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City. On June 7, 1965, appellants, herein petitioners Dignos spouses sold the said parcel of land to respondent Atilano J. Jabil for the sum of P28,000.00, payable in two installments, with an assumption of indebtedness with the First Insular Bank of Cebu in the sum of P12,000.00, which was paid and acknowledged by the vendors in the deed of sale executed in favor of plaintiff-appellant, and the next installment in the sum of P4,000.00 to be paid on or before September 15, 1965. On November 25, 1965 the Dignos spouses sold the same land in favor of defendants spouses, Luciano Cabigas and Jovita L. De Cabigas, who were then U.S. citizens, for the price of P35,000.00. A deed of absolute sale was executed by the Dignos spouses in favor of the Cabigas spouses, and which was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3344. As the Dignos spouses refused to accept from plaintiff-appellant the balance of the purchase price of the land, and as plaintiff- appellant discovered the second sale made by defendants-appellants to the Cabigas spouses, plaintiff-appellant brought the present suit. ISSUE: 1 . Whether or not there was an absolute contract of sale. 2. Whether or not the contract of sale was already rescinded when the Dignos spouses sold the land to Cabigas HELD: I. Yes. That a deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a “Deed of Conditional Sale” where nowhere in the contract in question is a proviso or stipulation to the effect that title to the property sold is reserved in the vendor until full payment of the purchase price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract the moment the vendee fails to pay within a fixed period. A careful examination of the contract shows that there is no such stipulation reserving the title of the property on the vendors nor does it give them the right to unilaterally rescind the contract upon nonpayment of the balance thereof within a fixed period. On the contrary, all the elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, are present. While it may be conceded that there was no constructive delivery of the land sold in the case at bar, as subject Deed of Sale is a private instrument, it is beyond question that there was actual delivery thereof. As found by the trial court, the Dignos spouses delivered the possession of the land in question to Jabil as early as March 27,1965 so that the latter constructed thereon Sally’s Beach Resort also known
on the contrary. 1952. Petitioners laid considerable emphasis on the fact that private respondent Jabil had no money on the stipulated date of payment on September 15. It was sold at a public auction to Marcela Soliven by the Provincial Sheriff of Cagayan to satisfy a judgment against Lino Artates by the Justice of the Peace of Calanlugan. 1955. vigorously denied having sent Amistad to tell petitioners that he was already waiving his rights to the land in question. equity and justice mandate as in the aforecited case that Jabil be given an additional period within which to complete payment of the purchase price. Considering that private respondent has only a balance of P4.OOO. it is required that acts and contracts which have for their object extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document. The appellants Artates and Pojas alleged that the sale violated the provision of Public Land Law exempting said property from execution for any “debt contracted within 5 years from date of the issuance of the patent. Such facts were admitted by petitioner spouses. however. Appellants prayed that the execution sale of the land to the defendant Urbi. 1965. and neither did they file a suit in court to rescind the sale. 2. It is undisputed that petitioners never notified private respondents Jabil by notarial act that they were rescinding the contract. that where time is not of the essence of the agreement. 1965. as well as the deed of sale executed by the latter in favor of the defendant Soliven be declared null and void.as Jabil’s Beach Resort in March. Under Article 1358 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the purchaser Marcela Soliven has acquired an absolute ownership or title in fee over the land. J 966 and Bevirlyn’s Beach Resort on September 1. The contract of sale being absolute in nature is governed by Article 1592 of the Civil Code. It has been ruled. a slight delay on the part of one party in the performance of his obligation is not a sufficient ground for the rescission of the agreement. ARTATES VS URBI FACTS: A homestead patent was issued to appellants Lino Artates and Manuela Pojas on September 23. .00 and was delayed in payment only for one month.1965 and was able to raise the necessary amount only by mid-October 1965. There is no showing that Amistad was properly authorized by Jabil to make such extra-judicial rescission for the latter who. No. Mactan White Beach Resort on January 15. Cagayan for physical inj uries inflicted by him upon Daniel Urbi on October 21.
Preysler for the sum of P8. 1959. the purchaser herein has not acquired an absolute ownership or title in fee over the land that would necessitate a deed of reconveyance to revert ownership to appellant spouses. Roxas. the Zambaleses. or ten (10) years after the Trial Court’s Decision based on the Compromise Agreement.00. 678 before the Court of First Instance of Palawan for “Annulment of a Deed of Sale with Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages”. No. It appears that what was issued here to the judgment creditor or purchaser was only the sheriff’s provisional certificate. 1958 a Civil Case No.000. on November 10. 1955 to September 30.70. On October 18. The execution sale being null and void. On appeal by the Corporation. the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court. December 6. Claiming that the Nin Bay Mining Corporation (Corporation.923. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved the sale to Preysler of the subject property.923. G. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ZAMBALES and JOAQUINA ZAMBALES VS COURT OF APPEALS 120 SCRA 897. and nine (9) years after the sale to Preysler.00 per hectare or a total purchase price of P8. for short) had removed silica sand from their land and destroyed the plants and others improvements thereon.HELD: No.784. 1960. After trial. the possession of the land should be returned to the owners.70 fixed in the Compromise Agreement. On September 10.R. In other words. the lower Court rendered judgment in favor of the Zambaleses. There would even no need to order appellee Urbi to execute a deed of reconveyance thereof to the owners.74. the Zambaleses filed Civil Case No. On.00) from September 9. On October 29. 1960. 316 before the CFI of Palawan claiming damages in the total sum of P48. duly assisted by their counsel and the Corporation. contending that the land was acquired and registered in the latter’s name through fraud and deceit. 1960 or a total rental price of P1. entered into a Compromise Agreement where the corporation agreed to pay the petitioners a rental of twenty pesos (P20. the herein appellants. . Palawan. the Zambaleses instituted. after finding that the alleged fraud or misrepresentation in the execution of the Compromise Agreement had not been substantiated by evidence. the Corporation sold the disputed property to Joaquin B. under which he derived no definite title or right until the period made. L-54070 FACTS The Zambales spouses were the homestead patentees of a parcel of land in the Municipality of Del Pilar. 1969. Respondent also agreed to purchase and pay for the aforesaid property at the fixed selling rice of P500. or issuance of a final deed or certificate of sale.
The contract only stipulates that J. The approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources after the lapse of five years from the date of the patent would neither legalize the sale. and to order the beds by the dozen and in no other manner. therefore. the agency to sell the homestead lot to a third party was coupled with an interest inasmuch as a bilateral contract was dependent on it and was not revocable at will by any of the parties. grants exclusive rights to sell his beds in the Visayan region to J. bound to restore to the Corporation the sum of P8. For all intents and purposes. That “rentals” were ostensibly to be paid during the five-year prohibitory period. 1955. The homestead in question should be returned to the Zambaleses. No. Parsons. The bilateral promise to buy and sell the homestead lot at a price certain. and to pay for the advertisement expenses for the same. Quiroga vs Parsons G. there was an actual executory sale perfected during the period of prohibition except that it was reciprocally demandable thereafter and the agency to sell to any third party was deferred until after the expiration of the prohibitory period. The contract stipulates that Don Andres Quiroga. here in petitioner.ISSUE Whether or not the execution of the Compromise Agreement dated October 29.Parsons should pay Quiroga within 6 months upon the delivery of beds. which was reciprocally demandable. in turn. L-11491 Subject: Sales Doctrine: Contract of Agency to Sell vs Contract of Sale Facts: On Jan 24. dated 10 September 1960 is valid HELD Although we find that the Zambaleses were not misled into signing the Compromise Agreement. With the exception of the obligation on the . The sale of a homestead lot within the five-year prohibitory period is illegal and void. 1911. who are. 1959 and the the subsequent Deed of Sale. to keep the beds on public exhibition. The law does not distinguish between executory and consummated sales. Further. Quiroga files a case against Parsons for allegedly violating the following stipulations: not to sell the beds at higher prices than those of the invoices. The evidence on record shows that the land in question was awarded to the Zambaleses as a homestead on September 6. plaintiff and the respondent entered into a contract making the latter an “agent” of the former.R. and the agency to sell made effective only after the lapse of the said period. was merely a devise to circumvent the prohibition. we hold that there has been violation of the Public Land Act. illegal and void. to have an open establishment in Iloilo. itself to conduct the agency. was entered into within the five-year prohibitory period and is therefore.70 as the price thereof. petitioners herein.923.
or in cash. either by agreement or by law. what was essential. Held: In order to classify a contract. we are of opinion that the contract by and between the plaintiff and the defendant was one of purchase and sale. Concrete Aggregates vs. But the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was his agent for the sale of his beds in Iloilo. These features exclude the legal conception of an agency or order to sell whereby the mandatory or agent received the thing to sell it. on the part of the defendant. by reason of the contract hereinbefore transcribed. and that the obligations the breach of which is alleged as a cause of action are not imposed upon the defendant. In respect to the defendant’s obligation to order by the dozen. and does not pay its price. has an aggregate plant at Montalban. and assessed and demanded payment from petitioner the amount of P244. therefore. without any other consideration and regardless as to whether he had or had not sold the beds. if the defendant so preferred. Sometime in 1968.76 as sales and ad valorem taxes for the first semester of 1968. In the contract in question. but delivers to the principal the price he obtains from the sale of the thing to a third person.part of the defendant to order the beds by the dozen and in no other manner. Issue: Whether the contract is a contract of agency or of sale. The said Court concluded that . The whole question. but if the plaintiff consents to fill them. and if he does not succeed in selling it. on receiving the beds. a domestic corporation duly existing under the laws of the Philippines. or before. the agents of respondent Commission on Internal Revenue (CIR) conducted an investigation of petitioner's tax liabilities. These are precisely the essential features of a contract of purchase and sale. and maintains and operates a plant at Longos. the latter. and that said obligations are implied in a contract of commercial agency. By virtue of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. and that the defendant was to pay the price in the manner stipulated. the effect of its breach would only entitle the plaintiff to disregard the orders which the defendant might place under other conditions. due attention must be given to its essential clauses. was necessarily obliged to pay their price within the term fixed. he waives his right and cannot complain for having acted thus at his own free will. reduced itself to a determination as to whether the defendant. the petitioner appealed to respondent CTA. Payment was to be made at the end of sixty days. at the plaintiff’s request. is that the plaintiff was to furnish the defendant with the beds which the latter might order. and. none of the obligations imputed to the defendant in the two causes of action are expressly set forth in the contract. the only one expressly imposed by the contract. inclusive of surcharges. to pay their price. Instead of paying. at the price stipulated. was a purchaser or an agent of the plaintiff for the sale of his beds. For the foregoing reasons. as constituting its cause and subject matter. and in these last two cases an additional discount was to be allowed for prompt payment. There was the obligation on the part of the plaintiff to supply the beds. he returns it.002. Quezon City for the production of ready-mixed concrete and plant-mixed hot asphalt. CTA and CIR 185 SCRA 416 May 1990 FACTS: Petitioner. Rizal which processes rock aggregates mined by it from private lands.
Petitioner contends. petitioner has also an asphalt mixing machinery where bituminous asphalt mix is manufactured. awarding Lot 4 with an area of 4.7 square meters. after which water is added and the concrete mixture is sold and delivered to customers. and at the same time filed an action for specific performance plus damages. now Section 187(x). and that it produced asphalt and concrete mix only upon previous orders. Enrique Esteban. all of whom made the initial deposit. Quezon City where the specified aggregates from its plant at Montalban are mixed with sand and cement. Quezon City. and re-awarded said lot jointly and in equal shares to Miguela Sto. ISSUE: Is the petitioner a contractor subject to the 3% contractor's tax under Section 191 or a manufacturer subject to the 7% sales tax under Section 186? COURT RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed respondent CTA’s decision and declared that petitioner is a manufacturer as defined by Section 194(x). Leonardo Redublo and Jose Fernandez. it operates a concrete batching plant at Longos.182. plus interest at the rate of 14% per centum from January 1. The spouses Mendoza asked for reconsideration and for the withdrawal of the said 2nd award to Sto. subject to the approval of the Court Court Council of the PHHC’s consolidation subdivision plan. however. the PHHC withdrew the tentative award of Lot 4 to the spouses Mendoza for the latter’s failure neither to pay its price nor to make a 20% initial deposit. The Court Court Council disapproved the consolidation subdivision plan in August 1960 but approved in February 1964 its revised version where Lot 4 was reduced to an area of 2. The subdivision of Lot 4 into five lots was later approved by the Court council and the Bureau of Lands. that it is a contractor within the meaning of Section 191 under the same Code. that its business falls under "other construction work contractors" or "other independent contractors". Court of Appeals. It reiterated the respondent CTA’s finding that petitioner was formed and organized primarily as a manufacturer. that it has an aggregate plant at Montalban.petitioner is a manufacturer subject to the 7% sales tax under the Section Section 186 of the 1968 National Internal Revenue Code.608.2 square meters located at Diliman. and Mendoza 133 SCRA 777 December 1984 FACTS: In February 1960.00) per square meter. and at its plant site at Longos. People’s Homesite vs. Virgilio Pinzon. The trial court sustained the award but the Court . and ordered it to pay what the respondent CIR demands. Domingo. 1973 up to the date of full payment thereof pursuant to Section 183 (now 193) of the same Code. of the Tax Code. Rizal. Then in October 1965. Court City to respondents Rizalino and Adelaida Mendoza (spouses Mendoza) at a price of twenty-one pesos (P21. which processes rock aggregates mined by it from private lands. Domingo and four others. herein petitioner People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) passed a resolution.
Pasig (petitioner Toyota) on June 14.7 square meters at P21. however. 928 which showed Sosa’s full name and home address.A. and signed the "Agreements Between Mr. the receipt of which was shown by ." to be financed by "B." and that the "BALANCE TO BE FINANCED" is "P274.00.7 square meters at P21 a square meter and the PHHC board of directors acted within its rights in withdrawing the tentative award.608. between the parties? COURT RULING: The Supreme Court found that there was no perfected sale of Lot 4 because the said lot was conditionally or contingently awarded to the Mendozas subject to the approval by the Court council of the proposed consolidation subdivision plan and the approval of the award by the valuation committee and higher authorities. but the spaces provided for "Delivery Terms" were not filled-up. Article 1475 of the Civil Court says “*t+he contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. the spouses Court should have manifested in writing their acceptance of the award for the purchase of Lot 4 just to show that they were still interested in its purchase although the area was reduced. the parties may reciprocally demand performance.000. Inc. and Sosa 244 SCRA 320 May 1995 FACTS: Luna L. subject to the law governing the form of contracts. petitioner Toyota did not deliver the Lite Ace. Sosa asked that his down payment be refunded and petitioner Toyota issued also on June 17 a Far East Bank check for the full amount of P100.608.000. Hence. and a balikbayan guest would be using it on June 18 to go home to Marinduque where he will celebrate his birthday on June 19.00 on June 15. vs. When June 17 came. Sosa and Gilbert delivered the down payment of P100.00 per square meter to spouses Mendoza.608. ISSUE: Was there a perfected sale of Lot 4. Sosa emphasized that he needed the car not later than June 17. Toyota Shaw Inc. there was a no meeting of the minds between the parties on the purchase of Lot 4 with an area of 2..” a document which did not mention anything about the full purchase price and the manner the installments were to be paid.7 square meters was approved in 1964. 1989 because he. Sosa & Popong Bernardo of Toyota Shaw.” Indeed. that payment is by "installment. declared void the re-award to Sto. When the plan with the area of Lot 4 reduced to 2. Sosa and his son. Court of Appeals. went to purchase a yellow Toyota Lite Ace from the Toyota office at Shaw Boulevard. Gilbert. with its reduced area. 1989 where they met Popong Bernardo who was a sales representative of said branch. From that moment. Domingo and four others.137. his family. and ordered the PHHC to sell Lot 4 with an area of 2. Bernardo assured Sosa that a unit would be ready for pick up on June 17 at 10:00 in the morning..00".of Appeals reversed the said decision. 1989 and Bernardo accomplished a printed Vehicle Sales Proposal (VSP) No.
and its non-delivery did not cause any legally indemnifiable injury. 4 parcels of land. "without prejudice to our future claims for damages.a check voucher of Toyota.” was not a perfected contract of sale. as VSP No.However. ISSUE: Was there a perfected contract of sale between respondent Sosa and petitioner Toyota? COURT RULING: The Supreme Court granted Toyota’s petition and dismissed Sosa’s complaint for damages because the document entitled “Agreements Between Mr. Defendants paid. Sosa and Toyota as parties to a contract.00 on account of the purchase price. The trial court found that there was a valid perfected contract of sale between Sosa and Toyota which bound the latter to deliver the vehicle and that Toyota acted in bad faith in selling to another the unit already reserved for Sosa. Sosa and Bernardo as private individuals and not between Mr. plaintiff Addison sold to the defendant Marciana Felix and husband Balbino Tioco. ADDISON VS FELIX FACTS: By a public instrument.000. the sum of P3.00 made no specific reference to a sale of a vehicle. it could only refer to a sale on installment basis. The provision on the downpayment of P100. It was further stipulated that the purchaser was to deliver to the vendor 25 per centum of the value of the products that she might obtain from the 4 parcels “from the moment she takes possession of them until the Torrens certificate of title be issued in her favor. The VSP also created no demandable right in favor of Sosa for the delivery of the vehicle to him. 1989 confirmed. Addison was able to designate only 2 of the 4 parcels and more than two- . together with interest at the rate of I 0 percent per annum. she may rescind the contract of sale in which she shall be obliged to return to Addison the net value of all the products of the 4 parcels sold.928 executed on June 15.000.. If it was intended for a contract of sale. and bound herself to pay the remainder in installments. Sosa & Popong Bernardo of Toyota Shaw. at the time of the execution of the deed. Inc. There was no indication in the said document of any obligation on the part of Toyota to transfer ownership of a determinate thing to Sosa and neither was there a correlative obligation on the part of the latter to pay therefor a price certain. Toyota then gave Sosa the option to purchase the unit by paying the full purchase price in cash but Sosa refused. and Addison shall be obliged to return to her all the sums that she may have paid.A. which Sosa signed with the reservation.” It was likewise covenanted that “within I year from the date of the certificate of title in favor of Felix. but merely an agreement between Mr." Petitioner Toyota contended that the B. and the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision. Finance disapproved Sosa’s the credit financing application and further alleged that a particular unit had already been reserved and earmarked for Sosa but could not be released due to the uncertainty of payment of the balance of the purchase price.
symbolic delivery through the execution of the public instrument is sufficient. No. Addison filed suit in CFI to compel Felix to make payment of the first installment. it its material delivery could have been made. then fiction yields to reality – the delivery has not been effected. the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through another in his name.” It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract. 2. at the moment of sale. who claimed to be the owner of the parts so occupied by him. because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will. The thing is considered to be delivered when it is placed “in the hands and possession of the vendee. in accordance with the terms of the contract and of the interest at the stipulated rate. But if. I t is necessary that the vendor shall have control over the thing sold that. as she has demanded. that the mere execution of the instrument was not a fulfillment of the vendor’s obligation to deliver the thing sold. the rescission of the sale and the return of the price. Yes. Whether or not the purchaser can rescind the contract. notwithstanding the execution of the instrument. 2. . When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor. Defendant answered and alleged that the plaintiff had failed to deliver the lands that were the subject matter of the sale. notwithstanding the fact that the thing sold was not subject to the control of the vendor. more than two-thirds of their area was in the hostile and adverse possession of a third person. The record shows that the plaintiff did not deliver the thing sold. he was not even able to show them to the purchaser. The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. and as regards the other two.thirds of these two were found to be in the possession of one Juan Villafuerte. and that from such non-fulfillment arises the purchaser’s right to demand. Whether or not the delivery had been effected by reason of the issuance of the Torrens Certificate of title. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. It is evident in the case at bar. The thing sold must be placed in his control. ISSUES: 1. With respect to two of the parcels of land. HELD: 1. but. in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition.
Inc. On June 1. Inc. Quezon City an action to nullify the Sheriff's sale and for an injunction to prevent Jalwindor from detaching the glass and wooden jalousies.09.00 as attorney's fees. 1965 to vacate the premises and to pay Sampaguita. Sampaguita filed a complaint for ejectment and for collection of a sum of money against Capitol for the latter’s failure to pay rentals from March 1964 to April 1965. (Jalwindor) were domestic corporations duly organized under the Philippine laws. with Jalwindor as the highest bidder for P6. Capitol likewise failed to comply with the terms of the Compromise Agreement. the Sheriff of Quezon City made levy on the glass and wooden jalousies. Later. and on July 31. therefore. ISSUE: Was there a delivery made and.00. Meanwhile. Capitol purchased on credit from Jalwindor glass and wooden jalousies. vs. and on October 20. 1964. 1966. Sampaguita leased to Capitol “300” Inc.1964 and that all the materials that Capitol purchased will be considered as security for such undertaking. Jalwindor Manufacturers. On the other hand. payable in monthly installments of at least P300. Quezon City an action for collection of a sum of money with a petition for preliminary attachment against Capitol for its failure to pay its purchases. (Capitol) the roof deck of its building with the agreement that all permanent improvements Capitol will make on said property shall belong to Sampaguita without any part on the latter to reimburse Capitol for the expenses of said improvements. a transfer of ownership of the thing sold? COURT RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court declaring Sampaguita as declared the lawful owner of the disputed glass and wooden jalousies. Jalwindor filed with the CFI of Rizal.Sampaguita Pictures. 93 SCRA 420 October 1979 FACTS: Both the plaintiff-appellant Sampaguita Pictures Inc. (Sampaguita) and defendant-appellee Jalwindor Manufacturers Inc. the lower court dismissed the complaint and ordered Sampaguita to pay Jalwindor the amount of P500.000. Jalwindor and Capitol submitted to the trial court a Compromised Agreement wherein Capitol acknowledged its indebtedness of P9. permanently enjoining Jalwindor from detaching said . and the City Court of Quezon City ordered Capitol on June 8. Jalwindor was ordered to maintain the status quo pending final determination of the case. Sampaguita filed with the CFI of Rizal.531. but Jalwindor filed an idemnity bond in favor of the Sheriff and the items were sold at public auction on August 30. Shortly. replacing the existing windows. which the latter itself delivered and installed in the leased premises. Sampaguita filed a third-party claim alleging that it is the owner of said materials and not Capitol. 1967.00 a month beginning December 15. 1966.
the possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. . an entirely different matter calling for a new adjudication arises. the complaint of Sampaguita to nullify the Sheriff's sale is well founded. 1999 – a month after the last day forfiling. and ordered Jalwindor to pay Sampaguita the sum of P1. The items in question were illegally levied upon since they do not belong to the judgment debtor.1) The action filed by the petitioner. Thus. MTC ordered respondent to vacate the land and surrender to petitioner possession thereof. is improper. The power of the Court in execution of judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. Respondent is the true owner of the land. respondent was first in actual possession of the property. therefore. respondent answer with counterclaim that never was there an occasion when petitioner occupied a portion of the premises. respondent alleges that said land was a public land (respondent filed a miscellaneous sales application with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office) and the action for ejectment cannot succeed where it appears that respondent had been in possession of the property prior to the petitioner.items from the roof deck of the Sampaguita Pictures Building. As between the two buyers. Therefore. HELD: No.2) The subject property had not been delivered to petitioner. it did not acquire possession either materially or symbolically. • On October 2000. which was an action for “unlawful detainer”. On appeal. later. to Sampaguita by virtue of the agreement in their lease contract. andthat said land was again sold to respondent on April 1998. hence. the RTC reversed the decision. When a property levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution is claimed by a third person in a sworn statement of ownership thereof. TEN FORTY REALTY VS CRUZ FACTS: • Petitioner filed an ejectment complaint against Marina Cruz(respondent) before the MTC. As the bare allegation of petitioner’s tolerance of respondent’s occupation of the premises has not been proven. and should prosper. as prescribed by the rules. • On the other hand. the action had already prescribed because the complaint was filed on May 12. CA sustained the trial court’s decision. Petitioner alleges that the land indispute was purchased from Barbara Galino on December 1996. The fact that Capitol failed to pay Jalwindor the purchase price of the items levied upon did not prevent the transfer of ownership to Capitol and. the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry.000. However. ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner should be declared the rightful owner of the property. In addition.00 for and as attorney's fees.
at the time it purchased the property from Galino. At the time. . as provided under Section 3 of Article XII of the Constitution.As regards the question of whether there was good faith in the second buyer. DOCTRINE/S: Execution of Deed of Sale. As shown. because of a legal impediment. Not sufficient as delivery. the property — which was public land –had not been registered in the name of Galino. Nowhere in the Civil Code is it provided that the execution of a Deed of Sale is a conclusive presumption of delivery of possession of a piece of real estate. Disqualification from Ownership of Alienable Public Land. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected. the former’s name appeared on the tax declarations for the property until its sale to the latter in 1998. RULING: The Supreme Court DENIED the petition. Petitioner has not proven that respondent was aware that her mode of acquiring the property was defective at the time she acquired it from Galino. respondent relied on the tax declarations thereon. Galino was in fact occupying the realty when respondent took over possession. The established rule is that alienable and disposable land of the public domain held and occupied by a possessor — personally or through predecessors-in-interest. was deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. and exclusively for 30 years — is ipso jure converted to private property by the mere lapse of time. continuously. Thus. Such constructive or symbolic delivery. However. Ownership is transferred not by contract but by tradition or delivery. they can however acquire private land. openly. there was no circumstance that could have placed the latter upon inquiry or required her to further investigate petitioner’s right of ownership. The execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. petitioner has not presented proof that. the property had ceased to be of the public domain and was already private land. being merely presumptive. thus. While corporations cannot acquire land of the public domain. Private corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
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