(1930).

Moltke, Helmuth von ("The Elder"), Field Marshal of Germany. Twentieth


centurystrategistandmilitaryreformerwhosemilitarysuccessesledtoGerman
unification;linguistandnovelist.

Montgomery,ViscountBernardLaw,FieldMarshal,BritishArmy.Commander
of the British Eighth Army in North Africa;commanderofAllied landforces at
Normandy.

Murray, Williamson, Professor of History, Ohio State University. Author of


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Napier, Sir Charles James, General, British Army. Military leader in the
NapoleonicWarsandinIndia.

Napier,SirWilliam.MilitaryleaderintheNapoleonicWars;militaryhistorian;
youngerbrotherofSirCharles Napier.
Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France. Military leader; multiskilled
reorganizerofcontinentalEuropeanpoliticsandlaw.

Olds,Robin,BrigadierGeneral,USAF.WorldWarIIacewith13victories;wing
commanderinSoutheastAsiawithfourvictories.

O'Malley,JeromeF.,General,USAF.PilotofthefirstoperationalSR71mission;
wingcommanderofreconnaissancewingsinSoutheastAsia;commanderofTactical
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Pasteur,Louis.Nineteenthcenturychemist;"fatherofbacteriology."

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WorldWarI;commanderoflargegroundforces,includingThirdArmy,inWorld
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Robertson, Sir William, Field Marshal, British Army. Chief of the Imperial
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Spruance,RaymondAmes, Admiral,USN.TaskforcecommanderattheBattle
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Steuben, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm Augustin von. Inspector general of the


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Whitehead, Alfred North. Twentiethcentury British mathematician and


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Acknowledgments

LtGenTrumanSpangrudputthefuelintothisproject.DrDavidMacIsaac
withtheassistanceofLtColsJeffBenton,PriceBingham,RickClark,RickDavis,
and Frank Donnini, and Maj Tom Blowdid the preflight. The staff of the Air
UniversityLibrary,andinparticularMelroseBryant,hookedupthepowercart.Lt
ColCharlesWestenhoffcrankedtheengines.TheAirUniversityPressstaffran
thechecksandpulledthechocks.ColDennisM.DrewwasthemarshalerandCol
SidneyJ.Wisecalledforclearance.
ThelateLtGenRalphE.Havensinspiredusallandprovidedtopcoverthe
essenceofairpowerandleadership.