not without serious misgivings that I venture

at this late hour of

workers and



to place before my felloware interested in the growth

of philosophical thought throughout the world, some of the notes on the Six Systems of Indian Philo-

sophy which have accumulated




as early as 1852 that I many years. published my first contributions to the study of


Indian philosophy in the Zeitsckrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. My other occupahowever, and, more particularly, my preparations for a complete edition of the Rig- Veda, and

voluminous commentary, did not allow me at that time to continue these contributions, though my interest in Indian philosophy, as a most important part of the literature of India and of


Universal Philosophy, has always This interest was kindled

remained the



to finish for the Sacred

Books of the East

(vols. I

and XV)



my translation of the Upanishads. sources of Indian philosophy, and

especially of the Vedanta-philosophy, a system in which human speculation seems to me to have


of the other systems of Indian philosophy also have from time to time

very acme.



roused the curiosity of scholars and philosophers in Europe and America, and in India itself a revival of philosophic and theosophic studies, though not
leads to a

always well directed, has taken place, which, if it more active co-operation between Euro-

pean and Indian thinkers, rnture of most important

be productive in the results. Under these cir-


cumstances a general desire has arisen, and has repeatedly been expressed, for the publication of
a more general and comprehensive account of the six systems in which the philosophical thought of

India has found

its full


More recentlv the excellent publications of Professors Deussen and Garbe in Germany, and of Dr. G. Thibaut in India, have given a new impulse to
these important studies, important not only in the eyes of Sanskrit scholars by profession, but of all

who wish to become acquainted with all the solutions which the most highly gifted races of mankind have These proposed for the eternal riddles of the world. studies, to quote the words of a high authority, have indeed ceased to be the hobby of a few individuals, and have become a subject of interest to the whole nation Professor Deussen's work on

the Vedanta-philosophy (1883) an( l nis translation of the Vedanta-Sutras (1887), Professor Garbe's

Samkhya-Sutras (1889) followed work on the by Su^khya-philosophy (1894), and, last not least,, Dr. G. Thibaut's careful and

translation of the

most useful translation

of the Vedanta-Sutras in


of the East (1890

and XXXVIII of the Sacred Books and 1896), mark a new era in the


of the Viceroy of India, see Times, Nov.




study of the two most important philosophical systems of ancient India, and have deservedly placed the names of their authors in the front rank
of Sanskrit scholars in Europe. object in publishing the results of


my own

studies in Indian philosophy was not so much to restate the mere tenets of each system, so deliberately and so clearly put forward by the reputed authors
of the

a more

principal philosophies of India, as to give comprehensive account of the philosophical

activity of the Indian nation from the earliest times, and to show how intimately not only their religion,

but their philosophy


was connected with the


of the

a point

of view which has of late been


maintained by Professor Knight of University *.



was only

a country like India, with all advantages and disadvantages, that

such a rich development of philosophical thought as 'we can watch in the six systems of philosophy,

have taken


In ancient India there

could hardly have been a very severe struggle for

were abundantly provided by nature, and people with few tastes could live there like the birds in a forest, and soar like birds towards the fresh air of heaven and the eternal sources of light and truth. What was there to do


necessaries of


who, in order to escape from the heat of the tropical sun, had taken their abode in the shade of groves or in the caves of mountainous valleys except
for those

to meditate

on the world
See 'Mind,'


which they found them-

vol. v. no. 17.



placed, they did not know how or why ? There was hardly any political life in ancient India, such as we know it from the Vedas, and in consequence neither political strife nor municipal ambiNeither art nor science existed as yet, to tion.
call forth


the energies of this highly gifted race. we, overwhelmed with newspapers, with

parliamentary reports, with daily discoveries and discussions, with new novels and time-killing social

have hardly any leisure left to dwell on metaphysical and religious problems, these problems formed almost the only subject on which the old
inhabitants of India could spend their intellectual Life in a forest was no impossibility in energies.

the Avarm climate of India, and in the absence of

the most ordinary means of communication, what was there to do for the members of the small
settlements dotted over the country, but to give expression to that wonder at the world which is

the beginning of all philosophy ? Literary ambition could hardly exist during a period when even tli^
art of writing was not yet known, and when there was no literature except what could be spread and handed down by memory, developed to an extra-

ordinary and almost incredible extent under a careBut at a time when fully elaborated discipline.
people could not yet think of public applause or private gain, they thought till the more of truth

and hence the perfectly independent and honest character of most of their philosophy.

my wish to bring the results Indian philosophy nearer to us. and, if possible, to rouse our sympathies for their honest efforts to throw some rays of li<rht on
of this

It has long been



the dark problems of existence, whether of the objective world at large, or of the subjective spirits,

whose knowledge of the world

constitutes, after


the only proof of the existence of an objective world. The mere tenets of each of the six systems of Indian philosophy are by this time well known, or easily


accessible, I should say,

than even

those of the leading philosophers of Greece or of modern Europe. Every one of the opinions at

which the originators of the

six principal schools of

Indian philosophy arrived, has been handed down to us in the form of short aphorisms or Sutras, so as to leave but little room for uncertainty as to
the exact position which each of these philosophers occupied on the great battlefield of thought.


know what an enormous amount

of labour had

to be spent and is still being spent in order to ascertain the exact views of Plato and Aristotle,

nay, even of

Kant and Hegel, on some

of the most

important questions of their systems of philosophy. There are even living philosophers whose words
often leave us in doubt as to what they mean, whether they are materialists or idealists, monists
or dualists, theists or atheists.

Hindu philosophers

seldom leave us in doubt on such important points, and they certainly never shrink from the consequences of their theories. They never equivocate or try to hide their opinions where they are Kapila, for instance, the likely to be unpopular.

author or hero eponymus of the Samkhya-philosophy, confesses openly that his system is atheistic, ani.svara, without an active Lord or God, but in spite of
that, his

system was treated as legitimate by his conit

temporaries, because

was reasoned out


Mere names have acquired with us such a power that the authors of systems in which there is clearly no room for an active God. and the upholder of Brahman. to find in the some place for an Isvara or a personal God. shrink from calling themselves nay. original matter. a philosophical point of view. even though they have no eyes as yet to see what is hidden behind the idols. and admitted. This leads to philosophical ambiguity. What I admire in Indian philosophers that . and what was the true is meaning of them. nor in any reality the lookers-on themselves. power.svara. What is most curious is that a philosopher. but From yet endowed with wisdom. useful. free from all the if trammels of human activity and personality. no objective world. and will. as he thought. the most decided monist. the Yoga. and hence the Sa?/zkhya-philosophy declares itself fearlessly as an-i. them there would be no evolution of Praknti. the Purushas or spirits. in order to escape the damaging charge of atheism. is Deity. leaving it to another philosophy. try even by any means to foist an active God into their philosophies.X PREFACE. no theory of evolution? whether ancient or modern (in Sanskrit Parmama). and has often delayed recognition of a Godhead. nevertheless atheists. can provide any room for a creator or governor of the world. required some transcendent and Without invisible power. as a neuter. the so-called Purushas. symbols of the as the cause of all things. Lord-less. such as *Sa/kara. the not dishonesty. for the ignorant. nay. despite of all their hideousness. old Sa?/ikhya system reported to have been a worshipper of idols and to have seen in them.

even to the verge of nihilism. for instance. which is for truth is to account for the whole of the phenomenal world. is a fearless idealist. and an unseen Prakriti (objective substance). Kapila never refers to Him in his Sutras. They are bona Jide idealists or materialists. as a personal creator and ruler of the world. is concerned. that he cannot establish His existence by the In ordinary channels of evidential knowledge. however.PREFACE. denies the reality of anything but the One Brahman. and. These are sensuous perception. so far as the existence of an active God. They first examine the instruments of knowledge which man possesses. XI they never try to deceive us as to their principles and the consequences of their theories. but he is satisfied with stating. and verbal authority. as a monist. The followers of the Samkhya. as others have done. inference. and as none of these can supply us with the knowledge of a Supreme Being. The Vedantist. monists or dualists. but . and a if real. like Kant. he does not go so far as to say that he can prove the non-existence of such a Being. theists or atheists. They do not allow themselves to be driven one inch beyond their self-chosen position. on the contrary. neither of these statements can I discover. they hold that the objective world requires though not necessarily a visible or tangible substratum. If they are idealists. though likewise idealists and believers in an unseen Purusha (subject). leave us in no doubt that they are and mean to be atheists. As a careful reason er. because their reverence stronger than their reverence for anything else. they say so. a maker and ruler of the world. the Universal Spirit. they are never afraid to speak out. any trace of intellectual cowardice.

though he boldly confessed himself an atheist. or primordial matter with its infinite potentialities.). We must distinguish however. he simply treats them as 6ranyesvaras and temporal gods (Sutras and he does not allow. his aloneness. her evolution. more than a phenomenal existence. and all the rest. as postulated by other systems of philosophy or religion. produced a nihilist or Nastika. though we should always remember that with him there is nothing phenomenal. for himself his oneness. comm. his indepen- dence. such as is granted to human beings. however.Xll PREFACE. and the highest object of Kapila's temporary only. literally man. nothing confined in space and time. and thoughtless. was by no means or Karyesvaras. He recognised in every man a soul which he called Purusha. her changes and variety be accounted for. philosophy is to make Purusha turn his eyes away from Prakr/ti. such as >Siva. because without such without such endless Purushas. or a power. Supreme Isvara. and his perfect bliss. Only through the presence of this Purusha and through his temporary interest in Prakriti could her movements. simply a desire to abide within the strict limits of knowledge. spirit. Kapila. that does not in the end rest on something real and eternal. so as to stop her acting and to regain is presence of a magnet. Visrmu. the creator and ruler of the world. or subject. just as the movements of iron have to be accounted for by the All this movement. he held that Prakriti. motionless. 57. the Lord. would for ever have remained dead. even to the III. He does not argue against the possibility even of the gods of the vulgar. Whatever we may think of such views of the .

freshness. like the Vedantists. How do we know ? the first place. the Vedanta. but not argumentative. but we must remember that almost the first question which every one of the Hindu systems of philosophy tries to settle In thus giving the Noetics is. even if. It never leaves us in any doubt as to the exact opinions held by each philoWe may miss the development and the sopher. and that is the straightforwardness and freedom with which they are elaborated. Xlii world as are put forward by the Sa?7ikhya. a free chooser. that throughout. It has sometimes been said that asserts. positive This may be true to a certain extent and particularly with regard to the Vedanta-philosophy. Generally speaking. for some reason or other.PREFACE. the thinkers of the East seem to me again superior to most of the philosophers of the West. it seems to me the very perfection for the treatment of philosophy. It is in the bows before his self-chosen Veda as the seat of a revealed authority. in the etymological sense of the word. that is. he. However imperfect the style in which their theories perfect have been clothed may appear from a literary point of view. Hindu philosophy it is but does not prove. but we can always appreciate the perfect freedom. they admitted three legitimate channels by which knowledge can reach . and other systems of Indian philosophy. and downrightness with which each searcher after truth follows his track without ever looking right or left. dialectic eloquence with which Plato and Hegel propound their thoughts. nature of philosophy that every philosopher must be a heretic. there is one thing which we cannot help admiring.

particularly among Jewish. if a proper place had been assigned in limine to the question of what constitutes our legitimate or our only possible channels of knowledge. would useless controversy have been avoided. perception. The same relative authority is granted to Smrtti or tradition. telling us clearly what they take for granted. us. after giving us his reasons why reve- Veda stands higher with him than . $abda. revelation. r introduction to every system of philosophy.XIV PREFACE. and Christian philosophers. whether perception. freely chosen or freely and authority. inference. to form the S&mkhya philosophers. or the Veda. may nevertheless accept some of the utterances of the Veda as they w ould accept the opinions of eminent men or <Sishfas. and to have clearly seen this is. lation or the foundations to the highest pinnacles of their systems. but there with the proviso that it must not be in contradiction with ^Sruti or revelation. as it seems to me. of course. Mohammedan. Apta-va&ana. that authority is revelation. who profess themselves enon tirely dependent reasoning (Manana). a very How much high distinction of Indian philosophy. inference. though always with the proviso that even the Veda could never make a false opinion true. Such an examination of the authorities of human knowledge (Pramanas) ought. or anything else ! Supported by these inquiries into the evidences of truth. in others it is the word of any recognised Thus it happens that the authority. but authority In some systems rejected. Hindu philosophers have built up their various systems of philosophy. >Sruti. and then advancing step by step from the The Vedantist. or their various conceptions of the world.

it would constitute a limit to what was postulated as limitless. actually puts $ruti in the place of sensuous perception. what they called Brahman. namely. but must be accepted as the result of or Avidya. They knew that the one absolute and unde- termined essence. The conception of the world as deduced from the Veda. but can be destroyed . is indeed astounding. that it is not and cannot be real. and allows to perception and inference no more than an authority restricted to the phenomenal (Vyavaharika) world. that there should be multiplicity in the world. could have received no impulse to change. and would have made the concept of the One self-contradictory. at least for the discovery of the highest truth (Paramartha). nor from others. exists. though unreal it in the highest sense. if there was but the One. All that exists is taken as One. whatever the Second by the side of the One might be.PREFACE. It could hardly have been arrived at by a sudden intuition or inspiration. for it was perfect. for it was Second-less. undisturbed by any foreign influences. XV sensuous perception and inference. and chiefly from the Upanishads. fold Then what is the philosopher to say to this maniand ever-changing world ? There is one thing only that he can say. because if the existence of anything besides the absolute One or the Supreme Being were admitted. how it was possible. But then came the question for Indian philosophers to solve. but presupposes a long preparation of metaphysical thought. not only of individual but of ignorance as inseparable from ignorance. and that there should be constant change in our experience. That ignorance. nescience human nature. either from itself.

not to exist. a cosmos which. neither our it is not visible. by Vidya. it should be remembered. The One Real Being is there.XVI PREFACE. e. though we suffer from it for a time. knowledge. just as the moon which we see manifold and tremulous in bered that what ever changing reflections on the waving surface of the ocean. nor can it be said only. . is called forth. just as our own ordinary ignorance. one view of the world. according to the Vedanta. but a perverted picture only. that the former can be annihilated. unapproachable remote- Whatever we may think of such a view of the cosmos. Only it must be remem- we perceive can never be the absolute Brahman. as little as it is possible to define Brahman. includes ourselves quite as much as what we call the objective world. it is clear that our name of nihilism would be by no means applicable to it. it follows that this cosmic ignorance also must be looked upon as not real. another is that of the Sa?khya. is not the real moon. has its reality in Brahman alone. the Vedanta view. though deriving its its phenomenal character from the its real moon which remains unaffected in ness. however. i. but temporary It cannot be said to exist. and as nothing that can at any time be annihilated has a right to be considered as real. the latter never. the Brahman. The phenomenal world which. Self nor what in our knowledge is not our Self. with this difference. can never claim It is impossible to absolute reality and perpetuity. the knowledge conveyed by the Vedanta. define Avidya. only nor perceptible in its true character by any of the senses but without it. like the mirage in a desert. nothing that exists in our knowledge could exist. which looks upon This is .

entomologist. as put forward by the other systems of Indian philosophy. that is an explanation of the world. Of course. These two. does not call himself His Majesty. I hope that the time will come when no one will claim that name who is not acquainted at least with the two prominent systems of ancient Indian philosophy. And if hitherto no one would have called hima philosopher who had not read and studied the works of Plato and Aristotle. of Prakrtti. and treats the individual perceiver as or separation produce final bliss or absoluteness. and to include on the contrary name self every botanist. of Locke. possible so to define the meaning of philosophy as to exclude men such as even Plato and Spinoza altogether. a collector and analyser. Hume. This determining idea has secured even to the guesses of Thales and Heraclitus their permanent place among the historical representatives of the development of philosophical thought by the side of Plato and Aristotle. or bacteriologist. of Des Cartes and Spinoza. by what we call the world.PREFACE. and by their discrimination individual. however powerful. I a place of honour for the that claim philosophers representatives of the it is Vedanta and Samkhya. and Kant in the original. b . of Des It is in that Walhalla of real Cartes and Spinoza. the Vedanta and the Samkhya. constitute the real object of what was originally meant by philosophy. but its definition is. A President. XV11 our perceptions as perceptions of a substantial something. eternally these two besides admitting nothing cause which union identification their or powers. with some other less important views of the world. why should an observer. the potentiality of all things. The itself is of no consequence.

full ? however of information. if . to me less important and not calculated to appeal to European If we want our friends to love our sympathies. no one knows so well the and I can own case that few people can be so more than a description of some of the salient points of each of the six recognised systems of Indian philoIt does not claim to be complete on the sophy. for they all share so . because the chronological framework is. while I should not be surprised. . claim the name of philosopher As a rule. and in the distant Past. own purThus. from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his poses.XVlil PREFACE. with but slight modifi- and the longer I have studied the various the more have I become impressed with the systems. almost entirely absent. friends. and all the rest. as It professes to be no yet. Even thus it could not well be avoided that in giving an account of each of the six systems. truth of the view taken by Vigwana-Bhikshu and cations others that there behind the variety of the sixsystems a common fund of what may be called is national or popular philosophy. truly say in my conscious of the defects of this History of Indian It cannot be called a Philosophy as I myself. Kapila. I believe that defects of his book as the author himself. it is for having endeavoured to omit whatever seemed. a large Manasa lake of philosophical thought and language. This is what I have tried to do for my old friends. history. far away in the distant North. Badarayana. much in common. there should be much repetition. contrary. but we dwell on one or two of the strong points of their character. if I can claim any thanks. we do not give a full account of every one of their good qualities.

little as it may be. the great Commentaries of the A&aryas and the Bhagavad-gita. Sanskrit scholars were to blame XIX having left out too much. such as the Paw&adasl Some and Yoga-Vasish^Aa. a native of India. he writes. mixed with religion. but not parts. and the Vallabhas. discussed again and again in the six different schools. and numerous Pandits can be found to-day in all these sects who have learnt at least the principal works by heart and can expound them. and my best reward will be if a new interest shall spring up for a long neglected mine of philosophical thought. such as the Upanishads.PEEFACE. year performed last Of the other systems. b2 . although expensive much in other sacrifices are occasionally The Agnishfoma was performed. not the earlier ones. the Nyaya only finds devotees. whom I consulted about the various degrees of popularity enjoyed I at the present in his day by different systems of philosophy own country. at Benares. informs me that the only system that can now be its said to be living in India is the Vedanta with danta. especially in Bengal. and if my own book were soon to be superseded by a more complete and more comprehensive examination of Indian philosophy. the Ramanu^as. but the works studied are generally the later controversial treatises. A friend of mine. being branches. students of philosophy may think that there is really too much of the same subject. of the less important treatises also are studied. The Purva-Mlma msa / is still studied in Southern India. the MadhThe Vevas. the Advaitis. me for have done my best. has become a living faith. the BrahmaSutras.

Italy. Rome. enthusiasm of native students may seem to have carried them too far. What we want are texts and translaand tions. that and most degenerate even this small remnant of philosophical learning will vanish in one or two generations. In the their labour be restricted to Sanskrit texts. however. But though we may regret that the ancient method of philosophical study is dying out in India. the Liyht of Truth. do not take to these studies. have been doing most valuable service. have devoted themselves to the honorable task of making their own national philosophy better known to the world at large. after studying the history of European philosophy. and lately the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society. any information that can throw light on Nor should the chronology of Indian philosophy. even if belonging to orthodox Brahmanic families. as there is no encouragement. except in its purely practical It is feared. though it may show clear traces of Sanskrit . South of India there exists a philosophical literature which. inevitable I as it is said to be in India.XX PREFACE. and England. the Brahmavddin. we should welcome all the more a new class of native students who. is neglected and so is the Yoga. Germany. The Vaiseshika form. In some cases the France. But such journals as the Pandit. and a mixing up of philosophical with religious and theosophic propaganda. hope that my book may prove useful to them by showing them in what direction they may best assist us in our attempts to secure a place to thinkers such as Kapila and Badarayana by the side of the leading philosophers of Greece. is always dangerous. as the youths of the present day.

C. . M. How much may be done in another direction by students of Tibetan literature in furthering a study of Indian philosophy has lately been proved by the publications of Sarat Chandra and Satis Chandra Achaiya Vidyabhushana. I believe.I. In conclusion I have to thank Mr. as yet. E..' for his extreme kindness in reading a revise of my proofA man of seventy-six has neither the eyes sheets. XXi influence. M. the study of the Dravidian languages and literature. 1899. M. OXFORD. and the Das. F.A.. but young students who purposes. Gough. May i.PREFACE. author of the 'Philosophy of the Upanishads. memory which he had at twenty-six. the translator of the Vaiseshika-Sutras.E. contains also original indigenous elements of great beauty and of great importance for historical Unfortunately few scholars only have taken up. and he be allowed to appeal to younger men for such may help as he himself in his younger days has often and nor the gladly lent to his Gurus and fellow-labourers. would. A. and their friends. find their labours amply rewarded in that field. complain that there is nothing left to do in Sanskrit literature.


A^atasatru A^atasatru Buddhist Period .. . .. c.CONTENTS. ...... . ..... 43 Basis of the Vedic Gods Three Classes of Vedic Gods Other Classifications of Gods The Visve or All-gods . .. . Prasena^it and Bimbisara . . INTEODUCTOEY CHAPTEE. .. . ... . . 34 36 39 CHAPTEE TheVedas The Philosophical II. Brahma-^ala-sutta Mahabharata Buddha . . . . .. . . . from about 700 B. . . .... . . . ...... . . 14 18 19 21 21 . . .... ... . . 28 30 Greek Accounts . 46 48 49 51 ... . . .. Period antecedent to the Upanishads Intellectual Life in ancient India 6 6 9 1 1 Kshatriyas and Brahmawas . . Philosophy and Philosophers Sruti and Smnti . . .. ... Buddhist Pilgrims... . .. . . . .. THE VEDAS. .. ... .. . . . kanaka.. . . . The Evidence of the Upanishads. Hiouen-thsang King Harsha . PAGE i 3 Upanishad-period..

. .. .. . . Search for a Supreme Deity Hymn to the Unknown God .. .... .. . . . . . . . . . . . ..119 . Visvakarman Tvashfri . . . .138 .137 . 6. . Bnhaspati-Sutras Books of Reference . ..... Atman . . . . its various Meanings Br?h and Brahman. . . . . 59 60 63 64 68 72 77 . . . . . . ... . . .139 .. . .. . . .. . .143 .. CHAPTEE III. Word East and West Mind and Speech . .. . . . . Tad Nasadiya Ekam ..146 . . Pessimism . . .113 .. . Infallibility of the Veda . . . .. . .. .118 . . Dates of the Philosophical Sutras . 4. .116 . ... .. Mnemonic Literature The Brihaspati. . . 88 93 95 Pra^apati. . .. THE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 52 53 53 55 57 57 . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . Karman .Philosophy . .. 98 1 1 1 1 1 1 Literary References in the Upanishads The Six Systems of Philosophy . .146 . PAGE the Gods . . 97 Prasthana Bheda . . Hymn . . . .. Three Guwas . . . .... among . Atman. .. ..121 ... Brahman. . . . Tendencies towards Unity Henotheism Monotheism and Monism Pra^apati . . . . . Growth of Philosophical Ideas .XXIV CONTENTS..114 . . Immortality of the Soul . .. .. . .123 137 Common 1. . . . .. Brahman.. . . Brahman. . . Atman . 5.. . Sawkhya-Sutras Vedanta-Sutras .. Philosophical Ideas Metempsychosis Sawisara .. . . . . . . . . 3. . .. 2.

. Philosophy and Religion Karman Brahman . . . Pramawas Pramawas according . .189 .188 188 Pratyaksha Anumana Sabda .186 . . .236 ..187 .229 . . .195 195 . . 224 is Everything . The Sthula. .182 . . . . 239 243 255 . . 159 Translation of the Upanishads Character of the Upanishads . ... World . . . . .... ..... . . Work-part and Knowledge-part of the Veda Vidya and Avidya Subject and Object . . .. . . . . . . . .148 .. . to the Samkhya . . . . . . .. . . . ... Studying Philosophy . .. . . . . . . .. . .179 .. . Authority of the Vedas . ..190 . . . . .. . . Ways Ramanuf/a Metaphors . . Vedanta-Sutras .217 . . .224 . . . . Badarayawa Fundamental Doctrines of the Vedanta ... ..CONTENTS. .226 . . .. . . .. .. .. .. . X 53 . . . Freedom Different in this Life . of . XXV CHAPTER IV. . .. . Appeals to the Veda . .and Sukshma-sarira The Four States Eschatology .. . . . . . . . . . . 198 199 199 202 . . . ..184 . .. The Phenomenal Cause and Effect Keality of the Creation or Causation Dreaming and Waking The Higher and the Lower Knowledge Is Virtue Essential to Moksha ? The Two Brahmans .. . . . . PAGE Vedanta or Uttara-Mimamsa . . . . .. VEDANTA OR UTTARA-MIMAA/SA. .. . . 203 204 209 215 . ... . . .. . . . . The Meaning of Veda .. . .220 . .227 229 . .

. .. .. . to .. ... . . .. . . 281 Age of the Kapila-Sutras . .. . .266 270 275 . . Asvaghosha's Buddha-ftarita Buddhist Suttas . CHAPTER V. . .320 .. . . . . . .265 . . . . Has the Veda a Superhuman Origin ? . ... . . . . List of Twenty-five Tattvas .316 . PURVA-M!MAM8A. .. Ahamkara Five Tanmatras . . . Asvalayana's Gr/'hya-Sutras Did Buddha borrow from Kapila? . . . . . .. . .321 . .. SAMKHYA-PHILOSOPHY. . . 328 .. .. . Samkhya-Philosophy Later Vedanta mixed with Samkhya Relative Age of Philosophies and Sutras . 279 CHAPTER VI... Upanishads . . . . . . .. .281 . Purva-Mimamsa a system of Philosophy? . . . . . . . PAGH Purva-Mimawsa Contents of the Purva-Mimamsa 258 263 .294 . 309 . . . .XXVI CONTENTS..312 313 . 314 Bana's Harsha/oirita . .318 . Samkhya-karikas Date of Gaudapada Tattva-samasa . .. . . .. ..322 326 ... . ..... . .. . .. . . . Anteriority of Vedanta or Atheism and Orthodoxy Authority of the Veda Samkhya hostile to Priesthood . .. . ... . . . . .. The Avyakta Buddhi.311 . . . . .. .310 .. .. . .. . . .. . . . . .. The Tattva-samasa .. Supposed Atheism of Purva-Mimamsa Is the .-500 Samkhya 303 305 306 307 Parallel development of Philosophical Systems Buddhism subsequent Lalita-vistara . Pramawas of (?aimini Sutra-style . .292 . . .290 .. . .286 288 .

. 338 ..CONTENTS. . ..369 -374 37^ 379 The Sastra .. -335 -33^ . . . of the .. . . .. Sawkhya . . .. -343 -345 .. XXV11 PAGE Sixteen Vikaras .. . ... . . . .. and Aviveka Sawkhya. . . . . . .. . . ..360 . . . . . . 346 348 348 350 35 1 351 (5) . .. . . . .. . .. . 358 358 359 The True Meaning .330 330 331 ..356 356 357 35? . Vedanta Sayings Early Eelation between Vedanta and Sawkhya Traiguwya San&ara and Pratisaw&ara .. ... .. . .. . Aviveka Atman and Purusha . .-35 . . ... . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . Five Buddhindriyas Five Karmendriyas . .366 . . -33 -33 .. Nescience Weakness Atushti and Tushft Asiddhis and Siddhis Tushfts and Siddhis .. . . .. .. . . . . Anugraha-sarga Bhuta-sarga . .. . ... ... .. . .. . . . . Origin of Avidya .361 ... ... .... . . Bandha. .. Adhyatma. .. .331 .. . .. . . (28) .. Adhibhuta. . . Nature of Pain Vedanta and Samkhya Vedanta. .. .. ... . .. .-352 . . (5) Avidya. . ... .367 .. .. . . Manas Five Mahabhutas Purusha Is Purusha an Agent ? Three Guwas Is Purusha one or many ? . .. . Adhidaivata Abhibuddhis (5) Karmayonis Vayus (5) (5) Karmatmans Asakti. 334 335 .... . . ... .. . . . -355 . . . Bondage Dakshiwa-bondage. .. . ... 352 353 354 Mulikarthas ShasbJi-tantra . . Avidya. Gifts to Priests Moksha Pramawas Du/ikha . .. . ..

.. ..450 . . . . ... .. .440 440 Functions of the Mind Exercises ... Dispassion. . Retrospect Is Sawkhya Idealism ? . . . .443 . What is Isvara ?. . . ? . .432 438 The Four Books Jfitta True Object of Yoga ..... . . . . . 447 .. . . . .. .C. 404 405 407 . . .. .XXViu CONTENTS. . Second Century B. . .444 .. . . VII. . Cosmic .. but Disunion Yoga as Viveka Pata%ali.411 .. . . . . . . . . 384 Purusha and Prakriti State of Purusha. .Philosophy Misconception of the Objects of Yoga Devotion to Jsvara.. . Prakn'ti.402 . . .. Misconceptions . .. . . . . ... . . Yoga. . . . . . . . . .. .. .381 . .. . of Yoga-Sutras . ..391 ... Vairagya Meditation With or Without an Object. . .. . . Kapila's Real Argument The Theory of Karman . . Vyasa . . .. .... . . -398 -399 CHAPTER Yoga and Sawkhya Meanings of the word Yoga . . . .392 393 The Atheism of Kapila Immorality of the Samkhya 395 .418 .. . . .421 . Sawkhya Parables . . . . Chronology of Thought .454 Other Means of obtaining Samadhi ... .442 . . . 386 387 389 390 . . .429 . . . .410 . ... Development of .4^1 .. . . PAGE 380 . U'vara once more .412 415 The Yoga. . not Union.. . . Meaning of Pain when Free Purusha Prakriti an Automaton Prakr/ti's Unselfishness Gross and Subtle Body . . . . . . . . ... . Samadhi Apnu//Vitii .416 . . . .. YOGA-PHILOSOPHY.... . .

.... .. . .. 474 476 484 .. .469 . . Yogangas. . . .. Helps to Yoga Vibhutis... V. Comparison or Anumana or abda .501 . Object Six Padarthas of Vaiseshika . Vitawc?a. ... ... 509 . .496 . .491 . Tarka IX. . Gati.. . . . Vada.. . .. . Pramawa . . . . ... .. . Prayof/ana. Powers Sawyama and Siddhis . Objects of Knowledge . .492 . . . ... III.. . . XXIX PAGE Kaivalya. . . .. .. Word II. ..471 CHAPTER Eelation between VIII. . .485 . .481 489 .. . Freedom .. . ..496 ..500 500 504 504 504 505 Prameya Samsaya .... ... . VII. .. . . Nigrahasthana .456 . . ... . Hetvabhasa. . . -455 ... . Madhava's Account of Nyaya I.. .. .. Nyaya and Vaiseshika . . .. . . . Siddhanta IV. ... . .. ... . . . . . . Miracles True Yoga The Three Gunas Samskaras and Vasanas Kaivalya Is Yoga Nihilism ? .. ... Padartha.. . . .. . .471 . . ... . . VI. Dn'shfanta. . . .. . . NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA.458 . . . . ... .. ... . Nimaya X-XVI. The Avayavas. . . .. .. .493 493 496 Perception or Pratyaksha Inference or Anumana . . . . . .489 . . . or Members of a Syllogism Indian and Greek Logic VIII.. .... . .490 . . . . . . 508 509 6ralpa... Dignaga Bibliography Nyaya-Philosophy Summum Bonum Means of Salvation The Sixteen Topics or Padarthas Means of Knowledge .CONTENTS.459 462 466 468 ... . ... .

. . .. Atman Memory Knowledge not Eternal More Prameyas Life after Death Existence of Deity Cause and Effect Phala. . . . .... 539 542 543 . .516 516 518 Word .VESIIIKA PHILOSOPHY.. .. 546 549 549 552 . ... . . . Date of Sutras Dates from Tibetan Sources . . . Upamana. . . .. . .. . ... .-576 574 577 . . the . . . . . -553 -556 -557 559 ...510 513 Time Present. Prameyas. Future .. -552 553 555 . .. . .. . -565 CHAPTER IX.. ... 530 532 532 .. . .. . . . .. 515 . Past.. . Kawada .. PAGE Judgments on Indian Logic The Later Books of the Nyaya . . . ... . .. .. . . Comparison abda.... .. ... . .. .... ..... . . . Mind.. 536 . Body Manas. The Eight Pramawas Thoughts on Language Sphofa .. . . . ... . . of Ideas.. . ... .. Senses arira.. ... ... ... not of Things 560 562 Pramawas Anumana in different Philosophical Schools for Others . Rewards Emancipation Knowledge Syllogism . . 520 527 Words express the Summum Genus Words expressive of Genera or Individuals? All Words mean TO ov .544 -545 545 . Vedanta on Sphofa Yoga and Sawkhya on Sphofo Nyaya on Sphoa Vaiseshika on Sphofa Indriyas. .. . VAI... . . Objects of Knowledge .XXX CONTENTS. ..

. 583 584 586 586 Samanya "Vlsesha Sama>vaya Abhava The Six Systems ... .. ............. . Substances Qualities XXxi PAGE Actions Cause Qualities Time Space Manas Amis or Atoms ..... ... ..... . ...... .......... ......CONTENTS. Examined .....581 ....... 586 587 589 . . 578 578 579 580 582 582 ... ........


maxims of morality and worldly wisdom. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. were generally quoted as the utterances of certain persons or at least ascribed to certain names. the simplest views of the world and of the destinies of man. We have some idea of who B .INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. from the earliest times. such as the Seven Sages. Philosophy and Philosophers. and wise saws of every kind. in India we have indeed ample materials for watching the origin and growth of philosophical ideas. but of the philosophers themselves hardly anything remains to us beyond their names. even though they contained nothing very original or personal. but hardly any for studying the lives or characters of those who founded or supported the philosophical systems of that country. Not even their dates can be ascertained with any amount of certainty. In Greece. nay even popular sayings. WHILE is in most countries a history of philosophy inseparable from a history of philosophers. so as to have something like a historical background. Their work has remained and continues to live to the present day.

no philosopher owes everything to himself. where and when but of Kapila. individual author. grows from a soil that is ready made for him. the founder of the Yoga. we know that Socrates drank poison. presupposes an It is poem makes itself. they lived. no poet makes at large. and no philosophical system is elaborated by the people But on the other hand. and he breathes an intellectual atmosphere which is not of his own making. or with dates before the time of Buddha. nor do I see chance of knowing more about any them than we do present. Whether any of these Indian philosophers same time and in the same place. if far more strongly than the Greeks. we know next to nothing. and what they did the supposed founder of the S&mkhya philosophy. but there is nothing to connect the names of the ancient Indian philosophers with any historical events.2 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. We read that Thales warned King Croesus. we are told that Empedocles finished his days by throwing himself into the flames of Aetna. of Pata/l^ali. The Hindus seem to have He felt this indebtedness of the individuals to those before and around them who. Thales was. that no himself. of Badarayawa and 6raimini. of Gotama and Ka?iada. they cannot find a human . . with any political characters. and that Anaxagoras was the friend of Pericles. quite true that every literary composition. lived at the all this is unknown our ever at to us. whether in prose or in poetry. and what we know hardly ever rests on contemporary and trustworthy evidence. whether they were friends or enemies. whether some were the pupils and others the teachers. and who was Plato.

while Srmntam or Smriti comprised all that was individual. 3 have recourse even to mythological arid personages in order to have a pedestal. $rutam or /Sruti came afterwards to mean what has been revealed. $rutam and Smntam. is. recognized as possessing human authority only. The Hindus are satisfied with giving us the thoughts. nay even to individual poets. or the Word. The Hindus have divided the whole of their ancient literature into two parts. $rutam. what was remembered. author. a name. so that if there ever was a conflict between the two. such as the hymns of the Rig-veda. however. and an authority for every great thought divine and every great invention of antiquity. and Smr^tam. exactly as we understand that word. Nor are even these fictitious poets supposed to have created or composed their poems. and leave us to find out their antecedents as best we can. commonly Brahman. though many of the names of these poets are clearly fictitious. It is curious.SRUTAM AND SMfl/TAM. human or divine. and has always been treated as the work of an whether man or god. which really mean two periods. but only to have seen them as they were revealed to called them by a higher power. and was not the work of men or any personal being. from an Indian B 2 . what was heard. have in later times been ascribed to certain families. Snmti or tradition might at once be overruled by what was called $ruti or revelation. What we call philoin its sophy systematic form. to observe how the revealed literature of the Hindus.

to the Sutra. but belongs to Smriti or tradition. such as Hegel's or Plato's. carried on for centuries in the forests of India. understood him. point of view. Brahmana There is no topic within the sphere of philosophy which does not find a clear or straightforward treatment in these short Sutras. The Sutra style. the large number of technical terms possessed by them in common or peculiar to each system. and followed by large commentaries or independent treatises which are supposed to contain the outcome of a continuous tradition going back to very ancient times. possess it in carefully and elaborated manuals. can leave no doubt on this subject. ascribed to authors of whom we hardly know anything. Nor can we doubt that what I for a long time the philosophical in embodied thoughts of India were call a Mnemonic Literature. /Srutam. in composed systematically We short aphorisms or Sutras or in metrical Karikas. namely. imperfect as it is from a literary point of view. would be invaluable to us in other systems of philosophy. and elaborated in its minutest details. that they represent the last result of a long continued study of philosophy. period. We should always know where we and we should never hear of a philosopher who declared on his deathbed that no one had are. nor of antagonistic schools. divergOne ing from and appealing to the same teacher. not revealed. The ideas which are shared and hermitages by all the systems of Indian philosophy. . nay even to the though in their present form they the work of medieval or modern are confessedly In the Sutras each system of philosophy writers. thing must be quite clear to every attentive reader of these Sutras. is complete.4 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Whenever there arose a dispute as to the true teaching of Buddha.). and if we have to begin our study of Indian philosophy with the . The very name of a Council was Samgiti or Mahasawgiti. ink.. and At this time also the A^Aakatha (commentary).. but of course the inevitable chances of oral tradifor philosophy exposed to all That Mnemonic Period existed as well as for everything else. 5 Writing for literary purposes before the rise of Buddhism. but only of oral and even musical repetition. rehearsed by certain individuals. the monks. we must accustom ourselves to the idea that all that could be called literature then was mnemonic very tion. but an invitation was addressed to a member of the Samgha who knew the text by heart.' Such a state of things is difficult for us to imagine. still if we wish to form a true idea of the intellectual state of India in pre-Bud- dhistic times.C. and in order that the Law might endure for a long time. we hear nothing as yet of paper. only. the Tripkaka.MNEMONIC LITERATURE. singing together. perceiving the decay of beings (not MSS. carefully strict guarded by a peculiar and educational discipline. Nothing can be more explicit it than the statement that point ' : the chronicles of Ceylon on Before this time the wise monks had in handed down the texts of the Tipkaka orally. about 80 B. but reeds. e. and the different parts of the Canon were not consigned to writing. they caused it to be written down in books. was not settled by an appeal to any MS. under King Va^agamani. was unknown in India and even at the Bud- dhist Councils was when their Sacred Canon. assembled. i. and settled. c. It is actually mentioned that the Southern Canon was not reduced to writing till the first century B.

ready made. and that there will be a storm. the air. I should even go a step further. and many more.C. Nay. during which we can watch something growth. Dharma. and that there will be thunder and lightning to follow soon. . previous to the Sutras. we feel. The Upanishads contain too many technical terms. Yrata. Sutras. In order to be able to account for what seem to us mere sparks of thought. mere guesses at truth. Yoga. Even if the later systems of philosophy did not so often appeal themselves to the Upanishads . Period antecedent to the Upanishads. little or is electricity in the Indian mind.6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Atman. in our sense of the word. in Indian philosophy. Mimjimsa. we are driven to admit a long familiarity with philosophic problems before the time that gave birth to the Upanishads which we possess. one period. B. this period is in fact the most valuable though of systematised philosophy. it nothing. that there is philosophy in As we can feel that there contains. as represented to us in the Upanishads. from about 700 But while the Sutras give us abstracts of the various systems of philosophy. to allow us to suppose that they were the products of one day or of one generation. nay there was. like For gaining an insight into the early growth of Indian philosophic thought. TJpanishad-period. these Sutras themselves as the last activity carried on must be considered outcome of a long continued philosophical by memory only. and that is the last stage of the Vedic period. there must have been. like life and strife. as yet. such as Brahman. on reading the Upanishads.

as has been hastily thought. J we could easily see for ourselves in though flowing very different directions. while the original springs are lost to us for ever. among the savage tribes of to-day. Bhils. and language which reach back far beyond the Upanishads and even beyond the folklore of Khonds. speakers of Aryan languages. but until these have been classified according to language. nothing would be more wel- come tribes to the historian of philosophy. philosophy was not yet separated from religion but the earliest in the . these systems of philosophy can all be traced back to the same distant And as heights from which they took their rise. For the present we must be satisfied with the germs of thought such as we find them in the Upanishads. as their authorities. and Koles. India. Upanishads. all pointing to the Snowy Mountains in the North. but the first philosophy also. like the Ganges and the Indus. as well as If it is the object of philosophy to discover the causes of things. that. not only by the Ganges and Indus. seems always to have been not only the first religion. we must leave these dangerous enterprises to others. we can see the Indian mind also being nourished through ever so many channels. rerum . but by ever so many rivers and rivulets. all starting from a vast accumulation of religious and philosophic thought of which we seem to see the last remnants only in our Upanishads. If some of the seeds and germs of philosophy could be discovered.UPANISHAD-PERIOD. India was fertilised. of the at least among the races that of the best had taken possession of soil of Asia and Europe. It is true that during that distant period which in the archives of we can watch religion.

we should carefully gather whatever there attempt to study Indian philosophy in tiated before^we of our in- its differen- and systematised systems. forgetting that there was an ancient reservoir of thought from which all could have drawn and drunk. and calling all of them Devas. earliest what was the creation of the mythological gods but an attempt to explain the causes of light. the Asvins. first Of course. or dii. the feeders of the idea of the Godhead. of fire.8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and philosophy. Indra. Much formation may represent a chaos only. but we w ant r . we should be careful not to conclude at once that they must have been borrowed by one system from the other. has left us no Here and there we can dis- India. of rain and thunder. whatever tributaries it may have received afterwards. essential that is. of dawn. light or Ushas. the gods ? Here are fire. day and night. that distant period to which we have to assign this earliest growth of language. historical it so little to guide us in our is of great importance to remember that there was such a distant period of and that. literary cover faint traces in language. law. of day and night. thought. cognoscere causas. is Considering how small our historical information as to the intellectual and social life of India at it is different times of its history. monuments. if at a later time we nascent thought meet with the same ideas and words turning up in different systems. where we have researches. indicating the footBut in prints left by the strides of former giants. the sky-god. whether of religion or philosophy. the Bright. religion. and calling them Dyaus or Agni. morals. dawn. by postulating agents for every one of them. .

. more marvellous. is an absurd fancy. which seems fully to justify the saying that India has always been a nation of philosophers. In certain chapters of the Brahmanas and in the Upanishads we see a picture of the social and intellectual life of India at that early time. that they wished to appear more ancient than more heroic. The picture which these sacred books give us of the seething thoughts of that country may at first sight seem fanciful and almost incredible . not to say. as they are there represented to us. ancient nations of the world wished to impose on us. and had no word as yet for Such thoughts belong to much later posterity. people seem to imagine. Why should these accounts have been invented. unless they contained a certain verisimilitude It is eyes of the people ? some as quite clear that they were not composed. the scholars of The idea that the Europe. even think of us. Intellectual Life in ancient India. provincial poet like Horace should have thought so much of ages to come. times. more They did not enlightened. in order to impose after in the two thousands of years on us. and even then we wonder rather how a local. We must not allow such ideas of fraud and forgery to spoil our they were.INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN ANCIENT INDIA. or on anybody else. if by tradition only. 9 such a chaos in order to understand the kosmos that followed. but because the men of ancient India. it does not follow that we have not before us a faithful account of what really existed at one time in the land of the Five or Seven Rivers. are different from Greeks and Romans and from ourselves.

what the ancients tell us about their own or about the past which could never have extended very far back. and what they were intended for here on earth. ancient history. times. as far back as we know anything about them. to ask who they were. particularly while there was as yet no struggle for life. Thus we read at the beginning of the Whence are we born ? iS'veta. seems incredible to us. and our interest in ancients thought much of the nations of the distant future. they did not so very farfetched a problem. That in very early times kings as possible. to thoughtful people. in ancient times. was not they came. have always been divided between practical and intellectual pursuits.10 faith INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and whither do we go ? O ye .s'vatara-upanishad ' : Whereby do we live. a country which for thousands of years was free from w ar except the war of exocean. as an inten- and nobles and sages in India should have been absorbed in philosophical questions seems no doubt strange to us. the former. which was protected on three sides by the silver streaks of the of its cultivators. we should always try before first of all to understand it we reject it as impossible and tional fraud. finding themselves placed on this planet. and on the fourth by almost impassable mountain barriers. r termination directed against barbarous tribes. the so-called sons of the soil ? After all. conBut why siderably preponderating over the latter. because the energies of the people of Europe. without much effort on the part yielded in abundance all that was necessary for the support of life. The more of themselves than If. whence it know how or why. however. should not a different kind of life have been possible in a country which.

that is. This term caste has proved most mischievous and misleading. such as we find from very early times to the present day in India.. a Portuguese word. or necessity. But this is by no means the case. The fact is that we have to deal in the earlier period of ancient India with two rather than with four castes and their numerous subdivisions. 311. of course. B. . the better state we shall be able to understand the true ! of society in the ancient times of India. II who know Brahman. The so-called Kshatriyas or It military nobility take nearly as active a part in the intellectual life of the country as the Brahmans themselves. and was applied from about the middle of the sixteenth century by rough Portuguese sailors to certain divisions of Indian society which had struck their fancy.KSHATRIYAS AND BRAHMANS. XX . Caste is. or the elements be considered as the cause. E. To ask what caste means in India would be like asking what caste means in England. chap. the man. or chance. S. or what fetish 1 See also Anugita. In 1613 Purchas speaks of the thirty and odd several castes of the Banians (Vani</). It had before been used in the sense of breed or stock. (tell us) at whose command we abide here. the Supreme Spirit ' l ? Kshatriyas and Brahmans. p. VIII. or He who is called Purusha. and the less we avail ourselves of it . might be thought that all this was due to the elevating influence of an intellectual aristocracy. originally in the sense of a pure or unmixed breed. whether in pain or in pleasure ? Should time or nature. the Brahmans.

B. while the races of indigenous origin who remained hostile to the end. and after- wards merchants and mechanics last To the very also. if submissive to their conquerors.12 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. read as early as the Mahabhanita The three in darkness in the abide the thus S'udra. every stick a totem. were classed as altogether outside the pale of political ] The Aryas in India were naturally differentiated like other people into an intellectual or priestly aristocracy. while the great bulk remained simply Vis or VaLvyas. Brahmans. 329. or ruling aristocracy. The We former are named Aryas or Aryas. 6rati (kith). p.. What we really want to know is what was implied by such Indian words as Varaa (colour). Gotra (race). to say nothing of $&pindatya or Samanodakatva. E. Kshatriyas. that is. means in Portugal. are the . three castes qualities passion in the Kshatriya. >Sudras or Dasas. in the ' 1 Thus we : Brahmami. Pravara (lineage) otherwise we shall have once more the same confusion about the social organisation of ancient India as about African fetishism or North American totemism Each foreign word should (feiti9o) . every idol a fetish. and the native inhabitants on the other.' (Anugita. slaves. and a fighting society. Kula (family). have in India the Aryan settlers on one side. its own distinction will be called caste. goodness. it should be most Otherwise every social carefully defined afresh. if generalised for scientific purposes. or. the three great divisions. and the highest.VIII. the Kshatriyas. that is.) . S. householders and cultivators of the soil. cultivators of the soil which they had conquered the latter. the Brahmans. ! always be kept to native meaning.

that into Brahmans. The lessons as described by Manu. Kshatriyas. and air is prescribed for the three twice-born ' : (classes) . division into Aryas and Dasas was due to descent.' ^i I ^ have been due to occupation only. the Kshatriyas after the welfare of the body politic. and not only allowed. is prescribed B.E. Still even that rubbish heap deserves to be sifted. The Brahmans had to look after the originally to welfare of souls. but obliged to be educated in Vedic knowledge and to pass through the three or four Asramas or stages of life. 13 and Vaisyas. though it may soon have acquired an hereditary character. does not concern us for our present purpose. and Vaisyas seems for all. Nay women also claimed a right to be . under different forms to the present day. the order of householders S. 316. and as preserved which the names of Varwa (colour) and G&ti (genus) teach us had long been forgotten even in Manu's time. in the ordinary occupations of The later subdivision civilisation. shared certain privileges and duties in common. and are buried at present under a heavy heap of rubbish.VIII. Thus we read in the Mahabharata The order of Vanaprasthas.. p. of sages who dwell in forests and live 011 fruits.) While the (Anugita.CASTES. as I believe it is now being sifted by scholars like Mr. Originally they were all of them called twice-born. which seem to have occupied India far more than wars of defence or conquest. and the Vaisyas represented originally the undifterentiated mass of the people. In ancient times neither Kshatriyas nor Vaisyas were excluded from taking part in those religious and philosophical struggles. Bisley and others. engaged an incipient of Indian society. roots.

his capital and wide (Kaush. was Mithila. A^atasatru. He was a king ). or at least in the times represented to us in the Upanishads. Besides. a prince of Kapilavastu. and against the infallible and divine character ascribed by them to their Vedas. Sita. as the friend of Yagwavalkya. is represented to us in later times as the famous wife of Rama (Ramapurvatap. . Up. Ganaka. of the Videhas. claimed by the Brahmans as their exclusive property. and they occasionally asserted it with great force and dignity. The Kshatriyas never surrendered their right to take part problems of life and death. Up. we must not forget that Buddha also was a Kshatriya. one of the most famous philosophical teachers of . IV. Ar. as bestowing his patronage on the most eminent sages of his kingdom. and that his chief opposition. successful We read of him as taking part in metaphysical discussions. But in the Upanishads he is represented. life we look back once more to the intellectual of India in the ancient Vedic times. of view. not as a general or conqueror. the strong reaction in the discussions of the great for against priestly supremacy came at last from them. we fame read there of an ancient King kanaka. not so much as a brave knight.). from a social and political point and was against the privileges of teaching sacrificing. i i daughter. II. as presiding over philosophical councils. The Evidence If of the Upanishads. whose at the time when the Upanishads were composed had already spread Up. i Brih. victorious in chivalrous tournaments.14 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. heard in their philosophical assemblies. and his far .

What is important 1 Kaushitaki Up. and even women. IV. Artabhaga. Up. While death swallows the whole world. Ar. the other Brahmans present propounded a number of questions which he was expected to answer in order to prove his superiority. i. such as Gargi. take an active part. Ar. who is the deity that shall swallow death ? What becomes of the vital spirits when man dies ? What is it that does not forsake man in the hour of death ? What becomes of man after his speech at death has entered the a fire. his breath the wind. the hair of his head the trees. a disputation in which philosophers. king apart day for a Brahmodyam. i . his body the earth. The first question is how a man who offers a sacrifice can be freed thereby from the fetters of death. the hairs of his body the herbs. 15 1 performing a great this sets a sacrifice. Bhh. Ill. Ill. 5). the Upanishad period. such When Yagwavalkya. his Atman his ear space. i. And so he does. . Then follow questions such as. his mind the moon. Up. the daughter of VMaknu To (Brih.KING GANAKA. his blood and seed the waters ? Whither did the descendants of King Parikshit go ? contains the worlds 1 yet is What is the soul ? What and from it Who rules everything ? different from everything Far be me to say that these and other questions were answered by Yagwavalkya in a manner that would seem satisfactory to ourselves. As Yagwavalkya claimed these cows on account of his superior knowledge. Asvala. the ether. the victor in these disputations the king promised as a reward of a thousand cows with ten padas of gold fixed to their horns. his eye the sun.

Ill. that. is that such questions should have been asked that all. he turned round and said. Ar. ' When is burnt. and deserves was destroyed by a conflagration. question which. That these disputations took place in public and in the presence of the doubt. and that his answers should have satisfied his contemporaries. There is no other country in the world where in such ancient times such disputations would have been thought of. Up. they should have formed the staple of public discussion at that early time. nothing that is mine to remain so. 2. 13) where we are told expressly that the two disputants. but the vanquished was Very curious is . there king we have no reason to is one passage (Brih. Mithila. in these public assemblies not only was a royal reward bestowed on the victor. unless it were in Egypt. his capital. as not admit of being discussed one of any other country where at that such time religious congresses would have early been thought of. retired into a private place in order to come to an understanding about they thought. Besides. to us at in the fifth century B. namely. and royal rewards bestowed on Do we know those who were ? victorious in these philosophical tournaments of the sayings of kanaka has remained One famous in Indian literature for ever. neither Achilles nor Ulysses would have shone in them. Ya^/navalkya and Artabhaga. While Mithila is burning.l6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. a time previous to the establishment of Buddha's religion in India.. did in public. Neither Menelaos nor Priam would have presided over them.' another feature.C.

but we have no right to mere invention. 26). Must we withhold our belief from such III. in the case of $akalya (Brih. i. Ill. between Sanatkumara. Upanishads with philosophical dialogues between gods and men also. is (Brih. and Na&iketas. 9. surrenders himself to him as his slave. the representative of the Brahmans. for the cases are not quite parallel. the typical warrior deity.e.f/apati. for such stories would hardly if have been invented. call all this call it We may exaggerated. but it actually happened. 2 3 . we also read of private conferences in which Ya^/lavalkya enlightens and after receiving every kind of present from him is told at last that the king gives him the whole of his kingdom. between Indra and Pratardana. Indra. and Viro&ana. Up. Up. It true we meet in the everywhere in ancient times. Would C . and Narada. 17 Nor sometimes threatened with losing his head was this a threat only. statements.KING KANAKA. such as Kaush.) they had sounded as in- credible in India itself as they sound to us. we are told. between Yama. 4. IV. Ar. to by 'to burst/ and not the causative by 'to make fall off/ 'to burst' have been vipaf? cut off. Besides these public disputations. nay his royal patron 6ranaka. l . the god of death. it does not follow that the great gatherings of Indian sages find such as we presided over by their kings should be equally 1 I translate vipat by 'to fall off/ not i. because we have learnt to doubt the burnt hand of Mucius Scaevola and the suicide of Lucretia ? I believe not. But though these are naturally mere inventions. between Pra.

however. not vice versa. in order to secure his But though this may have been the original relation between Brahmans and Kshatriyas. See also the dialogue between Sanatkumara and Narada . as he appeals to his fame as widely established. (/tfmnd. and must have been later than kanaka. and here again it is the king who has to teach the We Brahman. Up. foundation in fact. 2. IV. and remained so to the time represented by Manu's Law-book. Ar. for incase of the stance. to deny that originally the between the kings and the sages of ancient in we see represented. i). a certain have a record of another disputation between a King Af/atasatru and the Brahman Balaki. who contemptuously rejects all offers of friendship from the king. country of the Mahav?^'daughter. the proud Brahman actually declares himself the pupil of the king 2 . When he has convinced Balaki of the insufficiency of the information which this learned Brahman had volunteered to impart to him.l8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2 Brfli. . I relation do not mean. till at last the India was that which king has to offer him not only gold and land (the Raikvapama villages in the shas) but his own amity and his instruction. the warrior class had evidently from a very early time produced a number of independent thinkers who were able to 1 2 Kaushitaki Up. Even imagination requires imaginary. i. Up. II. Ar/atasatru was king of Kasi (Benares). VII. King 6r4nasruti and the Brahman Raikva.

question which they discuss is. and which is marked by the rise and growth of Buddhism. Such a royal pupil would become a sage 1 1 Again. told. Buddhist Period. Though there is every reason to suppose that their sacred When we the original text of the Tripifaka. descendants in India.BUDDHIST PERIOD. and cited. whose name may contain the first allusion to $akas and their of retires into the forest. .C. Up. in the TTAand. gives up is instructed by the sage >Sakayanya. In the Maitra- King Br^hadratha who and kingdom. V. though not written down. The Kaikeya. nay. the yawa-upanishad we read his Self. in their knowledge of the Atman. and was settled and recode. we may therefore safely accept its descriptions as us a true picture of what took place in India giving c 2 . during the reign of Asoka. grapple with and to hold their 19 own against the to them particularly priests. naturally in the course of his studies and teacher himself. leave the period represented by the and turn our eyes to that which follows Upanishads. belongs to the third century B.. we know at all events that it was reduced to writing in the first century before our era. as represented to us in the Sacred writings of the Buddhists. of eminent we see a number Brahmans approaching King Asvapati and making themselves his pupils. namely. who were superior as we are in one subject. 1 1 i ) ? and this question the king was supposed to be able to answer better than any of the Brahmans. What is our Self and what is Brahman (V. we find no very sudden change in the intellectual life of the country.

we are probably not far wrong if we look upon the doctrines which he gave form and life. at all events with the very peculiar names of these literary com- must not. may seem to us at first .. and which became later on the to feeders of what are that called in India the six great systems of philosophy. were acquainted with the Upanishads and the Sutras. even in its latest offshoots. suppose that as positions. however. soon as Buddhism arose Vedism disappeared from soil of India. Buddha. was not satisfied with teaching a philosophy. however.C. his ambition was to found His object was to induce people to withdraw from the world and to live a life of abstinence and meditation in hermitages or mona society.soka had extended his We the patronage to the Buddhist fraternity. while Buddhism was slowly but surely supplanting the religion of the Veda. when highest importance that the Buddhists at the time their Suttas were composed. if we consider that Buddha died about 477 B.20 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. who actually gave up his palace and made himself a beggar. for if we of may retain name the young prince Kapilavastu. as represented originally by one of the many schools of thought which were springing up in India during the period of the Upanishads. and Vedism may have continued to flourish in the West while Buddhism was gaining its wonderful triumphs in the East and the South. including kings and nobles. asteries. Nay. and even of the Buddhist laity. new The description of the daily life of these Buddhist monks. We have no reason to doubt that some of the later Upanishads were composed long after King A. It seems to me a fact of the the Upanishads. India is a large country.

the followers of Buddha. blot (Sept Suttas Palis. before which the paramount sovereigns of India address these mendicants. hardly have been so. the read in the Tripkaka. The earlier translations by Gogerly. If we want to get an idea of the immense wealth and variety of philosophic thought by which Buddha found himself surrounded on every side. by Grim1876). the sacred code of Buddhists. . likewise of King Bimbisara. the Brahma-^ala-sutta are too apt to imagine that both the believers . we cannot do better than consult one of the many Suttas or sermons. We in the Veda and the followers of Buddha formed compact bodies. each being held together by generBut this can ally recognised articles of faith. 4). for instance. as we read in the Brahma(/ala-sutta that even among the disciples who 1 We Ehys time possess now an excellent translation of this Sutta by Davids. when they were made. such as. drawing near to Buddha and sitting down respect- We fully 'at one side before venturing to ask him a read question (Samyutta Nikaya III. i. sight as incredible as 21 before in the what we saw Upanishads. but have were very creditable for the now been superseded. of Magadha. and now forming part of the Buddhist l canon.BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. of King Prasenagdt. supposed to have been preached by Buddha himself. Prasena#it and Bimbisara. of Kosala. showing the same respect and veneration to this poor monk We asking him any questions or making any Bante or Lord is the title by suggestions to him. Brahma-<7ala-sutta.

though they differed. such as Brahmadatta. and he who eminent in knowledge and virtue is even by is most Buddha dis- himself called is ' a true Brahma?*a. spoke openly against all the three. try to get rid of the idea that Brahmans and Buddhists were always at daggers drawn. Buddha mentions no less than sixty-two of them. in e. In the Brahma-iyala-sutta. other by religious hatred. Though there was a clear line of demarcation between Brahmans his disciples. the two are constantly addressed together by Buddha. which. and claims to be acquainted with every one of them. we can discover the faint traces of some of the schools of philosophy which we shall have to examine hereafter. spoke in support of Buddha. some.' Brahman with us first caste. Their relation was not originally very different from that between different systems of philosophy. with many subdivisions.22 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. which all philosophical theories are supposed to have been caught like so many fishes. followed Buddha. who are under the spiritual sway of the Brahmans. meaning either a member of the orone belonging to the three castes of the twice-born Aryas. . in support of his doctrines and while others. and We must divided the whole of India between themselves. as far as their daily life and outward ceremonial were concerned. were but seldom inflamed against each i. Brahmawa is often used by him as a mere expression of high social rank. though standing himself above them all. such as the Vedanta and Samkhya. often used in two senses which should be kept tinct. and Samanas or Buddhists. particularly when philosophical questions are discussed. the net of Brahma. such as Suppiya.

They hold that the soul and the world are partly eternal. There are some Samanas and Brahmans who are with regard to some things. they and the world.BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. the Lord of all. them radiating light. But he who had come first began to think that he was Brahma. or in the ordinary God. And just then other beings fell 1 2 Brahma-#ala-sutta. creatures transmigrate. the Supreme. translated by Khys Davids. but it was empty. made of mind only. the Ruler. Then a certain being fell from the World of Light and came to life in the palace of Brahma. we are are eternalists. Living steadfast nothing new. in all respects like him. including their names. and partly not. According eternalists to will this world-system will pass away. he became dissatisfied and longed for other from the World of Light. giving birth to is as a mountain peak. but not with regard to others. their lineage. but they are for ever and declare. and there then be beings reborn in the World of Light (Abhassara). feeding on joy. 26 seq. p. 23 There are some Samanas and Brahmans. ever. . eternal. who profess to be able to remember an endless succession of former births. This would be like the asvata-vada. After remaining there in perfect joy for a longperiod. beings. and who proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal 2 They told 1 . there appeared (they say) the palace of Brahma. is The soul. account of how people began to believe in one personal Supreme Being. . When the world-system began to re-evolve. traversing the air and continuing in Here follows a most peculiar glory for a long time. and their former dwelling-places.

immutable. neuter. and it was thought that this Brahmcl must be eternal and remain for ever. masc. the that are and are to be. infinite in height and depth. and who set forth the infinity and finiteness of the world. that it neither finite nor infinite. and eternal. and body form an impermanent Self. . This Brahma reminds one of the Isvara of the Samkhya and other philosophies. and eternal. another class of speculators who are called Antanantikas. and therefore will remain for ever steadfast. because he was there first and they came after him.. and eternal. They maintain Next follows either that the world or that it is is finite or that it is infinite. and limited in duration of life. immutable. tongue. Lastly. but is finite in lateral extension. these beings themselves also thought that he must be the Supreme Brahma.24 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. must be distinguished from Brahma. while heart or mind or consciousness form a permanent Self. immutable. because as soon as he had wished for them. The other beings he looked upon as created by himself. These fall from their divine state. which as Brahma. nose. while others who abstain from such indulgences remain steadfast. ear. Then we are told that there are some gods who spend their lives in sexual pleasures and then fall from their divine state. while others who are free from such failings remain steadfast. the Maker and all Father of Creator. they had come. that there are certain gods so full of envy that their bodies become feeble and their mind imbecile. mutable. or lastly. some Sam anas and Brahmans are led to the conclusion that eye. Again. while those who came after him were impermanent. the Ancient of days. Nay.

the soul and the world. M. often disinclined to commit himself on some of the great questions of philosophy and religion. or a cause. took the same view. others again Keligion. there are Samanas and Brahmans who hold that everything. 105. is would seem. 25 The next description of the various theories held by either Samanas or Brahmanas seems to refer to what is known as the Sy4dv ada. are accidental and without a cause. p. according to some of the Suttas. Those who hold to this are called wriggling eels. that there is is chance in the world or that there not.BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. Next. who Furthermore. and they will not commit themselves to saying that there another world or that there is not. others that ] it has no form. that anything has a result or reward or that it has not. that man continues after death or that he does not. Natural . They will not admit any difference between good and bad. Some maintain that the conscious soul after death has form. but they differ on several points regarding this conscious existence. and Mahavira.. He was often in fact an agnostic on points which he considered beyond the grasp of the human mind. because they can remember that formerly they were not and now because they prove by means of logic that the soul and the whole world arose without they are. the theory that t everything may be or may not be. the founder of (rainism. M. there are Samanas and Brahmans hold and defend the doctrine of a conscious existence after death. often taking refuge It that Buddha himself was in Agnosticism or the Ae/mlnavada 1 .

e. are the it is highest Nirvana. and others that it neither has nor has not form. is both or is neither.. Against this view. is has limited. a state of joy born of seclusion and followed by reflection and meditation. and while in that state form. or neither . and that therefore the highest Nirvana consists in putting away all sensuous delights and entering into the first (VMna. There are. that it is both and that it is neither. there are some Samanas and Brahmans who teach the entire annihilation of all living beings. that it is finite. . such as Alara Kalama. Thus when the here possible in perfect enjoyment of the five pleasures of life. is however. c.26 that it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. both Again. that is. however. Some say that others it it it has one mode of conof sciousness. 1. is miserable. others that it is infinite. that has various modes consciousness. they call that Against this view. it is asserted that such happiness involves reasoning. and have in their general outlines been traced back to some of the teachers of Buddha. Their arguments are various. it is held that the soul after death happy. others who say that the soul after death has either unconscious. has nor has not form or neither. has and has not. again. others that Lastly. i. and is thereKhys Davids. others that it has unlimited consciousness. has and has not. p. Uddalaka and others They uphold the doctrine of l . infinite. the senses. Some say it is finite. 48. or no form. said that sensuous delights transitory and always involve pain. Dhyana. happiness in this salvation soul is is and maintain that complete on earth.

(/ala-sutta professes that all speculations about the past and the future are included in this Sutta of the net of Brahma. a state of elevation and But even this does not satisfy the internal calm. The extraordinary part is that in the end all these . pain. existence. By division and subdivision there are said to be sixty-two theories. grief. and true Nirvana can only consist in total absence of all longing after joy and thus entering into the third 6rMna. serene and thoughtful. death. as it seems. disease. Lastly. weeping. The very dwelling of the mind on care and joy is declared to be gross.BKAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. as if the philosophical of Buddha himself was so very different at teaching . and therefore. and the final Nirvana is said to be reached in the fourth 6rMna only. because any sense ofjoy must be gross. attachment. This abstract may give an idea of the variety of philosophical opinions which were held in India at The Brahmaor even before the time of Buddha. while Buddha alone is able to cut off the root of all error and all misery. true Buddhist. while the highest 27 when Nirvana can only arise has been reasoning conquered and the soul has entered the second 6rAana. It does not seem. sorrow. even this is outbidden. a state of joy. arranged into two classes so far as they are concerned either with the past or with the future of the soul the soul. misery. being always taken for granted. though well known by Buddha. indeed. and to impart the truth that leads to true Nirvana. are condemned by him as arising from the deceptive perceptions of the senses. fore gross. birth. a state of self-possession and complete equanimity. and theories. born of all serenity without reasoning. reproduction. which produce desire.

we can . from that of other schools which had flourished before and during his lifetime in India nay.28 first INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. chap. that it exists. they run on irrigating the same expanse of country without proving in the least philosophy. Karikas and Sutras. often perceive clear traces of a distant relationship between Buddhism and the six orthodox systems of Like streams. too. Some and others that there say everything is doubtful . and others. similarity between their statements and those which we have just read in the Buddhist Brahma-r/ala-sutta. that one channel of thought was derived from another. . as has been so often supposed in the case particularly of Buddhism in its relation to the Sa??ikhya philosophy. and from each other on some very Mahabharata. which as known to us from the Though the Brahma-^ala-sutta does not enter may Suttas. Some say . into full details. all springing from the same summit. of philosophical schools it shows at differed all events be gathered from other how large a number how they was in existence then. we by the great. If now we compare one sects in the of the numerous passages Mahabharata. Some is no doubt. ' : shall be struck Thus we read in the Anugita. is We piety remains after the body some destroyed say that it is not so. almost verbal. XXIV observe the various forms of piety to be as it were contradictory. essential points. and others that it exists and does not exist. Some say the permanent principle is impermanent. containing descriptions of the philosophical then flourishing in India.

that of the Tairthikas. Brahman as possessed of quali- they are distinct. believe that it is others that it is distinct and others again that it is manifold. say the . . thus say the YogaMras they are mixed. Some extol final emancipation and various kinds of enjoyments some wish for riches. Some people are for bathing some for the omission of bathing. but only momentarily.TTarvakas. Mimamsakas nothing exists. worshippers of the ties . . . Some have matted hair and skins and some are clean-shaven and . Everything is impermanent. Some are for taking food others are intent on fasting.' This last can only refer to the followers of Buddha. such is the view of the . body is is lost others. who hold that special acts are the cause (of everything) manifold they are. Some say both time and space exist. without any covering. after the ' Some hold. and others that is mixed.' . . say the Saugatas or Buddhists. . r hold the contrary. the great teachers. say it it 29 is of one form or twofold. the view of the Satyavadins (Syadvanothing is doubtful. Everything is doubtful. Knowledge is one. dins (] . who know Brahman and one . and others for indigence.MAHABHARATA. say the /Simyavadins something exists.' The commentator Nilakan^Aa refers all these remarks to certain sects known to us from other ' . . Some Brahmawas. whatever the date of our Mahabharata may be. . he says. say the atomists time and space . and others that it is not so. perceive the truth. Some people extol actions. the ego and non-ego are two different principles. it is thus say the Tarkikas permanent. say the Uc/ulomas they are one. ' that the Self exists is. that the Lokayatas or . say other Mimamsakas. but . and others tranquillity. too. sources.

He need not have been a powerful prince. are. not a mere name. a man who made a new epoch in the growth of Indian philosophy. His teaching must have acted like a weir across a swollen river. the existence of a large number of religious and philosophical sects in the ancient days of India. is are the ancient philosophers the rule of the Naish^Aika BrahmaMrins bathing that of the householders. there must have been Whether he some one. they is not say the astrologers. such as he is described to us in the Suttas. Buddha. that is to say. And no if we consider that Buddha was a prince or nobleman who gave up whatever there w as of outward splendour pertaining to his rank.' Thus both from Buddhistic and Bran manic sources we learn the same fact. Those so. that great influence on his contemporaries many generations after his death. far more than his doctrine. and still more of Indian religion and ethics. but rather philosophy. r Does not this refer to the solemn bathing which is the first step towards the stage of u Gr/hastha or independent householder ? 1 . that what all. I cannot that it was Buddha's marked help thinking personality.30 IXDIAN PHILOSOPHY. first. wonder. calling for Out a hearing. at new not as the herald of any brand which he has to teach. real existence at omission to bathe . as some have imagined. of the midst of this whirlpool of philosophical opinions there rises the form of Buddha. 1 who say that it we see has no . but a real power in the history of India. gave him the and on so existed or not. as preaching a new gospel to the poor.

who. i). as in the Upanishads. p. IV. this is the same Agdtasatru. not as a proper that may be. and the very fact making himself a popular teacher and religious reformer attracted attention as a social anomaly in the eyes of the people. At all events. . A(/ata. king of Kasi (or Benares). B. to him on what he ought Buddha It has been supposed by some scholars that to do. But. he was a Kshatriya. as we saw in the Upanishads. see in fact that one of the principal accusations brought against him. kings appear as friends and 1 we S. note. but consulted his own time. e. E.s'atru. sends two of his ministers.' should be taken. as a general ' However of royalty. by the kings of the son of Vaidehi. He. but likewise the counsellors of princes. Tripkaka also. so in the see that. in order to consult without an according to others. was that he had arrogated to himself the privilege of being We a teacher. a name well known to us from the Upanishads. Curiously enough one of these kings has the name of A(/atasatru. silenced the Brahman Balaki (Kaush. i. And as these Brahmans had always been not only the teachers of the people. and it does not appear that he and his house had any suzerain over them. Up. a privilege that had always been recognised as belonging to those only who were Brahmans by birth. 31 but he belonged to the royal class. and requires further explanation. who were Brahmans by birth. enemy. at a later time. we find Buddha also not only patronised. the coincidence title name is ' . a Videha princess.. like Devanam priya. 2. XI. of his Like several of the philosophers in the Upanishads.BUDDHA. i. cer- tainly striking.

32 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but if this shows that they are post-Buddhistic. the nave of checked by the quality of goodness as its circumference. the turning of the wheel from the same source. such as Buddha. little difficulty in accounting for this as for the conThe Buddhist tinuity between Sanskrit and Pali. But though Buddhism and the Upanishads share 1 Cf. The best known are Bimbisara. and which does not turn hack. enlightened. Anugita. long before he had become recognised as the founder of a new they take a prominent part in public convened for discussing the great problems assemblies. or afterwards for settling the canon of their religious texts. without Bhiksh. chap. is taken from the dictionary of the Upanishads. in the The name of . the spoke the understanding. and possibly 7\akrapraalso is taken vartana. it is true. it suggests at the same time that the old Upanishads must have been pre-Buddhistic. occurs in later Upanishads only. king of Magadha. could hardly be understood without the previous employments of the root Budh in the Veda nor Bhikshu. monk was clearly prefigured in the Parivra//aka or itinerant mendicant of the Upanishads (B?~ih. XVII 'You : arc the one person to turn which is the Brahman. Para gati. There is in this respect a clear continuity between the Upanishads and the earliest appearance of Buddhism and if some of the tenets and technical terms of the Buddhists also are the same as those of the Hindu schools of philosophy. the highest goal. to beg. king of Kosala. beggar. and Prasena^it. Nirvana. Buddha.' . Ill. l . there would be as . that of religion and philosophy. religion. as the awakened and 5). and which is this wheel. patrons of a philosopher. Upanishads.

Though kings and noblemen who had embraced the doctrines of Buddha were not obliged to become actual mendicants and join the fraternity. if whole of once more to have been absorbed in religion and philosophy nay. 33 things in common which point back to the same distant antiquity. and other entertainments of a less spiritual character. the India at the time of Buddha would seem D . Though it did not abolish caste. he was free from all family ties and allowed to support himself by charitable gifts (Bhiksha). In fact. a public dis- rejoicings. Once a member of the Samgha. it led to a mixture of which had formerly been kept more carefully distinct. without reference to his birth. and of wealthy persons such as AnathaWhenever the Buddhist friars appeared pmcftka. Buddhism in its practical working produced a complete social revolution in India. they seem to have been re- ceived with splendid hospitality. as has many sometimes been supposed. including a public cussion.BUDDHA. He could then become an itinerant (Parivra^aka) friar. in villages or towns. as we see in the case of the kings already mentioned. they could become patrons and lay sympathisers (Upasakas). and the arrival of Buddha himself with his six hundred or more disciples was generally made the occasion of great sermon. classes could jt>in the Buddhist fraternity. we may judge from the Tripifcika. Anybody. the old saying that the Indians are a nation of philosophers would seem to have never been so true as at the time of the great . if only he was of good report and free from certain civil disabilities. without any of that previous discipline which was required from a Brahman.

events. 242 B. . we are told. in its earlier elements. We among the Brahmans as among the Buddhists with an immense variety of philosophical and religious thought. no doubt.C. Asoka certainly extended his patronage. took the warmest It is interest in the proceedings of that Council. are onesided and exaggerated but when we consult the . like kanaka of old. It might be objected. to the new brotherhood founded by Buddha. at Vaisali. perhaps too much to say that he made Buddhism the state-religion of India. but there was nothing in India corre- sponding to a Defender of the Faith. at all may we be assigned to the same Buddhistic meet get just the same picture. Pateliputra. period. Nor have are the scant accounts which the Greeks left us of what they saw during and after the invasion of India by Alexander the Great at variance with what we learn from these native Nothing struck the Greeks so much as the philosophical spirit which seemed to pervade authorities. held. at and later on at the new residence of Asoka. but by serious argumentation. not yet by persecution. There never was such a thing as a state-religion in India. even that of Asoka. that the authorities on which we have to rely for a description of the intellectual state of India at the time of these Councils.34 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. represented by schools and sects striving against each other. formerly confined to Brahman s only.. Buddhist Councils. This Asoka. Greek Accounts. Mahabharata which.

who. D 2 . 'in a simple style.C. and spend their time in listening to serious discourse and in imparting of rushes or skins.. subsisting on leaves and wild fruits. . They he writes. adds that they neither live in cities nor even in houses. the members of the Buddhist brotherhood who then seemed to have lived most amicably with the Brahmans. have generally been accepted as representing the /Sramanas or Samanas. we are distinctly informed that they lived in the forest. and wore garments made and 1 2 of the bark of trees (Valkala) -. 35 When Megasthenes 1 the that mysterious country. Even we see described in the Upaniname did not tell us. such shads. W./Tandragupta (Sandrocottus).sized enclosures. or in later Ancient India.' having their abode in groves in front of moderate. ambassador of Seleucus Nicator at the court of . p. and give themselves up to asceticism as if their and meditation. Strom. told. at a certain distance from their villages. and lie on beds within ' They abstain from animal food and sexual pleasures. M p. Clement Alex. he speaks of gymnosophists living on mountains or in the plains.' The so-called $armanas mentioned by Megasthenes. however much they may have differed in their philosophical His Hylobioi or forestand religious opinions. dwellers are probably meant for the Brah manic Vanaprasthas. Prasena^/it and Bimbisara. A(/atas'atru. describes what he saw in India in the third century B.GREEK ACCOUNTS. c Crindle.. their knowledge to such as will listen to them. They comwith like we are 6ranaka municated. the members of the third Asrama who had to live in the forest. cities live. by J. 1877. 97 seq. Nothing at least is said of any personal enmity between them. i. kings. 305.

Chinese Buddhists who made their pilgrimages to India. whom they honour as a god on account of his extraordinary holiness. with the figure and name of Boddo. though there are early coins. after repeating all this. remaining for whole days motionless in a fixed attitude. witnessed alreadv the evident simis c? decline. This is Greek mention of Buddha. consulted them by messengers regarding the causes of things. Some pendent centuries later we have another and is inde- source of information on the intellectual state of India. Those who came early. for no one else can have been meant by Clement. both by undergoing active toil. Beginning with the fourth century of our era. as to their Holy Land. which point to Greek influence. Clement of Alexandria. Buddhist Pilgrims. The name was never mentioned by Alexander's companions. that is. and this also in perfect accordance with what we have hitherto learnt about India as the home of philosophers. The most important among them visited India from was Hiouen-thsang who 629 to . such as Fa-hian. adds at the end that there are also philosophers in India who follow the precepts of Butta. at the time when what I call the Renaissance of Sanskrit literature and national independence began. those who came of its flourishing in the fifth later in the sixth and / seventh centuries. described to us the state of the country such as they saw it. and who through them worshipped and supplicated their gods. Hiouen-thsang. saw Buddhism century. and by enduring pain.36 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. times King Harsha. We are also the first told that these philosophers practised fortitude.

Twenty kings were gathered there. described as having conquered the five Indias. Julien. was allowed to eat flesh in his dominions.CHINESE ACCOUNTS. was invited by the king to be present at one of these great assemblies. though he may have been deceived in some of his observations. . on the southern bank of the Ganges. each bringing with him both $ramanas and Brahmanas. p. Hiouen-thsang. we are told. particularly those that took place at the court of /S'iladitya Harshavardhana 610-650. commonly called $ri-Harsha of Kanyakub^a. 1 Memoires sur les Contrees Occidentales. and made them discuss in his presence the most important points of Buddha's doctrine. and the king himself was present to judge of their learning and their good behaviour. 37 have been translated by my late friend. i. 645. is who though he bestowed his patronage and protection on all sects alike. and whoever had killed He built a living thing was himself put to death many hospitals and monasteries. assembled the >Srama^as from different kingdoms. and entertained many Buddhist friars at his own expense. Each disputant had his chair. No one can doubt the trustworthiness of this witness. having studied the Buddhist writings under some of the most illustrious teachers of the time. seems to have been in his heart a Buddhist. the schools of the most illustrious teachers whose lectures he attended. He describes the Buddhist monasteries scattered all over the country. Stanislas Julien. No one. whether followers of the Vedas or of Buddha. 251 seq. Every year he '. This travels and whose king. and their public assemblies. who by this time had made himself a proficient Sanskrit scholar and Buddhist theologian.

' After reasonable deductions. enough seems to me to remain to show that from the time of the Upanishads to the time of Hiouen-thsang's sojourn in India. . the interest the great problems of humanity here on earth. This. excited the anger of some Brahmans who were present. however. large A camp was constructed. and the people at large developed and strengthened their old taste for origin. and forgave the would-be assassin. They tried to set fire to the camp and the magnificent buildings erected by the And when they failed in this. The king. as celebrated in their in epic poetry on account of their acts of bravery or cunning. While in other countries the people at large cared more for their national heroes. escaped. at This gives us the first idea of what that time religious persecution meant on the These part of Buddhists as well as of Brahmans. as would seem. they actually king. India under the sway of its Vedic poets. but they cannot be altogether denied. persecutions may have been exaggerated.38 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Hiouen-thsang himself seems to have taken an active part in this who Congress of Religion. and every day rich it alms were bestowed on the $ramanas. one dominant interest pervaded the whole country. but exiled a large number of Brahmans from his kingdom. hired an assassin to kill the monarch. such as we should making make in the case of the descriptions of any enthusiastic witness. Its kings surrounded themselves witli a court of sages rather than of warriors. most of them of a priestly rather than a warrior remained true to its character. and I still believe it was he is mentioned by his Sanskrit name as Moksha' ' deva or as the all ' Master of the Tripiteka.

and that in early days men and even women will place muscle higher than brain. Das Mahabharata. strange to say. Dharmasastra and to a certain extent it may have fulfilled that purpose. l . was a warrior. origin. the poetical form of what we should call epic poems. if we call the people of present day. and was looked upon as r It is curious the very incarnation of the Deity. and is not extinct even at the Of course. The two great worship is epic poems are there to testify that hero- human heart. speak of their Mahabharata as a Law-book. But many even of these epic innate in the heroes have a tinge of philosophical sadness about them. If the account spiritual state of India at the 1 given by Hiouen-thsang of the time of his visit See Dahlmann. class also had their and that their achievements also excited the interest of the people. as described Bhagavad-gita. . 39 dured religious and philosophical problems that has enfor centuries. is at the same time the recipient of the highest wisdom communicated to him by KHshna. that the Sanskrit language has no w ord for epic Itihasa refers to the matter rather than to poetry. the most popular of their gods. enough for many phases of thought. India is large We must not forget that even in the Vedic hymns Indra. the greatest among them. and the Hindus. this is not meant to deny that the warrior popular heroes. and Argoma. India a nation of philosophers. the hero of the Bhagavad-gita. in the KHstma was of Kshatriya himself. King Harsha.KING HARSHA.

and obeying the orders of the same king. represents to us the different schools and teachers. to feel convinced of the faithfulness of his account. nothing. We see him. but had been converted to Buddha's doctrine. who had been by birth and education a Brahman. . as living together apparently in perfect peace. without. as it would seem. 235. While still at a distance from the holy man's abode. the friend and patron tolerated both Buddhism and realm. pay his respects to a sage of the name of Divakara. for instance. though not a Buddhist. incurring thereby the displeasure In the Harsha-/rarita' of the king or of his friends. They would naturally discuss their differences and exchange opinions on points on which they were agreed or opposed to each other. much by the sentiments of the we have only to consult the history of Harsha as written in Sanskrit by Ba/ia. whether followers of Buddha or of the Veda. the king leaves his ing suite behind arid proceeds on foot. but of violent persecutions by one side or the other. the king is represented to us as entering a large forest. translated by Cowull and Thomas. the king perceived a large Harsha-frarita. p. When approachthe abode of the sage. but Bai^a also. surrounded by his retinue. No doubt Hiouen-thsang looked at India with the eyes of a follower of Buddha. his stay at the court of and of Harsha should seem to be tinged too Buddhist priest. or of excommunications and massacres.40 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. we hear very little or The king in himself. of Hiouen-thsang. attended by only a few of his vassals. and we feel doubtful sometimes which of the two he favoured most in Brahmanism his his own mind.

assayers of metals (?). We cannot dissociate intellectual schools. but in villages and forests. seated on rocks. dwelling in bowers of lying in thickets or in the shadow of branches. because we forget the totally different conditions of in- tellectual life in India and elsewhere. even incredible. urging objections. but that is our fault. museums. ascetics who pulled out their hair. followers of Krishna (Bhagavatas). pondering. discussing and explaining moot points of doctrine. believers in God as a creator (Naiyayikas). followers of Kapila (Samkhyas). nay. 4! number of 'Buddhists from various provinces. and disputing. and that the vast majority of universities. perched on pillows. followers of (Vaise- Kamda shikas). religious students (Brahma/iarins). Lokayatikas (atheists). . the real of India was not lived in life However.KING HARSH A. raising doubts. adepts in grammar. 6rainas in white robes creepers. in perfect peace and harmony. all diligently following their own tenets. Now in the ask once more. it would seem. giving etymologies.' and all this. 6rainas. towns.with mendicants (Bhikshus orParivra#akas). followers of the Pa/l/taratras. or squatting on the roots of trees. from cities. adepts in sacrifices requiring seven priests. Even at present it should be remembered that towns are the exception in India. students of legal institutes. students of the Purcbias. and others beside. followers of the Upanishads (Vedantins). I a always the same from century to century ? Such life as here described may seem very strange to us. ($vetambaras). devotees dead to all passions. resolving them. and all the rest. is there any other country world of which a similar account could be given. life from palaces.

dreamers of dreams without which life would hardly be worth living. . but philosophers. As far back as we can trace the history of thought in India. and in the end the Upanishads themselves. from the time of King Harsha and the Buddhist pilgrims back to the descriptions found in the Mahabharata. the minute accounts of the Buddhists in their Tripi^aka. a society in which spiritual interests predominate and throw all material interests into the shade. a world of thinkers. / were not dreamers. and their Here the old sages were free to adjoining groves. let If they them be called necessary as a preliminary to a study of Indian philosophy as being throughout the work to me of the people rather than that of a few gifted individuals. meditate on the problems of life and on all that . in villages. An insight into this state of things seemed is nearest to the heart of man. and the hymns of the Veda. people live in the country. \ve are met everywhere by the same picture. a nation of philosophers.42 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the testimonies of the Greek invaders.

has been preserved to us.CHAPTER The Vedas. people it at the conclusion that very beginning of all find in the hymns of the Rig-veda the very songs of the morning stars and the shouts of the sons of ' jumped would bring us near to the things. having nothing whatNo ever to do in its origin with any litera scripta. it one has ever doubted that in the Veda we have the earliest monument of and. of in Aryan language and thought. There have been curious misunderstandings about this newly-discovered relic of ancient literature. But seeing that the Veda was certainly more ancient than anything we possess of Aryan literature elsewhere. IF after these preliminary remarks we look for the real beginnings of philosophy on the soil of India. if literature may be called. we shall is find them in a stratum as where philosophy yet from religion. in a certain sense. that is in the Vedas. during the long night of centuries. II. of these ancient hymns. chiefly by means of oral tradition. an almost miraculous way. and that we should God. turning out to be When . and long before the fatal divorce between hardly differentiated religion and philosophy had been finally accomplished. Aryan literature which.' many these expectations were disappointed.

Whatever the Vedas may be called. but neither can they be proved.C. as it always does after an excessive enthusiasm. though we should not forget that this is a constructive date only. however. and it was even hinted that they might be but forgeries of those very suspicious individuals. In the end. and real. It may be very brave to postulate 2000 B. and with little of positive beauty. they are to us unique and priceless guides in opening before our eyes tombs of thought richer in relics than the royal tombs of Egypt. from our point of view. as a is minimum date for the Vedic hymns. often commonplace. This 'too is a lesson worth learning. we are probably on safe ground. or novel truth. nay sometimes very commonplace. and that such a date does not become positive by mere repetition. natural. And . not with I what European philosophers thought ought to have been. or even 5000 B. and often. The Vedic hymns were looked on askance. very simple. they teach us that very useful lesson that the earliest religious aspirations of the Aryan conquerors of India were simple and natural. but with what is and has been not with what is beautiful. considering that we have no contemporaneous dates to attach them to.44 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the Brahmans or Pandits of India. and more ancient and primitive in thought than the oldest hymns of Babylonian or Accadian poets.C. but what gained by such bravery ? Such assertions are safe so far as they cannot be refuted. . a reaction set in. and the historian now sees that in the Vedas we have to deal. If we grant that they belonged to the second millennium before our era. the historical school has prevailed. very commonplace. but with what is true and historically If the Vedic hymns are simple.

THE VEDAS. of altars. whatever their these sense. sceptres and crowns. cities and libraries. the light of mankind. Babylonian hymns are thought than the very latest hymns Rig-veda. There are thoughts in those ancient Mesopotamian hymns which would have staggered the poets of tablets. the advanced civilisation at that time which they reflect. faces. ideas. for do not speak here of philosophical we have learnt by this time that they are of no age and of any age. and public squares. age. 45 when I say that the Vedic hymns are more ancient and primitive than the oldest Babylonian and Accadian hymns. that makes the Babyearly in more modern of the lonian hymns I so interesting in the eyes of the historian. not In that yet reached by the poets of the Veda.' of bronze and lead thou art the mingler.' thou art as strong bronze. We should look in vain in the ideas as ' ' Veda for such advanced ' deep/ is ' the holy writing of the mouth of the the god of the pure incantation.' thy will in I fill heaven and the angels bow their hand with a mountain of diamonds. all that I mean and could mean is that they contain fewer traces of an advanced civilisation than the hymns deciphered from cuneiform which we find mention of such things as temples in stone and idols of gold. in the Veda. Whatever may be the date of the Vedic hymns. such as their chief god being called the king of blessedness.' my of turquoises and of crystal. but in the progress All this of human thought these ideas mark a point.' ' ' made known or ' the wide heaven is the habitation of thy liver.' may be very old as far as the progression of the equinoxes is concerned. . &c. though I confess that it is that very fact.

nor would it be easy even now to prove a negative One of these agents to this view of the world. The Philosophical Basis of the Vedic Gods. as established in India in the second mil- lennium B.C. should grow strong and weak again every month or every year. Let us begin with the simplest beginnings. unless there was an possible to agent behind who controlled them. yet inseparable from Surya. an agent of fire and light. but they were natural thoughts. but of a lighter and burner. We may smile at such thoughts. is nay every word an authentic document in the history of the greatest empire. far superior to the oldest chronicles. in the eyes of the historian and the psychologist they will always retain their peculiar value. a Dyaus (Zevs) and an Agni (ignis).C. or vtnos). in them. It seemed im- them that sun and moon should rise every day. far superior to the most ancient inscriptions. They tell us something of the of which early growth of the no trace anywhere else. the enlivener. whether 1500 or 15000 B. What can be simpler than the simple conviction that the regularly recurring events of nature require certain Animated by this conviction the Vedic agents ? poets spoke not only of rain (Indu). but of a rainer (Indra). the empire of the human mind. they called Savitar as distinguished ('^L^TT/P. the . not only of fire and light as a fact.. for every verse. they have their own unique place and stand by themselves in the literature of the world. human mind we find Whatever aesthetic judge- ments may be pronounced on them. and there is certainly little of poetical beauty in them.46 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

we cannot watch it with our own eyes. while the creation of Dyaus. the sun. and in it we have application of the to recognise the only true solution of Indo-European mythology. light and sky. of Prithivi. and lastly the enlivening draught. Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophic. while more or less obscured in in all it the Big-veda as other religions. from a plant called Sorna or the enlivener. dark sky. The gods of the Vedic. and indirectly of all the Aryan people. the first law of causality. we can only guess at. Greek Helios. if we wish to understand the beginnings not only of Indian mythology and religion. a plant known to Brahmans and Zoroastrians before the In this way both the reseparation of the two. . 47 Soma. p. were the agents postulated behind the great phenomena of nature. then the moon which was supposed to send dew and rain. 1 requires neither hypothesis nor induction. and other such Vedic deities. 83. earth.' which originally all gods depended for their very existence. used for sacrificial purposes and prepared i. and deserve our attention. of Agni.' as Deussen truly says. or the activity attributed to the great natural phenomena. e. ' ' should in future talk about these things who does not know the liig-veda 1 The process on or . of Vanma. takes place were in the full light of day. from the heavenly. but of Indian philoNo one. fire. the personification of. same root Su.PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF VEDIC GODS. This was the beginning of philosophy. Whatever may have existed before these gods. can sophy also. and likewise of Aryan philosophy. the rain. Deussen. was likewise at first what enlivens. ligion and the mythology of the Vedic sages have a philosophical basis.

agent and as a masculine noun came first. To the earth belong Prithivi as active . as rising from the earth as well as from the sky. the agent of the sun Savitn'. of rain the Marutas. the agent of the bright sky and day Varu??a. To mid-air belong Indra. that of the mere objective sky. the agent of the sky Mitra. sphere in the giver its change between light and darkness. and several others connected with meteoric phenomena. called Dyaus. the agents of .40 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the agents of the . the agent of the dark sky and evening Surya. the first attempt at . . Dyaus. . . this hence To say that fetishism or totemism. as a feminine. . These gods were the first philosophy. those of the sky. We causes. At all need not be refuted before it has been Possibly the naming of the sky as an proved. Three Classes of Vedic Gods. . sometimes the Dawn also. the maiden of the dawn. the earth i Saras vat and Agui. There was the sky. . apparently there must be an agent. know now by what very satisfied simple process the Vedic Aryas how they the whole drama their earliest craving for created their gods. the agent of the enlivening or morning sun Asvinau. and divided of nature into three acts and the actors into three classes. . events. herself. active. it Aryan Theogony was preceded by a period of is simply gratuitous. those of To the first belong mid-air. the agent of storm and lightning. the agent of fire other rivers. the agent of the atmo. Vayu and Vata. the agent of the rain-cloud Iludra. and those of the earth. the twin agents of morning and evening Ushas. air Parr/anya. Dyaus. second. the storm-clouds .

of the earth. we can clearly see that it was not artificial or the work of one individual only. and marking the time of rain (Hyades). The gods. and different phenomena by the same agents. however. are triads clearly visible in nature. and sky. and night. They were less interesting to the dwellers in India. and winter. the philosophy of the race.. M. and of the clouds l . of the stars only. but they never rose to the rank of the high gods. Contributions to the Science of Mythology. but human was suggested by nature herself. mirrored in ancient mythology in every part of the world. Other Classifications of Gods. or the time for mowing (Krittikas). or again. such as were connected with human affairs. as gods of the sky. the was of course no settled same phenomena being often represented by different agents.OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS OF GODS. were noticed and named. spring. If we call this creation and likewise first classification of the Devas or gods. E . determining certain seasons. because they did not exercise the same influence on their daily life as they do in Europe. noon. Earth. There in this system pantheon. These triads are very different from the later number assigned to the gods. the return of calmer weather (Pleiades). morning. observe the absence of anything like star-worship in A few India among the Aryan nations in general. air. under different names and forms. 475. 49 It is curious to explaining the wonders of nature. Though the Devas are known in the Kig-veda and the 1 M. and therefore. had evidently been known before they were distributed into three classes. summer. p.

Even this taken by some scholars in the general sense of many. too. What we look for in vain in Veda are the names of seven Maruts or seven Hudras. plying them to . i. i. p. Indra. they are Agni. though possibly the as in a late verse. The seven Adityas. We can perhaps make out seven Vasus. may possibly be counted as Vanma. in the sky. the Marutas. 139. 1 1). . the Asvins and Iludra. the eleven Maruts. 2 3 Contributions. and Kig-veda X. We are told that they were the gods clouds (I. 122. 5. p. Bhaga. Daksha. Visve Devas. and in the or again that they wr ere Vasus. and Maruts number of each of these classes of gods seems to have been originally seven rather than eleven. the Adityas. and the twelve Adityas. we find no real tradition. and Tvash^rt. all this is A??isa. to which two other We 1 Satap. 28. times eleven replaced by the eight Vasus. . I. number of seven veda VIII. 3. we are told. like devanam bhuyishthsih but it is at all events recognised in the Higis '. 6. Aryaman. Mitra. meant for if. Vedanta-Sutras 28. Br. Avesta as thirty-three. 475. Adityas. XII. eleven . 3 but the Rudras. I doubt whether there is any physical necessity for this number '. Ushas. but when we ask who these three times eleven are. on earth. but see in fact the three very uncertain. 205.50 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but only more or less systematising theories. It seems rather due to a taste very common among uncivilised tribes of playing with numbers and multi2 We see the difficulty any extent experienced by the Brahmans themselves when they had to fill the number of thirty-three and give their Sometimes they are called three times names.

are different from other class-gods inasmuch as their number is hardly fixed. It means the gods to- gether. 'all beings together. but there is hardly one of the Vedic gods who does not at times appear as one of them. so that even the other classes (Ganas). as Taitt. Visva bhuvanani sarva. to bring their number up to the required thirty-three. not simply all the gods (omnes). was raised to twelve. such as Adityas. from Sarva. i. E 2 . Br. The Visve or All-gods. What is really important in these Visve is that they represent the first attempt at comprehending the various gods as forming a class. the exact number or names of these gods. Ill. Gesammtgotter (cuncti). in the sense of all the These Visve.' The Maruts are called Visve Mariita/^.THE VISVE OR ALL-GODS. having been taken for the solar light in each sucI look upon cessive month. though they belong to the class-gods (Gawas). therefore. all these attempts at a classification of the Vedic gods as due once more to the working of a philoIt is not so much sophical or systematising spirit. Vasus. 51 gods are added as leaders. Visva is all. the two words can be used together. that interests the philosophical observer. i. Indra often stands at their head (Indra^yesh^aA). The first sented by different step in this direction seems to be reprethe Visve or the Visve Devas. It would be endless to give the names of all Maruts together. In still later times the number of the Adityas. as the fact that attempts had been made at so early a time to comprehend certain gods under the same name. Sometimes. the gods who are praised in the hymns addressed to the Visve Devas.

Mitra and Varu?za. Tendencies towards Unity among the Gods.52 or INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Another god or goddess. that Agni not only acted with Indra or Savitn'. It is all the more curious that this important class. should have attracted so little attention hither- to. On other occasions three gods were praised as working together. or Agni. Hence arose a number of dual gods. rising in the morning. important not only for mythological but for philosophical and religious purposes also. culminating at noon. Soma and Gandharva. strides Aditi. were seen to perform the same acts. was identified with the sky and the air. the fifth volume of Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts. owing to their position in nature. and setting in the evening. such as Indra-Agni. while from another point of view. Mitra-Varunau. But while the first this conception of Visve Devas marks important approach from the many incoherent gods scattered through nature to a gradually more and more monotheistic phase of thought in the Veda. and hence a poet might well take upon himself to say direction. such as Aryaman. but they ought not to be ignored by those who are interested in the progress of the ancient mythological religions from given multiplicity to postulated unity. was . Agiii-Shomau. also the two Asvins. as an essential character of the godhead. other movements also tended in the same Several gods. Rudras may be comprehended under the wider concept of Visve. Vishnu with his three represented originally the same heavenly as being. They are passed over. but that in certain of his duties Agni was Indra and was Savit?^'. even in that rich treasure-house of Vedic Mythology. as a class.

46. 352 . which I wished to mark definitely by a name of its own. 53 and gods and the five races and the future. father. Rv. Ekam sat vipra/i bahudha vadanti. and it was this phase. Professor misunderstood was called all the of men. included the ideas of being one and without an equal. Agnim. Agni. I. Matarisvan. in The sages call that One Yama. if once clearly conceived. and. gods. so fully developed in the hymns of the Yeda. Matarisvanam ahuh. MONOTHEISM AND MONISM. they declared that there was behind all the gods that one (Tad Ekam) of which the gods were but various names. syncretism to address either Indra or Agni or . To it is identify Indra. 164. p. calling it Henotheism l . They thus arrived at the less distinctly more or conviction that above the great multitude of gods there must be one supreme personality. p. This phase of religious thought has been well described in fifth the same see . I. and Vanma is one thing. Weber has strangely he imagines that I designated this phase of religious thought as Henotheism.also volume of Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts. . called 'mother. Deussen. All these tendencies direction. Monotheism and Monism. the time being the only god in existence with an entire forge tfulness of all other Vanma. 104. was called the past son. Geschichte der Philosophie. is as for quite another . 1 many Agni.HENOTHEISM. after a time. they call it Yamam. if me Henotheism. worked together in one and made some of the Vedic poets see that the idea of god. ways.

Speaking as yet hymns i only. But we must never forget that is but a fragment.54 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and I confess that there is some excuse for it. the latter. In trying to trace religious the onward movement in the of and philosophical thought Veda. Kv. we have taining about ten verses. That One breathed breathlessly by itself. more have no right to suppose But and this collection in was that we have even a hundredth part of the religious and popular poetry that existed during the Vedic We must therefore carefully guard against age. because we possess in our Rig-veda-samhita but one hymn addressed to a certain deity. . we should of the recognise once for all the great difficulties with which we have to contend. as ive shall see. . made at different times systematically in some or less at random. respects. a monotheistic to a monistic philosophy. Anit avatam svadhaya tat ekam. but in others. X. 129. just as there was for looking upon Homer as the sole representative of the whole epic poetry of Greece. We different places. 2. tasmat ha anyat na para/j kirn fcana asa. such conclusions as that. Tlie former thought led by itself to religion. therefore that god was considered as less important or than other gods.o 1 collection of 7 in the Rig-veda a each on an average conhymns. was less widely worshipped This has been a very common mistake. and upon his mythology as the mythology of the the Ilig-veda whole of Greece. and represents the whole of Vedic mythology and religion even less than Homer represents the whole of Greek mythoIt is wonderful enough that logy and religion. other than it there nothing since has been.

Pra#apati. Nor can the hymns which have come down to us have been composed by one man or by members of one family or one community only they reach us in the form of ten collections (Manc?alas) composed. by an almost incredible. men. writing being perfectly unknown. nay often chaotic form. and says towards the end whether it should be. to what Deva. ya/i deveshu adhi devaA eka/i . is to us a fragment only. which is philosophy. between what has been called tentative monotheism. he should offer his sacrifice. I called Unknown God. Though there is great similarity. but the art of mnemonics being studied all the more as a discipline essential to intellectual life. however. What has come down to us of Vedic hymns. nay even monotony running through them. we must be told. Distinguishing therefore. we are . by different careful not to go beyond the evidence before us. 55 such a collection should have escaped destruction or forgetfulness. and tentative monism. Here the poet hymn asks in every verse to whom. which is religion. and we must be on our guard not limits assigned to us by to go beyond the the facts of the case. and very likely at different periods. there are differences also that cannot fail to strike the attentive reader. yet well attested process. as much as possible.PRAAPATI. which. In all such matters. 121. and abstain as much as possible from attempting to systematise and generalise what comes to us in an unsystematised. years ago. we can to the discover traces of the former in the famous the hymn X. when we keep in mind that the ancient literature of India was purely mnemonic.

and where it might seem natural to imagine a number of supreme gods. Aristotle already 1 remarked that. i. it was he \vho had made the sun to shine. T. Politics. thou art the maker of all things. O. At first.56 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as men have one king. we can watch a slow and natural satisfied progress. At the end the poet sums up by ' saying Visva-karma visvd-deva/i maha'n asi. V. in the demand for and in the supply of a supreme deity. Still all this would clans and tribes have the monistic craving for a time only.' The last word is difficult to if but its real purport becomes clear. whether Rar/ah or Maharajah. 5. . xviii. Here too. n). must be governed by one king gods however. Aristotle might no doubt have strengthened his argument by appealing to India where ever so many But had each their own king. He was called iS'atakratu. when (Rv. 89) Indra was to be praised for his marvellous deeds. or Abhibhu. 7 we 1 Arist. (all-god). 2. but this is demand here made by the poet all very different from the distinct for a god that should gods (Exod. VIII. thou art the great Visvadeva translate. as in Greece all demand It is other gods. p. each with their own limited supremacy. . with an entire forgetfulness that one only can be so be above Semitic . Muir. : and all-wise. that the ground for this lies deeper. the all-powerful the conqueror. &sit. for instance. S. they imagined that the . and also that the idea of oneness idea of is really involved in the God as a supreme and unlimited being. he who alone was god above gods/ Many of the ordinary gods are constantly represented as supreme. or for a father of gods and men.. I believe. for a god above much more like the (narrjp av8pS>v re 6t5>v re).

however. II. 5). 2. he is so here and there. and still more in Visvakarman. Indra. X. being supposed to have created even some of the gods. only that he did not rise to the position of a real creator of all things. their god above all gods.VISVAKARMAN. this is . 89. TVASHTRI. that there was already another maker. well known as the father of Saranyu and Visvarupa. we see the clear germs that were to grow into the one supreme As soon as Visvakarman was used as a subdeity. they All-maker. 57 remember what we saw before with origin of the Visve Devas. merely in consequence of that syncretism which identified Agni with ever so many (Rv. 1 10. nay. the 3). It The maker should not be forgotten. fact all that a Creator can such as Agni. 9). 17). called Tvashfrn. or creator of all things is the nearest approach to the one and only god of later times. as when he is addressed as having formed heaven and earth (X. He seems to have been too old. too mythological a character for philosophical purposes. i. He had all the requisites for becoming a supreme deity. god whose friendship the other gods were eager to secure (VIII. the had their Brahmans had what they wanted. reference to the Visvakarman.e. the maker of all things. He is in be required to be. 23. the Hephaestos. In such adjectives as $atakratu. He remained the workman. Tvashtfn. i. re/crew. stantive. If Agni himself is called Tvash^H II. and Brahmaviaspati (Rv. 7 . in fact. of the Vedic gods. as having begotten everything (visvam bhuvanam </a(/ana).

but more particularly with Tvash^ri'. this does not necessarily imply his identity with the god SavitH. but the word should in that case be taken as a predicate. This might also account for Indra's hostility to Tvashf?^'. his mythological character. and other ancient Devas. just as in other places he is praised as the nourisher or preserver of all One of the creatures. Ill. the simper of all things. gods. Tvash^r/ is sometimes but he never becomes. When Tvash^ri is called Savitrz. had himself supplanted the older gods. Those who so confidently identify Yama and Yami with Adam and Eve seem to have entirely forgotten In that Yama never had any children of Yami. but it is a mistake to suppose that as father of Yama and Yami he was ever father of Sara?iyu conceived as the progenitor of the whole human race. also that the We possibilities. as a new god. . such as Dyaus. it.58 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. considering that he (Indra). like Prar/apati or Visvakarman. enlivener. must be prepared for many such though I give them here as guesses only. given to Tvash^ri and It is to his son Visvarupa. Tvash^ri is best known as the and the grandfather therefore of the Asvins (day and night). and that we should take evil spirit. identical with Dyaus (Zeus) as has sometimes been supposed. a purely abstract 1 . p. as the sun (Rv. 1 Contributions. II. meaning the why he did not. points in the same direction. 560. name possible of Asura. become a supreme god and creator was his having belonged to a more ancient pre-Vedic stratum of causes gods. 55. 19). not in the sense of an but in the sense of an ancient daimon in which it is applied in other hymns to Varmza.

who is sent to act as hairdresser to Buddha. and no offspring. one supreme deity which led the Vedic priests to address their hymns to the Visve Devas or to Visvakarman as the maker for The same human yearning of all things. we can see from the fact that the Taittiriya Brtihmana ascribes the very acts here ascribed to Visvakarman to How Brahman 2 . 9. arms and feet.T. Br. as Visvakamma.S. originally a mere predicate. 2 Taitt. p. the support. 355. blows (forges) with his two arms and with wings. meaning This blowing has reference to the forge on which the smith does his work. 59 and in this we see the real difference between Tvash^H and Visvakarman. has no antecedents. deity . This name. X. which have a slight mythological colouring What was the stand. became with the Buddhists. O. 6 . 81. their fates ! The gods also have Search for a Supreme Deity. Visvakarman. induced them likewise to give a more personal character to Pra^/apati. like Tvashiri (Rv. while producing heaven and earth l .. Wings were used instead of bellows.SEARCH FOR A SUPREME DEITY. no parents. The work of Visvakarman is described in the following words.' vague and uncertain the personal character of Visvakarman was in Vedic times. Muir. from whence the all-seeing Visvakarman : ' produced by his might the earth and stretched out the sky ? The one god who on every side has eyes. mouths. II. the All-maker. At a later time. and not as a man. V. 1 and we must take care not to ascribe angels' wings to Tvash/rt or to any god of Vedic times. what and how was it. 4). Visvakarman. a merely subordinate spirit. 8. . unless he is conceived as a bird.

T. like all that is omitted in the Pada-text of the Rig-veda. will be seen that History of It has been ' have had but little Hymn . and though. this was I probably no excuse for omitting it. lie 2. i o. lord of creatures. the sea and all that in them is. But many first scholars take it as intended from the verse for the individualised god. index verborum is by no means infallible. Hirawyagarbha he was the one born lord of all that is. 390. In the beginning there arose the germ of golden light. I considered and still consider this verse as a later addition. gives strength . as I thought. very I doubt this still. howFirst of all my ever.60 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The whole hymn must have been. He who all gives who . of the mass of religious In the case of Pra^apati poetry that once existed. X.. is used in the Rig-veda as a predicate of several gods. and His later origin has been inferred from the others. had left out in my Index one passage. for very good reasons.S. and secondly our Samhita of the Rig-veda is but a segment. but to alter. probably a very small segment. who had made heaven and earth. fact that his name occurs but three times in the Rig-veda *. 121. whose comimmortality mand the bright gods revere whose shadow is 1 Muir. These arithmetical statistics should. my Ancient Sanskrit Literature translated I many times since. and I give therefore the translation of the hymn as I gave it in 1 ' 860. such as Soma. it 568). Savitri. the expression of a yearning after one supreme deity. V. . to the Unknown God. O. Pra</apati. He stablished the earth and this sky Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice? life. be used with great caution. 1. in (p.

the . he. because it seemed to me that. he who also created the bright and mighty waters Who is the god to whom we should our sacrifice ? which I treated as a later addition. He who by May he the righteous. and the earth firm. the two armies) standing firm by his help. he would not have asked. who the god was to whom sacrifice should be offered. He through he through heaven. or he. he who alone is god gave strength above all gods Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 9. and the sea. He through whose greatness these snowy mountains are. they say.HYMN TO THE UNKNOWN and mortality (gods and men) should offer our sacrifice ? 3. the distant river. trembling in their minds. thence he arose who is the sole life Who is the god to whom we should offer our 8. nay the highest light in the air sacrifice ? Who is the god heaven and earth (or. poets have their own ways. he who measured the to whom the sky is strong. offer not destroy us. sacrifice ? his might looked even over the waters. is my critics have evidently overlooked. he over whom the rising sun shines forth Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 7. holding the fire. he whose two arms these regions are Who is the god to whom He who we should offer our sacrifice ? 5. He to whom offer our When germ and generating of the bright gods the great waters went everywhere. GOD. 6l Who is the god to whom we through his power became the sole king of this and breathing slumbering world he who governs all. with the Kasa. who created the heaven. the creator of the earth. whom the heaven was established. at the end of every verse. man and beast Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 4. whom we should 6. if Pra^apati had been known by the poet as the god who did all this. Then follows the verse But the strongest argument against the which final verse. However. which and produced the sacrifice. look up.

M. Pnma. Theosophy. the monotheistic yearning was satisfied. developed into These names have had different fates in later times. spoils the It runs as follows : 10. maker VidhatH. one god. And what is curious is that we see the same attempt l Like Visvakarman and repeated again and again. though not.' . and character of the hymn. Skambha. Prar/apati we find such names as Purusha. Hira?iyagarbha. whatever names may have been given to him. 1 Even the gods of modern times M. support (X. . spirit . golden germ . or rise to the surface in the more modern pantheon of India others have disappeared altogether after a short existence. that lame and weak. . DhatH. even though all With the existence of other gods was not denied. therefore. and to the present day the religious wants of the great mass of the people in India seem satisfied . or have resumed their purely predicative character.7). no other but thou has held together all these things whatever we desire in sacrificing to thee. arranger Namadha. fact that this verse has not Padakara. breath. 81. through the idea of the one supreme god. the . But the deep in the which made Indian mind has groove they remained. I still hold. like Pra^/apati. '0 Pra^apati. pp. that it it is been divided by the was a later addition. exalted above all other gods. man . fullgrown divine personalities. all names for the Eka Deva. may that be ours. Some meet us again during the Brahmana period and in the Atharvawa hymns. name-giver of the gods. ovo^aToOerrjs and others.. 244 seq. may we be the lords of wealth.62 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. this conception of Pra</apati as the lord of created things and as the supreme deity.

was limited ipso facto. By the side of the stream of thought which we have hitherto followed. as neuter. originally was Brahman. are but new names for what embodied in the lord of created things (Prae/apati) and the maker of all things (Vi. we see in India another powerful movement which postulated from the more than a god above.s-vakarman). Tad Ekam. ATMAN. not even Pra^apati or Visvakarman. called by a personal and proper name. 164. We have now to take another step in advance. the author of which is called Dirghatamas. TAD EKAM. that is. It indeed full of obscure passages. i. first In the eyes of more thoughtful men every one of the gods. . as the primary cause of all created No name that expressed ideas connected things. such as Kali. p. as neither male nor female. Long Darkness. and thus we see that as early as the Yedic hymns it was spoken of as Tad Ekam. 63 such as /Siva and Vistmu. with the male or female sex. in his Allge- meine Geschichte der Philosophie. We come across it in the 1 hymn is of Dirghatamas (I. 1875) and more successfully by Deussen. Parvati. Atman. yet among. has been explained by Haug (Vedische Rathselfragen und Riithselspriiche. This hymn. and therefore not fit to fill the place which was to be filled by an unlimited and absolute power. Durga. In spite of their mythological disguises. that One. but it still contains much that has to be cleared up. these modern gods have always retained in the eyes of the more enlightened of their worshippers traces of the character of omnipotence that was assigned even in Vedic times to the one supreme god. other gods. where. nay goddesses even. the god above all gods. was considered as fit for such a being.BRAHMAN. 6 x ). 108.e.

There was then neither what is nor what is not. abyss (in which it lay)? . in the shape of the Unborn (masc. p. which One. being differently born. the poets call in many ways. form or the unborn. and tremble the One rules not.' Here we see the clear distinction between the is the One that is various gods. 54. that walks is flies. Mitra and Varuwa. who he was that established these six ' spaces of the world. The One is placed in the nave of the unborn where all beings rested/ Again in a hymn ' to the Visve Devas. Agni then (comes) the heavenly bird Garutman that : . over or all that is unmoving and that moves. 569.64 after asking INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. of which I likewise gave a translation in my History of Ancient Sanskrit It has been frequently Literature' (1859). the poet asks. the poet. though bearing the great gods . the and again between the One without is. says They keep apart all created things. Nasadiya Hymn. 82. Matarisvan. is ' the Unborn. i. and established the whole world. What covered ? Where was it. there was no sky.' The same postulated Being scribed in ' most fully de- hymn X. nor the heaven which is beyond. those or who the unmanifested. translated since. This One. 8. Yama. where we read mentioned also in X. 129.)?' ' This should be read in connection with : the famous forty-sixth verse They call (it) Indra. they call it Agni. III. 6. that named and the names. and in whose shelter ? Was the water the deep i. Was it perhaps the One (neuter). : when speaking of heaven and earth. but the meaning has on the whole remained much the same. that is.

Their ray which was stretched it is across. in 1859. in spite of much labour spent on them by eminent scholars. Even the question which in Europe was asked at a much later date. power below. But the step from a sexual to a sexless god. was it below or was there were powers. There was no death. other than it there has been nothing. 3. 65 2. above? There were seed-bearers. whether he made or did not forsooth make knows it. this creation arose. from whence was born this creation ? The gods came arose ? later than this creation. it who 7. which was the seed springing from mind poets having searched in their heart . Love overcame it in the beginning. and will above. 6. remain as obscure now as they were to me The poet himself is evidently not quite clear in his own mind. and he is constantly oscillating between a personal and impersonal or rather superpersonal cause from whence the universe emanated. 4. That One breathed by itself without breath. in the beginning all this was a sea without light the germ that lay covered by the husk. what is not. selfin it Who He then knows. where the Creator could have . the Highest Seer in the highest heaven.NASADIYA HYMN. found by wisdom the bond of what 5. There was no light (distinction) between night and day. that One was born by the power of heat (Tapas). . hence was there nothing immortal. he or does even he not know ? There are several passages in this hymn which. had evidently been made at that early time. then knows whence from whom . Darkness there was. from a mythological Trpcoros to a metaphysical irpw-rov. It is strange to meet with this bold guess in a collection of hymns the greater part of which consists of what must seem to us childish petitions addressed to the numerous Devas or gods of nature. who it has declared here. and with it the decisive step from mythology to philosophy had been taken.

8 1 was the support. 2 : must not. called simply Tad Ekam. that One. and who saw and fellow men. as if inspired by a power not themselves. howcould have become possible. from whence Visvakarman produced by his might . : ignorant in my own mind. Thus. whether religious or philosophical. what what and how was it. the poet says 'As a fool. or It Varu/ja. Soma. when surrounded by millions who never got tired of celebrating the mighty deeds achieved by such Devas as Agni. Rv. a TTOV o-rco found for creating the world out of matter or out of nothing. the all-seeing These startthe earth and stretched out the sky ?' of outbursts seem indeed philosophic thought ling to require the admission of a long continued effort of meditation and speculation before so complete a rupture with the old conception of physical gods and 4 'What was the stand. 5 and 6. proclaimed. and afterwards addressed by such dark names as Brahman and Atman. nor forget that there always have been priin vileged individuals whose mind was untrammelled by the thoughts of the great mass of the people.66 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. I ask for the hidden . not necessary that the historical progress of thought. measure every nation with the same measure. to declare that these gods were nothing but names of a higher power which was at first without any name at all. 167. had evidently passed through the minds of the Vedic seers when they asked. in I. should It is We have been exactly the same must we every country. Indra. truths far beyond the reach of their must have required considerable boldness. Savitr/. ever. X. The poets who utter these higher truths seem fully conscious of their own weakness in grasping them.

stretched the seven strings over the newborn calf . but strove to rise by their any own exertions out of the clouds of their foolishness towards the perception of a higher truth. the blood. nay even by many Jews and Christians to their Jehovah or God. : Who went to one In selves all this it is who proclaimed quite clear that the poets themthe great truth of the One. as the substance of all the gods. did not claim inspiration ab extra. Prar/apati is often identified with the year. the self? who knows. if endowed with personality at all. when he who had no bones him that has bones (form)? Where is the ver. between the visible and the invisible. had perceived in their heart what was the bond between what is and what is not. F 2 . in order to from the character of a mere Deva. The wise. and. then so far only as personality was necessary for will. from parentage and sex. between the phenomenal and the real. as they said. and hence also between the individual gods worshipped by the multitude. and it is certainly difficult to imagine how 1 strings This calf seems meant for the year.' Not having discovered I ask the sages who may have dis.NASADlYA HYMN. 347. 1 covered. in order to know six skies in the form of the unborn : he who supported the that was he perchance One?' ' And again in Who has seen (no form) bears breath of the earth. entirely free from mythology. v. to ask this ? ' 4 of the same hymn the firstborn. This was very different from the vulgar personality ascribed by the Greeks to their Zeus or Aphrodite. All this represented an enormous progress. and in the seven we might see a distant recollection of a year of seven . seasons see Galen. places of the gods ' 67 the sages. and that One Being which was . not knowing.

life without a long previous Brahman. That One. neither male nor female. it may be. which afterwards became so important as the two main supports of Vedanta-philosophy. or. poets had arrived at a conception of the Godhead which was reached once more by some of the Christian philosophers of Alexandria. One above Being. a Being raised high all the conditions and limitations of per- sonality and of human nature. if later on we meet with such questions as of . nay even by the name of In fact the Vedic Prar/apati. Matarisvan.68 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. in the midst of prayers and sacrifices addressed to a crowd of such decidedly personal and as mythological Devas as Indra and Agni and Still it was achieved and whatever rest. even at the same time. do not spring into incubation. many Such efforts had been made in the same direction. all is the the age when the collection was finished. but which even at present is beyond the reach of many who call themselves Christians. Before that highest point of religious speculation was reached. . and nevertheless the Being that was really meant by all such names as Indra. If then its various Meanings. it were. or Purusha. Agni. the name of the transcendent soul as used in the Sawkhya system. we find Bnihman used as another name what before was called Tad Ekam. could have been achieved at that early period and. names as Brahman and Atman. for chronology is very difficult to apply to the spontaneous intuitions of philosophical truths. it viction was had been formed that there of our Rig-veda-sawhita before that age that the conis but One. lord of creatures.

whence came these ? What did Brdhman mean so as to become l to signify rb ovroos ov ? It is curious to observe how lightly this question has been answered Brali. Dr. Muir starts from Brahman in the sense of prayer. Lastly. . is accident. Theosophy. and what meaning of growth and causes growth and welfare.' words difficult to render into intelligible 1 M. He then assigned to Brah- man the more abstract welfare. to swell it was said or to grow. man. have mostly thought. namely sacred songs.BRAHMAN. Haug. p. M. ' ITS VARIOUS MEANINGS. by Dr. Roth maincould have come to mean prayer. while with the ordinary change of accent Brahman means he who prays. 240. means prayer. are the elements. Gemiiths auftretende und den Goiter n zustrebende Andacht. ye knowers of Brahman ? Is time. so that originally it would have meant what swells or grows. however. or is Purusha to be considered the source ?' We names fit naturally ask. 1 confess I can see tained that Brahman expressed the . is necessity. 69 Was Brahman the first cause ? Whence are we Whither are we By what do we live hastening By whom constrained do we obtain born ? ? ? our lot in life whether of happiness or of misery. repeated the same view.. is the nature of things. no continuity in this string of Other scholars. and was derived from the root Barh or Bn'h. Here the first question seems to be how Brdhman Prof. and that of universal force as the Supreme Being. he assigned to Brahman the meaning of force as manifested in nature. ' force of will directed to the gods and he gave as the first meanDie als Drang und Fiille des ing of Brahman. first of all.

holy These are mighty strides of thought. when we are trying to discover the almost imperceptible transitions by which a root which expresses the idea of growing forth (Vriddhau). then sacred and divine a sacred or magic formula words. 245). came to supply a name for prayer as well as for deity. and without any analogies in the Veda itself. the fervid impulse of the will. opposed to ordinary language sacred wisdom. trace of such thoughts in the Veda. . according to him. there is if any. p. of the heart. Though the idea of prayer as swelling or exalted thought may be true with us. is English. they to be derived one from the other I Prof. the elevation of the mind.this is little more seems to me than what we mean by saying that they magnify the gods (Deussen.JO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Of course we cannot expect perfect certainty in a matter like this. Deussen (p. seem to be several missing links in the chain of meanings. the absolute or impersonal god. growing strong. but how are life .. Even if a more profound intention were supposed to be necessary for the word Brahman in the sense of prayer. This evolution of thought must have taken place long . increasing.' lifting up of the will above one's own individuality of which we become conscious in religious I must confess that here too there meditation. . bursting forth. c. there would be nothing to prevent its having originally grown out of Brdhman in the sense of word. of the prayers there are very matter-of-fact Most petitions. i o) sees in Brahman the ' prayer. 1. and all that has been said of the swelling little. lastly. as expressed by the word Brahman. decidedly modern. The second meaning. When it is said that the hymns make the gods grow (Vndh).

Cf. I. and admitted by uncertain are the intermediate links is connecting the two. to spread. lord of speech. however. 20. as we say. BHh. 2.2. 1 See /fAand. Up. as little as Brahma?^as-pati could have been possible without Brahman 1 . 7! the Vedic period. u. meant to grow. Br/h. though we cannot attribute much importance to the fact. fore. that BHmhati and . The next step to consider is the name BrihasWe must start from the fact that Brzhaspati pati. Hence Brihat means simply great (like great from I suppose. long before the Aryan Separation. We BHmhayati also w ere quoted by Indian gramr marians in the sense of speaking and shining.BRAHMAN. to break forth. tasya esha patih va&am brahma * ity upasate. 2. vag ghi br/hati. and that word has been conceived as that which breaks forth. strong Barhish^a. strongest. before ITS VARIOUS MEANINGS. an utterance (Ausdruck). or is uttered. to grow. broad. that Vn'h or which I take to be a parallel form of VHdh. 3. That Brahman means prayer is certain. should note. . all. yo . Unless Brih had once meant speech. and VII. long before the final constitution of the Aryan language of India. is synonymous with Ya/ias-pati. I. and I can say no more. growing). it would have been impossible to form such a name as Br/has-pati. and we should never We can but guess there- forget this in trying to traces which the earliest steps the faint interpret of the human mind have left on the half-petrified sands of our language. ' ' Here we can see that speaking could originally have had the meaning of uttering. to come forth. What is equally certain. and that the root BHh meant to grow.

Divyadasa Datta quotes a passage from the YogavasishMa Brahmavn'wihaiva hi ^agarj. holy wisdom to the source of that wisspeech. corresponding In that to a possible Sanskrit Vw'h-a or Widh-a. we can easily understand how the general concept of word was specialised in the sense both of sacred utterance or formula and of . whether in speech or in nature now comes a much more perplexing question. suppose therefore I say no more that Brdhman meant force or even germ. they are known to in us. what broke forth. of a force that will manifests itself in audible become easy to understand how also. the word or speech. Word. ^/aga/c A'a brahmavnwhanam 1 : ' (Vedantism. But if I am Brdhman the it original meaning right in seeing of what breaks forth. If we have arrived at this. or shone forth. We need not suppose that it had to ascend a scale first from holy word. l . so far as it bursts forth. From this point once gained I make the next step and suppose that Brdh-nlan was formed to express what was uttered.72 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. prayer lifting without any idea of swelling meditation or up of hearts. . p. Bnh and Brahman. that is. from the very beginning though in a different direction. Brahman could dom. We may But It can hardly be doubted that Vrih or BHh is a parallel form of VHdh and it is a well-known fact that both . so alien to Vedic poets. 28). the absolute god. such as . the Latin vei'bum and the German Wort can be regularly derived from the same root. have been used as a name of that universal force which manifests itself in the creation of a visible universe.

but in the face of well-known facts he added Without wishing to give a de' : In the Rig-veda we have only va'/ca/i words. 26. even after Colebrooke's remarks. and by whom all things were made.' remarks on it. the utterer. that was with God. 2 After reading Colebrooke's proceeding from him early as 1805. So far we on safe ground.' IX. p. as two Brahma^as i. and brahman are still as the speaker. remained still undecided. But Colebrooke and other Vedic scholars have often pointed out the fact that in the Veda already we find a goddess Va&. which. Professor ' Weber in his 'Indische Studien. the lord of This Va&. was 'the active power of Brahma. 3. occurs frequently in Eig-veda. 28. The important question. . IX. I. pati/i as II. however. 473. or whether it was an idea that sprang up independently in both countries.Bfl/H AND BRAHMAN. X. and again patiw vaA'a/i. was whether this idea of the creative Word was borrowed by the Greeks from India. 2 1 pate. 166. This is a question the answer of which must lead to the most far-reaching consequences.h man also may be taken as a direct deriuttered vation in the sense of the word. WORD. gyeshtharag&m Miscellaneous Essays. and in the present state of our knowledge I should not venture to go much beyond. published an article with the object of showing that the Logos-idea had no antecedents in Greece to account for it. as Colebrooke pointed out as speech. &c. speech. brahma^as pate. or by the Indians from Greece. 73 case Brd.' This was certainly a startling assertion. which we met in Va&as-pati and BHhas-pdti *. . 4. few Sanskrit scholars could help being reminded of the Logos or the Word that was in the beginning. brahnia^am. 23.

she obtained the highest position. the surmise is obvious. being identified with the absolute Brahman.. While Professor Weber had asserted that the Logos appears in Alexandria without any preparatory steps.' Professor Weber's somewhat have thus given a correct account of vague yet startling assertion. be ignored. but there are dissimilarities also which ought not I hope I to To say nothing else. considering the close relations at that time existing this on between Alexandria and India. without entering on any useless controversy.74 cision INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and that involves more than a difference of grammatical gender.' He simply on account of the invigorating influence which the gods were believed to derive from the hymns.' that the facts of the case lead us to a very If I different. that the goddess of Speech was conceived as furnishing to Pra^/apati the strength of creation. particularly in the shape of Om. question. ' India. no doubt. I have tried to show in my ' Lectures on Theo- sophy. VaA' is a a feminine. . that the Alexandrian Logos idea had no antecedents in Greek philosophy. that the growth of this Neoplatonic idea was influenced by the like views of the philosophical systems of that it may have been says again. There are. leaving classical and Sanskrit scholars to form their own conclusions. similarities. though at last. nay to the very opposite opinion. it was because I thought it better to state the facts as they really are. but was influenced by the Vedic VaA. Logos masculine. did not enter on a discussion of the arguments which prove the absence of antecedents of the Alexandrian Logos idea in Greek to were intended philosophy.

In all this I thought It is that facts would speak far better than words.' I had said before. and the Logos also ? Then the question arose. and the claims of India and Greece would be equal so far as the original idea Word. was there at least a between Charis and the Haritas. when she has become the wife of Hephaestos. Logos. the red horses Dawn' (p. was concerned. The Historical Antecedents of the . we must here also admit that what was possible in India was possible in Greece likewise. 75 I did my best to point out these very steps leading to the Logos. WORD. stands completely cannot claim for it any historical relationship with the earliest Greek philosophy. of the Vedic is of the Haritas. between As there were no linVaA. even in that embryonic form in which of the ' ' we by find itself. as a potentia of the absolute Being. I arrived in the end at the conclusion. it in We the Upanishads. p. Real Indian philosophy. 79). such as exists guistic indications whatever in support of such a view. between Zeus and Dyaus. 384. that striking as are the coincidences between the Vedic Va& and the Greek Logos. The two are as independent of each other as the Greek Charis. and that we have no evidence to support us any further conclusions.BtfTH AND BRAHMAN. add was careful to true Professor Weber that quite in 1 Theosophy. which are very well known to every up student of the early history of Greek philosophy If I have succeeded in this. the presumption in 1 . favour of any Indian influence having been exercised on the philosophers of Alexandria. would fall to the ground of itself. distant relationship.

p. rejoicing always before him. as the companion of Pra(/apati 2 . is made to say. 30. The Eternal possessed me in the beginning of his way. the Purvapaksha and the Uttarapaksha. Theosophy. viii. would require a far stronger lever to lift and to remove the weight of evidence on the other side than the arguments hitherto brought forward. It is easy to state the pros and cons. The historical consequences of such an admission would carry us very far indeed. coincidences between VaA.or from the 0. 22. viii. Sophia. i). . would not have been revived. and I was daily being his delight.76 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.' While in the Kanaka we read of VaX* impregnated by Pra</apati. and the Sophia of the Old Testament 1 might have been adduced. in Prov. had derived their information from him. M.. 381. and it . I was by we read of Va& ' him. for as Wisdom.' But with all this I cannot admit that there is any evidence of borrowing or of any kind of in- between Indian and Greek philosophy. as one brought up with him . and I should have thought that after the historical antecedents of the Logos and the Logoi in Greece had been clearly laid open. If 1 M. 2 KAMaka 12. the idea of the Greeks teraction having borrowed their Logos from Vedic VaA. 5 (27. T. the conclusion. we read ' in Prov. but the both are meant in the end to lead on to Even stronger Siddhanta. ' the clause that he did not intend to give any opinion on this question/ hut after such a confession it is hardly becoming to hint that those who have given an opinion on this question. before his works of old.

can teach or influence a philosopher. without a perfect knowlanguages. Has he left any trace of Chinese thought. Every indication of a possible intellectual intercourse between Greeks and Hindus in ancient as well as in more modern times. the difficulties of an interchange of thought. has been carefully noted and strongly urged of late. pher becoming a proficient in the philosophical ledge of the We language of India in the case of Hiouen-thsang. accredited by membership in the ruling race. but the position of the Christian missionary in India. whether derived from Confucius or Lao-tze. nothing beyond mere possibilities of an exchange of religious or philosophical ideas between Greece and India has as yet been established. It seems not to have been perceived that an exchange of philosophical thought is very different from an adoption of useful arts. have left some imprint of Christianity and European philosophy on the native mind. or articles of trade whether jewels. in India ? Modern missionaries. why should they not have adopted any of the consequences that followed from East and West. coined money. particularly for ancient times. may. 77 the Greeks had really borrowed their idea of the Logos from India. is very different from what the position of a few Buddhist .EAST AND WEST. no doubt. if unsuccessful in conversions. it ? This requires some fuller consideration. are far greater than we have an instance of a foreign philosoimagine. astronomical observations. or It is only a philosopher that clothing materials. such as alphabetic writing. wood. but I feel bound to say that. and even in the cases of two such men meeting.

to point out coincidences between Kapila and Zenon. priests. such as kings. but let him try to discuss metaphysical questions.78 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. But long before that time both Greeks and Hindus had invented many tilings. and could not here. we must be is marriages and funerals. ideas in common. If then in India as well as in Greece with similar philosophic ideas. without our having to imagine that there was at that time any exchange of ideas we meet between the two countries on such points. or even to translate a book of Vico's into English. as. for instance. but it is even more interesting to point out the shades of difference in cases where . Pythagoras. no doubt. numbers. and India by Alexander the Great. Persia. though. or Kanada his Anus from Epicurus ? It is interesting. with a name meaning atom and with the atomic theory. A courier may be very conversant with French or Italian. Plato and Aristotle. times. whether in Persia. assumed no importance till we come to the invasion of Asia Minor. should we suggest at once that Epicurus must have borrowed his atoms from Kanada. Later contact between Indians and Greeks. That there was a time when the ancestors of the Aryan speakers had the same language and held many of their mythological and religious names and no longer doubted. even monks could possibly have been in ancient if they had reached Alexandria. and it will be perceived what difference there is between an interpreter and a philosopher capable of discussing religious and metaphysical problems. even satisfied with names. and learnt to speak and converse on certain subjects in Greek or Egyptian. common expect mythological speculations. and seasons. Asia Minor or Greece.

but if traced back to its origin. is very different from that of Pythagoras and other philosophers. evaporates completely. At first sight it is certainly startling. Kama. least of all as a name of the teacher Buddha. well ? If the Vedanta could why not the Eleatics as And yet where is there a trace of such a philosophical theory as the absolute identity of (the Self). there was a more real intercourse even between philosophers of Greek and Indian origin. besides being borrowed from the Veda. The belief in transmigration among the Buddhists. both civilised uncivilised. what is good. 79 they seem most to agree. after the establishment of a Bactrian . is best exhibited by the often attempted identification of the names of Pythagoras and Buddha-guru.EAST AND WEST. Who would see to be found in Greek philosophy ? more than a very natural coincidence between the Atman Sanskrit triad of Dharma. and deed spread has been shown very clearly by my old is what useful. North of India. but no one would venture to accuse either Greeks or Indians of borrowing or of theft on such evidence. love. It is quite true that after Alexander's conquests. TO. in the and and kingdom. virtue. The real character of most of these coincidences between Greek and Hindu philosophy. and Brahman (the absolute being). word. Artha. Buddha-guru does not occur. -fjSea friend Professor Co well and others. o0eAi/ia 3 How is what is pleasant ? the triad of widely thought. wealth. while ascetic practices were certainly not confined to either India or Greece. and whether as a common it Aryan name or as borrowed. First of all. and the Platonic TO. and TO. Pytha could never be the same as Buddha. KaXd. elaborate an ideal Monism. or Goras as Guru.

as early as the Veda. native wood-architecture for instance. The later influence which Christianity is supposed . than this much Kama on the back of a parrot. Skanda. >Siva. shows as clear surviving traces of as. which With regard to require more convincing proofs.8o INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. heads. howIndia. were anthropomorphic. that too may be admitted.e. and Visakha. Indian coinage. 1897. coins. nor is there any reason to doubt that the idea of temples or monasteries or monuments. on the back of a parrot. it should be observed that the three gods mentioned by Patafkjrali as used for commerce. built and carved in stone. We earlier are now Greek in possession of specimens of workmanship in India. V. cf. on coins. But even he brings forward coincidences. even when a in stone. 3 99 provided that Visakha can refer to Kama and many of the 5 > shooting his arrows ? It cannot be doubted that the art of coining money was introduced into India by the Greeks. but he was very different from the Kama. came from Greece. the Lycian tombs. Psm. i. facts bearing on this subject have been very carefully put together by Count Goblet d'Alviella in his Ce que I'lnde doit a la Grece. had legs and arms. and the absence of workable stone in many parts of India would naturally have been unfavourable to a development ever. The Hindus had a god of love in the Veda. while some of the Indian architecture. are the very gods found on the earliest Mauryan coins. and if the images of Indian gods and even of Buddha on ancient may be supposed to have favoured idolatry in Indian gods. imaged on more modern coins as an archer sitting of sculptured idols. noses and eyes.

that they should learn to translate both Sanskrit and Greek before they venture to compare. it may belong to the end of the Upanishadperiod. it would have to be referred to a much later period than that which gave rise to the six systems of philosophy. 167. for.e. D. as the late Professor Telang maintained. But iteration yields no strength to argument. he even knew that he had 1 See Goblet d'Alviella. and . does not help us much even as indicating the way by which the idea of the Creative Word could have reached Clement of Alexandria or Origen. It should not be forgotten j that as the Bhagavad-gita bears the title of Upanishad. and we are as far as ever from being able '^ point to any historical channel through which the legends of Christ or Kn'srma could have to travelled. these startling similarities between Krishna and Christos have been pointed out again and again. can account for of those them.EAST AND WEST. and may. one can deny the similarities. if it should be admitted at all. I believe. If Damascius tells us that there were Brahmans l we must not forget that this living at Alexandria refers to the end of the fifth century A. such but no one. p. nay even before. have been rightly warned by native scholars themselves. Some who have been most anxious to gather coincidences between the Bhagavad-gitsi and the New Testament. G .. be older even than the New Testament. to have exercised in 81 originating or in powerfully influencing the sectarian worship of K?'istma does not concern us here. Ever since the beginning of Sanskrit studies. I.. No as they are. That Clement of Alexandria knew the name of Butta is well known.

according to Eusebius. had preached the Gospel in India. under an Indian sitting fig-tree (faux religiosa) has nothing whatever in with Nathaniel sitting under a Palestinian common fig-tree. I have treated of them on ' several occasions. are story of Buddha The repeated again and again. particularly by their number. Some of the coincidences between Buddhism and Christianity are certainly startling. without our dragging in what has no power of proving anything-. which have been proved to be anything but real coincidences. such arguments as have been used to establish a real exchange of thought between India and Europe in ancient times. No critical historian would listen for one moment to the similarities to startle New Testament. been taken a god. that Pantaenus who. or that their opinions were influenced by a few Indian travellers staying at Alexandria who cared for none of these things. On this point we owe a great deal to students of ethnology. who have pointed out coincidences quite as startling between the religious and philosophical folklore of uncivilised and civilised faces. was one of the teachers But all this is far from proving that of Clement.' but the same coincidences.82 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but in several cases they exist on the surface only and are not calculated to carry conviction on one side or the other. without venturing to suggest any borrowing . and the parable of the Prodigal Son scriptures in is in the surely very different in spirit Buddhist from that There remain quite sufficient and perplex us. for be forgotten. for the last time in my paper on Coincidences. Nor should it Clement or Origen was able to study the VedantaSutras or the Buddhist Abhidharmas.

C. D. Alexandria was known by name. as Alasando. very characteristically from the Persian bridge. community of origin. Again. Thomas' travels to India. had its antecedents as far back as the and is matched by a similar Veda. G 2 . was certainly a missionary religion quite as much as Christianity was at a later time. 177. 3 Theosophy. Le Comte d'Alviella. p. All this is true. is mentioned in the legend of St. has been authenticated on Indo-Parthian coins as Gondoof name King Gondaphoros. or 83 any historical bridge.. Besides. and possibly. p. p. and vice versa. Nor should phares.. it is well known that the creation of the world by the Word has been discovered .e. such channels were there neither mountains nor seas would have formed impassable . 168. The which seems so peculiar to the Persians. for instance. who name of his nephew Abdayases. and shows that the way between Alexandria and Benares was wide open in the first century A. barriers. a similar . that of Vasu Deva as Misdeos. as I pointed out. No doubt. 383. for it differs also. Levi.EAST AND WEST. On the other hand. likewise the 1 Contributions to the Science of Mythology. S. This should serve as a useful warning to those who are so fond of suggesting channels through which Indian thought might have influenced Palestine or Greece. I. Buddhism. 2 4 Theosophy. to century the author of the the Mahavamsa 4 . according to M. among so low a race Klamaths 3 but no one has ventured to say that the two accounts had a common origin or were as the borrowed one from the other. bridge. as early as the third B. bridge among the North American Indians 2 I say.

but they leave the question which concerns us here totally untouched. unless ment of India is once more to be revolutionised. and of a Buddhist some of the highest philosopher. and yet we are as far as ever from having discovered a Greek or Indian go-between in flagrante delicto. discussing together problems of philosophy and religion. They may point out Manichaean sect in whence these heresiarchs derived their wisdom.S'akya the Scythian. but we could not expect any bond jide historian to accept any one of them as a proof of a real influence having been exercised by Greece on India or by India on Greece. All this is possible. Though the no trustworthy chronology. Gorres. a name of Buddha. the whole structure of the literary developstill. or still have been amenable to Indian schools of thought might have gratefully received fresh impulses from the West. Bodda and Zarades Babylon. We have before us ever so many possibilities. but no more.84 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. was right when he looked 1 a similarity It has been suggested that Scythianos may have been an adaptation of . nay even probabilities. have been forgotten that in the Dialogues between Milinda and Nagasena we have a well authenticated case of a Greek king (Menandros). literature of India has we can hardly imagine names as that the occurrence of such (Zoroaster) among the followers of Mani. and Terebinthos may contain traces of Thera (elder). would help us to discover the secret springs of the wisdom of Kapila or Buddha /SVikya Muni. . or that of Terebinthos the the very founder of the pupil of Scythianos l . in spite of for all his mysti- cism. at a time when Greek philosophy and religion might Eastern guides. All this is true.

though he philosophy. applied it wrongly. worship of trees and ancestors. Ind. Vivartate*rthabhavena prakriya gag&to yatha. like the evolution of the world. p. they might as well the discovery of one coin with the name of Augustus on it is a more convincing proof of Roman influence in India than the discovery of pieces of uncoined gold. It is the same as in ComThere may be ever so many parative Mythology. we could not admit it without admitting at the same time a community of thought. and of deep philosophical thought. is indeed ' Brahman. To return to the origin of the word Brahman. at a period There is a curious passage in Bhartnhari's BrahmakawcZa which seems to identify Speech and Brahman. is more convincing than all of them taken together. but one such equation as Dyaus = Zeus. in the sense of speech. l Tempting as the distant relationship between Bra'h- ever so many man and ~Brih.' .. similarities between two mythologies. See Sarvadarsana-sangraha. which is the eternal essence of speech. belief in spirits and visions in sleep or dreams. with verbum and Word may be. Sphotekhyo niravayavo nitya/i sabdo brahmaiveti. 1 140: Anadinidhanam Ibrahma sabdatattvam yad aksharam. Bibl. such as changes of men and women into animals or plants. in technical terms in order to establish 85 an Indian influence on Greek or a Greek influence on Indian His principle was right. Brahman without beginning Equally strong is the statement of Madhava himself. ask why If people ask why. Is changed into the form of things. The eternal word which is called Spho^a and does not consist of parts. or end.EAST AND WEST.

as a name of the TrpvTov KIVOVV. 125. who never required any prayers at all.86 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the of those who merit worship the 4. who hears what is spoken. on the sacrificer who presses Soma. staying with many. : Va& took in the as saying ' : wander with the Vasus and the Kudras. also in Atharva-veda IV. 2. I am knowing. and also for men . the gatherer of riches. . I support Agni and the two Asvins i. I shall first of all subjoin here a few passages from the hymns. 30. for I him . I . need not have passed through a stage when Brdhman meant prayer only. I wander with the Adityas and the Visve Devas. I bestow wealth on the zealous offerer. lie By me it is that he who sees. I. eats food without . gods have thus established me in many places. he who breathes. they rest on me. I support Tvashfr't and Pushan and Bhaga. . that is. first the queen. Soma. the Universal Spirit. good love. prayer. knowing 1 it. what whomsoever this. speaking in her own name. thee what believe. and that Brahis man. the Brahma?ias and Upanishads Va. I support Mitra and Varima both. (?) even I myself. could not have assumed the meaning of the object of prayers. is introduced in hymn X. one and is all ! tell 5. say gods. previous to the Aryan Separation and we certainly have no evidence sufficiently strong to support so What we may carry away bold a hypothesis. I support the swelling (?) 3. speech. In order to show what direction the thoughts connected with Veda. from a consideration of the facts hitherto examined that in India itself Brahman. I Hear. entering into many.

him a sage. I hold earth I 011 . indeed spread forth like the wind. showing that those who uttered it had not yet ceased.. 148). where we meet with some important remarks showing that language formed an But object of thought even at that early time. 6. I bring forth the this world. G. approaching to the conception of the Word as a creative power. my height. no doubt. as yet. like ourselves. and eloquence is celebrated as a precious the existence of such a thing as language. This is. meet with such observations as that words We were made in the beginning in order to reveal what before had been hidden. all from thence spread over beings. make formidable. I 87 a Brahman. 71) which is very obscure and has for the first time been rendered more intelligible by Professor Deussen (A. beyond the sky. I bend the bow for Rudra (the storm-god) that his arrow may strike the hater of Brahman I make . . sifting as by a sieve the coarsely ground flour.' is there any trace in these utterances of the thoughts that led in the end to the conception of the Greek Logos? There is another hymn (X. to wonder at The struggle for life that is going on among words is alluded to by saying that the wise made speech by mind (Manas). . p. an important thought. him I make him a Rishi. for the people. beyond the ask such have I become through my greatness. The power of speech is greatly extolled.EAST AND WEST. war and 7. P. I have entered both heaven father (Dyaus) on the is earth. (my ?) summit of in the sea my I origin in the waters. here also there is nothing. to lay all things. and touch yonder heaven with 8.

They may be Sec Deussen. holding men by his words (Sabhasaha). 12. the knowledge of the origin of things.. One of the most startling is found in a verse inserted in the Purusha- hymn. All shout when the eloquent man apthe assembly subdued or spellbound pears. p. The knowledge of all things or. addressing I know them. and names by Aoyof. rests. is We meet with passages of a very similar character. and having made their given ' in the Taittiriya-aranyaka (III. which can be so clearly read in the Greek word Logos. in various parts of the Brahmanas. when on the verge of darkness.' Here we have only to translate forms by e'i'Sr). he.e. the wise.88 gift. taught by the Brahman. nay he is supposed to remove all sin and to procure sustenance for his friends. we look in vain for the clear and definite idea that language and thought are one. in this But although we can discover hymn an appreciation of the mysterious nature of speech. . 290. nor do we find more than slight anticipations of the Neo-platonist dogma that the creation of the universe was in reality an utterance of the hidden thoughts and words of the Deity.17). after having thought all forms. I. The following passages will give some idea of what was thought in India about mind and language and their mutual relation. both word and thought. and we shall not be very far from the world of thought in which Plato and Aristotle 1 moved. that great sun -coloured Punish a. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Mind and Speech. as Deussen says.

for Va& was his. mind the Ya^/ur-veda. neut.. I. 21 and from Va& Visvakarman (the all-maker) begat ' : living beings. and men. Up. breath the sky. Ar. and there arose from the water an egg which he touched and commanded to multiply. 3 mind. i. $atap. speech the gods. He then entered the waters with Brahman. this world.' first Brahman. neut. but they show at all events that a good deal of thought must have been expended by the early thinkers of India on this problem. $atap. The same are the three Vedas. 14. &c. that is. created the : waters out of Va& (speech). 2. Up. and Va& was his own. speech the Eig-veda. ancestors. the nature of speech and the relation between speech and thought. I.' ~Brih. the threefold Veda. speech is : 'The Atman consists of There are also the three worlds . 5. mind the ancestors. breath men. 17 'This world in the beginning : was Atman (Self). speech. 24 : 'He desired. the three' Pra(/apati alone was this. VII.MIND AND SPEECH. i 'Pra^apati. for she will go and become all this. That was created (sent forth). let a second body be born of me. : Paft&avimsa Brahmana XX. He desired. i. . The same are gods. 2 this Va&. alone and lonely.e. i.' The unborn is Va/j. Ar. Let me create (send forth) second. 5. Brahm. breath the Sama-veda. mind the air. Va& as the He thought.). after having created the Veda (Brahman. and breath. 89 vague and mystical.' And ibid.' Bn'h. Brahmana VI. I. Then from the egg there arose fold Veda. and he (death or hunger) embraced speech with his mind. 4.

. are certainly vague. Sutras I. because they sprang from different minds without any prearranged system but tbey seem to me to show at all events that thought and language must have occupied the philosophers of .' And to quote but one passage from the /Santi-parva. 3. and often contradictory. breath the or very similar and often contradictory Thus we read in ideas occur in later works also. Manu 2 1 : 'In the beginning he (Brahma) fashioned from the words of the Veda.' >Sa??ikara. . more correctly. are no doubt later than the Brahma?(as. beginning without Vidya (knowledge. eternal. Manas (mind) child. and chaotic. when treating of Sphofa (word). speech the wife.90 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. quotes from the He with his mind united himself with speech. consisting of Veda. to which many more might be added. ' : of all beings and the procedure of of all acti\'ties. 1. 4 ' ' : : ' activities proceeded And again In the beginning Mahe. 28. the clan of Manu. w as sent (speech) forth by Svayambhu. . Maha- bharata. The same I. without beginning or end.' The Laws Manu. 1 Vod. of the Manavas. and conditions of all things.' and he adds an important verse from some Snu'iti In the beginning divine Va&. from which all shall we Br/h. I May have a wife .svara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms . the self-existent. was uttered by Svayambhu. Up. These utterances.' is the Self. or. the several names. Ar. Vedas. works. but they often contain old thoughts. of which : 8533 'In the r 1 have to treat further on. 2. Speech. Sophia) beginning or divine Va& of the the end.

and even in later times those of modern Europe. for what thou knowest I make known. II. and Pra</apati decided in favour of Mind. 'A dispute once /S'atap." : They went to appeal to Pra^apati for his decision. that trary lord of speech looks up to the mind. and since thou art only an imitator of what is done by me and a follower in my wake. But that ancient chapter of thought which lies beyond . Vag vai Brahma). and the mind runs after them.MIND AND SPEECH. but tried hard to discover whence it and what was we read in the true relation to thought. i. 262) we read on the conihen the lord of speech was produced. 9! India far more than they did the philosophers of Greece. 10." surely better than thou. I. 5. this also serves to show that at all events these early guessers did not accept language simply as a matter of course. And if some of them assigned the first place to thought and others to speech. ' : are words produced. Br. 4. verily.' ' In the Anugita (p. as most of our modern philosophers are so apt to do.' Some of the Brahmanic thinkers say in so many words that Speech is Brahman ($atap. I communicate. "I am excellent. 8 its : came Thus the better of the two. Br. First. took place between Mind and Speech as to which was Both said." Surely I am better than thou. for thou dost not speak anything that is not understood by me. 4. I am Mind said " : " Speech said Surely I am better than thou. and the co-existence of Brthaspati and Brahma/zas-pati could hardly have failed to suggest to them the identity of Brahman and BHh ful in the sense of speech. just as every thought- Greek must have known that there was a reason why Logos meant both word and thought. &c.

239). the Urgrund der it der zum Heiligen. Brahma \ No doubt in those dark fore passages through which words passed silently bethey emerged into the full light of literature. which. He calls given currency. in all. I prefer to begin with Brahman as a synonym of B?vh in Br/haspdti. we may often fail to discover the right footsteps of 1 Tuitt. and from prayer came to mean he who is prayed to. 17. whether ritualistic or unpremeditated. but which certainly requires a fuller Instead of beginning with the spejustification. whether as a neuter. reluctant to differ on such a point from Professor Professor Deussen holds that Brahman Deussen. the childhood of all philosophy is for ever lost to us and can be reconstructed by conjectures only. though they produce conviction in some minds. II. 7. cialised meaning of prayer. that which is the universal support (Skambha) or force (Daksha). meaning word or speech. in fact the Brdhman. such as we find it afterwards. i. Gottlichen Wille des Menschen. for more popular purposes. Brahman. and to admit by the side of it another Brahman. I all these scattered indica- cannot bring myself to accept the evolution of the various meanings of the word Brahman as I am particularly elaborated by former scholars. which is much emporstrebende the same idea to which Roth and others have Welt. . cannot be expected to produce the same Taking into account tions. as a masculine.Q2 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. had a ritualistic origin (p. meaning that which utters or drives forth (Pra/t-yavayati) or manifests or creates. Br. or. and then rising to the object of prayer.

5 . 23. I. and the two together may be called the two pillars on which rests nearly the whole of the edifice of Indian philosophy. 4. by assigning to Bnihman the rb TrpcoTov final meaning of TO 6V. 8. every (created) thing. 2. i The Brahmam who is wise and recognises all things to be in the Atman. ' of the Apastamba-S&tras.ATMAN. 23. Atman. bnt not yet as definite systems of philosophy. : at the end of the Vedic period. KLVOVV. 8. Apastamba-Sutras. TO 6Vro>y 6V. as the cause of the world. as not one corresponds fully and exactly to the character of Brahman as developed in the history of the Indian mind. 93 their progress. we read. 8. and we must be prepared for differBut the really important point is ences of opinion. that on which all scholars agree.' indeed in heaven And in the definition of same Sutras. though. I. even of those terms. and who recognises the Atman in . is. which presupposes. also are mentioned by name 13. next in importance to Brahman only. more particularly of the Vedanta and Samkhya systems. the prevalence of Vedantic ideas l at the time of the author of this Sutra ' : He who is intelligence itself and subtler than pervades the in the the thread of the lotus-fibre. I. we shall see. II. As early as the time that 23. 1 He who Yoga and Mimamsa Cf. we find a Brahman. . . The next word we have It is to examine is Atman. he shines . who does not become bewildered when pondering (on it). 8. as clearly as possible.

was frequently used in the sense of what we call soul. son. 30 we read : Atmanam G'ayam pitiiram put ram paiitram pitamahiim.' in several places. In some passages it is difficult to say vital breath. wife. from the knowledge of this world which is obtained by the senses and is identical with its objects. IX. unchangeable and larger than the He who is different earth. words addressed to a dead person. like the spirit or breath. eternal and unof changeable.' In the end Atman became the regular . just as we may say. However.' The etymology At man it scure. X. Rv. probably because again extremely obbelongs to a pre-Sanskritic. divides himself. the breath (Atma) to the wind. grandfather.' But Self may here be translated by soul or person also. is though Aryan stratum of Indian speech. there can be little doubt that in the Veda Atman. i. mean whether we should translate it by life or by spirit. r/iinitrim miitaram ye priyas tan upa hvaye. still means breath. spring all (objective) He is the primary cause. whoever upon them. bahim dddhana/i atnuini. life. va'tam atma. and that often grammatical rather than real. possesses the highest From him who bodies. I call Myself. the Atharva-veda IX. mother. May the eye go to the It then came sun.' Again we read. su'ryam MkshuA gaMatu. 3. 'putting strength into oneself.94 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. contains this universe . grandson. (form of absolute knowledge).' instead of 'I magnify the Lord. i 13. ' we have are dear. father. If in is 5. universe and who. My soul doth magnify the Lord. Kv. as ' in to and. 1 6. From step soul there is but a small step to Self. ' to translate in English.

Deusseii's Gescliichte Philosophic.' In this sense Atman is afterwards used as the name of the highest person. 4. not go through all the be seen in any Sanskrit dicmay but we have still to see at what stage in I need development Atman became the definite name of the soul or Self within. sarvesham bhutanam rac/a. evidence which tionary its . 200 seq. XIV. ATMAN. der pp. Prar/apati. pp. or more recentl}-. 324 seq. which we examined before. BRAHMAN. I. Brahman. . 95 pronoun 1 self. 'That Atman is the sovereign of beings. ' or Indian philosophers the Idant& of things.. the soul of the world (Paramatman). 1 We See Anthropological Keligion.PRA0APATI. see thy Self by thy Self. Atman. Brahman. This transition of meaning a curious parallel to that of As. Thus we read at first atmanam atmana pasya. pp. Br. 'Where was the breath. Theosophy. have thus seen three words growing up in the hymns and Brahmanas of the Yeda. 'Self is the Self. 5. and Atman. bhumyaA asu/< in offers Atman asn'k a'tma kva svit. . 164. and we read (/S'atap. Atman philosophers would have called the quiddity. so that in the end it means much the same as what medieval rendered by spirit or life.15)^ sa va ayam atma sarvesham bhutanam adhipatiA.' all beings. the Here Atm may be blood.' witness of atmaiva hy atmana/i sakshi. the spirit of the world ? ' But in other passages the inmost nature of anysignifies simply thing.5. he is the king of all Pra^apati. each of which by itself represents in nuce a whole philosophy or a view of the world. and more particularly of man. There are passages such as Rv. in Asu and Asti. 247 seq.

a god above all gods. the primeval waters seem to have been admitted as existing by themselves and apart from Prat/apati also read that in the beginning (Rv. there was water over which Pra^apati breathed as We wind and produced the earth. 134. . In other places. . 287. 1 M. a creator and ruler of the world. material cause of the world may seem doubtful. to animate.. while the recognition of Brahman and Atman. or that the waters themselves produced a golden egg from whence arose Pra^/apati. and to rule all Whether this Pra^rapati was himself the things. constituted the foundation of all the monistic philosophy of that country.M. India. X. or that a tortoise supported it belief in that Pra(/apati. the creator of gods and men. however. as a personal god. Many times it is said that he was everything and that he desired to become many. in order to send forth. 7). as one.96 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. There occur even in the Brahmanas allusions to the legend well known from the Puranas. 121. and thus created the world. He created the primeval waters and rose from them as Hiranyagarbha. In Pragdpati we have the admission of a personal and supreme being. pp. that a boar brought forth (Udbabarha or Udvavarha from V?^h) the l earth. in which case matter also \vould have come out of him. A was the beginning of monotheistic religion in India.

cosmological. The wonder is that. Here once more the Nebeneinander gives us the true key.e. we are told. must not suppose that these ideas follow each other in chronological succession. or even Atman. burst forth in India in great profusion and confusion. Brahman. munication. and at last collected whatever could be It would be a mistake to imagine that there was a continuous development in the various meanings assumed by or assigned to such pregnant terms as Praf/apati. to the to those who handed down the saved of it. This was due. It H . even the simplest means of comneither control. Parampara. Every Asrama or settlement was a world by itself. much more than the Nacheinander.CHAPTER III. metaphysical. tradition i. and without any preconceived system. We must remember that philosophy existed for a long time without being fixed by writing. such as high-roads or rivers. THE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. being often wanting. and otherwise. that there was this earliest We nor public opinion to protect it. authority. WE all have thus learnt the important lesson that these ideas. Growth of Philosophical Ideas. in spite of all this. we should find so at much unity preserved to in the numerous guesses truth us among these Vedic ruins.

the Brahmans themselves thought of their philosophical literature we may learn even from such treatises as the Prasthana-bheda. cannot possibly claim to represent the very first attempts at a systematic treatment . from which some extracts by way of introduction to some gave papers of mine on one of the systems of Indian I What modern . But if the period of Upanishads we have to find our way through religious and philosophical thoughts. We must not imagine that even then we can always discover in the various systems of philosophy a regular hisThe Sutras or aphorisms which we torical growth. essence. scattered all over the country. spirit. came to signify speech and prayer. I have ventured to render by the BrahmaTias and the Self. which is characterised by persistent attempts at clear and systematic thought. das in Selbst. of all things. they are rather the last summing up of what had been growing up during many generations of isolated thinkers. while meaning what bursts or drives forth. as well as creative power and creator. the outlook becomes brighter as soon as we approach the next period. each distinct from the other. as through clusters of thickly tangled creepers. in which either the one or the other view should then underfound influential advocates. much more in accordance with what we learn from the Brahmawas and Upanishads of the intellectual life of India. and why Atman meant soul. possess of the six systems of philosophy. or what not only breath. to admit an infinite number of intellectual centres of thought. Prasth&na Bheda. We stand better how Brahman.98 is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but life.

time by Professor was published in the and death mean- Weber in his Indische Studien. belonged really to Colebrooke. 2 Nyaya is derived from ni 'into.' he writes. Dr. could possibly be called categories or praedicabilia. and is more comprehensive than 4 logic. published as long ago as 1852 in the Journal of the German Oriental Society. who had prepared a illness critical edition of but was prevented by It from publishing it. 3 knowledge of the nature of the sixteen Padarthas by means of name. vary between Gotama and Gautama. used sometimes as synonymous with Mimawsa.. 99 philosophy. As the MSS. 'philosopher. occurs also in Gautama's Dharmasastra II. I myself came to be acquainted with it through my old friend. It is but fair to state that the credit of having discovered that tract of its Madhusudana Sarasvati. it. 'and i 'to go. ' or Anvikshikl as an old name of philosophy. 1849. No one could understand why such things as doubt. i. example. definition. and perceived importance. vol.PRASTHANA BHEDA.e$o8os. . 1894. wrangling. 44.' Ballantyne translates Nyaya by yu.' The fourth ' member of 3 a syllogism is called Upanaya. 'is logic Gotama 4 in five Adhyayas as promulgated by Its object is (lessons). H 2 . p. 3. Deussen translation of the Prasthana-bheda has been pubas an Introduction to his Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. leading towards 'induction. . and I think it may be useful to give once more some extracts from it ] .' the latter for Buddha. more particularly It is of logic. Trithen. &c. and it is no wonder that Ritter and others should have spoken of the 1 Nyaya with open A new lished by Prof. I have kept the former for the Nyaya. and examination/ These Padarthas are the important or essential topics of the Nyaya philosophy but it has proved very misleading to see Padartha here translated by categories. 'Nyaya 2 .

was used in Sanskrit in the sense of things in It is rightly translated by general. what is special. contempt. literally the meaning of a word. remarks. activity. le in his work on Indian Logic. differences. if such things were represented to them as the categories of Indian logic. coinme Aristote. To which may be added 7. &c. leurs propriety's. what predicated by. Dravya. for they represent what can be predicated. inseparable inherence. 'There is also the Vaiseshika philosophy in ten promulgated by Kawada. doubtful even in 1 Bartliolemy p. is 4.' These Padarthas of the Vaiseshikas. or objects. the differentia or eternal atoms. from an Indian is view. Hilaire. . &c. is or. as they have done. 3. or sense (Artha) of words (Pada).100 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. St. Abhava. 'Mais les philosophe Vaiseshika n'a point categories entre elles. category when applied to the five Padarthas of Ka/tada. cherche a distinguer 356. II n'a point montro. quality. but such a translation. as between cause and effect. leurs rapports et leurs But this is exactly what he has done. negation. Guwa. 1.' 8 seq. in general. Sutras I. * the six Padarthas. Samanya. is called Nyaya. may indeed be called categories. 5. Visesha. 6. substance. at least 1-5. : 2. of the objects This philosophy also of our experience. The highest Samanya general and found in more than one is Satta or being. residing in Samavaya. en 6mnnerant 1'a comine fait le Stagirite. Karman. what Thus it point of the highest has come to pass that Padartha. parts and the whole. cf. what object. Its object is to establish by their similarities and dissimilarities lessons. viz.

The second. TheKarma-Mima??isa has been brought out by the venerable (raimini in twelve chapters. is explained as consisting of acts of duty. . the co-operation of several acts for a single I give this more intelligible description from Colebrooke. and the sixth the qualifications of The subject of indirect precepts performers. and so as to be hardly intelligible without a reference to the original Sutras. Miscellaneous Essays. meaning not so much what has to be proved or established. 330 seq. and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth that 1 . The real categories would. vol. The fifth chapter tries to settle the order of all sacrificial performances. p. and bars or exceptions in the tenth. as what forms the object of our knowledge. find their place mostly under Prameya. would of course be quite misleading when applied to the Padarthas of Gotama. and the members. Madhusudana continues The Mimamsa also is viz. fully in the eighth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh chapter. in Gotama's system. its parts (or appendent contrasted with the main act). the Karma-Mimawsa (work-philosophy) twofold. 1 third.PRASTHANA BHEDA. are discussed in the ninth. principal purpose of each sacrificial performance. chiefly sacrificial. is. IOI the case of the sixth or seventh Padartha of the Vaiseshikas. ' : and the $ariraka-Mima???sa (philosophy of the embodied spirit). Dharma. the object of this philosophy. its is varieties of opened in the seventh chapter and carried on more any was Inferrible changes. adapting to variation or copy of certain sacrificial acts what designed for the types or models of them.' The objects of these twelve chapters are then indi- cated very shortly. and fourth chapters treat of the differences and Dharma. i.

102 result is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. i. &c. second-less Brahman. directly or indirectly. Sutras V. Thus the consideration of the Vedanta refer to 1 Professor Deussen has given a. to the inward. because it teaches the act called Upasana or worship.' for Read Adya Akhya in the Prasthana bheda. of which the chief purpose is different. undivided. for instance. &c. recitation. and it is quoted by different names. subject-matter. and mostly is Brahman. such as Uttara-Mimamsij Brahma-Mima/Jisa. as enjoined by S'ruti. somewhat different version of these titles.S'ruti. fiftli He gives. of Devata-kanc/a. passages which have obscure indications of Brahman. ' In the first lecture is shown the agreement with which all Vedanta passages refer. . passages which have obscure indications of Brahman. In the first section are considered Vedic passages which have clear indications of Brahman in the second. name known by the belongs to the Karma-Mima??isa. Vedanta. an object of worship. is discussed in the other ' l . Its object is to make clear the one' ness of Brahman and Atman (Self). and refer to Brahman so far as he . consisting of four chapters. There is is also the Samkarsha^a-kcuicZa. i. composed which by (raimini. but to judge from Mini. as the subject of the chapter the successive order of recitation. in the third. &c.' It is in fact much more what we call a system of philosophy than the PurvaMlmamsa. and to exhibit the rules which teach the investigation (of it) by means of Vedic study. consisting of four chapters. and this. according ' to . the right meaning seems to be the settling of the order of performance. Next follows the $ariraka-Mima??isa. the subject of the one. so far as he or it is an object of knowledge. and the incidental effect of an act.

second-less The convergence of all Vedanta texts on the Brahman having thus been established. are removed in the first part. Agd. which is to ideas. T because every examination should consist of tw o parts. 103 texts has been finished. ' by nature. and by the arguments employed by the Samkhyas. of the views of the followers of the Samkhya. and tries to establish the incontrovertible validity of his own arguments in the second lecture. Vyasa or Badarayawa. In the third chapter follows the examination of ' the means (of salvation). In the third section the contradictions between the passages of the Veda. generally. are considered. the establishment of our own doctrine and the refutation of the doctrine of our opponents. are disposed In the second section is shown the faultiness of. fearing an opposition by means of arguments such as have been produced by acknowledged Smntis and various other systems. of which it can be doubtful whether they may not refer adapted and formulated by the Samkhya philosophers. translated as independent of Brahman or Purusha. Here. PrakHti. in the first section. referring to the creation of the elements and other subjects. &c. the objections to the convergence of the Vedanta passages on Brahman. such as Pradhana. and in the fourth section such words as Avyakta. all In the fourth section are considered apparent contradictions between Vedic passages referring to the senses and their objects.PKASTHANA BHEDA. as stated by the Snmtis of the Samkhya-yoga. Here in the first section. though quite wrongly. while considering the going to and returning from . and in the second those referring to individual souls. undertakes their refutation. the Kanadas..

$akhas or branches of the Veda and at the same time the question is discussed whether certain attributes recorded by other $akhas in teaching a qualified or unqualified Brahman. the Vedanta. and afterwards the meaning of the word That. another world dispassionateness has to be examined. if not purely referring to the unqualified Brahman.104 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. is considered. any other doctrine is but a complement . In the fourth section the means of obtaining a knowledge of the unqualified Brahman. In the third section there is tautological. (transmigration). are investigated. after he has realised the unqualified Brahman &c. In the second section the mode of departure of a dying man by means of repeated study of the Veda. such as quietness. promised to all who know the qualified a (or lower) man who knows Brahman. may be taken together or not. 'This. such as sacrifices and observing the four stations in life. In the fourth chapter follows an inquiry into the special rewards or fruits of a knowledge of the ' In the first qualified and unqualified Brahman. road of a man In the third. a collection of words. all as recorded in different . is indeed the principal of all doctrines. and afterwards the abode in the world of Brahman. section is described salvation of a man even in this life. In the second section the meaning of the word Thou is made clear. In the fourth section the obtainment of disembodied aloneness by the unqualified Brahman is first described. and meditation. when free from the influence of good or bad acts. and the internal. control. the further (northern) who died with a full knowledge of the unqualified Brahman is explained. both the external.

Anyhow it is clear that Samkhya and Yoga were looked upon as belonging to a class different from that to which the two Mimamsas. and the remaining two. Das Mahabharata als Epos und Eechts- buch. and the other recognised branches of knowledge belonged. or revelation. 1896. and this according to the interpretation of the venerable $amkara this is and therefore the secret ' ! see clearly that Madhusudana considered the Vedanta-philosophy as interpreted by Sawikara. nay even Nyaya and Vaiseshika. the philosophies of Gotama and Kanada are treated simply as Smritis or Dharmasastras. if not in the legal. the Samkhya and Yoga-philosophies on philosophies. they may be said to teach Dharma. and the Ramayana of Yalmiki. the distinction itself should not be passed over. . which together represented as the eighteen branches of the Trayi (the Veda).Mimamsa on one side. if not as the only true one. Purva.PRASTHANA BHEDA. Though it may be difficult to are understand the exact reason of this distinction. like the Laws of Manu. 105 it alone is to be reverenced by wish for all who liberation. the other. of it. 1 See Dahlmann. at least in the moral sense of that word. still as the best of all Here we He made an important distinction also between the four. as they are Snm'ti or tradition. to It is curious indeed that this distinction little has been hitherto so remarked. and Uttara. According Madhusudana. Dharmasastra and not >Stuti . Vaiseshika. the Nyaya. nay like the Mah&bharata of Vyasa. l Of course these systems of philosophy cannot be called Smriti in the ordinary sense of but.

' Madhusudana brought out by the venerable Kapila In the first . consisting of four parts. dispassionate persons. The Arambha-vada. the theory of atomic agglomeration. whose thoughts are distracted. in six was Adhyayas. the supernatural powers ness. Here in the first part meditation. observances. it should be clear that there are after all but three roads.' After this follows a short account of the Pa. The chief object of the Sa??ikhya-philosophy is to teach the difference between Praknti and the . such as Pingal (IV. contemplation. the in the fifth there is refutation ttetcher (IV. Here Madhusudana says. 'that after the various systems have been explained. posture. . &c. 1 8). such as (II. Purushas. . and. or original matter in the third aloofness from sensuous objects in the fourth stories about . 1 1). . of opposite opinions in the sixth a resume of the whole. Adhyaya the considered objects for discussion are in the second the effects or products of . in the fourth alonethird. 29) restraint. concentration by means of stopping all wandering thoughts. in the devotion. as a means ' are discussed repeated practice and dispassionateness in the second the eight accessories which serve to produce deep meditation even in one towards it.'aratra-systems. i. Then follows the Yoga-philosophy as taught by the venerable Pata%yali. regulation of breath.106 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and meditation . which stops the activity and distraction of the mind.supata and Pii/V. ' The Samkhya. and then a recapitulation which is of interest. Pradhana. The chief object of this philosophy is to achieve . continues.

while the Vaishnavas (Ramanu^a. and these different views have .PKASTHANA BHEDA. The first theory holds that the four kinds of atoms (A. and Pasupatas. 2. and Tamas (bad). through activity The second theory. as the world. 13. is evolved through the stages of Mahat (perceiving) and Ahamkara (subjectivity) into the shape of the (subjective and posed. &c. sometimes called Prakriti or original matter. com- Gunas of Sattva (good). This and an effect which was not is patan^alas. considering that they are omniscient . that of the Tarkikas (Nyaya Vaiseshika) and the Mimamsakas. These Munis cannot be in error.. that of the Samkhyas. and was rendered manifest through the activity of a cause. &c. of the From this point of view the objective) world. theory. Yoga(the world). IOJ The Parmama-vada. fire. says that Pradhana alone. that of the BrahmavMins (Vedanta). appears by The third mistake. the theory of illusion. effected world existed before as real. says that the self-luminous and perfectly blissful Brahman which has no second. llamas (moderate). as it is. those of earth. though in a subtile (invisible) form. But in have put reality all the Munis who forward these theories agree in wishing to prove the existence of the one Supreme Lord without a second. water. begin the world which culminates in the egg of Brahman.) hold that the world is an actual and true evolution of Brahman. by becoming successively double atoms. through its own power of Maya. ending in the theory of illusion (Vivarta). and air. teaches that first produced which the of causes are. the theory of evolution. The Vivarta-vada.

which we see now and then in other writers also. to study the different paths by which different philosophers. It is the very multiplicity and variety of these paths that form the chief interest of the history of philosophy.I08 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. from not imagined that understanding true these Munis would have propounded what is contrary to the Veda. and because they were afraid that human beings. Sa??ikhya.' Much of what has here been translated from Madhusudana's Prasthana-bheda. nor is it at all certain that his view of the development of Indian philo- sophy is historically tenable. have become followers of various paths. and Nyaya one and the same truth. men. right when we understand their that object. accepting their opinions. whether by the light of revelation or by that of their own unfettered reason. But it shows at all events a certain freedom of thought. have striven to discover the truth. in order to keep off all nihilistic theories. But however we may admire this insight on the bhikshu. and the fact that to the present day these six different systems of philosophy have held their own in the . a>s historians of philosophy. could not be expected at But all comes once to know the true goal of man. but truth is one. such as Vi<7/iana- showing that there is behind the diversity of Vedanta. though it gives a general survey. may be many. in fact. is obscure. and thus. who are bent on part of Madhusudana and others. though differently expressed that philosophies. but will become more intelligible hereafter when we come to examine each of the six philosophies by itself. only been propounded by them. it is our duty. . with their inclinations towards the objects of the world.

still less the ipsissima verla. shows that we must try to appreciate their characteristic before peculiarities. called also Uttara-Mimamsa-Sutras. the author of the Yoga-Sutras. called also Vyasa Dvaipayana or Krishna Dvaipayana. the author of or UMka. the Nyaya-Sutras. Kanada. 109 midst of a great multitude of philosophic theories. also called Ka7iabhu<7. often refer to some of the Sutras quote and refute the opinions of other Sutras. 5. Pataw/ali. 3. the reputed author of the Brahma-Sutras.PEASTHANA BHEDA. other philosophers. attempting with Madhusudana to eliminate their distinctive features. cannot be considered as the These Sutras first originators of Indian philosophy. 6raimini. the author of the Vaiseshika-Sutras. 4. also called Akshapada. When they refer to such we know that they topics as Purusha and Prakn'ti refer to the Samkhya. the author of the Purva-Mimamsa- Sutras. 6. Kanabhakshaka. also called /Stesha or Phamn. It is easy to see that the philosophers to whom our Sutras are ascribed. be accounted for without admitting a growing up of different philosophical schools side by side during a period which preceded their last arrangement. Unfortunately such references hardly ever give us the title of a book. Kapila. Gotama. or Vyasa-Sutras. if they speak of Arms or . the author of the Samkhya-Sutras. propounded by the thinkers of India. or its author. who therefore must have existed before the time when the Sutras Nor could the fact that received their final form. Badarayawa. 2. first of all These philosophers are 1.

Philosophic. . D. sixth cent.110 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Our SawkhyaSutras. Hall's dis- In this case. claims not only the famous Sutras of Pamni. which as early as the had probably been already superseded by the popular Sawkhya-karikas and then forThis late date of our Sawkhya-Sutras may gotten. therefore. and afterwards of religion. are so modern that they could not possibly Sawkhya be quoted by ancient philosophers. F.C. his Council in 242 B. as far as Asoka's reign in the third century. as has been proved. have been proved by Dr.. but has also been fixed upon as the period of the greatest philosophical activity in India. seem incredible.. Hall to be not earlier than about 1380 A. Die Suwkhya. and they may be even later. Startling as this discovery was. 71. Some of these. but though a still I still hold that the for Sutra-style literary arose in period when writing are purposes was in its tentative stage. there is certainly nothing to be said against the arguments of Dr. by the strong commotion roused by the rise of the Buddhist school of philosophy. we know Vaiseshikas. atoms. reaching Sutra-style. refer to the that their remarks are pointed at the But it by no means follows that they or Vaiseshika-Sutras exactly as we now possess them. p. an activity called forth. ' Curbo. D. for instance. Hall or against those by which Professor Garbe l has supported Dr. the place of earlier Sutras. it would seem. we know that even in our time there find learned Pandits ancient who no difficulty in imitating this down and The Sutra-period. A. these Sutras should be looked upon as a mere rifaccimento. to take covery.

while the names of Kapila and Gotama.Sutras XIX. when they occur. nor do we meet with such words as Hetuvidya. The Southern not claim to have reduced their A curious distinction is made in a commentary on the Gautama. one can suppose that those whose names are mentioned as the authors of these six philosophical systems. to quite different per- The Six Systems of Philosophy. namely Samkhya and Yoga or Samkhya-yoga. . except those of the two Mimamsas.' . except in the $vetasvatara. or Ka7^ada. If the third century B. should seem too late a date for the introduction of writing for literary purposes that even inscriptions have not yet been found more ancient than those of Asoka. and there is a wide difference between inscriptions we should remember and do Buddhists 1 literary compositions. are absent altogether.C. or Anvikshiki. would seem. nor with the names of the reputed founders of the six systems. Literary References in the TTpanishads. were more than the final editors or redactors of the Sutras as No we now possess them. Nyaya and Vaiseshika are altogether absent. danta does not occur.THE SIX SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. The names of Pata/lr/ali. Velosophy. refer. in India. Munc/aka and some of the later Upanishads 1 Mima?ftsa occurs in the general sense of investigation. Badarayana and 6raimini. it sonalities. 12. where it is said that 'those parts of the Arawyakas which are not Upanishads are called Vedantas. Ill of considerable importance to remember that of the technical names of the six systems of phiIt is two only occur in the classical Upanishads.

Possibly Sutra was originally meant for the text to be elucidated in a sermon. that the existence of Upanishads. could to a Dar^anas. so that long Buddhistic sermons came Suttas in consequence. we are told. as a component part of the Buddhist Canon.C.. partaking of a Vedanta. should have been irretrievably lost. though it is well known that they kept up close with their Northern co-religionists who were acquainted with writing During all that relations 1 . is recognised in the Buddhist Canon. because in the meantime the meaning of the word had been changed from short mnemonic sentences to fully developed the discourses. We need not wonder that much of that literature.112 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the to be called The sac rod Bo-tree in the was grown. c. considering that it could be mnemonic only. therefore. nay even in some of the Vedic hymns. Sacred Canon to writing before the first century B. nay even of a Buddhist chahave sprung up and have been reduced mnemonic form in various Asramas. from Gay a. and we must take care also not to look upon what has been left to us in the old racter. as representing the whole outcome of the philosophical activity of the whole of India through so All we can say is that phigenerations. 1 city of Anuradhapura in Ceylon a branch of the tree at Buddha . though not necessarily our own. ever so many theories of the world. and lastly that tilled name of Suttas. between 477 and 77 B. time.. must be later than that of the earliest Brahmanic Sutras. in India during the period to ferment losophy began many by Brahmanas and Upanishads. Sawkhya or Yoga.

i. That some of the earlier philosophical Sutras were shown in the case of the B?^'haspati-Sutras. is yatikas or /farvakas.Btf/HASPATI-SUTRAS. 3. and not It is a sad truth which we have to learn more and more. Brahmanic. who deny the existence of what is given by the senses. though no MS. or sensualists. that of the old pre-Buddhistic literature we have but scanty fragments. 3. Misc. the work of a living 1 2 Colebrooke. 113 Brihaspati-Stitras. of them has been found as yet in India. p. it would seem. not long ago that I received a Sanskrit treatise written in Sutras with a commentary. 53 \ and as he gives an extract. it is likely that they still existed in his time. and intended. and Mahabharata successfully that few as the It is scholars could tell the difference. and that even these may be. vol. the Laukalost. The same applies to such Sutras as the VaikhanasaSutras. 2 They were identified . for yet for Buddhistic mendicants. Essays' . Vedanta-Siitras see by Taranatha TarkavJi/aispati with the Siddhanta Kaumudi. to say nothing of such poems so and Ramayawa. 592. know now that such Sutras could have been produced at any time. India still possesses scholars who can imitate Kalidasa. . no. in We the general decay of Sanskrit scholarship. everything beyond They are referred to by BhaskaraMrya at BrahmaSutras III. I. as in the case of the Sa?^khya-Sutras. and we should not forget that even at present. in some cases. mere reproductions of lost originals. 429. I . These are said to have contained the doctrines of the out and out materialists. and the Bhikshu-Sutras 2 quoted by Panini. IV. possibly intended for the Vanaprasthas.

p. ii. 1896.114 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. vol. and in the Catalogues. He makes no secret that Sutraw vrittis /robhayam api mayaiva vyaraA'i. from which students of philosophy.7. For the Vedanta-philosophy of Badarayawa the most useful book is Thibaut's English translation of the text of the Sutras and /Sa?kara's commentary in j the S. may gain by themselves a knowledge of the six recognised svstems of Indian Philosophy. should not the same have taken place during the period of the Renaissance in India. in Europe and India. scholar in India. preceded as it was by his in Of books written by -A'andrakanta and gives additional Sutras to the Katantra on Vedic Grammar.7mnda//prakriva Tarkalarikara.' is ' It called Katantra/. of the various collections of Sanskrit MSS. . B. 'the Sutra and the commentary. it was possible in the fourteenth century. . both were composed by me. though grateful at an earlier time ? why what has been preserved. vols. The titles of the more important of the original Sanskrit texts may be found in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essavs. or that we possess what we possess in its original form. 1887. I shall mention here some of the most important works only. 259 seq. xxxiv and xxxviii. nay even At all events. particularly those ignorant of Sanskrit. as in the case of the KapilaSutras.. E. Books of Reference. if. and preserved in what may seem to us an almost miraculous manner. published since his time. which might have deceived many a European scholar of Sanskrit literature \ If that is possible now. Deussen's translation of the same work. we for should not imagine that we possess all. German.

1892. nach den Quellen.BOOKS OF REFERENCE. Wilson. Hindu Philosophy. iibersetzt von II. can be thoroughly recommended. Oxford. which deals chiefly with the nature and authority of the Veda with special reference to sacrificial and other duties. is also a very useful work. von H. Colebrooke. Of the Purva-Mimamsa or simply Mimamsa. Die Samkhya-Philosophie. 1881. 1837. commentary published as yet no book be studied. iibersetzt von K. we have the Sutras with $abarasvamin's . 1865. advantage. 1889. except Professor Thibaut's translation of I in the original but there is in English in which that system may 2 . The Samkhya Karika by Iswarakrishna. T. Va&aspatimis'ra's Sa7?ikhya-tattva-kaumudi. 1852. Garbe. with illustrative extracts from the Commentaries. Samkhya-Sutras. 115 'System des Vedanta/ 1883. may : still be consulted with Other useful w^orks are John Davies. Of the Samkhya-system we have the Sutras translated by Ballantyne in 1882-1885. 1885. . Also Aniruddha's Commentary and the original parts of Vedcantin Mahadeva's commentary on the Richard Garbe. 1894. Vigwana-bhikshu's Commentar zu den In Samkhya-Sutras. the Aphorisms of the Samkhya Philosophy of Kapila. H. ' Garbe. also the Bhashya or commentary by Gaurapada translated and illustrated by an original comment by H. Garbe. 1892. German we have the Samkhya-Prava&anaBhashya. translated from the Sanscrit by H. . The Sankhya Karika of Iswarakrishna. by Der Mondschein der Samkhya Wahrheit. London.

this social chiefly due to the political importance which they acquired the fifth. and We know also that there were many teachers. 482. and that it has been But if in possible to fix their dates. 4. The Yoga-Sutras are accessible in an English translation by Rajendraldla Mitra. and the third centuries during and not simply to their philosophical tenets. No. 478. should hitherto have failed. in the Bibliotheca Nos.C. by Ballantyne. vols. nay even their mutual relationship. The Nyaya-Sutras of Gotama have been translated. Gough. Allahabad. B.. we cannot wonder that all attempts at fixing the dates of the six recognised systems of philosophy. Indica. with the exception of the last book. con- . Benares. 1849.Il6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 462. a short abstract of that philosophy. the fourth. their case we know something O about is their dates and their historical development. 21 and 22. Dates of the Philosophical If in Sfttras. Laugakshi Bhaskara's Arthasawgraha. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenliindischen Gesellschaft. 1873 also in a Gertnan trans. Sanskrit Series. 491. and 492. It is true that Buddhism and (-rainism were likewise but two philosophical systems out of many. 1850-57. and afterwards the canonical books of the Buddhists. The Vaiseshika system by Roer. published in the Benares of philosophy may be studied in an English translation of its Sutras by A. and in some articles of mine in the same Journal of the German lation Oriental Society. consider the state of philosophical thought India such as it is represented to us in the in we Brahma^as and Upanishads. E.

disappeared 6r/mtiputra or was senior of the Buddha. the Nirgrantha or gymnosophist. Agita Kesakambali. I. Gosali with the bamboo stick. the date of many of the texts which canonical is we now possess and accept as by no means beyond the reach of doubt. however. the prince of the clan of the Sakyas. originally an A^ivaka. One of these only became known in history. developed into a powerful sect. 6r7iatiputra. the founder of Katyayana. This is owing to the vague- ness of the quotations which are hardly ever given In India. the (rainas. has now l the Sutras which we possess. became likewise the founder of a sect of his own. like the brotherhood founded by Buddha. which. during the mnemonic period of verbatim. In the Buddhist annals themselves other teachers such as 6rfiatiputra. Bucldhismus. though not the authors of . in their literary form. Nor should we forget that. but they have left no traces in the literary history of India.DATES OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SUTRAS. Gosaliputra. the Nirgrantha. 1 Kern. 117 temporaries of Buddha. then a follower of Mahavira. Sam^aya Vaira^i-putra. literature. are mentioned by the side of 6rainism. are presupposed by Buddhism. it is by no means clear that any which gave of these systems. the Maskarin. p. the contents of a book may have become 182. belonged to the same period of philosophical and religious fermentation rise to the first spreading of Buddha's doctrines in India. though the date of the Buddhist Canon may be fixed. Purana Kasyapa. . Kakuda Gautama. because the society founded by him. Another. Nataputta actually it seems that the founders of the Though likely six systems of philosophy.

we have no right to conclude that he knew these Darsanas exactly as we know them. which the Sa?/<khyas were supposed to disregard. (V. /SYuti. Sm/'/ti once (V. The Sa??ikhya-Sutras. careful not to rely too to.-firya (VI.) referring to the Mima?/isaka. when he quotes no means follows that he knew Naiyayikas. considerably modified. is . 86). while the title remained the same. when VI. and Vaiseshika Darsanas. Whenever they refer to the Anus or atoms. 123). mentioned in general. or rather allusions other systems of philosophy. Sawkhya. while the teachers.vikha philosophy in their minds .veshika- and once the Vaiseshikas are actually mentioned by name (I.possible. They clearly refer to Vaiseshika and Nyaya. the A&aryas. are explained as com- prehending Kapila himself. D. as well as others. 32.Il8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 25). much on quotations from. nor have we any right to say that our Gotama-Sutras existed in his time. and Vamadeva. though he may well have known these philosophies after they had assumed their Again. 69) andPawX. is mentioned as one who had obtained spiritual freedom.-a. as we possess them. Sawzkhya-Stltras. . it is We must therefore be very probable. we know that they have the Vai. But of individual philosophers we meet only with Sanandana A/. 85) and the sixteen Padarthas of the latter (V. are very chary of references. but it is not certain. is very frequently appealed to. 68). when they examine the six categories of the former (V. when we see Bharb'/hari (died 650 A. by our Gotama-Sutras. whose name occurs in both iSVuti and Snm'ti. Even at a much later time. It systematic it form.

Pasupatas. the Yoga. Asmarathya. and Yoga a long previous development reaching back through Upanishads and BrahmaTias to the very hymns of the Kig-veda. all of whom he is endeavouring to refute. Samkhya. and among Mimamsic their authors. Badarayana refers refer- ences. and Vaiseshika were in his mind when he composed his Sutras. nay to a Badaraya>ia also. Still Purva-Mlmamsa. he seems to avoid almost intentionally the recognised names of refers. the 6rainas.VEDANTA-SUTRAS. Samkhya. as I explained before. Samkhya Philosophy (1871). and Atreya. Bhandarkar. particularly in the cases of Vedaiita. Badari. but they too do not help us much for chrono- more or less clearly to the Buddhists. 3. because. and Pa/iAaratras. nay even their technical terms. He never however. . are presupposed by p. to any literary work. they quote each other mutually. is it clear that the systems of the authorities he refers by name to (raimini. Vedanta-Stltras. We cannot be far wrong therefore if we assign the gradual forma- from Buddha tion of the six systems of philosophy to the period (fifth century) to Asoka (third century). Karslmagdni. Audfalomi. It is equally difficult to fix the relative position *- systems of philosophy. Kasakn/tsna. though we have to admit. With regard to the relation of Buddhism to the six great of the orthodox systems it seems to me that all we can down honestly say is that schools of philosophy handing doctrines very similar to those of our six or classical 1 orthodox systems. and even when he refers to other philosophical systems. 1 19 The Vedanta-Sutras contain more frequent logical purposes.

in the form of Sutras. which was common property this floating that the regular systems slowly emerged. prove any actual borrowing ? or his time at that Buddha of disciples early part earlier samasa was an work. but that the Kshatriyas also took a very active and prominent part in the elaboration of such fundamental philosophical concepts as that of Atman or systems of India. which belong to the sixth century Even if we admit that the Tattvaafter Christ. We know nothing of Samkhya-literature before the Sca??ikhya-karikas. philosophical manuals. it is quite clear that what we now possess of in India. Even in the hymns we meet with great independence and individuality of thought. how is is a In the Upanishads and Brahma?? as. the Buddhist Suttas. without on the parallel dates. Though we do not know in what form this took place. and a variety of opinions supported by different teachers and different schools.120 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Self. which occasionally seems to amount* to downright scepticism and atheism. could we. We We It is out of and religious mass of philosophical opinion. could not have been written down during the time when writing for any practical purposes except inscrip- . must keep all this in mind if we wish to gain a correct idea of the historical origin and growth of what we are accustomed to call the six philosophical have seen already that philosophical discussions were not confined to the Brahmans. though there common note running through them all. But this is very different from the opinion held by certain scholars that Buddha or his disciples actually borrowed from our Sutras. there as yet great latitude and want of system.

not to the original We must authors. as classified in the Pratisakhyas. I. which continued down to the Sutra-period. p. that Smr/ti. the Brahmanas and Upaniif shads . on the date which we can assign. the written letters are still called unreal (AnHta) in It has now been comparison with the audible sounds. probably took place in something like the form of Sutras.MNEMONIC LITERATURE. that whenever writing has once become popular. if there had been manuscripts in existence at the same time ? When that mnemonic literature. very few. I believe. any. 451). it is next to impossible that there should be no allusion to it in the poetical or prose compositions of the people. tions on 121 monuments and coins was still unknown in India. generally admitted. purposes. came for the first time to be reduced to writing. never forget that there was in India during many centuries a purely mnemonic literature. The value of these allusions to writing which occur in the literature of the Buddhists depends. 14. and which was handed down from generation to generation according to a system which is fully described in the What would have been the use of Pratisakhyas. Sutras II. Letters at that this time were as yet monumental only. Even as late as the time of $amkara. for in India also . Mnemonic Literature. but to the writers of our texts. or at all events for literary had not yet been employed so far as we know. The very helplessness of the Sutra-style would thus become intelligible. that elaborate system. of course. in the Sutras. which are represented by them (Ved. There is no allusion historical to writing in the hymns.

Much of that mnemonic literature has naturally been lost.122 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. unless it was reduced to Often the name may writing at the proper time. It is clear at all events that it could not have been our Sa//<khya-Sutras. Writing material was scarce in India. have survived. it is impossible to tell whether even at that time there existed a work on the Sawkhya-philosophy in the form of Sutras. and the number of those who could read must have been very small. invested with a kind of sacred character. It to might be possible. such as the Visuddhi-magga (chap. Considering that in Buddha's eyes the world was Maya or illusion. it seems more likely that the name was given to his mother by early tradition. whether to her it was her name was or a name assigned by tradition. She called Maya or Mayadevi. At the same time there existed the old mnemonic literature. And so this could only . while the body of a work was enHence when we see the Sa?nkhya tirely changed. which had so far answered all purposes and was not easy to supplant. and to the adoption of a cursive alphabet. and that if it was given not without a purpose. mentioned by name in the Buddhist texts. if not to prove. XVII). while our present Sutras date from the fourteenth. by a reference to the more name real assigned to his mother. part and parcel of the ancient system of education. nor even the Samkhya-karikas which seem to have superseded the ancient Sutras early in the sixth century. at all events render probable the position assigned here to Buddha's teaching as subsequent to the early growth of philosophical ideas in their systematic and or less technical form. monumental writing is anterior to literary writing.

the name of May& never occurs and it It is well . /SVetasvatara. but whatever may have existed in it. can see this clearly in the case of the We Bn'haspati-philosophy. X. in the old classical Upanishads. X. The Bnhaspati-Philosophy. Maya in its technical belongs certainly to a secondary period.' to the Samkhya system in which Prakriti acts the part of Maya and fascinates the Purusha. is for ever lost to us. as the meaning it might name of not likely to have found a place in the Buddhistic legend during the early period of Indian philosophy. 71. is Upanishads. Let him know that Prakrit i is Maya or May4 PrakHt This refers. 10. ' In the I. for instance. and therefore be argued that May&. and of PrakHti in the Samkhya-philosophy had been replaced by the technical term of Maya. i. and even in the Sutras of these two prominent schools. Brihaspati His name is no doubt a very perplexing character. a certain amount of philosophical mnemonic composition after the period represented by the old Upanishads. it would seem. no doubt. 123 have been after the name of Avidya (nescience) in the Vedanta. and before the systematic arrangement of the philosophical Sutras. at all events as far as he is concerned. There was. a distinction being made .THE BB7HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. Vedic given as that of the author of two is hymns. But whether in Samkhya or Vedanta. we read. 72. equally significant that less it does occur in the later and more or apocryphal Upanishads. Maya?)i tu Prakntim vidyat. till he turns away from her and she ceases to exist. is known that. as represented in the early Buddha's mother.

that of the preceptor of the gods. we read that Indra. so that Brihaspati-purohita has become a recognised name pati is besides the of Indra. barren. having become or having assumed the shape of ukra. knowledge. That being so. with 15. He is afterwards quoted as the author of a law-book. His name is well known In Rv. It seems strange. (but the demons only) study that false . that the same name. overcame the godless people (adevi/i vis&h). as having BHhaspati for his Purohita or chief priest and helper. which upsets the Veda and the books. for it is wrong Its reward lasts only as long . it is said. atheistical. Up. also as one of the Vedic deities. it is. between a Bn'haspati Angirasa and a Brihaspati Laukya (Laukayatika ?). B?^'hasdecidedly modern. as with one who has fallen from his station (caste). but for Thus we read. Maitrdyami their own destruction. 96. sacred should be studied (by the Asuras. which we still possess. and sensualistic system of philosophy in India. not for their benefit.>s the pleasure lasts. and they say new law. good other is evil that this By it they show that and that evil is good. 9 : Bn'haspati. therefore. . ' 7. as it were.124 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. should have been chosen as the name of the representative of the most unorthodox. and of the preceptor or Purohita of the gods. in which Bn'haspati is represented as teaching the demons his pernicious doctrines. for the safety of Indra and for the destruction of the Asuras (demons). VIII. name of the planet Jupiter. B?*?'haspati as his ally. the Let no man demons). We may possibly account for this by referring to the Brahma?ias and Upanishads. brought forth that false knowledge.

and therefore a very On that Self different Self was taught to them. on that the wise take their stand. Let that it is 1.THE B#/ HASP ATI-PHILOSOPHY. VIII. A7. crosses death by means of the imperfect. that is true. clinging it. possessed of a desire for knowledge pleasures do not tempt him away. 125 false doctrine 1 : not be attempted. II. true. the one known I knowledge. the other as (Yama) believe Na&iketas to be . like jugglery. they said "0 blessed one. II. after considering. wishing to know Self. II. these demons believe in a difference of the Atman (from themselves). for thus said Widely divergent and opposed are these two. as false knowledge. : ! he thought. But in reality. Up. and What is untrue they see as praising untruth. 4. destroying the true boat of salvation. Up. the him. 2 in imperfect know- alone wise and learned. 8. What is said in the Vedas. what is said in the Vedas. . do thou tell us Thus. 2. went once into the presence of Brahman 4 Having bowed before (their father Pra^apati ). even many same time both the imperfect knowledge (of ritual) and the perfect knowledge (of Self). we wish to know " the Self. There- Kai/?a Upanishad KaM. like the blind led by a man who is himself blind V ledge fancy themselves And ' again : The gods and the demons. knowledge Those who are wrapt up . 5. wander about they floundering and deceived. : 4 Va#.and. Up. and obtains immortality by means of the at the He who knows perfect 3. these to deluded demons take their stand.

In the A'Mndogya Upanishad it is the Pra^tipati himself who imparts false knowledge of Atman to the Asuras. or this will be the result (as in the case of the demons). were told to look for it in the person seen in the pupil of the eye. Secondly w e see an alteration which was evidently made inis r tentionally. howonly. or in the image in a looking-glass. while in the Maitrayana Upanishad Bn'haspati takes his place. be wrong that this highest deity should ever have misled anybody. of all it is a clear reference of one Upanishad to another. even the demons./TMndogya. without however losing its own identity. In the A7mndogya the demons who believed in the is i/ Anyata (otherness) of the Atman. we may possibly be able to under- stand how his name came to cling to sensualistic . unlikely that Brihaspati was introduced Upanishad because it It is not in the later in order to w as r felt to take the place of Pra^apati. ever. or in the shadow in the water. in which this episode of Bn'haspati giving false instruction to the demons more fully detailed. he declares at last that Atman is what remains in deep sleep. and as this would be the individual man. refer to a visible body goes on to say that the about full of pleasures in Atman Then Prar/apati moves is what a dream. that to sav. All this would. still If thon in the Upanishads already Bn'haspati was introduced for the purpose of teaching wrong and unorthodox opinions.' First This passage is curious in several respects. no Brahman study what is not in the Vedas.126 fore let INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. in the possibility that the Atman could / be in some place different from themselves. namely to the .

the son of Parasara. he was them. or a scepticism. of the latter as /Silalin. But although such we have no means of fixing their date as either anterior or posterior to the other philosophic Sutras. '. a Barhaspatya. well known that the Lalita-vistara Besides. opinions. held responsible for existed even at an earlier however unfairly. however. 3. p. II. 1 Colebrooke. were contained. which we about the That would fix their date fifth century B.THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. 429. no) the author of the former as As Parasarya Parasarya. to a scholion of Bhaskara on the Brahma-Sutras. it has been supposed that Pamni meant by Bhikshu. even at that late time. he seems to have known.Sutras. 113. Among the works mentioned in the Lalita-vistara as studied by Buddha a Barhaspatyam is mentioned. and has been readily accepted therefore by all who wish to claim the still possess. unbelievers. If we may trust.C.. some Sutras ascribed to BHhaspati in which the doctrines of the ^arvakas 1 . i. tions (IV. but whether composed in follower of BHhaspati.Sutras L sometimes ascribed to Vyasa. is a name of Vyasa. e. in quoting Bhikshu-Sutras and Na^a-Sutras. That such opinions time. 127 and how at last. Pamni knew of Sutras which are and some of them may be He also safely referred to the time of Buddha. z See before. the Brahma . menlost to us. has is Sutras or in metre does not appear. is it rather a broken reed to rest upon for chronological purposes. . some of the hymns come to mean an infidel in general. we can see in in which many years ago I out these curious traces of an incipient pointed In later Sanskrit. Sutras may have existed.

though the lines that separate philosophy and religion in India are very faint. we know them. go far beyond Buddhism. They would show us that India. The Barhasif patyas speak as being inter jxtrcs. opposition against the religion of the Traces of an Vedas (Kautsa) . There are some tenets of the followers of Bn'haspati which seem to indicate the existence of other schools of philosophy by their side. up among Of course the doctrines of Buddha would be called certain sceptical and atheistic by the vaka as well as Nastika are to the Buddhists. and mav be said to be hostile to all religious feelO while Buddha's teaching was both religious ings. and philosophical.C. as soon as we get any coherent on treatises philosophy. they are expressed in verse. as if taken from a Karika rather than from Sutras. authority do the same hesitate to assign to the Vedanta a place in the fifth century we cannot on such T slender for the Sutras themselves.128 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. because they is generally con- and istic home of all that is most spiritual was idealistic. and /iar- as far as / names freely applied But the doctrines of Brihaspati. nay even earlier. which sidered as the possess a peculiar interest to us.. though we should not doctrines of the B. by no means devoid of sensualBut though it is difficult to say philosophers. old such theories how is may have been in India it that. possible antiquity for the But Parasarya of India. When we meet elsewhere w ith the heterodox doctrines of Bri'haspati. sensualistic opinions crop them. Brahmans. greatest literature philosophical have been chosen as the titular would hardly name of Vyasa and . they differ from others as others differed from them.

Madhava. but to out and out nihilists only.THE B. is given to them as saying No to everything exthe Sutras. and on account of the strong feelings of aversion which they excited. and it is for that very reason. He looks upon it as the lowest of all. the opposition represented by Bn'haspati and others may seem insignificant. and the them would give us an entirely false idea of the religious and philosophical battles and battle-fields of ancient India. but nevertheless. a name not applicable to mere dissenters. like sense-perception. curiously enough. was called by the Vedantists Pratyaksha.K/HASP ATI-PHILOSOPHY. begins with K . Sarvadarsana-samgraha or the philosophical systems. as we shall see. and we have no other. that is. but the very name given to these heretics would seem to imply that their doctrines had met with a world-wide acceptance Another name. because in arguing against other philosophies. in his Epitome of all an account of the Nastika or TTarvaka system. appear in 129 hymns. ipso facto. like that of the Samkhya. . schools of Indian philosophy could tolerate much they were tolerant. As viewed from a Brahmanic point of view. These Nastikas. they prove. that it seemed to me right that their philosophy should not be entirely passed over by the side of the six Vedic or orthodox systems. the existence of orthodox philo- The recognised sophical systems before their time. which. particularly to the evidence of the Vedas. (Lokayatikas). the Brahmaftas. and to ignore cept the evidence of the senses. even towards a qualified atheism. self- evident. that of Nastika. are interesting to us from a historical point of view. But they had nothing but hatred and contempt for the Nastikas.

s'astrin in the Preface to his edition of the of name represented as a teacher of the Lokayata or world-wide system. should be noted however.' This name Lokayata occurs already in Pamni's Ga>ia Ukthadi. shows clearly that there must have been i. is given in the Prabodha- following words: 'The Lokayata system in which the senses alone form an authority. affirmation (Aptavakya) . The statement that the Lokayatus admitted but one Pramana. other We shall philosophical systems already in existence. namely sensuous perception. authority of knowledge. and death It is the end of all things. though he does not tell us which he considers the exact points on which the two are supposed to have differed. adding trustworthy mana) . and wind (not Akasa or ether). perception (Pratyaksha) and inference (Anuthe Sa?/ikhya three. in the water. the other world is denied. as not to be ignored in a catalogue of the philoAarvaka (not Aarvaka) sophical forces of India.130 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and Aarvaka or Lokayatika. fire. and he is is the given treated as a historical individual to pati whom Brt'has- or ViU-aspati delivered his doctrines. in which the elements think. the Nyaya four. as name of a Rakshasa. The Buddhists use Lokayata for philosophy in general. by Bala. adding . He is account of this system fcandrodaya 27. see that the Vaiseshika acknowledged two. 18. that Hema&andra distinguishes between Barhaspatya or Nastika. if that is the meaning originally intended by that word. in which the elements are earth. e. 2). A short Kasika (p. The Aarvaka is clearly connected with that of and this is given as a synonym of Buddha Aarva. in which wealth and enjoyment form the ideals of man.

All this shows the philosophical activity of the Hindus from the earliest times. They held that it simply the body over again. The /Tarvakas only denied this. required some time to develop. as we see in the history of the Greek a-To^ia. In the Upanishads we see traces of an even earlier triad of elements. probably because it was invisible. excluding ether. comparison (Upamana) . and yet such an idea was evidently quite familiar to the . an idea as that of the four or five elements. as if it had been. and ether. though they saw it day rotting away and decomposing. 131 six. fire. They held that what was called soul was not a thing by itself. that remembered and thought. air. admitted five. i. the two Mimamsas and adding presumption (Arthapatti) privation Of these and others we shall have to Even what seems to us so natural hereafter. was the body that felt. with a K 2 . earth. appealing to the intoxicating power that can be developed by mixing certain ingrediflesh./Tarvakas. that saw and heard. any new again with regard to the soul. and exhibits to us the K&xvakas as denying rather what had been more or less settled before their time. but every Arya in India had a word So it is and never doubted that there was something in man different from the visible body. they admitted four only. e. but was for soul. for the evolution of consciousness arid intellect out of mere We except that they took refuge simile. than as adding ideas of their own. speak (Abhava). By such opinions they naturally in conflict with religion even more than every never came with do not know how they accounted philosophy. While other systems water. Not only philosophers.THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY.

. and that they have accepted pain simply as an inevitable concomitant of pleasure. water. to consist . &c. it is no wonder that they should have considered the highest end of man in sensual enjoyment." these attributes abide in the same subject. as an analogy to the production of soul from body.' In this way the soul seems to have been to them the body qualified by the attribute of intelligence.should quoted The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects. Thus we read There are four elements." I am lean. seeking his true interest. Sarvadarsana-sawgraha. And it alone since fatness. would fiing them away. &c. And such phrases as " " my body are only signi- ficant metaphorically. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. . l)e relinquished as accompanied by painthe warning of fools berries of paddy. Holding this opinion. is the soul and no other. What man. : ' A verse is Is to such is The grains. fire. and therefore supposed to perish with the body. mixed together . rich with the finest white . because covered with husks and dust ' ] '( 1 See for those vorsos Cowell and Gough's translation of the p. 4. which by themselves are not intoxicating. and air. And from these four elements alone is intelligence : ' produced Just like the intoxicating power from Kinwa. resides only in the body. " Since in I am " fat. earth..132 ents.

no deliverance. productive of rewards. Why sacrificer 1 is ? not his own father killed there by the Dhatri. creator. and certainly no Self in another world. Nor are the acts of the Asramas (stations in life) There is or the castes. If a victim slain at the 6ryotishoma will go to heaven. rather than metaphysical. the chief character of the j^arvaka system was practical.' Bnhaspati himself following invective ' : is held responsible for the no paradise.THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. . They are the mode of life made by their creator ' for those who are devoid of sense and manliness. the three staves (carried by ascetics) and smearing oneself with ashes. water cold. It is a pity that all authoritative books of these materialistic philosophers should be lost. Madhava in his six Darsanas on which we have The following verses preserved by Epitome are nearly all we possess of the teaching of Brihaspati and his followers Fire is hot. therefore it must have come from their own : ' . nature (Svabhava). though fundamental philosophical principles are involved. as they would probably have allowed us a deeper insight into the early history of Indian philosophy than the ready-made manuals of the chiefly to rely. 133 From all this we see that. can here be used ironically only. teaching utilitarianism and crude hedonism in the most outspoken way. or nature. The Agnihotra. instead of Svabhava. and the air feels cool By whom was this variety made ? (we do not know). the three Vedas.

The three makers of the Vedas were buffoons. As a means of livelihood. How can there be a return of the body after once been reduced to ashes If he ? it has who has left the body goes to another world. knaves. for without we should hardly .134 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. If those who are in heaven derive pleasure from offerings. ? Why does he not come back again perturbed by love of his relations Therefore funeral ceremonies for the dead were ordered by the Brahmans. Then why not give food here are standing on the roof? As long as he lives let a to people while they live happily man . after borrowing money. nothing else is known anywhere.IK The of flesh was likewise ordered by is any modern certainly very strong language.' Tliis . It is well that we should this know how old and how widely it spread materialism was. The speech of the Pandits is (unintelligible). and likewise other things to be taken in hand. The obscene act there (at the horse sacrifice) to be performed by the queen has been Proclaimed by knaves. would be useless. If the *Sraddha-offering gives pleasure to beings that are dead. eating demons. and demons. let him drink Ghee. Then to give a viaticum to people who travel here on earth. as strong that has ever been used by ancient or materialists. like ^r'arphari Turphari.

seems altogether out of place in India. and who. arid drove him to found a new religion or brother- hood. the reputed founder of the Samkhya. however incon- Buddha brought with orthodox Brahmanism and differs from the Buddhists. in the eyes of the Brahmans. stamped Buddha at once as a heretic. were tolerated as find of the authority of the Veda which. and who on many important points did not differ much secure within the pale of of the orthodoxy. the Pramanas. while those who followed the Sa??ikhya. question of the authority of the Veda the Sa??ikhya agrees. orthodox as long as they recognised the authority of the Veda. If we are right in the description we have given sistently. so natural to us. and other fundamental truths which were considered philosophy. It is this denial philosophers in India of a personal god or nevertheless. charges brought by the Barhaspatyas against the Brahmans who followed the Veda are the same which the followers of from him. wild mass of guesses at truth idea of A . is in India from what it has been shall elsewhere. remained Some Considering thereagainst them. We the who deny existence Isvara. that on the vital fore. and tried to bring their doctrines into harmony with Vedic texts. of the unrestrained and abundant growth of philosophical ideas in ancient India. however.THE B5IHASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. the borrowing. essential both for religion and for very different The idea of orthodoxy. understand the efforts 135 that were made on the other side to counteract it by establishing the true sources or measures of knowledge. it would be far easier to prove that Buddha derived his ideas from Brihaspati than from Kapila.

not even. or Modern Europe. unfortunately. floating in the air. or. any binding public opinion to produce anything like Hence we have as little right to order in it. In India we move in a world different from that which we are accusships tomed to in Greece. because similar opinions prevail in Buddhism and in the Sawkhya-philosophy of Kapila. They are to us no more than names. maintain that Buddha borrowed from Kapila as No one would that Kapila borrowed from Buddha. imagine what the spirit of the philosophy of the ancient Indian heretics. and there was no controlling authority whatever. such . as some hold. much less doctrines than of any other school of philosophy. and credited there with certain know a few of the conclusions at utterances. such as the names of Ya^Havalkya. but of the processes by which they arrived at them we know next to nothing. or any other ancient leaders of Indian thought mentioned the Upanishads. or reducing it to writing. Rome. therefore the former must have borrowed from the latter. Even when the names of certain individuals. or that of building Stupas from the Egyptians.136 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. whether they are called TTarvakas or Barhaspatyas. What we may learn from these utterances is that a large mass of philosophical thought must have at existed in India long before there was any attempt dividing it into six well-defined channels of systematic philosophy. in We which they arrived. Raikva. borrowed the of building Hindus idea the that say was from the Phenicians. well Though we can may have of their been. the latter from the former. and we need not rush at once to the conclusion that. \ve know. as far as we know.

As early as the period of the Upanishads we hear of human souls being reborn both in animal and . even of plants. strongly that there existed in India a large common fund of philosophical thought which.METEMPSYCHOSIS SAJJfSARA. are given us as the authors of certain systems of philosophy. of animals. is so self-evident that it was never meet hardly ever questioned. we must not imagine that they were the original creators of a philosophy in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle seem to have been so. and others. and is rendered in German by Seelenwanderung. be explained that we find all. is is known under the name of Metempsy- chosis. into new We with any attempt at proving or disproving it among the prominent writers of ancient or modern times. 137 as 6raimini. and which belong to no one school in particular. Thus only can a number of ideas in Metempsychosis Sawsara. nay. It corresponds in meaning to the Sanskrit Sa?7isara. Common It Philosophical Ideas. belonged to no one in particular. Kapila. like language. To a Hindu the idea that the souls of men migrated after death bodies of living beings. which belong to India rather than to any individual philosopher. like Metensomatosis. or nearly all. the systems of Indian philosophy which all philosophers seem to take simply for granted. but without any literary authority in Greek. The best known of these that which ideas. This is a Greek word. but was like the air breathed cannot be urged too by every it living and thinking man. 1.

but the Sukshma- Sawkhya Purusha by Soul the subtile body.138 in vegetable INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as is commonly supposed to have been the case. The Self remains always intact. and Scythic or Hyperborean tribes are mentioned as having entertained a faith in Metempsychosis. or whether Pythagoras and his teacher Pherecydes learnt it in India. idea from the Egyptians. that some systems. Immortality of the Soul. nay. The idea of the immortality of the soul also should be included in what was the common property of all This idea was so completely Indian philosophers. howlinguistic ever. bodies.sarira. traces of it have lately been discovered even among the uncivilised inhabitants of America. Among the Aryan races. To me it seems that such a theory was so natural that it might is perfectly well have arisen independently among different races. 2. do not admit what understand by Seeleuwanderung. and its highest purpose is this recognition that it is above and apart from . was held by Empedocles this In Greece the same opinion but whether he borrowed . And why not . ? In and if developed spontaneously this was so in India. Italian. taken for granted that we look in vain for any elaborate arguments in support of it. and Eastern it Asia. a question still hotly discussed. a mere looker on. Celtic. anything that has sprung from Prakr/ti or nature. particularly the Sa/wkhyaparticularly philosophy. Mortality . India certainly among races belonging to the same ? stock It should be remembered. why not in other countries. it not the Purusha that migrates. the is we commonly If we translate instead of Self. Africa.

Besides.PESSIMISM. Sat. and need not have forgotten the so-called wisdom of savages as little as the >Sudras themselves from it ? whom they are supposed to have learnt 3. as they at one time were no doubt savages themselves. a longcontinued metempsychosis and as to a final annihila. 139 to with the Hindus is so entirely restricted the body which very eyes. Pessimism. All Indian philosophers have been charged with pessimism. are not likely to have looked upon what is as what ought not to be. This is a mere fancy. would a future life. Indian philosophers are by no means dwelling for ever on the miseries of life. *mHtatvam. the followers of tautological in Sanskrit. . immortality of the would sound to Indian ears as a contradiction in itself. but not derived their in all. that posed to be universal among savages who thought that man left a ghost behind who might assume the body of an animal or even the shape of a tree. and in some cases such a charge may seem well founded. People who name for good from a word which meant originally nothing but being or real. decays and decomposes before our that such an expression as Atmano Self. and though it cannot of course be disproved. that they have actually tried to trace it back to a belief suption of the true Self. it does not thereby acquire any right to our consideration. There are scholars so surprised at this unwavering belief in a future and an eternal life among the people of India. but all the other Bn'haspati deny schools rather fear than doubt a future life. why should the Aryas have had to learn lessons from savages. sounds almost No doubt.

and. overcome. because. in fact. something suffering is in the world. They simply state that they received the first impulse to philosophical reflection from the fact that there They evidently in a world had no that suffering perfect thought it is that place. are not always whining They life is and protesting that not worth living. It is interesting. not the principal impulse to philosophical thought in India. and the attainment of the highest happiness. Considering that the aim of all Indian philosophy was the removal of suffering. something anomalous. to observe the unan- in India. be of no avail. They would. we should have more right to call it eudsemonistic than pessimistic. that ought at all events to be accounted for. which was produced by knowledge. If we begin with Cr'aimini. and that this counted for and removed. which is chieHy . and how it could be But this is not the disposition which annihilated. imity with which the principal systems of philosophy nay some of their religious systems also. That is not their pessimism. an imperfection. if Pain. however. the same troubles and the same problems would have to be faced again and again in another life. of suffering should be acThis seems to have been if one of the principal impulses. Indian philosophy contains no outcry against divine injustice. is full start from the conviction that the world suffering. we cannot expect much real philosophy from his Purva-MimamsA. and. according to Indian views. certainly. as such. which was caused by nescience. we are accustomed to call pessimism. seems to be possible. and in no way encourages suicidal expedients.140 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. may well have caused the question why it existed.

i). they were never supposed to secure the highest beatitude for which all the other and The Uttara-Mima?nsa philosophers were striving. declare that this is the best means of escaping from all earthly troubles (II. which is also the highest bliss (Taitt. But though these sacrifices are represented as being the means of a certain kind of beatitude. sophy of logic holds out blessedness (Apavarga) as is in its first its Sutra complete highest reward. at least such as we know it from the Karikas and the Sutras. arid so far as serving to diminish or extinguish the ordinary afflictions of men. the annihilation of DuAkha or suffering (Nirva/ia) require further elucidation. and proclaims as its highest object the complete cessation of all pain while the Yoga philosophers. The Samkhya. begins ground. Up. and through it cessation of all pain and even Gotama's philo. and had the same object. and thus to bring about that true knowledge of Brahman. meditative absorption (Samadhi). such as &c. and. 141 sacrifices. That Buddha's religion had the same origin. at once with the recognition of the existence of the three kinds of suffering. and that it is the object of his philosophy to remove that nescience by means of science (Vidya). II. in the end. 2). all the other philosophies take much higher Badarayana teaches that the cause of all evil is Avidy4 or nescience. after pointing out the way to .PESSIMISM. of reaching KaiThe Vaiseshika promises valya or perfect freedom. a clear perception of human suffering and its causes. which all obtained by the complete destruction of pain by means of logic. not however the Tattva-samasa. to its followers final knowledge of truth. but is it too well known to should be remeni- . concerned with ceremonial questions.philosophy.

end of DuAkha. mental pain. when quired they all under different names. being traced back to our worldly attachments. though the cause of suffering is inhave but one answer to give. false know- . whether in this or in a previous existence. Aviveka. though without any hope of a rich harvest. and it the sowing of good seed. Indian philosophy professes its ability to remove pain. the Nyaya. The Vedanta gives Avidya. source. Even physical pain. If therefore all i. and a systems. there are some other ideas which must be traced back to that rich treasury of thought which was open to These common ideas every thinking man in India. ceases to affect the soul. though it cannot be removed from the body. e. different guises in different but this ought not to deceive us. for. The cause of all suffering having been discovered in ourselves. Thus. no doubt. pain. in our works and thoughts. little reflection allows us to perceive their common assumed. whether Nirvana or DuAkhanta. would vanish by freeing ourselves from the desires which cause these attachwhile all ments. non-discrimination. it can hardly be called pessimistic in the ordinary sense of the word. the Sar/vkhya. We is are we have what we have made ourselves. that is represented as the chief purpose of a philosopher's life on earth. Besides this conviction that all suffering can be removed by an insight into its nature and origin.142 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Mithyiu/ftana. nescience. we reap what we have sown. all clamour against divine injustice is silenced at once. we suffer what done. as soon as the Self has fully realised its aloofness from the body. name bered that other systems also have one and the same for the state to which they aspire.

The next idea that seems ingrained in the Indian mind and therefore finds expression in all the systems of philosophy is a belief in Karman. It never was. revealed by a Brahmin Yogee. ledge. Karman. . is nothing in the eyes of Hindu like proofs of immortality. 4. and never will be. good word.' the philosophy. the same eternity which is claimed for works and their results is claimed for the soul also. and deed through all ages. by idea that 'to be could ever become not to be seems to have been impossible to the mind of the Hindus. whether to-day that ' or thousands of years ago l . deed. then Hindu philosophers would never look upon it as real. so common in Knowing what ' ' is ' ' 5 Cf. 143 and these various aberrations from knowledge are generally represented as Bandha or bondage. only And with this difference. to be broken again by means of that true knowledge which is supplied bythevarious systems of philosophy. it never is. 1898. The idea of the soul ever coming to an end is so strange to the Indian mind that there seemed to be no necessity for anything European to meant be. the continuous working of every thought. If by 'to be' is meant Samsara or the world. or bad. is. all must bear and do bear fruit/ is a sentiment never doubted by any Hindu. however enormous.KARM AN. Allahabad. The Mysteries of Karma. Length of time. the soul itself continues after the obtainment of freedom or final beatitude. All works. however long it may last. that while works will cease to work when real freedom has been obtained.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and all this according to their previous merits and demerits. Brahman has then assumed its new Karyavastha or effective state which lasts for another But all this refers to the world of change Kalpa. 2 Sawkhya-Sutras VI.144 philosophers. xxviii. i. but even then eternity and reality lie In order to get an easier hold of this far beyond. 42. the temporary produce Maya. Brahman creates or lets out of himself causal condition a world. S. V. and souls become active and re-embodied. is not poise between them.e. They represent length of time by much bolder similes. it is not yet of Nescience. solution occurs at the end of each According to the Vedanta there Kalpa a Pralaya or disof the universe. matter becomes gross and visible once more. has been invented. or real reality. I. while creation results from the upsetting of the equiWhat is truly eternal. (undeveloped) state \ however. eternity. In the Sa?>ikhyathese take Pralayas philosophy place whenever the three Gimas of Prakrit i recover their equipoise 2 . containing both soul and matter in an Avyakta At the end of this Pralaya. To reckon a thousand years as one day would not satisfy them. . new though with a higher enlightenment (Vikasa). It is the world of Karman. 1 Thibaut. and Brahman is then its reduced to (Karariavastha). the very popular idea of Pralayas. By the time he has completely wiped them out by this process the world or Sawsara may indeed come to an end. p. and unreality only. destructions or absorptions of the whole world. such as when a man once in every thousand years passes his silken kerchief over the chain of the Himalayan mountains. of Avidya.

that among whom have borrowed it from a from the popular belief of is. what we call creation. The idea of the reabsorption of the world end of a Kalpa (aeon) and its emergence again there follows at the in the next Kalpa. according to different poets likely that and philosophers. and its freedom from all conditions and fetters. the idea of Pralayas. of their end the Bhagavad-git& IX. than that they should each have invented the same theory under slightly varying aspects. or at least is so for a time only. there ensues dissolution (Pralaya). . are already quite familiar to the poets. and Professor Garbe is inclined therefore to claim the idea of Pralaya as peculiar to the Samkhya-philosophy. and their beginning (Kalpakshaye and Kalpadau). and may recover at any moment its selfknowledge.K ARM AN. creation According to the Vaiseshikas this process of and dissolution depends on the atoms. if motion springs up in them and they are united. that is. 221. from it by the other systems *. 1 Sawkhya-Philosophie. The exact nature of the Pralayas differs so much. and of Kalpas or ages. If they are separated. nay even the name of Samsara is absent from them . they were brought up and from all whom they learnt their language and with it the materials of their thoughts. but 7. its self-being. p. does not occur as yet in the old Upanishads. that it is far more they may common those source. as and as adopted may be so. It in more recent. affected 145 by the cosmic illusion. absorptions.

5. and something between the two. and appeals to it even in matters of minor importance. Infallibility of the Veda. The impulse to everything in nature. It is important to observe that the distinction between $ruti and Smn'ti.. such as cold. not to be found Three Guwas. calling it /Sabda. recognises the authority of the Veda. idea. is ascribed to the three Gu^as. familiar as it may The Sa?>ikhya-philosophy in supposed to have been originally without a belief the revealed character of the Vedas. the cause of all and variety. but we are warned expressly life not to take it. but rather as something it substantial by itself. when ordinary fact the sense. ' m>od. The theory of the three Gunas also.146 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. seems in its unscientific form to have been quite familiar to most Hindu philosophers. occurs in philosophy. but it cerI. antithesis. certainly a startling sound to us at present. 5). so well is known in the later phases of philosophy. 6. In the most general sense they represent no more than thesis. in the of quality. Gunn means quality. which has been claimed as originally peculiar to the Sawkhyaphilosophy. O . in ancient times. and neither cold nor warm . tainly speaks of /Sruti (Sutras it As long as we know the Samkhya. as yet in the old Upanishads. so that the Gumis become in component constituents of nature. warm. revelation and tradition. One more common element presupposed by Indian of the supreme authority acter ascribed to the Veda. is is philosophy might be pointed out in the recognition and the revealed charThis.

GU7VAS. unevenness. That Tamas stood in the Highest. That llamas. in order to establish the general acceptance of the theory of the Gunas. and neither bright nor dark. 147 and neither good nor bad bright. was Ra^as (obscurity). when moved. caused by a preponderance of one of the sion is three. Moved by the Highest. for instance. That Sattva. ran forth as essence (Rasa).' Here we have clearly the of names the three Gunas. sometimes represented as Vishamatvam. and so on through every part of physical and moral nature. became uneven. dark. in the 2 ' : Maitrayana This world was in the beginning Tamas (darkness) indeed. and it might therefore be argued that it does not In that form it count for much. as we read. at all events. L 2 . . and this is the form of Sattva (goodness). Upanishad V. in which the three Gunas are fully recognised.THREE bad. Tension between these qualities produces activity and struggle: equilibrium This mutual tenleads to temporary or final rest. not for more. it became uneven. but the Maitrarecognised yana Upanishad shows several Samkhya influences. than the later Upanishads or the Bhagavad-gita. when moved.

CHAPTEE IF IV.isa. 32. Of course when we possess commentaries on any Sutras. though he mentions This convinced Windischmann Badarayana as such. 3. In India he has been identified with Vy. in the whole of his commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras. This Vyasa is said by /Samkara. *Samkara. and to have had intercourse with the gods. c. I. I. as Vyasa of the Mahabharata also is hardly more than a name to us. that the Sutras of Badaraya?ia were older therefore than Samkara.. to have lived at the end of the Dvapara and the beginning of the Kali age. II. but without sufficient evidence. and this judg- . 3. 3. now we pass on to a consideration of the six orthodox systems of philosophy. and begin with the Vedanta. Vedanta or Uttara-Mimawisa.e. nor should we gain much by that identification. the re- puted author of our Sutras. the collector of the Mahabharata. we know that the Sutras must have existed before their commentaries. and the commentary of *Sa. we have to take as our chief guides the Sutras of Badarayana. But though he calls him the author of the Mahabharata. that ASamkara himself did not consider these two Vyasas as one and the same person. III. 1. never mentions that the Vyasa of the epic was the author of the book on which he is commenting.mkara. their commentator.. 33. 47. We know little of Biidaraya?ia.



ment ought not to have been lightly disturbed. It was excusable in Colebrooke, but not after what had been said byWindischmann, particularly when no new argument could be produced. All we can say is that, whatever the date of the Bhagavad-git4 is, and it is
a part of the Mahabharata, the age of the VedantaStitras and of Badarayana must have been earlier.



also say that

Badarayana himself never

any work which could be assigned with any amount of certainty to any time after our era. Even when Badarayana quotes the Snm'ti, it does not follow that /Samkara is always right when
refers to

suggesting passages from the Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita), or from Manu, for it is not too much to
say that similar passages may have occurred in other and more ancient Srnnti works also. Badarayarai
certainly most provoking in never quoting his If we could follow $amkara. authorities by name.

Badaraya^ia would have referred in his Sutras to

Bauddhas, 6rainas, Pasupatas and Paft&aratras, to Yogins, Vaiseshikas, though not to Naiyayikas, to By the Sawkhyas, and to the doctrines of (j'aimini

name of Sruti Badarayana, according to $amkara, meant the following Upanishads, BHhad-aranyaka, /^Aandogya, Kanaka, Kaushitaki, Aitareya, Taittiriya,

Munc^aka, Prasna, /Svetasvatara, and 6rabala. This must suffice to indicate the intellectual sphere in which Badarayana moved, or was supposed to have

moved, and so


be said to determine his

chronological position





another Vyasa, who was the father of $uka, the teacher of Gauc?apada, the teacher of Govinda, the

Deussen, System des Vedanta,

p. 24,



teacher of $a?kara, and who, if $a?>ikara belonged to the eighth century, might have lived in about

the sixth century of our era


literary works to which >Sa??ikara refers commentary are, according to Deussen (System,


in his
p. 34),

among the


that of the Big-veda, of the

Va^asaneyins, Maitrayamyas and Taittiriyas, and Ka^as, (nothing from the Sama and Atharvasamhitas)

among the Brahmanas, the


Arsheya, Shac^viwisa, /S'atapatha, Taittiriya, Ta/^c/ya, TTMndogya among the Arawyakas, Aitareya and

and among the Upanishads, Aitareya,


Ka^Aa, Kaushitaki-brahmana,

Kena, jfiTAandogya, Maitrayaniya, Munc/aka, Prasna, jSvetasvatara, Taittiriya. These are sometimes called the old or classical Upanishads, as being quoted by

though Paiwgi, Agnirahasya, Narayawlya and G'abala may have to be added. As belonging to Smn'ti$amkara quotes Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita),

Ramayana, Marka/ic/eya-purana, Manu,Yaska, Pa?iini, Paribhashas, Samkhya-karika, and he refers to Sa??ikliya-Sutras (though it is important to observe that he
gives no ipsissima verba from our Samkhya-Sutras), to Yoga-Sutras, Nyaya-Sutras, Vai.veshika-Sutras, and to Mlmamsa-Sfrfcras. When he alludes to Sugata

Buddha he

refers once to a passage

which has been

traced in the Abhidharma-KosAa-vyakhya. He also knew the Bhagavatas and the Svapiuidhyayavids.
old Upanishads,

Though the name of Vedanta does not occur in the we can hardly doubt that it was the

Another sternum of Vyasa, given by native writers, is Naraya/w, VasishMa, (Padmabhava), *S'akti, Parasara, Vyasa,






kara, &c.



Vedantic thoughts, contained in the Upanishads, which gave the first impulse to more systematic
philosophical speculations in India. Several scholars have tried to prove that Samkhya ideas prevailed
in India at



time than, the Vedantic ideas.

But though there
theories in

germs of Samkhya the Upanishads, they are but few and

certainly are

the strictly Vedantic concepts meet us at every step in the hymns, the Brahma/ias, the Aranyakas, and in the Sutras. Vedanta is clearly
far between, while

the native philosophy of India. It is true that this philosophy is not yet treated systematically in the

Upanishads, but neither


the Samkhya.

To us







thought on the ancient

philosophical of India, Vedanta is

and the question whether clearly the first growth lived before Kapila Badarayana, or whether the
systematic treatment of the

Samkhya took


before that of the Vedanta, can hardly arise.

only wonder that those who maintain the priority of the Samkhya, have not appealed to the Lalita-vistara, twelfth chapter, where, among the subjects known to Buddha, are mentioned not

only Nirghar^u, X/^andas, Yagraakalpa, 6ryotisha, but Samkhya, Yoga, Vaiseshika, Vesika (Vaid-


Arthavidya, Barhaspatya, AsA'arya, Asura, There Mri'gapakshiruta, and Hetuvidya (Nyaya).

are several

names which are

difficult to identify,


there can be no doubt that the five philosophical systems here mentioned were intended for Samkhya,

The Yoga, Vaiseshika, Nyaya, and Barhaspatya. two Mimamsas are absent, but their absence does
not prove that they did not exist, but only that they were considered too orthodox to form a proper



This shows the real subject of study for Buddha. character of the antagonism between Buddhism and

Brahmanism, now so often denied or minimised




confirmed by similar references, as when Hema&andra in his Abhidhana mentions indeed such names
as Arhatas or (9ainas, Saugatas or Buddhists, NaiyaBarhasyikas, Yoga, Samkhya or Kapila, Vaiseshika,

Nastika, AUrvaka or Lokayatika, but the two really dangerous systems, omits carefully the Mimamsa of Badarayana and that of 6raimini. It should also be remembered that considerable



doubt has recently been thrown on the age of the Chinese translation of the Lalita-vistara, which seemed to enable us to assign the original to a date

The case is not at all events anterior to 70 A. D. quite clear yet, but we must learn to be more
cautious with Chinese dates.
It has been the custom to give the name of Vedanta- philosophy to the Uttara-Mimams4 of

Badarayam, nor
should not


there any reason




Vedanta is used as synonymous with Upanishad, the Uttara-Mimawsa

certainly the Vedanta-philosophy, or a systematic treatment of the philosophical teaching of the

no doubt, that Vasish^a as well as Gautama distinguishes between Upanishads and Vedantas (XXII, 9), and the commentator to


Gautama XIX,

7 states distinctly that those parts of the only Arawyakas which are not Upanishads are to be called Vedantas. But there is no real harm

in the received

name, and we see that the followers of the Vedanta were often called Aupanislmdas.

See Brahmavadin, Feb., 1898,

p. 454.





Badarayana, the reputed author of the Vedanta-Sutras, we had to confess before that we know nothing about him. He is to us a name


and an


intellectual power, but nothing else. the date of his great commentator, /Samkara, in the eighth century A.D., and we know that another


commentator, Bodhayana, was even

know that Bodhayana' s commentary was followed

by Kamanu^a. It is quite possible that Bodhayana, like Ramanu^a, represented a more ancient and more faithful interpretation of Badarayana's Sutras, and
that $amkara's philosophy in its unflinching monism, is his own rather than Badarayana's. But no MS.

Bodhayana has yet been discovered. still more ancient commentator, Upavarsha by name, is mentioned, and /S'amkara (III, 3, 53) calls him Bhagavad or Saint. But it must remain doubtful again whether he can be identified with the


Upavarsha, who, according to the Katha-sarit-sagara,

was the teacher of Panini. It must not be forgotten

that, according to Indian

tradition, Badarayana, as the author of the VedantaSutras, is called Vyasa or Vedavyasa, Dvaipayana


Krishna Dvaipayana. Here we are once more in a labyrinth from which it is difficult to find an exit. Vyasa or Krishna Dvaipayana is the name given to the author of the Mahabharata, and no two the styles can well be more different than that of Vyasa of the Mahabharata and that of Vyasa, the
supposed author of the so-called Vyasa-Sutras. I think we should remember that Vyasa, as a noun,

meant no more than compilation

or arrangement,



as opposed to Samasa, conciseness or abbreviation so that the same story might be recited Samasena,



and Vyasena,


a complete


should remember next that Vyasa is called Parasarya, the son of Parasara and Satyavati


and that Pawini mentions one Parasarya

as the author of the Bhikshu-Sutras, while Va/raspati Misra declares that the Bhikshu-Sutras are

the same


the Vedanta-Sutras, and



followers of Parasarya Parasarins. (Pan. IV,
This, if



consequence called



no.) rely on


would prove the

existence of our Sutras before the time of Pamni,
or in the fifth century B.

This would be a most


gain for the

chronology of Indian philoare





(Vivyasa) not only the Vedas, the Mahabharata, the Puranas, but also the Vyasa-Sutras, nay even a prose commentary on Pataf^ali's Yoga-Sutras,

that the work ascribed to him must be taken as the work of several people or of a literary period rather than of one man. I formerly thought that Vyasa might have represented the period in which the first attempts were made to reduce the ancient mnemonic literature

we can hardly doubt

of India to writing, but there is nothing in tradition support such a view, unless we thought that

Vyasa had some connection




Indian tradition places the great Vyasa between the third and fourth ages of the present world, whatever that may mean, if translated into our
If Vyasa had language. really anything to do witli our Vedanta-Sutras, it





would hardly have been more than that he arranged
or edited them.

His name does not occur



Sutras themselves, while that of Badarayawa does, and likewise that of Badari, a name mentioned by (raimini also in his Purva-Mimawisa l In the Bhaga.

vad-gita, which might well be placed as contemporary with the Vedanta-Sutras, or somewhat later, Vyasa is mentioned as one of the Devarshis with Asita and Devala (X, 13), and he is called the greatest of Rishis (X, 37). But all becomes confusion again,
if we remember that tradition makes Vyasa the author of the Mahabharata, and therefore of the Bhagavad-gita itself, which is even called an Upani-


The only passage which seems
the relative



to settle

age of the Vedanta-Sutras and the 2 Bhagavad-gita is in XIII, 3 'Hear and learn from me the Supreme Soul (Kshetrar/ria) that has been
celebrated in

many ways by Rishis

in various metres,

and by

words of the Brahma-Sutras, which are and furnished with reasons.' Here the words Brahma-sutra-padai/?,' the words of the seem to me to refer clearly to Brahma-Sutras,' the recognised title of the Vedanta or Brahmathe



Whatever native



say to

the contrary, the words definite and argumentacan refer to Sutras only. And if it is said, on the other side, that these Brahma-Sutras, when they
refer to Snm'ti, refer clearly to passages

taken from

the Bhagavad-gita



and must therefore be later, They never mention the name of the

Colebrooke, M. E., II, p. 354. Prof. T. E. Amalnerkar, Priority of the Vedanta-Sutras, 1895.



Bhagavad-gita, nor do they give any ipsissima verba from it, and as every Smrzti presupposes a $ruti.

may have been meant



sages which


the Bhagavad-gita had adapted, and Brahmahave shared with other Snmtis.

Sutra, on the contrary,

a distinct




more significant where it occurs, because neither in the word Sutra nor Brahma-Sutra occurs ao;ain ~

any other passage of the Gita. However, even admitting that the Brahma-Sutras quoted from the
Bhagavad-gita, as the Gita certainly appeals to the Brahma-Sutras, this reciprocal quotation might

be accounted for by their being contemporaneous, as in the case of other Sutras which, as there can
be no doubt, quote one from the other, and sometimes verbatim.

As to the commentary on Pataf^ali's Yoga-Sutras being the work of the same Vyasa, this seems to





the question.

There are

hundreds of people in India

who have the name

of Vyasa. Nor has it ever been positively proved that Pataf/r/ali, the reputed author of the YogaSutras, was the same person as Pata/l^ali, the author

Mahabhashya, the great commentary on Pa?iini's grammar, and on Katyayana's Varttikas. Some scholars have rushed at this conclusion,

chiefly in order to fix the date of the Yoga-Sutras, but this also would force us to ascribe the most

heterogeneous works to one and the same author Even the age of Pata^r/ali, the grammarian and

author of the Mahabhashya, seems to

me by


Botli Lassen

seem inclined

to accept the identity of the

and Garbe, Die Sawkhya-Philosophie, p. two Puta%alis.




I gladly admit the settled. plauof Goldstiicker's arguments that if Pataft^ali sibility presupposed the existence of the Maurya-dynasty he

means positively

might be placed in the third century B.C. I look upon the Ar&aA, which he mentions in the famous Maurya-passage, as having been devised by the Mauryas for the sake of trade, as the first coins with
images of the
gods, introduced

by the Maurya-

Such coins, when they contain images dynasty. of the gods, should not, according to the grammarian, be called simply by the names of the gods,
but by a derivative name, not >Siva, but $ivaka, just as we distinguish between an Angel and an Angelot. And I pointed out before, the very gods

mentioned here by Pataf^/ali are the gods the images of which do occur on the oldest Indian coins which we possess, viz. Siva,, Skanda, and Visakha, the last, if taken for Kama. As a constructive date
therefore, that assigned

by Goldstlicker to Pata%ali

might stand, but that
tive date.

is very different from a posithe name of Maurya in the MahaBesides, bhashya is doubtful and does not occur again in it. saw before that Badarayana refers in his


Sutras to 6raimini, the author of the Purva-MimamsaSutras, and that (7aimini returns the compliment

by referring to Badarayawa by name.


likewise acquainted with the atheistical doctrines of Kapila and the atomistic theories of Kanada,








India this



proving the later date of Badarayawa.


must learn to look on Badarayana, 6raimini, Kapila, and similar names, as simply eponymous

so that at whatheroes of different philosophies ever time these systems were reduced to the form



of Sutras, certain opinions could be called




scholiast to

Colebrooke states, on the authority of a Manu and Ya^fiavalkya, that the instruc-

were often reduced to writing by his pupils, and that this would account for the fact that the author of a system is often quoted in the third person in his own book. It would be interesting if this could be established with reference to
tions of a teacher

ancient texts, but I remember nothing of the kind. All this is very discouraging to students accustomed to chronological accuracy, but it has always seemed


far better to

acknowledge our poverty and the

utter absence of historical dates in the literary history of India, than to build up systems after systems which
collapse at the first breath of criticism or scepticism.





that there

speak of a chronology of thought, what is a chronology which enables

us to distinguish a period of Yedic thought, subdivided into three periods of Mantras, Brahmanas, and Upanishads. No one would doubt the succession of these three periods of language, but if some scholars wish to extend each period to thousands of

them success. I confess I do not share the idea that we should claim for Indian literature as remote an antiquity as possible. The same attempts were made before, but nothing was gained by them, and much was lost as soon as more
years, I can only wish

After the sober and critical ideas began to prevail. of that would follow Buddhism, Upanishad-period marked, on the Buddhist side, by the Suttas, on

the Brahmanic

and possibly somewhat earlier, by the large mass of Sutra literature. To that period seem to me to belong, by similarity of thought,

not of style, the six systems of philosophy.




should have said by style also, because the earliest form in which we possess these systems is that of Sutras. Unfortunately we know now how easily even that very peculiar style can be, and in case of the Samkhya and some of the legal Smritis, has been

must not therefore ascribe too much weight to this. The next period would be what


have called that of the Renaissance, beginning at a time when Sanskrit had ceased to be the language spoken by the people, though it continued, as it has

to the present day, to be cultivated by the learned. Such are the difficulties that meet us when we

attempt to introduce anything like chronological order into the literature of India, and it seems to


far better to state

them honestly than

to disguise




the importance of that literature,

philosophical portion, It has something to quite independent of age. teach us quite apart from the names and dates of its authors and grateful as we should feel for any real

and more particularly of

light that can be thrown on these chronological mazes, we must not forget that the highest interest of the

Vedanta and the other philosophies
but their truth.


not their age,

Fundamental Doctrines of the Vedanta.

fundamental doctrines of the Vedanta, the Hindus themselves have helped us and given us in a few words what they themselves
for the

we ask


as the

my thought. Three Lectures on the Vedanta' (1894) In one half verse I shall tell you what has been

quintessence of that system I quoted these words at the end of



taught in thousands of volumes






is false,

the world

the soul


Brahman and nothing




There is nothing worth gaining, there is nothing worth enjoying, there is nothing worth knowing but Brahman alone, for he who knows Brahman, is
This resume of the Vedanta

very true, and

very helpful as a resume of that system of philosophy.



distinguish fundamental doctrines and


we must




can never carry


these details in

our memory, but we may always have present before our mind the general structure of a great system of thought and its salient points, whether it be the
philosophy of Kant or of Plato or of Badaraya?ia. It would be quite impossible in a historical sketch of
the six Indian philosophical systems to give all their details. They are often unimportant, and may
easily be gathered from the texts themselves, such as we have them in the original or in translations but they must not be allowed to crowd and to


obscure that general view of the six systems which alone is meant to be given in these pages. have another and still shorter abstract of the




the famous words addressed by Uddalaka to his son vetaketu (AMnd. Up. VI, 8),
' '

namely, Tat tvam asi,' Thou art That.' These words, however, convey little meaning without the context in which they occur, that is to say, unless we know



meant by the Tat, that, and by the Tvam, The Tat is what we saw shadowed forth in

See also Theosophy,

p. 3





the Upanishads as the Brahman, as the cause of the world, the Tvam is the Atman, the Self in
various meanings, from the ordinary I to the divine Soul or Self, recognised in man and it is

the highest aim of the Vedanta to show that these two are in reality one 1 This fearless synthesis,


in the simple

words Tat tvam




the boldest and truest synthesis in the whole

history of philosophy. recognised the Tat or

Even Kant, who clearly it, that is the Ding an sich

behind the objective world, never went far enough to recognise the identity of the Tat, the objective

Ding an


and the Tvam, the Ding an



the subjective side of the world. Among ourselves such a synthesis of the subjective with the objective

would even now rouse the strongest theological, not philosophical, protests, whereas the theologians of India discuss it with perfect equanimity, and see in it the truest solution of the riddle of the world.

In order fully to understand it, we must try to place ourselves firmly on the standpoint of the

Vedanta philosophers, forgetting all our own inherited theological misgivings. Their idea of the Supreme Cause of the universe went far beyond


meant by God, the creator and ruler of the world (Prar/apati). That being was to them a manifestation only of the Supreme Cause or Brahman, it was Brahman as phenomenal, and it followed that, as Brahman, as they held, was indeed the cause of

everything, the All in All, man also could be nothing but a phenomenon of Brahman. The idea therefore that it would be blasphemy to make the creature

Mawdukya Up.


Ayam Atma Brahma.


never presented itself to their minds. this lifting up of the Tvam into the Tat might prove the equivalent of the idea of divine sonship. it was the absolute divine essence. r Pra<yapati I say when as the creative god. Translated into the language of the early Christian philosophers of Alexandria. including gods all and men. They saw. they saw Rig-veda . the lord of all creatures. real recognition of the original divine nature of man. manifested in a subjective and personal creator. that God is hardly a name that can be used for that Supreme Brahman. because theology steps in and protests against them as irreligious and blasphemous. for we ought never to forget that we and the absolute Cause of w hen taken have always to be satisfied with what we take God to be ( Vidyamatra). also. however much hidden and disfigured for a time by Avidya. and that we can never go beyond. With us unfortunately such questions can hardly be discussed in a calm philosophical spirit. the absolute Cause of the universe. and present likewise in all its phenomenal manifestations. in fact. Their Tat was something behind or above the purely personal creator. Prar/cipati. but from the Vedanta point of view it means real identity. that he shares in the nature of Brahman. taken as such. or ignorance. or in the spirit of God. just as the Jews declared it blasphemy in Christ to teach that He was . the Godhead. and all its consequences. as it did in the hymns of the and though they might have shrunk from identifying gods and men with that personal divine being. Even their god beyond gods (Deveshu adhi ekaA) did not satisfy them any longer. nothing but truth in the doctrine that man in his true nature was the same with Brahman.1 62 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. equal to the creator so far as their substance was concerned.

groping their way in the dark. seem to be moving in the most serene atmosphere of thought. bring us very near to the earliest Christian philosophy. A few extracts. equal to God. The teachers of the Vedanta. and help us to understand it. p. though it was recognised as the by early fathers of the Church. the unity of the Father and the Son. B. I Christianity. To maintain the eternal identity of the human and the divine is very different from arrogating divinity for humanity and on this point even our philosophy may have something to learn which has often been forgotten . these Vedanta teachings may. nay that 163 He and the Father were one. though indirectly. 92 M 2 . It is as difficult to give an idea of the form of the Upanishads as of the spirit that pervades the Upanishads. Tat tvam asi. of the Father and in vital all modern His sons. of man and God. however. E. and in their stiff and algebraic Sutras they were working out these mighty problems with unfaltering love of truth. and in an unimpassioned and truly philosophic spirit. nay. as it was understood by the great thinkers of Alexandria. I. while resuscitate in striving to man the consciousness of the identity of the Tat and the Tvam. The first is taken from the JTMndogya Upanishad w hich belongs to the Sama-veda and is generally regarded as one of the earlier Upanishads *. T 1 Translated in S.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. arid. may help to show us the early Vedantists as they were. though under a strange form.. If properly understood. We do not indeed get there the pure wine of the Vedanta. but we get the grapes from which the juice was extracted and made into wine.

is ' : What ' of clay all that known. ' all that is made of steel (Karsrmayasam) is known. as you 3. : and so stubborn. have you ever asked by which we hear what is not perceived. FIRST KHANDA. go to school for there none belonging to our race. by one pair of nail-scissors 6. a Brahmabandhu. who. . considering himself well-read. His father said to him are so conceited. Sir ? he asked. The son said ' : Surely those venerable men . when he was twenty2. The father replied My dear son. arising from thus. the grandson . but the truth being that all is steel. arising from speech. not having studied (the Veda).e. my for that instruction dear son. my dear son. of Arima. ' being only the name. but the truth being that all is gold Arid as.164 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.' 7. darling. To him ' : of Arima) said is his father (Uddalaka. my dear son. the difference being only the name. arising from speech. is that instruction. all that is made of gold is known. the difference being only the name. by one nugget of gold 5. and stubborn. the son $vetaketu. i. is. /Svetaketu returned to his father. ' conceited. but is made of clay is the truth being that all is clay And as. $vetaketu.' Having begun his apprenticeship (with a teacher) when he was twelve years of age. having then studied all the Vedas. speech. the difference . as by one clod 4. considering yourself well-read. four. rny dear son. a Brahma?ia by birth only. /Svetaketu was the son of Arum. 1. by which ' that instruction. ' we perceive what is not by which we know what is not known ? heard. as it were.

my son. ' It sent forth water. ^ born. that which is. therefore tell me that. ' It sent forth fire. one only. 'It thought. without is a second. most food is then produced. No. ' 2. one only. Therefore whenever it rains anywhere. drink as much water as you like. only was in the beginning. is From water alone eatable SEVENTH KHAJVTDA. 165 (my teachers) did not it. may I grow forth.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. my dear son.' said the father. But how could ' it be so. consists of sixteen Abstain from food for fifteen days. Man (Purusha). ' anybody anywhere is produced on him from many. my dear son ' ? the father continued. my dear son. water fire alone. be born of that which that which is. 'In the beginning. And therefore whenever is hot and perspires. Water thought. Others say. but parts. was . for breath comes . food produced. For if they had should they not have told it me ? Do you. SECOND 1. 3. I be may I grow forth. fire may I be many. How not could that which ? is.' ' Be it so. known why Sir. in the beginning there was that only which is not (TO 6V). may I be grow forth. one only. ' It sent forth earth (food). there was that only which is (TO 6V). may I 4. without a second and from that which is not. know that. That thought. without a second. ' i . may many.

' Then his father said to fire him : 5.' After that. he understood NINTH KB. Thus. which would not burn much more than this (i. taketu ate. and by it you remember now the Vedas. 'As the bees. Sir. and reduce the juice into one form. lighted up with food. He replied and Saman verses. very little).1 66 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. he understood what his father meant when he said Mind. breath from water.' 2.' He it. he knew it all ! ' by heart. And whatever his father asked him. thus. and therefore with that one part you do not remember the Vedas. of a firefly. fire. there was one part of the sixteen parts left to you. if you drink /SVetaketu abstained from food for fifteen days. and will thus burn more than this. my son. e.' 3. my dear son. 2.' Then Sve4. and water. one coal of the size be made to blaze up again by putting grass upon it. make honey by col- lecting the juices of distant trees. and that. understood what he yea. will not from water. my dear son. be cut off. my son. Ya^us. And as these juices have no discrimination. may ' 6. The father said to him fire : one coal only of the size 'As of a great lighted of a firefly may be left. As of a great lighted if left. ' : What shall Then he came to his father and said The father said I say ? Repeat the Rile. speech from said. ' . and afterwards approached his father. comes from ' : food.' They do not ' ' : ' : occur to me. burnt up. 1. Go and eat Then wilt thou understand me. one part only of the sixteen parts (of you) is left.ANDA.

my child. It is the True. whether a lion. Whatever these creatures are here. ' 4. inform me still more. ' 2. when they have become merged in the True (either in deep sleep or in death). when they are in the sea. ' as those rivers. that they become again and again. or a boar. so that they 167 might say. Be it so. all these creatures. They go from sea to sea (i. e. the eastern (like the Ganga) toward the east. or a boar. or a musquito. ' Be my child. my son. that subtile essence. sea. or a worm. That which is that subtile essence. the western (like the Sindhu) toward the west. ' its Self. whether 3.' said the son. It is it. Sir. the clouds lift up the water from the sea to the sky. They become indeed 1. do not know. my son. know not that they have come back from the True. it.' the father replied.' it is the ' ' and thou. in it all 3. know not or that. And In the same manner. in the that they are merged in the True. inform me still more.' said the son. run. in Self. Now that which its all that exists has Self.' It is the and thou. ' or a gnat. or a gnat. ' that exists has Self. art Please. Sir.' the father replied. I am the juice of this tree same manner. or a midge. all these creatures. when they have come back from the True. /SVetaketu. or a worm. >Svetaketu. and send it back as rain to the sea). my son. a lion. TENTH These rivers. or a musquito. or a wolf.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. that they become again and again. Whatever these creatures are here. or a midge. or a wolf. It is the True. . I am this or that river. art Please. it so.

' ' ' ' do you see there ? 'These seeds. Sir. It is the Self. but it would live. It is the True. . it would bleed. ' if it leaves branches.' ? ' Not anything.' ' ' What do you see there Sir. If it leaves the whole tree. ' i . Pervaded by the living Self that tree stands firm. of its . bleed.' the father replied. Sir. Sir.' thence a fruit of the Nyagrodha tree. Fetch me from Sir.1 68 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. This (body) indeed withers and 3. If he were to strike at its top. That which is that subtile essence. In exactly the same manner.' Break one of them. it would bleed. but it would live. the whole tree withers.' Please. this. drinking in its nourishment and rejoicing But if the life (the living Self) leaves one 2. ' art it. that branch withers if it leaves a third.' It is ' broken. and thou. ELEVENTH were to strike at the root of this large would tree here. ' If one it . : Thus he spoke my son. If he were to strike at its stem.' ' ' Here is one. inform me still more. . but it would live. in it all that exists has its Self. almost infinitesimal. left it . Break it.' ' know dies when the living (Self) has ' the living (Self) dies not. $vetaketu. ' Be it so. that branch withers.' said the son. i . TWELFTH KHA#Z>A. my child. that branch withers a second.' ' What It is broken.

The son having looked for course. ' 3. 2. and thou. of it from the surface of the water. Sir. my son. you do not perceive the True (Sat). inform me more/ said the son. and then wait on me in the morning/ ' . THIRTEENTH ' 1. ' How ' is it ? The son ' replied : It is salt/ it from the bottom. The father said Taste ' : found it not. art it/ ' It the and thou. essence. That which is the subtile essence. its Self. Place this salt in water. The father said to him Bring me the you placed in the salt. that subtile essence there. 2. ' Be it so. father said Here also. It is the True. How replied ' is it ? ' : The son ' It is salt/ Taste Taste it from the middle. Believe it. That which is the subtile 3. my child/ the father replied. art . $vetaketu. in it all that It is the True. ' : How it ' is it ? The son replied The father said on me/ It is salt/ ' : Throw away and then wait He did so . still O /Svetaketu. it/ exists has its Self. in it all is that exists has Self. my but there indeed it is. son . but the salt continued to exist. Please.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. which water last night/ it. for. which you do not perceive ' of that very essence this great Nyagrodha tree exists. in this body. It is the Self. The son did as he was commanded. it was melted. 169 The father said: 'My son. ' : Then the indeed.

' the father replied. he " knows them. go in that direction thereupon. ' it all its Self. it. 'And as thereupon some one might loose his " bandage and say to him. or the west. or " I have been the north. his relatives assemble ? him and ask " : Dost thou know me round Dost thou know me merged heat ? in his (fire). . ' Be it so. art Please. Go in that direction. having been informed and being able to judge for himself. Sir. covered . here with my eyes covered. in exactly the same manner does a man. Sir. O /Svetaketu.' said the son. FIFTEENTH ' KHAA /)A. FOURTEENTH KHA^Z>A. . Please. he would by asking his way from 1. 'As one might lead a person with his eyes away from the Gandharas. my child/ the father replied. and leave him then in a place where there are no human beings and as that person would turn towards the east. it " and as is the Gandharas. and then I shall be perfect. If a is ill. 'That which is the subtile essence. I have been brought left here with my eyes covered. village to village arrive at last at the Gandharas.' It is the and thou.170 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. inform me still more. as long as his speech is not mind." 3. inform me still more. in that exists has Self. breath in heat in the Highest Being (Devata). it so. his mind in breath. T i . and shout. Then. learn that there is " delay so long only as I am not delivered (from this body). who meets with a teacher to inform him. ' Be my man child. It is the True.' said the son." 2.

surrendered (at a sacrifice) i. at the head in the I go midst work of Yama 6. and thou. FIRST VALLI. That which is the subtile essence. heat in the Highest Being. mind in breath.' . breath in heat (fire).' the father replied. then he knows them not. that he possessed. ' 171 But when his speech is merged in his mind. and has by many scholars been classed as of later date. it.) first. The next extract is from the Ka^Aa Upanishad of the Ya^ur-veda. The son said of many (who have still to die) . He (knowing that his father had promised to give up at a sacrifice all that he possessed.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. his * exists has its Self. 4. it was with those who came before. inform me still more. sacrifice his son. He had a son of the name of Na&iketas. like corn he springs up again. my child. Sir. desirous all (of heavenly rewards). look forward how come A it will be with those who mortal ripens like corn. Va^asravasa. It is the True. (The father. ' : Then the father replied (angrily) I shall give thee unto Death. ' What will be the dying). having once said ' : though in haste. ' /Svetaketu. in it all that 2.' so. ' Be it so. had to be true to his word and to I go as the 5. and therefore his son also) said to his father Dear ' : father. art Please.' It is the Self. to whom it He ' said wilt thou give me ? a second and a third time. ruler of the (the departed) which to-day he has to do unto me ? of many (who are now Look back how hereafter.' said the son.

pacified. is is Naiketas . rejoice in the world of heaven. and be again towards ' thee as he was before. hast dwelt in my house three nights without eating.' . be that he may from anger towards me and know me and greet me. Leaving behind thirst. Yama said thy father. when a Brahmana That fire is quenched by this enters as a guest. both hunger and all and out of the reach of sorrow. to me Na&iketas said kind. Auddalaki Arum. said: 'In the heaven-world there no fear afraid on thou art not there. will With my leave.172 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as thou. righteousness. and there is no one to receive him. after having seen thee freed from the jaws of death. as the of the three boons I choose that Gautama. my father. peace-offering Brahmana that dwells in the house of a 8. during which time Na&iketas had received no hospitality from him. ' Hail to thee first ! and welfare 10. when I shall free thee. know thee. destroys his his expectations. . and Death.' 12. He shall sleep peacefully through the night. all his sons and cattle/ hopes and and (Yama. . his sacred and his good deeds. (Na&iketas then enters into the abode of Yama Vaivasvata. returning to his house after an absence of three nights. and no one account of old age. 9. says :) Brahma?ia. ! ' A foolish man without receiving food to eat. Vaivasvata bring water. his possessions. Thereupon one of the attendants of Yama is sup- posed to say ' :) Fire enters into the houses. a venerable guest. Death. and free from anger. 7. ' therefore choose now !' : three boons.' : have been dismissed by 1 1.

and how they . he is others. Death. Choose now. NaAiketas said ' : On this point even the gods have been in doubt indeed. Choose anunderstand. ' : .FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. and which thou hast chosen as thy second boon. that it is the attainment of the eternal worlds. said again : Na&iketas. ' : are to be placed. learn it from 14. O Na/dketas. for I am Those who live in the heaven-world full of faith. hast declared it to be not easy to understand. and what bricks are required for the altar. do not press me. Na&iketas. Then M?^'tyu. and another teacher like thee is not to be found : surely no other boon is like unto this/ 'Choose sons and grandsons who 23. Yama then told him that fire-sacrifice. Death said : . this is On this point even the gods it is not easy to have been in doubt formerly That subject is subtle. and how many. Na&iketas said There is that doubt.. Yama said thou when understandest that fire-sacrifice and me. know. which leads to heaven. This. when a man is dead. this I ask as my second boon/ reach immortality. and let me off that boon/ 22. some saying. And Na&iketas repeated all as it had been told to him. he is not.' 15. I will tell it thee. the fire-sacrifice which leads us to heaven tell it to me. 173 IT. ' 1 9. thy third boon/ 20. should like to know. other boon. Na&iketas. . in the beginning of the worlds. and thou. is thy fire which leads to heaven. 'Thou knowest. hidden in darkness. O Death. being pleased with him. That fire all men will proclaim as thine. Death said ' : . taught by thee This the third of my boons/ I 2 1 . and their firm support.

desires.' NaMketas said: 'Thoughts of to-morrow. . Let us Shall we have wealth. No man long live. pleasures which arise from beauty and love?' Death. Na&i- ketas does not choose another boon but that which enters into what is hidden. after he has pondered on the and knowing. earth. men. Be (king).174 shall live a INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. would delight in a long life. ments. I make thee the enjoyer of all ' 24. after having approached them. and live thyself as many harvests as thou desirest. horses. on the wide earth. keep dance and song for Keep thyself/ can be made happy through wealth.' rulest ? What mortal. ' Only that boon to be chosen by me. thou thy horses. elephants. slowly decaying here below. 29. Death. as as thou is (which I have chosen) 28. choose wealth. me about dying. wear out the present vigour of all the Even the whole of life is short. Choose the wide abode of the and gold. the freedom from decay enjoyed by the immortals. Na&iketas. ask for them according to thy wish fair maidens with their chariots and musical instru' 25. but do not ask 26. that on which there is this doubt. tell us what there is in that great Hereafter. hundred years. when we see thee 1 ' 27. such are indeed not to be obtained by be waited on by them whom I give to thee. senses of man.' If thou canst think of any boon equal to that. herds of cattle. 'No. and long life.' Whatever desires are difficult to attain among these mortals.' .

. ignorance.' The Hereafter never 7. "there is no other. ' : Yea." thus he falls again and again under my sway. who is able to teach this (the Self) wonderful is he who comprehends this. staggering to and fro.' .' The good and the pleasant approach man 2. . round and round. "This is the world. chain a man. He (the Self) of whom many are not even able whom many. go ' 5. wise in their own conceit. I believe Na&iketas to be one who desires knowledge. It is well with him who clings to the good he who chooses the pleasant. greed and avarice. even when they hear of him.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OP THE VEDANTA. Thou hast not gone into the road that perish. like blind men led ' rises before the eyes of 6. . the careless child. O Na&iketas.' leadeth to wealth. when found. sures that are or seem delightful. hast dismissed ' them 4.' Thou. for even many pleasures did not tear thee away. having different objects. the wise goes round about them and distinguishes 1. in which many men 'Wide apart and leading to different points are these two. and what is known as wisdom. good is one thing. but the fool chooses the pleasant through them. all. do not comprehend wonderful is a man. to hear. the pleasant another these two. Death said: 'The . misses his end. deluded by the delusion of wealth. the wise prefers the good to the pleasant. when taught by an able teacher. 175 SECOND VALLI. after pondering all plea3.' ' by the blind. and puffed up with vain knowledge.' Fools dwelling in darkness." he thinks.

then. Ancient is unborn. the rest. 'A mortal who has heard this and embraced it. If the killer thinks that he kills. is killed. rejoices. 'The knowing Self is not born. Self. who has removed from it all qualities.' 12. : the fulfilment of all desires. the endless rewards of good deeds. Hence the Na&iketa fire-sacrifice has been laid by me first then. but when is . May it now 9. he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind. O Na/dketas. killed. the shore where there is no fear.' Yama said 1 1 Though thou hadst seen ' .' 13.' 19. and has thus reached that subtle Being. the wide abode. if the killed . because he has obtained what is a cause for rejoicing. I have obtained what . for the eternal not obtained by things which are not eternal. not to be obtained by argudeclared by another. thinks that he this one does not kill. they do not understand nor is that one killed. The house (of Brahman) is open. The it sprang from nothing. by means of meditation on his recognises the Ancient.176 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. who has entered into darkness. that which is magnified by praise. is That doctrine it ment. nothing sprang from it. who dwells in the abyss. ' The wise who. is not transient (the teaching of Yama). by means of transient things. inquirer like thee Na&iketas said I know that ' ' ! : what is is called treasure is transient. we have always an i o. Thou hast obtained thou art truly a man of true resolve. it dies not. who is hidden in the cave. who is difficult to be seen. yet being wise thou hast with firm resolve dismissed it all. as God.' 1 8. I believe. the foundation of the world. eternal.' for . it is easy to understand. everlasting he is not . ' though the body is killed. O dearest.

turned away from his wickedness. Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot. know that God. 'The wise who knows the Self as bodiless within the bodies.' . A man who free from desires and free from grief. ' Though down. ' 1 . he can never obtain is the Self (even) by knowledge.' 21. by him the Self can be gained.' THIRD VALLI. dwelling on the highest summit (the ether in the heart). those householders light Tri?ia/dketa sacrifice. as unchanging among changing things. own them shade and who perform the 2. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda. smaller than small. save who rejoices and rejoices not ? 22. is sitting still. Those who know Brahman call likewise. he ' goes to able everywhere. rite which a bridge for sacrificers which is the highest. he never grieves. sees the majesty of the Self by the grace of the Creator (or through the serenity of the elements).FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. entered into the cave (of the heart). and subdued. greater than hidden in the heart of the creature. ' 177 The is is great. 20. There are the two. He whom the Self chooses. as great and omnipresent. not at rest. nor by much learning. own. Self.' 23. imperishable Brahman for those to cross over to the fearless shore.' ' The Self chooses him But he who has not first (his body) as his 24. who is or whose mind not tranquil. Who. drinking O their reward in the world of their works. 'May we is be able to master that Na/t'iketa .' ' who wish 3. though lying myself. he walks far . nor by understanding. x .

the Great Self is beyond the intellect. and who holds the reins of the mind. like good horses of a charioteer. 'A wise man should keep down speech and . this i is 2. the intellect (buddhi) the charioteer. the senses. the furthest road. He who has no understanding and whose mind is ' never firmly held. then wise people call him the Enjoyer. never reaches that place.' He who has no understanding. reaches indeed that place. beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person (Purusha). and that is the ' highest place (step) of Vishmi.' That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth. ' Beyond the Person there is nothing the goal.' ' 8.' Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped. the objects of When he (the Highest Self) union with the body.' unmanageable. his senses (horses) are like vicious horses of a charioteer. ful and always impure.' ii. but is ' enters into the round of births. he reaches the end of his journey.' 10. who is mindful and always pure. who is unmind7. The senses they call the senses their roads. O 6. But he who has understanding. the body to be the chariot. intellect.' in ' 5. rioteer.' But he who has understanding for his cha9.178 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 'Beyond the senses there are the objects. beyond the objects there is the mind.' 13. is the horses. but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle. 'But he who has understanding and whose mind (the reins) always firmly held. beyond the mind there is the intellect. his senses are under control. and the mind.' ' 4. and the mind the reins. from whence he is not born again.

without end. . difficult is the path (to the He who has perceived that which is without without sound. When therefore. know how far we are still from a perfect understanding of the Upanishads. without smell. I knew that I could count on the same indulgence which is always granted to a first attempt at translating. eternal. is beyond the Great. often. will easily see that I have altered it in several places. understand them The sharp edge of a razor is is I ! (the Great) within the Self w hich T difficult to Self) 15. awake having obtained your boons. I undertook a translation the more important Upanishads. and unchangefreed from the jaws of death. as in our case. such as it is presupposed by the commentaries of /Samkara. without decay. my my But I do not wish it to be understood that I consider my translation even scholars Our best now as quite free from doubt. and he should keep that the Quiet/ 14. all I could hope for was to give a better translation than what we had before. May I be allowed to say here a few words with transtranslation. Though I was well aware of the of all difficulties of such an undertaking. touch. 179 mind is he should keep them within the Self which knowledge he should keep knowledge within the .' Translation of the Upanishads. in 1879. Self which is the Great . . able. instead of intro- N 2 . without begin' ning. wrong in following a text. nay.TRANSLATION OF THE UPANISHADS. at guessing and deciphering an ancient Nor have I been at all convinced that I was text. 'Rise. without taste.' . without form. published in 1879 and 1884. pass over the wise tell it. Those who know regard to lation of the Upanishads.

may be criticised. who after all lived a thousand years ago. and when my translations diller from his. however obvious they seem to be. and I never Besides represented it as more than a pis aller. to with /Sawkara's interpretations. Such a work as Colonel Jacob's Concordance of the Principal Upanishads and the Bhagavad-gita. But the work of the children that glean some ears is very different from that of the mower who has to mow a whole field alone. in 1897. Scholars should learn that the more obvious their emendations are. B. waiting for the ninth year. as those who come after me a will field no doubt glean many a stray ear even in which so many mowers have mowed. whenever it was impossible to be satisfied a satisfactory meaning. anybody who will take the a sacrifice in trouble to compare them with my own will find a good harvest of them. E. Though I have hardly ever referred to the mistakes made by earlier translators of the Upanishads.l8o INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the more difficult it becomes to account for the introduction of such palpable corruptions into an ancient text. the careful and brilliant translation of the Sixty Upanishads published by Professor Deussen. of translators the S. . shows what an immense advance has been made with have adopted many emendations in the extracts given above. had to make all the that. ducing conjectural emendations. giving what they could give at the without time. My determination discover also. from Professor Deussen's its help. I work. such as it was at the time of $a??ikara. but have simply corrected them. published in 1891. has placed at the disposal of all Vedantic students what may almost be called a mowing machine in place of a sickle and .

for instance. 13. at least at present. If we could always at what time each Upanishad was finally settled and reduced to writing. is never mentioned in the second chapter. that Purusha must always be taken in the technical Samkhya sense. whereas Purusha and PrakHti at once remind us of Sawkhya by no means unknown to early Samkhya philosophers. Whenever we come across such words as Atman and know Brahman we doctrines. nor is Purusha entirely To say. all I l8l can say is that I always differ most reluctantly from one who has devoted so many years to Vedantic studies. what do we know of the compilers of the Upanishads to enable us to speak so positively on such a subject ? Everybody can see that there was a division at III. The technical repetition of certain words in IV. But on the other shall prove that it was not so ? hand. for instance. and Atman in that of the Vedanta. or 16. that there But Atman We was a time when it consisted of one chapter and It may have been so. with regard to the Ka^Aa Upanishad. or 17. whether before or after the time when the Vedarita and Samkhyaphilosophy assumed each its own independent and systematic form. is is go still going too far. suspect Vedantic influences. and that V. . outside the Vedantic horizon. therefore. our task would be much lightened. and who three Vallis only. except last and probably spurious or additional in the verse. and whose mind is so thoroughly imbued with Vedantic ideas. 1 8 is later.TRANSLATION OF THE UPANISHADS. The name of Naiketas. further out of our depth if we maintain. 1 7 might indicate that the Upanishad originally ended there. Anybody can see also that the second Adhyaya differs in spirit from the first.

still and second plenty of work left first Valli. Character of the Upanishads. which preceded. the age of pbilosophy. so as to to describe them give a clear idea of what Such utterances as will I us philosophy always means something systematic. except in India. With But that is the very reason the are so interesting to the hiswhy Upanishads torical student. whilst the great ocean of that ancient literature lies before us undiscovered and unexplored. have here quoted from the seem hardly Upanishads worthy of the name of would have It been almost impossible philosophy. for with all that has been achieved are on the threshold only of a truly historical study of Indian philosophy and literature. however. half poetical. Possibly. may easily discover a different spirit in the third. for those who after us. is that the systematic philosophy of India would be perfectly unintelligible without the previous chapter of the Upanishads. if we knew more of the utterances of such men as Heraclitus show some or Epimenides in Greece. we Here. is fact. we are still like children playing on the sea-shore and finding now and then a pebble or a shell. also. Nowhere. watch that period of chaotic thought. can we consecutive treatises. in India at least. and then We In as compared with the there come. What is quite clear. And however unsystematic . not from the old form NaHketas. properly so called.1 82 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. appears as NaAiketa. they might likeness to the outpourings of the authors of the Upanishads. as derived from Na&iketa. half religious. while what we find here are philosophic rhapsodies rather than the Upanishads really are.

and is then only learning from his father the highest wisdom. though invisible. in this unreal or phenomenal world. Upanishads. as the germ of life in the smallest seed. That divine essence. and without it there would be no seed. you cannot handle it. often mixed up with what seems to us childish and absurd.' that is. thou. that which is alone true and real it and know that. but to we must remember tradition that a long continued oral must naturally leave a wide door open of these additions of every kind. is as true as it is difficult to explain. You cannot see it. . but you can taste though invisible. cannot be doubted that they represent the soil which contained the seeds of philosophy which sprang up and had their full growth in the great it Whatever we may think systems of philosophy of a later age. we see that that highest wisdom had already been fully elaborated in the of famous teachers he is formula of Tattvam asi. man. schools If /SVetaketu is is recorded to us in the Upanirepresented as attending the till twenty-four years of age. it is there. as without God there would be no That this ancient wisdom should be so world. there is really during the age that shads. art not different from that divine nature which ' ' pervades the whole world. these relics of the 183 childhood of philosophy may more system in them than first at sight. no tree.CHARACTER OF THE UPANISHADS.' Thou art that. is present likewise. as salt pervades the sea. no fruit. They contain a number even appears of technical terms which show that the Upanishads did not spring up in one day. and that there must have been a good deal of philosophical controversy seem.

but a carefully reasoned system. 'Now then research of Brahman. now we turn to these. and that only after having gained a virtue. Now then a desire to know Brahman. as one body. learning by heart the text of the Veda.' The two words Atha and AtaA which. always give rise and most fanciful interpretations. and which occur again and again at the beginning of Sanskrit works.' or as Deussen translates Giyn&sh. contained in 555 short paragraphs. the Purva-Mimawsa forming the the Uttara-Miinib/isa the second part. We read there in the ' first Sutra and as a kind of title. such as Upanayana. as . were originally no more than introductory. Ve cUinta. would there arise a desire to know Brahman. also. including the Upanishads. it seems to me best to take Atha in the sense of Now. reception by a teacher.S fttras If . the so-called Vedanta-Sutras. to the philosophy elaborated by Badaraya/ the sense of Then or Therefore. particularly of the sacrificial Dharma. Vedadhyayana. implying to endless thereby that the student has fulfilled certain preliminary conditions. If we must assign to them any special meaning. and we should have to consider the practice of virtue and the performance of sacrificial acts as a necessary . &c. knowledge of Dharma. law. It may some commentators maintain. that in real life the first step would have been to study the Purva-Mimamsa. I believe. and first of all. we find no longer rhapsodies.184 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and Ata/z. and that he is therefore likely to feel a desire to understand the be true Veda and to know Brahman. In that case the Mimamsd might be looked upon first. or what is called Dharma.

according to the commentator. Up. 185 preliminary to a study of the Vedanta-philosophy. 6 The words which actually occur in the Sutra are printed in italics. 2. Up. IV. as it is generally expressed. 18. . (origin. 2 Brih. II. 2. When we read. to all these questions That from which is that given in the next Sutra. or. . VII. 6. by being defined and So. 7. research or discussion. . i. Up. i VII. and their utter uselessness without a commentary. i. on purpose. to give an idea of the enigmatical style of the Sutras. He was may have used I confess I doubt impossible. it can be explained negatively as Not so and Not so. present to the mind of Biida- Gign&sa. because in the true sense Brahman cannot be defined or known. i. . ' is : That JDmnd. 5 Mahanar. 12. 4. Up. V. 2 Brill. XI. Ar. 19. VII. The best answer. how- Brahman that Manas is Brahman that Vi^fiana is Brahman 3 that the sun is Brahman 4 nay that Narayana is Brahman 5 there ever. subsistence. 4 J^and. 1 2 . like all be known as So But although Brahman cannot other things. Ar. 7. i Brill. that food -. 3 JOand. . 3. Khaud. 9. is l . is surely room enough Brahman really is. Ill. Up. ' for trying to determine what or at least what he or it was the origin &c. to Badarayana and his predecessors. we should have to consider works as essential for producing that purity and serenity of the mind without which a knowledge of Brahman all this is whether raya?ia. instead of ViMra.. . however. .VEDANTA-S^TRAS. Ill. wish to know. and can thus be cleared from many doubts which arise from the various utterances about it in the Upanishads.' The full sense of this Sutra. and dissolution) 6 of this world proceed . Up.

such intuition also presupposes a previous working of the organs of sensuous perception. but simply by the Veda (Upanishads). Though the Vedanta appeals to the Veda.' Appeals to the Veda. contains many agents and enjoyers. it appeals to it. by names and forms. where Varu^a explains to his son that ' that from which these beings are born. can at first be supplied by the Veda In only. looking back to it . they live. in the Sutras.1 86 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. If it be asked. i. how this is known. omniscient. omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin. e. strictly speaking. times and causes. or manifestation. Ill. and is the abode of fruits or effects. caused by former actions. Up. the commenwhich world is differentiated tator insists very strongly that such knowledge is not to be gained by sense perception or by inference. that can only be meant for intuition. while the object of such Sakshatkara. and the nature of whose arrangement cannot be conceived by the mind that cause is Brahman. that is Brahman. And here we should mark a curious feature of orthodox Indian philosophy. support therefore of our Sutra which is intended to give a general idea of Brahman. but rather as an independent witness. not as having itself grown out of it or as belonging to it. i. subsistence and dissolution of the world. Brahman. when born. a passage is quoted from the Taitt. that into which at their death they re-enter. If in but. that by which. try to know that. passages of which have been collected and properly arranged some places he admits as a second source of knowledge Sakshatkara. these fruits having their definite places.

Veda as the highest authority was justified by the most elaborate arguments. because we have no historical documents. or to establish their conformity with the Veda. to their original home. the evidence of the others. also. but that there had been something very important intervening between the old Upanishads and the first attempts at systematising Vedanta and Samkhya doctrines in the form of Sutras is very clear by the manner in which the Sutras This constant appeal to the appeal to the Veda. they seem to come back to get the approval of the Veda. for sanction 187 and confirmation. they defended that excluding sensuous knowledge against the uncertainties inherent in it. But it is characteristic of the Vedanta-Sutras. How this came about. the Sutras.Sfarvakas admitted but one senses. after they had done so. because we do not possess How those Sutras. the sources and authorities of knowledge. we do not know.PRAMAJVAS. Pramawas. as part of the question. This shows that a certain time must have elapsed after the final redaction of the Upanishads and the return. source of knowledge. that they pay much smaller attention to the Prama/ias. as it were. to The same applies. These questions of Pramawa are often referred to in the . though in other systems They all speak as if they had for several generations elaborated their doctrines independently. and. as the recognised highest authority. We saw how the all . we cannot tell. a less degree. than the other systems. How tial do we know ? a question which forms an essen- preliminary to all philosophy in India. of their offspring.

with doubt and without doubt.l88 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but not so much in the text. the Dn'shte. description and /Sabda. Pratyaksha. from Ma. . an authoritative order. and then declaring that it is this or that the latter in simply accepting . produces Pramiti. though it is also used in the sense of what can be perceived by the senses. truth or certainty. is what shall find there a we very full of the three essential perception. what is seen. and union of Manas. and Pra. called Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa. The first PraAnumana. authority. The Pramana which serves as a means (Sadhana) of determining. It is explained (Sawkhya-Sutra 89) as cognition which arises from contact (with objects) and represents their form. and is said to involve really three stages. The former seems to consist in our seeing an object. forth. I. Pramanas according to the Sawikhya. and survives in the modern Persian Ferman. viz. with Atman. contact of the sense-organ with its object. commentaries. and at the same time union of the sense with Manas. i. There is a distinction made between two kinds of Pratyaksha. mind. just as a Sadhana (means) produces Siddhi. contact of the senses and their respective objects. When we come to the Sawikhya. It may be translated by measure. mind. Self. Pratyaksha. Pratyaksha. to measure. Pramaia is originally the instrument of measuring.e. accurate knowledge. we mean by sensuous ma?ia. standard. It is generally explained by Indriyartha-sa?miikarsha. and perhaps the oldest Pram&nas.

or as knowledge of something that but is known with is not perceptible. e. c. is the Asadharawakararia. i. the special or exclusive instrument of the knowledge conveyed by it. But not every sound . . one wave propelling the other across the vast ocean of ether. for instance. see a tiger. and is conveyed by Akasa or ether. by means of we may perceive the beating of a distant drum. Anumana. Sound. on its own and itself. such as when we awake from sleep. always supposing that fire but it suffices for has been proved to be the Vyapaka or the sine qua non of smoke. hich will be more fully explained hereT after.. the ear. objects only. till it strikes the shore. which explained (1. as when we perceive fire (Vyapaka) from perceiving smoke This is a very imperfect description of (Vyapta). as being invariably connected (Vyapya) something else that is perceived. so that it brought into is transmitted we are told. without any previous idea of it. w Anumana. an our present purpose. as waves (ViAita). is heard by the ear only. I. and that we know the absence of smoke when we see no fire. 100) as knowledge of the connected on the part of one who knows the connection. that we know the presence of fire when we see smoke.ANUMANA. As we have the common illustration illustration. Each sense working by and at once run away. is immediate contact with the ear through the ether. 189 a thing such as it is. The next Prama^a is is Anumana or inference.

metal. whether this $abda. or on acquaintance with the person who is or is not to be trusted. plant.3. . another word. even dog or cow. was to signify the Veda such as we taken originally I have elsewhere given my reasons possess it T . and that it may have been intended at first for Brahman. is. the concomitance between smoke and fire and the like. another Pramana. but for the Samkhya and other systems. also such animal. convey knowledge that cannot be gained either by perception or by inference alone. p. 37. 101) or word. word. goodness. 1 tion Samkhya-Philosophie. nay. is explained to be instruction given by one that can be trusted (Aptopadesa) this one that can be trusted (I.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. because the invariable . we Sutra V. 154. these three Pramanas all easily be shown that any knowledge conveyed by word must equally depend on experience. on which the Anumana rests. for believing the Word. $abda being for the Vedantists the Veda. . any other person also endowed with authority and therefore considered back to one. can have been established by sensuous experience only and the trustworthiness of go Pratyaksha. nay. . Anin. The question that /S'abda had really a far more general and more philosophical meaning. It might as trustworthy. and therefore the authority see from of words by themselves. occupied the Sawkhyas. Sabda. That the connecbetween sound and meaning. but only by the The same applies to Aptava&ana. or for verbal knowledge as is conveyed The Hindus knew quite well that by a word. as words such as greatness.

However. at first sight makes the case still worse is . and they are even referred to by the commentators of the Vedanta all The Sutras of also. not a human origin of the Veda. Apta. little reflection will show us that there was What the Vedanta a sufficient excuse for this neglect. word. It seems strange at first sight. should apparently have attached so little importance to what may be called their Critique of Pure Reason. forms the founda- tion of every true system of philosophy. used in the Samkhya-philosophy. can It means what hardly be translated by aptus. or even of a book believed in by the world at large. the other systems of philosophy are well acquainted with them. the followers of the orthodox . Samkhya understood /Sabda in the sense of Veda though. $abda. and Aptavakya or for term Aptava&ana need than it originally have meant no more our traditional language such as it is. though not the later Vedanta works. which is explained by Yogya.SABDA. it is difficult to understand how they could afterwards take it in the general sense of the word of one that can be of philosophy have trusted. has been obtained or received. considering that they admitted a divine. This would seem indeed to lower the Vedanta-philo- sophy to the level of but a in all Pre-Kantian philosophy. considering that the question of the possibility of knowing or of the instruments of knowledge. though was explained afterwards as meaning the word of a person worthy of confidence. we must be satisfied with what the Sa?7ikhya philoand there can be no doubt that sophers tell us . that the Brahma-Sutras. question for us to consider is The important what other systems made of these three Pranuwas.

It will then become intelligible why an appeal to the evidence of the senses or to inference would have been out of place and almost self-contradictory in the Vedanta. and one that could never claim more than a subordinate place. the ordinary means of right knowledge. become invalid. presented to us by the senses. is unreal. To most philosophers revelation would seem a very weak instrument of knowledge. nor to inference which is founded on it. perception. as we saw. the only evidence invoked by Badarayafta is $ruti or revelation.192 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. witli objects of right knowledge and its its instruments and results of actions. . which. inference. The commentator admits this when he says. it does not enter his mind that the world bf effects.' prove that the manifold world. though it acknowledge their importance for all the ordinary Thus /Sawkara continues 'So transactions of life. was often invoked by the modern orthodox Samkhyas under the name of $abda or word. are ignored. or right knowledge. But we must remember that it is the highest object of the Vedanta to prove that there is only one true reality. even if treated as a subdivision of Anumana or inference.. acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity (Brahman). could not well appeal at the same time to the evidence of the senses. perception. and that the manifoldness of the visible world is but the result of that nescience which the Vedanta is meant to destroy. &c. : support of truth may and does readily in long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self. because the If ' we absence of manifoldness deprives them of their Hence. a doctrine which undertakes to objects. namely Brahman. that while Pratyaksha. and Anumana.

Kamida. such as Kapila. applying (I. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered. which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only. nay even the Sawkhya and Yoga systems (IV. II. Thus /Samkara. whether Kapila or any one else.21). both Pratyaksha and Anumttna. .SABDA. 2.' How well B4darayawa must have been acquainted with the ordinary evidences of knowledge. every kind of Tarka or speculation. is excluded when the fundamental truths of the Vedanta are at stake. But everything else. while other works. the Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita). says ' : In matters to be is mere reasoning o 1 not to known from $ruti be relied on. there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not go on undisturbed. is best shown by the new meaning which he assigns to them. since we observe men of the most undoubted intellectual eminence. Nor can we get ing as having a sure foundation. 28) Pratyaksha to Srut'i (revelation) and Anumana to Snm'ti (tradition). being Snmti. 3. are true in so far only as they are not in opposition to the Veda. and other founders that even o . reasoning. are shown by people still more ingenious to be fallacious. 193 is untrue and hence. has no proper foundation. such as the Law-books of Manu. it is impossible to accept mere reason. and how the arguments of the latter are refuted in their turn by other men so that on account of the diversity of men's opinions. n. as long as true knowledge does not present itself. the Veda being to him self-evident. over this difficulty by accepting as well founded the reasoning of some person of recognised eminence. i . One sees how arguments which some clever men had excogitated with great pains.

The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot. and have possibly to admit a weak link in the strong chain armour of both Badardyana and awkara. of philosophical other. that it is self-luminous like the sun for the its but . ' ' Moreover. form and the like. to an end.' if all reasoning were unfounded. maintain that no reasoning whatever is wellfounded. You cannot. seems certainly strange in a philosopher and it is not unnatural that $amkara should have been taunted by his adversaries with .' they using reason against reasoning.' schools. holy texts . have contradicted each This rejection of reason and reasoning. the whole course of practical human life But even is this does not frighten ' would have to come $amkara. as it it is devoid of characteristic itself to inference signs or qualities. to some things reasoning admittedly founded on perception that although with regard is known to be well founded. cannot lend and other means of right knowledge. and. the supreme authority of the established against those who doubt it ? is How Veda It to be may be is : orthodox to say that the Veda enough own proof. reasoning cannot there escape from the charge of being ill-founded.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. on reasoning only. i. with regard to the matter in hand there will be no escape. As all reasoning and inference.' Here we approach a very difficult question.e. on account of its excessive abstruse- even be thought of without the help of the for it cannot become the object of perception because it does not possess qualities such as ness. he replies. though not unfamiliar to ourselves. say. for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation.

THE MEANING OF VEDA. and Brahman is Veda. It is hardly But who says so ? Who but a fallible mortal ? enough if we were to say that the Veda was the oldest document which the Brahmans possessed. my impression has always been that this would be taking too low a view of the Indian intellect. and are perfectly fearless in the treatment of all other problems they can enter into the most subtle controversies. like Aptava&ana. The Meaning of Veda. was not merely the name of a text or of texts. We often read that Veda is Brahman. to which we referred before. and in such passages Brahman is now generally taken in the sense of the Samhitas But and Brahmanas such as we possess them. i). have meant originally knowledge or wisdom o 2 . I hold. might it not. i. 195 ? The Vedanta no have on superstitions philosophers any other points. Veda. and at the same time the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour Authority of the Vedas. (II. that it is direct evidence of truth. Veda with some kind of mysterious character but . but was originally conceived in a far deeper sense. that its very language required to be interpreted by competent All this might have helped to invest the persons. and yet they are satisfied with the mere assertion that the Veda wants no proof. that its authority requires no support from elsewhere how are objections to be silenced . nirapeksham). just as the light of the sun is its own evi- dence of light. (pram4?iyam. that it may even have been brought into India from another country.

3. 10). even in a very early period of thought. but an first act em- bodying for the time a definite idea which came by being uttered. and afterwards thrown forth and realised in our objective world. because there is so of real evidence left to which we could appeal. and Bf'ih. Veda means to originally knowledge. the creation of divine thought. and as such would come very near Wisdom or Sophia. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.196 or Sophia . and as such a Sophia was impossible without words. manifestation or creation of a Divine Power is by no means so strange. give it to my mind simply as an idea that has presented itself as a way out of many difficulties. might we not here also have a faint recollection of Brahman as the Word. would naturally. recognise in every word an act of a Divine Thinker. just as in every species they have to recoginto existence nise the will of a Divine Creator. i. People who have at all about what a word is. I do not venture to speak little I positively on such a subject. the All I should venture to suggest is that the idea of Word or the Logos being the first revelation. Ar. first After all. or had been matured during the as yet undivided Aryan period. as it seems to us. not a mere thought sign or a means of communication. and men [. and not hymns and Brahma/ias. whether in Greece or in India. Nay he speaks still all know from more distinctly in I. To prevent all misunderstandings I say at once that I do not entertain the idea that such thoughts were borrowed from Greece and Alexandria. so far as to declare that the Veda >Sawkara goes is the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and ( conditions (species) of gods. II. 28 ' : We . animals. 4. Upari. 3.

and in support of which there is but one appeal. such as the earth. but to the Word full itself. or Brah- man is eternal. i. from the word Bhur. the Vedic that is. observation. first remembers the word denoting the thing. has first to be created ? therefore conclude that. when it says 'uttering Bhur He created the earth. self-evident.. The Sruti also.. or as Veda. in fact all that the Veda or Va/v or *BHh = word.' shows that the worlds. self-luminous. not to sensuous experience nor to inference. would by no means be so surprising as it sounds to us at first.THE MEANING OF VEDA. when setting about something which he wishes to accomplish. thinkers of Brahman In that case the recognition by Indian as the Word or the Divine Thought. i. were created. We words became manifest in the mind of Pragrapati the creator. and that after that he created the things corresponding to these words. which had become manifest in the mind (of Pra^apati). absolute. truth for which the Vedanta-philosophy is fighting. &c. if I know well how entirely hypothetical.' What should he do when there is as yet no word to remember. before the creation. and after that sets to work. e. but could not entirely suppress these thoughts.' he says. or the Veda. ' 197 that any one. for imagining that they could establish the highest truths which are within the reach of the . this I may sound to many Sanskrit scholars. as they seem to me the only way in which we can free our Vedanta philosophers from the charge of childishness. e. was Two such words as Brahman and Atman would by themselves convey that eternal said to be. It might then be said quite truly that the $abda. the idea. but the word. to Brahman. became manifest. not mystical. &c. sound.

198 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. in fact. and thus become The hymns and Bralmia/ias liberated (III. such as we find it in our manuscripts. as we possess them now. but the Word ($abda) alone. Returning to the Vedanta. are he says.sramas. on such authorities as the hymns. or ' ' Not all the Vedas together. all A phenomenal world. Both are called Veda or tion. and has been made by Badarayawa between the Knowledgepart. except in order to be discarded as soon as he has understood the knowledge-part. Work-part and Knowledge-part of the Veda. however. or freedom. of good works and refer in fact to the . of an suppose of what is to be enjoyer enjoyed. 4. or rather in the oral tradition of the Veda. a man who has lost caste. chiefly the Upanishads. more useful to one who has obtained true knowledge than is a small tank of water in a country flooded with water/ man who has neglected the Vedas and disregarded the rules of the four A. human mind.' Mukti. revela- exist for the true philosopher. and yet the work-part does not /Stuti. the hymns and Brahman as. Of course a distinction has to be made. 36). such as we know it from the Sutras. the Work-part. we must be satisfied with the expressed view of Badaraya?ia that the evidence for what the Vedanta teaches is neither perception nor inference. the Brahmanas and even some of the Upanishads. may still be allowed to study the Vedanta as the fountain of true knowledge. they prethe existence of a manifold creation. the 6r?lana-karica. Sam- kara is is useless to a bold enough to declare that the whole Veda man who has obtained knowledge. and the Karma-kanc/a.

This Avidy^ is the next point that has to be /Sawkara. are their very essence opposed to each other. as we told. and it is this and annihilate Avidya.' he says. many individuals. it belongs to the realm of Avidya. and If then the highest truth contained in the is Veda are the Tat (the Tvam Asi. It is to be observed in as a lower stage. 199 is But all this. only to what is the very o. as we shall see. the world. the 6rivatman. such as essential in leading it is. ? and the If the immense variety of the objective world Veda is true.SUBJECT AND OBJECT. and that the one can never therefore as we should take the place of the other. Nescience. in the introduction to his comAs it mentary. and You (or which fall under the concepts of ' We in say. there is but one Brahman and nothing beside it. the Vedanta philosopher is at once met by the question. 62. but as on to a higher stage. has some important remarks on it discussed. like darkness and light. How then the are we to account for the manifold Thou's. art it Paramatman or Brahman). and replace it by VidyL Subject and Object. and if. of the Ego and Non-Ego). Nescience.bject of the Vedanta-philosophy to expel view of the world cannot be It can therefore be due called Avidya. and vanishes as soon as true wisdom or Vidya has been obtained. that object and subject. but phenomenal. is well known. p. not real. Thou. . our true at the same time. that is. 1 it follows further that Three Lectures on the Vedanta. ] ' . their fruit.

must be altogether wrong. for conceived as subject. I am this. and the whole visible world.' It is clear that $amkara here uses subject and object not only in their simple logical sense. ' adds. such as the body with its In I am. attributes also can never be interchanged.' object and subject mutually exclude each other. though it is inseparable from human thought. so that what is conceived as object can never in the same act of thought be We can. verb has a totally different character from what it has is ' in ' thou art T ' or ' he ' is. subjective ought : We for objective ' ' qualities.' or I am blind.' the organs. caused by a false apprehension and predicate. This means that are you. the Nevertheless.PHILOSOPHY. which consists of thought. but transferring the essence and is This the qualities of the one upon the other. or You instance. as we might call it). never say or think substitute nor we ever to are we. while object means with him what unreal and phenomenal. has slowly to be over- . the Ego.' ' A subject can never be anything but a subject. objective. but that by subject he means what is real and true. in fact the Self.' he object always remains the object. we may conclude is that to transfer what that what is perceived as You or Non-ego with its qualities. that is what perceives as We.200 their INDIAN .' arise from a false apprehension which. to say. of subject a habit. combining what " " is true and what is false.' Such statements therefore as ' am strong. or vice ve*rsa to transfer what is subjective to what is objective." this is mine. and by not distinguishing one from the other. it is a habit in human nature (a necessity of thought." &c. and vice versa. such as it is.' he is continues. Therefore. to what is subjective.

It the Nescience of Brahman. and it is in causing this mistake that the chief power of Avidy& or Nescience consists. as darkness is with So far as in true reality we are light. our being unacquainted with the truths of the Vedanta. we can . or. I should even go so far as to say that this warning might be taken to heart by our own philosophers also. 2O1 come and at last to be destroyed by the Vedanta- philosophy. is simply our own supposed. our Nescience might indeed be called forth. It must not be however. and are due in the end to the attribution of phenomenal and objective qualities to the subjective realities which we should recognise in the Divine only.SUBJECT AND OBJECT. is It follows in fact from this fundamental distincpredicate tion that we should never what is pheno- menal or objective of what is real and subjective. Brahman. for many of our own fallacies arise from the same Avidya. and as underlying the Human Self and the phenomenal world. individual ignorance. if for a time only and if we remember that it can be annihilated. or what is real and subjective of what is phenomenal and objective. as the result of accumulated thoughts and deeds before the mountains were brought has truly been called a general cosmical Nescience. from an Indian point of view. It should rather be looked upon as inborn in human nature. and stamps the whole of the Vedanta-philosophy with its own peculiar character. . inevitable for a time. This distinction between subject and object in the sense of what is real and what is phenomenal very important. that the Avidya or Nescience which makes the world what we make it and take it to be.

never changing.202 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and phenomenal. even of the work-part. religious activity should not more particularly. devoid of all form. 3. Brahman and nothing else and to this . Brahman. as the subject. All we may predicate of that Highest Brahman is that it is one. a general principle of the Vedanta. he nevertheless allows it to be real for all practical purposes (Vyavaharartham). nothing that is real can ever be annihilated. should not be obeyed. why all go on undisturbed. no doubt.' Hence. . But apart from this concession. but Brahman is not the individual soul. The individual soul is. But it is very curious to find that though $a??ikara looks upon the whole objective world as the result of Nescience. understand why according to The Phenomenal Reality of the World. the fundamental doctrine of There is $amkara remains always the same. i. 14). as long does not knowledge present itself. for 19). so that nothing that is liable to annihilation has a right to be called real. Brahman the simple reason that there is nothing but Brahman. nothing must be ascribed that is peculiar to the individual living soul (I. that is conditioned. eternally anything To ascribe intelligent and free. for. . it was said to be nought. and the commands of the Veda. Thus w e r read (II. never in contact with anything. just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to existence is l)e as true true until the sleeper wakes. 'The entire complex of phenomenal considered as true so long as the knowledge of Brahman and the Self of all has not arisen. there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and . which in its present state is personal. . to or Atman that Brahman phenomenal pure.

that the created world is the effect. cause and effect are really the same thing looked at from two points of view. Here lies our great difficulty in rendering Hindu- The terms used by them philosophy intelligible. But the Vedantists have elaborated their own According to them theory of cause and effect. 203 would be the same error as to ascribe blue colour to the colourless ether of the sky. If with these ideas. and not only as the efficient. if Brahman is everything. Creation or Causation. and nothing exists besides Brahman. and the effect is always selves. Hence. and yet Brahman is again and again represented as the cause of the Vedantist. As long . but as the material cause as well. supposed to be latent in the cause.CREATION OR CAUSATION. the substance of the world can be nothing but Brahman. 24. Divyadasa. so far as such foreign terms can be applied to the reasoning of the Vedanta. as creation is con- ceived as a making or fashioning of matter. it is clear that creation in our sense cannot exist for the Vedantist. a living Vedantist. all its sins Lectures on the Vedanta. . and that Brahman is the cause. seems therefore to draw a quite legitimate inference when he l says 1 that the universe with p. taken as granted. we approach the problem of what we call the creation or the making of the world. it does not exist for Badaraya?ia only so far as it is a calling forth out of nothing does it approach the ideas of Creation with Badaraya?^a would be nothing but the result of Nescience. It is easy to say that Karana is cause and Karya effect. the world. seem to be the same as those which we use ourand yet they are not.

for instance. the non-difference or substantial identity of cause and and the Sarakhya philosophers agree with them up to a certain point. Nor does /Sa?/ikara support this principle by passages from the Veda only. In the threads again we perceive finer threads. 14. an aggregate of threads. On this ground we conclude that the . and in these again still finer threads. are not effect. This question of cause and effect and their mutual relation has occupied most of the philosophical systems of India and when we remember what different views of cause and effect have been held by some of the most eminent philosophers of Europe. rests identity of their dogma of Brahman and the phenomenal as a general the substantial world. they. are not other. it is not surprising that the Hindus also should have arrived at very different results. II. but merely threads running lengthways.204 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. not when it does not exist. Effect.' On this. Thus he continues. II. though it does not become evident as vapour till fire is brought near Cause and to- water. Vedantists stand up for Karya-kara?iabheda. and so on. that is. cause and effect. but he appeals likewise to observation. In the Vedanta. The . 'Only when a cause exists is an effect observed to exist. other. 15. and crossways. i. Tadananyatvam. and miseries mijst have existed latent in Brahman. just as steam existed latent in water before it was heated. we read in so many words. The non-difference of the two (cause and effect) in is perceived. ' different from each principle. i. when we do not perceive the thing which we call cloth in addition to the threads.

by its very nature. the seed. viz. Or again. e. and ask again what it is. it would not be difficult to match it whether the answer comes that were not Brahman. even in cases where the coni. red. and black. can never become the object of perception. ' Perhaps this earth and : all that is in it storms. while what Tennyson calls the distorted shadow would come very near to the Avidya of $amkara. its bark and wood.' Is not this pure Vedanta ? only that the Vedantists hold that a cause. these again with and.' air. that it would not be at all but for Brahman. a distorted shadow. 205 very finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes.CAUSE AND EFFECT. as. viz. the effect. in the nature of the cause. white.' A^amkara adds that. such is our petty nature. as applied to the sprout. that it lives : from our own philosophers or our poets. is with- out a second and the ultimate cause of the whole when we look at a tree and ask what it is. the term birth. being. previous to its And actual beginning. as it were. when we see through its leaves and fruits. cataracts. for instance. The Veda has declared that what is posterior in ' time. has its tinued existence of the cause (in the effect) is not perceived. Brahman which the air with ether. This is the real Pantheism of the Vedanta and strange as it may sound to us. . mountains. it would be nothing if it through Brahman. that it exists through Brahman. Even so recent a poet as Tennyson is reported to have said. means only that the causal substance. at last. the sun and the skies. but we see His shadow. the ether with world. we Almighty cannot see Him. in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which spring sprouts and new trees. are the in fact.

14. be asked how two such answers ' : opinions can be reconciled. Up. ' 3. that is Brahman' Let me evolve names and ('A7*and. and reabsorption If it of the world are said to proceed. it. particularly to the Upanishads. such as He who is called Ether is the revealer of all forms and names that wherein these forms and names are contained. except that. of the omniscient Lord. They are the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world. . from all this is the Omniscient Lord. and from him. Up. not to be defined as either real (Brahman). however. or nature (Prakrtti). sustentation. ' .206 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2) . the cause passes again beyond the sphere of visibility.' of Greek philosophy. there are names and forms (NamaThese correspond very closely to the Logoi rupa). the creation. VIII. as the Samkhyas hold. while the term death means no more than that through the secession of these particles. becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continued accretion of similar particles. from a second non-intelligent power. they are the figments of or as different from Nescience. called Prak?*iti. Different. $amkara Belonging to the Self. lie. power (*S'akti). while in other passages the same Brahman is called the Creator. and not. This problem of cause and effect in connection with the problem of Brahman and the world was no doubt beset with difficulties in the eyes of the Vedantists. and in support of this a number of Vedic passages may be quoted. forms' (AV/tind. of and Smrzti is called illusion (Maya). as it were. VI. i) what in >S'ruti ' . there were ever so many passages declaring that Brahman is one and unchangeable. If they turned to the Veda. instead of being the ideas of a Divine Mind. the wise one. that is.

though of the world. all conditions. Though dif- . on taking (Purusha) notice. free is all the time free from from names and forms. Up. different from Brahman. is called the material cause (Upadana) which he at the is himself immaterial. though very imperfectly. 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (Svel. only so far as . Ar. it is taken notice of by he. 207 having defined all forms and having made their names. according to the Vedanta. and informed or enlightened man the whole phenomenal world is really non-existent. the identity of cause and effect. creations of a Divine Wisdom. as Lord or Isvara. not like the The true Logoi. PrakHti exists. To steer between all these rocks is no easy matter. may therefore be called the efficient cause of man and the world. sits speaking/ i. VI. PrakHti itself being its material cause. creating (Taitt. a power far generally. nay the world. de- pends upon the limiting conditions or the Upadhis of name and form. for the truly Brahman. as the material cause of the world. less philosopher starts with a PrakHti. Ill. threatened by is all these the Samkhya He imperilled. 12). are represented as products of Nescience. While the Vedantist breakers. no real effect would be possible without the continuance of its cause. Otherwise Kapila takes much the same view of the relation between cause and effect as the Vedantist. The Karya-kara?iabheda.CAUSE AND EFFECT. the Purusha. of the cause. The Lord as creator. translated by Nature. even in the Lord. is considered as unreal. is valid as much for S&mkhya as for Vedanta. as far as man is concerned. Self. 7) . 12. while effect are held to same time cause and is be identical in substance. and these.e. According to both.

which might be compared with ' Hume's view of If it 1 Samkhya -Philosophic. lie causality. law or hold (Niyama) between cause and effect. i. while the Asat-karyavada is peculiar to Nyaya and Vaiseshika. may be right in supposing that would be a more natural theorem for a follower it for of the Sawikhya than of the Vedtinta. fSawkara himself certainly gives us the impression that with him the recognition of the identity of cause and effect came first. . the promise is fulfilled. both are the same newly An effect substantially. i. the identity of For he says (II. claims it Kapila. This is so characteristic a dogma of the Sawkhya that this philosophy is often spoken of as the Sat-karyavada. produced or created. 232. and is the effect of something real. but this could never be used as an argument that the Sft???khyaphilosophy is older in its entirety than the Vedanta. is And whole world an effect of Brahman.' The Sat-karyavada. almost in so many words. p. ferent in appearance or phenomenally. the effect from the cause therefore.' curious that Kapila seems. 20). and non-different from It is it. there would be no says. Professor Garbe first l . the cause being never destroyed. application. the doctrine that every effect pre-exists. but rendered invisible only. Whether this doctrine of the identity of cause and effect was proclaimed by Kapila or by Badarayana is who almost impossible to settle. as the and afterwards its religious Brahman and the world.208 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 'Thus the non-difference of is to be conceived. 4. to guard against what is known to us as For in Sutra I. and strongly supported by the Buddhists. it is a is not something new manifestation only. were only priority.

as well as in other many systems of philosophy. is. and apart from Brahman the world would be simply nothing. has the very real effect of frightening those who step on it. If. therefore. Even the apparent and illusory existence of a material world requires a real substratum. Dreaming and Waking. There first is more is is in this often- quoted simile than at sight meant to show that as the rope It is appears. in fact our sense of the word. There Brahman. which is Brahman. And so in a certain p . strictly speaking. just as the appearance of the snake in the simile requires the real substratum of a rope. so Brahman no idea of claiming for the rope a real change into a snake. however. not meant in the sense in which the clay is the material cause of a jar. even in its mistaken character. to the snake. is often illustrated by the very popular simile of the rope which is mistaken for a snake. we shall also see that Nescience Brahman. would have denied all reality in the highest sense to everything except Brahman. who look upon everything as the result of Avidy& or Nescience. a certain ambiguity as to what is meant by material and real. but which. 209 Herbart's Selbsterhaltung des Realen. Brahman this is is called the material cause of the world. when perceived as the world. the there is being that. with the Vedaiitists no matter at all. in the Vedanta.DREAMING AND WAKING. One There would have thought that philosophers. If we once see this may quite as well be called the material cause of the world as clearly. and in the same way no real change can be claimed for is to the world. Brahman presents itself as the world.

not only perceive our perceptions.210 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. there is a difference between perceiving viands and perceiving the satisfaction arising from eating them. . but perceive someHe thing not ourselves. Dreams at night are contradicted by full daylight. also points out that there is this difference between and that dreams on awaking are waking. there is another important argument. that in perceiving anything we These maintain that perception in of the same kind as all other perception. therefore. says $a??ikara. by-the-by. and have actually been called Cryptobuddhists in consequence. Although some Vedantists have been credited with holding the same opinion. This is called the $ilnyavada (doctrine of emptiness or vanity) or Vidyamatra (knowledge only). carrying the Vedanta principle to its extreme consequences. He holds. and not our perceptions. we alluded before. dreaming found to be unreal. which even Berkeley and Kant would readily have allowed. but he enters on a full argument against the nihilism of the Buddhists. not only allows the reality of the objective world for practical purposes (Vyavaharartham). that for practical purposes (Vyavaharartham) things may be treated as real. But besides the concession to which sense they do. things is therefore unnecessary. a concession. but perceptions in full day-* When the light are not contradicted by dreams. and that all we have and know are our perceptions only. whatever we may think of them in our heart of hearts. It is clearly directed against Buddhist philosophers who. /Samkara himself argues most strongly against this extreme idealism. held that everything is empty and unreal. He dreams is and that the admission of the existence of external No.

' to which all things perceived by us are referred ? If our perceptions conform to anything without is the existence of such perceived objects No one would say that peripso facto admitted. us. and what was the meaning they attached to Avidya by which not only the individual Egos. ception and what is perceived are identical they stand to each other in the relation of instrument of an impression. No wonder that.DREAMING AND WAKING. we admit something that impresses as well as something that is impressed. we never can be said to perceive anything but perceptions. Avidya. and that European scholars also should have failed to form a clear idea of that creative Nescience of which we can neither say that it is or that it is not. the Ved4ntist answers that. but the whole phenomenal world exists or seems to exist. effect. these perceptions are always perceived as perceptions of something. the Vedantist asks What is meant by that 'without us. but it is real in so far as it is phenomenal. like all other words. . for nothing can be phenomenal except as the phenomenon of something that is real. In the Upanishads p 2 . in spite of that. Creation is not real in the highest sense in which Brahman is real. and just as when we speak This must suffice to show what the Vedantists thought of the difference between the real and the phenomenal. different schools even in India should have differed in their views about Avidya. with all these ambiguities about the phenomenally real and the really real. though we perceive perceptions only. And if the Buddhists answer that these perceptions are illusive only. has had a history. that they are perceptions of things as if they were without us. 211 Buddhist replies that.

sense simply subjective. Kh&nd.' is not pure Vedanta. that is Or again. just as we saw that the higher concept of the Self. Maya. is said to shake off his body and his Avidya.212 it is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 10 call : Prakn'ti (nature) as Maya (magic). IV. which is the cause of what world. IV. knowledge. It is then no longer the Nescience of the individual. he Up. if historically we trace the concept of Avidya back to the subjective ignorance of the individual. I believe. when awake. more efficacious. IV. Vidya. but the result of that universal Nescience. when as yet not free from the limits of the Ego. 20 then. with faith. I. when dying. Up. and the Though this great Lord as the Mayin (magician). is a difference ' : Upanishad. Ar. i. ' we should Thus we read the phenomenal in the /SVet. the way by which . 4. a man. though in the end identical with Brahman. often used in the simple sense of ignorance. he takes that to be real whatever he fears. Know the ignorance of the individual became the cause of what we call objective reality. We are right therefore. and Both are in that opposed to Vidya. 10: 'Both perform the sacrificial act. arose from that of the individual personal Self. in his ignorance. But there between Vidy (knowledge) and For what is performed with Avidy& (nescience). Thus we read. 3. 3.' If he feels in a dream as if he were murdered. at all events. Up. and with the Upanishad. Brz'h. it shows us. viz. who knows and he who does not know. this Nescience or Ignorance In some of the later Upanishads assumes a more inde- pendent character and even a new name.' Here we see that it is ignorance alone which imparts a false character In the same of reality to the visions of a dream.

the Indriyas. grasping. and. and. senses. if we may say so. taste. in both There is here again a certain ambiguity. going. 13. . ready to receive what is conveyed to it by the separate senses. evacuating and generating 4. 3.DREAMING AND WAKING. the Upadhis being caused by primeval Avidya. Sawkhya-Sufcras II. the five senses. vital spirit (uncon- scious) 2. These Upadhis are 1. perceives. The five afferent (Upalabdhi) senses are the senses of hearing. Manas being that which. there was the world. both afferent and efferent. the conSelf. five efferent The ) or acting senses (Adhyavasaya l are the senses of speaking. . and to react on them by will. the Manas. 1 Adhyavasayo buddhi/A. the central organ of perception. the Atman. deceived by that Maya or Avidya. Maya of the internal or subjective This was originally the only Maya. somehow or other related to Brahman But before there arises this it May& of objective nature. to the admission of an active and creative Lord. the personal Brahm or Isvara how Avidya in fact became a $akti or led. itself. conditioned by the so-called Upadhis. 213 the same time. ditions or impositions. or pure or was covered up (Upahita) or blinded. : The Mukhyaprana. at . thinks and wills . the material organic body. Avidy& being caused in the individual soul ((rivatman) by the Upadhis. as we say. from another point of view. scent. sight. the . and potentia. feels. touch. belonging as were to Brahman himself.

To these is sometimes added 5. meanings of the senses (Artha). or would not be. and therefore an end. for perishable it cannot be the Indriyas or these. are to be treated as Not-self. for he who would say so. All that we should phenomenal. but through a Nescience that is not only casual or individual. comprehending the phenomena of our inward as well as of our outward experience. as the phenomenal was considered . though our philosophy has no better name for call led to two distinct. All these are not the or the objects or Atman. conditions. All . a growth. I (I ' am not ' I or what is there real behind the I.214 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. What in our is common language we call the Ego or Aha?nkara but a product of the Manas and quite as un- substantial in reality as the Manas itself. The question then is What is really can say. was unreal . We can understand how it this startling idealism or monism for it is not nihilism. The objective environment. is in That there man something that can be called Atman or Self requires no proof. the senses and the whole body. and it is only through Avidya that the Atman has become identified with them. yet closely united views of the world. but universal. arid if it be asked why they should ever have been treated as Self. would himself be not. the only possible answer is that it was through Nescience or Avidya. called the Upadhis. but if a proof were wanted it would be found in the fact that no one being the disguised Atman). by our objective environment. but. It cannot be the body as influenced that body is the Manas or the Mukhyaprima. for all these have a beginning.

exists. and teaches. but how it or he is to be worshipped in or his phenomenal state. though phenomenal aspect only. well known under the names of Apara-. that is. it it. nay by way of preparation. it In this sense has been truly said that $a??ikara . or even under the name of any its This worship (Upasana) being enjoined in many parts of the Veda. is recognised as obligatory on all who have not yet reached the individual deity. and this not for this life only. they are really worshipping Brahman. in worshipping a personal god. it was in that sense real also. that is. but chiefly on its work-portion (Karmakant/a). and they are promised. the true Godhead. comfort that. The Higher and the Lower Knowledge. and can only exist. These are even allowed the highest knowledge. the lower. happiness on earth and in heaven. not how Brahman is to be known.THE HIGHER AND THE LOWER KNOWLEDGE. a slow advance (Kramamukti) towards complete in its Moksha or freedom. that is. The lower knowledge is likewise founded on the Veda. behind And this led to the admission The higher knowledge consists in the distinction and thereby the freedom of the Self (Atman) from all its Upadhis. without the real Brahman. with Brahman by the strict Advaitists or Monists of two kinds of knowledge. as a personal Lord and Creator. as a reward of their worship. This is the true Moksha or freedom which implies knowledge of the identity of the Atman with Brahman. 215 impossible without the noumenal. the higher knowledge. and deliverance from birth and rebirth in the constant evolution (Sa??isara) of the world. and Para. but for all eternity.

and though he did not cut off all connection with idolatry. is a religious algebra. in his Lecture on Vedantism. and . till it has acquired the strength to resist the nipping frost of worldliness When the scepticism. . . Who would object to the use of language in But if the one is allowed. . idolatry is a necessity of our The tender seed of a religious spirit requires to be carefully preserved in a soft coating of symbols. verbal symbols. though with him On it was always symbolism rather than idolatry. whether to in words Verbal the ear. . I may quote the words of a living Vedantist. without the spirit or in a corrupted spirit. . or suffered to remain from their harmlessness. are not objectionable. Idolatry in the sense of religious symbolism and I believe the most orthodox Hindus would take no other view cannot be open to objection. its growth. Symbolism or things. .2l6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. apart from And not attendant corruptions. or stocks and stones also are unobjectionable. 12. Divyadds Datta. Verbal symbolism is language. why should religion ? not also the other ? To my mind. and that is all the difference between them. which has given rise to much controversy Hindus themselves. stage of nature. he tried to ' ' introduce the right spirit of idolatry. At one ?] so. religious spirit is mature. and the symbols of symbols appeal to the things eye. symbols are either given up. [but are they its if and to the same extent. It is certain. this point others to his defence of a worship of the popular gods. did not attack or destroy idolatry. some appealing to the among $amkara's contempt of all ritualism and Karman.' he says. there must be. formal symbols. p. that $a??ikara was opposed to the abuse of ritualism. idolatry.

end lead to Moksha.' though by their divine powers they can. of the restraint of passions and of perfect in the tranquillity of soul. . subject to birth and death. such as 1 we find it described. they are still. Journal of the R. with regard to the Buddhist Nirva/ia. sometimes as symbols of the great Infinite. . If I. S. are phenomenal. Indra. at one and the same time. Vishmi.IS VIRTUE ESSENTIAL TO MOKSHA ? 21 7 $amkara did bow to idols. 28) he says: 'The gods (or deities) must be admitted to be corporeal. Brahma. This also was in the beginning the result and the reward of moral virtue.' he says. and subject to creation and dissolution as much as /Samkara himself expresses this opinion very clearly when (I. knowledge alone can . others would not have followed my steps. O Lord ' ' ' ! Is Virtue Essential to Moksha? Another question which has been hotly contested both in India and in Europe is whether Moksha can be the result of knowledge only. like ourselves. for See Moksha or the Vedantic Release. had not walked without remission in the path of works.' If $amkara did not claim full freedom or Moksha for himself. he did so. lower orders of divine beings. partake of oblations offered at numerous sacrifices. vol. virtue is certainly preIt is the same question which meets us supposed. for the sake of others. Yama. sometimes as symbols of lower orders of beings in whom he believed. as he says. &c. by Divyadas Datta. A. 3. part 4.. in whom he believed. or whether it l Though. xx. These . requires a fulfilment of moral duties also as far as I understand $amkara. . and ourselves..

' : the Ka#7ia Upanishad II. presuppose high morality on the part of the candidate. so that Ar</una is made to say for himself: dharmam. ' nay. Yea. the wise prefers the good to the pleasant. if we only : Wide apart and leading to different points are those two. which is generally quoted The good is one thing. showing that virtue was conIn essential preliminary of Moksha. amounting to a denial of all reality in subjective in world. but it soon assumed a different character.2l8 instance. but the fool chooses the pleasant through greed and avarice.' And Still Na/tiketas is praised because he desires know- ledge. as representing freedom from all bondage and illusion. ignorance (Avidya) and what is known as wisdom (Vidya). no doubt. na /ra me mvritti/t. a man . we see secure Moksha .' But even in this passage we are not told that virtue or self-denial by itself could or perfect freedom read a few lines further. clings to the good but he . and likewise in the There are a few traces left sidered an the Upanishads. we read these two having different the pleasant another . if he who chooses the pleasant. It objects chain a man. G'anamy adharmam. i. the objective. All of them. though they do not explicitly say so. in the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The good and the pleasant approach the wise goes round about them and distin- guishes them. is misses his end. a work which was meant to present different views of Moksha. na //a me pravn'ttiA. for that purpose. convincing are passages taken from the is Bhagavad-gita. Dhammapada . and less not tempted away from it by pleasure. G'uniimi \\lnc\i has been somewhat freely translated ' : For . well with him.

may well be uttered 2 &)1 ! Lead me from the unreal to the real Lead me from darkness to light Lead me from death to ! ' immortality its ! lower knowledge only. that is. 22). should lay great stress on the religious and moral side of Moksha is quite compatible with what has been maintained before. It would not be difficult. but that is very different from saying that Moksha can be obtained by mere Good works. even merely abstaining from sin. 3. but in the end by knowledge only. but what I hate that such as do I/ That treatises. ceremonial works. but not by the true Mumukshu. the heaven world. Even the prayer from the BHhad-aranyaka (I. and has for reward another world. by charitable . which will also pass away. form an excellent refers to the preparation for reaching that highest knowledge which it is the final aim of the Vedanta to impart. Up. that Moksha cannot be achieved by sacrifices or by moral conduct. May such unchanging love as foolish people feel ' for earthly pleasures I call upon Thee ' ! never cease in my heart when by worshippers of Brahma or Isvara. 4. to produce passages which declare that a sinful man cannot obtain Moksha. no doubt. And thus we read ' : Brahmanas seek to know Him by the study of the Veda.IS VIRTUE ESSENTIAL TO MOKSHA I ? 2 19 what I would that later do not. by gifts' (Bnh. the Pan/t-adasi. if performed from pure motives and without any hope of rewards. sacrifices. who is yearning for Brahman and true Moksha. IV. Hence a prayer such as.

with or without qualities. remains always Nirgunam or unqualified. to imagine that true Moksha can be obtained by moral conduct alone is a mistake. . to be conceived and to be is the same thing. it God. 2. so far as we are concerned. with to be produced regard to Brahman. properly understood. however. 68). II. 8). that whosoever is born of sin. broken. heart is away. ' works. not by the Avidya of single individuals. was even in this life above the distinction of good and could do nothing that he considered good and nothing that he considered evil. whether good or bad. The Two Brahmans. so likewise. that is. this sense alone that Brahman also may be said to be affected by Avidya. sometimes seems as if *S'a??ikara and Badarayawa had actually admitted not only two kinds of knowledge. v. whatever we may think about him. but this would again apply to a state of Nescience or Avidya only and it is in It . Dangerous as this principle seems to be. of St. inherent in sentient nature. John (Ep. doubts are solved.220 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. knows Brahman cannot if is hardly more than the saying dangerous. all T ' fall The fetter of the Hence. but two Brahmans also. nay by Avidya. Sagu/iam and Ni rgu n am. of the highest But when the knowledge has once been reached or is Brahman all within reach. but by an Avidya. w hen He has been beheld who is both high and low (Muwd Up. and as. sinneth not. extinguished are all his works. The true Brahman. while passages in the Upanishads to show that some Vedantists taught that a man who had there are reached Brahman and the highest knowledge. that whosoever evil. I.

nay which changed this Avidy& into a $akti or potentia of Brahman. so that in truth na. he is not that. 221 conceived by us and becomes to us qualified. If in the later Upani- Sat and Asat. is Brahman In the same way the creation of the world and of man not the work of Brahman. to the character of an active creator. clouds ipso facto Brahman also. no is all he is not say. we can and more than everything In that sense Brahman may be called both being. No. Only we must (6rivatnian) never forget that all this is illusion. we can i. unaffected and untrammelled by . but the result of Avidya and of man while under her sway. He that else. as our maker. not being. creative and personal through the deception of the same universal and inevitable Avidya. make Brahman. for he or it could not be is called Sa-id-ananda. is. being in the highest sense. Atman and Brahman being substantially one. but the same Nescience which clouds us for a time. predicate nothing of . being and not shads Brahman being. perfect. It will be seen how small a step it was from this view to another which looked upon Brahman itself as affected by Avidya. thus lowering him. If the qualified Brahman makes us. ' without perceiving or it itself (esse est percipere). Brahman but Na. the qualified Atman. not raising him. This is ambiguity runs through the whole of the Vedanta. perceiving. this.' then these three predicates are in reality but one. is e. as different from all that the world calls being or true. In full reality Brahman is as little affected by qualities as our true Self is by Upadhis (conditions). we.THE TWO BRAHMANS. active. and he could not perceive himself or itself except as independent. at least according to the interpretation of /Samkara. and blessed.

svara. accom- plishment) as an approach of the individual soul towards God. just as everything else exists. a revival of its true nature. Even Yoga. as creator. the convictions of the people of India. of Brahman as our own that an ecstatic perception of as Brahman was allowed now and then modern times. . nor Yogin a man united with God. such as the Yogins in possible in a state of trance.222 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It seems only a concession to the prejudices. as we shall see. 2). If it knows. a return. TO oWcoy 6V. shall thus understand the distinction which We the Vedaritists and other Indian philosophers also make between the Brahman. but lights itself. the personal God. there can only be recovery what or restitution. but Yoga is effort towards Nirodha or suppression of A'itta (the activity of thought) (see Yoga-Sutras I. anything highest dicates. else (Advitiya). . and not it liable to objec- can only know itself. where there is There can be no such approach identity. worshipped different names. like the sun that is not lighted. practised in ancient. The fatal mistake which interpreters of the Vedanta-philosophy both in India and Europe have made is to represent this absorption or recovery (Samradhanam.uid the Brahman under as I. and even though. Our knowledge of Brahman also can only be consciousness subjective Atman or Self. this perception also could only be a perception of the Atman as identical with Brahman. and This Isvara exists. did not mean technically union. Having no of course be qualities. strictly speaking. a becoming of the soul of it always has been. this Brahman cannot It is known by any pre- subjective. preserver. or let us say. tive attributes. as phenomenally only. not dissolver of the universe.

though this Mukti involves by necessity the are produced directly disappearance of Isvara as a merely phenomenal god. so entirely new at the time when they were uttered. directly or indirectly. and man at last obtains true knowledge and Mukti. of the I and This constitutes the unique It.THE TWO BKAHMANS. But it is He through whose grace deeds are followed by rewards. as this identity of subject and absorption of the object object. Most important acts are ascribed to him. or this by this subject. rewards and punishments. and whatever he may appear to be. though he does not cause. and determines. and have little if anything to do with the true Vedanta in its highest rests chiefly and truest form. The soul and the world both belong to the realm of things which are not real. unique as compared with the every other philosophy of the world which has not been influenced by it. it is of Avidy& a phenomenal world. though When by the acts themselves. he is always Brahman. complete . If we have once grasped that synthesis. It must be clear to any one who has once mastered the framework of the true Vedanta-philosophy. they contain no thoughts. carefully thought out and worked out details are full of interest. It on the tremendous synthesis of subject object. we know the All its other teaching flows naturally Vedanta. character of the Vedanta. as I have here tried to explain it. the identification of cause and and effect. 223 as absolutely real. that there is really but little room in it for nay even for ethics. he rules the world. from this one fundamental doctrine and though its . This consists in the complete surrender of all we are and know. psychology or kosmology. These personified by the power or Nescience.

Nor did the Vedanta . from all eternity. it accepted all that is taught about the gods in the hymns and in the Brahma^as. again at the beginning of every new Kalpa. The creation of the world. Here we perceive the so principal moral element in the ancient Vedanta. has remained to the present day. to break forth again and acts as resting on the authority of these Brahmawas. interesting to see how this very bold philoof the Vedanta was always not only tolerated. to which we alluded before. so far as they can claim any are told.224 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. They are clothed in their Upadhis (conditions) according to the merit or demerit which they have acquired by their former. The individual souls also were supposed. and not reality. whether it was under the The whole sway of Brahmans or of Buddhists. to be drawn back into Brahman. The individual souls. Philosophy and Religion. acts. . at the end of each Kalpa. and recommended a number of sacrificial and ceremonial hymns and were even considered as a necesThey sary preliminary to higher knowledge. as a philosophy interfere with popular religion on the contrary. from the day of their birth on earth. date. and lias leavened the whole of India. was accepted as an emanation from Brahman. to be followed in great periods by a taking back of it into Brahman. sophy It is its but encouraged and patronised by religion and by recognised representatives. unless entirely liberated. . but. though not the making of it. Karman. and this doctrine far as it is meant for practical life of Karman or deed. we though long-forgotten.

left the contrary. though for a time only. . as say. in this life. for at the end of a Kalpa even gods like Indra and the rest have to begin their career afresh. it is not to be accounted for as as On little Brahman can be accounted for. another strong and It can be the result of former acts only. The merit which can be acquired by man even in Brahman differs this state of Avidya is such that he may rise even to the status of a god. man we A who enjoys health and wealth is made to feel that he is spending more than he has earned.KARMAN. . and that he has therefore to It cannot be make up his debt by new efforts. is aware even necessarily a punishment. which is the eternal life-spring of Brahman. It is not stated. is the result of acts character and fate of each man are the result of his acts in this or in a former acts of others. Like it has to be accepted as existent but it from Brahman in so far as it can be destroyed by Vidya. except of Brahman . A man who suffers and suffers. unjustly. Q . 225 the world. such as it is. by a Divine caprice that one man is born deaf or dumb or blind. this primeval Avidy& is unexplained. it may be a reward in disguise. It This is is their Theodicee. possibly also of the with them the solution of what we venture to call the injustice of God. In fact it might be said with some truth that Avidya is the cause of but that the cause everything. It might seem sometimes as if Avidya too. seems to them but paying off a debt or laying up capital for another life. had to be taken as the result of acts far back before the beginning of all things. healthy. life. whether. But this is never clearly the doer of them of them or not. which is answerable for the whole of this phenomenal world.

though subjective. are accepted as true. These powers of conception are real indeed for all practical purposes. according to the Kantian philosophy. though the two agree with each other again when we remember that Kant also denies the validity of these forms of perception and purposes in this thought when applied to transcendent subjects. the Brahman clearer if that receives them. is and nothing else. the forms of intuition and the categories of thought. name and form . there is them. In this sense the Vedarita is more sceptical or critical than even Kant's critical philosophy. tical though true for all pracphenomenal life. of that primeval conception.226 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. According to $a?/<kara the world is. cording to the Vedanta this kind of creation is due And strange as it may sound to apply to Avidya. Avidy4 is beyond our powers of Brahman is Everything. According to Kant it is man who creates the world r as far as its form (Namarupa) is concerned ac. or as a modification of Brahman but no. but in the highest sense they too are phenomenal only. remembering only that. as . They too are but Namaand the reality that lies rupa. the Rupa. This might become we took Brahman for the Kantian Ding Atman sich. though hidden under It would be natural to suppose within that Atman had been taken as a : part of Brahman. behind them. that name of Avidya to Kant's intuitions of sense and a his categories of the in common element this different names. understanding. while the Vedanta treats them also an as the result of Nescience.

These are the conditions or Upadhis which consist of Manas. anticipated in India. to be though we know but very far from omniscient. as determined by the outward world. vital spirits. all this. and not a part only only. and omnipotent too well that in ourselves it is The Sthftla- and Stikshma-sarlra. 280. and the $arira. also. I tried to 227 on a former occasion. p. limited like the Brahman when seen in the objective world. mind. may Theosophy. said to see by the mind (Manas. Adhyavasaya. but it seems to have been more or less the common property of all Indian philosophers. receiving and arranging what has been conveyed to it by the have no separate organs of sense. Q 2 . This Vedantic arrangement of our organic structure and our mental organisation is curious. Brahman ought . It would represent perception as uniting and arranging the great mass of sensations. Pranas. so far as it depends but he on a is previous interaction of percepts. perception. wrongly conceived and individualised. body. and supplied by the common language of the people. show theory of Plotinus and of Dr. senses. omnipresent. mind. Henry More. 1 Hence a man vovs). peculiar in it is We word corresponding tations we may though with proper limicontinue to translate it by mens or to it. but it includes besides Upalabdhi. Here we have in fact the Holenmerian l .AND SUKSHMA-SARIRA. determination. Indriyas. owing to Avidya.THE STHULA. If the Atman within seems. the whole of Brahman in all its integrity. this is once more due to Avidya. What is the admission of a central organ.

This body is supposed to remain after death. and out-breathing. the coarse and the fine body. may seem very crude. to most systems of Indian philosophy. in an unconscious state.228 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. with-. and> Indriyas. and of percepts into Here the concepts. for the most part. though it is difficult it to see by what physiological observations could have been suggested. By the side of the vital spirit. subtle this Sukshma-. being opposed to the admission of various mental faculties. and consisting of Mukhya Prtuza. leaving particularly the question of the change of mere sensations into percepts (Vorstellungeri). unapproached and unexplained. . What is more interesting is the distinction between the Sthula. off-. though transparent or nevertheless accepted as material and .and Sukshma-sarira. also be said to decide and act by the mind (Manas). latter invisible spirit. but. vital Manas. It is not like a human body with arms and legs. the Mukhya Prana. is is body. the former the visible outward body the . through-. meaning originally forth-. is satisfied tries to explain all with one. and psychical phenomena whatever as the result of the action and interaction of elemen- tary Vorstellungen (ideas or presentations). and Udana. mind. organs of sense. while the outer body is dissolved into its material elements. we find a fivefold division into Pra/ia. Vyana. but afterwards defined differently and without much reference to any This also is a doctrine common physiological data.sarira which is supposed to migrate after death from world to world. a subject so carefully elaboAll this rated by modern philosophers. Upana. Samana. philosophy of Herbart would supply what is wanted. the Manas. The thin it or invisible. He too.

the state of deep and dreamless sleep. the Atman with the Sukshma-sarira is supposed to escape from the heart through a vein in the head or through the hundred veins of the body. While these are absorbed in the vital spirit. a complete Eschatology. It is taken over from the Upanishads. remains in full activity. the doctrine of the four states. we can hardly understand how Vedantists accepted this account of the Sukshma-sarira. joined to the Manas. in fact. simply on the authority of the Veda. according to merit paths into the next life. but the Manas remains active. to which is added as the fourth. the Atman in the heart is supposed to have for a time become one with Brahman. . nition of the limits of human knowledge. In the first state the Atman is supposed to be perceiving and acting In the by means of the Manas and the Indriyas. with the full recog. different Eschatology. Such sophy fancies like seem strange in systems of philothe Vedanta and. the state of death.ESCHATOLOGY. The Four States. moves through the veins of the body and sees dreams made out of the remnants of former impresThe third state arises from a complete separation of Atman from Manas and Indriyas. and knowledge. the state of dreaming. the circumstances attending the departure of the soul. but to return unchanged at the time of In the fourth or disembodied state awakening. and the Atman. second the Indriyas cease to act. Here again we come across an original idea of Indian philosophy. and then to take. the state of being awake. which sions (Vasanas).

while much may be taken over from the Veda as due to Avidya. as a means of subduing the passions in the l . All the sacrificial rules. For practical purposes Avidya may often be called common sense. nay the very conception of a sacrifice. But these dreams about the details of a future life are a mere phantasmagoria. under its wellunderstood limitations. a self-contradictory state- ment any that kind at least which is unsupported by This is evidence. Vedantists had once for all bound themselves to accept the Upanishads as revealed truth. fanciful or false knowledge. or inevitable. had no place Para Vidya. and cannot be helped. the lower knowledge only. But we should see clearly that. as a preparation. had to be accepted with the rest. and the Upanishads. though accepted as part of the Apara Vidya. . They cannot even be treated as Naisargika. if not that which is commonly illustrated by the son of a barren woman that is. a great portion of the sacred traditions of the Vedic age. such as the horn of a hare. the Brahmanas. After the supreme and superhuman authority of the Word or of the Veda had once been recognised. 1 See (Sawkara's Introduction to the Aitareyu Upanishad. and the truly enlightened man cannot be either an actor or an enjoyer However. because they involved an actor and an enjoyer of the fruits of such acts. and the usual result followed. and that may be the excuse for it. really a weakness that runs through the whole of the Vedanta. or the wisdom of the world. or the highest knowledge. incorporated as they are in the hymns. we are here really moving in an Avidya within that Avidya. They are simply Mithyagwana.230 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

ESCHATOLOGY. As these eschatological dreams have been included in the Vedanta system. souls remain for a time enjoying the rewards of and their good deeds. and supported by the remnant of . the capital following path of the fathers (PitHyana) or the path of the gods (Devayana). 23! and purifying the mind by drawing it away from the low and vulgar interests of life. in the pages We who are told there that. the stations on the road by which the subtle body is supposed to travel from the veins of this body to the very steps of the golden throne of the Lower Brahman. the waning year. The former leads on to smoke. the world of the fathers. but have not yet reached the highest knowledge. the ether. might perhaps have been tolerBut when we come to a full description of ated. the Murdhanya the Nac?i. night. in then descend again. all such commandments. we wonder at the long suffering of the true philosopher who has learnt that the true and highest knowledge of the Vedanta removes in the twinkling of an eye (Apatata^) the veil that in this seems to separate Atman from Brahman. the waning moon. here. they had to be mentioned life though they are better studied of the Upanishads. company with the Pit?^'s. In the moon the departed lastly the moon. carried along by the and have Udana through vein. if good people. together with the promises of rewards vouchsafed to them. either The former lower. the latter for those who are good and have already reached the is meant for not the highest knowledge. the subtle body in which the Atman is clothed migrates. in the case of persons have fulfilled their religious or sacrificial duties lived a good life.

" Here a doubt arises whether the descending souls the pass over into a state of identity (Sabhavyam) with ether. it may be of interest to see in what sense $arakara 1.. and plants.E. xxxvii. Thibuut's translation. the former is to be preferred. We now have to inquire into last. having become a cloud he falls down as rain. ' works their and then redescend with a remainder of good works. unrewarded merit due to their good works.22 took it It has been explained. and whenever the doubt lies between a directly expressed and a merely indicated meaning. wind. having become smoke he becomes mist. having become mist he becomes a cloud. smoke. because this is directly stated by the text. On this point the Veda makes the following statement " They return again the way they came to the ether. Thus the following words also. may warrant. the plants springs seed which. begins a new life on earth in such a station as the rest of his former deeds (Anusaya). e. vol. from the ether to the Then the sacrificer having become air air (wind). called indication only (Lakshana. . when matured in the womb. : mode of that descent. dwell there as long as their in his ' commentary on Sutra * III.232 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.. &c. As this is. place what is Otherwise there would take i. &c. the earliest allusion to metempsychosis or Seelenwanderung.. after having reached the moon. rain. the state is one of identity. becomes smoke. .B. that the souls of those who perform sacrifices. "Having become air ! S. Anlage.' he says. as far as I know. cloud. to the From ether. or into a state of similarity (Samyam) The Purvapakshin (opponent) maintains that only. secondary application of a word).

&c. Hence it follows that the souls (of the departed) become really identical with ether.. When the body. not possible that one thing should become 1 If. the souls became identified with ether. air. to an end. on account of its allno other connection (of the pervadingness. &c. eternal. he violently between the departed . moreover. $amkara believed in a an outward and temporary similarity (in its . in doing so.ESCHATOLOGY. consisting of water which the soul had assumed in the sphere of the moon it for the purpose of enjoyment.' We see from this that similarity only. passes air. dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes like ether. from the ether to the air. To this we ($awkara) reply that they only pass into a state of similarity to ether. souls) with it can here be meant. 5 233 he becomes smoke. They return as they came to the ether. In cases where it is another in the literal sense of the word. and so on. nection with the ether it impossible to accept the literal meaning of the text. has to be taken in the secondary sense of their passing into a state of similarity to ether. mist. they could no longer descend through the air. are appropriate only if the soul be understood to identify itself with them. is quite proper to assume the meaning which is merely indicated. And as conis." &c. &c. cloud. Sukshma-sarira) and the ether. For these reasons the souls' be- coming ether. but their entering into a state of similarity to it. then becomes subtle and then gets mixed with smoke." &c. How is this known thereupon into the power of the to be the meaning For it is Because thus only is it possible. and rain and it is important to observe how. This is the meaning of the " clauses.

mist. twisted the natural meaning of Sabhavya. such as rice. and born again according to his former works. For the progenitor must exist long before he eats the rice or the beans. 1 See Vishwu Dh. denies this with reference to the departed who. actually becomes a plant. I must confess that. though here again the actual words of the Sutra have certainly to be twisted by him . plants as the habitat. this also. Anyhow. can only mean that it is joined with a progenitor. the is child when begotten is the soul that had ascended to and descended from the moon. if it is said that the plant. though the temporary habitat only. of the departed in their subtle body 1 . Lastly.234 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. it seems to me as if the author of the Sutras himself had taken a different view. and are after that redescending upon earth. when eaten. though the Vedantists may be bound by *S'a?kara's interpretation. cloud. on account of their bad He only deeds. air. rain. XLIII. the word used in the Sutras. S. 45. have already reached the moon. . in his further descent. rather than altering a word of the Sutra. on account of their pious works. though other people amkara himself has to admit that may really. corn. nay. &c. and replacing Sabhavyam by Samyara. according to $amkara. sink so low as to become plants. A similar difficulty arises again when it has to be determined whether the departed. or becomes merely connected /Samkara decides strongly in favour of the latter view. arid had looked throughout on ether. be- comes a progenitor. beans. with them.. sesamum. and is able to beget a child.

to the world of Varuna. hand him over to a person who is said to be not-a-man. at once frees a man from all illusion.ESCHATOLOGY. lastly to that of Pra^apati or the qualified Here the souls are supposed to remain till realise true and Brahma. that knowledge which. i. Upanishads of those who. when fully released. the year. Upanishad V. This person conducts him cession). the . which does not mean universal. deeds. neither t:ie . 10. 12) who reap the fruits of their evil actions in owing to their evil moon and descend again. the day. the waxing moon. but guides only who. But while evil doers are thus punished in different hells. the sun. the world of Vayu. then to that of Indra. and then lightning but all these. but thorough and com- plete knowledge. they enter the flame. they knowledge or the Samyagdarsana. 4. are not abodes for the soul. the waxing year (northern pre- world of the Devas. and while pious people are fully rewarded in the moon and then return again to the earth. air. Theirs is the third place alluded to in the jKMnd. share in all the powers of Brahman except those of creating and ruling the universe. the moon. do not even rise to the Samyamana (abode of Yama) and then ascend to earth again. They are not supposed ever to retura to All this is world of Samsara (IV. we are told. 17). those pious and have also reached at knowledge of Brahman follow a who have been least the lower road. when the departed has reached the lightning. if obtained on earth. Finally the souls. hardly to be called philosophy. Little is 235 said in the But Badaraya?ia tries to that the make it clear Upanishads know of a third class of beings (III. different After leaving the body. as mentioned in the Puranas. 8.

of past and present. is even in this life so free from the body that it feels no longer any pain. but as freedom that can 1 Vedanta-Sutras III. But in the beginning it meant no more than that the Atman. to become once more what the Atman always has been. and must be judged from a purely historical point of view. whether good or bad. Freedom in of importance to remember in these ancient fancies is that the enlightened man may become free or obtain Mukti even in this life (6rivanis What mukti 1 ). and no doubt it may be both misunderstood and misapplied. The Atman. But much towards a it real insight would have been unfair to leave out what. is also by necessity above the distinction of good and evil. which is above the distinctions of subject and object. This is indeed the real object of the Vedanta-philosophy. This has been always laid hold of as the most dangerous doctrine of Vedantism. 3. help us into the Vedanta. which. This never was intended as freedom in the sense of licence.236 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. to overcome all Nescience. and then to wait till death removes the last Upadhis or fetters. do the different descriptions of the road on which the souls of the pious are supposed to wander towards Brahma. is a characteristic feature of the Vedanta-philosophy. remain like broken chains hanging heavy on the mortal body. and which naturally vary according to different schools. and cannot do anything. this Life. though they fetter the mind no longer. of cause and effect. having recovered its Brahmahood. . 28. namely Brahman. though childish.

It is called the Mohamudgara. Fool give up thy thirst for wealth. is for a moment the only boat for crossing this ocean of the world. . it may hastha). and is ascribed to $amkara. whether as a student (Brahma&arin) or as a householder (Qri- In order to make this quite clear. with what is gained by thy Karman. of friends. Who art thou ? Whence didst thou come ? Ponder on this. Time takes all away in a moment. though only." not be proud of wealth.FREEDOM IN THIS LIFE. being at rest and blessed in itself and in Brahman. 237 neither lapse into sinful acts nor claim any merit for good acts. leave quickly and enter into the place of Brahman. It was carefully edited with Bengali. Life is tremulous like a water-drop on a lotus-leaf. Hindi and English translations by Durga Das Ray. No one can even approach it who has not previously passed through a course of discipline. O Brother. ' ! Who are is thy wife and who is thy son ? Curious " the ways of this world. the Hammer of Folly. out no encouragement to vice. it may serve at Though not least to show is the state of mind in which the true Vedantist meant to maintain himself. is full The company of the good. strictly philosophical. or youth. be useful to add a few verses from one of the many popular works intended to teach Vedanta to the masses. and published at Darjeeling in 1888. Leaving all this Do which of illusion. holds Far from it. banish all Let thy mind be satisfied desires from thy heart. even in its popular form. It is hardly necessary to say or to prove that the Vedtlnta-philosophy.

Time is playing. leaves not the anchor of hope. son. or relafor war or peace. Thus is the dwelling manifest the misery of the world. and so is the mother's womb. thought The child is given to play. the rule established everywhere. Brahma. to sleep on the earth. the mouth has become toothless. . winter and spring come and go. his family is kind to him. Indra. an old man is absorbed in cares patient. I and the whole world are nothing why then is there always. it is useless to be angry with me and imSee every self in Self. the youth delights in a beautiful damsel. the stick in the hand shakes. Preserve equanimity if you desire soon to reach the place of Vishnu (Vistmupada). the Sun and the Rudras.238 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Consider wealth as useless. in me. the hair grey. So long as a man can earn money. The body is wrinkled. whether not trouble about enemy. morning and evening. and in others there dwells Vishnu alone. to put on a goat-skin. this is . thou. and give up all of difference. any sorrow ? In thee. when does such Do tion. But when his body becomes infirm son. no one clings to the Highest Brahman. O Man How ! can there be satisfaction Day and night. To live under a tree of the house of the gods. to yet man abandon all worldly enjoyment surrender not make happy ? . life is waning yet the breath of hope never ceases. friend. The eight great mountains. the seven oceans. is As in birth so is death. there is truly no particle The rich are afraid even of their of happiness in it. here for thee.



through old age, no


in the house asks after

Having given up

lust, anger, avarice,



Fools traction, meditate on thyself, who thou art. without a knowledge of Self are hidden in hell and

In these sixteen verses the whole teaching of the disciples has been told. Those in whom this
does not produce understanding,

who can do more






of Studying Philosophy.



not be exactly moral teaching as




But there


two ways of studying


may study



critical or in

would no doubt fasten, spirit. at once on the supersession of morality in the Vedanta as an unpardonable flaw. One of the corner-stones, without which the grandest pyramid of thought must necessarily collapse, would seem to be missing in it. The historian on the other hand will be
a historical

with simply measuring the pyramid or









thoughts the labour

will carry him.

He would thus understand

it has required in building up, and discover some possibly counteracting forces that render the absence even of a corner-stone intelligible,

It is surely aspardonable, and free from danger. tounding that such a system as the Yed^nta should

have been slowly elaborated by the indefatigable and intrepid thinkers of India thousands of years ago, a system that even now makes us feel giddy, as in mounting the last steps of the swaying spire of an
ancient Gothic cathedral.
of our philosophers, not excepting Heraclitus, Plato, Kant, or Hegel, has




ventured to erect such a
storms or lightnings.

never frightened by Stone follows on stone in

regular succession after once the first step has been made, after once it has been clearly seen that

the beginning there can have been but One, as there will be but One in the end, whether we




We may

prefer to

look upon the expansion of the world in names and forms as the work of Sophia or as the realised

Logos, but we cannot but admire the boldness with which the Hindu metaphysician, impressed with the miseries and evanescence of this world, could bring

himself to declare even the Logos to be but the result of Avidy:! or Nescience, so that in the destruction of

that Avidya could be recognised the highest object, and the summum bonum (PurusMrtha) of man.


need not praise or try to imitate a Colosseum, but if we have any heart for the builders of former days we cannot help feeling that it was a colossal and stupendous effort. And this is the feeling which I cannot resist in examining the ancient Vedanta.

Other philosophers have denied the reality of the
world as perceived by us, but no one has ventured to deny at the same time the reality of what we call
the Ego, the senses and the mind, and their inherent forms. And yet after lifting the Self above body and
soul, after uniting

heaven and earth, God and man,
these Vedanta philosophers

Brahman and Atman,

have destroyed nothing in the life of the phenomenal beings who have to act and to fulfil their duties in
the contrary, they have shown that there can be nothing phenomenal withthis

phenomenal world.


out something that is real, and that goodness and virtue, faith and works, are necessary as a prepara-




nay as a sine qud non, for the attainment of that highest knowledge which brings the soul back to its source and to its home, and restores it to its true nature, to its true Selfhood in Brahman. And let us think how keenly and deeply Indian thinkers must have felt the eternal riddles of this
world before they could propose so desperate a solution as that of the Vedanta; how desperate they must have thought the malady of mankind to be before they could think of so radical a cure. A student
of the history of philosophy must brace himself to follow those whom he wants to reach and to under-

has to climb like a mountaineer, undismayed by avalanches and precipices. He must be able to breathe in the thinnest air, never disstand.


couraged even


snow and


bar his access to the

highest point ever reached by the boldest explorers. Even if he has sometimes to descend again, dis-

events strengthened his lungs and his muscles for further work. He has done his athletic exercise, and he has seen views

appointed, he

has at

such as are never seen in the valleys below. I am myself not a mountaineer, nor am I altogether a




if I

can admire the bold climbers

Mount Gauri-Samkar,

can also admire
heights of the to us in clouds





Vedanta where they seem lost and sky. Do we imagine that these ascents were undertaken from mere recklessness, from mere love
of danger? It is easy for us to call those ancient explorers reckless adventurers, or dispose of them with the help of other names, such as mystic or
pantheist, often but half understood by those who The Vedaritists have often been employ them.



called Atheists, but as the gods which they denied were only Devas, or what we call false gods, they might thus far have been forgiven. They have been called Pantheists, though their theos, or their theoi, were not the Pan, but the Pan was their theos. They have been called Nihilists, but they themselves have drawn a sharp line between the up-

the emptiness-doctrine, and their own teaching, which, on the contrary, insists throughout on the reality that underlies all

holders of the $unya-vada


phenomenal things, namely Brahman, and inculcates
the duties which even this world of seeming imposes on all who are not yet in possession of the highest truth. That this phenomenal world has no exclusive
is surely implied by its whatever Besides, perishes can never If heaven and earth shall pass real. if we see our away body, our senses, and all that has been built up on them, decaying and perishing every

right to the


of real

very name. have been

day before our very eyes

the very Ego, the Aham, dissolved into the elements from which it sprang,



should not the Vedantist also have held to his

alone is really real, and everyand dream that even the Nama-rupas, thing the words and things, will vanish with each Kalpa? To sum up, the Vedanta teaches that in the highest sense Creation is but Self-forgetful ness, and Eternal Life remembrance or Self-consciousness. And while to us such high abstractions may seem useless for the many, it is all the more surprising
belief that
else a


that, with the Hindus, the

fundamental ideas of the
between Buddhists and Vethe Sat or





that the former hold the world to have arisen from


is not,

the latter from






Vedanta have pervaded the whole of their literature, have leavened the whole of their language, and form

day the common property of the people ideas assume in the streets a different garment from what they wear among the learned in the Asramas or the forests of the country.
to the present
at large.

No doubt these

K-Jffay even

among the learned few stand up for the complete Advajfca or Monism as represented by

The danger with /Samkara's Vedantism was that what to him was simply phenomenal, should be
taken for purely fictitious. There is, however, as a difference between the two as there is great between Avidy^ and Mithyagwana. May4 is the

cause of a phenomenal, not of a fictitious, world; and if $amkara adopts the Vivarta (turning away)
instead of the Parinama (evolution) doctrine, there is always something on which the Vivarta or illusion

at work,

and which cannot be deprived of



There are schools of Vedantists who try to explain the Sutras of Badarayana in a far more human spirit.

The best known

the school of Ramanur/a, who lived in the twelfth century A. D. 2 If we place $a???kara's
3 the claim literary activity about the eighth century of priority and of prior authority would belong to


But we must never

forget that in India

more than anywhere

philosophy was not the


2 8

In the only passage where the Sutras speak of Maya it need not mean more than a dream.
Wilson, Works,
I, p.




788-820 A.D.



750 A.D.





property of individuals, but that, as in the period of the Upanishads, so in later times also, everybody was free to contribute his share. As we find a

number of teachers mentioned in the Upanishads, and as they give us long lists of names, pupil succeeding teacher through more than fifty spiritual
generations, the commentators also quote ever so many authorities in support of the v^ews which they
either accept or reject.

Hence we cannot accept

/Samkara as the only infallible interpreter of the Vedanta-Sutras, but have to recognise in his com-

mentary one only of the many traditional interpretations of the Sutras which prevailed at different times in different parts of India, and in different schools. A most important passage in this respect is that in which ASa??"tkara has to confess that others (apare tu vadina//) differ from him, and some, as he adds, even
of our

own (asmadiyas a




This allows us


a fresh insight into the philosophical life of India is worth a great deal, particularly as the

difference of opinion refers to a

fundamental doctrine,

namely the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman. iSamkara, as we saw, was uncompromising on that point. With him and, as he thinks,

with Badaraya?za also, no reality is allowed to the (Atman) as an individual (Criva), or to the world

as presented to
soul's reality is

and by the senses. With him the Brahman, and Brahman is one only.


souls also.

others, he adds, allow reality to the individual this is the very opinion on which


another philosopher, Ilamfmur/a, has based his own interpretation of Bddarayana's Sutras, and has



p. xx,




founded a large and influential sect. But it does not follow that this, whether heretical or orthodox
opinion, was really first propounded by Ramanu^a, for Ramanucfa declares himself dependent on former

teachers (Pur vaMry aA), and appeals particularly to a somewhat prolix Sutra- vritti by Bodhayana as his



himself quotes not


Bodhayana, but

him Tanka, Dramic?a (or Guhadeva, Kapardin, BharuH. One of

them, Dravicfa,
to $aikara,

expressly said to have been anterior



and so must Bodhayana have been, if meant by the Vrittikara whom $amkara him-.

self criticises

ought, therefore, to look on Ramanu^a as a perfect equal of /Samkara, so far as his right of interpreting Badarayana's Sutras, according to his own It is the same here as everyopinion, is concerned.




The individual philophilosophy. but the mouthpiece of tradition, and that


tradition goes back further and further, the more we try to fix it chronologically. While $a/?ikara's




Advaita, i.e. absolute Monism, that of has been called Visish^a- Advaita, the

doctrine of unity with attributes or Monism with a difference. Of course with Ramanur/a also Brahman

the highest reality, omnipotent, omniscient, but this Brahman is at the same time full of compassion

or love.




new and very important


Brahman, compared with the icy self-sufficiency ascribed to Brahman by $amkara.
in Ramanuir/a's

Even more important and more humanising





p. xxi.
p. 31.


The Vedanta-Philosophy,



recognition that souls as individuals possess reality,
A/lit, what perceives and what does not soul and matter, form, as it were, the body perceive, l of Brahman are in fact modes (Prakara) of Brahman.

that Kit and


Sometimes Kit



a conscious cause, AHt matter but there is always Isvara as a third, the Lord and this, originally Brahma, is later on iden;

the Supreme Spirit as for the unconscious effect or

Vislmu, so that Raman w/a's sect is actually called $ri-Vaistmava. It assumed no doubt the greatest importance as a

without much

ado with

religious sect, as teaching people how to live rather than how to think. But to us its chief interest is

philosophical character, and more particularly its relation to the Badarayana-Sutras and $arakara's

explanation of them.

Brahman, whether under the name of Isvara, Vishnu or Vasudeva, or Bhagavat, is with Ramanuf/a as with $a??ikara both the efficient and the material cause of all that exists, and he is likewise the lord and ruler of the world. But here mythology comes in
at once.

according to Ramanu^a, soul ((7iva), from the individual spring Samkarshana,

From this Brahman,

Samkarshana Pradyumna, mind (Manas), and from Pradyumna Aniruddha or the Ego (Aharikara).
Brahma, masc., here called Vasudeva,

not without

qualities, as >Samkara holds, but possesses (7/kina

(knowledge), $akti (energy), Bala (strength), Aisvarya

(supreme power), Virya (vigour), and Te^as (energy), as his Gu?tas or qualities. Much more of the same



be found in Colebrooke



Colebrooke, Misc. Essays,
Ibid., I, p. 439.








Vedantism has

real philosophical character of Ramanw/a's for the first time been placed in its

true light by Professor Thibaut, from whom we may soon expect a complete translation of Ramanw/a's own commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras, the Sri-

As, according to Ramanugra, Brahman is bhashya. not Nirguna, without qualities, such qualities as intelligence, power, and mercy are ascribed to him, while with /Samkara even intelligence was not a
quality of Brahman, but

Brahman was


these being. as conto qualities, possess, supposed stituent elements, the material world and the indi-


thought, and





vidual souls, and to act as the inward ruler (Antaryamin) of them. Hence, neither the world nor the
individual souls will ever cease to exist.

All that

Ramanu</a admits
stages as


that they pass through different

Avyakta and Vyakta. As Vyakta, developed, they are what we know them to be on earth as Avyakta they are enveloped (SamkoHta). This involution takes place at the end of each Kalpa,

when Brahman assumes its causal state (Karanavastha), and when individual souls and individual
things lose for a time their distinct and independent character. Then follows, by the mere will of Brahma,

new creation of gross and visible and an matter, assumption by the individual souls
the evolution, or the
of new material bodies, according to the merit or demerit of their former existence. The important

that the individual souls,

according to

Ramanuf/a, retain their individuality even when they have reached the blissful abode of Brahman. The
not considered by him as merely the result of Avidya, but is real, while Brahman is to be looked





upon and worshipped as a personal god, the creator and ruler of a real world. Thus Isvara, the Lord, is not to be taken as a phenomenal god and the difference between Brahman and Isvara vanishes, as much as the difference between a qualified and an unqualified Brahman, between a higher and a lower knowledge. Here we perceive the influence exercised on philosophy by the common sense or the common sentiment of the people. In other countries in which

philosophy is, as it were, the private property of individual thinkers, that influence is far less perBut extreme views like those propounded ceptible.

by /Samkara were, as might be expected, too much for the great mass of the people, who might be willing to accept the doctrines of the Upanishads in their vagueness, but who would naturally shrink

from the conclusions drawn from them with
exorable consistency by >Sa??ikara.



it is


to say, as >Samkara says, I am not,' it is difficult at least to say, 'I am not I,' but 'I am Brahman.' It may

be possible to say that Isvara or the Lord is Brahman but to worship Isvara, and to be told at the same


but phenomenal, must be trying even to the most ardent of worshippers. If theretime that Isvara

Ramanur/a, while professing his faith in the Upanishads and his allegiance to Badaraya^a, could

give back to his followers not only their own souls, but a] so a personal god, no wonder that his success should have been so great as it was.

In the absence of any definite historical materials is quite impossible for us to say whether, in the


at the time of

development of the Vedanta-philosophy Badarayana and afterwards, it was

the absolute


as represented





that took the lead, or whether the more temperate Monism, as we see it in Ramanur/a's commentary, There are certainly some exercised an earlier sway.

Sutras which, as Dr. Thibaut has shown, lend them-

more readily to Ramanur/a's than to Ssunkara's interpretation. The question as to the nature of individual souls seems decided by the author of the Sutras in favour of Ramanw/a rather than of $amkara. We read in Sutra II, 3, 43, The soul is a part of Brahman.' Here the soul is clearly declared to be a part of Brahman, and this is the
selves far

by a as it since not were,' Brahman, being part, composed of parts, cannot have parts in the literal sense of

view of Ramanur/a

but /Samkara explains



the word.

This seems a bold proceeding of /Samkara's and, though he tries to justify it by very ingenious

arguments, Ramanu^a naturally takes his stand on the very words of the Sutra. Similar cases have

been pointed out by Dr. Thibaut



this very

diversity of opinion confirms what I remarked before, that the Vedanta philosophers of India, though they

look both on Upanishads and the Sutras as their highest authorities, often present a body of doctrine

independent of them
that had


were, of thought to be independent of the mother;

colonies, as


country, but are anxious nevertheless to prove that their own doctrines can be reconciled with the old

This was

the position

assumed by

Badarayana towards the Upanishads, so much so that nearly the whole of the first book of his Sutras had to be devoted to showing that his own views of Brahman were not in conflict with certain passages in the Upanishads.



them may




to the lower Brahman, some to the individual soul as one with Brahman and it is on these points that, at a later time, $amkara and Ramanuf/a would

What was important for naturally have differed. Bcidarayawa to show was that no passages from the
be quoted in support of other philosophies, such as the Sa??ikhya, of which both /Sawkara and RamanuT/a would disapprove.

Upanishads could

are anxious to

In the same manner both /Samkara and Ramanuc/a show that they themselves are in

perfect agreement with Badarayana. Both, however, approach the Sutras as if they had some opinions of their own to defend and to bring into harmony

with the Sutras.

can only suppose that schools in different parts of India had been growing up fast in the hermitages of certain teachers and their
pupils, and that all were anxious to show that they had not deviated from such paramount and infallible authorities as the Sutras and the Upanishads. This was done by means of what is called Mimawsa, or a critical discussion of passages which seemed to be ambiguous or had actually been twisted into an


unnatural meaning by important teachers. Dr. Thibaut therefore seems to me quite right when he says that both $amkara and Ramanm/a

pay often less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing



to bear testimony to the truth of their philosophical theories. This only confirms what

I said before


about the rich growth of philosophical India, independent of Sutras and Upani-

though influenced by both.






p. xcvi.



admit that Badarayam wished to teach in his Sutras nothing but what he found in the Upariishads, it must not be forgotten that the Upanishads contain
ever so many conflicting guesses at truth, freely uttered by thinkers who had no personal relations with each other, and had no idea of propounding

a uniform system of religious philosophy. If these conflicting utterances of the Upanishads had to be

reduced to a system,

we can hardly blame $amkara

for his taking refuge in the theory of a higher and a lower Brahman, the former being the Brahman of philosophy, the other that of religion, and both, as

he thought, to be found in different parts of the Veda. By doing that he avoided the necessity of arguing

away a number

of purely anthropomorphic features, incongruous, if applied to the highest Brahman, and dragging down even the Brahman of the lower Vidya
to a lower stage than philosophers

Ramanugra's Brahman
according to


would approve always one and the
the knowledge of but his Brahman is

same, and,



likewise but one

more than an exalted Isvara. He is able to perform the work of creation without any help from Maya or Avidya and the souls of the departed, if only their life has been pure and holy, are able to approach this Brahma, sitting on his throne, and to enjoy their rewards in a heavenly The higher conception of Brahman exparadise.
in consequence hardly

cluded of course not only everything mythological, but everything like activity or workmanship, so that creation could only be conceived as caused by Maya

Ved. Sutras II, 2, 2, sub fine: Avidyapratyupasthapitanamarupamayavesavasena, Through being possessed of the Maya of names and forms brought near by Avidya.'


instead of one Vedanta-philosophy. springing from the same root but extending its branches in two very different directions. and unworthy of the name of philosophy. whatever have been its value in the East. as the last cause of all that is. a personal god. and always will require. and an eternal soul that yearns for an approach to or a reunion with that Being. supported by an unwavering faith in Monism. that of RamanuT/a. of God. even of the individual soul being a separate part of Brahman. quired. was incompatible with the fundamental tenet that the two were. The idea of an approach of the soul to Brahman. am well aware that the view of the world. has often been declared strange and fanciful. we have really two. as explained by $a?'/ikara. never separated except by Nescience. or of their souls being merged in Brahman. nay. least of all in . I have nothing to say against this criticism.252 . and always remain. however prominent it may be in the Upanishads and in the system of Ilamanur/a. to be again joined to Brahman after death. nor have I ever tried to make propaganda for Vedantism. whether in the Upanishads or in the Sutras and their commentaries. trying hard to reconcile their Monism with the demands of the human heart that re. runs counter to the conception of Brahman. one and the same. while the very idea of an approach of or Avidya the souls of the departed to the throne of Brahman. and of the soul. I at all may events utterly unsuited to the West. as propounded by the Vedantists. do not shrink from any of its consequences another. It must be admitted therefore that in India. that of $awkara being kept for unflinching reasoners who. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

After all it is not everybody in life. that it would fail to call out and strengthen the manly qualities required for the practical side of life. Platonist. I quite admit that.RAMANUffA. the Vedanta would have its dangers. But I maintain that it represents a phase of philosophic thought which no student of philosophy can afford to ignore.' my Schopenhauer was the last man to write at random. who is called in de- upon to take an active part in breaking whether fending or ruling a country. At the same time I make no secret that all my life I have been very fond of the Vedanta. and an honest . and quite understand what he meant when he said. 253 England. It has been the solace of my life. And I go even a step further. I can fully agree with Schopenhauer. as a popular philosophy. or stones . for fitting men to lead 7 quiet lives. contemplative and preparation than the Vedanta. I know no better and A man may be a Christian. And I am neither afraid nor ashamed to say that I share his enthusiasm for the Vedanta. except that of the original (of the Upanishads). and that it might raise the human mind to a height from which the most essential virtues of social and might dwindle away into mere phantoms. In the whole world there is no study. and feel indebted to it for much that has been helpful to me in my passage through life. it will be the solace of death. or to allow himself to go into ecstasies over so-called mystic and inarticulate thought. and yet a good citizen and I should say the same of a Vedantist. and which in no country can be studied to greater advantage than in India. Nay. so beneficial and so political life ' elevating as that of the Oupnekhat (Persian trans- lation of the Upanishads). in amassing wealth.

both mental and physical. Self. St. may often seem very startling to us. the unreality of the material world. the very type of manliness and strength. if not self own blasphemous. and of the voice of God within us nay.' then may we not hope that even the quiet in the land are not so entirely useless as they appear to be ? And while some of the most important doctrines before us in the plain and direct language of the Vedanta-Sutras. it is curious to observe of the Vedanta. called useless They may be by the busy and toiling portion of humanity. while the that our in and the Divine Self are nature might seem irreverent. they do not jar at on our ears. speaks like a Vedantist of the shadows .254 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. being in God. among which we move : . hesitation of our body as the temple of God. one of contains the prayer. are in full harmony with our intimate convictions. Paul that we live. when placed all how. if clothed in softer language. yet we Again. seems to many a pure fancy and yet one of our most popular poets. but if it is true that 'those also serve who only stand and wait. though proved point by point by Berkeley. and have our shrink from adopting the plain and simple language of the Upanishads that the Self of God and man is the same. and move. nay. our own favourite hymns And Should that a higher gift than grace flesh and blood refine. God's Presence and His very And Essence all-divine ! also speak without pure Vedanta. own most idea identical Thus. we repeat with This is We .

Goethe. though differently expressed.METAPHORS. and that most of them. the into Nameless. and yet no shade of doubt. The Ancient Sage. Thus. and thro' loss of Self would be easy to add similar passages from Wordsworth. no doubt . and not to allow these inevitable prejudice us against what. ' 255 of the Self was loosed. is often meant for the same. to show that after all there is some of the Indian leaven left in us. Metaphors. not mine utter clearness. leave us in the end unsatisfied. been said that the Yedanta-philosophy in metaphors. This is true. Indian It thought will never quite square with English thoughts. and I doubt whether they were ever meant for more than that. and others. For more than once when I Sat all alone. strange. but in philo- sophy illustration also by means of metaphors has its value. however unwilling we may be to confess it. when the Vedarita has to Tennyson. I touched limbs the limbs The word that is The mortal limit revolving in myself the symbol of myself. because they can only illustrate. but It has often deals too much cannot prove. And my Were But The gain of such large life as matched with ours Were Sun to spark unshadowable in words. Themselves but shadows of a shadow-world. and the English words which we have to adopt in rendering Indian ideas are never quite adequate. There is one more point that requires a few differences to remarks. as a cloud passed Melts into Heaven. . though fascinating at first sight. All we can do is to strive to approximate as near as possible.



explain how the Sat, the Real or Brahman, dwells within us, though we cannot distinguish it, the author
of the jfTMndogya Up. VI, 13, introduces a father telling his son to throw a lump of salt into water, and

some time to take it out again. Of course he cannot do it, but whenever he tastes the water it is In the same way, the father says, the Sat, the salt.



within us, though

we cannot



by Another application of the same simile (Brihad. Ar. Up. II, 4, 12) seems intended to show that the Sat or Brahman, in permeating the whole elementary
world, vanishes, so that there is no distinction left between the individual Self and the Highest Self 1


that the manifold beings are produced from the Eternal as sparks spring from a burning fire, we should remember that this
illustrates the idea that all created beings share in the substance of the Supreme Being, that for a time they seem to be independent, but that

Again, when we read



they vanish again without causing any diminution in the Power from whence they sprang. The idea of a creating as a making of the world

most repugnant to the Vedantist, and he tries in every way to find another simile by which to illus-

trate the springing of the world from Brahman as In order to avoid seen in this world of Nescience.

the necessity of admitting something extraneous, some kind of matter out of which the world was
shaped, the Upanishads point to the spider spinning web out of itself; and, in order to show that


things can spring into existence spontaneously, they


See Deussen, Upanishads, Bnh. Ar. Up. II, i, 20.

p. 416,

fora different explanation.



use the simile of the hairs springing from a man's head without any special wish of the man himself.



may be

quite true that none of these

were they intended as arguments in support of the Upanishadphilosophy, but they are at all events very useful in reminding us by means of striking similes of certain doctrines arrived at by the Vedanta philosophers
illustrations can be considered, nor
in their search after truth.



IT would be interesting to trace at once the same or very similar tendencies as those of the Vedanta in

the development of other Indian philosophies, and particularly of the Sarakhya and Yoga, and to see

what they have

to say on the existence

and the

true nature of a Supreme Being, and the relation human beings to that Divine Being, as shadowed






Veda, though

differently interpreted by different schools of philoBut it seems better on the whole to adhere sophy.

to the order adopted by the students of philosophy in India, and treat of the other Mima?sa, the Purva-

the Former Mimamsa, as it is called, in connection with the one we have examined. The Hindus admit a Purva-Mima?rtsa and an UttaraMima?HS'i, that


They look upon the Vedanta



Uttara- or later Mima?^sa, and on that of G'aimini as the Purva-, or prior. These names, however, were

not meant to imply, as Colebrooke seems to have supposed, that the Purva-Mimfvwsa was prior in

time, though



true that


sometimes called really meant no more than that


of Philosophy, vol.

Colebrooke, Misc. Essays, vol. i, p. 239. Kilter, History iv, p. 376, in Morrison's translation.
p. 122,





the Purva-Mimamsa, having to do with the KarmakancZa, the first or work-part of the Veda, comes first, and the Uttara-Mimarasa, being concerned with
the Grfl&nak&nda,, comes second, just as an orthodox Hindu at one time was required to be a Grihastha or



and then only to

retire into the

and lead the contemplative

of a Vana-

prastha or a Samnyasin.


shall see, however,

that this prior Mima??isa, if it can be called a philosophy at all, is very inferior in interest to the Vedanta, and could hardly be understood without

the previous existence of such a system as that of Badarayana. I should not like, however, to commit

myself so far as to claim priority in time for the Vedanta. It has a decided priority in importance, and in its relation to the (r/lana- portion of the



saw why the




cannot be used for chronological quotes purposes, for (7aimini returns the compliment and quotes Badarayana. How this is to be accounted
for, I

tried to explain before. Badarayana endeavoured to



clear that while


order into

the Upanishads, and to reduce their various guesses to something like a system, 6raimini undertook to do the same for the rest of the Veda, the so-called Karmakaijc/a or work-portion, that is, all that had

regard to sacrifice, as described chiefly in the Brahmanas. Sacrifice was so much the daily life of the

Brahmans that the recognised name for sacrifice was simply Karman, i.e. work. That work grew up in different parts of India, just as we saw philosophy springing up, full of variety, not free even from contradictions. Every day had its sacrifice, and in some respects these regular sacrifices may be
s 2



They depended on the seasons or regulated the seasons and marked the different divisions of the year. There were some rites that lasted the whole year or even several

called the first calendar of India.

And as philosophy existed, independent of the Upanishads, and through BMarayana attempted to make peace with the Upanishads, we must conexisted for a long time without the Brahmar/.as, such as we possess them, that they grew up without being restrained by
sider that sacrifices also

generally binding authorities of any kind, and that at a later time only, after the Brahmanas had

been composed and had acquired some kind of authority, the necessity began to be felt of reconciling variant opinions and customs, as embodied in the Brahmanas and elsewhere, giving general as well as special rules for the performance of every

kind of ceremony. We can hardly imagine that there ever was a time in India when the so-called priests,

know how to perform their own sacrificial duties, for who were the authors of them, if not the priests? But when the Brahmanas once existed, a new problem had to be solved how to bring the Brahmanas into harsettled in distant localities, did not

mony with themselves and with local customs, and also how to

existing family and discover in them a

meaning that should satisfy every new generation. This was achieved by means of what is called


is little

investigation, examination, consideration. room for real philosophy in all this, but

there are questions such as that of
sacrificial duties,


or duty,

which offer an opportunity including for discussing the origin of duty and the nature of its rewards while in accounting for seeming contradic;

tions, in


arriving at general principles concerning

problems would naturally turn up which, though often in themselves valueless, are In generally treated with considerable ingenuity.


the work of 6raimini secured for


works ascribed to Badarayafta, Kapila and others, and was actually raised to the rank of one of the six classical philoa place

by the




sophies of India. It cannot therefore be passed over in a survey of Indian philosophy.

While Badaraya^a begins

his Sutras

with Athato



therefore the desire of


ing Brahman,' 6raimini, apparently in imitation of

begins with Athato Dharmaf/ig^asa, Now therefore the desire of knowing Dharma or duty.' The two words Now therefore offer as usual a large
' '

number of interpreters, but they mean no more in the end than that now, after the Veda has been read, and because it has been read, there arises a desire for knowing the full meaning of either Dharma, duty, or of Brahman, the Absolute the former treated in the Uttara-, the latter in the Purva-Mimamsa. In fact, whatever native commenscope to a



may say to the much more than a

contrary, this first Sutra is title, as if we were to say,


begins the philosophy of duty, or the philosophy of (raimini.

Dharma, here translated by duty, refers to acts of prescriptive observance, chiefly sacrifices. It is said to be a neuter, if used in the latter sense,
a very natural distinction, though there is little evidence to that eifect in the Sutras or in the literature

known to us. This Dharma or duty


enjoined in the Brah-



and these together with the Mantras are held to constitute the whole of the Veda, so that whatever is not Mantra is Brahmana, whatever is not Brahma/ia is Mantra. The Brahmarias are said to consist of Vidhis, injunctions, and Arthavadas, The injunctions are meant either to make glosses. us do a thing that had not been done before, or to make us know a thing that had not been known

Subsequently the





into Utpatti-vidhis, original or general injunctions, such as Agnihotram guhoti, he performs the Agnihotra, and Viniyoga-vidhi, showing the manner in

which a


to be performed. The latter injunctions as to the details, such as



he performs the


with sour

milk, &c.


settle the exact

and there

follow the Prayoga-vidhis which order of sacrificial performances, lastly a class of injunctions which


to perform a sacrificial act.

They are called Adhikara-vidhis. The hymns or formulas which

are to be used at

sacrifice, though they are held to possess also a transcendental or mysterious effect, the Apurva, are by 6raimini conceived as mainly intended to remind

the sacrificer of the gods
sacrificial gifts.


are to receive his

likewise lays stress on what he calls Namadheya or the technical name of each sacrifice,


such as Agnihotra, Darsapurttamasa, Udbhid, &c. These names are found in the Brahmawas and they
are considered important, as no doubt they are, in The Nishedhas defining the nature of a sacrifice.




p. 5. p. viii.

Thibaut, Arthasawigraha,



or prohibitions require no explanation. They simply state what ought not to be done at a sacrifice.

Lastly, the Arthavadas are passages in the Brahmanas which explain certain things they vary in character, being either glosses, comments, or ex;

planatory statements.
Contents of the Purva-Mlmaws..
I cannot do better than give the prinof (raimini's Sutras, as detailed by contents cipal


Madhava in his Nyaya-mala-vistara \ The Mima/wsa consists of twelve books. In the first book

discussed the authoritativeness of those collec-

tions of

words which are severally meant by the

terms injunction (Vidhi), explanatory passage (Artha(Mantra), tradition (Snm'ti), and name (Namadheya). In the second we find certain subvada),


sidiary discussions, as e. g. on Apurva, relative to the difference of various rites, refutation of erro-

neously alleged proofs, and difference of performIn ance, as in obligatory and voluntary offerings.

the third are considered revelation ($ruti), sign or sense of a passage (Linga), context ( Vakya), &c.,




respective weight, when in apparent then the cerarnonies opposition to one another called Pratipathi-Karmam, things mentioned by the

way, Anarabhyadhita, things accessory to several main objects, as Praya^as, &c., and the duties of the sacrificer. In the fourth the chief subject is
the influence of the principal and subordinate rites on other rites, the fruit produced by the (ruhA


See Cowell and Gough in their translation of the Sarvadarp. 178.



of the

when made

dice-playing, &c.,

Butea frondosa, &c., and the which forms part of the Ka^/asuyafifth

the subjects are the relative order of different passages of the /Sruti, &c., the order
of different parts of a sacrifice, as the seventeen animals at the Va(/apeya, the multiplication and
non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words of the /Sruti, the order of mention, &c., as

In the

determining the order of performance. In the sixth we read of the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, then: obligations, the substitutes for prescribed matesupplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the Sattra-offerings, things proper to be given,

and the

different sacrificial fines.

In the seventh

treated the


of transference of the cere-

monies of one

sacrifice to

another by direct

in the Vaidic text, others as inferred

command by name or
' '

In the eighth, transference by virtue of the

clearly expressed or obscurely expressed by the predominant sign,' and cases also



where no

transference takes place. In the ninth, the discussion begins with the adaptation (Uha) of hymns,

when quoted in a new connection, the adaptation of Samans and Mantras, and collateral questions
connected therewith.

In the tenth the occasions are discussed where the non-performance of the and nonprimary rite involves the preclusion performance of the dependent rites, and occasions


rites are precluded,

because other rites pro-

their special results, also Graha-offerings, certain Samans, and various other things, as well In the eleventh we as different kinds of negation.
find the incidental

mention and subsequently the discussion of Tantra, where several acts are




combined into one, and Avapa, or the performing an act more than once. In the twelfth there is the discussion on Prasaiiga, when the rite is performed with one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference, on Tantra, cumulation of concurrent rites (Samu&Maya), and option. It is easy to see from this table of contents that

Kant would have felt much the But we must take philosophies as they are given us and we should spoil the picture
neither Plato nor

wiser for them.


of the philosophical life of India, if we left out of consideration their speculations about sacrifice as con-

There are passages, however, which appeal to philosophers, such as, for instance, the chapter on the Pramanas or the authoritative sources of knowledge, on the relation between word and thought, and similar subjects.
tained in the Purva-Mima/msa.
It is true that in

most of these questions are treated the other philosophies also, but they have a peculiar interest as treated by the ritualistic Purva-

Pramawas of



we turn our


to the Pra-

manas, the measures of knowledge, or the authorities to which we can appeal as the legitimate means
of knowledge, as explained by the Purva-Mlma??isa, we saw before that the Vedantists did riot pay




quainted with the

them, though they were acthree fundamental Pramawas

and revelation. The on the Purva-Mimamsa, contrary, devoted considerable attention to this subject, and admitted five,
sense-perception, inference,

Sense-perception, Pratyaksha,

when the organs



are actually in contiguity with an object (2) Inference (Anumana), i. e. the apprehension of an

unseen member of a known association (Vyapti) (3) by the perception of another seen member Comparison (Upamana), knowledge arising from

(4) Presumption (Arthapatti), such be derived of as can a thing not itself knowledge perceived, but implied by another (5) >S'abda, verbal




information derived from authoritative sources.
sect of Mima?nsakas,


those who follow Kumarila admitted besides, (6) Abhava, not-being, Bha^a, which seems but a subdivision of inference, as if we infer dryness of the soil from the not-being or

absence of clouds and rain.


it is

of information



examined, but

curious that

Mimamsakas should

admit this large array of sources of valid cogconsidering that for their own purposes, establishing the nature of Dharma or duty,

they practically admit but one, namely scripture or /S'abda. Duty, they hold, cannot rest on human

which underlies ought all duty, can only be supplied by an authority that is more than human or more than fallible, and such an authority is nowhere to be found except in the


Veda. This leaves, of course, the task of proving the superhuman origin of the Veda on the shoulders of 6 aimini and we shall see hereafter how he per?





Before, however,


enter on a consideration of

any of the problems treated
a few remarks have to be

the Purva-Mimamsa,
peculiarity in

made on a



the structure of the Sutras.
subject fully,

In order to discuss a


to arrive in the

end at a


opinion, the authors of the Sutras are encouraged to begin with stating first every possible objection

that can reasonably be urged against what is their own opinion. As long as the objections are not
perfectly absurd, they have a right to be stated, and this is called the Purvapaksha, the first part. Then follow answers to all these objections, and this
is called the Uttarapaksha, the latter part and then only are we led on to the final conclusion, the This system is exhaustive and has many Siddhanta. but it has also the advantages, disadvantage, as far

as the reader


concerned, that, without a com-

mentary, he often feels doubtful where the cons end and the pros begin. The commentators themselves differ sometimes on that point. Sometimes again, instead of three, a case or Adhikarana is

stated in five members, namely 1. The subject to be explained (Vishaya).

2. 3.


The doubt (Samsaya). The first side or prima facie view (Purvapaksha). The demonstrated conclusion (Siddhanta) and The connection (Samgati).
l ,

is illustrated in the commentary on the first and second Sutras of the Mimamsa which declare that a desire to know duty is to be entertained, and


then define duty (Dharma) as that which recognised by an instigatory passage, that


to be

by a

Here the question to be passage from the Veda. discussed (Vishaya) is, whether the study of Duty in
Sarvadarsana-sawgraha, p. 122; translation by Cowell and Gough, p. 180; Siddhanta Dipika, 1898, p. 194.






The Purvapaksha says
it is

really necessary to be underof course, No, for


said that the

Veda should be

learnt (Vedo

*dhyetavyaA), that clearly means either that it should be understood, like any other book which we read, or

should be learnt by heart without any attempt, as yet, on the part of the pupil to understand it, simply as a work good in itself, which has its reward in




a very

common view among


Brahmans for, as they had no written books, they had a very perfect system for imprinting texts on the memory of young persons, by making them learn every day a certain number of verses or lines
by heart, without any attempt, at first, of making them understand what they learnt and afterwards

only supplying the key to the meaning. This acquisition of the mere sound of the Veda was considered
highly meritorious

nay, some held that the





not understood than


This was in fact their printing or rather their writing, and without it their mnemonic

would have been simply impossible.


we warn

our compositors against trying to understand what they are printing, Indian pupils were cautioned against the same danger and they succeeded

in learning the longest texts by heart, without even attempting at first to fathom their meaning. To us

such a system seems almost incredible, but no other system was possible in ancient times, and there is

no excuse

for being incredulous, for it in India to the present day.




Only after the text had thus been imprinted on the memory, there came the necessity of interAnd here the more pretation or understanding.

such as is given in the Mima??isa. and learns to understand it in the house of his teacher. so that it is argued there would actually be no time for any intervening study of the MimamsEi.SUTRA-STYLE. 269 enlightened of the Indian theologians argue that the Vedic command Vedo-dhyetavyaA/ the Veda ' ' is to be gone over. the Purvapakshin. though his learning of diately bathe the text of the Veda is useful in every respect. the Veda. considering that it rests on no definite sacred command. though I must confess There that its meaning is not quite clear to me. After that he bathes. proper performance of are besides several points in the course of this dis- . the its commands. But if so. asked. though miraculous rewards may be held out for that. is Therefore the imaginary opponent. cannot be considered superfluous. it is what can be the use of the Mima?nsEi? The pupil learns the Veda by heart. as a means towards the highest object of the study of the Veda. These considerations in support of the Siddhanta or final conclusion would probably fall under the name of Samgati. after to his house is having finished his apprenticeship. connection. is to be acquired. viz. a more minute study of the sacrificial precepts of . to be learnt stood. he should immeand because. But here the Siddhantin forward and says that the Snm'ti passage enjoining a pupil's bathing (graduating) on returning steps not violated by an intervening study of the Mima??isa. objects that the study of the Mimamsa not necessary at all. that is. marries and sets up his own house. because it is not said that. by and that heart.' implies that it is also to be underpreferable this intelligible purpose is to the purely mechanical one.

important like any other work. were riot represented as having been the work of Jehovah. inspired person. or whether it is what we should If it were the work of a person. and I doubt whether such a problem could have arisen in the ancient any country besides India. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. then. much Has the Veda a Superhuman Origin? This discussion leads on to another and more one.270 cussion. the so-called is four Kriyaphalas. on which more information to be desired. but these books. though sacred. such as the Yeda promises again and again nor could . The Jews. or of some authority. such as. had their sacred books. to those therefore who perform Vedic* sacrifices. or that it cannot be the work of a personal or human author. no doubt. It follows either that the Veda has no binding authority at all. They were acknowledged to literature of . for instance. call revealed. it promise any rewards as a motive for the performance of any duty least of all. it could not establish a duty. This is a dilemma arising from convictions firmly planted in the minds of the ancient theologians of India. */ even to start such a claim as being revealed for any book requires a considerable advance in religious and philosophical thought. whether the Veda has supreme whether it is the work of man. a reward in heaven. The subject is interesting even though the arguments may not be convincing It is clear that O to us. arid it is interest- ing to see how they try to escape from all the diffi- culties arising out of their postulate that the Veda must be the work of a superhuman or divine author.

John. eternal and infallible. so that we mistake mother-of-pearl for then may we misapprehend the meaning of revealed words However. any part of the Veda. when given. this would exclude the possibility of error. the first thing is to see how the Brahmans. for. therefore Deuteronomy must be considered the work of a superhuman writer and some of our modern . can deceive us. as in the case of Moses. as not they truly remark. To the Brahmans. much as the Gospels are in the eyes of certain Christian theologians. by historical persons. 1 quote from Madhava's introduction to his com- . or by apostles such as St. Let us see therefore how the down Mark Mimamsa deals with this problem of the Apaurusheyatva. Inspiration in satisfied these the ordinary sense of the word would not have Indian orthodox philosophers. message.HAS THE VEDA A SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN? 27! have been composed. even if. e. or St. tried to maintain a superhuman authorship in favour of the silver . even though they maintain at the same time that they are historical documents written by illiterate people. and particularly the Mimamsakas. i. as they point out. they actually related the death of their reputed author. however true the message might be. the non-human origin of the Vedas. because. even if it bore a human or historical name. the human recipient would always be a possible source of error. if not written down. as being liable to misapprehend and misinterpret such a Even the senses. how much more easily ! Veda. theologians have not been very far from taking the same view. was superhuman. The Mimamsa philosopher would probably have argued that as no writer could relate his own death.

with 6raimini's Sutras. he says. mentary on the Rig-veda in He is a great authority matters connected with the Purva-Mimarasa. The Vedas.. &c. l . vol.. that the Vedas must be of 1 new objection. Kauthuma. by showing that they were He perfectly intelligible.272 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. And Ka^Aa. Valrniki. human origin. a very comprehensive treatise on the subject. so also are the Yedas. in accordance. were suggested that such names as were meant for men who did no more like teachers. and other sections of the &c. . they continue. See my Second Edition. case of Vyasa's Mahabharata and Valraiki's Rama- ya?ia. having written the Nyaya-mala-vistara. if it &c. i. In his introduction he establishes first the authority of the Mantras and of the Brahmanas. thus in the case of the Kanaka. than hand down the oral tradition. and he means of course the Purvapakshins. the recognised objectors. as he says. Ka^Aa. and hence we find men quoted in As in the as the authors of the Vedas. .' ' they hold that as the Raghuvamsa of Kalidasa and other poems are recent. are given us as the names of the authors of these branches of the Veda and hence it Veda. 10. them ning or eternal. Vyasa. uphold approximation towards the Vedas. are not without a beginsay. Taittiriya.' that is to 'Some people. which had been denied. follows that the Vedas were the works of human authors. the Purvapakshin is ready witli a namely. p.. are known to be their human authors. then proceeds to establish the Apaurusheyatva. the non-human authorship of the Veda. both Vidhis (rules) and Arthavadas (glosses).

and Pravahana meaning 'carrying along. or Babara Pravaham. (raimini should appeal to a former Sutra in which he established that even the relation of words to their meanings is eternal. and that Babara Pravcaham was meant. Pravaham. established by men. and therefore liable to error quite as much as the evidence of our senses. or eternal. therefore. but only handed down a certain portion of the Veda. in this place. and thus fortified he next proceeds to answer the objections derived from such names as Kanaka. the Purvapakshin. done by showing that Ka^/ia did not compose. we may surely mistake the meaning of words. and hence cannot be prehistoric. could not have existed in times anterior to these persons mentioned in them. but as a name of the wind.HAS THE VEDA A SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN? because 273 we see in the Vedas themselves the mention Thus we read of a Babara of temporal matters. This is T . It is seen from this that what is claimed for the not only revelation.' as it were pro-vehens. This subject had been discussed before. Babara imitating the sound. therefore. but existence from all eternity. &c. and hence the meaning of words of the Veda also. nay. pre-temporal. that sound itself is eternal. 6raimini. The Vedas. not as the name of a man. in answer to the inevitable Objector-general. communicated to historical persons. For as we may mistake mother-of-pearl for silver. who had maintained that the relation between words and their meanings was conventional (6eo-ei). which is the We Siddhanta or final conclusion. wishes us first of all to keep in mind that the words of the Vedas themselves are superhuman or supernatural. can understand therefore why in the next Sutra. and is Veda before the beginning of all time. of a Kusuruvinda Auddalaki.



Then follows a new objection taken from the fact that impossible or even absurd things occur in the Veda for instance, we read that trees or serpents

performed a

that an old ox sang foolish 1 Hence it is argued once for the Madras.
sacrifice, or

more that the Veda must have been made by human But the orthodox (raimini answers, No beings. for if it had been made by man, there could be no

injunction for the performance of sacrifices like the (ryotish toma, as a means of attaining Svarga or paradise, because no man could possibly know either the

means, or their effect and yet there is this injunction in the case of the 6ryotishoma, and other sacrifices

are not different from


Such injunctions as Let a

man who

desires paradise, sacrifice with the 6ryotishon the are not like a speech of a madman

contrary, they are most rational in pointing out the
object (paradise), in suggesting the

means (Soma,



mentioning (Dikshamya, &c.).




the necessary subsidiary acts see, therefore, that the com-

of the Veda are not unintelligible or absurd. we meet with such passages as that the trees and serpents performed certain sacrifices, we must recognise in them Arthavadas or glosses, conveying




in our case indirect laudations of certain sacrifices,


even trees and serpents perform them, how much more should intelligent beings do

to say,
' !



the same

As, therefore,

human workmanship can
origin and

no flaws that might arise from be detected in the Veda,

concludes triumphantly that its superhuman its authority cannot be doubted.
Miidruku, see Muir, Sansk. Texts, II,






This must suffice to give a general idea of the character of the Purva-Mimamsa. may wonder




should ever have been raised to the rank of

a philosophical system by the side of the UttaraMim&msa or the Vedanta, but it is its method
rather than the matter to which

seems to have invested


applied, that with a certain importance.
it is

of discussing questions has been adopted in other branches of learning also, for instance, by the highest legal authorities in trying

Mimamsa method

to settle contested questions of law. meet with in other systems of philosophy also as the recog-




of discussing various opinions before

arriving at a final conclusion. There are some curious subjects discussed by (raimini, such as what authority can be claimed for

from revelation, how far the recognised customs of certain countries should be followed or rejected, what words are to be contradition, as different

sidered as correct or incorrect


or again,

how a good





has been performed can, in

spite of the lapse of time, produce good or bad results for the performer. All this is certainly of

interest to the

student of Indian literature, but

hardly to the student of philosophy, as such.
Supposed Atheism of Purva-Mim&wsa.
point seems to require our attention, namely, the charge of atheism that has been brought This sounds a very against (raimini's Mimamsa.

One more

strange charge after what we have seen of the character of this philosophy, of its regard for the Veda, and the defence of its revealed character,
its insistence

on the conscientious observance
T 2



ceremonial injunctions. Still, it has been in both ancient and in modern times. So brought
early a philosopher as Kumarila Bha^a tells us that the Mima/nsa had been treated in the world
as a Lokayata



an atheistic system, but that

he was





Professor Banerjea- tells us that Prabhakara also, the other commentator of the Mima/msa, had openly
treated this system as atheistic, and we shall meet with a passage from the Padma-Pura?ia supporting the same view. However, there seems to be a mis-

understanding here. Atheistic has always meant a great many things, so much so that even the most
could be imagined, the Vedanta, has, like that of Spinoza, been accused of The reason is this. The author of the atheism.



Vedanta-Sutras,Bcidaraya?ia, after having established the omnipresence of Brahman (III, 2, 36-37) by quoting a number of passages from the Veda, such

is all

is all

this' (Mu^cZ.


II, 2,







(III, 2,

(A"Mnd. Up. VII, 25, 2), proceeds to 38) that the rewards also of all works

proceed directly or indirectly from Brahman. There were, however, two opinions on this point, one, that

the works themselves produce their fruit without any divine interference, and in cases where the fruit
does not appear at once, that there


principle, direct result of a deed,


Apiirva, which

a superis the

and produces

fruit at a later



the other, that

are directly or

Lokayata is explained by Childers, s.v., as controversy on fabulous or absurd points, but in the Amba/Ma-Suttu, I. ,3, it is mentioned as forming part ot the studies proper for a Brahman.

Muir, III, 95.

indirectly requited


by the Lord. The latter opinion, which is adopted by Badarayana, is supported by a quotation from Bn'h. Up. IV, 4, 24, This is indeed the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of

we are informed by next Sutra, Badaraya^a accepted the former The command that he who is desirous of opinion. the heavenly world should sacrifice,' implies, as he holds, a reward of the sacrificer by means of the
(jaimini, however, as

in the


and not by any other agent. But how a sacrifice, when it had been performed and was ended, could produce any reward, is difficult
sacrifice itself,

to understand. In order to explain this, 6raimini assumes that there was a result, viz. an invisible something, a kind of after-state of a deed or an invisible antecedent state of the result, something Apurva or miraculous, which represented the reward inherent in good works. And he adds, that if we supposed that the Lord himself caused rewards

men, we should often have to accuse him of cruelty and partiality

and punishments and that

for the acts of



better therefore to allow that


works, good or bad, produce their own results, or, in other words, that for the moral government of the

world no Lord
Here, then,


see the real state of the case as


between (7aimini and Badarayana. Graimini would not make the Lord responsible for the injustice that seems to prevail in the world, and hence reduced everything to cause and effect, and saw in the inequalities of the world the natural result of the
continued action of good or evil acts. This surely was not atheism, rather was it an attempt to clear the Lord from those charges of cruelty or undue



partiality which have so often been brought against him. It was but another attempt at justifying the

wisdom of God, an ancient Theodicee,




we may think of name of atheism.


certainly did not deserve

however, thought otherwise, and quoting himself, he says, Badarayana thinks the Lord to be the cause of the fruits of action/ and



even the cause of these actions themselves, as we may learn from a well-known Vedic passage (Kaush. Up. Ill, 8) He makes whomsoever he wishes to lead up from these worlds,

he adds that he

do good deeds and makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds.'



a charge very freely brought against

who deny certain characteristics predicated of the Deity, but do not mean thereby to deny its If the Mimamsakas were called atheists, existence.

meant no more than that they

tried to iustify the J

But, once having ways were accused of ever so been called atheists, they In a passage quoted by Professor many things.
in their


own way.

Banerjea from a modern work, the Vidvan-modatararigmi, we read They say there is no God, or world nor maker of the has the world any sustainer


or destroyer





conformity with his maker of the Veda, for


obtains a recompense in works. Neither is there any


words are








self-demonstrated, for since

has been established
be dependent upon

how can


This shows how the Mimamanything but itself ? sakas have been misunderstood by the Vedantists,

and how much $awkara


at cross-purposes with







has happened in this case in India

is what always happens when people resort to names of abuse rather than to an exchange of ideas. Surely a Deity, though it does not cause us to act, and

does not itself reward or punish us, is not thereby a non-existent Deity. Modern Vedantists also are

enamoured of their own conception of Deity, that of Brahman or Atman, that they do not hesitate,

Vivekananda, for instance, in his recent address on Practical Vedanta, 1896, to charge those who He is the atheist,' differ from himself with atheism.

he writes,



does not believe in himself.

believing in the glory of

your own



Not what the

Is the

calls atheism.'

Pftrva-Mimawsa a system of Philosophy?

Let me say once more that, in allowing a place to the Purva-Mimamsa among the six systems of Indian
Philosophy, I was chiefly influenced by the fact that from an Indian point of view it always held such

a place, and that by omitting it a gap would have been left in the general outline of the philosophic thought of India. Some native philosophers go so

both systems, that of (raimini and Badarayana, by the same name of Mimamsa, but to look upon them as forming one whole. They actually take the words in the first Sutra of the
far as not only to call



then a desire to know

Brahman,' as pointing back to (raimini's Sutras and
as thereby implying that the

be studied


Purva-Mimamsa should and should be followed by a study
Besides, the

of the Uttara-MimamsEi afterwards.

authors of the other five systems frequently refer to
(raimini as

an independent thinker, and though



sacrificial system of the Veda would to seem us to deserve the name of a system hardly

treatment of the

of philosophy, he has nevertheless touched on


a problem which

falls clearly

within that sphere of

Our idea of a system of philosophy is from the Indian conception of a Darsana.

meaning philosophy, as a love of comes nearest to the Sanskrit 6ri(//iasa, wisdom, a desire to know, if not a desire to be wise. If we take philosophy in the sense of an examination of our means of knowledge (Epistemology), or with Kant as an inquiry into the limits of human knowledge, there would be nothing corresponding to it in


based, not on independent reasoning, but on the authority of the /Sruti, would lose \vith us its claim to the title

Even the Vedanta,

so far as

it is

of philosophy. But we have only to waive the claim of infallibility put forward by Badarayana in favour of the utterances of the sages of the Upanishads,

and treat them as simple human witnesses to the truth, and we should then find in the systematic
arrangement of these utterances by Badarayarza, a real philosophy, a complete view of the Kosmos in which we live, like those that have been put forward

by the great thinkers of the philosophical countries of the world, Greece, Italy, Germany, France, and




HAVING- explored two of the recognised systems of Indian philosophy, so far as it seemed necessary in a general survey of the work done by the ancient thinkers of India, we must now return and enter
once more into the densely entangled and almost impervious growth of thought from which all the

high roads leading towards real and definite systems of philosophy have emerged, branching off in different directions.

seems to me, by far the most important for the whole intellectual development of India, the Vedanta, has been mapped out by us at least in its broad
of these and, as



It seemed to me undesirable to enter here on an examination of what has been called the later Vedanta which can be studied in such works as the Pan&adasi or the Vedanta-Sara, and in many

popular treatises both in prose and in verse.
Later Vedanta mixed with Sawkhya.

would be unfair and

unhistorical, however, to

look upon this later development of the Vedanta as simply a deterioration of the old philosophy. Though
it is

certainly rather confused, if compared with the system as laid down in the old Vedanta-Sfttras,



represents to us what in the course of time became of the Vedanta, when taught and discussed in the different schools of philosophy in medieval

and modern



strikes us


in it is

the mixture of Vedanta ideas with ideas borrowed

as it would seem, from Samkhya, but from Yoga, and Nyaya sources. But here again it is difficult to decide whether such ideas were actually borrowed from these systems in their


whether they were originally comin later times only had become which property restricted to one or the other of the six systems of
finished state, or

In the Pa?U*adasi, for instance, we meet with the idea of Praknti, nature, which we
are accustomed to consider as the peculiar property of the Sa/mkhya-system. This Prakrit! is said there
to be the reflection, or, as we should say, the shadow of Brahman, and to be possessed of the three Gunas or elements of goodness, passion, and darkness, or, as they are sometimes explained, of good, indifferent, and bad. This theory of the three Gu?;as, however,

altogether absent from the original Vedanta at least, it is not to be met with in the purely Veduntic


occurring for the





/SVetasvatara Upanishad. Again in the later Vedanta works Avidya and Maya are used synonymously,
or, if

distinguished from one another, they are supposed to arise respectively from the more or less The omniscient, pure character of their substance

but personal tsvara is there explained as a reflection of Maya, but as having subdued her, while the






by substance,




hardly allows that

we should

for the


of goodness.

individual soul, Pragma or 6riva,


represented as

having been subdued by Avidya, and to be multiform, owing to the variety of Avidya. The individual
being endowed with a causal or subtle body, body to be its own, and hence error and suffering in all their variety. As to the desoul,

believes that

velopment of the world, we are told that it was by the command of Isvara that PrakHti, when dominated by darkness, produced the elements of ether, a,ir, fire, water and earth, all meant to be
enjoyed, that

to be experienced

by the individual

this we can hardly be mistaken if we the influence of Samkhya ideas, obscuring recognise and vitiating the monism of the Vedanta, pure and



In that philosophy there is no room for a Second, or for a Prakn'ti, nor for the three Gums, nor for anything real by the side of Brahman.


that influence was exercised

we cannot

discover, possible that in ancient times already there existed this influence of one philosophical system upon the other, for we see even
it is


some of the Upanishads a certain mixture of what we should afterwards have to call the disin

tinctive teaching of Vedanta,

philosophy. idea of private property in any philosophic truth did hardly exist. The individual, as we saw before,


Samkhya, or Yogamust remember that in India the

was of little consequence, and could never exercise the same influence which such thinkers as Socrates
or Plato exercised in Greece.

If the descriptions of

life emanating from the Indians themselves, and from other nations they came in contact with, whether Greek conquerors or Chinese pilgrims, can




be trusted,
or as private,

we may

well understand that
to be truth,


what was taken

was treated not but as common property. If there was

an exchange of ideas among the Indian seekers after truth, it was far more in the nature of cooperation towards a common end, than in the

any claims of originality or priority That one man should write by and publish his philosophical views in a book and that another should read and criticise that book or carry on the work where it had been left, was

individual teachers.


If never thought of in India in ancient times. A. referred to B. often, as they say, from mere civility, Pm/artham, B. would refer to A., but no

one would ever say, as so often happens with us, that he had anticipated the discovery of another,

some one else had stolen his ideas. Truth was not an article that, according to Hindu ideas, could ever be stolen. All that could happen and did happen was that certain opinions which had been discussed, sifted, and generally received in
or that

one Asrama, hermitage, Arama, garden, or Parishad, religious settlement, would in time be collected



members and reduced


a more or less

systematic times we may

that form was in early see from the Brahmanas, and more


particularly from the Upanishads, i. e. Seances, gatherings of pupils round their teachers, or later on

from the Sutras.

It cannot be

doubted that these

Sutras presuppose, by their systematic form, a long continued intellectual labour, nay it seems to me difficult to account for their peculiar literary form except on the ground that they were meant to be
learnt by heart

and to be accompanied from the very



beginning by a running commentary, without which they would have been perfectly unintelligible. I suggested once before that this very peculiar style of the Sutras would receive the best historical explanation, if

could be proved that they represent




attempts at writing for literary purposes Whatever the exact date may be of

the introduction of a sinistrorsum and dextrorsum

alphabet for epigraphic purposes in India (and in spite of all efforts not a single inscription has as yet been
discovered that can be referred with certainty to the period before Asoka, third century B. c.), every classical

knows that there always is a long interval between an epigraphic and a literary employment of the alphabet. People forget that a period marked

by written and a large

literary compositions requires a public, public, which is able to read, for where

no supply. Nor must we forget that the old system of a mnemonic literature, the Parampara, w as invested with a kind of sacred character, and would not have been easily

no demand there




mnemonic system was upheld

strict discipline which formed the principal of the established system of education in India, part as has been fully described in the Prati.sakhyas. They explain to us by what process, whatever

by a

existed at that time of literature, chiefly sacred,

was firmly imprinted on the memory of the young. These young pupils were in fact the books, the scribes were the Gurus, the tablet was the brain.


can hardly imagine such a state of literature,

and the transition from it to a written literature must have marked a new start in the intellectual
of the people at large, or at least of the educated



Anybody who has come

in contact


the Pandits of India has been able to observe the





achieved by that


discipline even at present, though it is dying out before our eyes at the approach of printed

nay of printed editions of




need hardly say that even


idea of the introduction of a Semitic alphabet into India by means of commercial travellers about 800
or 1000 B.C.

were more than a hypothesis,



not prove the existence of a written literature at The adaptation of a Semitic alphabet that time.
to the phonetic system as elaborated in the Prati-

sakhyas may date from the third, possibly from the fourth century B.C., but the use of that alphabet for inscriptions begins in the middle of the third
century only

and though we cannot deny the

possibility of its having been used for literary purposes at the same time, such possibilities would

form very dangerous landmarks in the chronology of Indian literature.

But whatever the

may have

origin of the peculiar Sutrabeen and I give my hypothesis

as a

hypothesis only all scholars will probably agree that these Sutras could not be the work of one individual philosopher, but that we have in them the

outcome of previous centuries of thought, and the labours of numerous thinkers whose names are forgotten and will never be


final result of



of Philosophies and Sfttras.


we keep

this in mind,


shall see that the

question whether any of the texts of the

six philo-

before each system reached the form in which we possess it. 3. 287 sophies which we now possess should be considered as older than any other. IV. if we as feel justified in one Greek author quotes another. because Patan^ali other systems. I. i i and inserts it totidem verbis in his own work. But all such conclusions.RELATIVE AGE OF PHILOSOPHIES AND SUTRAS. I. IV. while Gotama attacks in turn certain doctrines of Kapila and Bada- He does the same for the Yoga-Sutras in II. 34. actually adopts one of Badarayana's Sutras. to whom . 5 and II. 24 in the Sawkhya-Sutras which we possess. p. taking the one who is quoted or the predecessor who quotes. which would be perfectly legitimate in Greek and Latin literature. Ka^ada was clearly acquainted with Gotama. which occur rayana. who is acquainted with Kapila. is really a question im- The tests for settling the possible to answer. applicable to European literature. because during its mnemonic period anything could be added and anything left out. . that therefore he was them l . 46. 33. at Kapila. 1 Kajendralal Mitra. have no weight whatever in the literary history of India. contemporary of the one But because G'aimini quotes Bada6raimini.e. the S&mkhya-Sutras are ascribed. and VI. is clearly critileast in our Kapila-Sutras.. we have no Kanada. are not applicable to Indian literature. It has ignores all anterior to all of been supposed. . xviii. relative ages of literary works. cised by Kapila. arrange them in chronological succession. III. Thus. rayawa five and Badarayafta and because right to their systems show an acquaintance with the other systems of philosophy.

philosophy presupposes a Sa?7ikhya-philosophy. and afterwards in All such indications may the smaller Upanishads. the reputed author of Yoga-Sutras has been referred to the second century B.. . Age of Kapila-Sfttras. as a technical term. it is now generally admitted that our Sawkhya. It occurs in the Taittiriya and Ka^Aa Upanishads. Up.C. which have come down to us.Sutras cannot be earlier than the fourteenth century A. It should be first observed that Vedanta also occurs for the in time the same SVetasvatara VI. VI. 10 we meet even Sutras. with Yogins. VI. and is mentioned in as early an authority as the Asvalayana-Gn'hyaIn the Maitray. i 3 and in several of the minor Upanishads.D. The Sutras of Kapila. 22. are so little the work of the founder of that system. was the same as what we possess in Pata/lr/ali's Sutras of the Yoga-philosophy. classical We for look in vain in the so-called Upanishads the names of either Samkhya or Vedanta. But it by no means follows that the Yoga.288 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and the Sutras which embody their teachings and have been handed down to us as the earliest documents within our reach. Yoga. known in those early times. occurs earlier than the name of any other system of philosophy. but while Pata%ali. that it would be far safer to treat them as the last arrangement of doctrines accumulated in one philosophical school during centuries of Parampanl It is easy to see that the Yogaor tradition. It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the six philosophies as so many channels of thought. but Sa/wkhya occurs in the compound Samkhya-Yoga in the /SVetasvatara Up.

the As author of the Samkhya-tattva-Kaumudi. V. to our Samkhya-Sutras their antiquity was first shaken by Dr. 5. as was then the fashion.. is of that modern date. Varshaganya. Ra^avcartika. It is quite possible that our Samkhya-Sutras may only be what of the old Sutras. become valuable hereafter 289 for chronological purposes. quotes not a single Sutra from our Samkhya-Sutras. whether from scattered MSS. 39 we meet with the Samkhya as the name of a system of philosophy and likewise as a name of its adherents. as we know. He declares that they were all com- posed by the well-known Vi^/nana-Bhikshu who. for instance. and have been TJ . and the composition of which is assigned by Balasastrin to so far. can be safely referred to about 1150 A. or from the recollection of less forgetful or forgotten If that was the case. D. In the Bhagavad-git IJ. why by no means follows that every one of the Sutras which we possess in the body of the Samkhya-Sutras. who evidently knew the Sutras of the other systems. according to Professor Garbe. with individuals. Va&aspati Misra. who.AGE OF KAPILA-SUTKAS.. D. but appeals to older authorities only. But we must not go too It late a period as the sixteenth century. why should not certain portions of the Samkhya-Sutras have been preserved here and there. and the Even Madhava about 1350 A. never quotes from our Samkhya-Sutras and not.. as. wrote also a commentary on them. if they had been in existence in his time ? . such as PaMasikha. FitzEdward Hall. the Sutras of Panini. so voluminous a work as the Mahabhashya . we should call the latest recension We know that in India the oral tradition of certain texts. was interrupted for a time and then restored again.

the utterances of Kapila. we are fortunate in being able to assign a much earlier and much more settled date if But we must to another work which for centuries seems to have formed the recognised authority for the followers of the Sa?7ikhya in India. consider the circumstances of the case. Samkhya-Sara. equally ascribed to that author). Karikas Alberuni. p. Sawkhya-karikfts. till they meet us at 'last in their final form. PafU-asikha and Varshaga?iya. . may not be older than the time of Des Cartes. who wrote his account of India in the 1 See Hall.290 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. added to or remodelled from time to time. to have to confess that a work for which a most remote date had always been claimed. Deusscn. accept so very modern a date for our Kapila-Sutras. p. 12 .nine or seventy Versus memoriales of Isvara-Krtshna (with three supple- mentary ones. 361. the so-called Sawkhyakarikas or the sixty. Vedanta. at so late a date as the fourteenth or even the sixteenth century ? It was no doubt a great shock to those who stood up for the great antiquity of Indian philosophy. That these Karikas are older than our Sutras could easily be proved by passages occurring among the Sutras which are almost literally taken from the 1 . at least in that final But if we literary form in which it has reached us. more than possible that our Sutras of the Samkhyaphilosophy contain some of the most ancient as well as the most modern Sutras. as well as those of Lsvara-KHshfta and even of VigwanaBhikshu. it .

as has been shown. U 2 . 7. first 29! half of the eleventh century. less than twenty-eight of his translations now in (not 583). told. made by . 557 to 589 Paramartha came to China in about Emperor Wu-ti of the Lian dynasty which ruled in Southern China from 2 502 to 557 A. it by no means follows that this work itself did not exist before that time. For the Samkhya-karikas exist in a Chinese translation also.D. Sawkhya und Yoga. for instance. with Gauc/apada's Nay. But though we are thus enabled Samkhya-karika to the sixth century A. . TTan-ti was not considered a good Chinese scholar. which gives the exact dates. See Mayer's Chinese Header's Manual..D. ' the Golden Seventy Discourse. assigns his Native tradition. that of the Suvama-Saptati-sastra being the twenty-seventh (No. possibly Paramartha.D. but likewise.SAMKHYA-KARIKAS.D. was well ac- quainted not only with Lsvara-K?^'shna's work. and was followed by the Kh&n He lived till 582 A.C.300 in B. had in consequence to be replaced by a new transto assign the lation by Hiouen-thsang. and his translation of the Abhidharma-Kosha-sastra.' the number supposed to refer to of verses in the Karika. p. a Tripkaka (lit. work 1 2 Garbe. 1.Kan-ti true truth). Nanjio's Catalogue). A. existence. law-teacher of the Kh&\\ dynasty. another step backward. we are to the first century B. and there are no dynasty. in the reign of the . The name given is to it in Chinese. we can even make commentary on it 1 .D. 547 A.

so difficulties arise But even here new we were informed by Beal. had been translated into but how is that possible Chinese before 582 A. to translate portions of the Chinese commentary for me . is Jan. informed Chinese translation of the commentary me was that the not. This commentary also. in 590 A. Beal could no longer be consulted I asked one of my Chinese pupils. . the author of the commentary on the Karikas. Dr. XIII. in the Indian Antiquary. about 788 A.292 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 95. as is generally How then could he have supposed. and that Fleet. and he.. with regard to the age of Gauc?apada. . but the specimens he sent me did not suffice to settle the question whether it was really a translation of Gauc?apada's commentary. In order to escape from all these uncertainties I wrote once more to Japan to another pupil of mine. Takakusu. Kasawara. a translation of So much trouble may Gauc/apada's commentary. after carefully collating the Chinese translation with the Sanskrit commentary of Gauc/apiida.D.D.. 1887. and could not in any sense be called. and son or pupil of Govinda ? As Mr. without upsetting the little we know of Gauc/apada's $a?7ikara is represented as the pupil of date ? Govinda who was the pupil of Gauc^apada. It but right to state here that Telang in the Indian Antiquary. places /Samkara much earlier. D. assigns 630 to 655 as the latest date to King Vrishadeva of Nepal who is said to have re- ceived $a7ftkara at his court. the late Mr. $arakara's literary But career began. Date of Gatif/apada. been the literary grandson of Gauc/apada. and actually to have given the name of $a?ftkaradeva to his son in honour of the philosopher.

2 See Karika. i. e. it reached even Isvara-Kri'shria 2 He calls it the . by an uninterrupted series of teachers.asikha. vv. proclaimed by the greatest sage. and Asuri admitted that he was He then satisfied with the state of a GHhastha. Pata%ali. ! 293 be caused by one unguarded expression Anyhow is now removed. as the Tattva-samasa adds. was a jRishi ' ' descended from the sky and was endowed with the four virtues. had been communicated by him to Asuri. and. He saw a Brahman of the name of O-shu-li (Asuri) who had been worshipping heaven or the Devas for a thousand years. and /Samkara's date need not be disturbed. that to him also Kapila and Asuri were persons of a distant past. A similar account is given by Paramartha in his comment on the first verse. separation from desires (Vairagya). dutifulness (Dharma). wisdom (Pragma). Kapila. by Asuri to Pa?iA.DATE OF GAUDAPADA. 71. 1 This would seem to place the Tattva-samasa later than 70.' to Asuri. whereupon Asuri quitted the state of a householder and became a pupil of These may be mere additions made by Kapila. and freedom (Moksha). . Kipila (Kapila)/ he says. but they show. at all events. and said to him ' : Asuri. . The author of the Karikas informs us at the end of his work that this philothis difficulty sophy. came a third time Paramartha. art thou satisfied with the state of a or householder ? GHhastha After a thousand years he came again. Shashd-tantra. from Pan&asikha to Patan^ali l and had been widely taught until. the Sixty-doctrine.

such as were handed down for other branches of learning by oral tradition. also Besides these stories other K/'i'shna. therefore. they are what they are. they did not. The Karikas themselves presuppose such a tradition quite as much as the much later Sutras which we possess. if they ever existed or. never to originate what we should call new and original thoughts.) Karikas on grammar. They are both meant to recapitulate what existed. There is clearly a great gap between the end of the Upanishad period and the literary period that was able to give rise to the metrical w. but neither Karikas nor in stories in the the Tattva-samasa. In what form could the Samkhya-philosophy have existed in that interval ? To judge from analogy we should certainly say. D.ork of Isvara-Kristma. why there should never have been such Sutras for so important a system of philosophy as the Samkhya. Everybody has wondered. Tattva-samasa. if 650 . were omitted by I. what could have become of the real Samkhya-Sutras.294 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.svarathings comprehended under the name of Para- . When we see the Karikas declare that they leave out on purpose the Akhayikas. a metrical in the style of a later age. this cannot prove their posteriority to the Sutras as we have them but it shows that . in the form of Sutras. the illustrative stories contained in the fourth book of our Sutras. at Isvara-Knshna's time there existed a body of as Samkhya-philosophy which contained such we find in our modern Sutras. an age that gave to other Karikas like BhartHhari's (about A. But however far the Karikas of may go work rise back.

' he wrote. but that we are in actual possession of it. 7. e. it has been put down at once as modern. sometimes almost verbatim. It was a mere accident that he.' And It appears from the Preface of again he wrote the Kapila-bhashya that a more compendious tract in the form of Sutras or aphorisms. Colebrooke. We know text of the far too little of the history of the so confident a conclusion. namely in the much neglected Tattva-samasa. On in it of its being the contrary there are several indications an earlier form of the Samkhya- philosophy than what we possess in the Karikas or in the Sutras. is not certain. 244. and probably is so. to Kapila. bears the is title of Tattva-samasa. if to justify Colebrooke told us Samkhya l long ago that. could ' ' the scholiast of Kapila 2 may be should he not ? the Tattva-samasa Whether that Tattva-samasa not find a copy of it. or whether the of Kapila be extant. probably controversies.TATTVA-SAMASA. pp. sucb as those on the necessity of an Isvara. Under these circumstances I venture to say that such a work in Sutras not only existed. Sawkhya-prava&ana-bhashya. as if what is new to us must be new chronologically also. trusted. When it agrees with the Karikas. it is the metrical text 1 Essays. but I find no other marks of a modern date in the body of the work. . and i. 295 v4da. I ascribed to the same author. p. Sutras of Paw&asikha be ' : so. admit that the introductory portion of this tract sounds modern. Because it contains a number of new technical terms. 2 I. no. and why was the proper text-book of the Samkhya-philosophy.

and not the it for author of the Tattva-samasa. of the ancient Samkhya. In the Sutras themselves find no allusion as yet to the atheistic or non- which distinguish the later texts of the Samkhya. no mean authority on such matters. takes granted that the Tattva-samasa was certainly prior to the Kapila-Sutras which we possess. Introduction. though this is very doubtful but the direct identification of Purusha with Brahman in the Tattva-samasa points certainly to an earlier and less pronounced Nirisvara or Lord-less character theistic doctrines . For why should he defend Kapila. . and why should he have found no excuse for the existence of the Kapila-Sutras except that they are short and complete. while the Tattva-samasa is short and compact 1 ? able to find a MS. It should also be mentioned that Vi^wana-Bhikshu. not the we prose the metrical version. and even supposed by some to have been himself the author of our modern Samkhya-Sutras. The so-called Aisvaryas or superhuman powers. of the Tattva-samasa Colebrooke decided to translate instead the Sa?khyakarikas. This is the way in which certain 1 Sawkhya-prava&ana-bhashya. Not being and thus it came to pass that most scholars have been under the impression that in India also this metrical version was considered as the most authoritative and most popular manual of the Samkhya-philosophy. me to presuppose the prose. which are recognised in the Tattva-samasa.296 that seems to INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. might seem to presuppose the recognition of an Isvara. against the charge of Punarukti or giving us a mere useless repetition. and which are still absent from the Samkhya-karikas also.

i. Hall. 297 have learnt since from prepossessions arise. called Samkhya-krama- dipika. 2 Five are mentioned by Hall in his Preface. 33. him rightly. p. l at that Benares. in his commentary on the Samkhya-Sutras (v. 5). but it is not quite clear to me whether this is the same as the one published by Ballantyne.. must not forget that in modern times the in Samkhya-philosophy has ceased to be popular parts of India. these Ballantyne We known at all except to those seen Professor Wilson's English edition of them.TATTVA-SAMASA. if we consider the number of commentaries written on it 2 and the frequency of allusions to it which occur in other commentaries. nor have I We several had access to any other MSS. and that but a small part of the moon of knowledge remained . to Ballantyne was . 10. during the whole of his intercourse with learned natives. Nor Karikas were hardly who had can we doubt that it in the part of India best known really an important and popular work. p. The comif I understand mentary published by Ballantyne is. and then the Samasakhyastitra-vritti/z. the Samkhya is spoken of as Kala-vipluta. It gives first what it calls the S&mkhya-Sutrara. 13. anonymous. . I. p. while the Tattva-samasa was well known to all the native assistants whom he employed. destroyed by time. where he resided. while in the Bhagavata Purana I. he met with one Brahman only who professed to be acquainted with the 1 Drift of the Sawkhya. Even in the sixteenth century Vi^nana-Bhikshu.. 3. quotes one com- mentary by Kshemananda. Professor Wilson told me that. complains that it has been swallowed up by the sun of the time.e.

both the Samkhya-Sutras and the YogaSutras are really mere developments of the Tattvasamasa-Sutras. it was considered to be in India. c. definitions without Some of them are mere any attempt at etymology. and. It is possible also that the very smallness of the Tattva-samasa it may have lowered in the eyes of native scholars.. 3) states that the very name of Sawkhya-prava&ana was unknown on his side of India. ed. may have been eclipsed by But if and what. By itself it would fill a few pages only. In fact it is a mere enumeration of topics. 1 and that in time it more voluminous we accept it as what it proits compared with this. the latter adding the peculiar arguments in support of the existence of an Lsvara or fore called Sesvara. Hence we may well understand that Sawkhya MSS. or Lord-less. According to Vi^/lanaBhikshu in his commentary on the Sutras (pp. as such. up to the time of Vign&na. and thereopposition to the Sawkhya. the Doctrine of the They are mentioned in the Preface to Hall's edition of tho Samkhya-pravaA'ana-bhashya. 6. writings of this philosophical school. name of Shashh-tantra. p. . and Professor Bhandarkar (1. in Supreme Lord. All other derivations of this title seem far-fetched commentaries. Hall. fesses to be.298 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. exposition of the Samkhya. it seems to me just the book that was wanted to fill the gap to which I referred before. which is called An-i. Both are called therefore Sa?>ikhyaas prava&ana. 1 10). and entirely absent in certain localities. are scarce in India. it is And the 1 here important to remark also that Sixty. 1856.Bhikshu at least.s-vara. which means no more than enumeration. it would agree very well with the somewhat puzzling name of Samkhya.

or at all events of the 72nd of his Karikas. which generally form the . should the author by occur and be accounted for in the Tattva-samasa. to whom I had handed over my materials. The whole arrangement is different from the other and more recent treatments of Samkhya . for instance. certainly not either of the Karikas or of the modern Sutras. However. for we find similar short. such as we possess them. the Sarvanukrama and other Anukramanis described in my History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature 1 . no doubt. which as containing the 17 (enumerated in 64 and 65). The three kinds of pain. as it We would seem. the end of the 25 great topics of the Tattva-samasa we find the straightforward detogether would claration ' : Iti tattva-samasakhya-samkhya-sutrani/ Here end the Samkhya-Sutras called Tattva-samasa. Samasa seems to mean a mere abstract but Samasa may be used also in opposition to BHhat. . in matters 1 These Anukramas have been very carefully published in the Anecdota Oxoniensia by Professor Macdonell. previously exhibited in 62 and 63. for instance. 299 is given by Isvara-Krtstwa.philosophy. yet old Sutra-works. more modern Samkhya works. The smallness of the Tattva-samasa can hardly be used as an argument against its ever having been an important work. starting-point of the whole system. together with the 10 Mulikarthas or fundamental facts which make up the sixty topics of the At Shashri-tantra. At first sight.TATTVA-SAMASA. and there is no other work in existence of which it could be called an abstract. and the 33. relegated meet with technical subjects and technical terms which are 'not to be found at all in other and. are to the very end as a separate topic.

though the commentary is. and as distinguished from the Sutras in which we possess them. What weighs with me is the fact that Indian Pandits evidently considered the Tattva-samasa-Sutras as the original outlines of the Samkhya-philosophy. and admit that the Sawikhya-philosophy may have of the into been a kind of toning down of the extreme Monism Advaita Vedanta. on no real argument whatever. and the other schools. It must be clear from all this how useless it be. of the seeds scattered about in the Upanishads. I think we can enter the misgivings and fears of those who felt . while the idea that they are a later spurious pro- duction rests. no doubt. as systems of philosophy. We there could arise in time the systematic arrangement and final representation of systems such as have been handed down to us in the Sutras of the Vedanta.300 of this kind in INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. can but seldom amount to can understand how. Anteriority of Vedanta or Sawkhya. to attempt to prove the anteriority either of the would Vedanta or of the Samkhya. It cannot be denied that in the Upanishad period Vedantic ideas are certainly more prevalent than I go even a step further those of the Sa/mkhya. the Satkhya. External or historical evidence we have none. with the limited means at our disposal. though it may support a suggestion. All I can say is that there is no mark of modern age in their language. and internal evidence. of a later date. we must avoid being too positive either or denying asserting the age and authenticity of Sanskrit texts. out positive proof. as far as I can see at present.

would seem to have been the total denial of what is meant by the reality of the objective world. such as Bodhayana and other Purv4Mryas. startled 30! by the unflinching Monism of the Vedanta. and . at least as interpreted by the school which was represented rather than founded by $amkara. These are the points which seem most startling even to ourselves. had an advantage over the Vedantists in admitting only. and led them to propound their own more human interpretation of the Vedanta. and it is quite possible that they may have given rise to another system free from these startling doctrines. that we can well understand that in the oral tradition of the schools the Samkhya doctrines should have exercised a limited influence whatever favour they may have found with those who were repelled by the extreme views of The followers of Kapila the monistic Vedanta. however. Ksithsi Upanishads. Maitray. They certainly formed the chief stumbling-block to Ramanm/a and those who had come before him. there are utterances that come very near to what we rather than Vedanta doctrines. and of God. . such as we find in the Samkhya. the two points which are most likely to given offence to ordinary consciences.ANTERIORITY OF VEDANTA OR SAMKHYA. of the soul. for instance. Now. These conflicting views of the world. so decidedly in the Upani- shad literature. have caused difficulty or and the required surrender of all individuality on the part of the subject. though sacrificing the Isvara in order to save the reality of each Purusha. know as Samkhya ideas Vedanta preponderate. emerge already in the Upanishads and in a few of them. that is. the $vetasvatara. of ourselves.

though called into life and activity by the look of Purusha only. the Vedanta unflinchingly following its straight course. but as something real in the it ordinary sense of that word. as presented to us in the Tattva-samasa. not only as the result of Avidya or Maya. and when it allowed to the individual souls or (rivas also an independent character. or a something objective. and though far from proving that it was therefore to the Vedanta in its severest form. the Sa/ttikhya. Dualism is always more popular than rigorous Monism. but diverging afterwards. To the people at large it would naturally seem as if the Vedanta taught the oneness of all individual souls or subjects in Brahman. avoiding certain whirlpools of thought which seemed dangerous to the ordinary swimmer. a Prakriti. It should be of an Isvara or remembered that the denial personal Lord did not probably form part of the original Samkhya. They were also opposed to the common consciousness of man- kind in admitting the reality of individual souls. and disless appearing when that look ceased.302 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and the illusory character of all that is objective. it might well be accepted as an indication that these two streams of thought followed parallel courses. and the Sa??ikhya was clearly dualistic when postulated nature. It would seem therefore that on these very important points the Samkhya was more conciliatory and less defiant to the common sense of this is posterior mankind than the Vedanta. the other. independent of Brahman or Purusha. while the Sawkhya allowed at events the temporary reality of the objective world and the multiplicity of individual all . starting from a common fund of ancient Vedic thoughts.

the difference between the two systems would certainly seem to be irreconcilable. Indian philosophers to' Even on what seems seem to have been able to come to an understanding and a compromise. never denies the authority of the Veda in so many words. to be raised to the same position which others. Whether in its origin the is Samkhya was quite independent of the Veda. a mere stroke of theological diplomacy. The Samkhya. he PurvaMryas in Sutras. for the present Hamanu^a. or whether. like Of course. we should be forced to admit philosophers wished. though it may express a less decided submission to it.ATHEISM AND ORTHODOXY. say. difficult to scholars think that the recognition of the supreme authority of the $ruti was an after- Some thought with Kapila. by orthodoxy was with them not much more than a recognition of the supreme authority of the Veda.impossible but the fact is that orthodoxy has a very different meaning in India from what it has with us. while minor differences between them would ment. whatever we may think of its Yedic character. by means of this diplomacy. in India at least admit of a friendly adjust- Atheism and Orthodoxy. This seems to us. had occupied that the Samkhya before them . also could claim the authority of If that his interpretation of Badarayana's were so. and so far it might seem to indicate . such as the Vedaiitists. What we mean . souls. us so vital a point in every philosophy as theism or atheism. We must remember that in the eyes of the Brahmans the Samkhya is atheistic and yet orthodox. But if so. 303 we must leave it an open question whether the extreme monistic view of the Veda was due to $amkara.

But he really says no more there than that certain remedies for the removal of pain. enjoined by the Veda. . important here to remember that the Sawnot only declared for the authority of the Veda. This does not affect the authority of the . khya but had never openly rejected it. are good.304 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. more efficacious (Tattva Kaumudi. particularly Buddha. and that other remedies enjoined by philosophy are likewise good but that of the two the latter are better. as well as $awkara. should deny the correctness of the interpretation of the Veda. the great defender of Vedantism. that is. other meritorious acts (Sawkhya- pravaana 5). v. compared with philosophy or We must not forget that after all it is >Sruti or O revelation itself which declares that all remedies are palliative only. of the Upanishads. That *Sa??ikara. and that this is incomparably higher Veda as a whole. as a system of philosophy. and that real freedom (Moksha) suffering can be derived from philosophical knowledge only. but it would show at the same time that Kapila. like Bnhaspati or It is It is quite another question whether it really carried out the spirit of the Veda. 2). as human knowledge. had tried to represent his philosophy as supported by passages from the Veda. proves after all no more than that a difference of opinion existed between the two. To judge from a passage in the beginning of the Samkhya-karikas it might seem indeed that Kapila placed his own philosophy above the Veda. the posteriority of the Samkhya. from all than sacrifices or I. adopted by Kapila.

$ruti can here the Veda and only considered as equal to sensuous perception inference. or. Nyaya. is the received. though. person. However He mean only. which clearly means received revelation or revelation from a trustworthy source. 305 Authority of the Veda. There are many passages where Kapila appeals quite naturally to $ruti or In I. where we read There is no denial of what is established ' x . or true may be. that word. that with the true Samkhya philosopher the Veda does not possess that superhuman authority which is ascribed to it by Badarayana. 51) declares it to be self-evident. I cannot bring myself to believe that this concession on the part of Kapila was a mere stance. perception. reasoning. therefore. but in many places he appeals to $ruti/ alone. Svata^- but are admitted to be confirmation. liable to error and to require Though it is true.AUTHORITY OP THE VEDA. but is placed by him on an even higher pedestal. the word of a trustworthy explains Aptava&ana in v. 36 he appeals to both Sicuti and revelation. artifice to escape the fate which. the Veda as interpreted by Kapila. 5 by Aptasruti. And that the Veda is not the commentators may differ. it possible sources of knowledge. That revelation is to be looked upon as superior to experience or sensuous perception is stated by him in so many words in I. correct. for in- befell Buddha. while perception and inference are not. 147. pramawam. no doubt. is shown by the fact that Kapila (Sutras V. What authority Kapila assigns to the Veda may be gathered from what he says about the three and Aptava&ana. inference.

and even the fact that it did not appeal to a personal Lord or creator. 83. 22. mere Vikaras of Ahawkani? 2 See Tattva-samiisa 22 Sawjkliya-karikas 44.306 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It was probably 1 But are not the elements . is which men are liable. when the Nyaya philosophy tries to establish by reasoning that the organs of sense are formed of the elements. was simply one out of many attempts to solve the riddle of the world. II. 15. 22. bondage arising from having to offer gifts to priests. self-consciousness (II. was evidently at first riot considered sufficient to anathematise it as unorthodox or un-Vedic. $ruti. 20) V Other passages where the authority of /Sruti is invoked as paramount by Kapila.' he ' says. It was probably at considered as neither orthodox nor unorthodox. 20. 147. which seems to . III. 80. ' They cannot be says so formed. Sflwkhya hostile to Priesthood. &c. Among the different kinds of bondage to be. one passage only in which a decidedly hostile feeling towards the Brahmanic priesthood may be discovered in Kapila's Sutras. the Sa??i- khya. Kapila squashes the whole argument by a simple appeal to $ruti. 154. IV. but ought not to one called Dakshma-bandha. may be found in SamkhyaSutras I. and it seems There is full of meaning. 77. like the Vedanta-philosophy. be condemned as superstitious and mischievous 2 As springing from the great mass of philosophic thought accumulated first in the Upanishads. 36. or supposed to be so by the commentator. because $ruti that they are formed of Ahamkara.' by Again. .

has often proved most mischievous. at a 307 later time when the Vedanta and other had systems already entrenched themselves behind revelation. to the Veda was an afterthought and not an original system. is entirely wrong. as we catch glimpses of it now and then in the course of centuries. and Apta-va&ana. more ancient than the with words. would be mere playing Parallel development of Philosophical Systems. may We admit that the Samkhya has no need of the Veda. it must be clear that. where dates are impossible. but why should it appeal to it even on indifferent questions. while the Vedanta. as the highest authority much even on philosophical questions. whether Samkhya or Vedanta. authoritative tradition as human.DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS. that other systems. I know that other scholars maintain that with the Samkhya any appeal only. was safe under the shadow of the Veda. not even essential part of the quite honest. or the Veda. to call one channel of philosophic thought. as its very name implied. It is possible that there may have been originally a difference between $ruti. The result of this desire to fix dates. ception of the development of Indian philosophy. having been proved un-Vedic. other. revelation as not human. in the present state of our knowledge. and that with Kapila the Veda was treated at first as coming under AptaBut however this may be. unless our conva&ana. if the Veda had not been considered by it as of supreme authority. nay. came to be considered as objectionable or unorthodox. riot only widely X 2 . in the form in which it has reached us. Scholars of recognised authority have arrived at and given expression to convictions.

but Latin also has some forms more primitive than Greek. instead of being satisfied with taking things as Nebenein- ander. while the it Samkhya ideas stand out less prominently. like language. philosophy also formed at first beyond the we may of kind common property. cannot be a than Latin. Instead that early period already by the Vedanta. Both branched off. . But it for all that. religion. springing from a common source and flowing on side by side in the same direction. as a language. though as yet in a very undecided form. The chief cause of this confusion has been that. It is true that we know earlier literary productions in Greek at a literary much Latin. time than productions in nor would any Sanskrit scholar deny that the Sutras of Badarayana are older than the Sa?nkhyaSutras. as we now possess the two. Brahmawas and they meet us again in some of the Upanishads. mythology. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. learn how. would seem. We meet with philosophical ideas of a Vedantic character. we always wish to arrange things Nacheinander or in causal connection. from the time when the Aryan separation took place. far India and a In limits of any chronology. No one would say that Greek was older than Latini Greek has some forms more primitive than Latin. to the ascendency gained at owing. A reference to the history of language may make my meaning clearer. Greek. but diametrically opposed to each other. as far back as the hymns the of the Ilig-veda in . by a very natural tendency. slowly day older may be and almost imperceptibly at first. In their embryonic form they both go back to some indefinite date.308 different. parallel and formed under similar conditions.

seems to me simply taken over from the Brahmans. the first or the third of the Asramas or Vanaprastha). Manu and 2 afterwards. a BrahmaA-arin is mentioned who has begged. The very name its of Upanishad. that the name of Bhikshu does not occur in the classical whether in Upanishads. Up. Up. The technical term for this . 5. that the third and fourth Asramas are not only so clearly distinguished in early times as they are (BrahmaMrin in II. In the Kaush.BUDDHISM SUBSEQUENT TO UPANISHADS. It is true. The recognition of mendicant friars also. Ill and exactly the same compound. is fully recognised. we read of a man who a village and got nothing JTMnd. no doubt. 309 of supposing. Ar. that passages in support of Sa/n-khya ideas occurring in certain of the older Upanishads were foisted in at a later time. IV. is so peculiar that occurrence in ancient Buddhist texts proves once for all the existence of some of these works before the rise of Buddhism. has begged through in the (Bhikshitva) begging (V). comes from the same source. however. it seems far more probable to me that they were survivals of an earlier period of as yet undifferentiated philosophical thought. i. is BhikshaMry in the B-rih. The very name of Bhikkhu. applied to the members of the Buddhist fraternity. Up. but the right of begging. as a social institution. 3. Buddhism subsequent to Upanishads. Bhikkha- . What remains of the chronological framework of Indian philosophy is in the end not much more than that both Vedanta and S&mkhya ideas existed before the rise of historical Buddhism. 5. for instance.

E. has long been known. Mrya. Lalita-vistara. the rainy season. 3. occurs in the Dhammapada 392 BhaikshaHry occurs also in the Mwic/aka I. I less have explained before why at present I attribute importance than I did formerly to the occurrence 1 S. we can hardly doubt that the three or four stages (Brahma&ari. and so is the quinquennial celebration is of the Pan&avarsha-parishad. name does not occur in the classical Upanishads but. the only Asramas that remained among the Buddhists were two. 2. 13. Gaha^Ao. that of the Grihins and that of the Bhikkhus. n. we find Asramin in the Maitray. . Socially. clearly taken over from the Varshas. Bhikkhu) were known before the rise of Buddhism. Without Brahmanism no Buddhism. ing Asrama. . so that the fact that the substantive Bhikshu does not occur in the classical Upanishads can hardly be used as an argument to prove that the status of the mendicant friar ing of Buddhism. p.) could have come from the same source only. for instance. as kept by the Brahmans. the retreat during the rainy season. so much so that it has been rightly said. and taken over by the Buddhists from the Vedic Brahmans. the as was not known before the spreadIt is true that in its social meanof the three or four stages.310 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. IV. and many other customs adopted by the Buddhists. . &c. VIII. The institution of the Vasso l . 213. Up. Vanapa^Ao. That many of the technical terms of the Buddhists (Uposhadha.

/Siksha. the passage so often quoted from the twelfth chapter would be of considerable value to us in forming an idea of Indian literature as it existed at the time when the Lalita-vistara here the names not (Nigha^u das. If the date assigned by Stanislas Julien and others to certain Chinese translations of this work could be re-established. known most king. ritual three systems of philosophy also. Vedas. the well. Asvaghosha's Buddha-&arita. By far the important passage in it for our present purpose is the conversation between Arac/a and the future Buddha. the author of the Ramayana. He mentions Vyasa. the son of Sarasvati. and kanaka. though not of the Vedanta-Sutras he knows Valmiki. which. as the compiler We may of the Veda. Yoga. what would be most important for us. possibly including Samkhya. as a teacher of Yoga. was originally grammar. with great probability. astronomy (6ryotisha). Atreya as a teacher of medicine.ASVAGHOSHAS BUDDHA.JTARITA. in the Lalita- vistara. Nyaya. has been ascribed to the first century A. we must abstain from using them for assigning any dates to their Sanskrit originals. here already called Bodhisattva . But until the dates of the various Chinese translations of the Life of meant for Buddha have been re-examined. Puranas. and titles. while Hetuvidya can hardly be anything but Nyaya. and Vaiseshika. but. We find only of the Vedic glossary the Nigamas (part of Nirukta). the names of Itihasas. Khan(Kalpa). ?) composed. perhaps place more reliance on Asvaghosha's Buddha-A-arita. Nirukta.D. of a 31! number of Vaiseshika. Yoga. Samkhya.

as the birthplace of Buddha and as the No reference dwelling of the famous sage Kapila. a clear reference to that philosophical system which is known to us under the name of Samkhya. of Samkhya-philosophy. we find there also first views ascribed to the Brahmans of Buddha's time which clearly breathe the spirit of the Sa??ikhyaBut it would be very unsafe to say philosophy. If we consult the Buddhist Suttas. were at all events reduced to writing in the century B. and we have actually the name of Kapila. though the substitution of the Vedantic of name of Brahman for the Sawkhya name Purusha deserves attention. The name of Kapila. . Vastu became Vattliu in Pali. D. earlier state . to the Vedanta has been met with in Asvaghosha's Buddha-arita.. Here then we have in a poem. the reputed author of that system. the name of Kapila does (XII. and even a disciple of his is mentioned. This Arac/a it in the twelfth book. may clearly a teacher be of Sa??ikhya in an is and. and may be safely used therefore as historical evidence for that time.312 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and was then probably retranslated into Sanskrit as Vastu. more. or of anything very different from what we find already in certain Upanishads. because that alone means dwelling-place. while Vastu means thing. which. though the name of Samkhya does not occur. All we can fully 1 I write Vastu. 2 1 ). ascribed to the first century A. Buddhist Suttas.vastu l also occurs..C. and to maintain that such passages prove in any way the existence of developed systems of philosophy. whatever the date of their original composition may have been.

but again not a single specimen or extract from their compositions. Dharma. . such as the Lankavatara where the names of Kanada. Six con/Sa-svata. Nigan^o Nataputta. Atman. 313 say is that there are a number of terms in the Suttas which are the very terms used in the Vedanta. works belonging to the age of Vedic literature. Samkhya and Yoga-philosophies. Brahman. such as temporaries of of (jrainism. Kapila. Nitya (? Anitya). But we hear nothing of any literary compositions ascribed to B4daraya?ia. being the well-known founder Kassapa. though it may be to the very end of what I call the Sutraperiod. Brthaspati are met with. Akshapada. We should remember that in the Buddhist Canon we find constant mention of Titthiyas or Tirthakas and their heretical systems of philosophy. . but. there is not one of which we could say that it could have been taken from the Sutras only. Pataf^/ali. one of them. or Kanada. Asvalayana's Gnhya-Stltras. so tsvara. Another help for determining the existence of ancient Sutras and Bhashyas may be found in the GHhya-Sutras of Asvalayana and /S'amkhayana. as I pointed out in 1859 in 1 my History Samar5f?a-Phala-Sutta 3. Buddha Purana are mentioned. and from nowhere else. Akshobhya. Gotama of these names occur in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts also. Here.ASVALAYANA'S GS/HYA-S^TEAS. Some Kapila. the names of the reputed authors of the six systems of Brahmanicphilosophy absent from the Tripi^aka. Parmama. Agita. 1 . and many more far as I know. Pakudha and Sa^k/aya Nor are Makkhali. (raimini.

Bahavi. not only to the existence of Sutras. Bharata. Gautama.314 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Sulabh4 Maitreyi. Bhashyas. as I said before. Mahaudavahi. Vaisampayana. in the sense which we ourselves assign to borrowing. Aitareya. $a??ikhayana. though leaving out a few names and adding others. it seems to me. (raimini. Kahola Kaushitaka. Gargi Va&aknavi. the Sakala Mahaitareya. 1 Buddha. but of Bhashyas or commentaries also. of the law. 10. 4. Did Buddha borrow from Kapila I ? may seem very sceptical in all this. we find not only the Rig-veda with all its subdivisions. Mahakaushitaka. Asvalayana. left . read Bharatadharma/raryas while in the Samkhayana Gn'hya-Sutras IV. Babhravya. teachers Gargya. give the same list. Mahapai?gya. as known to us in its Sutra form. Sau^ami. we must . nor the grammatical. had as much we may learn from the fact How careful be. 1 Sutras. (text). . 10. but I cannot even now bring myself to believe that the author of Buddhism borrowed from the Samkhya or any other definite final system of philosophy. Suyagwa Audavahi. Bharata (ninanti. that instead of Bharata and Mahabharata. neither the philosophical. The most valuable part in both sets of Grihya-Sutras is their testifying at that early and probably pre-Buddhistic time. of Ancient Sanskrit Literature. Mahabharata. nor any other Sutras would ever have been intelligible. Paila. Su^atavaktra. Mancfavya. The ^S^ikhayana G?^'hya/Saunaka. but such names as Sumantu. ^Sakalya. without which. or even possible. the Bashkala (text). Vadav& Pratitheyi. Mahabharata and Dharmaftaryas are out altogether. other MSS. Paimgya. Manc/ukeya. Siitras IV.

(8) Aviruddhakos. (4) 6ratilakos. the latter belonging to the Digambara sects. such as (i) Agdvakos. pupils of the shaveling. (3) Muw<iasavakos. two things which should be It is carefully distinguished. how do we know that they anything written that we possess ? Unless we meet with verbatim quotations. the tradition. i. were told that in Professor Hardy's most valuable translation of We the Anguttara a number of philosophical sects were mentioned which existed at the time of Buddha's appearance. Our difficulties are very great. while Munc/asavakos. (2) Nigan^Aos. (5) Paribba^akos.DID BUDDHA BORROW FROM KAPILA ? 315 right to many of the so-called Sa?>ikhya or Yedanta ideas as Kapila or anybody else. as handed down in various Asramas. and (10) Devadhammikos. would say. (7) Tedancfrkos. may In the great dearth of historical dates it no doubt be excusable. for instance. strange to see how often our hopes have been roused and disappointed. Agdvakos and Nig&nthos are the names of (7aina ascetics. that his belief in Samsara or migration Who of souls It was borrowed from Badarayawa or Kapila ? belonged to everybody in India as much as a belief in Karman or the continuous working of deeds. or simply the general Parampara. But not one of these names helps us to a real chronological date. that is.even when the names of the principal systems of philosophy and the names of their reputed authors are mentioned. and Gota- . Gotamakos.e. for . the Buddha. if we lay hold of any- thing to save us from drowning while exploring the chronology of Indian literature. (6) (9) Magandikos. we can never know whether a certain book of a certain author is refer to intended. which could hardly have been established long before Buddha's appearance.

. religious mendi- cants. but the Vedantins. 197. if schools they were. would be applicable both to Brahmanic and Buddhist sects. Sawmyasins carrying the three staves. we do not hear a single word. A. seventh. by any desires. in the sixth Cf. if meant for Magadhikos. people of Magadha. J.. Teda>ic/ikos. Jan. a name not clear to me. the six Darsanas.e. Magandikos. Kapilas.. Not even Bana. All they teach is that at the time Brahmanic and Buddhist existing side means. while Devadhammikos are clearly worshippers of the ancient therefore Brahmanic. in his Life of King Harslia. ascetics. and and possibly Vedic. have been intended for ascetics no longer impeded i. Buna's Harshafcarita.316 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but by no commonly supposed. the Aupanishadas can hardly be meant for anybody . knows indeed of Aupanishadas. as is flict sects were by side in large numbers. Paribba^rakos.D. We get dates from the names of any of these schools. no historical national Devas. K. would be Buddhists Aviruddhakos. Ka^adas and if the Kapilas are the followers of the Sawkhya. p. of their eponymous heroes or their written works. and eighth centuries A. do we meet with actual quotations from our Sutras of in later works. makos would seem to be schools which owed their The other names existence to Buddha himself.. in constant con1 . which have been referred to the sixth. with each other Of the six recognised systems of philosophy. Ka^adas the followers of the Vaiseshika school. Varaha-Mihira also. S. 1898. Ehys Davids. may again. (ratilakos.

though he speaks of a number of Yoga works. . that therefore these Sutras did not exist in his time. and all that Is vara. proof. mentions The Chinese translator of the Karikas. century A. as little as But it is no we may conclude from the fact that Hiouen-thsang translated the Vaiseshika-nikayadasapadartha-sastra by 6rrtana&andra. he says not a word of the most important of them all. as I pointed out before. likewise in the sixth century. is no doubt.Krishna did was to select seventy of them two Karikas. 317 Kapila and Kanabhu^ (Vaiseshika).). for the unreserved acceptance of a purely conjectural date is very apt to inter- with the discovery of a real date. informs us that these Karikas contain the words of Kapila or of Pan&asikha.000 We Gathas. Does that prove that Gotama's Sutras were unknown in the seventh century of the 1 It may or may not. a strong argument in support of their non-existence in his time. are told even that there were originally 60. That MMhava (1350 for his seventy or seventy- A. D. We cannot be too careful in such matters. And here again. who was the pupil of Kapila. but even this does not help us to the dates of any Sutras composed by them. as is well known.. He relates that Gimamati defeated a famous Samkhya philosopher name of Madhava. was the Yoga-philosophy. the pupil of Asuri. should not have mentioned those of the Samkhya.BANAS HARSHAJTARITA. the more. and not the Vaiseshika-Sutras by Kanada. Hiouen-thsang likewise mentions a number of Nyaya works. but fere not Gotama's Nyaya-Sutras. while mentioning the Sutras of the other systems. D. but again he tells us no His own special study.

1898. particularly the Karikas. p. If. What we possess in the shape of commentaries may not be very old. for commentaries may come and go 1 in different schools. India. and I may now add to Satish Chandra Banerji. Both of them. give us certainly better arranged accounts of that philosophy. they would always retain their value as showing us in how . of Pata/i^ali J . the Tattva-samasaSutras are older than our Samkhya-Sutras. M. If then I venture to call the Tattva-samasa the oldest record that has reached us of the Samkhyain the ac- philosophy. it is true. great a variety the systems of philosophy really existed in so large a country as India. a mere S4mkhyam or Parisamkhya. I am quite aware that many scholars will object. Yet I doubt whether we may conclude from this that these Sutras did not exist at his time. These Samasa-Sutras. and if I prefer to follow them count I give of that philosophy. their account of the Samkhya-philosophy would always possess its peculiar interest from a historical point of view while even if their priority with regard to the Karikas and Sutras be doubted. 362. while the M. The Tattva-samasa. as may be seen in the excellent editions and translations which we owe to Professor Garbe. and will prefer the description of the Samkhya as given in the Karikas and in the Sutras. are hardly more than a table of contents. as I believe. .. but that would only show once more that they presuppose the existence of a commentary from the very first.318 Sfttras INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

' topics which are twenty-five Then number : follow the 1 In the Bhagavata-purawa I. though it may sound like a late tradition. p. his name. and his clan in order to become his pupil. but reminds us in some respects of the dialogue at the beginning of the Chinese translation But of the commentary on the Samkhya-karikas. Hall. must surely have existed both before and after the time of Isvara-Kn'srma. would remain unchanged. the pubwhich we owe to Ballantyne. earth the highest (the summum bonum) do to be saved in ' ? What is truth ? What must I ? Kapila said. overcome by the three kinds of pain. the teacher (not necessarily the origi- and having declared his family. he said Reverend Sir. no doubt. certain A Brahman. u. 'I shall tell thee. 319 Sutras which they intend to explain. the Karikas. note). ed. now lost to us ? lication of The commentary on the Tattva-samasa. How tenacious that philosophical ParampaKi was we can see from the pregnant fact that the Akhyayikas or stories. have revived the Sawkhya (Sawikhya-Sara. they reappear in our Samkhya-Sutras. Kapila is said to 7.THE TATTVA-SAMASA. begins witli an introduction which sounds. engraved on the memory of teachers and pupils. 3. we are told. What is here on nator) of the Samkhya ' : l . Chronology is not a matter of taste that can be settled by mere impressions. it would be very difficult to prove that it was so. Where were they during the interval if not in Sutras or Karikas. though left out in. took refuge with the great Tfo'shi Kapila. . for though absent in the Tattva-samasa and in the Karikas. like a late tradition.

The sixteen ViMras (modifications). . VI. kinds of Ahamkara. XII. II. i. The Purusha (Spirit or Self).. tive elements). The five Karmayonis (sources of activity). List of Twenty-five Tattvas. The Prakriti as Avyakta (the non-dif. to bud- TV X. Manas. Ahamkara. IV.' . ferentiated or undeveloped principle) The Buddhi (intellect). savour. The five Tanmatras (essences) of sound. five Karmendriyas . XT. ele- 25. and odour.e. A1 . The five Buddhindriyas (perceptive organs) .320 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The Mahabhutas (material ments) III. Ihe Adhiuaivata v rin 11-1 tlln. The Aha?nkara (the subject). The eight Prakritis (primary and produc1. The five Karmatmans. The Adhyatma / \ A referring to the thirteen VIII. of eight kinds . five acts Buddhi or the Indriyas. . / a 0> 9-13. 14-18. . and the ten T Indnyas. . The five Vilyus. The Traigunya (triad of forces). 2. The Sahara (evolution). of three . Bhutadi) 4-8. colour. Tai^asa. The Adhibhtita instruments. IX. V. { The . i of The five Abhibuddhis (apprehensions). kinds (Vaikarika. (active organs) 19. The PratisafJiara (dissolution). Manas (central organ or mind) 20-24. winds or vital spirits. XIII. touch. I. i VII. . . 3.

again in technical terms which will have to be explained ' ' : I. The Avyakta (chaos). and it does so on the whole satisfactorily. The commentator begins by asking. Bandha (bondage). XXII. XX. even when they can be found. Tushd (contentment).' The Avyakta. Siddhi (perfection). 321 XIV. Mulikarthas (cardinal facts). XVII. but the English word seems never to square the Sanskrit terms quite accurately. XIX. threefold. threefold. fivefold. because their English equivalents. Bhutasarga fourteen. XXI. Asakti (weakness). 2. Du/ikha I (pain). He then continues ' : i . is neuter (the undeveloped). shall often have to use these Sanskrit terms. and 4-8. ninefold. XXIV. with sixty-two XV. explained. XXIII. XVIII. Buddhi (light or perception). twenty-eightfold (nine Atushds and eight Asiddhis). XVI. Here then the Avyakta. and have given these titles or headings in Sanskrit. are too often unintelligible or misThis commentary leading without a commentary. Ahamkara (subjectivity). eight. (Nescience). Moksha (freedom). eightfold. Pramana (authorities). 3. threefold. Avidya subdivisions. five Tanmatras (transcendental elements). is meant to elucidate their meaning. the i. Anugrahasarga (benevolent creation). which follows immediately on the Sutra. As in the . Now what are the eight PrakHtis V and he answers. threefold. (creation of material elements).THE AVYAKTA.

Pradhanaka (chief). Mahat in the sense of mind. but of an immaterial world. not a man. but strictly 1 speaking Prakn'ti also would. and Pradhana in the sense of nature. one only. such And why ? Because it has neither manifest. without parts. pre-eminent. the Avyakta not apprehended by the senses. nor has It is it any parts. Akshara (indestructible). Dhruva (unchanging). and to be synonymous with Purusha or Atman rather than with the Avyakta." . ' 2. Brahman 2 Pura (abode).. is not so beginning. producing (Prasuta). without beginning or end. inaudible. &c. indestructible. as the ear. &c. object). And these are its synonyms. as it would seem. And again. world various objects such as water-jars.. but common to all. this Avyakta is subtle. without savour and odour. intangible. from a Vedantic point of view. fall to Brahman as being what is called the substantial cause of the world. It is given as a synonym of Purusha further on. this (Pratipatti). in It is that which there regard to a cow.' Buddhi. that is to say. not otherwise. cloth. the conviction " This is so and so.322 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. unchanging. seem hardly to be appropriate here. nor end. but alone of all the eight PrakHtis unproduced (Aprasuta). (darkness). . is And what is is called Buddhi (intellect) ? Buddhi through Adhyava'saya (ascertainment). 2 Brahman seems out of place here. &c. The learned eternal. vases. Tamas : . not a horse this is a post. Prasuta (productive). invisible. under certain circumstances Pradhana (principal). beds. Kshetra (field. middle. to be beyond what is great *. words applicable to the Avyakta. are It is manifest. declare it to be without beginning and middle. is a cow. without attributes.

it If taken in a psychological sense. or at least Tanmatras. But originally it must have been meant as Prak?^'ti illuminated and intellectualised.BUDDHI. mind. it would clearly presuppose the later phases. even in its widest sense. like Prakriti in the beginning. sense is more important than commentaries. and Indriyas. and no longer as dull matter. can only be PrakHti as lighted up. 323 Such kn'ti. and the senses and the other organs of the soul. we can hardly help taking this Great Principle. and however violent our proceeding may in the cosmic seem. as rendered capable of perception. and as yet senseless Prakriti. the undeveloped.' is Buddhi. only after mere material contact has become conscious- Y 2 . no doubt. or of the determination of this and that. Now the first step after Avyakta. of individual perception also. in a later stage. this psychological acceptation is the Though accep- common Buddhi among native writers on Samkhya. Only after PrakHti has become lighted up or perceptive. If Buddhi meant only determi- nation (Adhyavasaya). it is impossible that this should have been its original meaning in the mind of Kapila. Manas. Indriyas. the possibility supplies. as subjective. such as Mahabhutas. but likewise something that is knowable and determinable. but whatever native and Euro- Buddhi pean authorities may have to say. dull. yet The Buddhi or the Mahat must here be a phase tation of growth of the universe. the Mahat. in a cosmic sense. and rendered capable of becoming at a later time the germ of Aha?7ikara (distinction of subject and object). Manas. the most wonderful phase of Prais generally taken here in its subjective or psychological sense. not only Ahamkara. apprehensive senses.

it cannot possibly be right as representing the first evolution of PrakHti from its chaotic state towards light and the possibility of perception. but unless a more reasonable and intelligible account can be given of Buddhi. can distinction. There are eight manifestations of this Buddhi (intellect). as I on one side and this and that on the other. and lastly he decides with his Buddhi what to do. and their new relation as perceiver and perceived. he explains them by a very favourite process. (i) Dharma. This may seem a very bold interpretation.324 ness. dispassionateness.' This may considers external senses. S. (3) Vairagya. then he refers the be quite right in a later phase of the development of PrakHti. namely. I am glad to find that Mr. As each of these requires explanation. vice. Manas. Banerji on p. nay. if it were no more than the act of fixing this or that in thought. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. super- power. whether general between subject and object (Aha??ikara). revelation It is not opposed to. (2) 6r/lana. knowledge. virtue. it is in . What may ' native interpreters have all - made on of Buddhi 23 be seen in their commentaries. is the opposite of Adharma. (4) Aisvarya. and even the Tanmatras. ' ' ' ' ' a complete forsaking of native guidance. and we imagine the or individual. enjoined by >S'ruti and Smn'ti. C. VaA'aspati Misra's commentary first his Karika : Every man uses (with the various objects to his Ego (Aha?wkara). for instance. by contrasting them with their opposites. It could not be the antecedent of Ahamkara. 146 of his work arrives at much the same conclusion. and saying that (i) Dharma. there seems no escape from it. human and is and tradition. then he Manas). virtue.

Manas. upward. the practice of the best people. the opposite of Agwana or ignorance. Pragma. These four kinds of intellect (Buddhi) are classed ' as Sattvika. and consists of the eight qualities such as Amman. Thus has Buddhi scribed. great. and consists in not being dependent on or influenced by external objects. its and has happiness for 6r/iana or is outward mark. thought. Mati. Their opposites are classed as bad. the states of thought (Bhava). and are acquired by Yogins by means of long and painful practices. masc. inspiration. is the opposite of passion. &c. In later times Buddhi. taken collectively. 2 the Mahat. through there takes place knowledge there arises through dispassionateness men are absorbed in Praknti (Prakrit ilaya?). as a means. &c. virtue.BUDDHI. (4) Aisvarya. through superhuman power there comes unfettered movement. $ruti.. unless the Sawkhyas own meaning both to Brahman and Brahma. Synonyms of Buddhi . Khyati. dark or Through going liberation. extreme minuteness. wisdom. such as sound. 325 harmony (2) with. knowledge. These Aisvaryas are believed in by Sawkhya and Yoga. being able to assume the smallest form and weight. . becomes the Upadhi or mental limitation of Brahma or Hirawyagarbha. 2 1 give their This also seems out of place here. Tamasa. is the opposite of powerlessness. explained as the understanding of twenty-five subjects (Tattvas). and the elements (Bhuta). in its eight forms been de- are. dispassionateness. the (3) Vairagya. i. e. superhuman power. mind. Brahma discrimination.

I feel. in fact. devoted to virtue. to perception (Buddhindriya?ii) ? read the Samkhya-philosophy in two texts. am in the sound. and as personal that the idea of a cosmic stage of and intellect. dispassionateness. and DM. taken as intellect. ' What is is called Aha??ikara ? And I he answers. as when a man. imagines that he . e. shall be slain am some more instances. I hear. Pragwanasantati. How could this be possible before the distinction between subject and object has been realised by Aha??ikara. one. and before Buddhi has assumed the character of sense- have. giving the cosmic process. Thus intellectuality has been entirely forgotten. thought. &c. firmness. memory. though from a different point of view. it takes the four opposite forms of vice. is said to assume the form (Rupa) of virtue. as it were. he asks. I see. Srrm'ti. I am lord and am Isvara. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Buddhi is only can we account for the statement that this Buddhi.326 Dhn'ti. rich. I taste. interpreted in a psychological or epistemological sense. I enjoy. It Abhimana. if while. dominated by Tamas (Gu?ia of darkness). I and I I I smell. 3. assumption or misconception. Ahamkara. &c. and superhuman powers. knowledge.' >S'a?yikara in his commentary on the VedaritaSutras gives. in the old uncial writing that shows forth here We and there. the other in the minuscule letters of a much later age. by me a man was slain. because his wife and children are unhappy. and this consists in the belief that i. Now. by powerful enemies. It is quite clear that in all these explanations continuity of meditation. if dominated by Sattva (Gu?za of purity).

Ahamkara was so familiar in the sense of Egoism that.' Here we must distinguish again between Ahamkara. or rather modifications of it. Buddhi cannot really act without a distinction of the universe into subject and object. its psychological interpretation is far more easy. modifying. is stout. that jumps. is in the Samkhya something developed out of primordial matter. or something objective. the rival understanding of the Vedanta. or fair. but to Prak?^'ti only. that he is dumb.AHAMKARA. Tair/asa. and Ahamkara as a condition presupposed in any mental act of an individual thinker. the first of elements. thin. this objectively the creation of what is subjective and objective is ment of what the only possible meaning of the cosmic Ahamkara. Bhutadi. must remember proceeding. Niranumana. Sanumana. like Buddhi. or ' he Synonyms of Ahamkara. not dependent on in- ference. deaf. as a cosmic power. are Vaikarika. whereas all these things do not pertain to him at all. dependent on inference. or fears. is 327 unhappy. that he has desires. I cannot see. After that only do we watch the develop- is objective in general into what is But while or that (the Tanmatras). which again is impossible without a Non-Ego. whatever it may mean in later times. but We that Ahamkara. without the introduction of the Ego or I. walks. it was taken in its ordinary rather than in its technical Samkhya I quite admit that this is a somewhat bold how to get without it at a proper of the ancient Samkhya. sense. after that matter has passed through Buddhi. luminous. Thus we are told that there are three or four . doubts. blind. or that he stands. impotent.

dominated by the Sattva-gu?ia. circumfiexed. savour. and the notes of the gamut. and thus divides the whole world into what is subjective and objective. are . guwa.328 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. yet should be taken as an act of the production of Ego involves that of the Non-Ego. while in another place the Tattva-samasa itself explains that Ahamkara Buddhi directed towards the perception of the nature of what is Self (subjective) or Not-Self (objective). rather confused. for unintentional evil works. though at all events that the Aha?nkara is here treated as simply a moral agent. such as acute. G. Pa/U'ama. The five sub(substances) stances or essences as emanating from Ahamkara. matras the essence of sound. Though Ahamkara means only the production of Ego. contact odour. the very essence of our acts. grave. helps to do good works (2) the Tai^asa. i. /foshabha. shows This division. in sounds Differences of sound. (5) the Niranumana. dominated by the Ra^as(3) the Bhutadi. 4-8. 1). colour. E. helps to do hidden works (4) the Sanumana Ahamkara is responsible . Nishada. for unintentional good . Gandhara. A. the Vaikarika. Five Tanmatras. F. dominated by the Gunas. If it is asked. but no longer as a cosmic potentia. Madhyama. e. helps to do evil works dominated by the Tamas-gima. C. These five modes of Ahamkara are spoken of as Karmatmans also. . such as Shac/r/a. . Dliaivata. (i) modifications of the Ahamk4ra. B. and The essences of sound are perceived only. ? What are the five Tan- he answers.

touch soft. such as white. Differences of are perceived in savoursavour. offensive.FIVE TANMATRAS. red. riot-stupid the last therefore not perceptible. Mahabhutas (?). but there is no difference in the essence of savour. or evolve. such as and hot. are said to be Avisesha. three being negations of the qualities of the Mahabhutas. there yellow. not to be experienced. The essences of savour only. Asanta. corrosive. Abhogya. slippery. are perceived. perceived in odour such as sweet and odour. are Differences The essences of odour of Thus have the essences been indicated : . atomic. not differentiated. such as pungent. the answer is because they alone Prakurvanti. but there is no difference in the essence of odour. though sometimes very inaccurate ones. these eight Prakritis only. are perceived. only. bitter. . 329 but there is no difference in the essence in The essences of touch are perceived only. they alone bring forth. not-terrible. The essences of only . is colour are perceived in colourof colour. astringent. Differences green. are called Prakritis. Aghora. Differences of touch. salt. perceived of sound. not-pleasurable. acid. and the great elements PrakHtis. sweet. . black. are perceived. purple. cold. . natures. Amuc/Aa. Ami. . hard. but no difference in the essence of colour. there is no difference in the essence of touch. are perceived. from Avyakta to the Tanmatras. according to the three Gunas preAnd if it is asked why ponderating in each. and their synonyms. but rough.

the organ of generation pleasure. and the Five Buddhindriyas. 9-13. the nose Being produced from the Tanmatras.' as its object sound. Vaika' . action. hands. the feet perform movement. II. If it be asked ' ' Which are the sixteen Vikaras ' or evolutions ? the answer is. as perceiving. Sa??ikhya definition.' Manas. and at the same time active like the Karmendriyas. instruments. the skin. are represented as being of the same nature as the objects perceived. and the nose. The ear perceives odour. both perceptive and active. Five Karmendriyas.' Central organ of the senses or KOLVOV ala-OriTripiov might be the nearest approach to the meaning of Manas but mind may do. the skin touch. the eye colour. The voice utters words. the eyes. 14-18. mind. . 'Now the organs are set forth. Manas. Sixteen Vikaras.33 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Kara/ta. performs its acts of doubting and ascertaining. the organ of excretion.' organs (including Manas). the hands work. the tongue. or perceptive organs. 'The five Karmendriyas or organs of feet. a view of considerable antiquity. the senses. the organ of excretion evacuation. and the organ of generation. perform each its own work. like the other organs. the eleven sense five elements. Their synonyms are. Thus have the eleven organs been explained. voice. constitute the five Buddhindriyas. the ear. as perceptive. the tongue' savour. if we only remember its ' 1 9.

fearful. Mahabhutas explained. four qualities. Light helps the other four by Here the we Air helps the other four by drying. 331 Padani. sound. ripening. Purusha objects. Vigraha. Tanu. 2 Anu. : Thus Their synonyms are Bhutas. atomic. without qualities. spotless. sound. 2 p. Bhutaviseshas. seer. light. skin (or body ?). modifications. Ghora. and odour. scribed. changing. rika. sound is and touch. eternal. air. 25. and because it serves I Because of its 1 Garbe. Water is possessed of colour. Now it is ' asked. are the five Ether has one quality. earth. pleasurable. kept under organ.' are told. experiencer. Niyata. Why is it called Purusha it being old (Pura?iat). species. sound. 20-24. sound. not producing. Ether helps the other four by giving space. or gross elements. and colour. /Santa. elements. colour. Akritis.PURUSHA. Muc/Aa. it subtle. Vikaras. knower of is.' Purusha. not an agent. savour. perceptive. Earth is possessed of five qualities. and ether. special. 257. Siunkhya-Philosophie. appliances \ . touch. by being their support. touch. Aksha Five Mahabhfttas. III. are earth. shapes. 'The Mahabhutas. and savour. imperishable ? . Air is possessed of two qualities. because rests in the body (Puri say ate). Water helps the other four by moistening.' (?). water. omnipresent. AvadhHtani. ' Light possessed of three qualities. 'What is is the Purusha ' ? and the answer is without beginning. special elements. helps the other four. touch. Thus have the sixteen Vikaras been destupid. Or Akshara.

It is the multiplicity only of the Purusha which ' is peculiar to the Sa??ikhya-philosophy. And why but it is probably meant for no more than that we never perceive a beginning.' . a time) pleasure. no middle. not made.' This is not a very satisfactory answer. or end of it. being perceptive it Why enjoy er Be- perceives (for awhile) not an agent ? Because pain. by the side of Prat/apati. a recollection of the Vedic Purusha. These are. Hira?iyagarbha. Visvakarman. indifferent. and trouble. &c. one of the many names of the supreme deity. is the Purusha without beginning ? Because there is no beginning. Why Because it perceives ? the modifications of Prakrtti. and it was seer ? cannot be made. Why it is indifferent and without the qualities (Gimas). of course. the of or of knower Because it Why objects ? body pleasure and knows the less ? qualities of objective bodies.332 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Like Brahman when conceived as Atman. in the name of Purusha. pain. Thus has the Purusha of the Sawkhya been described. as Purohita (Director). omnipresent ? Because. Why Why for perceptive ? Because it perceives (that Why good. Why not-producing? Because it has no seed. middle. fanciful etymologies and we can hardly doubt that we have. Why is it subtle ? Because it is without parts and supersensuous. Why spot- Because neither good nor evil acts belong to the Purusha. Why cause eternal ? Because and bad are not found in it. and its extent is endless. and no end of it. it can produce nothing. . that is. without qualities ? Because the qualities of is. like the sky. Purusha also was probably used both for the divine and for the human side of the same power. it reaches everything.

Pi-ana. first Purusha I (subject). male. tasting in tongue. Here.i. ether (sabda). 2. Touch. Sound. Moving in feet. the eight Prakn'tis. and intelligence as Samashii.PURUSHA. Buddhindriyas. 1 As ya/i. 5. 4. . or be shaven. earth (sabda + sparsa + rupa + rasa + gandha). Sabda. or Buddhi (light 5 Tanmatras (Sattvika) (subtle elements). indestructible. Sparsa. the sixteen Vikaras. Generating in Upasth. Karmendriyas. 4. 1 . Kshetragwa. A'akshus. and Manas). 2. Ap. fire (sabda + sparsa + rupa). Rupa. Mahabhutas (Tamasa). Gandha. 4. Odour. 333 The synonyms of Purusha are. Speaking in tongue. 2. Puman. 1. Thus have the twenty-five substances been described. Akshara. Pn'thivi. 3. Self. 3. 5. Srotra. anybody. 5. 5. Ghraxa. water (sabda + sparsa + rupa + rasa). hearing in ear. Te</as. Pumgu^a^antugivaA. Sa. YaAkaA ] . there is no doubt. the part of the Tattva-samasa is ended. I supposed it the relative pronoun could hardly be used as a might be meant for the indefinite pronoun is ya/ika/j. Prakrit! (object). r. Grasping in hands. 5 1. Kavi. 3. seeing in eye. He who knows these twenty-five substances. a topknot. spirit. 3. 10 Indriyas. TvaA touch in skin. but this doubtful. a male living creature. whatever stage of life he may be in. seems. Atmari. Gihva. i. he is liberated. viz. This verse is it often quoted by Samkhya philosophers. Rasa. 2. in the three divisions of Prakn'tis. and whether he wear matted hair. air (sabda + sparsa). Tanmatras. organs (Ragasa) (5 + i Manas (mind) Buddhindriyas. Akasa. knower of objects or of the body. poet. Evacuating in Payu. i. and the Purusha. containing a list of the twenty-five Tattvas. Mahat | 3. and Purusha. 5 Karmendriyas. Brahman. Avyakta 2. man. smelling in nose. Colour. not yet individualised). Vikaras. 4. He. name. Ahawzkara (subjectivation). Vayu. Nara. Savour.

lassitude. even when the Suwkhya We speaks of moral qualities. displaying of supernatural powers. Is the Purusha an agent. . bad bright. and which. he would do good actions only. discontent. are (i) Good conduct. freedom from hatred. reflection. which consists in kindness. dim and dark light. . contrary ingredients of Prakrit! in its differentiation of good. They are not they are on the qualities or mere attributes at all . fault-finding. seems to me. nihilism. intoxication. indifferent. . They are here taken as purely moral qualities. would render the original conception of the Samkhya-philosophy quite unmeaning. drowsiness. (3) Madness. must never forget that. heavy. worthlessness. sloth.334 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. or is he not ? If Purusha were an agent. these qualities belong to nature as seen by the Purusha. greed. control and restraint (of the organs). and there would not be the three different kinds of action. called virtue (Dharma). which seemed to require fuller treatment. violence. never to Purusha apart from Prakriti. anger. whereas originally they must have had a much larger cosmic sense. Is Purusha an Agent? Now follow a number of special questions. see here once more that the three Gmias We must have had originally a much wider meaning than is here described. The first is. de- votion to women. rudeness. shown by change of coun(2) tenance. The three kinds of action But passion. mobile. of cosmical ideas which in the case of it We see here the same narrowing we had to point out before Buddhi and Ahamkara. these are called indifferent conduct. these are called bad conduct. impurity.

he becomes an agent. perceived in the world is clear that agency belongs to the Gunas.' Is Purusha one or many? Now comes the important question. and taking a wrong view of these Gimas which belong to Prakriti. health. . XIII. even while staying in the body. deluded by the conceit of the I (Ahawikara). 2 7) 'Acts are effected by the qualities (Gunas) of PrakHti in every way. though in reality he is unable by himself to bend even a straw. as it were.IS PURUSHA ONE OR MANY? 335 Three Guwas. and follows that Purusha is not the agent. trouble. neither acts nor suffers. and upon the Self as never an agent. Nay.' ' And He ' XIII. Is that Purusha one or many? The answer to this question divides the Samkhya from the Vedanta-philosophy. 29 :sees (aright) who by all respects performed looks upon actions as in Prakn'ti alone. from being without beginning and devoid of qualities. All this was made by me himself is ' and belongs to me. but the Self (Atman). imagines that the I : is the agent. The Sa?nkhya answer is that the Purusha is clearly many.' Ibid. a fool imagines that he the agent.' And then it is said (in the Bhagavad-gita III. because of the variety in the acts of pleasure. foolish and intoxicated by vain imagination and saying. not to himself. 31:This imperishable supreme Self. confusion and purifying (of race). this triad is Whenever it it Deceived by passion and darkness. pain.

all would be unhappy. that is Surya. Purusha 1. Yat annenadhirohati. is to be. I. . confusion of race. And why so ? Because (as the Vedanta says). there is fortune. 32. case of people affected by trouble. all Pan&asikha and Pata/l^ali. that is Brahman. birth. That is true. 15. occurs also Taitt. But teachers who follow the Vedanta. that is Vayu. Asuri. i. 12. ' is all this. health. 152. 3. then if one were happy. as the Vedantins hold. he is lord of that immortality which springs food. 1 These verses arc meant to represent the views of the Vedanta. Hence purity of race. Mahanar. and death also on account of the stages in life (Asrama) and the difference of caste ( Vama). Vedanta Sayings. birth and death.336 birth INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. society or loneliness. Ar. Ill. If there were but one Purusha. Up. abode. cf. 2 p. that up by (sacrificial) he is beyond the l . Ill. Sawih. Thus Kapila. that is immortal. describe Purusha as one. that is /ifandramas. and other Sawikhya teachers describe Purusha as many. liberation. that it is is water and Prar/apati ~. 7 . 2. Geschichte. and they are mostly taken from the Upanishads. . i. Va#. where we should I. The first from . immortality of the ordinary immortal gods 2. not one Purusha. but many. and in the Eig-veda X. what has been and what is. Up. and so on in the . that is pure. Vyasa and others.S'vet. on account of the manifoldness indicated by form. such as Harihara. 90. read. see Deussen. Hiranyagarbha. all would be happy if one were unhappy. That is Agni.

337 it is it is indestructible. dwells beings. the great Self. Up. Ill. Wise 4 people see the same (Atman) in the Brahman. in beasts. Brahmabindu Up. . Shining through the qualities (Guna) of all the senses. 17 . and yet free from all the senses. in all whom all this 10. all. because of the existence of knowledge. (because knowledge 11. As one and the same Mahanar. Bhag. cf. the One stands like a tree planted in the sky by him and by the Purusha. in the dog and the elephant. For there is but one Self of beings. Having hands and feet everywhere. the Self of . the highest point. different in different people). X. cows. 12. that in which everything is absorbed. and gnats.VEDANTA SAYINGS. the Higher than which there is nothing else. 4 string passes 1 vet. it is seen as one and as many. ] . 2 of all. Ill. in the outcast. He is all substances everywhere. and nothing greater. it stands covering everything 4. 3 8. 9 . having mouth. Cf. whether moving or motionless. settled in everybody. the master 6. it was spread out. &c. glory of the sun it is . the great refuge of all 7. . like the moon in the water. 12. in worms and insects. 13. 20. 2 3 Svet. that the sages know as Brahman. gadflies. he by 9. For he alone. the source of all . Up. the Lord. Bhag. 14. hearing everywhere in this world. head and eyes everywhere. all this is filled 5. nothing smaller. 18. Gita XIII. This Self of the world ? is one by whom was Self as made manifold Some speak is of the several. z . Up. Gita V.

. porcelain. Brahman. and others. and silver. belongs decidedly to a later period. . but may also represent to us a period when these two views of the world were not yet finally differentiated. which remind us at once of the Vedanta-philosophy but even these terms are used far more freely in the Brahmawas and Upanishads than in the Darsanas. through gold. &c.338 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The Most relation between Samkhya and Vedanta is during the Upanishad-period scholars it by no means clear. Early Relation between Vedanta and Samkhya. property of the . Buddhi. the Samkhya philosophers are not altogether wrong when they maintain that their view also can be supported by Yedic authority. corals. are given in the same breath. to that of systematised arid controversial philosophy. Maya. which are looked upon as the peculiar Samkhya. thus is one and the same Self to be known as dwelling everywhere in cows. . and pearls. There are certain technical terms. and We see in these extracts a mixture of . such as Purusha. Avidya. jewels. All these views were at first no more than guesses at truth. and were not felt to be altogether incompatible. Vedanta and Samkhya terms and ideas and in verse 10 the two views of Brahman being one.' &c. &c. men. gropings in the dark but the idea that if the one was right the other must be wrong. seem to regard it as a kind of syn- cretism.. deer. and the Purusha being many. Though there is in the Upanishads which w e possess a of philosophic thought r decided preponderance of a Vedantic interpretation of the world. in elephants. such as Atman. Gunas.

ii. 4. VI. 1. is not in strict accordance with the systematic but still less does it represent to us Samkhya. in the during the Upanishad-period. Beyond the Great the Undeveloped (Avyakta). the highest point. 8. Purusha. beyond the objects is the mind (Manas). higher than that being is the great Self (Mahan Atma). Buddhi.' In the same Upanishad. Beyond the Purusha is there ' the goal. as given same Upanishad. 1 1 : 'Beyond the senses are the objects (Artha). as here described. beyond the undeveloped there is the Purusha. 5. 3. Z 2 MaMn Atma. Mahan Atma. 8. is development. 6. beyond the mind is nothing. beyond this great (Self) is the highest.' the Purusha. vary slightly. 10. Ill. 339 nor are they always used in the same sense or in the same order by earlier and later authorities. showing to us how little of technical accuracy there was as yet Vedantic ideas. Avyakta. that is : the highest being (Sattvam Uttamam). the Great Self (Mahan Atma) there is beyond the intellect. 10. the Undeveloped. Arthas. III. Indriyas. 7. VI. Avyakta. Beyond the Undeveloped all-pervading and that knows him is liberated. Manas. we read Beyond the senses is the mind. the Every creature imperceptible. successive The Even the two accounts. Thus we read in the Kanaka Up. Manas. 7. Indriyas. and obtains immortality. Purusha. Sattvam Uttamam. beyond the mind is intellect (Buddhi). . We get 7.RELATION BETWEEN VEDANTA AND SAMKHYA. 2.

. and belief in subject and object (Ahawk. I. mendriyas. of the Arthas as objects would not signify. they are implied by the Indriyas or senses. 2 3 as invisible. 2 see Garbe. The Anubhuti-praka. knowing the body. dwells of his own will here in part ' : . for Buddhi is often called Mahat. II. because. in his Introduction.ira) is Pra/yapati. and how could this be said to emanate from the Avyakta ? Another passage which reminds us of Sa?khya rather than of Vedanta-philosophy occurs in the He who has the Maitray. the five Kar. the Ekadasakam is Sattvi- kam. the individualised Self. willing (Buddhi). 1 8. the Great. man who is fast asleep awakes of his own will. where we read name of Purusha. be replaced by Sattvam The omission Uttamam. xcvii. which is entirely intelligent. Sawkhya-pravafcana- p. see Vedanta-Sutras II. present a in every single man. 5. Deussen translates 3 Abuddhipurvam. 43. the idea of parts (Awsa). and is very small. As to 3. Up. attested by conceiving (Manas). that is the live Buddhindriyas. intangible.340 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.s'a roads Buddhipurvam. as Professor Wilson l . And this part. 61. and Thibaut's remarks . But why should Buddhi. as Indriyarthas. called 1 See Samkhya-Sutras cf. 71 . generally the first emanation of PrakHti in its undeveloped (Avyakta) state. the Highest Being ? The word may be meant for Buddhi. i8H. II. lent of the Phenician certainly not an equivaMot. and the Manas bhashya. but difficult why It it is should be called Great is to say. p. Mahfm Atm& looks conjectured many years ago like a Vedantic term. but even then it would only occupy the place of (rivatma.

be mentioned. touch. Carried along by the Gimas. however.Upanishad. . Tau/asa and Pragma. thought. taste. 2. and because thus bewildered.' intelligent. called the elemental Self (Bhutatma) who. The whole passage. III. is obscure. is the body made is the driver thereof. the aggregate of all these is called /Sarira. thus overpowered. light. he becomes bewildered. such as Samkalpa. the intelligent. enters on a good or evil birth. lotus-leaf. 341 him. nor does the commentator help us much. yet may here doctrines. point to the same source. $ 138). so that his and that overis upward or downward. e. by the pairs is (the opposites) he roams The five Tanmatras (of sound. This passage does not contain much of Samkhya By and he the words Purusha and possibly Buddhipiirvam seem to allude to Kapila's ideas Other words rather than to those of Badarayana. powered about. and the five Mahabhutas (gross elements) also are called Bhuta. his immortal Atman elementary Atman). and smell) are called Bhuta (elements). he sees not the creator. as reminding us of S&mkhya There we read There is indeed that ' : other different one. also. darkened. is in the power of the Gunas of Prakn'ti. body.EELATION BETWEEN VEDANTA AND SAA/KHYA. called Visva or Vaisvanara (Vedanta-sara. the Bhutatman. Then. in the sense of Aha?nkara. unless he is right in recognising here the germs of the later Vedantic ideas of a Pra^/apati. overcome by the bright and dark fruits course of action. abiding within him. Visva. (Self) remains untainted. Adhyavasaya and Abhimana. Then this And the explanation. the holy Lord. One more passage of the Maitray. i. and he who dwells in that body is called Bhutatman (the True. like a drop of water on a but he.

' Here we see again a mixture of Samkhya and Vedanta ideas. But if this Bhutatman is said to spring from Prak? viti. though quoted sometimes as a synonym of Purusha. $arira. Upanishad. believing "I am he. this is mine. Ill. he enters into Abhimana (conceit of subject and He object). the Samkhya claiming such terms as Prakriti and Gums. or downward pairs. which is a compound of Tanmatras. system. he enters on a good or evil birth. is by no means so clear as has sometimes been imagined. It is a term peculiar to the Maitray. and. In fact. and Mahabhutas.342 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. pound to be looked as belonging to the The Maitray. this Bhutatman fits neither into . Up. i itself says that the Atman of Bhutatman is another. Bhutas. however. it is upon Samkhyawe must that remember Atman. because their little Purusha does not spring from Prak?v'ti." &c. overcome by the he roams about. crippled. overcome afterwards by the fruits of what he has done. This Bhutatman. vacillating. upward in his course. Nor could any be said to be purely objective. full of devices. unstable. It would therefore correspond to the Vedaritic (rivatman. it could not possibly stand for the Purusha of the Sawkhyas. A comsuch as Bhuta-Purusha would be impossible. as a bird is bound by a net. strictly speaking. binds himself by himself. the Vedanta such terms as Atman and possibly Bhutatman. and that he dwells in the body. though likewise called Atman. fickle. as Atman as Prakriti springs from him. Upanishad. like many other things in the Maitray. and. cannot be supposed to stand here for Purusha. and seems to have been borrowed from it when it occurs in some of the later Upanishads. If.

as yet. 12. and would rather seem to belong to a philosophy in which these two views of the world were not yet finally separated. Sawkhya should be here taken as the title of the two Samkhya and Yoga. Samkhyayoga. all we meet about 1 of with some more remarks Sattva. where it Praknti. we have Pradhana. 22. or better still as one word. . difficult and rather obscure expression the Maitray. VI. Upanishad is Niratman (selbstlos]. IV. In verse is I. which is Vedanta. and Maya. at least the later Vedanta. But though Upanishad Samkhya ideas would seem to Vedanta ideas are not excluded. nor into the Samkhya-philosophy. It cannot well mean Priifung. while in IV. IV. 13). 10. and on their philosophy as the result of a later syncretism. but the name of Vedanta also is not absent. If now we first return to the Tattva-samasa. evidently stands for Brahman. and is certainly perplexing even in the Samkhya. neither pure Samkhya nor pure Vedanta. which Samkhya. Traiguwya. explained as systems. in i. 10 Maya is directly identified with Purusha occurs in III. an expression which would be impossible in the Vedanta- Another in philosophy. unless we look on these Upanishads as of a far more modern date. A similar mixture of philosophical terms meets us in the $vetasvatara Upanishad. The very prevail. In this all this we may possibly get a glimpse of a state of Indian philosophy which was.TRAIGU^YA. 343 the Vedanta. 1 name of Samkhya and Yoga occurs (VI. the three Gunas. for instance.

explained as dust. there being neither thought in English corresponding to Gu?ia. misery. considering that our substances never exist without stances. movement. drowsiness. distress. qualities. though for a time retainConstituent parts ing their different colours. PasThe triad of Gu?^as means the three Guwas. such as covering. nor our qualities without subOur commentary continues : He now the answer sion. virtue. is. purity. ourselves have inour ideas of substance and quality from Greek and medieval philosophers. and Tamas. is of endless variety. heaviness. attainment of what In is wished for. but are of its essence. such as calmness. . excitement. These three qualities. ' are not mere accidents of nature. Ra^as. contentment. but is for the present it nor word herited best to retain Guna. &c. What is the triad of Gu?ias ? and and Darkness. the triad consists of Goodness. patience. darkness. lightness. is Goodness (Sattva) short consists of happiness. In short is it consists of pain. &c. In short it consists of trouble or madness. mist. as defined in the Samkhya.' ' ' ' might be a better rendering. separation. of endless variety. as Colebrooke had already warned us ignorance. but even with us We a definition of inherent qualities is by no means easy. passion. disgust. itc. asks. Darkness . ignorance. joy.' he says. attainment of what is it Passion evil. complacency. intoxication. and enter into its composition like different rivers forming one stream. sloth. such as grief.. goodness against taking the Gunas of the Smkhya in the sense of qualities. of endless variety.344 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

and indifferent. see in the preponderance of any one of first and they them the activity in Prakriti or nature. This is what is named Trai- Let it gunya. San&ara is evolution. with many applications and modifications. . Then comes the question. These Gunas act a very prominent part in Indian philosophy. in fact the beginning of creation. Pratisafl&ara dissolution or re-involution. light.. is far has the triad Gunas been be known that goodness is all that bright. and darkness all that is not bright. &c. Saw/iara cause of movement and and Pratisawytara. The four sides of a cube. matter quality and what is qualified . VI. Evolution is as follows : From the Avyakta (undeveloped Praknti) before explained. We can best explain them by the general idea of two opposites and the middle term between them. bad.SAjYA'ARA AND PEATISA^A'ARA. for instance. manifested in in morals nature by darkness. tain objects as meaning that ness in us. of the 345 ex- Thus plained. or as Hegel's thesis. What is San&ara and what is Pratisa?I&ara ? The answer is. V. being considered in the Samkhya as inseparable. passion all that excites. we should remember that we also call sugar sweet. it calls forth the sensation of sweet- The Hindus look upon the state of equilibrium of the three Gmias as perfect. These Gimas have been again and again explained as Dravyam. If the Samkhyas look on cer- happy instead of happifying. and mist by good. these being . would be called its Gmias as much as the blue of the sky. antithesis and synthesis. and have quite entered into the sphere of popular thought.

' Ahawkara .Philosophic. both. no beginning. Pratisa?7/:ara or dissolution is as follows : The material elements are dissolved into the essences. all being different forms The Undeveloped is nowhere dissolved. as under the of influence luminous. the substance of (conceit Aha??ikara is of I. What is Adhibhuta ceived is objective. which under the influence of Tamas produces the gross material elements. Thus has dissolution been explained. Vaikarika. 1 Gurbe. Adhyatma. llamas producing the Buddhindriyas and Bhutadi (first of elements). modified of Sattva Tau/asa. arises From this Buddhi. because it was never evolved out of anyKnow both Prakrit! and Purusha as having thing. Bhutadi. what is to be received and perceived by p. the Tanmatras . of Prak?'tti. spring the gods and the senses from the first of elements. Adhibhtlta. Tair/asa. . sub- of three kinds. (Spirit). are produced the material This is the development or Sa/U'ara. (essences) . modified. Samkhya. Buddhi (intellect) arises. 236. that is. and Adhyatma (subjective). from the luminous. Buddhi into Avyakta (the undeveloped). and or this of eight kinds. Aha??ikara into Buddhi (intellect). jectivity). meant by (objective). Adhidaivata (pertaining to deity) ? To this it is answered. Brahma is deity. it is Now asked. Tanmatras. . Intellect is subjective. From the Tanmatras. when superintended by the high and omnipresent Purusha intellect. and Adhidaivata.346 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. what is to be perVII-IX. the essences and senses into Aha?kara. essences. elements. Ahamkara is subjective. From the modified or Vaikarika Aha??ikara.

Mitra is the deity. The ear is subjective. what is to be enjoyed is objective. 1 Evidently taken already as god of the waters. is what is to be smelled objective. what deity. . The feet are subjective. what is to be excreted The organ of generaobjective. is the deity. Agni. Rudra what is is the deity. is to be conceived objective. what has to be gone over is objective. -/Tandra. the sun. lord of creatures.ADHYATMA. it 347 is objective. what is to be seen is objective. Earth jective. what is to be grasped is objective. the discussion of the Tattvas (substances) 2 . and the deity. Vayu. fire. is is moon. I did not like to leave them out altogether. is subjective. Varuna is the is ! The nose what is is subjective. is the deity. objective. to be tasted is objective. Here ends (Gu?ias). Akasa. tion is subjective. mind. to be heard is objective. without being myself able to connect any definite ideas with them. is the The skin is subjective. Thus in Pragdpati. The tongue is subjective. ADHIBHUTA. The organ of is excretion subjective. Indra is the deity. the deity. wind. AND ADHIDAIVATA. Manas. but 2 while they may be safely passed over by philosophical readers. Whoever has forms of the objective. learnt the substances. but is not united to them. The voice is subto be uttered is objective. ether. is Vishnu is the deity. and the deity (Adhidaivatam) is freed from evil and released from all his sins he experiences the qualities . I I ought to say that in this and the subsequent paragraphs had often to be satisfied with giving the words such as they stand. The two hands are subjective. is the deity. the properly what is qualities (Gu?^asvarupa^i). subjective. is is the deity. what deity. the case of each of the thirteen instruments is there what is subjective. Aditya. is what is to be touched The eye is the deity.

I hope. Thus have five Abhibuddhis (apprehendhindriyas. an act of the intellect. . Sukha. &c. is of the intellect. an act conceit. elicit from Sanskrit scholars some better elucidation than I am ablo to #ivo. faith or faithfulness. ? XL What is are the five Karmayonis The answer that they are Dhr/ti. Lkkhh. &c. the act of the intellect. directed towards the perception of the nature of Self and not-Self. Abhimana. The answer are the five Abhibuddhis (appreis. is an act of the intellect pertaining to the BudKriya. for their objects. is The apprehension that this has to be done by me ascertainment an act of the intellect. sions) been explained. X... it is Ahamkara. . Abhimana. is action '. is wish. Kriya. Kartavyata. desire. conceit. &c. bliss. action. 1 The text is somewhat doubtful. desire. desire of knowledge. performed by the senses that have sound. Karmayonis (5). Avividisha. pertaining to the Karmendriyas. the will of doing such acts as hearing. Kartavyata. is said to consist in study of the Veda they may. carelessness. energy. $raddha.348 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. such as speaking. Vividisha. faith faithfulness. Abhibuddhis (5). They are Vyavasaya. Now what ? hensions) ascertainment.. determination to act or will. /Sraddha. O resolves or The character of Dhr/ti or energy is when a man and carries out his resolution. an idea of the mind. I/t&Aa. At present most of them seem to me to consist of useless distinctions and hair-splitting definitions of words.

but this is a mere guess. and not-percipient. the separateness (ofPurushaandPraknti). and penance. devotes himself to knowledge. What has to be known is the oneness (belonging to Prakn'ti).. dishti is a state belonging to Prakriti which helps to destroy cause and effect by showing that they are one and the same. and not to be disturbed . the desire of knowledge. The third line is quite unintelligible to me. sacrificing and causing sacrifices to be performed. 6rneyam. Satkaryavada. with real and this is products. being always engaged in penitential acts. AvividisM or carelessness consists in the heart's being absorbed in the sweetness of sensual pleasures. I separate Sukshmam and take it in the sense of Sukshmatvam. Some the text for portions of these verses are obscure. &c. I have taken Grneyft. Vividisha or desire of knowledge is the source of knowledge of thoughtful people. .. penance.. and Ballantyne has very properly left it It may mean that Vivialtogether untranslated. subtle. .KARMAYONIS. giving and receiving- proper gifts. is and probably corrupt. Vividisha. but may be excused in what is after all no more than an index. is conThe construction is very imperfect. Satkaryam refers to the cerned. referring to each of the subjects with which Vividisha. But Sukha or bliss arises when a man. 349 religious studentship. destroying is Karmayonis been explained (?). in order sacrifices to obtain blessedness. (Prakr/ti) being eternal. and making Homa-oblations. It a state belonging to Prakriti cause and Thus have the five effect.

SanuNiranumana. and mana. luminous. and is called Samana The because it leads equally and moves equally.350 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. of these winds has never been they are rendered by vital spirits. the (Ego as ? They are Vaikarika. possible. Karmatmans XIII. because the Bhutas. active) (5). is action of the senses (Indriyas) and of other organs of the body also. 1 . r Vyana is the all-pervader. Apana. are due to it. and Apana is superintended Apana because it leads away and moves downward. The wind nose. Tair/asa. The Tauyasa. wind called Udana is superintended by the throat. and Vyana. Vayus XII. nothing gained except explaining obscurum per obscurius. is the doer of good works. (5). The Vaikarika. the winds in the bodies of those who have bodies. modifying. Udana. though springing from the Tanmatras. but their special functions organism are often stated differently by different authors. The Bhutadi first of is the doer of bad works. They form a kind of physical or AntaAkara^a. It is called Udana because it goes upward and is The wind called moves out. i. What are the Vayus (winds) ? They are Prana. The wind called Samana is superintended by the heart. called Prana called is and out. They may have been intended to account for the vital processes which make the discovered. '. Samana. Thus have the five w inds been meaning If The real explained. is Praa superintended by mouth and because it leads out or called moves by the navel. but their original intention escapes us altogether.e. Bhutadi is used in the sense of Manas. Bhutadi. What are the five Karmatmans.

Moha. First. namely with PrakHti. &c. is the misconception eighteenfold. is the misconception arising from the obtaimnent of supernatural powers.ASAKTT. five Karmatmans been explained. Gloom unrestrained hatred. such as minuteness and the rest. utter gloom. great illusion. r Asakti. with regard . Weakness (28).. whether heard or seen. Here darkness and illusion are again each eightfold. illusion. &c. colour. and the five Tanmatras. such as minuteness. darkness. illusion. Ahamkara. great is XIV. gloom. &c. Moha. gloom and utter gloom are Tamas. with inference (Niranumana) it is the doer of what Thus have the is not good and not reasonable. directed against the eightfold superhuman powers. Thus has ignorance w ith sixty-two subdivisions been explained. What The is called the twenty-eightfold weakness ( faults of the eleven organs of sense and the seventeen faults of the intellect. Nescience (5). WEAKNESS. is when one supposes oneself to be liberated in the ten states with regard to the objects of sound. is the doer of hidden works. illusion.. What Tamisra. and against the tenfold w^orld of sense causing is threefold pain. Avyakta. 351 If associated elements. Avidya. Andhatamisra. darkness. Utter gloom is that distress which arises at the time of death after the eightfold human power has been acquired. the Aha?ttkara is the doer if not associated of what is good and reasonable . Mahamoha. with inference (Sanumana). Buddhi. Mahamoha. XV. and the tenfold world of sense has been conquered. is the fivefold Avidya (Nescience) ? It Tamas. great illusion is tenfold. that Self is identical with things which are not Self.

lameness in the feet. addiction to en. are the causes of the elements Asutara. the denial that the . contentments. been explained. defects of the intellect are the opposites of the Tushds. when . crippledness in the hands. the contentments. there deafness in the ear. . . blindness in the eye. engaging in enjoyment . when.352 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. occupation for wealth. is no Pradhana Tamasalina. Asiddhis and Siddhis. is to the organs of sense. the conviction . (Prakrit!) in the in Atman the Mahat consisting recognising (Buddhi. essences. Thus have the nine opposites of Tushd. loss of smell in the nose. and of the Siddhis. as. without seeing that it is liable to be lost AsumarUika. non-perfections: Atara. constipation in the organ of excretion. joyment Anuttamambhasika. Asupara. diversity is mistaken for phenomenal unity Sutara. without seeing the evil of injury (to living beings). leprosy in the skin. dumbness in the voice. the non-recognition of the Ego (Ahamkara) Avrish^i. contentment. occupation in acquiring the objects of the senses . madness in the mind these are defects of the eleven organs. Next follow the opposites of Siddhi. perfections. intellect) Avidya. occupation in their preservation Asunetra. Tanmatras. when after hearing that a man who knows the various principles . . for instance. XVI. that there First then the opposites of the Tushfis or They are Ananta. The seventeen in . which are also called Asiddhis. the is opposite understood. impotence the organ of generation. Atushfa and Tushft. after hearing words only. XVII. perfection. dullness in the tongue.

when a man. Pramudita. Tushfis or contentments Sutara. Pramodarnana. the opposite plained.TUSHTIS AND SIDDHIS. SuniariAika. The names Ambhas. though overcome by mental suffering. Kainyaka. Some of these technical terms vary in different texts. though devoted and studying. Siddhis are : 1 of the nine Salila. is Asatpramuditam. Uttama The names Supara. Satpramudita. and Siddhis themselves. are : Ogha. Ignorance of a man of undecided mind even with regard to what has been taught him by a friend is But failure of an unfortunate man in obArasya. being careless as to transmigration. is not anxious to know. water. but . (tattvas) is 353 liberated. that such a man is not liberated Ataratara. Tarayanti. Suof the eight Tara. posite. l I am afraid they are of very small importance that even what I have given of these long lists. netra. to hearing ignorance. but as their opposites have already been examined follow the Tushris Xext we may dispense with their enumeration here. been ex- and the twenty-eightfold A^akti (weakness) finished. a man understands the op. Sattviki. does not succeed in knowing the twenty-five principles. this is Apramoda. Tushfts and Siddhis. Thus have the eight Asiddhis. knowledge is no pleasure to him. Prainoda. Vr/shfi. is of the Siddhis or perfections. Sutara. either because of bad instruction or disregard on the part of the teacher. taining knowledge. A a . owing either to his obtuseness or to his intellect being impaired by false doctrines. Thus the next pair also of Apramudita (mutually not delighted) and Apramodamana so that (mutually not delighting) should be considered. If a man.

object or p. surprising. and for a right appreciation of the methods of Indian philosophy. but far as I know. This large number of technical terms is certainly sions.354 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 59. We have still to examine. though as briefly '. I confess that in several cases many of these subdivisions seemed to me entirely meaningless. but thought that they were of some importance historically. and this. 1 are with regard to its reality its having an (Astitva). on the contrary. an See Samkhya-tattva-kaumudl. may have proved very tedious. they do not. which has been taken for a sign of their more recent date. &c. of Nescience with its sixty-two subdiviI though certainly meaningless to my mind. If these technical terms were modern would occur more frequently modern works on the Sawkhya-philosophy. may possibly serve to show how long and how minutely these philosophical questions must have been discussed in order to leave such spoils behind. Avadharita. Some of them. the Mulikarthas or eight cardinal facts. its oneness (Ekatva). that is. and not very closely connected with the great problems of philosophy. to speak in favour of an early and independent origin of the Tattva-samasa and its commentary. are not mentioned either in the Karikas or in the Sutras. for instance. the most important subjects established by the Sa<khya They PrakHti or Pradhana. seems to me. The long lists of the instruments and the acts of intellect. as possible.. as. they Mftlikarthas. SuA:i. inventions. which are so characteristic of the Sa??ikhya-philosophy. . in as XVIII.. &c. Pada. of the sources of activity.

however. Shashft-tantra. not 8. to Purusha his being different from Prakn'ti (Anyatva). and Prof. all is Astitva with Purusha as well as with PrakHti. highest reality of the Purusha or the is The matter Atman khya or has of course never been doubted by SamVedanta philosophers. but that is more than mere Astitva. the 33 (Avidya 5 + Asakti 28) and 10. reality. Astitva. Aa 2 .and Sthula-sarira. both Prakriti and Purusha. is said to refer to the Sukshma. and thus The Chinese name presuparriving at 60 topics. of little consequence. Garbe connect also. might seem to belong to both PrakHti and Purusha. the gross and the subtle bodies. but this time by adding 17 Tushes and Siddhis. their temporary union and separation. commentator. It should be added that the commentator in this place accounts once more for the name of Shashdtantra. durability. 355 and some one else (Pararthya). intention (Arthavattva). unless Astitva is taken in the sense of phenomenal or perceptible The reality. his not being an agent (Akartritva). Mulikarthas. and his being intended for They are with regard its They are with regard to being many (Bahutva). which the with establishing as against the Vedantins who deny it with regard to Samkhya that is chiefly concerned objective.SHASim-TANTRA. the poses a Saptati-sastra. while Sthiti. or Seventy-treatise. keeping it for the subject The only. the Sixty-doctrine. probably with reference to the original number of verses in the Karika. but it is meant as the reality of PrakHti only. whether he is called Purusha or Atman.

the threefold creation. wild animals from lions down to jackals reptiles . . This gods. But even here the Tattva-samasa finished. Tliis passage is very doubtful. the creation of benevolence. Rakshas. and take measuring in the sense of perceiving. Pragrapati. of man The human creation from Brahmans down to K&ndiil&s. for it goes is not yet on to explain the Anugrahasarga. Indra. . but as yet without a sphere in which their measuring or perceiving power could find scope. Brahma. After this divisions. creation conreptiles. men. forming again 1 five classes. after seeing these (the organs of sense ?) produced. wild animals. from immovable Sesha (world-serpent) down to worms things from the Pari^ata-tree (in paradise) down to grass. birds. Domestic animals are from cows down birds from to mice . domestic animals. Gandharvas. lit. the animals. such as Pi.9aas. only. which is explained as the production of external objects from the five Tanmatras or subtle essences for the sake of the Purusha. The animated or plants. XX. living is beings. follows the Bhuta-sarga in fourteen The divine creation has eight divisions.356 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. i. created for them the so-called benevolent creation. sists of and Brahma. Garur/a down to gnats . and immovable things consists of one. shaped from the Tanmatras \ Bhtita-sarga. e. XIX. Anugraha-sarga. consisting of and animals. so that the creation would be represented as made for man. consisting of good and evil spirits and gods. Yakshas. unless we connect Man a with Tanmatra.

it is replied. whose minds are overcome by passions and delusions. they are devoted to objects of sense.' to me very important. 357 XXI. whether householders. however. If it (Bandha) consists be asked what the threefold bondage in. Dakshiwa-bondage. mendicants or anchorets. 321. Vikaras applies world. 329) and as long as a man considers . bondage applies to those. if they are ignorant and deluded by passions. and who from misconception bestow sacrificial gifts on priests. A verse is quoted here in support priestly : The * Bondage bondage. That this See. is spoken of by the name of Prakriti- and thirdly bondage Vikara-bondage. This last bondage seems through priestly gifts. In the eight Pra- kritis. There are eight Prakritis. one to be fee'd ? In the Aitareya-Brahmana already we said to have been 1 readofYatis who condemned sacrifices. but they are thrown to the jackals. Karika the sixteen Vikaras. if if The bondage of the sixteen both to ascetics and to men of the they are subdued by the senses. . GIFTS TO PRIESTS. l . if their organs of sense are not in subjection.DAKSHItfA-BONDAGE. he is absorbed in PrakHti and bound by Prakn'ti. Bandha. and it is strange that it should never have been pointed out as marking the unecclesiastical and unorthodox character of the What would have become Samkhya-philosophy of the Brahmans without their Dakshmas or fees. which are Vikaras. the very name of a Brahman being Dakshimya. and in Dakshma (gifts to often described priests). these as the highest. students. Gifts to Priests. Bondage. as before (pp.

The Vedanta. or lastly from the destruction of the whole. and in concentration of the Purusha in himself. What is most creditable is that each system should have recogeach nised more or the liminary to every philosophy. looks upon the Veda as the only source of true knowledge. as a preThis distinguishes Indian philosophy very favourably from other philoAll systems of philosophy in India admit sophies. XXIII. importance of this question. and . as they have been fully examined before. The three Pramanas which follow next require little explanation here. Still each system of philosophy takes its is own view less of them. Pratyaksha or perception of the senses as the first of Prama/^as. the highest aim of Kapila's again of three kinds. This Moksha. from the quieting philosophy.35^ INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and from the destruction of merit and demerit there arises final beatitude consisting in complete detachment from the world. Moksha. feeing of a priest should have been considered one of the three bondages shows at all events that the followers of Kapila were above superstition. Pramawas. according as it arises from increase of knowledge. and the character of determined by the view taken of the real nature of knowledge. however. is of the passions of the senses. Moksha of XXII. From increase of know- ledge and quieting of the passions of the senses there arises the destruction of all that is commonly considered as merit and demerit . and looked upon sacrifice and priestcraft as hindrances rather than as helps to true freedom and the spirit.

the king of the gods. is meant . what is seen and instead of Veda we meet with >Sabda. The Pramanas of the Mimamsa would apply to the world of Avidya or nescience See only. perception. the Northern Kurus. as. are measured or proved by the Prama?ias. word. Munis such as Vasish^a must be accepted as authorities.DUJ7KHA. or measures. What- ever cannot be proved by either sense or inference has to be accepted as Apta-va&ana. such as. right affirmation. is sometimes called Drish^am. DuAkha. We saw in the beginning how . inference. i. the golden mountain. &c. but the meaning if it is the same. all virtues. and endowed with relied upon.. and who can therefore be These three Prama?ias. and AnuApta-va&ana (Samkhya). mana. 14. weighed by a balance. are so called because in the same way as in common life grains are measured by measures such as a Prastha. times. or nymphs of Svarga. elemental substances. man who is explained as a name for a assiduous in his work. actually applies to ordinary three or it 359 the six name of Pratyaksha. XXIV. Meru. the existence of Iridra. The names vary someVedanta-Sutras II. and sandal wood. inference of rain from the rising of clouds. inference of fire from the rising of smoke. the For all these Apsaras. free from hatred Apta is arid passion. the Tattvas also. The last paragraph in the Tattva-samasa points back to the first. inference of water from the appearance of cranes. is illustrated by the usual examples. for Sensuous what is perceived. learned. the Bhavas (their modifications). for instance. &c. never to the true world of Brahman. the principles. and the Bhutas. things.

from a study of the Tattva-samasa. greed. I was cpiite aware that the Karikas or the Sutras might have supplied us with a clearer and better -arranged account of that philosophy. The True Meaning of the Sawkhya. But if I am right. If a Brahman is affected by this threefold pain. &c. If we ask what was meant by that threefold pain. as a desire for water arises in a thirsty man. heat. Adhyatmika is pain arising from the body. such as is thieves. Adhidaivika caused by divine agents. &c. folly. that the Tattva-samasa is older than either.. the doctrine of the great sage Kapila. such as is due to desire. I have followed entirely the Tattva-samasa. union with what is disliked. whether produced by wind. anger. overcome by fold pain. and thus is finished the commentary on the Sutras of the Tattva-samasa. Freedom from pain. In giving an account of the Samkhya. separation from what is liked. and Adhidaivika. Adhibhautika is pain that arises from other living is it is that beings. without mixing it up with the Karikas or Sutras.. three- a Brahman was introduced who. is not born again. a desire to know (the reason) arises in him. or phlegm. took refuge with the great Jfo'shi Kapila. wind. rain. Whoever knows the philosophy which is contained This is in the Tattva-samasa. &c. or final beatitude. Adhibhautika. the answer Adhyatmika. is cattle. as we are told.360 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and from the mind (Manas). as pain arising from cold. wild beasts. all under the direction of the Vedic pain that Devas. &c. bile. envy. is to be gained. it seemed to me more important that we should know what . thunderbolts.

no doubt.NATURE OF PAIN. or what kind of comfort. and . Nature of Pain. all that is essential can be found in the Samasa. do we find what we most value in every philosophy. nor in the Tattva-samasa. we can easily see how this dry system was developed in later times. If we were asked why such a system should ever have been imagined and elaborated. the 361 Samkhya really was in its original form. such as Kapila. should seek advice from a philosopher. All we can learn is that a man crushed by the burden of what is called the threefold misery. believing that he could procure for him entire freedom from all his troubles. but as an appaacross Here we come rent anomaly or imperfection in the universe. which can promise no more than a temporary happiness on earth or in Heaven. By comparing the Tattva-samasa with the Karikas and Sutras. the Karikas. an insight into the mind and heart of the founder of that philosophical system. if only we try to arrange the dry facts for ourselves. It must be confessed. something like a really human sentiment. and seeing no hope of relief either by means of good actions or of sacrifices. that neither in the Sutras. it could have afforded to any human being. not only as actual suffering. We can well understand why pain. whether intellectual or moral. and it is world in which he found himself. should have opened man's eyes to the fact that there was something wrong in the or limited in his nature. But though the Karikas and Sutras give us a more systematic account of the Sawkhya. we should indeed have little to answer.

' This seems 1 human by the ancient Indian philosophers. however low an opinion they may otherwise have formed of Indra and Agni. or dumb. then in a former No deed (Karman) good or bad. in a wider sense. must have existed already before this question of the origin of suffering could well have been mooted but religion seems rather to have increased the difficulty of the questioner than solved it. and an excellent principle it was. of deeds done. How then could : they be the authors of suffering. Jt was but another version of what we mean by eternal punishment. was that all that seemed wrong in the world must have been the effect of causes. This was the fundamental principle of their ethics. the origin of evil. who shrink from charging any divine power with injustice or cruelty towards men. or mad. particularly of that suffering. quite intelligible that this consciousness of his limitation should have acted as the first impulse to an inquiry for the cause of it. could ever be without its effect. bodily or mental. if not in this.362 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The gods or god. nay was first brought to life. Visvakarman or Brahma. and it certainly did so in India. or deaf. for it has rightly been observed that . its reward or punishment. for which the individual was clearly not responsible. even in their imperfect conception. small or life. Here then it was that philosophy was called in. nay even of Prar/apati. without which the world would it fall to pieces . and the answer which to felt have been keenly gave as to the origin of suffering or. were generally supposed to be good and just. such as being born blind. This would naturally lead on either to a religious or to a philosophical A religion solution. great.

however. acts can be shaken means only. And here the bold answer was. because man himself had made it what it was. though the seeds themselves were the deeds performed by men. and with it all bodily sufferings might seem to end. a personal God. Yes. and annihilated. from all the bondage of the He must world. as independent actors. But though this ought to have sufficed to convince men that the world was exactly as it ought to be. cannot hang in the air. man must learn what he really is.NATURE OF PAIN. for the body decays and dies. whether good or evil. namely. is 363 in reality but another name This idea of eternal love. whether. off In order to achieve this deliverance from all suffering. in fact. there arose question which could not well be suppressed. though allowing deeds to have their effects. just as the giver of rain enables seeds to grow. man's former of his fellow creatures . they went so far as to admit at least the superintending care of a Divine Being. learn that he is not the body. In some cases. and therefore liable to take all their consequences upon themselves. But this is again denied. it presupposes an eternal lover. Whether it was beyond the power of man ever to put an end to the unbroken and irresistible sequence of the effects of the deeds of himself and a new the cycle of life and death. whether as an individual or as a member of a class. eternal punishment for eternal love. or what was called Samsara. and could not have been otherwise. would go on for ever. but by one by means of knowledge or philosophy. a creator and ruler of the world but even this idea Indian philosophers would : not have taken for granted. from all limitation. because through an in- . the Samsara can be stopped.

namely. blissful in its independence and in the complete aloofness from everything else. or as Atman. the view of the Vedanta. Their Moksha or Nirvana was not meant for Vergotterung. not even for the Vergottung of Eckhart it was meant for complete freedom. The former was. and will vanish again like everything else. independent. freedom from all conditions and limitations. perfect. what is called the Purusha or the Atman. Brahman. or the individual person. but they differ The view which the Vedanta took of man has sometimes been mistaken for human apotheosis. Both may have had the same roots. and whose eminence they could have reached. in their later growth. or as Purusha. undetermined by any qualities. the latter is the view of the Samkhya-philosophy. The Divine which they meant was the Divine in man. as the eternal Subject. or as something beyond all names that had ever been given to the Divine. and what they wanted was reconciliation between the Divine within and the Divine without. Then what remains ? There remains behind the body. as we saw. whether as recovery of the Divine as Brahman. just as learn therefore that for the cir- he not even what also has been meant by the Ego. and that Self is to be recognised either as identical with what was in earlier times conceived and called the Divine. . the Unconditioned. and behind the Ego. liable to suffer for it was is in this life. agency (Adnshtfa or Apurva) a new Ego would its spring up. Ego formed by surroundings or cumstances. the Eternal. self. the Self. clom.364 visible INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. A man must is former acts. sophers there were no theoi left But people forget that for these philo- whose company man could have joined. and absolute in itself. in fact.

of anything beyond our bodily senses. None of them seems to me to have so completely realised what may be called the idea of the soul as the Phoenix. and hence was carefully distinguished in India from the atheism of the Nastikas or nihilists. a world that must exist. soaring towards which are more real than anything that can regions be called real in this life. who denied the existence of anything transcendent. It is true that the Samkhya-philosophy was accused of atheism. of admitting an active or limited personal god. but they are visions which. consumed by the fire of thought from his own ashes. solutions Whatever we may think of these two of the world's great riddle. if you like. . satisfied 365 in his and blissful in his own being and own thinking. would be philosophically most unfair. and it does call the Samkhya atheistic. whether of ancient or modern times. Such views cannot be and rising criticised as we criticise ordinary systems of religion or morality. The most curious thing is that such views could be held by the philosophers of India without bringing them into conflict with the representatives of the ancient religion of the country. we cannot but admire their originality and their daring. but that atheism was very different from what we mean by It was the negation of the necessity it.NATUKE OF PAIN. however different in its eternal silence from what we and from what the ancient seers of India imagined it to be. to have seen is like having been admitted to the vision of another world of . particularly if we compare them with the solutions proposed by other philosophers. of anything divine. To and the Vedanta not. They are visions.

It was a common belief in India that man could. There are ever so many legends to that or Deva. to start from such opposite points of view as the Vedanta and the Samkhya. acquired the strength and fitness necessary for so arduous a task. by a previous severe discipline. or at all events as not prohibited. At first sight no two philosophies would seem to be so different from each other. provided always that the students had. but it was by no means so. nay. How different the world of thought in India was from our own. if we consider the popular superstitions of the Hindus at the time. Vedanta and Samkhya. The Vedantist of the school of /Sa?>zkara looks upon the whole world.366 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. explanations. as a phenomenal manifestation of an unknown power which he There is nothing beside it. . We have thus finished our account of the Vedanta and of the Sa?>ikhya-philosophy. raise himself to the status of a god. by severe penance. including animate and inanimate nature. absurd. including the small gods and the still smaller men. the Indian priesthood great credit that they treated both systems as orthodox. nothing calls Brahman. and yet in India they seem quite 'bond fide. we may see by an extraordinary defence set up for the so-called atheism of the It seems to us perfectly Samkhya-philosophy. . This might no doubt be called apotheosis effect. was expressly stated that it was in order to put an end to such vain desires of becoming and it personal gods that Kapila ignored or left out of question the existence of such theomorphic or anthropomorphic beings as could ever excite the We are hardly prepared for such rivalry of men.

He accepts the this was not $amkara's theory. but one answer is possible. not. never see it or know it.VEDANTA. How could that eternal Brahman ever give rise to the world. Hence nothing remains but ful phenomenal to ascribe the changecharacter of the world to something else. but so far only. 367 that can be called real except this one invisible Then came the question. whatever name be given to This view of the it. not only as its efficient. and it was clearly that of Ramanu^a and his followers. impossible to think that this eternal Being. however. That Brahman it world. ever passing away. and consequently never. two facts that the world is changing and unreal. to our individual ignorance. and yet that the is real cause of it. incapable of change. and that the Brahman. to ignorance. such it. . as it really is. But whence Brahman. and Aviveka. that is. We we have become Ved^ntists. according to the Vedanta. is as we see it and live in changeful. and. as he starts with the idea of there being but one real being from eternity to eternity. Brahman. AVIDYA. This ignorance or Avidya. this phenomenal world ? or rather. until real. but to some primeval ignorance directed towards Brahman as manifested and seen. It is universe as a development of Brahman was possibly the original view taken by Badaraya?ia. is the world. Avidya. who But explain the world as an evolution (Pari/iama). is is The phenomenal world. Vedanta. if indeed there is any- thing material in the objects known to the Vedantist? Under the circumstances thus given. could ever change or be changed. in the Vedantic sense of that word. so far as real. but also as its material cause. AND AVIVEKA.

e. should of course ask at We Whence comes is it ? what How can that Avidy& or that Maya. is not to be called real.368 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. though O 7 for a while we are divided from it. which what we once. or as Maya. is avoided by looking upon Brahman. or is answerable for call creation. but ourselves also. must not be called something The great difficulty how Brahman could ever be affected by Avidya. the time under a cloud or forgetful of itself. and. other Vedantists differ from $a?kara. and represent Avidy& as an actual . the only thing that exists ? The answer given by $amkara. was that we know as a fact that Avidy4 or Nescience that it is is there. The Avidya. power (/Siakti) of Brahman. While that state of Avidya lasts the true Brahman. We individual souls. though real. as soon as we soon as we are able to annihilate is it given Vedantist holds that nothing that can be annihilated can claim true reality for itself. as for to us by Vidya or knowledge. nothing therefore that could ever have dominion over Brahman. in fact. is one and all though here again. masculine. All such views are excluded by the postulate that Brahman is free. that is the never really unreal. but we see also know through it. can be in full reality nothing but Brahman. such as by the Vedanta-philosophy. and it be anything. may become the creator and ruler of the world. because forgetful of Brahman through Avidya. illusive power. neuter. while affected by Avidya or seen through Avidya. i. which satisfied his mind. again. in fact performs. Therefore it is. if not again Brahman. which is a weakness or a defect. it is nothing by the side of Brahman. Brahma. if not the minds of other Vedantists. as may become to us . as not there.

containing in itself the possibilities of all By itself it has no consciousness. supplying the instruments of perception and thought. may be called the undeveloped matter or Urstoff. receive worship from his creatures. But in order to account for the world of experience. because the idea which it of every philosophy. It is. Avidya is lifted. as little as could ask that question with regard to Brahman. it Bb . or what he is and always has been. or Lord. this creator also recedes and is restored at once to his true state and He. or Selfhood. that is Brahman. 369 But as such. a word often translated by Nature.SAMKHYA. it has been. the so-called Isvara. The Samkhya takes what seems a very different These attitude towards the problem of the world. Sawkhya. not as if we had ever been divided from it. but only as having been blinded for a while by Avidy& so as to forget ourselves. becomes Creator. but in reality untranslatable. but at the same time. soon as the cloud of. If call we represents has never arisen in our philosophy. And it develops not only into an objective or material world. PrakHti things. both what perceives and what is perceived. . and thereby recover our true Brahmahood. AVIVEKA. It accepts the the Samkhya is decidedly dualistic. the whole Brahman and we ourselves also remember dignity. it simply grows or develops into consciousness when seen by Purusha. whole objective universe as real. into what we should the subjective or intellectual world. our true Self. attitudes towards the world form indeed the kernel the Vedanta monistic. Aviveka. The call we question whence it came is never asked. and calls it Praknti. and it has had no beginning.

This is an important condition. operative. tellect (rouy). such as ' (/fAand. so long as Praknti is at work so long only as it is perceived by a Purusha or a true Self. but really a kind of perception that involves something like what we should call inPrak?-iti. and always passing through a process of evolution. is the lighting up of Praknti or dull matter by intelligence. the Samkhya philosopher saw clearly enough that dead. and to the recognition that the world exists for us in the form of knowledge only. inert matter alone would not account for the world. Therefore If call Prak?^'ti we he makes develop into Buddhi. 3) Let me multiply myself. In the cosmical sense the development of the world is often spoken of as Samashfi. under the eye of a Purusha. according to passages of Sruti and : Smriti. me procreate. though it supplies. is really meant by Buddhi in this place.' the creation of . Thus Vu//lfma-Bhikshu (Sa?>tkhya-Sutras I. no doubt. 63) remarks As. 2. let Up. and as applied to each individual it goes by the name of Vyash^i. It is the Indian is ' Let there be light. as far as I can see. commonly translated by perception. is supposed that this undeveloped PrakHti it is always noticed or perceived by a Purusha (Self). possibly importance in the great development of the universe. This would come very near to the recognition of the subjectivity of all our knowledge. in the psychological sense. What. the possibility of the intelligence of the individual also. It cannot be taken here in an exclusively psychological sense. VI. the great. and also perceptible. matter. so as to render it perceptive.' In this stage Praknti in order to called indicate its Mahat.370 is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. dull.

but begins to perceive as root Budh. and inert to the world. as force. For shortness sake. however. perceiving or perception. as yet. cannot work without Ahamkara. it is sometimes said that Abhimana in the or Ahamkara is the cause of creation. the cosmical Buddhi. &c. identified with Manas or Anta^karana. really the cause of the creation of the as world. the elements. neither subjective nor objective. requires a new development before it can serve for conscious intellectual work. as we must always remember. though not quite correctly.SAA/KHYA. Budh means And as a sleeping person is dull literally to awake. Buddhi exists in human nature as the power of perception. for end all the Vikaras or evolutes serve one and the same purpose. i. AVIVEKA. if I am B b 2 . the mental activity going on within us. literally I-making or Egoism. according to the S4mkhya..e. which combines and regulates the impressions of the senses. is preceded by Abhimana it e. Perception. but philosophically used with a much larger meaning. as Buddhi is generally explained is Ahamkara Abhimana or subjectivity). is here conceived as a development of Prakriti. and thus becomes Buddhi. two ideas often comprehended by the or to perceive. and not simply the personal organ of deciding. follows that this when part of the individual or psychological development. Prakriti also is inert till it is awakened (Pra-buddha). 371 (i. is But as a cosmic Buddhi that essential condition of all which gives light as the knowledge. namely. which. and is after- wards developed into the senses. This Buddhi. we shall see hereafter. and as. and it is then. to awaken soon as he is awake. the powers of light and thought. preceded by an activity of Buddhi.

all this development remains without real consciousness. Nature. Spirit who by becoming conscious of Prakrit! and all works. such as sight and light. perception and thought as an instrument. therefore. would seem to be the nearest any real perception can take place. into subject and object.372 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and therefore in one sense the same thing. only viewed from different points of view. whole world. the faculties as well as the corresponding qualities of sense-perception. ready made by Prakrit! for the use of the Purusha. the phenomenal reality of hope I have understood this train of thought rightly. the division of the of itself. but a self-conscious soul. the elements of the senses as well as of the sense-objects. and in consequence of object also. right. are modifications of the same Prakrit!. as that which produces the sense of subject. even after it has reached the stage of Buddhi. and as changed at last into the material reality of the sentient powers on one side. Lastly. but there is much that Does Kapila really look upon requires fuller light. produces what is the only reality of which we have any conception. the next step is that it produces the Tanmatras. smelling and odour. as subjective and objective. its the attention of some Purusha. and its differentiation as subjective and objective. and the objective world on the other. that before is. tasting and savour. All these. approach. After this development of Prakrit! into Buddhi. feeling and touch. requires. till it attracts or Self. though naturally there can be no subjectivation without simultaneous objectivation. ] . in spite of being lighted up or rendered capable of perceiving and being perceived. hearing and sound. as we should say. Subjectivation.

nay. generally ascribed to the working Gunas feel ? Much may be said for either view. 1. but in the end both Vedanta and Sa?7ikhya look upon what we call reality as the result of a temporary error.SAJfKHYA. 24. therefore. like a telescope. call it nescience. is ? the difference between the two views of the universe There is a difference in the mode of representation. and his freedom from PrakHti (Karika 66). we may well ask. it is hardly fair to . 373 till remaining inert. Where then. want of discrimination. philosophers like Vi^wana-Bhikshu recognised this original similarity in the tendencies both of the Vedanta and the Samkhya. it is actually said to have the one object only of evoking at last in the Purusha a revulsion. but to a want of discrimination (Aviveka) with the Samkhya philosopher (S. and this want of discrimination is actually called by the Vedantic term of Avidya in the Yoga-Sutras II. no doubt. do not competent to pronounce so decided an opinion as others have done on this subject. AVIVEKA. the Samkhya explains it by the temporary union bet ween Purusha and Prak?^'ti. and in the end a clear recognition of his complete independence. or is it the first glance of Purusha at Prakn'ti in its state of Avyakta or chaos. If the Vedantist explains what we call Creation as the result of Avidya or Nescience. or anything else. it is looked through by the Purusha. Thus the creation of the phenomenal world and our position in the phenomenal world are due to nescience (Avidya) with the Vedantist. This union is said to arise from a want of discrimination (Aviveka). S. 5 5). that gives the of the I first is which impulse impulse to the activity of PrakHti. If. and it is not in the highest sense a real union. because it vanishes again by dis- criminating knowledge (Viveka). illusion.

and their plurality is conceived as eternal. one sun reflected in the countless waves of the world-ocean according to the latter there are many Purushas. as it seems to me. therefore. as it were. Where then their is the difference ? If their later defenders forgot and laid greater stress on the points of difference than on the points of similarity between them. is that between the Brahman of the Vedanta.374 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and the many Purushas of the Sawkhya. . According to the former there is in reality but one Atman or Self. Greater. it was but right that those who could interest see deeper. No doubt these two philosophies diverged in their later development. accurate reasoning on the part of the Sii^khyas. the difference between and want of discrimination. according to Vedanta and Sa??ikhya. to a want of . veka. than according to Kapila they are. If the Vedantists desired to arrive at what discrimination is called Atma-anatma-viveka. not as phenomenal only. as the causes of the world. discrimination between Purusha and Prak?'/ti. should bring to light whatever features there were left of the original family likeness between common the two philosophies. however. the Sa??ikhyas looked forward to Prakr/ti-purusha-viveka. blame them as having mixed and confounded the two. but they started with the same object in view. and vegetal souls. Such a peculiarity must not be slurred over in an . human. Atman and Purusha. there is a radical difference and this is due. According to $awkara the individual souls are not. between Atman and Anatman. AviNescience. Avidya. as many as there are divine. animal. On this point. and they advanced for a time in the same direction.

call him Adam or Manu or any other name. it ought have been clear to Kapila that the plurality of such a Purusha would involve its being limited. as men are descended from man. and unconditioned. It may last as and at be said that this we have It is is going beyond Kapila. as eternal. determined or conditioned. at all events. that we should see all this clearly. many Purushas. they would not be Purushas. of course. just as the many gods had to be recognised as in reality the One God without a second. just as Vi^nana-Bhikshu and other . but surely a right to do so. if the Purushas were supposed to be many. the absolute subject. to self-contradictory. Kapila has certainly brought in for- ward every possible argument plurality of individual Purushas. but he has forgotten support of the that every plurality presupposes an original unity. only in that the Purusha was never conceived as the material cause of the universe. necessary. but it is fair to point out what the reason of this aberration may From a higher point of view the Purusha of Kapila is really the same as the Brahman or the Atman of the Vedanta. and would render the character of it lute. while Brahman differs was. and being Purusha they would by necessity cease to be many. necessitate the admission of one Purusha. In this way Vi^?7ana-Bhikshu was right that Kapila did not differ so much from Badarayana as it would seem. from a metaphysical point of view.ATMAN AND PURUSHA. It have been. and that as trees in the last resort presuppose the tree. 375 account of the Samkhya-philosophy. because. mere mistakes of Brahman. if the Purusha was meant as absoimmortal. though. with the important proviso that everything material was due to Nescience. Apart from that.

in fact. We have no such remnants of an earlier period of philosophy anterior to the Sutras. the final outcome of ages of inquiry and discussion. changes for better or for worse. c. and possibly of some of the more ancient parts of the Mahabharata but in other respects we are left without any earlier facts. Nor should we ever forget that our philosophical Sutras. in order to perceive the unity that underlies the apparent diversity in the philosophy of India. though not without a firm conviction that such perfect systems as we find in the Sutras cannot have sprung up in a day. it can do . philosophers saw it clearly. If this is seen and accepted in a historical spirit. Sutras are. where the two follow different roads. with the exception of the as yet unsystematised Upanishads. but that they must have passed through many . are but the last outcome of the philosophical activity of a whole country. We should remember that the grammatical Sutras of Pa?nni are contradicted again and again by grammatical forms which have fortunately been preserved to us in the earlier Brahmarcas and Mantras of the Vedic period. and that we are entirely ignorant of their historical antecedents. still less from one brain. before they could assume that final and permanent form in which The they are now presented to us in literature. whether of the fourteenth century A. whatever their age. if he could only see that.. or the fifth century B. It would seem then to follow from Vi^nanaBhikshu's remarks that in India a philosopher might at one and the same time have been a follower of the Vedanta as well as of the Sa?>*khya. they started nevertheless from the same point and were proceeding towards the same goal.376 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. D.

These two. they were all Snm'ti. succeeded in discover- of both of them. or the Purusha. We thought in ancient India. at least to my mind. In one respect Vi</Mna-Bhikshu.ATMAN AND PURUSHA. petrified. though no doubt there is danger of the distinctive features of each system becoming blurred. and that during that period philosophical ideas. though not $ruti. if we dwell too much on what they share in common or on what they may have shared in common at an earlier period of their growth. but the six Darsanas or systems of philosophy were orthodox. in the Sutras that these schools It was became sterilised and far. whenever Vedanta and Samkhya shared the same should always remember that there must have been a period of unrestricted growth of ideas. might seem to be contradicted by the Vedanta and Samkhya which show that the Self. as they represent the Self as ing the common background endowed with qualities. he attempted to do the same for the Nyaya and Vaiseshika. to mention him only. cannot be endowed with qualities . Hence his natural desire to show that they did not on any essential points contradict each other. all To him not only Vedanta and Samkhya. but this is not so. After he had reconciled to his own satisfaction the conflicting tenets of Vedanta and Samkhya. whether true or false. were common property and could be freely philosophical adopted by different schools of philosophy. has certainly seen more rightly by not resorting at once to the idea that actual borrowing must have taken place. and had certainly. Nyaya and Vaise- . as he says. 377 no harm. On one point Vi^nana-Bhikshu may have gone too yielding to a temptation which does not exist for us.

They present themselves as independent philosophies. 1. To the followers of the Nyaya-philosophy Brahman. 1 1 truth. that the Nyaya and Vai.378 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the usefulness Nyaya and Vaiseshika. the Absolute. as he thinks.. standing but as unaffected by pain and joy. to the effect The question which the Sawkhya may seem have left to unanswered. quite as nor do I remember themselves Ka/<ada and where Gotama any passage represent their teaching as a mere step leading to the higher knowledge of Vedanta or Sawkhya.seshika were intended as a preparation only. seem to be any ancient evidence to support this view of Vu/mma-Bhikshu's. not only as different from the body. as neither suffer- what marks the ing nor enjoying. as slowly preparing him for the acceptance of the highest truth. but which is really unanswer- . of the Sa?>ikhya-doctrine might dazzle the beginner. however. undefinable or inexpressible. but the other systems are never represented as merely preparations for it. The full light. to be qualified by pain and joy. This is first advance toward a right underof the Self. of the hence. however. is AnirvaA'aniya. and also. There does not. as neither thinking nor acting in any way. still less that they existed as systems before the doctrines of the Samkhya began to in- fluence the thinkers indeed mentioned in as the highest The Sawkhya is the Mahabharata (XII. nor as the other Darxanas : much any utterance of P>adarayaa or Kapila that such preparation was required. they teach that the Self is at all events different from the body. according to Vi^ftana-Bhikshu. as a first step only towards the truth and though they admit the Self . 98) of India. Origin of Avidyfi. shika are intended.

is said to stand for the whole of creation. or subjectivity as inseparable from objectivity. as superintended by Purusha. able. beginning with Buddhi or intellect..THE SASTRA. within his experience. with all his regard for Aptava&ana. 379 How this Aviveka. institute of reasoned truth. or. is. and going on from Buddhi to Ahamkara. as his own ? What Kapila wishes to teach is that nothing is in reality his own or belongs to him except his Self. in fact. we have to 1 confess with the author of the Samkhya-sara (p. asked how Kapila came to know anything about Prakriti or Urstoff which. and how and by what stages the development of Prakr&ti may be supposed to have taken place which led in the end to the delusion of Purusha and made him look on the senses. though without any declared antagonism to the Vedas. these discussions Badarayana had only to appeal to the Veda in support of any one of his statements. could ever have arisen. &c. Kapila. and how we ourselves can know anything about its various developments. 6) that there was nothing but the $astra itself to depend on in support of what may . The If then it is Sastra. and from Ahamkara to the Tanmatras or subtle substances. a real difference And while in all Here we can observe between Sawkhya and Vedanta. on the Aham or ego. the Purusha. as belonging to him. as he calls it. the making of the I or Ego. had evidently meant to reason out his system by himself. on everything. this failure of Purusha to recognise himself as distinct from PrakHti. on the Manas (central sense). nay on Buddhi or intellect. Hence the Sutras of Kapila received the name of Manana-sastra.

Sutras. such as the Sa?ftkhya-karika or the original text of the to Samkhya. and not infer1 ence. Mahat being than that the seven modifications (Vikaras) and For the actual succession in the evolution of AhawkAra from the Mahat. and invisible. When is. those beginning with Buddhi or the distinguished as produced as well as while the first. and that produces every- thing without being itself produced. the S'dstrn alone. no doubt. though there is is hardly a more convenient term to render it by. or from Avyakta. Cosmic. is producing producing. the undeBut we must remember that all these veloped. because inference can only lead us to the conclusion that all effects must have a cause. we are told. undeveloped. Development of Prakriti. the Avyakta. English renderings are very imperfect. it At first sight.. Then what is meant by 6astra here ? . or the whole body of Samkhyaphilosophy. as handed down from time immemorial in various schools in India. nature. or that beginning with the mind in the way in which the Sawkhya-philosophy teaches. seems strange to us to derive Buddhi or Intellect from PrakHti. In place of this one Prakriti we often read of eight Prakrttis. In the Samkhya-philosophy Prakriti is a postulated something that exists.380 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It seems rather be to point the existence of a treatise. that means that it chaotic. called Avyakta. This need not mean more only. felt to l . & from Prakr/ti. be very crude and startling assertions $astra sometimes stands for Veda. but it cannot well be taken in that sense here. while there is no inference to prove either the succession beginning with the elements. can be our authority. but not produced. and of the Mnh. Prak?"iti very different from nature or 0i/o-i?. it is at first.

Some such impulse required by all metaphysicians. Whether we begin with the beginning.BETEOSPECT. the differentiation between perceiver and what is perceived. namely. described as Prakasa. and serve again as causes.IVOVV. another distinction was necessary in this luminous and perceiving mass. to its physical and intellectual activity. while the Avyakta itself. he imagined that it was due to the disturbance of the equilibrium of first was is three constituents (Gunas) that it awakened to life and light or thought. the phenomenal world as reflected by the Indriyas and the Manas. the undeveloped Prakriti. Given the undeveloped PrakHti. or light. or how all that did follow could be traced back to this postu- could account for all lated Prakriti. or potential perception. Retrospect. the lighting up. After going through the long list of topics which form the elements of the Samkhya-philosophy. is conceived by Kapila as Buddhi. the undeveloped PrakHti. has no antecedent cause. between subject and object. the chief condition of all per- After Praknti has thus been lighted up ception. the postulated PrakHti. and hence. This . it may be well to try to give a more general view of Kapila's system. it is but natural that Kapila should have asked himself the question how what was postulated as the beginning. or with the end. 381 forms of Prakn'ti are all effects. a ir^rov K. so long as it is confined to PrakHti. this first awakening of the inert substance. in this so-called Mahat or Buddhi. and become Buddhi. This first step in the development of Prak?"iti. that was to follow. but serves as cause only for all the other forms of PrakHti.

is perdpi. and Taste. ergo cogito. Touch. touching. 18. Hindu Philosophy. which by subjectivation (Snbjectivirung.. or even percipere ? I should prefer to translate When far. that esse. but they contain the possibilities of both. Garbe) rather than by Ego or Egoism. p. and the objects of sound. touch. smelling. Hence. As there is no hearing without sound. the powers of hearing. In their final form the taste. the Sawkhyas seem to have argued. potential perceptilnlia. sight. These five potentialities are Sound. nor what actually hears and sees. They are not yet what is actually heard. the evolution of the Avyakta has gone so the question arises. and corresponding to them as the five five objects of sense. in fact. I believe. If we begin with the objective side. and tasting. as showing that being itself would be impossible unless it were first lighted up. was the work assigned. to Aha?ttkara. odour. according to the division produced by Ahamkara into subject and object. Odour. how this process of perception could take place. neither is there any sound without hearing. the five Tanis But there in the matras are realised as the five subjective powers of perception. &c. . potential Tanmatras stand before us in their 1 Duvies.382 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Tanmatras the potentiality of both. Light. but of this and this only(Tan-matra). how it is possible objectively. which are not the potentialities of everything in general. This step from Buddhi to Ahamkara has been compared to Des Cartes' Cogito ergo sum\ but is it not rather Sum. and differentiated into subject and object. seeing. the answer of Kapila is that there must be Tanmatras (This-only). how perception is possible subjec- tively. seen.

that in order to perception such as it really is. air. 383 material shape. but even this would hardly help us to a clear view of what Kapila really meant by Manas. They all are necessary for the work of perception. and I am far from maintaining that \ve have gained. being in fact the conditio sine qud non of all well- necessary. quite different from the highest Self. might also be called the point of attention and apperception. and tongue. These five supply all possible and real forms under which perception can and does take place. eyes. as we should say. clined to translate One might feel in- Manas by term brain. Only we must guard against taking this Manas.RETKOSPECT. acting as a door-keeper. as yet. and is for a time misled into believing in his identity with the workings of Prakriti. however. or into the solutions which he proposed. It should be account for remembered. to arrange them into percepts. objectively as ether. into concepts also. The Purusha watches the clockwork. which is but really a kind of central organ of perception. water. light. meant to prevent the crowding in of perceptions. is a sixth sense. in addition to the five. This is but a poor attempt to make the Samkhya view of being and knowing intelligible. conception. nose. whether it is called Atman or Purusha. and earth (the five Mahabhutas). a full insight into the problems which troubled Kapila. called Manas. Manas is as much a mere instrument of knowledge and a product of PrakHti as the five senses. subjectively as ear. skin. and all the rest. or mind. as a kind of clockwork. . another. if brain had not It become so unscientific a in our days. generally translated by mind. and. ordered and rational thought. for the true Self.

to is after appropriating it. I feel is.384 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. hand it on to the inner sense. or rather that one Buddhi in its two functions. an illustration in the Sawkhya-tattva36.' they from the householders and hand 'As the seniors of a the governor of the district. could have been admitted by one and the Ahawikara . supreme. nor is it same philosopher. to make them. when them over to they have perceived anything. and the treasurer to the king. not enough simply to repeat the watchwords of any ancient philosophy. but that that it What is we must at least make an attempt to bring those ancient problems near to us. the organ which determines what there is and then hands it over to Aha??ikara. thus do the outer senses. who again remits them to the treasurer. which may be called Avidya. and the Ahawkara. which suggests a very different view of the process of knowing. and that all we call bodies. We are . the supreme Lord. the Manas. our own. to the Buddhi. which are easily accessible in the Sutras. Is Sa?nkhya Idealism ? There to is another point on which it is difficult to come understanding. is no more than the result of an irresistible inference of our mind. and deserves to be taken There is Kaumudi into consideration ' : say.' Here Buddhi. and try to follow the ancient thinkers along the few footsteps which they left behind. whether the Hindus fully realised the a clear We are asked fact that we are conscious of our sensations only. though decidedly different from the cosmic Buddhi that springs from the Avyakta and leads easy to see how these two Buddhis. or the outside or objective world. collect taxes village.

the fundamental error by which. The closing of the mental eyelids would be the dropping of the curtain and the c c close . our Buddhi. more than the development of thoughtless nature as reflected through the senses on our enchanted The riddle of the world which the SamkhyaSelf? philosophy has to solve would then be no more than to account for the mistaken interest which the Self takes in that reflex. not excluding sich. the . and all that remains. is PrakHti as looked at by Purusha. though not our work. he actually identifies himself with those images. that we are not ourselves the cause of our sensations. and that what we call the real. It is within us. after deducting both . our creation blue. it is. our senses. determine not only ourselves. Was this the view taken by the Samkhyas ? Did they see that the our development of the world. the consciousness which he assumes of it. our Ahamkara. the Ego. the sensuously perceiving and perceived world. our Manas. takes place within us.IS SAAfKHYA IDEALISM? 385 no doubt. really take the place of what we call creation. or under our sway. is the light within us that has the power of perceiving by its light that both the Aham. the sky. as Buddhi emerges from Prakriti. and the Tvam. as we should say. that this PrakHti has grown to all that it is. so to we make the sky concave or say. that the light which. the Non-Ego. own bodies. but the whole world. our Tanmatras. This identifying process would. the primary and secondary qualities. but that it is given us. is our growth. from this point of view. for a time at least. that we do not make conscious. But beyond that. das Ding an which we can never know directly. our world is only an inductive world. is no Saft&ara. or.

much in the Sa??ikhya-philosophy would cease to be obscure. Purusha and Prakr/ti. might truly be explained as due to Aviveka. whether Kapila or Asuri or Parl/rasikha. freedom from all cosmic being. by itself. objective. and put an end to that suffering which is the result of bondage or finiteness. . thoughtless. and yet with a constant longing after a higher and truer her part so long only as it . r state. and this final recogni- tion of our cosmic misconception would lead the Self back from the stage of the world to himself. w hile interested in the world. but Prakn'ti as always active why Purusha should sometimes mean the eternal Self. But if we may credit the founders of the Samkhya. was taken as A&etana. would undo all creation. the absence of discrimination between the It would become Self and the imagery of nature. freedom from the world. and sometimes man such as he is or imagines himself to be. and the belief in the reality of things.386 of the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. both objective and subjective. freedom as alone with himself. It sometimes seems to me as if such views had been at the bottom of all Hindu philosophy. with such . drama of the world . intelligible why Prakn'ti should be supposed to play was noticed by Purusha it would explain why Prakn'ti. though forgotten again or obscured by a belief in that reality which determines our practical life (Vyavahara). . believing in the world. By admitting this blending of cosmic and psychological views. the Buddhi of the world and the Buddhi of ourselves would indeed become one. and the Purusha only as subjective. conscious and thinking why in its solitude Purusha was conceived as not active. freedom from pain.

but at last to be set it may be said that she is free by her. because there will always be new Purushas to be enchanted and enchained for awhile. please others who are still looking at her. and so far never annihilated. WHEN FREE. 387 advanced views. and he has ceased to take any interest in the phantasmagoria of the world. all willing also. but to a stranger. and to will. when he seems to see. she does not dance for him. not to the to the Manas. to combine. after the spell of Prakriti has been broken. on Prakrfti. What then becomes of the Purusha. The night. If he does not look. while the Purusha. it is said. whole development of PrakHti. in consequence. leaves the theatre of the world. takes place only when Purusha is looking on the dancer. when Free. hension only. State of Purusha. she She may altogether ceases to try to please him. that is. all joy and pain. and.STATE OF PURUSHA. but who in the end dries his tears and stops his sighs. But this is a question c c 2 . to suffer. if clear to themselves that they really had made it quite human beings cannot have anything but their own knowledge. thrown on him by the Manas and all the products of PrakHti that support the Manas. and as soon as he turns his eyes entirely away from her. ing. we can understand why they should have represented the whole process of perception and combination. and indirectly to Prak?"iti. to rejoice. like a spectator does so by misappre- who is carried away by his sympathies for Hecuba. in all her disguises. Often has the question been asked. and breathes the fresh air of a bright The Samkhya uses this very simile. as belongPurusha or the Self.

while to the truly enlightened (/Santi). Buddhismus von Joseph Dahlmann. but by each in his own fashion. this unfathomable bliss assumed naturally the character of paradisiacal happiness painted in the most brilliant and even sensuous colours. it We see in the Buddhist Suttas how was used by the Buddhists. and l agree with Dr. such as the oneness with Brahman. perfect rest. though it is the Sa?/ikhya-Sutras. and it was worked out by Bud dim as well as by Kapila and Badaniyana. While I Vedanta and Sar/ikhya-philosophy. 1896. Berlin. in the simple sense of but was developed higher and higher. the NiAsreyasa or Non plus ultra. like many technical terms of Buddha's teaching. not interfered with. as that of the higher bliss of the Brahmanic. absent at in It occurs in the Vedanta. freedom from passion.J. in the air in India. . In the eyes of less advanced thinkers. whether ignorance or knowledge. I cannot believe that it was borrowed by the Buddhists from either of those Nirvana was one of the ideas that were systems. has naturally shared the fate of similar conceptions.388 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. joy or sorrow. free and independent. All that can be said is that Purusha. and bliss This ineffable state of the Nirvana of the Buddhists. freed from all PrakHtic bonds. it repreself- sented tranquillity satisfaction. would be what he alone can be. would remain himself. was no doubt originally. perfect and happy in himself. The name itself. till first. Dahlmann that the Buddhist idea of Nirvana was the same. eine Studio zur Vorgeschichto dos S. in the highest sense of the word. unrestricted. 1 in the Nirvana. which no philosophy can be expected to answer. and hence.

Kaivalya. if Kapila had had eyes for the ordinary sufferings only which are entailed on . I must say once more that I cannot yet any evidence for supposing that either Buddha borrowed direct from Kapila or that Kapila borrowed from Buddha. or happiness as a positive predicate of the Negatively. But in spite of Dr. as peculiar Brahman. and wholly unworthy of a great philosopher. His object was to show how pain arose and how pain If freedom from limitation and pain is happiness. probably about the same time. and elaborated them its origin. it would betray end it spring up as naturally in Buddha's philosophy as in that of Badarayawa and They all took their materials from the secured by the Samkhya just as much as by the Vedanta and the Buddhist-philosophy. 389 became altogether negative.MEANING OF PAIN. same stratum of thought. Meaning of Pain. freedom from all limits or fetters. Dahlmann's very learned and very able pleading. but though the Vedantist admits happiness (Ananda) by the side of existence and perception (Sa&-/. while we see it into systems. he does not attempt to explain what kind of happiness he means and some Vedanta philosophers have actually objected to to the highest . It would seem extraordinary. If it had been simply taken over by Buddha from some individual teacher of an established philosophy. Ananda highest Brahman. however. and therefore perfect bliss. as he calls it. this happi- ness may surely be defined as freedom from pain. Kapila does not enter into a minute analysis of see his Nirvana. aloneness. or. that happiness can be can be absolutely removed.

this suffering. Kapila meant something else by pain. as we Purusha. He must have known that there happiness also for them. and therefore very much the same as the Atman of the Vedanta. the even tenour of a man's life. It is true he is after as well as before his release. he tells us. this suffering. or fettered. is not. . also belongs to PrakHti and not to oursuffering selves. must wait for further light. we have to admit not only Prakriti. which is But whatever suffering inseparable from this life. the sons of men. he may have meant. and something between suffering and happiness.390 all is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and Manas to the height or the deptli of individual existence. rising in the form of Buddhi. perception. our Like the whole evolution of PrakHti. Both Purusha and Atman. Ahawkara. limited. He seems to have felt what Schelling felt. the Purusha. Kapila evidently meant by Du/^kha or pain something more than physical or even mental suffering. but that is very different from always being intent on getting rid of the sufferings inherent in life on earth. the method suggested by him for its removal is certainly bold and decided. All imagine. the real or the better and truer Self. it should be remembered. not to the Purushas. With Kapila the Purusha or Self always remains. but likewise another quite independent being. and action. that sadness cleaves to all finite life. In order to explain the world. are absent in Buddha's teaching. namely the consciousness of being conditioned. and by their removal the idea of Nirvana has become But on this point also we almost meaningless.

such as Des Cartes described. imagines therefore that he himself sees and hears. whether in life or in death. above all suffering. ceases her jugglery as soon as Purusha turns away. but acts only as impelled by her nature when looked at by Purusha. Professor Huxley who showed that. from mere sensation to con- . organs of sense. His very body. which has no soul. that takes place through were into a glass in which all For a time by this Purusha. looking as it the doings of Prakn'ti are mirrored. and if we It tion took the rational soul. the Purusha. how- He himself is an I. performing all the functions which we consider our own and which are common to man and animals. always one of and many Purushas. only learn the wisdom of Kapila. that he really possessing all that the world offers to him. as in fact a mere mechanism. if we saw in Prakriti an automaton. he is for ever above the body.R/TI AN AUTOMATON? all 39! only the looker on of Prakrtti. above all sensation. as the chose It was pensante. his . Prakrit! an Automaton? might possibly help us to understand the relabetween Purusha and Praknti better. Nay Prakriti even. are neither he. superadded to the automaton. as a consequence of this assumption. that he himself suffers and rejoices. and unwilling to give it up again. forgets his true nature identifies himself with this image of PrakHti. some strange o want of discernment.PRAK. nor his ever. In the same way all the changes of PrakHti. all our mental conditions might be regarded as simply the symbols (Pratibimba) in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism. nay his mind and his and if he can individuality.

. There is gazed 62. nor Praknti alone. . a new application of the simile mentioned Prakr/ti's Unselfishness.392 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. might be taken as including pain and joy and consequent action. than Prakriti. is bound. at. but as trying herself to open his eyes and make him free from her charms and fetters. wanders dependent is . In many ways PrakHti serves Purusha. after she knows that she has been 6 1. I think. No Purusha from birth to birth. or wander as different she is on Purushas. and is freed/ In fact it would seem that Praknti. ceptual thought. independent of the looker on. does lie become free. the working of PrakHti. read in the Karikas 59-62 As a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage ceases to dance. although that looker on in his enchanted state imagines that he is himself doing what in reality Prak?^'ti is doing This is beautifully illustrated by the simile of the dancing-girl to which we referred before. when she has made ' : We herself manifest to Purusha. 60. and by discrimination become free from them (Kurika 59). We thus get before. therefore really chained. nothing more modest. but who is here represented not only as intent on pleasfor him. has no object in view except that Purusha should in the end perceive his fetters. who she is noble yet does nothing for her in return minded and cares only for the welfare of him who is so ungrateful to her. ing and beguiling Purusha. so does Nature (PrakHti) cease. who does not expose herself again to the gaze of Purusha. in enchanting or binding Purusha.

as soon as Purusha has distinguished between himself and what is not himself. among the Greeks also Pythagoras claimed a subtle its grosser clothing when united with the body. and the Purusha is supposed to be clothed in what called the Liriga-sarira. while all this. The idea of a subtle body by the side of our and we know that gross body is very natural . or subtle body. Until that final liberation has been accomplished and everything like body has been completely removed. Gross and Subtle Body. 393 Here is indeed the Gordian knot of the whole Samkhya-philosophy. transmigration continues. we suffer. that suffers. we imagine that we ourselves do and suffer As soon as this insight has been gained. ethereal clothing for the soul apart from by no means as clear as we could Both Samkhyas and Vedantists agreed in admitting the necessity of a subtle body in order to make the process of migration after death intelligible. or vehicle. till our eyes are learn that it is Prak?^'ti that sees all acts. liberation is achieved at once. Whatever we may think of the truth of such a system we canis not help admiring its consistency throughout. that kills and is killed. and the dance of life is ended for ever. In the Vedanta the name of that body. . and so long as we do this. We are and exposed to opened and we kinds of pain. and its boldness and heroism in cutting the Gordian knot. We believe for a time in our own physical nature and in the nature by which we are surrounded.GROSS AND SUBTLE BODY. But the exact nature of that subtle body and its relation to the grosser body is wish it to be. at least so far as the liberated Self is concerned.

. eyes. or on the process by which the one affects or controls the other. The Vedantists are. the vital spirit. This subtle and invisible body or Suksh ma-sarira remains. but as their functions only (Vritti). such as ears. and but neither the Upanishads nor the Vedanta-Sutras are always quite this in the subtle body . This from the to Vedanta. Vedana (sensation). according to the Vedanta. and the individual soul recovers its true being in Brahman.394 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. till true knowledge arises. and of Manas (mind). and consists of the senses of the body (Dehendriyas) it on the subject. of Buddhi (intellect). dissolution of the coarse At the final body we are told that the Indriyas are absorbed in the Manas. according the so-called Upadhis (conditions). which at death leaves the coarse subtle material body. this in the (7iva. Its physical life is dependent on the Mukhya Prana. implying beyond itself the Vishayas. consistent . the Its Indriyas or senses are not specialised spirits. however. the individual. by no means consistent in their views on these two bodies. objects required for sensation and presupposed already by Manas. The Vedantists look upon or this thin and transparent vehicle of the soul as a seminal or potential (Vigra akti) body. both perceptive (Buddhindriyas) and active (Karmendriyas). without being injured itself. seems to me useless to attempt to reduce clear in their views and their various guesses to one uniform theory. the subtle and the coarse body (Sukshmaw and Sthulam $ariraw). to be taken as the external organs of sense. body arises. &c. or Asraya for the journey of the soul from existence to existence is Sukshma-sarira. the Manas In the Mukhya Prami. and on the five Pra/ias. the subtle body.

and unchanging. being itself what it has been made to be by former works. sinews. . and (9-18) the ten senses. till final freedom is obtained by the Purusha and not only the gross body. hair. flesh. (2) Ahamkara. It forms what we should call our personality. (3) (4-8) This body is of bhutas. is difficult to say. or the Ativahika-sarira. course invisible. is formed of eighteen elements of (i) Buddhi. accord- ing to some Samkhya teachers. or the sign-body. and it likewise determines by means of its acquired dispositions the gross bodies into which it has to enter from life to life. for the time being. 9. identifies himself with the subtle body. and causes the difference in the characters of individuals. and Suwkhya-Sutras III. have still to say a few words about the charge of atheism brought against the Samkhyas. but without it the coarse body would be useless. The Sthula-sarira or coarse material body consists. blood. the five Tanmatras or SukshmaManas. The subtle or inner body. All fitness for reward and punishment attaches to it. and is made up of six coverings. The Atheism of Kapila. unless Eka is taken for the Purusha who. of the five or four coarse elements (Bhutas). sometimes called the vehicle. who also is reabsorbed in Prakrit i. according to others of the element of the earth only.THE ATHEISM OF KAPILA. bones and marrow. 395 In the Samkhya-philosophy this Sukshma-sarira appears as Linga-sarira. but the subtle body are all alike . It seems certainly strange that at this early time Karika 40. not to the Purushas 1 . sarira should be said to consist of seventeen 1 We Why the Linga- and one (Sapta- dasaikam) elements.

we are told. He had. should have been said by Kapila either for nothing or against these beings. Prakriti. selves. Prakr/ti. and then working. Both Pra^apati and Visvakarman. as we are told. meeting another cripple who As they could not live by them- they lived together. before his time. unless when looked at by Purusha. no out-spoken atheism in that sense. Most likely at his time and hymns addressed Devas of the popular had religion already been eclipsed in the minds of thoughtful people by one Deity. could not walk. There is no direct denial of such a being. in fact. as proceeding out of something that is real (Sat- . but there is none for God. whether as the creator or as the ruler of all things. the lame one mounting on the shoulders of the blind one. that traveller. because the Sawkhya-philosophy looks upon every thing that is. This has sometimes been illustrated by what must have been a very old fable. But even such a supreme Deva or Adhideva is never asserted or denied by Kapila.396 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. however. are mentioned in the Tattva-samasa- bhashya. There is a place in his system for any number of subordinate Devas. Purusha the lame must remember. though blind. him in but there is simply no place left for the system of the world. put nearly everything that belonged to God into Prakriti. whether Pra^apati. and as working without a conscious purpose. the different BrahmS. is always conceived as real. as elaborated by the old philosopher. viz. We was the blind. or Brahman. sacrifices and surrounded as he no doubt was by and to the innumerable Vedic Devas. for his benefit only. only that this Prakriti is taken as purely objective. that of a cripple who could not see.

difference 397 Arid here we see again. and in that he does not differ much says respect from Kant that there are no logical proofs to establish that existence. karyavada). know that Kant. and Prakrit! enters on the course of her unceasing labours. there is tension. The Gu?ms. are first in a state of equipoise. Sawkhya-Philosophie. 202. but neither does he offer any something real. the fundamental between the Sa?nkhya and the other philoas sophies. honest thinker as he was. while the Samkhyas derive what is from what is l If it be asked how the unconscious Prakr&ti began to work and attract the attention of Purusha. and ending with the last of the twenty-four Tattvas. . p. denies distinctly the existence even of the purely mythological gods. he says. beginning with the emanation of Buddhi. that Kapila nowhere puts himself into a hostile He nowhere attitude towards the Divine idea. and based the arguments for his belief in 1 We God on purely Garbe. which is strange nor does he enter on any arguments to indeed He simply disprove the existence of one only God. Va&aspati-Misra has pointed out in his commentary on the Samkhya-karikd 9.THE ATHEISM OF KAPILA. such proofs for denying it. The Buddhist takes the real world as the result of nothing. There is this difference also between the atheism of Kapila and that of other atheistic systems of philosophy. such as Indra. . but as soon as one of the three preponderates. Kapila has an answer ready. the Vedantist takes the unreal world as proceeding from Naiyayika and Vaiseshika derive what does not yet exist from what does exist. . rejected all the logical proofs of the existence of Deity as insufficient.

neither merit nor demerit. existing any longer arid other for him. he is certainly not like allowed to be immoral. but produce effect Karman and transmigration. to Kapila. could hardly have seriously believed in. It has also been said that Kapila's only without a God. only God. will be better discussed when we reach the Yoga-philosophy and have to examine the argu- ments produced by Pata%ali against Kapila. Immorality of the Sawkhya. the First Cause of the world. grounds. This whole question. were unconsciously approaching We should not forget that with the true Purusha. and means. in the whole of his philosophy. virtue nor vice. we should say. a denial of many people Devas rather than the denial of the one. the existence of a supreme God. generally called Isvara. . The Sawkhya. possibly however. of anything The Devas he like animus against a belief in God. can never cease. strong moral sentiment in the belief in (deed) Kapila also holds that deeds. the Vedanta implies systems of Indian philosophy. right to assume anything of the kind with regard to Kapila. and in support of the admission of a Supreme Being. except at the time of Moksha. in worshipping them. atheism meant. when once done. we ought to mark his impartiality and the entire absence. Purusha in his perfect state is noning moral. the Lord.398 ethical INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but likewise system is not without any But though it is quite true that. when brought face to face with this great religious Though we have no and moral problem. and yet he spares them and allows them to with the reservation that people. exist. accordmorality.

' The story which follows is that a young prince who was born . so as to recall the whole lesson which they were meant to A doctrine of Kapila's. assigned to a collection of stories. Some teach. each of which is meant to illustrate some are very much to the point. may be true that mere calculation in this way morality is of consequences. as a preliminary. the dispraise of passion and the praise of disThese are represented as forms of Buddhi. inhering in Buddhi. still less that it encourages vice. as Rupas or Bhavas. passion. Sutras. because the other Indian philosophies. deserves to be mentioned. besides the admission of virtue and vice. but one more feature of the Samkhya that it is not found in may be supposed to have suggested to the Buddhists their method of whole chapter of the teaching by parables. Nay. 'As in the case of the son of a king. is the fourth. Samkhya There is Parables. one of the unalterable convictions in the Hindu mind. There is. after effect. which is only another name for reasoning. it is distinctly added that going upward is due to virtue. and they can be appealed to by one word. The first is meant to illustrate the complete change that comes over a man when he has been taught his true nature by means of the Samkhya.SAMKHYA PAKABLES. Anyhow there is no ground for saying that Kapila's system ignores ordinary morality. and therefore following the Liiiga-sarira from birth to birth. forms or states. but even such a calculation. going downward to vice. would serve as reduced to a strong incentive to morality. It is really in- dispensable to final liberation. both in this 399 This is life and in the lives to come. so that virtue.

and assumed a truly royal bearing. is 'like a cut-off hand. The . and not a being different from him in this phenomenal ' world. and recovers his true nature.400 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. imagines that he is a /Sudra. When he grew up he naturally thought that he himself was a iSabara. knows that he is a Brahman. after once having surrendered the illusion of the objective. surrenders the idea that he is a material and mortal being.' as no one takes his hand after it has once been cut off. went to him secretly and told him that he was the son of the king. when the possession is over. if even from one small piece of gold one has learnt to know what gold is. posfrom knowing after sessed by Maya. who had found out that the prince was alive. As a Brahman possessed by an evil spirit. and says. and lived accordingly. in the same way God the whole world becomes known. At once the prince gave up the idea that he was a savage. saying As a son of Brahman I am nothing but Brahman. was taken out of his capital and brought up by a $abara. In the same manner a man who has been told his true character by his teacher. under an unlucky star. I am a Brahman.' The seventh illustration and is meant to teach that. But a minister. but. a kind of wild man of the woods. believed that he was a prince. imagines that it Maya has come to an end. is the body.' The commentator adds : an extract from the Garuc/a-Purana which must have been from a Sa?7^khya source borrowed 'As everything that is made of gold is known as gold. thus the soul. and not a Sahara. but it knows its own true being again. no one should a^ain o identify himself witli anything objective.

Neither nets nor anything else was of any avail for bringThus ing her back. true knowledge also will disappear by one act of negligence. that is in the sixteenth century. must have existed the time in the Parampara of the Brah- mans. had seen a beautiful girl in a forest. 4<DI sixteenth. the king had lost her for ever.' ' The story is that of a king who. tired after playing. I have called attention already to the fact that these illustrative parables. asked him for some water. which existed for centuries. to which I called attention many years ago as connected with old Aryan folklore. and disappeared in the lake. DC! . is meant to teach that even an accidental negligence may be fatal to our reaching the highest goal. and it is just possible that the first impulse may have come from the followers of Kapila.SAMKHYA PARABLES. who are so often called Kryptobuddhists or Pra&Manna-Bauddhas. but once when the queen. and brought her some. he forgot his promise. other Sutras also may occur in our modern collection of Samkhya-Siitras. This system of teaching by parables was very popular with the Buddhists. as in the case of the frog-wife. She became his wife see water. but were omitted in the Karikas and even in the Tattva-samasa. because they appear in the modern Sutras. as handed down by tradition. though they do not occur in the Karikas and all in the Tattva-samasa. while hunting. whereupon the daughter of the frog-king became a frog (Bheki). on condition that he should never let her He gave the promise. and will never return. Like the Sutras referring to these stories.

Thus the Bhagavad-gita V. Sawkhya and Yoga. Kapila and Pataf^ali and they are spoken of in the dual as the two old systems (Mahabh. . who is mentioned in the Siitnpatha-brahmawa. XII. as it were between faith (knowledge) and works. find the S4mkhya and Yoga represented. which are ascribed to different 1 . may no doubt have existed in India in very The identification of these two names with tho n. in the sense of ascetic practices and meditations. also find a philosophy called Sa?>?khya-yoga (Svetasv. as it were. once proposed by Professor Weber. Up. each We in its own Sutras. distinguish between Samkhya and Yoga at all. as a neuter sing. II. but as . that he we read again in who understands Sa//<khya and Yoga to be one. Yoga and Sawkhya. but the Bhagavad-gita V. 104. p. not learned people.CHAPTER VII. ' Philosophie. representing and Samkhya together as one. lias probSee also Garbe. 67) but we one philosophy. 5. 13).. goes so far as to say that children only. Sawkhyaably long been given up by him. 26. THE is relation of the Yoga to theSam-khya-philosophy not easy to determine.ime of one person Kapya Fataf/A'ala. understands aright. 4. and this not as a Dvandva. Yoga. authors. or possibly as Yoga Yoga belonging to the Sa?nkhya.

Those who wanted an Isvara have formed one might have him as a first and super-eminent Purusha while those who had gone beyond this want. tions of former systems. 15). by their names at least. But the deplorable scarcity of any historical documents does not enable us to go beyond mere conjectures and . and from Manu to the people (to Ikshvaku. called Puratana G. was not so essential a point to them as it seems to us. 3). A according to $awkara) is mentioned already in the JjfMndogya Upam'shad VIII. seem to sanction. the suspicion of their former unity.and Uttara-Mimamsa. need not have quarrelled with those who still The Nyaya and Vaiseshika show clear traces felt it. were amalnay gamations of systems which had originally an independent existence.. Thus royal sages came through tradition know it. of a origin while the two Mimamsas. and we are left in doubt as to whether the three (III. or whether they were differentiacouples. n Samkhya and Yoga. or Lord. when he made : I declared this imperishable it Yoga to Vivasvat. Manu to Ikshvaku.' similar oral tradition descending from Pra^apati to Manu. easily Samkhya and Yoga might comprehensive system. having received it but this Yoga was lost here by long lapse of time. common the other systems. (B. Nyaya and Vaiseshika. . even Purva. which in character are more remote from one another than . because their divergence with regard to the existence of an Isvara. IV. i) the Bhagavat say to Ar^una ' and this is probably what the author of meant. . ancient times.YOGA AND SAMKHYA. It is 403 (old). to . Vivasvat told to Manu. It is much the same with the other philosophies. D d 2 . the Bhagavad-gita (IV.

from Yu</.404 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and it only requires the removal of ignorance for the soul to recover its Brahmahood. would have shown that such an idea could never have entered the mind of a Sawkhya. though the names of Kapila. moment's consideration. a very common misconception nay. 48). even though it does not know it.isa. meant originally Even native joining the deity. In the Bhagavad-gitft Yoga is defined as Samatva. from meaning to join. or to become what it always has been. such as we possess them. Yu^/. Vy. for hard work. Sutras. 'By this the Yoga is refuted/ proves of course no more than the existence of a Yoga-philosophy at the time of Badarayana it cannot be used to prove the existence of the Yoga. Etena YogaA pratyuktaA. authors occasionally favour that view. The soul is always Brahman. again that Yoga. i. (raimini. 3. Meanings of the word Yoga. to mean to join oneself to something. The often-cited passage from the Vedanta-Sutras II. for the simple reason that there was nothing for him that he could have wished to join. and Kanada. A Even the Vedantist does not this is really join Brahman. to harness oneself for some Thus Yu^/ assumed the sense of preparing work. by means of a very old metaphor. to join. a though movement of the soul towards Brahman is distinctly guarded against as impossible. as previous to the composition of the Vedanta-Sutras. we must not in such matters allow ourselves to be guided by mere impressions. or union with it. and Gotama may seem to have an older air than those of Pataftr/ali. however. whether preparing others or getting . . came. It has been repeated again and equability (II.

mortifications. " into the supreme Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory. . meaning. and the like.YOGA. 405 ready oneself. like Kapila. Yw/. &c. . was therefore Professor Weber. 2." he adds. satisfied with the isolation of the soul. 238-9). that is. i. BUT DISUNION. or the effort of concentrating our thoughts on a definite object. but Disunion. has entirely : when he wrote Rajendralal Mitra. e. the outward means." " The idea of absorption." rests Pata%rali. the effort of restraining the activities or distractions of our thoughts (TTitta-vHtti-nirodha). Possibly the German Angespannt and Anspannung may have been suggested by the same metaphor. Atman./Tittam. came to mean to exert oneself. or to buckle-to. to get ready for hard work. whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained. i. A false interpretation of the term Yoga as union has led to a total misrepresentation of Patark/ali's philosophy.. Yoga. I. in the sense of concentrating or exerting one's mind and it is in this sense only that our word Yoga could have sprung from it. such as penances. to prepare for work." he continues rightly. One very peculiarside of the Yoga doctrine and one which was more and more developed as time went on is the Yoga practice. p. 208. though the usual explanation is that it was so by a metaphor taken from the In Sanskrit this Yu# is stretching of the bow. NOT UNION. and does not " " . quite right History of Indian Literature (pp. often used with such words as Manas. He says. not Union. And as people with us use the expression to go into harness. in his ' " misrepresented the case. particularly in the Atmanepada. as the Yoga-Sutras tell us at the very beginning. e.

not Sa?nyoga). yogaA karmasu kausalam.406 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Yoga. Yoga might mean union. ' He who is good and evil devoted to knowledge leaves behind both deeds therefore devote yourself to . or anything but effort (Udyoga. separation. Rajendralal Mitra. where he states that. means really Viyoga. however. pulling oneself together. 50 Buddhiyukto (/ahatiha ubhe sukn'tadushkrite. By which (teaching of Pata/i^ali) Yoga (union) : ' is said to be Viyoga (separation) of Purusha and Prakn'ti. much less can the first historian of opinion. joining.' Yoga. that it is small blame to a man who writes a complete history of Indian literature. did not mean union with God. from his own experience. in the philosophy of Pataf/ali and Kapila. Yoga (all) That native scholars were well aware of the double is success in meaning of Yoga. subject and object. Thus we read in the Bhagavad-gita II. if he has not read every book on which he has to pronounce an German literature can hardly have read every German author of any eminence. concentration. exertion. discrimination between PurushaandPrakr/ti. with a true Yogi n. Even the best historian of Sanskrit literature. but the proper term would have been Sa?/iyoga. self and nature. actions. we may see from a verse in the beginning of Bho<yadeva's commentary on the YogaSutras. : Tasmad yogiya yu(/yasva. such as it is taught in the Samkhya Pumprakr/tyor viyogo'pi yoga ityudito vaya." But when he charges the professor with ' not having read the Yoga he goes a little too far. is quite right so far that Yoga.' . and he ought to have known. or Viveka. pry into the how and where the soul abides after separation.

bodily as well as mental. (rfianayoga) and even when it to be maintained ? By knowwould be the answer of Kapila (by is it to be reached. he presupposes it useful support. this subduing and drawing away of the Self from all that is not Self. Self. . the case with the self-imposed discipline and tortures of the Yogins. render Purusha by Self rather than by man. In that sense he tells us in the second is the effort of restraining the or of our distractions Before we activity thoughts. cf. and this has been. Everything can become absurd by exaggeration. Atman. 1 But originally their to I prefer. is the highest object of philosophy. we ought first of all to try to understand their original intention. 21 II. by ascetic exercises delivering the Self from the fetters of the body and the bodily senses. Yoga as Viveka. is often used by Pata%ali himself for Purusha. as a contrary. crimination. a number of exercises. 407 We saw that this Viyoga or Viveka was indeed the highest point to which the whole of the SamkhyaBut granted that this disphilosophy leads up. Yoga-Sutras III. 41. how how is . and other means of mental concentration. Patan^ali by no (by Karmayoga) adds Patawr/ali. because in English man cannot be used in the sense of simply subject or soul. by which the senses should be kept in subjection so as not to interfere again with the concentration of all thoughts on the Self or the Purusha l . means ignores the (rftanayoga of Kapila. ledge chiefly. even in the Sawkhya-philosophy. reached. no doubt. Besides. .YOGA AS VIVEKA. . begin to scoff at the Yoga and its minute treatment Sutra that Yoga of postures. breathings. On the he only adds.

Manas. More minute directions as to how this desired concentration and abstraction could be achieved and maintained. The real relation of the soul to the body and of the senses to the soul is still as great a mystery to us as it was to the ancient Yogins of India. the attempts to reduce these sensuous affections to some kind of quietude or equability (Samatva) need not surprise us. deserve certainly the same careful attention as the stigmata of lloman Catholic saints. and their experiences. nor need we be altogether incredulous as to the marvellous results obtained by means of ascetic exercises by Yogins in India. but if carried too far they would inevitably produce those torturing exercises which seemed to Buddha. if only honestly related. as they do to most people. They . of the outer world upon him. object seems to have been no other than to counteract all consider the the distractions of the senses. in that sense This was the simple beginning of Yoga. so utterly foolish and useless.408 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. might at first have been quite harmless. as little as we should treat the visions of St. because even a convinced Samkhya philosopher who had obtained 6rfianayoga or know- ledge-yoga would inevitably suffer from the disturbances caused by external circumstances and the continual i. But if we ourselves must admit that our senses and all that they imply are real obstacles to quiet meditation. inroads his upon by Karmayoga e. and it was meant to be a useful addition to the Sa??ikhya. We closing of the eyelids and the stopping of the ears against disturbing noises useful for serious meditation. Teresa as downright impositions. Francis or St. unless strengthened to resist or work-yoga the ever present enemy of his peace of mind.

more particularly of the physical school of psychologists. and the sweating processes of the American Indians in their steambooths. and is always presupposed by the Yoga. before they and philosophers.. may easily be seen from the excellent Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology. after we have once understood the position of the Samkhya-philosophy though it may be quite towards the great problem of the world. enter upon an examination of the peculiar teaching of the Yoga-philosophy. prepared by cultivation. and I did not feel justified therefore in passing over this system altogether. the Samkhya as such. by J. is not. to mention no other and more painful reports. . may or may not But how little of true similarity there really exists between the Yoga and Tapas of the Hindus. Powell. although our Samkhya-Sutras are very modern. 117 seq. this point of view it seems to me that the Yoga-philosophy deserves some attention on the part of philosophers. W. but there no reason From why they should be treated as a priori untrue. became civilised have passed through such a phase. to depend for our information may be . we shall not glean many new metaphysical or psychological ideas from a study of the Yoga. true that. 1892-3. which we see among savage tribes The Hindus also. We must never forget that. p. 823 seq. 409 is may be or they may not be true. a few words with reference to the sources on which we Before we have useful. p. and has but carefully orgiastic ecstasies It has its roots in a soil centuries little in of philosophical common with the of the present day.YOGA AS VIVEKA.

then why not to of course as impossible to prove Pata/Vyali that Pata/V/ali the philosopher and Pata?Vyali the It is grammarian were not the same person. &c. assigned him to the second century B. as to prove that they were but if style of language and style of thought are any safe guides in such matters. the author of a late commentary on Pata/l^ali's Yoga-Sutras.C. Vislmu. though some scholars have. .410 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It has actually been asserted that Vyasa. are ascribed The Sutras of the Yoga-philosophy to Patari^ali. That is not the case in any other country. but we should say no more. and can hardly be true in India considering how freely the names of the gods or of great Rishis We were taken. and are still taken. Vedanta-Sutras. the divine serpent. little about the history of Sanskrit proper names to be able to say whether the same name implies the same person. as proper names. Even the commonly received identification of the philosopher Patan^ali with Pata/1(/ali. Vyasa. the reputed author of the Mahabharata and of the But there are ever so many Vyasas and no solid argument could poseven now. the collector of the Vedas. the grammarian and author of the Mahabhashya. garbha. It may be so. Pata?I#ali. Ilarihara. who is also called Phamn or $esha. is the same person as Vyasa. we . ? . He may have been the author or the representative of the Yoga-philosophy without being His date is of necessarily the author of the Sutras. course uncertain. with great assurance. living sibly be derived from the mere recurrence of such There are works ascribed to Hira/jyaa name. should be know too treated as yet as a hypothesis only.

but on that point also it seems to me better to wait till we get some more tangible proof.C. all dates to be assigned to the philosophical it is the Sutras. In son. or rather ignorance. Besides. favour of their being anterior to the other Sutras but we saw already why we could no more build any chronological conclusions on this than we should think of proving the anteriority of our Sa?nkbya-Sutras by the attacks on its atheistical doctrines which occur in the Sutras of the other philosophical systems. duty of every scholar to abstain from premature assertions which only encumber and obstruct the way to further discoveries. before taking the grammarian and the philosopher Patafk/ali as one and the same per- would no doubt be a great help if we could transfer the date of the grammarian. The fact that these Yoga-Sutras do not enter on any controversy might certainly seem to speak in .C. but that is no excuse for saying that the Yoga-philosophy was reduced to the form of Sutras in that century. Second Century B. It of the present state of knowledge. to the author of our YogaSutras.C. and should do so any other literature. the second century B.SECOND CENTURY B. because the grammarian Patan^ali has been referred to it. 411 in ought certainly to hesitate. and should not for the present be considered as more than a working hypothesis. fied I think we must be satiswith the broad fact that Buddha was later .. The second welcome as a date century would certainly be most for any of our extant philoso- phical Sutras. even the date assigned to the grammarian Patafk/ali is a constructive date only.

i. Chronology of Thought. but of the chronology of thought and taking the Yoga. and that our philosophical Sutras are later than Buddha. in its systematic form. . . . kara would appear on earth to uproot all heresies. Patan^ali. This is the kind of useless information which tradition gives us. Iii India we must learn to be satisfied with the little we know. p.though not to his name. as post-Buddhistic. we can best understand the prominence which it gives both to the exercises which are to help toward overcoming the distracting influences of the outer world. and S&m* have been a portion of Sarikarsha?ia or Anarita.. if they had lived before the great heresy of Buddha. e. As to popular tradition. classical Upanishads. Ixvi.412 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. encircling the world. to prophesy in the Saiikshepa-^amkara-Vir/aya elsewhere that (raimini. because they evidently refer to his doctrines. 1 Jf we took away these Yoga Aphorisms. and it may be for the same reason that he is sometimes called Pha?iin (Phambhartn). eye on the one or the other. it is no doubt of little than the value. the hooded serpent /Sesha. particularly in India still I doubt whether tradition could have gone so completely wrong as . Pata7l(/ali is said to and Vyasa. and to the arguments in support of the existence of an Ixvara or Divine This marked opposition became intelligible and necessary as directed against Kapila as well as against Buddha and in reading the Yoga-Sutras it is often difficult to say whether the author had his Lord. not of the chronology of years. in the Pataf^ali-Siitras.

a kind of via media. From Ahamkara is produced the development. if we turn to the of the Mahabharata.' As to the Yoga-practices or tortures that. which sages by their understanding meditate upon. the great elements. unperceived a development of this unperceived power is the Mahat and a development of the Pradhana (when it has) become Mahat. namely. That is . the wish to the existence of an Isvara against all comers. but likewise all that belongs to the Karmayoga or work-yoga was known before the rise of Buddhism. of colour. we find that the twenty-four principia. are often mentioned.CHRONOLOGY OF THOUGHT. though arranged and described in different read Then we That again (Anugita XXV) ways. 413 two establish characteristic features of the Yoga. of their danger. Thus. His own experience at the beginning of his career had convinced him of their uselessness. such as taught by the Sawikhyaphilosophy. touch or that is called Pradhana (Prak?Tti). moderated than encouraged the extravagant exercises of Buddha himself Brahmanic ascetics. and from the elements respectively. little would seem to remain that is for true peculiar to Patafw/ali. are post-Buddhistic. after practising the we know for a most severe Tapas declared against it. ' : which sound. is Aham. remained throughout . Pradhana kara (egoism). and to teach the means of restraining the affections and passions of the soul. of taste. the objects of sense are stated to be a development. is void of smell. there can be no doubt that not only the general outlines But though the Sutras Samkhya. and rather time. with Purusha as the twenty-fifth. as a preparation knowledge. nay. But a moderately ascetic life.

not so of thought.Buddhistic as in its final . according to Patan^ali at least. if it came more boldly forward. lest it should be supposed that the Sa??ikhya-philosophy. should have been anterior to that new and systematic development of Samkhyaphilosophy. which for a time had been as a much new system thrown In by the Buddhist apostasy. the existence side by side of two such systems as those of Kapila and Buddha. which we know in the Sutras of Kapila into the shade it this or in the Karikas or even in the Tattva-samasa in fact. after the rise of Buddhism. would become intelligible that way Buddhism. had given its sanction to Buddha's asceticism.414 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the Sa/mkhya should pre. the ideal of Buddhism. condemn a belief even in an Isvara. that in its be decidedly That systematic form it was post -Buddhistic. but as a re-invigorated and determined assertion of ancient Samkhya doctrines. by showing that the Samkhya. or Lord. it would have seemed all the more necessary to protest decidedly against such denial. should have tried to place before the people an even more perfect system of And. denial of an Atman and Brahman. admitted a belief in something transcendent. . and we can well understand that the Brahmans. In that sense it might truly be said that the Yoga-philosophy would have been timely and opportune. Lord. and did by no means. though sprung from a soil saturated with Sfiwkhya ideas. which was far more serious than the denial of an Isvara. and thus to satisfy the ingrained theistlc tendencies of the people at admitting Purusha. in trying to hold their own against the Buddhists. the one deemed as elements. which was considered as orthodox or Vedic.

14). yet it is curious that the only apparent. the other unorthodox. considering that Word-teaching might be taken in the sense of teaching coming from words as well as teaching having words for its object. 66). easily see that Sanskrit did not sanction compounds which might be ambiguous. 3. Atha Yoganusasanam. Atha $abdanusasanam.' to the This title . 1852. both being ascribed to same. It is true that this apparent irregularity might be removed by a reference to another rule of Pawini (II. we can and as /Sabdanusasanam would Mahabhashya 2. but title it may deserve to be mentioned. if . irregularity should occur both in the Mahabhashya and in the Yoga-Sutras. The Yoga-Sutras. a translation 1 It is not much of an argument. both being considered as expositions of the old Samkhya. viz. 'Now begins the teaching of Words or of the Word. If both were omniscient. or the Yoganusasana called also by the same name which was given to the Samkhya1 .' and not Atha Yogar/i<7asa. Samkhya-prava&ana. really offend against one of Panini's According to Pamni there ought to be no such compound. Sutras. but it is curious that such a compound rules (II.THE YOGA-PHILOSOPHY. and though he does not give us the reason why he objects to this and other such-like compounds. gave matter for reflection to the people in India we see best by a well-known verse which ago (p. may have been contained originally in some such text-book The Sutras were published as the Tattva-samasa. reminds us of the title which the grammarian Pataf^ali gives to his Mahabhashya. in my ' : I quoted many years of Ancient Sanskrit Literature History 102) is If what truth Buddha knew the law and Kapila not. and translated by Ballantyne. how could ? ' there be difference of opinion between the two ? The Yoga-Philosophy. does not belong to Pamni's Sutras. 'Now begins the teaching of the Yoga. 415 orthodox. that the given by Pata%ali to the Yoga-Sutras.

which has been edited and translated by Ganganatha Jha. is still most useful and trustworthy and there are in German the excellent papers on the Samkhya and Yoga by Professor Garbe in Biihler's Grundriss. An explanation of Prasastapada's commentary on the Vaiseshika-Sutras. ascribed to him. 'Yoga Aphorisms of Patafk/ali. It as 1 was almost impossible that the Yoga-philosophy. not always quite correct translation. The Prasnopanishad-aloka. with the commentary of Bho^a Ra(/a. The Sawkhya-karika-bhashya. called Vi</nananmta. . p. Misconception of the Objects of Yoga. the Yoga-varttika. There are printed editions of the Samkhya-prava&anabhashya. and the Samkhya-sara. 1894. continued by Govindadeva-sastrin in the Pandit. and may be consulted with advantage by students of philosophy. I have not been able to obtain. is the author also of the Yoga-sara-sam- graha. 28-68. Die Yoga-philosophie nacli clem Itdjamdrtanda daryestellt. should not Other works ascribed to the same author are The Brahma-mimawsa-bhashya. however. 2). A more useful edition. an abstract of the Yoga. represented by European scholars.' Vi^lana-Bhikshu. was given by Rajendralal Mitra in the Bibliotheca Indica. Ill. Markus.416 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Garbe speaks well of a dissertation by P. called Vaiseshika-varttika. Bombay. The Isvara-gita-bhashya. whose commentary on Kapila's Sawkhya-Sutras was mentioned before \ and who is chiefly known by his Yogavarttika. from the Kurma-purawa. but really : composed by GaueZapada (see Ganganatha. . like all his essays. 1883. which. Colebrooke's essay on the Yoga. but Nos. vol. The Yoga-vfirttika.

and make and unmake E e . and by admitting devotion to the Lord God as part of that discipline. Samkhya. with very few ex- many It against the few is is ceptions. if they represent as the creator and ruler of the world. as the Brahmans say. Nor does Kapila. elaborated his theistic and a majority in favour of a theistic philosophy of the universe as against an atheistic. He criticises theists Him indeed the usual arguments by which their God. like other atheistic philosophers. Whether this was done. properly so called. All its metaphysical antecedents were there. but whether Pata/l^ali may be fairly accused of having yielded to the brutal force of numbers.MISCONCEPTION OF THE OBJECTS OF YOGA. certainly extraordinary to see the perfect calmness with which. only modified. Yoga is indeed. and curried favour with the quite another question. display any animosity against the Divine idea and its defenders. particularly in one point. namely. from mere theological diplomacy is a question we should find difficult to answer. as is generally supposed. considering how little we know of the personal character of Pata?k/ali or of the circumstances under which he Samkbya-philosophy. Kapila's atheism is discussed. There is an entire absence of animosity on his part. and how little there is of the adpopulum advocacy in support of a belief in God and a personal God. 417 have suffered from its close association with the Samkhya. such as our own philosophers would certainly have displayed in accusing another philosopher of atheism in trying to amend his system in a theistic No doubt there must always have been direction. in its attempt to develop and systematise an ascetic discipline by which con- centration of thought could be attained.

But all this is done by Kapila in a calm and what one might almost call a businesslike manner and .' or. or the name of any special god. charge him at Kapila's arguments. as it all is generally translated 'devotion to God. 23. Pata?l^ali also the same Samatva or even temper. mentioning simply as one of many expedients.' Devotion or Pranidhdna (lit. 'Devotion to the Lord. In this respect also we have something to learn from Hindu philosophers. an Isvara. Devotion to isvara. at the end of the first chapter. He preserves imputes no motives to his antagonist. Considering the importance of the subject. Misconceptions. though it occurs as a name of Rudra. we should have expected to see this ques- tion treated in the most prominent place. Isvara was not even a popular name for God. After all. If it either by Kapila or by we remember how the two philo- sophies were in popular parlance distinguished from each other as Sawikhya with and Sa?khya without a Lord. by him making responsible for the origin of evil also. and in later times was applied even to such gods as Vistmu and /Siva. it is useful to see how little heat was expended on Pataw/ali. I. Instead of which we find Pataw/ali. nor does in answering he anywhere defend himself against any possible suspicion that in showing the necessity of a personal God. after having described the different practices by which a man may hope to become free from worldly fetters.418 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. he was defending the interests of the Brahman priesthood. placing oneself forward and into) . after they had been divested of much of their old mythological trappings. the same time with cruelty.

that. the name of Him. the majesty. As has been said that Samadhi or complete absorption can be obtained through devotion to the Lord. that means that He and able different from all other Purushas (Selves). MISCONCEPTIONS. they are instincts (Samskara) or impresIf the sions (Vasana). without wishing for any rewards consisting in worldly enjoyments. Lord is is called a Purusha. 24 I-svara. the proof. caste) and while dispositions (Asaya. are not dependent on each other. it is Pramdhana. rewards. then goes on. is a Patark/ali goes on to say never been touched by Purusha (Self) that has ' : sufferings.DEVOTION TO ISVARA. is the nature of that Lord. Anlage) are so-called because they lie in the soil of the mind till the fruit has ripened. and this prevalence of goodness arises from His eminent knowledge. that means that He is the whole world. forbidden. makes over all his cares to Isvara as the highest guide. and as the surrender of all one's actions to Him. who has no beginning. the next that has to be explained in order. actions. His very relation to that goodness is without beginning. or tions. the order of His worship. Avidya. for they are eternally abiding in the very substance of Isvara. by His work alone to liberate Such power is due to the con- stant prevalence of goodness (a Guna) in Him. is 419 explained by Bho^a as one of the forms of resignation. &c. or mixed rewards are the ripened fruits of actions life. as worship of Him. the Lord. If a man. and the fruit thereof.' The commentary adds . But the two. Pata>1<7ali we ' are told.' In I. . actions are either enjoined. ' : consequent disposiSufferings are such as Nescience. because the union E e 2 . manifested in birth (genus. if He is called Lord. knowledge and power.

the Isvara. from a Yoga point of view. and delusion. becomes conscious of the incidence of the if pictures mirrored on the mind. and has to be guarded against by such means as are inculcated in the Yoga but he.' this difference .420 of Prakrit! INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. different. that is. and full of virtue. The Patafyyala-bhashya dwells very strongly on between the liberated soul and the Lord for 'the liberated or isolated souls.' . are And though there be a possibility of more or yet the most eminent would always be the Isvara or the Lord. nature be of free. Again. and Purusha.' it says. good. while in the body. he alone having reached the final goal of lordship. in enjoyment through Isvara. unhappiness. but this can never be predicated of the Lord. Purushas. it His highest modification Isvara. modifications tending towards happiness. is not like a man who has gained freedom. even for one who has gained freedom. is is not so with of goodness is and he remains steadfast it. While the ordinary Purushas or Selves undergoes. whereas in regard to Isvara there never was and never can be such bondage. and. eternal union with Therefore he alone eminent above all other Purushas. yet as their aims such a view would be impossible. The emancipated implies bondage. 'attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds.. Altta or mind in remaining without blemish. alone. a return of sufferings. but he is by . less. the creation would. is possible. Nor should one say that there may Though there be equality qud Purushas. have been impossible without the will of such an Lsvara. many such Isvaras. as he is always such as he is. &c.

is more than a god. but it We may be well to try to compare our own ideas of God. hardly be considered as a convincing argument of the existence of a Being endowed with all such transcendent excellences as Though this could . as compared with other Purushas. But Bho^/a without the help of the commentary. His Isvara may be primus inter God. (or the omniscient would be difficult to explains that what is meant here is that there are different degrees of all excellences. though he does not go quite as far as the pares. certainly not what we mean by God. is what is claimed for Isvara or the Lord.WHAT IS ISVARA? 42! need not point out here the weak points of this argument. smallness. ' by saying : In Him the seed of omniscience) attains infinity. with the ideas here propounded. and the purely relative character of the greatness and separateness claimed for the Isvara. greatness. and other Aisvaryas. this non plus ultra of excellence.' discover in this anything like a proof or a tenable appeal to any Prama/ia. Pata?l^ali proceeds in the next SCitra to offer what he It calls his proofs. and all that therefore there must be for of them a point beyond which it is impossible to go. when put into clear and simple language. This Niratisaya point. such as omnisci- ence. but as one of the Purushas. Pataf^ali seems to me to come very near to the Homoiousia of man with Vedantin who claims for the Atman perfect Homoousia with Brahman. he is but one among but he his peers. is He a little What is Isvara? As Kapila had declared that the existence of such a being as Isvara did not admit of proof.

as we are told. without any inducement. as we saw. so and by superior is meant instructor and that it would seem difficult to assign a higher position to any divine being than by placing him thus above Brahma and other accepted builders of the world. ' Next is follows his name. and that where there is good and better. there must be best. What he means that where there is a great and greater. such as Brahma and guide. the great destructions and reconstructions of the world. others. Next ' Pata/lgrali proceeds to explain the majesty in I. assigned as a name to the possibly a relic of a time beyond is . of Isvara by saying. the superior (Guru) even of the former ones. Nor does he flinch in trying to answer the The question is supposed questions which follow. 27 : His name Pra?^ava. 26. there must also be a greatest. could have caused that union and separation of himself and Prakn'ti which. and this is Isvara.422 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the first creators. being himself not limited by time. how this Isvara. it shows at all events an honest intention on the part of Patafi^ali.' By the former ones are meant. of course. This. I. The answer is that the inducement was his love of beings. Patafw/ali's argu- ment reminds us is to a certain extent of the theistic argument of Cleanthes and Boethius. arising from his mercifulness. would not have been admitted by Kapila. is only another name for creation. his determination being to save all living beings at the time of the Kalpapralayas and Mahapralayas. is He the ancients. to have been asked. are here postulated.' Pranava might etymologically mean breathing forth or glory. It sacred syllable Cm.

IS LS'VARA? 423 It is said to have been the name of all eternity. they must have had a beginning. and if it has any historical or etymological justification. who sees in it an Indianised form of the Hebrew Amen First of all. just as the name of father This may old However be true. 38. us. But however that may be. and how should such a word have reached India during the Brahmana period ? Pataw/ali continues by telling us in Sutra I. in the sense of Yes. but it does not satisfy the name Pranava and the may have been. their sacred syllable. but in spite of all the theories of the Brahmans. and it is tracted to oui. its . And this. as Bho^a says. as Bho^a adds.' this. as a means to concentrate our thoughts. and then drawn in ' . Still we ! cannot go quite so far as Rajendralal Mitra. stopped by the labial nasal. a name. that repetition of the syllable and reflection Om on meaning are incumbent on the student of Yoga. there is not one in the least satisfactory syllable Om to the scholar. and to attain to Samadhi. But why it is so we cannot tell. riot made by anybody. this is at all events not known to us.WHAT our reach. used certainly much as hoc illud was used in French when conthat. called PraTiava. and cannot It is be explained any further etymologically. or it may ' be the contraction of a pro- corresponding to Ayam. which has to be repeated a hundred or a thousand times in order to draw the mind away from all disturbing is Om impressions and to concentrate it on the Supreme Being. it is praise or breathing forth. I9vara from or son. Amen does not mean God.' nominal stem Avam. It may be a mere imitation of the involuntary outbreathing of the deep vowel o.

tremor of limbs. doubt. pity. distress. 29 'Thence also obtainment of inward-turned thought.' I. 'To prevent all this. and not keeping it these are the obstacles causing . and of thus in time obtaining Samadhi. and turning them back upon the mind. virtue and vice. one should think how it could be removed if one sees virtuous people. and disturbance of the regular inbreathing and outbreathing. But all these are only outward helps towards fixing the mind on one subject. one should preserve indifference.' I have given this extract in order to show how subordinate a position is occupied in Patafi^ali's . : and absence of obstacles. Are they really virtuous ? if one sees vicious people. error. In that sense he adds. The obstacles to Samadhi are mentioned in the next Sutra. I.3i. one should rejoice and not say. one should not envy them if one sees unhappiness. people. the chief end of the whole Yoga-philosophy. idleness. carelessness. fixing of the I. I.' The commentator ' adds. unsteadiness of mind/ 'With them arise pain. unhappiness. there is constant mind on one subject (Tattva).' 'And likewise from a reviving friendliness. I.424 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as 'Disease. 30. there arises serenity of mind. . not having a settled standpoint. languor. Thus does the mind become serene and capable of Samadhi. If one sees happy . and show neither approval nor aversion. and indifference towards objects of happiness. complacency. 33.' is Inward-turned thought (Pratyaketana) plained as a turning exall away of our senses from outward objects. 32. worldliness.

and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to of liberation Nor directly grant it. the father. given to the Yoga. do not think. second in importance. It is but one of the many means for steadying the mind. however. in the Sa?nkhya. would seem to speak in his favour.WHAT IS ISVARA? 425 mind by the devotion to Isvara. is Om. in stating the tenet. the I summum bonum of mankind. works. or all soul. Rajendralal Mitra is right. are first. and desires. that there is a Supreme Godhead who is ' ' purely spiritual. with which He is absolutely unconnected. and assume . theistic at this the Sutras themselves to see that originally a personal God was by no means looked upon as the most characteristic feature of belief in Patafk/ali's system. But we have only to look opinion. . and thus realising that Viveka or discrimination between the true man (Purusha) and the objective world This remains in the Yoga as it was (Prakrit!). lii) he represented this belief in one Supreme God as the first and most important tenet of Pataf^ali's philo- The leading tenets of the Yogins. creator. perfectly free from His symbol afflictions. They are pure and immutable but by their association with the universe they become indirectly the experiencers of joys and sorrows. Him by facilitating but He does not their attainment is He and the very name of Sesvara-Samkhya. therefore. that Rajendralal Mitra in his abstract of the was right when Yoga (p. and are eternal. sophy. or protector of the universe.' he says.' Rajendralal Mitra does not stand alone in this . to have been that there are countless individual souls or Purushas which animate living beings. deserts. Samkhya.

or side must remember that Kapila had committed himself to no more than that it is imany criticism. The Isvara. with the Yogins. We possible to prove the existence of Lvvara. According to him. but from a philosophical point of view. aloofness. or liberating means of obtaining of quieting the mind previous to useful altogether. in the current sense of that word. was originally no more than one of the many souls. issues. but one that has never been associated with or implicated in metempsychosis. aloneness. Such a confession not of an inability to prove the existence of an Isvara does not amount to atheism. yet of the same kind as all other Purushas. and not even as the most popular atmosphere of In the in India this belief one Supreme Being may have been a strong point in favour of Patavk/ali's system. supreme in every sense. but restricted to a personal creator and ruler of the world. but again as one only out of many means. Pataw/ali's so-called proofs of the existence of God would hardly stand against They are mere vrapepya. ness. and . innumerable embodied forms in the course of an ever-recurring metempsychosis. or rather Selves or Purushas. devotion to the Isvara is mentioned.426 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. or self-centred- As one it of the that freedom. in the highest sense of the word. efficacious of all. this I-svara being synonymous with God. the highest object of the Yogin was freedom. The idea of other Purushas obtaining union with him could therefore never have entered Pata?1(7ali's head. and thus only can we explain the fact that Kapila himself was considered orthodox by friends In the Vedanta-philosophy the question of the real existence of a personal Isvara foes.

explain Samkhya. when animated by Purusha. has no need to call in the assistance of a personal Lsvara. His supreme Purusha. afterwards raised into an Adi-Purusha. or First Being. in to the universe. it was this natural craving rather than any vulgar wish to curry favour with satisfied the human the orthodox party in India that led to Patan^ali's partial separation from Kapila. attempting it is. but it therefore atheistic. so far as I can see. IS ISVAKA? 427 though we know how saturated that philosophy is with a belief in the existence of Brahman. the absolute Divine Essence of which the active or personal Isvara or the Lord is but a passing manifestation. We certainly need . though we know that both Newton and Darwin were Darwin himself went thoroughly religious men.WHAT never arises. The masc.. and. and even those Darwinians who look upon this admission of Darwin's as a mere weakness of the moment. such as both in its subjective and objective character. neuter. presented by Brahma. a mere phase of Brahman. not is. creator His system is therefore without a if we called or personal maker of the world. Kapila might easily have used the very words of Darwin. the work or outcome of Prakrit i. so far as to maintain most distinctly that his system of nature required a Creator who breathed life into it in the beginning. and this is very much what Pataf^/ali actually did in his Yoga-Sutras. would strongly object to be called irreligious or atheists. What we mean by the objective world of according to Kapila. craving after a First Cause. we should have to apply the same name to Newton's system of the world and Darwin's theory of evolution. Brahman.

but and Nyaya-philosophies also. . the Tattva-samasa and the Karikas '. Preface to Sawkhya-sara. in later times. of atheism became more popular in seems to me an so that in the is Padma-purana the charge of atheism not against the Sa??ikhya only. 5. I. the Uttara-Mimamsa and the Yoga and in the case of the Uttara-Mimawzsa. duction to Sawkhya-pravafcana. we saw. which teach the identity of the 1 individual soul p. that is. 4. Two systems brought only escape this charge. and that these defenders of the faith were satisfied with an sincere in- the Vedas. Up. with the highest 39. its explanation by $amkara is stigmatised as no better than Buddhism. Brahmans Besides. 1 2. do not even allude to the difficulty arising from the Isvara question. and BHhad. to the Veda in when it supports his own to such passages as $vetasvatara Upanishad IV. note. 7. oldest representatives of the Samkhya-philosophy. Hall. the Vaiseshika against nay even against the Purva-Mima??isa. because it perverts the meaning of passages of the Veda. of the of the recognition of the supreme authority of I confess that with what we know life religious of India and the character at all times. which ment important arguThe charge favour of their antiquity. as good earnest. not suppose that the recognition of Kapila's orthodoxy was a mere contrivance of theological diplomacy on the part of the Brahmans. The two that can be made to support his view. Kapila appeals.428 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. particularly views. and Intro- . Ar. it seems to me very difficult to admit the idea of such a compromise. as in V. when he wants to prove 'that the world arises from primitive matter/ and appeals to the Veda.

Yogins without denying their reality. because it would not include. and complete indifference towards this world and the next. perceptible Isvara. the perceptions of the Kapila replies that these visions of the do not refer to external objects. It is then that Kapila turns round on his opponent. starts up and maintains that Kapila's definition of perception is faulty. soul 429 (Brahman without qualities). Yogins. or at all events not wide enough because it does not include the perception of the Isvara or Lord. and says that this Isvara. and that. he is dealing with the perceptions of ordinary mortals only. And here he 89). as it in discussing (I. But the Another opponent controversy does not end here.KAPILAS REAL ARGUMENTS. And here it is important again to observe that Kapila does not make a point of vehemently denying the existence of an Isvara. and recommends the surrender of good works. this. as he says. is He had stopped by the inevitable opponent who demurs to this definition of perception. has never been proved to exist at all. but seems likewise to have been brought to discuss the subject. that . This may seem to us to amount to a denial of an Isvara. but "V i(//ianaBhikshu remarks with a great deal of truth. has never been established of by any of the three legitimate instruments knowledge or Prama/ias. were by the way only. as it is pretended. while engaged the nature of sensuous perception been explaining perception as from actual contact between the cognition arising senses and their respective objects. Kapila's Heal Arguments. But it is but fair that we should hear what Kapila himself has to say.

and not IsvarasiddheA.' Then . some kind of which every activity presupposes is of evil. or to a Yogin who by devotion has obtained super- . a Sat-kara. because Isvara has not been proved to exist. sopher follows Anyhow this is not the tone of a philowho wants to preach atheism. because Isvara does not exist. and in what we shall see that it is the manner rather than the matter of the proof of an Isvara which is challenged by Kapila and defended by his antagonist. he would have said Isvarabhavat. Kapila had wished to deny the existence of God. and not.43 if INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and therefore he must Kapila does not spurn that argument. but. namely the glorification of a liberated Self or Purusha. or of one who by devotion has attained supernatural power (I. follows fact that the a more powerful objection. he would be distracted and deluded and unfit for the supreme task of an fsvara. he says that ' every proof in support of an Isvara as a maker or Lord. he could not have willed to create the world if he were not so. have a different purpose. that is. This is explained by Aniruddha as is referring either to a Self which almost. it could have no desire. 95). as he says. would break down. For if he were supposed to be above all variance and free. as he has recognised once for all the Veda as a legitimate source of information. nor even the desire of creation . Taking his stand on the ground that the highest blessedness or freedom consists in having renounced all activity. exist. because desire. because if altogether free. though not altogether. he endeavours to prove that the Vedic passages relied on in support of the existence of a maker of the world. free. based on the Veda speaks of an Isvara or Lord.

But this also he rejects. who in the theistic Yoga-philosophy takes the place of the Creator. The Purusha therefore cannot be called superintendent. that is. 431 natural powers. as if exercising an active influence over PrakHti. . while what is really moving. or being created is PrakHti. if it is meant to prove the existence of an active creator. In support of this Aniruddha quotes a passage from the Bhagavad-gita (III. unintelligent Prakn'ti would never have acted. but Prakriti is evolved up to the point of Manas under the eyes of Purusha. and declares that it refers either to a Self that has obtained freedom from or to the Self that all is all variance and disturbance. though it remains all the time quite unmoved. Vigwana-Bhikshu goes a step further. because the superintendence of the Purusha of the Samkhyas over PrakHti is not an active one. What he means is that in the Samkhya the Purusha is never a real maker or an He simply agent. and who may. have been the origin of the later Purushottama. or the products of PrakHti are reflected on him and as anything reflected in a crystal or a mirror seems to move when the mirror is moved. but arises simply from proximity. .KAPILAS REAL ARGUMENTS. for all we know. 27): 'All emanations of Prakriti are operated by the Gunas . free and has remained from eternity. reflects on Prakr^ti. as in the case of a crystal (I. and the Purusha does no more than witness all this. to the Adi-purusha. the First Self. Aniruddha thereupon continues that it might be said that without the superintendence of some such intelligent being. thus the Purusha also seems to move and to be an agent. 96). wrongly imagining all the time that he is himself the creator or ruler of the world. changing.

Thus when he it is said.' is (in spite of the PrakHti. a mere witness of such omniscience and omnipotence for (III. as in order to settle the old question of the continuous effectiveness of . as little as a dead body eats. the impossibility of his being a creator. namely that. The Atman reflects hension of the Manas. for a time. is once more discussed in the Sa??/khya-Sutras. It is the individual Purusha (6riva) that performs such acts. meant deluded. In another place where the existence of an Ls-vara. and Manas). yet the teaching anything. in that case. while the Atman or Purusha remains for ever unchanged. by Prak?^ti. he says. such acts are performed not by a dead or inactive Atman. that is. altogether is that though the Atman is not cognitive. or active ruler of the world. a dead body also might be supposed to perform the act of eating. Manas on the Manas. 56). when under the influence of Prakn'ti (Buddhi. as developed into gender) and not for the Purusha who in reality is Manas. namely the uselessness supposing the Self to be To this the answer without cognition. while in reality he does no more than witness the appreis. The Theory of Karman.432 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. ' He is omniscient and omnipotent. But no. but the Self deluded by Ahamkara imagines that he is the operator/ Another objection is urged against the Samkhya view that the Purusha is not a doer or creator. the subject is again treated not so much for its own sake. and hence the illusion that he himself cognises. Ahamkara. A last of attempt is made to disprove the neutrality or non-activity of the Atman.

for any desire to free living beings from pain (which is the main characteristic of compassion) and if you adopt the second alternative. does not depend on any ruler the works themselves are working on for evermore. since the hypothesis fails to meet either For does He act thus of the two alternatives. to a Lord who is nevertheless supposed to be loving and gracious. as every activity presupposes desire. in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha (transand Gough. pf . 228) uses the same Cowell by As for the doctrine of " a argument. but always leads to the same result in the end that is to say. according to of the world . sires. you hand you will be reasoning in a circle. again. we or after creation ? in the absence of as cannot arise that reply pain bodies. saying Supreme Being who acts from compassion. to the conviction that the highest state of perfection and freedom from all conditions is really far higher than the ordinary con. If it were otherwise. p. this has wellnigh passed away out of hearing. ception of the status of the popular Hindu deities. with all its suffering.. is . there will be no need. as on the one will hold that God created the world through compassion." what has Madhava lated ' : been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of His existence.' And others. The reward of every work done. and on the other hand that He compassionated it after He had created it. the Lord. we should have to ascribe the creation of the world. Kapila. If you say before. as long as there before no creation.THE THEORY OF KARMAN. &c. 433 works (Karman). whether working for Himself or for would ipso facto cease to be free from deThis argument is examined from different points of view.

Nor must it also besides the be forgotten that other philosophies Sa?7ikhya have been suspected or openly accused of atheism for the same reason. which was supposed to imply a denial of God nor did the Nyaya and Vai. if higher even than that of an Isvara. so far as I can . by far the most effective defence against the charge of atheism. escape the same suspicion. whether Indian or European. and to have made this quite clear would have been. which was a later expedient. and to exalt the idea of the Godhead. if it endeavours to purify.seshika systems. that the recognition of the authority of the Veda was considered sufficient to quiet the theological conscience . or of being without a belief in the God of the vulgar. but there is certainly. It is well known that on that ground even the early Christians did not escape the suspicion of atheism. has been charged with atheism. of the liberated Purusha or conceived as This concept has in fact Atman superseded the concept of the Isvara. we It may be saw. on the part of Kapila.434 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. though based on the belief that the Veda is of superhuman origin. to dehumanise. as because it . The conscience of Kapila and of the ancient Samkhyas was evidently satisfied with a belief in a Purusha in which the old concepts of the divine and the human had been welded into one. 6raimini's Purva-Mima/msa. without claiming even the aid of an Adi-purusha. can hardly avoid the suspicion of denying the old gods. admitted the independent evolution of works. a first Purusha. It is easy to understand why almost every philosophy. a maker and ruler of the universe. Even and though entirely devoted to the interpretation of the Vedic sacrifice.

that none of the three Prama^as can prove ' a Supreme Being.Sutras where an tsvara is clearly denied or postulated. I quote from the translation by Cowell and Gough (p. but otherwise we hear nothing of to consist. we established by proof. shows that they at all events took them seriously. on the other side. because the Deity. must have had a maker. a watch) And that they are effects can easily be proved by the fact that they possess "? parts. but the tone in which they are met. These attacks. because they possess the we nature of being effects. is There meant to be or to do. seas. because we Naiyayikas have ourselves proved it to be nonAll this we admit to be quite true. as should say. that eternal. namely Book V. the old argument that the mountains. 435 no passage in the Nyaya and Vaiseshika. bethe existence of cause there is no universal proposition or middle term that could apply. by later what the Isvara is philosophers such as Madhava in his Sarva-darsanasamgraha. Perception cannot.. admit that a Supreme Isvara cannot be is. 171): 'It is quite true/ he says. But is there not. Sutras 19-21. The Veda cannot. may be looked upon as purely academic. F f 2 and . as met by the Nyaya philosophers. must be beyond the senses. being devoid of form. Inference cannot.THE THEORY OF KARMAN. for instance. these parts existing in intimate relation. As specimens of Indian casuistry some extracts from Madhava's chapter on the Nyaya may here be of interest. quite as much as a jar (or. see. either as the author or as the controller of the infinitesimally small elements or atoms of which the world is by them supposed one passage in the Nyaya-Sutras in which the question of a divine Lord is discussed in the usual way. &c.

For if any one should argue that the mountains cannot have had a maker because they were not produced by a body.436 again INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Nor has any proof ever been produced on the opposite side to show that the mountains had no maker. he had any. it would not be fitting to admit that God created the world. they could not be effects. and to His action in consider . the objector asks next. that is. not by themselves alone. produced. be pleased to close for a moment thy envy-dimmed the following suggestions. for you have not even shown that what you say about the eternal ether is a real fact. Hereupon the Nyiiya philosopher ' : be- comes very wroth and exclaims thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school. one of them A maker is a being possessed of a being a maker. A feeling of compassion. since this militates all him to and not laden with Hence he concludes that against his compassion. but KIVOVV CLKLV^TOV)' Aristotelian (the But though yielding to this argument. combination of volition. We therefore abide by our old argument that the mountains have the nature of effects. just as the eternal ether this pretended inference would no more stand examination than the young fawn could stand the attack of the full-grown lion. setting in motion itself all other causes. should surely have create living beings happy. desire to act. and if they had no maker. but by concurrent causes. a knowledge of proper means. by the fact that they possess a limited magnitude half-way between what is infinitely great and infinitesimally small. what object this maker or Isvara could moved by none have had induced in view if in creating the world. misery. creating but idea the is indeed caused by compassion only. eyes.

for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any Yogin endowed with transcendent faculties of (Tivra. the atheistic opponent returns once more to the authority of the Veda and says ' : But then. Therefore. source nor. and then again God's existence by the Veda].).THE THEOEY OF KAKMAN.' In answer to this. and replies ' : We defy you to point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the Veda might be learned from some other the Veda. Do you suspect this "reciprocal " of each which you call " reasoning in dependence a circle. ledge the non-eternity of the Veda. for though the production of the Veda is dependent on God. thus everything is clear.' . since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good and evil actions (Karman) of the beings who are to be created. liberation. there is no possibility of His being produced nor can it be in regard to their being known.' But the Nyaya is theistic interpreter and defender of the not silenced so easily. is obtained. still as God Himself is eternal. how will you remedy your deadly sick- ness of reasoning in a circle [for you have to prove the Veda by the authority of God. . 437 of a creation which shall consist of nothing but happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things. again can it be in regard to the know." in regard to their being produced or in regard to their being known ? It cannot be the former. &c. the desired end. when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of duties which produce His favour.

is devoted to an explanation of the form and aim of Yoga. view it would certainly seem the it is but from our point of that. now we turn to the Yoga-Sutras of Pataw/ali we find that the first book. powers that can be obtained by absorption and ascetic exercises while the fourth. an not very successful in proving by its logic the necessity of admitting a maker or ruler of the world. whether Isvara. and of Samadhi. the Samadhi-pada. an Isvara. Vibhuti-pada. That this is the riofht O view of the case is confirmed by the remarks made by Vi^nana-Bhikshu in his Here we are told that Yoga-sara-sa?y/graha. the Kaivalyapada. even when there is some imperfection in the employment of the above means (faith. p. though the non-existence of Nyaya does not teach Isvara. . the Sadhana-pada. meditation or absorption of thought the second.438 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and secured by devotion to Him. explains Kaivalya to be the highest object of all these exercises. Everything the Indian may be clear way of arguing to one accustomed to . the Highest Lord. memory. Brahman. gives an account of the supernatural . and of deep absorption and ecstasy. energy. and not to any other being. the means of arriving at this absorption the third. absorbing and . the two results (absorption and liberation) can be brought very near by the grace of the Parama-Isvara. The Four Books of If Yoga-Stltras. explains . that is. knowledge). means the isolation of the soul from the universe and its return to itself. Kaivalya. meditation. 18. alone. of concentration of thought. or any one else. from Kevala.

because it leads to greater nearness to the final goal. i. and imparts spiritual vision (6r/lana&akshus) through the Vedas. he said to consist in contemplation and to end in Steadfastness with regard to direct perception. He probably refers to his commentary on the Vedanta and he . put an end to &c. a man is sure to be . is represented as the principal factor in abstract meditation and in liberation. or by any residue (results of former deeds) in general. nor by virtue or vice and their various developments. ' all (I. the Divine idea of both schools is much the same. 30) . 439 is By Parama-lWara meant that or the Highest Lord here particular Purusha (Self) who was never touched by the five troubles. thinking only with the mind. such as Brahma. because. Vishnu.THE FOUR BOOKS OF YOGA-SUTRAS. as he says. he has treated of this Being very fully in his remarks on the Brahma-Sutras I. and a passage the impediments. For one desiring liberation the most comfortable path is clinging to or resting on Vishnu otherwise. however different the roads followed by the Vedantins and Samkhyais yogins may be. nescience and the rest. evidently quite convinced that. that he is the spiritual chief and father of all the that gods. is quoted from the Smn'ti. and that he is the inner guide. Devotion to Him Hara. saying much more on the Vi^nana-Bhikshu abstains from Lord. such as illness.' . deceived. steadiness Isvara is with regard to the human self being secondary This devotion to Isvara is also declared to only. He only adds that the powers and omniscience of the Isvara are equalled or excelled by none. and called Pranava.

It curious that the Yoga should have employed is a word which. True Object of Yoga. though fully to its true nature. has often been trans. it may he. It is clear throughout the Isvara that devotion to him whole of this chapter on is no more than one of the means. Vritti. however true the Samkhya-philosophy may be. But it is not that highest goal itself. was not a recogterm of the Sawkhya. restraining in or steadying the actions and distractions of thought. this what Pata/^ali is chiefly concerned with. Yoga. has also been while A"itta. but only a means towards it. if there were no means of making the mind as firm as a rock. which I translate by action. but as far as technical . that is. this 7fltta. nor could it be accepted as the most important feature of the Yoga. though. the impressions of the senses and all the cares and troubles of every-day life would return. for the attainment of liberation.440 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The character in of the consists really important Yoga teaching that. Now We Yoga saw that as the second Sutra he explained Altta-vn'tti-nirodha. is steadying of the mind. would soon be torrent away again by the of life . the highest goal of the Yoga. lated by mind or the thinking principle. In the Sa?ftkhya the term would be Manas. mind. rendered by movement or function which T give as thought. a very important one. helps which the Yoga-philosophy enlightened as carried The human mind. nised I know. it fails to accomplish its end without its those practical alone supplies.

and is very differently by different used most promiscuously in common parlance. as It has a development of Ahamkara and Buddhi. but in reality it is . provided always that we remember being a technical term of the Yogaphilosophy. with us also. But for practical purposes. in so of the Buddhi. as carried word when used by Yoga philosophers. as we have to do whenever we render Prakrtti by nature.. is simply our thought or our thinking. concentration only. restraint. it would be difficult to find a better rendering for thought. as a name on in real life. for the time being. does not its mean movements of thought. Like the moon reflected in the ripples of the waters. what is meant by Kitta. though it leads in the end to something like utter vacuity or selfentire suppression of all first but at the functions of the Manas. to be taken here as a psychological term. has been defined philosophers.OTTA. and indirectly As I had to only of the instrument of thought. which itself has passed through Ahamkara or the differentiation of far as it is a modification of subjectivity and objectivity. of course. the Self appears as moving is in the waves which break against O it from the vast not moving. its etymological relationship with Manas pointed it out as the most convenient rendering of Manas. though not absorbed in it except by a delusion only. Of course Manas is always different from Buddhi. and. ocean of Praknti. Nirodha. It is he who is temporarily interested in what going on. 441 Manas in a state of activity. use mind for Manas in the Samkhya-philosophy. all In seer or perceiver is. the Purusha or Self. and though mind. it must be remembered that the real self-conscious absorption.

notions require no explanation. It is significant that Pata?l^ali should have used Agama instead of the Aptava&ana of the S4??ikhya. They illustrated by our mistaking mother-of-pearl a rope for a snake. and testimony. . it perceives nothing but itself. and they may be either painful or not. so well known from different systems of Indian philosophy. and thus would establish once for all what is called the orthodox character of the Yoga. saw that the mind. classed among wrong notions. Wrong are for silver. Functions of the Mind. We The sleep. fancy. . A state of doubt are uncertain whether also when we is what we is see at a distance a man or the trunk of tree. as sensuous perception. for Agama means distinctly the Veda. Fancy is explained as chiefly due to words and a curious instance of fancy is given when we speak of the intelligence of the Self or Purusha. was supposed in Hindu philosophy to assume for the time being the actual form of the object perceived. but that the Self is altogether intelligence. the fact being o 1 that there is no in- telligence belonging to Self. when once perfect in Yoga. just as llahu. and remembering. Right notions are brought about by the three Prama^as. principal acts and functions of the mind are described as right notion. the monster that is that has a head. but.44s INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. inference. is not a being is a head and nothing else. when receiving impressions from the outer world. Vedic or otherwise. &c. wrong notion. but supposed to swallow the moon. or of the head of llahu.

but he answers that he means hereafter to use this term in the sense of effort towards steadiness (Sthiti) of thought. Indian philosophers have the excellent habit of always explaining the meaning of their technical terms. while sleep has no perceptible object. he declares that it means that state of the mind. when. Having introduced for the first time the terms exercise and freedom from passion. Patafk/ali asks at once is ' : What ' is Abhyasa or exercise ? Abhyasa generally used in the sense of repetition. explains that in sleep also a kind of perception must take place. and in the said to be effected end to be suppressed. false perception.EXERCISES. ception. free from all activity (V ritti). And if it be asked what is meant by steadiness or Sthiti. we could not say that we had slept well or badly. 12. it remains in effort its own character. as Such must be continuous (I. itself the not wiping out of an object While true perperceived. because. implied by the term Abhyasa 13). and fancy take place in a dream. which is a perception of vivid impressions. Remembering may depend on true or false perceptions. Remembering is that has once been a waking state. otherwise. unchanged. repeated. I. Exercises. and this by exercises (Abhyasa) and freedom from passions (Vairagya). however. and even on dreams. on fancy. that or is. takes place in sleep. . The commentator. Now is all these actions or functions have to be restrained. 443 Sleep is defined as that state (Vritti) of the mind which has nothing for its object.

as it is derived from Anusrava. &c. visible whether visible or revealed is).444 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It is constantly mentioned as the highest excellence not for ascetics It sometimes does not only. including all that has been handed down. Next follows the definition of dispassion( Vairagya). we are told. as the consciousness of having overcome (the world) on the part of one who has no longer any desire for any a. very good of or is what description ought to be is Vairagya A preserved to us in the hundred verses ascribed to Bhartnhari (650 A. objects whatsoever. intermittingly Dispassion. said to become firmly grounded. such as the stories about the happiness of the gods in paradise (Devaloka). Perhaps Anusrava is more general than Veda. a long time thoroughly and un14). is Vairagya or dispassionateness.). and this is identical with /S'ruti or Veda. while Anusravika may be translated by revealed. Here The consciousness of having subdued or overcome all such desires and being no longer the slave of them. but for everybody. is This Abhyasa if practised for (I. Vairagya. (DHshte) stands for perceptible or sensuous objects. It is interesting to see how deeply this idea of Vairagya or dispassionateness must have entered into the daily life of the Hindus. D. that. mean much more than what we mean by the even and subdued temper of the true gentleman. which are preceded by two . and that is the highest point which the student of Yoga-philosophy hopes to reach. but it signifies also the highest unworldliness and a complete surrender of all selfish desires.

DISPASSION.' If. and Tamil MSS. and it is very doubtful whether BhartHhari was really the original author of them all. is the precept is the only means our old and it Bishis. It was perhaps bold. a few extracts from it may serve to show that the old teaching of Pataw/ali and Bhartn'hari has not yet been forgotten in their native country. should not be subservient to ' it. to undertake a similar collection of verses on the same subject. 1896-97.' ' . therefore. taught by of liberating yourself from the world. one on worldly wisdom and the other on love. good deeds. nor has it ceased to do so to the present day. Self is imperishable and everlasting it is connected it with the body only by the link of Karman . you do nothing good work 1 His is actually called Subhashita-trisati. Pity it is that you have not tried the ' ' " Know ' Yourself. Death follows man like a shadow. or whether he only collected them as Subhashitas \ Anyhow they show how the philosophy of Vairagya had leavened the popular mind of India at that distant time.." it. by Seshagiri . 445 other centuries of verses. VAIRAGYA. p. and pursues him like an enemy perform. 7. so that you may reap a blessing hereafter. Frequent enjoyment of earthly prosperity has led to your sufferings. while the . through sheer negligence. see Eeport of Sanskrit astri. after Bhartn'hari. But as the Vairagyasataka of (rainaMrya seems in more recent times to have acquired considerable popularity in India.' ' Live in the world but be not of The body is perishable and transitory. Many of these verses occur again and again in other works.

pride." bearing universe. speech. p. to carry out your secular affairs with calmness. ' like a pure gem. to devote yourself to the worship of " Permanent God.' Dispassionateness.' If you are unable to subject yourself physically to penances.' Better to do less good. as here taught for practical purposes chiefly. instead of thinking what is and doing harm to others. the proper course to liberate your soul from the hard fetters of Karman would be to keep the passions of your heart under control. Patu/i/yali 1 . but good and loving work. after he has attained to the knowledge of Purusha. good words. says in a somewhat obscure to Sutra ii) Sutra seems intended describe the highest 1 state within reach of the true VairiUnn. reaches its highest point in the eyes of the Yoga-philosopher. and good deeds. has freed himself entirely from (or their products). when a man. untruth. or pithy advice.' 'To control your mind. you will be your own enemy. or fraud. and body. to undergo austerities. all desire for the three is Gimas This c"> This at least what (I. to check your desires. like but. malice. silent or inactive. . the essence of a drug. and become a victim to the miseries of this world. does not mean to be thoughtless. is always valuable. for your fellow creatures. speech. speaking and mind. thoughts. involving O c* 1 Garbe. with purity of heart. Little. than to do more with jealousy. evil. body should be applied to good beasts or trees. 49. Grundriss. and to realise in yourself the in mind the transitory nature of the Truth.44^ INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and engage in ' deep contemplation.

Buddhi. the gross elements and the organs (2) Avisesha. particularly as the 23. and Aliwga. 447 indifference not only to visible and revealed objects. e. where we meant for (i) Visesha. and there- between Purusha and the Gunas of Prakr^ti. i. ledge of the Purusha implies the distinction between what is Purusha. read that the four Guwas or Guwaparvam are .' Meditation With or Without an Object. that is curious Rajendralal Mitra should have rendered Purushakhyate^ by conducive to a knowledge of God.e. which he calls Sampra^nata 1 These Guwas are more fully described in II. the twenty-four Tattvas. i. (4) mentary to the Aliwga. 19.' than ' conducive to. that is. i. if I am not mistaken. on the devotion to the Lord. but likewise towards the Gimas. In the comI. i. the subtle essences and the senses : Aliwga.e. e.e. the Self. The knowJ . (3) the Liwgamatra. the same classes of Gvmas are described as of Pradhana. and what is not.MEDITATION WITH OR WITHOUT AN OBJECT. Visishfaliwga. Liwgamatra. the Pradhana. a (Bhutani) name . . 1 7) to explain an important distinction between the two kinds of meditative absorption (Samadhi). and fore also not as a possessive compound remaining much the same. however. the subtle elements and the mind.' From may a purely philosophical point of view Purusha be translated by God. i. Vigrnana-Bhikshu explains it by Atmanatmavivekasakshatkarat. ' : It the sense. the gross elements AvisisbJalimga. Praknti as Avyakta. here called Guwas because determined by them. but such a translation would Sutra misleading here. Pataw/ali next proceeds (1. It would have been better also to translate ' be arising from. 45. from realising the difference between what is Self and what is not Self. that is. follows so soon after.e. i. Buddhi .

but only existence. and another when no definite object of meditation left. but at all events identify themselves no longer with the body. This again is . The twenty-four Tattvas are called unconscious. Those who in their Samadhi do not go beyond the twenty-four Tattvas. as referred to the subject. literally with a seed. but it is hardly necessary that we should enter into all the intricate subdivisions of the two kinds of meditation. the twenty-fifth or Purusha is conscious. without seeing the twentyfifth. and from which or is it some seed on which can develop. for though these two kinds of meditation may well be kept apart. knowing. Here the spirit of minute distinction shows itself there is once more. known. or. the numerous divisions of each hardly deserve our notice. This seems to and Asampra<7?iata. The without a Asampra^rtata-samadhi. which I am inclined to take in the sense of having it can fix. and the former be considered preliminary to the latter. from which to spring or to expand.448 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Native com- known mentators. not quite clear to me. are called Prakwtilayas. but also Savi^a. is mean that there one kind of meditation when our thoughts are directed and fixed on a definite object. looked upon as one of the Purushas. When meditation (Bhavana) has something definite for its object it is called not only Pra^/iata. take a different view. meditation called Avi(/a. as sub- We are told that what is called conscious meditation may have for its object either one or the other of the twenty-four Tattvas or the Isvara. yet. the Purusha. are called Videhas. not having a seed object. others who do not see the Purusha bodyless . however. absorbed in Prakf'iti.

'Quo semel Testa diu. unconscious meditation. deliberawith false contive. its its have rendered by previous impressions. such as Prakn'ti. Savi&ara. or. They may become important in a more minute l . The Asamprae^ata-samadhi. and Sasmitil ceit. that there is may mean which are I a is residue not. but they can hardly be of interest to speculative philosophers except so far as they furnish another proof of a long continued study of the Yoga-philosophy in India before the actual composition of the Sutras. manifested in the final act of the stopping all functions of the mind. Gg . previous impressions. it may be. 449 such as Savitarka. its everything that has given to the mind flavour. or that there The Sawskaras. character. joyous. study of the Yoga. &c. Sutra has been differently explained by It different European and native commentators. or meditation with- out a known object. 1 9) once more that in the case of the Videhas and Prakviti- 3 Asmita is different from Ahawkara. argumentative. peculiar so to say. or general disposition. Sananda. 18. Ahamkara. conception that I am am not. In summing up what has been said about the different kinds of Samadhi.' est imbuta recens servabit odorem It all may be intended that these Sawiskaras are either wiped out. of previous impressions. or that there is but a small residue of them. is explained as being preceded by a repetition of negative perception. Manas. and as the end of all This I. Pata?"k/ali says (I. and means the mis- (Asmi) what I Buddhi.MEDITATION WITH OR WITHOUT AN OBJECT.

with moderate. with mild. and which I translated before by Devotion to the Lord. Every one of these Samadhis is again carefully defined. layas (as explained before. 22) according as the means employed by them are mild. which has always been supposed answer to Kapila. to contain. and knowledge succeeding each other. to translate this famous Sutra I. Such divisions and subdivisions which fully justify . energy. . enumeration. with liajendralal Mitra. if you like. tsvara Once More. 448) the object or.45 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Thus we get nine classes of Yogins. an alternative. or with excessive zeal and those who employ excessive means with mild. with moderate. These strong-willed or determined aspirants are again divided (I. in ' . but that for other Yogins there are preliminary conditions or steps to Samadhi. with mild. or excessive. After an enumeration of to be employed all these means of Yoga by the student. follows at last the 23. and I shall in future dispense with them. 21). where we read that Samadhi may be said to faith. or with excessive zeal.and Yoga-philosophies extremely tedious. the name of Samkhya.' The commentator calls Nor is it simply an easy expedient. make both the Samkhya. or with excessive zeal those who employ moderate means. and some more helps are mentioned in the next Sutra (I. those who employ mild means. namely. memory. the cause of Samadhi is the real world (Bhava). concentration. be near or within reach when the zeal or the will is strong. moderate. p. it right. the proof of the existence of a Deity. though they may contain now and then some interesting observations. with moderate.

He is a God. which we can well believe. Expedients. the so-called Pranayamas. it would be impossible to look upon it as which there is really a real proof in support of the existence of God. that the orthodox Yogins derived great comfort from this Sutra as shielding Patan^ali against the charge of atheism.' Isvara. the highest God. even the last or the highest Upaya. 29 Nor is this devotion to I. The benefits arising from this devotion to the Lord are not essentially different from those that are to be obtained from other Upayas or means of attaining Samadhi. too large a subject for our purpose in this place. follow next. as may be seen from Sutras I. no room in the Samkhya system. 33 translated before. Though it is true. approach here to the pathological portion of the Yoga. ' 451 Sutra at once by Devotion to God. as we saw. for Patark/ali goes on immediately after to mention other means equally conducive to concentrated meditation or absorption in the thought of one object. contrivances to subjects may have been really useful as all draw away the thoughts from except the one chosen for meditation. such as the expulsion and retention of the breath.OTHER MEANS OF OBTAINING SAMADHI. the so-called Ha^a or Kriya-yoga. a subject certainly far more important than has generally We Gg 2 . 25) and omniscient. no doubt. Other Means of Obtaining Samadhi. he never seems to have risen to the rank of a Creator. for . or as more than a somewhat forced confession of faith. But this opens far generally one of the Tattvas. but always one of many Purushas and though he was looked upon as holy (I. is not God in the sense in which Brahm^ might be called so.

37). on the aims. and even if they could be proved to have been mistaken in their observations. as is now include the so-called physico-psychological experiments under the name of philosophy. by being directed to the tip of the nose. outward which produces a steadiness and contentedness of the mind when directed towards objects which no No wonder longer appeal to the passions (I. . All these are means towards an end. such as the moon without. and there can be no doubt that they have proved efficacious only. and to such . as so often happens. to fix the attention. and the same with all the other senses. cognises a heavenly odour. they are honest in their statements as to the discipline that can be applied to the mind through the body. Next to the moderation or restraint of the breaththe mind. we . the means have evidently encroached in this case also. though it is far from my purpose to undertake a defence of all the doings and sayings of modern Yogins or Mahatmans. follow descriptions of how tion towards objects. which therefore are supposed to have no longer any inclinaing. but a subject for students of pathology rather than of philosophy. We are next told of the perception of an inward luminous and blessed state. that even objects seen in dreams or in sleep are supposed to answer the same purpose. having everything they want in themselves. or our heart within.452 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. unless. their illusions do not seem to me to have been mere frauds. In fact any object may be chosen for steady meditation. at least in the days of Pata?l(/ali. One thing may certainly be claimed for our Sutras the fashion. that is. been supposed. provided always that these objects do not appeal to our passions.

the question would be whether we should meditate on the sound it is called Savitarka. Now. This impression remains true as grounded in the object. we are told at other times that any step may be useful. supposing that our meditation was centred on a cow. called mind ascends step by step. 453 an extent that Yoga has often been understood to consist in these outward efforts rather than in that concentration of thought which they were meant to produce. 41). . This true Yoga is often distinguished as Ra^a-yoga or royal Yoga from the other ing Yoga. and that some may be skipped or taken for of staircase on which the passed. meaning. becomes really red to our eyes. when placed near a red flower. if we ask what is the result of all this. and our mind should always be centred on one object of meditation. we are told in Sutra 41 that a man who has put an end to all the motions and emotions of his mind. in the same way the mind is supposed to become tinged by the objects perceived. which is though it is not clear why. Having mentioned in a former Sutra that Samadhi (here called Samapatti) may be either Savitarka or SaviMra. and which was to lead on to Kaivalya or spiritual separateness and freedom. Thus. As a crystal. obtains with regard to formation grounded in all them objects of his senses con(sic).OTHER MEANS OF OBTAINING SAMADHI. 42) that when meditation is mixed with uncertainties as to word. Though some of these bodily exercises are represented as serving as a kind Kriya-yoga or worksometimes called HaAa-yoga. the idea being that the mind is actually modified or changed by the objects perceived (I. he now explains (I. or knowledge. or steadiness and consubstantiation.

meditation . that is. If we look upon the NirviMra Samadhi as the highest of the Samadhis. Such a meditation would be called opposite is Nirvitarka when all memory vanishes and the meaning alone. They are defined as having reference to subtle objects essences. as the commentator puts it. This knowledge therefore would seem to be the but no. Sk. and thus we learn that the former. the next division is into Savi&ara and NirviMra. still something beyond knowledge. without any form. when the knowing mind (Pragma). has been described. then there would follow on the completion of that meditation contentment or peace of the Self (Atman). to the Tanmatras.subtle. had to deal with and the senses. and becomes. that is the genus cow. and that is what was called before Apragr/iat& Samadhi. and there is nothing subtle beyond it. remains. Savitarka. or. the Savitarka Samadhi. for the Purusha is neither subtle nor non. as it were. Samadhi Aprar/uatft. is Knowledge in this state called Tfo'tambhara. Go. material objects only. or the idea or picture (Vorstellung) conveyed by it. cow. 44). right or truth-bearing. quite different from the knowledge which is acquired by inference or by revelation. Subtle objects include Prak-riti also. And from this know- ledge springs a disposition which overcomes all former dispositions and renders them superfluous. forgets its own subjective form of knowing.454 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. After Samadhi. there is highest goal of the true Yogin . tinged with the form of its object. or on the meaning of it (Begriff). Its though not much more clearly. both Savitarka and Nirvitarka. one in form with the object. (I.

namely. which is tantamount to a meditation which does not dwell on anything that can be offered by an ideal representation of what is called the real world. as distinct from all the is Tattvas of Praknti. FREEDOM. and more particularly on the twenty-four Tattvas. each Purusha on It is really meditation of himself only. the postures and other ascetic per- formances (Yogahgas). no longer restricted to any of the Tattvas. without any object.KAIVALYA. It shows us the whole drift of the Yoga in with the means of mind on certain and the steadying concentrating things. beginning leading on to a description of meditation. but that is almost the only allusion to what in later times came to be the most prominent part of the practical or Kriyayoga. and in its simplest form. as taken over from the Samkhya. i. are just alluded to. This short account of what first is contained in the all chapter of the Yoga-Sutras contains almost that can be of interest to European philosophers the system of Patan^ali. Outward helps. the in- and out-breathing. such as the Pranayama. e. supposed to prepare the mind . and it is not impossible that it may have originally formed a book complete in itself. the Purusha to his delivered from all 455 This restores own nature. Freedom. Kaivalya. after he has been life. or pure ecstasy. This Kaivalya or the highest bliss in the eyes of the true Yogin. Yoga carried on by thought or by the will alone. and it may well be called the highest achievement of 6rfiana-yoga. the outside disturbances of and particularly from the ignorance that caused him to identify himself for awhile with any of the works of Prakrit i (Asmita).

true that considerable antiquity is claimed for some of these Yogangas. It is quite possible that some of my readers will. better still . It is . The above-mentioned Isvara-pramdh4na. There is nothing to show that Patafi^/ali imagined he had thereby given a full and satisfactory answer to the most momentous of all questions. the existence or non-existence of an individual Creator or Ruler of the world.456 for its INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but it seems to me that they really have nothing to do with philosophy in the true sense of the word and those who take an interest in them may easily consult texts of which there exist English translations. 32). 1895. Devotion to the Lord/ is classed here as simply one of the Yogangas or accessories of Yoga. the Ghera/<c/a-samhita. 1880. edited by Siris Chandra Basu. Bombay. Bombay. meditation. 1893 On the Vedantic Haj-Yoga. There is also a very useful German translation by H. own higher ' efforts. it is a kind of worship (Bhaktibut that is all the visesha) addressed to Bhagavat . Yogangas. contentment. be disappointed by my having suppressed fuller details about these matters. Lahore. Svatmarama's Ha^Aa' yoga-pradipika. commentator has to say in recommendation of it. and mumbling of prayers showing how little of it real philosophical ascribed to by Patafk/ali. or members of Yoga. Walter. (II. Helps to Yoga. and . such as the second and third books of the Yoga-Sutras. importance was It helps towards Sa- madhi. 1893. the Ha^aprayoga. penance. translated by Shrinivas Jyangar. Mimchen. by Sabhapati Svami. and several more. together with purification.

and I shall abstain from giving descriptions of the Mudras (dispositions of upper limbs). himself is reported to 457 have been their author. Bhadrasana. 102. I believe. lotus-seat. p.YOGANGAS. Siva. 103 i Padmasana. and the two thigh J . of the Bandhas or bindings. : ' . and names such as Vasish^Aa and Ya^navalkya are quoted as having described and sanctioned eightyfour postures.' This will. and the left foot on the right the hands should be crossed. . and in this . Sitting straight with the feet is placed under the (opposite) thighs sana. food and dwelling of the performer of Yoga. Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum. p. and of the rules regarding the age. extended on the legs. 3.400. cross-seat. posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. Svastikasana. 4. while Gorakshanatha reckoned their I take a few specimens true number as 8. fortunate-seat. caste. great toes should be firmly held thereby the chin should be bent down on the chest. and under the feet. HELPS TO YOGA.000 from Eajendralal Mitra's Yoga Aphorisms. stick-seat. 2. It is called Padmasana. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh. and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases. be considered enough and more than enough. is called Svastika- Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed 5. and there Bhadrasana. Danc/asana. Virasana. To most people these 1 See Eajendralal Mitra. . sex. and it will produce the heroic posture Virasana. Place each foot under the thigh its of side. Yoga Aphorisms.

and PrakHti. the same tendency nings which led from intellectual to practical Yoga. II. but as an essential condition of perceiving the difference between the Purusha. Yoga-Sutras is devoted to a description of certain powers which were supposed to be obtainable by the Yogin. or simply Bhutis. Vibhdtis. Yoga-Philosophy. MahaHere also we are siddhis. presented to Purusha through the agency of the Manas pleasure. Professional students for of hypnotism would probably be able to account many statements of the followers of Kriya-yoga. Pata/lr/ali's The third chapter of are called Vibhutis. are helpful in producing complete abstraction (Pratya- hara) of the senses from their objects. indriy4?^im. Jfo'ddhis. Powers. cold ] . They able to watch the transition from rational beginto irrational exaggerations. Paul. as developed from Prakriti. which to a reader without physiological knowledge seem simply absurd and incredible. in a general way. hunger and thirst This is what is meant the by complete subjugation of the senses (Param& vasyatS. for some of these facts have. the spectacle. . the seer. and a complete indifference of the Yogin towards pain and and heat. or Aisvaryas. been recorded and verified so often that we can hardly doubt that these postures and restraints of breathing. That transition is clearly indicated in the Yogangas or Cf. and this not for its own sake. if properly practised. C. minute regulations will seem utterly absurd. 55) which it is the highest desire of the Yogin to realise. N.458 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. I do not go quite so far.

regulation of breathing (Pranayama). but in III. postures (Asana). and the mind can be kept fixed on one object. however. 459 find eight of these accessories mentioned. and absorption (Samadhi). Samyag adhiyate. Dharawa. which leads on to the Siddhis. is thoroughly collected and fixed on one point without any disturbing causes (III. confinement of the Manas to one place. By this all other VHttis or motions of the Manas are stopped. or perfections. real the mind. Dhyana. viz. The next. 29 we subduing (Niyama). firmness (Dharana). abstraction (Praty4hara). arid Samadhi. which comprises the three highest is called internal (III. but. arises when while the third. is in i) as the this and said to be the tip of the nose. the sky or some other place. DharaTia. . 8). firmness. 7) in contra- distinction from the other helps. its absorption. Samadhi. the navel. a very of is which or meditation madhi. firm grasp being no more than an approximative rendering. absorption poor rendering. namely Dhyana. Siddhis. In II. the other five being treated as merely outward helps. 3). in itself. It is this Sawiyama. lost in This Sawork. word for Samyama. illuminates one object only. is explained (III. 4 three only are chosen as constituting Samyama. is explained etymologically as that by which the mind. Sawyama and helps to Yoga. firmness holding. of Yoga. The Samyama. place the ether. it is still but an outside help of the so-called objectless It is difficult to find a (Nirvi^a) state (III. is contemplation of the one object to the exclusion of all others . restraints (Yama).SAM YAM A AND accessories SIDDHIS. contemplation (Dhyana).

nor are they the last and highest goal of Yoga-philosophy. but for all that. a Yogin by applying Sawyama other animals. This is expressed by So far all is clear but Pataf^ali in Sutra III. and certainly became in higher degree to the achievements by means of Sawyama claimed by the Yogins in the following Svltras. superstitions which little claim on the attention of the philosopher. it is now. to Patafw/ali. the threefold modification. or of the future from the present. before explaining these Siddhis. These are at first by no means miraculous. to this gift. and it is no has been broken up and reduced to it . when we are told . is supposed to be able to understand the language of birds and get more and more into in other superstitions. as not yet. though they become so afterwards. it sounds very much like a claim of the so time. have how- . and as no more. endeavours show that every thing exists in three forms. by no means without parallels In fact we countries.460 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. exists only as clay the visible jar. when So in all things. and that it is possible from knowing one to know the other states. i 7) because a man has learned to understand applies The same a still the meanings and percepts indicated by words. as has often been supposed both by Indian and by European scholars. be . as now. 16. when dust again. Thus a jar it is is not yet. when it more. known from the it is difficult to see why Samyama is required for is this. gift of prophecy. it is said. and how it is to be applied to what called Knowledge of the past from the present. that a Yogin by means of Sa??iyama knows what to is come and what in is past. Here (III. the future may present and the present accounted for by the past. is hardly miraculous yet though.

our senses and our thinking organ are liable. conquest of all elements. These matters. by meditating on the Polar star. but soon after the supernatural. even from a . They form an essential part of the Yoga-philo- sophy. acquire the strength of an elephant. or thought-reading. whether we accept them as mere hallucinations to which. acquire knowledge geography. Samyama. Then follow other miraculous gifts all ascribed to as a knowledge of former existences. effulgence. ascension to the sky. This again natural. More of these Siddhis are mentioned from IV. a fore-knowledge of one's death. lightness like that of cotton. unlimited hearing. By Samyama with make respect to kindness. He may actually suppress the feelings of hunger and thirst. conquest of the organs. if only he can bring his will or his Sawyama to bear on the things which produce such effects. be could not trivial. a knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies. though not of the merely casual objects of his thoughts. as we know. such as the soul entering another body. a knowledge of astronomy. see heavenly visions. a man may is himself beloved by everybody. 38 to 49. such a power of making oneself invisible. by meditating on the moon. a knowledge of anatomy. &c. by meditating on the a of sun. conquest of time. in fact know everything. a knowledge of another's mind. sometimes indicated by portents. 461 ever interesting they may appear to the pathologist. and by meditating on the navel. we are landed once more in when we are told that he may may see things may. and it is certainly noteworthy. he may acquire firmness. passed over. invisible to ordinary eyes.SAMYAMA AND SIDDHIS. though omniscience. or whether we try to account for them in any other way.

had a vision of the Infinite Spirit.. that I who said to him in ' : Know. xiii. and all the are You not separate from me. Theosophy. relates not only which the young student had these might but miracles in the presence of many people. in all creations. and bid you rise and go to the Agastya A. In reading the accounts of the miracles performed by Yogins in India we have in fact the same feeling of wonderment which we have in reading of the miracles performed by the Neo-platonists in Alexandria. A writer with whom I have been in correspondence. Sabhapati Svamy. because I see that : you are holy and sincere. that we find such vague and incredible statements side by side with specimens of the most exact reasoning and careful observation. I accept you as my disciple. M. Lcct. where you will find me in the shape of Rishis and 1 M. born in Madras in 1840. The same writer who can enter into the most abstruse questions of philosophy 1 with perfect good faith how he saw sitting in the air so feet will tell us his master above the ground.462 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Miracles. the author of a short visions life of his teacher. many One instance of the miracles supposed to have been wrought by a Yogin in India must suffice. pati. Sabhaare the Infinite Spirit creations am me.sTama. are told that it was in the twenty-ninth year be accounted for like other visions which he performed We of his age that Sabhapati. . thirsting for Brahma^/Mna or knowledge of Brahman. neither is any soul distinct from me I reveal this directly to you. philosophical point of view.

Sabhapati left his wife and two sons. also called Vedasrem-Svayambhu-sthalam. But though he himself declined to perform any of the ordinary miracles.' it 463 After that. Be liberal in imparting the truths that should benefit the GHhasthas (householders). The Yogin had been expecting him ever since Mahadeva had commanded him Agastya Asrama. in a vision to proceed to the Agastya After many perils he at last reached that Asrama and found there. his face benign and shining with divinity. and try to do good to the monger world by revealing the truths which thou hast to proceed to the ' : learned from me. declining. But beware lest thy vanity or the importunity of the world lead thee to perform miracles and show wonders to the profane. to perform any miracles. He became his pupil. seven miles from Madras. in a large cave. There he sat for three days and three nights immured in deep contemplation. went out of his house and travelled all the night till he reached the temple of Mahadeva. for was one o'clock in the morning when he saw the divine vision. After seven years his Guru dismissed him with words that sound strange in the mouth of a miracleGo my son. acquired Brahmagwana and practised Samadhi till he could sit several days without any food. a great Yogin. howIn 1880 he was ever. he has left us an account of a miracle performed by one of the former members of his own Asrama. still living at Lahore. in the dead of the night. two hundred years old. and was again commanded Asrama. Yogins. About i So years ago a Yogin passed through Mysore and visited .' Sabhapati seems after- wards to have taught in some of the principal cities and to have published several books.MIRACLES.

him with great reverence and hospitality. and the tempest and the thunder. the world will be in ruins. and in the midst of this conflict of the : elements. . and rain began to fall in torrents. Student. Of course. asked ' : What power ' ' .464 the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Destruction was impending ' . thunder began to roar in the air. the voice of the Yogin was heard to say If I give more power. 'Yes. ness spread over the land. and what have A you that you call yourselves divine persons ? Yogin answered. in me it is the simplicity with which everything is told. and the rain and the wind. gave divine power to it. Government College. and lightning began to flash. and the fire and all were stopped. The Nabob. a deep dark- man.' The people implored the Yogin to calm this universal havoc. clouds overcast the sky. we know that such things as the miracle here related are impos- Om. and the unhesitating conviction on the part of those who relate all this. by the Mahatma Giana Guroo Yogi Sabhapati Sovarni. He willed. and they all went with the Yogin to his Asrama. Meanwhile the Nabob of Arcot paid a visit to Mysore. edited by Siris 1 Chandra Basu. it The stick was transformed into millions of arrows. and threw in the sky. and cut down the branches of the fruit trees to pieces. and the sky was as serene and calm as ever I V do not say that the evidence here adduced would All that strikes pass muster in a Court of Law. a treatise on Vedantic Raj Yoga Philosophy. 1880. we possess the full divine and the Yogin power to do all that God can do took a stick. being a Mussulreceived Rj ah who have you that you arrogate to yourself divine honour. Lahore.

feared. in its early stages. and from prophecy even of recurrent events. we must also remember that the influence of the mind on the body and of the body on the mind is as yet but half explored and in India and among the Yogins we certainly meet. or expected. however. leading in many cases to a systematic deception of others. But all this is beyond our province. Apart from that. and should still continue to be beThis belief in miracles evidently began with lieved. soon be accepted as the work of the prophet who foretold it. with what Pata^ali describes as a foretelling of the future by a knowledge of the What could be foretold might present or the past. knew little or nothing of all this.MIRACLES. it but human nature small beginnings. 465 seems almost as great a miracle in that such things should ever have been believed. is Prophets would soon begin to outbid prophets. however interesting it may be to modern psychologists. sible. particularly in more modern times. with many . and it was only in order to guard against ordinary being supposed to be unwilling even to listen to the statements of those who believe in Kriyayoga that I have given so much space to what I cannot help considering as self-deception. and the small ball of superstition would roll on rapidly till it became the avalanche which we know it to be. and the chief object it had in view was to realise the dis- Hh . but a step to prophesying other whether wished for. It was truly philosophical. there events also. indications artificial that hypnotic states are produced by ference means and interpreted as due to an interof supernatural powers in the events of life. Yoga. and to have been at all times and in all countries.

Moksha. in truth. claimed by the Yogins. freedom. and Yoga. or perceiver of pain or pleasure. when perfect. are useless and may even become hindrances (III. but simply the working of Prakn'ti. Sutras can really be the work of one and the same Thus while in the course of Patangrali's . between subject and object. he never forgets his highest object. repre- sented the achievement of this distinction. experience arises from our not distinguishing between these two heterogeneous factors of our consciousness. In enumerating the means by which this distinction can be realised. nay he allows that all the Siddhis. 37) in the career of the true aspirant after Viveka. aloneness. the separation or deliverance of the subject from all that is was objective in him the truth being that the Purusha never can be the immediate experiencer or ever .466 tinction INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but can only see them as being reflected on the Manas or mind. Patafw/ali always gives the preference to efforts of thought over those of the flesh. or as we should call it. If he does not discard the latter altogether. the Purusha's. we ought reject to remember that only by practical experiments could we possibly gain the right to them altogether. though false. the ever objective. One sometimes doubts whether all the mind. We are told again and again that our ordinary. and Kaivalya. between the experiencer and the experienced. distinction. his. this mind not being. But though Patam/ali allows all these postures and tortures as steps towards reaching complete abstraction and concentration of thought. True Yoga. or miraculous powers.

Bnddhi. we are sud- 46) that loveliness. it is to serve as a discipline for subduing all the . Sattva. which the commentator renders by A'ittasattva. In the passions arising from worldly surroundings. Pata%/ali says simply Sattva. it is to serve as a Taraka (III. the general drift of the Yoga remains always the same. across the ocean of the world. and defines as the entering of thought (Jiitta) into its own causal form. Prakrit!) as soon as Hh 2 . 55) : mind and the Kaivalya (aloneness) Self have obtained the same achieved when both the purity. or in something like the pineal gland. and is to be reabsorbed into its cause . Patan^ali sums up what he has ' said by a pregnant sentence is (III.TRUE YOGA. strength and adamantine firm- ness be gained for the body. 467 we could not but give him credit for never trying to locate the mind or the act of perceiving and conceiving in the brain. This requires some explanation. speculations. However. 34. as a light by which to recognise the true independence of the subject from any object and as a preparation for this. may as a ferry. always regarded as dark and as unclean. we find him suddenly in III. so that the Yogin shrinks from contact with his own. (III. claiming the muscle of the heart as the seat of the consciousness of thought (HHdaye While the human body as such is 7ifittasa?nvit). for if we activity. last Sutra of the third book. while the Manas has a cause. by Samyama or restraint. after the removal of the misconception of This seems not quite exact.' Instead of Mind. bodies. much more from contact with other denly told colour. we should be told that a Guna cannot have a cause. 54). or causes (Ahamkara. took Sattva as the Guna.

to incantations. 15) l Sattva of the mind is goodstriving for mastery and its ness. but also to birth. joy. Guna. serenity. darkness (II. but I am bound to confess that their nature is by no means clear to me. The Three Gums. the case of the Purusha. from concentration. from this Indriyar/aya. to drugs. then as being tinged once more by the Gunas of object fact is the objects perceived (IV. meditation in its various forms. From this passion. aloneness. and from this at last Atmadar-sanayogyata.' doubly affected by the Gimas. the thought also is threefold. . We are I always told that the three Guas are not qualities. to Indian philosophers they seem to be so clear as to require no explanation at all. perfections. but something substantial (Dravyam). light. has become perfectly *Santa or quieted. fitis the same as In the fourth and last chapter Patafw/ali recurs once more to the Siddhis. purification means its not also. which Kaivalya. holding the Self. or in ness for beholding himself. first as having thorn or being them. . subjugation of the organs of sense. while. have tried to explain the meaning of the three Gu?ias before. purification springs first Saumanasya. 1 and to heat Yatharthas trigunas tatha A'ittam api triguwam. Manas being overcome by the other two Gu^as of Ra^as. natural or miraculous. unfortunately. fitness for bethis Ekagrata. or Tamas. 'As the is The mind in threefold. here the Sattva. and tells us that they may be due not only to Samadhi. 16). In everything that springs from nature. and therefore in the there are these three Gu?ias (IV. 47).468 its INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

and in the time Brahman or /Sudra. bird. near to what we call instinct. because desires and fears can only arise when there are objects to be feared or desired (IV. 469 By birth is meant not only birth in this or in a future life. often dormant. (Tapas) or ardour of asceticism. the act of a Yogin. because it is performed without any desire. Though. &c. Sawskaras and Vasanas. a Brahman. dispositions. as a rule. perceptions. desire all is from nescience. or when Visvamitra. became by penance a Brahman. or that on which they lean. we are told. 10). but break out again when he enters on a canine birth. This is accounted for as being simply a removal of hindrances.SAMSKARAS AND VASANAS. As the results of actions we have Vasanas. These rethe mainders never cease. it produces no fruit. whether good or bad. so that pensities animal pro- may lie dormant for a time in a Brahman. whatever a man does has its results. in the locality when a man is born. Impressions are caused by from desire. wishing to irrigate his field. as when a husbandman. cow. but also rebirth. They show themselves either in what remains. or Samskaras. and is then called memory l or in the peculiar genus. as a Brahman or /Sudra. impressions. perceptions spring The result of its instincts. They are not said to be without beginning. . their support. or . such as when Nandisvara. 1 This kind of memory comes very untaught ability. became a Deva. their them the body with habitat the mind. from being a Kshatriya. pierces the balk of earth that kept the water from flowing in. is neither black nor white. of man. propensity.

this A'itta. mind (Svabuddhi-Sawvedanam). present and future. I confess I hardly understand his meaning. e. exists can be made not to exist. how(III. the concepts in our minds. or affect the mind. when roasted. not directly of the Buddhi. 1 8) and as becoming conscious and intelligent for a time only by the union between it and the Purusha. self-illuminated. and the universalia post rem. i. definition of consciousness (con-scientia) as well as of the Sanskrit Saw-vid. whether Rajendralal Mitra can be right 9. e. as past. The Manas only receives the consciousness of perception which conies in reality from the Purusha. It should never be forgotten that the mind is taken by Patafl(/ali as by itself unconscious (not as Svilbhasa. knowing along with the impressions of the apprehending i.470 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. In what anything can ever be completely destroyed. the same as the support of perception. like seeds. correspond to the admission ofuniversalia ante rem. and holds that the three ways or Adhvans in which objects present themselves to the mind. side when seen by the seer (Purusha) on one and tinged with what is seen on the other. the mind. the ideas or types. IV. 12) when he discovers here something like the theory of ideas or logoi in the mind of Patafi<?ali. though . the essence. and how what does not exist can be how how made to exist. who is pure intelligence.e. ever. IV. But though Altta the work of the Manas. may be spoken of as the thought of the Purusha. is i. I doubt. so that here we should have the etymological. though somewhat fanciful. but that by Knowledge and Yoga they can be annihilated also like seeds. the Hence it is said that they sprout. the universalia in re. objective world. connexion with this the question is discussed.

Prakriti. having done their work. knowledge and virtue being inseparable like cause and effect. turns more and more inward and away from the world. 24). perfect discrimination is rewarded by what is called by a strange tion. and no it should have been mistaken for . the very Gunas. of bringing him back to a final recognition of his true Self (IV. so as not to actor . but works really for another. and mind may lose its steadiness. Then at last. we Kaivalya. once achieved. even what is to be known becomes smaller and smaller. unless the old Yoga-remedies are used again and again to remove all impediments. This again is coloured by many former impressions It be called the highest form of PrakHti. the Purusha knows that he himself is not experiencer. undisturbed. Dharmamegha. i. free. sole purpose. (Vasana). and blessed. have now ceased. the Purusha. the term. the cloud of virtue. obtainment of the highest bliss of the Purusha. cease troubling Purusha becomes himself. Yet there is always danger of a relapse in unguarded moments or in the intervals of meditainterfere with the Old impressions may reassert themselves. and as such it serves no purpose of its own. Is Yoga Nihilism? This is wonder that the end of the Yoga-philosophy./Litta by a temporary misconception only.IS YOGA NIHILISM ? 47! it is so . neither knower nor If that is and the Manas or active mind.e. is independent. may whom it binds and fascinates for a time with the are told. All works and all sufferings . when beginning to feel the approach of Kaivalya.

Nirvana in its highest sense is a name and a thought. other innumerable Purushas and is not thereby annihilated. or of the Samkhya. I know but too well that there are several points which require further elucidation. but nothing can be It is what no eye has seen and predicated of it. nay even of the Vedanta and of Buddhism. like the 6rivan- nmkta of the Vedanta. studies is rejecting as absurd whatever we cannot understand at once. we need not attempt what Pata?~^ali himself has passed over in The final goal whether of the Yoga. unchanged himself in this ever- changing Samsara. complete nihilism by Cousin and others. though freed . However. that the Purusha in his from illusion. is supposed to be going on for ever for the benefit of as long as there are any spectators. aloneness may continue his life. I know from my own experience how . a mere phantasmagoria or to a nothing.472 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.' We ' know but no one can say what it is. what has not entered into the mind of man. though it has ceased for our Purusha. the Purusha. to supply silence. who has gained true knowledge. He is from himself. and on which even native expositors hold different What w e must guard against in all these opinions. and those who attempt to do so are apt to reduce it to that it is . though it is not distinctly stated. and it is possible. Though I hope that the foregoing sketch may give a correct idea of the general tendency of the Yoga-philosophy. maintaining his freedom a crowd of slaves. or what to us seems fanciful or r irrational. apart nature. Secondly. always defies description. the play of Prak?^'ti. without any fear or hope among of another life. the spectacle of Prakrit! will never cease. But first of all.

but they are not decepti deceptores. could not be entirely suppressed. and never use empty words. should be put down as a mere economy or as an accommodation to popular opinion. though often for what seemed me absurd. and I can only hope that if others follow in my footsteps. and we be afraid to follow in their track. and words that truth many are than sacrifice They may err. they will in time make these old bones to live again. These ancient sages should become fellow-workers and fellow-explorers with ourselves in unknown ought not to They always have the courage of their convictions. in contradistinction to Kapila who denies that there are any arguments in continents of thought. support of such a being. The great multitude of technical terms. because it helps to show through how long and continuous a development these Indian it may systems of thought must have passed. disclosed after be bewildering to us. . 36) says in so is . nor do they try to deceive others. they shrink from no consequences if they follow This is the inevitably from their own premisses. remains with philosophers me are a strong conviction that Indian honest in their reasonings. But there remains much to be done.IS YOGA NIHILISM? to 473 a long time unmeaning. 1 Satyapratish^ayam kriyaphalasrayatvat. as it was by Patafw/ali and There others. before any attempt was made. as Plato has erred and even Kant. they do not deceive or persuade themselves. to reduce them to systematic order. letter Indian philosophers l Patark/ali (II. a time a far deeper nay meaning than I should ever have expected. truthful. reason why I doubt whether the admission of an Isvara or lord by Pataf^ali.

possess indeed a separate body of Nyaya-Sutras and another of Vai. of our faculties or powers of perceiving. and Yoga. that the literary style which sprang up naturally in what I called the Sutra-period. conceiving. the period to which the first attempts at a written in place of a purely . and the objects which they present to us. have long been accepted as the original sources We whence these two streams of the ancient But we know now philosophy of India proceeded. particularly in the Vedanta. Nyaya and Vaiseshika. that is. there runs a strong religious and even poetical vein. Eelation between Nyaya and Vaiseshika. and should be remembered that. businesslike expositions of what can be known. on the other.CHAPTER VIII. and much more like what we mean by scholastic systems of philosophy. like the Samkhya to a certain extent like the Purva and Uttara-Mimawisa. systems hitherto examined. and these with their reputed authors. or reasoning on one side. Samkhya. we to two systems. which are very dry and unimaginative. NYAYA AND VALSESHIKA. either of the world which surrounds us or of the world within. Gotama and Kanada. It WHILE in the now come and Yoga.veshika-Sutras. the Nyaya and Vaiseshika also have by the Hindus themselves been treated as forming but one discipline.

the two systems of Vaise- shika and shared of course Nyaya branched off. and hence we can as one. but continued to be so well imitated in later times that we used with great success not only in the Samkhya-Sutras. 475 mnemonic literature may have to be ascribed. It should always be borne in mind that the Sutras ascribed to Gotama and Ka^ada presuppose a long previous development of philosophical thought. may have been an and may have to remain always.RELATION BETWEEN NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA.e. the other after the confluence of the two. the TarkamHta. well understand that at a later time they as should have been drawn together again and treated we see in >Sivaditya's Saptapadarthi (about 1400 A. and on the means of acquiring such knowledge. in the Bhasha-PariM'Aeda. from which at a later time. in the Tarkasamgraha. omne scibile. bearing on things that can be known. so that.).D. &c. There old Tarka. it seems far more likely that there existed at first an as yet undifferentiated body of half philosophical half popular thought.D. very like our Tarthe one before the bifurcation of the kasamgraha. the Padarthas. These two systems many things in common. old system of Anvikshikl.). which are later than Madhava find it (1350 A. was by no means restricted to that ancient period. according to the preponderance of either the one or the other subject. and instead of regarding the two as two independent streams. but in more modern compositions also. i. with its commentary the Muktavali. the Tarkakaumudi. For practical purposes it is certainly preferable that we should follow their example and thus avoid the necessity of discussing the same subjects twice over. in the present state of our mere conjectures know- . But these are as yet conjectures only.

had by him also to be left a blank. as systems of thought. Bodas places the Sutras of Gotama and Kanada in the fifth or fourth cent. Bodas. Dignaga. D. and this . however. in the present state of our studies. but treat each system by itself in spite of unavoidable repetitions. Was not Kalidasa himself assigned to a period long before the beginning of our era ? It seems now generally accepted that Kalidasa really belonged to the sixth century A. former years to assign the Kapila-Sutras to the fourteenth or even fifteenth century A. as we have to treatment. for the simple reason that nothing is known of Nyaya before Gotama. and. has indeed promised to give us A some kind of history of the Nyaya-philosophy in India. do.C. chiefly on the existing Sutras as the authorities recognised in India itself. and he expresses a . we must not attempt a historical and depending. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.476 ledge. Mahadeo Rajaram Bodas. and I may refer my readers to him for the best information on the subject. D.. were anterior to Buddha. Dates are the weak points in the literary history of India. should be welcome. in the Introduction to his edition of the Tarkasa??igraha. The later periods. nay even the Samkhya.. without however adducing any new or certain belief that the Vaiseshika. proofs. Mr. very zealous native scholar. however late. But unfortunately that period in the historical development of the Nyaya which is of greatest interest to ourselves. have been extremely well treated by Mr. would have seemed downright heresy. namely that which preceded the composition of the Nyaya-Sutras. B. In any date.

and assign the same or rather an earlier date to the svamin. in his Nyaya-varttikatatparya-ika. may be fixed by means of that of Dignaga as I tried to show in the passage quoted above (India. I have pointed out l that. Sutras of Gotama. 307 seq. A more comprehensive study of Buddhist literature may possibly shed some more light on the still to be worth much. according to native interpreters. with the literary It is quite intelligible 1 2 India. Kalidasa alluded to the logician Dignaga in a verse of his Meghaduta 2 . as explained by him and other Nyaya philosophers. p. . while Uddyotakara wrote his commentary to refute his interpretation and to restore that of PakshilaIf Va&aspati Misra is right. 307. p. See also Prof. IV.DIGNAGA. Satis of Buddhist Text Society. traditions of the Brahmans. though it may be despised by those who imagine that the value may of Sanskrit literature depends chiefly on its sup- posed remote antiquity. is said by Ya&aspati Misra. parts Chandra Vidyablmshana in Journal iii. if I am right in supposing that in the beginning the followers of Buddha broke by no means so entirely. date of Kalidasa 477 help us to a date for the Sutras of Gotama.). as has generally been supposed. We may suppose therefore that Dignaga was con- Now Dignaga sidered a contemporary of Kalidasa. we should be allowed to place Dignaga in the sixth century. to have interpreted the Nyaya aphorisms of Gotama in a heterodox or Buddhist sense. I think it is Several other dates chronology of the later literature of the Brahmans. valuable to us. So late a date may not seem worth having. and iv. pp. 16.

1896.). in one case at least.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. This Buddhist commentary was attacked by Uddyotakara. as a very old man. concerned as they both were why among the with the Veda. clearly for the six Brahmanic systems of philosophy. and we know that the same Sutras were explained afterwards by Dignaga. But there was no reason why the Buddhists should forswear the study of either the Nyaya or Vaiseshika systems. the same as those which we possess. for instance. though making their reserves on certain points. p. Brahmans. . 16. a commentary by Pakshila-svamin or Vatsyayana on the Nyaya-Sfitras. various systems of Hindu philosophy the Buddhists should have paid little attention to the two Mimawsas. See also Journal of Buddhist Text Society. had read with his 1 not only master. such as the existence of an Lsvara. before he became a Buddhist. was actuallv the teacher of Hiouen-thsang. or even the Sawkhya system. while of the in the beginning 1 seventh century Dharmakirtti. and 6rainas were equally welcome (India. For we possess. dhist. D. the Buddhist. a Brahman. an authority which the Buddhists had rejected. This Yasubaridha. We know from Chinese travellers such as Hiouen-thsang that Vasubandha. meant but also the six Tirthya philosophies. 307 seq. but denied by Buddha. Bauddhas. Therefore in Vasubandha's time all the six systems of Indian philosophy must have been in existence. in the form of Sutras or Karikas. of the sixth century. We know that at the court of Harsha. pp. Vinayabhadra or Samghabhadra the books of the eighteen schools which were Bud. who travelled in India from 629 to 648 A. which was admitted by the Nyayas.

3 1896. be distinguished from the system of thought which they are meant to explain. the first or in Madhyamika now lies before us the Madhyamika 'Vritti by A^andra-Kirtti. of course. to is 479 said to have defended Dignaga l and have criticised Uddyotakara's Nyayavarttika. Though none of Dignaga's writings have as yet been discovered. a Buddhist. defended Dharmakirtti's and indirectly Dignaga's interpretation of the Nyaya-Sutras. The Sutras or rather Karikas of the Madhyamika school must. In the ninth century Dharmottara. Yogalura. the Madhyamika. his This would coincide with the period of the Brahmanic reaction and the general collapse of Buddhism in India. 17). while the revival of the Nyaya dates from Gamgesa Upadhyaya who lived in the fourteenth century at Mithila. the Nyaya-samuM'aya. and every hope that other philosophical treatises for instance. we have lately gained access to some of the Sutras of the Buddhist schools of philosophy. part iii. and thus place before us an intelligible progress in the study of the Nyaya both by Brahmans and Buddhists from the sixth to the tenth century. Sautrantika. and it was not till re-established the in the tenth century that Va&aspati Misra finally Brahmanic view of the Nyaya Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-ika. made accessible to us by the labours of these inde- fatigable scholars. may be is there also.DIGNAGA. Sri Sarat Chandra states that there is in the library of the Grand Lama a Tibetan translation of his Nyaya-samuft&aya (Journal of Buddhist Text Society. and Vaibhashika. Of the four great schools of the Buddhists. Thanks to the labours of Sarat Chandra Das and Satis Chandra Vidyabhusharta. p. a Buddhist. which are full of interest. .

As such it is referred to and refuted in Gotama's Nyaya- Sutras IV. perceptions of them. D. it nevertheless shares in common with them many of the ideas and even technical If it teaches the /Sunyatva or emptiness of the world. where $a??ikara distinctly refers the doctrine that we know no objects. or nihilism. Madhyamikas between what is Paramarthika. as explained by A'andra-Kirtti. 43. no doubt. is a son. is much the same as the distinction of the later Vedanta between what is really real (ParamarthaPratitya in Pratitya-samutpada and similar words may best he rendered by dependent or conditioned. characteristic feature The of that system is the unya-vada. If Nagar^una was really the author as of the Madhyamika-Sutras.480 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. real in the highest sense. we now all the six systems. but only our to Sugata or Buddha. they would carry us back to about the first century A. 37 to 40. from . and a father 1 A is impossible without a son. in Badarayana's Yedanta-Sutras II. and Samvntika. on something else need be no more than the dependence of everything The distinction made by the 1 . veiled. Though it is different. 2. that terms. which will require very careful examination. for instance. dependent on a father. and we should have in his Karikcas. in Kapila's Samkhya-Sutras I. 28. and the Sa?>ikhya Aviveka. the oldest document of systematic philosophy in India. 44. son. In the same way everything is dependent on something . and if it teaches the Pratityatva of everything. this after all is not very different from the Vedantic Avidya. else. pure and simple. possess them. Pitaram Pratitya. The author of the Parl&adasi quotes the Madhyamikas by name as the teachers of universal nihilism (Sarvam iSunyam).

the veil that covers the Nirgwia Brahman or the Tad. We that to them neither the objects of sense nor the sensations point to an underlying substance or reality. What is peculiar to the Buddhists is extrinsic. intrinsic. pain. and sound. light. which again is not very different from what the Buddhists is and what meant originally by /Sunya. is the very opposite of the Buddhist view of the world. Du/ikha. for they hold that even the $unya is not altogether nothing. phenomenal or the result of Maya. and we look forward to many valuable contributions from their pen. more Sri Satis Chandra Das and particularly for retranslations from Tibetan. and we also have the well-known idea that Manas. owe a great debt of gratitude to both Sarat We Chandra Vidyabhushana for their labours in Tibet. It was in 1852 that published my first contributions to a study of Indian philosophy in the Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandisclien Gesellschaft. fundamental position of the Samkhya. taste. as Satkaryavada. Many of the technical terms used by the Madhyamikas are the same as those with which we are acquainted in the other systems. smell. 481 Vyavaharika. water. Bibliography. for instance. Adhibhautika. is divided into Adhyatmika. and with their five causes. These papers did not extend. meet with the five perceptions of colour. mind. divine or supernatural. however. earth. touch. i i . forms the sixth sense. and Adhidaivika.BIBLIOGRAPHY. and ether. Whether Buddhist philosophy shares more in common with the Samkhya than with Vaiseshika seems to me as doubtful the Nyaya and The as ever. empty. ta/i). sometimes called Samvn'ti. air.

482 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 1873. E. Gough. The difficulty in giving an account of these systems for the benefit of European . Thus it may be understood why as 1824. particularly through the publications of the Vaiseshika-Sutras the Bibliotlieca Indica. and in my paper on Indian Logic contributed to the late Archbishop Thomson's Laws much of Thought. the meaning of creation. so that there can be little doubt as to what Ka?iada or Gotama thought about the nature of the soul. the reality of human knowledge. the relation between cause and effect. such as Professors Deussen and Garbe. beyond the Vaiseshika and Nyaya-philosophy as treated in the Tarkasa?ttgraha. through the complete translation of them by A. Though. and Vai. and more urgent occupations connected with the edition of the Rigveda prevented me at the time from finishing what I had prepared for publication on the other systems of Indian philosophy. much new and important material has come to light in the meantime.veshika and the other systems even papers published so long ago Colebrooke's papers on the Nyaya of Indian all philosophy. I found that there was not to alter in my old account of Gotama's and Kanada's philosophies. and through the comprehensive rein searches of European scholars. such as J. may still be recommended to who want trustworthy information on Indian philosophy. and the relation between God or the Supreme Being and man. as given in the German Oriental Journal. These essays have sometimes been called antiquated. but there is a great difference between what is old and what is antiquated. of course. Indian philosophy has this great adthat each tenet is laid down in the Sutras vantage with the utmost precision.

Sanskrit and English. 1886. 1850.363 (incomplete) see also Bibliotheca Indica. Benares. 1877. The Vaiseshika Aphorisms of Kanada. The Tarka-Kaumudi. 60. so as to bring out the salient points of each system. The Tarkasamgraha of Annambha^a. 311. Uber das Nyaya-bhashya. Manilal Nabubhai Dvivedi. Mahadeo Kajaram Bodas. and published with critical and explanatory notes. Gautama as that of Buddha. 483 readers consists far more in deciding what may be safely omitted. Windisch. (Gautama is the same as Gotama. The Aphorisms of the Nyaya-Philo- sophy by Gautama. but not too late to enable me I i to profit 2 by several of . s. pp. Kesava $astri. 09. prepared by the late Kao Bahadur Yasavanta Vasadeo Athalya. the MSS.) A. than in recapitulating all their tenets. to the family of the Gautamas or Gotamas. . This book reached me after these chapters 1897. Bombay. 1873. with the author's Dipika and Govardhana's Nyaya-bodhini. Books in which the Nyaya and Vaiseshika-systems may be studied by those who are unacquainted with : Sanskrit are. besides the papers of Colebrooke Ballantyne. Gough. a. E. it would seem. on the Nyaya and Vaiseshika were written. being an introduction to the principles of the Yaiseshika arid Nyaya-philosophies by Laugakshi This is the same author Bhaskara. to whom we owe a valuable edition of the Yogasara- sawgraha. Allahabad. both belonging. varying with regard to the vowel. 1 in the Pundit. The Nyaya-darsana with the com- mentary of Vatsyayana. Leipzig. translated. only that a tacit by agreement Gotama has generally been used as the name of the philosopher. Bombay.BIBLIOGRAPHY.

or indifference to any rewards in the to come fear. which is to follow by Thin perfect itself. a greater amount of space allowed to logical questions in these than in any of the other but originally the systems of Indian philosophy name of Nyaya would have been quite as applicable . or resignation. according to the ancient commentator Vatsyayana. state of freedom. namely. the non plus ultra of blessedness. and prevent that perfect freedom from all fear or hope. we must not imagine that the Nyaya-Sutras are anything like our treatises on formal logic. by knowledge. for instance. literally that which has nothing better. published by Goldstlicker. and in the nonis acceptance life of. the all. is salvation. Ny ay a-P hilosophy Though Nyaya has always been translated by logic. This summum bonum which is promised to summum bonum is called by Gotama Ni/zsreyasa. . Even this Brahmahood must not be an object of desire. by a knowledge of the sixteen great topics of the Nyaya-philosophy. which is actually called Nyaya in such works. There is. for such desire would at once produce a kind of bondage. but should never be yearned for. before they were . without as being in fact what Brahman is. Nor is logic the sole or chief end of Gotama's philosophy. according to Gotama. Its chief end. described as consisting in renunciation with regard to all the pleasures of this life. without decay. like that of the other Darsanas. can. the Purva-Mimamsa. as Sayana's to Nyaya-mala-vistara. printed. and in this case. his explanations and criticisms. and without death. no doubt. without desire. be realised in one way only.484 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. . This blessedness.

the true means of recognises destroying all bondage is and regaining perfect freedom of the spirit in our distinguishing clearly between spirit and matter.SUMMUM BONUM. as the Upanishads already declare. In this respect all the six systems of philosophy are alike. saw that the Vedanta recognised true salvation or Moksha in the knowledge of Brahman. and the character also of the bliss is not always the same yet in each of the six systems philosophy is recommended not. though it is to be reached by a different road. but for the promised . as with us. which knowledge is tantamount to identity with Brahman. and far beyond the reach of the But he can be ordinary faculties of our mind. his own salvation. as the fulfilment of all desires. The approaches leading to that bliss vary. and the surcease of all ' ' We suffering (Du^khanta). invisible. and to realise his identity with Brahman.' every Vedantist is to learn in the end the same lesson. highest purpose that man can strive after in this life. Kapila. likewise the object of the Samkhya-philosophy. learnt from revelation as contained in the Veda. and as $vetaketu was taught Tat tvam asi/ Thou art it. 485 Summum Bonum. for the sake of knowledge. . admits all suffering is The end of an objective substratum by the side of a subjective spirit or rather spirits. they always promise to their followers or their believers the attainment of the highest bliss that can be obtained by man. and he sees the cause of all suffering in the spirits' identifying themselves with what He therefore purely objective or material. that is. This Brahman or God is. being a dualist.

but it insists strongly on certain spiritual exercises by which the soul ness. and holds that salvation may be obtained through the performance of such works. The other Mima?usa. illusions and It also lays great stress on devotion to a Spirit. the Vedanta on the contrary postulates the surrendering of all between the Self and the world. between subject and Prak?-iti. or aloneness. supreme spirits.486 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Of the two Mima??isas we have seen already that the Brahma-Mimawsa or the Vedanta recognises salvation as due to knowledge of the Brahman. The Yoga-philosophy holds much the same view of the soul recovering its freedom. and between the Self and Brahman as the right means of Moksha. while the Sa?7ikhya insists on a distinction between Purushas. the subjects. and Prakriti. (7aimini. the Pramawas. object. It indeed '). that of diverges It lays its chief widely from that of Badarayami. among the other whose very existence. according to Kapila. if only . all that is objective. stress on works (Karman) and their right performance. ' He who knows Brahman is is Brahman curious to observe that. the right is name for that highest state of bliss which promised to us by the Samkhya-philosophy. may best obtain and maintain peace and from the all quiet- and thus free sufferings of itself effectually life. cannot be established by any of the recognised means of real knowledge. which knowledge produces at once the recognition of oneself as in reality Brahman (Brahmavid Brahma eva bhavati. between Purusha and is Kaivalya. as the only means of final beatitude. but the point distinction reached at last is much the same. The roads are different.

That paradise has no attraction. Their blissful knowledge is described as oneness with Brahman. Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems. it is very difficult to see in what that actual happiness was supposed to consist which remained after that removal.SUMMUM BONUM. such as can only be obtained from a clear apprehension of the sixteen topics treated by Gotama. and would give no real satisfaction to those who have reached the know- ledge of the Highest Brahman. . . 487 they are performed without any desire of rewards. if this belief in the body as our own is once surrendered. They different are satisfied with teaching that from the body. the though they also aim at salvation. The Vedanta speaks of Ananda. These two philosophies. whether corresponding to Brahman or to Prak?^'ti. Lastly. which always reach us the soul is through the body. and they think that. seem to me to differ very characteristically from all the others in so far as they admit of nothing invisible or transcendent (Avyakta). whether on earth or in heaven. but no details are added. or bliss. or the six or seven categories put forward by Kar^ada. The bliss held out by the It Samkhyas also is very vague and indefinite. are satisfied with pointing out the means of it as consisting in correct knowledge. will cease by themselves. But while we can understand that each of the six systems of Indian philosophy may succeed in removing pain. is not considered assigned to a lower class only. our sufferings. but is in a kind of paradise. that but the happiness resides in the highest Brahman to be enjoyed by the souls near the throne of Brahman. and as final. agreeing as they do among themselves.

in the shorter text of the Maitreya Nirvanam anusasanam occurs. Nirvana help us much. immortality.' We cannot prove. Kaivalya. p. NiAsreyasa. isolation or ultra. What should be clearly understood is that in the early Buddhistic writings also. detachment.' the right form ' would be Nirvata/^. can arise only from the Purusha himself. however. Nirvfwa does not yet mean a complete blowing out of the individual soul. Lastly. We know indeed from was pre-Budtells Pa?iini (VIII. the teaching of Nirvana. or the works of Pralm'ti. 1 Sacred Books of the East. such as Nirvat'o vata/i. far from all the illusions and disturbances arising from objective nature.sasanam. Upanishad where possibly meant for l Nirvananu. 50) that the word dhistic and existed in his time. XV. 'the wind has ceased to blow. the fire is gone out. Amrita. 2. the Apavarga (bliss) of the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems seems entirely negative. if He us that. 61. Apavarga.' but Nirvano *ghih. that Nirvana was used as the technical term for the summum bonum in Pa?dni's time. Even the bliss names given to the supreme each promised by system of philosophy tell different little. and it does not seem to the all occur in the classical Upanishads. and produced simply by the removal of false knowledge. if left entirely to himself. Its occurring as title of one of the modern Upanishads makes it the more likely that Buddhistic sources. plus Nor does the well-known Buddhist term delivery.488 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. . it was borrowed there from There is one passage only. us very 7io?i Mukti and Moksha mean deliver- ance. used in the sense of blown ' out.

argumentation. VI. 1 quibbles. (13) Hetvabhasa. reasoning . instance DHsh^anta. Means of Salvation. thought ' is not likely to fare better. con6ralpa. . (12) Vitanc/a. they confess themselves (Taitt. fallacies. and no one certainly could form an idea of what that Nirvana was meant to tion be in the Buddhist Nihilistic or >Sunyata-philosophy. (9) Nirnaya. (8) Tarka. . . The meaning of complete annihila- was a later and purely philosophical meaning attached to Nirvana. 4. I doubt even whether the Upanishads could have given us a description of what they conceived their In fact highest Mukti or perfect freedom to be. . (15) See a very learned article on Nirvawa by Professor Satis Chandra Vidyabhushawa. 489 but rather the blowing out and subsiding of all human passions and the peace and quietness which result from it. cavilling. . . p. : we find them enumerated in the following list The Sixteen Topics or Padarthas. (5) Prayo^ana. in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society. doubt (4) objects of knowledge (3) Samsaya. premisses clusion . Turning now to the means by which the Nyayaphilosophy undertakes to secure the attainment of the summum bonum or Apavarga. means of knowledge (2) Prameya. (n) (14) /f/^ala. purpose established truth (7) Avayava. sophistry. (i) . Pramana. i) that all speech turns away from the bliss of Brahman. II. . Up. (6) Siddhanta. (10) Vada. unable to reach it V an d when language fails. wrangling.THE SIXTEEN TOPICS OR PADARTHAS. part i. 22.

faculties. inference. more particularly the revealed word. it seems to me highly creditable to Indian philosophers that they should have understood the necessity of such an analysis on the very threshold of any system of philosophy. Perception comes begin to do its the way. particularly by one title of that claims the Nyaya or logic. that in reality the chapters on Prama?ia or means of knowledge. particularly that of the Veda. Anumana. depends again. comparison. and Prameya. has first been established. are Pratyaksha. unfitness for arguing. and >Sabda. the question whether revelation falls under the one or the other. How many if all misunderstandings might philosophers had recognised of such an If the necessity introductory chapter. than a subordinate kind of inference. according to Gotama. or whether it can claim an . Imperfect as this analysis of our instru- ments of knowledge may seem. (16) Nigrahasthana. This may seem a very strange list of the topics It is clear to be treated by any philosophy. analogies. as we should say. while the $abda or the word. Means of Knowledge. first on our on our combinatory and reasoning then senses. on a previous inference by which the authority of the word. objects of knowledge.49 ^rati. comprehend the whole of philosophy. Upamana. word. sensuous perception. Comparison is no more because inference can only work after perception has prepared first. and has supplied the material to which inference can be applied. have been avoided we must depend for all our knowledge. false INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The four Pramanas.

objects of knowledge. will. Objects of Knowledge. the treatment of which led gradually to subject It is the elaboration all of general rules of its thought. whatever may be. in fact. enjoyment. cognition. though a glance at the history of Greek philosophy would show us that. quibbles. steps instances and established truths supply materials. such as body. we have rules for dialectic rather than for We are taught how to meet the artifices of our antagonists in a long argumentation. and downright misstatements. From Nos. before logic became an independent branch of philosophy it was likewise mixed up with dialectic and with questions of some more special interest. pain. These death. how to avoid or to resist sophistry. mind. wrangling. comprehend omne scibile. w hile premisses and reasoning lead on to the concourse little to first do with mark the r clusion 10 to logic. of are but have afterwards discussed objects singly. quite clear that these sixteen topics should . false analogies. The of Doubt and purpose logic. can far more easily be settled than if such questions are not asked in limine.OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE. 1 which disputants wish to reach. and final freedom. but turn up casually whenever transcendental problems come to be treated. applicable to reasoning. organs sense. how to defend truth against unfair antagonists. qualities. soul. If from our point of view we deny the name of logic to such problems. as given by the Nyaya. fallacies. towards philosophical discussion. we should be perfectly justified. fault. 49! independent authority. 6.

i. Categories are the praedicabilia. Pada. Nothing shows so well the philosophical character of the Sanskrit language than this very word PadIt artha. which has been translated by category. the object. Object. from y]nosco. the meaning. it could never have been so far extended as to include wrangling. names. as we drop it involuntarily in gnat. Latin called every kind of knowledge or to know all . by the sixteen categories. What we should call objects of thought. . their ynomina became nomina. We shall see fallacies. Their language passed through an opposite process to that of Latin. means in ordinary Sanskrit simply a thing. thus showing that from the earliest times they understood that no thought was possible except in a word. quibbles and all the rest. they called far more truly objects of words.492 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but literally it meant Artha. things gnomina. and however much the meaning of this term may have been varied by European philosophers. and that the objects of our knowledge became possible only after they had been named. but after a time. mere forgotten ynomina they became nomina. and were then supposed to be something different from the old and e. and after the initial y known had been dropped. on no account be rendered. . that the six or seven Padarthas of the Vaiseshikas correspond far more nearly to the categories of the Aristotelian and afterwards of European philosophy in general. as they mostly have been. or whatever can be predicated. Padartha. of a word.

or even to absolute Abhava. Six Padarthas of Vaiseshika. categories or predicates. i. are treated by the Vaiseshikas under this head. or negation. we have six Padarthas. very near to the Avinabhava. it may be useful to look at an account of given . to which all words i. The next two. or motions.MADHAVAS ACCOUNT OF NYAYA. parts and the whole. Madhava's Account of Nyaya. 493 According to the Vaiseshikas. itself is one of the substances. and can be applied to previous. i. such as cause and It comes effect. it would seem. however. stances things must be either subqualities (24). so that many things which with us belong to psychology and logic. and what is peculiar to one. the it Nyaya-philosophy was meant to achieve. the Not-withoutbeing. to present or to subsequent non-existence. and should be carefully distinguished from mere conjunction or succession. e. the last known meaning. In order to see what. Knowledge (Buddhi) is which here treated as one of the qualities of the soul. more than mere local movement. six general meanings. and the like. comprehend what is shared in common by many objects. e. Samavaya or intimate connection is a very useful name for a connection between things which cannot exist one without the other. All (9). e. in the eyes of native scholars. all things can be referred. Abhava. and thus distinguishes it from all others. so as to correspond in fact to our activity or even to our becoming (Werden). at a later time. the general and the particular. The seventh category. was added.

or highest happiness. "understanding (Buddhi) and mind (Manas). " the second he investigates the truth as to the " causes of the faults. and final liberation (Apavarga) . and refutes all objections that could be made against their being considered as instruments of right know- ledge tion " .' he says. the body. the senses." and also the subject of "wholes" and "parts.494 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. first daily portion of the second book he examines doubt (8). fruit or reward (Phala)." In the first daily portion fifth book he discusses the various kinds of the various kinds futility (Giiti). faults (Dosha). transmigration (Pretyabhava). the compendium of all the systems of The Nyaya-sastra. by the great Madhava/iarya in his Sarvadarsanasa?ttgraha. and each book contains two daily In the first Ahnika of the portions or Ahnikas. Ni//. consists philosophy.vreyasa. in pain (Du/ikha). third book he of the examines the daily portion in the soul. Gotama proceeds at once to a description of the steps by which the promised is to be attained. of five books. beginning with proof" (Pramana). and their objects . and in the second he shows that " presumpand other Pramanas are really included in the " four kinds of In the first proof" already given.' After having held out in the promise of eternal salvation to all first Sutra the his who study philosophy properly. beginning with discussion (Vada). second. first book the venerable Gotama discusses the ' ' " definitions of nine subjects. . In the first daily portion of the fourth book he examines activity (Prav?"itti). and in the second of the of objectionable proceedings (Nigrahasthana). and in the second those of the remaining In the seven. discusses the four kinds of proof.

some of the links in the PadM^a Samuppada of the or blessedness Buddhists. 495 namely by the successive annihilation of false knowledge. the twelve Nidanas. Vedana. attachment. Gautama. Daurmanasya. sensation . on these the Shac/ayatana. sensation. literally abstersion or This process reminds us strongly of purification. This of successive proclaimed by Buddha has formed the subject of ever so many commentaries. the six organs of perception. despair states 2 . on Vi(/?lana. and Upayasa. This is of Causation. 269 seq. names and forms sion Sparsa. fering.MADHAVAS ACCOUNT OP NYAYA. is still a contested question. been annihilated there follows ipso facto freedom. /S'oka. Childers. Samkhya-Philosopliie. Upadana. decay and death. Parideva. on this Namarupa. of the last or suffering has birth and suffering. state of exis- tence. sufbirth. . . According to the Buddhists there follow on Avidya origin resting on something else. really first means is step so fully elaborated in the Vedanta-philosophy. Gotama or Gautama. s. 2 Garbe. but what- ever the age of our Sutras (the sixteen topics) 1 may Cf. Then follow in succes- contact. Who was the earlier of the two. sorrow. and. none of which seems quite satisfacThe chain of Gotama is shorter than that of tory. 6rati. THstma. Cf. p. When (Apavarga). but the general likeness can hardly be mistaken. of activity. Du^kha. chain grief. of faults.v. desire. and was meant generally translated by Chain to sum up the causes It of existence or of misery. lamentation. in consequence. Avidya or that cosmic Nescience The which was the Samkharas these ] . Bhava. all the varieties of existence . (^aramarana.

a consequent . rise of Nyaya-philosophy existed clearly before the Buddhism. Perception (Pratyaksha) is explained as knowledge produced by actual contact between an organ 1. all being means or The first measures of knowledge. Gotama. corresponding object. topic or Padartha is Pramana. proceeding from what is constantly seen together. parison. which is said to consist of four kinds.sra very acutely (Karika in attacking his antagonists for . I.e. from what was before. sense-perception (2) Anumana. inference (3) Upamana. as 5). Inference or 2. an antecedent *Seshavat. this object How a mere passive being supposed to be real. a INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Perception or Pratyaksha. e. and Samanyato Dn'shYa. i. to examine each of the Gotama proceeds next sixteen topics. i. impression. supposing the contiguity of the organs its of sense and of sense with outward objects had once been established. Pramawa. . the A7irvaka rejects every kind of he. proceeding from what was after. Anumana remarks or inference. Vaaspati Mi. and (4) /Sabda. proceeding . Anumana.496 be. is Inference (Anumana). described as of three kinds. Though. preceded by perception. word. They are in the Nyaya as in the Vaiseshika. can be changed into a sensation or into a presentation (Vorstellung) or what used to be called a material idea. Purvavat. (i) Pratyaksha. is a question not even asked by . com. as we saw.

The meaning of the three kinds of inference differs considerably according to different commentators. refers to the mutual relation between a sign and what is signified by it. wander away. preceded by or possessed of a prius. turbance of their peacocks may really and the screaming of the have been imitated by men. we infer as its Purva When we see that the ants carry their eggs. is universally or is marked by This uncon- ditional association afterwards treated under the name of Vyapti. but being sup- posed to exist on the strength of Anumana. or that the peacocks are screaming. in such cases does not affect the of and as inference. OR ANUMANA. 5. (Nyaya is S. . but the Vyapti only process soon as the relation between the sign and the fault. In that case the fault arises from the conditioned character of the Vyapti or the pervasion. 497 their mistaken faith in inference. Examples will make this clearer. so that the observation of the sign leads to the observation or rather inference of associated with it what it. we infer as the $esha or posterior that it will rain. Thus the rising of a river may be due to its having been ants dammed up. When or prius we see a river rising that it has rained. that is. It is generally explained that a Purvavat. The however. may what may prove too much or too little. literally pervasion of one thing by another. does really himself rely on inference. 37). the carrying off their eggs by the may have been caused by some accidental dishill.INFERENCE. such erroneous opinions being never brought into contact with his organs of sense. It is true that in all these cases the reason given for an inference called. Kk . II. without which he could not so much as surmise that his antagonists held erroneous opinions.

Even a deaf man may sound if he sees a particular conjunction of a drumstick with a drum. The third kind of inference. because that is logicians depended. the truth of the conclusion quite another. that of a each inductive sign (Linga). is truth. Thus smoke is the sign (Linga. is the sine qud non of smoke. the Samanyato Drishta. and fire is what pervades the smoke. the latter being always conditioned by the presence or absence of certain Upadhis. rectified. what is to be pervaded. based on what is constantly seen together. everything seen in different places being known to have Here the Vyapti. the sign itself Vyapya. on which the ancient moved. thing signified has been the inference will is come right. is . These conditions are called the Upadhis. Vyapya). But everything depends on whether the two are either absolutely or only conditionally related. is therefore Lingin or Vyapaka. or to infer fire from perceiving the heat of water. In all such cases the correctness of the inference one thing.498 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as in a red-hot iron ball. had to wait till it was corrected by Copernicus. always present when there is smoke. is illustrated by our inferring that the sun is moving it is seen in different places. nay to infer the existence of an organ of touch from our feeling any animated body. It requires but a certain amount of experience to infer the presence of an ichneumon infertile existence of from seeing an excited snake. fire and smoke is conditioned by damp and there are other cases also where fire exists without smoke. Thus the rela- tion between firewood . and the bearer The bearer of the sign is called Vyapaka or pervading. Each Vyapti. consists of a sign (Lingin).

499 Different from this very natural explanation of the three kinds of to which >Sesha is Anumana is another. as in scented articles. because it is Aprasakta.. i.e. and as no actions can take place without instruments illustrated we may infer the existence of senses as instruments Kk 2 . Thus from smoke on a hill we should infer the presence of a particular fire on the hill. the prius. This is not supposed to illustrated by an example. allowing is to be taken in the sense of what is left. inference.' that left over. but effect. as belonging to the genus fire. except artificially. But as earth is different from all other substances. But this is wrong. is by our inferring the existence of senses. should not be taken in the sense of antecedent cause. earth is being separated from all other elements One might have peculiar quality of smell. which would be simply absurd. by inferred from the fact that the element of earth possesses smell. infer that smell does not belong to anything that is not earth. falling under the general concept of fire The third. that all elements possessed the same. according mean subsequent us infer its to invariable cause. It would be no better than if we were to infer that smell must belong to other qualities and actions also. its it alone posto say. or Sarnanyato Drishta. such as is ' Earth is dif- ferent from all other elements. does not apply. OR ANUMANA. In the same manner we are told that Purva. which are by themselves imperceptible (Indriya/a Atindriyani). but as a general concept the properties of which have been formerly comprehended as known. or method of residues.INFERENCE. because sesses the quality of smell. because we do perceive colour &c. we may This is the residuary inference.

we should Comparison (Upamana) or recognition of likeness. and seeing an animal like 3. It is Word curious to see that among the people to be trusted (Apta) the commentator . or what call the members of a syllogism. I must confess that I prefer the more natural explanation of the three kinds of inference being based on cause. having been told that a Gavaya (bos gavaeus) is like a cow. effect. Among these three inferences. the second Avita. It inference from the sensible to the supersensible. the Avayavas or Premisses. or as a right It refers. man may infer that it is Word 4. &c. the first and last are called Vita or straightforward. For instance. or Sabda. Samanyato Dn'shte. Comparison or Anumana. ($abda) is explained either as a preof one cept worthy to be trusted. shall have to deal again with Anumana We when we come to consider the seventh Padartha. but not a cow. a a Gavaya.500 for INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. or not straightforward but this only if we adopt the . we are told. either to visible or precept. With all respect for native commentators. nay I find it difficult to understand why this view should have been given up by the modern Naiyayikas. Next follows a cow. thus becomes very like the seeing of a general concept. our action of seeing. and association. invisible objects. both is ancient and modern. second explanation of the three kinds of Anumana. explained as an instrument for ascertaining what has to be ascertained by means of similarity with something well known before.

or what we should call omne scibile. will. and knowing (Buddhi). (7) activity (will). 2 Body is defined as the seat of action. They . water. &c. (5) understanding. touch. Gotama next proceeds to define each of these Prameyas. provided they are well Strictly speaking the Veda would not abda. hatred. (2) body. but or barbarians also. It is essential to recolour. 4. and according to the next Sutra. and what they intimate. (9) transmigration. 501 MleMAas informed. touch. by enumerating the characteristics peculiar to each. 1. The first six of these are called causative. The senses or organs of sense are defined as those of smell. sight. savour. member that 1 of the elements the first four are both According to the commentary the sensations. or topic is The second Padartha all Prameya. pain. (6) mind. (12) final beatitude. (4) sense-objects. unless it can be proved to be AptavaA-ana. (10) rewards of deeds. . the other six caused. and hearing. their objects 1 3. that is. (u) suffering. These elements (from which the senses draw their origin light. that can be established by the four Pramanas. taste.. The characteristics of the Self are desire. and ether while the objects of the senses . the word of one worthy to be trusted. come under II. the qualities of the objects of sense. . and sound. of the senses. are the qualities of earth. air. should mention not only Rishis and Aryas. such as odour. that is. are supposed to arise from the elements. which alone can be perceived. (3) senses. and their perceptions) are earth. pleasure. (8) faults. Twelve such objects are mentioned: (i) Self or soul. Prameya.FRAME YA.

and the question has been fully discussed how Manas. and regulates them in our conit sciousness. if once effected. . such as we know there is in sleep. it were admitted that the two could unite. which translate by ether. Anubhava. we and non-eternal. It is sometimes called the gatekeeper or controller of the senses. If. and so on. The non-eternal substances are either inorganic. Vorstellungen. Bcgriffe. and of percepts into concepts. would naturally fall to the Manas. then there could never be any cessation of knowledge. being A?m. it is by the Naiyayikas explained as being the same as apprehension or knowledge. lias never been fully realised Manas or by Indian logicians. for the union of Atman and Manas. can be united with Atman. mind is considered as A/m or an atom. and concepts.502 eternal INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and hence not tangible. this subject. Even the distinction between percepts. while the fifth. that is to 6. The transformation of sensations into percepts. Smarana. The sense of scent perceives odour only. but always related to the sense. or infinitely great. and remembrance. understanding. which is Vibhu. and is explained as that which prevents more than one notion from arising at the same time. and as being twofold. As from understanding. organic. would be indissoluble. with the Mimawsakas. notion. so that the sense of light perceives or sees light only. Akasa. prevents the rushing in of all sorts of sensuous impressions at once. a subject little cultivated by Indian philosophers. is eternal only. however. Little attention. or sensitive. is paid by Hindu logicians to which has assumed such large proportions with us. to Buddhi. 5. is Mind (Manas) different say.

4. Apavarga or final beatitude. Rewards are consciousness of pleasure and pain. Pretyabhava is transmigration. 24). so that they are sometimes explained as 10. of the understanding working through the mind (Manas). eternal (Tarkakaumudi. 7. 1 1 Pain is characterised by vexation . however. If Manas were supto be co-extensive with the body it would posed neutralised. voice. non-eternal. and of the 8. p. Pravnttidosha<7anitartha/i phalam. . nay we should be unable to account for a future life and the in- we should equalities of birth in any future life have to admit. and we should lose that which retains the impressions of acts done in the body. and by actions consequent on them. and Nitya. Entire deliverance from pain and pleasure 12. The Naiyayikas hold. It is 503 held by the Naiyayikas that when Manas enters a particular region of the body called Puritat. is eternal and numerous. while Manas. infinitely small. and be destroyed with the body. Activity (will) is the effort of body. both pain and pleasure are here treated together under pain. and as pleasure also involves pain. fruit. from Atman by being atomic in dimension. good or bad 9. in the most general sense. results produced by faults. be Anitya. and acts bear 1 . the effect of the union of Atman and Manas is and sleep ensues. differing. like Atman. . that the Manas is both Anu. therefore. 20. n. Faults cause acts. is Having thus examined 1 all that can form the See I. .PRAMEYA. effects without a cause. in fact.

that is. Dnsh^anta. we are told. The definition given of doubt shows that the ancient logicians of India ties of a man and had carefully thought about the different causes of doubt. so that they were led to the admission of three or even five kinds of IV. tenets. Prayo^rana. contain nothing that is of peculiar interest to the historian of philosophy. But these disquisitions. Doubt. . the Pramanas or measures of knowledge. neither of which has as yet been proved. . except so far as they offer once more the clearest evidence of a long continued previous study of logic in the ancient schools or settlements of India. or Members is of a Syllogism. object of our knowledge. The Avayavas. example. and the Prameyas. or of Indian on Greek philosophy. purpose or motive (V) D?*ishanta. arises Sa?nsaya or doubt. familiar case (VI) Siddhanta. from our recognition of various attributes opposed to one another in one and the same object. as when we recognise in a distant object the qualiof a post. unless we are inclined to admit either an influence of feel we hardly Greek on Indian. it. the members of a sylloits structure are so surprised at meeting with it in the schools of logic in India.504 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the coin- . V. familiar that members. Yet. we now enter on the third of the sixteen topics. as well as those referring to (IV) Prayo^ana. Much more important so-called gism. VII. III. VI. Siddhanta. Samsaya. the To us a syllogism and the next subject.

we are told. We At the time when the philosophy became different systems of Indian first known to the scholars of Europe everything that came from the East was looked upon as of extreme antiquity. expressed years ago. was deeply impressed with that idea. and that the Greeks had borrowed the first elements of their philosophy from the Hindus. is possible in another also. as we may gather from his desire to communicate with the gymnosophists of India. by European scholars that the Hindu systems of philosophy. either on one side or on the other and though I am far from denying . Alexander himself. who died a voluntary death by allowing himself to be burnt before the eyes of the Macedonian army. that we must here also admit the existence of undesigned coincidences to a much I keep to many larger extent than our predecessors were inclined must never forget that what has been to do. therefore. Indian and Greek Logic. manuscripts in India were still . cidences between the 505 to myself I feel evidence of any direct influence. my conviction. as far as we know at present. One of these gymnosophists or Digambaras seems to have been the famous Kalanos (Kalyana T). The view that Alexander might actually have sent some Indian philosophical treatises to his tutor at home.INDIAN AND GREEK LOGIC. and this even at a time when. possible in one country. were more ancient than that of Aristotle. As two are certainly startling. There had been vague traditions of ancient Indian philosophy even before the time of Aristotle. bound to confess that I see no its possibility. and particularly Indian Logic. It was readily admitted.

without giving any reference. inconceivable as it now seems to us. would have clinched the argument once all. we cannot explain this similarity except by the inter- 1 Plutarch. O r/V UVTU> CUCT^TIKOV. but none in technical proper names in Comparative Mythology. but even that one coinNo doubt cidence has not yet been discovered.aTov. was taken up and warmly defended by men like Gorres and others. and that Aristotle might have worked them up into a system. Gorres. terms. <Uld & fourth UKUTOVO/AaOTOV. De Placit. this being probIt ably an ingenious conjecture for aKarovo^aa-Tov \ is quite true that one such verbal coincidence would settle the whole question. show a higher of historical criticism. the fifth being called Akasa. quotes Epicurus us to the HOU! being a mixture of three elements. look at Indian philosophy we discern traces of a great similarity with that of the Greeks. on the other hand. if Niebuhr and others power stood up for the opposite view and tried to derive But does Indian philosophy from Greece ? Niebuhr is reported to have said in his Lectures on Ancient History. air. Gorres undertook to prove that the Greeks had actually retained some For instance. as Indian philosophers admit five elements. e. unknown.T-ov6fj. there were many points of coincidence between Greek and Indian logic. ether. which. Now ' If we as people have given up the hypothesis that Greek philosophy formed itself after Indian philosophy. i.. like for it. akds-nominatum. . and water. Philos. quoted a passage from Aristotle in which he speaks of a fifth element and calls it dKa. fire. technical terms taken from Sanskrit.506 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

They know how Greek philosophy grew up gradually. how they assumed a more and more definite form. But they ought not scholars have just the Sanskrit same feeling with regard to Indian philosophy. are as certain that philosophy was autochthonous in India as that Gotama and Ka?iada were Brahmans and not Greeks.' To Niebuhr and to most Is that really so ? Greek scholars it would naturally seem next to impossible that Greek philosophy. religion. They also can show how in India the first philosophical ideas. or in Greek of Sanskrit origin. trace their gradual development in the and Upanishads. which can be watched from its first childhood. as yet in a very vague and shadowy form. should have been of foreign origin. art. What it then remains ? It seems to me that until can be proved historically that the Greeks could freely converse with Indians in Greek or in Sanskrit on metaphysical subjects or vice versa. or until technical philosophical terms can be discovered in Sanskrit of Greek. public at last they were fixed in different schools in that form in which they have reached us. a mere importation from India. They feel it to as Plato be a home-grown production. course which the Indians 507 had with the GraecoMacedonic kingdom of Bactra. too. show themselves in the hymns of the early poets of the Veda. . and civilisation. They. rise They can Brahmanas They can show how they gave and private.INDIAN AND GREEK LOGIC. as certainly and Aristotle were Greeks and not to be surprised if Brahmans. and how to discussions. how its growth ran parallel with the progress of Grecian poetry.

to conclude at once that they cannot be explained except by admitting a historical contact and a borrowing on one side or the other 1 No . we must wait and not hamper the progress of research by premature assertions. genus = Samanya. though seeing smoke does not see that there must be fire. as on a 1 hill. doubt there are the Vaiseshika categories = Padarthas. Having once learnt this lesson we shall feel less inclined. or reasoning from the fitness of the case. and deduction = Upanaya. and species = Visesha. that in philosophy also there is a wealth of truth which forms the common heirloom of all mankind. and is On Coincidences. which is explained as refutation. Guna. be best to accept facts and to regard both Greek and Indian philosophy as products of the intellectual soil of India and of Greece.508 it will INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. substance. Tarka. even syllogism tion = Vyapti. and derive from their striking similarities this simple conviction only. Sanskrit and in Greek. But before we enter into the intricacies of the Indian syllogism. After the five members follows VIII. there is Dravya. why not in India ? Anyhow. whenever we meet with coincidences of any kind. . quality there is . M. VIII. But why not ? If they could be developed naturally in Greece. both in . Tarka. when a person. it will be best to finish first what remains of the sixteen topics of the Nyaya. 1896.. and may be discovered by all nations if they search for it with honesty and perseverance. a paper read before the Royal See M. Society of Literature. = the Avayavas there is inducnay.

Vitanc&i. unfitness for discussion. fraud in using words in a sense different from what is generally understood.. 509 thereupon made to see that if the hill were without It is fire. however. it would of necessity be without smoke. We next come to XIII. is The next topic to be considered IX. Vada or argumentation. Hetvabhasa. (ralpa. cavilling. If this wrangling is devoid of really establishing any attempt it at an opposite opinion. alpa. (7ati. . that tell equally on both sides. paralogisms and sophisms. and XVI. As to XV. and XIV. both disputants. they have been mentioned before. that stand themselves in need of proof. and not for truth. ati.. XIV. Viruddha. Sadhyasama. such as objections X. quibbling arising from . meant to be a reductio ad absurdum. that is. Nimaya. consisting of and answers. ETC. Nigra- hasthana. Hetvabhasas. mistimed. Vitawda. futility. X-XVI. Prakaranasama. 6rati. sophistical or attacking what has been established. Khsila. truth only next XI. XV. It is difficult to . IX. . ascertainment. These are SavyabbiMra. . and Kalatita. caring for wrangling by means false of fraud analogies . Then follow the rhetoric or eristics paragraphs connected with rather than with logic. Nirwaya.NIRA7 AYA. that prove the reverse. Kh&la. In the last five cases disputants are supposed to care for victory only. is called XII. Nigrahasthana. futility arising from change of class. arguments that prove too much. Vada. or specious arguments.

If we were topics. The last. Here the same soldiers man from is referred first to the class of those fever. in the school of Zeno. and unmethodical. for instance. but it cannot be called loose at the same time. Nigrahasthana. because understand why 6rati. is cussion. though in several cases there are subdivisions which have here been left out. unfitness for diswhen a man by misunderstanding or not understanding. e. mean a futile he has a fever. and yet at the end of the list Gotama actually apologises and says that there are many more sorts of futility. This may seem a long Judgments on Indian Logic. unfair to It all is charge the Nyaya and equally the other . as when. as to look upon this list of the sixteen some have done. i. loose. in answer to an argument that a man is unable to travel. should unless it meant argument. which have mixed with nothing certainly up subjects to do with pure logic. as an abstract of Gotama's whole philosophy.510 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. originally a transitio in alterum genus. but will have to be discussed hereafter. as his table of the categories. may be also too minute for our taste. because he a soldier. but so was Greek logic in its Nyaya is It beginning. it should be answered that he is is able to travel. which have been passed over by him. renders himself liable to reproof. &c. and then to that of who suffer who are always supposed to be able to march. list. yet continuing to talk. birth or genus. European philosophers would no doubt be justified in saying what Hitter said in his History of Philosophy that the exposition of the It is tedious. or with others.. XVI.

but it produced at all events a deep sense of responsibility. Instead of complaints about the injustice and cruelty of God. free for ever from the chains and pains of this transient episode of life on earth. and in one respect the safest means of paying off all debts.JUDGMENTS ON INDIAN LOGIC. Philosophy at the same time held out a hope that in the end might be broken through. The popular mind of its being unthe problems But India seems never to have doubted the fact that every good or every evil thought or deed will grow and bear fruit. sophers as they are. Morality with the Brahmans depends either on prescriptive sacra (Dharma). return to whence it came. with and with entirely ignoring all of ethics. according to . were in fact the natural consequences of previous acts. We must remember that philosophy in India had very different antecedents from what it had with us. We ourselves can hardly conceive a philosophy which in the end is not to be of practical usefulness. That highest freedom and beatitude. and that no one can ever escape from the consequences of his own acts and thoughts. Whether such a belief is right or wrong is not the question. return to himself and be himself this net of consequences . that is. systems practical 5! I of Indian philosophy. enlightened by true knowledge. were fully deserved. and the Self. people were taught that what seemed undeserved misfortunes. and a firm conviction that nothing can ever be lost. or on what is called Samaya. and which ignores all questions But we must learn to take philoof morality. be again the Universal Self. strongest support is a firm belief in the solidarity of life here and hereafter. the agreement of good people.

but I can discover no looseness of reasoning in it. with his Critique full detail of Pure Reason. like Badaraya?ia and Kapila.512 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Indian views. first of is it all. from a Hindu point of view. which is the cause of birth. the tracing of the limits of Pure Reason. are they so far wrong ? And what is true in the case of the Vedanta. nor in Indian philosophy in general. seemed necessary to the limits of the two. Prama?ia. This again may be right or wrong. If they hold that a knowledge of the true relation between man and the world. . if indirectly the whole Nyaya-philosophy is called the cause of final freedom or blessedness. which. This. mental points of this philosophy are contained in what can be known. and the means of knowing. which is the cause of suffering ' ' (I. is the true cause of error or sin. nor does it betray any looseness of reasoning. that Gotama just as Kant began to say. But this being done in under Gotama too. enters on an explanation of the process by which it was possible to destroy ignorance or Mithyar/mina. his philosophy is. but is a mere nothing compared with what earth is lies behind and before. and between man and the Author of the world. We must not forget that. is true in a certain sense It may be said that the fundaof the Nyaya also. is at all events perfectly coherent. Modern Nyaya is almost entirely confined to Pramana. whether right or wrong. which is the cause of activity. . is essential to true freedom and tine happiness. depended on philosophy or knowledge it could not be acquired by good works or good thoughts alone. 2). the Samkhya and Yoga systems of philosophy. that his sixteen headings. this life on but an episode that may be very important in itself. to establish. the eternal life of the soul. Prameya. as he holds.

they prove at all events the conscientiousness of the early Naiyayikas. that if there is no authority anywhere. it and so on ad infinitum. The objector would cut away the ground under his Ll . This is an idea that anticipates an important element of modern As a balance may serve to weigh philosophy. or authority would hardly But quired further proof. PEECEPTION. starts the question. these books Some of the questions discussed in show quite clearly that they must have formed the subject of lively and long-continued controversy. the third and fourth of the Prameyas. or who the authority of its authority. the fifth treats of all that comes under the head of paralogisms.PBATYAKSHA. namely. Pratyaksha. the Prama?ias. 513 The Later Books of the Nyftya. but must also be weighed or tested itself. might be said that the authority of the senses also requires to be established by another authority. Perception. for though some of the objections raised may seem to us of little importance. while the following three books enter into a more minute examination of its Thus the second book treats more fully of details. a thing. In answer to this Gotama uses what seems to be an ad hominem argument. In this gives us way the first indeed a fair book of the Nyaya-Sutras outline of the whole of Gotama's philosophy. on That sensuous perception should be a Pramarca seem to us to have re- Gotama or his opponent what ground the evidence of the is senses can claim such authority. there can be none on the side of the objector either.

yet we know that it can only be successive. own and thus would himself have no locus stanch for offering any objections (II. Another question also which has lately occupied our psycho-physiologists. does by no means exclude that between mind and Self. that which results from contact of sense with its object. are alluded to by Gotama and his school. whether . But admitting that sensuous perception has authority just as a lamp has light to light up the things around it. Here the piercing seems simultaneous. as when we are so absorbed in listening to music that we do not perceive the This objects around us. that in fact there may be sensation without perception. 13). though it dwells only on what is essential (the contact of sense and object). because for real perception there must be contact not only with the organs of sense. again reminds us of modern philosophy. feet. he only defends himself by saying that everything cannot be said at the same time. Even such questions as to whether there is any interval of time between our hearing the sound of a word and our realising its meaning. and the question whether several impressions can be taken in at the same time is negatived by a reference to the running of a pin through a number of sheets of a MS. is not incomplete. This is not denied by Gotama. from want of attention. He also admits that contact between sense and object does not invariably produce perception. but likewise between the senses and the mind (Manas).514 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and that his definition of perception. the next question is whether the definition of sensuous perception. on the contrary takes it here for granted. and between the mind and the Self (Atman).

but never r it is falling. for instance. we see only that it has fallen or that it has still to fall. yet taking it as a whole. 31). by Gotama (II. of which one side only can be seen at the time. FUTURE. The next problem that occupies Gotama is that of time of present. is 515 discussed perception does not involve inference. it seems. may seem childish to us. if the present did not exist. Past. The illustration given by Gotama to show that a tree is a whole. The objector. and in this case. while the rest has This leads to be supplied by memory or inference. PAST. he tries to account for the process by which we take a part for the whole. we postulate and are convinced that there is another side also. the it whole tree trembles. a very real objector. No one. past. so-called childish Time Present.TIME PRESENT. a tree. Gotama remarks that in that case perception and all that springs from it that Ll2 . namely. has ever seen more than one side of the moon. Here the answer is that past and future themselves would be impossible. particularly in cases where our senses can apprehend a part only of their object when perceiving. and as we can in reality never see more than one side at a time. him on to another question whether there really is such a thing as a whole. and as a globe. because the moment w e see a fruit falling from a tree. and future. because is when we shake one branch of it. Future. and on the objector's admitting such a possibility. for instance. for it is the opinion of the Buddhists. denies that there is such a thing as present time. but exactly in these simple and thoughts that the true interest of ancient philosophy seems to me to consist.

so that a mere reference to the subject cannot be used as deterthis that . as essentially different from Anumana. inference. All we can say is that. Upamana. as we shall see. would by no means a kind of Anumana. by the side of Anumana. And here Gotama seems in conflict with Kawada who. analogy or comparison. But first of all. might feel tempted to conclude from We Gotama must have been later in time than Kawada.516 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. events. can only said in this place about the validity of inference. we find Gotama bent on establishing is Passing over what by the side of it. mining the seniority either of the opponent or of the defender. if presented as Sabda. because we shall have to return to it hereafter. declines to accept Upamana. we know that we have to deal with followers Nyaya but the Vaiseshika. of at the all independent evidences. Vaiseshika and secondly. the Word. we know that this question of the Pramanas had been discussed again and again in every school of Indian philosophy. Comparison. comparison. namely Upamana. Kanada's name is not mentioned here nor that of his system. it would be altogether impossible. though an independent place among the Praschool . reject it. whenever we see Upamana appealed to as a means of valid knowledge. of the denying it manas. We now come to the various kinds of verbal is testimony. because depend on what is present. Testimony said to be conveyed by . authoritative as one or. his next instrument of knowledge.

but as the highest authority is as the Veda is the word of chief authority for deterof a word is admitted to be the The argued that Brahman or God.' between acceptance of the word of an authority (Aptopadesa) and reliance on an inference. mining the meaning usage of trustworthy persons. conveying the meaning of each word in its relation to the other words. it follows that every word of the Veda possesses the highest This. consisting of many words. find again the same question started as before. and certainly do not enable us to admit more than the ' ' ' contemporaneous activity of the various schools of . the word or the sound of a word. though clearly referring to (raimini. we In the examination of the validity of /Sabda or word.SABDA. ments in defence of the supreme authority of the Veda with which we are familiar from the PurvaMima?nsa. or whether it should not rather be treated as a kind of inference. he enters on new problems such as the association of sense with sound. 517 words. does not authority. Then. and by a sentence. who assign eternity to the $abda itself. is Though the meaning of words because admitted to be conventional. but which again. yet opinions differ some consider such conventions to be eternal or divine. and it is Brahman. as we know. however. after Gotama has shown the difference be- tween I know and I infer. while others take them to be non- eternal or human. THE WORD. a question which is intimately connected with the question of what authority is due to the Veda as the Word par Here we meet with a number of arguexcellence. it whether deserves a place by itself. satisfy the Mimamsakas. must not be taken to prove the anteriority of 6raimini's Sutras to those of Gotama's.

that there are Gotama Prama/ias. may. was a zealous student of the Nyaya-philosophy. Having defended the teaching of the Nyaya. Arthapatti. p. Aitihya. 1 . whole of Nyaya. and The Eight Pramaflas. like written letters. while /iesh^a. centuries intervening rise Hindu philosophy during the between the close of the Vedic age and the spread of Buddhism. before he became a Buddhist. or under Anumana. that he must Of these four Prama/ias the first is referred by Gotama to $abda. - . tradition. not necessarily authoritative. probability. the others to Anumana. non-existence. He wrote a work. be classed either under Word. have gone out. IV. Sambhava. called Prama/ia-samuK'aya. assumption. They include. till Sarat Chandra discovered a Tibetan version of it in the library of the Grand Lama at Lhassa (Journal of Buddhist Text Society. are told that Nagaiv/una. and shows that their number is superabundant. This would prove at the same time the study of the Nyaya philosophy in the first century of our era see p. as supplying knowledge. 17) '. neither more nor less. 480. We which was. The Pramanas seem to have formed a subject of prominent interest to the Nyaya philoin modern times they have absorbed the sophers . as we saw. because they hold that there can be knowledge arising from not-being or from absence. Word. parts iii and iv. inference. or mere gesture. as when we conclude from the fact that Devadatta is not in his house. and even Abhava. proceeds to criticise the four additional four Pramawas of the Mimamsakas.518 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. however. it is added. supposed to be lost.

on words and their true nature. or not. the Indian philosophical systems. But we shall see that . and I do not mean to deny that some of their remarks on philosophers. language are really childish. where we meet with them again as worked out by Gotama. for all the discussions (f>vo-L about the or Secret hem of the question. nay transcendental character of language. The true problem of language has been almost entirely neglected by Greek philosophers and theii difference disciples in Europe. in fact whether any letter can ever become another letter. these disquisitions shall be surprised to how intimately in problems of philosophy. and at last on the divine. such as the existence of a Creator and the relation between the cause and the effect of our created world.THE EIGHT PRAMAA AS. the more we shall feel the between Eastern and Western philosophy. it will be necessary to examine them more fully in this place. The oftener we read these discussions on the eternal character of sound. and we the minds of Hindu philosophers they are connected with some of the greatest branch out very see far. as is origin of language touch only the very it presents itself to Indian The way in which the problem of handled language by them will no doubt be dismissed as childish by modern philosophers. T 519 Here follow long discussions as to the nature of words. and as I passed them over before. Though is the word eternal. the difference between sound (Dhvani) and words. till we arrive again at the question whether and therefore a Pram&na by Similar questions occur in most of itself. as whether a vowel such as they deal with such purely grammatical questions i can ever be changed into the semi-vowel y.

At all events the idea that Brahman was the Word. would carry us back even beyond what we call the Vedic period. It was shadowed forth in the very language of India. long before the rise of philosophical systems. 28 refute his objection on the ' : We We ground that (the world) originates from the Word.520 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.' Perception is here taken in the sense of /S'ruti. Students of philosophy should overlook what may seem strange to them in the manner of treatment. and always try to keep their eye on what is important and has often been overlooked even us. We as expressed in the philosophical hymns. back to the same root as that of Brahman. speech. as we saw. by the greatest thinkers Language has been to most of us so among familiar a subject that we have hardly perceived what is behind it. and have scarcely asked the questions which it has cost so much effort to Indian have already on a former philosophers to answer. read in Sutra I. 3. Word and Creator. was right in tracing the word B?*ih. existed. as is shown both by perception and by inference. the whole question is treated by Hindu philosophers in a very serious and searching spirit. and Upanishads of the Vedic period. scrip- . to which we must return for our present purpose. and that the world was created by the Word. the connection of the two ideas. but If I it received its full development in the Sutras only. have now We to follow up these views as they are presented to us in a more systematic form in the Sfttra-period. in Brihas-pati. occasion examined some of the views on language. more particularly in the Vedanta-Sutras. Thoughts on Language. Brahma??as.

It is Brahman. if it contained names of non-eternal things. which was thought and uttered at of things first by Brahman. ' : . and as all individual things are created in this. nor this or that Deva. possibly be ante-temporal or eternal. the gods and other beings. the fify (Akritis). This is afterwards confirmed by passages from /Stuti and such Then with as BHh. it is not the individuals. nay the whole world. An objection had been started that the Veda could not be considered as eternal. the Devas. tradition. /Samkara argues. and that this Word is Only. Hence genus to which they belong. which is therefore more than the Word. are not capable of entering into that connection. he adds. it followed that the Veda. and as even the gods. could not Against this. 52! and inference in the sense of Smn'ti. that in spite of that. for these. not this or that cow or horse. but not the also. as containing their names. posed that the . 2. that had their origin in the Word. 4 it. lies in Brahman The only. with the genus that words are connected. though readily admitting the non-eternal character of the gods. Up. SmHti. and individual gods are allowed to have had an origin. but the genus to which they belong. Ar. that is. were looked upon as non-eternal. having been proved to be subject to birth and rebirth. as being infinite in number. all individual things. the Devas. ture. must be admitted to have originated from the Word or the Veda. Word be supconstitutes the material cause it Nor must shown before. not with individuals. I. word of the Veda is simply the expression of what is permanent and eternal in all things (universalia in rebus). as accordance with their true origin in the they are rightly said to have Veda and in Brahman.THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE.

before he in this. Let there be light. and Brahma^as. which is identified with the words of creation. of Neo-platonic reminiscences. if we can bring light. when we mean to do anything. II. me when I T. and comprehends all named concepts. manner the words of the Veda had to be present to the mind of the Creator. In order to show that there all is nothing strange $amkara remarks that even we ourselves. it is easy to see that Veda. necessary for the creation three of created things. could have created the is things corresponding to them. and the . Speech.' I This will sound strange to confess. Veda stands here for Logos or Sophia. nay even to such thought as '(Jod spake. so full (). and there was Of course. sounded strange came across these thoughts. : ' continuous process of their works. Pra^apati. the Divine Word which we read in the Veda. it to many readers. Br. 8534: 'He who exists by himself let first stream forth the Word. the Mahabharata XII. e. 8535 created the names and forms of things.' The Word therefore. XII. as we mind he united himself with also. 2): '"This as. And 4.' If we read such passages carefully. without beginning or end. g.522 his INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. said.' ourselves to say that the Logos of the Alexandrian ." he and created the earth. the eternal. or the ideas or logoi of the world. 2. or Speech. thus it said in the is Veda (Taitt. have first to think In the same of the word for what we mean to do. existed before creation. Mahabh. the Samhitas. first the earth. read in the Burnt i and whence proceeded the evolution of the world 'God in the beginning again. was meant for more than what was afterwards called the Vedas.

$abda means word. because it is supersensible. and thus to dis- Why courage further research ? Hindu philosophers have treated this whole question with so much care that we can see at least that they truly cared for it. if indeed it admits of will people not see that it is far more any. but it was admitted as an independent element by the other schools of thought. scholarlike to confess our ignorance than to give an answer. knows that the very opposite is the case. 218 seq. They begin with the beginning and try first to make what /Sabda is. which was meant to be the vehicle of sound and The existence of this fifth element was altogether denied by the materialists. and indoctrinated pagan and Christian philosophers with their ideas But as every Greek scholar of Va& or Speech. and of sound only. Brahmans came to Alexandria. however hesitatingly. . pp. because 1 See Anathon Aall. We have it clear to themselves seen already that they actually postulated a fifth element Akasa.THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. and they therefore begin with asking what sound is. philosophers l 523 had no antecedents in early Greek there would be an end of the whole philosophy and we should simply have to admit that question. and had fully perceived its intimate connection with some of the highest problems. requires a very different solution from that proposed by Professor Weber. the question . but it also means sound. which we translate by ether. both religious and philosophical. the Barhaspatyas. and I have tried to show this on several occasions. which were nearest to their heart. 1896. even by the Buddhists. Gescluclite der Logosidee.

but a i. 21).). sound cannot be eternal. its substance. Ka-making perceived by &c. to their honour that they allow ' full credit to the Purvapakshin who opposes the eternal character of sounds and words. Muir. having Akasa or ether for and eternally. 70 seq. I. however. it changes (as Dadhi Atra changes (6) and that it it. which takes a special interest in the question of the elements. (5) that to Dadhy Atra). sounds and words being accepted as momentary manifestations only of eternal sound. but not air could they held that of sound.). Ballantyne's Mimawm-Sutras. whether sound or word. No. and that it is only carried along by the air. explains sound as the object apprehended by the sense of hearing (II. The Vaiseshika-philosophy. (2) that it passes away. where we can clearly see that sound is produced by a conjunction between a drum and a drumstick. Ka-kara &c. All these arguments are clearly directed against the Mima/msakas who for reasons of their own re- quire >Sabda.' he says *. p. 6 com. which This is illustrated by the striking of a drum with a drumstick.524 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Sansk. A-making. its quality. is the number of those who make augmented by But to all these 1 Cf. is rejected by Kanada. to be eternal. Texts. 8 . It must be said. The opinion that sound exists always and is only made manifest by each is held by the Mimamsakas. neither substance nor action. ' (3) that it is made it is (the very letters being called A-kara. pp. speaker. 2. III. not possibly be the vehicle Its loudness might depend on it. It then declares that sound is quality (cf. We see (4) that different persons at once. for instance. Orig. . because we see (i) that it is a product..

it is the same. if repeated. he says. but is sensitive only to what is intangible in sound. and that we have 110 right to suppose that it is ever annihilated. that only is means that it is employed. eternal. there are the definite words of the Veda which tell us of an eternal Voice. only not always manifested on account of the absence of an utterer or an exciter. If is heard. it is said that sound the same which has always been is made. now heard. and though the per- is the same on both sides. and if it the same time by many. before. The letter ception of sound right in looking k. to his Having thus established own satisfaction the eternity of sound. the answer is that the ear does not simply hear the air.THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. that everywhere at the same time that. difficulties 525 The word is the Mima/msaka has a ready answer. when the authorship of the Veda had to be discussed. and as to the increase of due to the increase of the number of conjunctions and disjunctions of the air. though the sound in is may vanish. perceived at applies to the As to the modification of sound. noise. the quality. it is not the same letter modified. and when it was shown that the author of the Veda could not have been a personal being. its traces it the mind of the hearer or learner . but it is another letter in the place of a letter. . If it should be supposed that sound is a mere modification of air. we are on sound as eternal and as always present. Besides. (raimini proceeds to defend the sounds or words of the Veda against all possible These arguments were examined by us objections. it leaves . that is (raimini's reasons in support of the eternal char- acter of sound are that. the same sun.

naked thought. except in the form of words.526 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. to the question. we may gather from the fact that they actually admitted Panini. not as made by them. nay skinned thought. it was the duty of a student of thought to inquire into the nature of words before he approached or analysed the nature of what we mean by thought. as human beings possess no means of perceiving the thoughts of others. We may therefore at once proceed to the next point. They had evi- dently perceived that language is the only pheno- menal form of thought. and how clearly they had perceived the intimate relation between language and thought. namely. as to what and what according to Indian character. that there is a difference between VorsteUurifj (presentation or percept) cept). their greatest grammarian. philosophers Though these discussions are of a grammatical rather than of constitutes a word. and Bcgriff (conand that true thought has to do with conceptual . they deserve our attention. among their representative philosophers. and in consequence between the Science of Language and the Science of Thought or Philosophy. when divested of its natural integuments. as it has been truly called. and that. is its real a philosophical character. How well the Hindus understood that the study of language forms an integral part of philosophy. because they show how keen an interest the ancient philosophers of India had taken in the Science of Language. but that the Veda could only have been seen by inspired Rishis as revealed to them. nay even their own thoughts. the words. They understood what even modern philosophers have i'ailed to understand.

is eternal or not. the Purva-Mimamsa when treating of the question whether sound. apart from its component letters. i. It is true that in Pamni's own that of Sphofa. he shows first of all that the /Sabda or word which Pamni professes to teach in his $abdcanusasana. also treat most fully of linguistic questions. notion. 527 words only. It really means the sound of a word as a whole. in his survey of all philosophies. is the true cause of the world/ is in fact Brahman. Sphoa must have meant originIt has been translated by ally what bursts forth. and perish when separated. assigns a place between Purva Mim4msi and Kapila's Samkhya to the Panini Darsana. Here. and he adds thereupon some lines from grammar. Spho^ayana. are M&dhava inseparable. or is really the ' he writes. and as conveying a meaning. shows that this peculiar word Sphofci must have existed before Pawini's time. expression. Sutras the word Sphoa does not occur. when examining the P4mni Darsana. 123). as. but the name grammarian whom he quotes (VI. Derived as it is from SphuZ. for instance. but none of of a these renderings can be considered as successful. nay that the two. word and thought. Hindu philosophers have actually elaborated an idea which does not exist in any other philosophy. Sphofo. parts. the material element of (7aimini's words. same as Brahman. what we should call Other systems the grammatical system of Pamni.SPHOTA. The eternal word/ which is called Spho^a. The subject has been well treated by Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-sa??igraha. and is without ' . concept or idea.

where that grammarian (died ' 650 A.' What more ? could be said of the Neo-platonic Logos In answer to some who deny the existence of such a Sphofa. as we knew already from the Pratisakhyas.D. . because letter. Splio^a. he says. without beginning or end. the : in- Which developed destructible essence of language. there must be something else by means of which knowledge is produced. Bhartn'hari's BrahmakawcZa. each as soon as pronounced. for all men. should never have appealed. cannot produce cognition. and whence springs the creation of the world. long before they became acquainted with the written letters of a Semitic alphabet. and therefore cannot form a whole nor can it be in their separate form. vanishes. whether these letters are supposed to produce cognition in their collective or in their separate form. though ' vainly. it is maintained that it is actually an object of perception. It cannot be in their collective form.528 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.' know it as distinct from the letters composing it. This shows. because no single letter has the power of producing cognition of the meaning of any word. arises from the separate letters of a word. whether in their single or their united form. on hearing the word cow. in the form of things.) says Brahman. in support of And if it were said that cognition their opinion. and that is the the distinct from the letters though sound. nay even of vowels and consonants. As therefore the letters. that the Hindus had elaborated the idea of letters. to the discussions of Spho^a. we ask. and I only wonder that those who believe in an ancient indigenous alphabet. .

' Kaiyate.' The objector. ' : 529 He Now Mahabhashya is that by which. . it there. 14) seems to have given the right solution. would arise again. if the letters expressed there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones (as the first would already have it.SPHOTA. does not thereby escape from a single difficulty. when pronounced. but if it requires always manifestation. explains this more it is ' fully by saying : Grammarians maintain that the word. hoofs.' severally On this point Panini (I. though one and indivisible. this could be by its letters only. simply help to convey the meaning by means of a conventional association (0ecrei). since. which expresses the meaning. and horns. there duced then quotes from Patan^ali's what is the word Cow ? It is proin us the simultaneous cognition of dewlap. too. ' : Spho^a itself is manifested by the letters as they are pronounced and apprehended. and that is what we call the Sphoa. however. This dilemma is put forward by Bha^a in his Mima??isasloka-varttika The grammarian who holds that manifest or non-manifest. conveyed all that is wished). asks the question whether this Sphoa is If it required no maniwould be festation. as are they apprehended. when they are pronounced and thus the same difficulties which were pointed out before as to the collective or single action of letters. by laying it down as a principle that letters can never form a word unless they have an affix at the end. while the letters. This shows that the conventional character Mm . tail. It is therefore some- thing distinct from the single letters which conveys the meaning. He. as distinct from the letters. is not silenced at once. hump. 4. revealed by them.

namely. otherwise Vasa and Sava. accept the revealing the invisible Sphote. Words express the Summum Genus. no more than a catching at a straw by a drowning person. and that all the objections are . our philosophical grammarian takes another step. All this was meant to show that the admission of a Spho^a was unnecessary but we now get the orthodox answer. Brahman.. we are asked to admit a Sphoa. as a crystal reality. as little as flowers without a string would And as the letters cannot combine. would carry the same meaning. that the admission of Spho^a is necessary. namely pure existence. is coloured by its surroundings. they must also follow each other in the same order. the characteristic of which is consciousness of the supreme the meaning of all words is And lest it should be thought that in that words would mean one and the same thing. whereas the following letters serve only to make that Spho^a more and more manifest and first letters. Nava and Yana. when con- . it is remarked that in one sense this is really so but that. &c. Nor is it enough that the letters should be the same. case all . namely Brahman or being. trying to prove that ultimately that summum genus (Satta). because separate letters would never be a word.53 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. of the relation between sound and meaning was fully recognised in India. as explicit. After having thus in his own way established the theory of a Spho^a for every word. and to be a wreath. as soon as they have been proevanescent being nounced. which they do not. whether that sound was called $abda or Spho^a.

and on it all words depend. to which I added the amendment that they expressed either an action or a status.. in cows. in individuals. according to the Vedanta. Brahman thing. the root expresses Bhava. horses. 53! nected with different things and severally identified with each. and there(or fore all words. we must remember that. the Pratipadika. as others say.. which form abstract nouns. the meaning of the stem. horses. this is the great Atman root.. such as cows. If this true kernel of every word is by Hindu philosophers called the Great Atman (Mahan Atma). This they call objects. &c.WORDS EXPRESS THE SUMMUM GENUS. existence. expresses existence. is found in all things. or. the summum genus. &c. is the true substance of every: This is stated again by Bhartrihari Mm 2 . stands afterwards for different species. rest ultimately on the summum genus. and Satta. Brahman). Greek as well as medieval logicians and it is exactly what my late friend Noire tried to establish.' This will remind us of of many of the speculations .. such as Go-tva. Tal. If the stem-word. such as cow.. expressed by affixes such as Tva. Kriya. &c. is called this or that species by means of its connection with different phenomenal world. cow-hood. as the summum genus. horse. action. For existence. as found in cows. differen- tiated by various thoughts or words. &c. &c. these being first of all 'existence' (Satta) or the highest genus. &c. and the meaning of the This is existence. that all words originally expressed action. a state. in which it resides. as found and then only what they are in this In support of this another is Bhartrihari's of quoted: 'Existence being passage divided. expressive of definite meanings.

the Paramatman and the 6rivatman. All The idea that all end mean Brah- man. 2. who holds Pamni holds that they mean individual things. pure houseis hood 3 only expressed. like the house of so for a vanishing reason (that called Devadatta. the other. many Brahmans. Words mean TO words in the QV. 58. and the living or individual 1 Read Gnhatvam instead of Grihitam? . varies as it does in the case of the two Atmans. which admits of no duality except as the result of nescience. Ramas means always Kama.532 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the highest or universal. and it is identical with the : ultimately identical. 2. but by the word house. both views as true in grammar. while they are . maintaining that our ordinary words mean a genus. I.e. that a Brahman 'a in another. Hence it is said denoted by all word but the relation of the two. the one of Va^apyayana. The Supreme Being is the thing words. of Vyat/i. the one Supreme Being. is Brahman' may mean when we say. the true forms. I. reality is known under its illusory words under untrue disguises. was necessitated by the very character of the Vedanta-philosophy. only so long as Devadatta is the possessor of reality named the house) . is. by The true is (for a time). i. Rama so many single Ramas.' of Genera or Individuals? Words Expressive But while the meaning of all words is thus admitted to be Brahman. to be honoured 64. he shows that as . we meet with two schools. he states that the plural and Rama. for in one place.

if OV. the medicine of the diseases of language. by themselves. 533 the difference between the two being due to Avidyd or temporary nescience.' may be accepted as representing the views. As early as the Maitrayana Upanishad we meet with verses to the same effect. 22). and the straight royal road among This if all the roads that lead to emancipation. there would have been no necessity for the admission of a Sphoa.' conveying a meaning which does not depend ' on any single letter nor on any combination of them. and that words existed long before even the idea of letters had been formed. Letters. . It was evidently not seen I by the inventors of this Spho^a that letters have no independent existence at all. the door of emancipation. leads up to final bliss. Though from our point of view the idea of such a Sphoa may seem unnecessary.V ALL WORDS MEAN TO soul. and of an earlier date than itself. and by the Word alone is the Non-word revealed. have no raison d'etre. we cannot help . the Word and the Non-word. the breaking forth of a whole and undivided utterance. as ' it was called by Pata%ali ($abdanusasana). such as Go. cow. the science of sciences it is the first rung on the ladder that . 'Two Brahmans have to be meditated on. the means of final beatitude. at least of his followers and must say that if his explanation of a word as a number of letters ending in a suffix had been accepted. not of Panini himself. is.' In this way the grammatical philosophers endeavoured to prove that grammar or exposition of words. the purifier of all sciences. such as (VI. Sphoa is in fact the word before it had been analysed into letters. like every other system of philosophy. and can be considered only as the result of a scientific analysis.

though never even suspected by the philosophers of other countries. and in seeing difficulties which never attracted the attention of European philosophers. makes an organised whole of it. the basis of the Christian theory of creation. in Greece. and receive their special meaning from their relation to the genera or all mind of Brahman. have no reality and no power. and that we should find it so fully elaborated in the ancient world of India is surely a surprise. should have sprung up in India Do we not suddenly or. required so till many evolutions of thought they reached the point which they reached in Alexandria. expressive of its meaning in its undivided form only. as we should say. and as genera they are eternal. a welcome surprise. Words are not names of individuals.534 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. admiring the ingenuity of the ancient philosophers of India in inventing such a term. much-despised Neo-platonic philosophy. something undivided and indivisible. This is the nay. casually ? rather see clearly here also how long and . Vox. logoi in the These logoi existed before the creation of the world. as it were. and that every word is something different from its letters. and this may be raised to the status of a word by means of a grammatical suffix which. which would be nothing. and afterwards in Palestine. Still more important is the idea that all words originally meant Brahman or TO 6V. and. but we have an indivisible explosion. we have not a combination of three letters v. as such. For it is perfectly true that the letters. In such a word as Va&. All this is true and recognised now by students of the Science of Language. but always of classes or genera. as creative types. I should add. rendered that creation possible. And can we suppose that ideas which. a. k.

That mind. and that the whole universe of Brahman.V ALL WORDS MEAN TO OV. being strengthened by . I am bound to say that I have felt an acquaintance with the if general spirit of Indian philosophy as a blessing it from all against the antinomies of being and thinking. though visible to the human mind. that there in the world. which ended where Greek philosophy ended. in which it lives and moves. according to Indian philosophy. and tried to establish ' the truth that there is is Rhyme and Reason is full a Logos. and will remain in our memory as a sight never to be forgotten. In the beginning was the Word. it 535 of thought must have taken place south of the Himalayas before such Would any Greek fruits could have ripened ? scholar dare to say that all this how continuous a development was borrowed from Greece ? Would any Sanskrit scholar be so intrepid as to hint that the Greeks might possibly have learnt their Logos from the Vedic V&k ? Even if we do not accept the last results of this Indian line of thought.' we can at least admire the struggle which led up to this view of the world. not visible to the human eye.all the encounters with the scepticism and ma- my very youth. even we have to descend again frightened and giddy. and nerved in . the Eternal and the Divine. and where Christian philosophy began. To have mounted to such heights. nay even if we should put aside as unintelligible the beginning words of the fourth Gospel. even in the lower spheres in which we have to move in our daily life and amidst our daily duties. which Atman is Brahman. thought. Speaking for myself. in which it has its true Self or Atman. must have strengthened the muscles of human reason. has its true being in the alone Divine Mind.

Why not do the same for Indian philosophy ? Why not try to bring it near to from it we may seem at us. In other countries philosophy has railed at religion and reIn India alone the ligion has railed at philosophy. may be Vedanta on Sphote. even in the most modern. or at the location of the soul in the pineal gland or in certain parts of yet all this belongs to the history of . and had its right place in it at the right What the historian of philosophy has to do time. Is not that something to make us think. however far removed all first sight. It is no to discover blemishes in the form doubt. and to sweep away the rubbish. But there are such blemishes and such absurdities in all philosophies. and to cite expressions which at first sight seem absurd. philosophy gaining its spirituality from religion. then to winnow what is permanent from what is temporary. if is first of all possible. the brain philosophy. own ephemeral philosophy. two have always worked together harmoniously.536 terialism of our INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Humani nihil a me alienum puto ? rich kernel is often A covered by a rough skin. and true wisdom hiding where we least expect it. and to remind us religion deriving its of the often-repeated words of Terence. the vein of gold that runs through the quartz. and to discover. easy. at the atoms of Democritus. Many people have smiled at the Platonic ideas. for it is quite We . and style of Indian philosophy. I mean chiefly the Vedanta. have now to see what the other systems of philosophy have to say on this subject. to try to understand the thoughts of great philosophers. freedom from philosophy. to keep the gold.

that the letters cannot convey the meaning. &c. but always clothed in sound. and which in conversation conveys to others what is in our own mind. /Samkara in order to himself. entirely unnecessary. but he asks. how were these words Beginning as usual with the Purvapresent ? pakshin or opponent. or for the Siddhanta. as repre- senting the Vedanta-philosophy. This is one of the cases where the Purvapaksha. Hence something different from the letters must be admitted. however. is entirely opposed He fully admits that to the admission of a Sphoa. earth and all the rest were created according to the which were present to the mind of the Creator. presenting itself all at once as the object of our mental act of apprehension. to admission of a Sphoa this. 3. l favour of the admission of a Sphoa. 537 them. because they possess neither singly nor collectively any significative power. considers such calls an and. That Sphoa is what is eternal. because as soon as they are pronounced they perish. clear that the idea of a Spho^a.. the outburst of the whole word. and it is that Spho^a from which whatever is denoted by it was produced in creation. prove he goes back and 1 Ved. was not accepted by all. because not even the last letter with the impression left by the preceding letter in our memory. Sutras I. different therefore from perishable and changeable letters. the Sphotfa. the opponent's view. would convey to us the sense of a word. has been mistaken for 5amkara's own final opinion.VEDANTA ON SPHOTA. 28. . because they differ according to the pronunciation of each speaker. he produces as arguments in words earth. though known to $amkara.

but as actually the same. pronounce the same word differently. with having borrowed an from Badaraya/za. or an army. argument 1 Here tator on the . i. or a wood. strong or weak. this is not so. we do not think that two words have been pronounced. may. because though they perish as fast refers to elsewhere also as they are pronounced. 3. cannot form the object of one mental act. Upavarsha. whom he This Upa(III. being several. cuckoo and ape. The sound which enters the ear (Dhvani) be different. but the letters through all this are recognised as the may be said that the letters of a word. because the ideas which we have same. we have only to look at a number of ants. not only as belonging to the same class. and not to the intrinsic nature of the holds that the apprehension of difference on external factors. 1 . but that the same word has been And though two individuals pronounced twice. which as long as they move one after another in amkara charges Sabarasvamin. the famous commenPurva-Mimamsa. no doubt. be asked why groups of letters such as Pika and Kapi should convey different meanings.538 his INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. they are always recognised again as the same letters. such differences are due to the organs of pronunciation. viz. high or low. aid an old Vedantist. 5. 53) varsha argues that the letters by themselves constitute the word. I. He letters. but that their recogdepends nition is due only to the intrinsic nature of the letters. show that things which comprise several unities can become objects And if it of one and the same act of cognition. Thus when the word cow is pronounced twice. if it And of a row.

convey the idea of a row. Without adducing further arguments. 539 a certain order. Hence we see that. by the eternal words from which all non-eternal things. which. but cease to do so if they are scattered about at random. originated. after apprehending the several letters. . and the rejected creation of the world by Brahman in accordance with the eternal words. in order to maintain the identity of Brahman and the Word. Samkhya-Philosophie. being considered essential. though the theory of the Spho^a is by the Vedanta. the Sphoa in turn would have to manifest the sense. but in either case we should gain nothing by the Sphoa could that we admission of it. the eternal character of the words is strenuously retained. It would even be preferable to admit that letters form a genus. We never perceive a Sphoa. n.YOGA AND SAMKHYA ON SPHOTA. not have without such as gods. p. for. and as in the always presenting themselves in a definite order to our understanding. as it would seem. and if the letters are supposed to manifest the Sphoa. and horses. finally comprehends the entire aggregate as conveying a definite sense. 1 1 1 Garbe. he argues. The Yoga-philosophy accepted the theory of the Sphoa. cows. Yoga and Sawkhya on Sphofa. according to the commentary. and as such are eternal. *Samkara end maintains that the admission of a Sphoa is unnecessary. nay it has been supposed to have first originated 1 it 1 . and that it is simpler to accept the letters of a word as having entered into a permanent connection with a definite sense.

proves no more than their belonging to one and the same genus. namely that existence cannot be proved. we can witness their production . and which exists as little apart from the letters as a forest exists apart from the trees. not that it does not exist. was against the Yoga-philosophers. What Kapila says about Sphote. as Badarayana also re- marked. is meant for the group of letters forming a word.54 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. according to Kapila. because. and our being able to recognise them as the same. This eternity is denied by Kapila (Sa??ikhya V. is to Indian philosophy. mean no more ' than unbeginning and unbroken continuity. from Kapila's point of view. of the Veda. as manifesting its sense ? Why invent something which has never been perceived. and simply speak of a word (Pada). and from him. thus heated. then why not be satisfied with this. as is of much the same character what he had said about its Isvara. the Lord. Nor are the letters. that Kapila's objections concerning the Sphoa were directed. It is curious to observe the elaborateness with which what seems to us a purely grammatical question is discussed in the various schools of Indian The Sphoa. he says. what is in fact entirely gratuitous (V. eternal (V. 46) because the Vedas speak of themselves as having been produced in such passages as : He became heated. 57). 58). the three Vedas were produced. rather than against the Mimarasa. it is thinkers not merely a grammatical problem distantly connected with the question of the eternity . but not their being eternal.' Eternity of the Veda can therefore. If Sphoa. so that even at the beginning of a new creation an . however.

tain. rise spontaneously like an exhalation from the Highest Being. by medical formulas taken from the Ayur-veda. non-liberated Purusha have been the author. and it presupposes a will. This is the same argument which was used in the Nyaya-Sutras II. without any No. such as tsvara. but by some miraculous virtue. and their innate power is proved by the wonderful effects which are produced. such an Isvara has never been proved to exist. this is declared impossible by Kapila. the order of words in the as before. because he would not have this possessed the omniscience required for such a work. for instance. For he holds that the Lord or Isvara could only have been either a liberated or an unliberated Purusha. ancient or modern. as he holds. therefore the Veda eternal. in the same way as germs and sprouts. nor could an active. But we must not conclude that. 68. should not call the mere breathing of We But the Vedas. a person in sleep. Now a liberated Purusha.YOGA AND SAJlfKHYA ON SPHO^A. and this the Hindus. because. a personal work. not be supposed that the words of the Veda are manifested. this 54! Veda remains the same But if. as we read. not by any effort It must of will. would find . because we know of no possible personal author. as a tangible and irrefutable proof of the efficiency of the Vedas. they are the means of right knowledge. purpose or meaning. What is called the wT ork of a personal being always is presupposes a corporeal person. as Nyaya and Vaiseshika mainVeda was the work of a personal being. Here all would depend on the experimental proof. because he is free from all desires. like the notes of birds. could not have composed enormous Veda. such as Vislmu for instance.

but it si iows at all events the freedom Indian philosophers were allowed to handle the ancient Sacred Books of the country. 0. whilst their authority depends on the authority of the most competent persons. 3. This is the same with secular words This last admission would of course be resisted and resented by Vedanta philostrongly '. but it is nevertheless a something perceptible by one of our senses. Indica.. Muir. we should be able it always. and because it is known to be factitious. and hence it must be non-eternal. in the unbroken continuity of their tradition. there being no known barrier between the ether and our ear (II. study. all with which 1 Vatsyayana's Commentary on the Nyaya. p. sophers. 3. Nyaya on If Sphola. because it is an object of senseperception. The true eternity of the Vedas of sound is. p. . but if the Hindus were satisfied. ed.542 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. now we turn to the Nyaya-philosophy we find Gotama also denies the eternity of sound. intangible (II. 104). T. according to Gotama. we can see that it has a that beginning or cause. if sound were eternal. that of hearing. 86). even before it is uttered. Besides. consists. Biblioth. and employment. 115. This ethereal substratum to perceive no doubt. Ill. S. we have no reason to find fault. both in the Manvantaras and Yugas which are past and those that are still to come. it is argued. difficult to supply . because. 91.

it is doubted whether he can justly claim any authority. to which the is final Sutra refers. too. Thereupon the eternal character. X. and whoever its author may have been. . tautology.VAISESHIKA ON SPHOTA. In answer to this sweeping condemnation the Vaiseshika points out VI.' teaches duty (Dharma). ' upon intelligence/ or as we should say. The very last Sutra of the ' Vaiseshika-Sastra. and not of an author of limited intelligence. but they follow their of reasoning. because no merely rational author could propound such a rule as sacrifice. because. 543 Vaiseshika on Spho/a. e. such as self-contradictoriness. of the Veda is called in question. as pointed out by the native ' ' commentators. the words because uttered by Him. whether human or divine. there attaches some uncertainty meaning.' But in either case there are objections. The Vaiseshikas the Naiyayikas or not. says: It has been declared that authoritativeness belongs to the Amnaya (Veda) because is and this declaration uttered by Him found likewise in the third Sutra of the first book ' it is . is lastly do not differ much from as to whether the Veda is eternal own way authoritative or not. the Veda must at least be admitted to be the work of a rational author.ksha in the Vedanta and Mimamsaka-Sutras. because it with which we are familiar from the Purvapa.' ' He who desires Such matters could not be paradise. should known in their . the same as those ' i. 9. and the rest discovered by some critics in the text of the Vedas. 2. But though this Sutra to its given twice. i i that at all events there is in the Veda a construction of sentences consequent .' may also be translated by because it declare's it.

in this case of Isvara. in his third book. he could not possibly have declared things that are beyond the knowledge of ordinary rational beings. we return to the Sutras of Gotama. besides being the work of a rational being. after an examination of the various opinions entertained by the Nyaya and other Hindu philosophers of the significative power of words. They argued that. it shows at events the state of mind of the earliest defenders of revelation. The Vaiseshikas admitted a personal author of the Veda. he is chiefly concerned with the Prameyas. the ISelf. men Whatever we may think all of limited knowledge like of this argu- ment. causes and effects to ourselves. at least as trustworthy safely be regarded. as established by the Pramanas and the first question that meets us is. an Isvara. we find that. such as the rewards of sacrifices in another world. that the objects of knowledge. the instruments of objective knowledge. but some further supports to its authority were found in the fact that.544 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. . but this by no means involved the eternity of the Veda. the eternity of the Veda meant no more than its uninterrupted tradition (Sampradaya). With the Vaiseshikas. Objects of Knowledge. the Lord. or not. should be treated as different from the Atman. because the author must at least be admitted to have been a rational being. it had been accepted as the highest authority by a long line of the great or greatest men who themselves might infallible. also. if not as and authoritative. and other matters beyond the ken of experience. Prameyas. is whether the senses or Indriyas. If now. .

least carefully considered. mere remembrance of an acid substance can make our mouth water. all showing how much objections this question had occupied the thoughts of the series of births Nyaya ties philosophers. After these questions have been. each sense could perceive by each sense its own object only. he argues. if not solved. Senses.SARIRA. would perceive . the body has once been destroyed by because. Indriyas. the Manas or mind. the eye colour. . if memory is supposed duality of perception to be a quality or mode of the Self. A number of similar and answers follow. according to other systems. the ear sound. It cannot be. &c. a question which would Next never occur to a Vedantist. Body. namely the Atman. there is no why. /Sarira. with the dual organ of vision. that itself. But Gotama asks it and solves it in his own way. being burnt. follows the question whether the body is the same as the Atman. Some of them suggest difficul- which betray a very low state of philosophical reasoning. at to Gotama goes on show N n . while other difficulties are such that even in our own time they have not ceased to perplex minute philosophers. the skin warmth. the consequences of good and evil deeds would cease to pursue the Self through an endless when and rebirths. BODY. We meet with the question why. holds that they are different from the and in order to prove this. and that therefore what perceives all these impressions together. must be something different from the several senses. at the same time and in the same object. he says. or. 545 Gotama Atman if .

is . they say. our Indian movements objector declares that such are to be considered as no more than And the opening and closing of a lotus-flower. while the mind or Manas is only the instrument (Kara?ia) of knowledge by which attention is fixed on one thing at a time. as maniappealed to as showing a child's previous existence. And when. Mind. Gotama answers once more that a child cannot be treated like a piece of iron. the smile of a new-born child can only arise from memory While our modern psychowould physiologists probably see in the smiles or the cries of a new-born child a reflex action of the of a previous experience. muscles. as a last resource. And here a curious argument is brought in. because. The Self is The Self is eternal. a mere vegetable. different from the usual Indian arguments in support of our previous existence. arid when this also has once fested by a child. towards a magnet. because we see that iron also moves milk. as he says. in a former life. when this view has been silenced by the remark that a child does not consist of the five elements only. Manas. without beginning and therefore without end. the body be not Atman. be conceived as the Atman. is not in fact. acquired a desire for When this again has been rejected as no argument. mind. desire in general. not of this life only. to show that our Self does not begin with our birth on earth. a new argument of the same character is adduced. as we should say. namely the child's readiness to suck. the knower. which can only be accounted for.546 that if INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. neither can Manas. by the child having.

and their relation to knowledge. 547 more been answered by the remark that a child. water. . is naturally of small interest in our time. earth. Here we should remember Nn 2 that. like every other substance. contain curious suggestions for the psychophysiologist. the mind (Manas). but there is little of what we mean may by The qualities it. and they may be passed by here all the more because they will have to be considered more fully VaLs'eshika system. because it displays the qualities of the five. in so far as it is * made of earth. The consideration of the body and of the substances of which it consists. It is chiefly concerned More with the nature of Self (Atman). and the question whether we possess one general sense only. or many. or of three elements. The final solution only deserves clearly shows that the Nyaya also recognised in some cases the authority of the Veda as supreme. fire and air. but can arise from experience and previous im- pressions (Samkalpa) only. the discussion of sight or of the visual ray proceeding from the eye. the difference between the two. must be possessed of qualities. when we come to examine the interesting is the discussion which occupies the rest of the third book. Gotama finally dismisses all these objectors by maintaining that desires are not simply qualities. MIND.' because scripture says so/ What follows. by stating that the body our attention. earth. or of four. and why ' ? /Srutiprama^yat.MANAS. water and fire. of to the objects assigned perception are not very different from what they are supposed to be in the really philosophic matter in other systems of philosophy. whether of earth only. or of five.

and in many would be the best rendering of Manas. is Manas often called the doorkeeper.' ' This is cases this declared to be due to attention. verbal testimony. for instance. inference. The Buddhi of the Nyaya philosophers. we must always remember its technical meaning in Indian philosophy. or by understanding. and 6rn4na (knowledge) are used synonymously. The difference between the philosophical nomenclatures in English and Sanskrit for the Manas and its various functions is so great that a translation almost impossible. while the Buddhi of Gotama is distinctly declared to be non-eternal. at least so far as it enables us to transform and understand the dull impressions of the senses. feeling of pleasure. or as Gotama explains it (1. cognition. and its being originally different from Buddhi. is what we should call attention. and all the rest. and knowledge in general. is totally different from the Buddhi of the Sa7?<khyas. perceptions. doubt.548 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. according to I. yet its distinguishing feature. we are told. which might often be rendered by light or the internal light that changes dark and dull impressions into clear and bright sensations. and I am by no means satisfied with my own. It should also be remembered that is the same Sanskrit term has often very different meanings in different systems of philosophy. dreaming. Buddhi (understanding). desire. imagination. from rushing in promiscuously sensations preventing and all at once. 16). 15. guessing. Though there are many manifestations of Manas. the preventing of knowledge arising altogether. . Upalabdhi (apprehension). understanding. If therefore we translate Manas therefore by mind. Their Buddhi is eternal. such as memory.

the Self or Gotama the cannot belong to the senses and their objects (Indriyartha). and the wielder of that instrument. like the Buddhi of the Samkhyas. which is but the instrument of knowledge. though it may be ignored. must be some one different from it this. but it arises from the conjunction of Atman (Self) with Manas (attention). can only be the Self who in the end knows. which is either immediate or mediate. like the wielder of an axe. It suppressed. Snm'ti. and meant to account for the existence of the light of reason in the whole universe while in the Nyaya-philosophy it signifies the sub. and on the other side of Manas with Indriyas (senses). pain and pleasure. while an eternal essence. In answering the question. because knowledge abides even when the senses and what they perceive have been soul. What is knowledge. an end and vanish by forgetfulness. Manas is the instrument. who feels . Memory. Memory. Atman. . it falls under Anubhava. jective activity of thought in the acquisition of knowledge. declares in this place quite clearly that real knowledge belongs to the Atman only. who remembers. who desires and acts.MEMORY. can never be destroyed. has not received from Indian If it philosophers the attention which it deserves. according to the Nyaya. 549 The Buddhi of the Sarakhya is a cosmic principle independent of the Self. or in the lighting up and appropriating of the inert impressions received This knowledge can come to by the senses. is treated as a means of knowledge. Nor does knowledge belong to the Manas.

when royal attendants remind us 9. Attention to an object perceived : . joined with something else. recalls 3. Absence. sign. as when the pounding . Here we have Anubhava. and the various associations which awaken memory are enumerated as follows 1.550 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. number of things together. Possession. or kine of a bull 10. minds one of sprinkling 1 1. This is he. impression. as Repetition. when one disciple reminds . called Smn'ti. Belonging. one calls up the other 4. as when on seeing a man we say. what has to be proved learned a . 2. as us of the co-disciples 12. A . . as when a . or This is Devadatta. Succession. Relation. Connection. when a property reminds us of its owner 8. as of a wife Fellow-workers. knowledge of this. 5. as when the word when one has Prama/ia. The subject of memory is more fully treated in III. or Smriti. . Prameya. as of the king . 113. which is capable of being revived. 7. namely he or Devadatta. as when a standard reminds one of its bearer 6. . Every Amibhava is supto an leave posed impression or modification of the mind. as when a thing recalls its sine qud A 'iion . a revived Samskara. as when one body recalls a similar body. mark. disciple reminds us of the of rice re- teacher. Likeness. There is and then another manifestation of memory in the act of remembering or recognising. proof. as .

of the wind . reminding us of . tator himself. *Sishyavyutpadanaya. as . which makes us think of those who can . chiefly in order to stir up the thoughts of the learners. when a gift reminds one of the giver 1 6. as . and they show at the same time that it is a mistake to ascribe them exclusively to the SamkhyaThough they do not add much to our philosophy. they show once more how much thought had been spent in the elaboration of mere details and this. reminding us of a son. Such lists are very characteristic of Hindu philosophy. as we are told in this case by the commen. Receiving. Pre-eminence. as when investiture with the sacred string recalls the principal agent. what is feared. . Desire and aversion. each of which recalls the it . when a sword reminds one of the sheath 1 7. Want. supply our wants 21 Motion. Affection. as . the Guru or teacher 15. &c. Opposition. which make us reflect on 23. knowledge of the fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy. reminding us of their . as when a shaking branch reminds us . . and Merit Demerit. when the ichneumon recalls the snake 14. such as death 20. to independent activity. occasioner of 1 8. Covering. Pleasure and pain. joys and sorrows of a former life22. 1 551 3. causes 19. Fear.MEMOKY. .

(9) Pretyabh&va (trans( i migration). such as (7) Pravritti (activity). which Gotama wishes to establish is this. as eating a cake full in of different kinds of sweets. Manas ari is Ami. we ought to admit more than one Manas and he ex- plains that this simultaneousness of perception is apparent only. The important point. he states that the infinitely small. or. and not in succession. i) DuAkha (pain). central sensorium. body. and therefore gave rise to some important questions not only of metaphysics. one after Lastly. are treated in it which . More Prameyas. including the whole apparatus of knowledge. Knowledge not Eternal. is not in itself eternal. the fourth book which is devoted to the remaining six Prameyas. however. or objects to be known and proved. is naturally of a more practical character. the other. Manas. however. but vanishes like any other act. just as the fiery circle is when we whirl a firebrand with great rapidity. that knowledge. Indriyas. atom. He also guards against the supposition that as we seem to take in more than one sensation at the same time. such as Atman.552 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. (8)Dosha (faults). and less attractive to the student of the problems of being and thinking. mind. understanding. Some questions. though belonging to the eternal Self. senses. or as we imagine that a number of palm-leaves are pierced by a pin at one blow. but of psychology also. and /Sarira. (10) Phala (rewards). Buddhi. as we should say. . and (12) Apavarga (final beatitude). Self or soul. While the third book was occupied with the six of the first Prameyas.

It comes in when a problem of the Buddhists under discussion. is subject. and that its chief object was the same as that of all the other systems of Indian philosophy. 553 cannot well be passed over. namely salvation. illustrated by the fact that the seed has to But Gotama perish before the flower can appear. interesting subjects treated here is Pretyabhava. incidentally only. strongly denies this. Life after Death. As the Gotama made is to this tenet are easily disposed of. as it was by Kapila. Another important over altogether. and reminds the opponent that . and whether the manifestation of is anything presupposes the destruction of This is its cause. says (IV. or even as a plant. but nothing said to establish what is meant by transmigration. namely. I mean the existence of a Deity. if we wish to give a full insight into the whole character. and this is proved in a very short One of the seven Self has been proved to be eternal.EXISTENCE OF DEITY. Though this philosophy is supposed to represent Indian logic only. we have already seen enough of it to know that it included almost every question within the sphere of philosophy and religion. Some of the objections way. if it is not passed treated by Gotama. is that a human being born again in another world as either or as some other animal being. 10) it follows that it will exist after what is called death. literally existence after having departed this life. Existence of Deity. and the practical bearing of the Nyaya-philosophy. whether the world came out of nothing.

that is. however. its existence to the simple destruction of Therefore. as its real cause. He holds. but under the superintendence of some one. if it had. and afterwards to disprove the idea that effects can ever be fortuitous. is to refute the Buddhist theory of vacuity (6'unya). as developed out of Prakriti. while. Nor could be said that the flower. if work done continued to work entirely of men do by itself. or of Nothing being the cause of the world. though not by itself. Gotama's real object. even though in the capacity of a governor rather than of a maker of the world. are real only so long as they are noticed by the Purusha. ' We then meet with a new argument. the seed were really destroyed by being pounded or burnt. that every act of man invariably produces its result. And as Gotama differs from Gautama in denying the origin of the world out of nothing. different from that of the Mimamsakas. the fact that some good or evil deeds riot seem to receive their reward would remain unaccounted way for. the world also cannot have sprung from nothingness. who hold that all tilings. destroyed the seed. the flower would never appear. he also differs from the Sawkhya philosophers.554 if INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. nor from an annihilated something. namely that. he continues. as nothing can be produced from nothing. And this admission of an Isvara. namely. of Lsvara. on the contrary. the Lord. is confirmed by what was evidently considered by Gotama as a firmly established truth. but requires the admission of an Isvara. if it had not existed previously. . like a seed. This is certainly a curious of proving the existence of God by the very argu- ment which has generally been employed by those who want to prove His non-existence. it would it have owed the seed.

This l is a novel kind of argument for an Indian philosopher to use. If we were to doubt this. the denial of a supreme and absolute Being but we saw that even the so-called atheism of the is Samkhya-philosophy does not amount to that. liable to change. as an active and personal creator and ruler of the world. but others are not. And even such a personal God is not altogether denied by the Samkhyas they only deny that He can .CAUSE AND EFFECT. . and shows that with all the boldness of their speculations they were not so entirely different from ourselves. be proved to exist by human arguments. a personal Isvara or Lord. 555 that some things are real and eternal. and to reappearance at the beginning of a new aeon. that is taken for granted by the It is this J Sarvalaukikapramatva. because we actually see both their production and their destruction. they hold that in the eyes of philosophers He would be but a phenomenal manifestation of the Godhead. With us atheistic implies . If. kind of a divine being. liable even to temporary disappearance at the end of each aeon. however. It simply the denial of an Isvara. and not entirely indifferent to the Securus judicat orbis terrarum. Cause and Effect. and if He exists as such. we should doubt what has been settled by the authority of all men. we call the Nyaya-philosophy theistic. and there would be an end of all truth and untruth. we should always remember that such terms as theistic and philosophy in the atheistic are hardly applicable to Indian sense in which they are used by Christian theologians.

stated that 'the Atman Self). and.. We Phala . and that can be Isvara only. though from a different point of view. 133. which is one only. and that no effects would take place without the working of human with The actions of men. but we require another power. only they are not the sole cause of what happens. the (rivatman (the (personal Highest Self). p. p. is ParamIt Paramatman before is only. Isvara is not Paramatman. S. but a phenomenal manifestation of and the Paramatman must not be supposed.556 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. l the Vaiseshika by philosophers also In the Tarka-Samgraha. vol. agents. fully The argument which we met stated in Gotama's Sutras. always produce an effect. that Lsvara. Hence there must be another power that modifies the continuous acting of acts. Christianity contrasted with . 19-21. Though Paramatman is Isvara. 0. philosophers. for instance. Good actions do not always produce good results. Hindu Philosophy. it is said. as they ought. iii. . it may be added at once. 1 Bullantyne. the omniscient Lord. while the (rivatman is separate for each individual body. T. an Lsvara. do not IV. Phala. Rewards. or Self is twofold. it is distinctly Nyaya . It is not denied thereby that human actions are required. to account for what would otherwise be irrational results of human actions. all-pervading and eternal. atman. if every act continued to act (Karman). now come the tenth of the Prameyas. nor bad actions bad results.' however. and here the same subject is treated once to It is more. 12 Muir.

or is or is not. We can see every day that a cloth. asked. is Emancipation. is no receptacle (Asraya) or. there is a permanent receptacle. And if it should be argued that the fruit produced by a tree is different from the fruit of our acts. no subject. this is met by the declaration that. on the contrary. poslife ? life. Gotama at last approaches the He begins emancipation (Apavarga). takes a bolder step. not to be frightened by this apparently Buddhistic argument. however. sible in another As both good and evil works are done in this the cause. The ob- is not. as usual with objections. for no weaver would say that the threads are the cloth. After examining the meaning of pain. which because there alone or in capable of perceiving pain or joy in this any other state of existence. that certain last subject. but. 557 how are effects.EMANCIPATION. that we actually see production and destruction before our very eyes. such as that it is impossible in this life to pay all our moral debts. is full of pain. namely the Self. and denies that any effect either is or is not. would have ceased to is exist long before their fruit be gathered. even pleasure. rewards or punishments. This objection is met by an illustration taken from a tree which bears fruit to long after jector it has ceased to be watered. as we should say. before it has been woven. . or the cloth the threads. arid expressing his conviction that everything. at the same time. in the case of good or bad acts. namely these works. satisfied with this. does not exist. namely. but appeals again to what we should call the common-sense view is Gotama of the matter.

even when he is no longer able to perform his daily duties. therefore. good works will be paradise. namely the admission of Anus or atoms. sacrificial duties are enjoined as incumbent on us to the end of our lives. If wholes are constantly divided and subdivided. in fact there though even this would really have to be looked tion. to how this desire. and this can be effected by knowledge of the truth only.558 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. If. but this is not to be. he should not perform certain duties. which arises from false what is the distinguishing doctrine both of the Nyaya and of the Vaiseshika-philosophies. There cannot be annihilation because the A?ius or (IV. and of the Nyaya-philosophy in The first step towards this is the cessaparticular. Therefore knowledge of the truth or removal of all false notions. to their cannot be further according very nature. we should in the end be landed in nihilism. if in thought only. apprehension is carried can be Gotama eradicated. and. namely whether the objects of desire And this leads him on exist as wholes or as parts. eradicated and aversion also but before he explains . here used in the sense of personal feelings. reduced or compressed out of being. there will be rewards for them. is the beginning and end of all philosophy. of all upon as an obstacle to real emancipaNothing remains but -a complete extinction desires. (Mithyagtfiana) been dishad once more to a which back subject cussed before. such as desire for a beautiful and aversion Desire therefore has to be to a deformed object. 8-82). and that if it is said that a man is freed from these by old age. tion of Ahamkara. Against this the smallest parts are realities view of the existence of what we should call . this does not imply that. continue.

or independent of our knowGotama objects to this ledge. And now (Vidyamatra) doctrine. namely that ether (or space) is everywhere. presuppose previous perception and that even in mistaking we mistake . if . again. first of all because. and if an atom has figure or a without and a within. so that false knowledge can always be removed by true knowledge. appeal is made to a recognised maxim of Hindu philosophy. is to be preserved. as there would be in attempting to divide an atom. All we have is knowledge. because we saw that knowledge is not eternal. not of Things. is. the opponent. divisible. like it an appeal were made by a mirage. a Buddhist. the usual arguments are then adduced.KNOWLEDGE OF IDEAS. or by should be remembered that dreams also. can exist for us. or visions produced jugglery. it would be their non-existence. equally impossible to prove to dreams. After granting that. once gained. that there. and therefore in an atom also. must never be a regressio in infinitum. but vanishes. it would seem. nor preventing and in the end an others from occupying space . neither resistant nor obstructing. 559 atoms. . if it were impossible to prove the existence of any external things. it is of necessity In reply. if And of things remembrances. something. that neither occupying space against others. And here the Nyaya suddenly calls the Yoga to its aid. how that true knowledge. ether is said to be intangible. Knowledge of Ideas. one more question arises. NOT OF THINGS. he says. makes a still bolder sweep by denying the existence of any external things. not things nothing different from our knowledge.

No. while the Nyayaphilosophy retains its own peculiar usefulness as of all employed in the defence of truth against all comers. XIV. which the Nyaya certainly held and still holds among the recognised systems of orthodox philoIt would be useless to go once more over sophy. But considering the activity of philosophical speculation. XVI.560 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. one subject. in spite disturbances from without. futility. however. 1867. treated as VII. . and teaches that Samadhi or intense meditation will prove a safe preservative of knowledge. would secure for their system that high position history of India. of which we have had so many indications in the ancient as well as in the modern we can well understand that philoin skilled all the arts and artifices of reasonsophers. to No. Syllogism. objectionable proceedings. which are ' fully treated in the fifth book. in which case even such arts as wrangling and cavilling This may prove of service. may seem a very humble view to take with regard to a system of philosophy which at the very outset promised to its students final beatitude as the highest reward. point of view this syllogism or even logic in general 1 Cowell. namely the Syllogism. This has always excited the special interest of European logicians on account of certain startling similarities or the which no doubt exist between it and the syllogism of But from a Hindu Aristotle and the schoolman. There is Five Members. which requires some more special consideration. Nigrahasthana. the topics from ati. ing. Report on the Toles of Nuddea.

and once more in the Vaiseshika it but as it forms the pride of the Nyaya. Anumana or inference. of four kinds. comparative. to go over some of the ground again. it is Wrong perception represents a thing as silver.. back to the Prama/was brought again which were discussed in the beginning. as we saw. Garbe. l priate place here . den Erkenntnissmitteln. Appendix to Archbishop Thomson's Laws of Thought also Die Theorie des indischen Rationalisten von 1 . sensuous. revealed and Here we are parison. is language. according to the Nyayaphilosophy is. Perception or twofold. Right perception a such as it is. by authority. but among which one. and authoritative. inferential. Prama. It has been Samkhya systems. treatment. following the Sutras. silver as silver. 1888. though in the larger sense of being the cause of every conception that has found expression in Knowledge. nor fully discussed in the Vedanta and chief object of the Nyaya-philoexclusive property. not. mother-of-pearl as This right perception. receives here a more special produced by perception. right again wrong. as we saw.SYLLOGISM. and is by inference. Different systems of philosophy differed. O O . according to the Nyaya. we found knowledge put forward as the characteristic feature of Self. by com- We are thus in See M. obliged. is 561 by no means the is it its sophy. represents thing either is This is called truth. M. perception or remembrance. . will find its most appro- colour mentioned as the distinguishing quality of light. von R. The Nyaya looks As we saw upon knowledge as inseparably connected with the Self.

and actions. Five. 37) called Purva vat. the ants carrying off their eggs in the third the sign of the motion of the sun was its being seen . Three. AeshZa.562 in the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. inference. inference. Others admit also Aitihya. examined. when all that we do see is merely that the mountain smokes ? We should remember that there were three kinds of Anumana (NyayaSutras II. and comparison Naiyayikas. inference. Pramanas in different Philosophical Schools. : equivalence. revelation. qualities. tradition. In class the sign of past rain was the swelling in the second the sign of coming rain was . the question how can we know things which are not brought to us by the senses ? How do we know. Perception AUrvakas. . Sambhava. Perception. presumption. that there is fire which we cannot see in a mountain. : One. having the sign before. for instance. gesture. and not-being Mlmamsakas. revelation. keen together. number of Prainanas which they admit. : Two. has been arises. Perception. Perception. having the sign after or as the the effect. revelation. Six. : and presumption : Prabhakara (a Mimamsaka). tion) : Vaiseshikas and Perception. comparison. $eshavat. arid word (revela- Sa?>ikhyas. Four. comparison. first of rivers and S4manyatodri'shZa. of After sensuous knowledge. Perception and inference Buddhists. or as the cause. or that a mountain is a volcano. which takes cognisance substances. inference. according to what each considers the only trustworthy channels of knowledge.

we are told that we must be in possession of what is called a Vyapti. what pervades. fieriness. however. Literally it means pervasion. The latter pervaded by fieriness. or invariable concomitance. This. pervaded. fieriness by We arrive by is induction at the is smoke. there fire. not. in possession of a true Vyapti as smokiness being there is smoke. it Thus sea-water is is always pervaded by it. as the Hindus it is some cases say. and in this sense what is to be Vyapya. . for instance. This expression. there is fire. or. inseparable or universal concomitance. may sometimes be taken as a general rule. which we see rising from the mountain. but not that wherever there is Vyapti in order to be true would require a condition or Upadhi. Vyapti that wherever there fire. viz. If we once are that the firewood should be moist. or even as a general law. and in order to arrive at it. that smokiness is pervaded by smokiness. It is such a Vyapti. is called inferential knowledge (Anumana). . what must be pervaded Vyapaka. such wherever there is smoke. was the most important word in an Indian syllogism. inseparable from Vyapti. in simply the sine qud non. 563 in different places. came to be used for what we should call the middle term in a syllogism. to pervade. is used by logicians in the sense of invariable. a Paksha or member of our Vyapti. 002 . must have fire. saltness. as we saw. Vyapta means pervaded Vyapya.' The as conclusion then follows that this mountain which ' shows smoke. that smoke is pervaded by or invariably connected with fire. Knowledge of things unseen. we only require what is called groping or consideration (Paramarsa) in order to make the smoke.PRAMAJVAS IN DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS. acquired in these three ways.

but what the Hindus describe as Paramarsa or groping or trying to find in an object something which can . we might have said that our knowledge that S is P arises from discovering that of saying that discovering in S is M. axpov rS> 6 o-yAXoytoyioy Sia fj. . and it is this very thing. g. by predicate or is to be pervaded. might and make easily clothe Ka?iada in a Grecian garb him look almost like Aristotle. the smoking mountain. Multa jiunt eadem. e. Vyapaka or Sadhya. may sound it logicians. terminus medius. fieriness. sed aliter. what should we have gained by this ? All that is i. Paksha. have with us an historical colouring and may throw a false light on the subject. but translate it We very clumsy to European would have been easy enough to into our own more technical language. Kanada e. Wliat calls one member of the pervasion.crov rb rpiTcp Seixvvo'ii'. Instead inferential knowledge arises from an object something which is always pervaded by something else. This is done by what we may call syllogism. that constitutes the principal charm of a comparative peculiar to Indian logic Even such terms as syllogism or conclusion are inconvenient here. and the remainder might have been taken for a clumsy imitation of Aristotle. The Sanskrit Anumana is not exactly the Greek o-u/zTrepacr/za. by Vyapya. But smokiness. and TOV M is P. this aliter. terminus major e. because they study of philosophy. and that the pervading predicate is predicable of all things of which the pervaded predicate is. might have been translated by subject or terminus minor what pervades. but it means measuring something by means of something else. . g. and what would have evaporated. or with Aristotle.564 All this INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

again. What pendium. is or inferential mountain for a volcano. that is. as arising from the perception of a connection or a law. smoke always pervaded by fire. ' twofold. and the process is this. follows ' is The act of taken from Annambha^a's Comis concluding. that is. By this process we arrive at Anumiti. are known by inference. 61) principal object said to be transcendent truth. knowledge of the connected. that the So much for the inference the inference for ourselves. The former is the means of arriving at knowledge for oneself. knowledge. as in . But. truth which to the looking for a terminus medius. the result Anumana. Next follows others. By repeated observation. the relation of what pervades and what JQI) as is pervaded call is very different from what we should the relative extension of two concepts. transcends the horizon of our senses. Things which cannot be seen with our eyes. Anumana for Others. in our case. For the present we must remember that in the case before us the act of proving by means of Anumana consists in our knowing that there is in the mountain something always pervaded by.' he says. it being intended either for one's own benefit or for the benefit of others. Gotama therefore defines the result of inference (I. This become more evident as we proceed. if it smokes. This corresponds in fact In Kapila's of inference is the system (I. will has of fire. 565 the be measured by something else or what can become member of a pervasion. or inseparable from something else. when what is seen is smoke only. and that therefore the mountain.ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. as fire is.

We now approach a mountain and wonder whether there smoke. and immediately perceive that the mountain itself is fiery. and hence you will admit that T was right when I said that the mountain is This is called the five-membered form of fiery. (3) of Nidarsana. the case is then start with the assertion. and the five members are severally called l . we remember the rule. The mountain is fiery. . because it has smoke fire . and the mountain has . Why? and we We then give our answer. (4) Anusamdhana. 32. like. different. We are asked.' Nyaya-Sutras 2 Synonyms The Karawa.566 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. therefore I. (2) Apadesa. and Vaiseshika-Sutras IX. smoke (5) 1 Conclusion (Nigamana). Now you perceive that the mountain does smoke. that all that smokes is fiery. and remember the Vyapti between smoke and (4) fire . This is the process may or may not be fire in it. or the major premiss. it has fire 3 . Vaiseshika terms are (i) Prati^na. exposition. . Prainawa. 3 Hetu are Apadesa. reason. as you may see. we have to convince somebody else of what by inference. Because it smokes. (1) Assertion (Prati^fta). the mountain has 2 (2) Reason (Hetu ). (3) Instance (Udaharana or Nidarsana). the case of kitchen hearths and the we are reminded of a rule (Vyapti). 2. such as that wherever we have seen smoke. We know to be true. We see the when we But we. look at the kitchen hearth. if reason for ourselves. (5) Pratyamnaya. Application (Upanaya). on a kitchen hearth and the like. we have seen fire. 4. Liwga. for instance.

How it is that we know any thing which we do not. Deductive reasoning may in itself be most useful forming Vyaptis. nay which we cannot under his observation. and therefore more troversy.ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. 567 In both cases the process of inference is the same. It is not so logic as it is noetic that interested Kamida. \vould be sufficient for him. how we can taken by itself. if perceive by our senses. From this point of view we can easily see that neither induction nor deduction. more persuasive. justify inferential knowledge. and as this knowledge is not confined to sensuous perceptions. he arranges and analyses the functions of our reasoning faculties. The mountain smokes Therefore the mountain is fiery. has but one object with Gotama. but the second is supposed to be more rhetorical. he collects. from the time of Aristotle to our own. as they fall But the question which occupies Gotama is. . that whatever of formal Logic in these short extracts. corresponds totidem verbis to the first form of Aristotle's syllogism All that smokes is fiery. that of describing knowledge as one of the qualities of the Self. tive and deductive reasoning. takes a much He was purely technical interest in the machinery of the human mind. of aware of the inducclearly inseparability The formal logician. however. useful in con- What is called by Annambha^a the conclusion : for oneself. Gotama felt it incumbent on him to inferential kind of explain the nature and prove the legitimacy of the knowledge also. in fact. We there is must not forget. it for may give a variety of .

But there he would not stop. and mule man. we also see the attribute much from of long life. wherever we see a different way. He would value this Vyapti merely as a means of establishing a new he would use it as a means of deduction and rule . because it teaches nothing new. and not what Gotama would call Prama. He knew to as well as Aristotle that tirayayri in order to prove the oAo>y must be Sia TrdvTtov. The only object of all knowledge. and not for others. but he would express himself in He would say. at which Aristotle arrives by way of induction.. say. would say that kinghood is . always e?n TO 77-6X1. he cannot on the other rely entirely on induction. that animals with little bile are long-lived. Gotama. is absolute truth or Prama. or that we have never seen men humanity without mortality . because it cannot teach anything certain or unconditional. He arrives at it by saying that man. and that this is impossible. &c.. horses. i. have little little bile (B) . The conclusion. is pervaded by mortality. 'Now we know that the elephant has little therefore we know also that he is long-lived.568 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. horse. of little attribute the bile. Knowledge gained by epagogic reasoning is. might be called a Vyapti. strictly speaking. where Aristotle says that would say that humanity are Ka?^ada all mortal. and mule (C) (C) are long-lived (A) . Or to use another instance. but it can never add to it.' bile. as for instance in men. horse. f. Gotama does not this. mules. if he argued for himself only. different aspects to our knowledge. therefore all animals with differ bile are long-lived. according Gotama. And if on one side Gotama cannot use deduction. and where Aristotle concludes that kings are mortal because they belong to the class of men.

as in the afore-mentioned Indian method. and these by way of illustration only. exceptions. the mutual inherence and inseparable connection of l 1 ' Satasah sahafcaritayor api vyabhiMropalabdhe/i. we add horses. however. of little bile. we have observed long life. . case. and thus throws the onus probandi as to any case to the contrary upon the other side. and therefore kings are mortal. though not the possibility. that because in ninety-nine cases a Vyapti or rule has happened to be true. instance where smoke was seen without fire. One thing can be said in favour of the If we go on accumulating instances to form an induction. possible.ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. we approximate no doubt more and more to a general rule. The Hindu knows the nature of induction quite well enough to say in the very words of European philosophers. it does not follow that it will be so in the hundredth case. mules. If it can be has been an that there never proved. much less all The Hindu. we have seen the attribute Wherever by saying. ' ' attribute of little bile. excludes the reality.' and by then giving a number of mere instances. 569 pervaded by manhood and manhood by mortality. as a fact. He states.' or better We have never observed long life without the still. but we never eliminate all real. if. of exceptions. that wherever the one has been. on the contrary.' Anu- manakhawcZa of TattvaJtintaniani. and the like. the other has been seen likewise. and likewise in answering them. It would be easy to bring objections against this kind of reasoning. and we shall see that Indian philosophers themselves have not been slow in bringing them forward. men.

the universality of the conclusion . They look upon the instance simply as a helpful reminder for instance is 1 Ritter. smoke and fire is more firmly established than it would be by any number of accumulated actual instances where the two have been seen together. Thus it has been pointed out by European philosophers that the proposition that wherever there is smoke there is fire.' evidently superfluous. philosophers. every conceivable objection was started by them and carefully analysed and answered. hitherto been started were certainly not unknown to Gotama and Ka?^ada themselves. IV. of Kamda's argument of is are by the introduction an example in the vitiated. would really lose its universal with their system of by the introduction of the instance. History of Philosophy. It cise seems hardly time as yet to begin to critithe inductive and the deductive methods as elaborated by Hindu philosophers. In accordance Purvapaksha and Uttarapaksha. third. as on the kitchen hearth. The conditions (Upadhis) under which it is allowable to form a Vyapti.570 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. We must first know them more Such objections as have fully. have greatly occupied the thoughts of Volumes after volumes have been written on the subject. Hindu they furnish at all events a curious parallel to the endeavours of European philosophers in defence both of inductive and deductive thinking. says that 'two members while. and though they may not throw any new light on the origin of universals.' But the Hindu logicians also were perfectly aware of the fact that this character l ' not essential to a syllogism. to form a universal rule. that is to say. 365. p.

is is illus- Whatever cognisable nameable. as an illustration to assist the memory. It is meant to remind us that we must look out which we see. than for the manner in which it may serve hereafter as the basis formation of of a syllogism. there is and where fire is not. 57! controversial purposes. The fire. present only. which must depend on the character of the Vyapti. present by such a case as.' rhetoric therefore far is more than Indian responsible for the introduction logic that of this third . 35 is Gotama some The third member the to fact is or example says. familiar case which. as Whately says. though it is not logic. or Kevaldnvayi. pervasion. member which contains the objectionable instance and rhetoric. smoke is not. but not for a rhetorical syllogisms or syllogisms for others only that the instance has therefore in its ' proper place. the and absent. second. or Kevala-vyatireki. Vyapti was considered as three- A fold in the school of Gotama.ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. not as an essential part of the process of the proof itself. It is Vy4pti between the smoke the fire which is implied. and Kevala-vyatireki. is an offshoot of logic. i. The third case. con- junction with the reason) the existence of that It is Indian character which is to be established. and seen. Kevaldnvayi. The fact is that Gotama cares far more for the a Vy4pti. character which through its having a invariably attended by that establishes (in which is be established. trated by such a case as. The first. is e. Where there is smoke. yet. of In Sutra I. as Anvaya-vyatireki. is illustrated by a case such . where it is impossible to bring forward anything that is not cognisable. is illustrated Anvaya-vyatireki.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. because fire is not pervaded by or invariably accompanied by wet smoke. as. in this case. This Upadhi pervades what is to be established (Sadhya-vyapaka). : is to be established (Sadhya-vyapakatva) consists in the not being the counter-entity (Apratiyogitva) of any absolute non-existence (Atyantabhava) having the . because there is fire. not so. from the other elements. i. but it does not pervade what establishes (Sadhana-vyapaka). or indispensable condition. ' 59 To be the constant accompanier of what p. Much attention has also been paid by Hindu philosophers to the working of the Upadhis or assigned to a Vyapti. in the case of a red- hot iron ball. all that is from the other in elements has odour. fire. or that How there is no fire because there is no smoke. fuel. for instance. Earth it is is different because odorous.572 as. and the other therefore not not-different from elements. we have to say. where we have really fire without Hence it would not follow by necessity is smoke. what is not different from the other elements is But this earth it is is not odorous. is not inodorous. because the only case But point (Udaharana) would again be earth. founded chiefly on the Tarkasaragraha. e. the presence of wet fuel was conditions an Upadhi. Thus in the ordinary Vyapti that there is smoke in a mountain. Here we could not go on different and say. q. but different from them. Ballantyne in his Lectures on the Nyaya-philosophy. as water (by itself). d. e. smoke. far the Indian mind may go in these minutiae of reasoning may be seen from the following instance that there fire because there is given by Dr.

. Ballantyne. who was assisted in unravelling these cobwebs of Nyaya logic by the Nyaya-Pandits of the Sanskrit College at Benares. but to the late Dr. Such native aid would seem to be almost indispensable for such an achievement.' The credit of this translation belongs not to me. To be not the of inhesion constant accompanier of the argument (Sadhanavyapakatva) consists in the being the counterentity (Pratiyogitva) of some absolute non-existence [not impossibly] resident in that which possesses [the character tendered as an] argument.ANUMANA FOR same subject is OTHERS. 573 that which (Samanadhikara?ia) as to be established.

fortunate that with regard to the Vaiseshika philosophy. is the age of thirteenth century A. referred now to the no great antiquity. we are told. and hence called If there could be any doubt that this is Chauluga meant for the VaLseshika-Sutras it would at once be 1 . still.. published an article. even such a date. the sixth. Among the various heresies there mentioned. it by Professor Leumann and is certainly not later. 121. dispersed by the 144 so-called points of that system. we are able to fix a date below which their composition cannot be placed.D. p. if in the This.. Date of IT is Stltras. would be worth having.D. if only But we can make certain.' in the Indische Studien. The old reports on the schisms of the (rainas. VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 1 Haribhadra. another step backward. or rather with regard to the VaiseshikaSutras. Professor In the year 1885 his valuable re- Leumann. was founded by the author of the Vaisesiya-sutta of the Chaulti race. well known by searches in ' 6raina literature. originally a meant for Could this be Auluku ? . 6'inabhadra.CHAPTER IX. 9 i-i 35. (7inaas mentioned by the author. bhadra's date is fixed eighth century A. we consider our Samkhya-Sfttras. pp. is true. XVII.

but a most decided Nastika system of philosophy. . already firmly For. Samkhya.D. there would be only five orthodox systems (Astika). which contains a short abstract of the six Darsanas in which the Vaiseshika-darsana is described as the sixth. (4) traina. Puini for this and other valuable contributions of his to 6raina literature. for reasons explained before.