CIVIL LAW

Gerbert R. Corpuz v. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, THIRD DIVISION, (Brion, J.) The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree. HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED. The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion - i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of

They had five children. every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made. Marable v. or clear mistake of law or fact. Rosalino L. THIRD DIVISION. Rosalino decided to legally end his marriage with Myrna so he filed a petition for absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. after years of being together. Within the same month after the civil wedding. at the same time.R. fraud. Needless to state. between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. a church wedding was celebrated. once recognized. The quarrels between them unfortunately worsened and this led to Rosalino’s departure from their home. When Myrna discovered it.. 17 January 2011. Dr. However. He went to a clinical psychologist to be examined for the purpose of presenting evidence in court. Later on in their relationship. Rosalino L. Marable were sweethearts since they were still students at Arellano University. had an affair with another woman. The foreign divorce decree itself. serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert. as provided in Section 48. This was aggravated when they encountered problems with their daughter who was transferred from one school to another because of misbehavior and then later on became pregnant untimely. A remand. Tayag. will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction. who is beginning to get worn out by their unhealthy relationship. Rosalino’s way of of spoiling their children also was a cause of quarrels between him and his spouse. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Jr. Rosalino. want of notice to a party. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. Myrna F.) It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link. shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties. Marable G. they eloped from their homes and married through civil rites before the mayor of Tanay. Myrna. (Villarama. pursuant to Section 48. Marable and Myrna F.CIVIL LAW the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. Rosalino immediately ended the relationship with his mistress. concluded that Rosalino is suffering from “Anti-Social Personality Disorder” which manifests a pervasive . medical or the like. 178741. he converted to Islam after going out with many women. collusion. they started to fight verbally and even physically more frequently. the clinical psychologist who examined him. J. Rizal. After some time. after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence. leaving his wife and children. No. as the foreign judgment.

was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that Rosalino is a socially deviant person. are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. rebelliousness. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity. and lack of remorse. the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. most especially his children. permanent and incurable. The evaluation of Dr. and constant need for attention. CA Decision AFFIRMED. self-centered and deceitful. HELD: Appeal DENIED for lack of merit. this appeal. However. as amended. It was said to be rooted from Rosalino’s childhood hardships due to a dysfunctional family. deceitfulness. For sure. rebellious. Hence. self-centeredness. it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the RTC which granted the annulment of marriage of the Marable spouses based on the evidence of Rosalino’s psychological incapacity. His tendency to womanize. as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children. Dr. impulsive. was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave. Tayag concluded that Rosalino was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Here. Also. However. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. the spouses’ frequent marital squabbles and differences in handling finances and managing their business affairs. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence submitted was insufficient to prove psychological incapacity. impulsivity. the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. deep feelings of rejection. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of Rosalino’s alleged psychological incapacity. Because of this finding. In fact. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo rendered judgment annulling the marriage of the Marable spouses. the records . Rosalino even admitted that despite their financial difficulties. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC upon granting the appeal of the Office of the Solicitor General which declared the marriage as still valid and subsisting. assuming he had such tendency.CIVIL LAW pattern of social deviancy. Rosalino tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father. the records would show that the Rosalino acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family. they had happy moments together.

That not being the case with Rosalino. Alain M. the dispositive portion requires that a decree of . Tayag. he immediately terminated it. However. Extrajudicial service of summons was sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated at that time. (Carpio. Thus. Rather. No. Furthermore. J. However. He also alleged that Caridad tends to be violent toward him. they reunited and later on decided to get married. Diño v. and prodigal.” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. January 19. Rosalino’s marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. Petitioner Alain M. a psychological report was submitted by Dr. Caridad L. SECOND DIVISION. unfaithful. In short. and is now married to another man. The prosecutor of Las Piñas declared that there was no collusion between the two parties. Diño G. his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. Alain’s marriage to Caridad was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Diño and respondent Caridad L. In Santos v. it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so. stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was founded to be long-lasting and incurable. what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. 2011. The Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas granted Alain’s petition. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity. He alleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout their marriage and was irresponsible.R. After two years.CIVIL LAW show that when respondent learned of his affair.) In this case. 178044. She did file any answer within the reglementary period. the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. by itself. It was also learned that she already filed a divorce in the United States. a clinical psychologist. Court of Appeals. Diño have been childhood friends and sweethearts. They lived together for ten years then separated. which was granted by the Superior Court of California. Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of marriage based on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad. due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make Rosalino completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

and Their union is without the benefit of marriage. . The RTC partially granted the petition with modifications stating that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply. 19. partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Hence.(1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition. 2. which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Partition and Distribution of Properties. Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was contracted. and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Under Article 40. Alain filed a petition questioning that requirement. Decision. 9 All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between Alian and Caridad. or their marriage is void. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code . “[t]he absolute nullity of a . HELD: RTC Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. 3. In short.CIVIL LAW absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. this petition. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. The Court agrees with Alain that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife. partition. Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation. the following elements must be present: 1. it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation. partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

v. it was also held that the applicable laws were Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code which require that it is necessary to either judicially or extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as their family home prior to its exemption. al. Moreover. et. The Labor Arbiter decided the case in favor of Pangilinan. the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by Ramos. However. meaning. J. al. refers to voidable marriages.. THIRD DIVISION. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. separation pay.CIVIL LAW previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Ramos (Ramos). Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains. only P300. Ramos Electric. he passed away and he was thereafter substituted by Juanita Trinidad Ramos. 13th month pay. et. During Ramos’ appeal to the Court of Appeals. unfortunately failed to comply with . countered that such property is not a family home because it bears the address of the company and. supposing it is a family home.) There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home. In both instances under Articles 40 and 45. Ramos’ property in Pandacan. however. 185920. The article. filed a complaint of illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter against E. Ramos. et. al. (Carpio-Morales. Pangilinan. the herein petitioners. al. Manila was ordered to be levied.” Article 45 of the Family Code. it was alleged by Ramos that the Pandacan property is a family home and therefore exempted from execution to satisfy the judgment award. Respondents Danilo Pangilinan. al. which was owned by Ernesto M. et al. on the other hand.R. al. Danilo Pangilinan et al. has no retroactive effect. and ordered Ramos to pay the latter their backwages.M. No. G. Inc. et. and service incentive pay. there is a need to liquidate. et. marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juanita Trinidad Ramos. partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.000 is exempt from execution. the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. et. The Court of Appeals held that the Pandacan property was not exempted from execution notwithstanding Article 153 of the Family Code which provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. 20 July 2010.

Meanwhile. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. or if exclusively by one spouse. the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership. And in both cases. for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225. On the other hand. Moreover. this petition. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3. Hence. claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3. and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. Hence. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3. 1988. extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. its constitution must have been with consent of the other. In the present case. al. two sets of rules are applicable. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. For the family home to be exempt from execution. they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. 1988. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding the levy upon the Pandacan property. since Ramos. and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further. there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially . it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home. whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code. HELD: Petition DENIED. the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by . et. distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.CIVIL LAW the requirement resulting to the denial of the motion to quash the writ of execution. 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. or as early as 1944. 1988. 154 actually resides therein. 1988.

R. J. being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter. Parenthetically. Hence. however. represented by her mother Araceli Lopez G. She assailed that she is the illegitimate daughter of Nepomuceno submitting as evidence the handwritten note allegedly written and signed by Nepomuceno. et. FIRST DIVISION. Nepomuceno denied the assertions reasoning out that he was compelled to execute the handwritten note due to the threats of the National People’s Army. this petition.CIVIL LAW Ramos. the records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos’ bank accounts were already closed while other properties in his or the company’s name had already been transferred. HELD: Petition GRANTED. No. ISSUE: Whether or not the filiation of Archbencel as illegitimate daughter of BenHur Nepomuceno is established by the handwritten note submitted as documentary evidence. Ben-Hur Nepomuceno v. 2010. the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article: . She was represented by her mother. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals and the trial court’s decision was reversed. Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles. (Carpio-Morales. Araceli Lopez. Respondent Archbencel Ann Lopez. On the other hand. As the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City ruled in favor of Archbencel. Arhbencel’s demand for support. Archbencel Ann Lopez. and the only property left was the Pandacan property. March 18. 181258. just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family. As such. filed a complaint for recognition and support of filiation against petitioner Ben-Hur Nepomuceno. It is.) The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation. Nepomuceno thereafter proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the trial court stating insufficiency of evidence as the reason for dismissing the case against Nepomuceno. She also demanded for financial support along with filial recognition. falls under Article 195(4). al.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. xxxx ART. fails to establish her claim of filiation. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. 172. and 5. in the main. Arhbencel relies. Legitimate ascendants and descendants. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter. Herrera v. has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner. In the present case. 2. 175. . It is. therefore. Legitimate brothers and sisters. Here. The note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. however. The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel. The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. At bottom. rules. 3. all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which. He has consistently denied it. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter. the latter not having signed the same. and jurisprudence on establishing filiation: ART. without more.CIVIL LAW 1. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. whether of the full or halfblood. For it is not even notarized. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment. a copy of her Certificate of Birth. It is. The spouses. not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. 4. Alba summarizes the laws. not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. on the handwritten note executed by petitioner. or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family. this petition. (Carpio. No. Remo’s counsel sent a letter to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to express the same request. SECOND DIVISION. Before the expiration of her passport. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs G. despite the subsistence of her marriage. Rallonza. stated that the request can only be granted in cases where a woman had not used her husband’s surname in a previous passport. However. OR . can revert to the use of her maiden name. Otherwise. which is considered superior to all other official documents. In the case of a married woman. Article 370 of the Civil Code provides: ART. Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. Petitoner Virginia V. 5 March 2010. who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport. filed an application for its renewal with a request to revert her surname to maiden name. HELD: Petition DENIED. she used the last name of her husband as her surname and maiden name as her middle name. or death of the husband which was neither the case with Remo and her husband. Hence. it was also denied.) Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport. A married woman may use: (1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER HUSBAND’S SURNAME. undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Remo filed an appeal to the Office of the President which was dismissed. Ma. although recognizing the non-mandatory use of the husband’s surname. 169202. Virginia V. The same action was filed to the Court of Appeals resulting also to denial. her her she her Consequently. 370.R. cannot be countenanced. The Office. Remo v.CIVIL LAW however. Her request was denied. and that reverting to one’s maiden name is only permitted in cases of annulment of marriage. All motions for reconsiderations filed to both offices were also denied. divorce. ISSUE: Whether or not Remo. J. Remo is married to Francisco R. In passport.

to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. which is considered superior to all other official documents. BUT PREFIXING A WORD INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS WIFE. but not a duty. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370. Clearly. placing her case outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name). undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. but also her maiden name upon marriage. annulment or nullity of marriage. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport. SUCH AS “MRS.” We agree with Remo that the use of the word “may” in the above provision indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. may not change her family name at will. . Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists. Thus. Otherwise. for passport issuance purposes. a married woman has an option. Remo. in her previous passport application. cannot be countenanced. on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 “limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport.CIVIL LAW (2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME. divorce decree. In the present case. Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname before. such as Remo. this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. However. The Court notes that Remo would not have encountered any problems in the replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first applied for a Philippine passport. and now desires to resume her maiden name. whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her husband’s surname in her old passport. she does not change her name but only her civil status. OR (3) HER HUSBAND’S FULL NAME. If we allow petitioner’s present request. Further. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries. a married woman.” These instances are death of husband. she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. whose marriage subsists.

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