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pher and mathematician There are profounddifferences between Ibn Sina's and Husserl'saccounts of intention and intentionality.They were particularly notions in the Christian.Afterthis I shall arguefor the superiority Husserlian transcendentalist view over the Avicenniannaturalistic view. physics.IBN SINA AND HUSSERL ON INTENTION AND INTENTIONALITY MarinaPaola Banchetti-Robino of Philosophy. in many ways. in his psychology and his metaparticularly as in found the Kitab and the Kitab al-Shifa'. even those who do not consider themselves phenomenologists. in manyways.Ibn Sina and Husserlwere. To this end. are somewhat familiarwith Husserl'stheory of intentionality. of course. a response to FranzBrentano'spsychologisticaccount of 'intentional in-existence'.and it is particularlyinterestingto examine the influences and the specific philosophical concerns that helped to shape each philosopher's unique conception of intentions and intentional processes and of intentionality'srelationto consciousness.I shall begin by examiningthe concept of intention as it appears in the work of Ibn STna.Therefore. and Islamic philosophical traditionsof the Middle Ages and regained philoin the writingsof Edmund sophical importancein the twentiethcentury. that of the physician and the mathematician. IbnSTna's Account of Intentionand Intentionality Although many philosopherstoday. in part. strongly influencedby the professionalcultureto which each belonged. unless. influencedby the traditionof the Baghdadschool of philosopher-physicians and their understanding of the 'internalsenses'. Number 1 January 2004 71-82 ? 2004 by University of Hawai'i Press 71 . in theirapproachto the concept of intentional meanings and of intentionality.particularly Husserl. they are medievalistsor have a certain degree of competence in medieval philosophy.I shall arguethat. I shall firstexamine Ibn Sina's naturalistic conception of intentionand how it was. Jewimportant ish. Philosophy East & West Volume 54.Lastly. Afterthis I shall examine Husserl'santi-naturalistic stance and how this stance was both influenced by regardingintentionand intentionality and. they are less familiarwith Ibn Sina's understandingof the concept of intention. This essay proposes to confront medieval philosophy with contemporary phenomenologyby conductinga comparativestudyof the concepts of intentionand as they appear in the philosophicalworks of the Islamicphilosopher intentionality and physician Ibn Sina (latinizedas Avicenna)and the phenomenologicalphilosoEdmundHusserl. of the respectively. al-Najat The theory of intentionelaboratedby Ibn Sina in his accounts of psychology.Florida AtlanticUniversity Department The concepts of intention and intentionalityhave enjoyed a long history within Westernphilosophy.
This is the reason for which they are to the internalsenses. In his theoryof knowledge.. In Ibn STna'sdiscussion of Being and substance. in turn.. This form is certainlyperceived by the innersoul of the sheep. seeing a yellow liquid that is honey.e. The sweetness that is seized by this judgment is not sensible.3 seizes the object] by the attribution 72 PhilosophyEast& West . and one cannot point to anything specifically perceived by the external senses that displays the intention. Being per se is substance. rather.. judges that it is sweet and proceeds to taste it.2 Why does the sheep.Some faculties.which is a substanceof inferior order. which causes it to fear the wolf and to flee from it. and metaphysics was transmitted to Scholastic philosophy through the work of Thomas Aquinas. Being is the properand primaryobject of metaphysics.the howls and the scent of a wolf.. can both perceive and act while others only perceive and do not act.and colour.... but it is firstperceived by its externalsense. the externalsense.good or bad. because it has not yet actuallybeen tastedby the animal. the animal. but the externalsense perceivesit firstand then transmits as for example. As for the intention. But received firstby the externalsenses and are then transmitted the 'meanings'that these objects signify are not such corporeal qualities but. through its internal sense.. such as the quality of being agreeable or disagreeable." we read the following account of intention: There are some faculties of internalperceptionwhich perceive the form of the sensed things. what is firstperceived by the sense and then by the internalfaculties is the facultiesperceive withoutthe externalsense is the inform. There is. leads to the perception of intention by the internal senses: Sensibleformsare ... sympatheticor non-sympathetic. althoughthis qualityin itself is sensible.It is not merelythat it seizes the living object by simply accepting certainof its vital qualities. [IbnSTna] reachesthe conclusion that one thing can legitimately exist in the spirit and be missing from externalobjects. justas the sheep perceivesthe intentionof harmin the wolf.. The sheep. form. without harmhaving been perceived at all by the external sense. he calls this type of existence intentionalbeing uses [the concept of [or intentionalexistence]. Now.and otherswhich perceive the 'intention'thereof. judgesthat he is ferociousand dangerous.. perceivingthe figure.(Emphasis mine)' In chapter 3 of the Najat.The distinctionbetween the perceptionof the form and that of the intentionis thatthe form is what is perceived both by the innersoul and it to the soul. its shape.but also [thatit of these qualitiesto the object. within this [IbnSTna] distinguishesseparateand materialforms and matter.. however. otherssecondaryperception.. Some possess primary perception. when the sheep perceivesthe formof the wolf. corporealqualitiesthataffectthe sensoryorgansin such a way that they are received by virtue of their similitude.again. qualities or values that are latent in the sensible forms. For example...while what only the internal tention. .epistemology. perceive hostility in the wolf? According to one reading of this text. titled "InternalSense. [IbnSTna] intention]to explainthe relationbetween object and subject..etc. i. the intention in itself is not perceived by the external senses. something about the form (sura) that is perceived by the external senses and which.it is a thing which the soul perceives from the sensed object without its previously having been perceived by the external sense.and runsaway fromit immediately.
The two types of sensible objects are sensible forms and intentions. in humananimalsthe estimativefacultyand the intellectivefacultyare co-present. thus.whereasthe memorative faculty retains intentions. accordingto IbnSYna. in this context.As has already been estabintentionsare closely connected to sense perceptionsbelished above. perceivable by the externalsenses.We must understandthat. percipientsubject. there are two types of sensible objects thatcan be perceivedby the internalsenses.On the other hand.However. the sensible form to the example used by IbnSYna. ma'nan or intentions.5 and Plotinus.Ibn STna he also indirectlymaterializeshis account of intention. Thus. sense perceptioncontains a clearly physiological and materialisticelement: "althoughthe estimativefaculty has nonsensible intentionsas its properobjects. for IbnSTna cause they are dependent on them and. ception non-physiologically. This is why IbnSina can referto intentionsas 'sensible objects' even though. The proper objects of the estimative faculty are. intentionsare never perceived or perceivable by the externalsenses. complex Baghdad school of philosopher-physicians. Althoughthe sheep does not literally'see' hostility in the wolf's eyes. as established in the Najat. Accordingto this scheme.Thus. it only possesses those intentionswhen they MarinaPaola Banchetti-Robino 73 . for intentionality.to the sheep. the estimative faculty is somewhat limited. and there are two types of faculties. that the wolf is hostile. as the example of the sheep illustrates. in human animals.it does not affectany sense organat the time duringwhich the judgmentis being made. The two types of facultiesof internalsense are the receptivefacultyand the retentivefaculty. when receiving a form.who understoodthe idea of perUnlike Alexanderof Aphrodisias rematerializes perception.within the internalsenses.This faculty is part of Ibn STna's rather in scheme of the 'internal senses' that he from the inherited. retentionrequiresa stable substrate retaininga form requiresa changeless substrate."4 However. Ibn Sina explains that these two faculties are distinct from the fact that reception requiresa malleable substratesince. because an intention is not itself a sensuous quality of the object. for him. of intentions and.to return of the wolf 'signifies'hostilityto the sheep. whereas the formative(or retentive)imaginationis the facultythat retainssensible forms.the facultyof estimationis responsiblefor the perception Accordingto IbnSTna.and. there is a faculty of the receptive type and a facultyof the retentivetype that handle each type of sensible object. but merelyperceivableby the internalsenses. are what sensible form 'means'or 'signifies'to the Intentions. although it may be conveyed to the percipient througha sensoryfaculty. They can. a change must take since place in the substrate.perceive non-sensual aspects of the environment"thatexceed the perceptualcapacities of the [external] senses and the imagination. then. The ferociousnessof the wolf is latent in its appearance and comportment. Commonsense is the faculty that receives (or perceives) sensible forms. the sensible form of the expression in the wolf's eyes 'means'. part. that perceive these sensible objects. the estimativefaculty also has cognitive functions that it does not have in nonhumananimals.The estimativefaculty (wahm)is the facultythat receives (or perceives)intentions. that is. In nonhuman animals. In the scheme of internalsenses. 'sensible' does not mean 'sensuous'. in doing this.
perception.We find for example."8 They were not only prominentphysiciansbut also translators and it is out of this culturaltradition of the workof Aristotle. was the Baghdad school of Thismedical circle represented the 'afterlife' of the Baghdad philosopher-physicians. However. philosophicaltradition. The physicians'account of the mental faculties was much more physiological than the account to be found in the Aristotelian tradition. "[F]orall five senses. one would have to conclude that intentionalityhas. thatare received by common sense and thatare retainedby the This.. in Ibn Luka.Once the formwithout matterhas been received by common sense. Althoughthere are Neoplatonic influIbn Sina's understanding ences in IbnSina'sconception of the intellect. form without matter. occurs when common sense receives sensible forms.the evidence suggeststhat IbnSTna's Peripatetic psychologistic.then."'6 As we have seen above. were "a feature of the intellectual of medieval and constant life they Peripatetics.is not Neoplatonic. influencedby his own trainingas a physicianand by his attemptto respondto and mediate between the physicians'account of mental facultiesand the philosophers'account. the imaginativefaculty retains these sensible forms.that is. Now.. Thus. However. the reception of form as makingthe perceiverbecome like the form of the without matteris interpreted thing perceived. intentionality. establishesthe dependence of the facultyof estimation. and quasi-physiologicalaccount of perception and other mental faculties was. in many ways. in some ways.This account of perception is directly inherited from Aristotle. rather I focus on ethnic culture. such as perception."The spirit.for IbnSTna. 74 Philosophy East & West . shall focus on the professionalculturethat helped to shape of these concepts. there is nothing in the imaginationthat is not first receivedthroughthe perceptionof sensible forms. is a physiological element to the reception and retentionof the sensible forms of external objects.his account of other mentalfaculties.or formwithoutmatter. one should not extractfrom this account of perceptionis entirelyAristotelian. ultimately. I would like to examine the culturalinfluencesthat helped shape than IbnSTna's account of perception. of the philosopher-physician that IbnSina emerged.the estimativefaculty receives intentionson the basis of the sensible forms.for whom the reception of form without matterwas interpreted by the Scholasticsas 'intentionalin-existence'.sensible formsrepresentedin the imagination.for Ibn Sina.on sense perception.. however. inheritedfrom Aristotleand the naturalistic.and intentionality.the from matterin sense-perceptionis not so complete as in the estimative abstraction since it can be shown that. Althoughthe form is received strippedof its originalmatter. and students Islam.cognition..the following purelyphysiologicalconception of the spirit. there facultyor in the intellect.or of imagination. Galen. and Hippocrates. the fact that IbnSTna's Notwithstanding that his account of perceptionwas. physiologicalorigins. At this point.and to refuseto assent to them.."7 Therefore. are conjoined with particular thereby the of which cannot be estimation to existence 'impede things imagined compelling and are not imprintedin [the imagination]. especially that of perception. of Greatly influentialin Ibn Sina's medical trainingand in his understanding the mental faculties.
in a specific bodily location.for example.but also in Shifa'and Kafet. to breath. since this materialsubstance called 'spirit'must also interactwith the immaterial the problemof interaction. to the bodilyorgansin which the faculties of the soul are regarded only withreference with reference to the of function reside and not whichthey perform. the Canon. Thus. as distinctfromthe retentivefacultiesby focusing on theirfunctionaldifferences. the physicians made no distinction. It is throughthe spiritthat the soul communicates life and sensation to the body.a sheep whose middle hollow of the brain had been MarinaPaola Banchetti-Robino 75 . it directs itself in the arteriesand gives birthto life. Furthermore. soul. any injuryto this partof the bodily organ would affect the animal'sabilityto receive intentions. between the receptive and the retentivetypes of facultyof internalsense. will the two faculties alike.it passes throughthe nervesand producessensationand movement."9IbnLukaviews the spiritas an intermediary between the body and the soul. one malleable and the other stable.Only a malleable substratecan acquire the nonmaterialsensible form that is received in perception. or the estimativeor intentionalfaculty. concern themselves faculties hindrance only physicians in the bodilyorgansin whichthey are in the functioning can be tracedto an injury if two functionally different faculties of the soul residein one located.especially in his medical magnumopus..He appeals to syllogistic logic to make his argument. Inthese works.Consequently.abstractand nonsensory aspects of the external environmentthat.such as al-Kindiand al-Farabi.'1 organ affect Thus. Arisingfrom the heart.12 Thus. Therefore.are not themselves perceived by the externalsenses.to follow the reasoningof the medical circle. although he does not endorse a materialist conception of the soul. the receptivefacultyand the retentivefaculty must be distinct in kind. IbnSina seems to want to balance the account given by the medical circle and that given by the philosophers.however. arisingfromthe brain. QED. is not tion between a materialand an immaterial successfully avoided by adding a thirdand materialsubstance as an intermediary.is a subtle substance that emanates throughoutthe body. his account of intentionsis that they are 'meanings'or 'significations'.Therefore. Ibn Lukadoes endorse a materialist between conception of the spiritas the intermediary soul and body. for variety they in with of the soul so far as a .The problem.Only a stable substratecan retainthe form afterit has been acquired. in that it one as any injury then as inasmuch physicians regard faculty. However. there is also evidence in several of Ibn Sina's writings.and to arterialpulsation and.IbnSina places wahm. It is clear that in his scheme of facultiesof the internalsenses Ibn STna tries to break away from the strictphysiological account of the Baghdad He does this by consideringthe receptivefaculties school of philosopher-physicians.A substratecannot be both malleable and stable. at the end of the middle hollow of the brain.that he does not completely breakaway fromthe physician'saccount. although they accompany sense perception.10One could speculate that Ibn Lukamight be tryingto avoid the obvious philosophicaland physical problemsassociated with the notion of interacsubstance. bodilyorgan. therebyresurrecting Accordingto the physiciansof the Baghdadschool..
he claimsthat AlthoughHusserldistinguishes all mental processes. its objective sense. whereas perceptionand all actionally directed mentalevents are not states but mobile activities. Husserlalso refersto intentionality as 'egological constitution' forthe reasonthat the intentionalact is one in which subjective consciousness synthesizesthe sensuous data that is given to it and bestows sense or meaning upon it." but [Erlebnis] whatever.somehow injuredto the point of affectingthe estimativefaculty.Husserltells us that all consciousness is necessarilyactionally'directed'towardan 'object'. even those which are not themselves intentive.for example. ples supplied internally.'Pain'.are ultimately This is due to the fact that Ego unificationitself born in and borne by intentionality. which is "noetic.but withoutany injuryto any other partof the brain. In Ideas I. within itself. so that experience contributions is construed to be a complex of data given externally and organizationalprinciOnce one has suspended all ontological commitments. The act through which the ego bestows meaning upon its object is called the noetic act. its intended object.that there could be an almost perfectlyfunctioningconsciousness without intentionsor intentionality. This would then lead to the conclusion. apperceptionsare states. not Thisactional Ego-advertence mental event is directed or intentional. Husserltells us: Likeperception. is rather living in (Emphasis original)14 is not to be found in every mentalevent. and the meaningfulobject or 'meaning'that is constitutedthroughthis act is called a noema. Or. occurs throughan intentionalact. It is this peculiarityof mentalprocessesthat is known as intentionality. Husserl's Account of Intention and Intentionality is a highlysophisticatedand developed versionof Husserl'sdoctrineof intentionality the frequentlyheld epistemologicalpositionthat "the humanmind makessubstantial to the specific structure of what appearsbefore it.the strucassumptions."i."'3 and and once contingencies are bracketed.But. in some other words:to have sense or "to intend to" something [etwas "im Sinne zu haben"]. between apperceptionand perception.Thus.would conceivably be able to perceive the wolf but would be unable to detect hostilityin the animal. is the of all consciousness which. therefore. Thus.every intentivementalprocess-just this makesup the fundamental part of intentionality-has its "intentional Object. whereas those mental events that are intentionalare called inner or outer perceptions. In other words.e. every mental process can.the intentionalobject and the noema are one and the same..that is.is not just any mental fundamentalcharacteristic a (mental living) havingsense. the most fundamentalof all intentionalacts. for Husserl.The essential dynamic of an intentionalevent is that it projects itself toward something. presuppositions ture of consciousness is revealed in its essence as being intentional. unacceptableto someone like EdmundHusserl. for example. all consciousness is necessarilyconsciousness of something.Husserlcalls those mental events that are not intentionalapperceptions. include intentionality. for 76 East &West Philosophy . is a mentalevent every that is not itself intentional.
it is absurd to speak of any conscious state or mental event as being.from the long traditionthat preceded him. Foras long as there is consciousness. there must an constitutive act of and intentional. called the intentional (or mental)inexistence MarinaPaola Banchetti-Robino 77 . for the empiricalor psychological self is itselfthe productof the transcendentalEgo'sact of constitutive synthesis. only beings with a nervoussystem Althoughwe understand of consciousness. and consciousness presupposes intentionality. subject Ego. afterthe Scholasticperiod in medieval phiby other authors. then. FollowingHusserl. intentionality."[re]introduced into the philosophy of mind the seminal idea of an intentionalobject. concept of intentionalityexisted in semi-obscurityuntil 1874 when Franz Brentano. and a brainhave consciousness.The two are.is thus immersedin intentionality. capable synthesizing unifyingthe streamof consciousness. Meaning must. and. ality. Intentionality only presupposes pose consciousness. intentionality. that is.an apperceptionlike 'pain'. that.15 the losophy. to brain that could lead to non-intentional concan be done the no Thus. The traditionthrough was transmitted from Aristotleto the twentieth which the concept of intentionality and one. For there to be mental there must be an events. one and the same. The only possible damage to the brain that could destroy intentionalityis damage that destroysconsciousness altogether. It is not the purpose throughScholasticismon its way to contemporary of this essay to tracethis long history.we realizethat intentionality does not presuplocated in a particularbrain or part of the brain. is a contradictionin terms. for Husserl. therefore.the productof an intentionalact. Thus.in his Psychologie vom empirischenStandpunkt.and what we mightcall. A non-intentionalconscious state. Consciousnessis Consciousness. in essence.we can draw the following conclusions. the essentialcharacteristic the brain itself or to is not reducible to any particular partof the brain. and because we have bracketedall ontological commitmentsto or assumptionsabout a materialworld cannot be reducedto brainstatesor externalto the Ego. Intentionality of a material brain. damage scious states. there is intentionthere is no longerconsciousness. is but one of the many philosophers is a STna Ibn complex century long through which this concept passed from its origins in Aristotelianpsychology philosophy. Ego serving as the in of mental order for there to an these be events. in no mannerwhatsoever.for Husserl.is experienced by an Ego that is unified and is. Thus.which has alreadybeen successfullyaddressed Suffice it to say that. was not born in a void but was It is clear that Husserl'sconcept of intentionality inherited.without it there would be no unified streamof consciousness.founded on intentionalacts. the existence physical. althoughit is not itselfa mentalevent characterizedby intentionality. as a matterof fact. And. be bestowed upon the Ego before meaning can be bestowed upon the world of experience.rather. Because we are not speakingof the empirical Ego but of the transcendentalEgo."16Brentano tell us: is characterized mental of the Middle by whatthe Scholastics Every phenomenon Ages of an object. when there is no longer intentionality.
"Naturalism.17 In Brentano. in the sense in which Husserl understands it. Logical psychologism. that is..define mental phenomena phenomenon anything that are within those by saying they phenomena which contain an object intentionally themselves. concerned with developing an account of consciousness and intentionality that is nonpsychologistic. provide us with a phenomenology that could serve as the truly scientific foundation for logic. on the other hand. objective. in love loved. the feature that distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena is that they are directed toward objects that have intentional inexistence. that is. were responsible for the emergence of logical psychologism. however. After inheriting the concept of intentionality from Brentano. the definition of intentional inexistence remains virtually unchanged from the definition found in the Scholastics. of empirical consciousness and. nonnaturalistic. and non-reductionistic. in desire desired and so on. seems . is very different from that to be found in Husserl. mathematics. inevitably leads to relativism and skepticism. and the empirical sciences. he believes.referenceto a content. and logical psychologism emerges from naturalism. mathematics. This intentionalin-existenceis characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. and reductionism that. We can. Logic. and meanings. empiricism.18 It is this aspect of Brentano's theory that greatly influenced Husserl.. to be nothing more than one of those many residual tendencies all of which converge in the overlooking of the act in favor of the object. rather. as a mathematician who embraces the Bolzanian requirement for a pure logic. remains psychologistic and naturalistic.Every mentalphenomenon includes somethingas object within itselfalthoughthey do not all do so in the same way. According to Brentano.in judgementsomething is affirmedor denied. Although Brentano's account is not naturalistic in the same way as Ibn Sina's. there is nothing a priori. Only such a nonnaturalistic account could. according to Husserl. Husserl clearly broke away from Brentano's account. According to logical psychologism. therefore. directiontoward an object (which is not to be understoodhere as meaninga thing).19 Understanding that these laws are not merely descriptive and contingent features of the empirical world but are. their directedness toward intentional objects. for Husserl also concludes that mental events and consciousness as a whole are essentially distinguished by their intentional character. To embrace logical psychologism is to embrace a view of logical and mathematical laws as contingently true descriptions of how empirical subjects happen to think.or immanentobjectivity. as Husserl claims."20 It is within the framework of his reflective and 'transcendental' phenomenological method and of the variously stated theory of intentionality that Husserl offers 78 PhilosophyEast& West .though not wholly unambiguously. theoretical laws holding for the domain of ideal meanings. In presentation somethingis presented. Brentano's conception of intentional inexistence is a theory about the nature of the psychological Ego. is not concerned with the vague laws of empirical psychology but with precise and universal laws. therefore. is. Psychological facts serve as the foundation of logical laws. according to Husserl. in hate hated. Husserl seeks to overcome the naturalism. or necessary about logic. No physical like exhibits it. The concept of an intentional object that we find in Brentano's work. Husserl.
certain remnantsof still linger in many of his writings.and this includes the wolf's ferociousness. Thus. Although in both Ibn Sina and Husserl intention refersto the 'meaning'of the perceived object.Although account of mental strictlyphysicalistic activityfound in the medical circle and the account in found the nonphysicalistic philosophical circles. although not a corporealquality of the object.and this activityis intentional. Ibn Sina's account is naturalisticfor two reasons. tionalityand intentionalacts could never be conceived in naturalistic.reductionism. the meaning signified by the object. Thus.are bracketedpriorto the discoveryof intentionality. To conceive it in those terms would undermine Husserl's entire anti-psychologistic foundationalproject. truth.for Ibn Sina the wolf's ferociousnessis latentin its appearance and comportment. his account of Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino 79 . intenreductionistic. is latent in the sensible form of the object. on the other hand. since physicality and all other of itself.and ontology. although Ibn Sina's contributionto the theory of intentionalityis certainly both in itself and for its influence on the Scholastic notion of 'intentional important inexistence'. Discussion of the Avicennianand HusserlianConceptionsof Intention Comparative and Intentionality It is clear thatthe medical cultureof which IbnSTna was a partgreatlyinfluencedhis his views on the natureof mind. I wish to argue that Husserl'saccount of intentionalityis far superiorto Ibn STna's. Husserltakes this notion much further than Ibn STna the conprecisely because he de-materializesand de-naturalizes of intention and and moves from a substantivetheory of cepts intentionality away consciousness. or physiological terms.and naturalism those that are philosophicalrather than medical. particularly in Ibn Sina we find an attempt to mediate between the intentionality. Firstof all. For Ibn Sina.consciousness (or mind.his own solution to the problemsof the theory of evidence. To discuss further how the phenomenologicalmethodand its discoveryof intentionality put the nail in the coffin of psychologismis beyond the scope of this essay. and philosophical work. Sufficeit to say thatsince the laws of logic and mathematics are the productof intentionalacts of the transcendentalEgo and since they are not descriptiveand contingent. For Husserl. assumptions the naturalattitude. soul) is no longer a substance but an activity. althoughfor Husserlthe sheep constitutesthe wolf-as-perceived. it is from this Scholastic notion that Brentanoresurrectsthe concept of intentionality that will laterallow Husserlto give us a new way of understanding consciousness. the intentional object is a productof the constitutiveactivitiesof consciousness and of its directness.even physicalism. perception.Consciousnessbestows meaningupon the world ratherthan finding meaning already in the world. As we have seen. It is also clear that Husserl'sbackgroundas a mathematician and his desire to ground mathematicsand the empiricalsciences in a trulyscientific philosophy led him to the rejectionof psychologism and naturalism and to the development of a of as not reducible to concept intentionality physiological states.
The influencedby their training. unfortunately. [T]he sense belongs to the content of the experience..."22 intentionalthoughtsbeing the acts that constitutethese very senses. Second. able to divorce himself a psycholoand his own early psychologismand naturalism. was drawntowarda transcendental 80 Philosophy East & West . althoughthey are not themselves sensuous qualitiesof the object.Itis clear thatboth Husserland IbnSTna. Husserlunderstands that. is to fall into a reductionisticprogramthat is not able to Husof our mental life.they are abstract'contents' of intentionalthoughtsor experiences.It is not given to a passive consciousness. tions in a particular part The riskof this. however. Husserlis. while the propertiesbelong to the object. even if there is no object that 'satisfies'this sense.. riorto thatprovidedby naturalistic in their development of an account of mental events and intentions.cognition. It is in these and many other respectsthat transcendental phenomenology proof intentionality-that is supevides an account of mentalevents-and particularly theories. They are in the object. and a psychologicalempiricalself. In doing this. perception. Intentionsor 'meanings'are latent in the object perceived.as a mathematician because of a need to locate mental funcphysician was drawn toward naturalism in of the brain order to explain injuriesto those functions. Rather. Husserlisolatesconsciousness as such and discloses its activities. mistakesthatwe find in IbnSTna. Husserl focuses on intentional acts of the subject ratherthan objects. rather than being the productof the subject'sactions. Husserl is able to arrive at his conception of intentionalityprecisely by bracketingor suspending all assumptionsabout a materialworld. is guiltyof thinking of intentionsor 'senses' in a way similarto Ibn STna.were greatly and a physician. Husserldoes not makeeitherof the naturalistic First of all.Although suspends Husserlis not embracinga conception of consciousness as disembodied. a physiological self. "senses are propertiesof the sort that physical objects have. even if one in an has belief extramental reality."21Itseems that Dretske. he nevertheless realizes that meaning must not come from outside consciousness.respectively.and his account of perception suffersfrom a materialism that is inheritedfrom the medical traditionto which Ibn STnahimself contributedgreatly. and other mental faculties by suspendingthe naturalattitude in which the existence of the materialworld and the psychological empirical self are taken for granted.For both Dretskeand Ibn STna. on the other hand. from both Brentano's of Ibn STna's and naturalism that. The mathematician explain the qualityand meaningfulness account because of his serl. the same criticismthat Mcintyre raises against Dretske could also be raised against Ibn STna. As was recentlystated by aspects of naturalism Ronald Mcintyre in his critique of Fred Dretske's 'representationalnaturalism'. For Husserl. thus. clearlypermeate understanding gism intentionalmeaningand of intentionality. his account of intentionsfocuses on the object ratherthan on the act. This is one of the to which Husserlhimselfobjected. Second. An act is intentionalby virtueof having a sense or content. Thus. it is constitutedby an active consciousness.intentionsis dependenton his account of perception.at least in this respect. Husserlavoids physicalisticreductionsof intentionality. Fromthis.experience-as-such meaning. It is not latentin some extramental reality. "senses are not propertiesof the objects we intend.
Ce n'est pas seulementqu'elle saisit I'objet vivantpar la simple acceptationde certainesde ses qualitesvitales. 1952. "Imagination and Estimation:Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations. dentrode esta distinguelas formasseparaday materialy la materia." Topoi 19 (1) (2000): 60. p. 37. d'Avicenne et de St.... Book II.. car elle n'est pas encore goutee actuellementpar l'animal. with an introd. mais aussi par I'atde ces qualit6sa I'objet. quoique cette qualite en elle-meme soit sensible. The original text reads as follows: El ser es el objeto primarioy propriode la metaffsica. 1981). 158.desire to escape psychologism.Ibid. The original text reads as follows: Lesformessensibles sont . Al-Shifa': AI-Nafs (Healing: De anima). 3 . Etude Comparative de la Psychologie d'Aristote. Black is here quoting Avicenna. and notes. p.sympathiqueou antipathique. Sobre Metafisica (Antologfa).... doux et va le gouter." Being the Psychological Part of Kitab alShifa'.. telles que les qualitesagreablesou d6sagreables.. des qualitescorporellesqui affectentles organessensoriels en sortequ'elles sont reguesen vertude leursimilitude. Connecticut: Hyperion Press. Chapter VI with HistoricoPhilosophical Notes and Textual Improvements to the Cairo Edition (Oxford University Press. juge qu'il est etc. ed. 4. El ser per se es la sustancia.Noriko Ushida. Rahman (Oxford: Oxford University Press.Ibid. reprint. p. Labrebis. 5 . Rahman.." in F...que es la sustancia de orden inferior. su teorfadel conocimiento la usa paraexplicarla relacionentre los objetos y el sujeto.1. Black. 6 ..Ladouceursaisie parce jugementn'estpas sensible. en voyent un liquidejaune qui est du miel..en percevantla figure. in Avicenna's "De Anima. 1968). 1950). F. 166. IlegaAvicena a la conclusi6n de que una cosa puede existirlegitimamente en los a esta existencia llama ser intencional. juge qu'il est feroce et dangereux. p. En le faltar espirituy objetosexteriores. 1959).et le fuit tout de suite.. I'animal. trans. Parexemple. MarinaPaola Banchetti-Robino 81 . p. by Miguel Cruz Hernandez (Madrid: Revista de Occidente.Avicenna. tribution 4 . Avicenna's Psychology: An English Translation of Kitab AI-Najat. from the Arabic. en el . Mais les sens que les objets signifientne sont pas telles qualitescorporelles. Husserl was successful in providing us with an account of experience and mental life that is much richer than the naturalistic account found in Ibn Smna. In doing so. 30.. Westport. Notes 1 .bonne ou mauvaise.mais plutot des qualites ou des valeurs qui sont latentes dans les formes sensibles.C'estpourquoielles sont repues en premierlieu par les sens externes. 2 . 61.Avicenna.les cris et I'odeurd'un loup. Thomas d'Aquin (Tokyo: Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies.Deborah L. "Concerning the Soul..et ensuite elles sont transmises aux sens internes.
ed.Natalie Depraz. trans. First Book. ? 90. 247. 79-80. The original text reads as follows: . Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.Edmund Husserl. J. Psychology from an EmpiricalStandpoint. 484. "From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality. ed. p. Francisco J. 1982). xxvii. chap. Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion. p. Peters. p. 163. vol. pp. Contribution a I'Etude de la psychologie a travers la philosophie avicennienne. p. "Prolegomena. Varela. The Paris Lectures. p. 1972). Peter Koestenbaum. I refer the reader to Sorabji's "From Aristotle to Brentano." in Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.Ibid. with an introductory essay (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers." 16. Terrell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. p. 78. A.Ibid.HarryAustin Wolfson. 236. Jean Petitot. trans.Ibid." in Aristotle and the Later Tradition. trans.. Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. "Dretske on Qualia. and Jean-Michel Roy (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1. 10. 18 . E. pp. 284. S'elevantdu coeur. p.7 . 114.Ibid. Findlay from the second German edition of Logische Untersuchungen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. p. Naturalizing Phenomenology. preface de Roger Deladriere (Tunis: Universite de Tunis 1. 15 .Richard Sorabji." Logical Investigations. Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam (New York: New York University Press.Franz Brentano. ed. Supplementary volume (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1968). Bernard Pachou.. Henry Blumenthal and Howard Robinson. 13 .Edmund Husserl. N. 1. 17 . vol. 1973). 433.For one excellent account of this history. 1970). 88-89. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 19Edmund Husserl. 8 . 9 . partantdu cerveau.Abderrahman Tlili. F. 5.F. 1999). "When Transcendental Genesis Encounters the Naturalization Project. a la respiration arterielleet. p. 14 . 82 PhilosophyEast& West .. p." in Petitot et al. ed.. 21 7. 22 Ibid. trans. 1991). elle se L'esprit et a la pulsation dirige dans les artereset donne naissance a la vie.. 11 . elle passe dans les nerfset produitla sensationet le mouvement. 21 . Rancurello and D. 283.Ronald Mcintyre. est une substancesubtiler6panduedans le corps. 1995). 1964). ?25.. Isadore Twersky and George H. 20 . Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Linda McAlister. 12 . p.
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