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L-8927, March 10, 1914) FACTS: This is an appeal which involves a question which arises from the interpretation of the first and second clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson. The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only that portion which their respective mothers would have taken if they been alive at the time the will was made; that the property should be divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number of sisters; that each living sister should take one-sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each one- sixth to be divided among said children equally. The appellants asserted that under a proper construction of the paragraphs of the codicil, the property should be divided equally between the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the same share that a sister receives. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall take per capita and in equal parts the property passing under the codicil in this case. RULING: Yes. The appellants' contention is well founded. The court finds expressions which seem to indicate with fair clearness that it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters and nieces. Upon looking at the codicil, it can be observed that: first, that the testatrix, in the first paragraph thereof, declares that after her husband's death she desires that "my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs‖; in the second place, that the testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and identifies each one of her heirs then living, in each one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the property. Among those mentioned specially are the nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters. Each one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the other and under exactly the same conditions; and in the third place, the last clause of the second paragraph of the codicil, taken together with the last clause of the first paragraph, is decisive of the intention of the testatrix. In the last clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to take under her will be name "so that they must take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives." We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires shall become the owners of her property on the death of her husband – her nieces as well as her sisters. We have also the final declaration of the testatrix that she desires that the sisters and the nieces shall
take and enjoy the property in equal parts. Thus, of the property passing under the codicil, the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall take per capita and in equal parts. (2) Austria vs. Reyes (February 27, 1970) Austria vs. Reyes (G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970) FACTS: Basilia Austria Vda. De Cruz filed a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners who were nephews and nieces of Basilia. The opposition was dismissed and the probate of the will was allowed. Under the will of Basilia, the bulk of her estate would pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Lyn Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. More than two years after her will was allowed, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was subsequently appointed as executor of her estate. However, the petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law. Such petition in intervention was allowed. More than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents. Before the date of the hearing arrived, one of the respondents Benita Cruz Meñez filed a motion asking the lower court to confine the petitioner‘s intervention to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent. The court granted the said motion. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the lower court. Hence, this instant petition for certiorari to have the order restricting petitioner‘s intervention to properties that were not included in the decedent‘s testamentary dispositions annulled was filed. ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of the heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent was false. RULING: Yes. Article 850 of the Civil Code provides ―The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.‖ Under this provision, before the institution of heirs may be annulled, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
From the use in the will of the terms ―sapilitang tagapagmana‖ (compulsory heirs) and ―sapilitang mana‖ (legitime), the petitioners contended that the institution of the respondents as heirs was only impelled by her belief that they were her compulsory heirs. However, the Court made mention of the fact that if such reason indeed prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, Basilia did not make it known in her will. The Court found petitioner‘s theory to be highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed the will. The Court could not annul the institution of heirs on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications. The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana" were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offered no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate which largely favored the respondents showed a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. This may be taken in comparison with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. If respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al, were excluded from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the estate by intestacy — a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent. (3) Maloles II vs. Philips (January 31, 2000) Maloles II vs. Philips (G.R. No. 129505, January 31, 2000) FACTS: In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He declared that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The petition was granted. Shortly after, he died. Octavio, his nephew, filed a ‗Motion for Intervention‘. He argued that as the nearest of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. ISSUE: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the probate proceeding. RULING: No. In order for a person to be allowed to intervene in a proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate or in the will or in the property to be affected by it. He must be an interested party or one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct. Octavio is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the decedent. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit
However. all such property shall be given to Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. 72706. Article 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.R. (4) Acain vs. i. Ordinarily. they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia. a legally adopted daughter of the deceased. The will shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Constantino). it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same . for she is not in the direct line. The oppositors Virginia. IAC (October 27. In cases for the probate of wills. probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator. whether the testator. and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings. No. His claim to being a creditor is belated as it has been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene and is not supported by evidence. being of sound mind. In case Segundo dies.from the latter only in case of intestacy.e. ISSUE: Whether or not there is preterition of compulsory heirs in the direct line under Article 854. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. He can only inherit if the will is annulled. or. A probate proceeding is terminated upon the issuance of the order allowing the probate of a will. NCC with regards to respondents. though mentioned. RULING: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein. October 27. 1987) FACTS: Constantino provided that all his Segundo (father of Segundo‘s children. His interest is therefore not direct or immediate. Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator. IAC (G. 1987) Acain vs. freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.. Insofar as the widow is concerned. there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance. although she is a compulsory heir.
Petitioner is not the appointed executor. The inheritance. forgery and undue influence occurred. At the outset. the Isarog property included. 2000) Non vs. No. or in the property to be affected by it. However. CA (G. except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. Petitioners are vague on how and in what manner fraud. neither a devisee nor a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment.R. intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs. ISSUE: Whether or not the exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado from the deed of extrajudicial settlement has had the effect of preterition RULING: Yes. remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. . or in the will. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. 2000) FACTS: Petitioners contended that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation. 137287. in the extrajudicial settlement. CA (February 15. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate. February 15. her part of the conjugal property. When Virginia died intestate. which vested from the moment of death of the decedent.amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. was transmitted to her heirs — her husband Julian and their children. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs . She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister. *(5) Non vs.without any other testamentary disposition in the will . he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. Petitioner Rebecca averred that her brother Nilo employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. Delia Viado.
But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime. shall annul the institution of heir. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. A compromise agreement was entered wherein it was to be owned in common by Julian and his 2 children from the 1st marriage. by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly.. son. it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. etc. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will. 2005) JLT Agro vs. This kind of preterition. A Supplemental Deed was later executed transferring ownership over the lot in favor of JLT Agro. or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him. No. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud. in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith. (6) JLT Agro vs. Milagros and her children took possession over the subject lot. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian‘s desire along this line. 2005) FACTS: Julian married Antonia and they had 2 children. 141882. nor assigning to him some part of the properties. Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one. whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator. as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. The 3 of them executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets and Liabilities in favor of JLT Agro. the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado. Besides. RULING: No. either by not mentioning him at all. Meanwhile.The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado. since there was no total omission of a forced heir. the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. March 11.R. omitting him in the testament. while mentioning him as father. ISSUE: Whether or not there is preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage. Thus. but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. After Antonia‘s death. Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties. Balansag also bought the said lot from Milagros. Balansag (March 11. either by not naming him at all or. In the case at bar. some. Again. even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. does not justify a collateral attack on the TCT issued. Julian married Milagros and they had 4 children. . there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. however. Balansag (G. or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line. alleged to be a retardate. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir.
It is subject to no other form. taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. A holographic will. the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. At the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering the lot in question in favor of petitioner. Private respondents opposed the probate on the ground that the holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased. *Cases 7-12 c/o Macoy (13) Dy Yieng Seangio. the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. must be entirely written. 140371-72. al (G. Petitioners opposed assailing among others that Segundo left a holographic will which is entirely a declaration of disinheritance affecting Alfredo. the disinheritance of the son (Alfredo) nonetheless. dated. and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter‘s property. or public policy that it cannot be given effect. and may be made in or out of the Philippines. November 27. being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert. al vs.Moreover. Holographic wills. Reyes. RTC dismissed the petition for probate reasoning that the holographic will clearly shows preterition. is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded. therefore. as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code. and need not be witnessed. 2006) FACTS: On September 1988. et. expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law.R. In . a requirement for preterition to exist. Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. It is written. Hence. and signed by the hand of the testator himself. RULING: Yes. private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo. the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian‘s heirs from the second marriage. must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. ISSUE: Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. Moreover. it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator. morals. although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument. one of the private respondents. In other words. The document. dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. is an act of disposition in itself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument. No. et.
RULING: Yes. From Father Rigor‘s testamentary provisions. Again. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands. There being neither substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands. With regard to the issue on preterition. ISSUE: Whether or not the intestate heirs of Father Rigor are entitled to the ricelands and that the aforesaid devise/bequest is deemed inoperative. the disinheritance cannot be given effect. Unless the will is probated. who was forbidden to sell the ricelands. had not yet entered the seminary or. Those two contingencies did not arise. the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death. the administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors.R. Rigor (G. Rigor (April 30. he was excommunicated. having been ordained a priest. 1979) Testate Estate of Rigor vs. who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood. 1979) FACTS: Father Rigor bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest. in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated. . L-22036. the court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two. If there is no qualified devisee or the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated. it may be deduced that the he intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest. No. Clearly the bequest herein refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. and who would be obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents. was intended by the testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana. (14) Testate Estate of Rigor vs. It was Segundo‘s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs. he was excommunicated. April 30.this regard. On the other hand. who desired to become a priest. the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. with the sole exception of Alfredo. the document. it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: one. or having been ordained a priest.
the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.*(15) Bagunu vs. being a 3rd degree relative. In fine. In the collateral line. ISSUES: Can petitioner. Piedad (December 8. Among collateral relatives. right of representation is proper only in the descending. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts. is an absolute rule. expressed in Article 962. a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree (Ofelia). Thus. Piedad. being in the 4th degree in relationship. lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors. 2000) Bagunu vs. a collateral relative of the third civil degree (Pastora)? Does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives? RULING: Ofelia cannot inherit alongside Pastora.R. 2000) . Ofelia assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad (collateral relative of the third civil degree) contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing. and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. Piedad (G. No. being a relative within the third civil degree. *(16) Bagunu vs. from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent. 14097. a relative of the fifth degree. Piedad excludes petitioner. line. 2000) FACTS: Ofelia Hernando Bagunu (collateral relative of the fifth civil degree) moved to intervene in a special proceeding for the intestate proceeding of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad (December 8. never in the ascending. inherit alongside respondent. In the direct line. December 8. a maternal aunt can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood but an uncle or an aunt. the latter in turn would have priority in succession to a 5th degree relative. Pastora excludes Ofelia from succeeding ab intestate to the estate of Augusto. excludes the cousins of the decedent. of the late Augusto H. the rule of proximity. Respondent.
RULING: By right of representation. by operation of law. (17) Intestate Estate of Petra Rosales vs. the petitioner. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into 2 groups. her mother-in-law. The trial court denied her plea. Carterio. Macikequerox. ISSUE: Whether or not the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter. Macikequerox (grandson). raised to the same place and degree of relations as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. predeceased her. this petition. The relevant provisions of the CC are Arts. claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son. 1/4. L-40789. 1/4. Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio. an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of representation. and Antonio (son). 981. Another child. leaving behind a child. not from the latter. Rosales (G. Magna (daughter). February 27. The right of representation does not apply to other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree. In the intestate proceedings. No. If the legislature intended to make . and those who inherit by the right of representation. The estate of the deceased has an estimated gross value of about P30. but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. RULING: No. She was survived by her husband Fortunato and their 2 children Magna and Antonio.R. 1987) FACTS: Petra Rosales died intestate. Rosales (February 27. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent. 1/4. as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the CC or by the right of representation provided for in Art 981 of the same law. the trial court issued an Order declaring the following individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate: Fortunato (husband). 982 and 999. 1987) Intestate Estate of Petra Rosales vs. and his widow Irenea.000. Restated. Hence. 1/4. A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his/her parent-in-law. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds. 980. namely. son of the deceased. There is no provision which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. Macikequerox. with the State as the final intestate heir. those who inherit by their own right. a more distant blood relative of a decedent is.
887. but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. He does not succeed his father. Respondents are the heirs of the children of Simeon in his second marriage. for their shares in the properties of Maura Bagsic.R.Art 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. the provision of Art 999 does not support Irenea's claim. November 29. the mother-inlaw of Irenea. Irenea also contends that at the time of the death of her husband.. No. He did not succeed from his deceased father Carterio. to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. They said the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. There are 3 sets of plaintiffs: the Bicomongs. Simeon remarried to Silvestra and they had 2 children (Felipa and Maura). The subject matter is the half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in 5 parcels of land which she inherited from Silvestra Glorioso. he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. When Sisenanda died. . Almanza (G. and Francisca Bagsic. the properties passed on to Cristeta Almanza. who also died without division of the properties. the Tolentinos. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. L-37365. The provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It was contended that since Maura died ahead of Felipa. The estate contemplated in the article is the estate of the deceased spouse. When Maura Bagsic died. Carterio (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother. The Almanzas appealed to CA. Be that as it may. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. 1977) Bicomong vs. (18) Bicomong vs. The subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra Rosales. said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox who succeeded from Petra by right of representation. Petra. Igmedia and Ignacio).the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law. the latter succeeded to Maura‘s estate. 1977) FACTS: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda and they had 3 children (Perpetua. The plaintiffs claim that Felipa died ahead of Maura. it would have so provided in the Code. It is from the estate of Petra that Macikequerox draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Art 981. Almanza (November 29. The plaintiffs are the grandchildren of Simeon with his children in his first marriage. By the same token. Irenea argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Art.
2010) (20) Calisterio vs. 183053. The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta. Upon the . collateral relatives succeed to the entire estate of deceased. is valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James. (19) In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. no evidence having been adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses. Marietta can inherit from Teodorico. who disappeared without a trace. 975 of the New Civil Code. illegitimate children. No. alleged that the marriage between Teodorico and Marieta was bigamous and thus. died intestate without an issue. In the absence of descendants. claiming to be sole surviving heir of Teodorico. No. namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the 10 children of her brother and 2 sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. ascendants. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between deceased Teodorico and Marietta is valid and thus. Calisterio (April 6.R. Article 975 makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood. surviving sister of Teodorico. Teodorico was the 2nd husband of Marietta who had been previously married to James. or surviving spouse. RULING: The 2nd marriage. Calisterio (G. Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her.ISSUE: Whether or not Maura is succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of nephews and nieces of half blood. By virtue of said provision. Antonia. April 6. child of the 2nd marriage in which her share is in dispute. pertains to them in common.R. June 16. 2000) Calisterio vs. she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives. 2000) FACTS: Teodorico died intestate and was survived by his wife. al vs. null and void. It appearing that Maura Bagsic. Marietta. the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and 2 sisters of half blood. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (G. 136467. et. having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code. RULING: No. the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. Teodorico and Marietta were married without having secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
The petitioners. for otherwise. had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties. before her demise. herein respondents Evangelina and Elisa Baranda. Baranda (GR No. 1987) FACTS: Paulina died intestate without leaving any direct descendants. the petitioners.73275. is ½ of the inheritance. being entitled to the other half. entitled to protect their share of a successional right. and are thus. 1987) Baranda vs. Their claims are not merely contingent or expectant. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased. will be excluded therefrom to their prejudice. them being not a party-in-interest in the deed of sale. In fact. While they are not compulsory heirs. There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate. since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or suit. As heirs. Moreover. Baranda (May 20. now sought the annulment of the supposed sale or transfers. She was survived by her 2 brothers and several nephews and nieces. petitioners have the legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale purportedly signed by Paulina. they are nonetheless legitimate heirs and so. siblings of the decedent. who would thus have been permitted to benefit from their deception. the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces. this Court has repeatedly held that the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased. Brothers and sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predeceased or are incapacitated to succeed. provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate. even if it were assumed that those suing .dissolution with the death of Teodorico. May 20. without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent. Otherwise. no one else could question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof would remain in the name of the alleged vendees. have already taken possession of 6 parcels of land and caused the transfer of such by virtue of questionable sales which the late widow had also sought the reconveyance which did not however materialized. but to the estate itself of the decedent. as her intestate heirs. the property should be divided into 2 equal portions: one portion to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. ISSUE: Can the petitioners impugn the validity of the sales? RULING: Yes. Respondents question the petitioners‘ legal standing. ascendants or compulsory heirs. not to them. for distribution later in accordance with law. concurring with the legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation). (21) Baranda vs. including private respondents as well as petitioners who are children of 2 deceased brothers and a sister. property claimed to belong to her estate. But.
not precluded or estopped form subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation. October 8. Leoncio died. leaving as his only heirs 2 children. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not Victor was deemed to have renounced his legitime RULING: No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. Ricardo died. CA (G. No. 112483. Both filed a complaint seeking to nullify the Deed of Absolute Sale alleging that the conveyance of said property impaired the legitimate of Victor. 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre. No. But said dispute was resolved through a compromise agreement. Pending execution of the said judgment. It requires an express act on the part of the heir. survived only by his natural father. 1999) Imperial vs. childless. Our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff and even moved for the execution of the judgment. Victor died single and without issue. He was. Epifanio R. Ricardo.. Tupas died on August 20.R. precluded from doing so. the judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been rendered. (22) Imperial vs. his right shall be transmitted to his heirs. But it was alleged that the sale was in fact a donation. their natural brother and predecessor-ininterest. Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground that he was deceived into signing the said document. Victor.his private capital. as their right to do so is expressly recognized. leaving . De Tupas vs. (23) Vda.through attorneys-in-fact were not properly represented. it was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation. CA (October 8. When Leoncio died. Nor are Victor‘s heirs.R. the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale. 1999) FACTS: Leoncio sold his land to his natural son. leaving only 2 heirs – his natural son and an adopted son. 15 years thereafter. which had thereafter obtained title to said lots. On August 2. Victor‘s act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. 1978. In 1962. 1977. At the time of the substitution. But instead of filing an action to contest the donation. October 3. Inc. RTC of Negros Occidental (G. Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the said case and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. Tupas owned lots Nos. 2 years after the donation. therefore. Cesar and Teresa. He was not a party to the compromise agreement. 837. he donated the foregoing properties to the Tupas Foundation. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance. upon his death. L-65800. 1986) FACTS: Epifanio R. 4 years after.
The fact. its value is in imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate. giving rise to the hereditary estate. 771. of donations subject to collation. 838 and 839. If he does. 752. A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations. although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation to the latter class of donations. but that he gave more than what was within his power to give. debts. and (3) Tupas Foundation. and (5)the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the . one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment. 837. that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. RULING: Yes. `Collationable gifts' should include gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs. at the time they were made. Inc.C. C. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. so that in computing the legitimes. though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. (2) the donated properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs. to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime. Partenza Lucerna. In order to find out whether a donation is inofficious or not. therefore. Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation. Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance. the donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art. was subject to collation. Civil Code). as his only surviving compulsory heir. but even those made in favor of strangers. Civil Code). moreover. Inc. that is. 1061. Inc. Such a donation is.(2) determination of the obligations. 1976. 1978. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint because: (1) the properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his deathon August 20. the value of the property donated should be considered part of the donor's estate. Collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. being a stranger and not a compulsoryheir.his widow. the rules are: (1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the testator's death. of the value. because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his. therefore reducible by one-half. so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess. and charges which have to be paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left.(4) the addition to the net value thus found. collationable. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation inter vivos made in favor of Tupas Foundation.(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities. He also left a will dated May 18.
which consists of lots no. In 1964. one of his children. then it must be allowed to stand. partitioned the afore-cited properties among his four children. must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent. all surnamed Zaragoza. 2000) FACTS: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land. it shall be returned or reverted to the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale.R. which include Lots 871 and 943. September 2. *(24) Zaragoza vs. was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then because she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. in his lifetime. In this case. CA (G. collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. as provided for in Article 1061: Every compulsory heir. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference.R. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. during the lifetime of the latter. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation. No. Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured. (25) Noceda vs. filed a complaint against his other child Florentino for delivery of her inheritance share. by way of donation. who succeeds with other compulsory heirs. is valid. 119730. as her inheritance share. while her share. had no legal basis since there was no will nor any document that would support the transfer.total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respective compulsory heir. But if it does. Florentino contended that the adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of Alberta. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. he died without a will and was survived by his four children. or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir. Alberta. consisting of Lots 943 and 871 claiming that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and alleged that her father. 871 and 943. if any excess be shown. Tupas. Zacariaz. but without valid consideration. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitimes and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partition inter vivos. Florentino and Alberta. Unfortunately. the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. 106401. ISSUE: Whether or not the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties. He had four children: Gloria. In 1981. and in the account of the partition. 1999) . CA (G. No. September 29. RULING: Yes.
1981 only meant that the latter was intended to supersede the former. extrajudicially settled a parcel of land known as Lot 1121. on August 17.R. or that dominion over each portion less exclusive. No. each part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage. his intestate estate was partitioned into 3 parts by his heirs. it was found out that Lot 1121 contained an area in excess of that stated in its tax declaration. the heirs were actually occupying a bigger portion the total land area of which exceeded that of what is stated in the tax declaration. 1981. There is no coownership where portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable. heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo. in their respective owners. another extrajudicial settlement – partition of Lot 1121 was executed: 3/5 of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while Direto and Noceda got only 1/5 each. Directo. a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation was filed against Noceda. which was the basis of partition. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. and Arbizo.FACTS: On June 1. In 1948. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. . Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1. or distinguishable. 1981? RULING: Yes. At the time of his death in 1943. one from the other. After Directo demanded from Noceda to vacate her land on the ground that the latter fenced the entire land of the former without her consent. 2000) FACTS: Marcelino contracted 3 marriages. 1981. the heirs of Celestino partitioned only less than the actual land area to conform with the area declared under tax declaration. 1981 and August 17. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each co-owner. Noceda. The discrepancies between the extra-judicial settlements executed by Directo. or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable. April 28. he had 15 children from his 3 marriages. though not technically described. Later. CA (G. Noceda claimed that the discrepancies between the two deeds of partition with respect to the area of Lot 1121 and the respective share of the parties therein indicated that they never intended any of the deeds to be the final determination of the portions of Lot1121 allotted to them. (26) Heirs of Seraspi vs. ISSUE: Should Lot 1121 be partitioned in accordance with the extra-judicial settlement dated August 17. 135602. However. Although in the extra-judicial settlement dated August 17.
He was survived by his heirs. it follows that private respondent. and Vicente. collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. Patronicio.Cavite. Crucillo was married to Juana Aure. Maximino. *(27) Zaragoza vs. as heir of the 3rd marriage. who became co-owners of the . Juana Aure died on November 19. CA (September 29. 1949. Adelaida. Since the contested parcels of land were adjudicated to the heirs of the first and second marriages. Rafael. As such. Marcelino‘s child by his third wife. private respondent was co-owner of all of his father‘s properties. among other things. They had eight (8) children. taking advantage of the illness of Quirico. In the partition of the intestate estate of Marcelino. Balbino A. ISSUE: Whether or not Simeon has a right over the parcels of land in question on the basis of succession. RULING: No. Dominador then sold said share to Quirico and Purficacion Seraspi. such co-ownership rights were effectively dissolved by the partition agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino. 2000) RULING: A partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. all surnamed Crucillo. Miguel. to which he belongs. Santiago. Simeon. Crucillo died intestate in 1909. two(2) parcels of unregistered land situated at General Luna Street. Elena. The petition must be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding wherein all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitimes and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos. Article 1080 is clear on this. the properties were divided into 3 parts. The Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon for recovery of possession of the lands. (28) Crucillo vs. IAC (317 SCRA 351) FACTS: Balbino A. Perpetua. namely. Rata allowed Quirico to administer the property.In the same year. has no right over the parcels of land. representing the heirs of the 1st marriage. the lands were sold to Kalibo Rural Bank and then subsequently sold to Manuel Rata. an heir of the 2nd marriage. forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof. each part being reserved for each group of heirs belonging to one of the 3 marriages Marcelino entered into. Simeon cannot base his ownership on succession for the property was not part of those distributed to the heirs of the third marriage. who had been paralyzed due to a stroke. The legitime of the compulsory heirs is determined after collation. Unfortunately. Crucillo left. as heir to the intestate estate of his father. They then obtained a loan but failed to pay it. sold the share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador. While. Mendez-Nunez. Balbino A.
Cavite. as evinced by their possession of the inherited premises. Primitiva Mendoza is in possession of an agricultural land in Pulong Munti and also in Niko. An agriculturalland located at Sitio Niko. Moreover. RULING: Yes.R. Higino.and Nicasio Sarmiento. Miguel Crucillo is in exclusive possession ofa residential lot located at General Trias St. while Carlomagno Crucillo possesses an agricultural land at Sitio Maykiling. Still another property covered by Tax Declaration No. 2000) FACTS: Jacinto Pada had 6 children. It is certainly foolhardy for petitioners to claim that no oral partition was made when their acts showed otherwise. Miguel Crucillo is exclusively occupying an agricultural land at Pulong Munti and Ulo ng Bukal. Then too. namely. his son. CA (G.. Adelaida Crucillo. Marciano. Additionally. binding and enforceable on the parties. Valentina and Ruperta. judging from the introduction of improvements thereon and the length of time that such improvements have been in existence. 1179 is owned in common by Vicente Crucillo. petitioners are estopped from denying or contesting the existence of an oral partition. continued living in the house together with his 8 children. 653is owned in common by Buenaventurada Sarmiento and Vicente Crucillo. covered by Tax Declaration No. Mendez.aforesaid lots and thereafter. 5581. Mendez. The oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid.. Petitioner . When Feliciano died. Feliciano Pada. is owned in common by the Heirs of Elena Crucillo. Pastor. Cavite. and the remaining portion another agricultural land after the other portion thereof had been sold by Rafael Crucillo. During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada. Amador. Ananias. Mendez. whose share was acquired by Miguel Crucillo. Mendez. 134329. their construction of improvements thereon. Buenaventurada Sarmiento (daughter of the deceased Perpetua Crucillo). Nicasio Sarmiento (son of Perpetua Crucillo) has caused a residential lot situated at Gen. From the foregoing facts. Mendez. and their having declared in their names for taxation purposes their respective shares. No. for why should they construct improvements thereon. his half-brother. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy. entered into the possession thereof with each one of them possessing their respective shares and exercising acts of ownership. Crucillo agreed to divide subject estate among themselves. (29) Pada-Kilario vs. January 19. if they did not firmly believe that the property was theirs. it is unbelievable that the possession of the heirs was by mere tolerance. These are indications that the heirs of Balbino A. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. after exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested estate. Another agricultural land situated at Pulong Munti. pay the taxes therefor. Trias St. it can be gleaned unerringly that the heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to orally partition subject estate among themselves. Rafael had sold two other lots belonging to the estate. and Atty. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a partition of the disputed property. Conrado Crucillo (son of the deceased Santiago Crucillo). Cavite to be registered in his name alone. He died intestate. Adelaida Crucillo. and exercise other acts of ownership. Cavite. Cavite. 5581. His estate included a parcel of land denominated as Cadastral Lot No. obtained permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
Moreover. one of Pastor's children. it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which. Maria. represented by his daughter. Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Concordia. Ananias was himself present while his other brothers were represented by their children. both died without any issue. transmission. his daughter. For this purpose. Amador was represented by his daughter. that Cadastral Lot No. never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. Their sisters. Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. Juanita. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property. It was to both Ananias and Marciano. is only for convenience. ISSUE: ---RULING: The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid. it was effectuated only through a private document that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. Marciano was represented by his daughter. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation. succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property. in the first place. and Higino was represented by his son. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. The requirement in Sec. modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada. they executed a private document which they. Silverio who is the private respondent in this case.Verona Pada-Kilario. albeit executed in an unregistered private document. must appear in a public instrument. No showing. it was contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by either Marciano. Later on. At the execution of the extra-judicial partition. their division is conclusive. When Ananias died. however. considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather. In 1951. the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not been paid. Valentina and Ruperta. has been living in that house since 1960. Without creditors to take into consideration. As such. 1. it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. Maria. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. .
. there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts. on February 1988. as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. the said agreement was void. respondents‘ father died.however. was. that is. Santibañez (G. the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the respondents. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs. corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In her answer Florence Ariola alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. and that there can be no valid partition until after the will has been probated. executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors. assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void. wherein the FCCC as the assignor. February 23. hence. Demand letters were sent by the petitioner to Edmund for the settlement of his account with the petitioner but Edmund failed to heed the same and refused to pay. a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. leaving a holographic will. Accordingly. (30) Union Bank vs. Sometime in February 1981. Sometime in 1981. Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola. Thus. before the RTC of Makati City and summonses were issued against both. Thus. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court. 149926. Ariola must necessarily fail. No. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC. has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) entered into two successive loan agreement with the respondents‘ father which Edmund and his father Ephraim were signatory to a promissory note in favor of the FCCC for the purchase of (3) three Agricultural AllPurposed Diesel tractors. Edmund and Florence. a partition of the estate of the decedent. she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement. the surviving heirs. 2005) FACTS: Sometime in 1980.R. However. testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City appointing Edmund. Subsequently in March 1981. as one of the heirs. among others. the trial court held that the petitioner‘s cause of action against respondent Florence S. as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings. The RTC in its decision favoring the respondents stated that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending. in effect. two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Ariola. the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. The second one having a Continuing Guaranty Agreement. it was null and void.
it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp. it is well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased. . The Court in perusing the joint agreement. the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world. considering the express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named respondents. as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The petitioner also proffers that. that is. the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint. there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration. The CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court thus the petitioner filed an appeal before the SC. that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. Finally. Thus." The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event. to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect. rights and obligation of the decedent without probate of a will of the decedent. the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition. RULING: The Court held that. and. and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. in testate succession. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it. liquidation and distribution of the estate and to avoid prejudice to other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased. The Court also stressed that.On its appeal to the CA. there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can hold the respondents’ liable on the obligation of their deceased father being the successor of the property. not as heirs of the deceased. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed. petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code.
The SC denied the petition. (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners.R. Appellee Philip Santos. 139524. and that estoppel barred the instant action for partition. that. against his brother. a resident in the U. averring that when his and Eliseo Santos' sister. exclusive. The petitioner. 1980 up to the time Ladislao Santos filed the action for partition on May 13. and (4) he has been in possession through open. Ladislao Santos (Appellant). sometime in 1993." . The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. Santos (G. ISSUE: --RULING: Considering that there was no proof that Ladislao Santos executed any "Combined Deed of Partition" in tandem with the Eliseo Santos. Isidra Santos. 1967. Virgilio Santos executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Residential Land" on the basis of which Tax Declaration No. purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez. These 26 years of inaction call for the application of the principle of estoppel by laches. 1993. 1115 had been cancelled by Tax Declaration No. Article 494 of the Civil Code states that. Court of Appeals. in turn. "prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or his co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Eliseo Santos and the latter's son. 1967 to December 16." In Adile vs. filed a complaint for Judicial Partition. a co-ownership stillsubsisted between the brothers over the Isidra property. Philip Santos took possession of the subject property on December 16. 1980 upon its sale on said date. They reasoned out that more than 13years had lapsed from April 1. and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. without any issue. No. The Appellees insisted that acquisitive prescription had already set in. Thereafter. on December 16. it was held: ―…Prescription. 2000) FACTS: In 1993. with the RTC of Rizal.S. 7892. died intestate on April 1. and that. and that more than 12years had lapsed from the time Philip Santos took possession of the property on December 16. The act of repudiation. must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). 04-0016 was issued to the Philip Santos. they inherited her parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration 1115. he discovered that Tax Declaration No. under the name of his nephew. Further. 1967. Philip Santos (Appellees). it was argued that the possession of Virgilio Santos could be tacked with the possession of Philip Santos bringing to a total of 26 years the time that elapsed before the filing of the case in 1993. According to Appellees.The Court in determining whether the heirs‘ assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding without a probate proceeding.. the Court ruled in the negative. 1980. October 12. should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5. as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership. (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive. continuous. (31) Santos vs. is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership. 1980. Virgilio Santos was already in possession of the subject property since after the death of Isidra Santos on April1.
IAC (159 SCRA 259) (34) Primary Structures Corp. and considering that Virgilio Santos was the ward of Isidra Santos ever since when Virgilio Santos was still an infant. vs. petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. such possession by Virgilio Santos and Philip Santos of the property did not constitute a repudiation of the co-ownership by the Appellee Eliseo Santos and of his privies for that matter. that his brother. 1984. On January 3. Filipino family ties being close and well-knit as they are. acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or tolerance of the owners shall not be available for the purposes of possession. Saturnino Balus. Appellant must have assumed too. Meanwhile. 2010) FACTS: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement. On October 10. Lanao del Norte. . No. herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. 2003) (35) Celestino Balus vs. the action for partition is not barred by laches. The SC was not convinced that Eliseo had repudiated the co-ownership. or on January 25.There was no showing that Eliseo Santos had complied with these requisites.R.246 square meters. 1989. Subsequently. Under Article 1119 of the New Civil Code. it was but natural that the Appellant did not interpose any objection to the continued stay of Virgilio Santos and his family on the property and even acquiesced thereto. et. Amador (G. which he owns. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land. No. 2004) (33) Alonzo vs. As a result. and even if he did. 1979. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property. a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. August 19. Thereafter. More than two years after the auction. 160701. 1992.R. the Appellee Eliseo Santos. the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Valencia (G.R. as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo. al (G. February 9. 150060. allowed hisson to occupy the property and use the same for the time being. On October 12. Sps. Penultimately. there was no showing that the same had been clearly made known to Ladislao. Rufo failed to pay his loan. January 15. a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Indeed. Hence. No. a TCT was issued in the name of respondents. (32) Baylon vs. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time. herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10. 168970. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.
ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. 1995. but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them.On June 27. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. In addition. it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father. petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. 1984. vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank. after the period of redemption expired. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner. At the outset. Stated differently. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25. it only follows that at the time of his death. The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Furthermore. since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime. In the present case. Hence. RULING: The court is not persuaded. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank. petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father. as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. Hence. their co-ownership was extinguished. In other words. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6. respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner. Rufo. the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death. the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28. there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank. Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC. 1984. 1996. the purpose of . herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
respectively. The division of Lot 769-A. (36) Heirs of Joaquin Teves vs. Andres. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition. namely Teotimo. 1999) FACTS: Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children. Ricardo Teves has no right to demand partition of Lot 769-A because the two extrajudicial settlements have already effectively partitioned such property. wherein the representative is raised to the place and degree of the person represented and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living. No. or if there were debts left. all had been paid.R. on the other hand. an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409 purports to divide Joaquin Teves‘ estate among only six of his heirs. (3) the heirs are all of age. Asuncion. The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent‘s estate is authorized by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. For a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid. predeceased both his parents and died without issue. However. however. a . although it should purport to be a sale. The fact that Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not mean that he or. (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. Teotimo. or if they are minors. ISSUE: ---RULING: The extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding. more accurately. the action of Pedro and Cresenciano had already prescribed because an action for reconveyance based upon an implied trust pursuant to article 1456 of the Civil Code prescribes in ten years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title. Andres. the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives. Gorgonio. the following conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no will. an exchange. in 1943 and 1953. After Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died. his heirs. was embodied in two extrajudicial settlements and do not purport to exclude Cresenciano from his participation in Lot 769-A or to cede his share therein in favor of Asuncion.partition is to put an end to co-ownership. are entitled to a proportionate share of the decedent‘s estate. intestate and without debts. Arcadia and Maria. CA (G. Arcadia and Maria Teves. The validity of these settlements executed pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the primary issue in the present case. their children executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the ownership over two parcels of land belonging to their deceased parents and to alienate their shares thereto in favor of their sister Asuncion Teves. October 13. (2) the decedent left no debts. lose the right to share in the partition of the property for this is a proper case for representation. Felisia. 109963. Cresenciano. Pedro. Gorgonio. namely Asuncion. It does not mention nor bear the signatures of either Pedro or Cresenciano Teves although they are both intestate heirs of Joaquin Teves and as such. Felicia.
ISSUE: -----RULING: Under Article 1104. However. alleging that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioner bases its title is null and void for being fraudulently made. 35 the Court. After learning the transaction. there was no evidence of bad faith or fraud. a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was executed between Rodolfo and Generosa. (39) Fernandez vs.compromise. partition made with preterition shall not be rescinded unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud. August 28. Fernandez (G. de Reyes vs. 2000) FACTS: Private respondents set up the defense of ownership and questioned the title of Aznar to the subject lot. The extrajudicial settlements executed in 1956 and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal shares unto the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca.R. Such a partition. CA. As to the 2 parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs. Private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta participated in the extrajudicial partition and that 2 person who participated and were made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta. In this case. confers uponeach heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. When Jose died. the partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in accordance with their intestate shares under the law. 2000) (38) Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. which was legally made. interpreting section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Although Cresenciano. . CA (February 15. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void. in the case of Vda. upheld the validity of an oral partition of the decedent‘s estate and declared that the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. 143256. Article 1105 is applicable. was not a signatory to the extrajudicial settlements. No. The participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding them. or any other transaction. 2001) FACTS: Rodolfo was adopted by the late spouses Jose and Generosa. CA (March 7. The extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were never registered. the nephews and nieces of Jose filed an action to declare the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition void ab initio. Jose Fernandez between Generosa vda. Ricardo‘s predecessor-in-interest. *(37) Non vs.
He thus still has the right to redeem said 1/3 portion of the subject property. the 30-day period never commenced. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned. the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale. The SC has long established the rule that. Private respondent was never given such written notice. notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner. Such is a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. BAYLON vs. IAC 159 SCRA 259 .RULING: While one‘s legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party. Possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment. Jose Fernandez . AMADOR February 9. 2004 HELD: The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. this doctrine has no application in the instant case considering that respondents‘ claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez. The Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights is a public document but it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose with Rodolfo. they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified. On account of the lack of written notice of the sale by the other co-heirs. We do not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncle‘s wife. There is no record of the birth of Rodolfo. but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. The public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code refer to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay. Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. Exception (case where the SC held otherwise): ALONZO vs. While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents. Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa vda. its terms and conditions as wells as its efficacy and status. it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.
before the trial court. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos(respondent). 1987. Maria. Exequiel. IAC. who is Leonor‘s siste r. the SC made it clear that it was not reversing the prevailing jurisprudence. it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter. as well as its efficacy and status. adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. . the latter is still entitled to a written notice form the selling coowner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale. is also in the name of respondent but coowned by Victoria Pantaleon. Lot No. After Leonor‘s death. SPS. as a general rule: PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. Gregoria. not just days or months. her share went to Gregoria. Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City or when the case was initiated on October 16. after the consummation of the contracts of sale but more than 13 years after the sales were concluded. relied upon by the petitioner in contending that actual knowledge should be an equivalent to a written notice of sale. married to Leonor. petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them. applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserve troncal. the right of legal redemption was invoked several years. Bulacan: Lot Nos. They claimed that after Gregoria‘s death. The written notice is mandatory. vs. SC rules that written notice is mandatory.HELD: Actual knowledge was considered an equivalent to a written notice of sale because the right of legal redemption was invoked more than 13 years after the sales were concluded. who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings. Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio. The SC simply adopted an exception to the general rule in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. In Alonzo. 1646-B. 1987. VALENCIA August 19. (12) MENDOZA vs. The SC has long established the rule that notwithstanding the actual knowledge of a co-owner. 2013) FACTS: The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. on the other hand. Hence. Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Dominga‘s properties that were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. Even in Alonzo vs. After Ex equiel‘s death. DE LOS SANTOS (March 20. 2003 HELD: The 30-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on March 31. In 1992. Gregoria died intestate and without issue. respondent. Apolonio and Valentin. its terms and conditions.
who now holds the properties in dispute. and 2. Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. Article 891 on reserve troncal is not applicable. therefore. First. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return. RULING: Based on the circumstances of the present case. Moreover. The conclusion. Gregoria. is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in character. The RTC found merit in petitioners‘ claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by ReservaTroncal. It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel‘s as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred. petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. being her first cousins. Petitioners are Gregoria‘s fourth deg ree relatives. on the other hand. Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. because petitioners are not Gregoria‘s relatives within the third degree. is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property. is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title. Whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties. Moreover. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. Whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. It is Gregoria in this case. denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate from petitioners‘ familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga. ISSUES: 1.Respondent. . or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. petitioners cannot benefit from reservatroncal. because Julia. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. however.
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