A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF INDIAN, MAINLY BUDDHIST, THOUGHT ON SOME ASPECTS OF ¯ DOCTRINES KALAM

Shlomo Pines∗
In Beitr¨ age zur islamischen Atomenlehre, published in 1936 in Berlin, I pointed out similarities between the atomic doctrines of the Kal¯ am and those of various Indian philosophical and/or theological systems, but failed to propose a definite hypothesis accounting for these similarities. In the above work I also quoted some of the Islamic sources referring to Jahm’s disputation with the Samaniyya,1 but did not discuss, as I shall do in the present article, the implications of points raised in this debate for the doctrine of early Islam. My inability at the time of writing the Beitr¨ age to formulate a supposition accounting for the similarities between Indian and Islamic atomic theories was due, I believe now, to my not having sought out an able source of information bearing on religion and scholarship in Central Asia in the first half of the seventh century. This evidence also helped me to interpret the sparse accounts of and reference to Jahm’s disputation with the Buddhists occurring in the writings of Arabic polemists and doxographers. In 620 (or 627) the Chinese pilgrim Yuan Chuang, a Buddhist monk, started on his voyage to “the countries of the West”, his final destination being India. He brought back 657 Buddhist works,2 and devoted the last twenty years of his life to translating seventy-five of them. In his reports concerning the “countries of the West” he gives various details concerning the Buddhist movements and communities, of which only two instances will be quoted here. Speaking of the city of Balkh, he mentions the following Buddhist buildings: a hundred monasteries, a temple and several hundred St¯ upas.3 Three thousand Buddhist monks studied the doctrine of the H¯ ınay¯ ana branch of Buddhism. [p. 183] In 644, a short time after Yuan Chuang’s visit, Balkh was captured by the Muslim invaders. In the kingdom of K¯ apis¯ a (in the region of Begram in Afghanistan) there were, according to our traveller, a hundred monasteries, in which six thousand monks studied the doctrines of Mah¯ ay¯ ana Buddhism. He mentions also
∗ Profossor Pines died on January 15, 1980. This article was seen through the press by the editors. 1 To whom I refer (Beitr¨ age, pp. 121–122) as follows: “Von der kaum greifbaren indischen Sekte der Samaniyya”. This mistaken view has been taken over by G. Vitestam in the introduction to his edition of Ab¯ u Sa ¯ ıd Uthm¯ an Ibn al-D¯ arim¯ ı, K. al-Radd al¯ a ’l-Jahmiyya, Lund-Leiden 1960, p. 15, n. 3, p. 16. This introduction contains a detailed analysis of alD¯ arim¯ ı’s exposition of Jahm’s Kal¯ am. 2 More than four hundred of them belonged to the Mah¯ ay¯ ana branch of Buddhism. 3 Buddhist monuments.

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may be called philosophical (this was the case in China and Tibet). 7 His theological views will not be discussed here unless they have an immediate relevance to his discussion with the Buddhists. prove that some of the countries conquered by Muslims in Central Asia. J. Buddhist treatises of this kind are frequently full of polemics. 118–120 6 Samaniyya is the Arabic form of Samana (in Sanskrit Sraman ´ . pp. 1927. and among certain groups China and Japan. 123) that the .ajam ) in the region cd Khur¯ as¯ an. S. p. I. Some of the texts translated and studied were doctrinal treatises which. Filliozat. S an with the . had been converted in various degrees. as well as others with which this invasion brought them into close contact. This meant that Buddhist texts. These citations from Yuan Chuang. Ritter. La doctrine classique de la m´ edecine indienne. and that they formed a part of that considerable portion of Asia which. Darul-f¨ unun Ilahiyat Fak¨ ultesi Mecmusai. Ah azin¯ ı in the last period of the rule of . we shall consider the disputation of Jahm b. to which others may be added. al-Tanb¯ ıh wa ’l-radd al¯ a ahl al-ahw¯ a wa ’l-bida . There were also a thousand “heretics”. Buddhist missionary activities included the establishment of monasteries.2 Shlomo Pines a monastery in that country inhabited by approximately three hundred monks who studied the doctrines of H¯ ınay¯ ana Buddhism. mad b. 10 Ed. sinf ) of the Iranians (al.. According to Ah a al-zan¯ adiqa wa ’l-jahmiyya. Jahmiyya. After enumerating heretical opinions professed by the Jahmiyya. Berlin 1929. Paris 1975. p. waz al-M¯ Ban¯ u Umayya. Ab¯ u ’l9 H usayn al-Malat¯ ı states: “This is the sum of the discourse ( Kal¯ a m ) of the . Hayderabad 1958. ed. who are a subdivision (. because Jahm b. It seems probable that the fact related by al-Bir¯ un¯ ı (F¯ ı tah ıq m¯ a li ’l-hind. V–VI. had been strongly influenced by Buddhist missionary activities. cf. in the course of many centuries. see also Pines. S afw¯ a n was the first . Beitr¨ age zur islamischen Atomenlehre. p. and translations into the local language made available. p. Dedering. religious influence went hand in hand with the diffusion of Indian science in Tibet.e. which were sometimes centres of study (see above). For he said: ‘I will not pray to someone whom I do not know’ ”. The written appellation of the Buddhists as encountered in the Sogdian script is ˇ smm. 745) is said in Al-Ash ar¯ ı’s Maq¯ al¯ at al-isl¯ amiyy¯ ın 8 to have been killed in Merv by Salm b.4 had to be procured. p. 5 Indian 4 Or . but receive a fair amount of information about Indian philosophical standpoints which are at variance with these views. in Indonesia. H . Istanbul 1926. who derived this discourse from that of the Samaniyya. 8 Ed H. 77. q¯ translation of the Sanskrit medical treatise of Caraka was made at the behest of Ban¯ u Barmak is connected with the Buddhist antecedents of this family: They were descended from the superior of one of the Buddhist monasteries of Balkh. afw¯ Samaniyya. 184] Jahm (d. in Central Asia. members of Indian non Buddhist sects. i. . a common designation for Buddhists. and a careful reader may not only apprehend the views of their author. for want of a more suitable term. 1. 314f.5 At this point. They induced him to have doubts with regard to his religion in such a way that for forty days he stopped praying. and whose local elites had been moulded by Buddhist thought. anbal’s al-Radd al¯ in other Indian languages. in Indochina. 280 9 In K. originally composed in Sanskrit. They were called after Jahm. a).6 We shall start with the following quotations concerning Jahm:7 [p.10 .

Upon their replying in the affirmative. as follows: It is reported that some Samaniyya said to Jahm b.¯ . stopped praying for forty days.¯ Jahm’s disputation obviously represents an attempt by a Mu tazil¯ ı author to glorify the founder of the sect. . 17 Besides the five senses. . had a conversation with him. it seems. Ibn al-Murtad¯ .18 namely inference (dal¯ ıl ). There is no doubt about an affirmative answer. Now this is known by means of inference. Jahm points out that the soul (like God) cannot be perceived by the senses. this analogy between the soul and God may be regarded as the s point of Jahm’s doctrine concerning God. 12 R¯ uh . Hereupon he remained silent and wrote about this to W¯ as . in this passage the translation of the Arabic term as “soul” rather than as “spirit” seems to be appropriate. see Diwald Wilzer’s Einleitung.Buddhist thought and Kal¯ am doctrines 3 Jahm and his Buddhist opponents enter their debate of the condition that the worsted party will adopt the victor’s religion. According to Ibn H . He asks his opponents if they believe that a soul12 is present in them. Another account of Jahm’s disputation occurs in Ibn al-Murtad a’s T at . afw¯ the knowledge of what is regarded as good14 follow (yakhruj ) from the five senses (mash¯ a ir )?” He answered:15 [p. At a ¯ . one is reminded of al-Malat¯ . see p. . by Diwald Wilzer. They said: “Consequently He is unknown”. XVI. When Jahm gave this answer. but his work is based on earlier sources. nor can anyone be found who has perceived Him in this manner. S an: “Does . The question posed by the Samaniyya is: “What is Jahm’s reason for asserting that there is a God?” The fact is that none of his five senses perceive Him. 16 Literally “said”. il. They said: “Tell us about the object of your worshup (ma b¯ ud ). and his perplexity lasts forty days.13 in the section dealing with W¯ as il’s b. 18 The text has wajh. p. and were converted by him to Islam. He informed them (of the facts). one may draw upon it in my opinion in analysing the philosophical or theological problems raised by the disputation as related by Ibn al-Murtad a. 185] “No”. principally. a died in 1437. 14 Al-Ma r¯ uf . on a work of Abd al-Jabb¯ ar. il: You may posit a sixth17 (source of knowledge). because of doubts instilled in him by the Samaniyya. 15 Literally “said”. 13 Ed. Wiesbaden 1961. anbal. This question at first discomfits Jahm.11 Finally he comes up with the following argumentation. il into Ibn ai-Murtad .¯ aqil ) and a madman. they (the Samaniyya) said: “This is not your discourse (Kal¯ am )”. The introduction of an appeal to W¯ as a’s version of . ı’s statement (see above) according to which Jahm. abaq¯ al-mu tazila. between rational being (al. which may be translated “aspect”. Hereupon they will say: “He (God) does not follow either from the senses or from inference”. 34. Hereupon they went to W¯ as . the translation “what is known” seems to me less appropriate than the one adopted in the text. Do you know Him ( araftahu ) by any of them?” He answered:16 “No”.¯ 11 In connection with these forty days. Thereupon I shall ask them whether they distinguish between the living and the dead. It may be rendered . .

22 Dharmakirti. It should. [p. 21 See Th. il’s advice (or W¯ as il himself). p. as (singular pram¯ an a ). p. cf. p. may account to some extent for this resemblance. 20 See for instance Jayatileke. have clearly one important point in common. whose theological doctrines may be supposed to have been rather inchoate. New York 1962. anbal. Since God cannot be perceived by them. 587. known to exist.20 The Buddhists do not reject inference.21 According to a Buddhist author. it is impossible to know Him. Sa ˙ Commentary on the Ved¯ anta S¯ utras of B¯ adar¯ ayan a . 405. Some of the Buddhist thinkers dealt with by Stcherbatsky are contemporaneous with or even posterior to some of the Mutakallim¯ un referred to in the present article. who refuse to accept his assertion that . Deussen. . I have not encountered an identical statement in Indian 19 Sometimes referred to as “materials”. Stcherbatsky.24 In Ibn al-Murtad a’s version of the disputation. in my opinion. a designation which does not seem to me to be felicitous. Erkenntnis theorie und Logik nach der Lehre der sp¨ ateren Buddhisten. IV. 209. ads. answers the Samaniyya. He is unknown. Stcherbatsky. This knowledge is acquired by a kind of extrasensory vision. God is known by means of inference. This need not. The fact that Arab conquests in central Asia brought about an encounter between Buddhist centres of learning (see above) and Muslim missionaries. ´ nkara’s Leipzig 1926. 71ff. as it seems more than probable that to a large extent the later Buddhist authors took over the doctrines of their predecessors. p. 186] The thesis that knowledge can be obtained only by means of the five senses was put forward in India in the first place by Lok¯ ayata heretics. which are designated in Sanskrit as pram¯ an . . blance between the various Kal¯ am doctrines in this matter and those of Indian schools. Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie I iii. In both Ibn H a. op. affect the argumentation. be noted in this connection that there are ex. some of these may have been Buddhist converts to Islam. according to which both the soul and God. on W¯ as .¯ the Samaniyya start with the assumption that knowledge can be acquired only by means of the five senses. for instance. London 1963.4 Shlomo Pines The latter’s version and that of Ibn H . by pointing out that it is by resorting to inference that the living are distinguished from the dead and rational beings from madmen. amples in Greco-Roman philosophy of an analogy being drawn between human perception of God and one’s own soul. anbal’s version of the disputation and that of Ibn al-Murtad . an appellation which in this context may be translated as God This teaching goes back to the Upanis . Jahm. 24 See Jayatilleke. anbal’s version of Jahm’s reply to the Samaniyya.. but assert that knowledge attained by inference cannot transcend the domain of what may be perceived by the senses. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge.¯ . 1. though dissimilar in some respects. however. nevertheless. Buddhist Logic.22 “God (¯ ı´ svara ) is an unreal substance”. cit. may be found in a doctrine of ¯ the Ved¯ anta school.. The latter affirmed the identity of Atman (the Self of the Soul) with Brahman. p. They deal with what may be called sources of knowledge.23 A possible resemblance between Ibn H . 613. Munich 1924. It should be considered in this connection that this encounter and clash of two civilizations may have engendered the need for interpreters versed in the languages and the thought of the warring parties.19 There were among them adherents of schools of thought which denied the validity of inference (anum¯ ana ) altogether. 23 See Th. though not perceived by the senses are. 4. It is my contention that there is an unmistakable resem.

Anum¯ ana is recognized in the Ved¯ anta as a valid mode of obtaining knowledge. Lacombe expounds in L’absolu selon le Ved¯ anta (Psris 1966. anum¯ ana not being explicitly mentioned in the text he quotes. Chrysippus states that the krit¯ eria are perception (aisth¯ esis ) and prol¯ epsis. This is also the opinion of Antipatros and Apoll¯ odoros. I believe that this is correct. however. Thus.27 The Ny¯ aya. which . but some parallels may be mentioned. . 42–43. from the structure of the two theologies or philosophies in question.Buddhist thought and Kal¯ am doctrines 5 philosophical texts. inference (anum¯ ana ). on his own text a proof of the existence of God (¯ ı´ svara ) by means of inference (anum¯ ana ). just as the existence of a pot that of a potter.28 which means that they recognize the authority of the Vedas. amalgamated to some 25 extent with those of the Vai´ ses One finds in the author’s Commentary .29 The [p. as stated above.26 As Fouchet points out (p. In the first book of his work Peri Logou. 187] to this same passage. 29 The Stoic concept krit¯ erion may seem to disprove this assertion. is also assigned the function of apprehending the distinctiveness of a thing or an element that singles it out when it is compared to all the others. apprehended by means of inference. The Purus am . 28 There are also others. a’s Tarka-Sangraha sets forth in the main the doctrines of the Ny¯ aya school. syam that the cause of the world is a principle endowed with intelligence. Lacombe believes that this proof requires the use of inference. Le Compendium des Topiques (Tarka-Sangraha ˙ ) d’Annambhat . Boethus. . a passage in Gaud ada’s Commentary on the S¯ am arik¯ a (6–7). tation attributed to Jahm and to W¯ as il. ika and Ved¯ philosophical systems. Foucher. for his 26 See 25 The . the krit¯ erion of truth is the katal¯ eptike phantasia.a and the Pradh¯ ana Prakr iti (Nature). a treatise expounding . it is possible both to apprehend transcendent entities and to distinguish among things that are perceived by the senses. which cannot be perceived by senses. iti are the two primordial entities in the S¯ am khya school. as set forth by some Western philosophers or theologians: the existence of the world entails the existence of a Maker. the Purus . which is stated in an abridged form. The example given (pp. This proof is based on the fact that the order obtaining in the world is of teleological nature.t . Both the similarity of this passage to the argumentation under discussion and its difference from it are obvious: Inference has in both texts two roles: through its instrumentality. others) derives. . which clearly . According [p. can be assimilated to the so-celled “cosmological proof”. pp. presents a certain analogy to the argumen. Vai´ ses anta are non-Buddhist. a. kas. a term corresponding to a wholly satisfactory extent to the latter does not appear in the Greek philosophical systems. unlike everything else. a and Prakr . khya is something quite different from the God of Islam. a of the S¯ . The Purus . it is likewise by means of inference that one pigeon is distinguished from others belonging to the same species. 13). 27 O. The two extant accounts of Jahm’s disputation fit neatly into an Indian framework. are .t . According to Chrysippos in book IV of his Physics. A somewhat closer resemblance to Jahm’s argumentation as given in Ibn al-Murtad a’s version may be found in Annambhat ˙ . pp.¯ . ap¯ . According to this passage. The main divergence then (there are. A.¯ presupposes discussions concerning the pram¯ an a s. so-called orthodox . but he too is. has a smell (characteristic of it). a transcendent entity. 188] two schools tend to merge. which is not explicitly mentioned in this. in my opinion. Paris 1949. This proof. This is particularly true of Ibn al-Murtad a’s version. khya-K¯ the doctrines of the S¯ am khya school. of course. 134–135) is the distinctiveness of the earth apprehended because it. 226–228) on a proof ´ nkara’s given in Sa ˙ Brahma-S¯ utra-Bh¯ a. ed. As far as I know.

13–14): . as regards the matters with which our enquiry is concerned. ibidem. cit. ibidem VIII. always had the “indicative sign or signal” in mind. It would seem that the early Stoics (this may also be true of Oin¯ esidemos). VII. An explanation of the various terms mentioned above would entail a disquisition on the whole system of Stoic logic. n. we foretell the impending death” (Sextus. Consequently. p.) discusses whether the distinction in question. VII 54. V. by the points of similarity that exist between the Stoic and the Indian teachings under discussion. Prol¯ epsis. we are informed. which Chrysippus. since what is not observable as a fortiori not observable in connection with something else (Sextus. Brochard (Les Sceptiques grecs. Nevertheless. transmitted by Diogenes Laertius. The indicative signal. khya. this is denied by Brochard. op. in one of his two differing statements on the subject. 154). or as Mates proposes to call it. the Indian (which varies greatly from one school of thought to another) and the Stoic. which would go beyond the scope of the present article. on S¯ emeion. seems to indicate what V. a. for when we see the scar we recall the antecedent wound. 54). Adversus Mathematicus. see B. perception. the equal validity of the inference which may be identified with the “indicative signals”. For we “reason” that the body has a kind of internal power to manifest such motions (Sextus. “signal”. A clear-cut answer to this question is rendered difficult. Stoic Logic. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961. recognize. when we see smoke. see Diogenes Laertius. having been observed in a clear perception together with the object signified. in the case of the scar which follows the wound and in the death following rupture of the heart. I refer to the term s¯ emeion (“sign”). we have many times observed smoke and fire in conjunction. 10ff. The kinship between some elements of Stoic logic and epistemology and the corresponding Indian teachings may appear to be at least as close. II. It may be noted that the Buddhists accept only the kind of anum¯ ana which is similar to “commemorative signals” and deny the validity of anum¯ ana which may be quoted with the “indicative signals”. The resemblance between Aristotelian Syllogistic logic and the corresponding Indian doctrines has often been remarked upon. 13) that the Stoics distinguished between commemorative (hypomnestika ) and indicative (endeiktika ) “signs” or “signals”. Beyond that they have little or nothing in common. This statement appears to be false or doubtful as far as the early Stoics are concerned. 342f. . p.6 Shlomo Pines debates concerning the existence of God may have some similarity with the part. 152). it is indicated. G¨ ottingen 1949.. 153). a s similar functions. when speaking of s¯ emeion without any further specification. like the Stoics. 88f. and it is set forth by Carneades. p. regards as being a krit¯ erion (the other being perception). For example. our expos´ e of some traits . the Vai´ . VIII. the Sceptic Oinesidemos. The soul is an example of something that is naturally non-evident. makes us remember that which was observed along with it when the object is not evident (Sextus Empiricus. 269. was already known to his predecessor. However. The commemorative signal. 127) this distinction was first made in the “sceptical” 2nd Academy. The same relations hold. believes that the krit¯ eria are reason (nouns ). can never be observed in connection with the signified. ibidem. The S¯ am ses . which is expounded by Sextus. on the other hand. 154). The difference between the two kinds of “signals” stands out clearly in the following quotations from Mates (pp. According to Pohlenz (Dir Stoa. Goldschmidt calls “les pr´ enotions” (“notions communes” or “notions . Mates states (p. as and relevant doctrines occurring in the Kal¯ of Stoic logic and epistemology was undertaken with the intention of finding out whether the latter presented equally close parallels to the Kal¯ am opinions under discussion. or signified indicatively by the bodily motions. From our point of view the significant point in the passage by Diogenes is the fact that the one Stoic term which might be thought to correspond to the Sanskrit anum¯ ana does not occur in the enumeration of the krit¯ eria. . though I think not impossible. these two doctrinal systems. we immediately recall the (presently unseen) fire. for it never presents itself to our clear perception. desire (orexis ) and knowledge (epist¯ em¯ e ). and seeing the rupture of the heart. Mates. We are concerned in the present enquiry with the parallels between the Indian conceptions relating to pram¯ an am. ika (see below) and other Indian “orthodox” systems. dissimulate essential difference. Paris 1932. on the contrary. and both regard perception as krit¯ erion or a pram¯ an . in the case of the Stoics this function is explicated in the expression krit¯ erion al¯ etheias (Diogenes Laertius. Both assigned to the krit¯ eria and the pram¯ an . p. 1 and p.

). for obvious reasons. A study in ancient empiricism. At this point we may ask why the Stoics did not consider the “sign” or “signal” as a krit¯ erion of truth. both the Stoics and the Epicureans lacked. No attempt will be made here to set forth the arguments on which Br´ ehier bases his conclusions. but not the kind that is immediate. thinking.33 The statement according to which the knowledge of God is not necessary knowledge is negated by the as ab al-ma ¯ arif 34 such as J¯ ah u Al¯ ı . 190] Mu tazil¯ ıs believed that this knowledge can be obtained in this life only through speculative thought (dal¯ ala. seems to have been much less thought out than that of the Stoics and the equivalent ideas in the Indian systems of philosophy and in Kal¯ am. feeling disgust. H. 31 Ed. believing and so forth (p. An example of immediate necessary knowledge is our awareness that we are willing. by Indian views (see above) to be dismissed out of hand as the kind of baseless accusation characteristic of Islamic sectarian polemics? I should hesitate to do so in view of the fact that Jahm’s negation of divine attributed and of various statements regarding God current in Islamic theology may lend colour to Ibn H . 48f. and Ab¯ naturelles”) (see Le syst` eme stoicien et la notion du temps. 34 See on them J. by Abd al-Kar¯ ım Uyhm¯ an. 32. the knowledge that a thing exists or is nonexistent. which is used as a term for inference in Jahm’s disputation.Buddhist thought and Kal¯ am doctrines 7 one in which Jahm was engaged. 189] is used. speaking of the epistemology and logic of the Stoics. and it should be borne in mind that the fragmentariness of the sources from which we piece together our knowledge of Stoic logic makes any sweeping assertion concerning the latter somewhat doubtful. et non pas. “ainsi le rapport du signe ` a chose signi´ ee est entre deux termes incorpotets. Cairo 1965. p. de Lacy and E. Paris 1959. the motivation to set up a revealed speech as a source of knowledge. 142ff. Perhaps the answer may be sought in an assertion made by Br´ ehier. 51).¯ 33 Abd al-Jabb¯ ar believes (p. the [p. connect a deed with him who did it. He contends. It should be also noted that. but rejected by others. is that it is knowledge that cannot be negated by the person that this has this knowledge because of a doubt or a difficulty. . 48ff. du tout entre deux r´ ealit´ es”. as it depends upon the senses encountering objects and perceiving them. According to him. 17. 30 Is Ibn Hanbal’s assertion that Jahm’s doctrine concerning God was strongly influenced . . p. a s in most Indian systems of logic and epistemology.) on the Mu tazil¯ ı doctrine regarding man’s knowledge of God (ma rifat Allah ). The perception of . A. for instance. anum¯ ana. al-us . La th´ eorie des incorporels dans l’ancien stoicisme. However. In fact. any further discussion of this point would seem to me to be quite profitless. Die Erkentnislehre des Adudaddin al-¯ Ij¯ ı.) accepted by some theologians.32 This knowledge is not obtained through perception (mush¯ ahada ) and is not necessary knowledge ( ilm d ur¯ ı ). see E. 51). Br´ ehier. deux inexprimables. iz . de Lacy. 32 Both these words are related to dal¯ ıl. as reported by Ibn al-Murtad a (see above). in view of the present state of our knowledge. but is not used in connection with inference. van Ess. Abd al-Jabb¯ ar al-Hamad¯ an¯ ı gives in his Sharh ¯l al-khamsa 31 the fol. Paris 1980. It may be noted that a definition of “necessary objects” (p. 51) that things known in the perfection of reason (kam¯ al al. desirous. unlike the “orthodox” Indian systems and the Kal¯ am.¯ . anbal’s charge. . The Epicureans had a theory of inference which was very different from that attributed by Br´ ehier to the Stoics. istidl¯ al ). see P. or a pram¯ an . which is one of the pram¯ an . Philodemus: On Methods of inference . Bound up with this are rules with regard to deeds being good or bad.h .aql ) are also necessary knowledge. a. But their idea of krit¯ eria in the technical sense. ar¯ the senses (p.u lowing information (p. particularly p. disliking. but as a rule a different kind of vocabulary [p. Philadelphia 1941. Wiesbaden 1966. p.30 In what follows I shall try to assess the possibility of (probably indirect) Indian influence on the views of later Mutakallum¯ un concerning the sources of knowledge. 159ff. In other cases this knowledge may depend upon report (khabar ) which may. is another source of knowledge. first and foremost the sense of sight. for instance. A different example is our awareness of our perceptions. it is “necessary knowledge”. if they had one.

. Teheran . Abd al-Jabb¯ ar. Abd al-Jabb¯ ar (op. ilh¯ am and the recourse to these terms by some Mutakallim¯ un cannot in my opinion be ruled out. intuition). related to ilh¯ am. persons near God (al-awliy¯ a ) and righteous persons (al-s alih ¯n ) who . 132ff.e. There are. (for.h . cit. .¯ . op. The verb alhama. Kit¯ ab al-bad wa al-ta r¯ ıkh. An early Mu tazil¯ ı.h .. T . 34–56. Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam II. pp.. van Ess.35 With the exception of as ab al-ma ¯ arif. Kraus in Raziana. is reported to have contended that knowledge of the existence of God is obtained by means of inference (dal¯ ıl ) which is based on the perception of the fact that bodies and other things that are subject to change are created. which is provided through speculative thought with a place (or substratum) in which to be. ed. cit. they (the as ab al-ma ¯ arif ) are not of one mind. Cf. Huart. p. 203: He (Ab¯ u Bakr al-R¯ az¯ ı) said: The (things) most fitting for the wisdom and mercy of the Wise and Merciful one is that He should instil (yulhim ) into all His slaves ( ib¯ ad ) the knowledge of what is useful and what is harmful to them. ar ]. mad b. published by P. It seems probable that this conception has an historical connection with Jahm’s p. is a religious obligation [w¯ ajib ]).¯ (al-ma ¯ arif ) are acquired through ilh¯ am (inspiration.e. 109–110 of the Arabic text. is used by the physician and heretic Ab¯ u Bakr al-R¯ az¯ ı (the Rhazes of the Latins) in his disputation against the hierarchical views of the Ism¯ a¯ ıl¯ ı missionary Ab¯ u H atim al-R¯ az¯ ı. Pines. cf. but not in the perspective in which we consider it obligatory. p. p. The relevant passage is translated in S.llah believed that there are some people. 1980. p. also Mut ahir al-Maqdis¯ ı. See also on ilh¯ am van Ess. p. A latter-day Mutakallim whom Abd al-Jabb¯ ar believes to have been (Ah . . J. In a parallel way what is known necessarily cannot be otherwise. pp. Ab¯ u ’l-Q¯ asim al-Balkh¯ ı contends that God is known through inference (dal¯ ala ) both in this life and in the afterlife. Ab¯ u l-Hudhayl (d. However. 191] It should be noted that out statement only hold good in this world.¯ disagree with us” (with regard to his opinion that speculative thought [al-naz . 358– . is not abolished). For what is known through inference cannot be known otherwise. 906) set forth in his al-Kit¯ ab al-awsat ı l-maq¯ al¯ at. cit. knowledge of God is necessary knowledge. This would be preferable for them than the setting up of some of them as the Im¯ ams (religious guides) of the others.. [p.8 Shlomo Pines al-Asw¯ ar¯ ı. Cl. On these problems see also the views of N¯ ashi al-Akbar (d. p. 65. 841–842?). “Shi‘ite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari”. 110. as a consequence of this) they strike the faces of each other with the sword. The latter consider speculative thought (with this in view) obligatory. f¯ ed. Fr¨ uhe mu tazilitische H¨ aresiographie: Zwei Werke der N¯ aˇ si al-Akbar. Beirut 1971.¯ 1962. . op. the Mu tazil¯ ıs that are referred to . tab ).h .¯ above (as well as others that are not) appear to believe that cognition of God is inseparable from the knowledge of the inference (dal¯ ıl ) entailing this knowledge. 329f. 67) states that the “as ab al-ma ¯ arif . Orientalia V. Thus the difference of opinion between us and them remains (i. Some of them believe that all the species of knowledge . II. such as prophets. these deny absolutely that speculative thought is obligatory. i. V (1936). (so that) a universal calamity ensues and they perish. This leads to the knowledge that they have a Creator. p. because of their mutual aggression and strife. in such a way that one sect proclaims its own Im¯ am as the true one and the others as false. In the afterlife. 160. however.u have a necessary knowledge of God while they are in this world and yet have the obligation to fulfil God’s commandments. in this life and in what comes after (f¯ ı ¯ ajilihim wa-¯ ajilihim ) and that none of them should be superior to the other. 340. 35 See van Ess.. other who assert that the sciences are a species of knowledge acquired by nature (. whose purpose is to obtain knowledge of God... . In this way no quarrels or differences of opinion would occur between them and they would not perish. cit. in relation to people who have an obligation to fulfil God’s commandments. asan) al-Mu ayyad bi. The possibility that there may be some connection between al-R¯ az¯ ı’s use of alhama. p.. H . op.¯ 378. 121f. ahhar b.

in His Oneness (tawh ıd ) . W¯ . “said”.e. id ) considered by you as signs (dal¯ ala ) indicative of religious commandments (alah am al-Shar iyya )? Why then do you not number them among . p. . aqq ) that are enumerated in the above passage from Sharh ¯l al-khamsa. . ujjat al. continues as follows: If it is asked:37 “Why do you limit the signs (that lead to the knowledge of something other than themselves (al-adilla. dal¯ ala. al-us . In this enumeration the latter term clearly has approximately the meaning of dal¯ ıl and dal¯ ala in the texts quoted above. literally: “when the speculative thinker thinks about it”. the consensus of the community (al-ijm¯ a ).¯ 36 See. The latter (and perhaps also other discussions of a similar nature) can account for the impact of the Indian notion of Anum¯ ana on Islamic thinking. il b. whose beginning has been . In a passage from Sharh al-us u ¯ l al-khamsa (p. . may He be exalted.. The indubitable reason (or so it appears to me) for this change in his vocabulary will be set forth presently. and it is not obligatory to mention them separately. which will be explicated below. If it is asked:40 “Are not reasoning by analogy (al-qiy¯ as ) and a tradition transmitted by one person (khabar al-w¯ ah . ara al-n¯ 40 Literally: “said”. . S. 126. one of these ways being h . . 192] reason (h ujjat alaql ). 37 Literally: . 88f. the Book. i. Abd al-Jabb¯ ar is possibly thereby assigning a different.Buddhist thought and Kal¯ am doctrines 9 disputation. “Why do you say that knowledge of God can only be obtained by a proof based on reason?” We reply38 with regard to the first (question): “Because the sign (dal¯ ıl ) is something that. it signifies “inference”. iz . At . (al-sunna ). The knowledge of God can only be obtained by a proof (based) on reason. . are four: a proof (based on) [p.u translated above. plural of dal¯ ıl )) to these four?” Also. 42 Literally: “say”. Pines. the Qur ¯ an (al-kit¯ ab ). more extended meaning to dal¯ ala and dal¯ ıl. i. when it is made an object of speculative thought.aql.¯ the founder of the Mu tazil¯ ı sect. zir.u . was the first to have enunciated the four ways of reaching the truth (al-h . 41 In addition to the four “signs” mentioned above. or (the sign) Book (kit¯ ab ). Beitr¨ age zur islamischen Atomenlehre. 88f.39 leads the thinker to the knowledge of these four only and not of anything else”.). Know that the signs (that lead to the knowledge of something other than themselves). tradition . 38 Literally: “say”. k¯ the ‘signs’ ?”41 We would answer:42 “They fall under (the sign): consensus (ijm¯ a ).e. or (the sign) tradition (sunna ). a somewhat different terminology than the one employed in the passages of this work quoted above. this is because anything else (in the way of a sign) is but a ‘branch’ (far ) of our knowledge of God. As for the second (question) with respect to the statement that knowledge of God can only be obtained by proof (based) on reason. The passage in Sharh ¯l al-khamsa (p. 39 Idh¯ a naz a.. 36 According to a tradition of which we are apprised by J¯ ah as a. al-us . for instance. .) Abd al-Jabb¯ ar employs .

The Ash ar¯ ı Muh aqill¯ an¯ ı (d.. The various kinds of necessary knowledge listed by B¯ aqill¯ an¯ ı (p. the knowledge that when bodies exist they are either Mu tazil¯ ıs call themselves “the people of Oneness (or Unification) and Justice”. strength (to do something) or weakness. ar ). If we had made an inference (istadlaln¯ a ) from something pertaining (to one of) these (other signs) with regard to God and His Oneness and Justice. inferential (istidl¯ knowledge of created beings (who may be angels or jinn or men). and both of these are but “branches” with respect to the knowledge of God. 44 Ed. Khodeiry and M. primarily Buddhist. 193] this would be. M. The knowledge characterizing the latter is either necessary or speculative. There is also the knowledge that one has of the purpose aimed at by a person who speaks45 (or makes a discourse). as has been noted. if another terminology is used. A. In this passage Abd al-Jabb¯ ar states unequivocally that the fundamental beliefs of Islam relating to the Book. which is eternal and to which the distinction between necessary knowledge and the speculative (naz al ) knowledge does not apply and (2) the . it is a (valid) proof only when it established that it is a tradition (deriving) from the envoy of a Just and Wise One. This may be explained (as follows): The Book has been established as proof (h . ujja ) only when it has been established that it is the discourse of the Wise One. for whom lying is out of the question. may He be exalted. 35ff. health or sickness. Now this is “a branch” of the knowledge. . which can only be acquired by proof based on reason. perception or blindness and other [p. anxiety or joy. with inference. for instance. Cairo 1947. from ‘a branch’ with regard to ‘the root’.43 [p. and al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı and Sa adia briefly mentioned. a wa al-khaw¯ arij wa al-mu tazila 44 the various kinds of knowledge and sources of knowledge. notion. M. be equated. 43 The . This aspect of the matter will be discussed below after some relevant points in the teachings of the Ash ar¯ ıs al-B¯ aqill¯ an¯ ı and al-Juwayn¯ ı have been summed up. 1013) classifies and defines in his . The case of consensus (ijm¯ a ) is similar. He differentiates between (1) the knowledge that characterizes God. will or reluctance. the Prophet and the consensus of the community are derivative. see p. ammad al-B¯ polemical work al-Tamh¯ ıd al¯ a al-mulh ida al-mu at tila wa al-r¯ afid . 194] things that may occur in the soul and are apprehended by a living being when they are there. in His Oneness and His Justice. as.10 Shlomo Pines and His Justice ( adl ). depending as they do on the knowledge of God. pleasure or pain. and this is not permitted”. Other sources of knowledge (though not of the knowledge of God) are. various sorts of “necessary knowledge” of which it is impossible to admit any doubt. Its being a proof has to be validated either by the Book or by tradition. who may not lie.) are: The knowledge acquired through the instrumentality of the five senses. 45 The phrasing seems to indicate that it is not the self-awareness of the person who speaks that is meant here. This proof can. 36ff. It seems to me that the Kal¯ am conception of “necessary knowledge” is derived to a considerable extent from an Indian. Such is man’s knowledge of his own soul (or of himself. bi-nafsihi ) and of what he finds in it. Ab¯ u R¯ ıda. according to Abd alJabb¯ ar (as noted above). As for tradition (sunna ). the knowledge that without occurring in one of the senses is produced (tukhtara u ) in the soul. .

It is knowledge that is assured by correct speculation based on inference (dal¯ ıl ). 51 Ilm had¯ .50 They will be discussed here very briefly. 195] necessary (d ur¯ ı ). such as the knowledge that comes about when men report information about China. . of piety and recalcitrance. one cannot rid oneself of it or doubt it. D. Paris 1938.Buddhist thought and Kal¯ am doctrines 11 discrete and separate or joined together. (Finally) there is the knowledge that is produced in the soul because of a continuous series of reports (khabar ) that arrive and are spread concerning occurrence and existence of (a certain fact). bi-nafsihi ). is based on the knowledge obtained through the senses and necessary knowledge (p. appeared. . furthermore. Him and for all the prophets. of (reverently) saluting and of scoffing. may God pray for . The . spontaneous (bad¯ ıh¯ ı ) and acquired (kasb¯ ı ) knowledge. that information (khabar ) about the existence of a thing and about some of its particularities must be either true or false and that this holds true also for other statements that are contradictory so that reason cannot admit an intermediate position between the two. 47 Apparently 46 The . al-irsh¯ ad. see p. aramayn) on some of the topics that are dealt with more particularly in the present enquiry are stated in K. Al-Juwayn¯ ı does not deal in this context with information (khabar ). 49 The wording seems to suggest that there are two distinct kinds of knowledge. He distinguishes between the knowledge of God and the knowledge of created beings. 50 Edited and translated by J. 8 of the Arabic text.¯ knowledge. Khur¯ as¯ an. and (in general) the knowledge that comes about when certain characteristics are perceived. arar ) or need (h . The etymological explanation proposed by al-Juwayn¯ ı for the use of the translation is ad sensum. p. This would not agree with our author’s statement (see above in the text) that the knowledge obtained through the senses forms a par of necessary knowledge. approximately: “knowledge that is created”. existence of the Creator (al-s a ¯ ni ) is known by means of inference (al-dal¯ ıl. the knowledge that the conjunction of things that contradict each other is impossible and forth. Acquired knowledge is the knowledge that comes about when there is the power to have it.48 internecine struggles (fitan ). which is the knowledge obtained by means of inference (istidl¯ al ). Luciani. without. Such is the knowledge of things perceived.. however.51 The latter kind of knowledge is divided among [p. ıth. Persia (F¯ aris) and Kirm¯ an or about the fact that Moses. Sometimes one of these two is called by the designation of the other. 39). realms and governments”. p. of courage and of cowardice. by empathy.46 There is. the knowledge that man has of himself (or of his own soul. Speculative knowledge. Spontaneous knowledge is like necessary . 48 Or battles? Waq¯ a’i’. Al-Juwayn¯ ı propounds the following classification of the various kinds of knowledge. the knowledge one has47 of the shame felt by a person who is ashamed and of the fear experienced by a person who is afraid. Jesus and Muh ammad. the characteristic of necessary knowledge is that it is continuous. According to established habit. ar¯ Necessary knowledge does not depend on man’s capacity52 and is connected with harm (d aja ). of God). being connected with harm or need. Such are also the reports concerning (various) events. The views of Abd Allah al-Juwayn¯ ı (Im¯ am al-H .49 Inference (dal¯ ıl ) leads to the knowledge of what is hidden (gh¯ a’ib ) from the senses and is not known through necessary knowledge (bi-id t ir¯ a r . 44). 52 On the capacity of the slave ( abd. All acquired knowledge is speculative. 36).

196] existence and that which brings about their end. 55 The reading ikhb¯ ar is possible. while not being regarded by al-Tawh ıd¯ ı as . One engages in a disputation with him. 7. p.57 he is lower than they. his denial would be annulled and if he should say yes. as it shows that recourse to this adjective gives rise to questions. that we know that he knows what is perceived (al-’iy¯ an ). might be a more exact translation.) also saw fit to write a disquisition on the mwaning of the word d ura (necessity). 54 Ed. by F. 7). contradicts himself. . Al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı goes on to expound the reasons for considering certain traditions concerning the prophets as trustworthy (pp. aq¯ perception ( iy¯ an ). ar ) is needed for several reasons. whereas he who does not accept the perception of the senses does not know these things. Al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı goes on to speak of reported information. 944). ar¯ some interest.. 7–9). one of them being that it is necessary (id tir¯ ar ) for knowledge with respect to the senses . Al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı says in relation to a person of this kind. 35f. be noted that akhb¯ ar. one can say to him: “Do you know what you deny”? If he should say no. “beasts”. whereas Abd al-Jabb¯ ar believes that it forms a part of “necessary” knowledge (see above). It is a knowledge to which no contradictory (statement can be offered) through ignorance. that which gives them pleasure and that which gives them pain. reported information (akhb¯ ar )55 and speculative thought (naz ar is given by al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı the status of an . his denial would be affirmed.uq¯ ul (which is plural). 56 It should. Perception is what is apprehended by the senses. Now if one must accept al-akhb¯ ar in general by the necessity of reason. 58 Jawhar. however. cannot but be accepted by “the necessity of reason”.12 Shlomo Pines adjective al-d ur¯ ı in the expression al. because there is no khabar whose veracity is more manifest—because of the signs that make it clear—than that which is enunciated by them. ar¯ explanation for the use of this expression will be proposed below. In his K. He accounts therein for the expression ilm d ur¯ ı. He is ignorant. The level of whoever makes such a statement could not be considered on a par with the level befitting the nature of animals. p. It may be noted that akhb¯ independent source of knowledge. Another . (op. ar )”. and when will he achieve knowledge whereby he could make a living.56 The three sources of knowledge will be discussed here in the order proposed by al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı. of his name.. The various kinds of good and evil can only be grasped by reason59 when these matters are talked over. or knowledge of the food he requires? All this can be obtained by him only by reported information (khabar ).ilm al-d ur¯ ı (necessary knowledge) is of . However. Speculative thought (al-naz . Khaleif. ar¯ . “stock”. but akhb¯ ar seems preferable. He who rejects all of it. How can he achieve knowledge of what is hidden from him.53 Ab¯ u Mans ¯r Muh atur¯ ıd¯ ı. 59 Al. ammad al-M¯ kand (d. Beirut 1982. who was born in the region of Samar.u . since this is necessary knowledge (p. . one must (a fortiori ) accept the akhb¯ ar of the messenger of God. For everyone knows that which assures the continuance of their [p. cit. He ought to be ignorant of percepts and to be incapable of giving information as to what he perceives. for his rejection must in itself be considered as information (khabar ). al-tawh ıd 54 he names these sources of knowledge: “The . of the name of his substance58 and the names of all things. his essence. 53 Al-B¯ aqill¯ an¯ ı . ar¯ . 57 Bah¯ a im. founded a school of Kal¯ am which may be regarded as a rival of the Ash ariyya. This term possibly has here its old signification: “family”.¯ ways by which one achieves knowledge of the reality (h a’iq ) of things are: .¯ forming a part of the first source of knowledge he names.

they are created in time (h adith ). Al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı differs from the other Muslim authors discussed in the present article in that he states that the fact that the substsnces61 are created by God can be proved by all the three sources of knowledge he has listed. God has proved (dalla ) that signs came from Him by miraculous (mu jiza ) proofs60 (adilla ) such as the Qur ¯ an. evil and good. al-tawh ıd the translation “proof” (rather than inference) for dal¯ ıl . Now. Thus it can be proved by khabar. . w¯ motion and rest. consequently these must come about one after the 60 In al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı’s K.¯ eternity (qidam ) is a condition of self-sufficiency (ghinan ). 9–10). a y¯ an. . One of them. increase and diminution. This being so. Now it is impossible that that which may be annihilated should exist (independently and) by itself. for He has informed (akhbara ) (us) that he is the Creator of all things. If follows. For being pre-eternal is incompatible with depending on something other than itself. Thus one has to distinguish between the signs of the prophets and the deceptions of the sorcerers. big and small. 62 Ilm al-hiss. which in my opinion may be equated with ilm al-naz . ar has no way of justifying this rejection other than by an inference (dal¯ al ) based on naz . The arguments which stem from the “knowledge of inference”63 do not seem to me to be essentially different from those which derive from “the knowledge of the senses”. According to one of them every substance ( ayn ) feels that it is necessarily surrounded (or encompassed) (muh a. above. t) by something other than itself. he who rejects naz . Al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı sets forth several more arguments pertaining to what be called knowledge of the senses. for it is impossible . therefore. . the like of which could not have been achieved either by men or by jinn. and not only by inference. it is dead (not alive) it is dominated by what is alive. It is patent that union brings about strengthening. for being pre-eternal (a substance) may dispense with what is other than itself. Now pre. 63 ilm al-Istidl¯ al. 197] by means of a proof (dal¯ ıl ) the like of which man cannot put forward. if. or rather a part of one of them. may be summarized as follows: The world has various states (ah al ). Al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı sets forth several arguments belonging to this category. however. that neither of them can exist without something other than itself. [p. This being so. light and darkness are subject to change and disappearance: they may be destroyed. One of them may be summarized as follows: Good and evil. There is gathering and separation. 61 Or “things”. literally: “knowledge of the senses”. whereas separation leads to annihilation. ar. This entails the createdness in time of (substances). I shall mention two of them which seem to me to be of considerable interest. the createdness in time of things is established. According to a second argument. it is clear that it cannot (by itself) remove the deficiency that causes it not to be perfect with respect to strength or knowledge.¯ (plural adilla ) seems to be called for in most cases. and for knowledge with respect to reported information (khabar ).Buddhist thought and Kal¯ am doctrines 13 as far as objects too distant or too subtle to be perceived by the senses ate concerned. according both to the senses and to reason. but are somewhat more elaborate. if a thing is living. with regard to which errors are possible. aw¯ to bring together contraries. whereas necessity and being lacking make us need something other than oneself.62 which prove that all substances are created. ar (pp. Moreover. the createdness in time of things is established.

2. pp. al-Am¯ an¯ at wa l-I tiq¯ ad¯ at. 14). and indeed runs counter to. . 18). which means that they are created in time. Internal evidence suggests that he was influenced by pagan Greek doxographical texts. . His main theological work. he died in 943. al-Am¯ an¯ at wa l-I tiq¯ ad¯ at. 67 Kull ilm. which had been translated into Arabic. The knowledge of what is necessary ( ilm al-d uriyy¯ at ). al-Am¯ an¯ at wa l-I tiq¯ ad¯ at. of other Greek philosophical texts. ar¯ meaning which has nothing in common with. ar¯ as employed by Muslim Mutalallim¯ un. to note Saadia’s argumentation in K. of .64 Saadia refers to the three sources of knowledge. Y. which is peculiar to the “community that proclaims the unity of God” (jam¯ a at al-muwah ın ). a Jew. in the expression ilm al-d uriyy¯ at.65 One of the examples adduced by Saadia in order to illustrate the third source is the inference from the perception of smoke to the existence of fire.h . 198] composed in 933. id¯ the veridical discourse (al-kal¯ am al-s adiq ). directly or indirectly. 14. . consistent in his listing of sources of knowledge. 3. 35). was [p. Further on (p. Saadia’s object in chapter 1 is to prove that all existences have been created in time (muh at ). the knowledge of all science67 is hidden in reason. Thus he appears to enumerate in his Commentary on the Book of Proverbs 66 (written in Arabic) only two sources of knowledge: (1) the five senses. Saadia refers in the same context (p. which is transmitted in the revealed . 18–19. He thus may be regarded as a contemporary of al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı. see p. we must use reason ( uq¯ ul ) in order to discover the answer sought. as far as the present article is concerned. Q¯ afih’s edition of this work: K. . and the purpose of teaching is to influence them so that they become manifest.). who wrote in Arabic in Iraq. The fact that truth is considered good and lies bad is given as an example of this knowledge. 15). however. and all that is created in time comes about after non-existence (pp. Saadia is not. or: all knowledge. 18) to a fourth source of knowledge. he remarks. The last Mutakallim who will be discussed in this section of the present article is Saadia Gaon. Qafih. . talab al-hikma. K.aql ). “thereupon 64 In this I use Y. i. The knowledge obtained by means of reason only ( ilm al. He may have been aware. and (2) reason. which are characterized by him as follows: 1. Jerusalem 5730.14 Shlomo Pines other. and he starts by explaining his method in pursuing this . It may be more significant. 33ff. has sometimes been explained by the influence of Aristotelian vocabulary. chapters 1 and 2. born in Egypt. This source of knowledge is . 11ff. after quoting Biblical passages in which it is stated that God has crested in time all things ex nihilo. 65 Saadia’s attribution to the term al-dar¯ at. In the introduction to K. which is not seen (p.e. uriyy¯ . ed. ar¯ 66 Mishlei.. ar¯ expression al. Jerusalem 5736/(1976). The knowledge obtained by means of the five senses ( ilm al-sh¯ ahid ). but the indications on this point are rather elusive. It is probably connected with the difficulty experienced by some Muslim Mutakallim¯ un in accounting for the usual signification in Kal¯ am of d ur¯ ı in the . that of d ur¯ ı .ilm al-d ur¯ ı. He points out that as no valid answer can be provided in this matter by the senses.).¯ books and elsewhere (p. ar¯ The result of regarding this kind of knowledge as untrue would be the invalidation of a cognition obtained by the senses or by reason (p. al-Mukht¯ ar f¯ ı l-Am¯ an¯ at wa l-I tiq¯ ad¯ at. dath¯ enquiry (pp. As Saadia explains. the Jews.

too. The disputations of Jahm with the Buddhists do not by themselves adequately account for the origins of these Kal¯ am doctrines. but also probably to a lesser degree of the tenets of other philosophical schools (and also of Indian science). An affirmation of the oneness of God is found in the discourse of the prophets. despite Saadia’s definition of the sources of knowledge. part of the sometimes elaborate doctrines concerning the sources of knowledge. In their studies some members of these elites acquired knowledge not only of Buddhist philosophy. afw¯ seems to have been a memorable encounter of this kind. At this point an attempt will be made to sum up and to draw some conclusions. artu bi-hadh¯ (in order to find out) whether this is true. S an with the Buddhists . however.Buddhist thought and Kal¯ am doctrines 15 I looked into this matter using speculative thinking (naz a al-ma n¯ a) . was adopted by many Mutakallim¯ un. adilla. and found there a flourishing Buddhist culture. p. as it is true according to prophecy”. Omniscient (¯ alim ) and so forth (p. His oneness can.68 One of the answers ascribed to Jahm. . ar. The second chapter of K. Omnipotent (q¯ adir ). ar and to adilla in order to obtain some knowledge of God. however. 200] The Muslim conquests brought about encounters and clashes between two missionary enterprises. ) is concerned. as far as speculative thought (naz ar . Saadia does not seem to have any use for his unusual terminology as regards the sources of knowledge. he. which establish this thesis. it is. We have chosen as our starting point the account of a Chinese pilgrim. which have numerous points of resemblance with the Indian teachings concerning the pram¯ an . his capacities are finite. believes that in order to resolve the question treated in the chapter one must employ naz . 83). as in the first. in consequence. The Buddhist missionary activities which had transformed religious attitudes in a considerable part of Asia had also extended to these countries. This cannot be grasped by the senses in view of the fact that man is a finite body and that. The questions posed according to the two extant versions of this disputation appear to fit into the framework of Buddhist thought. ar. 82f). Hence. al-Am¯ an¯ at wa l-I tiq¯ ad¯ at (p. too. and may have Left a durable impression on Jahm’s theology. also be inferred through speculative thought (naz . The missionaries aimed at creating elites who were versed in complex systems of thought and capable of appreciating and engaging in disputations on a philosophical and theological topics. Now we know from many examples that these activities were not confined to preaching the good word to ignorant masses. plural of dal¯ ıl ). 84) Saadia set forth his arguments (as proofs. In the same context (p. 76ff. a s and may be regarded as having been originally conceived under Indian influence. which does not quite fit into the pattern propounded by some of the Mutakallim¯ un discussed above. Like other Mutakallim¯ un. who traversed countries of Central Asia a short time before they were conquered by the Muslims. quoted above.) propounds the thesis that the Creator in time of (all) things is one. In Kal¯ am as we know it. The disputation of Jahm b. where they also speak of Him as being Living.¯ . he resorts to naz . [p. namely that the existence of God was known by inference (dal¯ ıl ). we may note that. Their adoption appears to point to 68 This holds good more particularly with regard to Ibn al-Murtad a’s version. Thus in this chapter.

201] As we have seen. p. a. and perhaps also to adepts of other Indian philosophical schools. Erkenntnistheorie und Logic. and ilm d ur¯ ı. 71 God. The terms d ur¯ ı.. whose etymology is evocative of perception. 114. The Buddhist view. as far as I know. Ash ar¯ ı and other Mutakallim¯ un who lived two or more centuries after these contacts may be supposed to have ceased. Stcherbatsky. a ) and inference (anum¯ ana ). some Mutakallim¯ un appear to have felt that the choice for this purpose of terms denoting “necessary” seems to have posed a difficulty. If we assume. the Mu tazil¯ ı Abd al-Jabb¯ ar. 72 See van Ess. cit. namely niyata. p. whereas awareness of the perceptions of the senses generally presupposes that one has had such perceptions. [p. Our awareness of these.16 Shlomo Pines numerous and prolonged intellectual contacts between Muslims and Buddhists. as a part of “necessary knowledge”. came about in . self-perception immediately follows upon perception and is considered part of the latter. may create in us awareness of perception of senses without our having such perceptions. as he puts it. as seems plausible. d ura and various other forms derived from the same . whereas the Mu tazil¯ ı Abd al-Jabb¯ ar and the Ash ar¯ ıs al-B¯ aqill¯ an¯ ı and al-Juwayn¯ ı speak of “necessary knowledge” ( ilm d ur¯ ı ) and .. i.69 It seems to me that s particularity of the Buddhist notion of perception provides a strong argument in favor of such a correspondence. which seems to indicate another characteristic of the faculty in . 26ff.u us (from) the beginning (mubtada ). we should have to suppose a correspondence between the connotations of pratyaksam. 182ff. ar¯ root seem to have been used in order to describe a certain kind of knowledge very early in the history of Kal¯ am. Buddhist Logic. recognizes two sources of knowledge (pram¯ an . as Abd al-Jabb¯ ar points out in Sharh ¯l al-khamsa (p. no counterpart in Greek philosophy. volitions. ar¯ question.72 As we have seen above. however. that there is a correspondence between the Buddhist doctrine of two sources of knowledge. al-us . ar¯ “speculative thought” or “inference” (dal¯ ıl ). whereas their resemblance to the Buddhist conception of perception seems to me to be unmistakable.. These origins may be clearly discerned in the theories of Mu tazil¯ ı. po. without requiring a preliminary stage. and the various categories of “necessary knowledge” propounded by the Mutakallim¯ un have. I shall try to explain in a few words why this hypothesis shall presently try to account for the Arabic term. it called for a justification or at least an explanation. as stated by the Buddhists themselves. and they too have self-awareness. Let as now compare this view with those of some of the Mutakallim¯ un mentioned above.70 Beyond this.. ar¯ .73 I believe that this may point to these terms possibly by attempts to translate a Sanskrit word.e. op.71 This way of thinking.. all mental phenomena. 50). or. a s): perception (pratyaks . of his own desires. such as pleasures. 70 See 69 I . 114f. the Ash ar¯ ı al-B¯ aqill¯ an¯ ı and others we have mentioned regard man’s knowledge (or awareness) of the states of his soul. but at least one important point requires an explanation.e. p. is direct. ideas and so forth are also subsumed under pratyaks . cit. p. volitions. and that of the Mu tazil¯ ıs and the Ash ar¯ ıs. thoughts and so forth. i. 73 See also van Ess. According to this notion perception also perceives itself.

However. 21. Al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ıs introduction of khabar as a separate independent source of knowledge and possibly Saadia’s al-kal¯ am al-s adiq may be due to the influence . veridical discourse. p.75 In the sphere of pratyaks . cf. “has been said”. p. 78 Perhaps with one doubtful exception. a strong probability80 that the latter were influenced by the former. Stcherbatsky.b. Al-M¯ atur¯ ıd¯ ı regards khabar as a separate source of knowledge. p. Buddhist Logic. Given the pronounced similarity between the Buddhist doctrine concerning sources of knowledge and those of the Mu tazil¯ ıs and the Ash ar¯ ıs. as d ur¯ ı. 6. they seem to me to be representative. according to a ¯ definition found in the Ny¯ aya-Vai´ ses ika Tarkasa ngraham ˙ (p. n. The term niyata is used in Buddhist terminology in connection both with pratyaks . n. 1. 76 See Buddhist Logic. Only a very small sample of the relevant Kal¯ am texts has been referred to here. . I refer to information or veridical reports (khabar in Arabic). a. the term niyata was translated. a verb which may connote constraint. al-Am¯ an¯ at wa l-I tiq¯ ad¯ at.e. 21. niyama. We have seen above that al-B¯ aqill¯ an¯ ı regards the knowledge resulting from a continuous series of reports (khabar ) as “necessary knowledge”. on the whole. the term al-khabar is replaced. It should be noted that knowledge provided by this source is drawn only from the Jewish prophetic books and is intended solely for the benefit of the Jewish community. which is cognate with niyata . included in it are continuous reports concerning geographical.77 but that [p. 1. The doctrine concerning the sources of knowledge should. 75 Cf. p. Niyata derives from ni-yam. This appears to mean that ´ sabda does not refer only to knowledge drawn from the Vedas. 140. be regarded as one Buddhist Logic. source of knowledge.76 My hypothesis rests upon the assumption that in the course of the rendering and adaptation of Buddhist terms by various translators and by the Mutakallim¯ un. Fouchet’s French translation. There remains one “source of knowledge” (not acknowledged by all Indian and Kal¯ am schools as having an independent status as a “source”) to be discussed here. The independent status of this source of knowledge is recognized in India by all78 the so-called Brahmanic schools of thought. there is. ar¯ the meaning approximating that which niyata has when used in connection with pratyaks . 202] this word was given . 79 Or. 151): Aptav¯ akyam . niyata may indicate an immediate sensation which has not been turned by Stcherbatsky into a “constructed synthetic object”. i. see Index III. It is designated as ´ sabda “word”. which is regarded as an independent . by al-kal¯ am al-s a ¯ diq . 2. Cf.Buddhist thought and Kal¯ am doctrines 17 is perhaps not quite as far-fetched as at first it appears to be. 92. also the rendering of the term niyama. however. those that recognize the authority of the Vedas. 77 Or cognate words. n. ´ sabdah . a.¯ of Brahmanic systems which consider ´ sabda an independent pram¯ ana ˙ .. This means if we follow A. 74 Stcherbatsky. I think. the testimony) is what is said79 by a trustworthy person”. 4. a and anum¯ ana (and logical theory in general). p. as we have seen. in accordance with its etymology and some of its connotations. cf. I believe.74 In the latter case the translation “necessary” is sometimes indicated and used by Stcherbatsky. . including the Stoic system and the patristic literature. historical. political and other information concerning the prophets. In Saadia’s K. “the word (or . Erkenntnistheorie und Logic. 80 Particularly given the absence of parallel doctrines in Greek philosophy.

the Kal¯ am atomic theory.18 Shlomo Pines of the two main contributions of Indian philosophy to the formation of Kal¯ am thinking. While in atheistic Buddhism these “momentary flashes” appear “out of nothing”. 82 Stcherbatsky. n. op. “The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word ‘Dharma’ ”. pp. The impact on later Buddhist thought appears most evident in the conception of certain Mutakallim¯ un according to which the existence of all accidents and all substances. . cit. in the next moment they are replaced by other newly created accidents and substances. 31–32. the other one being. lasts only a moment.. In further research. Calcutta. which are atomic. 81 Stcherbatsky.81 In more precise Buddhist terminology. p. 23. in monotheistic Islam thay are created by God. as I attempted to [p. This notion has a rather paradoxical resemblance to that in which “the elements of existence are momentarily flashes into the phenomenal world out of unknown source”. 102. they appear “out of nothing”82 (or out of non-being). the strong probability that both Kal¯ am theories concerning the sources of knowledge and those concerning the atoms have been influenced by Indian (Buddhist and non-Buddhist) conceptions may help to shed some light on the various groupings of the early Mutakallim¯ un. 203] show in my study published in 1936.