Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Michael L. Peterson
ASBURY C O L L E G E
Pubiished in 1998 in the United States ofAnlerica by Wesmietv Press, 5500 Central
Avenue, I-lnutcter, Colorado 250303-2877, and is1 the iiilited Ecrgdom Ity KTesrciie\v
Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ
Press, 12 Hici's Copse ltoad, Gu~~lr?lor
'The paper used iit this publica~onmeets the requirements o f the American Na&onal
Standard for Permanence of 13agter f i r Printed 1,ibrary Materials Z39.48-198.1.
For my sons,
Aar~PzaPzd Adam
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
3 T l ~ eFunction of Defense
The Free Will Defense, 53
The Colllpatibilist Position, 35
The Incompatibilist Rejoinder, 37
The f:urrcnt State of the Debate, 41
Notes, 43
Suggested Readings, 45
Index
Preface
an Existence
In June 199 1, Time magazine asked the question, "Why?"-"Why
does evil happen?"' In the cover essay, journalist Lance Morrojv re-
views the rz~ultitudeof eviils that haunt our cox~scioust~ess-from
Hitler's Auschwitz to Saddanl Husscin" invasion of K~~wait, from
KKK hangings of black men in prc-civil rights Mississippi t o the
AIDS epidemic. Kight there in a pok3ular ixagazinc, Mr~rrowraises
age-old questions in an article starkly titled "Evil." Is evil an entity!
Or is evil the immoral and inhulnane actions of persons? What about
bad and hurtful things that are out of our control, such as disease,
floods, and mental illness? Is nature responsible? Why does evil seem
2 12robigmoj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophy nfRel@Zon
This was the si~ockl~lg tiling; that the slime of the pit seemed to ~tttercries
and voiecs; that the amorphous dust gesricl.rlated and 811ncd; that what
was dead, and had no shape, sho~xldusurp the offices of life And this
again, that tile ii~surgenthorror was knit to him closer than a wife, closer
4 12robigmoj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophy nfRel@Zon
tl-ran an eye; lay caged in l-ris flesh, where l-re l-reard it rrittxtter and felt it
struggle to be born; and at every hour oft.rreakness, and in the corlfidence
of sltlmber prevailed against him, and deposed him O L Xof ~ life.7
Dr. Jekyll confesses the terrible truth that he is radically both natures:
"It was the curse of mankind that . . . in the agonizcd womb of con-
sciousness these polar wins should be continuously struggling."g
Paul, tlzc early C.:hl-istian evangdist, recognizes the war ~vitbinhim-
self: "I do slot understand my own actions. For I do slot do what I
want, but I do the very thillg I hate. . . . I can will what is right, but I
cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not
want is what X do."Vn a sirnlfar vein, St. Augustine recounts his un-
happy predicament in his Confcssio~zs:"I was bound, not with an-
other's irons, but by my own iron will. My will the enelny held, and
thence had made a chain for me, and bound ixe."l@This personal as-
pect of cvil most closcly coincides with what the Judeo-Christian
Scr-ipturcsdescribe as "sin. "
Once we recogilize the existence of something that can reasonably
be called persollal evil, we must then also recognize that it has collec-
tive as well as illdividual dimensions. Organized crime syndicates, mili-
tant emerging nations, oppressive social structures, and profit-crazed
multinational corporations are, in a real sense, the social extensions of
personal evil. On both individual and corporate levels, one of the sad-
dest features of hulxan evil is its strangc adrnixtllrc with good or appar-
ent good. Marriages are wrccked for lack of mutual understanding, ed-
ucafiond col-nmtlmiticsarc m k n n i n e d by disagreement about how to
pursue colnmosl ideals, political parties are throknn into disarray by ex-
cessive ambition, and nations are ripped apart by struggles for power.
Although we are perplexed by humanin's capaciq for evil, even the
best of us are someti~ueshurt and even crushed by the ilupersonal
forces of the universe. These forces know nothing of human agendas or
purposes and tend to thwart all that we hold dear. Herlnan Melville
deals 144th this thcrnc in Moly Dick. <:aptain Ahab of the Peguod, forq
years a whaler in thc first half of the last century, sets out from Nan-
t~xcketon what appears to be a long ~vhafingcruise, Little does anyone
b o \ v that Ahab's journey is not seamail's busiiless but a quest for the
meanh~gof life. Ahab had lost a leg in an earlier ellcounter with Moby
Dick, a great white bnhale, then the terror of the seas, and is nokn bent
on destroying it. The captain is obsessed with the meanillg of human
existence in the face of overwrhclming natural forces. Ironically, the
whale is white, a color often taken to symbolize what is sacred and
holy; but the whale is fearsome and hostile to hulnall values and, in the
end, triumphant. Ishmael, the ship's only survi\rol; claims that in losing
his life Ahab discovered its meaning." The modem world knows all
too well that this disturbing picture of life-life being ruined and finally
snuffcd out by forces bcyond its control---is a realistic onc.
There is no denying that persons often fall victiln to psychological
and physical forces beyond their control. Rut quite apart from how
these forces affect humall interests, they crrtai~llycause much pain
and death ~rithinllature itself. A%AAlered Lord Tellllpson reminds us,
nature is ""rd in tooth and claw." "rvival of the fittest is btiilt into
the mechanism of anilllate nature. Few anir~aXsare .Free from attack
by stronger animals or from suffering and death due to shifts in their
environment. Although animals d o not possess the higher self-
consciousness of hulllans, they still obviously feel pain and cndurc
suffering. T h o u g h t f ~ ~
people
l tind it very puzzling that the world
shorrld work in such a way as to maim, torture, and destrr~ylarge pm-
portiolls of these subhumall creatures.
At the end of any catalog of ills that plague the world comes death.
All thillgs ekrentually die. But death is a particularly acute probleln for
the human species because we humans sense that our existence has
value and worth, that our agendas have merit, that we deserve to go on
living and building our lives. And yet death stands as the final enem);
the last evil wc illust face; it puts an end not only to our doing and un-
dergoing further evils but also to our pursuing our most cherished
dreams. Thus, death is radically foreiw to all that is within us. Ludwig
Wittge~lsteillobserves: "Death is llot an event in life: we do not live to
experieilce death."" Death is the end of life. H. F. Lovell Cock5 urites
that the termination of one's omrn personal existcllce is the "great hu-
man repression, the univenal 'complex.' Dying is the reality that [per-
sons] dare not face, and to escape which [they] summon all [their] re-
sources."lVhose who have thought long and hard about the human
condition know that death is arguably thc most fearsome of all evils.
After pondering evil in the ~vorld,wc may be tempted to echo thc
sentiment in the chorus of T. S, Eliot's Mg~drpi"in the CTallhedg~al:
The anomic gl-renorritena mLlst not only be lived tl-rrough, they n ~ u s also
t
be explained-to wit, explai~~ed in tcrms of the nornos established in the
socieq in question. AI expla~lationof these pl-re~~ome~~a in terms of reti-
gious Xegi timatio~ls,of whatever degree of theoretical sophistication, may
be called a theodicqr. It is irnporta~ltto stress I-rere particularly (alttlo~xpb
tl-re sanle point has already bee11 made generally with respect to religious
legitimations) tttat s~tchan. expla~ratior~ need not ex~raila complex theo-
retical sysrexn. The ilititerate peasant who commenB q m n the death of a
child by referring to the will of God is e~lgagi~lg in tbeodicy as much as
the icarxred ttteologian who writes a treatise to demtsr~stratethat the suf-
fering of rhc innocent does not negatc the conceltGorr, of a God both ail-
good and all-po\"iierf~~l, All tl-re same, it is possible to differentiate tl~eodi-
cies in terms of their degree of rationalir~i,tttat is, the degree to ~~hiclt.
ttlcy exlrtdl a theory that col~crentlyand consistently explaixrs the pbe-
llonlella in question in ternls of a1 over-all vie\v of the unitrerse. Such a
theory? of cotrrse, once it is sociall~~.established, may be refracted or1 dif-
ferent lcr,rels of sapt~isricatiunttlroughoc~tthe socieqf. 'Ph~s,the peasa~lt,
when he speaks abo~xt:the will of God, may hill~selfintend, however inar-
ticulatel~p,the majestic theodicy corlstructed by the tttec~tc>gial~.lb
So, what a religious system sa)Ts about evil reveals a great deal about
what it takes ultimate reality and humanity's relation to it to be.
Hence, the credibility of a religio~lis closely linked to its ability to
give its adherents categories for thinking about the presence of evil.
Although evil poses a challenge that every major religion must ad-
dress, the challenge to Christianity is particularly formidable. There
seems to be a scrious tcnsion bcfi4rcen what Christian theolog). affim3s
about thc unrivaled power, nnlimited knodcdgc, and unrelenting Ir>w
of Cod, on the one hand, and what it admia about cvil in God's cce-
ated order, on the other. Many persolls think that the Christial God-
if He really exists a ~ isd the source a ~ guaraltor
d of value-\wuld not
dtow the world to be as it is. This is the crux of the issue for Christian
beliet:, it has traditionally been knowrn as the problem of cvil. Through-
out historj: Christian theologians and philosophers have ~vrestledwith
this problem. Thoughtfill and sensitive laity have also felt the need for
at least a gcncral explanation of how to relate God and evil. The co-
nundrum seems unavoidable. Aficr rc\?iewing all the evils that haunt
our contenlpr>rary consciousness, Lance Morrow raises this prccisc
problem at the end of his Tirne magazine article.17
Son~ethinkers believe that unless Christian believers have an ac-
ceptable solution to the problem of evil, they have 110right to hold
their distinctive theological position or to ask others to adopt it.18
Philosopher T. W. Settle argues that grappling with the problem of
8 12robigmoj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophy nfRel@Zon
Other authors do not depart far from this same general approach.
Although we could debate the exact boundaries bet\\reen natural
and moral evil, the basic distinction performs a helpful classificatory
it2 12robigmoj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophy nfRel@Zon
fu~lctio~l. It 110t only helps clarifp our thinking about evil but also al-
lows us t o divide the general problem of evil into subsidiary problems
related to moral and to natural evil and thus guides further stages of
inquiry. In his penetrating treatment of the problem of evil, David
Hulne shows he is alvare of this iznportant distinction. Hume ob-
serves that, in naturc, "the stronger prey upon the wcaker" m d ""thc
wcaker, too, in their turn, oftcn prey upon the stronger, and vex and
molest thcm \\;icbout relaxation." Achowlcdging that brr111aniq can
organize into societies and thus avoid some of the harm zlature might
do, he insists that humalls morally mistreat each other: "Oppression,
injustice, contempt, . . . ~riolence,sedition, war, . . . treacherh fraud-
by these they mutually torment each other, and they would soon dis-
solve char society which they had formed were it not for the dread of
still greater ills which must attend their separation."29
Quite apart from technical philosoph!~, the distinction behvecn nat-
nral and moral evil rkzns through most great literature. "The "f"yger'"
by William Blakc is a powerful poetic expression of the problcill of
natural evil. The poem forcefully raises the issue of whether a certain
instance of natural evil (e.g., the threat of being attacked by stronger
mimals) could have been created by the Gr>dof the C:hristian faith.
q g e ~ !T~ger!Itgrvtia8 b~$&ht:
IB the for^gs~'s
of the %&h$,
W ~ &immor~al
G h a ~ dor eyle
Darg @me thy fearful syrn metry l.3"
Suggested Readings
16 Yl2e 12robigm oj'Evbl and 12hilnsophy ofRel@Zon
( 1 ) God exis&;
(2) God is all-powerful;
(3) God is all-good;
(4) God is all-knoiving;
(5) Evil exists.
The set of beliefs ( 1)-(4) is what Kowe calls "restricted theism," a po-
sitioil that the theist, by jrirtue of being a theist, lnust accept. How-
ever, the ypical theist also accepts (5) as an element in his overall po-
sition. The critic, then, maintains that the set (1)-(5) is logically
ir1consistetlt.
The Structure and Strategy of the ent
Before embarking on a complete discussion of the logical argument
from evil, it is helpful to review the general concept of inconsistency or
contvadictiun.6 Actually, there are seveml types of contradiction to
consider. One type is a certain kind of proposition---a conjunctive
proposition in ~vhichone conjunct is the denial or negation of the
other conjunct. Consider the following proposition:
The first conjunct (Socrates is mortal) and the second conjunct (it is
false that Socrates is mt~rtal)car111ot both be true. WI-tat we have here
is an explicit contmdiction.
Thc bwoblclll, of course, is that one who asserts a contradiction
cannot be advancing a position that is cornblletcly truce By mctl~ods
found in any elesnentary text on logic, wc can know that a contra-
diction is a proposition that is necessarily false. Interestingly, k~lo\ving
the actual truth or falsity of the conjuncts in a contradictory proposi-
tion is not required in order to know that it suffers from incon-
sistencjc Presumably>few people commit such flagrant errors in think-
ing,
Mackit: speaks of a set of theistic propositions being inconsistent or
containing a contradiction. Rut what does it illcan for a set t o be in-
consistent or contradictory? WC may say that a set of propositions is
explicitly contradictory if one of the mcillbers is the denial or ncga-
tion of allother member. For example, consider the follo~ingset:
Using the logical rule morlgs punens (if p, then q; p; therefore g), we
can deduce
from (9) and (10). Proposition ( 7 )is logically inconsistent with (8).
Since it is not possible for propositions (7) and (8) both t o be true at
the salnr time; the set from which they are drawn is contradictory. We
shall say that set A is fbrmally contmdictory because we can deduce an
explicit contradiction from its member propositions by the laws of
formal logic.
Admittedly, this cxamplc of an inconsistent set of propositions is a
simplified one; seldom do such easy cascs occur in ordinary lifc. In
fact, the propositions that form an inconsistency in an opponent's po-
sition are sometimes not stated at a l , So, the critic is faced witl-1 the
double task of first producing all of the rrlrvallt unstated propositions
and then drawi~jgout the contradiction from the fully articulated po-
sition. In such cases, the sets of propositions in question are implicit4
contradictory.
For a third cxamplc, let us reflect on the following propositions as
forming an implicitly contradictory set:
( 14) If Socrates is older than Plato, and Pfato is older than Aris-
totle, then Socrates is older than Aristotle.
If we add (14) to B, \W get a set that is formally coimadictory Employ-
ing the laws of formal logic, (1I), (12), and (14)yield the denial of (13).
Now we have succeeded in lnaking the i~nplicitcontradiction explicit.
WC were able to deduce the cotltradiction in this set because we
employed an additional proposition that is necessari!y truc. There are
actually different varieties of necessary truth. The truth of solxe
bwopositions----such as (15) below----can be established by the laws of
logic alone.
( 15) If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates
is mortal.
This expresses a truth of logic. Yet the truths of arithmetic and math-
ematics generally are also necessarily true, such as
Let us call the type of necessity with which we are dealing here
bt~oadlylogical necessity. There is a correlative kisld of possibility as
well: A proposition p is possibly true (in the broadly logical sense) just
in case its negation or denial is not necessarily true (in that same
broadly logical sense).
Necessity and possibility in the broadly logical sense lnust be distin-
guished from another scnse of necessity and possibility. That other
sense is cngml!or ~agggffialnecessiq?and possibiliq. Fur instance,
For brevity and clarity, let us abbreviate the theistic position expressed
by propositions ( 1)-(4)in one complex proposition:
as well as to
Now i f (G) does entail (-EL), then the theist is unwittingly commit-
ted to both (El) and (-El). This means that his beliefs arc inconsis-
tent because both (El) and (-El) figurc into his theological position.
In order t o vindicate himself rationally>the theist must clarify and rcc-
ollcilr the propositio~lsthat supposedly generate the contradiction.
It is comlnonlp ageed that the alleged contradiction is not immc-
diately forthcolning from propositions (G) and (E,). So, the critic
must invoke the strategy previously explained for exposing ilnplicit
contradictions-that is, she must add certain propositions to (G) and
26 The Logical Problem of Evil
Yet evil does exist, and its existence is recognized by the typical theist:
Something like
and
Notes
X . 'The following works employ tttese differctlt labels for the problem:
Wlllialn XXmve, PhZ'10~0phyof R e l i ~ i o n :An Ipztf*p.odzaction(Encino and BeI-
mont, Caiif.: nickenson, 1978), pp. 80-86; Micl-rael L. Peterson, ""Christian
Theism a11d rite Problem of I:xri.il,'"fozjs~nnl @'$beE ~ n ~ g e f i c 'gf bl c o l f ~ i c gSl~ c k -
eo! 21 (1978): 3 5 4 6 ; and Nvin Plantia-tga, God and OtIi"ef# rtli~cds:A St$641!of
ithe Ratzonnl J%sr~ific~c.zlon of' Belzef in C7'0d (Ithaca: Gi~rnellU~liversirjrPress,
X 967), p* 128.
2.1. L. Markie, ""Eil ilalld Oxnnipotexlrce," Mind64 (1955): 200.
3, Ibid.
4. David Hurne, Dialoggggs Cr~nce~~i.tz'~g8 Natzgral Rel&Z'on, ed. Henry ID.
Aike1-t (New York: Hafner, l04S>,p. 66.
5, H. J. McGloskey, "The Probient. of Evil," fizitr~~znl of Bible n~zdR e l z ~ b l r ~ ~
30 (1962): 187,
6. I will follow Xzlantinga3 discussion throughout this exposition. See his
<$od, F~*eadn~z$, and Evil (Grand bpids, Mich.: Eerdma~ls,1877), pp. 12-24.
7 . Ir~~ing, M, Copi and Car1 Cohen, I ~ ~ t ' ~ ~ o n ! ~ ~$0l .IJ[@ic)
i c r n IOgh Editiol-2
( El-tgje~~aod GM&, N. J .: 13rrcl-ttice-EIatl,1998), pp. 342-301 .
8.Mackie, LCE\ril and C31ltniipotence~"p. 2209,
9. This terminolou is borrot.crcd fiorn Edward hiladclell and Peter Hare,
Evil and the Concept. of Chd (Springfield, 111.: Charles G, 'rboxnas, 19681,
chap, 6, pp. 104-136.
10, Pla~~tinga, a d , Freedom, alzn! E ~ i l p,, 55, ,4ls0 see remarks in his 2 % ~
Natzlz~eeof Nece~ssir;y(Oxford: Clasendon Press, 19741, pp. 190-191 .
1l . Tere~~ce Penell~sznl,""Divir~eGoodness and the Problcnt. of Evil," ~ I I
Rrndz~tgsin thr: Philosophy oj' Re1biol.t: A n Artalyzic Approlach, ed. Kaructt.
Brody ( E n g j c ~ ~ a oCliffs,
d N.J. : Xzrea-ttlce-Hall,19741, p. 226.
12. Pla~~tinga, God n~zdOther Minds, p. 117.
Suggested Readings
Adarns, Marityn M,, and Rt1bet.t: M. Adams, The P$eoktlg~gof E ~ i l New . Vc3t.k:
Oxf-isrd Univtrrsiq 13rrcs, 1990.
fi-rern, N. B, 7be Problem ofE~z"l, New York: Sel-rockenBooks, 1971.
Feihet-g, John S. 'f bc M ~ PF- ~E X~oj-Evil:
S ?!leulo~icnlS;liic~cm$
a ~ z d$be PaeobEe~la
of Evil. 2nd ed. Grand Ibpids, Mict~.:Zondertran, 1994.
Fletv? h ~ t o n y"Divir~eCjmnipotence and Human Freedom," Hibbert Joszr-
% @ l 5 3(January t 955): X 35-144,
Gale, fichard, f h ithe Ngtz~.rg&and Ekis$~~zce (?f1<;od, Gat-rtbkdge: Cambridge
University Press, X 99 f .
Mackie, 1. I,. ""Eil and Omniporexlrce." Mind 64 (1955): 200.
. ""The Problem of Evil," h Inbe Mia~acbc?f' Thezfm. Oxford: CXaren-
don Press, 1982,
McClosltejr, H. J. CJod and E ~ i l Thc . Hagtlc: Martinus Nijhoff> 1974.
Peterst~n,Michaet . ""Evil and Inconsistency. " Lci~phin(A gst~*alia)18 (July
X 979):20-27.
13ectrsan, Michael L,, eb. 279e I3~@ob7lem of Evil: Selecgcd R e a d i ? ; ~Notrc
~,
Dai~le,Ind,: University of Notre Dat-rte Press, 1992.
Petersoil, Michael, Wiltiarn Hasker, Brrrce Keichenbach, and Davtcl Basinger,
IZeaso~i!and Reltgiozi Beliej An I7il?t~~odi?.l,cirz'01:~ to the 13hZ'Io~-ophj~
ofl<eIz"~ion,
2nd ed. N e w York: Clxford U~liversityPress, 1998, chap, 6, pp, 116-1455.
Plantinga, A h n . Chd grid mhefpMinds: A Stud31o f ~ h eR~k.$io'~nnlJz#s~z$~at:I:on
ofB~lz'cfirtGod. Itfiaca: Corncll Univtrrsiq Prcss, 1967.
. <;od, F~~~ednm, and E ~ i k Grand
. h p i d s , Micb .: Eerdma~ts,1977.
. "Irie Na1:2.trc~ f ' N e ~ e s sOxford:
i~, Glarelilrdorl Press, 1974,
. "Which Worlds Could God Have Created?" Jour~wlof1>kilosophy70
(1973): 539-552,
Keichenbaclt, Kruce. "The Dcducti\re Argtrment from Evil," '$clphi&( 2 ~ s -
tralz'n)20 (April 198l): 2 5 4 2 .
. E ~ it%nd
l n Chad C;od, N e w York: Fordhat-rt University Press, 1982.
The Function o f Defense
Just as we have classified the two major versions of the problem of evil
into the logical and cvidentini formulations, wc Exay also classi@ thc
WO illain responses to the problcill as dgf~.fenseand theodicy. The aim of
defense is to show that antithcistic arguments from evil----either logi-
cal or evidential-are not successful on their own terms. The gelleral
aim of theodicb by contrast, is to give positive, plausible reasons for
the cxiste~lceof evil in a theistic universe. Defensc has come to be tbc
theistic strategy most closely associated with discussions of the logical
formulation of the problem of evil, ~vhereastheodicp has come to be
associated with the evidential formulation. Much controversy has
arisen over the rclativc nced for defensc and thcodicp, and wc shall
latcr scc how thcsc differences play out in the litcraturc on God and
evii.
and that
If God has made men such that in their kee choices they sometii-rites
prefer wlitat. is good and sometimes \%?hatis evil, why could he 110t have
rnade rnen such that they always freely choose the goad? If tliere is n o
logical i~npossibilityitit a mail's seely choosing the good on one, or on
scverat occasions, there catlIlot be a logical impossibility in his freely
choosing the good on every occasion. God was not, then, hced with a
choice between nitakiilg innocent autoi-ritata and making beings who, in
actirlg freejy, \%rouIci sometimes go wro~lg:there \%?asopen t o ltirn the
obviously bctrcr possibiliy of making bei~lgswho would act k e l y b t ~ t
always g o right. Clearly, his failure t o avail l~imsetfof this possibility is
inconsistent- with his beillg both omnipotent and ~7hoXlygood."
This position directly opposes the Free Will Defense, which, as Ivr
have already seen, relies on an i~zcvnzpatibilistpositioll: the view that
( 2 3 )and (24) are logically inconsistent.
As wc would expect, the controversy behvccn Frce Will Defenders
and critics historically rcvolved aro~undthe issuc of how key concepts
such as omnipotence and free will should be understood. Although
the Free Will Defellder may agree with critics that a world in which
all persoils freely choose to do what is right is indeed a possible bnorld,
he seeks to qualifp our understandings of free will and omnipotence
in a Ivap that avoids the dilelnma presented bp the critic. Obviousll:
the critic here believes that an omnipotmt deity can create just any
logically possible ~rorldhe selects. A ~rhollygood deity kvould select
the bvorld that is best on the whole, a j4rc1rld that we bvould surely
deem to be one in which everyone freely does what is right. At this
point, we have come to the hotly contested claim that God could
have created any possible world he pleased.6 The defender counters
that God, though omnipotent, could not bme created just any possi-
ble world. At this point, WC must pause to consider how Frcc Will
Defenders have co~llcto frame the issue of free will and omnipotcncc
in terms of contemporarjl ideas about possible \vorlds.
The Free Will Defender claims to the contrary that the following is
possible :
(26) God is omnipotent, and it was not uithin his power to bring
about a world containing moral good but no inoral evil.
Plantinga takes for granted that God cannot actualize a state of affairs
including the existence of creatures who fi.eely take some action or
other; this wotald be ~ ~ ' r oactualization,
~cg He then considers lveak ac-
tualization, which is all the critic really needs for his casc. What is at
issue, then, is whether there is solncfhing God cotald have done, some
series of actions he could have takm, such that if he had, a given pos-
sible world W jvould have been actual. Lct is say that W contains
inoral good but no inoral evil.
To develop his case, Plantinga provides an argument based on the
peculiar behavior of counterfactual condidonals. Rehearsing Plan-
tinga's o~z.11
example, we may imagille Curley Smith, sometime ma)Tor
of Boston, who was offered a $35,000 bribe to allow a disputed free-
way to be constructed. Suppose he accepted. Now, ponder:
and
Next, think of the possibk worlds that include the antecedent state of
affairs consisting in Cgulqy's bein8 offelfled $2620,000.Then think of two
possible ~vorlds,W and W", which arc exac~balike up to thc point in
time when Curley responds to the bribe offer. Lct us say that in U:
Crrrley acccps the bribc, and in kP, Curley does not. Le.t us call tfic
states of affairs shared by W and W* an initial world segment a1d even
suppose that God could actualize this initial world segment. If Curley
accepts the bribe, then God could ilot have actualized W*; if Curley re-
jects the bribe, then God could not have actualized W" So, there is a
possible world W* in which Curley does not go Ivrong with respect to
the bribe offer, but whether W* is actual was partly up to Curlep and
not completely up to God. Therefore, we have an instance of a possible
world- W*,in h i s casc-that God cotrld not have brought about.
Plantinga diagnoses Curley as suffering from what he calls trannvorld
depfpa~lity,a terrible malady. M e r defini~lgthe concept of an ilzdividg4al
nat8sre or esselzce as the set of all properties a person or thing possesses
in every possible world where he or it exists, Plantinga clainls that it is
possible that Curley's essence sufkrs from transworld depravity. He
states: "If an essence E suffers From trans~rorlddepravity, then it was
not within God's pokver to actualize a possible world W such that E
n t ~in W and al~j~gys
contains tile propertics i s f & ~ i ~ c afree does g?Itla$ is
r&bt in W."12 He then ventllres the further observation: It is possible
that every crcaturely ess~ncc-e\~ery esscncc, including the propert). of
being created by God ufkrs from trmsprorld depravity. From this, it
follo~rsthat it is possible that God could not have created a bvorld con-
taining moral good but 110 moral evil.
Now the Free Will Defender has made his case against the critics.
He has argued that, although there are possible worlds containillg
moral good but n o lnoral evil, it is not within God's power to bring
them about. Although W* is possible, it is nut possible for God to
bring it about. This establishes that the Free Will Defender's claim
that
and
Again, thc theistic defender here would need to e~nploythe same basic
assertiolls previously made in arguing against Versioll I-that God,
though omnipotent, calnot actualize a state of affairs consisting in an
agellt freely doing what is right, that all crraturely essellces might suffer
eom transworld depravity, and so forth. h successhl defensc against
Version II shows, in effect, that God's existence is compatible with the
existence of as much evil as the real world does, in fact, contain.14
In any event, the theistic defcndcr's strategy against all versions of
the logical problcrx is t o show that the two kcy theistic bclicfs in
question arc not inconsistent, that thcy arc logicall]? compatible. This
is not to say that he must show that they are both true. This \%~ould be
too strong a requirement for the defender and illappropriate to the
nature of the issue. A kind of minimalist response is all that the purely
logical problem of evil really requires: Accusations that theism is in-
consistent can be met with vindicatiolls showing that i t is not.
As theists have solidified their defensive position, they have exposed
one of two hllacics bp critics who adb~anccany version of the logical
problem of evil. It appears that critics either beg the guestition by selcct-
in6 propositions to whiril the theist is not comrnittcd or Iif~ozzl: of
cofztext propositio~lsto which the theists are colnmitted and impute
new meanings to them that are not fully coililected with the theists'
own theological background beliefs. So, the critic might find a set of
propositions that invo1j.e a logical contradiction, but doing so is irrel-
eFrant unless the propositions genuinely represent theistic belief.
In the final analysis, the logical problem of evil does not seem to be
a promising avellue of attack against Christiall theism. Ironically, the
atheistic challenger begins by accusing the theist of committing a log-
ical mistake and ends up embroiled in logical fallacies herself. Al-
though Version I is by far the most popular formulation of the prob-
lem, it appears no ixorc effective than the other two fonnulations. All
of the fonnulations of thc argurxent arc now thought to exhibit ccr-
tain sy~~dromatic errors.
Adlnittillg that the Free Will Defellse is successful but relnaining
convinced that a viable argulnent from evil can still be mounted,
srlmc critics have shieed the attentioil to what we may call the ejiiden-
tial yrobleln of evil. They agree that defense against the logical prob-
lem establishes that no claim about evil, conjoined with other key
theistic beliefs, sets up an automatic contradiction. These critics
lnalntain that, although evil does not: reveal theism to be inconsistentt
the facts of evil constitute evidence against thcism. Using the lan-
guage of possible ~vorldsthinking, they admit that thc Frcc Will Dc-
fense shows that there is at least one possible bnorld in kvhich the
propositions "God exists" and "evil exists" are both true, but they
n~aintainthat this does not shcw that it is reasonable to think that
God exists despite the evil in our world, the actual world.
Interestingl)r, theists seeking further understanding of the intellec-
tual commitments of their faith have also considered whether the log-
ical problem expresses the only rational concern rciatcd to God and
evil. Thus, they also express strong interest in solxe kind of evidential
problem of evil. The next chapters are de\?otedto analyzing the exact
structure as well as the proper strategy for such a response.
l . A v i r ~Pta~~dnga,
God n~zdOther Minds: A 'Cj~aitdy@'$ha Rac.innn;lJ25s88ficn -
$ion of Rdz'g'ilaz G d (Tthaca: Cornell i1712iversircy Press, 1967), pp, X 31-1 55;
Xzlantinga, Y7fe N ~ g u r eof Necg~xiql( O x f o r d : G l a r e ~ ~ d o13rrcss,
~l 1974),
pp. 164-195.
2. Augustine, 0r.t Free Choicg of'ghe Will, trans, *411na Rex~jaminand L, H.
EIackstaff (New h r k : Babbs-Merrili, li964), bk. 2, chap. l , p. 36.
3, Antony Flew, "Divir~eOmnipotence a ~ H ~ udn ~ a nF;reeCf~)m,"in Ncw E;-
says in Philosopd3z"cd 2'hcolo8yl, ecis. ,411t01ly Flew and Alasdair MacTrztyre
(New York: Macn-tillan, 1955), p, 149.
4, Ibid.
5 . J, L, Mackie, ""Ei(.iland Omnipotence," Mind64 (1955): 209.
6, See Robert M, Adat-rits, LCMustGod Create the Itcst?" in 726 PfpobIe~f$ of'
E P ~ /Se/gc$~-ed
; Re@d;En&sfed. Michael Peters011 (Notrc I>ame, h-id.: Ut1iversir-y
of Notre Dame 13ress, 1992),pp. 275-288; in tlie same volume, also see Philip
I,. Quinn, "God, Mord Perfection, and Possible Worlds," pp. 289-3132,
7 , 'The classical locatiotl of ,ALfvix~Plantinga" ideas on the logic of possiMe
worlds and inodal logic is his Nat5et.r: oj"N~cessz'q~~, cited in Notc l .
S, Ptantinga, C;od, Fffleedam, and E ~ i (Grand l Kqpids, Mich.: Eerdmarrs,
X977), p* 39.
9. 'I3here are a multitude of things that exist but that Gad did nor create.
In addition to the fact that God has not created states of affairs, he has not
created himself or nurn bers, propoktt ems, properties, and so forth. These
havc no begini2ings. God" activity results in sorne states of affairs being or
becoming act~xaf,See Plantinga, 7 b e Natuf*gof'Nc~essz'q~~ p. 169,
10. Gottfiied Wilhelm von LJeibiliz, "Xeudiicy: ESSGE~S 0% the Cgorrdng~sof
God, the Fr#r:edomoj'Man, a n d $he &k&in of Evil, ed. Austt n Farrer, trails. E,
h%,Huggard ( k ~ n d o nRouttcdge
: 8r Kegan Pa~xt,1952), p. 127-129.
X X . From this point: forbvard, \vc assume that God is a necessary and not a
cantingat being, that God exists in all passible worlds. l'lze question before
us, tl-ren, is whetl~erGod can actualize just any possible world that i~~cludes
his existence. iYe foflow~Planbnga" discussion of \~~hictit wc~rldsGod cotrid
havc created, kom his N&CZ.L~*C @OJgccssz"[y,pp. 169-174.
12. Pla~itti~lga,Chd, Freedurn, a ~ z dE ~ i kp., 53,
X 3, A complete statement of the Free FViH Dcfense ~~o-itlci need to take
into accoullt a11 of the eleinel~tsthat 131tandnga b~tildsinto it, such as a con-
cept of essences, a hller treatnlelitt of cor~~iterfactr~aIs of freedollit, aiitd so
forth. See his Natzgrc of'Ngc~rssz'ty,ppp,X 72ff.
14. Many thinkers, both theists and tl~eircridcs, havc Xong accelttcd the
pril~cipletl-rat there are no ~zop2Io~Tiicnl limits to what an o~~iti~ip~)telitt being can
do. In other wc~rds,God has the ability to bring about any z'~zt:~*i~zsicrsk.I[~pc~~s
bl~rstate of affairs (i.e., a state of affairs the description of which is not logi-
catty inco~itsistent).God could bring about, for example, white polar bears
and tI-iangfes because they are intrix~sicallypossible, but he could not bring
about rnarried bachelors and square cirdes bccause ttiey are intrinsically im-
possible.
Howcver, Planti~lgarevises the cotlcept of omnipotcxlce to aIlo\v for the
hct ttiat there are states ofafcatrs that are passible z'7.z tbe~$gclve~- (Le., intrinsi-
catiy) b ~ r that
t are not possible for Chd to bring about. Tllis poiritt depel-rds
on a proper ~11lderstandi1.1g of the logic of free witl. If a persoil is free with re-
spect to an action, then whether she perforrns or rekair-ts &am performing
that action is up to her, ~ z o God.
t A l t h o ~ ~ ga fworld
~ in which all persons a1-
\%raysfreety d o what is right is cereainly possible, it is not a state of affairs that
was within God's pawer to create; all of the kee crcattires in that world
would have to l-relp bring it about by their olirn choices. The Free Wi11 De-
fe~lderit~siststhat God cann<)t detc-ermi~zethe actiosls of fkee persons. See
Plantinga, The Natzgre of Nec~ssigf,pp, 190-X 9 1.
For a. i~elpfrrldiscussion of this matter, see Williarn kvainwrtght, "fircedam
and Cjmnipotence," Nosis 2 (1968):239-301,
Suggested Readings
Adams, 1Zc)bert M. "Middle ktowlcdge and the XZrobleinof Evil." Aifef*ic~n
Philosophical Qtggrgeriy 14 ( 1677)):109-1 17.
. ""Pat-rtinga 011 the Problem of :Evil."ln Alpin PlgFzri~wa,cdited by
James Tamberiiit and Ikter van Inwagen. Dordrcch t: IZeidel, 1985,
pp, 225-255.
Basinger, David. ""Christian Theism and the Free Will Defense," "phi@
(A$~stralin;) 19 (July 1980):20-33.
. "Determii~isnland Evil: So111e C:larifications."" Agstr;t~-lasian Pzitr~~zal
of PbiIt~sc~phy 60 ( IX 982): X 63-1 64.
. ""Il)i\iine Omniscricnce and the Best of ,411 130assibleWorlds." figrl.znl
of Valge I~zgwigty16 (1982): 143-148.
. "Hr~manFreedom and Divine Orutnipotence: Some New Thorrghts
on an Old XZrablem." R~eIz&z"o%s St$$diwl 5 (1979): 491-510.
. ""IWhat Se~lseM L I SG~ c )DC) ~ His Best? A Response to Hasker.?'
I%zg:e~.~i.tn$iortal
Jozg~~ialf"ar Philosophy ofRlirl@Zon X 8 ( X 985): X 6 X -1 64.
. "Must God Create the Best Possible World? A XZespoitse." htef*nn-
tiofzt%lPhiIosophiical Qtggr$gr[y20 ( 1680):339-342.
Co-itgltlan, Michaei L, ""'Fhe Free FVill Defensc and Natttral Evif," I%zg:ep.~ivtn-
tionat Jourrrat J b 12bilnsophyofReli~ion:20 ( 1986):93-1 08.
Gale, %chard, "fireedom and the Free Wilt Defense." 'Social 7beot#y and
Pfpgc$icli:(Fall X 990): 397423.
. OF$$he Na$zz~ee.end E x I ~ e ~ cofeC;od. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
rrcrsity Press, 1991.
Hasker, WiXliam, "hifust God Do His Rest.>" hz$gf*:mal.z'unnI Juzgr~ialfbrPhilos-
opj~yofRelz&t"opi!16 (t984):213-224.
Hoi tenga, Dewcy. ""Logic and the Pro ble1-11 of Evil." A kfze~#ican Pi?z'lusopk3ical
QgarzerI,~ 4 (1967): X 14-1 26,
b n e , G. Staniley. """l'hcFrce-kviitl Defcnse l3efcnded." " c Mc~aSchol@~$icism
50 (1976):435446,
Mavrodes, George. "The Problem of Evil ." "1 Bgli!jeSi~itG d : A &$$z&djf in the
E p i a ~ ~ ~ oofRglg&io~i!.
Io~y New York: Ibndoxn EIouse, 1970, chap. 4,
C)akes, Robert A, ""Actualities, Possibilities, and Free-will "fheodicy." '?he
Ne~vSeholns~icZsm46 ( X 972): X 9 1-20 1.
13ike, Nelson. ""Iflantinga on Free Will and Evil." R~eli~ioz~s S$z$diw l 5
(1979):449473,
PLarrtinga, B v i n . "Existence, Necessit~and God," The N;em ,5'cholastz'cisliaz 50
(1976): 61-72.
. ""Tl~eFrce bVill Defense." h In2hilnsopI3j~in: r(t~$er.ic&,edited by Max
Black, London: George AIlen and Unwin, 1965.
. Chd nrtd Qti$g~* Minds: A Stgdjf ofthe Rgtional Jzgstg$cation ~fRalz"@'
~ P ZGod. Ithaca: Cornell Ux-riversiv Press, 1967.
. <$od, Ff~cgdnm,and E~pil.Grand h p i d s , Micb.: Eerdma~ls,1977.
. "Irie M&I:~.~PC
of'N~~essz"~, Oxford: Glarelldorl Press, 1974,
. "Which Worlds Could God Have Created?" Jour~wlof1>hz"losophy70
(1973): 539-552,
Quinn, Phitip L, "God, Moral Perfectiotl, and Possible Worlds." h Chd:
Gm~~tcn'~pot.arj~ Disczzaion, edited by Frederick Sontag and M. Darrol
Bryant, New York: Kc~seof Sharon Press, 1982, pp. 197-21 3,
Kc?\vc, Wilfiam L, "Rlantinga on PossiMe iVorfds and Evi1," fi~uuz?.~i.tnl oj'philos-
ophy 70 (1973): 554-555.
Sennett, Janles F. ""The Free Will ITefc-nse a ~ l dDeter~ltillisnl.'' Fgkgh and Phi-
losophy 8 (1981 ): 340-353.
Smart, Ninian. ""C)mniyatence, Evil and Superinel-E." Philosophy 36 (1961):
188-195.
Stcw~ar t , Melville, 2 ge G~~eatct.er-C;ood
~ I ~ ~ TAJnSEss@*y
P : on the R~.k.ziofzalz-'qof'
F~z'lrh.Ncw York: St. Martin", 1993.
Wainwkght, William. "C:ii.iristian Theism and the Free Will Defense." hgtc~#-
national Jogsen~aIjb.~* P/$ilosophyof'flelgion 6 ( X 975): 243-2 50.
Walls, Jerry. '"I'hc Free Wilt Dcfcl-Ese, Calvinism, bVcsiey7 and tbc Goodness
of God," CC;'hr.af$ian c5'chalgr"s~evz'ew1 3 (January 1983): 19-33,
The Probabilistic
Problem of Evi
From the atheistic critics' point of view, the beautp of the logical ar-
gurxent from evil is that, if it could be made t o work, it would be a
tour de force for atheis~x.Critics could then ignore any allegedly fa-
vorable evidence for God's existence and declare theism patently irra-
tional. Hobnever, with what appears to be the decisive defeat of the
logical argulnent from evil by the Free Will Defense,] some critics
have developed a different kind of argumeilt from evil. This other
type of argument seeks to establish that the existence of God is still
somehow rationally unacceptable given the facts of evil. Philosophers
~vieldingthis kind of argument say that evil so~uehowcounts against
the existcncc of God, although it is not inconsistent with the exis-
tcncc of God. Since the mid- 1970s, the number of these argkllnents
in the philosophical literature has grown significantly. Such argu-
lnents have been ~rariouslylabeled evidential, inductiire, or a posteri-
ori? but one of the more prominellt formulations is now called the
probabilistic argumeilt from evil. It is to this argumeilt that I 12014~
turn, leab~ingconsideration of a more broadly conceived evidential ar-
gument until the next chapter.
h Initial SKrmish
Proponents of the probabilistic argument maintain that evil ixakcs
the existellce of God imp~pobableor unlikeb. Let us consider an early
exchange ben4reen noiltheistic and theistic philosophers along these
lines. Consider how J. W. Cornman and Keith Lehrer preseilt the
problem in the guise of a provocative thought experiment:
If you were all-good, all-k~lowing,and all-powerfut and you were going
t o create a universe in ~ ~ h i ctherett were scxltient beixlgs-beings that
are happy and sad; enjoy pleasure, feel pain; express love, anger, pity,
l-ratred-what kind of world would you create? . . . Try t o i~ltaginewltnt
such a \voriA WCIUIBbe like. FVould it bc like the one wl~ichactually does
exist, this world wc live in? bVould you crcatc a world such as this or-zc if
you had tl-re power and know-how t o create any logically possible
\%rorld?If yorrr anst;Grcris ""no," as it scerns t o be, then yorr sftorrlct begin
t o undersra~~d why the evil of suffering and pain i1-t this world is such a
problcnl for allyone who tl-rinks God created this world. . . . Girrcn this
\%rorld,then, it seems, we should cotlcltrde that it is z'mpgeoktaktk: that it
was created or sustained by anytfiing wc would call God. Thus, 81~~11
this particular world, it s e e ~ ~that e it is impmb-
t s we should c o n c l ~ ~ dthat
a6k that: God-who, if he exists, crcated the \%rorfd-exists, Conse-
quexlrtl!?, the belief that God does not exist, rather tfian the belief that he
exists, W O L I / ~seen1 to be jz&s"r~z$edby $he eviide~zeewe find in tl-ris world."
(34) ALl thc evil in this world is broadly illoral evil; and of all the
worlds God co-rrld have created, none contains a bctter bal-
ancc of broadly moral good with rcspcct to broadly moral
evil.
Plantinga here coins the term "turp" as a basic unit of evil in order to
facilitate discussion. Here the expression "1 013CUWS" nallles the past,
present, and future evil in the actual ~vorld.
Claiming that ( 3 5 ) does not disconfirm (349, Plantinga goes on to
sap that neither does it disconfirm the following:
So, the existence of the great amount and variety of evil does not ren-
der improbable the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and
wholly good God. Of coursc, therc may bc other things we know such
that the existence of God is improbable with respect t o them.
Nonetheless, the amount and variety of evil in this wodd does not
disconfirm God" existence.
Here we can sec how the Free Will Drfense works agaillst the prob-
abilistic problem of evil. Against the logical problem, of course,
Plantinga established that
and
and
But the theist might retort that the probability of (G) changes signif-
icantljr when we consider
(R) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil to ex-
ist.
has a low probability value, i.e., below .5.But how would one arrive
at such a judgment? Should we start bp imagining hypothetical uni-
verses (or what we have called "possible jwrlds") and simply estimat-
ing how mallp co1ltai1li13g as much evil as this one were created by a
being who has the relevant theistic attributes? Salmon ~vouldinsist
that the number here would be relatively low.
Plantinga poina out a number of serious difficulties in the frequen-
tist ixcthods Salmon uses for arriving at the conclusion that
P((G)/(E)) = .5. For one thing, how can the frequentist critic
count the possible ~vorlds,which arc theoretically infinite in nulxber,
so that he map perform his calculations! For another thing, what
about the differences in how the theist and atheist ~nakea number of
initial assesslnellts before arrij~ingat a final value for P((G)/(E))! Af-
ter all, the nontheist would typically assess the probability that there
would be less evil in our ~vorldif God did exist to be high, ~vhereas
the theist would most certainly disagree.
Herc Plantinga rccognizcs the fact that such initial assesslllcnts arc
nltimately rciativc to thc do;dnJ hseIiefsg$ that each party brings to thc
bwobabilitp judgment at hand and that the belicf sets of the theist and
the critic differ in some irreconcilable w a y s . l V e would expect the
theist and the atheistic critic to disagree, for instance, on the success
of various independent argulnents for God's existence, such as the
ontological and cosmological arguments. But surely, their assess-
ments of such matters will form part of their respective total belief
sets, or, as Plantinga calls them, their respective "noetic frameworks."
These as well as othcr problems undercut any effort to mount a viable
frcqucncy argument from evil.18
without appeal to my other beliefs. That is, it can be part of the foun-
dations of my noetic structure without being derived by argkllnents
koix bundational belie&,
Thc rclcvancc of Reformed epistemology to the discussion of God
and evil is that it changes how we think about the rationality of the
parties involved. Alld it is a llatural colnpollent in defensive maneu-
vers by theists. For one thing, Reformed epistemolog!? explains how
the theist may be rational ~vithoutmounting, say, a pprbbailistic argu-
lnent for divine existence that is aimed at overturning the yrobabilis-
tic argument from evil. The theist may siinply hold belief in God as
basic (\\?ithour:argmentj. Then, when a critic adtrances soi-ne version
of the problem of evil and thc theist feels its probative force, the the-
ist must deal with the oL7jcction. The objection is a potential defeatgr
of the basic belief in God; it threatens the theist's s~loeticstructure.
But the only action rationally required of the theist, according to Re-
forlned epistemology, is to depat the defeater, so to speak. This may
be done by defgnse, showing that the critic's case against theism does
not succeed, whatever that case map be (e.g., logical or probabilistic
probleln of evil). Of course, it is eiltirely possible for the antitheistic
critic to respond bp trying t o defeat the defeater defeater and so on.
Thus, although one may be rational in believing in God without dis-
cursive reasoning and argument, this would be a situation in which
reasoning and argkxment is needed. However, the point of theistic ar-
gurxentation in this casc has changed frolx thc positive enterprise of
showing that bclicf in God is rational because it is derived from basic
beliefs to the project of showing that antithcistic attacks do not rcveal
it to be rationally substandard.
Now the way is prepared fir construixig a probabilistic argrrmexlt from evil
along Uaycsial-t lines.
Reichenbach sets up the frame~iorkfor the Bayesian-ppe argu~tenth111 evil:
Suggested Readings
Adams, Robert M, "Hlantinga on the Problcnl of Evil." h Inlvzlaz P l a ~ z t z ' ~ % ~ a ~
edited by Jarnes Tornberlin and Peter 17anXn~ragen.Dordrecht: Reidcl,
1985, pp. 225-255.
Basinger, David. "Evil as E\rider~ceAgainst the Existerlce of God: A Re-
sponse," Philosopy Rcsn-a.ch Archivcs 4 ( f 978): article no. X 275.
Carti#irigl--tt,Na~lcy.""Comments on Wesley Salmon's '"Sience and Reli-
gion .'" Pjjz'los~pk3ic~l Stzbdies 33 (Fall 1978): 177-1 83.
C;brza~),Keith. ccPlantii~ga on Atheistic Induction. " Lcj~phia(A gstralin) 27
(July 1988): 10-14.
Draper, Xzaul. ""E.\iI and the XZroper Basicalier of UeXief in God." Fail-h a n d
Izhitosoph~y8 ( 1991): it 35-1 47.
. ""Pain and Pleasure: An E.\ride~-ttialProbXsrn ;for l'heists." Nags 23
(1989): 331-350.
. ""Prababilistic Arguxnents kern E.\iI." Raelgaiogs S$z%rrl!ies28 ( 1993):
303-3 X 7 .
Ho~%rard-Snjlder, Daniel. 2 ge Evidg..zlt.ti:z'alA ~ g ~ g ~ ~ c n t f k Eo r~pi zl .Bloomingtor1:
lrldialta Univcrsity Press, X 996,
Ihufman, Gordon D, ""E\ridexlrnalism: A 'Theologian" Xtcspoilsc," Fgigh alzd
Phikosc~phy6 (1989): 3 5 - 4 6 .
Martin, Micftael. rl~hl;risg%: A PhiZ~sophZ~alJ~~sl:i$c~ti:~'~~~, Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1990.
. ""God, Satm alld Natural Evil," "Tiaiphia (Agstrnlia) 22 (flctober
1983):4 3 4 5 ,
. ""I Evil Evidence Agait~stthe Existence of Gc>d?"~Wklzd87 (1978):
429432,
. Theistic I ~ l d ~ ~ c tArgul-tle~~t
ive from Evil?" I~~ite:ernt%tio~~t%Z Jozzr~zaI
jbr 12bilnsophy nfReli~iun:22 (1987):81-87.
Qakes, lXabert A, ""Cod, Suffering, and Cox~clusivcE.\ride~-tce."&pi$ia (Az$s-
tralia) it4 (July 1975): 16-20.
13cterson, Michael. "ltceent Work on the 13rablcm of Evil." Aifmefeic~n12biln-
sopI3icnI QztartcrCv 20 (1983): 521-339.
13ectrsan, Michael L., ed. 279e I3~@ob7lem of Evil: Selecgcd R e a d i ~ m s ,Notrc
Dame, Ind.: Univcrsity of Notre Dame Press, 1992,
Petersoil, Michael, Wilfiarn Hasker, Brrrce Xteichen bach, and Davtcl Basinger,
Rcgsc~rtalzd R el@iuus Retiq: A $2 I ~ t ~ ~ o d ~I;O~ &l;rz i oPhilosopb
n of Rci<qion,
2nd ed, New York: Qxfc>rd Plniversi~Press, 1998, chap, 6.
Plantinga, Alvin. ""X=,pisternicProbability and Evil ," A~rchiviod i fi"lofoji"a
(Italy) 56 ( X 988): 557-588
. <$od, F ~ ~ ~ e d nand
m , E~z'l,Grand h p i d s , Micb.: Eerdma~ls,1977.
. 7be N a t ~ ~ oftf'Nccessi9.
*g Clxford: C:larendon Press, 1974.
. T h e Probabilistic Arg~lntentfi-om Evil." Philnsopk~icaI Stz4dies 35
(1979): 1-53,
Reiche~~baeh, l n Ct'ood Ct'od. New York: Fordbnt-tit University
Itruce, E ~ i n~zd
Press, 1982.
-P . ""The l~lductiveArgumetlt from Evil." Az~erickavt Phz'lusf?phicgl
Q~fartea*(y 17 ( l980): 22 1-227.
Satl-riton,Wesicy. "Religion and Science: A N e w Look at Hunite's Dialn~ugs.?'
Philosophical Stztdigs 33 3 19978): X 43-1 76.
Wainwright, Williarn, "The XZrescl~ce of Evil and ttlc Falsificarisn of Theistic
A;sertic~ns." R~eli~iagfsStz4dies 4 (196";2:21 3-216,
The Prob
Gratuitous Evil
Again, it is not the sheer existence of evil per se that counts against
the existence of God but the fact that thcrc arc so many evils that arc
very severe and presellt in patterns de@ing comprehension.5
Formulating a reply to this ~rersionof the problem is dimcult but
not impossible for theists. Sorne theists have poilited out that this ar-
gumellt rests on an assulnption that the theistic deity would allowv
only certain amounts, kinds, and distributions of evil. Yet i t is hard to
kxlo\%rhow to establish how rz~uchevil is too mgcb for God to allow.
How, in principle, could we establish this? The logic of theism itsclf
does not scc131 to gcncratc any clear limit on the amount, type, and
bxoportions of evil in thc world. It also does not appear that thc
teachings of Christian theology, which expand upon restricted the-
ism, contain some limit. We could obviously apply one theistic re-
sponse to Versioll V here, sayillg that God could allow quite a lot of
evil, even very extreme evil, as long as it serves good purposes that
God could not otherwise achieve. A secolld question that theists of-
ten raise regards how any finite person could ascertain that the pres-
ent amount of evil in the world far exceeds the divinely set limit.
These and other perplexing questions make it difficult to imagine
how the atheist could ever establish such claims.6
What arc we to sal: then, about formulation V? In spite of its diffi-
cultics, wc should not dislniss V too quickl~r.After all, it is an attetnpt
to articulate one of the deepest and most profound objections to rcli-
gious disbelief. Expressions of this argument that describe concrete
instances of suffering, for example, strike a responsive chord in man)!
thoughtful people, believers and unbelievers alike. The critic can cer-
tainly argue strongly that theism fails to explain the large amounts,
extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil in the ~vorldand
that this is a prima facie good reason to reject theism. Further, critics
can argue that ~vhatcvcrdivine purposes thc horrible evils of our
world allegedly serve must be shown to be illorally worthwhile if God
is to be exonerated for permitting them.
The debate over Version V is vigorous and important. Theists typi-
cally argue that even quite considerable evil can be allokved bp a
morally perfect deity as long as it is necessary to either bringillg about
a greater good or preventing a greater evil. They employ either de-
fenses or theodicies that involve suggestions for what morally suffi-
cient reasons God has or rnight have along these lines? Atheistic crit-
ics find fault in attempts to arguc that all evils have a point. But this
rcally brings us to the consideration of the next version of the eriden-
tial problcim.
Version VI has become a major focus of both atl-reists and theists
alike. We map refer to this ~rersionhere as the evidefztial alzament
f i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r e~?il.
a t ~Many
i t u critics
~ s who advance Version V1 of the evi-
dential argument are willing to admit that the theistic deity might al-
low vast amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil
to exist. But they insist that God is justified in allowing the magni-
tude and profusion of evil only if it serves some purpose. Cornman
and Lehrcr speak of "unnecessary evil," Madden and Harc speak of
"gratuitous evil," and Danicl Howard-Snyder speaks of "poititless
evil."8 So, it is gratuitous or pointless evil, if it exists, that proirides
crucial e~ridenceagaillst the existence of a supremely pobverful, wise,
and good God. WC must now take a look at how the philosophical
cornmunitp has handled this argument from evil.
ProbZ~mof Gratuitous E ~ i l
The Appearance
Mally theists have joined the fray to rebut or lnitigate the force of
Rowr's first premise and thus stop the argulnent from ~vorking.Some
of them argue that the instances of apparently pointless evil that
Rowe cites are not generated by following proper inductive tech-
niques, that is, that they arc not part of a rcprescntativc sample.
These theists argue that wc arc rationally justified in belic\ring that
therc arc no goods that justi@ an evil only if we think the goods wc
kno~vof are part of a represeiltative sample. <)bviously, in making
many ordillarp illductive judgments, the rallge of relejrant items in
the sample falls kvithin our range of knokvledge (e.g., lookixlg all
around the world and seeing many storlts with red legs and then con-
cluding that it is reasonable to believe that all storks have red legs).
But Stephrn Wykstra argues that the atheistic critic has no reasoll to
believe that finite human beings can have a representatiire sample of
goods for the sake of which an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good
being would allow evil.
To begi12 to understand the exact point of this objection to Kowe, we
131ust understand Wybtra's analysis of appears-locutions. He assumes
Rowc uses the term "appears'? hil-t what Kodcrick C:hisholm calls the
"epistcrnic'? sense of the tcnn. That is, it pertains to what \VC arc in-
clined to belieire when we contemplate a situation. Then, Wykstra
makes a careful distinction in the different jwys that the word "not"
fullctions in such locutions. He argues that Ko\ve's statelnent that
"there does not appear to be any ounveighing good" should not be in-
telpreted as the initial premise in an argument h m ignorance, ~vhichis
a blatant fallacy. Rowre's statement, a5 Wykstra correctly poi~ltsout, is
bener i n w r p ~ t e das meaning that "it aayycars that tl~crcis no ourneigh-
ing good ."l2
Rowe's inference, then, may be understood as moving from a
proposition such as
to the proposition
This reasoning has this gelleral form: (A) It appears that p; therefore,
(B) it is reasollablc to believe that p.
Such an inference seems warranted by the Principle of Crcdkxliry ex-
pounded by Kichard Swinburne: lf something appears to be the case
(in the epistemic sense of "appears"), then this prima facie justifies
one in bclicving it is the case.lVhis pr;\nciylc is rooted in a wide-
spread philosophical opinion that \VC have generally rcliablc bclief-
forming powers (e.g., perception, memory) that incline us toward
certain belie& in certaill situations.l%ccordi~lg to Wykstra, hobvever,
the Principle of Credulity does not quite provide the criterion we
need. He argues that the epistelnic relatioil that the principle posits
bet\\reen (A) and (B) tnust meet the Condition of Reasonable Epi-
stemic Access (COIWEA):
CCILWEA: On the basis of cognized situation s, l-rut-ritanH is entirled to
claim "It appears that g" only if it i s reasonable for H to believc that,
give11 her c~gtlftivcfactzIties and the use she has rnade of them, if p wcrc
12ot the ease, s would likely be different than it is in sot-rite way dis-
cernible by her,'"
Ro~ve,of course, cites as justificatioil for (44)the fact that k2.e are unable
to think of any good that exists or might come into existeilce that both
ounveighs the fmrll's suffering a ~ could
d not be obtained by God with-
out permitting that suffering. If this is acceptable support for (44), then
the eilidential argument fioln gratuitous evil works.
Ho~vever,Wykstra counters that Rowe is not entitled to affirm (44)
ulllcss the following proposition is true:
(47) It is likely that the goods for the sake of which God per-
mits suffering are, to a large extent, beyond our ken,
Notes
X . Sec AIVIIIPlalltil~ga,"The Kefc>rmedObjection to Natrrral T h e ~ I o m ~ "
Ci!$ristian Scjgokgr S- Revieav l I (1982): it 87-198. See also Nicholas WoLter-
storff; "The Migration of the Tl~eisticArguments: From Natural Theology
to Ellidtentialist Apologetics," bin Rationnlit-y; Relz'~z'clz$sBeliq; sad bAo18~al
Ciovkz~~itment~ eds. Roberr Audi and Williarn J. bVainwrigl~t:(Xthaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986),pp. 38-81.
2. Gcorge Schlcsinger, Reltqz'clrt alzd Sez'e~t.tg3c6g190d ( F-Xi~~gIlam, Mass.:
IXcidcl, l977), p. 13,
3, Waiter &ufn-lan~~,?he Failch @"a Hgretic (Garden City, N.Y.: ITo~xble-
day, X 961), p, 139 (italics rnirle),
4. Gorcfan D, bufman, God: 2he IZroblem (Cambndgc, Mass.: EIarvard
University, 1972), pp. 171-1 72 (italics rritine),
5 . Pauf X3raper has offered the rnczst sopl-liseicatcd recent relldirion of ar-
gumcx~rV in ""Pin and Ncasure: An E~ridentiaiIZrobleinfor 'l'lzeisa," "1 Y79e
E ~ ~ i d e ~ z tA<qu$ge~zt
ial fgom Evil, ed, Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington:
Indiana Universi~Press, X 996), pp. 12-29. In the early X 980s, I i~ltroduced
the tailguage of "*ai~~ount," akind,'7 and ""distribution" iinto the discrission of
the evidential argrrmexlt in my E ~ i nrtd l tha Christi~anG d ( G r a ~ ~bdp i d s ,
Mich,: Baker Book House, 1982), p. 67. Peter van fslwagcl~has more re-
celntly used these collcepts as the basis for an artictc on the problem of evil.
See his "The Magnitrtde, Drtration, and I>iseribr~tionof Evil: A Tl~eodicy,"
I2hil~sophicai1>er~pectives 5 ( 1991): X 35-1 65. Brtlce XXusscfull acknowledges
this kind of problem in "Defensetess," bin 7be E~~identz.zlal Ar~g~s$ent fkom
E ~ i l ,ed. IDaniel Howard-Sr1-t7del.de ( Ifloomi ngton : Indiana University Prcss,
lY96), pp. 194, l99ff.
6, Peter van Inwagell discrisses the difficufties surroundi~lgthe argut-ritent
over the arnorrnt and kinds of evil in his ""The Probiern ofEvi1, the Probtern
of Air, and the Problem of Silence," Philosophical 13g~slfiect-zz7es 5 (199 1):
135-165, especially pp, 140-1 52.
7 . St~chan. appraisai of the situation seems more intellectrrafly hoxlest and
rnore philosoptlically proxnising than del-tj'inp that there reafly is as mueh evil
or tl-tnt rrituftitrzdes of people are really as ul-thappy as is iinibdiy supposed, It
is better fir the theist simply to admit that there are a great maxly severe evils
in the world and the11 t a argtle that the existel-tce of God is llelthcr precluded
nor n~adeunlikely thereby. The argllnlent can be constructed either fro111 the
logic of essc~~tiaf ttteistic coxlcepts ur from the additiotla! cotlcepts ir~cluded
in sarne e x p a ~ ~ d;form~ d of tftelsm that is represented in a Xivii-tg faith tradi-
tion, ssrch as C;l~ristianity,
Althczugh strclt theistic maxleu\rers seem reasonable, pertlaps there is at
least one sense in which the evidel-ztial argtlmel-tt kom the amounts, kinds,
and disrril;liutior~of evil is ii~lmediateiydestrt~ctiveto religious belief. The ar-
grrmexlt clearly discredits belief in a delry who places a felicitorrs limitation
01-1the evils that lrulnall beings can experience and about wham sixnplisttc
answers for evil may be given. Th~xs,the god of popu1~"fotk religion
peddled in the name of historical, ortltodox Christianiq-really is dead, The
burden, then, falls upon the shoulders of thoughtfufulChristian theists to ar-
ticulate a concept of God that is 111ore sopllisticated a i d profo~xndthan pop-
ufar theism envisioxls.
8. 7 . W Cornrnan and Keirfi Lefirer, 1>hilosophical1>roblgmsa d A ~ ~ E . c -
aazents: An I~trodaectio~$ (New York: h%acmiIlan,1970), p. 347; Edkirard
Maddell and Peter Hare, Evil grid the Concep~of C;c.d (Springijeld, Ill.:
Charles C;. Thomas, 19681, p. 3; Dalliel Howard-Si~yder,""l'be Argtlmel-tt
fi-om Inserurablc Evil," in his Evidential A ~ q u ~ s $ e n t fEvili o ~(Bloomington:
~
Indiana Universiry Press, X 996), pp, 29 1-292,
9. WiIliam Itowe, ""Tfie Problem of Evil and Soine Vaneties of Atheism,"
Amtsrica~zPhilosophical Qzir%rter1",~ 16 ( 1879): 336. I have changed nsxnlbers
and added parentheses to Ro\%rc?argrrment in keeping with the convcntioll
;for lluxnbering used thro~tphoutthis book,
10. Ibid., p. 337.
1l , In terms we used earlier,
(E3) Grat~zitclusevil exists
counts as negative er~idenceagai~lst
( G ) AI omnipotent, omnisciet~t,jiiholly good God exists,
But what is the sig~~ificant ~legatiifeer~identiairelationship to (G) in jiihich
(E3) sta~lds?Rrrrce Russell explains that ttterc are really m70ways ofcor~ceiv-
ing of this evidential relationship, one z'~tdi?.l.ct.zveand the other nbdacctive. AI-
though we callnot psrrstxe this distincdon here, the reader is encouraged to
read R~tsself'S 'Wefenseless,"" pp, X 93-2 X 8,
121. Stephen Wyksrra, ""'l'he I3trmean Obstacle to Evldel-zdal hguments
fi-om S~~ffering: O n AvoiQi~lgtl-re Evils of "ppearance,"' I~$er~~zac.innn;lJo~~~
nlili.l$%trPj~iltrscphjf~'Rel@z"on X 6 ( 1.984):80-8 l .
12%. lZichard Srvinburne, 2be E~igg~-zce of Chd (Oxford: Clarel-Edan lzress,
1970), pp. 245,254.
14, For example, Swirtbr~rnecircs an example o f a betiefformed 0x1 the ba-
sis of scl~soryexperience: ""If say 'ttil~cship appears to be mokring" am say-
ing that I am i~~clined to beliecre that the ship is movii~g,and that it is my
present sensory experience which leads me to have this ir1ciina6ol1 to belief."
See his Existence of'God, p. 246. For a fuller discussion of these cognitive
golirers and their function, see Afiin Pia~ltinga,Wa~.r#gnt and Pf*operFgnc-
tiun (New York: Oxhrd U111versit.y Press, 1993).
it 5. Wykstra, "Humcan Obstacle," p. 85.
16, Ibid., p. 89.
X 7 . Ibid., pp* 89,9l.
18. WiXliarn Rowc, ""E7il and the '~bcisricEIyyothcsis: A lXcsponsc t o
Wykstra," hic~:ep-pzatin~~t%I PhiIusopby of"Relg3ion16 ( 1984):99.
J1;1~a#nt%lf-;3~
X 9. Xi,owe observes that ~ 7 ecould, of cottrse, imagine a ~rersiotlof ex-
panded theism that conjoins a praposidan such as
The goods for the sake of which God rnLlst perinit suffering wilt. be real-
ized only at the e ~ l dof the wortd
with standard theisnl. This version of expanded theism is not rendered un-
likely by ttte items that render restl-icted theism ~tnXikeXy-See ibid.
Suggested Radings
Aston, William, "The Inductive Argut~le~lt from Evil and the Human Cog-
nitive Condition." Phz'kos~~phz'cnl Pe~~spccgi~cs 5 ( 1991): 2947.
Bear)?, MichaeI D. ""'l'lze Problein of Evil: l'lze Ux-rans\vered Questions Argu-
" kSuzdt.htvenPifilo~~phy
rrite~lt, R e v i e l ~4 ( 1988): 57-44,
82 'Ihe l3faoble~$
of C;r&ggit~gs
Evil
Hick states that it would have been better if such events had never
happened," an adjnission that seems to embrace the fact of gratu-
itous evil. Then he moves 011 to ask how, from the staildpoint of
Christian theodicy, we can address the utterly destructi1.e evils in our
world. Why does this world seem less like an environment for soul-
building and more like a cold and indifferent, if not outright hostile
and malevolent, place?33
Hick ultimately says that the exccss and random character of much
evil is mysterious to us. We sec no constructive purposc for it. Rut
then he begins to bring even dysteleological or excessic.e evil ~vithin
the ambit of soul-making theodicy, saying that even the lnpstery of
dysteleological evil has soul-making value. He argues that the human
misery in this jwrld calls forth deep perso~lalsylnpathy and energetic
efforts to help.31 He contends that unless the suffering is really unde-
served and actually bad for the sufkrer, we would not have such de-
sirable and valuable passionate reactions. He also argues that, in a
world where sufferillg and prosperity were exactly proportioned to
desert, we W O U ~lose ~ the moral environment in which persons do
what is right simply for the sake of what is right. Instead, persons
would act prude~ltiallyso as to bring about the most fakrorablr conse-
quences for themselves. So, bp the end of his treatment of dysteleo-
logical evil, it is not clear that the evil relnains dysteleolo@cal. In the
end, there is no gratuitous evil for Hick because all evil serves a pur-
pose. He says that God permits evil to "bring out of it an even greater
good than ~vouldhave been possible if evil had never existed."3"
A study of Hick's Ircnaean version of thcodicp would nor be corn-
pletc without analpzing his view of life akcr death as the continuation
of God's plan of soul-lxaking. Hick argues that God's plan is the uni-
versal salvation of all persons, a process that extends beyond earthly
existence and into the afrerlife. For those people who, for whate~rer
reasons, depart mortal life bnithout hajring achieved the proper degree
of moral and spiritual maturity (or soul-hood, one might say), God
pursues his same objective for them in the life to come. After all,
some of these persons would have been among those ~ v h osuffered
terribIy and whosc lives were snufkd out ~vithorzta fair chance to ma-
ture along moral and spiritual lines. So, God continkles his efforts in
the aftcrlifc, providing occasions for exercising love and trust, ulltil all
persons are brought into the heavenly kingdom. He notes that the
universal sal~rationof humaniy is not a logical necessiy ~rithinire-
naean theology but is a "practical certailly."36 This affirmatioil of di-
vine persistence completes the progressive, developmental, and escha-
tological orientation of lrmaean theodicy.
In the final analysis, then, Hick is not able to admit the existence of
gratuitous evil. On this point, ironically3Irenaean theodicjr falls back
into agreement with Augustinian theodicy. Hick says that "the King-
dom of God will be an infinite, because eternal, good, outbveighing
all temporal and therefore finite evils."37 Interestingl~: whereas Au-
gustinian theodicy argues for the possibilit). of evil in a theistic uni-
verse, Hick uses Ircnaean theodicy t o argue for its actuality being
necessary to the kind of theistic univene he describes. So, Irenaean
theodicy places the responsibilitp for evil on God in at least as strong
a sense as Augustiniall theodicy does. Yet in relatioll to the fulfilllnent
of God's purpose, "nothing will finally have been sheerly and irre-
deemably evil. For everything will receive a new meaning in the light
of the end to which it 1eadse7'3a
Hick's contributioll to the ongoing discussioll of God and evil is an
important one. He must be colxmcnded for not denying the reality
of the evil in the world by saying that it only seems evil fro111 our finite
perspective. Although he tries to facc even the most horrible and ex-
cessikre evils, his theodicy cannot ultimately recognize really gratu-
itous evils. Even though, for Hick, it %.as ~rithinGod's power to make
a world significantly like this one but uithout dysteleological evils,
such a ~vorldwould not have been as conducive to soul-making as is
this world. Thus, colltrarg to other relnarks he makes along the
way?" h the end Hick comes very close to arguing that our world,
even with its most extreme evils, is the best possible one for achieving
God's purposc of soul-making. For those whose intuitions run
counter to this conclusion, perhaps WC lxust say that it col-nes down
to difkrillg conceptions of goodness and what goodlless ~ r o u l dd o
regardill8 things that are kzithin its power.
Notes
oj'Relz&z'o~:An I~@ad.t~ct.z'on:o
it. Wilitiam Itowe, 13hz'lo~-ophy ( Encino and Bel-
mont, Chlif.: nickenson, 1978), p. 88.
2. Edward Maddell and Peter Hare, E ~ i arid l Conccp~ofC&n! (Sprixlg-
field, Ill,: Charles G, 'lVhomas,19681, p. 3.
3, Keith Yandel, Basic Isstbcs 6 ~ z$he f'hilosophy of Relzhion (Boston: Mlyn
and Bacon, 1971), pp. 62-63.
4, In the previous cilaptcr, we considered Stcphen Wj~kstra"ddefense, which
turns on the cognitive limitations of humall beings. S i ~ ~ ~ defe~lses
ilar are used
by iVittiarn Alstor~,""The Indtrctivc Arg~rrnelltkorn Evil and the Humail Cog-
ni tive Condidon," in 2 he &pidentigl Alyg~gentfro~gEvil, d. D a ~ ~ iEIoward-
el
Snqrdder (Bloomington: It~diallaUrliversixy Press, 19961, pp. 97-1 25, a i d by
Peter van Inwagexl, """fieProblem of k:viI, the Problem of Air, arid the Prob-
lem of Silence," in Howard-Snyder, pp. Isit-l 74, 131anrtngaalso alludes to the
cogi~itivelis~litatimthenle: ""ferhaps God has a good reason, but that reason
is too complicated for us to undersrand"~esecAtvirr Piax~tinga,God2Ffpegdom,
and Evil (Grand bpids, Mich. : Ecrdmans, 19772, p. 10.
E;, In otl-rer jiiords, these theodicies offer a moratly ssrfficient reasoil for
God permitting evil
6, This imagery is bornowed from Melville Stewart, The <$re~t~rfi-C~ood De-
fgnse (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p. fX.
7. And whether for purposes of defense or thcodicj?, both agrcc that a
Greater-Good "fhe~lteis ~teeded,Sir~cethe theme is assut-rted to be ileeessary
t o theism, authors developing both defel~sesancl theodicies c m p l q it.
8. Augustine, Y'he Natgre uf'the Good, cd. and trans. J.H.S. Burlcigh, in
Ag&~stine:Earlier W ~ i t i (LC)II~CJI~:
~g~ SrC.M, Press, 1953), p. vt.
9. Interestingly, Neoplatonism heavily influenced Augustine's view7 of evil.
For a discussion of Plotinian Ncoylatonism, see W. R. Ingc, ?'hel3hilo~-opi$j~ of
Pknginzes, 3rd ed, j h ~ r t d o i Longntans,
~: Green, 1929). Plotinus's view of evil
as lack occurs in Augustine, as explained in this chapter.
t 0. Friedricb Schlcicrmacher, " f k e Chrz'stknn Fgz'lih (Edinb~~rgh: 1'. cyi 'I3,
CLark, 19282, p, 161.
1 1. Augusti~~e, Cily oS"ll;od,trarrs, Marcus Dods, George Wilson, and I. 1.
Smith (New York: lbx~damHouse, t950), pp. 13, 14.
12. A~~gustine, C:olzt-ra Jglia~ztpaP~la&inawm,bk. 5, chap, M,
13. To see hc>wthis principle is wok7enthroitgh much of Western intellec-
tual history, sec A r t h ~ ~Lov~u);r ll&e Cbnir.a qf N e i ~ g(Camt>ridgc,
~
Mass,: Harvard Unikrersity Press, 1936)-
14. John Hick, Evil arid the God of-Love, 2nd ecd. (San Frarrcisco: Harper
Sr IXORT,19781, pp. 82ff.
15. Augustine, On Free Wiill,trans. J.H.S. Burleigh, in A ~ ~ z ~Ea~*Lier ~ z ~ e :
W~*i$ip.t&$, 3. 9. 26,
16. Augtlstinc, Cz'g~ofC;od, I. 1. 23.
17. Augustine, f='~tci~i~*idio~, trans. J, E;. Shay in Baszc W~*i;t.i~asof'Sc. A~8z"ts-
Z r i n ~(2 vols.), ed., FVhitney J. Oates (New b r k : Random House, 19481, .27
1.8. Ibid., 24.96.
19, Ibid., 8. 27.
20. Gottfii-iediVilhelm van I,eib~riz, "X;heudicjf:ESSGE~S 0% the Cgotrdng~sof
(;uA tht~eFz~gedu~6 ~J'LMcz-n,m d $he O$~inuf'Evil, trans. E. M . H uggard fi-om
C:. J. Cerhardfs edition of the CoIlectcd Philosopbicnl Wnt#ks( 1875-1 890)
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.).
2 1. Gotrfrictd Wif helm vor-1 Lei bniz, Ygeodic~trans. E, M . Huggard ( b r - 1 -
don: Rc~uticdge& ICegan Paul, 1952), paras, 30-33.
22. Ibid., para. 2.01.
23. Ibid., para. 127.
24. Ibid., para. 9.
25. The reader ~iiillll remember Plantingaysremarks 011 Leibniz's Lapsc that
was discussed ii-1 Chaptcr 3.
26, Hick, E~lil,p. 255,
22. Ibid., p*256,
28. Ibid., p. 281.
29, Ibid., p. 287.
30. Ibid., p. 272.
31. Ibid., pp* 329-330,
32, Hiclr speaks of "evil. wfilch is utterly grattlitous" (ibid., p. 324); of
""evil in so far as it is p~lrelyand unambiguously eli.21" (ibid., p. 325); and
"horrors ~vhichwill disfigure the universe to the end of time" (ibid., p*361 ).
33. Hick (ibid., p. 330) even quotes ShAcspeare ( I < i g Lcgr):
~ ''h Rics to
wailtoll boys, are Itre to the gods, They kill us for their sport.?'
34, Ibid., p+ 334.
35. Ibid., p, 176.
36. Ibid., p. 344.
37, Ibid., p+ 350.
38. Ibid., p. 363.
39, Many of Hick" statements about the Ilature of evil indicate that sin
and sufferit~gare to be regarded as ""gexluinefy spit! and utterly inimical to
God's wifI and p~~rpose" "(ibid., pp. 15-16); he also says: ""For it is an in-
ecritable deliverance of our moral conscio~xsness,of jtrhich nothilsg must be
allowed to rob LIS, that evil in all its forms is to be abhorred and resisted and
feared" "bid,, p. 363).
40. Aift.ed North Whitehead, Pr~ee,cfa n d i"Et7nlz'tyf(New York: Macmill~n,
1929), p* 343,
41. Michael Petcrson, "God and Evil in l)rocess 'rfrzeodiqr,,"YinlZrocess7%gol-
0g3f3ed. Rondd Nash ( G r a ~ dbpids, h%ich,:Baker Book House, 19871, p. 123,
42, See, for example, Charles Hart-shorne, "Omxlipotence,"' in Afz Eacy-
clopedia oJJIZet!z"gZo~ eb. V. Fenn (New Yorkz: 13hhllosophical Librar): 1945),
pp, 545f. See also C:harles Hartshorne, (Jl.rzn$atencc a~zdOther ~ ' ~ " J ~ O ~ D & Z C
LW2'~akcs (Alba~~y: State Uni\rersiry ofNew7 York Press, 1984), pp. 1If:
43. l3avid Iby Griffin, God, 130wer, and Epil (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1976), p. 280,
44. ,4lltred North Wttircltcad, R~k&ioni f z the IM;nkz'~z&(New York: Macmil-
Zan, 19261, p. 98; also sce his I3'i.aceaand Reality, pp. 524-525.
45, Sonte prcxcess philosophers 1-rac.e atte~~tpted to prcnride a prcxcss ae-
count of persotlal irnmczrtality, that is, life after death. See the discussiotl of
' o ~- s
thls in DaGd Ihy Griffirl, Ep61 Revisited: Rgspourscs and R e c o ~ s i d c ~ ~ n t z(AI
: State Universiq of N e w York Press, 1991), pp. 34-40,
(iba~ly
46. See the f~zll-scalediscussiot~of process thcodicy in Petersorl, "God and
Evil in 13rocess'I'k~eodicjr,"pp. it 2 1-1 39.
47, Naney Frarrkenberr~""Some Problet-rts in Process "fheodi~y~" Ri"~elz-
~ i o a ~ S t ~X7d i(1981):
~s 181-184,
48. I supgcsted that Christiall theists could take thls kind of approach in
11ty wcr~rkEvZI a d $he C;h~ez'st.z'gnCt'od (Grand Rapids, h%ich.:Baker Book
House, 1982), particularly cltag, 5 , pp. 101-1 33. X: also recommended it in
the book I wrote with WiiZla~nHasker, Ur~rccI<eict~enbach,and David
Basinger, Reason and Relli_qiufbsBelz'eJ1:AFZI~trod~.tctz'on $0 the PhiIos~phyof-'
Rer!z~icrfz,2nd ed. (New k r k : Oxford Universirjr Press, 1998),pp, 123-1 27.
iViIXiarn Haskcr makes a case fbr the possibifiy of gratrrito~rsevil from the
persyectivc of Christial~rheis1-n in his """l'hcNecessiy of Gratuitous Evil,"
Fgilch n~zdPhiIttsophy 6 ( 1992):23-44,
49. See Hasker, "Xecessity"flr~ruce Reichenbach, Evil ;land ;l G o d Cgod
(Ncw York: Forciiliam Ux-tiversiqr Press, 1982); David Basir~gcr,lfhe Cas6jbr
Frpca Will Thczffaz(Dolvners Grove, Ill.: Interh7arstrjr Press, 1996), chap. 4,
pp. 83-1 04; and Petersoxl, Evil alzd $he Chrz"st:igna d ,
Suggested Radings
Adarns, Marityn M, "Theodicjr FVithout RIame," PPhil~s~)phic&l Topics X6 (Fall
1988):215-245,
Adanls, Marityll M,, advisory ed, Theological C:tr>ntributions to Theodicy,
special iss~reof Faz'gh nrtd Philosophy f 3 ( X 996).
Basingcr, David. ""Uivil~eOxnnipotcnce: Ptantiinga vs, Griffirl." Procgss Stud-
has 11 (1981): 11-24,
Daris, Stephell T., ed. Evzcognl-erz"~-g E ~ i l L: i ~ Options
c ip.~"Irgeodz'cy.Atf anta,
Ga.: b o x Press, it98 X .
Fdcs, Evarr. "Antedilurrian "fheodicy: Str~nlpon the Fall." Faith n~zdPhiloso-
phy 6 ( l989): 320-329.
m
-
- . ""Shauld Gad Nor Have Created Adam? Fait/? a d 13/2ilosophy 6
(1992):192-218,
Ferrb, Nets, E ~ i l;lnd the CJ3rG~ianFai~h.New York: Harper, 1947.
12cllrintcd by Books for Libraries Press, Ncw York, 1972.
Griffin, David Rny E ~ i Revisited:
l Responses n~zdReeunsiderations. Af bany :
Seate University of New Vc>rkPress, X 99 I .
. CGod, Po1i57eq annd Evil: 14 12rocgss ?%ea&cjf. Philadelphia: bVcsrminstcr
Press, 1976.
Hare, Peter, "Review of David Xby Griffin, a d , P P P E ;l~zd ~ E~il." P$eocess
S~z.~dz'gs'S' ( 1977):44-5 1.
Hartshorile, C:harles. "A S,e\-\lr Look at the Problct-rit of Evil," "I ci,'~rr*g~zt
Philosophical Issgfes: Essgjrs Hoptor of'C@.t.gJohn Ducasse, edited by F. C.
l3ommcyer. Sprtrlgficld, f 11.: Charles C . 'l'homas, 1966, pp. 20 1-212.
Hasker, Wiuiam. ""Sffering, Soul-hlaking, and Sal~fation,"h z t e r ~ z a t i o ~ a l
Phikos~~phical Q@arge;.l;~28 ( X 988): 3-1 9.
Hick, ]ofin, Eviln;yrd the God @love. 2nd cd. New York: EIarper 8r lXowJ 1978.
. ""God, E\i1 and Mystery*"Rel&io~s,5'tzdies 3 ( 1668):5 39-546.
. "The Problem of Evil in the First and I,ast 2"hings." fig$r.utnl c~'"Ir3e-
olr~z'calS t u d z ' ~19 ( f. 968): 591-602.
Ibne, G. Stanley, "The Concept of ITiville Goodness a~itdthe Problem of
Evil ." Rek&z"uus '$tz&digsf l ( (1975): 49-72 .
. "Evil and Privation." hter~zalti;onnlJournt%l jbr Pi3ilosophy c?f" Reli-
~ i o r lt X (1980): 43-58.
. ""TIC Failcrre of Soul-Making 'rfieodicy.'Y~rzt.errraziournl Jotb~erratjbr
PhiIttsophy of'R~I&io~z 6 6 1975): l -22.
. ""So-ttl-Maliing 'Theadicy and Escttatology," %Suphi& (Az&s$rglza)X 4
(July 1975): 24-31.
I,e.c\liis, C . S , The P~pobLc;lazc?f'Pgin. New York: h%aclltillan,1962.
Maddexl, Ed\\~arcS,and Petcr Hare, E ~ i arid l $he Concgpt: ofC;ud, Springfield,
111.: Charles 6, l'lzoxnas, 1968.
h%aritair~, Jacques, Ct'od a ~ $he d Perfimissicjn oJ-'E~?il.Milwaukee: Brrrce Pub-
lishixlg, X 966,
13cterson, ~Vichael.""God and Evil in 13rocess Thcologr." h~n12rocess Y79ealo&jt7
edited by Rondd Nash. Grand Rapids, h%icl--t,: Baker Book Hosxse, 1987,
pp. X X 7-1 39.
. "lXcce~-EtbVork 017. the Probleln of Evil." A ~ ~ e j e i c a12bilosaphz'cal
n
Qzfartt:r1",y20 (1683): 321-339.
Petersoil, hiiichael, ed. Y'hg P~oblemof &P$/:Salcczgd R c g d i ~ g s .Notre Dame,
Ind. : Ux~ivcrsiyof Norrc Dame f3ress, 1992,
Peterson, Michaei, Williant Hasker, Bruee Reichenbacb, and David Basinger.
Rcgsort alzd Relgious Reli$ An In ~~poduction t o the Philosophjf of Rcli&z"on,
2nd ed, New York: Oxford Universi~Prcss, 1998, chap. 6, pp. 1X6-145.
Reiche~~bach, Bruce, E ~ i n~zd
l n Ct'ood God. New York: Fordbnt-rt University
Press, 1982.
. ""Natural Evils and Natural Law: A 'rheodicy ;for Natural Evils." h-
;t-ernt%$infzt%l Philosophical Qsfartt:r1",~l 6 ( 1676): l 76-1 66.
Swinburnc, &chard. "Does ?'X~cismNeed a 'Theodicy?'T~nnadz"g;~z Joztmal
of12bilosophy t 8 (1988): 287-31 X.
. "Kno\vledge from Experience, and the Problem of Evil." In 7be R n -
tzl"oaali2-yoj' Rt:r!&kozits Belig; Essajfs i.1.2 Hornor of Basil Migchell, edited by
bVilliam Abrafialn and Stcve1-1Holtzcr. Oxford: Czlarendon Press, 1987,
pp, 141-167.
-P . ""Natriral Evil." A~merz'cgnPljilosophickal Qggnrterly X5 (1978):
295-301.
. "The Problei~t-ritofEvil." In The &ZZstgnce crlf'C;od. Oxford: Clare~~don
Press, 1979, pp. 200-224.
. "A l'lzeodicy of I-Ieavcmi and Heill." h~n Y72e E~is$g;elzceand Nat:z$re of
C$od, edited by &fi-ed Freddoso. Natre Dame, Ind.: Notre Da~~t-rite U-~liver-
sity Press, 1983, pp. 37-54.
bVhitncy, Barry L. Evil and the Izrocess Chd. Ncw York: MelXc1-113rcss, 1985.
This page intentionally left blank
The Existentia Problem o f Evil
The question is imt whether my life is all that it ougl-rt t o be o r all that it
cor~ccivablycoufd be. It is not whetfier tile pleasure-pain batajlce in my
life ta date has bccx-1, on the whole, ;fa~.orableor unhvorabls. Ir is not
wl-rether my life is, in general, a benefit t o tl~osewho are affected by it,
It is not- even the questiorl whether my fife, all tilings considered, ctzri-
tains more good than evil. Ai of these q~~estions arc deeply interesting,
and the allsMiers to them, if knoliin, n~igl-rtaffect my arlsMier t o the qlxes-
tion which I am asking. But the questiorl is simplj~,am I glad that I am
alivc? Or is my existence, on thc whole, sainerbing which X regret? Is
~ g I affirmit,or do I wish, like Job, that I had
my life s o n ~ e t h i ~which
rlcvcr been?
This securcs the connection bernc.cn one" attitude toward one's ex-
isteilce and the j4rc1rld" trotal history.
The meeting and mating of our ancestors was influenced by the
events of their rir~es-many of j4rhich were undoubtedk calamitous,
such as wars, epidemics, crimes, accidents, and so forth. And we al-
ready know that no person has any reason whatever to suppose that
he would have existed had the course of the world's history been sub-
stantially diffcrcnt. WC arc now in a position to grasp thc link be-
wecn one's individual existence and thc existence of all the evils of
the world leading up to his coming-into-isei13g.ASRobcrl: Mams ob-
serves, "The farther back we go into history, the larger the propor-
tion of evils to which we owe our being; for the causal nexus relc~rant
to our individual genesis widms as we go back in time. We almost
certainly ~vouldneFrer have existed had there not been just about the
same evils as actually occurred in a large part of human history."21 Let
us now explore the bearing of this link on the original question, A m I
I ~~isli?
&Ifid t h a ~
Of course, a person may fcel both gladncss and sorrow about soille-
thing. This is what we mean j4rhen we sap that an eIrent in life is "bit-
tersweet" (e.g., a parent j4rhose child is grttillg married may be de-
scribed as "being sad" that a family lnember is leaving home but
"being glad" that she is finding committed companionship). Rut "be-
ing glad" in the relevant sense here involves an attitude of preference
to which principle (52) applies.
Let us now specifp some key definitions that will enable us to scc
the significance of some other important principles. Haskcr first sug-
gests this:
t z " X>'=
'A i s ~ z " ~ . ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ $ a ~that ~ I 'A
a I & cif a t 1zs glad rbat 13, and there i s
some state-of-affairs Qsuch that .A k~le>wsthat if Qdid 1l0t obtain nei-
ther wc~ufdP, and A regrets that Q.'
One mah for example, be circumstantially glad that the University of
Kentucky defeated the University of Utah to win the 1998 NCAA
basketball challlpionship but not prefer Kentucky's victory gnder all
possible ~igficztnzstnnces(i.e., on the whole). For example, one may have
placed a largc bet on Utah or bclic\rc that the N C M ? existencc is a
bad thing because its championships, telc~risioncontracts, and the like
foster corruption and an ulldue emphasis on athletics in our societ)'.
So, @iven the civc~mstalzces,one may be glad for Kentucky's ~rictory.
Rut this does not mean that one is glad on the ~vhole.We are now
ready for the second definition we need:
"A i s 8 I a B on the r??hokr:that I"'= df "A is glad that P, atld fbr any state-of-
affairs Qsuctl rbar A k~lowsrbar if &did not obtain neltlicr would P, A
is glad t l ~ a Q."
t
Modi@ing our example, we map say that one may be glad on the
whole whm, recognizillg that the NCAA involves some ulldrsirable
consequences, he still definitely prefers Kentucky's cha~npionshipvic-
tory. Finally, we may say that a person ve&lpe~son the ivholc that P
~vheneverhe is clearly nut glad on the ~vholethat P or is only circum-
stantially glad that P.
In light of these definitions, we can now see the significance of the
follo\ning principle:
These principles seem quite clearly correct. But when principle (54) is
combined with ( 5l ) from the previous section regarding self-identity,
\VC get an astotmding conclusion:
Of course, this conclusion does not follow dedtlctively from (54) and
( 5 1) as they have been stated. Principle (54) speaks of my klzo~vllzn
that if Qdid not obtain neither would I< whereas (51) saps only that
in all pffiobgbili~there is such a connection. This should makc little
difference in our attitude toward (55).32 Perhaps, then, the rcason
why (55) has been largely ignorcd is the fact that (50) and (51) arc
not obvious. The ideas expressed in (54) and (55) have been dis-
cussed in philosophical literature. Benedict de Spinoza, for example,
saps that our ordinar!. judglnellts of good and evil are irratioilal pre-
cisely because in lnaking them, we overlook the necessary connec-
tions bet~reenevents.2"
"Let the day perish in wl-ricb I was born, alld the night that said, 'A
mall-child is cotlceived."
"Let that &ay be darkt~ess!May Gad abovc not seek it, or light sfiine
on it.
"Let gloom and deep darkness claim it. Let clorrds settle upoxl it; let-
the blackl~cssof the day tern@ it.
"That light-let thick darkness seize it! tct it not rejoice among the
days ofthe year; let it not come into tile number of the moxlths.
"Yes, 1st that night be barrel-t; let no jo~rfix)cry be heard in it.
"Let those curse it who curse the Sea, those who are skilled to rouse
up I~viathan.
"Let the stars of its dawn be dark; let it hope ;for light, b ~ have
~ t none;
may it not see the eyelids of the morning-
""because it did not shut the doors of my mczther? s%romb,and hide
trouble fi-on1my eyes.
"Why did I not die at birth, come forth from the wo111b and expire,"
"liVhy were there knees to receive me, or breasts far me to suck?
""Now I wo~tIdbc Xying dawn and quiet; I wo~tldbe asleep; then I
w ~ t ~ be
l dat rest
"with ki~lgsand counsclors of the earth \%rhorebuild ruins f i r them-
selves,
""or with princes whc) have gold, who fit1 their houses with silver.
"Or why was I not: br~riediikc a stillborn child, like an ir1h:;lxlt:that
never sees the Iight?"25
This is the deep existential regret char is recluired for one meaning-
firlly to raise the argument from gratuitous evil. To be able to assert
the factual prelnise that there is gratuitous evil, the critic must posi-
tively regret on the %.hole that he, his famill: his friends, all his loved
otles, and all the rest of us have ever lived.
Perhaps lvan Karamazov is the paradigmatic figure here. Ivan re-
sists his brother" declaration that all events I11 the world contribute to
a dkinck designed ""frtigher harmony" that will bc rcvealed at the end
of time:
You see, Alyosl-ra, perhaps it really may happen that if X jive to that mo-
ment, or rise agaix~to see it, I, too, perhaps may cry aloud with the rest,
looliing at the mother en~bracirlgthe child's torturer, "Thou art just, 0
Lord!" "but I don" r7ant to cry aloud then. W~ilcsthere is still time, X
hasten to protect rnyself and so I renounce the higher harmor-zy alto-
getl~er.It's slot worth the tears of that one tortured child who beat itself
on the breast ~virtti t s little fist and prajxed in its stinkixlg outhouse, 1vit1-r
its unexpiated tears t o ""dear, kind God"! It's s a t worth it, because
those tears are unatoned for.26
Summarizing his existential posture, Ivan declares, "In the final re-
sult, I don't accept this world of God's, and, although I kno~vit ex-
ists, I don't accept it at all."27
Here we have a person who is willing to say that the existellce and
history of the world has not been worth it. For Ivan, man!. of the
world's evils are gratuitous because whatever purpose they serve is
not worth thc price, A rebellious existcntiali hero, Ivan clearly seems
ready to embracc the implication that he must be willing for his own
existence to be replaced by nonexistence.. W ~ a Ivan t does, then, is to
answer the penetrating question with which we have been working-
Am Iglnd that I mist?-and to ansNrer it negatiirely. This ansNrer al-
lows him to be existentially honest or authentic in rejectillg the evils
of the world.28 It is these kinds of persons-the Ivan Karamazovs of
this world-jvho are unaffected by the theistic response to the prob-
lem of evil that has been sketched here. Ivan is the person who can
honestly say that he regrets his own existence and the cxistcncc of all
whom he loves, since too great a price in terms of illiser): and suffer-
ing has been paid for thcir existencc.z"
In fact, for such a person, framillg his objectioll in terlns of the gen-
eral problem of gratuitous evil is somekvhat unnecessary because he
can consider the evils occurrillg in his o\vn life as the only factual in-
stance of gratuity he needs to cite. On that basis alone, he might ob-
ject that the God of theism does not exist. Or he might cite as a case
in point any single life that does not seem to be good on the whole,
not a great good to the person living it. A12 implicit assumption here
would be that a morally good deity would not allow even one individ-
ual to have a life that is not a great good to hirn on the whole, re-
gardless of what broad reasons there are for thinking that our ~vorldis
good on balance. This line of thought, of course, pursues the attack
in an Ivan-like direction. h d it ccrtaillly makes the attel-npt to apply
general explanations for evils to individual cascs impertinent, at least,
and damaging, at most.30
by evil. The difficulty that the Christian theist faces here is not only
that do we not know God's nctzlnl reason for permittillg horrelldous
evils but also that we cannot even conceive of any plausible reasons.32
Employing what she calls the "resources of religious value theory,"
Adams develops an argument that horrendous evils can be defeated in
the context of the lives of individuals who expericncc them. Let us
simply say that evil is "defeated" \vhen it is part of a life that is good
on the wholc, when it is related appropriatdy to relevant and great
goods. Adams agrees with rebels like Ivan Karamazov and John Stu-
art Mill in insisti~lgthat there is no set of temporal and firlite goods
that can guarantee that a person kvhose life includes horrendous evils
will be a great good to him or her on the whole.
According to Adams, i t is the intimate relationship with God that
has value incommensurable with anything else:
Thc ccntraf logic at work here is that the cwrst evils dernand to be dt-
feated bp the best goods.34 Christian theists such as Marilpn Adams
argue, then, that horrendous evils can be overcolne only by the infi-
nite goodness of God.
Adams claims that it is not ilecessary to firxi reasorls (eiien merely
logically possible reasons) ivhy God lnight permit horrendous evils.
Thus, theoretical theodicy is not essential. It is enough for the Chris-
tian theist to show bus, God can be good ellough to created persons
despite their participation in such horrors. For Christiall theists to
show this, according to Adalns, they must work out the implications
of divine goodlless conceived not just as aiming at the excellent pro-
duction of global goods but also as not allowing any individtlal life to
s~lstainevils that would ultimately engulf it. Her conclusion, then, is
that, for a person who experiences horrendous evil, God can ensure
that his life is a great good to him only by integrating participation in
those evils into a perso~lalrelationship with God himself. This is, in
effect, to offer a practical or existential theodicy.
How shall we think about what it means for God to integrate hor-
rendous evil into a relationship with himselfi Adams argues that
God's loving identification with the sufferer, vividly displayed in his
own self-sacrifice in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, is a helpful
Christian rl~odelin this contcxt."Vhe asserts that Christian theism
tcachcs that God through Christ participated in horrendous evil, ex-
periencing hulxan horrors. Thus, the sufferer can idcntie (either
sympathetically or mystically) with Christ and thereby have access to
the illner life of God. According to Adams, this experience of God
preelnpts the need to kno\\r why horrendous evils erist.36 At the end
of his long ordeal with anguish and loss, the biblical character Job was
not privileged to know the reasons why he suffered so terribly. But he
was given an intimate brision of God that seemed to satisfv hiin and let
him sec that his life was indecd a great good. Job answcrcd the h r d :
"I know that you can d o all things, and that no purposc of yours can
be thwarted. I have uttcrcd what I did not udcrstand, things too
wonderful for me, which I did not know. I had heard of you by the
hearillg of the ear, but 11ow my eye sees pou."37
In the final analysis, the issue comes down to whether Adams's case
is acceptable to the one to whom it is addressed. Adams can maintain
that her own distinctively Christian approach is internally consistent,
although the Christian theist and the critic will predictably differ on
the truth and plausibility of its claims. Thc antitheistic critic, bp con-
trast, could agrcc that God, if he exists, is a good incom~xensurable
with all other goods. But he might object chat some means by which
people can be collilected to God (e.g., horrendous suffering) are so
iiltrinsically awful that they still violate other moral principles we
hold. The critic inight also complain that Adalns has shifted ground
in answering the theoretical problem by giving a practical solution.
The critic might even press the point that i t is extremely difficult to
understand what it is for one person to experience another's pain or
for suffering to be an avellue of interpersoilal identificatioil and thus
that the acceptability of Adarns's answer hangs, in part, on fuller
analysis of such concepts. Adams and other Christian theists may
eventually offer complete accounts of these concepts so that this
strand of cxistcntial theodicy may adi~ancc.It is hard to sap exactly
wherc thc kxturc discussion of thc cxistcntial problem of evil will icad,
but it is surc to be both fascinating and important.
Notes
it. Kennetb Surin dlsrtngtlishes theoretical &am practical problems of cvil
y the Pr~bLep#%
in his ? h c o l ~ ~and oc?f'E~~ik
(Clxford: Black~vetl,1986), p, l 12,
Robert ,4dams calls it a psycltdogical problem in his "Irge Virgge of'Fgic'gJ3 alzd
Other Essays in lZhz"los~phical 2 heolo~y(New Yorlcr: Oxford Ux-rivcrsit>rPress,
l987), p. 75. Williaix Hasker alludes to the problenl beiilg a form of moral
protest in ""011 Regretting the Evils of this World," "~ultghernJuz#~~i.tnl ofphi-
losophy 19 (19811: 425.
2. M v i n Plantinga, ($04 fi-eedom, and E ~ i (Gmndl hpids, Micb.: Eerd-
mans, 1977), p. 63,
3. Marily1.r Adams, "lXedcmprive Suffering: A Christian Solution to the
Problem of Evil," in The Pffioble~n ofE11i1: iS"eIee$cdR s g d i ~ z ed,
~ s ~Michael I,. Pe-
terser1 (Notre Dame, Xnd, : Universi~of Notre IDarnc Press, 19921, p. 171 .
4, Ed-vzrard Madden and Peter Hare, Evil and t.hConcept of' God (Syring-
Geld, Ilt.: Charles C. Ihomas, 1968),p. 25.
5. Jeffrey Burt-on Itussell, "The Experiex~ceof Evil," Lz's2:g1~ifv 9 ( X 974): 72,
6. X%ut lGco~xer, is;ymbolisfnof'Epz'l, rrans. Exnersor-1Buchallan (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1967));see, for instance, pp. 3-5.
7 . John Bol%rli;er,Pffi~higitpzs
c ~ ~ S ~ in. ~ Z ' Pof ~the~ W ( I P I( ~
J ~R~l&z'ons Lotldox~:
Carnbrldge Universiq 13rrcss, 1970), p. 2.
8. A contenlporary classic, written for the layperson, that expresses grief
and bitterness in a strrrggle to mair~tair~ refigio-its faith i s C. S. I R ~ v ~ s ' s ,A
G r i q Observed (?clew York: Macinillan, 19611. Ar~athcrbook in the same
spirit is Nicholas Wc~lterstorff,Lt%f$$e~$t fbf* a Son (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmax~s,1987).
9. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Y79e NrotI~ef~s IC~ra~@.znzov, trans. Constance Garnert
(Xew York: Norton, 1976),pnrticrrlarty pp. 217-227.
X Q. ,4lmczse all of AI bert Camus" writings can be seen as dealing with the
problem of gratuitous evil and the senseless destruction of things of value.
But see particufarly his "The Mytl-r of Slsyphus,'Yin ?he Myth of-'i";<~pphgsm2d .
Og/ge~* trans, Justirl O'Br-ien (New York: AI&ed A, bopl.; 1955), pp,
Essaj~s~
1-1 38, Alst~see C:at-ritus, 7be Pla~ug,trails, Stuart Gifbert (New York: Alfred
A. h o p 6 1948).
it it. Miguel &c Unamuno, Y2e ??&&;C Sense of' Lge, trans. 1. Grawford
Flitch (New York: Dover, 1954;).
12, From John Stuart Mill, ""The Philosophy of the Col~ditiot~ed as Ap-
plied by Mr. Manscl to the 1,imits of ktigious TI-iought," i - t A B k i z ~ ~ g i n n -
$ion@",SirWilliam H&rnil$~n'~. PhiIos~ph, repri~~ted in Nelson Pike, ed,, <$od
a d Evil: Re&diaz&.f 0% Th@oZo~z"~nl I,gpoblem~f'lz.:~il(Engle~roodCliffs,
N.J.:13rcnttce-EIatl,1964), p. 43.
13, Plnntinga, CI-Tod,F ~ ~ ~ en~zd ~ ~ ~pp.
d o E~ik, , 63-44,
X 4, M, Adaxns, "Redemptive Srtfferi~-tg,"p. 171. .
it 5. Edward Waiter, """L"hcLogic of Emotions," "agthcr~ Jourrrat of'l3hz'l'os-
ophy 10 (1972): 71-78,
16, Sidtley Hook, "Pragmatism and the 'l'ragic Sense of Life," Paeoc~.edi;~&s
and Adds~esswof' the A ~aze.l.zcan15,hilosophicalAssocia$ion ( October 19601,
reprinted in Robert Gorrigan, ed,, 7'3"~1.~~47: n~zdFor~rn(San Francisco:
VZ'JJ~OP;~
Clrandter, 1965), p*68.
it?. 1olil-t Hick, E ~ i and
l the God oflove, 2nd ed, (San Francisco: Harper
& Ro~li;1978), p. 82,
18. 'Thornas OAen, ""A Theodicy for Pastoral Practice," in his Pgsto~e~aZ
2 heol08y (Sax1 Francisco: Harper & i$ro\\rl, 1983), pp. 223-248.
19. Hasker, "Regretting," pp, 4 2 5 4 2 6 .
20, Ibid., p. 427. Here X have renrtmbered Hasker? prix~ciptesfor the sake
of continui~rin the context of this book. ALI rc~naintngprinciplss cited here
rritay be k ~ u n din the context of Hasker" articles and will. lot carry hrtber
referel-tces.
21. llobert M, Adams, ""Eistcnce, Self-Interest, and the XZrablem of
Evil," kin his VZ'rt~e of"Fai$b,p, 66,
22. Hasker, "Regretting," p. 4431. Hasker writes: "Note first of all that,
ghcn the truth of (A), it is cert-&;B,and not just probable, that scrbsequel-tt to
any major c&anlit.fr,such as a war, maily of the persolls whc) come into exis-
tence are differexlt ir~di\iidttalsfrom those \%rhowczufd have existed had the
calamiq not occurrcd, Many persons who wo~tldotherlvisc have become
parents die without l-rairing children, Those who would have been their
mates have cltildren wit11 other partners, and so on. FVithi1.1a few genera-
tions, it is likely that hardly anyone Iivil~gin the affected area is idel-ttical with
any indijlidual who would have existed, had the calamity not occurred, What
is mczre difficrtft is to show that this is true in the case of a given individual.
But even in the indlvld~ralcase, the probabilities mount up very rapidly. Sup-
pose, for exat-ritpic, tl-rat had the First World War not occt-rrred tl-tere is one
cf~ax~ce in ten that my parents ~ ~ o - i thave
l d met each other. (X am sure that
this is too high. But at this point I can afford to be conservative.) Stlppose,
ft~rther~ltore, that on just ~ L V Oprevio~~soccasic~i~sthe meetitrg and mating of
some of my earlier ancestors has been influenced in similar walrs by ealami-
totts evellts of their own times. Then neglecti~igall other factors (all of
which, if considered, would further strel-tgthen my argtlmel-tt),the likelihood
of my existing, if just these three major calamities had not occsrrred, is 110
better than oxie in a thousaxid! The truth is, that I have no reasoil h hat ever
to suppose that I would have existed, had the coktrsc ofthe world" history
been ssrbstarrtially different,. But what I have 110reason to suppose true mlxst
for practical purposes be disregarded. So (55) must be acceptedm7'
23. Benedict: cie Spinoza, EtIfiq ed. Hcnry Frowde, trans. W. EIale White.
Revised by Amelia Hutchinson Stirtiilg ( k ~ n d o nClxfc~rd : University Press,
X 910), pp* 80-8 l .
24. R, Adams, ""Existence," p. 75.
25. Job 33-7 New Revised Standard Version,
2.6. Ivaxi K~ramazo\rin IDostoevsky, 2 ge B~*o$hew ICgf*&mazu~, p. 22 5,
27. Ibid., p. 216.
28. We nclte here b~xtcannclt pursue tl-re jirell-knokvn ease of Leo -rolstoy
\?rho came to the conclusiol~that lik had ~ i r meax-xirzg s and was ~ i owrtel-1
t living
and thus cajne to the brink of suicide. If the critic raising the problem of gratu-
itous evil is jirilling to say that he regrets his ow11 existence, tltat his own exis-
tence is not a positive good to him ox3 the ~ ~ h o tthen e , the theist might ask why
he does not colnrnit suicide. What we might call tlie suicide argumel-tt seerns
especidly strong for the one jirho is iviltitlg t c ~say he regets Iris existence. See
Leo 'Tolstoy, Mjj CJII~gkssiu~gs, trans. Leo FViener ( I ~ n d o nJ,: M. Dent, X 905).
29, Although wc canllot explore the inatrer here, the reality of suffering
and the search for the proper response to the aivareness of s~rfferinglies at
the heart of Ruddl-xism,Xirvana (no~~existence) is recommex~ded.See John
Bowkcr, l Z ~ o b b ~of'$ sStgjFcri~~ in: Rclg&iol.zsof $he Wo~eld(Cambridge: Garn-
bridge University Press, 19";""0), pp. 237-258.
30. The tendency of certain theodicaf ans\%rcrsto do damage to persoxis is
discussed in .rerrencc W. Tilfey, Y79e Evils of Ifheodicjt (kVashir-xgton, D.C.:
Georgetolirn University Press, l99 L1 ).
3X . I-\laxikramazo~rin Dostoe\~sb,Kbe Rr~~thers ICar~~azov, pp. 22+226,
32. M. Adams, "Horrel-tdous Evils and the Goodness of God," Praceed-
b ~ i l of'tha
p A ri$otgZI;apz ,"incz'e[?t3 supplcmentar y vol. 63 ( 1989): 297-3 10, The
presel2r quote is from the reprix-xted piece in Rt~bertMerrihew Adarns arid
Marilyn McCord Adams, eds., 77% l Z ~ o b l eofE~il ~$ (New York: Oxford Uni-
rrersity Press, 1990), p. 2 1E;,
33, M. *ALdams, "Horrelld~~ts Evils," p, 2.18. The reader should coxis~rlt
the coinpletc article for techxiical distinctians between bgknnciqg ofx de,l(bgt-
b ~ i l 8and
~ F P ~ B Z I . &evil,
~J~
34. Tofstoy (mentioxied in Note 28) came to accept this kind of logic: that
only the inf illre call give meaning ta the f i-xite. 'l'hus, he averted suicide and
claii-xited to find i-xitearringin his life,
35. M, Adams, "Redemptive Stiffering," pp, 169-187.
36. M, Adarns, "Horrendo~rsEvils," p. 222.
57. Job 42-2, Sb, 5 Ncw IXevised Standard Version.
Suggested Readings
Adarrits, Marilyn h%."Horrendo~isEvils a i d the Goodness of God," The
A f8i@otelz'~lz 63 ( X 989): 297-3 l 0,
Society: S g p p l 8 r n e ~ t . tVoluf%.sz~
. ""Problcxns of Evil: More Advice to Christim XzhiXosotttbers," Faith
and Phiilosapby S (1988):f 21-143,
. "Redemptive Suffering: A Christian Solutiotl to the Problem of
Evil ." In l<atit:ol.zali~~~,Rer!z"giazl?sBelig; n ~ MOT&/ d C~mn'~itmen& edited by
Robert Audi and William J, Wainwright. Itbnca: C:ori~elt University Press,
1986, pp. 248-267.
Adams, Itobert M. ""Existcncc, Self-Interest, and the ProbXcm of Evil." l o g s
13 (1979): 53-65.
Dupri, L,ouis, ""E\rit--A Xi,cligious Mystery." Faith alzd Philosophy 7 (1990):
261-280.
Hasker, Willram, "On Regretting the Evils of This Wczrld." Soutbe~fi~z Jozitr~~zal
ofPhilusc1ph3t X 5) ( X 98 X ): 42 5 - 4 37.
Hauer was, Stanlcy. gi.ame"~& the Sibg$ces: God, lWgdicivre, n ~ the d l Z r o b b ~ o*f'
S$tfliP.Z~z~. Grnild bpids, Mich,: Eerdmarrs, L 990.
. S ~ j J h r i Presence:
~z~ r"Jigeolo&z'cnlReflections 0l.t Medz'cifzc, the LWg~ggl[$j
Hapzlilricapped, nvrd the CIs~.~rcIil. Notre Dame, Ind,: University of Notre
Dat-rite Press, 1985,
KohAXr, Erazim, "The Persoxl in a Persoxlal iVorfd: Axl lrlquiry into the Meta-
physical Slgi~ificanceof the Tragic Setlsc of Life," hdepe~dentloacrrrnlof
Philosophy 1 ( 1877): E;1-64.
I ~ w i s6,
, S. PaFoktliemofPgz'n, New Vc>rk:Macmittan, X 962.
Xzcterson, Michael. "Recent Work 01-1the Problem of Evil." A merkcan 12biln-
sopjjical Qgdnr$~-e~.& 20 (1983): 321-339,
Petersoil, hifichael, ed. ""JiiePi..oblcrfm of &P$/: Salccted Rcgdi~gs.Notre Dame,
Ind. : Ux~ivcrsi~ of Narrc Dame Press, 1992,
Index