Piaget's Concept of Formal Operational Reasoning and Whole Brain Function: Evidence From Eeg Alpha Coherence During Transcendental Meditation

PIAGET'S CONCEPT OF FORMAL OPERATIONAL REASONING
AND WHOLE BRAIN FUNCTION: EVIDENCE FROM
EEG ALPHA COHERENCE DURING TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION
by
John W. Sorflaten
An Abstract
Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Education
(Instructional Design and Technology)
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa
May 1994
2
Thesis cosupervisors: Professor Barry Bratton
Professor Darrell G. Phillips
1
ABSTRACT
No clear relationships have been drawn between Piaget’s concept of formal
operation reasoning and neuropsychological models of brain function such as leftright
hemisphere specialization. At least one popular science educator suggests that formal
reasoning is solely a lefthemisphere function and fails to tap aptitudes for right
hemisphere intuitive and metaphoric thought. On the other hand, Piaget’s writings
describe the “structured whole” and the need for “all possibilities” in a way that suggests
that formal reasoning indeed requires right as well as left hemisphere functions.
An EEG alpha coherence index of F3F4 + F3C3 + F4C4 O1O2 (FLRO index)
was measured on 58 college students during a “standard cognitive state,” Transcendental
Meditation (TM). Greater mean FLRO indexes were found for groups scored formal on
three clinically administered tasks: Shadows (testing for quantitative proportional
reasoning), Correlations, and Chemicals Combinations. The group scored formal on the
Communicating Vessels tasks, a test of the INRC group schema, demonstrated
significantly greater (p ≤ .05) FLRO index than the nonformal group. As expected,
significantly more males passed the Shadows task than females. Surprisingly, no
significant interaction was found between gender and task on the FLRO index or any of
the individual derivations.
These results give weak but positive support for the hypothesis. However,
additional support was found when studying the neuropsychological correlates of a
2
formal operational “stage.” Subjects failing all four tasks were considered to lack the
logical relations characteristic of the formal stage. Fail group subjects measured less on
the FLRO index than subjects who passed at least one of the tasks (p = .0558, and p =
.050 when adjusted for age and gender). These results lend credence to the hypothesis that
formal reasoning is a “wholebrain” activity.
In a speculating on neuropsychological theory of equilibration and development
of formal reasoning, I suggest that improvement in frontal executive control enhances pre
attentive orientation towards a task and simultaneous preattentive habituation to
distraction. This dual process supports accomodation and permits the cycle of
differentiation and integration to continue unimpeded leading, ultimately, to formal
operational reasoning. I suggest that EEG alpha anterior coherence represents temporal
and spatial coordination that supports improved information transfer and global brain
functioning.
Abstract approved: _______________________________
Thesis supervisor
_______________________________
Title and department
_______________________________
Date
_______________________________
Thesis cosupervisor
_______________________________
Title and department
3
_______________________________
Date

PIAGET’S CONCEPT OF FORMAL OPERATIONAL REASONING
AND WHOLE BRAIN FUNCTION: EVIDENCE FROM
EEG ALPHA COHERENCE DURING TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION
by
John W. Sorflaten
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Education
(Instructional Design and Technology)
in the Graduate College of
May 1994

Thesis cosupervisors: Professor Barry Bratton
Professor Darrell G. Phillips

Copyright by
JOHN W. SORFLATEN
1994
All Rights Reserved
Graduate College
Iowa City, Iowa
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL
_____________________
PH.D. THESIS
__________
This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of
John W. Sorflaten
has been approved by the Examining Committee for the
thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree in Education at the May 1994 graduation
Thesis committee:
____________________________________
Thesis supervisor
____________________________________
Thesis cosupervisor
____________________________________
Member
____________________________________
Member
_____________________________________
Member
_____________________________________
Member
2
3
To the memory of my mother and to my father.
4
5
There is no greater kindness than the kindness of nature. All the laws of nature
function in the direction of evolution. This inevitable flow of nature is a flow into which
the individual can consciously put himself to let nature work on him for his evolution in
accord with the natural flow of cosmic evolution.
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi
The Science of Being and Art of Living
6
7
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank all those who have encouraged and supported this work.
Archimedes claimed he could move the world if he were given a place to stand, a
sufficiently long lever, and an immovable pivot. My parents, who engendered that primal
cause, whatever it may have been, led me to pursue and complete the Ph.D. They gave
me a place to stand. I wholeheartedly thank the Eastman Kodak Company whose far
sighted grant provided the “pivot.” They funded the Visual Scholars Program at the
University of Iowa, which in turn provided me the time and resources to pursue research
into the “role of visuals in learning, thinking, and communication,” whatever my
definition might be. The lever in this analogy is, of course, the group of faculty advisors
who have encouraged me and who truly helped me leverage my own ideas. Special
thanks to Dr. Darrell Phillips, the thesis cosupervisor, who graciously extended the
welcome and time of the U. of I. Science Education Department to this study, and who
insightfully advised me on the Piagetian theory and protocols. I also thank my other
dissertation committee members who reviewed this work and, in the spirit of enlightened
science education, let me chart my own path through the territory I chose to study. These
include Dr. Barry Bratton, thesis supervisor, and Dr. Lowell Schoer both from the
Division of Quantitative and Psychological Foundations of Education, home of the
Instructional Design and Technology graduate program as well as the Visual Scholars
Program. Other members from the Division of Curriculum and Instruction include Dr.
Jim Shymansky, Science Education, and Dr. John McLure, Curriculum and Supervision.
8
All the above are from the College of Education. The “outside faculty” member of my
committee is Dr. Thor Yamada from the U. of Iowa Hospital’s EEG facilities.
Thanks to each of my Visual Scholars Program advisors for believing that this
study could be interesting, and even be completed. This includes Dr. Kathryn
Alessandrini Lutz who served several years as the Director of the Visual Scholars
Program and Dr. Bikar Randhawa, Director at the time I was selected for the program.
Also, my heartfelt appreciation to Dr. William Coffman and Lida Cochran, who nurtured
my own progress even as they nurtured the Visual Scholars Program, not only with the
right ideas, but also with the right feeling behind the ideas. I also thank the Iowa City
Chapter of Phi Delta Kappa, which honored me with the yearly local Young Researchers
award for an outstanding dissertation topic. The award included funds toward research
expenses. Special thanks to Dr. Eric Schaffer, President of Human Factors International,
Inc. and my employer over the last 6 years, who provided not only friendly
encouragement, but also valuable time during work hours for completing this work.
Additionally, I extend my gratitude to Dr. William Vesely, and Susanne Arass
Vesely, who supervised the EEG recording at Maharishi International University as part
of their responsibilities in the International Center for Scientific Research. I also thank
the students who participated in the study. Over time, I’ve had the chance to meet with
various EEG authorities who graciously answered my questions and made me feel “at
home” including Drs. Robert Thatcher, Alan Gevins, Don Walter (now deceased), Dulio
Giannitrapani and Hilton Stowell, who took time from his busy schedule to make a
delightful visit at my request.
Last, I wish to express my deepest appreciation to my wife, Theresa Olson
Sorflaten, whose love and devotion allowed me to bring this work to a close.
9
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Agreement on Value of “Wholeness
....................................................................................................................................
14
Implications of Frontal Functions for the OR and Adaptive “Stability
....................................................................................................................................
180
Orienting and the “Transcending Reflex
....................................................................................................................................
210
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION
1
General Rationale
...................................................................................................
1
Justification
...................................................................................................
1
Theory.....................................................................................4
Piaget’s Four Stages of Development......................................5
First Three Stages..............................................................5
The Fourth Stage: Formal Operational Reasoning...........6
Developing the Structured Whole.....................................7
Cognitive Evolution: Experience (Objects and Logico
Mathematical)..........................................................7
Cognitive Evolution—Social Transmission......................8
Cognitive Evolution—Biological Maturation...................9
Cognitive Evolution—Equilibration.................................9
The Direction of Cognitive Growth Greater Equilibrium
................................................................................10
10
Greater Adaptability........................................................10
Logic and the Left Hemisphere Fact vs. Fancy............12
The Measurable Left Hemisphere...................................14
The Structured Whole and EEG Coherence..........................14
....................................................................................................................................
14
EEG Studies of Piagetian Theory...................................15
EEG Coherence as Measure of WholeBrain Integration
................................................................................17
EEG Alpha Coherence and Psychological Measures......18
Statement of the Problem................................................21
Statement of Research Hypotheses.................................23
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
24
Writings of Jean Piaget
...................................................................................................
24
Reviews of Piaget’s Equilibration Model
...................................................................................................
29
Reviews of Research on Formal Operational Tasks
...................................................................................................
29
Replication vs. Group Tests
...................................................................................................
33
Projection of Shadows Task, Gender, Spatial Skills, and
Achievement
...................................................................................................
33
Research with the University of Iowa Grouping Model........33
College and 12th Grade Subjects....................................34
Elementary and Middle School Subjects........................41
11
Summary.........................................................................43
Other Research Using the Shadows Task..............................43
Other Research on Spatial Reasoning and Gender................47
Correlations Task
...................................................................................................
51
University of Iowa Studies....................................................51
Other Research Using the Correlations Task........................52
Combinations of Colored and Colorless Chemical Bodies Task
...................................................................................................
53
Communicating Vessels Task
...................................................................................................
56
Brain Localization and Piagetian Studies
...................................................................................................
56
EEG Coherence Studies
...................................................................................................
58
Standard Cognitive State (Transcendental Meditation) and
EEG Coherence Studies...............................................59
Studies Related to EEG Alpha Coherence and Intelligence. 60
Posterior Coherence Inversely Related to Intelligence....60
Anterior Coherence Positively Related to Intelligence...65
TMRelated Anterior Coherence Changes......................65
EEG Alpha Coherence and Frontal Lobe Activation............69
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
72
Pilot Study
...................................................................................................
72
Sample Selection
...................................................................................................
73
12
EEG Measurement
...................................................................................................
73
Equipment.............................................................................73
Procedures.............................................................................74
Task Measurement
...................................................................................................
75
Task Selection Criteria
...................................................................................................
75
Chemicals Task
...................................................................................................
77
Colored and Colorless Chemical Bodies Protocol................78
Equipment.......................................................................78
Instructions......................................................................79
Narrative Scoring Criteria for Colored and Colorless
Chemical Bodies Task..................................................80
...................................................................................................
81
Communicating Vessels Protocol.........................................82
Equipment.......................................................................82
Instructions......................................................................83
Narrative Scoring Criteria for the Communicating Vessels
Task..............................................................................85
Projection of Shadows Task
...................................................................................................
86
Projection of Shadows Protocol............................................87
Equipment.......................................................................87
Instructions......................................................................87
Narrative Scoring Criteria for the Projection of Shadows Task
......................................................................................91
Correlations Task
13
...................................................................................................
91
Correlations Protocol............................................................92
Equipment.......................................................................92
Instructions......................................................................92
Narrative Scoring Criteria for the Correlations Task............96
Analysis of Data
...................................................................................................
96
RESULTS 98
Results of Subject Selection
...................................................................................................
98
Sample
...................................................................................................
99
Measurement Reliability
...................................................................................................
101
Task Scoring Reliability......................................................101
EEG Artifact Analysis.........................................................102
Summary of Data
...................................................................................................
102
Summary of Task Scores.....................................................102
Summary of EEG Alpha Coherence Measures...................107
Analysis 1 Unitary Composition of Task Index
...................................................................................................
107
Analysis 2 Relationship Between Gender and Task Performance
...................................................................................................
115
Analysis 2 Relationship Between Coherence Index and Task
Performance
14
...................................................................................................
116
Analysis 3 Relationship between Coherence Index and Task
Performance Controlling for Age and Gender
...................................................................................................
119
Followup Analysis 1 Analysis of Differences in Various
Coherence Measures Between Pass and Fail Subjects
...................................................................................................
124
Followup Analysis 2: Tests for Relationships Between Preferences
and Task Performance
...................................................................................................
133
and Gender
...................................................................................................
135
Differences in Preference, by Gender, Without Regard to
Task............................................................................135
Differences Between Males and Females Within Each Task
(Pass Groups Tested Separately From Fail Groups)...138
Differences Between Pass and Fail Groups (Female Groups
Tested Separately From Male Groups).......................144
Conclusions Regarding Gender, Task Performance, and
Preference Measures...................................................145
Followup Analysis 4 Tests for Relationships Between
Preferences and Other Variables
...................................................................................................
146
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
148
Review of Purpose and Procedures
...................................................................................................
148
15
Discussion of the Data
...................................................................................................
151
Proportion Passing the Tasks...............................................151
Formal Stage Criterion..................................................151
Shadows Task................................................................151
Correlations Task..........................................................153
Combinations of Colored and Colorless Chemical Bodies
Task......................................................................154
Communicating Vessels Task........................................154
Hierarchical Ordering of Task Difficulty............................155
Inhelder and Piaget........................................................156
EEG Coherence Measures...................................................159
Task and EEG Alpha Coherence Index Relationships
...................................................................................................
161
Followup Analysis of Relationships Between Tasks and Other
EEG Measures
...................................................................................................
166
Summary of Followup Analyses in Various Coherence
Measures: The Effect of the TM Instructional Set.....169
Limitations of the Study
...................................................................................................
170
Longterm Effects of the Practice of Transcendental Meditation on
Cognitive Functioning: Toward an Organicist Reduction
Theory of Piaget’s Constructivist Principles
...................................................................................................
172
Regulation of Selective Attention and the Mechanics of TM
....................................................................................173
Cognitive Effects of the Practice of TM..............................175
Development of ORs to Significant Events and Habituation to
Distraction..................................................................177
16
....................................................................................................................................
180
“Integration of the Transcended in its Transcendence........183
Educational Implications of theTheory...............................191
Summary of the Theory......................................................196
Recommendations for Future Research
...................................................................................................
200
The Question of Bilateral Occipital Coherence..................200
The Question of Information Transfer................................204
TOWARD A NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF EQUILIBRATION
210
....................................................................................................................................
210
The Adaptive Significance of the Orienting Response
...................................................................................................
214
ORs Support Cognitive Success .........................................215
Stable Evoked Potentials Support ORs ...............................219
IQ and Evoked Potentials (EPs) in Relation to Orienting
...................................................................................................
220
Gating Out Distractions
...................................................................................................
222
Decentration Consists of Resistance to Involuntary ORs
...................................................................................................
226
A Role for Coherence in Accommodation and Reequilibration
...................................................................................................
229
Relationships Between EEG Alpha Coherence and Increased EPs
for Voluntary ORs
17
...................................................................................................
232
Conclusion–A Neuropsychology of Equilibration Processes in the
Context of TM
...................................................................................................
234
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
INTRODUCTION
1
General Rationale
...................................................................................................
1
Justification
...................................................................................................
1
Theory.....................................................................................4
Mathematical)..........................................................7
................................................................................10
18
....................................................................................................................................
14
................................................................................17
24
...................................................................................................
24
...................................................................................................
29
...................................................................................................
29
...................................................................................................
33
Achievement
...................................................................................................
33
Summary.........................................................................43
19
Correlations Task
...................................................................................................
51
...................................................................................................
53
...................................................................................................
56
...................................................................................................
56
...................................................................................................
58
72
Pilot Study
...................................................................................................
72
Sample Selection
...................................................................................................
73
EEG Measurement
20
...................................................................................................
73
Equipment.............................................................................73
Procedures.............................................................................74
Task Measurement
...................................................................................................
75
...................................................................................................
75
Chemicals Task
...................................................................................................
77
Equipment.......................................................................78
Instructions......................................................................79
...................................................................................................
81
Equipment.......................................................................82
Instructions......................................................................83
Task..............................................................................85
...................................................................................................
86
Equipment.......................................................................87
Instructions......................................................................87
......................................................................................91
Correlations Task
21
...................................................................................................
91
Equipment.......................................................................92
Instructions......................................................................92
1.Description of Color Schemes for Correlation Task...........................................95
Analysis of Data
...................................................................................................
96
RESULTS 98
...................................................................................................
98
Sample
...................................................................................................
99
...................................................................................................
101
Summary of Data
...................................................................................................
102
2.Percentage Agreement on Pass/Fail Ratings By Two Independent Judges (N=14)
....................................................................................................103
3.Data Summary: Number of Subjects Scoring Each Level For Each of the Four
Tasks and the Formal Stage Criterion.........................................104
4.Data Summary: Number and Proportion of Subjects Passing Each Task, the
Combination of Tasks, and the Formal Stage Criterion..............105
22
...................................................................................................
107
5.Data Summary: EEG Data By Total Subjects.................................................108
6.Data Summary: EEG Data By Gender ...........................................................109
'7.Analysis of Relative Difficulty of Task Pairs: McNemar ChiSquare Test for the
Equality of Two Correlated Proportions (with Bonferroni
Correction)..................................................................................110
...................................................................................................
115
Performance
...................................................................................................
116
8.Analysis of Differences in Male and Female Performance on the Four Tasks..117
9.Results of Unpaired TTest of Differences in Coherence Index Means between
Pass and Fail Groups...................................................................118
...................................................................................................
119
10.Results of Tests of the Assumption of Homogeneity of Slopes for Age as a
Covariant with Task and Gender.................................................120
11.Results of Analysis of Covariance in Coherence Index Between Tasks,
Controlling for Age and Gender.................................................122
...................................................................................................
124
12.Results of Unpaired TTest of Differences in Various Coherence Measures
Between Formal Stage Criterion Pass and Fail Groups*............127
Between Vessels Task Pass and Fail Groups*.............................128
23
Between Shadows Task Pass and Fail Groups*..........................129
Between Correlations Task Pass and Fail Groups*.....................130
Between Combination Task Pass and Fail Groups*....................131
...................................................................................................
133
and Gender
...................................................................................................
135
Task............................................................................135
17.Results of Tests of Differences in Preference Measures Between Task Pass and
Fail Groups..................................................................................136
18.Results of Tests of Differences in Preference Measures Between Male and
Females ......................................................................................138
19.Results of Tests of Gender Differences in Preference Measures Taken
Separately for Each Task Pass Group..........................................140
Separately for Each Task Fail Group...........................................142
...................................................................................................
146
21.Results of Tests for Relationships between Preference Measures and Nontask
Variables: EEG Coherence Derivations and Ratios....................147
24
148
...................................................................................................
148
...................................................................................................
151
Shadows Task................................................................151
Task......................................................................154
22.Coherence Results for OrmeJohnson, Wallace, and Dillbeck (1982) ...........160
23.Coherence Results for Nidich, Ryncarz, Abrams, OrmeJohnson, and Wallace
(1983)..........................................................................................161
...................................................................................................
161
EEG Measures
...................................................................................................
166
24.Results Summary: EEG Component Measures By Task for p Values Less than
.18 for All Subjects Together.......................................................168
...................................................................................................
170
25
...................................................................................................
172
....................................................................................173
Distraction..................................................................177
....................................................................................................................................
180
...................................................................................................
200
210
....................................................................................................................................
210
...................................................................................................
214
...................................................................................................
220
26
...................................................................................................
222
...................................................................................................
226
...................................................................................................
229
for Voluntary ORs
...................................................................................................
232
Context of TM
...................................................................................................
234
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
INTRODUCTION
1
General Rationale
...................................................................................................
1
Justification
...................................................................................................
1
Theory.....................................................................................4
27
Mathematical)..........................................................7
................................................................................10
....................................................................................................................................
14
................................................................................17
24
...................................................................................................
24
...................................................................................................
29
...................................................................................................
29
...................................................................................................
33
28
Achievement
...................................................................................................
33
Summary.........................................................................43
Correlations Task
...................................................................................................
51
...................................................................................................
53
...................................................................................................
56
...................................................................................................
56
...................................................................................................
58
72
29
Pilot Study
...................................................................................................
72
Sample Selection
...................................................................................................
73
EEG Measurement
...................................................................................................
73
Equipment.............................................................................73
Procedures.............................................................................74
Task Measurement
...................................................................................................
75
...................................................................................................
75
Chemicals Task
...................................................................................................
77
Equipment.......................................................................78
Instructions......................................................................79
...................................................................................................
81
Equipment.......................................................................82
Instructions......................................................................83
Task..............................................................................85
...................................................................................................
86
30
Equipment.......................................................................87
Instructions......................................................................87
......................................................................................91
Correlations Task
...................................................................................................
91
Equipment.......................................................................92
Instructions......................................................................92
1.Description of Color Schemes for Correlation Task...........................................95
Analysis of Data
...................................................................................................
96
RESULTS 98
...................................................................................................
98
Sample
...................................................................................................
99
...................................................................................................
101
Summary of Data
...................................................................................................
102
2.Percentage Agreement on Pass/Fail Ratings By Two Independent Judges (N=14)
....................................................................................................103
31
3.Data Summary: Number of Subjects Scoring Each Level For Each of the Four
Tasks and the Formal Stage Criterion.........................................104
4.Data Summary: Number and Proportion of Subjects Passing Each Task, the
Combination of Tasks, and the Formal Stage Criterion..............105
...................................................................................................
107
5.Data Summary: EEG Data By Total Subjects.................................................108
6.Data Summary: EEG Data By Gender ...........................................................109
'7.Analysis of Relative Difficulty of Task Pairs: McNemar ChiSquare Test for the
Equality of Two Correlated Proportions (with Bonferroni
Correction)..................................................................................110
...................................................................................................
115
Performance
...................................................................................................
116
8.Analysis of Differences in Male and Female Performance on the Four Tasks..117
9.Results of Unpaired TTest of Differences in Coherence Index Means between
Pass and Fail Groups...................................................................118
...................................................................................................
119
10.Results of Tests of the Assumption of Homogeneity of Slopes for Age as a
Covariant with Task and Gender.................................................120
11.Results of Analysis of Covariance in Coherence Index Between Tasks,
Controlling for Age and Gender.................................................122
...................................................................................................
124
32
Between Formal Stage Criterion Pass and Fail Groups*............127
Between Vessels Task Pass and Fail Groups*.............................128
Between Shadows Task Pass and Fail Groups*..........................129
Between Correlations Task Pass and Fail Groups*.....................130
Between Combination Task Pass and Fail Groups*....................131
...................................................................................................
133
and Gender
...................................................................................................
135
Task............................................................................135
17.Results of Tests of Differences in Preference Measures Between Task Pass and
Fail Groups..................................................................................136
18.Results of Tests of Differences in Preference Measures Between Male and
Females ......................................................................................138
Separately for Each Task Pass Group..........................................140
Separately for Each Task Fail Group...........................................142
33
...................................................................................................
146
21.Results of Tests for Relationships between Preference Measures and Nontask
Variables: EEG Coherence Derivations and Ratios....................147
148
...................................................................................................
148
...................................................................................................
151
Shadows Task................................................................151
Task......................................................................154
22.Coherence Results for OrmeJohnson, Wallace, and Dillbeck (1982) ...........160
23.Coherence Results for Nidich, Ryncarz, Abrams, OrmeJohnson, and Wallace
(1983)..........................................................................................161
...................................................................................................
161
EEG Measures
...................................................................................................
166
24.Results Summary: EEG Component Measures By Task for p Values Less than
.18 for All Subjects Together.......................................................168
34
...................................................................................................
170
...................................................................................................
172
....................................................................................173
Distraction..................................................................177
....................................................................................................................................
180
...................................................................................................
200
210
....................................................................................................................................
210
...................................................................................................
214
35
...................................................................................................
220
...................................................................................................
222
...................................................................................................
226
...................................................................................................
229
for Voluntary ORs
...................................................................................................
232
Context of TM
...................................................................................................
234
36
1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
General Rationale
The object of this research is to examine the possible relationship between two
major currents of educational theory that have developed over the last two decades. The
first trend involves a neurophysiological approach to cognitive skills, specifically in terms
of hemispheric lateralization of brain function. The second trend involves a genetic
epistemological approach to cognitive development, specifically in terms of Piaget’s
theory of formal operational reasoning. Indeed it is difficult to imagine that a
relationship does not exist between these two theoretically attractive and empirically
convincing trends. While no literature has yet developed measures of one theory in terms
of the other, Inhelder and Piaget (1958) expressed the opinion that maturation of the
nervous system must certainly be a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the
presence of the formal operational stage of logical thought (p. 281).
The primary purpose of this research is to test the hypothesis that some degree of
neurological coordination between the two hemispheres can be defined which is at least a
necessary, if not sufficient, condition for development of formal operational thinking.
Justification
Research on socalled “split brain” patients began in earnest with publications by
Gazanniga, Bogen, and Sperry on the effects of surgical sectioning of the corpus
collosum—the nerve fiber bundle which connects the two major masses of brain tissue.
2
Since these studies voluminous research has been done on both sectioned and
normal subjects toward the end of determining hemispheric correlates of psychological
attributes. Neurological approaches to educational issues have stimulated widespread
interest by educators and researchers since the midseventies. Bogen (1975), one of the
original researchers on splitbrain patients found great encouragement for education now
that it has a fact about the brain—lateralization—from which we can begin to
systematically develop educational pedagogy. An entire issue of the UCLA Educator
(1975), edited by M.C. Wittrock, was devoted to educational applications of lateralization
studies.
Further interest was exemplified by the International Visual Literacy Association
which devoted its 1979 conference to the theme of integrated brain functioning and the
American Educational Research Association which has a special interest group devoted to
“Mind/Body Education,” including left/right hemisphere studies. More recently, Waber
(1989) explores the educational implications of not only left and right hemisphere
functioning, but also two other “axes” of brain function, frontal/posterior and
cortical/subcortcial. Waber points to evidence that frontal lobe activity modulates left and
right hemisphere biases that lead to differences in “cognitive styles” such as field
dependent vs. independent and impulsive vs. reflective behaviors.
As already mentioned, Inhelder and Piaget postulate an important role for
neurological development in the growth of logical thinking. To whatever degree that
educators advocate the ability to think rationally as the central goal of education, they
also presuppose development of neurological functioning as a necessary condition of
rational thinking (Educational Policies Commission, 1961). It should be noted that
logical thought is not solely the province of scientific reasoning; it belongs to the realm of
3
daily adult logical discourse as well, and for this reason has been adopted as an explicit
educational goal by various educators and curriculum authorities.
Therefore, an issue arises when after 8 to 10 years of formal education, many high
school students still have not attained the stage of formal operations (Haley and Good,
1976). Even more dramatic is the evidence that 50% or more of college undergraduates
may not possess formal operations reasoning (Haley and Good, 1976). Therefore, it will
be important to seek neurological evidence of maturational differences in early college
populations. Such evidence may come from studies of hemispheric brain functioning
with special reference to interhemispheric activity and Piagetian stages of logical
development (Dennen, 1985; Dilling, Wheatley and Mitchell, 1976; Kraft, 1976; Unruh,
1978).
Note that debate can be raised regarding the precise definition of “formal
operation reasoning, ” especially in the context of reports that 50% or more of college
undergraduates may lack formal reasoning. Such reports imply that a subject may not
have attained a “stage” of formal reasoning. However, such reports are misleading since
often they are based on the proportion of subjects passing a test of a given, single logical
structure, of which Piaget has identified ten. Failure on any given task should not be taken
as evidence for lack of “formal reasoning.” For example, Piaget has indicated that “the
developmental stages are not established by the development of single logical structures
as such. (Which one should we so privilege?)” (Italics by the author, Piaget and Garcia,
1991. p. 130).
What, then, defines a “stage?” Piaget‘s approach suggests a wider perspective,
one that inquires whether the subject has undergone a reorganization of cognitive
structures in general, above and beyond success or failure on a test of a single logical
structure. Garcia writes “Here we find the core of the problem we are discussing: Each
4
stage cannot be conceived as simply a natural growth of the preceding one; each stage re
organizes the whole of the instruments already used by the subject” (Italics by the author,
Piaget and Garcia, 1991, p. 136).
Further, Garcia explains:
Logical relations are not built in isolation, nor are they constructed all at
once...(L)ogical relations are slowly being built up as fragments of structure which
are gradually coordinated among themselves until some new structures with more
coherent internal organization emerge...The way such coordinations take place
represents a very complex process not yet studied in full detail. At a given
moment, there is a convergence of various structural fragments in what we
referred to above as a “structural kernel,” and, as already pointed out, each
“fragment” may find itself at a different “level of development“ from the others.
The stage is therefore not defined by any of those single lines of development but
rather by what the child is able to do with all the fragments of structures he has
built so far. (Piaget and Garcia, 1991, p. 140)
The “emergent” properties of stages reflect a discontinuity that may ultimately be
best explained by research into neurological readiness for higher stages of reasoning.
This is the thrust of the current study. I will examine both “stage” development and four
of the structures subsumed within the stage of formal operational reasoning.
Theory
One outcome of hemispheric brain functioning research has been heightened
awareness that current educational practices may discriminate against students who lack
aptitude in the verbalanalytic mode of instruction which predominates in most
classrooms today. The skills involved in such “lefthemisphere tasks” tend to reflect
processes associated with linear, timedependent, or timeordered stimulus or production
sequences such as speech or mathematical calculation. This is termed "propositional"
cognition in contrast to right hemisphere, “appositional” cognition (Bogen, 1975, p.26).
Appositional cognition excels at timeindependent processing such as configuration
recognition and facial or figural pattern recognition (Ibid.). It seems reasonable that the
aptitudes used in logical thinking fall somewhere on this leftright hemisphere
5
continuum. At least one educational researcher who utilizes left/right brain explanations
of pedagogical theory has suggested that formal operational reasoning is a leftbrain
process (Samples, 1975).
As will be demonstrated, there are many theoretical and empirical reasons to
suspect that a formal system of logical thought is very much a wholebrain process. The
following will first discuss important aspects of Piaget’s theory of cognitive development,
then relate it to brain functions.
Piaget’s Four Stages of Development
First Three Stages
Over several decades of research, Piaget and his colleagues amassed evidence of
four major stages of intellectual development: the sensorymotor, preoperational,
concrete operational, and formal operational stages. Intellectual development begins
with the stage of sensorymotor orientation. During this stage, beginning at birth and
lasting until roughly 18 months, the child begins to separate objects from one another and
find relationships between his physical actions and their effects on objects. The child
realizes that objects continue to exist even though they pass from view.
The second stage of development continues the child’s developing understanding
of his environment in terms of his actions on objects. This is primarily manifested in the
development of language, or symbolic representation of objects and events. However, the
child mentally represents his world in terms of static configurations; that is, he cannot
mentally predict what will happen during the process of transforming something. Since
the child cannot yet deal with mental operations, the stage is called preoperational
thought.
6
After about seven years, the child begins to apprehend mentally the operational
process of objects transforming or changing from one configuration to another. Thus, for
example, water poured from a short squat beaker into a tall thin beaker will be known to
maintain the same amount of water. Prior to this, the child would have said the amount of
water had changed as it was poured from one beaker to the other. The child’s ability to
grasp such transformations and, further, the ability to deal in terms of classes and ordered
relationships implies operational ability. However, these operations are limited at first to
experience of concrete objects rather than their mental representations. Also, the
operations remain uncoordinated between themselves.
This stage, which lasts until adolescence or later, is termed concrete operational.
A useful generalization is that the concrete operational thinker subordinates any thought
of what is possible to the actuality of his concrete experience.
The Fourth Stage: Formal Operational Reasoning
In contrast, the next stage, formal operations, is characterized by the
generalization that actuality is subordinated to what is possible. This is exemplified by
the system of formal logic and the possible relationships between two variables such as
“p” and “q.” For instance, given “p” and its negation “notp,” and “q” with its negation
“notq” there exist 16 possible combinations depending on whether the pairs are taken
onebyone, twobytwo, threebythree, the four together, or none at all. Logical thought
derives from possession of the implicit set of relationships represented by this integrated
“structured whole,” as Piaget calls it.
Making use of such combinations can result from either trial and error
experimentation, as is done by the concrete operational thinker, or by mentally combining
the variables in a hypotheticaldeductive mode of thought, as is done by the formal
operational thinker. The formal operational thinker will feel quite spontaneous in this
7
thought process. If he is able to proceed to the heart of the problem, generate all possible
relations of variables, and outline for himself a systematic experimental procedure to test
the truth value of each relation, then that individual has access to a formal system of
logical thought. Such an individual can perform mental operations which relate logical
operations one to another. Access to this secondorder ability to perform operations on
operations is the hallmark of the formal operational stage.
[In formal thinking, the subject seeks all possible combinations] so as to select the
true and discard the false. In the course of this selective activity he intuitively
constructs a combinatorial system. It is for this reason that he repeatedly passes
from one propositional operation to another. [Propositional operations]...form a
system or structured whole: such as the lattice or the group INRC (Piaget, 1957, p.
39).
Developing the Structured Whole
To fully understand what Piaget means by the “structured whole,” I turn to the
factors which Piaget has identified as contributing to the development of intelligence.
The most important of these in terms of a theory of formal operations will be covered last
under the topic of “equilibrium.” Piaget suggests four main factors supporting the
process of cognitive evolution: experience, social transmission, maturation and
equilibrium.
Mathematical)
Experience has two forms: objectoriented experience and logicomathematical
experience. Objectoriented experience involves situations over which the child has no
overt control such as the conditions of his environment, objects present within his field of
activity, cognitive challenges, etc. Logicomathematical experience involves events
which the child constructs for himself and which are applied to objects or events around
him.
8
Experience with objects can lead to figurative knowledge, (i.e. knowledge about
objects) or logicomathematical knowledge, (i.e. knowledge of what can be done with
objects). For instance, the child who has pebbles before him utilizes figurative knowledge
by using the color names or shape names. The child utilizes operational or logico
mathematical knowledge when he experiments in classifying the rocks by color or shape
or when he applies the number system to the succession of pebbles to see how “many”
pebbles are present. Through both kinds of experience the child eventually gains the
ability to “undo” an action mentally, leading to development of internal representations,
operations and ultimately operations on operations. Action on objects particularly aids
the child in eliminating contradictions in his thought and building consistency among his
mental structures.
Cognitive Evolution—Social Transmission
Accompanying the child’s experience with objects and logicomathematical
concepts is the process of social transmission. The child’s attention is guided by the
values and challenges presented in his social environment. Social transmission can occur
via example, verbal precept, or any other means of acculturation. Piaget has suggested
that many of the ills of modern education can be traced to over reliance on verbal modes
of information transfer when dealing with preoperational and concrete operational
students (Piaget, 1970, p. 72). Faced with teachercentered, verbal learning, Piaget
suggests that many students substitute memorization of concepts and relationships in
place of operational comprehension of the logicomathematical elements involved. As
many educators are finding, rote learning remains a fragile companion, and students
forget verbally founded “facts” because they have not developed the abstract reasoning
abilities necessary to support verbalization. For these reasons, curriculum developers
9
have advocated experiencebased learning, typically referred to as inquirybased or
discovery mode learning (Lawson and Renner, 1975; Matthews, Phillips, Good, 1977).
Cognitive Evolution—Biological Maturation
However, a problem remains with experiencebased learning. The problem is that
certain experiences will be meaningful only if the informationprocessing capacity of the
central nervous system is sufficiently developed to accommodate to a challenging
situation. Thus the study of the growth of logical thinking presupposes a developmental
sequence of neurological learning readiness as a necessary, but not sufficient condition of
growth. Without such biological maturational readiness, no amount of instructional
planning, either studentcentered or teachercentered, can bring about advanced stages of
reasoning.
Cognitive Evolution—Equilibration
Neurological readiness returns us to our main topic of discussion: equilibration.
Piaget specifically addresses the role of nervous system maturation in relation to the
abstract psychological processes associated with formal structures as follows:
If someone wanted to say that an a priori form of reasoning accounts for the
development of formal structures, he would have to accept the burden of proof of
the fact that this a priori form emerges so late. Of course, he could always call on
the effect of a latematuring nervous structure, and such a structure is probably a
necessary condition for the development of combinatorial operations. But the
neurological explanation cannot in itself be sufficient because the occurrence of
transitional phases shows that the new operations derive from earlier ones. Given
this fact, it must be that a continuously operating equilibration factor plays a role
beyond that of purely internal conditions of maturation, and the problem is to
understand how a tendency toward equilibrium or its results can lead the subject
to organize a formal combinatorial system. (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, p. 281).
Piaget’s discussions of equilibrium cover several chapters in The Growth of
Logical Thought (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958) and he utilizes a monograph Logic and
Psychology (1957) and a book The Development of Thought (1979) to develop the concept
10
fully. It seems reasonable to cover the most salient points as they relate to our specific
topic of interest (the “structured whole”) and let other definitions and lines of reasoning
be read in their original sources.
The “Structured Whole”
The most direct path to understanding the structured whole emerges from our
previous discussion of the combinatorial system. That is, a subject who is formal
operational actively seeks to construct all possible combinations of the variables at hand
in order to systematically test each for its truth value. This method of problem solving is
so powerful that philosophers of science have independently given it a descriptive title:
hypotheticaldeduction.
As Piaget has shown through many studies of child reasoning, hypothetical
deductive reasoning does not appear until adolescence (and, as we have seen, even later in
many college students). Piaget’s research specifically attempts to trace the causal origins
of the development of formal operations. He concludes that formal thinking represents
the most stable form of adaptive response to the logicomathematical environment. In
this sense, stability, or equilibrium in cognitive structures, takes on a causal role in
structural evolution by directing cognitive growth toward greater stability or greater
equilibrium.
Greater Adaptability
The drive toward equilibrium is initiated by the subject and not by his
environment. Cognitive adaptation in any other direction does not diminish
contradictions or increase the success of rational thought as much as the direction toward
the system of formal operations. Thus Piaget suggests that operational equilibrium
11
increases in adaptive mobility as it increases in stability. Growth in this direction of
increased number of possible transformations results from the use of mental reality or
mental representations of reality (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, p. 331). Therefore,
equilibrium may have a neurological basis in the sense that any organism must have some
drive toward adaptive or “coordinated behavior”:
The empirical reality behind [symbolic logic] is the field of coordinated behavior.
The concept of equilibrium proves indispensable to causal explanation from this
standpoint; it makes it possible for us to understand how at a given level of
development intelligence takes up simultaneously all of the directions opened up
in this field as a function of the potential transformations which characterize it [as
a “structured whole”], as well as of the portions already structured. If
neurological considerations come to round out our explanation at some later
date...these laws of equilibrium will prove to be more general than when linked to
behavior patterns alone (Ibid., p. 333).
The Boundaries of Awareness
Piaget notes that a subject will not be aware of the general structure as a totality
because the totality is formed out of simple possibilities. Only the operations and
operational schemata actually used in some performances are manifest at any one time.
“The others must exist only as latent transformations which may appear in performance in
the appropriate situation.” (Ibid., p.330).
Logic Governed by “Field” of Structured Whole
Thus we can conclude this outline of Piaget's theory with remarks regarding the
necessary relationship between the development of cognition and the structured whole of
propositional logic.
The different schemata [of formal operations which subjects acquire] imply not
merely isolated propositional operations, but the structured wholes
themselves...which propositional operations exemplify. The structured whole,
considered as the form of equilibrium of the subject’s operational behavior, is
therefore of fundamental psychological importance, which is why the logical
(algebraic) analysis of such structures gives the psychologist an indispensable
instrument of explanation and prediction....[The state of equilibration is] one in
which all the virtual transformations compatible with the relationships of the
12
system compensate each other. From a psychological point of view, the logical
structures correspond precisely to this view. On the one hand, these structures
appear in the form of a set of virtual transformations, consisting of all the
operations which it would be possible to carry out starting from a few actually
defined operations. On the other, these structures are essentially reversible; that is
to say, the virtual transformations which they permit are always selfcompensatory
as a consequence of inversions and reciprocities. In this way we can explain why
the subject is affected by such structures, without being conscious of them. When
starting from an actually performed propositional operation, or endeavoring to
express the characteristics of a given situation by an operation, he cannot proceed
in any way he likes. He finds himself, as it were, in a field of force governed by
the laws of equilibrium, carrying out transformations or operations determined not
only by occurrences in the immediate past, but by the laws of the whole
operational field of which these past occurrences form a part. (Piaget, 1957, pp.
41 & 45)
The notion of two largely lateralized modes of thought suggests that teaching by
either precept or percept affects primarily one or the other hemisphere. Learning of
almost any idea is likely to be better if both methods are used. Since education is
effective only in so far as it affects the working of the brain, we can see that an
elementary school program narrowly restricted to reading, writing, and arithmetic will
educate mainly one hemisphere, leaving half of an individual’s highlevel potential
unschooled (Bogen, 1975, p. 27).
Thus, on the one hand, we find an important link between Piaget’s emphasis on
experience with objects and Bogen’s previously mentioned emphasis on rightbrain
education. Both Piaget and Bogen suggest that development of intelligence can be
influenced by the types of experience gained by students. Both researchers imply that
experience is mediated by neurological functioning. Both researchers would agree that
experience also influences the degree to which brain function potential is manifested
developmentally.
Logic and the Left Hemisphere Fact vs. Fancy
On the other hand, however, there appears to be some disagreement about the
precise relationship between the development of logical thought and the correlates of
13
logical thought relative to left/right brain lateralization. At least one researcher appears to
equate reasoning skills with lefthemisphere educational practices. Robert Samples
(1975) suggests that Piaget’s developmental hierarchy deals only with leftbrain
rationality to the exclusion of rightbrain skills, here identified as metaphoric thought.
In early stages of development, according to Piaget, many of the kinds of
mindwork best labeled as inventive and integrative in the metaphoric styles are
common. Yet inherent in the philosophy of Piaget’s thinking is the developmental
thrust to get past those stages into more concrete and formal logical operations.
The results are obvious. Schools led by the psychological prejudices of cognitive
psychology, by the hierarchies of intellectual development of Piaget, and thus by a
dominance of lefthemisphere approaches, systematically wean out the metaphoric
strategies. Children, who have a natural tendency to deal with mindwork that
includes all four metaphoric styles, are trained to focus comparative and symbolic,
the counterparts of Piaget’s concrete operational and formal operational stages
(Samples, 1975, p.23).
Of course, Samples ultimately advocates development of both sets of skills in
educational settings. But it serves our research interest here to closely examine the reason
Samples chooses to link reasoning skills with lefthemisphere propositional aptitudes.
The outcome of this examination will suggest that formal operational reasoning actually
has a large component of what Bogen would call rightbrain appositional aptitude and
ultimately reflects wholebrain processes. It appears that part of Samples’ error results
from equating “reasoning skills” with the sort of verbal learning we have already seen
criticized by Piaget. Samples ignores the need for a “structured whole” to underlie any
reasoning skills demonstrated verbally.
Other writers also have questioned whether “meaning” in its essential nature is
solely sequential. Evans (1980) cites the dualprocess theory of Wason and Evans (1975)
that proposes two different kinds of thinking:
Type 1 processes, which are nonverbal and nonintrospectible but control actual
selections, and Type 2, verbal processes which underlie the rationalization. It is
interesting to note that the Type 2 process corresponds much more closely to the
commonsense reasoning....The striking point is, of course, that this Type 2 verbal
reasoning process does not operate to control the actual reasoning behavior.
(p.235236).
14
The Measurable Left Hemisphere
Samples (1975) suggests that propositional (or leftbrain) learning predominates in
education because it is easier to measure and evaluate for progress. He says:
Because the cognitive domain, as it has been called, was so rational, so logical
and so verifiable, it infatuated those who measured. It is, in fact, far easier to deal
with the functions of the left cerebral hemisphere, not necessarily in terms of
origins of complexity, but primarily because of the nature of visible cues.
Language, linear reasoning, arithmetic and mathematics are much easier to
measure and evaluate. The right cerebral hemisphere, on the other hand,
obviously capable of handling multiple variables simultaneously, is far more
elusive. The result was a detour that took educators’ attention away from intuitive,
metaphoric and inventive capacities of the mind. (Ibid. pp. 1920)
In speaking of “handling multiple variables simultaneously,” Samples ostensibly
refers to the nonlinear, timeindependent properties of appositional thought. It appears
that Samples does not equate that sort of mental process with the “cognitive domain” of
rational, logical thought. I contend that Samples has confused the process of speaking
about logical thought with the process of doing logical thought. Two reasons substantiate
this contention: 1) Piaget’s theory suggests that formal operational thought proceeds upon
access to a “structured whole,” i.e. multiple variables processed simultaneously and 2)
research using brainwave recording techniques indicates that, although the left brain is
engaged in speaking about a problem solution during a Piagetian task, the right brain may
be engaged in thinking about the problem. (Kraft, 1976)
The Structured Whole and EEG Coherence
Agreement on Value of “Wholeness”
Various statements by Piaget and Samples indicate that both agree on rational
thought requiring some version of “wholeness.” This joint conclusion by opposing
parties leads to a testable hypotheses regarding whether logical reasoning is a leftbrain
process, a rightbrain process, or a wholebrain process. Each alternative has its
pedagogical implications.
15
Piaget discusses the transition from the concrete to formal operational stage in
terms of access to the interconnected set of 16 propositional operations (the structured
whole). “Henceforth,” says Piaget, “[formal] thought proceeds from a combination of
possibility, hypothesis, and deductive reasoning, instead of being limited to deductions
from the actual immediate situation” (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, p. 16).
In comparison to Samples’ passage on rightbrain aptitudes, it appears that
Piaget’s concept of the structured whole is no different than the capacity of “handling
multiple variables simultaneously,” as Samples puts it. In fact, Piaget uses terminology
similar to Samples’ own phrases. For example, in a discussion of conservation of motion
in a horizontal plane, Piaget explains the cause of failure in the concrete operational
subject. He writes, “Time after time he fails to determine all the relevant variables
simultaneously. Thus, CHAP discovers the factor of air resistance but fails to think of the
friction for the heavy balls” (Ibid., p. 129) (My italics). In this sense, Piaget indicates
logical thought seems to have a necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) component of
rightbrain aptitude. Piaget uses the same line of reasoning about reasoning as Samples.
But interestingly, Samples still feels Piaget’s theory only covers half the brain.
Additional evidence of rightbrain involvement in logic comes from experimental
findings by Unruh (1978). Utilizing a psychomotor “torque test” for hemispheric
dominance, Unruh concluded that the Piagetian model does not refer to development of
the analytical hemisphere alone. He suggests that righthemisphere learning activities
may aid understanding in courses such as physics and astronomy.
EEG Studies of Piagetian Theory
From a neurological point of view, at least three studies have sought
electroencephalographic (EEG) evidence of “whole brain” correlates to performance on
Piagetian tasks.
16
In a study by Dilling, Wheatley and Mitchell (1976), formal operational university
students showed greater left hemispheric activity during a series of cognitive tasks than
concrete operational students. The EEG measure was log Left/Right alpha power ratio.
The findings seem to support Samples’ contention that formal operational thought
requires greater lefthemisphere activity than other modes of thought. However, the
findings must be considered in light of the restricted number of subjects (six concrete
operational and seven formal operational) and the fact that the findings held only for
alpha readings over the temporal region and not the central region. Readings were taken
during the problemsolving events and no information was presented regarding the
amount of verbal activity relative to thinking activity given during the EEG trials.
(Greater verbal activity will necessarily cause greater lefthemisphere activity, whereas
thought alone may not.) The influence of verbal activity was controlled in another study
done in Wheatley’s laboratory by Kraft (1976, published in Kraft, Mitchell, Languis and
Wheatley, 1980). This second study, however, dealt with concrete operations.
In Kraft’s (1976) study the subjects were six to eight years old and the measure
was also a computer analyzed log Left/Right alpha power ratio. However, measures were
taken during the thinking phase as well as the speaking phase of problem solving. During
the spatialvisual period of the problem solving tasks, subjects demonstrated rightbrain
activity. During the subsequent verbal response period, the tasks were accompanied by
leftbrain activity. High performers tended, however, to show less leftbrain
specialization than low performers during the verbal response period. The author
concluded that:
even while high performers gave verbal responses, they utilized greater ability to
tap the visuospatial right hemisphere’s knowledge about the stimulus. Therefore,
Piagetian tasks are behavioral measurements of interhemispheric communication
and selective inhibition and further, that the ontogeny of Piagetian stages is a
behavioral index of maturing neural fibers (between the left and right cerebral
17
hemispheres and from the reticular activating system to the two hemispheres)
which facilitate these processes. (Kraft, 1976)
This speculation is inferred on the basis that subjects who performed better had
higher left/right alpha power ratios during solution presentation, implying less
specialization of the left hemisphere under speech conditions. However, there is no direct
evidence of the degree to which either or both hemispheres contribute to performance
For this it is necessary to utilize a different computer analysis of EEG data, called
“coherence.” Also, there is no direct evidence of interhemispheric “communication” or
transmission of any signal between hemispheres. The Kraft (1976) and Dilling, et al.
(1976) studies merely show L/R ratio covariance with task performance. No causal link
between L and R hemisphere activity is shown. Again, EEG “coherence” can provide
such evidence.
The third Piagetian EEG study used measures of formal reasoning and EEG alpha
coherence (Dennen, 1985). It will be covered below.
Briefly, coherence is a mathematical function which describes covariation
between two frequency bands. It has the same interpretation as a squared correlation
coefficient. Coherence expresses the electrical activity of one EEG record as a linear
transformation of activity in another EEG record (Walter, 1963).
An EEG record can be a single recording site on the scalp or a combination of
sites. Coherence is typically computed by decomposing the complex EEG wave form into
its component sine waves. The sine waves are grouped by adjacent frequencies within an
experimenter defined bandwidth (2 to 5 Hz, typically). Within each band, one EEG
record is compared with its counterpart in terms of the change in phase angle between the
sine waves over a given period of time. Coherence, then, is an index of the degree of
stability in the phase angle estimated to relate two EEG records.
18
Coherence is influenced by changes in frequency or phase between two EEG
records and is unaffected by differences in amplitude. One may consider coherence as a
measure of the variance of one record accounted by variance in the other record, much in
the same sense that the Pearson productmoment correlation coefficient squared
expresses the variance shared between two variables.
Coherence was initially used to study vibration in aircraft and geological
structures, and was adopted for monitoring vigilance in the Gemini space program
astronauts. Initial studies of coherence for the space program investigated learning in cats
(Adey, Walter, and Hendrix, 1961). The researchers found that after training, cats who
responded correctly to stimuli showed greater coherence over the 210 Hz band than cats
making incorrect responses. This finding indicated that both vigilance and adaptive
advantage were possibly associated with coherence. Additionally, it is the intrinsic nature
of coherence to reflect anatomical integration and information transfer between brain
areas as measured by EEG.
EEG Alpha Coherence and Psychological Measures
Studies on humans have continued over the years, with at least two early studies
advancing the possibility of coherence measured during the practice of Transcendental
Meditation as an index of intellectual advantage. Most of these studies used EEG
measurements identical to those used in the current study. See Figure 1 for the
placements of the various leads mentioned in the following discussion. One study found
that alpha frontal bilateral coherence was significantly (p <.05) correlated with SAT
Math, SAT Verbal, grade point average, verbal IQ and moral reasoning (OrmeJohnson,
Wallace, Dillbeck, Lukenbach, and Rosenberg, 1979). Another study found that alpha
bilateral frontal coherence (F3F4) correlated positively with measures of Fluency,
Flexibility, and Originality on the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking, verbal form.
19
However, alpha coherence correlated negatively with the same test at the O1O2
derivations (OrmeJohnson and Haynes, 1981). This implies that bilateral occipital
coherence has functional significance different from bilateral frontal coherence. In a
third study, performance on a conceptlearning task was better for subjects who had
higher measures of alpha frontal coherence (Dillbeck, OrmeJohnson, and Wallace,
1981).
A fourth study used a coherence index which summed alpha coherence values
greater than .95 for Frontal, Left, Right derivations, and subtracted Occipital coherence
(FLRO). The authors found this index to be positively related to the subjects’ grade
point average of 20 courses and negatively related to neuroticism. Together they provided
a multiple R of .58 (p = .005). They concluded that “the Coherence Index may be a very
general index of CNS maturation” (OrmeJohnson, Wallace, Dillbeck, Alexander, Ball,
1982). The FLRO coherence index suggests that a simplistic acceptance of coherence as
interhemispheric “communication” may be unwise because O coherence is inversely
related to “CNS maturation” for these authors.
Dennen (1985), in a Ph.D. thesis for the University of Florida, found no
significant linear relationship between Piagetian cognitive performance and the EEG
alpha coherence index nor individual measures of coherence. I note, however, that
Dennen used a paper and pencil test of formal and concrete reasoning. A purely verbal
approach to examining Piaget’s concepts of intelligence may impose sufficient limitations
on strategies used by the subjects as to eliminate the expected EEG differences. Dennen
used 349 undergraduate students whose EEG measures were taken during TM at the same
university as the previously cited coherence studies. Therefore, the coherence measures
and subject selection are certainly comparable. Dennen did find,
20
Figure 1. Placement of the Derivations Used in TM EEG Alpha Coherence Studies
21
however, that physics majors, compared to other majors, displayed higher left, right, and
frontal coherences during TM.
In summary, neurophysiological evidence from this sample of studies using a
“standard cognitive state” of TM as well as Kraft’s (1976) study implies that the growth
of logical thought (and learning) reflects the activity of both hemispheres and is not
solely the province of leftbrain functioning, as proposed by Samples. This may be
termed “wholebrain” functioning. These conclusions are based on studies of leftright
hemisphere alpha power ratios as well as coherence for F, L, R, and O. Increased
hemispheric communication or interaction is suggested by increased bilateral frontal
coherence. The inverse correlation of bilateral occipital coherence with the anterior
derivations (viz. F+L+R minus O) remains to be discussed in the context of an extended
theory presented in Chapter Five.
Statement of the Problem
The present study tests the relationship of formal operational reasoning and EEG
alpha coherence. In order to decrease between groups variance, a composite measure of
alpha coherence will be used: FLRO. This measure also represents “wholebrain”
functioning acknowledging the asyetunexplained negative relationship with occipital
and lateral coherence. The formal structures tested in this project include the
combinatorial operations schema, the INRC group structure (as found in the mechanical
equilibrium schema), the proportionality schema, and the correlation schema. Subjects
will be grouped according to pass or fail for each task. The dependent variable will be
the FLRO coherence index measured during eyesclosed TM.
EEG coherence is defined for each subject as the mean coherence within the alpha
band, (911.95 Hz). Coherence is combined across the four major EEG derivations as
follows:
22
Coherence Index = (F3F4) + (F3C3) + (F4C4) (O1O2)
I shall abbreviate this as CI = FLRO. A single index of coherence is computed as
the sum of the frontal bilateral derivation and the two homolateral derivations minus the
occipital coherence. Since prior research indicates a negative correlation between
occipital coherence and creativity, as well as GPA, the occipital coherence is subtracted
from the three preceding coherence values.
To allow comparisons with previous coherence research and to provide a standard
cognitive state suitable for further replications, EEG measures are taken while the
subjects practice a standardized, commonly taught, and readily available closed eyes
meditation technique, Transcendental Meditation. This is also the same cognitive state
used in the previously described research by OrmeJohnson, Dillbeck, Dennen, and other
researchers.
The study evaluates the strength of the relationship between the scores on each of
the formal operational tasks and the Coherence Index. Since gender and possible age
differences are expected to interact with task performance, all EEG measures will first be
tested with no correction for gender and age. Followup analysis will also test for
relationships when alpha coherence is normalized with respect to gender and age prior to
applying any statistical tests.
The study will evaluate the relationship between the Coherence Index and
evidence for attainment of the “stage” of formal reasoning. I will assume that subjects
who fail all four tasks lack evidence of the cognitive reorganization characteristic of
formal reasoning.
23
Statement of Research Hypotheses
Ho1: There is no significant positive relationship between the FLRO Coherence
Index and passfail measures of formation operational reasoning in any of these four
tasks: Communicating Vessels, Shadows, Combinations, and Correlations.
Ho2: There is no significant positive relationship between the FLRO Coherence
Index and a passfail measure of the formal operational stage. The formal operational
stage is defined as passing at least one of these four tasks: Communicating Vessels,
Shadows, Combinations, and Correlations.
24
CHAPTER II
This dissertation examines the relationship between some formal operational
structures and physiological measures of EEG coherence, thereby qualifying as an
attempt at an “organicist reduction” explanation of abstract constructivist structures. This
program of research is discussed and advocated in Piaget’s chapter, “Explanation in
psychology and psychophysiological parallelism” in Experimental Psychology: Its Scope
and Method, Volume I History and Method (Piaget, Fraise, and Reuchlin, 1968). Of
particular interest is Piaget’s recognition of neural interconnection as a source of
psychological structure. He endorses Fessard’s idea of an interdependent lattice of
neurons, like the brain’s reticular formation, “whose elements have identical properties”
and which support “the possibility of introducing a certain homeostatic stability” amidst
“new functions being established between alreadyformed connections” (p. 173). Piaget
agrees with the organicist reduction trend of modern psychology. He then suggests that a
scientific explanation explains at least a complementary relationship between abstract,
deductive models and neurology, if not more.
We can now interpret this complementarity by basing it on deeper reasons:
if parallelism between facts of consciousness and physiological processes
is isomorphism between the implicative systems of meanings and the
causal systems of the material work, it is then evident that this parallelism
involves equally, not only a complementarity, but in the final analysis the
hope of isomorphism between the organicist schemata and the logico
mathematical schemata used in abstract models (p. 190).
25
As a biologist, most of Piaget’s work examines in one form or another the
development of the facts of consciousness. But only later writings attempt to explicate in
detail the laws that underlie the increasing capacity of intelligence to describe the
objective world. In The Grasp of Consciousness (Piaget, 1976) Piaget begins exploring
these issues by describing how the child’s actions themselves embody knowledge, albeit
of an unconscious nature. The theme is continued, with reference to conscious processes
in Success and Understanding (Piaget, 1978). Here, Piaget concludes that while success
is “effective utilization,... understanding brings out the reason of things (because)...it goes
on to knowledge that can dispense with action.” As the subject constructs operations on
preceding operations, indefinitely, the “world of possibilities...necessarily transcend the
bounds of action...the world of ‘reason’ spills over into the world of possibilities and thus
surpasses the given reality” (p. 222).
Piaget culminates this line of research in the development of knowledge in The
Development of Thought, Equilibration of Cognitive Structures (Piaget, 1977). Piaget
discusses the types of equilibration processes that give rise to structures, the reasons for
disequilibration, and causal mechanisms of equilibrations and reequilibrations. (See the
critical review by PascualLeone, 1988 that suggests that while the book describes the
varieties of equilibration, it fails to describe a causal mechanism.) This work itself
contains no clinical interviews, but rather builds on the body of prior research to expand
on the mechanics of cognitive development. Piaget acknowledges neurophysiological
mechanisms that influence knowledge of the object. He cites Pribram’s findings that the
cortex exercises selective attention, admitting some stimuli and eliminating other stimuli.
Piaget identifies this phenomenon as an analog of perceptual centration. “In these
(psychological) centrations, which are abstract and no longer perceptual, we again find
distortion caused by the overestimation of the importance of the characteristics of the
26
objects of attention and the devaluation of the others which are not centered” (p. 144).
Piaget suggests that the individual unconsciously perceives all the important
characteristics of the objects (via “subception”, Cf. Eriksen, 1960, not cited by Piaget),
and that normal regulations will ultimately lessen
the repression of the elements which earlier were set aside....(T)he
disturbance can be attributed to the nascent power of these elements,
which tend to penetrate into the field of recognized observables, and the
compensation will then consist in modifying the disturbance until it
becomes acceptable (p. 144).
Of importance to our study of left and right hemisphere differences, Piaget notes
that subception is probably not “unconscious” perception, but rather “perception of which
our consciousness is simply short and evanescent for lack of integration into the
conceptualized consciousness” (p. 146). Because this characterizes nonverbal, right
hemisphere activity (but not mentioned by Piaget), I give Piaget’s explanation in full:
For example, I often take out my watch and look at the hands without
verbal translation. Since it is not before me I take out my watch again a
few minutes later and then remember having previously looked at it. My
visual perception therefore was not unconscious, since there was memory
with delay, but suggests a primary state of consciousness without
conceptualized “awareness,” and therefore without the integration which
would make it knowledge (as opposed to a mere perception). (p. 146).
Further discussion sheds light on the constructive mechanisms used to overcome
disturbances in equilibrium. For our purposes, these mechanisms indicate the necessity
for neurophysiological mechanisms of inhibition to overcome habits or impulses that
otherwise erroneously represent an object or its status. An erroneous conceptualization
creates a “disturbance” by virtue of rejecting or repressing the true state of the object. To
ameliorate such disturbance, the subject invokes a compensation: “the action in the
opposite direction which will conquer this rejection.” Reinforcement of such
27
compensation is accomplished via regulations that become more operational over the
period of dissolving the disturbance. Piaget acknowledges the power of such regulations
as being formative, “since conquering the repression involves a modification of the
opposing conceptualization, and on a restricted terrain, it imposes a reorganization, which
is a construction” (p. 153).
Piaget explores similar themes of cognitive growth in Adaptation and Intelligence
, Organic Selection and Phenocopy (Piaget, 1980), originally published in French in 1974,
the year prior to the French publication of The Development of Thought. However,
Adaptation and Intelligence pursues the analogical parallels between the laws of cognitive
development and development of nonhuman organisms, with particular regard to the
processes of phenotypic adaptation representing equilibration processes between the
organization and its environmental niche. The volume attempts to clarify the adaptive,
constructive processes of intelligence through analogy to the processes of phenotypic
exploration of opportunities for survival in any new environment. While not using
organic reduction per se with regard to intelligence, Piaget provides many illuminating
insights into issues a biological model should address.
Guidance in the definitions of equilibration, formal reasoning, and in the
construction of the four tasks was found in The Growth of Logical Thinking, From
Childhood to Adolescence (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958). Design of the tasks was taken
from chapters 7, 9, 13, and 15, respectively titled, “Combinations of Colored and
Colorless Chemical Bodies,” “Communicating Vessels,” “The Projection of Shadows,”
and “Random Variations and Correlations.” Details on formal reasoning and
equilibration processes were given in the Introduction section, Chapter 1, of this
dissertation. Details on the tasks will be given in the Methods section, Chapter 3, of this
dissertation.
28
Other sources of Piaget’s discussion of equilibrium and equilibration include
Piaget’s (1977) article Problems of Equilibration in which he indicates that “self
regulation is the important idea for us to take from biology” (p. 9). and Piaget‘s (1972)
book The Principles of Genetic Epistemology. The latter book provides insight into limits
that Piaget would put on a “reductionist” course of explanation. The problem with
reductionism is that on face value, it suggests that higher level structures are “explained”
by lower level structures or regulations.
In the biological field there have been attempts to reduce living processes
to known physicochemical phenomenon, attempts that failed to note the
possibility of change in a discipline which is continually being modified; and the
reaction was an antireductionist vitalism, whose sole merit was the entirely
negative one of denoucing the illusions engendered by such premature
reductions....
From both these views every ‘new’ structure should be preformed: either
within the simplest element or within a complex one; and novelty would only
consist in a successful explication of preexisting relationships. Reciprocally, the
refutation of reductionism provides a basis for constructivism.
In cases where it has been possible to resolve the problem, the end result
has been a situation surprisingly in agreement with constructivist hypostheses:
between two structures of different levels there can be no oneway reduction, but
rather there is reciprocal assimilation such that the higher can be derived from the
lower by means of transformation, while the higher enriches the lower by
integrating it. In this way electromagnetism has enriched classical mechanics,
given rise to a new mechanics...In short, the construction of new structures seems
to characterize a general process which is constitutive in character and not
reducible to a method for achieving a predetermined end. The failures of causal
reductionism in the field of the natural sciences; those of deductive reductionism
with respect to the limits of formalization and the relationships between
mathematics and logic: these all spell the failure of the ideal of a complete
deduction implying preformation, and the success of constructivism, which is
becoming increasingly vindicated (pp 9293).
For additional discussion on the the question of the origin of “novel” Piagetian
structures, see Campbell and Bickhard (1987), Bereiter (1985). The relationship of
equilibration and the development of novel structure is covered in a dialog between
several writers: Juckes (1991), Boom (1991), Bereiter (1991) and PascualLeone (1991).
29
The issues of equilibration are made more palpable in several tutorial articles.
Lawson (1982) applies Piaget’s concepts of equilibration to biology instruction and
evolution. Renner, Abraham, and Birnie (1986) analyzed student teaching dialogs
from a 12th grade physics class to illustrate a cycle of learning. The learning begins
with assimilation that leads to disequilibration, and continues with accommodation
leading to a new organization and a more stable form of equilibration. Parkins (1987)
outlines the concept of equilibration in control system terms alluding to left/right
hemisphere differences. He makes his points in the form of several cybernetic control
flow charts that illustrate a selfcorrecting, selfregulating adaptive system.
Moessinger (1978) provides a concise tutorial on Piaget’s key ideas from the book
Development of Thought. It is particularly helpful in explaining notions surrounding
the types of equilibrium, including the relationship between the subject and the
object. It addresses the history of Piaget’s model and some criticisms levied against
it. Furth (1977) suggests that Piaget’s account of equilibration is “biologically and
humanly relevant” to students of psychology (p. 18). Gallagher (1977) gives a tutorial
relating the concept of equilibration to its conceptual roots in biology, logic and
cybernetics. Brent (1978) summarizes the implications of Piaget’s equilibration in the
context of Prigoine’s model of “dissipative structures” as a means by which complex
nonequilibrium systems paradoxically manifest selforganization.
Haley and Good (1976) point out the discrepancy between demands for formal
reasoning in introductory college biology textbooks and the lack of formal reasoning
among many students. They cite results from seven studies using subjects of college
age or above and six studies using high school students. Acknowledging variation in
30
tasks and procedures, they point out that between 1161% of the tested college subjects
and an average of only 44.5% of the tested 11th and 12th graders used formal reasoning.
Similar passing rates are presented in a review by Blash and Hoeffel (1974) who
thoughtfully lists studies by task, age groups, and the proportion of subjects passing the
task.
Modgil and Modgil (1976) have the distinction of compiling the most complete
review of Piagetian studies and monographs to date, using several volumes to present
their monumental work. It is a cornucopia of research abstracts and short monographs
classified by categories for easy access. The section on formal operations is
informative.
Chiappetta (1977) reviewed ten studies of high school and college students and
concluded that in addition to the overall low percentage of formal reasoning among
students, those who demonstrated formal reasoning on tests in many cases failed to do
so on course work. In light of this, Chiappetta cites Piaget’s (1972) extension of
developmental period of formal reasoning from 11 15 years to 15 20 years. He
emphasizes Piaget’s qualification that young adults use formal structures in relation to
their area of specialization. Implying, Chiappetta suggests, that science educators must
“build” such structures in their students by introducing concepts in concrete operational
form.
More recently, Nagy and Griffiths (1982) reviewed a large number of Piagetian
formal reasoning studies, paying particular attention to their (many) methodological
flaws. Ranging over many significant topics, the authors conclude: 1) the interview
method determines reasoning levels more effectively than groupadministered tests, 2)
even interview methods have pitfalls, such as inconsistent scoring criteria across tasks
by the same investigator or cumulative scoring across several tasks 3) the unity of
31
formal schema cannot be easily determined with factor analysis, but probably demands
a method based on “consistency of classification” (p. 535), 4) level of development is
clearly, but weakly related to achievement in the science classroom, 5) the jury is still
out on the efficacy of training students in formal reasoning skills.
Meehan (1984) examined the literature between 1972 and 1982 and found 53
studies of formal operational reasoning for her metaanalysis of sex differences. Twenty
seven studies dealt with propositional logic, 16 dealt with proportional reasoningtype
tasks and 10 dealt with combinatorialtype tasks. Taken together, she found performance
advantages for males with one to five percent of the variance explained by gender. There
was no difference between the 17yearold and under group compared with over 17year
olds. The most reliable finding of sex differences was for the proportional reasoning
problems, with a percent nonoverlap of the male and female distributions falling between
22.2 percent and 31.6 percent. (This group of tasks included three of the tasks in the
current research: Communicating Vessels, Projection of Shadows, and Correlations.)
Meehan did not present an overall pass rate for any of the tasks or groups of tasks. Note
that 34 cases used paperandpencil measures of formal operations and 108 cases used
manipulative measures.
Lawson (1985) reviews a large number of studies of formal reasoning and
concludes that: 1) lack of formal reasoning is a probable cause for lack of ability in “the
sciences, mathematics, history, social studies, English, and in everyday contexts such as
comparative shopping” (p. 609), 2) formal reasoning is hindered by “intellectually
restrictive social environments, field dependence, low mental capacity, and perhaps by an
impulsive cognitive style” (p. 609), 3) lack of lateralization or hemisphere specialization
may be related to lower developmental levels.
32
Dennen (1985) lists some Piagetian studies in which young and middleaged
adults outperform older adults in a variety of problemsolving tasks.
Halford (1989) reviews research that questions whether Piaget’s models of
cognitive development are as explanatory as more recent “neoPiagetian” theories.
Halford’s review is unique in mentioning neurophysiological evidence of brain and
hemisphere maturation that appear to support Piaget’s idea that certain structures can be
attained at lower age limits. This evidence suggests that “attempts to dismiss Piaget’s
theory may be premature, and furthermore, that the development of processing capacity is
overdue for intensive investigation” (p. 348).
While not a review, per se, Martorano’s (1977) interviewbased research deserves
some mention for its attempt to determine (“review”) relationships between a large
number of formal schemas. She used interview protocols to study females in grades 6, 8,
10, and 12. She administered ten tasks to each subject, over two meetings, to study these
five schema: combinations, proportionality, multiplicative compensation, mechanical
equilibrium, and correlations. She focused on females to overcome issues of
inconsistency in findings due to gender differences. She concluded that a given subject
did not score similarly across all the tasks. Thirtythree percent of the subjects showed
differences by two substages and 61% demonstrated differences by three substages.
Martorano ordered the proportion of passing performance of the ten tasks and found that
tasks that tapped the same schema appear adjacent to one another. Bart and Mertens
(1979) used her data for an “ordering theoretic” analysis and confirmed that the tasks
within schemes were empirically equivalent and that some common structure underlies all
the tasks. Relative to the schemas examined in the current research, Bart and Mertens
found that combinations was a prerequisite to the proportions and mechanical equilibrium
schemas. The correlation schema was also prerequisite to mechanical equilibrium. In
33
another analysis, proportions was shown to precede the schema of mechanical
equilibrium, the last schema to be attained.
Nagy and Griffiths (1982) indicate in their review that written tests fail to give the
same details on cognitive function as clinical interviews. This makes for difficult
comparison between Piaget’s work and structural relationships between tasks. Meehan
(1984) compared the percentage of studies that demonstrated male performance
advantages in manipulative versus paperandpencil formats. She concluded that females
have more difficulty with manipulative tasks of formal operations than males,
p < .08. Phillips (1980) indicates that a multiple choice question allows subjects to get
“correct” answers by chance. Given these issues and owing to the differences in purpose,
construction, and scoring procedures between group and interview formal reasoning tests,
this review only includes results of interview studies that replicate the original tasks
found in Inhelder and Piaget (1958).
Achievement
Research with the University of Iowa Grouping Model
The Shadows task has attracted a “complex” of issues. Research from a variety of
institutions has linked this measure of proportional reasoning with differences between
males and females and with associated gender differences in spatial and mathematical
reasoning. Obviously, investigators attempt to make sense of this “complex” through
discussion of genderroles, patterns of science achievement, hemisphere or training
differences between genders, and unequal acquisition of prerequisite concrete spatial
structures (the “geneticepistemological” hypothesis). This review gives an insight into
34
the relatedness of these issues as discussed by the various authors. The Science
Education Center at the University of Iowa (UI) has been particularly active in pursuing
these issues from the geneticepistemological point of view.
Several studies at the UI or by former students have used the Shadows task to
study the formal operational schema of proportional reasoning. These studies explored
the contingent relationships between specific concrete and formal structures guided by
Phillip’s (1992) grouping model (see Figure 2) as well as by Inhelder and Piaget’s (1958)
description of formal reasoning schema and associated tasks. The UI research gained
strength by using a reasonably consistent set of task protocols and scoring criteria across
the studies (Phillips, 1981). The proportional schema of the Shadows task and its
structural prerequisites or correlates are studied in Poduska (1983), Poduska and Phillips
(1986), Wavering, Perry, Kelsey, and Birdd (1986), Ibe (1985), Wavering (1984), Morgan
(1979), Treagust (1980, 1982), and Doyle (1980).
College and 12th Grade Subjects
Poduska (1983) (also see Poduska and Phillips, 1986) examined the order of
acquisition of structures that contributed to the concept of “speed” among freshmen and
sophomore community college students from five math and nonmath oriented science
courses. The Shadows task was included because it uses the formal operations schema of
proportions (as required for “miles per hour”).
Only eight of the 67 male subjects (12%) and none of the 33 females passed the
Shadows task, indicating that the proportional schema is passed late, if at all. Statistically
significant gender differences were found in three of the other tasks: Symmetric Speeds,
Asymmetric Speeds, and Onetomany (Circular) Speeds. Two other tasks, Distance, and
Time showed no gender differences. The authors found that students who had previously
completed one or more physics courses passed more tasks than those who hadn’t. This
35
was attributed to “selfselection” of science courses by subjects who possessed the mental
structures enabling them to understand it. The authors found it notable that a large
percentage of subjects did not pass the tests. They felt the genderrelated effects on the
36
Figure 2. Chart of Concrete Operational Structures ( From Phillips, 1992).
37
speed tasks lacked ready explanation and pointed to the need for more research.
Wavering, Perry, Kelsey, and Birdd (1986) investigated the spatial and logical
prerequisites to the formal schema of proportional reasoning (used in the Shadows task)
and the schema for control of variables (used in the flexible rods task). They investigated
101 students from grades 6, 9, and 12 (half were female in each grade). Only the 12th
grade results are of interest in the current discussion. 68% of the 12th graders
demonstrated the concrete logical structure of seriation (LG8). The two concrete spatial
structures were passed by less than half as many: PRO8, tilt of a cone (32%) and EU8,
location of a point (32%). Very few 12th graders passed the formal tasks: Shadows (6%)
and Flexible Rods (6%). The authors note that these rates of formal reasoning are much
lower than reported elsewhere “and may be due in part to the individual interview format
which permits greater exploration of reasons in contrast to the written instrument format”
(p. 330). Only one of the projective structures, tested with the tilt of a cone task,
demonstrated significant gender differences across all the grades, although the Shadows
task approached significance. The authors conclude that spatial reasoning skills must be
encouraged in the classroom. For example, the Shadows task measures reasoning needed
to graph data and the two concrete spatial structures are needed for using perspective,
such as in “stereochemistry, phases of the moon, and other concepts that require
reasoning about the orientation of objects in space” (p. 330). Student activities should
include building models and then making drawings of systems being taught. Student
involvement as well as discussion would support development of these important mental
structures.
Wavering (1979, 1984) studied the interrelationships among three formal schemas:
probability, proportions, and correlations in grades 8, 10, and 12. Only the grade 12
results are of interest here, consisting of data constructed out of raw scores from the
38
dissertation. Out of 29 seniors (14 females and 15 males); 15% (three females and one
male) passed the Shadows task, 10% (one female and two males) passed the correlations
task, and 24% (two females and five males) passed the quantification of probabilities
task. Wavering compared the scores of the Shadows task from all three grades with
Hensley’s (1974) results on the same task and found a nearsignificant difference. The
near difference may be related to the 12th grade passing rates. Of the 30 students in
Hensley’s 12th grade group (50% female), 11 passed (37%), a considerably larger pass
rate than Wavering’s 15% pass rate. Last, neither Hensley nor Wavering found gender
differences in Shadows task performance when considering the three grades together.
Wavering concluded that among his subjects, the schema of probability was acquired
before the schemata of proportions and correlations. This is contrary, he notes, to
Piaget’s theory, in which correlation derives from probability and proportions structures.
Wavering writes that his results suggest that the higher levels of proportional reasoning,
requiring both direct and inverse reasoning, develop after the correlations structure
because the latter only requires direct proportional reasoning. The Farrell and Farmer
(1985) study discussed below indicates that indeed, direct proportions, as demonstrated in
the Mr. Tall and Mr. Short task, is attained earlier than the combination of direct and
inverse proportions required by the Shadows task. In any event, Wavering indicates that
Inhelder and Piaget’s (1958, p. 324) statement about the sequence of these schemata is
“very vague and open to interpretation” (p. 90). I believe the interpretation should hinge
on subsequent statements by Inhelder and Piaget which suggest that the notion of
proportions has a qualitative form as well as a later, quantitative form. In the former case,
the subject
acts in conformity with a sort of schema of expectations, consisting of
operations which he could perform to demonstrate the compensation,
39
which is taken for granted. In other words, the compensation is in this way
recognized as possible and often as necessary before the operational
procedures which could justify it are made explicit (p. 328).
Therefore, correlations may be attained after the qualitative sense of proportions,
but prior to the quantitative sense of proportional reasoning. This is probably
demonstrated by Wavering’s subjects in that the scoring procedure for the Shadows task
requires a metric, quantitative approach for its solution. In fact, this qualification is
suggested by the sentence Wavering referred to: “Correlation is a notion which derives
simultaneously from that of probability and from a structure close to the one governing
proportions” (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, p. 324) (italics mine).
Ibe (1985) studied the prerequisite schema to proportional reasoning in a search
for relationships between spatial reasoning and proportionality (a relationship suggested
in Inhelder and Piaget, 1958). Ibe studied 8th, 10th, and 12th grade students. Of the 12th
graders (13 males and 18 females), one (male) out of 31 (3%) passed the Shadows task.
No females passed.
Ibe cites Piaget and Inhelder’s (1967) opening to Chapter 13 of The Child’s
Conception of Space which indicates the close relationship of Euclidean and projective
structures. Ibe develops an argument to show they are both closely related to the concept
of proportionality:
If the projective and Euclidean structures enable a subject to judge the
shape, position, and size of an object, then they must be closely related to
proportionality which, in its general logical form, is the equivalence of the
relations connecting two terms A and B to the relations connecting two
other terms X and Y (Ibe, 1985, p. 79).
Ibe studied two projective groupings: PRO4, OnetoOne Multiplication of
Projective Elements (Mountains task) and PRO8, OnetoOne Multiplication of Projective
Relations (Tilting Straw task). He also included two Euclidean groupings: EU4, Oneto
40
One Multiplication of Euclidean Elements (Conservation of Interior Volume) and EU8,
Multiplication of Placement and Displacement Relations (Location of a Point in Two or
Three Dimensions). Using ordering analysis among the five tasks, Ibe found that both the
projective and Euclidean structures were logical prerequisites to proportional reasoning in
the Shadows Task. The study found no gender differences across grades 8, 10, and 12. Ibe
comments: “The finding of no gender difference contradicts as many previous findings as
it agrees with” (p. 82).
In a similar vein and as part of the UI research program, Treagust (1980, 1982)
studied genderrelated differences in three projective and three Euclidean concrete
structures, in followup to various findings of male dominance in science attainment
(National Assessment of Educational Progress, 1977, 1978). Using 108 subjects across
grades 8, 10, and 12 (50% of each grade were female), he found males scored higher in all
six structures, with significantly higher scores for males on two of the projective
groupings PRO5 and PRO8 and two of the Euclidean groupings EU5 and EU7. Treagust
concludes from the pattern of results across grades, and results of other UI grouping
research, that the “personalhistorical” explanation of male spatial superiority may be
inadequate. Rather, the lack of gender differences in elementary school subjects coupled
with the consistency of gender differences on the six tasks of his research suggests that a
“genetic epistemological” account serves better. Treagust writes: “It is possible that the
apparently slower development in spatial conceptualization by females is a contributing
factor to their reported lower attainment of skills than that of males in handling science
information at the senior high school level and in later years” (1985, p. 95). Treagust
recommends that female students be taught more like male students to reduce differences
in spatial abilities and insure future employment parity with males in areas like science,
engineering, and architecture. In his dissertation, Treagust (1978) cites authors that
41
suggest a sexlinked gene favorable for spatial abilities in about 50% of males and 25% of
females. He also indicates that Piaget explicitly suggested that spatial structures,
Euclidean or not, did not seem hereditary (pp. 150151).
Elementary and Middle School Subjects
Given the low rate of success in finding evidence of proportional reasoning in the
Shadows task, and some evidence of females falling behind male performance, it is
reasonable to investigate whether prerequisite concrete spatial structures can be found at
earlier ages, such as between 7 and 1214, when Piaget found them to develop. We may
also ask, do gender differences begin at ages earlier than adolescence? Much research at
the UI Science Education Center has focused on clarifying and evaluating the presence of
concrete structures that comprise the “grouping model” (Phillips, 1992) that stimulated
both the above research on older students and following research on younger students.
Doyle (1980) reports a study of spatial skills that focuses on the eight concrete
projective grouping using 100 students in grades 3, 6, and 9. By grade nine, five of the
structures had been “completed” (over 75% of the subjects had attained the mental
structure). These included Additional and Subtraction of Projective Elements (PRO1),
Complementary Perspective Relations (PRO2), OnetoMany Multiplication of Elements
(PRO3), Rectilinear Order (PRO5), and Symmetrical Interval Relations (PRO6). The
incomplete structures were OnetoOne Multiplication of Projective Elements (PRO4),
OnetoMany Multiplication of Relations (LG7) , and Onetoone Multiplication of
Relations (LG8). The only structure to exhibit significant gender differences was
Rectilinear order (PRO5), with boys performing better. Doyle suggests that the lack of
overall gender differences fails to support the notion of greater mathematical and spatial
abilities reported in Maccoby and Jacklin’s (1974) book The Psychology of Sex
42
Differences. However, Maccoby and Jacklin also suggest that gender differences in
spatial skills do not become pronounced until later adolescence.
Other findings of the “grouping model” research are described and summarized
by Morgan (1979) who conducted an analysis similar to Doyle’s but across all eight
Euclidean groupings. Morgan concluded that although there were some differences
between studies in the proportions of students attaining the various concrete projective
and Euclidean operations, it is obvious that subjects in these studies develop much more
slowly than expected when compared with Piaget’s pass criterion of 75% for subjects at a
given age. Morgan suggests that “the lack of such structures could be a result of formal
schooling practices, nature of subject’s hobbies, and the large amount of time devoted to
watching television” (p. 147). Morgan suggests that student passivity in modern society
conflicts with Piaget’s premise that
knowledge is derived from action, not in the sense of simple associative
responses, but in the much deeper sense of the assimilation of reality into
the necessary and general coordinations of action (Piaget, 1969, p. 29,
cited in Morgan, p., 146).
Morgan (1979) also reviews the findings of gender differences across several
studies at the UI and concludes, “The relationship between task performance and sex
differences is not clear” (p. 151). This is less strong than Treagust’s (1978) view after
reviewing the same research, in which he concluded that there were few results indicating
significant relationships between gender and task performance. However, Morgan notes a
confounding element, namely that a large percentage of all subjects (male and female)
failed to develop the structures, and that females may be “caught in the middle” between
passive activities given both genders in school, as well as encouragement toward passive
activities by sexrole stereotypes. Thus, females in general may appear to perform more
43
poorly than males, with exceptions he observed among females who conduct handson
hobbies such as “woodworking, farming, auto repair, and carpentry” (p. 150).
Summary
The above findings indicate that proportional reasoning is a highlevel structure
that follows development of correlations and probability, probably because it requires a
quantitative approach. It also requires acquisition of both projective and Euclidean
concrete spatial structures, which are only partially attained among even high school
students. Among high school seniors and college underclasspersons, the pass rate ranged
from 3% to 37%, in which roughly 50% of the subjects were female. Among college
males the passrate was 12%. Gender differences are difficult to detect statistically, owing,
in many cases, to the lack of subjects passing the tasks. However, among the college
students studied by Poduska (1983) none of the 33 females passed the Shadows task.
High school students demonstrated some gender differences, at least with higher pass
rates for males, and with statistical significance in enough structures to support other
findings in the psychometric literature on male superiority in spatial tasks. Among
elementary and middle school students, gender differences are less pronounced, although
occasionally found. Again, this supports the psychometric literature that indicate spatial
skills are not differentiated by gender among early adolescents and younger (Maccoby
and Jacklin, 1974).
Other Research Using the Shadows Task
The following studies using the Shadows task are not part of the University of
Iowa research program. Therefore, the task protocols and passing rates will be less
comparable than in the preceding studies.
44
Dulit (1972) used the Shadows task with 96 subjects, 1455 years old. Of the 12
adults, 33% passed; of the 23 gifted 1617 yearolds, 57% passed; of the 40 1617 year
olds, regular students who had not failed science or math, 35% passed; of the remaining
21 average 14 yearold students (who had not failed science or math), none passed. Males
scored better than females by a factor of four for the 1617 yearold groups, and by a
factor of three among the adult group. It is possible that Dulit used easier criteria for
scoring than the UI experiments since he makes no mention of requiring subjects to
physically measure the diameter of the rings. They only needed “to make some verbal
statement equivalent to the proportionality principle, and to be able to show some
understanding of the connection between the principle and the correct placement” (p.
293).
Martorano (1977) gave the projection of Shadows task to middle class 6, 8, 10,
and 12th grade females. Of the 20 in grade twelve, 55% passed at level IIIA or better.
She doesn’t give a task protocol but does mention that passing the Shadows task required
use of a metric system of calculating proportions.
Piburn (1980) reviewed the evidence that spatial and visual imagination are
important for science studies. He examined the relationship between spatial reasoning
and proportional reasoning in 6th form (11th grade) New Zealand students certified for
university entrance. 34 S’s took the Card Rotation Test and Surface Development Test for
spatial reasoning as well as Piaget’s Balance and Shadows tasks. All tests except the Card
Rotations Test correlated significantly with the science portion of the university
certification examination and with a composite score of the Balance plus Shadows tasks,
both tests of proportional reasoning. Males scored significantly better on the science
examination and Shadows task. There were no significant gender differences on the
Balance task or on either measure of spatial ability. Piburn suggests these results support
45
the notion that proportionality measures involve an element of spatial reasoning different
from other schemas of formal thought. However, he was not sure of the mechanism
because the science examination “is nonmathematical, and does not contain items which
are obviously either spatial or require proportionality concepts” (p. 446). Piburn suggests
that the Surface Development test (r =.42 with total score for Balance plus Shadows
tasks) involves transformations of perspective central to the development of logical
thought on through to formal reasoning. Piburn notes that females can have spatial skill
equivalent to males: equal numbers of male and females scored in the upper quartile of
the Surface Development Test. And yet none of these females scored formal on the
composite balance plus Shadows tasks measure. This merits more research, he writes,
but in any event, curriculum design for the sciences must include more work to develop
spatial reasoning.
Bady (1978) attempted to validate the notion that several tasks can test for the
same schema, which resulted in scores being similar. He used five tasks for the schema
of proportions, including the Balance and Shadows tasks. He used three age groups, 9th
and 10th graders, 11th and 12th graders, and early college students. Among the early
college students, he found that 81% scored formal on the Shadows task (as well, 81%
passed the Balance task). In comparing each of the five tasks to the total score for the
schema across all age groups, the Shadows task was the most correlated, r =.84. The
other four correlated with the total score between r =.52 and .74 (Balance task r =.55).
Bady acknowledges the high correlations to be a function of including the target score in
the total score.
Farrell and Farmer (1985) performed an “indepth” study of proportional
reasoning in 901 collegebound math and science students from 10, 11, and 12th grade
classes across five upstate New York school districts. They investigated the relationship
46
between gender and course experience on the development of proportional reasoning.
First, a general test for direct proportions using the Mr. Tall and Mr. Short puzzle
identified 53% of the students who used direct proportional reasoning. Of a subsample of
128 students, administration of the Shadows task identified 24.2% as early or late formal.
While no gender differences were found on the Shadows task (21.3% males and 11.3% of
females passed) a significant difference favoring males was found on the first test for
direct proportions (58.2% males and 47.5% females passed). However, calculating the
percentages passing for each gender across both tests (not done by the authors) indicates
that 12.4% of the original sample of males passed and only 5.4% of females passed, a
difference of more than a factor of two. Among students who passed the test for direct
proportions, the authors also found no differences between genders in the number of
science or mathematics courses. However, students passing the test of direct proportions
were shown to have taken more science and math courses than those not passing. The
authors conclude that learning and development are related—more courses in science and
math accompany greater cognitive development. However, the absence of this
relationship among the students passing the more advanced Shadows test indicates that
learning fails to promote development after a point. More intensive developmental
instruction is required even in advanced courses. Regarding gender differences, the
authors acknowledge the oftnoted male superiority in spatial tasks. However, this
superiority vanished when subjects equally proficient at direct proportions were
compared again with the Shadows task. Therefore, they suggest, the Shadows task itself,
as a task with definite spatial components, may, in fact, indicate that gender differences
are not spatial in origin, but stem from some other source, perhaps related to direct
proportions, or not. For collaborating evidence, the authors cite Linn and Pulos (1983)
who used several proportional reasoning measures, including the Shadows task, and
47
found that although males performed better, the superiority could not be accounted for by
various measures of aptitude, including spatial ability.
In conclusion, the literature suggests that males acquire the schema of proportions
earlier than females. However, the exact nature of the influence of psychometrically
defined spatial skills upon proportional reasoning is not clear and remains to be
investigated.
Other Research on Spatial Reasoning and Gender
Halpern (1992) reviews studies of genderrelated cognitive differences (spatial,
verbal and quantitative) and concludes that, indeed, they are substantive. Her selfdefined
objective is to review evidence, hoping to reach some conclusion about the origin of
gender differences: whether they arose from biological or psychosocial causes. She
concludes that the two sources of gender differences are sufficiently intertwined to make
it impossible to assign a percentage of the variance that each contributes. However, the
main sources include psychosocial influences such as sexdifferentiated life experiences
and their concomitant beliefs, expectations, stereotypes, and selfconcepts and such
biological influences as cerebral lateralization, including preference for verbal or spatial
modes of thought. Of course, both sources arise out of the ontogenetic unfolding of
genetic and hormonal influences.
Halpern finds research to indicate that sex differences are diminishing in effect
size over the years. She suggests that the composition of collegeage experimental
subjects is changing as women engage themselves in traditionally maleoriented
occupationals. She qualifies this, however, suggesting that there will always be an
interaction with biological tendencies for or against spatial skills. Three spatial tests
appear to display differences that may be “immune” to any currently known psychosocial
moderation. 1) Piaget’s water level test using a drawing of a tipped empty glass. Females
48
fail to draw the water level line horizontally and tend to draw it in the direction in which
the glass is tipped. 2) Novel tests that require spatial visualization. E.g., males score
considerable higher on mental rotation tests of a threedimensional object (illustrated in a
twodimensional drawing). 3) The rod and frame test in which males more accurately
position a rod vertically within a distant tilted frame. Halpern mentions that a “popular
hypothesis” suggests that visualspatial differences underlie sex differences in quantitative
ability. However, her review suggests that empirical evidence is sometimes, but not
always, found. Meanwhile, Halpern also concludes that the verbal superiorities of young
females is probably biological in origin. She indicates that “verbal ability differences are
small, visualspatial ability differences are large, and quantitative ability differences are
intermediate” (p. 66).
Golbeck (1986) investigated development of a Euclidean system of coordinates
among college undergraduates (32 males and 32 females) using the water level task to test
for concepts of horizontality and the vanonthehill task to test for complementary
concepts of verticality. Subjects were asked to draw how a light bulb and cord would
appear in a drawing of a van going up a hill at differing degrees of tilt. Golbeck created
“nonphysical” versions of both tasks in an attempt to determine if females suffer a
performance deficit on the tasks (owing to lack of familiarity with the situation) or a
competence deficit (lack of the underlying Euclidean structure). Females scored as well
as males on the nonphysical task and significantly worse than males in the physical task.
Golbeck claims this indicates that females indeed possess the necessary Euclidean
structure, but that they may be delayed in its acquisition. Several educational implications
are given: educators must not succumb to lower expectations for females which in turn
could result in lower achievement (several studies are cited). Also, female elementary
teachers must understand that spatial performance in themselves (and students) may lag
49
their competencies and compensatory measures should be invoked in the classroom.
Finally, spatiallyoriented, handson science experiences are important to spatial
development. The premise of the study, however, appears flawed by Golbeck’s design of
the nonphysical version of the tasks. Essentially, she used tilted rectangles instead of
drawings of the physical objects, and included a sample response with a correctly drawn
line illustrated in the example. At best, this tested for competency to imitate an example
rather than competency in the Euclidean structure.
In a metastudy of sex differences in formal reasoning, Meehan (1984) found that
males performed significantly better than males across all types of tasks, but especially
on tasks using propositional reasoning: Shadows, Vessels, and Correlations. She
examines whether the advantage is due to differences in underlying “competence” in the
domain, or differences in “activation/utilization” such as lack of familiarity with
traditionally maleoriented “scientific” apparatus. Meehan cites research on the topic and
concludes that competencies may indeed underly differences in performance in
proportional reasoning. She cites Piaget and Inhelder’s (1967) suggestion that a
relationship exists between spatial imagery and formal reasoning on the Shadows task.
Meehan cites additional evidence for this claim.
Strauss and Kinsbourne (1981) found that age of menarche, a measure of
maturation, was not related to spatial skills as measured by the waterlevel test among 171
righthanded females aged 17 58, (mean age 26.6). This contradicted earlier findings by
Waber (1977) who used a block design test, a standard spatial abilities test, and a version
of the embedded figures test.
Pallrand and Seeber (1984) found that 11 hours of training for 81 students (11.1%
female) in a calculusbased 10week introductory physics class for college undergraduates
improved perception, orientation, and visualization skills. The training consisted of
50
“drawing outside scenes by viewing through a small square cut in a piece of cardboard.
They were encouraged to draw the dominant lines of the scenery and to reduce the scene
to its proper perspective” (p. 510). Other activities included a short course in geometry
and the “Relative Position and Motion” module from SCIS. The authors also found that
the 10 weeks of physics training in control classes also improved the tested skills,
although not so much. Students who had equivalent math skills, but who dropped out of
the physics class scored less on the pretest than those who stayed, implying “cognitive
abilities other than those associated with mathematical ability are utilized in an
introductory physics course” (p. 512). The experimental intervention also was associated
with significantly higher course grades. Physics class test items that demonstrated the
enhanced visualspatial skills were lab work and multiplechoice items requiring
graphical analysis.
Martin (19671968) evaluated 530 math teachers and college students in teacher
preparatory courses. Those with mathematics background had greater spatial
visualization skills than those without based on the differential “Aptitude Test of Space
Relations.” Students in different fields, (science or art/industrial arts vs. groups of
prospective secondary and elementary math teachers) but who had several courses in
math did not differ in spatial ability. Prospective teachers at the secondary level, with
more math training, scored higher on spatial visualization than prospective elementary
math teachers. These differences did not extend to scholastic aptitude, which showed no
relation to spatial visualization ability.
51
Correlations Task
University of Iowa Studies
Rubley (1972) studied four tasks of formal reasoning and their relationship with
dogmatic attitudes among 60 11th and 12th grade chemistry students (50% female). She
found that the Correlations task was the easiest of four formal tasks, passed by 57%. 43%
passed the Conservation of Displacement Volume, 42% passed the Flexibility of Rods
task, and 17% passed the Floating Bodies task. More males passed each of the tasks than
females, but the only difference to reach significance was the Floating Bodies task. Using
other evidence from the study, Rubley suggests the higher male performance may be due
to greater science knowledge, perhaps memorized from prior reading, compared with
females.
Wavering (1979) also studied Correlations in addition to the Shadows task,
discussed above. Wavering found that the proportion of subjects passing Correlations
was not statistically different than for the Shadows tasks, and, again there were no gender
difference. Out of the 29 12th grade subjects, 3 (10%) were level IIIB or IIIC. Note that
Wavering decided to classify level IIIA subjects as nonpass because IIIA only indicates
possession of proportional reasoning, not correlational. This strategy allowed greater
fidelity in establishing contingent relationships between target schemas, and is adopted in
my present research reported here. Wavering also compared scores from his 12th grade
subjects with Rubley’s (1972) correlation scores for 11th and 12th grade science students.
No significant difference was found comparing the two score sets across the levels 0 to 4.
However, Rubley identified 27% of her 60 subjects as pass compared with Waverings
10%. (The lack of statistical difference is probably due to Wavering’s use of five levels
for his Chisquare test rather than comparing pass vs. fail.) Wavering notes that Rubley’s
52
subjects were taken from chemistry classes, a selected sample, while his subjects
represented all levels of ability, thus resulting in a lower pass rate.
Other Research Using the Correlations Task
Lovell (1961) replicated the Correlations task of Inhelder and Piaget (1958). Of
20 least able 1518 yearold secondary school students, only five (25%) passed, and of the
26 ablest students, 20 (77%) passed.
Ross (1973) studied correlational reasoning (among three other formal tasks) in 65
university undergraduates, 35 females, 30 males, average age 20.3 years. 9.2% passed at
formal level two, which is equivalent to Waverings criteria (and mine) for passing the
Correlations task. When Ross included subjects who scored level IIIA, displaying only
direct proportions on the Correlations task, a total of 98.4% of subjects “passed.”
Martorano (1977) found 55% of the 20 12th grade females passed the Correlations
task at III or better. No clear definition of the scoring criteria was given.
Dulit (1972) studied correlational reasoning (as well as proportional reasoning,
reviewed above). Of the 12 adults, 25% passed, of 21 gifted 1617 yearolds, 62% passed;
of 36 1617 yearold regular students who had not failed science or math, 17% passed; of
the 21 average 14 yearold students (who had not failed science or math), 10% passed.
Males performed better by a factor of two or more in each group except among the
average 14 yearolds, where only females passed. In addition to the scoring liberties
mentioned above for the Shadows task, Dulit mentions that some subjects were
“inspirational” and would leap at a solution, “saying very little by way of explanation.” If
their answer was right, “I scored them as formal, since the Piagetian criteria do not
require awareness of the underlying formal mechanisms” (p. 299). Dulit’s scoring,
however, ignores Piaget’s requirement that subjects explain their rationale which in turn
indicates possession of the schema being evaluated. Of additional interest is Dulit’s
53
concern regarding the failure of his subjects to pass the tests of formal reasoning with the
same ease as Inhelder’s and Piaget’s original subjects. Dulit reports a personal
communication with Dr. Inhelder who confirmed that “indeed not all cases were
reported” (italics are Dulit’s) thus, invalidating any attempt to compare pass rates with
Piaget and Inhelder’s original research! In other words, the rule used by Doyle (1980)
above, to define “completion” of a mental structure for an age group cannot be applied to
tests of formal reasoning. Doyle defined “completion” as occurring when 75% of the
subjects passed the task. According to Inhelder,
There was no intention to speak to the question of “frequency” or
“incidence.” Protocols were used simply as illustrations. Adolescents who
failed to function at the formal stage were simply not reported (Dulit, p.
297).
Task
Ross (1973), in the same study described above for the Correlations task, found
75% of his 65 undergraduate subjects passed the Chemical Combinations task. When
comparing males and females on five tests of formal reasoning together, Ross found a
significant difference, favoring males, in spite of the fact there was no significant
difference in their ACT scores and in spite of the fact that females had significantly
higher GPAs. Ross invokes Elkind’s (1962) suggestion that gender differences appear in
the scienceoriented tasks due to female aversion to taking on the masculine roles
associated with science activities. Since females did well on the ACT and GPA scores,
Ross feels that females would score much better if tested for formal reasoning within their
vocational or profession specialty, as suggested by Piaget (1972). Of interest, Ross gave
his subjects the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking to evaluate correlations of the
subfactors with scores on the formal reasoning tasks. Five factors were generated from
54
the 14 variables (many for only 65 subjects!), and none of the formal tests appeared in
either of the two factors that loaded the Torrance subscales. Ross concluded that formal
reasoning does not include a creative “divergent component.” (See also, Ross, 1976).
Martorano (1977) found 85% of the 20 12th grade females passed the
Combinations task at level III A or better. Bart and Mertens (1979), in an order theoretic
reanalysis of Martorano’s data found that pass scores on the Chemical Combinations task
were not contingent upon passing any other task except the Colored Tokens task, also a
combinatorial schema.
Kolodiy (1975, 1977) studied the growth of reasoning by comparing formal
reasoning skills of motivated science students and science majors in the 10th grade and in
freshman and senior years of college. No gender breakdown was given. Performance on
the Chemicals task was significantly correlated to scores representing student’s
cumulative grade point average (r =.7781), SAT verbal (r =.3366) and SAT math ( r
=.3292). The other task, Hauling Weight on an Inclined Plane, demonstrated no
significant correlations on those variables. Kolodiy combined the scores of the two tasks
and found that high school sophomores (35% “passing”) and college freshmen (32%
“passing”) were similar in level of development, and both were significantly lower in
development than college seniors (64% “passing”).
Joyce (1977) studied 66 upperclass college students in a science education
curriculum, using five tasks including Chemical Combinations. 95.5% of the subjects
were classified formal, based on “certain criteria” which appear to be “the formulation of
a systematic approach to isolating the proper combination of liquids” (p.155). There is
reason to be suspicious of Joyce’s findings, however, in that he comments that the
“chemicals and simple balance tasks lend themselves to solution by trial and error” (p.
157).
55
Bady (1978) applied the same approach to combinatorial reasoning as described
above for proportional reasoning. He used five tasks for the combinatorial schema,
including the Chemicals and Tokens tasks. He used three age groups, 9th and 10th
graders, 11th and 12th graders, and early college students. Among the early college
students, he found that 76% scored formal on the Chemicals task (as well, 95% passed the
Tokens task). In comparing each of the five tasks to the total score for the schema across
all age groups, the Chemicals task was the most correlated, r = .70, not significantly
different than a “travel routes” analog, r =.72. The other three ranged from r =.50 to .55
(Tokens task r =.53.) Bady concluded that the nature of the task can indeed influence
the “pass” classification of a subject; and that tasks that appear similar may actually tap
different schematic requirements.
De Hernandez, Marek, and Renner (1984) evaluated the influence of age and
gender on development of four formal operational schema including combinatorial
reasoning. They compared two age groups of 70 subjects each (both 50% female) with
mean ages of 16.49 and 17.05 years. Slightly fewer passed the Chemicals task in the
lower age group: 20% females and 34% males versus the higher age group: 34% females
and 36% males passing. There was no significant difference between age groups for
either gender, nor was there any significant difference between genders within either of
the groups. Based on evidence including the other tasks (Conservation of Volume,
Bending Rods, Equilibrium in the Balance), the authors conclude that 90% of females
and 70% of males are functioning below formal operations, matching other’s
observations. They also conclude that lack of improvement in scores with age, especially
in combinatorial reasoning, indicates a failure in “providing adequate experiences to help
students develop the use of a systematic general procedure for generating all possible
combinations...an essential tool for learning many science concepts” (p. 369) They also
56
suggest, in light of their own and other studies of gender differences, that males mature
intellectually earlier than females.
Martorano (1977) found 45% of the 20 12th grade females passed the Vessels task
at level III or better. She determined that the Vessels task was passed by significantly
fewer subjects than any other task (including the Shadows, Combinations, and
Correlations tasks), except for the Hydraulic Press (also a test for the schema of
equilibrium). Bart and Mertens (1979), in an order theoretic reanalysis of Martorano’s
data found that pass scores on the Communicating Vessels task were contingent upon
pass performance of both Correlations and the Combinations tasks.
Over the last twenty years, most educators interested in brain research have
focused on lateralization as the source of educational implications for curriculum design
(E.g., TomlinsonKeasey and Kelly, 1979; Yeap, 1989; Rennels, 1976; Hart, 1978; Galin,
1976; Samples, 1980; Rekdal, 1979; Gray, 1980).
A variety of studies have looked at Piagetian cognitive development in light of
lateralization or brain localization. Wheatley, Frankland, Mitchell and Kraft (1978)
provide a review of issues related to mathematics education. They suggest maturation
moves toward lefthemisphere superiority in task performance and that problem solving
probably requires both hemisphere functions. Lawson and Wollman (1975) found that
students who demonstrated conservation (number, substance, continuous quantity, and
weight) reflected greater lefthemisphere specialization than nonconserving students.
Eye dominance was the independent variable. They conclude that lefthemisphere verbal
and linear functioning characterized intellectual development in the Piagetian sense.
57
The EEG study by Kraft (1976) (and published in Kraft, Mitchell, Languis, and
Wheatley, 1980), has been covered in the introduction, as well as the study by Dilling,
Wheatley and Mitchell (1976). Additional research from this group (Willis, Wheatley, and
Mitchell, 1979) indicates that purported visuospatial task processing demands were more
readily reflected in alpha power ratios than the perceptually obvious requirements. The
tasks, however, were not Piagetian.
Somewhat related, Butters, Barton and Brody (1970) found that successful
performance on tasks involving mental rotation (including the Piagetian “Village scene
task”) required intact parietal lobe functioning not only in the left hemisphere, but also in
the right hemisphere.
It is important to note that studies of laterality are beset by issues of interpretation.
What are the influences on a change in left/right EEG alpha amplitude ratios? Is the left
greater, the right hemisphere lesser, or do both hemispheres vary in their measurement?
McManus (1983) discusses pitfalls of this research and suggests alternative analytic
methods. Note that coherence measures avoid these pitfalls.
Several studies have noted frontal involvement in a Piagetian developmental
paradigm. Molfese, Molfese, Buhrke, Shute, and Wang (1983) used visualevoked
responses to study “conservation of quantity” in adults. Initial judgments were associated
with frontal activity over both hemispheres. Later judgments elicited only left
hemisphere responses, indicated an interaction between habituation and hemisphere
processing. Note, however, that these authors failed to use a task that would reasonably
meet strict criteria of a “Piagetian task,” their own claims notwithstanding. Diamond and
Doar (1989) and Diamond (1985) used Piaget’s “Object Permanence task” to study frontal
development in infants. They concluded that indeed, frontal lobe development was
58
measured in this Piagetian task the same as with the similar but more commonlyused
tool for frontal research: the delayed response task.
Case (1981, 1985) outlines a neurophysiological approach to answering many
questions associated with Piaget’s developmental psychology, and appends specific
suggestions for instructional design based on his findings. Other psychophysiological
studies using Piagetian theory will be discussed in Chapter Five, Discussion and
Conclusion.
The reader is directed to these references for a basic introduction to EEG
coherence: tutorials are provided in Shaw (1981 and 1984). Normative findings for male
adults are presented in Tucker, Roth, and Bair (1986), Tucker and Roth (1984), Wieneke,
Deinema, Spoelstra, Storm Van Leeuwen and Versteeg (1980), Adey (1967, 1969),
Walter, Kado, Rhodes, and Adey (1967), Walter, Rhodes, and Adey (1967). Studies with
substantive reviews include Gasser, JennenSteinmetz and Verleger (1987), Ford, Goethe
and Dekker (1986), Hinrichs and Machleidt (1992), Berkhout, Walter and Adey (1969),
French and Beaumont (1984) and Beaumont and Rugg (1979). Of particular interest is a
study by CorsiCabrera, Herrera, and Malvido (1989) that reports literature indicating that
EEG alpha power measures fail to correlate with measures of EEG alpha coherence.
The current study utilizes subjects engaged in maintaining a “standard cognitive
state” while having their EEG alpha coherence measures taken. The following sections
review the literature that reports results of studies into the relationship between cognitive
skills and EEG alpha coherence measured during the practice of a standard cognitive
state, in this case, Transcendental Meditation.
59
Specific experiences of “transcending” during TM appear related to increased
cognitive skills. The experience of transcending can be characterized a “going beyond”
thought, resulting in the experience of awareness without an object of thought. Reports
indicate that his may occur very briefly, and be hardly noticed, or it may occur for longer,
more noticable periods. It is also called the experience of “pure consciousness”. Jedrczak,
Beresford, and Clements (1985) measured subjective reports of transcending in TM and
vividness of imagery during practice of the TMSidhis (advanced TM practices) in
relation to fluency scores from the unusual uses subtest of the Torrance Tests of Creative
Thinking and scores on the WAIS digit symbol test among 152 subjects, 66 of whom
were female. The frequency of transcending and the clear experience of imagery were
significantly positively correlated with the Torrance tests. Clear experience of imagery
was also significantly correlated with the digit symbol test. The number of months of
practice of the TMSidhis program correlated significantly with both digit span scores
and fluency scores when the major confound, age, was partialled out.
OrmeJohnson and Haynes (1981) studied the combination of subjective
experience, EEG alpha coherence, and a measure of cognitive aptitude. They compared
two groups of males, both with a mean age of 25+ years. One group consisted of subjects
with selfreported clear experiences (CE) of inner awareness without thoughts (clear
transcending) and the other group without CE. The CE group showed significantly
higher measures of alpha coherence and creativity (ideational fluency on the Unusual
Uses subtest from the Verbal form of the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking). F, L, R,
and Central (C3C4) alpha coherences were significantly greater for the CE group in a
MANCOVA with all four measures, with the mean of these four coherences significantly
correlated with ideational fluency, r = .66. Similarly, the CE group also had significantly
60
greater R alpha coherence and “dominant” alpha coherence (using the largest coherence
measure from the four possible pairs). Both measures significantly correlated with
ideational fluency, r = .5, and r = .64 respectively. In addition, bilateral F alpha
correlated significantly with creativity, r = .65. As implied above, the CE group scored
significantly higher on the creativity test than the unclear experience group.
The current research utilizes a “Coherence Index” that reflects an inverse
relationship between anterior coherences and bilateral occipital coherence (FLRO). The
following studies explore this anteriorposterior difference in relation to measures of
cognitive aptitude.
Studies Related to EEG Alpha Coherence and Intelligence
In addition to their findings for FLRO index of alpha coherence index greater
than .95, OrmeJohnson et al., (1982) also examined effects related to individual
derivations. Among other findings, they found significant inverse correlations between
alpha O coherence and verbal IQ (WAIS), principled moral reasoning, and 4 of 6 scales
from the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking: Verbal fluency, Verbal flexibility, Verbal
originality, and Figural fluency. Correlations with anterior derivations, where found,
were positive. To explain the differential activity of the anterior and posterior cortex, the
authors hypothesize an “anteriorposterior axis” in which coherence is higher or lower in
different attentional processes, meeting specific brain processing needs. Specifically...
We propose that when a cortical area is involved in a generalized, integrative
function that coherence is high in that area, whereas when the area is performing
its specialized motor or perceptual function that coherence will be low (Orme
Johnson et al., 1982).
Posterior Coherence Inversely Related to Intelligence
It is important to examine in some detail the above claim since the functional
significance of coherence has been difficult to identify by many if not all researchers
61
using coherence. Some researchers suggest that low coherence fulfills the need for
functional differentiation among cortical locations, which essentially reflects the notion
of “concrete, specialized functions” given above. For example, Thatcher, McAlaster,
Lester, Horst, and Cantor (1983) correlated WAISR IQ scores with measures of
coherence across many derivations in a study of 191 normal children during eyes closed,
rest condition. Frequency bands included delta, theta, alpha, and beta. Of the
correlations that were statistically significant, all were negatively related to IQ. Most of
the correlations were in the posterior regions of the scalp, although some appeared
anteriorally as well.
For alpha, the posterior bilateral derivations included O1O2, P3P4, and T5T6; the
anterior bilateral derivations included C3C4, F3F4, and F7F8. Only the posterior T3T4
and anterior C3C4 were not significantly correlated with full scale IQ. Among the five
homolateral derivations, only the posterior P3O1 and P4O2 were significantly correlated
with full scale IQ. Thatcher, et al. speculated that for “local distance” electrodes (7 cm or
less apart), high coherence represents “neural redundancy,” or low functional neural
differentiation. They interpret this to reflect reduced capacity for information coding
capability and therefore, lower intelligence. “In other words, when the underlying
generators that contribute to the EEG seen at the two sites are coherent with one another,
there is less capacity for coding the information that may become available from the
outside world or from other groups of cells” (p. 143).
Thatcher, et al. also found that IQ was correlated with increased amplitude
asymmetry for all frequency bands (regardless of which side of the head displayed greater
amplitude). Differences in amplitude were interpreted to support the theory that
enhanced differentiation represented increased coding capacity. (In the alpha band,
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however, only F7F8 demonstrated a significant linear amplitude ratio correlation with
IQ.)
Other coherence researchers relate similar theories. Clusin and Giannitrapani
(1970) presaged Thatcher’s findings and interpretation with their study of 11–13 yearold
righthanded males. They found an inverse relationship between the Weschsler Digit
Span and resting EEG coherence between 2–34 Hertz. The relationship was present
across the entire frequency range, although strongest between 25 and 33 Hertz; it held for
both bilateral and homolateral measures in the occipital, lateralparietal, and prefrontal
areas. They concluded that shortterm digit retention scores
may be associated with a general differentiation [i.e., less coherence] of ongoing
neural activity in certain cortical regions. These findings are compatible with
clinical evidence on the effects of lesions in these areas, and with Luria’s
observations that the evolution of higher cognitive functions parallels histological
differentiation of the cortex (p. 418).
Similarly, Gasser, JennenSteinmetz and Verleger (1987) independently suggest
that the greater the maturation and intelligence among their child subjects (1013 years)
the lower the coherences—“assuming that progressing differentiation of brain regions
went along with an EEG at rest” (p. 151). This theory received statistically significant
confirmation in the alpha band for bilateral coherence between occipital O1O2 (7.5–9.5
Hz), as well as between O2 Pz (7.5–12.5 Hz). The experimental group of mildly mentally
retarded children demonstrated higher coherences during rest than the normal IQ
children, supporting (but not mentioned by Gasser et al.) the findings of both Clusin and
Giannitrapani (1970) and Thatcher, et al. (1983). All the above research used monopolar
electrodes with linked ear lobes (where reported) in contrast to bipolar electrodes, which
have been shown to reflect different coherence responses to task conditions (Merrin,
Floyd, and Fein, 1989).
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CorsiCabrera, Herrera, and Mavido (1989) studied the relationship of verbal,
spatial, and reasoning subtest scores from the Differential Aptitude Test (DAT) with EEG
alpha interhemispheric correlation at C, T, P, and O bilateral derivations during eyes
closed rest (referenced to “ipsilateral earlobe”). Note that EEG interhemispheric
correlation (Pearson productmoment correlation coefficients) is an analog to coherence,
but not an identical measure. They used nine males and nine females with mean ages of
23 and 27 respectively.
The authors found significant negative correlations (p < .05) in the alpha band
EEG for males at C3C4, T3T4, and P3P4 on the abstract reasoning subtest, at C3C4 and
T3T4 for the verbal subtest, and at C3C4 for the spatial subtest. This is in line with the
above research findings. For females, however, the authors report the alpha correlations
were mostly positive, with statistical significance only at C3C4 for both the abstract and
spatial subtests. The authors point out that the differences in signs for the correlations
mitigated against finding a significant DATIQ correlation for the group as a whole. They
conclude that sex indeed impacts the relationship between the EEG measure and
cognitive ability, in addition to individual differences, during rest. They point to similar
findings under task conditions reported by Beaumont, Mayes, and Rugg (1978) who
located higher coherences among females while performing cognitive tasks. No theory
regarding the cause of the differences was offered, except to point out that hemispheric
differentiation may play a different role for each sex. High intercorrelation (low
hemispheric differentiation) appears related to failure in information processing in men
and vice versa in women. They point out that their data also show higher intercorrelation
for the four derivation pairs for the female group (less hemispheric differentiation),
significant for C, P, and O derivations. They suggest this is consistent with reports in the
literature of lower hemispheric asymmetry in women (e.g., McGlone, 1980).
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Hernandez (1985) replicated the work of Thatcher, et al. (1983) in a sample of 48
school children ages 10–16 (50% females) who practiced the TM technique while EEG
coherence measures were taken. WAISR performance and verbal tests were
administered about four weeks prior to the EEG. Hernandez used three conditions for the
coherence measures: TM, eyes closed rest (EC), and eyes closed mental arithmetic (MA).
All three conditions revealed significantly greater anterior alpha coherences than
posterior alpha coherences. Looking at the correlation between alpha coherence and IQ
with seven anterior and posterior bilateral coherences pooled, the TM condition
demonstrated statistically greater correlations (p < .05) than the EC or the MA
conditions. This indicates the advantage of using TM as a “standard cognitive state” for
such studies.
Despite this overall advantage for the TM condition, tests of the posterior and
anterior derivations in the TM condition revealed only one bilaterally significant alpha
coherenceIQ correlation (C3C4, negative, p < .05) and one homolaterally significant
correlation (T3T5, positive, p < .05). In comparing pooled anterior bilateral derivations
with pooled posterior derivations, there were no statistical differences in the coherence
IQ correlations for the alpha band. However, delta and theta bands demonstrated
statistical differences with positive correlations in the anterior and negative correlations
in the posterior measures. Hernandez indicates the patterns were similar in alpha and
beta bands, but without significance. (When pooled, the homolateral alpha coherences
IQ correlations of left versus right derivations failed to indicate any hemisphere
advantage.)
In conclusion, when taking all three states into account, (TM, EC, and MA)
Hernandez found the patterns of negative coherenceIQ correlations within the posterior
regions to uphold Thatcher et al.’s findings. This caused her to conclude that “COH is a
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relatively stable, stateindependent characteristic of the subjects under the conditions
measured. These results are therefore consistent with the neural redundancy
interpretation of localdistance COH” (p. 59).
Anterior Coherence Positively Related to Intelligence
Regarding the anterior findings, however, Hernandez suggests two implications:
1) the children practicing TM may differ from those in the Thatcher et al. study, and 2)
the frontal, anterior areas, support different functions than the occipital, posterior, areas.
“Because of the highly integrative function of these (frontal) areas of the cortex, high
frontal COH may be more reflective of the potential for integrated function, in contrast to
high posterior COH which may be reflective of neural redundancy” (p. 66). Following the
second point, Hernandez suggests that the functional significance of coherence may vary
with scalp location. The integrative functions of the frontal lobes include
integration of multimodal sensory information, abstract conscious processing such
as comprehension, judgment, and social responsibility (Luria, 1980), and selective
attention (Yingling, 1980). Anatomically, the frontal cortex has extensive
interhemispheric connections as well as other cortical, limbic, and subcortical
connections. This structure allows for more integrated, synthetic functioning (p.
66).
This reflects the “integrative functions” suggested by OrmeJohnson et al. (1982)
and presumably holds for the current research using Piagetian tests of formal reasoning.
(A neurophysiological definition of “integration” will be offered in Chapter Vunder
Directions for Future Research, in the context of the functional significance of alpha
coherence.)
TMRelated Anterior Coherence Changes
Following the first point given by Hernandez, the difference in subjects may prove
a key parameter related to “integrative functions.” First, note that the Thatcher et al.
research measured EEG during rest, eyes closed. The TM subjects, although sitting with
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eyes closed and experiencing restful relaxation (Wallace & Benson, 1972), additionally
engage in following a set of simple instructions, i.e., the subjects engage in a task. The
results of the task have been characterized by Wallace (1970; 1986) as “restful alertness”
with an EEG “signature” different than either wakefulness, eyes closed rest, drowsiness,
or sleep (Also, see Levine et al., 1976).
Evidence that this task alters the subject’s coherence measures occurs in several
studies. All studies indicate increases in anterior coherence with TM .
First, Levine (1976) found that subjects practicing TM tend to increase alpha
coherence in the frontal and central areas at the beginning of the TM period, but without
marked decrease at the end of the period. He found that coherence also tends to spread to
other frequencies. Control subjects practicing “mock” meditation using repetitive
backwards counting in a nontaxing fashion usually demonstrated decreases in any alpha
coherence that may have been present upon closing the eyes.
Second, coherence is related to TM and not just rest. Dillbeck and Bronson
(1981) compared pretests during nonTM rest periods for 15 subjects in a longitudinal
study, with posttests taken during TM two weeks after instruction and found significantly
greater alpha frontal coherence above the .95 threshold. (No significant increases in
alpha power were detected, indicating that alpha coherence is not necessarily correlated
with alpha power.) Furthermore, the twicedaily 20minute rest period (i.e., rest without
TM) was not the cause of the change because prior to the TM instruction, coherence for
the same subjects was compared under other experimental conditions. Prior to the TM
instruction, half of the subjects performed twice daily relaxation (without TM) and half
followed their normal schedules for 2 weeks. There were no group differences in alpha
coherence or alpha power, indicating that the regular discipline of eyesclosed
“relaxation” was not the source of change in coherence.
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A third indication demonstrates that coherence has positive characteristics in TM
subjects. Anterior increases in coherence between eyesopen, to eyesclosed, and then to
TM, show a positive relation with cognitive skills. For example, OrmeJohnson et al.
(1982) report evaluation of a “second order coherence factor” (SOF) that consisted of
positive anterior and negative posterior measures of alpha and theta bands. The SOF
measure also correlated significantly with GPA, verbal IQ, and principled moral
reasoning. Among their 47 subjects, highly significant increases in the SOF factor
occurred in the transition from eyesopen to eyesclosed (p < .0001), and from eyes closed
to TM (p < .002). This indicates that increases in this coherence index from rest to TM
represent neurophysiological changes almost as great as from eyesopen to eyesclosed
(simple rest). And moreover, the magnitude of the SOF (with positive anterior
coherence) indicates emergent cognitive skills unrelated to any particular cognitive
training.
The fourth and perhaps the most compelling evidence supporting the positive over
the negative relationship between anterior coherence and IQ in TM subjects is offered by
Gaylord, OrmeJohnson, and Travis (1989). In this longitudinal study, 83 black adults
(aged 1744, median age 21) were measured prior to random assignment to one of three
treatments: TM, progressive relaxation (PR), or a cognitive program for stress
management. During the pretests, the authors found that bilateral frontal (F3F4) alpha 1
(810 Hz) coherence was negatively correlated with IQ (Otis Lennon Mental Abilities
Test) r = .31, p < . 05. (Unfortunately, occipital measures were lost during the study.)
The coherence measures also included F3C3, F4C3, F4C3, F3C4, and C3C4, using for
analysis the clearest minute of EEG near the end of the TM/PR/rest period. Note that
initially, all subjects were nonmeditators during the pretests. After two and a half months,
in the posttest of all subjects (in which one third (25) of the subjects practiced TM)
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analysis showed a positive correlation between left hemisphere (F3C3) alpha 1 (810 Hz)
coherence and IQ, r = .33, p < .05. The authors note there were insufficient subjects to
study posttest correlation patterns for each group separately, and therefore interpretation
of the finding is difficult. But they conclude from their own and prior studies (such as
given above) that frontal coherence may be different in meditators and nonmeditators.
Note that these findings by Gaylord, OrmeJohnson, and Travis (1989) are
conservative in light of the fact that no overall longitudinal changes were found in any
group. That is, the lack of longitudinal changes indicate that the observed switch in
correlation sign between anterior alpha coherence and IQ is based on minimal
neurophysiological “conditioning” and that the locus of the switch may well be the nature
of the task instructions given for TM practice as much as any longitudinal changes that
occur with the practice. The authors note that subjects reported at posttest a failure to
practice any treatment program with regularity and that this may explain the lack of
longitudinal changes. But this does not explain the switch in valence between anterior
alpha and IQ. In speculation for other causes for the switch, it can be said that the
subjects in the other two techniques may have responded differently during the posttest
eyesclosed rest EEG session, as well, such as reduced orientation, etc., thereby
contributing to the difference across the three groups. However, in defense of the position
that the TM condition was primarily responsible for the switch, it can be pointed out that
the authors also report that the TM subjects were unique among the three groups in
producing increases in EEG coherence from eyesopen to eyesclosed during the posttest.
Significant increases were found taking all coherence pairs and all frequency bands (425
Hz) into account, and also for righthemisphere (F4C4) coherences in theta (68 Hz),
alpha 1 (810 Hz), and alpha 2 (1012 Hz) bands. Given the reports of OrmeJohnson et
al. (1982) of longitudinal increases in the SOF factor for eyesopen to eyesclosed, as well
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as eyes closed to TM, we can reasonably speculate that a similar phenomenon occurs in
the Gaylord, et al. study.
In summary, an anteriorposterior coherence axis appears related to the cognitive
changes associated with the practice of TM. One author has suggested the mechanism of
the “transcending reflex” (Arenander, 1986) that is hypothesized to increase the EEG
coherence in a fashion that enhances the adaptive functions of the brain (also see Wallace,
1986). Arendander associates this phenomenon with mechanisms imputed by the
orienting response (OR) of Sokolov (1963). Various authors have indicated that voluntary
ORs are associated with frontal lobe activity (Cf. Hernandez’s, 1985 discussion of the
“integrating” influence of anterior coherence above). What additional support can be
given for this model? Let us examine evidence regarding orientation and habituation in
relation to cognitive aptitudes. Brain activation during problem solving can be associated
with the orientation response.
EEG Alpha Coherence and Frontal Lobe Activation
Several studies have evaluated the contribution of EEG alpha coherence to
cognitive success during decision making. The research task using the dependent
variable occurs outside of the practice of TM, however, subjects are experienced in the
practice of TM. These studies shed light on the significance of alpha coherence relative to
improvements in cognitive skills and intelligence. For example, Sheppard and Boyer
(1990) examined the influence of EEG alpha coherence on a decision task among male
and female adults. The study specifically tests whether coherence is related to brain
“semantic activation” as it is understood in the context of “priming” (or alerting) the
subject about a concept prior to exposing the subject to a target stimulus that may or may
not be associated with the concept. The study examines reaction times required for the
subject to determine if a target stimulus is a word or a nonword. In each trial, the
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stimulus is preceded by a “prime” that could take one of three values: a related word, a
nonrelated word, or a neutral letter string “xxxxx.”
The authors found evidence that, compared with trials preceded by low coherence,
trials with the greater coherence were associated with faster reaction times when the
target stimulus was related to the prime. In other words, under conditions of high
coherence the prime “activated” the brain to respond more effectively. (Their findings
apply only to right hemisphere coherence (10 pairs summed across both anterior and
posterior regions) and left hemisphere posteriorparietal (5 pairs summed)). Similarly,
when the target stimulus was not related to the prime, the activation associated with
coherence slowed the subject’s reaction time. The second finding suggests that coherence
can serve to inhibit reactions, as well as facilitate reactions.
The authors agree that this does not allow a clearcut generalization that
coherence speeds information processing. However, I suggest an amended interpretation:
that the delayed reaction time in the nonrelated prime condition actually results from an
orientation response (OR) that typically gives rise to momentary inhibition of motor
activity. This OR would result from the lack of relationship between the prime and the
target—a mismatch with the neuronal model. Greater coherence may support a stronger
OR, increasing the subjective salience of the mismatch, and thus slowing RT in the
context of providing adaptive cognitive value.
Sheppard (1989) concludes in his dissertation version of the above research that
the coherence results refute the “redundancy theory” of Thatcher et al. (1983) and other
authors mentioned above. Instead, he suggests his results support a notion of
“information flow” as suggested by Galbraith (1967) and Livanov (1977). Redundancy
theory suggests that coherence reflects the amount of coherent (redundant) activity in a
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neural system and is inversely related to the system’s capacity to encode and process
information (e.g., WAIS IQ).
A possible reinterpretation of the redundancy theory arises, given Arenander’s
(1986) transcending reflex model. We specifically note that during the Thatcher, et al.
study, subjects experienced eyes closed rest during their coherence measurements. It is
reasonable to assume that the youngsters of lesser IQ were more susceptible to
distraction, anxiety, and other, internally generated, stimuli that increased frontal and
posterior (voluntary and involuntary) OR activity. Conversely, higher IQ youngsters
would habituate more rapidly to the setting and events, and when told to “rest” would
indeed follow the instructions better, both mentally as well as physically, resulting in little
or no frontal or posterior OR activity. If EEG coherence is in fact related to brain
activation (and much evidence can be given to indicate this is so), then the lower IQ
subjects, engaging in various voluntary and involuntary orienting activities should indeed
display higher anterior as well as posterior coherence values since they would find it more
difficult to maintain attentional contol.
Note that several EEG derivations in the Sheppard and Boyer (1990) study
indicated higher posterior coherences associated with information processing. I suggest
that the interactive nature of the experiment could require automatized, posterior
functions, as well as anterior functions. Based on the above reasoning, I suggest that
higher anterior coherence during the practice of the set of instructions that constitute the
TM technique may reflect greater attentiveness to the task at hand (i.e., volition, paying
attention, anticipation) and lower bilateral posterior coherence may reflect greater ability
to habituate to distraction (i.e., to resist nonadaptive automatization, to decentrate). For
example, Berkhout and Walter (1980) report a biofeedback study in which “volitional
control” of interhemispheric coherence changed levels of occipital and parietal coherence.
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They found that behavior tending to increase arousal (i.e. enhance focusing) also
decreased coherence at 10 Hz, clearly for occipital areas, and less clearly for parietal
areas. This may explain the efficacy of the FLR minus O coherence index to discriminate
pass and fail scores in the tests indicated above by OrmeJohnson et al (1982). The notion
of “paying attention” in this context provides empirical and theoretical support to Orme
Johnson et al.’s (1982) suggestion that FLRO reflects an index of CNS maturation. In an
earlier exposition of the longitudinal study of the effects of the TM and TMSidhi
program, OrmeJohnson, Wallace and Dillbeck (1982) suggest that the “shift towards
relatively greater coherence in the frontal regions produced by the TMSidhi program is
developmentally beneficial, perhaps reflecting a change in developmental emphasis from
primary perceptual areas to higher association areas involved with planning and
sustaining intentionality” (p. 1685).
CHAPTER III
Pilot Study
A pilot study was accomplished to determine any difficulties which could arise in
the main study. The pilot study utilized 6 individuals associated with programs at
Maharishi International University. The pilot study served to:
1. Ascertain the efficacy of the protocols in determining the specific formal
operational structures for which they were designed.
2. Ascertain the adequacy and validity of the scoring criteria.
3. Test the equipment used for the tasks.
4. Provide experience with administering the tasks.
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Four interviews were audio taped for subsequent review by the experimenter and
an independent evaluator. After review, the protocols were adjusted to permit more clear
cut evaluation of performance.
Sample Selection
Students from Maharishi International University were participants in a routinely
scheduled yearly EEG battery. Recruitment of students tended to be on a classbyclass
basis, although no strict criteria were levied or met. Females were requested to schedule
EEG evaluation outside of three days on either side of their menstrual period (Becker,
Creutzfeldt, Schwibbe, and Wuttke, 1982; Little and Zahn, 1974; and Hampson and
Kimura, 1988). Both undergraduate, graduate, and some staff members were included in
the routine evaluations. The subjects were considered a random sample from the MIU
student population of individuals who regularly practice the Transcendental Meditation
technique.
EEG Measurement
Equipment
The electroencephalographic measurements were taken with a 17channel Grass
model 780 EEG and polygraph with a Megatek Laboratory Interface connected to a Data
General Nova 32K word Nova 3 minicomputer. The 7P511H amplifiers were set at 0.3
Hz, 0.1 Hz, and 5 µv/mm for EEG with a 60 Hz notch filter in. The output from the J6 of
each of the Grass amplifiers was digitized online to 12 bits at 60 samples per second per
channel. The pen filters were set at 90 Hz with the pen’s 60 Hz filter out, and the chart
speed was 15 mm/sec. Records of four seconds (240 samples per channel) were recorded
on a ninetrack, 75 inch per second, 800 bytes per inch Data General (Model 6030)
magnetic tape subsystem. The coherence spectrum, a measure of the correlation between
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two signals, was computed for the following pairs of electrodes: F3F4, F4C4, F3C3, and
O1O2. All recording was monopolar with linked ears for the reference electrode. The
Fast Fourier Transform, with epochs of four seconds was used according to the methods
of Levine (1976). Coherence was computed using the average of seven overlapping
frames of 128 samples each, incremented with 18 samples between frames. Coherence
was analyzed to .468 Hz resolution and averaged for the alpha band, 8.2 to 11.95 Hz.
Mean coherence scores were computed for ten .53 minute periods during which all
subjects practiced the TM technique. The 10 scores were averaged for an overall average
for each pair of derivations. All amplifiers were calibrated at the beginning and end of
each session. Measurements were taken in an electrically shielded, sound attenuated
room.
Procedures
Maharishi International University routinely administers EEG measures as part of
their student evaluation procedures. Two to three subjects were evaluated each half day.
When subjects came in they were shown the laboratory in order to familiarize them with
the environment, and then they filled out consent forms and background questionnaires.
Subjects had no recent history of neurological problems or drug use. No females were
scheduled within three days before or after menstruation. The International 1020 system
was used to place electrodes at F3, F4, C3, C4, and O1, O2, referenced to linked ears.
The head was cleaned with alcohol and Grass EEG 10mm gold plated cup electrodes
were attached with electrode cream (Grass type EC2). Electrode impedances were below
10K ohms. After application of the electrodes, the subjects were encouraged to walk
around for a few minutes to restore circulation and alertness prior to the EEG session.
The test session used instructions played from a tape recorder and received through loud
speakers set at low volume. Subjects sat for 5 minutes with eyes open then 5 minutes
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with eyes closed, 15 minutes of the TM technique, then 5 minutes with eyes closed
resting. The 5.3 minutes of EEG was taken towards the end of the 15minute TM period.
The above procedures and equipment were standard procedure for evaluating students
yearly at MIU. Other published research from MIU used essentially the same protocol
(e.g., OrmeJohnson et al., 1982; Dillbeck and AraasVesely, 1986).
Task Measurement
The protocols for formal operational reasoning were developed from guidelines
set out in Inhelder and Piaget (1958). The protocols assessed the presence of four formal
operational structures: the combinatorial operations schema, the INRC group (as found in
the mechanical equilibrium schema), the proportionality schema, and the correlation
schema. Sufficient test time was allowed to prevent distortion of performance due to real
or imagined pressure for speeded problem solving. The tasks were administered by the
male experimenter (the author) immediately after the EEG measurement, or in some
cases, immediately before the EEG. Subjects took about an hour for the four tasks total.
The order of tasks was counterbalanced across subjects.
Since we seek to verify whether or not a direct relationship exists between a
neurophysiological measure (coherence) and measures of formal operations, it serves our
purpose to select measures which are most likely to result in a spread of achievement
scores. This is a standard approach in correlation studies, for instance, in which there is
greater chance for locating correlations if the spread between high and low scores has
roughly the same distributions as the independent variable.
Thus, on the one hand, we could if we wished, include measures confined to
concrete operations in addition to measures of formal operations in order to achieve a
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spread of levels of cognitive development. On the other hand, we are particularly
interested in the neurophysiological conditions which support the “structured whole”—
Piaget’s term for the system which permits operations on operations. Since formal
operations express a qualitatively different mode of cognition than concrete operations,
this study focuses only on structures which Piaget has uniquely associated with the
structured whole, i.e., formal operations and operational schemata. Fortunately, it turns
out that these tasks can be scored for concrete operational as well as formal operational
performance, thus providing the range of performance needed for a correlational study.
Given this approach, it is possible to consider two choices:
1. The study can concentrate on the properties of formal operations per se which
support the formation of propositional operations, as in the case of the 16 binary
operations. Or,
2. The study can focus on the resultant “operational schemata” which Piaget
characterizes as operations and concepts which are new to the formal operational stage
yet which:
emerge in close linkage with the establishment of propositional logic; they require
intellectual capacities greater than those of the concrete level and derive from the
operational transformations entailed by the total structures... inherent in
propositional logic rather than the propositional operations themselves (Inhelder
and Piaget, 1958, p. 105)
It appears useful to select measures from the second set of options, the set of
“operational schemata” for the following two reasons:
1. We will be testing for the “structured whole” in its most general form in all the
tasks we select. That is, we will be dealing with general structures characterizing the
structured whole of propositional logic and the INRC group, as opposed to only dealing
with the more specific 16 binary propositional operations themselves. The selected tasks
not only represent logical structures of their own, but also give evidence of “certain
characteristic logical relations” (Piaget and Garcia, 1991, p. 130) that constitute the stage
of formal reasoning.
This differs from using individual tasks to evaluate the presence of absence of a
particular logic structure. Rather, failure to pass any of a reasonable sample of tasks
indicates an epistemological condition of the subject. It reflects the lack of any
reorganization of the “whole of the instruments already used by the subject” (Ibid, p. 136,
italics by the original authors).
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Thus, we can test for the failure of subjects to attain the “stage” of formal
reasoning by locating subjects who fail to pass any of the tasks that test for formal logical
structures. This approach follows the assertion of Garcia: “to say that there are
characteristic structures in action at each stage is very different from saying that the stage
is defined by a logical structure. Piaget’s formulation of stages involves the first assertion,
not the second.” (Ibid, p. 130)
2. Each task will not only speak for the structured whole, but will emphasize
a particular aspect of it. Certain of the operational schemata, as Piaget analyses them,
require a more explicit application of either or both the component structures which
contribute to the structured whole, viz., the group INRC and/or the lattice structure of
propositional logic. Other of the operational schemata seem to emphasize the important
utilitarian or intellectually practical applications of the group INRC or lattice structures,
namely, proportional and correlation reasoning.
Thus I will seek evidence of formal operational thought in four tasks. The first
two tasks will focus on the combinatorial system "presupposes the elaboration of a
'structured whole’ and consequently of a lattice structure with the general laws of
reciprocity which characterize it” (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, p. 307). Study of the
combinatorial system is, in essence, study of the structure of propositional logic (as
opposed to study of the propositional operations themselves). Piaget writes:
The new system which results from this combinatorial operation... is a generalized
classification of a set of all possible classifications compatible with the given base
associations. But this is exactly the same as the lattice structure, based on the
“structured whole” of nbyn combinations, in contrast to the structure of
elementary groupings [of concrete operations] (Ibid., p. 291).
Later in his exposition, Piaget explicitly links the combinatorial system with the
structured whole of propositional logic (i.e. the lattice structure):
The combinatorial composition deals with propositions (in formal operational
thinking).... As soon as the proposition states simple possibilities and its
composition consists of bringing together or separating out these possibilities as
such, this composition deals no longer with objects but rather with the truth
values of the combinations. The result is a transition from the logic of classes or
relations [of concrete operations] to propositional logic [of formal operations]
(Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, p. 292).
Chemicals Task
The specific task used to evaluate presence of the combinatorial structure will be
the Combination of Colored and Colorless Chemical Bodies tasks. Piaget suggests that
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this task represents two aspects of combinatorial structure: the mathematical
combinatorial system (which relates to units) and the propositional combinatorial system
(which relates to qualities). Thus, the Chemicals task serves to elicit the “deliberate and
reasoned use of combinations” (Ibid., p. 310) in a mathematical sense, while still
requiring the functions of the lattice (the structured whole) in a more general sense. This
task will test for both of these structures simultaneously, providing evidence of whether
the propositional combinatory structure (lattice) is present as well as providing evidence
whether the mathematical combinatory structure is also present. The former is used
spontaneously, without “conscious or explicit decision” and the latter is used
“intentionally when the subject is faced with problems whose solution requires a
systematic table of combinations” (Ibid., p. 313).
Piaget suggests that both of these combinatorial structures arise simultaneously,
but the nascent, maturing combinatorial system seems to deal first with qualities and then
numbers. This feature should allow us to observe a greater “spread” of formal
operational reasoning skill than if I were to test only for the combinatorial system of
propositional logic alone. The equipment, protocol and scoring for the Chemicals task
follows. The scoring form appears in the Appendix.
Colored and Colorless Chemical Bodies Protocol
Equipment
Four identical eyedropper bottles containing colorless solutions and identified as
follows:
“1” Dilute sulfuric acid
“2” Water
“3” Hydrogen peroxide solution
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“4” Sodium thiosulphate
One eyedropper bottle of distinctly different shape with a colorless
solution and identified as follows:
“g” Sodium iodide
Fifty small transparent plastic cups to hold combinations of liquids.
Only seven are made available on the work surface. The remainder are stationed
visibly in reserve until requested. (E may ask, “Do you need more?”)
One paper pad and pencil.
Instructions
1. Prior to S’s appearance, E mixes a solution of one and three in a small plastic cup.
When S is present, E says:
“This setup gives you a chance to do an experiment to produce a color
from these colorless chemicals. I prepared this solution earlier to show
you the color we want.”
E hands the bottle of “g” to S.
“Use this to add a squirt to the cup and you’ll see the color we are looking
for.” (S responds.)
“There are several ways to get the yellow color. I want you to work with
these chemicals and make as many different combinations as you can to
get the yellow color. You may use anything on the table if you think you
need it. Here is paper and pencil. The “g” solution is necessary to test
your combination. Any questions?”
E answers any questions.
“Go ahead.”
When S stops, E asks:
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“How did you decide what to test?” (S responds.)
2. If S has not stated that all possible ways were tried, E asks:
“Have you tried all of the possible ways of mixing the chemicals?” (S
responds.)
E permits S to continue or suggests S go on if additional ways are noticed.
3. When S is done, and S has not already volunteered answers to the following, E
asks:
“Can you tell me what each chemical does and how you can prove
it?” (S responds.)
If S is unclear, E says:
“With reference to creating the yellow color, what does chemical
one do? What does two do? What do three and four do?”
4. If S concludes with several ways of making yellow without clearly identifying the
role of each chemical, E asks:
“Which chemicals are necessary to create the color? How do you
know?” (S responds.)
Terminate.
Chemical Bodies Task
Scoring Level Criteria
5. S exhibits in speech and action a methodologically complete approach from the
beginning of the task. The approach allows for referral to the data, mentally or in written
form, at any time. S tries all combinations with no unnecessary repetitions. This score is
possible even if S makes additional combinations after E asks whether all possible
combinations have been made. S correctly identifies the roles of each chemical and the
two conditions of the yellow color. S utilizes propositional logic to make these
identifications. 1x1 combinations not required if S’s plan excludes them. This level is
scored formal (late).
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4. S ultimately performs the same as in level 5. However, S may begin with some
initial trial and error and may omit one or more combinations in an otherwise apparently
methodological system. This level is scored formal (early).
3. S exhibits a methodologically complete approach as in levels 4 or 5. However,
one or more of the following failures is evident:
a) S fails to identify the role of chemical 4, and no others;
b) S utilizes evidence, impression or guesswork in identifying the role(s) of the
chemicals and the conditions of the yellow color. (Viz., S merely relates what has been
empirically demonstrated to prove the roles held by each chemical).
2. S never exhibits in speech or action complete command of a methodological
approach to the data which permits its recovery and use for analysis. S does at least some
2x2 and some 3x3 combinations. The method may be replete with repetitions due to
forgetting what had been done. The level applies regardless of whether the S utilizes
propositions, empirical evidence or guesswork in proving the roles of the chemicals.
Likewise, it applies regardless of how well the S identifies the roles of the chemicals and
conditions of the yellow color.
1. S is methodologically incomplete to the extent of only dealing with 1x1 or 2x2
combinations. No regard need be taken of S’s logical rigor.
The second task evaluates the presence of the INRC group structure (see Easley,
1964 for additional description of the INRC group structure). This task will evaluate the
INRC group structure in the sense of both a general operational structure and a specific
operational schemata (belonging to the schema of mechanical equilibrium). Piaget
remarks on this dual presence of the group INRC. He suggests that the mechanical
equilibrium model,
which happens to be that of any equilibrium, corresponds to the internal
equilibrium of his own logical operations without his being aware of it. This
occurs in such a way that, in the explanation of a mechanical system in the
equilibrium, the group of inversions and reciprocities (INRC group) comes into
play on two completely different levels at the same time. First, it governs the
propositional operations which the subject uses to describe and explain reality; as
such it constitutes an integrated structure at the interior of his thought, a structure
of which he is naturally not aware. But second, as a direct phenomenon under
analysis (since, in the given data, these consist of a physical system whose
equilibrium represents the very problem to be resolved). Thus, the group gives
rise to the operational schemata which the subject uses in this and similar
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situations to account for the physical modifications he finds and their
coordination. (Ibid., p. 321)
The task for evaluating the presence of the group INRC structure is the
Communicating Vessels task. Of the four tasks Piaget uses to evaluate the INRC group
structure (that supports the schema of mechanical equilibrium) this task is easiest to
administer while simultaneously most suitable for avoiding the possibilities of facile and
rote responses by the subject. The equipment, protocol, and scoring for the
Communicating Vessels task follows. The scoring form appears in the Appendix.
Communicating Vessels Protocol
Equipment
1 glass titration tube, 20 x 400 mm, held in burette clamp and
stand
1 glass titration tube, 40 x 600 mm, held in burette clamp and
stand
2 moveable rubber bands (one placed on each tube)
1 piece plastic tubing connecting bottom outlets of the tubes
1 pinch clamp on the plastic tubing
1 stand with 80 x 600 mm cardboard rectangle attached to
permit concealment of the large titration tube
1 pencil
1 meter stick
red colored water to fill the connected tubes to the 200 mm level
1 flask shaped titration tube
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Instructions
1. E explains the apparatus and indicates by pointing:
“Here we have two glass containers connected by a plastic tube. Water can
flow between the containers. The tube is not blocked off. Here is pencil
and paper and a measuring stick if you need them.”
E points to the movable tube and says:
“We can adjust the height of this tube by loosening the clamp and moving it
up or down. We can mark the current water level with this rubber band.”
(E does this.)
2. E then asks:
“Compared to the rubber band mark would anything happen to the water
level in this tube if we raised the tube? Will the water level go up, down or
stay where it is compared to the rubber band? ” (S responds.)
“Why do you think so?” (S responds.)
After S responds, E covers the nonmovable tube (B) with the screen (blank side
to the S), raises the movable tube a predetermined distance (previously set so the water
will lower from M to S on diagram A), and sets the clamp. If S has not predicted the
outcome correctly, E terminates. If S has been wrong and wishes to see the result, E
shows the result and asks:
“Why do you think this outcome occurred? Tell me what happened.” (S
responds.)
3. E turns the screen around to reveal diagram A. E lowers the rubber band on the
movable tube all the way to the bottom.
“Look at the drawing of the narrow tube. It shows the tube behind it. The
line at M represents a rubber band marking the level of water in this tube."
(E indicates tube B). “Is the line even with the water level?”
If the line is not even, E suggests:
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“You can adjust the picture with the clamp to make it even.”
E continues:
“Now we’ll cover the tube with the screen.” (E does this.) “I am
going to lower the movable tube. Can you tell me the letter which matches
the water level of the hidden tube? ” (E lowers tube A the amount it had
been raised in item 2 above.) (S responds.)
“Is this as close as you can possibly determine? ”(S responds.)
“Why do you think the water level is there?” (S responds.)
If S predicts the water levels are the same, then continue. Note that due to parallax error,
S may respond with letter R even though E has set the apparatus for the level to be a letter
S. If S fails to indicate the proper level, terminate.
4. E continues and points as appropriate to tube A:
“Now look at the picture with the V shaped, conical tube. Pretend
that it is connected to this movable tube at the bottom. The water level
remains the same for this movable tube, here.” (E points.) “The conical
tube has letters down the center. Can you tell me the letter which indicates
the water level in the conical tube? ” (S responds.)
“How did you decide that?” (S responds.)
5. E brings out drawing B and hands it to S.
“You can see the conical tube and the movable tube in this drawing.
Use your pen to draw in the estimated levels as they are now. Imagine I
block off the connecting tube under the conical tube and that the bubble
tube is empty. Now we pour this water into the bubble tube and open up
the connection. Make a drawing of what you think will happen. Use this
pencil. You can estimate.” (S responds.)
“Why do you think the water levels are there? ”(S responds.)
Terminate.
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Task
Scoring Level

Criteria

5. S completely understands the system of inversions and reciprocities which relates
the water levels of the two containers. The system is understood in its most general case,
including containers of unequal volume and shape. Equality of water levels is described
in terms of mechanical equilibrium based on action and reaction of the quantities of
liquid in each of the containers. The terms need not be precise; however, the description
must convey that S appreciates the notion of equilibrium in a system. This level is scored
formal (late).
4. S seeks to explain the equality of levels in mechanical terms of action and
reaction. The explanation is incomplete, however, due to confusion regarding the role of
volume in maintaining equilibrium. Thus, S does not expect equality of levels to hold for
unequal forms and volumes. This level is scored formal (early).
3. S can predict that the levels will be equal based on past experience or current
observations. S cannot use terms of compensatory actions and reactions to give an
explanation for the equilibrium observed. S may or may not correctly identify conditions
of equal levels when presented with containers of unequal shape and volume.
2. S fails to predict the reciprocal equality of level in a hidden tube based on what is
seen in the connected tube. S may or may not invoke a rationale based on a system of
action and reaction. Usually, if such a system is described it consists of compensations
required in the hidden tube to offset changes in the movable tube, but which do not result
in equality of the water level.
1. S fails to predict the inverse relation between the lifting of the movable tube and
the lowering of the water level compared to a reference mark on the tube. If S does
correctly predict such an inverse relationship, the reasoning is based on guessing or great
uncertainty, admitted by the S.
The third and fourth tasks of this study represent those formal operational
schemata which have greatest utilitarian value in nearly any college science curriculum:
the proportional schema and the correlation schema. Proportions are the foundation of
reasoning with fractions and ratios. Correlations presuppose the presence of the notion of
probability and both the concepts of probability and correlation are the foundation of
statistical reasoning. All of these mathematical functions are of obviously crucial
importance to the qualitative and quantitative comprehension of social and physical
science topics.
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The proportionality schema will be evaluated using the Projection of Shadows
task, whose properties permit testing for geometrical/spatial operations in contrast to the
preceding two tasks which predominantly tested for mathematical skills. Piaget links
proportional reasoning to the structured whole by suggesting that “the notion of logical
proportions is inherent in the integrated structure which seems to dominate the
acquisitions specific to the level of formal operations” (Ibid., p. 314).
Logical proportions apparently precede mathematical proportions, which is a
distinction that the Shadows task can assess. Also, the schema of proportionality seems
to reflect a more general function of the INRC group structure than is found in the
schema of mechanical equilibrium. This expanded role derives from the fact the task is
more spatially organized than physically organized. This requires the subject to
simultaneously consider two distinct reference systems and coordinate them utilizing the
principle of inverse and reciprocal relationships between the variables (Ibid., p. 208).
Also, ratio is a concept that derives more from the INRC group structure than the lattice,
in contrast to the combinatorial schema (evaluated by the Chemicals task) which strongly
reflects presence of the lattice structure.
The proportional schema effects the transition between the schemata originating
in the lattice and those which are integral with the group structure, more particularly, the
group of inversions and reciprocities (INRC) (Ibid., p. 314).
Of special interest in a neurological sense is Piaget’s analysis that the concept of
ratio between time and distance (in the case of proportions of distance per time, or
“speed”) depends on an “intellectual decentration.” That is, when faced with unequal
times and spaces traversed by moving objects, the subject “is unsuccessful at the very
onset of the new construction, because he thinks either of the times, or of the distances, in
a kind of alternating intellectual centration, without being able to unite them in a single
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ratio” (Piaget, 1948, p. 214). Thus, it appears meaningful to seek neurological evidence
to aid our understanding of the process of decentration, or in other terms, see the
neurological correlates to the span of temporal and spatial attention. The equipment
protocol, and scoring for the Shadows task follow. The scoring form appears in the
Appendix.
Projection of Shadows Protocol
Equipment
1 Slide projector situated with the lens centered at 18.2 cm above the
working surface. The lens is covered by posterboard pierced in the center
with a light hole.
1 45 cm square screen constructed of rigid white cardboard located 120 cm
from the light hole.
1 Wooden beam, 5 x 5 x 100 cm, placed lengthwise between the screen and
light source. The beam contains holes 1 cm apart along the top. Every 10
cm is marked with a letter beginning with 0 at 10 cm, then B, A, F, G, K,
M, R and N at 90 cm.
1 Wire ring, 5 cm in diameter with white indicator tape.
1 Wire ring, 10 cm in diameter with red indicator tape.
1 Wire ring, 15 cm in diameter with green indicator tape.
Each ring also has a support wire of such length that the center of each ring is 20
cm above the bottom of the support wire. The support wires fit the holes of the
wooden beam.
1 Meter stick.
1 Paper pad and pencil.
Instructions
1. E begins with the light off and with the rings lying on the work surface. E turns
on the light as he speaks:
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“Here is a light source, some rings and a screen. We also have
pencil and paper and a measuring tape if you need them. When I place a
ring on this board the shadow appears on the screen.”
E places the red ring at the G position and removes the card blocking the light.
“Do you see the shadow? ” (S responds.)
Terminate if S doesn’t see a shadow.
2. E blocks the light with a card and picks up the green ring.
“If I use this ring at the same place on the board as the red ring, will the
shadow size be larger, smaller, or remain the same as the one for the red
ring? ” (S responds.)
“Let’s check your answer.”
E uncovers the light so S can inspect the shadows. If S’s answer was wrong, E asks:
“What happened?”
3. E covers the light, removes the red ring and places the green ring at G.
“If I move this green ring closer to the screen, will the shadow size
become larger, smaller or remain the same? ” (S responds.)
“Let’s check your answer.”
E first uncovers the light while the green ring is at G to see the current size, then recovers
the light, moves the ring to the N mark, and uncovers the light again. If S was wrong, E
asks:
“What do you think happened?”
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If S seems not to understand the change in shadow size, terminate.
4a. E removes the green ring and holds it with the red ring. E asks:
“Can you make a single shadow with these two rings? ” (S
responds.)
“Show me.” (S responds.)
If S says a single shadow is impossible, terminate.
After S has placed the rings, E asks:
“Why do you think this will create one shadow?” (S responds.)
“Let’s see what you have.”
E uncovers the light. If S is wrong or has indicated uncertainty, E allows further trial and
error with the light on by suggesting:
“You can move the rings.”
4b. After S has experimented making a single shadow, E covers the light and asks:
“Are there any other positions where the two rings will make just
one shadow? ” (S Responds.)
If S says there are none, terminate. Otherwise, E says:
“Show me.” (S responds.)
“Is this as accurate as you can get?” (S responds.)
“How did you determine this?” (S responds.)
4c. If E finds that S makes some attempt at analyzing the problem in some way other
than pure trial and error, E should permit a third attempt with two rings and a single
shadow. Repeat item 4.
5. If S attains accurate performance after 3 attempts with two rings, yet E feels
proportional reasoning is not totally comprehended, or wishes to check S’s reasoning, E
can introduce the white ring and ask:
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“Can you make a single shadow using three rings?” (S responds.)
5a. If S answers “no,” terminate. Otherwise ask:
“Can you show me?” (S responds.)
5b. After S has experimented making a single shadow, and if E wishes to check S’s
reasoning, E covers the light and asks:
“Are there any other positions where the three rings will make just
one shadow?” (S responds.)
Terminate.
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Narrative Scoring Criteria for the Projection of Shadows
Task
4. Whether from the beginning or after some trial and error S ultimately succeeds in
stating a metrical formulation of the inverse proportional relationship between the rings
and the light source. S can successfully place two or three rings to form a single shadow.
The distances have the same relation to each other as the size of the ring to the smallest
ring. Only this level requires that the subject utilize a metric approach. Therefore, only
this level is scored formal.
3. After some trial and error, S concludes by stating a nonmetrical formulation of
the inverse geometrically proportional relationship between the rings and the light source.
S asserts that the closer to the light the rings are placed, the closer together they should be
arranged to create a single shadow.
2. S never formulates a geometrically inverse proportional relationship, however, S
makes attempts to invoke metrical or perceptual strategies in solving the problem, or may
just place the rings in the correct order, with the largest nearest the screen.
1. S knows that shadow size depends on the ring size, but fails to understand the
inverse relation between the distance from the light source and shadow size. If S asserts
that the shadow does get smaller as the ring gets farther from the light, S can only base
the response on past experience or intuition and not on analysis of this inverse
relationship.
Correlations Task
The last task utilized in the study involves assessment of the degree of correlation
between two variables. Piaget suggests that while the notion of correlations appears later
than the qualitative notion of proportions, it appears before the quantitative sense of
proportions reasoning as discussed in the literature review. Thus, the proportions schema
serves as the topmost level of achievement in the range of tasks assembled for the study.
A balance of emphasis is obtained by using the correlation structure for evaluation in that
it utilizes the lattice structure (propositional logic) for its solution. Thus, two tasks
emphasize the propositional logic of the lattice structure (Chemicals task and
Correlations task) and two others emphasize the group INRC system of inverse and
reciprocal relationships (the Communicating Vessels and Shadows task). This balance of
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structural emphasis should prove useful in posthoc analysis of the data. The equipment,
protocol, and scoring for the correlations task follow. The scoring form appears in the
Appendix.
Correlations Protocol
Equipment
Two sets of 12 cards each, all of which carry the same line drawing of a child’s
face. Each card is 11 x 14 cm and each set is colored as listed below.
Each set has four groups of color schemes. The groups are referenced as A, B, C
and D and the set of groups is notated (A,B,C,D). Thus, if group A contains 4 cards, B
contains 2 cards, C contains 3 cards and D contains 5 cards, we will read (4,2,3,5). If one
group is absent in the set, zero is used to indicate this in the protocol.
Instructions
1. E presents set 1 randomly ordered. E says:
“Here are some pictures of children with differently colored hair
and eyes. Can you sort these cards into groups?”
If S sorts them into three or less groups, E asks:
“Is there any other way to group these cards? Show me.”
If S fails to locate four groups, terminate. Otherwise, S asks:
“Do you think there is a relationship between eye color and hair
color in these cards or not?” (S responds.)
If S says “no” then ask:
“Why do you think so?”
If S does not understand the question, E says:
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“Let’s go to the next question to clear it up.”
2. E removes groups C and D of set 1 and puts them aside, leaving (4,2,0,0). E says:
“Let’s look at just these cards for a moment. Pretend I cover my
eyes and pick one at random. What are the chances the card will show
brown eyes with blonde hair?” (S responds.)
“How did you determine that?” (S responds.)
3. E repeats 2 but utilizes groups C and D:
“If I pick one at random, what are the chances the card will show
brown eyes with blonde hair? ” (S responds.)
“How did you determine that?”(S responds.)
4. E removes groups B and C leaving (4,0,0,4) and asks:
“If I pick one of these cards at random, and tell you the hair color,
what are your chances of telling me the correct eye color?” (S responds.)
E desires S to notice that the set illustrates full relationship. If S correctly notes the
chances are 100%:
“Since you can predict hair color all the time, we call this a ‘perfect’
relationship, right?”
5. E replaces groups C and D of set one and says:
“Using any or all of the cards on the table, can you construct a set of
cards in which the hair color has no relationship with the eye color? You
can take away any cards you want.” (S responds.)
“How did you determine that?”(S responds.)
6. E rearranges set one in S’s original pattern (4,2,2,4) and says:
“Now judging from all of these cards, pretend I cover my eyes and
pick one at random. I look at it and tell you the color of hair. What are
your chances of telling me the correct eye color?” ( S responds.)
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If by this time, S has not utilized some type of probability to accurately relate at least A to
A+B and C to C+D in the full set of cards, then terminate.
7. E pushes the set to the side, saying:
“We’ll return to this set in a moment.”
E brings out set 2 which has been preordered.
“Here is another set of cards already sorted. You can set them out.”
(S responds.)
“Just considering this new set by itself, can you find a relationship
between hair color and eye color?” (S responds.)
“What are your chances of telling me the correct eye color if I pick
a card and tell you the hair color?” (S responds.)
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Table 1. Description of Color Schemes for Correlation Task
_____________________________________________________________________
The four colorschemes Number of cards in each group

Group

Set 1

Set 2_____

Blueeyed blondes (A) 4 3
Browneyed blondes (B) 2 3
Blueeyed brunettes (C) 2 1
Browneyed brunettes (D) 4 5
______________________________________________________________________
“How did you determine that?” (S responds).
8. E returns attention to set 1.
“Now let’s compare set 1 with set 2. Look at the hair color and eye
color relationships in each set. Can you tell me if the relationship in set one
is more, less or the same than for the second set?” (S responds.)
9. E points to groups A, B, C and D in turn in the second set, asking:
“What about this group? How does it influence your judgment?”(S
responds.)
10. Making reference to both sets, E asks:
“Using any or all of the cards on the table, form two sets of your
own. Can you make them so one set gives you a greater relationship
between hair color and eye color than the other?” (S responds.)
Terminate.
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Narrative Scoring Criteria for the Correlations Task
6. At one of three points in the protocol, S establishes a relationship between
confirming cases of a relationship and either 1) the whole of cases or 2) the
disconfirming cases. Thus, S invokes either of the following ratios: 1) (a+b)/(a+b+c+d)
or 2) (a+d)/(b+c). This is evaluated during questions about the relationship of hair color
to eye color in set I, set II, and during the comparison of set I with set II. This level is
scored formal (late).
5. S invokes a simple ratio of hair/eye color for each color of hair at the points of
evaluation listed for level 6. Thus, S makes comparisons in terms of a/(a+b) and d/(c+d).
This level is scored formal (early).
4. S is able to establish ratios between hair and eye color for a given hair color, as in
level 5. But when called upon to form two sets, one set with a greater relationship
between hair and eye color than the other set, S cannot do so. S may or may not be able
to construct a single set with a relationship which demonstrates zero correlation between
hair and eye color. Although Piaget scores this level as early formal, it only indicates
possession of direct proportions. Therefore, I do not score it as formal (see discussion in
Chapter II, Review of Relevant Literature.)
3. S is unable to correctly identify the probabilistic ratio of hair color to eye color
described in levels four and five. However, S is able to construct a relationship with zero
correlation and identify a relationship which exhibits a perfect correlation.
2. S performs as in level three but fails to either 1) construct a relationship with zero
correlation, or 2) identify a relationship which exhibits a perfect correlation.
1. S fails to correctly identify two simple probabilistic relationships in quantitative
terms: b/(a+b) and d/(c+d).
Analysis of Data
The responses to the Piagetian tasks were scored according to Inhelder and Piaget
(1958). Each subject’s name, sex, coherence, and task scores were recorded. Subjects
were additionally classified along a “Formal Stage Criterion” dimension. Subjects who
passed at least one of the four tasks were considered to have “passed” the formal stage
criterion. Subjects who failed to pass any of the four tasks were considered to lack
evidence of any cognitive “reorganization” that supports formal operational reasoning.
These subjects were classified as “fail” on the formal stage criterion.
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Scores were recorded that reflect the subject’s preference for Science, Math,
Verbal, and Art activities. (See background questionnaire in the Appendix.)
The EEG alpha coherence scores were combined to create a single number, the
“Coherence Index” (FLRO). The 4 basic coherence measures (F, L, R, O) for each
subject consist of eighty foursecond coherence measures taken over 5.3 minutes of
meditation. The number of samples during the 5.3 minutes is sufficient that we can
invoke the assumption of normality for the initial data. The resulting means for each
subject can also then be assumed to represent a stable measure of coherence.
Since the task data is ordinal (pass or fail), nonparametric analysis will be used
when the task score is the dependent variable.
Where coherence is used as the dependent variable, parametric analyses will be
used.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The population for this investigation is undergraduate and graduate students
attending a small liberal arts college, Maharishi International University (MIU), located
in Fairfield, Iowa. Fairfield is a rural town of about 7,000 persons supported mainly by
agriculture and light industry. Another 2,000 faculty, staff, and students are associated
with M.I.U. Most of the students live on campus. At the time of the research, all of the
students were from outside of Fairfield, with origins ranging from the U.S. west coast to
the east coast and Europe.
M.I.U. students can be considered “average” in many ways, since it has an open
admission policy. Many of the students receive financial aid and/or scholarships.
Therefore, family economic wealth is not a particular criterion for admission. The
students all participate in the schoolsponsored “Maharishi Technology of the Unified
Field,” otherwise known as Transcendental Meditation. The avowed goal of TM is to
culture the nervous system to support a state of “restful alertness” (M.I.U. Bulletin, 1992
1993) in which stress is minimized and expression of individual potential is maximized.
The students reputedly do not use alcohol or drugs, probably owing to peer pressure,
school policy, and the proselfdevelopment attitudes of the students themselves. Given
that the students participate in a specific program of selfdevelopment, the sample does
not represent any “average” university population. They are selfselected to join the
rather unique collection of students. This qualification limits the findings to similar
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populations of students practicing TM. However, since the study is correlational, and the
practice of TM is claimed to result in “naturally” occurring outcomes, it is not
unreasonable to generalize at least to others with similar age and education who practice
TM.
As part of an ongoing research program into longitudinal physiological changes in
students, M.I.U. required an annual electroencephalographic evaluation of each student.
I arranged to “piggyback” additional tests of formal operational reasoning onto the EEG
research program. EEG data was freely made available. Students attending more than
one year most likely had received a previous EEG evaluation. Therefore, it was not an
entirely new or unusual experience. This fact, plus the fact that students received the
measures during the practice of TM, suggests that no undue arousal effects would bias the
EEG data. The students were quite experienced in the practice of TM and would
therefore habituate rapidly to the situation and not feel “pressured” or otherwise distracted
during the EEG session.
Sample
The 58 subjects who participated in this study were taken as needed and at
random from the stream of students taking their required annual EEG readings at the
International Center for Scientific Research located at MIU. Only about 10% of the
sample are international students. They are European and sufficiently acclimated to
American culture that no obvious linguistic or cognitive differences seemed to set them
apart from their American peers.
Although students were contacted classbyclass, students in any selected class
could accept or reject the opportunity to have their EEG scheduled within a given week.
Females were not scheduled for EEG within three days before or after their menstrual
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period. All subjects were advised to eat lightly the meal before their appointment. The
research was conducted between midJanuary and midMarch of 1981.
Participation in the present study was voluntary and no one refused. Typically,
two to four subjects were scheduled for each of the morning and afternoon examination
periods. The EEG usually took approximately 6090 minutes including time to apply the
electrodes. Prior to removing the electrodes, subjects typically went immediately after
their EEG examination into a nearby room where they received the Piagetian protocols.
The presence of the leads was never mentioned as a hindrance to performance nor did
they appear to cause distraction or discomfort. Protocol administration required an
average of 6070 minutes for the set of four tasks. Two randomly selected subjects were
videotaped.
A total of seventyeight subjects were tested on each of the four tasks:
Correlations, Shadows, Vessels, and Combinations. The first ten subjects served in the
pilot study. Based on the pilot experience, the experimenter revised and standardized
both the written protocol and experimenter behavior. Of the remaining 68 subjects, eight
were not scored because the subject indicated some degree of lefthandedness to the
question: “Do you consider yourself lefthanded or ambidextrous in any regular activity
such as writing, eating or sports? (list).” Two other subjects were rejected due to possible
confounding variables: one subject stuttered, and another subject’s data set displayed
excessive EEG artifacts. This left a total of 58 subjects for the current data analysis. The
mean age was 26.7 years ranging from 17.8 to 35.8, with a S.D. of 4.3 years.
Thirtynine subjects were male and 19 were female. Male mean age was 26.9 and
female mean age was 24.6. Males were significantly older, t (56) = 2.002, p = .0502.
101
The mean year in college was 4.0 with a minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 8
years. The S.D. was 1.6 years. There was no significant difference in mean years of
college between males and females, t (55) = .437, NS.
Since the students were contacted on a classbyclass basis for their EEG
evaluation, an interest inventory was given to detect any bias in favor of science and math
in the subject group. Subjects marked their level of “fulfillment and success” on a scale
of 1 (lowest level)–7 (highest level) for Art, Science, Verbal disciplines, and Mathematics
(see Participant Questionnaire, Appendix A). Math and Science were not preferred over
the other disciplines. Thereby implying that the subjects were not biased toward those
disciplines. In order of preference, means were Art: 5.228, Verbal: 5.035, Science: 4.772,
and Math: 4.351. Differences in means were tested with a Friedman test for matched
groups (Hays, 1973, p. 785) resulting in a betweenmeasure chisquare approximation of
7.5105, N = 57, 3 df, marginally significant at p = .0573. In a posthoc comparison using
the Wilcoxon matchedpairs test (Hays, 1973, p. 780), Art and Verbal were preferred
significantly higher than Math, Z = 2.8203, p = .0048, and Z = 2.0276, p = .0426,
respectively. Science was preferred over Math with marginal significance:
Z =1.9040, p = .0569. All tests are twotailed.
Measurement reliability involves the possibility of scorer bias in evaluating
subject’s performance on each of the four tasks. Also, EEG data may be subject to
artifacts. Checks were made to evaluate both issues.
Task Scoring Reliability
To validate the reliability of the scoring criteria used in each of the four tasks, fourteen
randomlyselected subjects were independently evaluated by a second independent judge.
102
For each subject, the judge was provided with audio tape recordings of the protocols and
the experimenter’s scoring sheets. The judge had prior experience in Piagetian task
scoring, as well as task design and theory. Table 2 presents the percentage of agreement
between the investigator and the judge on pass/fail evaluations for each task.
EEG Artifact Analysis
Eighteen EEG records were set aside after inspection revealed eye or muscle
tension artifact in more than five of the eighty 4second sampling epochs. In subsequent
reprocessing of the digitized data, an artifact rejection program deleted all epochs that
exceeded a criterion voltage. Seventeen of the records were returned to the subject pool
after removing artifactual epochs. One record could not be used at all.
Summary of Data
Summary of Task Scores
The number of subjects scoring at each level of each task and the task index is
given in Table 3. The number and proportion of subjects passing each task and the
formal stage criteria are given in Table 4, together with the levels of attainment needed to
pass each task.
Passing achievement is defined on the basis of Piaget’s criteria for formal
operational reasoning, as given in the methods chapter. Generally, subjects are
considered passing (early formal) if they took a systematic approach to the task and if
they formulated the issues qualitatively correctly without guessing. The one exception to
this generalization is the Shadows task. Early formal, according to Inhelder and Piaget
(1958) requires that a metric approach be taken in addition to application of a qualitative
sense of positioning the rings with respect to their diameter and distance from the light.
For all the tasks, subjects are scored on a higher level of formal reasoning (late formal) if
103
Table 2. Percentage Agreement on Pass/Fail Ratings By Two Independent Judges
(N=14)
_________________________________________________________________________
Task Scored* Agree Percentage Agreement
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Vessels 13 12 92%

Shadows 13 11 85%
Combination 13 12 92%
Correlations 13 12 92%
_______________________________________________________________________
_
*Certain protocols could not be scored due to inability to hear portions of the audio tape, therefore only 13
data points were obtained across the 14 subjects.
104
Table 3. Data Summary: Number of Subjects Scoring Each Level For Each of the
Four Tasks and the Formal Stage Criterion
____________________________________________________________________________________
Scoring Level
Number of
Task Subjects 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
____________________________________________________________________________________
Vessels
Male 39 6 7 11 10 14
Female 18 9 2 2 3 2
Total 57 15 7 11 10 14
Shadows
Male 37 4 9 13 11
Female 19 10 4 4 1
Total 56 14 13 17 12
Combinations
Male 39 4 12 4 13 6
Female 19 5 6 0 7 1
Total 58 9 18 4 20 7
Correlations
Male 38 8 5 7 4 9 5
Female 19 5 4 4 1 4 1
Total 57 13 9 11 5 13 6
Formal Stage Criterion*
Male 36 8 8 9 7 4
Female 18 7 5 4 2
Total 54** 15 13 13 9 4
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
* The Formal Stage Criterion gives a summary measure of the number of tasks passed by each subject.
Subjects who fail all four tasks are considered to lack evidence of developing the stage of formal
operational reasoning. Subjects who pass one or more tasks are considered to have developed the
characteristic structures in action at the formal operational stage, acknowledging that the subject may not
have developed more logical structures than indicated by passing the particular given task. Here, 15
subjects, 8 males and 7 females, fail to meet the formal stage criterion.
** 4 subjects (3 male, 1 female) are not accounted in the Formal Stage Criterion because one of their 4
tasks lacked clear audio recording and thus prohibited proper scoring. Note that for each of these 4
subjects, none of the other tasks were passed. Therefore, the best they could have done would be a scoring
level of “1.” Using the observed probabilities (15 S’s scored “0” and 13 S’s scored “1”) as a guide to the
expected distribution, roughly half would then have scored “1” and the other half “0.”
105
Table 4. Data Summary: Number and Proportion of Subjects Passing Each Task, the
Combination of Tasks, and the Formal Stage Criterion
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Levels
Number of Constituting Subjects
Task Subjects Passing Passing Proportion (%)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Formal Stage Criterion 54 1 or greater 39 72.2

Vessels 57 4 and 5 24 42.1
Shadows 56 4 12 21.4
Correlations 57 5 and 6 19 33.3
Combinations 58 4 and 5 27 46.6
V,S,Corr,Comb 54* 4 7.4
V,S,Corr 54 0 0
V,S,Comb 54 1 1.8
V,Corr,Comb 54 5 9.3
S,Corr,Comb 54 3 5.6
V,S 54 3 5.6
V,Corr 54 1 1.8
V,Comb 54 4 7.4
S,Corr 54 1 1.8
S,Comb 54 0 0
Corr,Comb 54 4 7.4
V 54 6 11.1
S 54 0 0
Corr 54 1 1.8
Comb 54 6 11.1
None 54 15 27.8
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*Only subjects who were scored on all four tasks were included in this analysis.
106
they produced quantitative rationale for their explanations. In either case, whether early
formal or late formal, they receive a pass on the task.
Subjects who fail all four of the tasks are considered to lack evidence of
characteristic structures associated with formal operational reasoning. Therefore, these
subjects are scored “fail” on the Formal Stage Criterion (15 out of 54). Subjects passing
one or more tasks are scored “pass” on the formal stage criterion acknowledging that the
subject may not have developed more logical structures than indicated by passing the
particular task (39 out of 54). Note that 37 of the subjects who passed the formal stage
criterion passed either the Vessels task or the Combinations task or both. Conversely,
only two subjects failed both Vessels and Combinations tasks among those who passed
the formal stage criterion. (One passed the Correlations task and one passed both the
Correlations and the Shadows task.) This data suggests that the “Formal Stage Criterion”
is defined primarily by the structures associated with the Vessels and Combinations tasks,
namely, the INRC group and the combinatorial lattice, respectively.
According to Inhelder and Piaget (1958), a subject can score early formal (IIIA)
on the correlations task without actually demonstrating possession of the schema of
correlations. As pointed out by Wavering (1979), the first level indicates proportional
reasoning, a formal operation ability, but unrepresentative of the correlational schema.
Wavering excluded this level of performance from receiving a “pass” score with the
justification that correlational reasoning (IIIB and IIIC) must be demonstrated to justify
receiving a “pass” score for a correlational task that is comparable to a “pass” score in the
other formal schemata being tested and compared. I concur with this reasoning, and
adopt the same convention in this research.
107
Summary of EEG Alpha Coherence Measures
Descriptive statistics for the EEG alpha coherence measures and Coherence Index
are presented in Table 5 The measures are broken down by gender in Table 6. Since the
kurtosis values are less than 3.0 corresponding to the normal distribution, the
distributions are slightly platykurtic, or more flat. The skewness values also depart from
the value of 0.0 corresponding to the normal distribution. However, visual inspection of
the standardized form of the distributions indicates that none of the departures from
normality are extreme.
Although the formal stage criteria suggests that 72 percent of those subject
possess the characteristic structures in action at the formal stage, inspection of the rate of
passing the tasks suggested an obvious difference in difficulty between the tasks. Only
21% of the subjects passed the Shadows task compared with 42% passing the Vessels
task. To evaluate the degree and impact of this apparent nonhomogeneity of the formal
reasoning tasks, all possible pairs were tested using the McNemar chisquare test for the
equality of two correlated proportions (Hays, 1973, p. 740). See Table 7 for the calculated
chisquare values and the percentage of subjects that received the same score (confirming
cases) in a given pair of tasks. Figure 3 presents the contingency relationships for
subjects scored pass and fail on the pairs of tasks.
The ordered diagram of the statistically significant pairwise tests is presented in
Figure 4. It includes the percentage of subjects who passed one of the tasks more
frequently compared with all subjects who had a pass score on only one of the two tasks.
The more frequently passed task is assumed to be easier. Subjects gave evidence of
attaining the INRC group schema (Vessels task)and the combinatorial schema more
easily than the proportions schema (Shadows task). Although not statistically significant,
108
Table 5. Data Summary: EEG Data By Total Subjects
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Alpha Coherence
Coherence Index F3F4 F3C3 F4C4 O1O2
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Number of Subjects 58 58 58 58 58
Mean 1.513 .785 .714 .687 .674
SD .251 .077 .085 .102 .082
Kurtosis .251 .267 .128 2.181 .034
Skewness .592 .784 .463 1.111 .457
____________________________________________________________________________________
Correlations with...
Coherence Index 1.000*
(.000)
F3F4 .545 1.000
(.000) (.000)
F3C3 .922 .419 1.000
(.000) (.001) (.000)
F4C4 .85 .328 .787 1.000
(.000) (.012) (.000) (.000)
0102 .502 .136 .381 .208 1.000
(.000) (.307) (.003) (.116) (.000)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*Pearson correlation coefficient. Numbers in parentheses give the p value. Significance cutoff is p ≤ .05
109
Table 6. Data Summary: EEG Data By Gender
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_ Alpha Coherence
Gender Coherence Index F3F4 F3C3 F4C4 O1O2
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_ FNumber of Subjects: 19
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Mean 1.52171 .77955 .72371 .67726 .65397
SD .24227 .06291 .09358 .10071 .06735

Kurtosis 2.07886 .27102 1.15003 2.06954 1.27294
Skewness .52907 .05237 .35221 .94447 .93540
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
M Number of Subjects: 39
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Mean 1.50651 .78912 .70961 .69214 .68437

SD .25896 .08476 .08270 .10422 .08812
Kurtosis .14627 .24502 .39490 2.73066 .12699
Skewness .62486 .99174 .60749 1.24315 .24908
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Test for Differences Between the Means
t .291 .436 .584 .500 1.33
df 56 56 56 56 56
p value .772 .665 .562 .619 .188
_____________________________________________________________________________________
110
Table 7. Analysis of Relative Difficulty of Task Pairs: McNemar ChiSquare Test for
the Equality of Two Correlated Proportions (with Bonferroni Correction)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Confirming Cases Disconfirming Cases
Pair* Pass Fail (% of Total N) X2 (df=1) p N % of Both**
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Shadows12 43 35 7.200 .007*** 4

Vessels 24 31 (63.6%) 16 80.0%
Shadows12 43 40 3.267 .071 4

Correlations 19 36 (72.7%) 11 73.3%
Shadows12 44 33 9.787 .002*** 4

Combinations 27 29 (58.9%) 19 82.6%
Vessels 24 32 33 1.087 .297 14 60.9%

Correlations 37 19 (58.9%) 9
Vessels 24 33 34 .391 .532 10

Combinations 27 30 (59.65%) 13 56.5%
Correlations 19 38 43 4.571 .032 3

Combinations 27 30 (75.4%) 11 78.6%
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*Missing task scores cause the total N to vary from pair to pair.
**This statistic represents the proportion of subjects that pass the particular task but fail the other task
compared with the total number of subjects that pass either task but fail the other task (a disconfirming
relationship between the tasks). It gives a sense of the magnitude by which subjects as a group acquire the
underlying schema prior to acquiring the other schema with which it is compared. Note that this statistic
is inversely related to the p values.
***Significant at p ≤ .0083 (This criterion reflects a significance cutoff of p ≤ .05 corrected for multiple
tests (6) as recommended by Bonferroni. Note that the Bonferroni correction assumes independence
among the tests. However, in this case, we can reasonably expect correlated data, which would raise the
alpha level. Here, we divide the .05 alpha level by six, the number of tests, making the outcome a
conservative, overcorrected estimate of the probability that the proportions are correlated.)
111
112
Shadows Vessels Combinations
Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail

Pass 8 11 10 9 16 3

Correlations
Fail 4 32 14 23 11 27

Pass 8 19 14 13
Combinations
Fail 4 25 10 20

Pass 8 16
Vessels
Fail 4 27

Figure 3. Contingency Relationships for Subjects With Scores on Both Tasks
113
Most difficult task: Shadows (proportions schema)

73.3%*

Correlations
82.6%** 80%**

78.6%

Easiest tasks: Combinations Vessels (equilibration schema)

_________________________________________________________________
______________
*The percentage of subjects who pass the easier task compared with subjects who
pass only one of the two tasks
**Significant at p ≤ .0083, reflecting a Bonferroni correction for multiple tests
114
Figure 4. Ordering Diagram for Four Tests of Formal Reasoning: Arrow Indicates
Direction of Logical Prerequisite
115
the combinations schema is passed more easily than the proportions aations schemata.
There is no statistically significant relationship in the order of acquisition between
combinations and equilibrations schemata (Vessels task), or correlations and equilibration
schemata. There is a modest, but nonsignificant nd correlrelationship that indicates the
correlations may appear prior to the proportions schema.
As mentioned above, the Formal Stage Criterion is passed primarily by subjects
who pass either the Vessels task and/or the Combinations task. They may or may not have
passed the Shadows or the Correlations tasks. Only two subjects who passed the Formal
Stage Criterion failed to pass either the Vessels or the Combinations tasks. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to explain how both subjects passed the Correlations task without
giving evidence of either the INRC group or the lattice structure, and likewise for the one
subject that also passed the Shadows task. Presumably this is evidence of the notion that
formal reasoning “stage” is not bounded by possession of any particular structure.
However, given the preeminent “status” of the INRC group and lattice structure among
the ten structures Piaget has identified, the findings remain to be explained. It may be that
the contexts of these two tests were sufficiently unfamiliar to these particular subjects that
they could not extrapolate the structures to the situation.
Analysis 2 Relationship Between Gender and Task
Performance
A twotailed Fisher exact test of independence (Hays, 1973, p. 736) was performed
to test the null hypothesis that there were no significant differences between male and
female performance in each task. The Fisher exact test of independence was used
because some of the cells have expected minimum frequencies of less than 10 and the test
uses a df = 1. The chi square test of independence may not be conservative enough. The
test result for the Shadows task was significant at the 0.05 level, twotailed. Only 5.3% of
116
females passed compared with 29.7% of males. No other tests showed significant
differences. The results are summarized in Table 8. The Vessels task appeared to result
in similarly lopsided results with 27.8% of females passing versus 48.7% of males.
However, the difference was not significant, p = .161, twotailed. The lower passing rates
of females on the Shadows and Vessels tasks may reflect EEG differences reported by
other EEG coherence researchers in which females scored lower on tasks with spatial
components (Beaumont, Mayes, and Rugg, 1978). Normally, such gender differences
would dictate that further analyses would be done for each gender separately. However,
owing to reported gender differences in the Shadows task, it is expected that the EEG may
reflect gender differences that are task related. Therefore, the Analysis 2 following, will
not covary for gender or age. Note that females are significantly younger than males in
this study. Age is not covaried since age can also reasonably be expected to be reflected
in both EEG coherence and task performance.
Analysis 2 Relationship Between Coherence Index and
Task Performance
Student's t test was used to test the null hypothesis that there was no significant
difference in the mean Coherence Index of subjects who passed a task and those who
failed the test.
The results given in Table 9 indicate that subjects who passed the Vessels task
measured significantly higher on the Coherence Index than subjects who failed the
Vessels task, t (55) = 1.676, p = .0495 (onetailed). Passing subjects had a mean
Coherence Index score of 1.577 compared with failing subjects who had a mean of 1.465.
Means associated with the other tasks were in the predicted direction, with higher
mean coherence for subjects in the pass group. Interestingly, the test for the formal stage
117
Table 8. Analysis of Differences in Male and Female Performance on the Four Tasks
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_Performance N Number of Subjects Passing Fisher Exact Test
Measure Males Females Males Females of Independence (df=1)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Formal Stage
Criterion 18 36 28 11 .216
(77.8%)** (61.1)
Vessels 39 18 19 5 .161
(48.7%) (27.8%)
Shadows37 19 11 1 .043*
(29.7%) (5.3%)
Correlations 38 19 14 5 .555
(36.8%) (26.3%)
Combinations 39 19 19 8 .781
(48.7%) (42.1%)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*Significant at p ≤ .05 (twotailed)
*Percentage of males and females passing
118
Table 9. Results of Unpaired TTest of Differences in Coherence Index Means between
Pass and Fail Groups
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Group N Mean S.D. t df p *

_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Formal Stage Criterion
Pass 39 1.542 .234 1.618 52 .0558***
Fail 15 1.418 .298
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Vessels
Pass 24 1.577 .248 1.676 55 .0495**
Fail 33 1.465 .248
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Shadows
Pass 12 1.596 .289 .938 54 .176
Fail 44 1.492 .242
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Correlations
Pass 19 1.538 .196 .498 55 .310
Fail 38 1.503 .278
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Combinations
Pass 27 1.549 .236 1.021 56 .156
Fail 31 1.482 .261
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*All significance tests are onetailed.
**Significant at p ≤ .05
*** Trend at p ≤ .06
119
criterion was nearly significant at p = .0558. This suggests that the alpha coherence index
may indeed reflect a developmental function relative to stages of epistemological growth.
Analysis 3 Relationship between Coherence Index and
Task Performance Controlling for Age and Gender
In light of the Beaumont, Mayes, and Rugg’s (1978) findings of task and gender
interaction on coherence measures, it is surprising that Analysis 2 showed Coherence
Index differences between pass and fail subjects on the Vessels task whereas Analysis 1
indicated gender differences on the Shadows task. In other words, the anticipated
influence of gender on both coherence index and task did not appear. (Albeit, both
Vessels and Shadows used the INRC group schema.)
Therefore, to further examine the possible relationships between age, gender, EEG
alpha coherence, and task performance, we should also test to see if any interactions are
present between gender and task and also see if the relationship between task and EEG
alpha coherence strengthens, weakens, or remains the same when the influence of gender
and age are controlled. First, however, we must insure there is no significant interaction
between the continuous covariant, age, and the grouping variables. This is a test of the
assumption of homogeneity of slopes, and is accomplished by testing for significant
interactions with an ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) using a general linear model that
adjusts for unequal numbers of subjects in the various group cells (Wilkinson, 1989).
The results given in Table 10 indicate that assumption of homogeneity of slopes
holds. There are no significant interactions between the continuous covariant, age, and
any of the grouping variables, gender and task performance. Further analysis evaluated
the interaction between the grouping variables of gender and task performance. (See
Table 11). The model included task, gender, age, and taskXgender interaction.
120
Table 10. Results of Tests of the Assumption of Homogeneity of Slopes for Age as a
Covariant with Task and Gender
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
(N)
Group Effect SS df MS FRatio Probability *
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Formal Stage Criterion (54)
Formal Stage 0.0256 1 0.0256 0.3786 0.5413
Gender 0.0060 1 0.0060 0.0889 0.7669
Age 0.0278 1 0.0278 0.4119 0.5241
Formal StageXAge 0.0142 1 0.0142 0.2100 0.6489
GenderXAge 0.0195 1 0.0195 0.2893 0.5932
Formal StageXGenderXAge 0.1159 1 0.1159 .7173 0.1964
Error 3.1724 47 0.0675
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Vessels (57)
Vessels .0194 1 .0194 .2932 .5906
Gender .0244 1 .0244 .3691 .5462
Age .0011 1 .0011 .0166 .8980
VesselsXAge .0068 1 .0068 .1029 .7497
GenderXAge .0320 1 .0320 .4838 .7497
VesselsXGenderXAge .0063 1 .0063 .0956 .7585
Error 3.3088 50 .0662
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Shadows (56)
Shadows .0017 1 .0017 .0253 .8744
Gender .03800 1 .0380 .5537 .4604
Age .0240 1 .0240 .3509 .5563
ShadowsXAge .0089 1 .0089 .1295 .7205
GenderXAge .0537 1 .0537 .7832 .3805
ShadowsXGenderXAge .0157 1 .0157 .2296 .6339
Error 3.3583 49 .0665
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Correlation (57)
Correlation .0000 1 .0000 .0002 .9892
Gender .0528 1 .0528 .7640 .3863
Age .0008 1 .0008 .0115 .9149
121
CorrelationsXAge .0001 1 .0001 .0008 .9780

GenderXAge .0536 1 .0536 .7754 .3828
CorrelationsXGenderXAge .0077 1 .0077 .1110 .7404
Error 3.4543 50 .0691
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Combination (58)
Combination .0524 1 .0524 .8180 .3700
Gender .0547 1 .0547 .8543 .3597
Age .0412 1 .0412 ..6436 .4261
CombinationsXAge .0554 1 .0554 .8650 .3567
GenderXAge .0573 1 .0573 .8946 .3487
CombinationXGenderXAge .0935 1 .0935 1.4602 .2325
Error 3.2650 51 .0640
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*All significance tests are twotailed.
122
Table 11. Results of Analysis of Covariance in Coherence Index Between Tasks,
Controlling for Age and Gender
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
(N) Probability
Task Effect * SS df MS FRatio Twotailed Onetailed
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Formal Stage Criterion (54)
Pass Tasks 0.1849 1 0.1849 2.7980 .050**
Gender 0.0223 1 0.0223 0.3374 0.5640
Age 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0001 0.9939
Error 3.3037 50 0.0661
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Vessels (57)
Vessels .201 1 .201 3.177 .040**
Gender .013 1 .013 .200 .654
Age .013 1 .013 .204 .656
Error 3.350 53 .063
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Shadows (56)
Shadows .082 1 .082 1.250 .134
Gender .036 1 .036 .549 .463
Age .005 1 .005 .082 .776
Error 3.533 52 .066
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Correlation (57)
Correlation .017 1 .017 .257 .307
Gender .005 1 .005 .067 .797
Age .002 1 .002 .024 .876
Error 3.533 53 .067
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Combination (58)
Combination .068 1 .068 1.057 .154
Gender .006 1 .006 .086 .770
Age .002 1 .002 .032 .858
Error 3.486 54 .065
123
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*When the GenderXTask interaction is included in the models, the interaction p values are: Formal Stage
Criterion, p = .707, Vessels, p = .961, Shadows, p = .828, Correlations, p = .630, Combinations, p =. 287.
**Significant at p = or ≤ .05, onetailed test
124
ANCOVA revealed no significant interactions (see footnotes to Table 11). A subsequent
ANCOVA on the same model, but without the interaction, revealed that the Vessels task
demonstrated virtually unchanged results, F = 3.177, df = 1, p = .040, onetailed. That is,
when holding age and gender constant (a Type III test), the Coherence Index continued to
demonstrate statistically significant differences between the pass and fail groups for the
Vessels task. The test for Formal Stage Criterion indicated significant results (p = .050)
consistent with the hypothesis that the coherence index is a measure of developmental
progress with respect to the stage of formal operational reasoning.
Results of these tests on the other three tasks demonstrated similar resemblance to
their equivalent t tests. Therefore, it is concluded that overall, the relationship between
the Coherence Index and tasks are independent of age and gender. In other words, the
relationship holds across both genders. What holds for males is expected to hold also for
females, without regard to differences in age, for the given range and distribution of ages.
The Coherence Index is constructed as the sum of three “anterior” alpha
coherence derivations , F3F4 (frontal or “F”), F3C3 (left or “L”), and F4C4 (right or
“R”), minus the “posterior” derivation O1O2 (occipital or “O”). The Coherence Index
was constructed based on empirical relationships among the derivations (frontal + left+
right occipital or “FLRO”) established in previous research on creativity and mental
health (OrmeJohnson, et al., 1982). Do the empirical relations taking each derivation
separately still hold for the formal stage criterion or any of the four tasks for formal
reasoning?
Here, followup analysis reports additional tests on the derivations and the ratios
between certain of the derivations. Ratios were tested to explore possibilities for greater
125
discriminatory power between pass and fail groups within each task. The ratios included
typical measures of laterality differences, (RL)/(R+L), and the analog measures of
anterior/posterior differences, (RO)/(R+O) and (FO)/(F+O). Because frontal bilateral
activity may signify different mental processes than left or right homolateral activity, the
ratio of frontal to left coherence, (FL)/(F+L), was also studied.
The results are presented in Tables 12 16. Preliminary texts for taskXgender interaction
revealed only one statistically significant interaction (p ≤ .05): the ratio (LR)/(L+R)
demonstrated interaction in the Shadows task. However, interpretation is difficult since
only one female passed the Shadows task. Post hoc Sheffé tests of all possible pairs
indicated that the ratio was less for the pass female than the fail male group (p = .0665,
not significant). The lack of other interactions, especially in the (LR)/(L+R) ratio in the
two INRC group tasks, Vessels and Shadows, was surprising in light of the significant
difference between males and females in the Shadows task (p = .043) and the trend for
differences in the Vessels task (p = .161). Apparently, males and females are
“neurologically equivalent” for the measures used here. Subsequent analyses and
conclusions will, therefore, apply to both genders.
For tests of pass vs. fail, onetailed tests were made where the direction of effect
was expected (anterior derivations : higher for pass, posterior derivation : higher for fail).
For ratios constructed out of measures within the anterior derivations , no expectations
could be made regarding the relationship between pass and fail groups and the dependent
measures. Therefore, these latter tests used a twotailed alpha test. Because the tests are
exploratory, no Bonferroni corrections in the alpha level (p ≤ .05) were made to
compensate for the multiple tests in this and subsequent followup analyses. Although
results indicate that among the tasks there are no significant differences that
126
discriminated pass from fail groups, also note that results of the tests indicate no
significant differences
127
Table 12. Results of Unpaired TTest of Differences in Various Coherence Measures
Between Formal Stage Criterion Pass and Fail Groups*
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Probability
Group N Mean S.D. t df Twotailed Onetailed
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
F = F3F4
Pass 39 .789 0.070 0.413 52 .341
Fail 15 .780 0.092
L =F3C3
Pass 39 0.7236 0.0788 1.3875 52 .086
Fail 15 0.6868 0.1068
R = F4C4
Pass 39 0.6973 0.0975 1.1372 52 .130
Fail 33 .672 .099
O = O1O2
Pass 39 0.6683 0.0764 1.7135 52 .046**
Fail 15 0.7099 0.0883
FL ratio = (F3F4F3C3)/(F3F4+F3C3)
Pass 39 0.0447 0.0547 1.0867 52 .282
Fail 33 .057 .074
LR ratio = (F3C3F4C4)/(F3C3+F4C4)
Pass 39 0.0212 0.0526 0.0949 52 .925
Fail 33 .021 .042
RO ratio= (F4C4O1O2)/(F4C4+O1O2)
Pass 39 0.0187 0.1050 1.7433 52 .044**
Fail 15 0.0405 0.1284
FO ratio= (F3F4O1O2)/(F3F4+O1O2)
Pass 39 0.0841 0.0701 1.6639 52 .051***
Fail 15 0.0469 0.0825
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*ANCOVAs using a full model of gender, task, and genderXtask interaction indicated no significant
interaction. Therefore, male and female subjects were pooled for ttests of pass vs. fail.
***Near significant at p = .051
128
Between Vessels Task Pass and Fail Groups*
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Probability
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
F = F3F4
Pass 24 .794 .084 .595 55 .277
Fail 33 .781 .071
L =F3C3
Pass 24 .733 .077 1.507 55 .069
Fail 33 .698 .090
R = F4C4
Pass 24 .710 .107 1.393 55 .085
Fail 33 .672 .099
O = O1O2
Pass 24 .661 .085 1.198 55 .118
Fail 33 .687 .079
Pass 24 .041 .043 .959 55 .342
Fail 33 .057 .074
Pass 24 .020 .059 .001 55 .928
Fail 33 .021 .042
RO ratio = (F4C4O1O2)/(F4C4+O1O2)
Pass 24 .033 .114 1.558 55 .063
Fail 33 .013 .109
FO ratio = (F3F4O1O2)/(F3F4+O1O2)
Pass 24 .093 .076 1.463 55 .075
Fail 33 .064 .071
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
129
Between Shadows Task Pass and Fail Groups*
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Probability
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
F = F3F4
Pass 12 .793 .061 .442 54 .330
Fail 44 .781 .083
L = F3C3
Pass 12 .708 .086 .988 54 .164
Fail 44 .736 .092
R = F4C4
Pass 12 .684 .098 .087 54 .465
Fail 44 .686 .126
O = O1O2
Pass 12 .643 .082 1.525 54 .066
Fail 44 .684 .082
Pass 12 .039 .065 .494 54. .623
Fail 44 .050 .064
Pass 12 .044 .064 1.626 54 .110
Fail 44 .017 .046
Pass 12 .024 .146 .645 54 .261
Fail 44 .000 .104
Pass 12 .16 .068 1.650 54 .052**
Fail 27 .069 .077
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*ANCOVAs using a full model of gender, task, and genderXtask interaction indicated only one significant
interaction: (FL)/(F+L) p = .0352. Interpretation is difficult, however, since only one female passed the
task. Post hoc Sheffé tests of all possible pairs revealed that the pass female measure was less than the fail
male measure, p = .0665, not significant. Given the difficulty of interpretation with only one pass female,
male and female subjects were pooled for ttests of pass vs. fail.
**Near significant at p = .052
130
Between Correlations Task Pass and Fail Groups*
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Probability
_____________________________________________________________________________________
F = F3F4
Pass 19 .779 .070 .676 55 .259
Fail 38 .794 .079
L = F3C3
Pass 19 .722 .070 .419 55 .338
Fail 38 .711 .094
R = F4C4
Pass 19 .717 .077 1.515 55 .068
Fail 38 .673 .112
O = O1O2
Pass 19 .680 .077 .165 55 .435
Fail 38 .676 .083
Pass 19 .038 .059 1.022 55 .311
Fail 38 .056 .064
Pass 19 .004 .043 1.942 55 .057
Fail 38 .031 .053
Pass 19 .027 .087 1.041 55 .151
Fail 38 .006 .122
Pass 19 .069 .070 .549 55 .292
Fail 38 .081 .077
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
131
Between Combination Task Pass and Fail Groups*
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Probability
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
F = F3F4
Pass 27 .784 .067 .188 56 .425
Fail 31 .788 .088
L = F3C3
Pass 27 .721 .077 .585 56 .280
Fail 31 .708 .094
R = F4C4
Pass 27 .708 .088 1.411 56 .082
Fail 31 .670 .112
O = O1O2
Pass 27 .664 .076 .927 56 .179
Fail 31 .684 .087
Pass 27 .042 .053 1.021 56 .312
Fail 31 .054 .071
Pass 27 .011 .041 1.594 56 .117
Fail 31 .031 .056
Pass 27 .031 .101 1.573 56 .125
Fail 31 .014 .117
Pass 27 .084 .077 .670 56 .253
Fail 31 .071 .072
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
132
(p ≤ .05) that contradicted the expected directions. Two tests were nearsignificant at p ≤
.058. More important to our hypothesis, however, the tests on formal stage criterion
indicate two significant results and one nearsignificant result. These three results are
associated with the O1O2 derivation and suggest the group of subjects who fail the
formal stage criterion exhibit greater alpha coherence in the bilateral occipital derivation .
The three derivations include O1O2 (p = .046), (RO)/(R+O) (p = .044), and (F
O)/(F+O) (p = .051). The implications of observing negative relationship between the
bilateral occipital derivation and cognitive development as given by these results will be
explored in Chapter V under “Recommendations for Future Research.” I suggest that the
increase in anterior alpha coherence may, under certain conditions, give rise to reduced
bilateral occipital coherence as a necessary consequence of the lack of bilateral
commissural connections in the occipital lobes.
Of interest is the general pattern of nearsignificant p values (p ≤ .1) for the right
hemisphere derivation F4C4 in the Vessels, (p = .084) Correlations (p = .068), and
Combinations tasks (p = .082). This suggests that the right hemisphere may play a role in
discriminating pass from fail subjects, albeit, not statistically significant. The Vessels
task also resulted in a low p value (p = .069) in the left hemisphere deriviation and in the
ratios that compare the posterior derivation with anterior derivations (p = .063 and p =
.0745). Furthermore, Shadows task demonstrated nearsignificant differences (p = .065)
in the O1O2 measure associated with bilateral coherence in the occipital region and in the
ratio comparing bilateral frontal with occipital coherence (p = .052). These trends were
all in the expected directions: anterior derivations were higher for the pass group and
posterior derivations were higher for the fail group. These trends in general reinforce the
previous empirically supported relationship between adaptive functioning (positive traits)
and the individual measures of alpha coherence reported in the Introduction. Since left,
133
right, and occipital regions all contribute to the discriminatory trend, it may be suggested
that FLRO represents a “whole brain” measure.
Overall, in the case of tasks of formal reasoning used here, task success is
indicated across a greater variety of tasks in individual measures of right and occipital
coherences (and associated ratios) than by the Coherence Index alone. The anterior left
and/or right coherence measures appear to play at least a modest role in all four tasks as
well as in the formal stage criterion. The posterior, occipital coherence measures appear
to play an additional role in the Shadows task and significantly so in the case of the
Formal Stage Criterion. Together, these findings imply that the Coherence Index
maintains a relationship to formal operational reasoning through positive correlations
with anterior homolateral coherence and negative correlations with posterior occipital
bilateral coherence. This gives support to the original empirical equation (FLRO) by
OrmeJohnson et al. (1982).
Followup Analysis 2: Tests for Relationships Between
Preferences and Task Performance
The Art, Verbal, Science, and Math preference measures previously indicated that
subjects were not selected with a bias towards mathematics or science. Here, a followup
investigation examines the relationship between preferences and task performance.
Because the data lack an interval scale and fail the assumptions of normality, non
parametric tests were conducted using the MannWhitney test for two independent
samples (Hays, 1973, p. 778). Where a direction of relationship between pass
performance and a preference could be anticipated, the alpha criterion was made one
tailed. Specifically, other research indicates that affective and course performance
measures in science and mathematics correlate well with achievement in tests of formal
134
reasoning (Modgil and Modgil, 1976; also see Rennie and Punch, 1991). No predictions
can be made regarding Art or Verbal activity preferences.
Statistically significant positive relationships (p ≤ .05) were found between
preference for Science and pass performance on the Formal Stage Criterion as well as the
Vessels, Shadows, and Correlations tasks. Similarly, statistically significant relationships
were found between Math preference and pass scores on the Formal Stage Criterion as
well as the Shadows, Correlations, and Combinations tasks. (See Table 17.)
Confirming, and nearsignificant positive relationships were found between Math
preference and Vessels pass score (p = .055), as well as Science preference and
Combinations pass scores (p = .055).
Conversely, preference for Art was related to fail performance for Combinations
(p = .003). Confirming, but nonsignificant (p ≤ .1) relationships were indicated in the
same direction for Art preference in the Formal Stage Criterion, and the Correlations and
Shadows tasks.
The overall pattern of test results indicates that selfreported preference for (and
past success in) Science and Math are reasonable positive predictors of performance in
formal stage attainment as well as passing each of the four tasks, while Art, an hitherto
uninvestigated variable, is a negative predictor. In fact, based on the p values
demonstrated in this research, the preference measures were stronger and more consistent
indicators of formal reasoning across the tasks than any of the alpha coherence measures.
Selfselection processes should not be discounted in the search for sophisticated
“diagnostic” procedures of formal reasoning!
Note that “formal operations” have a contentspecific component, and may be
unaccounted in areas outside the subject’s domain of familiarity (Piaget, 1972).
135
Therefore, preference for Art may ultimately be related to formal reasoning if tasks were
invented that used the context of art activities!
Followup Analysis 3: Tests for Relationships Between
Preferences and Gender
Given the findings of significantly better male performance on the Shadows (p =
task, and given the success of the preference measure to predict task performance, I
conducted further analyses to see if the preference measures demonstrated similar gender
differences. Because the data is ordinal and lacks normal distribution, it is not
appropriate to use analysis of variance, a procedure that would allow straightforward tests
for interaction between gender and task performance. Instead, separate tests were
conducted on three main effects using the MannWhitney test for two independent
samples. Onetailed tests were used with Science and Math preference scores. Tests
evaluated:
• differences in preference by gender without regard to task,
• differences between males and females within each task (pass subjects examined
in tests separately from fail subjects), and
• differences between pass and fail (females examined in tests separately from
males.
Differences in Preference, by Gender, Without Regard to Task
Table 18 indicates that the male group has significantly greater preference scores
for math (p = .013) than the female group. Nearsignificant differences (p ≤ .08)
included higher scores for Science and lower scores for Art preference among males. The
greater preference for Science and Math among males parallels their tendency for better
performance on the Shadows task.
136
Table 17. Results of Tests of Differences in Preference Measures Between Task Pass
and Fail Groups
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Mean Preference Rating Probability
Task Preference Pass Fail U* Twotailed Onetailed
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Formal Stage
Criterion N= 39 15
Art 4.974 5.867 206.0 .087
Verbal 4.974 5.071 265.5 .875
Science 5.077 4.000 419.0 .006***
Math 4.641 3.600 392.5 .025**
Vessels N= 24 33
Art 4.875 5.455 467.5 .236
Verbal 4.917 5.094 412.2 .782
Science 5.375 4.303 218.0 .002***
Math 4.667 4.030 299.0 .055
Shadows N= 12 44
Art 4.417 5.455 356.0 .059
Verbal 4.667 5.139 290.0 .496
Science 5.417 4.614 167.5 .024**
Math 5.167 4.114 170.0 .028*
Correlations N= 19 38
Art 4.737 5.526 457.00 .093
Verbal 5.263 4.892 291.0 .275
Science 5.421 4.421 207.0 .004***
Math 4.895 4.053 252.0 .030**
Combinations N= 27 31
Art 4.556 5.839 604.0 .003***
Verbal 5.555 5.067 430.5 .846
Science 5.074 4.484 319.0 .055
Math 4.741 3.935 308.0 .039**
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*MannWhitney test for two independent samples
137
***Significant at p ≤ .01
138
Table 18. Results of Tests of Differences in Preference Measures Between Male and
Females
_______________________________________________________________________
_ Mean Preference Rating Probability
Preference Male Female U* Twotailed Onetailed
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
N= 39 19**
Art 4.949 5.842 476.0 .073
Verbal 4.923 5.279 387.0 .776
Science 4.9284.368 282.0 .066
Math 4.6673.579 237.5 .013***
______________________________________________________________________________________
**For Verbal, female N=18 due to missing data
It is interesting that Art, a presumed “ spatial” mode of expression, appears to be a
female predilection (p = .073), considering that Shadows and the Vessels tasks are
spatially oriented tasks on which females tend to perform poorly. Apparently, the INRC
group schema for “balance” that both tasks require is not an element exercised in artistic
endeavor, even though visual “balance” can be a significant component in a work of art.
This suggests that the results reflect the separate natures of operational spatial thinking
versus figurative spatial thinking.
(Pass Groups Tested Separately From Fail Groups)
The next main effect tested was preference differences between males and females
for each task separately looking at pass subjects separately from fail subjects. See Tables
19 and 20 for the results. Among the 40 tests, only five statistically significant (p ≤ .05)
139
differences discriminated males and females. Among subjects who passed a task,
preference for Science was greater for males than females in the Shadows
140
Table 19. Results of Tests of Gender Differences in Preference Measures Taken
Separately for Each Task Pass Group
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Task Preference Male Female U* Twotailed Onetailed
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Formal Stage
Criterion (Pass) N= 28 11
Art 4.679 5.727 206.5 .094
Verbal 4.929 5.091 157.0 .923
Science 5.250 4.636 116.5 .115
Math 4.964 3.818 96.0 .032**
Vessels (Pass) N= 19 5
Art 4.7475.400 56.0 .536
Verbal 4.7895.400 57.5 .467
Science 5.2635.800 58.5 .208
Math 4.9473.600 31.0 .113
Shadows (Pass) N= 11 1
Art 4.1807.000 .5 .138
Verbal 4.9112.000 10.5 .136
Science 5.7312.000 11.0 .050**
Math 5.3643.000 9.5 .118
Correlations (Pass) N= 14 5
Art 4.5005.400 24.00 .300
Verbal 5.4294.800 43.5 .392
Science 5.8574.200 54.00 .035**
Math 5.5003.200 61.0 .007***
Combinations (Pass) N= 19 8
Art 4.2635.250 103.0 .145
Verbal 4.8425.375 85. .607
Science 5.2114.750 60.0 .192
Math 5.0004.125 53.0 .107
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
141
**Significant at p ≤ . 05
***Significant at p ≤ . 01
142
Table 20. Results of Tests of Gender Differences in Preference Measures Taken
Separately for Each Task Fail Group
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Task Preference Male Female U* Twotailed Onetailed
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Formal Stage
Criterion (Fail) N= 8 7
Art 5.875 5.857 30.5 .76
Verbal 4.750 5.500 18.0 .4173
Science 4.125 3.857 29.0 .452
Math 4.125 3.000 38.0 .121
Shadows (Fail) N= 26 18
Art 5.231 5.778 200.0 .402
Verbal 4.923 5.471 184.0 .335
Science 4.692 4.500 256.0 .294
Math 4.462 3.611 296.5 .064
Vessels (Fail) N= 20 13
Art 5.150 5.923 99.5 .247
Verbal 5.050 5.167 120.5 .983
Science 4.650 3.769 171.5 .058
Math 4.400 3.462 167.5 .080
Correlations (Fail) N= 24 14
Art 5.250 6.000 131.0 .241
Verbal 4.583 5.462 106.0 .102
Science 4.417 4.429 166.5 .486
Math 4.250 3.714 197.0 .184
Combinations (Fail) N= 20 11
Art 5.600 6.273 134.5 .280
Verbal 5.000 5.200 108.5 .700
Science 4.700 4.091 81.5 .111
Math 4.350 3.182 65.5 .029**
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
143
144
(p = .05) and Correlations (p = .035) tasks. Preference for Math was greater for males in
the Formal Stage Criterion (p = .032) and the Correlations task (p = .007).
Among subjects who failed a task, males demonstrated a significant preference
only in the case of Math in the Combinations task (p = .029) compared with females.
Note that only one of the five significant tests occurred among the fail group.
Interestingly, Art does not discriminate males and females on any task, implying that its
predictive power was related less to gender and more to pass/fail intermediating variables
on the tasks.
Overall, the evidence suggests that males demonstrate greater preferences for
Math and Science activities than females especially among subjects that pass one or more
tasks.
Tested Separately From Male Groups)
The question now reduces to whether the pass subjects have greater or lesser
preference strength within a single gender group. Among females, MannWhitney tests
indicate no significant differences (p ≤ .05) that discriminate pass from fail groups.
(The Shadows task was not examined because only one female passed the task,
obviating any statistical variance.) However, nonsignificant trend differences were
demonstrated in Art (p = .055) and Math (p = .086) preferences when comparing pass
and fail females on the Combinations task. The pass group measured lower in Art
preference and higher in Math preference than the fail group. Pass means are presented
in Table 19 and fail group means are in Table 20. No table is given for the U statistic or
the p values. In summary, discriminations between pass and fail females only occurred
in the Correlations task, albeit nonsignificantly, by preference for Math (in the pass
group) and Art (in the fail group).
145
Preferences appear a weak indicator among females, perhaps due to an overall
weak preference for Math and Science. However, in tests comparing pass and fail males,
Science was significantly preferred by the pass group in the Correlations task (p = .001),
and the Shadows task (p = .013). Confirming trends occurred in the Vessels task (p = .061)
and weakly so in the Combinations (p = .094) task. Likewise, Math preference was
significantly greater in the Shadows task (p = .013) and confirmed with a weak trend in the
Vessels task (p = .064). Last, pass males exhibited a significantly weaker preference for Art
(p = .020) than fail males in the Combinations task, with a similar trend demonstrated in
the Shadows task (p = .096). In summary, among males, Science preference was stronger
(p ≤ . 1) in the pass group in all four tasks, with Shadows and Correlations exhibiting
statistically significant differences (p ≤ .01). The Shadows task demonstrated three
discriminating preferences (p ≤ .1) of which Science and Math were significant at p ≤ .02.
The third discriminating preference was Art.
Although the evidence does not support a causal relationship, it appears that males
who pass one or more tasks are more apt than females to express a stronger preference for
science or math than their female counterparts. It appears that among females, preferences
may be more homogeneous.
Preference Measures
We must remember that the statistical power is much less for these preceding
tests than for the tests including both genders together. (For example, passing females
numbered 1, 5, 5, and 8 across the four tasks). Yet, Science and Math preference still
discriminated males from females, and pass from fail within each gender in several
tasks. Therefore, given the nature of the findings, I suggest that they agree with the
generally acknowledged greater aptitude (and subjective satisfaction) for math among
146
males (Benbow, 1988). The findings also concur with findings that greater science
achievement is associated with higher performance on tests of formal reasoning (Modgil
and Modgil, 1976).
Given the tendency of several preference measures to discriminate pass subjects
from fail subjects on the various tasks, and given the association of some of the EEG
coherence measures to the tasks as well, it is reasonable to ask if a direct relationship
holds between any of the coherence measures and the task scores. Table 21 presents the
results of Spearman rank correlations between these variables.
As expected, the tests indicate a moderate and significant positive monotonic
relationship between Science and Math preference (p ≤ .002). Science and Art
preferences are inversely related, as expected, but not quite within statistical significance.
Unexpectedly, rank correlations indicate a complete lack of monotonic or linear
relationship between the physiological variables and the preference variables. Given the
reasonable degree of the previously established relationships between the physiological
measures and the measures of preferences and task performance, the lack of rank
correlations lacks ready explanation. Although speculative, it is suggested that the
attenuation of the rank correlations may be a function of the relatively short range of the
preference measures (17), their bunched distribution, and their interaction with the much
wider ranged and more normally distributed EEG coherence measures. In other words,
compared to the coherence measures, the preference measures had too many ties and thus
lacked rank differences needed by the statistic.
147
Table 21. Results of Tests for Relationships between Preference Measures and Nontask
Variables: EEG Coherence Derivations and Ratios
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Preference Measures
Covariate Art Verbal Science Math
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
Art 1.0000*
Verbal .0945 1.0000
Science .2239** .1902 1.0000
Math .0161 .0357 .4450*** 1.0000
Coherence Index .0379 .0209 .0252 .1243
F = F3F4 .1413 .0129 .1366 .1342
L = F3C3 .0338 .0210 .0561 .1817
R = F4C4 .0872 .0517 .0040 .0351
O = O1O2 .0490 .1161 .1059 .0256
.0478 .0247 .0084 .0607
.1265 .0870 .0448 .1211
.0156 .0721 .0545 .0031
F0 ratio = (F3F4O1O2)/(F3F4+O1O2)
.0888 .0858 .0163 .0927
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*Spearman rank correlation coefficient. Critical value for alpha p ≤ .05 is rS = .2582 or more.
**Nonsignificant but of interest, p >.05 and ≤ .1.
***Significant, p = .002
148
CHAPTER V
Although much has been said by educators regarding leftright brain approaches
to education in general, relatively little effort has been directed toward integrating
neurological research with the body of Piagetian theory and research. The lack of
research has led to speculations by a popular writer that Piagetian reasoning skills are
“left brain” and ignore student aptitudes for “metaphorical” or “right brain” thought
(Samples, 1975).
The current research attempts to examine the role of leftright hemisphere
involvement in formal operational reasoning. Early attempts to relate these two fields
using direct EEG measures of brain functioning have been illuminating, although
inconclusive. EEG power measures indicated increased left hemisphere activity among
university students during tests of concrete and formal reasoning (Dilling, Wheatley, &
Mitchell, 1976). However, no controls were made to discriminate the presumed right
hemisphere visualspatial “thinking” portion of the reasoning task from the left
hemisphere, speaking portion. A subsequent study from the same laboratory instituted
such controls and found that high performers differed less between the two conditions
than the low performers (Kraft, 1976). Subjects in the second experiment ranged between
six and eight years old and were tested on concrete operational reasoning.
Kraft suggests this implies that the left hemisphere verbal activity may have
simultaneously drawn upon right hemisphere thinking activity which reduced the EEG
hemispheric differences. She posits that this indicates greater leftright hemispheric
information transfer during the task. This indicates “whole brain” function is associated
with higher levels of reasoning.
149
The findings have limited scope, however. The limitation lies with an intrinsic
problem of using EEG power ratios. The experimenter cannot determine if the
experimental results indicate an increase in the power of one hemisphere, a decrease of
power in the other hemisphere, or a mixture of both. A ratio confounds the two.
Therefore, EEG power ratio measures cannot conclusively fix the locus of hemispheric
change.
A measure of EEG coherence, however, is free of the variables that confound
power measures, such as variation in skull and scalp thickness among subjects. EEG
coherence measures the degree to which two points on the scalp exhibit the same
frequency within a given short period of time. Coherence is analogous to the square of
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, which represents the percentage of variance in
frequency at one point accounted for by variance in frequency at another point of the
scalp. For example, a coherence measure of .95 indicates that the two EEG signals have a
difference of less than .05 Hz (Levine, 1976).
An additional obstacle in much EEG research has been the lack of a standard
cognitive state against which to evaluate the significance of the EEG measures
(Giannitrapani, 1985; and Webster and Thurber, 1978). Where tasks have been
administered during the EEG, experimenters usually lack knowledge of the subject’s
precise strategy in accomplishing a given task. This makes it difficult to evaluate the
significance of the EEG measures. For this reason, subjects were chosen who were
experienced in a commonlyavailable mental technique, Transcendental Meditation (TM)
which is claimed to result in restful alertness of the mind. The subjects were students and
staff at a small private university where all the students, faculty, and staff engaged in the
practice of TM as a regular routine. Students were accustomed to yearly EEG coherence
150
measures taken as part of their annual “EEG report card,” from which data for this
research was taken.
The common notion of right brain thought being “wholistic” supports Piaget’s
claim that formal reasoning consists, in part, of the “structured whole,” a key element of
formal operational reasoning. Piaget says the structured whole is nonverbal and requires
consideration of all the relevant variables simultaneously. Both of these qualities have
been applied to righthemisphere functions. Piaget suggests that cognitive growth moves
in the direction of greater stability or equilibrium. The structured whole acts like a “field
of force governed by the laws of equilibrium” (Piaget, 1957). In fact, he suggests that this
tendency to master the structured whole must have its reflection in neurology as well as
behavior. I suggest that righthemisphere functions must be represented as well as left
hemisphere functions in formal reasoning. The FLRO index captures data that reflect L
and R hemisphere operation during a standard cognitive state. This combination of L and
R measures reflects a “whole brain” approach to the study of reasoning skills.
This study seeks to extend the previously mentioned studies of the development of
logical thought by using the OrmeJohnson et al. (1982) FLRO index of EEG coherence
as a continuous measure and passfail performance on clinical versions of four Piagetian
tasks as the classification variables. Fiftyeight universitylevel subjects (19 F and 39 M)
were studied. The cognitive state is controlled during the measurement period by the
experienced practice of a stressreduction technique, Transcendental Meditation (Wallace,
1972). Immediately before or after the EEG session, subjects were tested for formal
operational schemata using clinical versions of tasks patterned after Inhelder and Piaget
(1958): combinatorial reasoning (Chemicals task); INRC group (Communicating Vessels
task); proportionality schema (Projection of Shadows task); and the correlation schema
(Correlations task). A composite measure was constructed in which subjects who fail at
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all four tasks were considered to have failed attainment of the Formal Stage Criterion.
These subjects gave no evidence of the cognitive reorganization characteristic of formal
reasoning. Subjects who passed at least one task, however, were considered to have
“passed” the Formal Stage Criterion.
Proportion Passing the Tasks
Formal Stage Criterion
In this study, 72.2 percent of the subjects passed one or more of four tasks
purported to evaluate the presence of logical structures associated with formal operational
reasoning. This contrasts with other published reports that only 50 percent or less of
college students exhibit formal operations (Haley and Good, 1975). The difference arises
out of a possible misunderstanding on the part of many researchers who feel that failure
on any one task indicates lack of development of the stage of formal operations. Piaget,
however, has made it clear that although a subject may indeed fail in exhibiting any
particular formal logical structure, the subject may still have undergone the cognitive
reorganization that gives rise to “characteristic structures in actions at the formal stage
(Piaget and Garcia, 1991, p. 130). In my study, I assume that each of such reorganizations
is implied by failure to pass any of the four tasks that test for their corresponding logical
structures. This assumption could be shown wrong if subjects, for example, were to pass
a task associated with any of the six remaining structures not tested here.
Shadows Task
In the current research, 21.4% of the subjects passed the test of proportional
reasoning (Shadows task). With only 5.3% of females passing versus 29.7% of males
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passing, the gender difference was statistically significant. The ratio of 37 male to 19
female subjects make it difficult to directly compare the overall pass rate with other
research. However, similar research at the University of Iowa (UI) suggests the pass rate
is within expectation for the subject age and education.
At the UI, Poduska (1983) and Poduska and Phillips (1986) found 12% of 67
university males passed and none of 33 females passed, also a significant gender
difference. Other UI studies used high school seniors. Wavering, Perry, Kelsey, and
Birdd (1986) found only 6% of their subjects (50% female) passed the Shadows task,
although they acknowledge their passing rate are much lower than reported elsewhere,
probably due to the interview format, they say. Wavering (1979, 1984) reports 15% of
seniors (about 50% females) passed the Shadows task. Hensley reports 37% of seniors
(about 50% female) passed. Neither of the last two studies demonstrated any gender
differences in the rate of pass. Ibe (1985) studied seniors also, among whom only one
(male) of 31 subjects (13 males) passed.
Other research, outside of the UI program, found different passing rates, probably
owing to different test protocols, gender ratios, and scoring criteria. Dulit found 33% of
adults passed, 57% of gifted 1617 yearolds, 35% of regular 1617 yearold students, and
no regular 14 yearold students passed. Across the groups, males scored better than
females by a factor of three or four. Martorano (1977) found 55% of her 12th grade girls
passed, a very good percentage considering she explicitly required use of a metric system
of calculating proportions. Piburn (1980) found that 11th grade males scored
significantly better on the Shadows task than females, no pass rates were given. Bady
(1978) found 81% of early college students passed the Shadows task. Farrell and Farmer
(1985) found 12.4% of 1012th grade males and 5.4% of females passed the Shadows
tasks. These last researchers go on to cite their own work and other’s to suggest that
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better male performance may not be accounted for by spatial ability, but rather some other
source, even though the Shadows task has definite spatial components.
Thus, in general, the current study appears within the range of results of other
studies. The significant difference in passing rates between the genders is upheld in
several other studies. This suggests that the gender difference should show up in the
alpha coherence measure, perhaps as a righthemisphere “deficit” for the female group
compared to males. This would appear as a genderXtask statistical interaction. However,
as we shall see, this was not the case.
Correlations Task
The current study found 33.3% of subjects passed (36.8% of males and 26.3% of
females passed). Among University of Iowa studies, Rubley (1972) found 57% of 1112th
grade chemistry students passing (50% of the subject group were females). Wavering
(1979) found that 10% of 12th grade students (50% females) passed. Neither researcher
found any gender differences. Wavering notes that Rubley’s subjects were a selected
sample, from a chemistry class thus accounting for their rather high pass rate. Also,
Wavering elected to classify IIIA subjects as nonpass because IIIA only indicates direct
proportional reasoning, not correlational reasoning. The current research takes the same
position.
Other research elsewhere indicates a range of task and scoring protocols that make
comparisons difficult. Lovell (1961) found 77% of ablest 1518 yearold students passed
and only 25% of the leastable students passed. Ross (1973) found 9.2% of university
undergraduates passed, not counting level IIIA. With level IIIA included, 98.4% passed.
Martorano (1977) found 55% of 12th grade girls passed. Dulit (1972) found 25% of
adults passed, 62% of gifted 1617 yearolds, 17% of regular 1617 yearold students, and
10% of average 14 yearold students passed.
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In general, the current study appears to have obtained reasonable results. The lack
of gender differences appears to be the norm.
Task
46.6 percent of subjects passed the task in the current study (48.7 percent males
passed and 42.1 percent of females passed). No University of Iowa research is reported
for this task. Elsewhere, Ross (1973) reports 75 percent of his undergraduate subjects
passed. Martorano (1977) found 85 percent of the 12th grade females passed. Joyce
(1977) found 95.5 percent of the subjects passing, although questionably, since subjects
may have been allowed to use “trial and error.” Bady (1978) found 76 percent of college
students passed. De Hernandez, Marek, and Renner (1984) found 34 percent females and
36 percent males passing (mean age 17 years) with no difference between genders. When
compared with studies done at other institutions, the current study appears to follow in the
conservative trend established by the UI clinical interview method. Therefore, although
the pass rates in my study appear less than reported in other studies, they are probably
acceptable. No published gender differences appear for this task.
42.1 percent of subjects in the current study passed (48.7% males and 27.8%
females passed). Martorano (1977) found 45 percent of 12th grade females passed. No
other results could be found. The current results must stand on their own as there’s no
ready explanation for the lower percent age of females passing in my study compared to
Martorano’s study. Both studies used the clinical interview method. Although males
scored better, as a group, the advantage was nonsignificant (p = .161). Both the Vessels
task and the Shadows task appear to be visuospatially oriented, with each drawing upon
the INRC group, albeit to different degrees (see discussion below). The apparent spatial
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orientation of the Vessels and Shadows task may contribute to the male advantage in pass
rate. And although the advantage is nonsignificant for Vessels, it may tap right
hemisphere skills in the same manner as hypothesized for the Shadows task. Again,
however, as we shall see, the expected genderXtask interaction, with a right hemisphere
“deficit” for alpha coherence among the females group, did not manifest.
Hierarchical Ordering of Task Difficulty
The current study found statistical significance (p < .05) on three tests when
testing pairs of tasks for differences in passing rates within subjects. Subjects passed
both Combinations and Vessels tasks more frequently than the Shadows task. The
Combinations task was passed more frequently than the Correlations task. Nearly
significant at p = .07, a fourth comparison, Correlations, was passed more frequently
than the Shadows task. These results were based on a sample that had roughly 33%
female subjects. To examine these findings in a more standard fashion, the same tests
were conducted for males only. Only one of the significantly related pairs changed status,
with the malesonly group passing the Combinations task only slightly more frequently
(p = .095) than the Correlations task. Also, males passed the Correlations task about the
same frequency as they passed the Shadows task. Based on the reasonable similarity of
the “standard” allmale profile with the mixed gender profile, the following discussion
will use the mixed gender result, thereby reflecting trends evidenced by gender
differences.
In summary, the Shadows task was more difficult than any of the other three
tasks. The Correlations task ranked more difficult than the Combinations task. This
pattern is borne out in the literature with some qualifications as follows.
Poduska (1983) and Poduska and Phillips (1986) studied university students and
concluded that the proportions schema used in the Shadows task is passed late compared
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with other schema used in the concept of “speed.” Wavering (1979, 1984) found his
research with the Correlations and Shadows tasks contradicted what he feels to be
Piaget’s claim that the proportion structure precedes correlation. (Wavering found no
significant difference in pass rates between the two tasks among 8th, 10th, and 12th grade
students.) However, Wavering failed to notice that Inhelder and Piaget (1958) define the
proportions schema with an early qualitative form as well as a later, quantitative form.
Therefore, correlations may be attained, in Piaget’s theory, after the qualitative sense of
proportions, but prior to the quantitative notion of proportions. The quantitative form is
tested in the current research. This latter sequence, correlations preceding the later form
of quantitative proportional reasoning, was found in the current research.
Bart and Mertens (1979) performed an order theoretic analysis of Martorano’s
(1977) data and found that passing the Combinations task was not contingent upon any
other schema. The current study reflects this finding.
Bart and Mertens also found that pass scores on the Vessels task depended upon
pass performance of both the Correlations and Combinations tasks. Furthermore,
Martorano’s original findings included these results with the addition that passing the
Vessels task also depended on passing the Shadows task. None of these findings are
supported in the current study. The difference in results may exist because Martorano
studied only female students. For example, the current study found that females passed
significantly less than males on the Shadows task and marginally less on the Vessels task.
Therefore, a sample of 100% females could possibly reverse Martorano’s ordering within
the confidence interval of the current study.
Inhelder and Piaget
Inhelder and Piaget (1958) suggest the following regarding the ordering of the four
tasks:
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The Combinatorial schema is a prerequisite to other elements of formal reasoning:
“The most general property in terms of which we can characterize formal thought is that
it constitutes a combinatorial system, in the strict sense of the term...this property implies
all the others and thus is more general than they are” (p. 254). The theorists affirm that
even at this initial level, “the main feature of propositional logic is not that it is verbal
logic but that it requires a combinatorial system” (p. 254). This statement implies, in our
current neurophysiological context, that formal reasoning is not solely a leftbrain, verbal
enterprise, but rather more. The authors imply they have been misunderstood on similar
points, and reiterate: “...in spite of appearances and current opinion, the essential
characteristic of propositional logic is not that it is verbal logic. First and foremost, it is a
logic of all possible combinations, whether these combinations arise in relation to
experimental problems or purely verbal questions” (p. 253). Given a characterization of
right brain processing as “simultaneous,” Piaget and Inhelder’s comment can be
interpreted to suggest that “all possible combinations” is a right brain function. The
current study found no prerequisite structures to the combinatorial schema, which is
consistent with Piaget’s theory. The current study also found that right brain coherence
contributed to the coherence index which was greater for the pass groups in all four tasks,
significantly so for the Vessels task.
The INRC group structure, as in the Communicating Vessels task, also is a
prerequisite to formal operational reasoning. The INRC group structure is used both as
an internalized formal structure that integrates the transformations of inversions and
reciprocities and also as a means to understanding the transformations that underlie
equilibrium in a mechanical system. In the sense of the “structured whole,” the INRC
group structure complements the combinatorial system. The INRC group structure
provides the set of transformations that permit inferences and implications to be drawn
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from propositions that arise from the combinatorial system (Inhelder and Piaget, p. 307).
The current study found no prerequisite schema to the INRC group structure, which is
consistent with Piaget’s theory. The INRC transformations in many ways suggest the
processes of “mental rotation,” which has been shown to utilize right brain functions (see
De Lisi, Locker & Youniss, 1976; Dean, 1978; Kerr, Corbitt, & Jurkovic, 1980; and
Shepard, 1984).
The correlations schema, according to Inhelder and Piaget (1958), appears to
require the combinatory schema. “The search for correlations does in fact require a
combinatorial system, since the subject’s problem is not simply to classify the four
possible cases, but to distinguish the various realized and realizable combinations among
them” (p. 325). The current study found that passing the Correlations task required prior
passage of the Combinations task, which is consistent with Piaget’s theory.
The proportions schema, as found in the Projection of Shadows task, has been
discussed in the context of Wavering’s (1979, 1984) interpretation that the proportions
schema should come before the correlation schema, contrary to Inhelder and Piaget’s
suggestion of a qualitative notion and a quantitative notion of proportional reasoning. I
suggest that several points indicate that the Shadows task has several prerequisites
including not only the quantitative version of proportional reasoning but also a version of
the INRC group that goes beyond mechanical equilibrium. Regarding the first point,
Inhelder and Piaget actually state that the discovery of proportionality in the Projection of
Shadows task “results from an understanding of multiplicative compensations” (p. 207).
In explaining multiplicative compensations, Inhelder and Piaget make clear that the
calculations that constitute the schema (e.g., x y = x’ y’) follow the qualitative notion of
proportions in which “the subject has the feeling that a proportionality exists before
calculating it” (p. 328). Regarding the second point, Piaget suggests that solutions to the
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Shadows task requires two other operational schemata, in addition to the schema of
Proportions, that involve the INRC group: the alreadymentioned Multiplicative
Compensations, as well as the Coordination of Two Systems of Reference. Therefore,
this broader range of schematic dependencies would certainly imply that the Shadows
task would follow attainment of other single schema tasks, such as Vessels, which use a
simpler manifestation of the INRC group. Likewise, it would follow attainment on
Combinations, which is prerequisite to any manifestation of formal reasoning schema.
The current study found that subjects passing the Shadows task generally had also passed
the Combinations and Vessels tasks. A nonsignificant trend indicated that the subjects
also had passed the Correlations task.
In summary, the current study demonstrated an ordered hierarchy of task
difficulty that was very similar to the hierarchy implied by Inhelder and Piaget.
EEG Coherence Measures
Several sources allow comparison of the EEG coherence means on other groups
of students as they were practicing the Transcendental Meditation program in the same
university setting. The equipment setup was the same as the current study. Orme
Johnson, Wallace, and Dillbeck (1981) published means and standard deviations of F, L,
R, and O alpha coherence measures for two groups of subjects with the following results
(see Table 22).
Nidich, Ryncarz, Abrams, OrmeJohnson, and Wallace (1983) also published
measures of coherence in two groups of subjects practicing TM in a separate study at the
same university using the same EEG setup. They used ten .53 minute periods as in the
current study (see Table 23).
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Table 22. Coherence Results for OrmeJohnson, Wallace, and Dillbeck (1982)
_________________________________________________________________________
Group A: N = 26, 15 males, 11 females, sophomores, mean age = 20.8
Derivation
Alpha Coherence

SD

F3F4 Frontal .7087 .1596
F3C3 Left .6497 .1514
F4C4 Right .6671 .1549
O1O2 Occipital .6885 .1533
Group B: N = 21, 11 males, 10 females, sophomores, mean age = 22.1
Derivation
Alpha Coherence

SD

F3F4 Frontal .7714 .0742
F3C3 Left .7114 .0785
F4C4 Right .6975 .0694
O1O2 Occipital .6782 .0764

_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 23. Coherence Results for Nidich, Ryncarz, Abrams, OrmeJohnson, and Wallace
(1983)
_________________________________________________________________________
Group C: N = 13, 6 males, 7 females, mean age = 28.7
Derivation
Alpha Coherence

SD

F3F4 Frontal .8220 .046
F3C3 Left .7343 .093
F4C4 Right .7127 .084
Group D: N = 13, 8 males, 5 females, mean age = 28.5
Derivation
Alpha Coherence

SD

F3F4 Frontal .7670 .051
F3C3 Left .7198 .065
F4C4 Right .7135 .071

_________________________________________________________________________
Of these four groups, group B is most similar to the profile obtained in the current
study (Frontal = .78, Left = .71, Right = .69, Occipital = .67). The variability across the
groups encompasses the range of findings and subject ages in the current study indicating
the reliability of the coherence findings of this study relative to other studies involving
similar subjects and the practice of TM.
The current study sought evidence of a relationship between a wholebrain index
of EEG alpha coherence measures and task performance. Prior research (Beaumont,
Mayes, and Rugg, 1979) suggests that gender and age contribute to differences in the
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proportion of subjects performing well on spatially oriented tasks as well as contribute to
differences in their EEG coherence measures when taken under task conditions.
Therefore my initial analysis did not control for gender or age because gender and age are
reasonable causal influences on both task performance and coherence measures.
Student’s ttests indicate that an index of four EEG alpha coherence measures (Frontal +
Left + Right Occipital: FLRO) was significantly greater for the group of pass subjects
than the group of fail subjects in the Communicating Vessels task (p = .0495, onetailed).
The other three tasks demonstrated nonsignificant differences in the same direction. The
Formal Stage Criterion test indicated nearsignificant differences between pass and fail
groups (p = .0558), in the expected direction. To validate these results in a way that could
be compared with future research with different ratios of gender and ages, subsequent
ANCOVA’s were performed that controlled for gender and age. Essentially the same
results appeared, with the Vessels task reflecting slightly stronger differences between
pass and fail subjects (p = .040) in the FLRO index. The Formal Stage Criterion also
reflected stronger differences in the expected direction (p = .050).
Two of the tests, then, appear to reflect differences between pass and fail subjects,
based on a “wholebrain” measure, FLRO alpha coherence. How do these two tests
relate to the other three tests? The Vessels task uses the schema of proportionality and
the INRC group structure. The INRC group structure, at face value, appears to tap visuo
spatial cognitive skills. Apparently the metric requirements for passing the Shadows task
pose an extra cognitive burden in addition to the visuospatial skills and therefore the
Shadows task is more weakly related to the FLRO index than the Vessels task. The
Combinations task draws on the combinations schema, which is fundamental to formal
reasoning, and therefore, it is theoretically required for the Vessels task. However, failure
of the FLRO index to significantly discriminate pass and fail groups in the Combinations
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task suggests that the INRC group visuospatial skills used for the Vessels task remain the
“unique” element that is detected by the FLRO index. In summary, while these three
tasks Vessels, Shadows and Combinations, have some theoretical relationship with each
other, only the Vessels task clearly demonstrates the INRC group schema. Therefore, the
significant difference between pass and fail groups with respect to the dependent
measure, the FLRO index, may reflect possession or absence of that schema. The FLR
O index failed to detect even marginal differences between pass and fail groups in the
Correlations task. This may result from the relative absence of the INRC group structure
in the Correlations schema.
The Formal Stage Criterion is met when at least one of the tasks is passed.
Therefore, subjects who pass the Vessels task will necessarily pass the Formal Stage
Criterion. It is speculated that the Formal Stage Criterion reflects possession of the
INRC group as a “minimum ” logical structure exhibited upon reorganizing the cognitive
assimilative structures. This suggests that EEG alpha coherence in the FLRO index may
reflect the emergent properties required to generate the discontinuity associated with a
“new” stage of reasoning.
These overall findings are quite dissimilar to those of Dennen (1985) who studied
subjects from the same university setting using the same EEG coherence measures
obtained while subjects practiced Transcendental Meditation. Dennen found no
correlation between the FLRO index and test scores of formal and concrete reasoning.
In fact, the correlation was negative at .06, with p = .19. Of the 349 subjects,
33% were female, the same ratio as the current study. The EEG data was provided from
the school year 19791980 with up to four months elapsing before subjects took a pen and
paper test (CAP) designed to measure concrete and formal reasoning. The current study
used EEG data from the spring of 1981, with clinical interview tasks administered
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immediately after the EEG session. Given the superficial similarities of the two studies,
the difference in lapse of time between EEG measure and cognitive testing between the
two studies could be a significant mitigating factor. Another factor could be the nature of
the Piagetian scores. In fact, Dennen questions the pen and paper test as a source for the
lack of relationship between the two variables, but cites a reported correlation of .7 with
interview investigations of Piagetian stages in defense. Removal of the influence of age,
sex, and length of time practicing TM did not substantially change his findings. Dennen
concludes that his research fails to support a relation between the FLRO index and
cognitive ability and leaves open the practical meaning of EEG coherence.
The current study, on the other hand, marginally supports previously reported
findings of FLRO as an index of CNS maturation—statistically significant with regard to
the Vessels task (p = .048) and a strong trend for the Formal Stage Criterion (p = .0558),
and at least in the predicted direction for the Shadows, Combinations, and Correlations
task. The failure of Dennen’s CAP test to detect differences among his subjects make the
“biological” validity of penandpaper tests suspect. For example, Stefanich, Unruh,
Perry, and Phillips, (1983) administered three wellknown written group tests of concrete
and formal reasoning to university students and failed to find strong agreement with
individual clinical Piagetian task interviews. The CAP test was not among the written
tests. However, generalization to the CAP appears appropriate as the authors cite findings
from other comparisons of about 50% agreement and correlations of about .5 between
written and clinical assessments. Additionally, Pratt and Hacker (1984) found failure of a
written test, Lawson’s classroom Test of Formal Reasoning, to demonstrate a unitary
dimension (formal reasoning) among the test items. They hypothesize that the written
test format fails to account for the element of experimentation and subsequent feedback
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allowed by the clinical task setting. Without such feedback, they suggest, the written test
merely examines the student’s current knowledge.
In Dennen’s study, a lack of confirmation of the theory could arise because
qualified “pass” subjects do poorly on the paper test, or the otherwise “fail” subjects do
better on the paper test. In any event, interaction with task materials in an interview
setting seems, at face value, to demand different cognitive skills than interaction with a
penandpaper test. For example, the subject must select a strategy based on interaction
with physical objects rather than interaction with the printed word. Also, arousal levels
may be generated differentially between the two test settings, influencing the strategies
applied to the problem and the subsequent level of success. Frontal brain structures are
particularly affected by demands to organize and plan strategies of problem solving
(Stuss, 1992). It is these skills tapped in the interview setting that may be evidenced with
the FLRO index in the current study. Further evidence of the possible inappropriateness
of the CAP test lies in the fact that Dennen found that physics and math majors,
presumably using more formal reasoning skills than students in other majors, measured
statistically significantly higher in alpha coherence than other majors together in F (p =
.006), L (p = .001), and R >.95 threshold (p = .046), all onetailed tests. The other
majors included art, biology, business administration, education, interdisciplinary studies,
literature, philosophy, and psychology.
The current research indicates that the FLRO appears to serve as an index of
central nervous system maturation in the context of formal operational reasoning for at
least one of the four studied tasks as well as marginally for the Formal Stage Criterion.
While only a modest confirmation, these results conform to the suggestion of Orme
Johnson et al. (1982) who found that their version of the index was significantly related to
firstyear university GPA and emotional health. Note that the methodology used by
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OrmeJohnson et al. may be more sensitive than the methodology used in the current
research. Their index represented the percentage of coherence over .95 that occurred in
the 5 minutes of greatest coherence out of 30 minutes recorded. The choice of the “best 5
minutes” sought to capture the period of greatest wakefulness (drowsiness or sleep
reduces alpha coherence). In the current research, however, the dependent measure
consisted of average coherence for the total measurement period (which happens to be 5.3
minutes). Therefore the current research did not compensate for possible drowsiness
during the TM session, and low coherence levels could result as a confound. (Note that
one subject who passed on all four tasks had among the lowest FLRO scores! Perhaps
he or she slept during the measurement period.) The above limitations may have reduced
the ability of the FLRO measure in the current research to discriminate pass and fail
subjects in more tasks than the Vessels task.
Followup Analysis of Relationships Between Tasks and
Other EEG Measures
An investigation was made to determine the underlying relationships between task
performance and each of the four derivations from which the FLRO index is composed.
Ttests of the individual derivations F, L, R. and O were accomplished along with tests of
four associated ratios (FL)/(F+L), (LR)/(L+R), (RO)/(R+O), and (FO)/(F+O).
Previous tests of differences in rates of passing tasks between male and female
groups suggested that females may suffer a “visuospatial” deficit. My results indicate
that significantly fewer females passed the Shadows task than males. Tests for
genderXtask interaction with each derivation and the four ratios as the dependent
variables indicated no significant interactions except for the Shadows task and the ratio
(FL)/(F+L), p = .035. However, this result is suspect, with only one female in the pass
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group. Sheffé post hoc tests of all possible pairs indicated that the one pass female
measured less on the (FL)/(F+L) ratio than the failing male group, p = .0665.
Pooling males and females, only one test among the tasks demonstrated a
statistically significant difference between pass and fail subjects—the (FO)/(F+O) ratio,
p = .052—for the Shadows task. However, beyond this, all tests upheld any predicted
direction of passfail differences, with 13 tests demonstrating p < .1 and 7 additional tests
demonstrating p < .15 (See Table 24). Since this was exploratory, and some degree of
multicollinearity among task performance is expected, no Bonferroni correction was
made in the alpha levels for Type I error. Tests using the Formal Stage Criterion revealed
three instances of significant differences between pass and fail groups, each in the
expected direction, all involving the bilateral occipital deviation.
The patterns that emerge from Table 24 provide an insight into contributions made
by various brain regions to the differences between pass and fail subjects in the FLRO
index. Foremost is the finding that the individual anterior derivations, F, L, and R, are
positively related to successful task performance and that the posterior, O, region is
negatively related. These findings reinforce the notion of “wholebrain” relationship that
I suggested may exist between the FLRO index and performance on Piagetian tasks.
However, the lack of significance at the p< .05 level for four out of five tests suggest that
any claims be duly qualified.
In the current study, the absolute values of R discriminates pass from fail in three
tasks at p < .085, compared to discriminating pass from fail subjects with measure of
FLRO coherence in only one task with value p < .085. Therefore anterior R appears to
play some role, in addition to the traditionally accepted role of the left hemisphere, in
logical reasoning. This refutes Samples’ (1975) claim that formal reasoning is solely a
left hemisphere function. Although the p values are not significant at less than .05, they
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Table 24. Results Summary: EEG Component Measures By Task for p Values Less
than .18 for All Subjects Together
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
p Value for Ttest Differences Between Pass and Fail Groups
EEG Parameter Formal Stage Criterion Vessels Shadows Correlations Combinations

_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
FLRO Index* (+) p = .0558 p = .049 p = .176 p = .156
FLRO (Adjusted)** p = .0500 p = .040

F* (+)
L* (+) .086 .069 .159
R* (+) .130 .084 .068 .082
O* () .046 .118 .065 .179
(FL)/(R+O)
(LR)/(L+R) .110 .057 .117
(greater = pass) (lesser = pass)(lesser = pass)
(RO)/(R+O)* (+) .044 .0625 .151 .125
(FO)/(F+O)* (+) .051 .0745 .052
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_
*Onetailed tests where F, L, R, RO, and FO are predicted (and found) to be positively related (+) to pass
scores; O is predicted (and found) to be negatively related () to pass scores.
**Adjusted for age and gender.
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support the finding of O’Boyle and Benbow (1990) that right hemisphere involvement is
associated with intellectual precocity. Since both R and L anterior and occipital
coherences appear related to formal reasoning, the remainder of the discussion will focus
on anterior/posterior functions rather than rightleft differences. Essentially, the data
have suggested that the major EEG alpha indicators of formal reasoning among subjects
practicing TM are positive homolateral frontal and negative bilateral occipital alpha
coherences. I have previously discussed the significance of each in light of the existing
literature, as given in Chapter II, Literature Review.
Measures: The Effect of the TM Instructional Set
In summary, the occipital alpha coherence in the current research is found to be
negatively related to formal reasoning skills, significantly so for the Formal Stage
Criterion (p = .046) and with strong trend for the Shadows task (p = .065). This finding
supports similar negative relationships between cognitive skills and occipital coherence
whether the subject practices TM during the EEG session or merely rests with eyes closed
as given in the Literature Review, Chapter II.
On the other hand, the anterior R alpha coherence in the current research is
positively related to formal reasoning skills with most trends for Vessels (p = .085),
Correlations (p = .068), and Combinations (p = .082). Anterior L alpha coherence in the
current research is positively related to formal reasoning skills with trends for Formal
Stage Criterion (p = .086) and for the Vessels task (p = .069).
The Formal Stage Criterion demonstrates two significant results in tests of a ratio
between anterior and posterior coherences. (RO)/ (R+O) distinguishes pass and fail
subjects at p = .044 and (FO)/(F+O) distinguishes pass from fail subjects at p = .051.
This supports other studies of IQ and EEG alpha coherence measures taken while
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subjects practice TM, but contradicts studies in which the subjects merely rest with eyes
closed. The conflict appears to reach some resolution by taking into account the
neurophysiological changes that occur as a result of the TM practice, namely that alpha
coherence increases globally and in the anterior regions especially. Cognitive skill and
IQ appear positively correlated to such changes. This implies that the set of instructions
that constitute the TM technique initiates a sequence of neurophysiological changes in the
brain that supports greater adaptability to cognitive demands. In Piagetian terms, this
implies movement toward higher levels of equilibration.
I used the FLRO index to test for a possible neurological “necessary but not
sufficient” condition for formal reasoning, as postulated by Piaget. However, some
subjects who failed the test of formal reasoning also had greater coherence than pass
subjects. This means that strictly speaking, alpha coherence as measured cannot be “a
necessary but not sufficient” condition. For example, one subject passed all four tests of
formal reasoning, yet demonstrated one of the lowest FLRO indices of all the subjects.
On the other hand, the group means for the FLRO index and other coherence
measures indeed showed differences between pass and fail subjects. The means were
normally distributed, therefore outlying values did not obscure any implications derived
from the difference in means. I can still conclude that, in general, subjects with lesser
coherence values tend to fail the task of formal reasoning as administered in this study.
However, only one of the four tasks demonstrated results that were statistically significant
at p ≤ .05. Interestingly, the Formal Stage Criterion demonstrated significant results at p =
.050 when adjusted for age and gender, and p = .0558 unadjusted. Note that of the 39
subjects who passed the Formal Stage Criterion, 37 passed both or one of the Vessels and
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the Combinations tasks, reflecting the relative primacy of the INRC group and the lattice
structures represented by these two tasks.
Upon review of the measures and their outcomes, several limitations of the current
research emerge, with the following corrective actions.
1. Episodes of sleep during the EEG were not evaluated. Future research should
eliminate portions of the EEG alpha coherence recordings that reflect any sleep stage. It
is known that during TM, occasionally subjects will sleep, with consequent lowering of
the coherence measure. This implies that subjects must be visually monitored for signs of
sleep such as head nodding, heavy breathing, etc. Also, the EEG record can be evaluated
for low voltage, irregular frequencies that indicate Stage One sleep. Sleep during the
EEG measurement could account for the one subject who passed all four tasks, yet had
the lowest coherence measures.
2. No controls for experimenterXsubject interaction. Future research should insure
that experimenter gender does not interact with subject gender. For example, it is
possible that a male experimenter may cause anxiety more for female subjects than for
male subjects, or vice versa. If the subject pool is mixed gender, then the ratio of male to
female will reflect not only task performance differences but also “distraction” or anxiety
differences which will show up in the task performance. Several alternatives exist: use
subjects and experimenter of one gender only, or use several experimenters of the same
gender as the subjects. (Several experimenters would be required in order to randomly
balance out any difference in style of their clinical interviews.)
3. No selection of EEG epochs was used, beyond artifact rejection. Future research
should use portions of the EEG record that reflect “best” performance. EEG variability
presumably reflects cognitive variability. Since the task performance reflects a “best
effort,” likewise, the EEG record can be examined for epochs that reflect a best sustained
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experience. This could be characterized as increasing the EEG signaltonoise ratio. For
example, OrmeJohnson et al. (1982) used the “best” 5 minutes out of 30 minutes for their
FLRO index.
4. Full characterization of a variety of brain regions was lacking. Future
research should use more derivations to characterize global brain functioning. For
example, the current index fails to measure posterior EEG within each hemisphere (e.g.,
P3O1 and P4O2) which would be analogous to anterior L and R measures. Therefore, no
statements can be made regarding the coherence within left or right posterior regions.
The current measure (O) only evaluates the degree of coherence between left and right
posterior occipital regions.
5. Insufficient number of females were tested. Future research should test
enough females to obtain a group passing the Shadows task large enough to provide
reasonable statistical power in tests of the FLRO coherence index. The current research
found only one out of 19 females to pass the Shadows task.
Longterm Effects of the Practice of Transcendental
Meditation on Cognitive Functioning: Toward an Organicist
Reduction Theory of Piaget’s Constructivist Principles
Although the results of the current research were significantly related only to the
Vessels task and can be generalized only to subjects measured while practicing the TM
technique, it is still instructive to pursue an explanation with the hope that later research
will draw linkages with neuropsychological processes among the larger, nonTM
population. Note also that the test of the Formal Stage Criterion resulted in near
significant (p ≤ .0558) differences between pass and fail groups, and when adjusted for
age and gender, the test is significant at p = .050, lending encouragement to locating a
theoretical link between equilibration and neuropsychological processes even though at
this time the theory must be in the context of subjects who practice TM.
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This said, the theory in principle has potential for generalization. For example, the
TM technique is claimed to be “natural” and “effortless.” The technique purportedly uses
the “natural tendency of the mind” to attain a quality of restful alertness that over time
brings the mind to its full potential (Maharishi, 1963). This implies that the TM
technique enhances the individual style of cognitive or neurophysiological functioning
that would otherwise be limited by psychological and physiological stresses. TM is said
to accelerate the normal course of development presumably through alteration of
neurophysiological functioning. Thus, it appears reasonable to hope for theory to later
“bridge” the gap between TM and nonTM populations. The following discussion
attempts to build on current neurophysiological knowledge as well as TM research to
show in a heuristic fashion one possible explanation for a putative positive relationship
between the FLRO index and cognitive skills. This effort attempts to meet Piaget’s
criteria of an organicist reduction model of genetic epistemology.
Regulation of Selective Attention and the
Mechanics of TM
The most immediate point of departure for discussing the effects of the TM
instructions on the brain is a physiological model of selective attention and the
accompanying “orienting response” (OR or “what is it?”) response of Sokolov (1963).
Several authors have suggested that the mechanics of TM can best be explained by
reference to the known properties and functions of the OR (Arenander, 1986; Wallace,
1986; Kesterson, 1986). The OR often is considered a response to some environmental
stimulus. However, the OR can also be elicited by internally oriented attentional
processes as well. For example, Maltzman, Gould, Pendery, & Wolff (1982) and
Maltzman (1979b) show that task instruction creates a mental set that gives rise to
manifestation of an OR beyond the OR normally elicited by novelty or stimulus change.
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The central process of TM involves the “transending reflex” which purportedly functions
using brain mechanisms associated with the OR, as presented by Arenander (1986) and
discussed by Wallace (1986) and Kesterson (1986).
In brief, the model suggests a system that leads to regulation of selective attention
mechanisms through orienting and habituation processes linked to the instructions given
for the practice of TM. The practice utilizes a meaningless sound called a “mantra” that
is repeated according to instructions given to the individual. The precise instructions for
using the mantra are proprietary to the TM organization, but instructors of the technique
regularly state that the practice uses neither concentration nor contemplation. Therefore,
it can be inferred that the technique does not require effortful focus on the mantra, and
neither does it require wandering digression from the mantra. Between these two poles,
the TM technique apparently provides for an effortless engagement of the mind with the
mantra, allowing comfortable assimilation of intrusive thoughts. The use of the mantra in
meditation leads to a process of “transcending” the thought of the mantra, culminating in
a state of awareness without any object of a thought.
While transcending may be brief and hardly noticed at first by some individuals,
the nervous system responds with relaxation of the skeletomuscular system and with
autonomic and EEG changes associated with relaxation. Meanwhile, the transcendental
state enhances the subjective alertness of the individual. Together, these effects have led
Wallace (1970) to dub the subjective experience of TM as “restful alertness.” The 20
minutes of TM is constituted by repeated encounters with the mantra and other thoughts,
interspersed with the experience of transcending on the mantra. The physiology attains
successively deeper stages of relaxation while the mind finds it easier to settle down the
conscious attention. The cognitive effects of the longterm practice of TM have been
documented in several studies as follows.
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Cognitive Effects of the Practice of TM
The following is a brief review of studies of longitudinal changes in EEG alpha
coherence during TM that relate to cognitive improvements or the number of months
practicing TM. Several other longitudinal studies give evidence for cognitive
improvement with the practice of TM outside of the context of alpha coherence. Together,
these studies suggest the efficacy of the TM set of instructions in optimizing brain
function and constitute the rationale for hypothesizing that alpha coherence measured
during TM should demonstrate a relationship with formal operational reasoning.
As mentioned above, OrmeJohnson et al. (1982) report several significant
longitudinal changes in a oneyear study of correlations between frontal, left, and right
anterior alpha coherence and various subtests of the Torrance Verbal and Figural Tests of
Creative Thinking. They also found significant inverse relationships between change in
bilateral occipital alpha coherence and the three verbal creativity subtests indicating that
posterior changes also result in conjunction with anterior changes.
Longitudinal enhancement of frontal alpha coherence over a mere two weeks is
reported by Dillbeck and Bronson (1981), however, no cognitive measure was included.
Nidich, Nidich, OrmeJohnson, and Wallace (1983) found the frontal, left, and summed
FLR EEG alpha coherence were positively correlated with the length of time practicing
TM among 37 Maharishi International University (MIU) students (range of 2 to 13 years
TM, mean of 6.77 years). The relationships remained significant even after partialling
out age. No relationship was found between time practicing TM and IQ.
In a study of math achievement prediction among college freshmen, Nidich,
Abrams, Jones, OrmeJohnson, and Wallace (1989) found that frontal and left alpha
coherence each significantly correlated with the math GPA of the subsequent
(sophomore) school year among 26 male MIU students (r = .476, and r = .336,
respectively). For comparison, the freshman year’s math and introductory physics GPA
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correlated r = .613 with the sophomore year. The authors note that other researchers find
typical cognitive entry characteristics such as aptitude and science performance correlate
with academic achievement between .5 and .7 and affective characteristics correlate with
academic achievement an average of .4 when corrected for unreliability. Therefore, the
EEG coherence correlations compare well with these other predictors.
Longitudinal studies of cognitive measures, without EEG, also indicate cognitive
growth. (Given the results demonstrated in the above studies, it seems reasonable to
assume similar EEG changes occurred in these meditating subjects as well.) Shecter
(1978) found a 9 point increase on Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices after 3.5
months among high school students practicing TM. Aron, OrmeJohnson, and Brubaker
(1981) reported significant freshmansenior increases of eight points over four years on
Cattel’s Culture Fair Intelligence Test and on sets of California Personality Inventory
among students practicing TM at MIU. Dillbeck (1982) found subjects instructed in TM
showed an increase in flexibility of perceptual processes over a two week period
compared with control subjects practicing daily relaxation. Dillbeck, Assimakis,
Raimondi, OrmeJohnson, and Rowe (1986) reported a significant increase of nine points
in scores over a threetofive year period on the Culture Fair Intelligence Test and the
Group Embedded Figures Test among 50 college students practicing the TM and a related
advanced meditation technique termed the TMSidhi program. Cranson (1989) (see also
Cranson, OrmeJohnson, Gackenbach, Dillbeck, Jones, & Alexander, 1991) conducted a
controlled twoyear longitudinal study in which MIU students practiced the TM and TM
Sidhi programs. He found a significant fivepoint increase on the Cattell Culture Fair
Intelligence Test and significantly decreased reaction time (typically inversely correlated
with IQ) compared with a control group at a matched university. Travis (1979) found
significant gains over five months among TM subjects compared to controls on scores
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from the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking: figural flexibility, figural originality, and
verbal fluency.
Development of ORs to Significant Events and Habituation
to Distraction
Maltzman (1979a, b) vigorously defends the notion that the “OR is not dependent
on novelty alone but is predetermined by the set or dominant focus present at the
moment.” This suggests that, during TM, the individual attends to the “set” or “dominant
focus” and generates an OR upon thinking the mantra. Note that “set” implies a cognitive
direction while “dominant focus” implies a neuroelectrical state. Evidence for the
concept of “dominant focus” comes from the neurophysiological research of Rusinov
(1973) and others that suggests that the CNS can support a “focus of excitation” that
modifies or directs the neural activity to give responses that otherwise would not arise. In
other words, these researchers have provided neurophysiological evidence for “the
Wurzburg school’s formulation of set, determining tendency, or Aufgabe” (Maltzman,
1979a, p. 280). Maltzman suggests that the dominant foci are the physiological bases for
attitudes and interests, and, through the mediation of instructions, can determine the
acquisition of stimulus significance in experimental studies. “According to our view, task
instructions induce a dominant focus which selectively determines which stimuli will
evoke an OR and which will not. It selectively influences the transmission of information
within the central nervous system” (p. 280). (For additional discussion of the dominant
focus, see Pribram, 1971, pp. 7781, and Simonov, 1985.) This view of the human OR
contrasts with Pavlov’s more simple model for dogs, where novelty or stimulus change
alone may have been the sole originator of the OR. Similar limitations are found in
Sokolov’s early formulation (1963) of the neuronal model which requires the notion of a
stimulus “mismatch” to create the OR. Maltzman points out that even Sokolov and
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colleagues later accepted the occasion of an OR to a significant stimulus in the absence of
stimulus change, an outcome that does not require the mismatch to a stimulus.
This subsequent interpretation of the OR (the voluntary OR resulting from
perceiving a stimulus imbued with significance) expands Arenander’s model of the
transcending reflex to include the mantra as a generator of the OR even if it did not
change in any way. It appears that the instructions given in TM serve to create a
“dominant focus” that “exercises” the brain in generating sustained ORs amidst a state of
physiological rest. Also, the instructions (and dominant focus) serve to define a class of
mental activity to which the subject habituates: namely thoughts, since the instructions
guide the subject towards an effortless response to thought, upon becoming aware that
awareness is on a thought other than the mantra. Presumably the longterm cognitive
benefits of TM result from extending this conditioning to daily life in which the subject
follows more attentively the train of thought associated with a task while simultaneously
habituating, or ignoring thoughts classified as distracting.
Note that Maltzman (1979b, p. 330) indicates that while anterior brain regions are
associated with voluntary ORs, involuntary ORs are associated with the more
perceptuallyoriented posterior regions. This implies that anterior coherence may or may
not exert “control” over the posterior, less bilaterally coherent, regions depending on the
relative “balance” between anterior and posterior regions. The findings of the current
research indicates that higher anterior homolateral alpha coherence correlates negatively
with posterior bilateral coherence (L and O r = .38, p =.0031; R and O r = .21, p =
.1163) . It is reasonable to infer that the L and R anterior derivations are activated, based
on other research that suggests increased anterior crosscorrelation (Livanov, 1977) or
coherence (Busk & Galbraith, 1975, Sheppard & Boyer, 1990; Dillbeck & Vesely, 1986)
result from higher demand “task” conditions. The negative relation of posterior
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coherence suggests reduction in involuntary ORs, perhaps due to the selective attention
and preattentive mechanisms enhanced by the anterior activity. (This issue will be
discussed below in the section “Recommendations for Future Research” under “The
Question of Bilateral Occipital Coherence.”)
The notion of frontal executive functioning may underlie the acquisition of
schema. For example, Shute and Huertas (1990) administered a clinical version of the
Shadows task to 58 undergraduate students (mean age 22.7 years) together with a battery
of neuropsychological measures commonly used to detect deficits associated with frontal
lobe dysfunction, plus four additional cognitive measures, as well as another two
measures of verbal ability. Factor analysis accounted for 70% of the variance, distributed
among four factors. The Shadows task score loaded most strongly on the tests used for
frontal assessment and not on the other measures, including those of verbal ability. The
authors conclude that “the ability to identify patterns among environmental stimuli and
make accurate inferences from those patterns, described by Piaget as formal operational
reasoning, may be related to adequate frontal lobe development...It may be that the ability
to anticipate the consequences of one’s own actions is a function of adequate frontal lobe
development” (p. 9).
Frontal versus posterior functions relate to physiological research on selective
attention and distraction. Skinner and Yingling (1977) also suggest separate systems for
voluntary versus involuntary ORs looking primarily at the electroanatomical evidence.
This occurs in the context of “central gating mechanisms” that underlie both behavior, the
occurrence of a frontal negative slow potential shift (CNV), and enhancement of certain
evoked response potential (ERP) components in response to “attentionevoking
situations.” They identify the mediothalamicfrontocortical system (MTFCS) as the
mediator of phasic changes in awareness (selective attention) through inhibition of
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“ascent to the cortex of information evoked by irrelevant stimuli” (p. 55). The
mesencephalic reticular formation (MRF) underlies tonic shifts in vigilance through
excitation of brain activity as in more primitive behaviors such as orienting reactions.
They both converge on the thalamic reticular nucleus, “a structure which is a switching
mechanism that gates the ascent of thalamic activity to the cortex” (p. 31), with a balance
between excitation (MRF) and inhibition (MTFCS) determining the subject’s current
conscious state. The former controls the more general and reflex oriented attentional
states and the latter controls the selective and voluntary types of attention. Both control
bioelectric EEG activity. Therefore, evoked potentials (EPs) can reflect differing
contributions from each system, thus complicating interpretations of EP features. “For
example, the dual control of the thalamic gates by cortical and brain stem mechanisms
quite obviously parallels two of the most salient subjective characteristics of attention, the
selective filtering of sensory experience and the overriding of volitional attention by
reflexive orienting mechanisms” (p. 63). This description of attentional gating
mechanisms also supports Arenander’s model of the “transcending reflex.”
Implications of Frontal Functions for the OR and Adaptive
“Stability”
Stuss (1992) summarizes the functions of the frontal lobes as executive functions
on the one level and as metacognition and selfreflectiveness at increasingly higher levels.
The primary goal of the first level is the “conscious direction of the lowerlevel systems
toward a selected goal. This control may well be divided into specific functions such as
anticipation, goal selection, plan formulation, evaluation and monitoring of behavior, and
other anterior attentional functions such as selectivity and possibly persistence” (p. 12).
In the context of the current research, this analysis appears relevant to the properties of
formal operational reasoning which requires a systematic control of variables as found in
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mental structures that reflect the propositional lattice and the INRC group of
transformations. But more to the point is the suggestion that the frontal lobes are
responsible for maintaining assimilative structures that govern accommodation to
observed discrepancies between expectation and actuality, i.e., passing judgment and
creating a plan for adaptation to the newlyperceived situation. Failure to equilibrate may
well be a failure of frontal functions. Berg and Sternburg (1985) suggest that response to
novelty is a major component of intelligence and that the ability to deal with novel
situations is prominent in Piaget’s theory of development. Also see Welsh and
Pennington (1988) for application of frontal functions to Piagetian development theory.
Stuss and Benson (1984) list several dysfunctions associated with prefrontal damage.
Note their similarity to dysfunctions of systematic reasoning in which a schema has not
been strongly developed:
1. Deficit in the ordering or handling of sequential behaviors
2. Impairment in establishing or changing a set
3. Impairment in maintaining a set, particularly in the presence of interference
4. Decreased ability to monitor personal behavior
5. Dissociation of knowledge from the direction of response
6. Altered attitude (p. 222)
Piaget suggests that once a structure attains sufficient breadth to anticipate all the
combinations given it by actuality, then the structure is relegated to “automatic” status.
Likewise, Stuss and Benson (1984) suggest that “learned” cognitive skills reside in the
posterior regions. For example, “reported findings of IQ deterioration after frontal
damage are rare, whereas the number of studies reporting negative results is
overwhelming. Even studies that do report IQ deterioration admit that other factors may
be important” (p. 197). Luria (1973) indicates that patients with frontal lobe lesions fail
to orient to “informative attributes” that would lead to hypotheses concerning a given
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problem. This means that posterior, automatic cognitive processes are able to solve
simple problems, but frontal, controlled cognitive processes fail under more challenging
situation.
As is known, formal logical operations may remain intact enough in patients with
lesions of the frontal lobes...[S]uch patients easily cope with simple problems that
have single solutions, i.e., that do not require any choice from several
equiprobable alternatives; but they are unable to solve a problem that requires
preliminary orientation within its conditions and formation of a hypothesis, which
in normal subjects leads to a proper choice from several equiprobable alternatives
and to the performance of some intermediate operations insuring attainment of the
final goal...[Frontal] patients do not subject the conditions of the problem to
preliminary analysis and do not confront their separate parts. Instead, as a rule,
they single out random fragments of the conditions and begin to perform partial
logical operations, without attempting to formulate a general strategy and without
confronting this operation with other elements of the condition of the problem;
neither do they match the result obtained to the initial conditions” (p. 2021).
In Piagetian terms, posterior functions appear to take on the role of “necessity,” in
which “virtual” operations replace the slow, conscious effort required by the transitional
formal reasoner (Piaget, 1986). Anterior functions appear to take on the role of
“possibilities,” the mechanisms for accommodation leading to higher forms of
equilibration. Luria’s (1973) comments above illustrate the failure of frontal patients to
consider “all possibilities.” As Piaget suggests:
Access to new possibles takes place in a framework of previous necessities. This
is because all accommodation is accommodation to an assimilation scheme.
These turntakings, which are in fact those of a ceaseless succession of access and
closure, are due to the general law of equilibration between differentiations and
integrations. They express one of the aspects of the essentially temporal character
of cognitive constructions, even though in outcome they lead to systems whose
necessity becomes atemporal. The possibles, by contrast, constitute phases in
temporal formation. One of the turningpoints marking the beginnings of modern
physics is known to have consisted, following Galileo, in the belief in time as an
independent variable. By the introduction of the genetic dimension in
epistemology, it can be hoped that an analogous service will, with due proportion,
be rendered, even if temporal formation terminates in atemporal structures. In this
case, the atemporal is the outcome of the integration of the transcended in its
transcendence. Such is the distinctive feature of cognitive equilibration (p. 303).
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“Integration of the Transcended in its Transcendence”
(Piaget, 1986)
Frontal functions remain important even after attainment of formal schema. The
individual must, for example, select the appropriate schema when faced with a cognitive
challenge. This source of difficulty suggests that individuals who are formal in one
subject may fail to transfer their skills to another subject because of inadequate or
unprepared frontal functioning. In the preceding passage regarding “integration of the
transcended into transcendence,” Piaget uses the framework of his genetic epistemology
to describe the process of automatization of accommodative behaviors and operations.
Automatization, I suggest, converts the slow, temporal thought process of the individual
into higherlevel assimilative schema that operate atemporally, using virtual
transformations to reach a logical outcome. This is not a new idea. In the context of early
cognitive psychology, for example, Schneider and Shiffrin (1970) outline differences
between “controlled and automatic human information processing.” Controlled
processing, I suggest, is a frontal activity. It requires the active attention of the subject,
and thus is limited to only one sequence of “memory nodes” at a time (Cf. “temporal
formation,” above). Automatic processing, I suggest, is a posterior activity. It can handle
several sequences at once because attentional resources are not consumed. The authors
point out that automatic processing can direct controlled attention automatically,
“regardless of concurrent inputs or memory load,” and “once learned, an automatic
process is difficult to suppress, to modify, or to ignore” (p. 2).
Other authors from “early” cognitive psychology such as Kimble and Perlmuter
(1970) suggest methods of deautomatizing, or in their terminology, restoring “volitional”
behavior. A research example is the conditioned pairing of a light with an air puff to the
eye (causing a blink), plus an instructed response to the subject to press a button with the
finger or to blink the eye upon getting the air puff. The finger press or eye blink become
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automated (nonvolitional) responses to the light. This is called “anticipatory
performance.” The classical theory of volition suggests that kinesthetic feedback of
consequences of selfinitiated acts (Piaget would probably call this “actions on objects”)
is the primary source of deautomatization. In a conscious departure from their
behaviorallycolored ethos, Kimble and Perlmuter indicate that research shows
deautomatization is never totally prevented by the loss of kinesthetic feedback, implying
for them that mental images, or “centrally located feedback loops” also play a role in
restoring volition to involuntary behavior. Based on their research, the authors suggest a
developmental sequence for the development, initiation, and control of voluntary acts
which is of interest in the context of mental practices such as TM. In other words, they
suggest that volition plays an important role. Development of volition, I suggest, may
develop frontal structures that support equilibration of more adaptive mental structures,
such as support formal operational reasoning. Kimble and Perlmuter write “[T]he
individual first acquires voluntary control over initially involuntary responses and then
with extended practice allows these responses to retreat from consciousness and attention
and, in that sense, to become involuntary” (p.382).
I suggest that the TM technique trains the individual’s preattentive faculties
(“volition”) to minimize the involuntary lapses of attention when distracted by task
irrelevant thoughts. This means the individual learns to habituate to distracting thoughts,
or in Piagetian terms, to decentrate. The TM technique, over time, allows this
“voluntary” control over previously involuntary distractions to become automatic—such
as may be evidenced in the various improvements on IQ tests described in the TM
research findings above. In this sense, the brain must, by implication, be attaching
“significance” to taskoriented cognition, thereby enhancing voluntary OR responses,
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otherwise known as “alertness”. Habituation to distraction reduces involuntary OR
responses, otherwise known as “decentration” and restfulness.
Note that the subjective experience during TM is one of mental alertness co
incident with physiological restfulness. A recent review by Jevning, Wallace, and
Beidebach (1992) suggests that many of the measured physiological effects of TM reflect
a state of increased alertness or CNS activation especially at periods of subjectively
deepest transcending. “Such states are accompanied by high amplitude theta and/or fast
frequency beta bursts consistent with activation...[Outside of TM, findings indicate]
decreased reaction time and other improvements in sensory and motor performance [that]
can be associated with a more alert state of the central nervous system” (p. 421).
Increased CNS activation during TM is also indicated by increased coherence, as well as
increased cerebral blood flow and other changes in peripheral circulation and metabolism
to support the increased activation. In contrast to mental alertness, the authors also point
out that the subjective experience of deep restfulness is supported by measures such as
decreased whole body, muscle, and red cell metabolism, plus decreased plasma thyroid
and adrenocortical hormone production. Other indicators of rest include the decrease or
disappearance of EMG (muscle tension), and decreased galvanic skin resistance and/or
decreased phasic skin resistance response. Together, these features characterize TM as a
subjective experience of “restful alertness.
Let us examine further some ideas that illuminate Piaget’s concept of
“decentering” as an element of cognitive growth. In brief, decentering can be considered
as the ability to ignore distractions. In a sense, the history of science is movement away
from distracting concepts and towards more inclusive formulations of the laws of nature.
“Impulse” as the emotional correlate to cognitive distraction could even be included as
“centering.” The nonconserving child, for example, can be seen to act “impulsively,”
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failing to take into account the requisite variables for conservation of weight or volume.
In another example, Piaget (1962) writes in response to comments from a fellow
developmental psychologist, Vygotsky:
On the affective level, it would require quite a dose of optimism to believe that our
elementary interpersonal feelings are always well adapted: reactions such as
jealousy, envy, vanity, which are doubtless universal, can certainly be considered
various types of systematic error in the individual’s emotional perspective. In the
field of thinking, the whole history of science from geocentrism to the Copernican
revolution, from the false absolutes of Aristotle’s physics to the relativity of
Galileo’s principle of inertia and to Einstein’s theory of relativity, shows that it has
taken centuries to liberate us from the systematic errors, from the illusions caused
by the immediate point of view as opposed to “decentered” systematic thinking.
And this liberation is far from complete.
I coined the term “cognitive egocentrism” (no doubt a bad choice) to
express the idea that the progress of knowledge never proceeds by a mere addition
of items or of new levels, as if richer knowledge were only a complement of the
earlier meager one: it requires also a perceptual reformulation of previous points
of view by a process which moves backwards as well as forward, continually
correcting both the initial systematic errors and those arising along the way. This
corrective process seems to obey a welldefined developmental law, the law of
decentering (décentration). For science to shift from a geocentric to a
heliocentric perspective required a gigantic feat of decentering. But the same kind
of process can be seen in the small child: my description, noted favorably by
Vygotsky, of the development of the notion of “brother” shows what an effort is
required of a child who has a brother to understand that his brother also has a
brother, that this concept refers to a reciprocal relationship and not to an absolute
“property.” Similarly, recent experiments (not available to Vygotsky) have shown
that to conceive of a road longer than another which ends at the same point, thus
separating the (metrical) concept of “long” from the (ordinal) “far,” the child has
to decenter his thinking, which at first focuses on the end point alone, and to work
out the objective relationships between the points of departure and arrival (p. 3).
The concept of decentering is central to Piaget’s theory because decentration is
prerequisite to disequilibration, which in turn is prerequisite to higher stages of
equilibration. In our current “translation” of Piaget’s formulation into neurophysiology, I
speculate that decentration develops when the subject’s frontal (assimilative) structures
assert volitional control over automatized posterior (assimilative) structures. This
assertion of voluntary, “temporal” cognition by the frontal structures is itself the process
of accommodation. See Pribram (1969) for a discussion of the neurology of
accommodation and assimilation. The frontal function of “integration” and
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“association,” he suggests, are carried out by frontal control over posterior input channels
(i.e., this is exercise of assimilative structures). In the current study, clear evidence was
found that for the Vessels task at least, greater anterior alpha coherence and lesser
posterior coherence during TM were related to formal reasoning. The evidence supported
similar implications for the Formal Stage Criterion (p = .0558, and p = .050 when
adjusted for age and gender ). Amidst the possibility that gender effects would
complicate this simple assertion, the statistical tests revealed no differences in the
findings for males compared to females. Thus, I suggest that the concept of formal
reasoning implies neurological conditions that are necessary, but not sufficient: namely
frontal homolateral coherence sets the stage for decentration and consequent
accommodation to more complex challenges in the environment.
Various researchers have studied biological development in relation to cognitive
styles such as impulsivity vs. reflection (Nelson and Smith, 1989). Trait differences may
exert similar influences. For example, studies of sex differences in cognition have
suggested, among other things, that males “excel on more complex tasks requiring an
inhibition of immediate responses to obvious stimulus attributes in favor of responses to
less obvious stimulus attributes” (Broverman, Klaiber, Kobayashi, and Vogel, 1968).
These authors attribute these findings to “differences in relationships between adrenergic
activating and cholinergic inhibitory neural processes, which, in turn are sensitive to the
‘sex’ hormones, androgens and estrogens” (p. 23). They extend these ideas to Piagetian
developmental issues, irrespective of sex, by suggesting that
the relationship of simple perceptualmotor and inhibitory restructuring processes
could be applied to all stages of development, that is, the more vigorous a given
lowerlevel function, the more difficult is it to inhibit and and subordinate the
lower function to a specific higher level function.... The varying outcomes of these
contests in different individuals may underlie the consistent bipolar factors of
ability found in the withindividual variance of abilities (p. 44).
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Maltzman (1959) found that males performed better in a test of problem solving
(the water jar problem). He concluded that males were less influenced by “mental set” or
“Einstellung”, suggesting that
more rapid extinction of the dominant long solution responses in men may be due
to a variety of different variables, for example more rapid accumulation of reactive
inhibition in men than women. Another possible variable is a higher anxiety level
in women, especially as induced by initial failure on the extinction problem (p.
242).
Bieri, Bradburn and Galinsky (1958) concluded from their study of college age
sex differences in spatial relations (Embedded Figures Test) that superior performance by
males was correlated with superior mathematical aptitude in combination with a
“conceptual approach approach to social and objective stimuli” (p. 11). This finding
parallels the findings in the current research in which males performed significantly
better than females on the Shadows task (a test of spatial proportions requiring a
conceptual, nonimpulsive, approach) together with greater preference for math (and
science). Furthermore, irrespective of gender differences, the current study also indicates
that subjects who pass the tasks preferred math and science significantly more than those
who failed the tasks (implying a similar relationship between math aptitude and
conceptual, nonimpulsive approaches to solving the task problems).
In summary, studies of “impulsive” individuals may characterize the failure to
decentrate. That is, subjects who fail to decentrate could be said to be “jumping to a
conclusion.” For example, Van den Broek, Bradshaw and Szabadi (1987) found that
females independently classified as “impulsive” demonstrated poorer performance than
nonimpulsive females when required to delay pressing a button for a given period after a
loud sound. Similarly, Wallman, Eylon, and Lawson (1980) suggest that the onset of
formal operations can be equated with development of the ability to avoid premature
closure in a problemsolving situation. Although Piagetian tasks were not used in the
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crosssectional study of student in grades 16, the authors found that training failed to
alter the native strategies for solving complex inferences. However, improvements were
noticed with increasing ages. The authors suggest that developmentally, high level
reasoning results when students “continue their thinking about the questions that had
been unanswered and reason hypotheticodeductively to generate and test their own
hypotheses” (p. 114). This appears to meet Piaget’s criteria for “decentration”. It suggests
jumping to conclusions—or impulsive thinking—has control mechanisms that are indeed
developmental in origin. To overcome impulsive thinking, the authors suggest that
teachers “emphasize the tentativeness and probablistic nature of knowledge” (p. 114).
This suggests that growth requires an assimilative structure that controls or overrides
tendancies towards impulsive judgements.
I suggest that frontal coherence represents just such an assimilative structure and
that this is the assimilative structure that supports accomodation leading, ultimately to
higher forms of equilibration, or the growth of “novel” structures not otherwise predicted
from the lower level structures. (For more details on the significance of frontal coherence,
or “time locking”, see discussion associated with Damasio (1989) below in Directions for
Future Research, under “The Question of Information Transfer”). The TM technique has
been characterized to reduce impulsivity, or “limbic outflow”, as follows.
The mechanics of Transcendental Meditation have been discussed in the context
of research into the medical applications of TM, including notions of selfregulation and
EEG coherence. Stroebel and Glueck (1978) (also, Glueck and Stroebel, 1978, 1975),
investigating various meditationrelaxation techniques for treatment of mental illness and
stress, found that Transcendental Meditation was preferred to biofeedback for “general
relaxation and creating a state incompatible with emergency response” in psychiatric in
and outpatients (p. 422). They speculate that during TM, “the usual affective outflow
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from limbic structures is diminished, with enhanced transmission of signals between the
hemispheres via the corpus collosum or other commissures” (p. 421). They report on the
results of their EEG alpha coherence research on patients practicing the various methods,
and suggest that differences in coherence patterns result from the specifics of the
techniques. They speculate on the causal mechanisms for the differing patterns of
increased EEG coherence observed in several of the mantraderived techniques. First, the
manta may be a “boring habituation stimulus leading to habituation of [left hemisphere]
beta activation and augmentation of alphatheta synchrony” through normalization of
visceroautonomic homeostasis, regulated by the normally unconscious right temporal
cortexlimbic system. Second, the mantras may introduce a resonant frequency (67 Hz)
“which is in the high theta EEG range and also approximates the optimal processing of
the basic language unit, the phoneme, by the auditory system.” They theorize that
“when one thinks a mantra, a significant stimulus in introduced in the [dominant]
temporal lobe and probably directly into the series of cell clusters and fiber tracts
that have come to be known as the limbic system....[This] may act, with
considerable rapidity, to dampen the limbic system activity and produce a relative
quiescence in this critical subcortical area.
Since there are extensive connections running from the thalamic structures
to the cortex, quieting the limbic system activity might allow for the inhibition of
cortical activation, with the disappearance of the usual range of frequencies and
amplitudes ordinarily seen coming from the cortex, and with the imposition of the
appearance of very dense, highamplitude, alpha wave production.
Similary, since the autonomic nervous system is controlled to a
considerable extent by stimuli arising in the midbrain, the rapid changes observed
in the peripheral autonomic nervous system—such as the GSR changes and the
change in respiratory rate, heart rate, etc.—could be explained by the quieting of
the limbic system activity” (p. 421).
They also suggest that the reduction in activation results in increased access to the
nondominant hemisphere (typically the right hemisphere), as in dreams or creative free
association, but without the accompaniment of any intense emotional affect that may
otherwise accompany such access.
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Selfregulation of arousal and activtion can apparently enhance cognitive
development in children. Warner (1986) reports that children who practiced
Transcendental Meditation achieved significantly higher scores when tests of four mental
abilities (informationprocessing, attention, cognitive flexibility, reflectivity) and three
tasks of Piagetian conservation were taken together and compared with scores from a non
TM, matched control group of children.
Educational Implications of theTheory
Much has been said in the past regarding “right brain” skills versus “left brain”
skills. The current research contradicts Samples (1975) claim that Piagetian formal
reasoning is solely left brain oriented and ignores right brain skills. Subjects who passed
the four tasks of formal reasoning demonstrated a higher coherence index than subjects
who failed the tasks. This was statistically significant for the Vessels task (p = .045) and
nearly significant for the Formal Stage Criterion (p = .0558). Note that when age and
gender were partialed out of the test for the Formal Stage Criterion, the differences
between pass and fail groups in the coherence index measurement were statistically
significant (p ≤ .050). However, three tasks did not show any statistically signficant
relationship. Therefore, the following educational implications are predicated on the
notion that the current research only partially supports an hypothesized relationship
between the coherence index measure and the development of formal operational
reasoning.
The coherence index consists of bilateral frontal homolateral left and right
anterior coherence as well as an inverse measure of bilateral occipital coherence: FLRO.
This measure represents both anterior and posterior measures as well as left and right
hemisphere measures. Therefore, it may be termed a “whole brain” measure of CNS
development. Many educators have called for “whole brain” education, taking into
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account the predilections and capacities of each hemisphere for gaining command of the
environment. In a monograph published by the Association for Supervision and
Curriculum Development, Caine and Caine (1991) suggest that the real challenge to
education is to create a more complex form of learning that takes into account integration
of “human behavior and perception, emotions and physiology. ” While not made explicit
in their book, I suggest that the Caines actually call for “frontal education” in their
apologia for “whole brain” education. They indicate that routine memorization, a
posterior brain function, remains insufficient for today’s educational challenges. For
example, they say
What we now appear to need is not individuals trained for the hierarchical and
mechanical workplace but individuals who can govern themselves. Tomorrow’s
successful employees will have to be problem solvers, decisions makers, adept
negotiators, and thinkers who are at home with openendedness, flexibility, and
resourcefulness....The ironic point is that memorization, particularly as practiced
in our schools, does not work to provide a foundation in basic skills and
knowledge (pp. 1415).
How to achieve this goal? At least we can exercise the frontal functions, so aptly
described in the above quote. This cannot be done in most “teachercentered” educational
curricula. The Caines suggest that we support a richer academic environment in which
students solve problems along thematic lines, immersing themselves in a “real world” of
interacting parts, leading to holistic development. They also suggest development of
“relaxed awareness” in which the student learns to override the jarring impulses, internal
and external, that distract the learner from his or her task (p. 136). (See Tobias, 1973; van
den Broek, Bradshaw, & Szabadi, 1987; and Singer, Cavanaugh, Murphey, Chen, and
Lidor, 1991, in this regard.) I suggest that failure to engage students in “whole brain”
learning is functionally equivalent to administration of a “frontal lobotomy” (Cf., Heath
and Galbraith, 1966). This characterization suggests a neuropsychological basis for the
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design of instruction (see Hartlage & Telzrow, 1983 and Farley, 1981)). An alternative
exists.
A series of studies has elucidated what I would term “frontal learning” in the
context of “studentstructured learning in science” (SSLS) in contrast to “teacher
structured learning in science” (TSLS). For example, Penick, Shymansky, Matthews, and
Good (1976) found that in the SSLS classroom
where the teacher removed virtually all restrictions on intellectual behavior and
provided no directions or praise, the students exhibited (1) fewer patterns
containing non lessonrelated behavior, and (2) greater clustering of patterns,
resulting in a more predictable set of behaviors than students in the TSLS science
classroom where directions and evaluation were provided (p. 295).
These results appear somewhat puzzling in light of traditional educational
approaches. Less teacher direction and evaluation resulted in more predictable and lesson
related behaviors. However, in light of the preceding discussion, I suggest that students
actually are a) learning to control their own levels of voluntary ORs, b) through
habituation to involuntary ORs arising from distractions, both internal and externally
generated. This line of thought has been expressed by Sanders (1983) in terms of “states
of stress” resulting from failure to control levels of arousal and activation, and elaborated
by Rothbart and Posner (1985). Penick et al. suggest, similarly, that
giving direction and other restrictive behaviors force the lessthanconforming
student into a variety of patterns to reduce tension or anxiety. The lack of
clustering of patterns and the consequent large numbers of infrequent patterns
may be a function of ambiguous directions or a lack of task orientation to
someone else’s task, a perception which could arise with a directive teacher....In
addition, it should be noted that SSLS students did not as often exhibit patterns
involving watching the teacher. Thus, it may be concluded that SSLS science
students were more involved in ontask behavior with the materials than were
TSLS students. This involvement, since it was not produced by teacher directions
or shaping, consisted of students identifying problems and solving them in their
own way (p. 295). (Italics are mine.)
Some evidence exists that student selfcontrol of arousal (i.e. distraction control)
is associated with higher levels of reasoning. For example, in a study of conservation
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among students in grades 15, Good, Matthews, Shymansky, and Penick (1976) found that
conservation on tasks of number, area, weight, displacement, perimeter, perimeterarea,
and internal volume influenced how the pupil interacted with the teacher and with sets of
manipulated materials. They found that
teacher’s directions, evaluations, etc., seem to divert the nonconservers’ attention
away from more productive activities with science materials to a greater degree
than for conservers. Because of this, a TSLS strategy could work to the
disadvantage of the “slower” students in a classroom even though they may have
the most to gain from a science class rich with manipulative materials (p. 537
538).
The advantage of the conservers is their greater ability to monitor and plan their
own behaviors. Essentially, a TSLS strategy works against “frontal” education, perhaps
unwittingly administering a functional “frontal lobotomy” to its students. The solution
lies in the directions offered by SSLS strategies that place responsibility on the students
for governing their investigative behavior. Thereby they learn to govern their own arousal
patterns. Similarly, Maltzman (1960) was able to train college subjects in “originality” of
word associations by encouraging the frequency of uncommon behavior in response to
lists of words used in training. Maltzman speculates that the transfer of this training to
other situations was actually a result of “the effects of inhibition” that “produce a
decrement in the excitatory potential of other common responses” (p. 240).
Attempts have been made to explicate these approaches, using concepts at hand,
for various authors. For example, Greeson and Zigarmi (1985) relate pedagogical
technique to achievement of Piagetian development in the context of “visual imagery” and
“visual literacy.” They suggest that teachers should “encourage students to generate
images themselves instead of constantly imposing images on their students.” They
specifically recommend the “discovery method” which reinforces problem solving and
demands creative recombinations of images and verbaliztions to solve problems” (p. 47).
It is reasonable to encourage skills selfregulation of arousal and activation in order to
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avoid premature closure, impulsivity, or jumping to conclusions (my terms). Greeson and
Zigami suggest techniques that exercise the student’s capacity for selfregulation of
arousal and activation levels such as Jacobson’s progressive relaxation, meditation
strategies, and creative visual ideation techniques. They point out that...
Problemsolving skills that involve transformations and combinations of
anticipatory images can be developed through curriculum activities ranging from
charades to building mockups of complex molecular models (p. 48).
Note that O’Boyle and Bembow (1990) suggest that intellectual precocity may be
related to right hemisphere functions, presumably related to visuospatial skills as related
above. However, more to the point may be the speculation that enhanced frontal
involvement may lead to the metacognitive controls that permit judicious application of
right hemisphere strategies, when appropriate. See Milner (1971), Fischer, Hunt, and
Randhawa (1982), and Tucker (1987) for discussions of hemispheric arousal levels and
anterior controls over lateralized and posterior functions.
One author in particular has explored the role of various brainmediated functions
in the context of neoPiagetian developmental theory. PascualLeone (1989) particularly
investigates a neuropsychological model of fielddependence/independence. Among other
things, he describes excitatory and inhibitory processes that govern attention and are
localized in the prefrontal lobe. He relates the mechanism of mental attention to the
notion of “centration” (p. 62), as well, suggesting that automatization of schemes is
associated with the reallocation of schemes from the frontal to the posterior areas. The
congruence of the current theory developed in this dissertation with PascualLeone’s
theory is striking, in light of the total independence of these two research efforts. (I had
not been introduced to his theory until completing this dissertation with the associated
theory.) Further explication of PascualLeone’s theory can be found in de Ribaupierre
(1989) and in Johnson, Favian, and PascualLeone (1989). Elsewhere, PascualLeone
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(1990) cites the coherence research mentioned in this dissertation (e.g., Dillbeck and
Bronson, 1981; Nidich, Ryncarz, Abrams, OrmeJohnson, and Wallace, 1983) to build the
case that coherence may be a neurophysiological component of “wisdom”. He suggests
that
Coherence should appear in the EEG under proper meditation conditions
whenever the person has developed numerous manifold structures spanning over
the brain: whenever the cortex is sufficiently integrated as a totality. This is, I
believe, a distinct structural mark of wisdom. Thus, wise persons placed under
proper meditation conditions and after some meditation training should exhibit
highcoherence spread over the cortex, particularly in prefrontal and vertex areas
(areas corresponding to regions where highlevel executive, metaexecutive, and
knowledge processing takes place) (p. 272).
Summary of the Theory
Extrapolating from Piaget’s theory, it appears that frontal functions support
volitional thought processes through mechanisms such as accommodation, decentration,
and growth towards awareness of “all possibilities.” Posterior functions appear to support
assimilative structures, i.e., automatic thought processes such as anticipation and the
regulations of “necessity.” Development of formal reasoning requires “whole brain”
interaction of frontal and posterior regions, possibly constituting the steps of successive
equilibrations through integration and differentiation of successively broader and more
stable schema, culminating in the “structural whole.” Piaget (1986) himself describes the
steps of development as a process in which linear, temporal thought becomes
simultaneous, atemporal competence. He suggests that “the atemporal is the outcome of
the integration of the transcended in its transcendence.” This implies “going beyond” or
transcending the lesser stage with temporal, linear, perhaps lefthemisphere, but definitely
frontaloriented, cognitive activity. Once the lesser structure is transcended, the new
structure, however, must be integrated back into the atemporal, automatic, perhaps right
hemisphere, cognitive processes supported by the posterior regions. It is not
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unreasonable to suggest that the “transcending reflex” hypothesized to give rise to the
benefits of TM is similar in functional characteristics to Piaget’s description of the
“integration of the transcended in its transcendence” that gives rise to the atemporal
structure.
This theory must be taken somewhat tentatively with regard to the current
research. Although a statistically significant relationship exists between the Formal Stage
Criterion and the alpha coherence index (p = .050, with age and gender partialed out, p =
.0558 without partialling out age and gender), only one out of four tasks displayed a
significant relationship with the coherence index (Vessels, p = .045, without partialling
out age and gender).
However, other studies demonstrate that TM increases frontal alpha coherence
over time and they also demonstrate a statistically significant relationship with cognitive
skills. Therefore, the collective body of findings can reasonably demand explanation
from a neuropsychological perspective. I suggest that both the practice of TM and the
development of cognitive skills engage functions of transcending, or “going beyond”
current mentation (i.e., voluntary orienting) and integrating the new observation so that it
makes sense (i.e., habitutation of the orienting response).
Assuming that neurological conditions pose a necessary but not sufficient
condition, low levels of frontal activation may be one of several reasons for reports of a
low incidence of formal reasoning among high school and college students today.
Alternatively, we could suggest that individuals failing to attain formal reasoning
structures could be aided by enhancement of a “dominant focus” that supported a habit of
attention to task and habituation to distraction.
Note that the current research did not uncover any alpha coherence differences
between males and females that interacted with task performance. This was an
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unanticipated outcome, especially surprising in light of known advantages in spatial
Piagetian tasks for males as given in the Chapter II literature review and known
interactions between gender and psychometric spatial skill in measures of coherence
(Petsche & Rappelsberger, 1992). In the current study, the two spatially oriented tasks
demonstrated no taskXgender interaction, only main effects: males performed
significantly better on the Shadows task and pass subjects demonstrated higher FLRO
coherence index measures than fail subjects on the Vessels task. On the other hand, the
lack of statistical interaction between gender and task performance simplifies the
implications of the study, suggesting that the conclusions apply equally to males and
females.
The lack of a genderXtask interaction suggests that reasons other than lack of
coherence hold back development of formal reasoning for females in the Shadows task.
Such impediments could include any that have been given previously in the literature such
as lack of exposure to manipulative learning opportunities, imposed role expectations,
and genetic or genderrelated predispositions.
In closing, I suggest that the current research and the accompanying theory sheds
light on Piaget’s advocacy of “active learning.” Physical action on objects necessarily
involves the student in different arousal and activation patterns than they experience
sitting in a chair, listening to a teacher. These learning situations culture (and require)
different dominant foci. Educators should provide “ecological validity” by giving
students opportunity to learn control of their arousal and activation patterns under
varying problemsolving challenges. Brezin (1980) suggests that instructional design
techniques can benefit from knowledge of “cognitive monitoring,” i.e. metacognitive
awareness made explicit in the design of instructional materials.
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All this suggests that a main challenge in education is development of self
regulation of the orienting reaction (e.g., Pribram, 1979; and Jeffery, 1968). I suggest that
educational methods that remain “teachercentered” unwittingly administer a functional
“frontal lobotomy” to the unsuspecting students. It appears that teachercentered
instruction shortsightedly focuses on posterior functions, treating the student as a passive
receptacle of information. Knowledge gained without active and intentional inquiry—a
frontal activity—fails to become integrated within successively more encompassing
mental structures.
Without active and intentional inquiry, the student is more likely to fail to
decentrate from automatic responses and thus fail to transcend old schemata. Without a
dominant focus of intentionality, the student fails to orient to discrepant occurrences or
fails to habituate to nontask related distractions such as a felt need to “check with the
teacher” or gain “teacher approval” (e.g., Shymansky & Matthews, 1974, p. 166).
Piaget’s recommendation of “active learning” in which students interact with objects to
discover regularities and laws appears to exercise important frontal executive functions.
The student gains experience and confidence in letting go of preconceptions and thereby
experiencing a larger sample of “all possibilities.” This is an adaptive dominant focus.
Piaget’s elucidation of the “structured whole” suggests a new outlook on the
neurophysiological prerequisites to education. The current findings suggest that students
can learn to govern their own level of frontal and posterior arousal and activation by
learning a mental technique such as TM to enhance “restful alertness”. Alternatively, in
terms of the goals of science education, selfgovernance of frontal and posterior arousal is
probably best supported in a “studentcentered” science curriculum.
The emphasis on development of purposeful (frontal) control of arousal and
activation by the subject also fits the “manifesto” regarding the proper use of visually
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oriented instructional technology as stated by members of the Visual Scholars Program at
the University of Iowa. Cochran, Younghouse, Sorflaten, and Molek (1980) suggested
that
Research in cognitive approaches attempts to provide adequate treatments of
internal order and adaptation to external order. Similarly, we believe that visual
literacy research should proceed on two fronts: the characterization of the
development of internal structures in cognitively valid ways and the
characterization of the external structures the developing individual finds salient”
(p. 261)....One axiom of the research approach we advocate is that research must
recognize that humans are purposive and intelligent begins who, individually or
collectively, make plans for action....Another axiom is that visual processes are
mediating systems of noteworthy complexity...and not simply a neutral mechanism
for the transmission of information (or instruction)....The study of visual literacy
as the human ability or set of abilities to use visual processes as mediating
systems must ...adopt a theoretical position than can encompass the purposive or
intentional aspects of the use of visual processes and visualization (p. 263).
The Question of Bilateral Occipital Coherence
A major topic has to now been postponed. This involves the developmental
significance of the bilateral occipital coherence measure (O). I suggest this is an area for
future research, but the recommendation follows from a perspective that both follows and
enriches the current findings. The topic has two boundaries that together, suggest a
model of brain functioning to support recent inquiries into “induced rhythms” in the brain
(Basar & Bullock, 1992). First, we note an inverse relationship between O alpha
coherence and performance on tasks of formal reasoning (as well as other indicators
reported above, such as GPA and creativity). Second, we note that longitudinal studies of
subjects practicing Transcendental Meditation demonstrate an increase in bilateral
occipital coherence. Additionally, during periods characterized subjectively as
“transcendental consciousness” (sustained periods of awareness without thoughts), the
EEG record displays sharp and global increases in coherence, including bilateral
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occipital coherence (Badawi, Wallace, OrmeJohnson, & Rouzere, 1984; Farrow &
Hebert, 1982). Behavioral correlates included spontaneous respiratory suspension
without being followed by significant compensatory breathing.
How is it that O alpha coherence on the one hand correlates negatively with a
psychological trait (e.g., formal reasoning) and yet on the other hand correlates positively
with a major indicator of the putative mechanism of developmental growth (e.g.
transcending)? The direction of research is indicated by the fact that the occipital lobes
do not, as far we know, share direct communication via the collosal connections, and
therefore, interhemispheric “transfer time much more likely depends on the association
areas where the stimulus is processed, and on the part of the corpus collosum that unites
these [association] areas” (Zaidel, 1986, p. 442). This implies that the frontal and
association areas support interhemispheric communication, whereas the occipital area
does not. Therefore, upon use of the frontal lobes, and in the absence of primarily visual
input (as in eyesclosed TM), it is reasonable to assume that brain activity is “pulled” into
coordination first on a homolateral basis, then bilaterally for more anterior regions, and
lastly, across the occipital lobes.
I call this a “tuning fork” model in which the tips of the tuning fork represent the
unconnected occipital lobes, whereas the fork of the tuning fork represents the more
anterior areas that have bilateral commissural connections. The fork portion of the
instrument will be the major junction between the otherwise independent frequencies of
each prong (this tuning fork has prongs of variable length!). Owing to the lack of direct
interconnection, the tips of each prong will vibrate more out of synchrony than the fork
portion. Meanwhile each prong will have its own independent frequency except as
checked by the influence of the fork. Analogously, coordination of activity within a
hemisphere is important and will lead to electrical activity that is homolaterally
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organized. Activities include monitoring and controlling primary sensory areas that
initially process stimuli, processing in the association areas, and coordination within the
motor areas. All activity presumably falls under the control of prefrontal executive
activity to one degree or another, perhaps developmentally influenced. For example,
several studies support the notion that cognitive development is associated with
homolateral alpha coherence. Thatcher (1991a) suggests that “each cognitive stage is
marked by extended periods of equilibrium between competing and cooperative neural
networks punctuated by brief periods of disequilibrium....Among the most dominant
corticocortico connections are those that develop between different regions of the frontal
cortex and posterior intracortical regions.” Thatcher, Walker, and Giudice (1987) trace
the developmental sequence of homolateral coherence (.5 to 22 Hz) in 577 subjects
between the ages of 2 months to early adulthood (26+ years old). They concluded that
coherence between frontal and various homolateral posterior regions increased in a
developmental sequence. They suggest that “spurts” in the rate of increased coherence
“overlap quite well with the timing for the Piaget theory of human cognitive
development.” In a further exposition of these developmental processes, Thatcher
(1991b) suggests that
the frontal lobe developmental spectrum is consistent with models of the frontal
lobes that postulate an executive type function that is called into operation for
novel and task demanding situations, especially when task demands exceed the
capacity of current categories of experience and action....[D]evelopmental growth
spurts result in a relatively sudden increase in the neuronal capacity of a subset of
frontal lobe connections. (p. 415)
Further discussions along similar lines are available in Thatcher (1992), Case
(1992), and Hudspeth and Pribram (1990). Although not Piagetian oriented, Gasser,
JennenSteinmetz, Sroka, Verleger, and Möcks (1988) identify developmental coherence
increases among subjects from 6 to 17 years of age. They classify 3 components of
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change: overall level of coherence, coherence of occipital with all other regions, and
anteriorposterior versus leftright coherences.
Given these findings, it is no longer an issue that homolateral coherence
accompanies human growth. However, links to developmental stages made by Thatcher
et al., Case, Hudspeth, and Pribram are currently inferential, based on ages assumed to
represent preoperational, concrete, and formal reasoning. The current research is the
first study to actually link tests of Piagetian cognitive development with increases in
homolateral L and R anterior coherence. The current study has also shown that clinical
Piagetian tests give results not otherwise available from pen and paper tests of Piagetian
defined reasoning skills. Obviously, in light of this momentum in tracing neurological
development in a Piagetian context, it seems reasonable to suggest followup studies using
clinical tests of Piagetiandefined reasoning, and link them with studies of EEG
coherence development.
To guide future research, I hypothesize that three stages of coherence reflecting
“whole brain” functioning could be identified, at least in subjects practicing TM,
following the “tuning fork” model. That is, upon cognitive task demands (e.g., TM), the
first stage will reflect homolateral coherence increases. These increases causes the “free”
ends of the tuning fork model (posterior lobes) to assume the frequency characteristics of
the more anterior portion of each hemisphere (this is essentially the definition of
increased homolateral coherence). First stage activity will therefore be evidenced by
decreased bilateral occipital coherence representing the fact that the free “ends” of the
tuning fork are pulled into synchrony with their respective anterior hemispheric executive
functions (Cf., Tucker, 1987). Recall the findings of Berkhout and Walter (1980) in which
decreased posterior interhemispheric coherence resulted from behaviors that tended to
increase levels of arousal (i.e., cognitive orienting).
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The second stage involves anterior bilateral coherence in which each hemisphere
takes on the frequency characteristics of the other, indicating integration of left and right
representational modes (Cf., Goldberg and Costa, 1981) (this is essentially the definition
of frontal bilateral coherence). This activity will be evidenced by increased bilateral
frontal coherence as well as possible slight increases or no change in bilateral occipital
coherence.
The third stage occurs when frontal bilateral and homolateral coherence is
sufficiently strong as to completely control the primary sensory areas, thereby causing the
anterior frequency characteristics to be reflected in the “ends” of the tuning fork. This
activity is represented in the sudden and dramatic global increase in coherence across all
frequency bands and brain regions during subjective reports of “transcendental
consciousness.” The fact that subjects experience spontaneous respiratory suspension
suggests the widespread nature of influences, which in the case for breathing appears to
be inhibitory. The global coherence could represent the framework for supporting
coordination required to “bind” functional components of thought (Cf., Damasio, 1989).
Component theorists have made significant progress in demonstrating the “distributed”
nature of mental functions, especially visuospatial (e.g., Kossyln, 1987; Posner, Inhoff,
and Friedrich, 1987; Mesulan, 1981; and Farah, 1984, 1988).
The Question of Information Transfer
Any discussion of optimizing brain function must cope with issues surrounding
the question of “how does the brain communicate within itself?” Some researchers such
as Sheppard and Boyer (1990) suggest that EEG coherence reflects “information transfer.”
Apparently the nature of “transfer” is indicated by the definition of coherence, which
states that two spatially separated points on the scalp share electrical activity at an
identical frequency for a specified period of time. However, it is reasonable to ask, if the
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frequency remains the same, how is information, i.e., variation in a signal, transferred?
Topics covered under the rubric of “induced rhythms” in the brain attempt to address this
issue, e.g., Basar, BasarEroglu, Parnefjord, Rahn, and Schurmann (1992). In general,
researchers point to phenomenon such as 40 Hz “oscillations” that are highly organized in
space and time across the entire scalp. Llinaas and Ribary (1992) suggest that “ultimately
this coherent 40Hz activity may serve as the basis for the conjunctive property that
characterizes the unity of cognitive experience....We hypothesize that this coherent sweep
of 40Hz response could reflect a scanning of the brain with a focus on the activated
sensory area in order to generate a single percept from multiple sensory components.” (p.
153).
Similarly, Eckhorn, Schanze, Brosch, Salen, and Bauer (1992) indicate that their
research on the cat shows that synchronization “forms the basis of a flexible mechanism
for feature linking in sensory systems...by synchronizing the activities of those neurons
that are activated by a coherent visual stimulus” (p. 47). These authors suggest that the
brain supports a specific network for generating synchronizing signals, and that authors
who speak of a similar need for “binding” brain functions, such as the University of Iowa
medical researcher Antonio Damasio (1989), get support for their theories in findings that
indicate synchronization of stimulusrelated brain activities (see also Buzsáki, 1991). For
example, Damasio suggests that consciousness is a function of the entire brain...
Posterior cortices require binding mechanisms in anterior structure in order to
guide the pattern of multiregional activations necessary to reconstitute an
event...Processing does not proceed in single direction but rather through
temporally coherent phaselocking amongst multiple regions. Although the
convergence zones that realize the more encompassing integration are placed
more anteriorly, it is activity in the more posterior cortical regions tthat is more
directly related to conscious experience....
It is not enough for the brain to analyze the world into its components (sic)
parts: the brain must bind together those parts that make whole entities and events,
both for recognition and recall. Consciousness must necessarily be based on the
mechanisms that perform the binding. The hypothesis suggested here is that the
binding occurs in multiple regions that are linked through activation zones; that
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these regions communicate through feedback pathways to earlier stages of cortical
processing where the parts are represented; and that the neural correlates of
consciousness should be sought in the phaselocked signals that are used to
communicate between these activation zones (pp. 129130).
While 40 Hz and similar high frequencies have been observe in this role, a
companion study of computer models of feature linking mechanisms suggests that alpha
frequencies also play a role. Eckhorn, Dick, Arndt, and Reitbroeck (1992) built computer
models of neural network stabilizing mechanisms that enabled simulations of EEG
phenomenon such as “isolated bursts” as well as rhythmic behavior. Their models
demonstrated that rhythmic activity results even under conditions of irregular stimulation.
This suggests for these authors that rhythmic linkages among regions can actually served
to enhance stimulus registration. Phase shifts in the linkages serve to magnify or reduce
the strength of response to a stimulus.
Basar, BasarEroglu, Parnefjord, Rahn, and Schurmann (1992) found that human
rhythmic 10 Hz (alpha) activity increases under certain conditions, and is associated with
improved performance. “[D]uring cognitive tasks, it is possible to measure almost
reproducible EEG patterns in subjects expecting defined repetitive sensory stimuli.
While paying attention to an omitted stimulus, the subjects probably anticipated with 10
Hz waves timelocked to the stimulus, showing almost reproducible patterns” (p. 172).
All of this work suggests that rhythmic activity plays a role in coordinating other, non
rhythmic activity. At least two hypotheses have been suggested, such as “linking
networks,” as explored in the computer models by Eckhorn, Dick, Arndt, and Reitbroeck
(1992) and the notion that EPs are a superposition of evoked rhythmicities, as explored by
Basar, BasarEroglu, Parnefjord, Rahn, and Schurmann (1992). However, there still
remains a missing link in the question of what is the mechanism that underlies the
adaptive value of global EEG coherence, especially alpha, as found by these researchers
and in the phenomenon of the transcending reflex?
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Investigators of the alpha wave have, at times, suggested that the role of the alpha
rhythm may be to serve as an “neuronic shutter,” or a gate that admits or ignores
incoming synaptic impulses, thus organizing the process of information transfer into
orderly packets of regular transmission exchanges. This hypothesis is also studied in the
context of a “scanning model” or “cortical excitability cycles” (Harter, 1967). For
example, visual stimuli can be presented at different portions of a single alpha wave cycle,
and it will be seen with greater or lesser probability, depending on the phase of
presentation. Nunn and Osselton (1974) used GSR measures (a typical OR measure) to
detect responses to a word (“Danger”) that was presented briefly (30 msec) and then
masked with a bright flash, thus in most of the 12 trials, obscuring conscious perception
of the word. Evaluation of the GSR response at each of four phases of the alpha cycle
indicated that perception of the word (increased GSR) occurred statistically significantly
more often “at a descending phase or trough in the parietaloccipital channels, and when
it occurred at a descending phase, trough, or ascending phase in the frontaloccipital
channels” (p. 300). Of interest in terms of preattentive models of selective attention that I
have proposed, the authors point out that
conscious perception was not necessarily involved because Shevrn and Fritzler
(1968) have shown that unconscious percepts can be encoded in the visual evoked
response, while experiments quoted in the introduction indicate that this response
varies according to the alpha phase at which the stimulus is presented (p. 301).
Other studies have suggested further refinements. For example, it appears that
excitability cycles apply much less to reflex action generated by the subject compared
with reports of positive findings with perception of incoming stimuli (Boxtel, 1979).
Shevelev, Kostelianetz, Kamenkovich, and Sharaev (1991) found that the phase of alpha
sensitivity depends on visual parameters such as the number of degrees the figure appears
in the visual field away from the direct line of vision as well as the visual angle, or size,
subtended by the figure. Varela, Toro, John and Schwartz (1981) found that two lights
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flashed with small intervals between them varied in being perceived as simultaneous or
sequential. The lights were more likely to be perceived as simultaneous during the
positive phase of the occipital alpha cycle. The authors conclude with an outline of the
postulated neurophysiological functions involved and suggest that
the connections of cortical afferent (and efferent) signals might be synchronized
via the temporal course reflected in the local alpha rhythms, providing an
integrative mechanism over extended regions of the brain. For two visual stimuli
to be perceived as separate in time, it seems that they must occur across the
temporal boundary provided by this cortical activity (p. 684).
Rice and Hagstrom (1989) found an auditory equivalent to the above research in
visual stimuli, thus laying to rest the criticism that any findings in the visual modality
could be attributed to eye tremor, which is correlated in phase and frequency with the
alpha rhythm. They found that auditory detection was significantly better at the negative
peak of the alpha cycle at the temporal derivation T5.
In summary, I propose that future research investigate cognitive correlates to EEG
coherence taking into account the “excitability cycle” hypothesis and its more general
forms discussed under the rubric of “induced rhythms” that coordinate global brain
functions. This implies that research can begin to define a consistent system of functions
that support cognition from not only from the level of global coherence, but also from the
level of electrical activity at the cell. This research would probably find that self
regulation in many cases consists of changing frequency and phase relationships between
brain areas, thus altering their excitability levels. As is known from biofeedback and TM
research, subjects indeed can change EEG frequency and phase relationships at will under
conducive situations.
Future research can delineate the processes of cognitive growth in terms of the
development of EEG selfregulation. Several lines of thought already converge in this
direction. Human factors studies of performance under conditions of stress look towards
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a taxonomy of stress states (Hockey & Hamilton, 1983). Sanders (1983) links arousal and
activation stress patterns to neurophysiological substrata initially proposed by Pribram
and McGuinness (1975) (also McGuinness and Pribram, 1985). Grones and Thompson
(1970), as well, cite early expressions by Pribram of the same theory in their exposition of
the dual process theory. Dual process theory holds that orientation (“sensitization”) and
habituation are independent processes for which neurophysiological evidence can be
adduced.
The oftcited model presented by Pribram and McGuinness has found
considerable following. Lateralization has been linked to their mechanisms of “self
regulation” by Tucker and Williamson (1984) as well as by Sanders (1983). Similarly,
Simonov (1984, 1985) suggests mechanisms of selfregulation in terms of a calculus of
motivation in contrast to “drives,” again linking his theory to the same neurophysiological
substrata given by Pribram and McGuinness. In each case, the substrata links frontal
structures to whole brain function. For a clear picture of this approach specifically in the
study of Piagetian formal operational reasoning, see McGuinness, Pribram, and Pirnazar
(1990).
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CHAPTER VI
(ADDENDUM TO THE ORIGINAL DISSERATION)
Orienting and the “Transcending Reflex”
As discussed in Chapter V, Arenander (1986) suggests that the process of
transcending can be understood in the framework of the orienting response (OR). The
current chapter explores the implications of this claim in greater physiological detail,
meanwhile organizing evidence across a range of literature that suggests a strong link
between OR phenomenon and intelligence, or cognitive success in general. The mediating
mechanics of the linkage will be shown to be EEG evoked potentials and their
relationship to coherence, particularly alpha coherence. This implies that the practice of
TM may strengthen the voluntary OR phenomenon that underlies intelligence. This
enhancement of the voluntary OR is hypothesized to occurvia the mechanism by which
EEG coherence reduces variability among averaged evoked potentials associated with a
particular stimulus.
The primary effect of the OR, as indicated in the general research (Lynn, 1966), is
to increase the sensitivity and speed of the sensory system, and to increase the signalto
noise ratio of the mental processing. While the OR is normally associated with external,
novel stimulation, it can also be elicited by attention to stimuli with subjective
significance or by attention toward a goal (Cf. Gruzelier & Eves, 1987). The theory of
the OR, and particularly the internally generated OR, contributes to our understanding of
the “transcending reflex” as outlined in the following summary of Arenander’s
presentation to the Society for Neuroscience Annual Meeting (1986).
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First, Arenander suggests that during TM, the individual alternates experiences of
orienting and habituation. Various brain systems control the process such that a state of
alertness is maintained, while the physiology experiences more and more deexcitation.
Second, the mantra (or other thought) is the focus of attention and is analyzed in
the appropriate thalamocortical channels related to the various senses. The hippocampal
based comparator seeks a possible match to the mantra (or other thought) and generates a
match or mismatch outcome, based partially on the significance of the stimuli.
Third, when a match is determined (usually the mantra leads to a match) then the
comparator signals other brain areas. The basal forebrain system (BFS) activates to
accomplish internal inhibition (II) and the mesencephalic reticular formation (MRF) and
associated brain structures are shifted into the oscillatory mode that reduces their internal
excitation (IE) role. The oscillatory mode gives rise to the observed increases in slow
EEG waves including alpha coherence. This functions to reduce thalamic responsiveness
to incoming sensory information, much as in the case of habituation to a stimulus. The
deexcitation associated with the match gives rise to transcending. Note that activation of
the BSF has been shown to induce sleep behavior and EEG synchronization, similar to
results of classical conditioning (habituation) paradigms. BFS stimulation has also been
shown to induce respiratory arrest in primates and human. Respiration suspension has
also been found and experimentally measured during TM related to subjective reports of
transcending (Kesterson, 1986; Farrow, & Hebert, 1982; Badawi et al., 1984).
Fourth, when a mismatch is detected the opposite occurs. The II system
deactivates and the IE system activates. Typically this brings the awareness to the level of
excitation required to repeat the process of transcending. Arenander suggests that the
flow of attention can be quite complex and could result in daydreaming unless the
prefrontal cortex asserts an influence by a) controlling thoughtprovoking interferences
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that give rise to distractions and b) providing a cognitive plan to guide the attention (i.e.,
the instructions for TM). He points to the research that indicates increased frontal
coherence with the practice of TM. Frontal coherence and increases at other derivation
pairs occur because of changes in thalamocortical “temporal integration” (i.e., EEG
coherence) which in turn depends upon prefontal cognitive functions. The
thalamocortical activity may be reorganized, Arenander suggests, through the repetition
of orienting and habituating during TM so that it supports a more distributed and
integrated mode of processing. The enhanced distribution and integration are reflected in
the reported increased spread of coherence across the brain in subjects participating in
longitudinal studies. Although low activation of the thalamus (inhibition) normally
would lead to loss of awareness (sleep), the increased connectedness of the brain permits
maintenance of awareness with the added benefit of increased allocation of brain
resources for stimulus evaluation. The thalamus contributes to high levels of cortical
coherence through the mechanism of the nucleus reticularis thalami (NRT). The NRT
exerts inhibitory influences on the thalamocortical sensory circuits by increasing its
oscillatory behavior. Such NRTthalamus feedback loops are reinforced by the cortico
thalamic discharges back upon the NRT and thalamus creating a stable basis for shifts of
attention during the TM process.
Note that Arenander suggests that the OR and habituation alternate. However,
other investigators (Thompson, Berry, Rinaldi, & Berger, 1979) suggest a “dualprocess”
trend in which sensitization of the OR can occur independent of habituation to repeated
stimulus. This causes two independent processes in the nervous system: habituation in the
reflex pathway and a more generalized sensitization of the “state” of the system. These
results suggest that sensitization may even serve as a necessary substrate for more
complex forms of associative learning (p. 37). This model could possibly provide a
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mechanism for Sokolov’s “stimulusmodel formation process,” according to the authors.
This dual process model supports the notion of the coexistence of two opposing states,
“restful alertness,” during TM more intuitively than the alternation of orientation and
habituation.
Fifth, overall, the individual experiences the alternation of ORs (according to
Arenander) and transcending (habituation) leading to progressively less excited states of
the central nervous system. Arenander notes that to maintain conscious awareness (and
not fall asleep), the MRF activity cannot be reduced completely. The maintenance of
MRF activity may result from the ORs that continue to be reevoked as the attention
repeatedly shifts.
Sixth, Arenander outlines the mechanisms of selective attention in greater detail.
In addition to any predefined task sequence, a direction of thought can also be defined
by the affective or motivational valence attributed to a particular stimulus or thought.
Cognition and affect are linked by the amygdaloid complex (AC), acting as part of the
limbic system. The AC can associate “reward” stimulus thereby giving it an affective
“match” and transferring it to the hypothalamus and BFS, leading to inhibition of the
physiology. The AC can also control cortical orientation by affective loading of selective
attention on the increased significance of lesser excited states of thought, leading to alert
awareness even while relaxed.
Seventh, focus of attention may also be aided by the activity of the locus
coeruleus (LC), known to control the ongoing state of the brain and behavior such as
wake and sleep. The LC acts to inhibit most neuronal cells in preparation for sleep state.
Arenander suggests that the LC may facilitate states of less physiological excitation that
appear in transcending. For example, reduction in the spontaneous activity of a cell
receiving an impulse dramatically increases the signaltonoise ratio. Thus, the ORs that
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do arise would be detected at earlier stages of processing, thereby biasing the thalamo
cortical structures towards supporting the focus of attention on transcending as well as
ignoring distracting stimuli. The LC, then, helps maintain high vigilance during the de
excited state of the brain and contributes to enhanced reliability and efficiency of feature
extraction during shifts of attention. Perhaps of greater interest is the outcome of recent
studies on the LC that suggest its role in cortical learning and plasticity. Arenander
suggests that the activation of the LC during transcending may modify the
thalamocortical system to allow new modes of neural organization to function during
ordinary activity. “Long term enhancement of brain function corresponding to least
excited states may support the conscious appreciation of a wider range (vertical) of
cognitive activity outside of meditation” (Arenander, 1986). Evidence supporting this
conjecture follows.
In summary, Arenander’s “transcending reflex” is hypothesized to increase the
EEG coherence in a fashion that enhances the adaptive functions of the brain. What
additional support can be given for Arenander’s model? Let us examine other evidence
regarding orientation and habituation in relation to cognitive aptitudes.
In her presidential address to the Pavlovian Society, Kimmel (1985) discussed the
“functional stability of the nervous system: a neurobiological basis of intelligence,” and
suggested that such functional stability may be modified by experience. Among other
evidence for a neurobiological basis for intelligence, Kimmel reports that gifted
intelligence children maintain larger and more persistent orienting responses (ORs) in the
form of skin conductance responses to visual stimuli than do average intelligence children
(DeBoskey, Kimmel, & Kimmel, 1979). Kimmel draws the concept of ”functional
stability” from the work of Nebylitsn, who in turn joins Pavlov’s idea of strength of the
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central nervous system (CNS) with Teplov’s concept of CNS “weakness” or high
reactivity to stimuli. Strength, in this case, refers to the “ability of the system to continue
responding under repeated stimulation.” Weakness refers to “the more sensitive CNS
(that) may be changed from a state of rest to one of catabolic, or destructive, activity by
extremely weak stimuli” (p. 59). Kimmel writes: “Strength and sensitivity both are
reflections of the same property of the CNS....Where strength is manifested in the ability
to tolerate excitation without reduction in response, sensitivity is manifested in an
instability and vulnerability to outside influences” (p. 60). According to Kimmel, a well
known researcher of OR and habituation phenomenon, contemporary measures of the
functional stability of the CNS are the resistance to habituation over many repetitions, and
the continued positive magnitude of the OR, both shown to be significantly correlated
with intelligence measures.
ORs Support Cognitive Success
Kimmel (1985) gives examples where intelligence measures have been influenced
by training or motivation. In DeBoskey, Kimmel, and Kimmel (1979), money was paired
with an OReliciting stimulus (a geometric form that changed shape or color in each trial)
for the experimental group, while the control group received no reward for observing the
stimulus. Half of each group was average intelligence (mean of about 101 IQ) and half
was gifted children (mean of about 145 IQ). Mean age was about 10 years. Among both
groups, the rewarded children maintained ORs with greater magnitude implying that
motivation enhances attentiveness towards successful performance. The gifted children
made lesser increases in OR, perhaps manifesting a ceiling effect not experienced by the
average children for whom monetary incentive did cause a gradual increase in OR
changes over the 18 trials. This evidence of “plasticity” (i.e., changes in ORs) in CNS
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functional stability must be viewed with some caution, according to Kimmel, given only a
few and inconclusive studies.
However, not mentioned by Kimmel, Zeiner’s (1979) study reported a significant
correlation of r = .47 between OR magnitude (skin resistance response) and fouryear
cumulative college GPA among 19 subjects preselected for high and low ORs. Zeiner
suggests the results indicate that the OR is an objective index of attention, which is
related, in turn, to academic performance. Zeiner also notes that his high OR subjects
were biased towards science majors (math, physics, electrical engineering, and
psychology). The low OR subjects selected majors in Spanish, physical education, dance,
and business.
ORs may reflect when individuals respond to attentional challenges not only
momentarily, but habitually as in the case of genderrelated predisposition. For example,
Castelman, Brennan, and Kimmel (1979) studied a visualspatial task of field
independence, the Embedded Figures Test, in relation to gender differences in auditory
evoked ORs. They found the predicted higher performance in males on the EFT, and also
slower habituation across trials upon listening to three randomly alternating tones. While
there was no correlation between habituation rate and EFT performance, the authors
ventured to speculate that the females habituated faster to the varying tones owing to
acculturation–socialization history and environmental factors.
The emotionally sterile laboratory environment may have been intrinsically less
interesting to the females, which would cause the stimuli to be perceived by them
as irrelevant or inconsequential, while appearing to the males as a part of the
problem to be analyzed (p. 663).
The authors also report prior research in which males displayed higher skin
conductance responses to visual stimuli than females presumably for similar reasons,
although they indicate that the male physiology may also be responsible.
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More specific to the attentional role of ORs, Maltzman (1979b) finds evidence
indicating that the “signal value” of a stimulus can be nonverbal, as well as verbal in a
problemsolving situation. He discusses at length findings of Russian researchers that
link stages of chess game problem solving with ORrelated changes in the GSR. In seven
cases, the GSR occurred simultaneously with the verbal solution, but in 31 cases, it
occurred perhaps a minute or so prior to the verbal solution. This suggests that variation
of problemsolving schema may be related to OR phenomenon, which have also been
shown to vary across individuals relative to their cognitive skills. Maltzman (1979b)
relates Luria’s clinical research that the voluntary OR depends on the normal functioning
of the prefrontal cortex, loss of which leads to loss of normal ORs and purposive
behavior. EEG changes were shown to be different, as well, for frontal patients compared
with posteriorlesioned patients. Posterior patients show deficits in the reception and
processing of auditory, tactual, or visual information. But their goaldirected or
purposive behavior is relatively intact. In contrast, patients with lesions in the prefrontal
cortex show a deficit in voluntary or goaldirected behavior, although their speech and the
reception and processing of sensory information are relatively intact (p. 329).
Relating these ideas of CNS functional stability and training to Arenander’s
transcending reflex model, it can be hypothesized that during TM the individual develops
the neurophysiological prerequisites for enhancing resistance to habituation and for
generating continued ORs to stimuli to which significance has been attached. Among
TM subjects, these changes have been reflected physiologically in longitudinal increases
in anterior coherence and psychologically in longitudinal cognitive improvements as
described in Chapter II. I suggest that the experience of TM conditions the mind to adopt
a mental set whereby preattentive mechanisms separate “task” stimuli from distracting
thoughts, creating for the subject a voluntary OR when exposed to the thought of the
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mantra (an intentional thought), and habituation when exposed to distracting
(unintended) thoughts.
This preattentive mechanism may carry over into daily activity, thereby giving rise
to the increases in cognitive skills listed above. For example, Öhman (1979) describes the
relation between OR and preattentive mechanisms, suggesting that identification of a
stimulus does not require central processing. Unattended stimuli can be completely
processed, such as detection of one’s own name or becoming influenced by an unattended
verbal source when interpreting the meaning of the attended phrase (p. 448). The results
of preattentive processing can lead to activation of the central attentive processors in two
cases: when the “mismatch” of stimuli and shortterm memory representations appear to
have adaptive consequences, or when the “match” identifies the stimulus as significant.
In the current study, the fail groups’ relatively poorer performance on the spatial
tasks, Vessels and Shadows, may result from failure of preattentive processes to identify
the INRC group operations as salient to the subject. The lack of salience may result from
lower ORs that in turn result from an inability of the brain substrata to support attentive
ORs in the hemisphere devoted to visualspatial representations, typically the right
hemisphere. Note that the lack of salience could also be partially an outcome of personal
historical influences during development (e.g., parents do not encourage any INRC group
activities).
See de Pibaupierre (1989) for a discussion of individual differences in acquisition
of Piagetian operations, particularly differences that tend to be dichotomized by INRC
group vs. combinatorial lattice operations. Another dichotomy appears to be verbal vs.
spatial. Taken together, there appears to be “at least four different says to enter the formal
operational stage” (p. 89).
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Stable Evoked Potentials Support ORs
In the same address mentioned above, Kimmel also discusses evidence of
“functional stability” from studies that related intelligence and EEG, in this case, evoked
potentials (EPs). She points out that Hendrickson and Hendrickson (1979) demonstrated
correlations of .773 between intelligence and a measure of auditoryevoked potential
(AEP) complexity—the total length of positive and negative excursions of the AEP, called
the “string measure.” The clarity of the peaks and troughs of a set of averaged AEPs are
a function of the stability or nonvariance in their shape across the numerous trials
required to obtain the AEP. This suggests that low intelligence results from the random
transmission errors that hypothetically destabilize the timing of the peaks and troughs of
the AEP, presumably the result of a “functionally unstable” CNS. These random errors
then smooth out the peaks and troughs, thus “shortening” the positive and negative
excursions. The above correlation may be an overestimate due to the use of groups of
predetermined high and low IQ children. However, a followup study of adults with the
Raven’s Advanced Matrices test found a correlation of .47, perhaps attenuated owing to a
limited range of IQs.
As evidence of “plasticity” of CNS orienting capabilities, Kimmel reports several
instances where the habituability of evoked potentials was modified either using
instructions to perform a task, which postponed habituation indefinitely, (i.e., maintaining
an OR)., or using biofeedback to directly influence a visible segment of the AEP. The
feedback paradigm, incidentally, improved subjects’ ability to detect and locate visual
stimuli, which Kimmel interpreted to indicate greater sensitivity to “weak stimuli” in
Teplov’s sense. However, we must recall that increased sensitivity is a hallmark of the
OR in general. Kimmel’s address offers much to the current discussion. The several
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topics will be addressed in order, and then taken up from the perspective of the “standard
cognitive state” (TM) used in the current research.
of Attention
While much can be found to criticize in the Hendrickson and Hendrickson work
(Stowell, 1985) and although some studies have failed to replicate the findings (Shagass,
Roemer, Straumanis, & Josiassen, 1981; Vogel, Kruger, Schalt, Schnobel, & Hassling,
1987), there still remains compelling evidence regarding neural correlates to IQ that
motivates continued investigation (see Chen & Buckley, 1988, and Mackintosh, 1986 for
reviews). For example, Haier, Robinson, Braden and Williams, D. (1983) found that
stimulus intensity for visualevoked potential research was systematically related to the
degree the evoked potential (EP) correlated to intelligence (Raven’s Advanced
Progressive Matrices test), perhaps explaining some of the inconsistencies in previously
reported studies. Under optimum intensity conditions, these writers found correlations up
to .5 for the string measure and up to .59 for P200 amplitude, and up to .69 for the peak
topeak excursion between N140 and P200. (Note: “P200” is the postitive peak that
occurs roughly 200 msec after stimulus onset. “N140” is the negative peak that occurs
roughly 140 msec after stimulus onset.) They also concluded that the string measure was
explained primarily by the N140/P200 excursion with a maximum correlation of .80
between the two.
Haier et al. (1983) identify several sources of the imputed IQ/EP relationship.
Both of them relate to Kimmel’s concept of “functional stability” as reflected in less
variability among EPs. First, other studies report that highIQ subjects demonstrated
more stable waveforms across the EP samples than low IQ subjects. The authors suggest
these findings are analogous to the EP differences between the IQ groups that is produced
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by the more intense stimulation: for both cases, higher IQ and increased intensity, the
N140P200 excursion is greater. The excursion is greater due to less variation among the
EP samples (i.e., greater “stability”). Second, other studies indicate that the EPs can be
affected by “state” changes or the deployment of “attention,” as well as stimulus intensity.
Each point is developed in the following. Both points suggest that CNS functions
determine how well the subject attends to significant stimuli.
Regarding the first point, Haier, et al. suggest that the influence of intensity in
discriminating IQ levels “supports the view that higher intelligence is a consequence of
greater activation in general of central processes (mediating N140P200 amplitude in
particular) in response to normal levels of stimulation.” They cite support from Robinson
(1982a, 1982b, 1983) who found that WAIS performance scores and Embedded Figures
Test scores were positively related to a measure of “balance” in strength, as defined in
Pavlovian terms. Robinson defined “balance” by measures of cortical responsivity to a
largefield, diffuse illumination that is sinusoidally modulated at various frequencies.
Robinson suggests that his statistically significant results link the optimum function of the
diffuse thalamocortical system (DST) with optimum balance of excitation and inhibition,
as represented in Pavlov’s concept of CNS “strength.” In other words, the EEG amplitude
(at Pz) is driven neither too much nor too little by variations in the light source. Said
another way, with “balance,” the CNS neither orients too little nor habituates too much to
stimuli.
Based on these results, Robinson suggests that CNS “balance” influences
variation in psychological style among his subjects: field independence (Embedded
Figures Test) and intelligence (WAIS performance test), both indicators of discrimination
skills. Robinson suggests future research into the relationship of WAIS subtests with
“different patterns of DTS mediated background activation of the cerebral cortex,”
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suggesting specifically future research with EEG coherence. Of course, this was the
general intent of the Thatcher (1983) and Hernandez (1985) studies or any study,
including the current study, that investigates links between EEG coherence and cognitive
individual differences.
Haier et al.’s second point suggests attentional factors play a role in the strength of
the OR. This implies that “strength” of the CNS (ability to sustain the OR) must take into
account the notion of the “significance” or “voluntary” OR. (Olst, Heemstra, &
Kortenaar, 1979; Maltzman, 1979 a,b). Also, “weakness” (susceptibility to stimuli) must
take into account whether the stimulus is indeed salient or whether it is distracting (for
which the ability to habituate the OR would be best). In both cases, the notion of a
direction of attention becomes important. Direction, or selectivity of attention, is
controlled by the subject’s level of development. The adult has far greater resistance to
distraction, and far greater access to goaldirected attention, than the child (Stuss, 1992;
Cooley and Morris, 1990). The adult is far more capable of “gating out” such
distractions. In Piagetian terms, selective attention in the service of a goal would be called
“anticipation” whereas the ability to resist distraction (defined as nongoal directed)
would be called “decentration.” These terms will be discussed in greater detail below.
First, let us examine the background for this higherlevel understanding of “gating out” of
distractionsalso known as decentering.
Waters, McDonald, and Koresko (1977) explore the behavioral implications of
gating mechanisms by addressing the question of whether selective attention consists
solely of the ability to maintain strong ORs in the face of repeated stimulation, or whether
it also requires the ability to habituate to distractions “whereby irrelevant and distracting
stimuli are ‘gated out’ (removed from attention and further processing)” (p. 229). To test
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this hypothesis, the authors compared four groups on their ability to respond with a
correct answer after listening to a taped male voice reading simple mathematical
problems. Various measures of autonomic reactivity evaluated the strength of the OR
throughout the experiment. The groups differed in the type of distraction (female voice,
500 Hz tone, none) during the math problems and in amount of prior opportunity to
habituate to the distraction. The results indicated that prior habituation to stimuli that
later became distractors resulted in better task performance and resulted in less skin
resistance fluctuations than subjects performing undistracted. The authors conclude that
the process of attention is
at the very least a dual process. One, an attention facilitation process, likely
involves the sensitization of responses (phasic and tonic ORs) that enhance
sensory reception, arouse the organism for energy expenditure and action on
stimuli, and prepare the organism for central processing of further input.
Attention facilitation responses are most probably elicited by stimuli labeled as
salient, perhaps on the basis that they are part of an active reinforcement
contingency (Mackintosh, 1975). It is this attention facilitation process that has
been the primary focus of psychophysiological research on attention (c.f., Raskin,
1973). The other process, an attention inhibition process, likely involves the
habituation of responses that enhance sensory reception, arouse the organism for
energy expenditure and action on stimuli, and prepare the organism for central
processing of further input....Interaction between attention facilitation and
attention inhibition processes would enable selective attention (p. 235).
These “gating” functions represent activity conducted by the anterior portion of
the cortex, the frontal lobes. For example, Brunia (1993) extends Skinner and Yingling’s
(1977) model for control of sensory input to include control of motor outputs. The frontal
cortex selects input or outputs by activating inhibitory neurons associated with the
unwanted input or output, thus leaving the selected pathway uninhibited. This resultant
access to the cortex from the thalamus is manifested as a local cortical arousal.
“Selection implies excitation within an environment of inhibition...Thus, the investigation
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of motor preparation and attention will reveal signs of both excitation and inhibition”
(Brunia, 1993, p. 328). Thus, while the previous discussion of cognitive excitation and
inhibition could refer to “alertness,” (a cognitive feature), Brunia’s model of motor
excitation and inhibition could refer to “restfulness” (a motor feature). The transcending
reflex, then, could shift various regulation mechanisms in the direction of coexisting
“restful alertness” with subsequent positive effects.
Mackintosh (1986), looking critically at various psychophysiological measures
that seem to correlate with IQ such as reaction time, the “string measure,” or inspection
time, suggests that they may reflect differences among subjects in concentration or
sustained attention, a more “basic” function that the other measures reflect to varying
degrees. An obvious candidate for this more basic function is selective attention, with
OR and habituation mechanisms supporting it. Regarding the string measure in particular
(Cf. Haier et al., 1983, discussed above), Mackintosh observes that the variance among
the EPs correlates with IQ as highly as the string measure of their average (r =.72 for the
string measure and r =.72 for the variance) implying that the variance indicates variation
of attention. Makintosh confirmed this inverse relation between variance and IQ by
finding lower correlations between IQ and string length calculated on each individual trial
(r =.52, significantly different than r =.72). This implies that relative to IQ, the
cumulative measure of EPs reflects attentional variance more than the single EP reflects
brain function. Mackintosh also points out that the standard deviation of reaction time
holds up as the best correlate of g (general intelligence) in relatively homogeneous groups
at a variety of ability levels, with r’s from .3 to .45. The simplest explanation for each
of these findings, according to Mackintosh, who indicates confirming studies, “is an
association between IQ and willingness or ability to maintain concentration on a routine
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task” (p. 14). Again, this is a function of maintaining OR to significant stimuli, which, in
turn, is a function of the anterior, frontal cortex.
Further evidence comes from Segalowitz, Unsal, and Dywan (1992) who
compared 18 “bright” 12 yearold children with 22 normal peers on skills related to
executive functions associated with the prefrontal area, simple attention and memory
tasks, and auditory oddball P300s, among other measures. Twentytwo adults (mean age
of 32.5) provided a second control group on the EP data. Congruent with the discussion
above regarding Kimmel’s concept of “functional stability” and EPs, the P300 amplitude
correlated significantly with scores on the vocabulary test from the WAISR measured
across both groups of children. Relative to the above discussion of EP variance, the
researchers found that among the normal group of children (and the combined groups of
bright and normal children) the P300 “amplitude jitter” was significantly less for those
who show better performance on the frontal measures (r’s ranging from .42 to .56).
The authors find that the stability of the P300 amplitude is a “strongly developmental
phenomenon,” able to predict a variety of intellectual measures including those associated
with the frontal system. They suggest that the amplitude stability is determined, in this
experiment, by
the cognitive effort or attention allocated to the stimulus...Thus, perhaps
amplitude jitter is an indication of the subject’s consistency in focusing on the
stimulus...What is still developing after 12 years of age is not the ability to
generate a P300 response to a stimulus, but rather the control over attention that
is necessary for the consistent production of P300 waveform components (p. 293,
my italics).
Also, the authors conclude from their electrophysiological measures that the
functions of the posterior area mature earlier than the prefrontal portion. “Our data
represent the first documentation that the prefrontal area shows electrophysiological
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activity suggesting very slow maturation in humans. This is consistent with the notion
that the prefrontal lobe is not functionally mature until young adulthood, whereas
posterior systems are functionally mature in middle childhood” (p. 295). These
observations suggest that a person may do well on a standard psychometric test of
intelligence or even traditional academic, teachercentered curricula, yet do less well on a
test of formal reasoning, because the frontal area has yet to mature. This may also
suggest a causal mechanism by which some students can do well in a college nonscience
curriculum, yet do poorly on tests of formal reasoning. Presumably, the nonscience
curriculum taps less frontal skills than the science curriculum which is typically oriented
towards solving novel problems that demand selforiginated solution patterns.
Kimmel (1985) suggested that “functional stability” is associated with decreased
variability between EPs and with increased amplitude of EPs. While Kimmel discussed
this topic in the context of paying attention to presumably significant stimuli, we can
adduce implications for EP behavior under conditions of nonsignificant stimuli.
Ignoring irrelevant stimuli is the process of “decentration” according to Piaget, as
explained in Chapter V. The literature suggests that subjects exposed to stimuli perceived
as irrelevant to their current task should have diminished EPs, if they have any EPs at all.
For example, Federico (1985) administered distracting clicks randomly with an
average interval of 1.5 seconds to subjects studying a training booklet on pulsed radar.
The auditory evoked potentials were measured in terms of the mean EP amplitude and
standard deviations over a period of 512 msec after the stimulus (Cf. variance among EPs
constituting the “string measure” of Hendrickson and Hendrickson (1979) discussed by
Kimmel (1985) and Mackintosh, (1986)). The measured sites were F3, T3, P3, and O1 as
well as the homologous sites on the other hemisphere. Federico found that the below
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average learners demonstrated higher mean EP amplitudes and greater standard
deviations than the aboveaverage learners. Note that the auditory clicks were a
distraction, therefore, the larger amplitude of the EP (and greater SDs) represent failure to
habituate to the distraction while reading the instructional material. The larger amplitude
EPs were recorded in the right hemisphere frontal, temporal and parietal regions, as well
as the left parietal area indicating that the poor learners engaged these areas less in the
concept learning task than their counterparts who learned better. Frederico concludes
that the right hemisphere appears significantly associated with concept learning, “not
only LH regions as proposed in the popular asymmetric model of the brain” (p. 249).
This supports the findings of the current study, as well. Frederico reviews similar studies
of EPs and cognitive performance and links the findings to proposed anatomical sites for
fluid, Gf, and crystallized, Gc, abilities. Not consonant with the theory I am developing,
Frederico equates the crystallized abilities with frontal, temporal and parietal regions,
based on his prior EP research that link these areas with
general aptitude (i.e. comprehending language, solving arithmetic problems) and
verbal and reading skill (understanding English words and prose passages), which
are chiefly measures of Gc. ERPs evoked in the occipital areas were generally
associated with spatial ability (i.e. manipulating spatial patterns), field
dependenceindependence (i.e. processing analytically vs. globally), reflection
impulsivity (i.e. deliberating vs. acting impulsively), tolerance of ambiguity (i.e.
inclining to accept complex issues) and cognitive complexity (i.e., perceiving the
environment in a multidimensional manner), which are chiefly measures of Gf (p.
244).
More investigation is required to reconcile this approach with my own
conclusions. As a start, however, it appears reasonable to suggest a reinterpretation of the
putative Gf posterior functions as more “automatized” than volitional functions, thus
restoring them to the class of crystallized functions. The putative Gc frontal functions
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must be examined in the light of the actual tasks. Perhaps frontal, adaptive, volitional
processes (as mentioned in Chapter V, Kimble and Perlmuter, 1970) were required to
perform them well, even though at face value, the listed tasks appear to represent
automatized knowledge. For example, Shallice and Evans (1978) tested patients with
localized posterior and anterior cerebral lesions using questions that apparently required
general knowledge available to almost all subjects, but for which estimation was required
and no immediately obvious strategy was available. (E.g., “How long is an average man’s
spine?”, “What is the largest fish in the world?”, “How many slices in a sliced loaf?”)
The frontal patients responded with significantly more “bizarre” answers than the
posterior patients, even after covarying for intelligence as measured by Raven’s Matrices
test. The authors concur with Luria (1966)
that the selection and regulation of cognitive planning is one of the main functions
of the human frontal lobes. Such planning functions would presumably be
mediated through highlevel programs which control the operation of lowerlevel
cognitive programs themselves more posteriorly sited....On this view routine
motor skills and routine cognitive skills such as the performing of mechanical
arithmetic calculations would mainly require the use of only the lowerlevel
programs. Even conventional intelligence tests, where a series of problems of the
same type is presented with gradually increasing difficulty, seem to demand the
use of relatively routine even though complicated cognitive operations (Shallice
and Evans, 1978, p. 301).
This view contradicts the Frederico findings, thus suggesting the need to
investigate the source of the apparent discrepancy.
However, both Frederico’s work and the work of Shallice and Evans illuminate
Piaget’s concept of “decentering” as an element of cognitive growth. To decenter requires
the subject to ignore outmoded or inapplicable schema that have been automatized. To
overcome automitized responses to stimuli requires that the subject exercise volitional
control, at least until the higher level schema is automatized.
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A Role for Coherence in Accommodation and
Reequilibration
How does the subject make the automatized behavior volitional? Given the
previous discussion, the frontal regions appear responsible for supporting the
“assimilation scheme” that governs all accommodation. The frontal regions are
responsible for “paying attention.” Kimble and Perlmuter (1970) point out that
automatized responses become volitional upon “paying attention” to the action, with
subsequent inhibition of the action. Piaget would suggest that the individual must
become aware of some contradiction between the behaviors of the objects themselves and
the concepts used to explain the behavior of objects. It appears reasonable to suggest that
this, too, is a form of “paying attention” and is prerequisite to higher forms of
equilibration.
“Paying attention” may have its neurological representation in increased
synchrony of EEG between various parts of the brain. Livanov (1977) reports that his
research on “crosscorrelation” of EEG during mental arithmetic (multiplication of two
twodigit numbers) indicates “a sharp increase in the number of cortical areas with high
crosscorrelation coefficients” (p. 120). (Note that crosscorrelation is an analog of
coherence that measures the “coherence” across all frequencies at once.) Immediately
after the solution, the crosscorrelations drop back close to their initial values. Increase in
synchrony apparently also depends on subject expertise because two experienced
mathematicians demonstrated no increase in crosscorrelations during the mental
mathematics. This possibly indicates that automaticity in mathematical calculation is
inversely related to synchrony. Experienced mathematicians did not need to “pay
attention” with their frontal structures. For the nonmathematicians, the synchronous
sites were mostly located in the prefrontal lobes and the motor centers, with high
correlations between many of the sites.
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Livanov points out that the frontal lobe activity is “a crucial factor in human
activities which involve initiative. It determines the course of complex behavioral
patterns and seems to be largely responsible for human intellectual activity” (p. 123). The
motor centers coordinate with the frontal regions in the form of “ideomotor acts.”
Synchronization of cerebral sites is also reported for physical movements, with greater
anterior synchronization at the beginning of the activity. After “transition to a stable
regime of work,” anterior sites demonstrate greatly reduced amounts of crosscorrelation
between hemispheres and between the prefontal and motor areas. Other evidence
indicates that the number of positive correlations increases with age, with adults showing
more correlations than children during performance of voluntary motions. These
outcomes suggest that volitional activity engages the frontal area, manifesting in
increased synchrony. Adults presumably act with greater intent and more developed
frontal areas than children, therefore, resulting in greater anterior crosscorrelations.
Livanov’s work compares with similar findings for Busk and Galbraith (1975)
who found 420 Hz EEG coherence high during the learning phase of a 60 rpm pursuit
rotor task. The degree of coupling depended on the difficulty of the task, with frontal
premotor (Fz) to motor (C3 and C4) coupling decreasing with practice. Coupling
between visual areas and premotor (OzFz) did not decrease, suggesting that the visual
input remained stable during the task. These authors concluded that the coherence
measure they used reflected not only some aspects of anatomical pathways, but more
importantly, reflected dynamic functional brain organization that supported the task.
Posterior regions support learned activity, but with slower responses, when
unaided by frontal functions. For example, Livanov (1977) cites one study in which 5
subjects received a dosage of chlorpromazine while performing mental arithmetic.
Chlorpromazine is known to inhibit the “tonic effect of the ascending reticular activating
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system (RAS), which is most closely associated with the anterior parts of the cerebral
cortex” (p. 126). The crosscorrelations decreased markedly in the frontal areas, while
the infraparietal and other regions maintained their level of synchrony. Notably, the
calculations were made at a slower rate. Livanov concludes that the infraparietal zone
“represents a posterior association zone which seems to be able to ensure all the
necessary forms of integrative cerebral activity” (p. 126), granting that the frontal lobes
still participate with much reduced activity. The association of the RAS with anterior
functions suggests the importance of “alertness” in the process of problem solving and
other frontal activity that may not show up in traditional IQ measures.
Note that the subjective experience during TM is one of mental alertness co
incident with physiological restfulness. A recent review by Jevning, Wallace, and
Beidebach (1992) suggests that many of the physiological effects of TM reflect a state of
increased alertness or CNS activation especially at periods of subjectively deepest
transcending. “Such states are accompanied by high amplitude theta and/or fast
frequency beta bursts consistent with activation...[Outside of TM, findings indicate]
decreased reaction time and other improvements in sensory and motor performance [that]
can be associated with a more alert state of the central nervous system” (p. 421).
Increased CNS activation during TM is also indicated by increased coherence, as well as
increased cerebral blood flow and other changes in peripheral circulation and metabolism
to support the increased activation. In contrast to mental alertness, the authors also point
out that the subjective experience of deep restfulness is supported by measures such as
decreased whole body, muscle, and red cell metabolism, plus decreased plasma thyroid
and adrenocortical hormone production. Other indicators of rest include the decrease or
disappearance of EMG (muscle tension), and decreased galvanic skin resistance and/or
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decreased phasic skin resistance response. Together, these features characterize TM as a
subjective experience of “restful alertness.”
Relationships Between EEG Alpha Coherence and
Increased EPs for Voluntary ORs
The coherence research cited above and in Chapter II suggests that enhanced
rhythmic coordination between spatially distant anterior locations (coherence) somehow
improves cognitive performance. I have suggested the improvements result from
enhanced voluntary ORs (anticipation),and the enhanced ability to resist distraction
(decentration) which in turn result from changes in the ongoing EEG. Empirically, the
phenomenon of enhanced ORs in relation to ongoing EEG has been studied in several
contexts. For example, Galbraith (1967) studied a special “weighted coherence” average
to evaluate the effects of increased coherence on the visualevoked response in the rhesus
monkey with implanted electrodes. He found that many of the derivation pairs
demonstrated greater EPs when immediately prior to the flash of light the pair had
weighted coherence above the mean, compared with instances when the coherence was
below the mean. In several derivations, the opposite held, suggesting that certain brain
centers hold responsibility for inhibiting visual signal processing. More important,
however, is Galbraith’s observation that “complex patterns of ongoing brain coupling
occurring just prior to, and at the moment of, stimulation, exerted a marked influence
upon the brain’s response to the stimulus. These results suggest that trialtotrial
variability in evoked response amplitude is not a form of CNS ‘noise,’ but a predictable
consequence of dynamically organized functional brain states” (p. 226). This implicates
the role of coherence in the improvement of cognitive functions, both anteriorly
(increased coherence) and posteriorly (decreased coherence).
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Basar (1980) has spearheaded continued investigation into the brain dynamics that
link the nature of the EP with the ongoing EEG. Recent research on humans (Basar &
Stampfer, 1985) has implicated ongoing alpha with enhanced auditory and visual EPs
that demonstrate greater amplitude, and more importantly, decreased variability in timing
relative to the stimulus onset. They write:
We have presented evidence that expectancy and selective attention are associated
with regular, frequent target stimuli [and] result in highly synchronized EEG
activity. This regular “limit cycle” activity occurs in various frequency ranges
between 1 and 40 Hz...Accordingly, we tentatively conclude that 14 Hz, 47 Hz
and 813 Hz activities serve as “operators” in the selective filtering of expected
target stimuli....Furthermore, experiments in this study have shown that a regular
pattern of stimulation can induce a “preferred” phase angle, which appears to
facilitate an optimal brain response to the sensory input [i.e., a particular phase of
the alpha cycle is time locked to the stimulus presentation] (p. 175).
The authors indicate that subjects’ EEG was flexible, and that unconscious,
preattentive mechanisms adjusted the phase of the EEG alpha to meet stimulus demands
for optimum processing.
When subjects were not informed that target stimuli would be presented regularly
and alternately, their EEG activity appears to have developed an “operator state”
spontaneously....[the] EEG operators appear to modulate the response
characteristics as a function of learning (p. 175).
In a companion paper, Basar, BasarEroglu, Rosen and Schutt (1984) suggest that,
“At present, it can be only stated in general that the preparation rhythms may reflect
several cognitive processes such as expectancy, conditioning, habituation, attention, and
even shortterm memory” (p. 19). However, at this time, it is reasonable to link these
phenomenon with learning processes and, as mentioned above, enhanced amplitude and
decreased variability of the EPs, indicating greater attentiveness.
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Some evidence has accumulated that the practice of TM is related to EP changes.
Goddard (1989) reports that a group of elderly TM practitioners demonstrated
significantly shorter P300 latencies in a visual oddball paradigm compared with matched
controls. No differences were found however, on an auditory oddball task. Goddard
suggests that longterm practice of TM may retain a more youthful style of functioning
(i.e., maintain shorter latencies). Kobal, Wandhofer, and Plattig (1976) found shorter
latencies in a TM group, both in an awake state and in meditation, compared to a control
group in both awake and semisomnolent states. The authors suggest the shorter latencies
“may be connected with an improvement or acceleration of the sensory perception.” But
of greater interest, in relation to findings related by Basar and Stampfer (1985), Kobal et
al. suggest that, “These results seem to be due primarily to the very characteristic change
in the background activity of the EEG in meditators as compared to controls. During the
period of activity between meditation sections we find an increase of the 89 Hz
components of the alpha band” (p. 827). This indicates that outside of TM, subjects
evidenced greater 89 Hz activity, a frequency that Basar and Stampfer suggest serve as
an “operator” for selective attention.
Conclusion–A Neuropsychology of Equilibration Processes
in the Context of TM
In a sense, Kimble and Perlmuter (1970) present their research as a volitional
“stimulusresponse” (SR) behavioral model for “transcending” (Piaget’s term) prior
“involuntary” SR conditioning. This supports the potential for a mental technique such as
TM (Transcendental Meditation) to enhance frontal skills in enhancing significance ORs
and diminishing involuntary ORs using the “transcending reflex” described by
Arenander. I suggest that the “transcending reflex” is a volitional event that generalizes
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to allow acquisition of control over involuntary responses. For example, in the context of
their own research, Kimble and Perlmuter write:
Such studies as there are of these processes suggest that the acquisition of control
over involuntary responses is always accomplished with the aid of supporting
responses already under voluntary control. The desired response is elicited
initially as a part of a larger pattern of reactions. With practice the supporting
responses gradually drop out, an accomplishment that required a careful paying of
attention to the desired behavior and a simultaneous ignoring of the others. With
still further practice the now voluntary reaction becomes capable of being
performed without deliberate intent. What was once involuntary and later became
voluntary is now involuntary again, in the sense of being out of awareness and
free of previous motivational control” (p. 382).
Even given the obvious differences between this paradigm of rather simple SR
conditioning and Piaget’s more complex topic of mental structures, I am still willing to
suggest this is a picture of what Piaget calls the “turntaking” between “new possibles”
and “previous necessities” mentioned in Chapter V. Kimble and Perlmuter suggest that
volition over voluntary response can be attained by “paying attention.” For Piaget the
picture would be viewed as the cycle of accommodation to an assimilation scheme, and
the expression of growing equilibration between differentiation and integration. The
“new possibles,” “accommodation,” and “differentiation” represent the “temporal,” or
sequentially contemplated form of cognition (i.e., “paying attention”). Kimble and
Perlmuter appear to identify this as the “voluntary” act.
These authors, as well as Piaget, suggest that one of the outcomes of the voluntary
act, (“cognitive construction” for Piaget) can be a consolidation into a new “automatized”
action (which Piaget terms an “atemporal structure,” or “necessity”). Piaget suggests that
the individual “transcends” the temporal cognitive construction, thereby “integrating” the
temporal construction into the atemporal schema. The same concept in neobehavioral
terms is that the volitional behavior becomes automatized.
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I suggest that in each case, the constructive or volitional process is handled by the
anterior, frontal regions of the brain. The resulting consolidated structure then is handled
by the posterior regions of the brain. Lack of development of one or more of the frontal
regions could impede successful adaptation or accommodation to new circumstances.
The current study indicates, to varying degrees, that failure on the formal tasks is
associated with diminished anterior L and R coherences. Also, in Chapter V, Directions
for Future Research, I suggested that bilateral occipital coherence, positively correlated
with fail performance, may be a necessary correlate, within certain boundaries, of
diminished L and R coherence. These points round out my attempt to bring together two
major thrusts of contemporary psychological research: neuropsychology and
constructivist developmental psychology.
APPENDIX
Subject Release and Background Letter
Approval Letter for Use of Human Subjects
Chemicals Scoring Sheet
Communicating Vessels Scoring Sheet
Projection of Shadows Scoring Sheet
Correlations Scoring Sheet
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238

239
Dear Research Participant,
The development of successful instructional methods at MIU can be aided by
systematic research into the variety of problem solving methods students use. Your
participation contributes directly toward structuring instructional methods which are
oriented toward student interests and aptitudes at MIU. Thank you for your cooperation.
Please sign the agreement below:
Sincerely,
John Sorflaten
“I agree to participate in the study.” _________________________________________
name date
Background Data
1. Major___________________________ 2. Year__________________
3. Age_________________ ________ 4. Years of college prior to MIU _______
years months Years at MIU________
5. Your most fulfilling areas of activity (list types of work or academic subjects or
hobbies):
6. Your most successful areas of activity in the eyes of others (list work, subjects,
hobbies, etc.):
7. Your least fulfilling areas of activity (list):
8. Your least successful areas in the eyes of others (list):
9. Now, considering number 7 as your highest level of fulfillment and success combined
and number 1 as your lowest level of fulfillment and success combined, circle the number
which best reflects your general feeling toward these areas:
Lowest Highest
Art (kind: ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Science (kind: ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Verbal disciplines such as literature, humanities, foreign language
(kind) ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mathematics (kind: ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Your current course at MIU:
11. Do you consider yourself lefthanded or ambidextrous in any regular activity such as
writing, eating, or sports? (list)
241
Chemicals Scoring Sheet
Ident________
Date_________
Mark “g” where S starts with “g”
Draw line to show where E asks if all possible ways have been tried.
1. Does S use systematic scheme to keep track of trials?
no yes mental = m Indicate on each trial S’s
paper = p system (m,p,vo) and the cumulative number
of cups
visual objects = vo
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2. “Have you made all the possible ways of mixing the solutions?”
S says: yes no don't know maybe
Actually: yes no
S continues: yes no
3. “Can you tell me what each chemical does?” “How can you prove it?”
S appears to have been working with eye toward proof:
yes no maybe
S’s proof relies on deduction from table
physical demonstration
impression
4. (Optional) “Which chemicals are necessary for creating the color?”
“How do you know?”
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Communicating Vessels Scoring Sheet
Ident______
Date ______
1. Introduction
2. Single tube prediction:
Water level will go: up down remain the same
3. Identical tubes: Movable is at _____(E)
Tube B is at _____(S)
S measures? yes no
4. Conical tube: Movable tube is at _____(E).
Conical is at _____(S).
5. Bubble tube: Movable tube is at _____(E).
Conical tube is at _____(E).
See drawing: Bubble tube is at _____(S) (approximate per S or estimate on drawing)
Conical tube is at _____(S) (if different from E's)
Questions to subject:
Please describe what you would see when the contents of tube A are poured into tube B:
First, draw in the levels of tube A and the conical tube as they exist on the apparatus you
have been working with. (Use pen.)
Then draw in the outcome of pouring tube A contents into tube B. (Use pencil.)
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Please describe what you would see when the contents of tube A are poured into
tube B...
• First draw in the levels of tube A and the conical tube C as they exist on the
apparatus you have been working with. (Use pen.)
• Then draw in the outcome of pouring tube A contents into tube B. (Use pencil.)
A B C
244
Projection of Shadows Scoring Sheet
Ident_______
Date________
1. “Do you see the shadow?” no yes
2. Green ring compared with red ring shadow prediction:
larger smaller same
3. Green ring moved closer to screen prediction:
larger smaller same
4. One shadow with red and green: possible impossible will try
4a. 0. . . . . 1. . . . . 2. . . . . 3. . . . . 4. . . . . 5. . . . .
6. . . . . 7. . . . . 8. . . . . 9. . . . . 10
4b. 0. . . . . 1. . . . . 2. . . . . 3. . . . . 4. . . . . 5. . . . .
6. . . . . 7. . . . . 8. . . . . 9. . . . . 10
4c. 0. . . . . 1. . . . . 2. . . . . 3. . . . . 4. . . . . 5. . . . .
6. . . . . 7. . . . . 8. . . . . 9. . . . . 10
5. One shadow with white, red and green:
possible impossible will try
5a. 0. . . . . 1. . . . . 2. . . . . 3. . . . . 4. . . . . 5. . . . .
6. . . . . 7. . . . . 8. . . . . 9. . . . . 10
5b. 0. . . . . 1. . . . . 2. . . . . 3. . . . . 4. . . . . 5. . . . .
6. . . . . 7. . . . . 8. . . . . 9. . . . . 10
245
Correlations Scoring Sheet
Ident_________
Date__________
Set I
1. Relationship observed by S? yes no
2. (4,2,0,0)_______
3. (0,0,2,4)_______
4. (4,0,0,4)_______
5. yes no a______b______c______d______
6. (4,2,2,4) ________
Set II
7. Relationship observed by S? yes no
8. Relationship of set I is more same less than set II.
9. Group a:
b.
c.
d.
10. Set I a______b_______c_______d_______
Set II a______b______c______d______

Piaget's Concept of Formal Operational Reasoning and Whole Brain Function: Evidence From Eeg Alpha Coherence During Transcendental Meditation

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Piaget's Concept of Formal Operational Reasoning and Whole Brain Function: Evidence From Eeg Alpha Coherence During Transcendental Meditation

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PIAGET'S CONCEPT OF FORMAL OPERATIONAL REASONING

Vessels 13 12 92%

Formal Stage Criterion 54 1 or greater 39 72.2

V,S,Corr,Comb 54* 4 7.4

Mean 1.52171 .77955 .72371 .67726 .65397

SD .24227 .06291 .09358 .10071 .06735

Mean 1.50651 .78912 .70961 .69214 .68437

Shadows12 43 35 7.200 .007*** 4

Shadows12 43 40 3.267 .071 4

Shadows12 44 33 9.787 .002*** 4

Vessels 24 32 33 1.087 .297 14 60.9%

Vessels 24 33 34 .391 .532 10

Correlations 19 38 43 4.571 .032 3

Group N Mean S.D. t df p *

CorrelationsXAge .0001 1 .0001 .0008 .9780

F3F4 Frontal .7087 .1596

F3C3 Left .6497 .1514

F4C4 Right .6671 .1549

O1O2 Occipital .6885 .1533

F3F4 Frontal .7714 .0742

F3C3 Left .7114 .0785

F4C4 Right .6975 .0694

O1O2 Occipital .6782 .0764

F3F4 Frontal .8220 .046

F3C3 Left .7343 .093

F4C4 Right .7127 .084

F3F4 Frontal .7670 .051

F3C3 Left .7198 .065

F4C4 Right .7135 .071

EEG Parameter Formal Stage Criterion Vessels Shadows Correlations Combinations

Water level will go: up down remain the same

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