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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY - ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. FACTS: PNOC is a government-owned and controlled corporation engaged in, among others of energy resources like geothermal energy. Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, duly registered with the DOLE. PNOC hired employees for its Leyte Geothermal Power Project whereby, their employment was only good up to the completion or termination of the project and would automatically expire upon the completion of such project. Majority of the employees hired had become members of petitioner. In view of that circumstance, the petitioner demands for recognition of it as the collective bargaining agent of said employees and for a CBA negotiation with it. However, PNOC did not heed such demands. Sometime in 1998 when the project was about to be completed, PNOC proceeded to serve Notices of Termination of Employment upon the employees who are members of the petitioner. The petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE against PNOC on the ground of purported commission by the latter of ULP for "refusal to bargain collectively, union busting and mass termination." On the same day, the petitioner declared a strike and staged such strike. PNOC filed a complaint for, among others, Strike Illegality with NLRC which ruled in its favour and whose decision was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: WON the officers and members of petitioner Union are project employees of respondent. HELD: The litmus test to determine whether an individual is a project employee lies in setting a fixed period of employment involving a specific undertaking which completion or termination has been determined at the time of the particular employee’s engagement. In this case, as previously adverted to, the officers and the members of petitioner Union were specifically hired as project employees for respondent’s Leyte Geothermal Power Project located at the Greater Tongonan Geothermal Reservation in Leyte. Consequently, upon the completion of the project or substantial phase thereof, the officers and the members of petitioner Union could be validly terminated. Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the [end of the] season. The termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal. G.R. No. 185556 March 28, 2011 SUPREME STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
Diminution of benefits is the unilateral withdrawal by the employer of benefits already enjoyed by the employees. Petitioner Supreme Steel Pipe Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing steel pipes for domestic and foreign markets. The CA declared. NLRC clearly did not apply as there was no doubtful or difficult question involved in the present case. No diminution of benefits would result if the wage orders are not implemented across the board. in favour of respondents. that the withdrawal of the COLA under Wage Order No. It pointed out that there was no ambiguity or doubt as to who were covered by the wage order. considering the foregoing. Respondent. therefore. There is diminution of benefits when it is shown that: (1) the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time. Respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Supreme Independent Union is the certified bargaining agent of petit ioner’s rank-and-file employees. RBIII-10 from the employees who were not minimum wage earners amounted to a diminution of benefits because such grant has already ripened into a company practice. (3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or . eight were decided in its favor." The CA opined that. the ruling in Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. Out of the eleven issues raised by respondent. RBIII10 from the employees who were not minimum wage earners amounted to a diminution of benefits because such grant has already ripened into a company practice? HELD: No. as no such company practice has been established. while the issue on visitor’s free access to company premises was deemed settled during the mandatory conference. ISSUE: WON CA was correct in upholding that the withdrawal of the COLA under Wage Order No. which affirmed the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) that petitioner violated certain provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision. Respondent alleged eleven CBA violations.NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG SUPREME INDEPENDENT UNION (NMS-INDAPL). two (denial of paternity leave benefit and discrimination of union members) were decided in favor of petitioner. (2) the practice is consistent and deliberate. Petitioner. v. may not invoke error or mistake in extending the COLA to all employees and such act can only be construed as "as a voluntary act on the part of the employer.
and (4) the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.71 more so when such implementation was erroneously made. which only lasted for less than a year. 2011 SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER). The implementation of the COLA under Wage Order No. vs. according to it. CHARTER CHEMICAL and COATING CORPORATION. we cannot give credence to respondent’s claim. ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO-Union President. under existing jurisprudence on this matter. FACTS: On February 19. but acted voluntarily. respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss4 on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law. G. Respondent. National Capital Region. 169717 March 16. an act carried out within less than a year would certainly not qualify as such. Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent company) with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE. and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees . cannot be considered as having been practiced "over a long period of time. 1999. From this. the CA arrived at its ruling by relying on the fact that there was no ambiguity in the wording of the wage order as to the employees covered by it. The isolated act of implementing a wage order across the board can hardly be considered a company practice. applies only when there is a doubtful or difficult question involved. repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of the practice. 1999. It therefore took exception to the Globe Mackay case which. the CA concluded that petitioner actually made no error or mistake. No. On April 14. Hence. RBIII-10 from the salaries of non-minimum wage earners did not amount to a "diminution of benefits" under the law.application of a doubtful or difficult question of law. the withdrawal of the COLA Wage Order No. in granting the COLA to all its employees. Absent any proof of specific. RBIII-10 across the board. To recall.Petitioner." While it is true that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years in order for a practice to be considered as a voluntary act of the employer.R.
the requirement under Sec. 9.within petitioner union. Petitioner union concedes and the records confirm that its charter certificate was not executed under oath. II WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding that the alleged failure to certify under oath the local charter certificate issued by its mother federation and list of the union membership attending the organizational meeting [is a ground] for the cancellation of petitioner *union’s+ legal personality as a labor organization and for the dismissal of the petition for certification election. respectively. said supervisory employees are prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees of respondent company. not being a legitimate labor organization. the Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization and Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas are not among the documents that need to be submitted to the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations in order to register a labor organization. 1992 and September 15. series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description of the bargaining unit. thus: II As readily seen. on June 21. Specifically. petitioner union has no right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. 1997.5 The Med-Arbiter further held that the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman. hence. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules – that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees – was removed. But then. As a result. However. HELD: I It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26. mill operator and leadman who performed supervisory functions. ISSUES: I WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding that the alleged mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employee*s+ of petitioner *union’s+ membership is *a+ ground for the cancellation of petitioner *union’s+ legal personality and dismissal of [the] petition for certification election. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code. As to the charter certificate. in San . Instead. the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases. 1995. the abovequoted rule indicates that it should be executed under oath.
it validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization upon submission of (1) its charter certificate. FACTS: Private respondent Geraldine L. 9. the Court ruled that it was not necessary for the charter certificate to be certified and attested by the local/chapter officers. Velasco replied through a letter defending herself re: accusations against her. Hon. as Professional Health Care Representative since 1 August 1992. etc. While Velasco was still on leave. . herein petitioner Ferdinand Cortez. Considering that the charter certificate is prepared and issued by the national union and not the local/chapter. While this ruling was based on the interpretation of the previous Implementing Rules provisions which were supplanted by the 1997 amendments . and its principal office.R. No. INC.24 (2) the names of its officers. Mandaue Packing Products PlantsSan Miguel Corporation Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW (MPPP-SMPP-SMAMRFUFFW). AND/OR ARISTOTLE ARCE. In accordance with this ruling. 356 (1996).O. Aside from mentioning about an investigation on her possible violations of company work rules regarding "unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks" and instructing her to submit her explanation on the matter within 48 hours from receipt of the same. No. Velasco had a medical work up for her high-risk pregnancy and was subsequently advised bed rest which resulted in her extending her leave of absence. Velasco received a "Second Show-cause Notice" informing her of additional developments in their investigation. the notice also advised her that she was being placed under "preventive suspension" and for her return of items (cars. her vacation leave from 19 June to 20 June 2003. Sometime in April 2003. petitioner union’s charter certif icate need not be executed under oath. their addresses. INC. Velasco was employed with petitioner PFIZER. it does not make sense to have the local/chapter’s officers x x x certify or attest to a document which they had no hand in the preparation of. Consequently. we believe that the same doctrine obtains in this case. Velasco filed her sick leave for the period from 26 March to 18 June 2003. we ruled – In San Miguel Foods-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. personally served Velasco a "Show-cause Notice". Respondent. and leave without pay from 23 June to 14 July 2003.Miguel Corporation (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Petitioners. AND/OR ALFRED MAGALLON. Thereafter. AND/OR REY GERARDO BACARRO. Laguesma.) related to her employment. PFIZER through its Area Sales Manager. Id.22 which was decided under the auspices of D. 331 Phil. 2011 PFIZER. vs.25 and (3) its constitution and by-laws — the last two requirements having been executed under oath by the proper union officials as borne out by the records. 177467 March 9. GERALDINE VELASCO. AND/OR FERDINAND CORTES. Series of 1997. G.
A perusal of the records. Finally. 2005 but it was respondent who unjustifiably refused to report for work. Not only was this sum legally due to respondent under prevailing jurisprudence but also this circumstance highlighted PFIZER’s unreasonable delay in complying with the reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter. (2) it was allegedly ready to reinstate respondent as of July 1. including PFIZER’s own submissions. 2005. . At the outset. 2005. when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring Velasco’s dismissal valid.Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch. or the date of the Labor Arbiter decision. National Labor Relations Commission which was supposedly "more in accord with the dictates of fairness and justice. Velasco received a "Third Show-cause Notice. The following day." together with copies of the affidavits of two Branch Managers of Mercury Drug. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordering her reinstatement until November 23." We do not agree. HELD: No. On 25 July 2003. which is almost two years from the time the order of reinstatement was handed down in the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated December 5. 17 July 2003. and (5) this Court should not mechanically apply Roquero but rather should follow the doctrine in Genuino v.963. (3) it would purportedly be tantamount to allowing respondent to choose "payroll reinstatement" when by law it was the employer which had the right to choose between actual and payroll reinstatement. PFIZER informed Velasco of its "Management Decision" terminating her employment. we note that PFIZER’s previous payment to respondent of the amount of P1. on 29 July 2003. 2003. In PFIZER’s view. 2005) that was successfully garnished under the Labor Arbiter’s Writ of Execution dated May 26.00 (representing her wages from December 5. 2005. it should no longer be required to pay wages considering that (1) it had already previously paid an enormous sum to respondent under the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter. PFIZER sent her a letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing to be held on 22 July 2003. Velasco received it under protest and informed PFIZER via the receiving copy of the said letter that she had lodged a complaint against the latter and that the issues that may be raised in the July 22 hearing "can be tackled during the hearing of her case" or at the preliminary conference set for 5 and 8 of August 2003. confirmed that it only required respondent to report for work on July 1.855. 2003. (4) respondent should be deemed to have "resigned" and therefore not entitled to additional backwages or separation pay. until May 5. She likewise opted to withhold answering the Second Show-cause Notice. 2005 cannot be considered in its favor. as shown by its Letter dated June 27. asking her for her comment within 48 hours.
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal. if the law is to serve its noble purpose. . To reiterate. In sum. an employee entitled to reinstatement "shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or. it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. under Article 223 of the Labor Code. or that there is an unfilled position which is substantially equivalent or of similar nature as the one previously occupied by the employee.to-work directive by downplaying the reasons forwarded by respondent as less than sufficient to justify her purported refusal to be reinstated. and any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed. the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during the pendency of the appeal.PFIZER makes much of respondent’s non-compliance with its return." It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal. merely reinstated in the payroll. Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which one had been removed still exists. at the option of the employer.
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