CIVIL LAW

Gerbert R. Corpuz v. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, THIRD DIVISION, (Brion, J.) The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree. HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED. The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion - i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of

Rosalino’s way of of spoiling their children also was a cause of quarrels between him and his spouse. Rizal. The quarrels between them unfortunately worsened and this led to Rosalino’s departure from their home. the clinical psychologist who examined him. Myrna.. Rosalino. J. he converted to Islam after going out with many women. Within the same month after the civil wedding. every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made. collusion.CIVIL LAW the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. Marable were sweethearts since they were still students at Arellano University. want of notice to a party. a church wedding was celebrated. He went to a clinical psychologist to be examined for the purpose of presenting evidence in court. No.R. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. at the same time. Jr. THIRD DIVISION. once recognized. pursuant to Section 48. Myrna F. Marable v. as the foreign judgment. who is beginning to get worn out by their unhealthy relationship. 17 January 2011. Rosalino L. they started to fight verbally and even physically more frequently. as provided in Section 48. or clear mistake of law or fact. shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties. They had five children. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. When Myrna discovered it. This was aggravated when they encountered problems with their daughter who was transferred from one school to another because of misbehavior and then later on became pregnant untimely. medical or the like. The foreign divorce decree itself. will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction. concluded that Rosalino is suffering from “Anti-Social Personality Disorder” which manifests a pervasive . However. Rosalino decided to legally end his marriage with Myrna so he filed a petition for absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. had an affair with another woman. Rosalino L. Rosalino immediately ended the relationship with his mistress. after years of being together. After some time. fraud. after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence. Marable and Myrna F. Needless to state. (Villarama. Marable G. A remand. Tayag. they eloped from their homes and married through civil rites before the mayor of Tanay.) It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link. Later on in their relationship. serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert. Dr. 178741. leaving his wife and children.

the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void.CIVIL LAW pattern of social deviancy. and lack of remorse. However. they had happy moments together. Here. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of Rosalino’s alleged psychological incapacity. Also. The evaluation of Dr. and constant need for attention. impulsive. Hence. it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence submitted was insufficient to prove psychological incapacity. permanent and incurable. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. rebelliousness. For sure. the records would show that the Rosalino acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo rendered judgment annulling the marriage of the Marable spouses. Because of this finding. as amended. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the RTC which granted the annulment of marriage of the Marable spouses based on the evidence of Rosalino’s psychological incapacity. rebellious. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that Rosalino is a socially deviant person. Dr. as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children. self-centeredness. However. CA Decision AFFIRMED. Rosalino even admitted that despite their financial difficulties. self-centered and deceitful. deep feelings of rejection. His tendency to womanize. It was said to be rooted from Rosalino’s childhood hardships due to a dysfunctional family. impulsivity. this appeal. HELD: Appeal DENIED for lack of merit. Rosalino tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father. assuming he had such tendency. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC upon granting the appeal of the Office of the Solicitor General which declared the marriage as still valid and subsisting. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity. was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave. most especially his children. the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. the records . was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. In fact. the spouses’ frequent marital squabbles and differences in handling finances and managing their business affairs. Tayag concluded that Rosalino was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. deceitfulness.

January 19. It was also learned that she already filed a divorce in the United States. by itself. However.CIVIL LAW show that when respondent learned of his affair. Diño have been childhood friends and sweethearts. he immediately terminated it. the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. (Carpio. However. it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make Rosalino completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.R. Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of marriage based on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad. Caridad L. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty. Rather. That not being the case with Rosalino. they reunited and later on decided to get married. a psychological report was submitted by Dr. Diño v. 2011. Rosalino’s marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. Petitioner Alain M. He alleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout their marriage and was irresponsible. Furthermore. In short. Diño and respondent Caridad L. Extrajudicial service of summons was sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated at that time. Thus. and prodigal.) In this case. the dispositive portion requires that a decree of . stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was founded to be long-lasting and incurable. SECOND DIVISION. 178044. J. In Santos v. No. his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. After two years. due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Alain’s marriage to Caridad was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. The prosecutor of Las Piñas declared that there was no collusion between the two parties. She did file any answer within the reglementary period.” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Tayag. and is now married to another man. unfaithful. a clinical psychologist. They lived together for ten years then separated. Alain M. which was granted by the Superior Court of California. The Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas granted Alain’s petition. He also alleged that Caridad tends to be violent toward him. Court of Appeals. Diño G. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity.

In short. and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. 9 All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between Alian and Caridad. The RTC partially granted the petition with modifications stating that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation. Partition and Distribution of Properties. . 19. the following elements must be present: 1. this petition.(1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition. Decision. 3. Under Article 40. Alain filed a petition questioning that requirement. Hence. partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. or their marriage is void. which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. The Court agrees with Alain that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation. Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was contracted. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other. and Their union is without the benefit of marriage. HELD: RTC Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. 2.CIVIL LAW absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. “[t]he absolute nullity of a . partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code . Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. partition.

. the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. al. al. Pangilinan. however. G. Inc. Ramos’ property in Pandacan.CIVIL LAW previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. However.000 is exempt from execution. supposing it is a family home. During Ramos’ appeal to the Court of Appeals. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains. The Labor Arbiter decided the case in favor of Pangilinan. v. No. et. Moreover. et. which was owned by Ernesto M. Manila was ordered to be levied. unfortunately failed to comply with . al. THIRD DIVISION. it was also held that the applicable laws were Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code which require that it is necessary to either judicially or extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as their family home prior to its exemption. et al. meaning. and service incentive pay. In both instances under Articles 40 and 45. there is a need to liquidate. he passed away and he was thereafter substituted by Juanita Trinidad Ramos. marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. countered that such property is not a family home because it bears the address of the company and. al. 13th month pay. Respondents Danilo Pangilinan. the herein petitioners. J. it was alleged by Ramos that the Pandacan property is a family home and therefore exempted from execution to satisfy the judgment award. 185920. the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by Ramos. al. has no retroactive effect. partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.M. The article. Ramos Electric. on the other hand. filed a complaint of illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter against E. Ramos (Ramos). et. et. et. (Carpio-Morales. Ramos.) There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home.R. The Court of Appeals held that the Pandacan property was not exempted from execution notwithstanding Article 153 of the Family Code which provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.” Article 45 of the Family Code. et. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. separation pay. 20 July 2010. refers to voidable marriages. al. and ordered Ramos to pay the latter their backwages. only P300. Danilo Pangilinan et al. Juanita Trinidad Ramos.

Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by . two sets of rules are applicable. 1988. the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home. there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially . for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. On the other hand. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved. 1988. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding the levy upon the Pandacan property. Moreover.CIVIL LAW the requirement resulting to the denial of the motion to quash the writ of execution. claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3. and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. its constitution must have been with consent of the other. 1988. et. or as early as 1944. Hence. or if exclusively by one spouse. the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership. whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code. Further. distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Meanwhile. al. they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. 1988. For the family home to be exempt from execution. 154 actually resides therein. And in both cases. 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3. this petition. Hence. HELD: Petition DENIED. In the present case. since Ramos. then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225.

Article 195. being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter. et. al. her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation. As such.) The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. FIRST DIVISION. Respondent Archbencel Ann Lopez. however. represented by her mother Araceli Lopez G. Nepomuceno thereafter proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the trial court stating insufficiency of evidence as the reason for dismissing the case against Nepomuceno.CIVIL LAW Ramos. It is. She also demanded for financial support along with filial recognition. She assailed that she is the illegitimate daughter of Nepomuceno submitting as evidence the handwritten note allegedly written and signed by Nepomuceno. 181258. Ben-Hur Nepomuceno v. Araceli Lopez. Parenthetically. Hence. the records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos’ bank accounts were already closed while other properties in his or the company’s name had already been transferred. J. filed a complaint for recognition and support of filiation against petitioner Ben-Hur Nepomuceno. 2010. She was represented by her mother. falls under Article 195(4). HELD: Petition GRANTED. Archbencel Ann Lopez. March 18. No. ISSUE: Whether or not the filiation of Archbencel as illegitimate daughter of BenHur Nepomuceno is established by the handwritten note submitted as documentary evidence. Arhbencel’s demand for support. (Carpio-Morales. Nepomuceno denied the assertions reasoning out that he was compelled to execute the handwritten note due to the threats of the National People’s Army. As the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City ruled in favor of Archbencel. this petition.R. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals and the trial court’s decision was reversed. the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article: . On the other hand. and the only property left was the Pandacan property. just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.

fails to establish her claim of filiation. Arhbencel relies. however. It is. In the present case. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter. therefore. whether of the full or halfblood. the latter not having signed the same. rules. 175. not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. 3. For it is not even notarized. At bottom.CIVIL LAW 1. without more. on the handwritten note executed by petitioner. The note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. Herrera v. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. a copy of her Certificate of Birth. The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter. or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which. in the main. Here. xxxx ART. It is. 172. Legitimate ascendants and descendants. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Alba summarizes the laws. and 5. . The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel. 2. Legitimate brothers and sisters. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. He has consistently denied it. 4. has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner. not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. The spouses. and jurisprudence on establishing filiation: ART. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment.

undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. The same action was filed to the Court of Appeals resulting also to denial. although recognizing the non-mandatory use of the husband’s surname. OR . Petitoner Virginia V. which is considered superior to all other official documents. can revert to the use of her maiden name. Before the expiration of her passport. despite the subsistence of her marriage. she used the last name of her husband as her surname and maiden name as her middle name. and that reverting to one’s maiden name is only permitted in cases of annulment of marriage. Remo v. Article 370 of the Civil Code provides: ART.) Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport. Virginia V. 5 March 2010. her her she her Consequently.CIVIL LAW however. this petition. Remo filed an appeal to the Office of the President which was dismissed. just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family. (Carpio. The Office. Ma. cannot be countenanced. Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. Her request was denied. who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport. Otherwise. A married woman may use: (1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER HUSBAND’S SURNAME. Rallonza. filed an application for its renewal with a request to revert her surname to maiden name.R. or death of the husband which was neither the case with Remo and her husband. No. ISSUE: Whether or not Remo. HELD: Petition DENIED. However. J. SECOND DIVISION. it was also denied. 169202. In passport. Remo’s counsel sent a letter to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to express the same request. 370. divorce. All motions for reconsiderations filed to both offices were also denied. In the case of a married woman. Hence. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs G. Remo is married to Francisco R. stated that the request can only be granted in cases where a woman had not used her husband’s surname in a previous passport.

undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. divorce decree. OR (3) HER HUSBAND’S FULL NAME. placing her case outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name). a married woman has an option. Further. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370. this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. In the present case. definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. she does not change her name but only her civil status. but also her maiden name upon marriage. If we allow petitioner’s present request. Thus. SUCH AS “MRS. requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name. annulment or nullity of marriage. and now desires to resume her maiden name. but not a duty. on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. However. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her husband’s surname in her old passport. Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname before. a married woman. which is considered superior to all other official documents. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries.” These instances are death of husband. whose marriage subsists. Remo. to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. in her previous passport application. Clearly. she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.CIVIL LAW (2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists.” We agree with Remo that the use of the word “may” in the above provision indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. . for passport issuance purposes. argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 “limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport. such as Remo. may not change her family name at will. The Court notes that Remo would not have encountered any problems in the replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first applied for a Philippine passport. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport. Otherwise. BUT PREFIXING A WORD INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS WIFE. cannot be countenanced.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful