From Okinawa To Japan - A New Era For U.S. - Japan Relations - Development On Guam

From Okinawa to Japan:
A New Era for U.S.-Japan Relations
Janice Dornbush
The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania
A Thesis:
Presented to the Faculties of the University of
Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts
May 2008
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Jennifer Amyx

Abstract:
The U.S.-Japan relationship is one of the longest and strongest such security relationships in the
world. The majority of US forces in Asia are located in Japan and the majority of those forces
are located on Okinawa. The U.S. military is currently in the process of working on a plan to
move a significant number of U.S. service personnel from Futenma Marine Corps Base in
Okinawa, Japan to Guam, USA. This move is unique in that the Japanese government is
expected to bear 60% of the cost associated with the Futenma relocation. This move is the result
of changing pressures and priorities with the U.S. and Japan. In Japan, the pressure comes from
Okinawans, and recognition from the Japanese government of the need, to reduce US military
presence on Okinawa. In the U.S., there is a desire for a modernized U.S. basing strategy for the
Asia Pacific region. The move is a herculean task, fraught with difficulty and private sector help
will be critical in completing this on time and on budget to usher in a new era of U.S.- Japan
relations.
Author:
Janice Dornbush
Janice.Dornbush.wg08@wharton.upenn.edu
2
Table of Contents
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..5
2. Japan: Understanding Changes that Led to Adoption of this Plan…………………………...7
3. U.S.: Understanding Dynamics that Led to the Adoption of this Plan .................................. 14
3.1 Decision to Move Troops as Part of U.S. Rebasing Strategy………………………..16
3.2 Why Was Guam Selected? …………………………………………………………..19
4. The Move: Understanding Funding and Execution to get from Okinawa to Guam…….….25
4.1 Relocation Plans and Cost…………………………………………………………...25
4.2 Funding………………………………………………………………………………26
4.3 Execution…………………………………………………………………………….27
4.3.1 Japan Bank for International Cooperation…………………………………………28
4.3.2 Joint Guam Program Office………………………………………………………..30
4.4 Potential Problems with Funding from Japan………………………………………..32
4.5 Potential Problems with Funding from the U.S. Side………………………………..34
4.6 Logistics……………………………………………………………………………...35
5. Conclusion: ……………………………………………………………………………...…44
6. Appendix……………………………………………………………………………………47
7. Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………..50
3
4
1. Introduction:
At the end of World War II, the Allied Powers took control of Japanese military bases and the
US stationed its troops in Japan to remove the threat of another rise of Japanese military power,
and at the same time protect Japan, who was not allowed to maintain military forces of its own.
During the 60 years following, the US/Japanese security relationship has evolved significantly as
Japan’s economy grew stronger and the Japanese people pushed for greater independence, and
less reliance on American troops. At the same time, the world political hegemony evolved and
the US has begun to evaluate how to realign its military forces to be more efficient.
The proposed military buildup on Guam is expected to cost US 10 billion and is intended to
facilitate a significant removal of troops from Okinawa, evidences a new kind of security
dynamic between the US and Japan in the coming years. The Japanese government has pledged
to fund 60% of this cost. Over the past 60 years, Japan paid various costs associated with
maintaining U.S. military forces in Japan; by providing infrastructure and outright cash payments,
but only to support U.S. military presence on Japanese soil. Until this point, Japan had never
directly funded U.S. military base expenditure on non-Japanese soil or paid to relocate U.S.
troops out of Japan. This is a key reason why this plan is especially notable; it is the first time
for such type of joint economic cooperation between the U.S. and Japan to accomplish shared
goals.
Analysts have debated who benefitted the most, Japan or the U.S., from the old model of security
cooperation. Japan has hosted the bulk of U.S. troop presence in Asia, both physically and
economically, by providing land and financial support to sustain U.S. troops. At the same time,
5
Japan has benefitted from the U.S. security alliance that protected Japanese interests so that
Japan, would not have to maintain its own military. The U.S. has long had a trusted partner in
Japan and in exchange for providing military security for Japan; it has been able project U.S.
presence in Asia through its series of relatively sovereign military installations in Japan. This
plan to move troops from Okinawa is the most significant change to the face of American
military presence in Japan, and Asia. This change reflects the new security dynamic of a more
independent Japan and a more independent U.S., which will be important in the coming years.
The paper is organized into several main sections: 1) description of the evolution of Japanese and
US priorities regarding troop presence, 2) discussion of the how the plan will be executed with
both Japanese and US management and how the private sector Japanese and US companies are
involved in the actual buildup and 3) a conclusion that recaps the changes in Japanese and US
priorities that have led to this move which reflects a new security partnership between two
important actors in the Asia region. After reading this paper, the reader should have the
necessary information to agree that this proposed plan, whether it is successful in achieving its
objectives or not, reflects a new type of cooperative arrangement between the U.S. and Japan.
6
2. JAPAN: Understanding Changes that Led to Adoption of this Plan
The current plan to rebase a large number of U.S. troops currently in Japan, to places outside of
Japan, results from a series of events that caused the Japanese government to change its priorities
for their country regarding U.S. troop presence. In the past ten years, the Japanese citizens on
Okinawa have ‘found their voice’ and been successful at getting the attention of the Japanese
central government to make changes in regards to the American troop presence which also alters
the dynamic of U.S. Japan security cooperation. Over the years, the U.S. troop presence in Japan
has been managed by the Japanese central government and largely concentrated on the island of
Okinawa. After nearly 60 years of U.S. troop presence in Japan, the Japanese government is in
the process of making some of the most significant changes to the U.S. military presence in their
country.
As of 2007; there are 33,453 U.S. military personnel (Army: 1,965, Navy: 3,742, Air Force:
13,322, Marines: 14,424) stationed in Japan, and another 5,500 American civilians employed
there by the United States Department of Defense1. Two-thirds of the of US forces in Japan are
stationed on the Japanese island of Okinawa and US bases on Okinawa comprise 75% of the
total US military land area in Japan while Okinawa only makes up 1% of Japan’s total land area.
Okinawa’s location far from the main island of Japan and the central government location of
Tokyo made it easy for Tokyo to ‘forget’ about the concentrated U.S. troop presence on
Okinawa.
Currently, the Japanese government provides subsidies and support to the U.S. government to
maintain the US forces in Japan. In 2007, the Japanese government paid JPY 217 billion (US 2.0
1
U.S. Department of State Website. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm. (accessed April 2008)
7
billion) as annual host-nation support called Omoiyari Yosan (思いやり予算)2. Since 1979, the
Japanese Government has paid over JPY 2 trillion for the construction of facilities inside U.S.
military bases in Japan from Japan's "sympathy" budget for the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.
This payment alone makes Japan an extraordinary payer among all U.S. allies.3 Following the
troop relocation to Guam, and fewer US troops on Japanese soil, it is expected that these types of
costs to Japan will decrease.
During the 60 plus years that the US forces have been in Japan, there have been roughly 200,000
accidents and crimes committed by the U.S. soldiers.4 According to the U.S.-Japan Status of
Forces Agreement, U.S. personnel have partial extraterritorial right, so in most cases suspects
were not arrested. Following a brutal rape of a young girl in 1996 by US service personnel, the
Okinawan government called for a return of US bases on the island in three stages, with the goal
of an Okinawa free of bases by 2015.5 As described later in the paper, the central government
effectively ignored Okinawan sentiment, partially due to economic reasons and never seriously
advanced a plan to reduce American military presence on Okinawa. In February 2008, there was
another attack on a young Japanese girl by an American service man, which only increased the
Okinawan’s efforts to reduce American military presence on their island.
In a recent conversation with an Okinawan student, they doubted that this plan would really
achieve their goal of an Okinawa free of bases. The fact that the plan to move the troops has
taken this long to develop and does not remove all US troops from Okinawa is reflective of the
2
思いやり予算８億円減で日米合意、光熱水料を３年間で, Yomiuri Shimbun, December 12, 2007.
3
Japan Press Co. “Paying Cost of Relocation of USMC to Guam is Absurd: JPC Ichida.”
http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/3390/1/167 (accessed February 2008)
4
衆議院外務委員会議事録、平成 17 年 7 月 1 日, House of Representatives of Japan Foreign Affairs Committee,
July 2, 2005
5
Global Security. Org. “Okinawa, Japan”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm (accessed
February 2008)
8
fact it is difficult to change the long standing status quo of US/Japan relations. Although the
Okinawan people feel the troop presence is a burden, they realize that the US troop presence also
provides significant economic benefit to their economy and there is a potential vacuum when the
troops leave. An equally significant reason for the delay is because the Japanese Government
has worked for nearly 10 years, from 1996 to 2006, to find ways to stall the relocation. Japan
sought to maintain its position as one of America’s most staunch allies by not forcing Americans
to leave Okinawa. The fact that the central government has now pledged to support this move
financially is in itself a major signal that there is a new dimension in US /Japan security
relations , in part because the Japanese central government is showing more respect for
Okinawan sentiment than in the past.
Since 1996, Okinawan residents have overwhelmingly supported mayoral and gubernatorial
candidates who profess a desire to reduce American military presence on Okinawa. Notably, a
Nago City plebiscite election in 1998 returned a resounding “No” vote to a proposed new US
military base at Nago City to replace the Futenma base. After the vote results were announced,
unexplainably, the mayor of Nago City flew to Tokyo to pledge support for the new base at Nago
City. Fortunately, Okinawa’s Governor Ota supported the result of the plebiscite; and informed
Tokyo that the Nago base would not go forward. This promptly put relations between Tokyo
and Okinawa on shaky grounds.6
In 1999, the Okinawan gubernatorial election resulted in the selection of an anti-base expansion
Governor Inamine. At that time, the economy was stalled and Tokyo offered significant
6
Gavan McCormack. “The Okinawan Election and Resistance to Japan’s Military First Politics.” Policy Forum
Online 06-99A: November 18th, 2006, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0699McCormack.html (accessed
February 2008)
9
financial incentive packages to Okinawa. In return for the economic incentives, Governor
Inamine reluctantly agreed to construction of a Futenma base replacement under three
conditions: 1) the airport would have joint civilian-military use, 2) be limited to a 15 year use
agreement and 3) only be constructed after an environmental assessment could reasonably
guarantee that there would be no environmental damage. Since Futenma is located practically in
a city, the idea of moving the base more towards the outskirts appealed to the Okinawans
because it would ‘give them back’ their city..But it was 2002 before a basic plan following these
guidelines was agreed upon by Japan and the US Governments.7
The 2002 plan eventually failed because of a never before seen show of Japanese solidarity;
Okinawans effectively blockaded the construction/environmental assessment site for a year and a
half. “At a makeshift tent headquarters, Okinawan elders, some in their 80s or even 90s, mingled
with fishermen and townspeople from around the island, while fishing boats, canoes, and even
hardy swimmers, conducted an offshore "blockade".” 8 This action vividly reflects the
Okinawan’s feelings regarding U.S. bases because it united residents from around the island,
across generations, in an effort to make sure the central government understood their view: the
status quo of U.S. basing on Okinawan could not continue9. In October 2005, Japanese Prime
Minister Koizumi acknowledged that the plan would have to be scrapped and after that, the
central government finally seemed to hear and support the Okinawan demands to reduce U.S.
military pressure.
7
ibid
8
ibid
9
Okinawans wanted to protect their island, and its beautiful beaches, from development into a military base at Nago.
10
In January 2006, a mayoral election was held in Nago City and all three candidates took an anti-
base construction stance. The winner, an LDP candidate named Shimabukuro Yoshikazu, wasted
little time after the election in reversing himself, like his predecessor in the aftermath of the 1996
Nago plebiscite. When he did so, 68% of his electorate opposed him, according to an Okinawa
Times survey, and the prefecture-wide opposition to the construction plan stood at 71%. 10
Although the base construction was unappealing to the Okinawan people, the economy was
struggling and even though reducing American troop presence was important, the residents
needed to consider how to bolster the economy and were required to consider plans to continue
U.S. troop presence on Okinawa.
Later in, November of 2006, the Okinawan gubernatorial race featured two candidates: Nakaima
Hirokazu, a 67-year old business leader and former head of Okinawa Electric Power, who was
backed by the ruling coalition's LDP and New Komeito. His opponent was a woman, a 58-year
old former bus guide, Itokazu Keiko, who had been elected to the Upper House in 2004 and is
supported by a coalition including the Democratic Party of Japan, Social Democratic Party,
Communist Party, and Okinawan Social Mass Party, together with labor and civic groups.
Nakaima had the support of the LDP ruling party, but could not bring himself to endorse the base
construction plan and wanted the Futenma replacement to be built somewhere outside of
Okinawa. Since the public was 70% opposed to the plan, it was clear that neither candidate
could win by supporting the plan. Nakaima focused on economic issues in his election platform
and pledged to do what was necessary to reduce Okinawan unemployment. At the same time,
Itokazu was perceived as a risk because in part she was a woman and perhaps unpredictable in
10
Excerpt from Ryukyu shimpo, 14 April 2006 as cited in: Gavan McCormack. “The Okinawan Election and
Resistance to Japan’s Military First Politics.” Policy Forum Online 06-99A: November 18th, 2006,
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0699McCormack.html (accessed February 2008)
11
her actions.11 Nearly 65% of the electorate turned out and Nakaima won by only about 40,000
votes (Nakaima: 347,303 votes and Itokazu: 309,985 votes). The economic issues and relative
stability of Nakaima’s platform led to his narrow margin of victory over the more maverick
Itokazu and it was presumed the status quo would continue with US troop presence on Okinawa.
In April of 2006, though, Japan’s Defense Agency Minister had already agreed to fund a portion
of the cost to move U.S. troops out of Okinawa and it appeared that a serious plan to reduce U.S.
troop presence on Okinawa would go forward. According to the Japanese Communist Party, the
government’s plan does not fully address Okinawan concerns, largely because troop movement
is potentially overstated and does not remove all military presence.12 Additionally, they point to
the fact that a new base is being built at Nago City, Okinawa and construction of a new based
does not suggest that U.S. troops will leave anytime soon.
The magnitude of this plan, however, will significantly reduce US presence on Okinawa and the
fact that there is a plan, is wholly unlike anything in the past. The effective 2003-2004
‘blockade’ and the results of both the 2006 Nago City mayoral election and 2006 Okinawan
gubernatorial election reflected the strong opposition to continuation or expansion of US military
presence on Okinawa. These events evidenced a growing conviction of the Okinawan people to
seriously reduce U.S. troop presence on their island. Prior to these events, the political
leadership in Okinawa had habitually caved to pressure from Tokyo, partially due to economic
pressures on the island and the need to continue U.S. troop presence to stimulate the economy.
11
Gavan McCormack. “The Okinawan Election and Resistance to Japan’s Military First Politics.” Policy Forum
Online 06-99A: November 18th, 2006, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0699McCormack.html (accessed
February 2008)
12
12
As a result, it took nearly 10 years to develop the current plan to move troops, following the
1996 attack that essentially catalyzed Okinawan sentiment regarding U.S. troops. In conclusion,
the pledge of support to fund the movement shows that the central government and Okinawan
government finally seem to be united in addressing the issue of reducing US troop presence in
Okinawa.
13
3. US: Understanding Dynamics that Led to the Adoption of this Plan
During the same period, the US military had been examining its global basing strategy and
especially focusing on Asia, as the region is expected to be tremendously important for the
foreseeable future due to the changing geopolitical and economic climate. Even though the U.S.
– Japan security relationship has been historically been strong; the U.S. has looked to increase its
independence; in part by reducing the number of troops on foreign soil. Additionally, the U.S. is
working to make the military more efficient by increasing cooperation across the different
military branches over the recent years. These factors have led to this proposed shift of U.S.
troops from Okinawa to Guam.
The majority of U.S. troops in Asia are located in Japan, largely a result of decommissioning of
Japanese military bases following World War II, when the bases were taken over by the United
States Air Force. The allied countries wanted to demilitarize Japan, and the U.S. imposed the
Constitution of Japan with a no-armed-force clause in 1947. In 1951, the Treaty of San
Francisco was signed by the allied countries and Japan, which restored its formal sovereignty. At
the same time, the US and Japan signed the Japan-America Security Alliance. As a result of this
treaty, the USAF is legally responsible for the defense of Japan. In return, the Japanese
government has offered military bases, funds and various other means of compensation as
defined by the Status of Forces Agreement. In 1960, at the expiration of the treaty, the new
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was signed
between the United States and Japan. The status of the United States Forces Japan was defined in
the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. The treaty is still in effect and the Japanese foreign
policy is based on these reciprocal obligations.
14
As detailed earlier, the majority of US troops in Asia are in Japan and the majority of US troops
in Japan are located in Okinawa. As a result, Okinawa has long been an important part of US
military presence in Asia. Due to the previously described sentiment of Okinawans regarding
the number of US troops on their island, it has long been apparent that the current basing strategy
of US troops, comprised largely of Marines, on Okinawa cannot continue. From 1996 until 2003,
though, there was very little evidence that the US was considering relocating the troops on
Okinawa and it appeared that the Japanese Government would not force the issue.
In 2003, the situation really began to change and the US considered moving most of the 20,000
Marines on Okinawa to new bases that would be established in Australia, while increasing
military presence in Singapore and Malaysia. In addition, the US sought agreements to base
Navy ships in Vietnamese and Philippine waters. In total, the US planned to move 15,000
Marines out of Okinawa 13 . A key reason that the proposal did not get very far, though, is
because the Japanese central government continued to support the status quo of U.S. military
presence in Okinawa and did not press the U.S. to change alter its basing strategy.
During the Okinawan blockade of 2003-4, however, the Japanese government realized that they
must find way to change the status quo on Okinawa and they began to talk more seriously with
the U.S. about the need to reduce troop presence on Okinawa. As a result of this change in
Japanese government mindset, relations with the U.S. military began to shift. As a result,
eventually the US government began talking more with the military, and eventually convinced
the Marines that it would be possible to find another place to serve as a replacement for the
Futenma MCAS on Okinawa.
13
Global Security. Org. “Okinawa, Japan”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm (accessed
February 2008)
15
Right about this time, the US government began to seriously consider using Guam as the right
place to relocate troops from Okinawa. The military felt that Guam offered advantages over
Japan, although the distance from Guam to East Asia was significant. This represented a change
in thinking from the past because the U.S. military down sized their presence on Guam in the
mid 1990s. During that time, they transferred the U.S. Naval Air Station (Brewer Field) in
Hagatna to the Government of Guam, largely because of political pressures from Guam and it
business leaders. The government and business people of Guam wanted to increase international
air traffic into Guam and needed the extra space14 so the US Government acquiesced to their
request.
In 2005, though, the Marines found training sites in Guam that were adequate for their needs,
despite the greater distance from Asia. They also found that they could have greater freedom to
operate out of a US territory and would not be subject to political restrictions that required them
to disclose certain activities to the Japanese government as was the case with the bases located in
Japan.15 Specifically, they would be able to pick up Marines on Okinawa and dispatch them
around the world, without consulting the Japanese government.16 In a sense, this move could
increase the effectiveness of U.S. forces because they would be able to act more independently,
without having to get approval from the Japanese government to accomplish missions.
3.1 Decision to Move the Troops as Part of the US Re-Basing Strategy in the Pacific Theater
14
Jerry M. Rivera, “Guam: America’s Forward Fortress” (strategy research project, U.S. Army War College, 2002),
7.
15
Richard Halloran, “Guam, All Over Again,” Air Force Magazine Online,
http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2008/0108guam.asp (accessed February 2008)
16
This is especially key now, because the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is in power and they have the potential
to cause unnecessary delay in the approval process required to move troops and effectively hamstring American
military power.
16
On a broader level, the U.S. currently has significant presence in Asia with troops located in
Japan, South Korea and Guam. There are roughly 29,000 army soldiers based permanently in
Japan and South Korea and the U.S. government must consider where to base these troops in the
event that the two Koreas unite and/or Japan takes full responsibility for its defense17. Various
experts believe that is it not a concern of if, but when, these changes take place in Korea and
Japan and so it makes sense for the U.S. to re-examine it’s basing strategy sooner rather than
later to determine how to best allocate military resources. (For further information on the basing
strategy, please see Appendix #1.)
Some analysts believe that U.S. troops in Korea is perceived negatively by China, could
potentially lead to unnecessary escalation of tensions18, so some analysts believed that locating
troops further from the border could prove ‘beneficial’. In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef
in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and built permanent wharf structures as part of its
military exercises and diplomatic tactics to apply pressure to Taiwan. The Philippines reacted by
signed a visiting forces agreement with the U.S. in February 1998 which seems to reflect a desire
for continued U.S. presence in the region 19 because of the uncertainty of China’s intentions.
Based on this and general sentiment in Asia, it appears that Asian countries welcome a certain
amount of US presence in the region.
China, Taiwan, Russia and North Korea all represent potential ‘flash points’ in Asia and the
political uncertainty associated with these countries necessitates U.S. military presence to
stabilize the region. If the situation between China and Taiwan gets more tenuous, the reaction
17
7.
18
Ibid, p 8.
19
Ibid, p 11.
17
of U.S. forces could force a confrontation with China and therefore requires continued U.S.
presence in the region to maintain the balance of power. According to retired Army Gen Barry R.
McCaffrey (s20) “by 2020 we will face resurgent and expanding Russian Federation military
power projection capacity as well as the likely emergence of other major maritime and air
nuclear powers.”20 It is clear that the region has the potential to undergo significant geopolitical
change in the near future and the U.S. should create a military backbone, on U.S. soil, to support
the Asian region.
Lastly, roughly half of the world’s merchant fleets pass through the South China Sea lanes,
which are important to the economic health of the Asian economies which have a strong
dependence on trade with the rest of the world. Northeast Asia imports oil and other good
through these sea lanes and export finished products around the world. As such, it is critical that
these sea lanes remain open or there could be significant disruption of shipping and international
trade,21 and so the US must maintain a significant presence in Asia for political and economic
reasons. (See Appendix #2 for Information on US Navy Presence in Asia/US Defense Strategy)
Considering the aforementioned reasons, it seems necessary that the US re-examine its basing
strategy in regards to the security developments of the major East Asian nations of China, Japan
and Korea, as well as Russia. Each of these nations has the ability to influence US foreign policy
over the next few years as they undergo change in the political and economic status quo, so the
US should move pro-actively to realign its Pacific Forces on US soil. For these reasons, the
20
21
11.
18
military decided that Guam, as a U.S. territory, would become more important in the context of
U.S. military basing.
3.2 Why was Guam selected?
Guam’s location became more and more attractive to the U.S military for three primary reasons;
firstly, because of Guam’s geographic location in relation to Asia. Secondly, because of the U.S.
government’s desire to create a more efficient military by achieving greater cooperation among
the different branches made sense, and was necessary, due to Guam’s small size. Additionally,
the military sought to increase control over their military, by locating the bases on U.S. soil,
Guam is a Pacific Island and US Territory with a population of 173,000 in a land area of 220
square miles, which is roughly three times the land area of Washington DC and equivalent to the
size of Singapore. Guam is roughly 4,000 miles southwest of the U.S. State of Hawaii, 1,500
miles south of Japan and 1,500 miles east of the Philippines. Guam is the largest island in the
North Pacific between Hawaii and the Philippines and between Japan and New Guinea. It is 35
miles long and 4 to 10 miles wide. The north part of the island is flat and sits on a high plateau
which is well-suited for airfields while the southern part of the island is more mountainous and
scenic with views of the Pacific Ocean and Philippine Sea22.
22
8.
19
23
Guam has been called the ‘tip of the spear’ for its location in defending US Military’s interests in
the Far East.24 The US military maintains jurisdiction over 39,000 acres, or 29%, of Guam’s
total land area and currently has an active duty and dependent military population of 14,195,
which is expected to increase by 176% to 39,130 by 201425. The military looks favorably at
Guam for several reasons: firstly, it has existing DoD infrastructure and secondly, because it has
been the site of unusual cooperation between the different military forces.
The US military has seven existing installations on Guam, primarily consisting of Naval and Air
Force facilities; including Apra Harbor (US Navy), Andersen Air Force Base, as well as a Coast
Guard facility and the Joint Forces Headquarters. “Guam has several advantages, including its
position in the Western Pacific,” said Air Force Lt. Gen. Dan Leaf, deputy commander of the
23
U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs
to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. Report to Congressional
Committees, September 2007. p10
24
Okinawa Times. “Guam Braces for Peaceful Military Incursion,” April 19, 2006.
25
Committees, September 2007. p33.
20
U.S. Pacific Command and the military’s point man on the build-up in Guam. “The fact that
there’s an existing [Department of Defense] infrastructure is another advantage because of the
significant amount of land” held by DoD.26
This is not the first time Guam’s location has made it strategically important to the military.
During World War II, Guam was actually captured by the Japanese during the war and later
liberated by the US. At one point during WWII, Guam and Tinian hosted a significant number
of US troops and Pacific Fleet. More recently, the different branches of the armed forces have
worked together to maximize the value of this relatively small location. In 2006, Exercise
Valiant Shield brought together ‘three aircraft carrier strike groups operating together, along with
other Navy ships and aircraft, Coast Guard units, and Air Force and Marine Corps aircraft.
Exercise Resultant Fury in December 2004 involved joint sea strike exercises with Air Force,
Marine Corps and Navy aircraft’27. This type of joint-cooperation is especially important to
maximizing synergies that will make the armed forces more efficient in the future, which is
critical as the U.S. government deals with funding pressures for the military budget and as
security issues evolve in Asia. According to Navy Rear Adm. Gary A. Engle, former
commander of the Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, “the advent of the
Marines creates the opportunity for forces on Guam “to be a model of joint-ness in how we
operate.28” Just as moving the US troops from Okinawa to Guam signals new priorities in Japan,
the troop movement to Guam also shows a new kind of cooperation between US forces.
In 2002, U.S. forces began to increase their presence on Guam when the Navy moved several
attack submarines to the naval base on Guam to bring them closer to deployment regions. This
26
Richard Burgess, “Guam’s Return to Prominence,” Military.com,
http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,123418,00.html (accessed February 2008).
27
Ibid
28
Ibid
21
reduced transit time, thereby creating more time for operations. The Air Force followed the
same idea and started rotational deployments to Guam29. According to Air Force Col. Joel S.
Westa, vice commander of the 36th Wing at Andersen. “If deterrence fails and hostilities break
out, Guam will become a front-line base. We will fight from here. The island’s benefits are clear:
It is sovereign US territory, it is central to numerous possible flash points, it provides strategic
depth, and it has space available for a military buildup”30. Guam has regained its status as a
place that is strategically important to the U.S. from a security perspective.
Perhaps even more importantly from a location perspective; Guam is out of China’s strike range
and could serve as an excellent patrol base or secure rear area during any sort of conflict or crisis.
Experts believe that ‘Guam is also situated along what the Chinese call the “second island chain”
to which the communist military intends to project air and sea power in the foreseeable future.
That island chain is anchored in central Japan, passes through Guam, and extends into the South
Pacific. (The first island chain passes from southern Japan through Taiwan into the South China
Sea.)’31 Guam provides a sufficiently close location to Asia, yet is removed enough to be a
strong basing location in peace and war time.
29
Ibid
30
31
Ibid
22
32
Based on these comments by Air Force and Naval leaders, it is clear that Guam has been and will
continue to be an important strategic location for their branches.
In conclusion, the US has been to work on the most major realignment of its Pacific Forces as a
result of changing relations with Japan and new priorities within the military. Although the shift
in Japanese central government’s priorities provides some of the reason behind the move, an
equally important part of the impetus for this move is the US desire to re-evaluate its Asian
basing strategy to increase its operational autonomy. By locating on U.S. soil and by locating
32
Ibid
23
U.S. military branches in closer proximity so they can work together more effectively, the U.S.
military is changing the operational status quo . By moving troops to Guam, the U.S.
government will also pull its troops out of the strike range of Asia and create a ‘safer’ basing
location to continue its peacekeeping activities in the Asia region.
24
4.The Move: Understanding Funding and Execution to get from Okinawa to Guam
As the preceding sections show; there has been increasing pressure within Japan and the U.S. to
think beyond the old status quo and create a new kind of U.S.-Japan security relationship, which
is evidenced by the plan. These pressures have led to the creation of the proposed plan, and the
fact that there is a mechanism for joint funding also illustrates a new type of partnership between
Japan and the U.S.
4.1 Relocation Plans and Cost
The US government is estimating a cost of US 10.27 billion dollars to move 8,000 Marines
and their dependents from Okinawa, Japan to Guam, USA. On April 23, 2006, US Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Japan's Defense Agency Director, General Nukaga Fukushiro
discussed the cost and Japan agreed to pay JPY 706.4 billion/US 6.09 billion, or 60% of the JPY
1.19 trillion /US 10.27 billion of the estimated cost. 33 At present, 2014 is the targeted
completion date for the relocation, which means that the process will have to move quickly to be
completed on time.
Initially, the US Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs said that Japan
should shoulder 75% of the cost burden because they initiated the plan. Tokyo protested and
said that they should only have to pay US 3 billion. They felt this amount would cover costs for
housing/roads/water and other things related to daily lives of the Marines, costs that essentially
Japan has borne as the host country.34 Although costs are estimated at US 10 billion35, they
33
David Pilling, “Japan and U.S. End Marines Wrangle,” Financial Times, April 25, 2006.
34
IHT/Asahi Shimbun, April 25, 2006 and Yomiuri Shimbun, April 25, 2006. “Japan to Pay $6BN to Move U.S.
Marines to Guam, http://japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2005, (accessed February 2008).
35
To understand the magnitude of this expenditure, the U.S. military construction appropriation request for fiscal
year 2008 was roughly $21.3 billion for military construction and family housing, with nearly $1.2 billion, or 5.6%,
25
could easily surpass US 13 billion when including the cost of upgrading additional civilian
infrastructure36.
Although the above-mentioned actual dollar cost division seems clear, it is apparent that there is
still uncertainty as to what costs are directly attributable to DoD facilities. According to the
Guam Power Authority website: “US Department of Defense monies are for infrastructure
development on-base, behind the fence. Japanese Government money is earmarked for
infrastructure development outside the base for the Guam civilian community, but it is unclear at
this point what this will mean and how much will be directly related to DOD facilities”.37 As
evidenced by the prior quote, there is significant interest from the public and private sector to
understand how the expensive troop movement proposal will provide opportunity for private
sector participation, through a never before seen type of US/Japan joint effort.
4.2 Funding
As regards the actual move, the US and Japan are planning to use a unique, never before seen
type of funding partnership. Japan is expected to shoulder 60% of the estimated US 10 billion
cost. Japanese funding will come from several different funding mechanisms: US 2.8 billion in
grants from national coffers, US 1.5 billion in the form of investment into a new special
company and US 1.79 billion in loans extended by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation,
or JBIC, and other entities. According to the Japanese Communist Party, the loan portion will be
designated for overseas locations. The money for overseas locations is mainly used to maintain, not build, the 766
installations which make up 20% of the U.S. military’s 3,731 installations. As per source: IHT/Asahi Shimbun,
April 25, 2006 and Yomiuri Shimbun, April 25, 2006. “Japan to Pay $6BN to Move U.S. Marines to Guam,
http://japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2005, (accessed February 2008).
36
Straits Times, “U.S. Buildup in Guam”, March 5, 2008.
37
Guamainian Power Authourity Website, FAQ regarding Military Buildup Money.
http://www.guampowerauthority.com/rates/BaseRateCaseFAQ/MilitaryBuildupMoney.html (accessed March 2008).
26
subject to repayment over a 50 year term, which is further evidence of the generous terms of the
Japanese assistance. 38 These costs are only estimates, as the plan has not been finalized or
approved, so could be subject to revision.
Actual construction funding will be divided into U.S. and Japanese responsibilities. US funding
will be used to build training sites, runways and entertainment establishments. 39 Japanese
investment/loans will be used to build family housing and on-base infrastructure, including
utilities and the investment is planned to be recouped by Japan via rent, through collection of
service member’s housing allowance paid with U.S. funds, and other miscellaneous service
charges.40 Japanese grants will cover facilities not directly connected to US military training;
such as barracks, administration and school buildings. Essentially, the reason for this delineation
of spending is to focus Japanese money on more ‘infrastructure’ type costs, costs that they would
have borne had the U.S. stayed in Japan and continued to use Japanese infrastructure as if the
move to Guam never happened. By the same token, costs for building actual military training
infrastructure/improvements will be borne by the U.S. as would have been the case if the
Marines remained on Okinawa.
4.3 Execution
The US effort is being led by the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO) and the Japanese effort is
currently being directed by Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). These two entities
38
39
IHT/Asahi Shimbun, April 25, 2006 and Yomiuri Shimbun, April 25, 2006. “Japan to Pay $6BN to Move U.S.
Marines to Guam, http://japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2005, (accessed February 2008).
40
27
are responsible for planning and conducting necessary due diligence on the departure from
Okinawa and construction/phasing on Guam. It is important to note that both of these entities
are relatively new; JGPO was created in 2006, especially for implementing this project to
interface with all associated parties. JBIC is actually transitioning to be part of a new entity
tentatively called the Japan International Cooperation Agency, or JICA, in November 2008; with
new mandates regarding international financial cooperation/aid. The next sections will look at
understanding the history and mission of these two entities.
4.3.1 Japan Bank for International Cooperation
The Japanese Diet has authorized the JBIC to take necessary steps on behalf of the Japanese
government to fulfill Japan’s share of commitments related to the Okinawa to Guam troop
relocation.41 JBIC is important to understand because it will be the main interface with the US in
executing this move and it is a reformed organization. JBIC is evolved from existing agencies
and was created through the passing of the Japan Finance Corporation Law in May 2007. JBIC
and five other organizations, including the National Life Finance Corporation (NLFC) will
merge to promote government policies and be wholly owned by the government. In October of
2008, the merger will create “one of the largest bilateral development organizations in the world
with a network of 97 overseas offices, projects in more than 150 countries, and available
financial resources of approximately JPY 1 trillion ( US 8.5 billion). This new company is
41
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Minister, “Joint Statement of the
Security Consultative Committee Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense
Cooperation,” (for Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma), May 1, 2007,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/U.S./security/scc/joint0705.html, (accessed February 2008).
28
tentatively named “Japan International Cooperation Agency” (独立行政法人国際協力機構
dokuritsu gyōseihōjin kokusai kyōryoku kikō), or referred to as JICA.42
The reorganized agency will also administer part of Japan's grant aid which is currently under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has historically
been an integral part of Japan’s foreign policy as it has disbursed development aid, which has
historically been a large line item in the Japanese budget. Due to covenants imposed after World
War II, Japan was not allowed to maintain a military force, so the US has ‘defended’ Japan’s
security interests and in return, Japan has ‘donated’ large amounts of money through official
development aid channels as a way to support peace keeping and economic development in the
world, in lieu of maintaining a military.
In the future all three major ODA components--technical cooperation, grant aid, and
concessional loans--will be managed "under one roof." New JICA will also strengthen research
and training capacity in the years ahead, acting as a kind of ODA think tank, contributing to
global development strategies, strengthening collaboration with international institutions, and
being better able to communicate Japan's position on major development and aid issues.43 (For
further information on JICA, please see Appendix #3)
This strategy will allow JICA to manage the Guam relocation effort for Japan and will be
instrumental in making sure the Guam redevelopment receives the promised funding from Japan.
As this entity is officially being formed in October 2008, in parallel to the completion of the
42
Asahi Shimbun, “Shrinking Public Lenders,” August 21, 2007.
43
Japan International Cooperation Agency website, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/, (accessed February 2008).
29
Guam master development plan, it is critical that communication between JBIC/JICA and JGPO
remain open to keep this proposed move on schedule.
4.3.2 Joint Guam Program Office
The Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO) was established within the Department of the Navy in
August of 2006 under the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England. Initial
implementation details for the movement of Marines to Guam and associated military
construction projects took place under the leadership of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)44.
The JGPO “is responsible for facilitating, managing and executing requirements associated with
rebasing Marine Corp assets from Okinawa to Guam, including master planning efforts” in
addition to any base realignment or closure decisions related to establishing a joint base on
Guam, which might include realignments at Andersen AFB. JGPO is required to conduct the
environmental impact assessment process and prepare and Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for the relocation of the troops from Okinawa to Guam. In short, JGPO will coordinate all
facets of the relocation and construction associated with the Guam buildup under the leadership
of Major General Bice and Captain Robert Lee who are key to orchestrating this Guam buildup.
As of March 2008, the JGPO has conducted a series of scoping meetings to solicit input from
Guamanians/military/private sector/other parties regarding the proposed buildup and post troop
relocation concerns that will impact the EIS. 'We'll have a working-level master plan done by
this summer [2008], and a draft environmental impact study a few months later,' said Captain
Robert Lee, a US military planner by background and acting director of the Joint Guam Program
44
Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo website, “Military Buildup on Track, January 9, 2007,
http://www.house.gov/bordallo/Press_Releases/2007/pr010907-2.html, (accessed February 2008).
30
Office (JGPO)-Forward. Capt Lee's JGPO team of six, stationed at Naval Base Guam, will
eventually grow to 20.45
As of March 2008, the US government Office of Economic Adjustment has provided nearly
$1.7M in grants to the island’s government to support planning studies and federal government is
reviewing how to make high-priority upgrades to Guam’s infrastructure. 46 According to the
GAO report on the potential Guam buildup, infrastructure is a serious concern:
The effects of the increased demand on Guam’s roads, port capabilities, and utility
services—such as electrical generation, wastewater treatment, and solid waste
disposal—have not been fully addressed. DOD and Guam officials recognize that the
island’s infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand and will require
significant funding to address these needs. For example, the Government of Guam has
estimated that it will cost about $2.6 billion to improve the local infrastructure to
accommodate forecasted military and civilian growth on the island and that federal
assistance is needed to meet these requirements. DOD officials and the Guam Integrated
Military Development Plan identified several infrastructure areas that are in need of
improvements: (1) the two major roads in Guam are in poor condition and, when
ordnance (ammunition and explosives) is unloaded from ships for the Air Force now and
for the Marine Corps in the future, it must be transported on one of these major roads
that runs through highly populated areas; (2) the Government of Guam plans a number
of projects to upgrade the capability and efficiency of Guam’s port facilities that total
about $155 million with only $56 million funded at the time of our review; (3) the utilities
transmission lines are antiquated and the system is not reliable, and voltage and
frequency fluctuations are common; (4) the wastewater treatment facilities have a long
history of failing and are near capacity; and (5) the solid waste landfills have a number
of unresolved issues related to discharge of pollutants and are near capacity. Although
the Government of Japan has agreed to provide $700 million for utilities infrastructure
on DOD bases in Guam, this funding is neither intended nor is it sufficient to improve the
infrastructure throughout the island. Future DOD operations may be constrained on
47
Guam if improvements are not made to Guam’s infrastructure
After this report was completed, it appeared that another US 2.6 billion would be necessary to
prepare the island for the arrival of the troops and related infrastructure before the actual
45
46
Defense Community Newsletter, “Guam Update,” March 14, 2008,
http://www.defensecommunities.org/DC360_031408.pdf, (accessed March 2008).
47
31
relocation construction can begin. It appears that the U.S. and Japan have created entities that
will be effective in orchestrating this move, but that is only part of the process. It is clear that
this task is mammoth, very expensive to complete as a result of necessary infrastructure upgrades
as well as actual construction of the facilities for the relocation and on a very tight timeline.
There is potential for a unique opportunity to see tremendous united effort to accomplish an
important goal, while at the same time, there is a risk of serious miscommunication and
execution error which could stem from a range of factors: mechanics of the move, the fact that
the organizing entities are new and potential problems with securing the necessary funding.
Although funding it has been tentatively approved by both sides, there is potential for a reduction,
or even cancellation, of pledged funds due to changes in national political parties and economic
conditions for both countries.
4.4 Potential Problems with Funding from Japan
Although preliminary plans are being made to move the troops and the Japanese government has
committed to funding a share of the costs; there are still many undecided issues. For one, based
on my conversations with a small sample of Japanese citizens, the Japanese government has not
extensively communicated their proposed contribution to the relocation effort to their citizens.
As this is the case, it is unlikely that there is full support within the country. As the country faces
the koureisha mondai, （高齢者問題） or two pronged challenge of a shrinking and aging
population, Japan’s funding priorities could easily shift.
Funding has been approved by high level bureaucrats, however, the actual money has not been
funded and this poses a real problem. According to Foreign Ministry North American Affairs
32
Bureau Director Kawai Chikao, “here is no precedent for having Japan or any other country use
money from the government coffer to pay for building a military base in Guam, which is U.S.
territory. The Japanese government has repeatedly acknowledged that the payment lacks legal
basis. SOFA is not applicable”48 Clearly, there are hurdles to getting funding approved by the
government.
As an example, the Japanese Communist Party Secretariat Head Ichida Tadayoshi criticized the
US-Japan agreement by saying "At no time in history has Japan ever used tax money to help
construct new foreign military bases on foreign territory. There's no such international precedent,
either. The US should pay all costs of relocation of US troops”. He also said: "The aim of
relocating USMC units to Guam is not to reduce Okinawa's burdens. They are moving to Guam
because the US wants to effectively implement its world strategy in this region by linking up
their units/facilities in Guam, Hawaii, Okinawa”49. The fact that this statement is from the head
of the Japanese Communist Party should be noted, as they are only a marginally important
political entity; but if it is spreads to, or is representative of, other political parties, getting the
funding approved could be very problematic.
Furthermore, the Government of Japan funds will not be available until there are specific
construction plans and they can see exactly what they will be building. The risk here is that the
planning process is lengthy and the administration and policy priorities in Japan could change.
Specifically, if the planning process for the relocation of MCAS Futenma from Okinawa to
Guam is delayed; that could delay the entire construction and move process which would create
48
49
Ibid
33
greater uncertainties regarding funding and government support for the Guam buildup. At this
time, “the Japanese legislature approved $228 million for planning and initial construction funds
for force posture alignments, including efforts for project planning in Guam, and authorized the
Japan Bank for International Cooperation to invest in businesses for Guam development.” 50
Whether or not there is a delay in the proposed schedule, Japan’s national funding priorities
could shift away from military to social spending and this might place a larger funding burden on
the U.S.
4.5 Potential Problems with Funding from the US
In 2008, just as the Guam master plan is scheduled for completion, the American people will be
electing their new President. At a time when the near term economic prospects seem grim for
the US and the war in Iraq seems to have no end in sight, it is difficult to say whether the US
people, and their representatives in Congress, will approve additional military spending for the
proposed move to Guam. Only if it can be shown that U.S rebasing will 1) be more
economically efficient and 2) improve America’s reputation abroad will the funding be approved.
If the move from Okinawa to Guam proceeds on plan and on schedule, the U.S. will incur
additional costs to fund operations/maintenance for the Marines, as well as additional airlift costs
because Guam is further from Asia. It is estimated that this operational cost will reach an
estimated $465 million.51 As mentioned earlier, the US Government has approved $1.7 million
to fund studies regarding Guam’s infrastructure and planning related to the troop buildup. The
50
51
34
military will certainly advocate the move as part of a plan to make the military more efficient
and as part of a longer term strategy. After completing the environmental assessment process,
the military will have to convince the US Congress and the new President that long term benefits
of this move are greater than the short term costs, which are high as described earlier.
Considering the fact that the 2008 fiscal year military budget for all military construction and
family housing is US 21 billion, and the Guam move will be at least US 7 billion (4M US share
of the 10 billion, plus US 3M for infrastructure improvements) is significant.
4.6 Logistics
Assuming that the funds are approved by Japanese and US governments, the actual move itself
will proceed along the following schedule, with a master plan complete in 2008, presentation to
Congress for funding approval in 2009 and a construction start date of 2010 (please see
Appendix 3 for a more detailed timeline). This is a tight schedule, which allows little room for
deviation if the move is to be complete by the targeted 2014 date. It has taken nearly 10 years
since the Okinawans stated their goal to remove U.S. troop presence from their island; but the
actual execution of this move could take place in just 8 years since the US and Japan agreed to
the plan and to share costs.
The process is complex because the US government requires a high level of oversight, advance
planning and cooperation before it can send a request to Congress for funding. As such,
planning, and certainly not construction, cannot officially begin until the Environmental Impact
35
Statement, or EIS, is completed52. The EIS was started on March 7, 2007 and could take up to
three years to complete53. Because the timing is relatively tight, a preliminary joint planning
process54 is being run simultaneously in an effort to meet the 2014 completion deadline.
Capt Lee estimates this buildup could involve between 8,000 and 15,000 workers. The coming
influx of foreign workers is among several issues that have prompted apprehension among
Guam's government and its people. 55 Guam’s construction capacity has historically been
approximately US 800 million per year and the estimated build out schedule calls for US 3
billion per year to meet the 2014 completion date; so there is a clear gap in capacity necessary to
meet targets. 56 Okinawan politicians have lobbied to get authorization for Okinawans to be
involved with the build out, but the Guam Contractors Association (GCA) feels that this is not
the most cost-effective solution.57 To address the construction labor issue, the DoD has been
working with Congress to increase the number of H-2B visas for temporary foreign workers
coming to Guam and Marianas, these are the workers who would provide labor for the
construction on Guam. 58 In the end, Japanese construction workers may prove essential to
providing the expertise to complete the job, especially since the Japanese have expertise in
building on Guam, evidenced by the number of Japanese resorts on the island. So, even if the
52
Environmental Impact Statement; a process that tries to determine issues related to social, physical infrastructure
and environmental impact of any proposed developments that must be completed before projects can be planned or
approved.
53
54
Ibid.
55
56
57
Gerardo Partido, “Japan May Control Military Money,” August 24, 2007,
http://decolonizeguam.blogspot.com/2007/08/japan-may-control-military-money.html7, (accessed March 2008).
58
36
actual plan and subsequent funding is actually approved, assembling the manpower necessary to
build the facilities poses another serious hurdle to completion and could provide another avenue
for US-Japan cooperation.
Despite the fact that the plan to execute this move is so daunting because of its magnitude and
timing, there is tremendous interest from several key groups; the Guamanian government and
also private sector companies, in Japan, the U.S. and beyond. During 2007, JGPO launched its
series of scoping meetings on Guam to: 1) educate the Guamanians about the buildup and at the
same time, get their input regarding the build up to ferret out any concerns in the Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) that must be completed to receive funding, and 2) provide information to
potential contractors who might bid on the jobs to facilitate the construction process.59 These
key entities will all have a stake the buildup, so it is critical to get their input early in the process
to make sure the plan can proceed on schedule and not jeopardize funding commitments from
Japan which will be helpful to completing this move.
The first scoping meeting in April of 2007 drew close to 800 attendees from Guam, Saipan and
Tinian; attendees provided more than 900 comments on the relocation’s affect on education, law
enforcement, immigration, and other social and economic concerns. Based on preliminary
reports, it is clear that Guam needs substantial investment in physical and social service
infrastructure to absorb the proposed troop relocation and associated buildup. “In the end, we
will build a capability that enhances our national security, supports peace and stability in the
Pacific, preserves Guam’s precious culture and provides economic opportunities for the people
59
Captain Lee, interview by Clynt Ridgell, KUAM News, October 3, 2007, http://video.aol.com/video-detail/joint-
guam-program-office-and-environmental-impact-statement/299649121, (accessed March 2008).
37
of Guam and surrounding islands,” said Bice.60 The information from this meeting is being
used to develop a comprehensive environmental impact statement that is sensitive to Guamanian
concerns to present to Congress as part of the funding approval process.
As detailed in this paper, the actual execution of this move as planned is fraught with potential
difficulties due to domestic political priorities for both countries, as well as national funding
priorities as a result of macroeconomic pressures, acceptance by the Guamanians (please see
appendix 4) and lastly, difficulties with the actual construction process due to Guam’s remote
location. A bright spot though, is the strong interest from private side contractors. In August of
2007, the first Guam Industry Forum was co-hosted by NAVFAC Pacific and the JGPO.
“Initially planned for 600 attendees, the event drew over 1,000 industry participants from Guam,
Europe, Asia, Hawaii and the U.S. mainland, and was simulcast between two venues. Army,
Coast Guard, Air Force and Marine Corps senior officers were also on hand to provide answers
to service-specific questions, and the government of Guam provided senior executives to answer
questions on topics such as utilities, roadways, public works, labor, immigration, taxation and
infrastructure development”61. The scope of this project and timing has made it attractive to
many potential developers as the real estate market is entering what some analysts fear is a
sluggish period and government funded projects of this type become especially attractive as a
way to guarantee income during a potentially slow time.
“The forum went further and drew more widespread participation than originally anticipated,”
reflected Andy Wall, acquisition director for NAVFAC Marianas and forum coordinator. “It was
60
Jesse Leon Guerrero, “Forum Focuses on Military Buildup,” U.S. Naval Forces Marianas Public Affairs, Official
Website of the Navy, August 30, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31566 (accessed March
2008).
61
Kyra Hawn, “Guam Industry Forum Unites Industry Innovation With DoD Opportunity,” Naval Facilities
Engineering, August 28, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31509, (accessed March 2008).
38
all about sharing ideas and generating momentum.” This type of enthusiasm from the private
sector may prove essential to keeping this project on track and on budget. In the course of the
scoping meetings, JGPO received information from international companies about the best way
to handle the build out in a short amount of time, in a relatively isolated location. One
suggestion was to do some construction, such as concrete, off the island where labor is available
and then ship the finished goods to Guam for actual building construction62. Creative solutions
like this will be necessary to meet the proposed timeline of completion in 2014. Future events
are being planned to address the needs of stateside and foreign contractors, as well as small
business owners. JGPO anticipates release of a formal infrastructure and personnel phasing
roadmap in 2008 in concert with the Program Objective Memorandum 2010 budget planning
process.63
Because Guam is likely to see $400 million to $1 billion in construction per year for a period of
six to ten years, there is intense competition from various entities to get the bids. The joint U.S.
and Japan funding mechanism also creates additional complexity with the construction bidding
process. Projects will range from on-base utilities, to housing, barracks, and highway
modifications. A significant portion of the projects will be military construction projects
requiring Congressional authorization64 and must follow appropriate protocol for Congressional
funded construction.
62
Brett Kelman, “JGPO: Space running out for industry forum,” Guam Pacific Daily News, February 18, 2008,
http://www.guampdn.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080219/NEWS01/802190308/1002, (accessed March
2008).
63
Kyra Hawn, “Guam Industry Forum Unites Industry Innovation With DoD Opportunity,” Naval Facilities
Engineering, August 28, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31509, (accessed March 2008).
64
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney and JGPO’s David Bice, interview on KUAM news,
October 5, 2007, http://video.aol.com/video-detail/general-bice-and-federal-offical-on-guam-for-military-
meetings/1307375410, (accessed March 2008).
39
Since Japan controls 60% of the construction budget, there is a concern that Japanese contractors
may be given preference for jobs. This could potentially be helpful, though, as Guam is in
‘typhoon alley’ and Japanese contractors are accustomed to buildings structures to withstand
typhoons. It is likely, though, that U.S. and Guamanian firms will be tapped as subcontractors. It
is reported that Mitsubishi Industries has already sent representatives to Guam to inspect the
territory and several other major Japanese firms attended the second scoping meeting, according
to a list of companies on the Guam Industry Forum website65. Japanese firms already have
extensive experience building on Guam as it is a favorite vacation destination for the Japanese
and there are a significant number of Japanese resort facilities. It is important to note that Guam
feels that they already have a strong relationship with the Japanese business community and this
will provide them with the opportunity to be involved with many of the projects, regardless of
whether the project is funded by U.S. or Japanese sources.
According to the Guam Industry Forum website, which catalogues information from the
meetings and about the process, many questions have been raised about how the joint
US/Japanese funding mechanisms would actually work. Specifically, there have been questions
regarding Japanese SPEs and rules of engagement for US and Japanese companies in the
bidding/construction process. Regarding SPEs that will be funded with Japanese monies; it
seems that American firms will be more likely to be involved with housing construction, while
utilities construction will likely be led by Japanese firms. Regarding rules of engagement; there
will be an attempt to create a level playing field to the best of the JGPO’s ability and to
maximize the buying power of US and Japanese monies by not requiring the ‘buy American’
principles usually used for US government sponsored projects. This should help to raise the
65
Website for Guam Industry Forum, www.guamindustryforum.com, (accessed March 2008).
40
level of competitiveness in achieving the highest value for the allocated dollars, because the
Guam project will be expensive to execute for two reasons: 1) Guam’s remote geographic
location and 2) it’s location in ‘typhoon alley’ on an island that also has seismic shocks, both of
which will require sturdy building construction (please see Appendix #5). Each industry forum
has served to advance knowledge of the plan and generate ideas on how to proceed most
effectively, which is critical to overcoming obstacles and minimizing confusion.
In March 2008, the JGPO and NAVFAC (Naval Facilities Group) sponsored a second industry
forum that attracted over 1,300 U.S. and international industry representatives, along with senior
representatives from the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO), the government of Japan,
government of Guam and the Department of the Navy for a three-day forum. Considering the
fact that the first forum was expected to draw 600 attendees and drew over 1,000, there is clearly
interest in this project which will likely increase competitiveness and thereby increase efficiency
of construction and use of funds. The amount of interest from the private sector is growing and
will be critical for executing this move efficiently, with respect to time and money.
Major actors are concerned about creating an environment to work efficiently as evidenced by
comments from the military and Guamanian government. "This industry forum and the whole
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) endeavor is historic; our work is in front of us, no
doubt about it," said Capt. Louis Cariello, operations officer for NAVFAC Pacific. "We feel
good about where we are in the process, and we're encouraged by the dialogue we've had to
date." As stated by Cariello, the intent behind the forum and associated discussions is to
"leverage industry expertise to optimize the strategy." Felix P. Camacho, governor of Guam,
extended the island's hospitality to industry participants, and expressed his optimism for the
41
future. "There are businesses in Guam ready to join you in a prosperous future. We welcome you
to join this community effort to be part of the bright future of Guam and her people." Brig. Gen.
Rex McMillian, deputy commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific provided the key note
address to forum participants on day one. At the start of his remarks, McMillian emphasized that
Marines in the Pacific are good neighbors, and will set the bar high for positive community
engagement on Guam.66
Despite all of this enthusiasm, analysts are estimating that the construction start will be delayed
in part because the EIS completion/master planning could uncover additional issues and costs.
An un-indentified Japanese businessman feels that the JGPO office has not done enough to
provide information that would be helpful to private sector partners for the construction planning
to proceed; although this is admittedly difficult because the scope of the project is somewhat
unclear as regards how the project will be funded and what will be ultimately approved after the
completion of the EIS is done. Additionally, a Japanese Defense Ministry official noted that
they had received very little information from JGPO in advance of the most recent Industry
Forum meeting in March of 2008. 67 Comments like this are to be expected because of the
project’s magnitude, but they must remain few in number or could signal serious problems with
proposed execution.
66
Kyra Hawn, “$10 Billion Price Tag Draws Industry Leaders to Guam,” Naval Facilities Engineering, Command
Marianas Public Affairs, March 7, 2008, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=35593, (accessed March
2008).
67
Editorial, “FOCUS: Guam nonplussed by mounting challenges for hosting Okinawa Marines,” Kyodo News,
March 14, 2008,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/FOCUS:+Guam+nonplussed+by+mounting+challenges+for+hosting+Okinawa...-
a01610938211, (accessed March 2008).
42
This relocation has many moving pieces; so it is important the JGPO has full oversight and
coordination responsibility to keep the project moving forward. Generally speaking, it appears
they have done a good job to educate the public on Guam and communicate with private
contractors in the US, Japan and beyond about the process as evidenced by generating a lot of
comments from Guamanians and a lot of interest from private side contractors; two
constituencies who can help to make sure the process goes smoothly. In the next year, it will be
critical to keep lines of communication open as the master plan is finalized and the budgetary
approval process begins so that the project can be completed as scheduled.
43
5. Conclusion: The Troop Relocation from Futenma Base Okinawa to Guam Reflects New US/
Japan Security and Economic Relations
At present, the plan to move US troops from Okinawa to Guam reflects several new dynamics in
the US/Japan security relationship. The plan’s evolution can be linked to changes in both US
and Japanese preferences, as a result of social, political and economic issues.
In regards to Japan, the most significant changes are that Okinawa seems to have a ‘louder’ voice
in determining its destiny and will have increased support from Tokyo in working to reduce US
troop presence. The Okinawan people have never seen troops leave their island, so they will
only believe this plan when it is complete. Additionally, the Japanese government is looking to
change the pattern of funding US troops; in part by helping them move out of Japan. Once
troops are out of Japan, the funding burden on Japan will also decrease. This is part of Japan’s
transition toward becoming more independent with regard to its own security. The US military
has not made a plan to wholly leave Japan, but this is a big step to changing Japan’s role in the
US-Japan security relationship.
In regards to the US, there is recognition from within that the US military will look to reduce the
American troop burden on Japan, both physically by removing troops from Okinawa and
economically by shouldering more of the cost to maintain those troops once they are back on US
soil in Guam. Additionally, the U.S. will increase effectiveness among the different military
branches, by encouraging more cooperation between forces.
Before the Guam troop movement can be completed there are several key measures that must be
approved and executed by the US and Japanese governments. Firstly, funding approval from the
44
US must be secured; pursuant to favorable EIS reports that garner Congressional support and
budgetary authorization for the move. Secondly, funding approval from the Japanese
Government is pursuant to approval by the Japanese Diet, which in the face of expensive
national costs in an era of a shrinking population, is not a sure bet. After funding is secured, the
actual construction process will likely be completed with joint U.S. –Japanese cooperation as
both countries control how the monies will spent and how the projects will eventually be built.
After the plan is complete and funding is approved, the actual construction can begin. As
described, Guam needs serious infrastructure improvements before the estimated US 10 billion
in military facilities can be built. There is likely to be significant cooperation between private
sector Japanese and US companies to achieve this joint goal.
At the end of the day, although this move is costly and complex, it is critical to complete as it
will improve overall US/Japanese relations and security partnership for the longer term. As this
is move is yet to be executed; it is difficult to assemble information to fully understand the
magnitude of this effort. As this is only in the preliminary planning stages; it is not certain if and
how the troop relocation will actually take place. Even if this move is not completed, as planned,
the genesis of this idea to significantly change the status quo of U.S. basing in Japan reflects a
real evolution and change within the context of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.
Considering the changing roles of the US and Japan in the geopolitical context of their neighbors
in Asia, it is critical that these two countries continue to respect each other and work to achieve
common goals in the most efficient manner; as evidenced by the Guam relocation plan. The plan
represents many years and many attempts to find a mutually beneficial plan for the future. Both
U.S. and Japanese Governments have adapted to the new global security and internal country
45
pressures to create and approve this preliminary plan. If the Guam troop movement is executed
according to/close to plan it will be with the creativity of private side contractors and will signal
a new era of US/Japanese cooperation with a more autonomous Japan and independent US. As
Asia is expected to see the most geopolitical change in the world as a result of economic growth
in the region during the next century, the US/Japan security alliance will continue to be
important in the region and will be strengthened by this type of joint cooperation to proactively
manage the relationship into the future and not simply maintain the status quo.
46
6. APPENDIX
1) Overseas master plans defined the bases categories as the following: (1) main operating
base, a facility outside the United States and U.S. territories with permanently stationed
operating forces and robust infrastructure and characterized by command and control structures,
enduring family support facilities, and strengthened force protection measures; (2) forward
operating site, a scalable location outside the United States and U.S. territories intended for
rotational use by operating forces with limited U.S. military support presence and possibly pre-
positioned equipment; and (3) cooperative security location, a facility located outside the United
States and U.S. territories with little or no permanent U.S. presence that is maintained with
periodic service, contractor, or host nation support. Cooperative security locations provide
contingency access, logistics support, and rotational use by operating forces and can be a focal
point for security cooperation activities.68
2) The US Navy's Pacific Fleet area of responsibility covers over half of the earth; which is
roughly one hundred million square miles. Each day, USPACFLT’s ships are at sea in the Pacific,
Indian, and Arctic Oceans, from the West Coast of the United States to the Arabian Gulf. The
Pacific Fleet is roughly comprised of 178 ships, 1,500 aircraft, and more than 159,565 sailors,
marines, and civilians which keep the sea lanes open, deter aggression, provide regional stability,
and support humanitarian relief activities. 69
In general, the U.S. military strategy has three goals as outlined in the current Quadrennial
Defense Review70:
1) Assure allies and friends: U.S. must maintain a forward presence to respond to regional threats
against any Asian ally or friend and create a favorable balance of power to discourage aggression
or coercion by fostering security cooperation among Asian nations.
2) Dissuade future military competition: Maintain significant advantage in major areas of
military capability to discourage other countries from competing with the U.S. or starting future
military competitions.
3) Deter threats and coercion against U.S. interests: Maintain forward deployed and stationed
forces with global intelligence that requires a minimum of reinforcement from other theaters.
3) Timeline for Guam Buildup

US Japan Agreement Signed May 2006
PACOM GIMDP Released July 2006
JGPO Established August 2006
Service Requirements Received January 2007
NEPA NOI Published March 2007
First NEPA Scoping Meeting April 2007
Japan Diet JBIC Authorizations May 2007
68
70
5.
47
First Guam Industry Forum August 2007
Second Guam Industry Forum March 2008
Working Level Master Plan Completed July 2008
NEPA Draft EIS Completed January 2009
FY 10 (Construction Program) Submitted to Congress February 2009
NEPA Record of Decision Signed Master Plan Finalized January 2010
Guam Construction Begins July 2010
Estimate III MEF Relocation Begins 2012
FRF Guam Agreed Completion 2014
4) Guamanian Sentiment Regarding Buildup

In general, the increase in military personnel is met with mixed feelings on Guam. On one hand,
the projected 25% increase in the island’s population in a relatively short, five year, time frame
causes concern. Gov Felix Camacho indicates Guam needs $3 billion in local infrastructure to
handle the increase in the island’s population, figuring in the increase in construction workers,
military and their dependents.71 On the other hand, Guam will maintain sole control of the
additional taxes generated by the increase in personnel and will have a more stable tax base to
fund their operations and diversify their economy further from tourism driven. A survey
commissioned in August [of 2007] by the Pacific Daily News, a newspaper published in Guam,
indicated that 61 percent of Guamanians -- including 56 percent of Chamorros -- rated the
military expansion of Guam as “a good thing.”72
Guam’s representative in Congress, Madeleine Z. Bordallo, said the build-up will “provide an
economic boost to the island with opportunities for new jobs, increased tax revenues for the
government, increased utilization of Guam’s hotels, businesses, restaurants and the like and other
corollary positive impacts.” “The governor and Guam’s local leaders are working toward
partnering arrangements in all places possible,” she said. “Further, we can predict now that
increased revenue that will come in to the government of Guam can provide new opportunities to
be dedicated to improving Guam’s aging infrastructure.”73
“We don’t have a monopoly,” said Camacho. “We have a market share and we have local
companies that have knowledge and technical expertise to ensure the success of this venture.”
Camacho stressed the island’s strategic location as being mutually beneficial for the people of
Guam and the military, and he encouraged the assembled business owners to continue supporting
the island with their investments. “We are where America’s day begins, and we are Asia’s
closest U.S. connection,” Camacho said.74
With the influx of thousands of new residents to the island, Penn said Guam and its surrounding
islands will benefit in many ways. Not only will the military construction projects generate
increased jobs and revenues for the construction industry, but the Marines and their families will
also spend for services affecting housing, consumer spending, entertainment and other quality of
life issues. “The arrival of men and women who continue to volunteer in support of churches,
71
72
73
Ibid
74
2008).
48
schools, youth sports, philanthropic organizations and community events will add to the social
fabric of the community,” Penn added.75
5) Actual Construction:
DOD estimates suggest that Guam is 2.64 times more expensive than the baseline average
construction costs considering: 1) cost of construction material, 2) labor, 3) equipments and
factors such as weather, climate, seismic conditions, mobilization, overhead and profit, labor
availability and labor productivity, in addition to additional facility repair costs from typhoons
and seismic shocks.76
75
2008).
76
49
Bibliography
Asahi Shimbun, “Shrinking Public Lenders,” August 21, 2007.
Brett Kelman, “JGPO: Space running out for industry forum,” Guam Pacific Daily News,
February 18, 2008.
http://www.guampdn.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080219/NEWS01/802190308/1002,
(accessed March 2008).
Captain Lee, interview by Clynt Ridgell, KUAM News, October 3, 2007,

http://video.aol.com/video-detail/joint-guam-program-office-and-environmental-impact-
statement/299649121, (accessed March 2008).
David Pilling, “Japan and U.S. End Marines Wrangle,” Financial Times, April 25, 2006.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney and JGPO’s David Bice, interview on
KUAM news, October 5, 2007, http://video.aol.com/video-detail/general-bice-and-federal-
offical-on-guam-for-military-meetings/1307375410, (accessed March 2008).
Editorial, “FOCUS: Guam nonplussed by mounting challenges for hosting Okinawa Marines,”
Kyodo News, March 14, 2008,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/FOCUS:+Guam+nonplussed+by+mounting+challenges+for+host
ing+Okinawa...-a01610938211, (accessed March 2008).
Gavan McCormack. “The Okinawan Election and Resistance to Japan’s Military First Politics.”
Policy Forum Online 06-99A: November 18th, 2006,
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0699McCormack.html (accessed February 2008)
Gerardo Partido, “Japan May Control Military Money,” August 24, 2007,
http://decolonizeguam.blogspot.com/2007/08/japan-may-control-military-money.html7,
Global Security. Org. “Okinawa, Japan”,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm (accessed February 2008)
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Japan International Cooperation Agency website, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/, (accessed
February 2008).
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War College, 2002).
Jesse Leon Guerrero, “Forum Focuses on Military Buildup,” U.S. Naval Forces Marianas Public
Affairs, Official Website of the Navy, August 30, 2007,
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31566 (accessed March 2008).
Kyra Hawn, “Guam Industry Forum Unites Industry Innovation With DoD Opportunity,” Naval
Facilities Engineering, August 28, 2007,
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31509, (accessed March 2008).
Kyra Hawn, “$10 Billion Price Tag Draws Industry Leaders to Guam,” Naval Facilities
Engineering, Command Marianas Public Affairs, March 7, 2008,
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=35593, (accessed March 2008).
Okinawa Times. “Guam Braces for Peaceful Military Incursion,” April 19, 2006.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Minister, “Joint
Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Alliance Transformation: Advancing United
States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation,” (for Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso
Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma), May 1, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/U.S./security/scc/joint0705.html, (accessed February 2008).
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2008)
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思いやり予算８億円減で日米合意、光熱水料を３年間で, Yomiuri Shimbun, December 12,
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Affairs Committee, July 2, 2005
52

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From Okinawa to Japan:

A New Era for U.S.-Japan Relations

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Jennifer Amyx

costs to Japan will decrease.

Okinawan’s efforts to reduce American military presence on their island.

Okinawan sentiment than in the past.

and Okinawa on shaky grounds.6

Inamine reluctantly agreed to construction of a Futenma base replacement under three

agreement and 3) only be constructed after an environmental assessment could reasonably

guidelines was agreed upon by Japan and the US Governments.7

U.S. troop presence on Okinawa.

gubernatorial election reflected the strong opposition to continuation or expansion of US military

troops from Okinawa to Guam.

policy is based on these reciprocal obligations.

Futenma MCAS on Okinawa.

strategy, please see Appendix #1.)

amount of US presence in the region.

the Asian region.

U.S. military basing.

3.2 Why was Guam selected?

scenic with views of the Pacific Ocean and Philippine Sea22.

there’s an existing [Department of Defense] infrastructure is another advantage because of the

significant amount of land” held by DoD.26

It is sovereign US territory, it is central to numerous possible flash points, it provides strategic

place that is strategically important to the U.S. from a security perspective.

strong basing location in peace and war time.

continue to be an important strategic location for their branches.

location to continue its peacekeeping activities in the Asia region.

Japan and the U.S.

4.1 Relocation Plans and Cost

approved, so could be subject to revision.

Marines remained on Okinawa.

understanding the history and mission of these two entities.

4.3.1 Japan Bank for International Cooperation

dokuritsu gyōseihōjin kokusai kyōryoku kikō), or referred to as JICA.42

world, in lieu of maintaining a military.

global development strategies, strengthening collaboration with international institutions, and

further information on JICA, please see Appendix #3)

remain open to keep this proposed move on schedule.

4.3.2 Joint Guam Program Office

eventually grow to 20.45

reviewing how to make high-priority upgrades to Guam’s infrastructure. 46 According to the

GAO report on the potential Guam buildup, infrastructure is a serious concern:

conditions for both countries.

4.4 Potential Problems with Funding from Japan

population, Japan’s funding priorities could easily shift.

funding approved could be very problematic.

4.5 Potential Problems with Funding from the US

of the 10 billion, plus US 3M for infrastructure improvements) is significant.

the plan and to share costs.

for US-Japan cooperation.

Japan which will be helpful to completing this move.

used to develop a comprehensive environmental impact statement that is sensitive to Guamanian

concerns to present to Congress as part of the funding approval process.

priorities as a result of macroeconomic pressures, acceptance by the Guamanians (please see

way to guarantee income during a potentially slow time.

modifications. A significant portion of the projects will be military construction projects

whether the project is funded by U.S. or Japanese sources.

effectively, which is critical to overcoming obstacles and minimizing confusion.

approval process begins so that the project can be completed as scheduled.

Japan Security and Economic Relations

and Japanese preferences, as a result of social, political and economic issues.

US-Japan security relationship.