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Torts & Damages 2013

Atty. Jess Lopez

1. Cachero v. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-8721, May 23, 1957 (En Banc) Facts: A taxi owned by defendant driven by Mr. Mira Abinion hit a MERALCO post. As a result, the passenger thereof (Atty. Cachero) suffered physical injuries slight in nature. Said driver was prosecuted and pled guilty. Thereafter, Cachero demanded from defendant an amount totaling P79,245 as damages. Though defendant wanted to settle the claim amicably, it could not accede to Cachero‘s demand of a minimum of P72k. As a res ult, Cachero sued defendant. The trial court awarded P5,900 total in damages including P2,000 moral damages. Both appealed from said decision. Issue: Is he entitled to moral damages? Held: NO. Defendant does not fall under the cases where moral damages are awardable (Art. 2219). The complaint was based on an alleged breach of camontract of carriage (rather than a quasi-delict resulting in injury) due to the defendant‘s failure to bring him to his destination safely. However, the driver was not made party to the case. It was the driver who committed a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Also, the action was not based on the defendant‘s vicarious liability based on Art. 2180 or Art. 103 of the RPC. A. Quasi-delict distinguished from other sources of obligations

1. Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768 (1918) Facts: Canco, a clerk of the defendant, was on his way home via train. As the train was about to stop in the station where Cangco usually deboards, Cangco, alighted from the train as he and other passengers always did. Unfortunately, due to the fact that it was nighttime and that the station was dimly lighted, Cangco was not able to see that there was a sack of melons on the platform. Thus, he landed on said melons and slipped. He was drawn under the train and his arm was injured so severely that it had to be amputated. Cangco sued defendant for damages due to negligence of servants & employees in placing the sack of melons which obstructed the passenger‘s egress. Held: Manila Railroad is liable under the old civil code. It is implied from the contract of carriage of the defendant the duty to carry him safely and provide him with a safe means to come in and out o the train. Being contractual, that duty was direct and immediate. Its nonper formance cannot be excused due to the fault of defandant‘s employees. Also, no contributory negligence can be attributed to Cangco because, as a public carrier, he had the right to assume that the platform was clear. Cangco was also very familiar with the place. As such, there can be no uncertainty in his mind that what he was about to do was indeed unsafe. 2. Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966) Facts: Respondent bought First Class tickets from petitioner‘s agent (PAL) for a trip from Manila to Lourd es. Upon confirmation of said tickets, he flew first class to the first 2 legs of the trip (HK, BKK). However, in Bangkok, after being seated, the manager of the petitioner asked him to transfer to the Tourist Class in lieu of another passenger (―white man‖). Reluctantly, he did. Respondent sued petitioner for damages on the ground of wrongful expulsion to which the Trial Court & the CA granted and awarded him moral (25k), exemplary (10k), and attorney‘s fees (10k). Petitioner appealed contending that its contract with the passenger was subject for confirmation. Held: Air France is liable. The facts and circumstances of the cases make it reasonable for respondent to be awarded said damages. Neither the captain nor any employee of the petitioner intervened. There was also no evidence presented that the white man had a prior right/reservation. Respondent is entitled to said First Class seat. The manager‘s arbitrary act made respondent suffer humiliation. Said manager acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, public policy (Art. 21 CC). Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier‘s employees with respect and kindness. Petitioner‘s contract is attended by a public duty and a violation of which is considered a quasi delict wherein damages may be awarded. 3. Singson v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 23 SCRA 1117 (1968) Facts: Singson was one of the defendants in a separate civil case along with a certain Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co. They were made liable to pay the sum of P105k. Singson and Lobregat appealed. However, Villa-Abrille & Co. did not and, as such, the decision became final with regard to it. Thereafter, a writ of garnishment was issued and was sent to BPI to which said Co. had an account. Upon receipt, without reading the body of the writ saying it was only intended for the accounts of other defandants, the clerk prepared a letter regarding the freezing of Singson‘s account for signature of the BPI President. Upon his signature, Singson‘s account was frozen. Meanwhile, Singson issued checks to corporations to whom he had business with but due to the freezing, the checks were dishonored to the detriment of Singson. Singson wrote the back explaining the contents of the writ. Upon realizing its mistake, BPI through its President immediately corrected it. Despite this, Singson sued for damages on the ground of illegal freezing of the said account. Unfortunately, CFI Manila denied the complaint saying that Singson cannot maintain an action for quasi delict because of the contractual nature of the relationship between the parties. Held: The existence of a contractual relationship between parties is not a bar for a commission of a tort by one against another. Even more so, it does not bar the consequent recovery for damages of the party injured. However, since BPI corrected their mistake immediately, nominal damages of P1,000 (need not be proven) + P500 attorney‘s fees would suffice. 1 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Torts & Damages 2013

Atty. Jess Lopez

4. Fabre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111127, July 26, 1996 Facts: Sps. Fabre owned a Mazda minibus used as a service vehicle to take children to and from school (St. Scho Manila). The sps hired Cabil after trying him out for 2 weeks. WWCF, a Christian group, hired said bus to transport their members from Mnla-La Union and back. It was Cabil‘s first trip to La Union. Upon taking a detour to avoid bridge repair, they came upon a sharp curve. It was raining, slippery, dark, and speeding at 50kp (20kph limit). As such, the driver lost control and fell on its side after hitting various objects in the vicinity. Several were injured. A certain Amy Antonio was severely injured that she became a paraplegic. She sued the Sps. as well as Cabil and the lower courts found them solidarily liable to pay plaintiff damages (CA increased compensatory damages from 500k to 600k). Fabre now challenges the award of damages claiming it to be unconscionable and speculative as well as the holding that Fabre is liable. Held: LIABLE. Cabil is liable for being negligent. Fabres are also presumed negligent in the selection and supervision of employees. Employer did not properly examine Cabil‘s qualifications, experience etc. Due diligence in supervision requires formulation of rules and regulations for guidance of employees and issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of compliance with said rules. Also, it does not matter if one is in the common carrier business principally or just a mere sideline. As such, extraordinary diligence should be exercised to safely transport passengers to their destination. Note: If a case was expressly tried and decided exclusively based on culpa contractual, a mere driver cannot be held liable for the injury caused by his negligence because the carrier and the passengers are the parties to the contract of carriage. (Phil. Rabbit v. CA) 5. Light Railway Transit Authority v. Navidad, 397 SCRA 75 (2003) Facts: Nicanor Navidad, while drunk, purchased a token to enter the EDSA LRT station. Whilst standing by the platform, security guard (Escartin) approached Navidad and a fist fight occurred wherein Navidad fell into the LRT tracks. At this time, a train operated by Roman passed by and struck Navidad. The latter‘s wife filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, Prudent Security Agency, and LRTA. Roman & LRTA presented evidence while Prudent & Escartin filed a demurrer contending that Navidad did not prove Escartin‘s negligence. Trial court held Prudent & Escartin liable. On appeal, CA held LRTA and Roman liable and exonerated Prudent and Escartin. CA held that a contract of carriage existed upon Navidad‘s purchase of the token and thus must be complied with. CA also held that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim but merely presented fact of his death as having hit by the LRT. Held: Only LRTA is liable. The duty of common carriers to provide safety to its passengers obligates it not only during the trip but for so long as they are in the premises. A common carrier is liable for death/injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its employees; or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier‘s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or sto pped the act or omission. In such cases, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent. By simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or its employees. The burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or force majeure. LRTA was presumed negligent. Also, Roman is not part of the contractual tie between LRTA (carrier) and Navidad (passenger). Roman can only be made liable for his own fault or negligence. Quasi-delict v. Delicts o Revised Penal Code  Articles 100 and 365

1. Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 (1942) Facts: A head on collision between a Malate Taxicab driven by Fontanilla (owned by Barredo) and a carretela occurred. The driver was speeding on the wrong side of the road. The passenger of the carratela, Faustino Garcia (16 y.o) was injured and died 2 days later. The driver was convicted while the right to file a separate civil action was reserved. Thereafter, parents of Garcia filed an action under Art. 1903 (old CC, quasi delict) against Barredo as the proprietor and employer of Fontanilla. It was contended that he did not exercise the diligence of a good father when he employed Fontanilla who had previously violated traffic laws. As such, the same court awarded damages in favor of plaintiffs. In Barredo‘s defense, he contended that his liability should only be subsidiary pursuant to the RPC. Also, he claims that 1903 only applies to obligations arising from wrongful or negligent acts/omissions not punishable by law. Hence, since RPC punishes said acts, 1903 no longer applies. Issue: Whether plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action against Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly liable under 1903 as Fontanilla‘s employer. Held: Yes. Counsel for defendant failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from crime (Penal Code) and responsibility for quasi-delict (CC). A quasi delict/culpa aquiliana is a separate and distinct legal institution, 2 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Torts & Damages 2013

Atty. Jess Lopez

independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability. The same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime or a separate responsibility for fault/negligence. Under 1903, an employer is primarily and directly responsible for the employee‘s negligent acts. Culpa Aquiliana Private concerns Indemnification Broad Delito Public interest Punish/correct the criminal act Not broad (punishable only by law)

What it affects Consequence Extent

2. Elcano v. Hill, G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977 Facts: Sps. Elcano filed a complaint for damages against Reginald Hill for the death of their son Agapito. However, CFI of QC acquitted Hill on the ground that the act was not criminal because of ―lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.‖ Sps. Elcano wish to continue to hold Hill civilly liable for culpa aquiliana. Issue: Is the civil action for quasi delict barred by the acquittal of Hill in the criminal case? Held: Civil action for quasi delict can proceed. The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character, whether voluntary or negligent. Acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from the crime, but for damages due to quasi delict. Double recovery, however, is prohibited. I. QUASI-DELICT A. Elements

1. Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990 Facts: Emmanuel & Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land in Silang Cavite. Adjacent to that is Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette (Missionaries), a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded Andamos‘ land which caused a young man to drown, damaged crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of Andamos and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. In 1982, the Andamos filed a criminal case against respondent for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC. Subsequently, they also filed a civil case for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction with the same court. Missionaries countered the civil case by filing a motion to dismiss, which was eventually granted by the Court. The Court ratiocinated that it had no jurisdiction over the subsequent civil case, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal was proper. Held: NO. (1) On the elements of Quasi delict : A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Clearly, from the complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is, therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. (2) On the propriety of the motion to dismiss: Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. Whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. Thus, the civil action for quasi delict may proceed independently. 2. Lucas v. Tuaño, G.R. No. 178763, April 21, 2009 Facts: Peter Lucas contracted ―sore eyes‖ in his right eye. He was referred to Dr. Tuaño, an ophthalmologist at St. Luke‘s. Upon consultation with Dr . Tuaño (9 days since the problems began), he was already taking Maxitrol to address the problem. Upon examination, Tuano diagnosed Peter with conjunctivitis or ―sore eyes.‖ He prescr ibed Spersacet -C6 eye drops for Peter and told the latter to return for follow -up after a week. A week later , Tuaño told Peter that the ―sore eyes‖ 3 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Torts & Damages 2013

Atty. Jess Lopez

in the latter‘s right eye had already cleared up and he could discontinue the Spersacet -C. However, The same eye developed Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC) so Tuaño prescribed to the former a steroid -based eye drop called Maxitrol. On a later check -up, Tuaño instructed the former to taper down the dosage of Maxitrol , because the EKC in his right eye had already resolved . Dr. Tuaño specifically cautioned Peter that , being a steroid, Maxitrol had to be withdrawn gradually; otherwise, the EKC might recur. Peter would go back and forth to Tuano‘s clinic to complain about the worsening condition of his right eye. In these instances, Tuano would prescribe different meds to counter the recurring EKC. On Dec. 1998, Peter had no vision in his right eye; right eye appeared to be bloody and swollen. Tuano ordered the immediate discontinuation of Maxitrol and prescribed other meds. Peter went to see another ophthalmologist , Dr. Batungbacal. Dr. Batungbacal‘s diagnosis was Glaucoma and recommended Laser Trabeculoplasty . Dr. Tuaño was at a loss as to how to balance the treatment of Peter‘s EKC vis -à-vis the presence of glaucoma thus he referred Peter to Dr. Agulto who concurred on Peter‘s condition and recommended the same medication. Also, Peter was prodded by his friends to seek a second medical opinion. Thus he consulted Dr. Mario V. Aquino who specializes in the treatment of glaucoma. He informed Peter that his eyes were relatively normal except for the tubular vision in Peter‘s right eye. Petitioners claimed that Dr. Aquino essentially told Peter that the latter‘s condition would require lifetime medication and follow-ups. Thus, he underwent 2 procedures of the laser trabeculoplasty. Claiming to have steroid -induced glaucoma and blaming Tuaño for the same , Peter filed a complaint for damages against Tuaño. He averred that as the direct consequence of hisprolonged use of Maxitrol, he suffered from steroid induced glaucoma as well as incurable impairment of vision which may lead to permanent blindness . They prayed that prayed that Tuaño be adjudged liable for compensation for his impaired vision , actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney‘s fees. In his defense, Tuano asserted that the drug-induced glaucoma is temporary and curable and that Steroids are prescribed to treat EKC. Contrary to Peter‘s fallacious claim, he did NOT continually prescribe the drug Maxitrol because it was discontinued as soon as EKC disappeared and was resumed only when EKC reappeared. He stressed that Peter‘s glaucoma can only be due to other causes not attributable to steroids — long standing glaucoma; and that in fact steroids were in fact beneficial as they provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier. RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficient evidence. Upon appeal, CA also dismissed it. Issue: Did Lucas fail to prove that Tuano ignored the standard medical procedure for ophthalmologists as well as administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an absence of competence and skills expected of him? Held: YES. The case at bar is a medical negligence case against a physician based on the latter‘s professional negligence. In order to prevail, the petitioner is required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages. Such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In medical negligence/malpractice cases, there exists a physician-patient relationship. To hold the physician liable for damages, 4 elements must be shown to co-exist: (1) duty (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation. There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty when the patient is injured in body or in health. Proof rests upon the testimony of an expert witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient; there must be a causal connection between said breach and the resulting injury - injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. In other words, negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury — or that cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. To establish the proximate cause, one must similarly use expert testimony to present to the court a realistic assessment of the likelihood that the physician‘s alleged negligence caused the patient‘s injury. No question that a physician-patient relationship developed between Dr. Tuaño and Peter . The onus probandi was on the patient to establish before the trial court that the physicians ignored standard medical procedure. Howecer, there was absolute failure on the part of petitioners to present any expert testimony to establish: ( 1) the standard of care to be implemented by competent physicians 2) that, in his treatment of Peter , Dr. Tuaño failed in his duty to exercise said standard of care that any other competent physician would use, 3) that the injury or his glaucoma was the result of his use of Maxitrol, as prescribed by Dr .Tuaño. Failure to prove the first element alone is already fatal . Petitioners maintain that Dr. Tuaño failed to follow in Peter‘s case the required procedure for the prolonged use of Maxitrol .

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Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Torts & Damages 2013

Atty. Jess Lopez

Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr . Tuaño under the circumstances , we have no means to determine whether he was able to comply with the same. The Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate or weigh the attendant facts to state with confidence that the acts complained of, indeed, constituted negligence. Critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiff‘s injuries. It is necessary to prove not only that he has been injured and defendant has been at fault, but also that the defendant‘s fault caused the injury. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony - proof that Peter‘s glaucoma would not have occurred but for Dr. Tuaño‘s supposed negligent conduct . What constitutes proper medical treatment is a medical question that should have been presented to experts. If no standard is established the courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach. Absent expert medical opinion, the courts would be dangerously engaging in speculations. 3. Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers Inc., G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012 Facts: On June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her friend, Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the hotel‘s pool. At around 7:00 p.m., the hotel‘s pool attendant informed them that the swimming pool area was about to be closed. The 2 went to the shower room adjacent to the swimming pool to take a shower and dress up. When they came out of the bathroom, the entire swimming pool area was already pitch black and there were the only ones there. The doors were also locked. After some time, Huang saw a phone b ehind the lifeguard‘s counter. As she went inside, the wooden countertop fell on her head and knocked her down almost unconscious. Delia immediately notified the hotel phone operator of the incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance door of the swimming pool area and gave her an icepack. Huang demanded the services of the hotel physician. Hotel physician, Dr. Dalumpines, instead of immediately providing the needed medical assistance, presented a ―Waiver‖ and demanded that it be s igned by Huang, otherwise, the hotel management will not render her any assistance. Huang refused to do so and left the hotel. Thereupon, Huang consulted several doctors (7 neuro, 1 optha) because she began experiencing ―on‖ and ―off‖ severe headaches that caused her three sleepless nights. They all said she had a serious brain injury. In defense, PHI and Dusit denied all the material allegations. According to them, a sufficient notice on the glass door of the hotel leading to the swimming pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel guests, that the swimming pool area is open only from 7am to 7pm. Nevertheless, the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m. for, (1) security reasons; (2) housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings; and (3) people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmer‘s World Gym, which was open until 10pm. Even granting that the lights in the hotel‘s swimming pool area were turned off, it would not render the area completely dark as the Slimmer‘s World Gym near it was well- illuminated. Around 7:40pm, Ms. Pearlie (hotel nurse) was informed that there was a guest requiring medical assistance. She hurriedly went to the pool area. Although Huang looked normal as there was no indication of any blood or bruise on her head, Ms. Pearlie still asked her if she needed any medical attention to which she replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and she did not need any medical attention. Instead, requested for a hirudoid cream to which Ms. Pearlie acceded. Dr. Dalumpines came to check Huang‘s condition. Huang insisted that she was fine and that the hirudoid cream was enough. Dr. Dalumpines requested Huang to execute a handwritten certification regarding the incident that occurred that night. An XRay test was also suggested to Huang but she replied that it was not necessary. She also refused further medical attention. On Aug 1996, Huang filed a complaint for damages against respondents. The trial court dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, Huang belatedly raises the defense on breach of contract. She maintains that that an implied contract existed between them in view of the fact that the hotel guest status extends to all those who avail of its services — its patrons and invitees. The CA affirmed the TC‘s decision. MR denied. Hence, this Petition for certiorari under Rule 45. She also avows that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior are applicable in this case. It was an accident caused by the fact that the hotel staff was not present to lift the heavy counter top for Huang as is normally expected of them because they negligently locked the main entrance door of the hotel‘s swimming pool area. Issue: Whether respondents PHI and Dusit are liable to Dr. Huang. Held: NO. Initially, Huang sued respondents mainly on account of their negligence but not on any breach of contract. Presently, she claims that her cause of action can be based both on quasi-delict and breach of contract. A perusal of the complaint evidently shows that her cause of action was based solely on quasi-delict (negligence). It is evident from the complaint and from her open court testimony that the reliance was on the alleged tortious acts committed against her by respondents, through their management and staff. In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former‘s complaint will be dismissed. In a breach of contract, negligence is presumed so 5 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

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Atty. Jess Lopez

long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed. It is now too late to raise the said argument for the first time before the SC without causing injustice. As Huang‘s cause of action is based on quasi­delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI and Dusit can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Further, since her case is for quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is upon her. Second element Absent: In this case, Huang utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of respondents. Other than her self-serving testimony that all the lights in the hotel‘s swimming pool area were shut off and the door was locked, which allegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other evidence was presented to substantiate the same. Even her own companion during the night of the accident inside the hotel‘s swimming pool area was never presented to corroborate her allegations. On the other hand, the witnesses presented by the respondents positively declared that it has been a normal practice of the hotel management not to put off the lights until 10pm. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings, including the toilets and counters. There is a remote possibility that the hotel‘s swimming pool area was in complete darkness as the aforesaid gym was then open until 10pm, and the lights radiate to the hotel‘s swimming pool area. Ergo, she cannot fault the Hotel for the injury she allegedly suffered because she herself did not heed the warning at the pool to the effect that it was only open from 7:00 to 7:00 P.M. Thus, when the her own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, she then cannot recover damages. Even Huang‘s assertion of negligence on the part of respondents in not rendering medical assistance to her is preposterous. Her own Complaint affirmed that respondents afforded medical assistance to her after she met the unfortunate accident inside the hotel‘s swimming pool facility. Moreover, the Hotel shouldered the expenses for the MRI services at the Makati Med. Res Ipsa Loquitur & Respondeat Superior: With regard to Huang‘s contention that the principles of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this Court holds otherwise. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means ―the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.‖ It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an infere nce to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff‘s prima facie case. The doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. In the case at bench, even granting that respondents ‘ staff negligently turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on Huang‘s head had she not lifted the same. Records showed that she lifted the said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her head. Doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any showing that the employees of respondents were negligent. Since in this case, the trial court and the CA found no negligence on the part of the employees of respondents, thus, the latter cannot also be held liable for negligence. With the foregoing, the following were clearly established, to wit: (1) petitioner stayed in the hotel‘s swimming pool facility beyond its closing hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her head; and (3) respondents extended medical assistance to her. As such, no negligence can be attributed either to or to their staff and/or management. Third element: On the issue on whether Huang‘s debilitating and permanent injuries were the result of the accident she suffered at the hotel‘s swimming pool area, the Court holds that there is no cogent reason to depart from the lower courts‘ findings. (1) Huang had a past medical history which might have been the cause of her recurring brain injury. (2) The findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995 accident and the brain damage suffered by Huang. Dr. Perez himself testified that the symptoms being experienced might have been due to factors other than the head trauma she allegedly suffered. (3) Dr. Sanchez‘s testimony was hearsay. (4) Medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors whom petitioner sought for examination or treatment were neither identified nor testified to by those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative value. All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents as well as their management and staff, they cannot be made liable to pay for the millions of damages prayed for. Since respondents arc not liable, it necessarily follows that First Lepanto cannot also be made liable under the contract of Insurance. B. 6 No Double Recovery Rule Civil Code: Arts. 1161, 2176, and *2177 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Torts & Damages 2013

Atty. Jess Lopez

1. Joseph v. Bautista, 170 SCRA 540 (1989) Luis Joseph is the plaintiff in a Civil Case entitled Joseph v. Perez, Villa, Vargas, Sioson, Villanueva, and Pagarigan before the CFI of Bulacan; Judge Bautista presided. Perez owned a cargo truck for conveying cargo and passengers from Dagupan to Manila. In January 1973, Villa drove the truck from Valenzuela to Pangasinan. Joseph, with his livestock, boarded the truck going to Valenzuela, paying P9. On the way, Villa tried to overtake a tricycle, but at the same time, a pick-up truck owned by Sioson and Pagarigan, and driven by Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck. The cargo truck was forced to veer towards the shoulder, ramming a mango tree. Joseph sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. He then filed a complaint for damages against Perez (owner) based on a breach of contract of carriage; against Sioson and Villanueva, quasi-delict. As he could not ascertain who the real owners of the vehicles were, he amended his complaint to implead everyone, including a certain Cardeno. On 27 September 1974, Sioson, Villanueva, Pagarigan, and Cardeno, through the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid Joseph‘s claim for P1,300. Petitioner executed a release of claim against them. They thus filed a motion to exclude themselves from the case. Perez opposed this, and filed a Counter Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the release inured to the favor of all respondents, as their liability was solidary. The judge agreed, and dismissed the case; a Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Issue: Whether or not the release of claim inured to the benefit of Perez. Held: YES. A Cause of Action is the delict or wrongful act or omission violating the rights of a party. It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where there is only one wrong, there is only one cause of action, regardless of the number of the rights violated. Here, there was only one injury sustained by the Joseph, vesting him with only one cause of action, though with different remedies against different persons. A recovery under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other; the rationale against this is the rule against unjust enrichment. Also, being solidarily liable, full payment by one or some, as well as their subsequent release, resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability all other solidary debtors. 2. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc., v. CA, G.R. No. 114841-42, October 20, 1995 Facts: Sometime in 1982, petitioner commenced the construction of a steel fabrication plant in the Batangas, necessitating dredging operations in an area adjacent to the real property of private respondents Castillo. An action for damages against herein petitioner was filed by the Castillos alleging that: During the on-going construction of its steel and fabrication yard, petitioner‘s personnel and heavy equipment trespassed into the adjacent parcels of land belonging to them without their consent. Petitioner‘s heavy equipment damaged big portions of their property which were further used by petitioner as a depot or parking lots without paying any rent therefor. As a result of the dredging operation of petitioner, the sea silt and water overflowed and were deposited upon their land. Said property which used to be agricultural lands principally devoted to rice production could no longer be planted with palay as the soil became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture. Petitioner denied all the allegations. Trial court ruled in favor of the Castillos ordering defendant to pay for damages. On appeal, the CA modified the decision and increased the award for damages. On appeal by certiorari, the SC ruled that CA erred in increasing the award for damages considering that the Castillos did not appeal but affirmed the decision of the trial court in all respects. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the Court of Appeals violated Article 2177 of the Civil Code on double recovery which states that: ‗the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant‘ when it condemned the petitioner as a result of its dredging operations, to pay private respondents not only the expected total amount of profits the latter would have derived from the expected sale of their palay harvest for 135 months or over 11 years, from the half hectare agricultural land, but also rentals on the basis of P5.00 per square meter of their said entire landholdings. Issue: Whether or not the provision against double recovery was violated. Held: NO. The Castillos specifically alleged in their complaint that as a result of petitioner‘s dredging operations, the soil of the former‘s property ―became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture.‖ They further averred that 7 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

The Court finds it immaterial that the Paduas chose. the court intended to adopt the same adjudication and award it made in civil case 427-O as Punzalan‘s civil liability in criminal case 1158-O. 427-O. Buan. The same judge tried. Issue: (1) W/N the judgment in criminal case 1158-O includes a determination and adjudication of Punzalan‘s civil liability arising from his criminal act upon which Robles‘ subsidiary civil responsibility may be based. an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176. on the contrary. precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission. Cusi. August 29. which action proved ineffectual. Robles filed a motion to dismiss based on (1) bar of the cause of action by a prior judgment and (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. consequently. Robles to enforce the latter‘s subsidiary responsibility under the provisions of article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. It would appear that a plain reading of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O easily results in the conclusion that the said judgment assessed no civil liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. Ongchuan. petitioner was guilty of two culpable transgressions on the property rights of private respondents: (1) for the ruination of the agricultural fertility or utility of the soil of their property and (2) for the unauthorized use of said property as a dump site or depot for petitioner‘s heavy equipment and trucks. would yield the conclusion that the court a quo. the Paduas instituted action in the same court against Gregorio N. Robles. (2) If in the positive. The same decision also said: ―The civil liability of the accused has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. by including such statement in the dispositive portion of the said judgment. a taxicab (driven by Punzalan and operated by the Bay Taxi Cab o wned by Robles) struck 10 year old Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio Barretto. the corresponding officer of the court a quo returned unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the amount of indemnity awarded to the Paduas in civil case 427-O. G. Allowance of the latter application involves no violation of the proscription against double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission. charged Punzalan with homicide through reckless imprudence. it cannot reasonably be contended that it was the intention. as hereinbefore stated. there is no double recovery. 1969 the court a quo. Anzures. ‖ After the judgment in civil case 427-O became final. for exaction of Robles‘ subsidiary responsibility . Padua v. adjudged for the Paduas but dismissed the complaint against Bay Taxi Cab.O. No.R. is there double recovery? Held: Yes. (as proven by the unsatisfied writ of execution from the civil case) There is no inconsistency between the aforementioned action previously availed of by the Paduas and their subsequent application for enforcement of civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and. the court a quo. as a result of which he died. Knowledge of and familiarity with all the facts and circumstances relevant and relative to the civil liability of Punzalan may thus be readily attributed to the judge when he rendered judgment in the criminal action. However. which stems from the subsidiary civil responsibility of Robles. Romeo Punzalan. in civil case 427-O. entitled ‗Paulino Padua. vs. On October 27. The city fiscal filed with the same court (criminal case 1158-O). Unable to collect the amount of P27. the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article 100 and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177. however. 3. Almost a year later. 8 Agas. Hence. There was an intention to adjudicate Punzalan‘s civil liability from the criminal case. on October 5. it was the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Paduas‘ right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158. in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O. the Paduas sought execution thereof. and 2180. in the first instance. Indeed. Reposo. 1975 In the early morning of New Year‘s Day of 1969. This proved futile and the corresponding court officer returned the writ of execution unsatisfied. and determined both civil case 427-O and criminal case 1158-O. heard. Jess Lopez petitioner‘s heavy equipment ―used to utilize (private respondents‘) land as a depot or parking lot of these equipment(s) without paying any rent therefor. The impact hurled Padua about 40 meters away from the point where the taxicab struck him. 2177. Normandy‘s parents (Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua) filed with the CFI Zambales (civil case 427-O) and sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab. Therefore. in criminal case 1158-O.‖ Clearly. 365. Navarrete. However. Paduas elevated the case to CA and CA certified case to SC.000 awarded in their favor. The court a quo granted Robles‘ motion to dismiss on the ground that the Paduas‘ complaint states no cause of action. et al. Consequently. Clearly. In negligence cases. Article 2177 of the Civil Code. a careful study of the judgment in question. convicted Punzalan of homicide through reckless imprudence under Art. the situation to which it applies. and the attendant circumstances. L-40486. recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding indemnity therefor. Paduas are entitled to the civil liability. to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor. et al.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Olongapo City. 1970. & Roco 3B . there is no merit in said objection of petitioner. For.

an action may be instituted against the employer for an employee‘s act or omission.200 remaining bags. Said WAs are valid for 6 mos. Reposo. In turn. Upon her inquiry. Co sold the same WAs to Lily Lim at P64/bag (3. Also. 9 Agas. Ongchuan. cement dealers/traders. It does not require that the employee is insolvent in this case. Additionally since respondents have proved the factual bases of the their right to their claim and that the present case falls under Article 2219 (2) which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict. These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed of. The court has held that regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle. Abovementioned traders/dealers sold their WAs covering 50. for civil liability ex quasi delicto. The house was destroyed and pinned under the engine of the tractor was the son of respondent Tamayo (Reniel) and the daughter of respondent Oledan (Felmarie). 175256.R. FRCC and Co explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the bags once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive lesser quantity of cement. She asserted 2 causes of actions: (1) Breach of Contract. Lim v. Employees may also be held subsidiarily liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of the latter‘s duties under Article 103 of the RPC. the failure to recover in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in the other. The WAs state the quantity of bags the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the cement plant. After trial. in which case the liability of the employee is direct and primary subject to the defense of due diligence.2M). In April 1999. No. or (2) under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It is clear that the damages caused were due to the fault of the driver of the tractor. Jess Lopez 4. she WAs covering 10. Buan. He was also relieved from civil liability in the same case. The complaint was dropped with respect to Ecatine and Lim.R. Denying the Motion. it could not escape primary liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver. for P63/bag (3. Respondents filed against Equitable. Ecatine Corp. holding that since the Deed of Sale between petitioner and Ecatine had not been registered with the LTO. Enano and the two sons of respondent Suyom were injured as well. the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned. 143360. they elected to file a separate civil action for damages based on quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.000 bags to Co Ping.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Held: YES. a case for Estafa through Misrepresentation/Conversion was filed in RTC Pasig with prayer for damages. This applies when the employee/s convicted of the crime are found to be insolvent. Co was later acquitted when his demurrer for insufficient evidence was granted. for civil liability ex delicto. the registered owner is considered under the law to be the employer of the driver while the actual operator is deemed to be its agent. 2012 Facts: FR Cement Corp (FRCC) owned/operates a cement manufacturing plant. However. Since respondents failed to recover anything in the criminal case. and (2) Abuse of Rights & Unjust Enrichment. Anzures. She also prayed for moral & exemplary damages. 2002 A Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into house/store of Tamayo in Tondo. Navarrete. The CA sustained the trial court. Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and independent of each other. Oledan. Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Pending her appeal.000 bags back to Co. the RTC said there was no forum shopping because the case pending in the Estafa case and this Civil case are different. In negligence cases. September 5. Equitable alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and it was no longer in possession and control of it at the time of the incident. Lim filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages in RTC Manila against Co and other parties indicated in the WAs. the legal owner was still Equitable. Issue: Whether or not Equitable is liable for the negligent acts of Tutor despite the fact that he was not its employee. it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. Thereafter. the court ordered Equitable to pay actual and moral damages to respondent. Co filed a Motion to Dismiss based on lis pendens and forum shopping. G.15M). FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37.800 bags. Cusi. the aggrieved party may sue the negligent party under (1) Article 100 of the RPC. Suyom. subject to the caveat that the offended party cannot ―recover damages twice for the same act or omission‖ or under both causes. August 23. It was later found out through the LTO that the registered owner of the tractor was petitioner (Equitable Leasing Corporation) leased to Edwin Lim. It issued several Withdrawal Authorities (WA) (imagine Warehouse Receipts) for the accounts Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt. No. Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor. Lim was able to withdraw 2. respondents failed to recover anything in the criminal case. (employer of Tutor). she demanded Co to resolve her problem with FRCC or for the return of her money. from issuance unless revoked. In the instant case. Ping. G. Thus. petitioners are thus entitled to the same 5. Lim sought refuge before the CA. Under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180. Equitable is liable since the deed of sale evidencing the sale of the tractor was not registered with the LTO . and Lim a Complaint for damages. Tutor was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries. consequently. Unsuccessful. The same goes for purposes of the law on quasi-delict. & Roco 3B .

The second action is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortuous conduct (abuse of rights). A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities namely: civil liability arising from the crime (ex delicto) and an independent civil liability. 10 Agas. The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense. they cannot escape liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB. Many roads became impassable due to the Pinatubo eruption. to other parties. was driving along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour with on their way to Baguio to attend their grandmother‘s first death anniversary. it having been instituted together with the criminal action. They.m. PNCC was in charge of the maintenance of the expressway and its obligation cannot be destroyed by virtue of a private agreement. they removed the warning devices. they placed lit cans with diesel oil on the road and lane dividers. Reposo. Navidad. As such. its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. PNCC failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued independently. litis pendentia. The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto. To warn motorists. should be held liable. Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) and PASUDECO entered into a MOA wherein the latter was allowed to enter and pass through NLEX provided it should comply with its safety measures such as putting a sign saying ―Caution: Convoy Ahead. Since most of the sugarcane had been cleared. No.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. left a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. Consequently. PNCC‘s appeal was also denied by the CA. Philippine National Construction Corporation v. it was stipulated tha t accidents and damages to toll facilities shall be PASUDECO‘s responsibility. Moreover. & Roco 3B . with Latagan & Generalao. CA held that PASUDECO and PNCC are solidarily liable. without offending the rules on forum shopping. It does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA. nature of liability Civil Code o Article 2194 (Memorize) 1. Their vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane and flew out of control and turned turtle several times.‖ Also. as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. however. a PNCC security supervisor were patrolling KM 72 when they saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle of the road. Arnaiz. a complaint for damages was filed against PNCC and PASUDECO on the ground of negligence to which the RTC granted. Jess Lopez Issue: Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages while her appeal on the civil aspect for estafa was pending? Held: NO. the MOA refers to accidents or damages to the toll facilities. the PNCC security supervisor thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. 397 SCRA 75 (2003) See above 2. its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. Later. jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively. PNCC & PASUDECO are SOLIDARILY LIABLE. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities. G. Cusi. Anzures. August 22. Court of Appeals. then he is guilty of negligence. Navarrete. PASUDECO and PNCC. As such. Ongchuan. Buan. hence. Issue: Is PNCC liable? Held: YES. Both defendants.R. since Latagan was not a party thereto. They contacted PASUDECO to clean up the mess. Moreover. 2005 Facts: Pampanga Sugar (PASUDECO) is in the business of transporting sugar cane from Pampanga. or res judicata. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. Light Railway Transit Authority v. At about 6:30 a. (3) Person/s liable. On the other hand. 159270. 5 PASUDECO men arrived to clear up the highway. Said MOA was approved by PNCC At 2:30am.

2005 Facts: Chan owns Aringay Shell Gasoline Station in La Union. Chan and Oller filed an Answer and impleaded Yoro as third party defendant. Inc. Issue: Whether or not the MOA entered into by the Chan and Yoro has the effect of making the latter solely responsible for damages to the respondent. Anent respondent Arnaiz‘s negligence in driving his car. the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case. All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable under Article 2194. Held: NO. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result. Chan. He argues that the MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight by the courts. Finally.R. Cusi. so the services of retired army general Ely Yoro was procured by Chan as the former was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality. is the proximate cause of the injury. and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices. in combination. Reposo. It is bounded on the south by a chapel of the INC. (3) Such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence. the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury. In the event that valuable objects are found outside the property line during the said digging. Chan was informed by the members of the INC that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered.. and considered the same in mitigating the award of damages. they were partners in this endeavor. and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. undoubtedly. It is sufficient that his negligence. (2) Such act or omission causes damage to another. Then. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to INC because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. morals. the same shall be divided among the parties (35% for Chan. Iglesia Ni Cristo. The trial court absolved Oller and adjudged Chan and Yoro solidarily liable holding that the diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. A complaint against Chan and a certain Teofilo Oller (engineer) was filed by the INC in RTC La Union.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's. 65% for Yoro) Diggings thereafter commenced. G. Any damage within or outside the property of the CHAN incurred during the digging shall be borne by the YORO 6. No. The findings of the trial court and the CA on this point are in complete unison. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone. and (4) There is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Anzures. 2176 the requisites of quasi-delict are the following: (1) There must be an act or omission. The trial court disallowed Yoro‘s appeal for failure to pay the docket and other lawful fees. Jr. Chan and Yoro appealed separately. They are each liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. 11 Agas. & Roco 3B . Chan appeal was given due course but was denied by the CA. The excavation on INC‘s premises was caused by fault. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons. it may appear that one of them was more culpable.. Ongchuan. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party. although acting independently of each other. Buan. or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tortfeasor. Negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. 3. Jess Lopez PASUDECO‘s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps. are. The gas station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. 160283. were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan‘s injuries. Chan instituted the this case. either is responsible for the whole injury. and the INC on the other. With PASUDECO‘s and the petitioner‘s successive negligent acts. October 14. there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the Chan and Yoro on the one hand. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the INC. v. Based on Art. which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury. good customs and public policy. Since nothing in the MOA goes against the law. Chan and Yoro were in quest for hidden treasure and. such was only contributory. Navarrete. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened. it must govern to absolve him from any liability. Chan and Yoro entered a MOA. pertinent portions of which are as follows: 4.

Chan and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort.00. Navarrete. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. Anzures. Cerezos utilized various remedies (relief from judgment. her husband Atty. Sps. In quasi-delicts. By gross negligence is meant such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness. It made no pronouncement on Foronda‘s liability because there was no service of summons on him. and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. While it is settled that a party who did not appeal from the decision cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment appealed from. Cusi. Juan Cerezo and driver Danilo Foronda. Tuazon. and is indifferent. as owner of the bus line. the MOA. Cerezo v.‖ hired Foronda as her driver. instead of exculpating Chan from liability. not delict under the Revised Penal Code. there being a ―Slow Down‖ sign. & Roco 3B . Cerezo. whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict. nevertheless. Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda‘s ―recklessness. Cerezo. Court of Appeals. Cerezo‘s ―lack of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees. Mrs. Fabre v. Tuazon alleged that Mrs. a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. the above exception applies. G.R. Ongchuan. Chan and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Cerezo‘s assertion. *Torts-related but not under the topic assigned: Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Cerezo and Mrs. It was held that Mrs. However.000. is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable. In his complaint. annulment of judgment under 47. affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action. when the rights and liability of the defendants are so interwoven and dependent as to be inseparable. the modification of the appealed judgment in favor of appellant operates as a modification to Yoro who did not appeal. The exemplary damages must correspondingly be increased to P100. Cerezo‘s employee. In this case. or worse. pursuant to Article 2180 of the CC. Buan. drove in a negligent manner which caused severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff (unable to walk. Cerezo‘s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi­delict is not only solidary. it is 12 Agas. Not to mention the damage that may be caused to the structure itself. or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. July 26. to the danger of injury to person or property of others. Hence. thumb and middle finger on the left hand cut) Trial court issued summons against Atty.‖ Article 2180 states in part: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.‖ aggravated by Mrs. The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The choice of remedy. Cerezo. the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasidelict is solidary. unquestionably amounts to gross negligence. Jess Lopez For the damage caused to INC. 4. the liabilities of Yoro and Chan being solidary. Cerezo‘s contention that the trial court could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda proceeds from the point of view of criminal law and not of civil law. Tuazon alleged that he was in the proper lane when Foranda. without due regard to traffic rules and regulations. There is. gross negligence and imprudence. however. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case.R.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. No. the present petition for review on certiorari contending that the CA ignored the allegation that driver Foronda whose negligence is the main issue is an indispensable party whose presence is compulsory but whom the lower court did not summon. Verily. thereby endangering the lives and limbs of the people in worship. Surreptitiously digging under the respondent‘s chapel which may weaken the foundation thereof. certiorari under 45. 1996 See above 5. No. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Held/Ratio: NO. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. 141538. Reposo. Cerezo was solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. 111127. became disabled. 2004 Facts: Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle in Pampanga. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court‘s action in the litigation. March 23. in which case. Contrary to Mrs. particularly Foronda. Thus. ―without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her employees and buses. The basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code. G. Trike driver Tuazon filed a complaint as pauper litigant for damages against Mrs. Cerezo failed to file their answer so the trial court issued an order declaring the Cerezos in default. and certiorari under 65 with CA) to overturn the ruling but were all denied. It also ruled in Tuazon‘s favor. Mrs. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside Chan‘s property line. Issue: Whether or not Foronda (driver) is an indispensable party. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The train. The Bonifacio immediately blew his whistle twice. which was unavoidable so far as this accused was concerned. Jess Lopez also primary and direct. unless there is something in the appearance or conduct of the person on foot which would cause a prudent man to anticipate the possibility that such person could not. in the same direction as that in which the train was running. the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. 1172. turned and attempted to cross the track. But there is no obligation on an engine driver to stop. G. as it is admitted that the distance from the curve to the point where the accident occurred was about 175 meters. each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. the maximum speed permitted under the railroad regulations. had the accused applied his brakes when he first saw the man walking near the track. to cross over to the other side. Reposo. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict. Moreover. Batangas. Concept Civil Code o Articles 2178. or would not avoid the possibility of danger by stepping aside. This is the fault that the law condemns. who said that his indicator showed that he was travelling at the rate of 35 km/hour. Eligio Castillo. the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. he was walking near the track. he tried to slow down the engine. and the man in front was about 175 meters ahead of the engine. Cusi. an employer‘s liability based on a quasi­delict is primary and direct. March 2. who. Cerezo alone. but did not succeed in stopping in time to avoid running down the pedestrian. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors. 1173. The deaf-mute stepped out on the track from an adjoining field shortly before the accident. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda. as in this case. United States v. but he claims that he did all in his power to slow down a few moments afterwards. and 1733  Memorize: Articles 1172 to 1174 1. Navarrete. Therefore. the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. sufficiently and conclusively demonstrates that the death of the deaf-mute was the result of a regrettable accident.R. Buan. he might have stopped the train in time to have avoided the accident. Cerezo. Anzures. as disclosed by the undisputed evidence of record. The mere statement of facts. Held: ACQUITTED. He did not attempt to stop his engine when he first saw the man walking along the side of the track. No. by an engine on which the Bonifacio was employed as engineer. 1916 On October 1913. Hence. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon‘s action for damages against Mrs. the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. but only mutual representation. NEGLIGENCE A. the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. while the employer‘s liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. when he sees an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near the track. a heavy freight train. However. about that time. a few moments afterwards. walked along one side of the track for some little distance and was killed as he attempted. Bonifacio. for some unknown reason. the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee‘s delict and corresponding primary liability are established. II. all that may properly be required of an engine driver under such circumstances is that he 13 Agas. Ongchuan. & Roco 3B . There is no merger or renunciation of rights. When the Bonifacio first saw the Castillo. was run down and killed. If the present action proceeds f rom a delict. It has been suggested that. According to Article 2194 of the Civil Code. had just rounded a curve. The undisputed evidence discloses that a heavy freight train running at the rate of 35 miles an hour could not be brought to a stop on that decline in much less than one 150 meters. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee‘s criminal negligence. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary. after his engine rounded the curve. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee. that is to say after he had blown his whistle without apparently attracting the attention of the pedestrian. that the man in front did not respond to the warning by stepping aside from the track. either of the parties is indispensable. 10563. and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Ordinarily. Issue: Whether or not Bonifacio is guilty of homicide committed with simple negligence. and noticing. a deaf-mute. while attempting to cross the railroad track in the barrio of Santa Rita.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. then the trial court‘s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. When an employee causes damage. or even to slow down his engine. The only evidence as to the rate of speed at which the train was running at the time of the accident was the testimony of the accused himself.

& Roco 3B . As a result. as the car passed. Smith guided his car to the right to avoid hitting the horse. Smith continued to approach directly towards Picart without diminution of speed. The accused was without fault. but the relation of cause and effect must exist between the negligence or imprudence of the accused and the injury inflicted. since the Pony had not exhibited fright and the fact that Picart made no motion to stop. that the accused had any reason to believe that his warning signals had not been heard. Issue: Whether or not Smith (driver) is guilty of negligence. Cusi. he incurs no criminal liability under the provisions of this article. that fact would not justify or require the imposition of the penalty prescribed in article 568 of the Criminal Code. if accompanied by a violation of the regulations. he blew his horn when he saw Picart. Consequently. in walking on the track without taking the necessary precautions to avoid danger from a train approaching him from behind. 809 (1918) Facts: Picart was riding his pony over the Carlatan bridge in La Union (75 m x 4. There was nothing in the appearance or conduct of the victim which would have warned the accused that the man walking along the side of the track was a deaf-mute. the car struck the left hind leg of the horse. and stepping out of the way of danger when their attention is directed to an oncoming train. Observing that Picart was not observing the rules of the road. Smith also guided his car toward the same side where Picart‘s horse was.8m). An engine driver may fairly assume that all persons walking or standing on or near the railroad track. he is guilty of negligence. Instead. Navarrete. the accident must have taken place whether the speed had been slightly under rather than slightly over the limit prescribed by regulation. Perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or rapidity of the approach. Picart moved his horse closer to the railing instead of going to the correct side of the road (which is the left side). further. the possibility of the horse moving to the other side also grew slim. Reposo. are aware of the danger to which they are exposed. It was only when the pedestrian attempted to cross the track. the latter was the proximate and immediate cause of the injury inflicted 2. just in front of the train. However. Smith. Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. and unless. just before the accident took place.5 meters. Buan. As he got closer. take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horseman. by blowing his whistle or ringing his bell until he is assured that the attention of the pedestrian has been attracted to the oncoming train. The horse died as a result and Picart suffered some contusions and temporary unconsciousness. If it appears that the injury in no wise resulted from the violation of the regulations. Before he had gotten half way across. While Smith had the right to assume that Picart would pass over the proper side of the bridge. Picart v. or the negligent conduct of the accused. However. the rider was thrown off. Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. 37 Phil. going at the rate of about 10-12 MPH. However. seeing there were no other people on the bridge. At this point.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. He did not take into consideration the fact that there was an appreciable risk with regard to the fact that the pony might get excited and/or frightened. if at the moment he happens to be guilty of a violation of some petty regulation. which the public interest demands. instead of veering away. Anzures. Conviction thereunder cannot be maintained. and the accident must be attributed wholly to the reckless negligence of the deaf-mute. This does NOT mean that in every case in which one accidentally injures or kills another he is criminally liable therefor. It was seen that the space between the horse and the car at the time of the incident was less than 1. Injury or death must have resulted from some "imprudence or negligence" on his part. and by that time it was too late to avoid the accident. Any other rule would render it impracticable to operate railroads so as to secure the expeditious transportation of passengers and freight. Under all the circumstances. it became Smith‘s duty to either bring his car to an immediate stop or. except children of tender years. Smit h and Picart are in a direct collision course. the pony became frightened and turned its body. Held: YES. by looking and listening for the approach of trains. As the horse fell. the Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. it affirmatively appearing that the slight excess of speed had no possible causal relation to the accident. when this eventuality had become an impossibility. Picart did this as he thought he had no more time to reach the left side. he was on the wrong side. Jess Lopez give warning of his approach. It is true that it only needs to be slight negligence. and that they will take reasonable precautions to avoid accident. In so doing. 14 Agas. and that it was due wholly to the negligent conduct of the deceased. Ongchuan. Even if it were true that the train was running at a speed slightly in excess of the limit prescribed by regulations. As Smith approached the bridge. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. unless there was culpable negligence in the violation of a duly prescribed regulation. Smith gave 2 more successive blasts.

wife of deceased. a 21 year old air police stationed at Clark Air Base. Corliss v. When they crossed the railroad tracks to reach the entrance of the base. G. Anzures. seeing that the train was coming. therefore. Preciolita Corliss. the train operator testified that the train was only running between 20-25 KPH and. 4. Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. On the knowledge of Corliss and his familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint. No. there being negligence. however ruled that based on the evidence presented. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Hence. and are not supposed to be. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. Without damage or prejudice there can be no liability. Despite the allegation that the crossing bars were not put down and the fact that there was no guard at the gate-house. filed a complaint for recovery of damages against respondent for negligence. it collided with a train operated by respondent. the lower court had the opportunity of weighing carefully what was testified to and apparently did not neglect it. one of which was the train operator. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have simply stopped his vehicle before crossing and allow the train to move on. Reposo. then negligence is ruled out. and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle. Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. Jess Lopez The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. In the present case. 3. Under said circumstances. and although this element is present no indemnity can be awarded unless arising from some person‘s fault or negligence. Cusi. the imposed on Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm. After all. Corliss‘ became a victim of his own miscalculation when he took a risk in his eagerness to beat the oncoming train. Despite this. therefore. followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision. If the objective standard of prudence be met. Reasonable foresight of harm. Corliss slowed down his jeep but this was due to the fact that he put the jeep on first gear in an attempt to give his jeep a boost so it could beat the train. Ongchuan. Philippine National Railways. there still was a duty on the part of Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a collision. Ralph was driving the jeep. May 31. Jr. Navarrete. 1979 15 Agas. It is entitled to great respect. In fact. the jeep was still caught in its tracks. despite applying he breaks. the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. one witness observed that.R. since the negligence of the Smith succeeded the negligence of the Picart by an appreciable interval. G.. L-29889. Manila Railroad Co. The circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in the light of what could reasonably be expected of the parties. term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. having recognized that the course he was pursuing was fraught with risk and would.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. omniscient of the future. Ralph Corliss. Those who ignore such warning do so at their own risk and responsibility. The lower court. The PC soldier suffered burns and serious physical injuries while Corliss died of his burns at the hospital days later. 1969 Facts: In December 1956. While Picart was also not free from fault for being on the wrong side of the road. March 28. Buan. Every case must be dependent on its facts. He should look and listen and do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track. had warned the oncoming traffic that it was approaching by blowing its whistle repeatedly in accordance with regulations. and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. Issue: Whether or not Manila Railroad is liable for negligence? Held: NO. a high degree of care is necessary. the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous.R. Cusi v. It is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing and hearing. that Manila Railroad was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. During the trial all 3 witnesses. Under these circumstances. the existence of the tracks. and a PC soldier was returning to said base. They are not. No. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown. the Civil Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. is under obligation to pay for the damage done. it is clear that Corliss. Where the danger is great. & Roco 3B . Authorities have many times said that the railroad track is in itself a warning of danger. was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident. The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. L-21291. which was heard by said witnesses. have foreseen harm to Picart as a reasonable consequence of that course. an appeal was filed to the Court. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. not an absolute. It is a relative or comparative. This action is predicated on negligence.

Similarly. The gross negligence of PNR was the proximate cause of the collision. He simply sped on without taking an extra precaution of blowing his whistle. Victorino Cusi and his wife Pilar attended a birthday party inside a subdivision in Paranaque. Manila Electric R. A need. She also bore ugly scars on several parts of her body. causing the vehicle to 16 Agas. Anzures. 1909. Wright drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. As a result of his injuries. and she suffered anxiety of a possible miscarriage being then 5 months pregnant at the time of the accident. the travelling public has the right to rely on such warning devices to put them on their guard and take the necessary precautions before crossing the tracks. Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed in railroad crossings. exists for the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep such devices in good condition and in working order. . & Roco 3B . he could have seen and heard the approach of the train. the SC is bound by their judgments. the same law states in its proviso that instead of coming to a full stop. and that had he made a full stop before traversing the crossing as required by section 56(a) of Act 3992 (Motor Vehicle Law). During that precise hour.(1) The question of negligence is a question of fact: The question of negligence being one of fact. 1963. the lower court's finding of negligence on the part of the PNR deserves serious consideration by the Court. Wright‘s Caloocan residence fronts on the street along which defendant's tracks run. Upon reaching the railroad tracks. which may be considered with all the circumstances of the case in determining whether the railroad company was negligent as a matter of fact. She was forced to quit her profession of teaching music and piano. Undisputedly. there would have been no collision. And unless it can be shown that error or errors. there was a shortening of about 1 cm. the Sps Cusi proceeded home in their Vauxhall car with Victorino at the wheel. (2) Definition of negligence: Negligence has been defined by as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care. 7760. 5. Held: YES. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. precaution. a train bound for Lucena traversed the crossing. These facts assessed together show the the absence of precautions taken by the PNR to warn the travelling public of the impending danger. since if such a signal is misunderstood it is a menace. At the same time. Jess Lopez Facts: On the night of October 5. it has been held that if a railroad company maintains a signalling device at a crossing to give warning of the approach of a train. However. therefore. and fell. Thus. elbow and shoulder. Thus. sense of hearing and neck movement.R. or that there was abuse in judicial scrutiny.M. Reposo. Issue: Whether or not PNR is guilty of negligence. be shown in the conclusion arrived at. Wright v. Defendant PNR raises the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of Cusi. Victorino was unable to properly attend to his various business undertakings after the accident.R. the train did not stop until it reached a distance of around 100 meters . Cusi merely slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. That the train was running at full speed is attested to by the fact that notwithstanding the application of the emergency brakes. Wright is has to cross defendant's tracks. thereby precluding them from recovering indemnity for their injuries and damages. Ongchuan. whereby such other person suffers injury. the failure of the device to operate is generally held to be evidence of negligence. the warning devices were not operating for no one attended to them. memory. October 1. As to the defense of Contributory negligence: PNR rests its defense mainly on Section 56(a) of the Motor Vehicle Law. the train for Lucena was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 P. The defense presupposes that the failure of Cusi to stop before proceeding to traverse the crossing constitutes contributory negligence. it can readily be seen that there is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is measured. By such a test. it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself so situated. it may slow down to not more than 10 kph when it is apparent that no hazard exists. Also. & Light Co. It states that vehicles moving on public highways shall be brought to a full stop before traversing any railroad crossing. 1914 Facts: The E. No. resulting in a collision between the two. and hearing no whistle from any coming train.M. of that arm. Victorino suffered a number of injuries. Buan. it has been the standing practice of appellate courts to accord lower court's judgments the presumption of correctness. As a result of the fracture on her right arm. at around 11pm. G. To enter his premises from the street. or to give notice that they are not operating. After the party. including brain injuries which affected his speech. All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of reasonable men under similar circumstances. Navarrete. substantial in character. leaped forward. and thus. She lost the flexibility of her wrist. On the night of the accident. the locomotive driver did not blow his whistle. the warning devices installed at the railroad crossing were manually operated. finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing that there was no flashing red light. The impact threw the Sps out of their car which was smashed. Cusi. Mrs Cusi suffered many fractures and underwent a total of four surgical operations . On the night of 9 Aug.

there were 2 hearing dates. had he not been intoxicated. At the succeeding bumping thuds. At the sound of the first bumping thuds. 2001 Facts: The last phase of the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit training was the ―endurance run. that GLENN suddenly heard and felt bumping thuds. he was asked by his friend Enting Galindez and the latter‘s fellow band members to provide them with transpo that would bring the ir band instruments. However. the rear guards told their co. GLENN switched his own lights from bright to dim and reduced his speed from 80 to 60 KPH. he was not able to pump the brake.‖ Since the jogging trainees were occupying the right lane of the highway. De Los Santos. He was trembling and could not see what were being bumped. If one's conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence. Moreover. Thus.R. That there is nothing in the opinion of the lower court which sustains the conclusion that the Wright was negligent with reference to the accident.‖ The guards forthwith jumped in different directions. Wright brought an action to recover damages for injuries sustained due to defendant‘s negligence. the rear security guards started waving their hands for the vehicle to take the other side of the road. & Roco 3B . Their duty was to jog backwards facing the oncoming vehicles and give hand signals for other vehicles to take the left lane. People v. GLENN could not distinguish in the darkness what he had hit. Immediately after receiving the report. Such state made him unable to properly take care of himself and it was the primary source of the accident. of 4 October 1995. he wouldn‘t have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found because it is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the calesa under the same circumstances. All in all. the Elf continued on its track and was able to stop only when it was already very near the next curve. It was only when the vehicles were at a distance of 10-15 m from each other that the other car‘s headlights were dimmed. but the vehicle just kept its speed. Anzures. Defendant admitted it was negligence in maintaining its tracks but it further averred that Wright was likewise negligent for being intoxicated at the time of the accident.trainees to ―retract.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Reposo. the Court refused to consider the evidence present and decided based on the facts stated in the opinion of the lower court and pleadings filed. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. Cusi. 131588. Kneedler. Both appealed. had he been sober. apparently ignoring their signals and coming closer and closer to them. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him. No. Jess Lopez strike one of the rails with great force such that one wheel broke. Accused Glenn‘s version: At about 10:30 p. only the evidence from the first reached the Court. nor did he notice that his foot was pushing the pedal. the physician who attended to him hours after the accident. the upper part of the rails was some 5-6 inches above street level. Mere intoxication is not negligence. Due to its momentum. it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. Realizing that the vehicle would hit them. 2 rear security guards were assigned to each rear column (there were 3 columns of joggers). Buan. *NOTE: In the trial. the rails were above-ground. They saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at high speed towards them. 6. GLENN blinked his headlights as a signal for the other driver. Defendant‘s conclusion that. and others were overrun by the vehicle. This happened while the truck was still cruising at a speed of 60 kph and immediately after passing the oncoming vehicle. But the impact was so sudden that he was astonished and afraid. This was gathered from Dr. Some were thrown. The trial court ruled that both were negligent and apportioned the damages that was awarded to Wright. They were supposed to be taken to Camiguin. Ongchuan. which led him to conclude that the brakes of the vehicle had not been applied. G. At a distance of 100 meters. GLENN found it extremely hard to adjust from high brightness to sudden darkness. GLENN put his right foot on the brake pedal. Issue: Accepting the findings that both were negligent. the ties upon which the rails rested projected out of the ground. Navarrete. As a result. band utilities and band members from CDO to Balingoan. nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. As the Elf was negotiating a left curve going slightly downward. March 27. policemen proceeded to the traffic scene to conduct an ocular inspection. especially since the right headlights of the truck had 17 Agas. The vehicle lights were in the high beam. This caused Wright to be thrown off the calesa thereby incurring injuries. The driver did not reduce his speed even after hitting the first and second columns. GLENN saw a very bright and glaring light coming from the opposite direction of the highway. he would not have fallen off.m. They did not see any brake marks on the highway. It was undisputed that at the night in question. In other words. whether Wright‘s negligence contributed to the accident OR only to Wright‘s own injuries. to participate in the Lanzones Festival. Held: DEFENDANT‘s NEGLIGENCE WAS THE MAIN CAUSE.

many trainees would have been spared. with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). Reasonable foresight of harm. Petitioners Kong. such as by slackening his speed. but this was ignored. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man would do. Navarrete. (12 dead. his failure to render assistance to the victim. Aguilar demanded reimbursement of all expenses. pinned by the store‘s gift wrapping counter. or if there were. 10 minor) Issue: Was there intent to kill or was he guilty of reckless imprudence? Held: NO INTENT TO KILL. and the windshield. Ongchuan. Furthermore. and (3) other circumstances regarding persons. taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation. and. which was refused. He should have observed due care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man. being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver. missing. it was established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward. constitutes a qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree. should have known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. 2 hours later. Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2F of the store. Hence. A complaint for damages was filed alleging lack of diligence in the supervision of its employees. GLENN did not report the incident to the Puerto Police Station because he was not aware of what exactly he had hit. GLENN surrendered that same day to Governor Emano. it is unusual or unexpected. operations manager. (4) his physical condition. but without malice. 7. Conrado and Criselda are parents of Zhieneth Aguilar. & Roco 3B . GLENN‘s offense is in failing to apply the brakes. reversed. The CA. Sps. the incident could have been avoided if it was repaired. Buan. Tiope. followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision. 321 SCRA 375 (1999) Jarco Marketing owns Syvel‘s Department Store in Makati. (2) his degree of intelligence. with no human agency. In his confusion and fear. She looked behind to see her daughter on the floor. he immediately proceeded home. Court of Appeals. the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results. or the doing of something which a prudent or reasonable man would not do. is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. the place of the incident was foggy and dark. GLENN. worse. foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so. this did not mean that he was exercising due care under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time. and Panelo are its branch manger. RTC convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple murder.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. the side mirror and round mirror. Glenn should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. The existence of a motive on the part of the accused becomes decisive in determining the probability or credibility of his version that the incident was purely accidental. Jarco denied liability claiming that Criselda was negligent in allowing her daughter to roam freely in a store filled with glassware and appliances and eventually climbing on the counter that had never collapsed in 15 years. time and place. he heard that an accident had occurred. Accident is an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches. therefore. Had he done so. It was only when he reached his house that he noticed that the grill of the truck was broken. with a top wider than its base — downward pressure could cause it to fall. in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed. at the age of 6. She was rushed the Makati Med where she was operated on. Even if he was driving within the speed limits. The incident was an accident and not an intentional felony. The RTC dismissed the complaint. She lost her speech. It is fortuitous. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily. multiple frustrated murder. and multiple attempted murder. however. On May 1983. By his own testimony. Respondent Sps. communicating through a magic slate. Jess Lopez been busted upon the first bumping thuds. GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. applying his brakes. Cusi. or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the moment he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. splintered. Held: It is due to negligence. She was signing her credit card slip when she felt a suddent gust of wind and a loud thud. Issues: Whether the death of Zieneth was accidental or attributable to negligence. finding that the counter was dangerous. It is the failure to 18 Agas. and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. There is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill. The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man. Two employees brought up the concern. She died 14 days later. The tragic event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on GLENN‘s part. respectively. 11 seriously injured. the present appeal. Reposo. and he realized that it was the PNP group that he had hit. Anzures. and supervisor. Jarco Marketing Corporation v.

Held: YES. Therefore. Thus. she asked the petitioner to bring the diamond earrings to be reset. the Sarmiento was forced to buy a replacement in the amount of P30. On appeal. they should be held liable for damages arising from its breakage. Sarmiento was charged P400 for the job order which was readily accepted. Virginia Lao. 401 SCRA 122 (2003) Facts: Tomasa Sarmiento states that. Cabridos seek to avoid liability by passing the buck to Santos who claimed to be an independent worker. Having acted the way she did. Issue: Whether or not Cabridos are liable for damages. negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof. Sarmiento filed a complaint for damages to which the MTCC of Tagbilaran City granted. Ongchuan. Tita Payag delivered to the jewelry shop one of Lao‘s diamond earrings. Cusi. Anzures. When they refused. Essentially. are liable for damages. The CA affirmed. precaution. This was never done – they only nailed it after the accident. Having initially examined one of them. They failed to discharge the diligence of a good father of a family. Santos acted negligently in dismounting the diamond from its original setting. requested her to find somebody to reset a pair of diamond earrings into two gold rings. which accepted the job order. Corollarily. such as diamonds. Santos removed the diamond by twisting the setting with a pair of pliers. Luis and Rose Cabrido. Sarmiento required the respondents to replace the diamond with the same size and quality. those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud. However. Reposo. Cabrido. Accident occurs when the person is exercising ordinary care. was an integral part of petitioner‘s job order. Unsuccessful. Marilou cannot now deny the shop‘s obligation to reset the pair of earrings. whereby such other person suffers injury. Hence. Santos employed a pair of pliers in clipping the original setting. The test in determining negligence is found in Picart — Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? The Court found Jarco negligent. Thus. Cabrido. the RTC reversed. petitioner claims that the dismounting of the diamond from its original setting was part of the obligation assumed by the private respondents under the contract of service. Zenon Santos. Dra.000. The fault or negligence of the obligo r consists in the ‗omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons. an obligation to pay actual damages arose in favor of the Sarmiento against the Cabridos who admittedly owned and managed Dingding‘s Jewelry Shop. breaking the gem in the process. she then delegated the task to their goldsmith. manager of Dingding‘s Jewelry Shop. thus resulting in breakage of the diamond. Sarmiento sent a certain Tita Payag with the pair of earrings to Dingding‘s Jewelry Shop. They stated that the counter was shaky and not nailed. Zenon Santos. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. She should have instructed Payag to have them dismounted first if Marilou had actually intended to spare the jewelry shop of the task but she did not. 8. After the new settings were completed. denied having entered into any transaction with Tita Payag whom she met only after the latter came to the jewelry shop to seek compensation from Santos for the broken piece of jewelry. Marilou expressed no reservation regarding the dismounting of the diamonds which. Jess Lopez observe.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. the present petition. 19 Agas. that degree of care. They are intrinsically contradictory. after all. of the time and of the place. one cannot exist with the other. a friend. It appears to be the practice of the trade to use a miniature wire saw in dismounting precious gems. The mangers were personally informed. to do it. a perfected contract to reset the pair of diamond earrings arose. & Roco 3B . Instead. Buan. it could collapse at any time. Respondent Marilou Sun went on to dismount the diamond from its original setting. that Marilou simply happened to drop by at Dingding‘s Jewelry Shop when Payag arrived to place her job order. from their original settings. Zhieneth herself stated at the ER that ―I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Unsuccessful. It held the Cabridos jointly and severally liable for damages. Sarmiento provided 12 grams of gold to be used in crafting the pair of ring settings. Navarrete. The jewelry shop failed to perform its obligation with the ordinary diligence required by the circumstances. yet did not do anything to ensure the safety of employees and patrons. Marilou went on to dismount the diamond from its original setting. However. giving credence to the testimonies of its former employees. the preponderance of evidence supports the view that Marilou and Zenon Santos were employed at Dingding‘s Jewelry Shop in order to perform activities which were usually necessary or desirable in its business. They also claim. she asked their goldsmith. Sarmiento v. In the case at bar. owned and managed by Sps. for the protection of the interest of another person.

L.C. there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller. Signatories.C. In culpa contractual. (It was later found out that an impostor deposited with Teller No.C. Diaz. Jess Lopez Moral damages may be awarded in a breach of contract only when there is proof that defendant acted in bad faith. G. Ongchuan. the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. Solidbank acted with care and observed the rules o savings account when it withdrew 300K in favor of the holder of the passbook prior to its receipt of a notice of loss thereof.‖ PBC subsequently dishonored the check because of insufficient funds and because the signature in the check differed from PBC‘s specimen signature. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to whom she gave the passbook. Buan.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. a professional partnership engaged in practice of accounting. Reposo.‖ For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence. Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 14 August 1991. Calapre. 6 handed to Macaraya a deposit slip dated 14 August 1991 (the same day the passbook was lost) for the deposit of a check for P90.000 bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of L. to deposit money with Solidbank. No.C. Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of last clear chance.000. When Macaraya asked for the passbook. Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre. When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank‘s tellers during withdrawals. Held: YES. which later bounced. 6 informed hi m that ―somebody got the passbook. Court of Appeals.C. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by CC on simple loan. Diaz could open a new account. Teller did not even verify the identity of the impostor who made the withdrawal. It was later found out that a certain Noel Tamayo received the P300. or culpa contractual. Diaz charged its messenger. Upon appeal.) Failing to get back the passbook. Teller No. The following day. he left the passbook with Solidbank. This means that the bank‘s obligation to observe ―high standards of integrity and performance‖ is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor and that this requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. This was eventually dismissed. for the unauthorized withdrawal of the 300K. Ilagan and one Verdazola with Estafa. he should have known that using a pair of pliers instead of a miniature wire saw in dismounting a precious stone like a diamond would have entailed an unnecessary risk of breakage.000 drawn on Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC). Thus. however.‖ Calapre went back to L. the CA found Solidbank liable for its negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Cabridos are liable moral damages due to the gross negligence of their employee. Navarrete. or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation. L. Diaz. Santos was a goldsmith for more than 40 years. Given his long experience in the trade. 6 the 2 deposit slips and the passbook.C. and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same. Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank. CA ruled that while L. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Diaz cashier.C. It turns out that this PBC check of L. Solidbank refused so L. Diaz was a check that it had ―long closed. or was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith. opened a savings account with Solidbank. denied signing the withdrawal slip. L.000 from its savings account.R.C. Diaz CEO called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook until L. 9. should have called up the depositor because the money to be withdrawn was a significant amount.C. Anzures.C. Article 1172 of the CC provides that ―responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. Diaz with Allied Bank. The impostor apparently deposited a large amount of money to deflect suspicion from the subsequent withdrawal of a much bigger amount of money. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. He went on with it anyway. 20 Agas.C. Diaz.C.C. Macaraya instructed their messenger. & Roco 3B . Teller No. Issue: Whether or not the bank was negligent. L. 138569. The RTC held LC Diaz negligent and caused the unauthorized withdrawal. who was not presented by Solidbank during trial.C. the bank is liable to its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor.000 PBC check. In culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. CA ruled against bank and held it guilty of simple negligence which was the proximate cause for the injury. Actual damages are also awarded. L. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence or culpa contractual. Hence. September 11. Macaraya reported the matter to the Personnel Manager of L. The withdrawal slip for the P300. On August 1991. 6 the P90. Teller No. Cusi. 2003 L. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook. Solidbank and Teller No. Diaz also learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before. of P300. once plaintiff proves a breach of contract. CA stated that the teller.

Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre. Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.R. As adjuvant treatment to 21 Agas. Jess Lopez In the present case. unlike in culpa aquiliana. After completion of the transaction. Angelica‘s right leg had to be amputated by Dr. which if confirmed would warrant the filing of the charges. care and skill in the treatment of their patients. Reposo.C. Results revealed that she suffered from osteosarcoma — a high-grade and aggressive cancer of the bone usually affecting teens. The Doctrine of last clear chance is NOT applicable in this case. Another element that must be established is causation which can be answered in two inquiries: whether the doctor‘s actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and whether these were the proximate cause of the patient‘s injury . Pascasio. the teller with whom Calapre left the passbook and who was supposed to return the passbook to him. Issue: Whether the the anaesthesiologist is liable.000 would not have happened. June 7. Because of that. G. The burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its employees. (surgeon) and Dr. Proximate cause is that cause which. the NBI recommended that the doctors be charged accordingly. Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility. Essentially it required two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized standards of medical community in the particular case and a showing that the physician negligently departed from this standard in his treatment. & Roco 3B . The breach of these duties constitute actionable malpractice. When they accepted the case.C. Additionally. Antionio and Dr. September 5. They have a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. there is thus a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. breach. 1997 Florencio Rueda. Six hours after the surgery. Garcia-Rueda v. produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Solidbank must pay the other 60% 10. where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is NOT a complete defense in culpa contractual. Anzures. in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia. It is apparent that L. Sps Soliman‘s 11 year old daughter. is chargeable with the loss. 165279. the doctors in effect represented that they possessed the required training and skill required and that they will employ such training. In the instant case. Antonio Jr. Solidbank‘s failure to return the passbook to Calapre made possible the withdrawal of the P300. the necessity of expert testimony and the availability of res ipsa loquitur have been held to be applicable. Navarrete. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract. Cusi. Florencio died of complications due to unknown causes according to the officials of the UST Hospital. When the victim employed Dr. 6. Luke‘s. Consequently. It was also found out that the surgeons did not conduct the proper interview of the patient and that the proper drugs were not applied to cope with the symptoms that arose 11. As a result. Doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss. Reyes. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor (NBI report on authenticity of signatures not presented in evidence). injury and proximate causation. Balatbat Reyes (anaestheosiologist). Petitioner requested the NBI to conduct an autopsy which it ruled that it was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. The liability of Solidbank should be reduced. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so. husband of herein petitioner Garcia-Rueda underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. in natural and continuous sequence.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Ongchuan. Soliman. He was attended by Dr. Diaz must shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by the CA. 118141. However. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor. Held: There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty. the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for negligence. Buan. in the event that any injury results to the patient from want of due care or skill during the operation. Tamayo to remove the tumor. there is indeed a causal connection between the death of the victim and the negligent act of the doctor. Li v. It was the negligent act of Solidbank‘s Teller No. a physician-patient relationship was created. G.R. this is a case of culpa contractual. No. would exonerate the defendant from liability. the loss of P300.000 by the impostor who took possession of the passbook. 6 that gave the impostor presumptive ownership of the passbook. Solidbank did not present to the trial court Teller No. L. underwent a biopsy of a mass in her knee at St. No. 2011 Facts: Angelica.

(2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks. health. In Feb. the CA found petitioner liable for her failure to inform the respondents on all possible side effects of chemotherapy before securing their consent to the said treatment. the Court holds that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica‘s parents. Solimans brought the cadaver to PNP crime lab for post-mortem examination because St. In turn. had revelation been made. Buan. Issue: Whether Dr. Unfortunately. Luke‘s on 18 Aug. When the case was appealed. The Doctrine of Informed Consent mandates that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment. Solimans claim that Li assured them of 95% chance of healing and told them that the side effects were merely slight vomiting. and weakness. consent to treatment would not have been given. They were charged with negligence and disregard of the safety. the therapy alternatives open to him. Li. the disclosure rule only requires of him a reasonable explanation. To successfully pursue such a claim. Held: NO. Angelica died. on 1 Sept. Balmaceda who was employed at DOH. bleeding. Li appealed. Luke‘s finally issued the death certificate. Vergara admitted she was not an pathologist but her statements supporting the Solimans were based on the opinion of an oncologist whom she interviewed. The essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent are as follows: (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks. complaint for damages was filed by Solimans against Li and oth er doctors involved in Angelica‘s treatment. exercising ordinary care for his own welfare. there must be causal relationship between physician‘s failure to inform and the injury to patient and such connection arises only if it is established that. Luke‘s refused to release a death certificate without full payment of their hospital bill. Solimans presented MedicoLegal Dr. Examining the evidence on record. Li asserted that she fully explained how the chemo will affect not only the cancer cells but also the patient‘s normal body parts including the lowering of white blood cells and platelets. an oncologist. Li explained to them that it was the result of the treatment. hair loss. Anzures. Hence. CA affirmed the finding that there was no negligence in the administration of the chemo drugs. and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Navarrete. A claim under medical negligence/malpractice is that which a victim has available to him to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional who has caused bodily harm. Angelica was admitted to St. a patient must prove that a health care provider. testimonial evidence was relied upon. For liability of the physician for failure to inform patient. Her blood platelet count also decreased severely and thus she had to undergo several transfusions. so that a patient. Since the medical records were not produced in court. 1993 for the chemo. commits an assault for which he is liable in damages. Ongchuan. & Roco 3B . Reposo. may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits. 1994. Weeks after recuperating from the amputation. Side effects showed discoloration of different parts of her body. (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose. Tamayo referred Angelica to Dr. The physician is not expected to give the patient a short medical education. and shedding of skin throughout the process. Cusi.‖ On the other hand. She also suffered LBM. Dr. However. in most cases a physician. 1993 or 11 days after the first chemo drugs were administered. The first cycle of chemo drugs were administered to her intravenously. Vergara and Dr. When Li informed the Solimans beforehand 22 Agas. and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon finding that Li was not negligent since she observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of chemo drugs. Rubi Li can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side effects to the parents of the child patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy. or alternative treatment. when St. chemo was suggested. In PNP‘s Medico-Legal report. Denying negligence. and the risks that may ensue from particular treatment or no treatment. or none at all. and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient‘s consent. it said the cause of death was ―Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation. Soliman regularly consulted with Li regarding the side effects. Jess Lopez eliminate the remaining cancer cells thereby minimizing the chance of the cancer spreading to other body parts. the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to. Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body. the immediate cause of her death was the osteosarcoma. and welfare of Angelica by their careless administration of the chemo drugs which caused all the complications leading to her death. the goals expectably to be achieved. either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done. or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Sps. and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment. Dr. which means generally informing the patient in nontechnical terms as to what is at stake. despite the absence of finding that petitioner was negligent in administering the said treatment.

by the nature of the disease itself. However. At the hearing of the case. possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers. the plaintiff must prove both the duty and the breach of that duty through expert testimony. The rule followed on matters of substitution of attorneys as laid down by this Court is that no substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless there be filed: (1) a written application for such substitution. Aldaba (the respondent in this case). Adarne. there must be filed with the application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the attorney to be substituted. Cusi. In the absence of expert testimony in this regard. & Roco 3B . informed consent laws in other countries generally require only a reasonable explanation of potential harms. Balmaceda who is not an oncologist but a Medical Specialist of the DOH‘s Operational and Management Services charged with receiving complaints against hospitals. Ongchuan. It appears that there have been 3 changes made of the attorneys. so that he did nothing more about it. (3) the written consent of the attorney substituted. and requested that he enter a special appearance in the case as his attorney is nowhere to be found. Adarne had changed his counsel 3 times through the course of the case. Aldaba for gross negligence and misconduct. Li can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the variables in the recommended treatment for their daughter afflicted with a life-threatening illness. Navarrete. the court declared the Adarne in default for his failure to appeal at the hearing set for that day. the case against the respondent attorney must be established by convincing proof. there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure. for failure to give his entire devotion to the interest of his client. Aldaba. It was neither gross negligence nor omission to have entertained such belief. An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence. on June 17. the complainant had also requested the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance of Leyte that Adarne be furnished with summons and subpoena accorded to him. so specific disclosures such as statistical data. Prone to err like any other human being. having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. It is well settled that in disbarment proceedings. he is not answerable for every error or mistake. Besides. he filed the present complaint against Atty. In the said case. as it was unlikely for doctors who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of chemo‘s success rate. noting that his attorney had not yet arrived. A. the Court feels hesitant in defining the scope of mandatory disclosure in cases of malpractice based on lack of informed consent. Anzures. To add to the confusion. The blame lies with the complainant for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he had given to them to appear in his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the respondent. Buan. and (4) in case such written consent cannot be secured. 12. decrease in blood platelets. Damian V. Besides. chanced upon Atty. the Aldaba honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant only for a special purpose and that the complainant had agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle his case after the hearing of October 23. Reposo.C. 1965. thus implying that he was handling his case personally. The judgment by default rendered against the Adarne cannot be attributed to the Atty. However. and for not taking steps to protect the interests of his client in the face of an adverse decision. Aldaba. and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge. each patient‘s reaction to the chemical agents even with pretreatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician. does not qualify as expert testimony to establish the standard of care in obtaining consent for chemotherapy treatment. Here. No. there is no sufficient proof to warrant the disbarment of the respondent attorney. a PNP Medico-Legal Officer. Atty Aldaba And again at a later hearing. in the manner prescribed by the rules. Vergara. who was his third cousin. Neither is there culpable malpractice to justify his suspension. He also filed a motion by himself. The same goes for the testimony of Dr. but only a reasonable degree of care and skill. may not be legally necessary. June 27. In the instant case. In a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent. 801. respondent Aldaba was again prevailed upon by complainant Adarne to appear in his behalf. even in foreign jurisdictions. It is difficult to give credence to respondents‘ claim that petitioner told them of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter. 23 Agas. warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. no formalities whatever were observed in those changes such that the respondent entered a "special appearance" for the complainant in order that he could ask for the dismissal of the case for the failure of the adverse party to prosecute. (2) the written consent of the client. Because of this. 1964. Jess Lopez of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells. the testimony of Dr. Issue: Whether or not Atty. much less set a standard of disclosure that. 1978 Facts: A forcible entry case was filed against Cesario Adarne (herein complainant). In other words. The respondent entered a "special appeara\nce" for the complainant and thereafter argued that the interest of justice would best be served if the Adearne were allowed to file an action for quieting of. Aldaba is guilty of gross negligence? Held: NO. has been noted to be an evolving one. Adarne v.

Inc. Before reaching its destination. Buan. No. 2002 Virgines Calvo is the owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services. Calvo v. TCTSI entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area in Manila to SMC‘s warehouse. Upon entering. defendant denied any liability and imputed it on the negligence of the pickup driver as well as Isaac‘s contributory negligence. though foreseen. There is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of each case. Cusi. Calvo denies liability for the damage to the cargo. having due regard for all the circumstances. the driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision and. immediately before the collision was running at moderate speed as it just stopped at a school zone. 148496. Jess Lopez 13. to whom the goods were unloaded and who allegedly kept them in open air for nine days from July 14 to July 23. and 1756 thereof. He was the only person in the bus to obtain any injury. as noted in the Marine Survey Report. The law concerning the liability of a common carrier has now suffered a substantial modification in view of the innovations introduced by the new Civil Code. A restatement of the principles governing common carrier liability are as follows: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. No. 24 Agas. cracked. He also claimed that defendant breach the contract of carriage due to its non-compliance with its obligation to transport him safely to his destination. a customs broker. Anzures. (3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of. was inevitable). it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence. As a result. In case of death or injury to passengers. and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel.. his left arm was completely severed. 1998 notwithstanding the fact that some of the containers were deformed. A. UNLESS they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. Where a common carrier is faced with a sudden emergency. Isaac v. Inc. 31. (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. boarded Bus No. Also. after 24 hours. or otherwise damaged. UCPB. RTC held that evidence such as the Warehouse Entry Slip. Ongchuan. Inc.. Upon seeing this. operated by respondents as a passenger paying the fare from Albay to Camarines Sur. Inc. the pickup still hit the rear left side of the bus. August 23. it is presumed to be at fault or negligence. Isaac underwent the necessary treatment which amounted to P623. the bus driver swerved the bus to the right as far as it could without endangering the life of his passengers. Manila Port Services. he seated himself on the left side of the bus and rested his arm on the window with his elbow protruding outside the window. . The goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors. in avoiding the collision which resulted in the injury caused to Isaac? Held: YES. It also alleged that the accident was due to a fortuitous event (could not be foreseen or. is relieved from liability under our law. Evidence shows that the bus. Unfortunately. thus. The court found no negligence on the part of defendant and that it did everything it could to avoid the accident. Navarrete. TCTSI. UCPB General Insurance Co.. It arrived Manila via ―M/V Hayakawa Maru‖ and. 14.40 and was shouldered by defendant. 1957 Facts: Cesar Isaac. the Damage Report coupled with the Marine Cargo Survey Report confirms the fact of the damaged condition of the subject cargoes. 1733. 1755. These provisions basically state that common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence due to the nature of their business and public policy. withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC‘s warehouse in Ermita. the bus collided with a pickup coming from the opposite direction.R. In turn. In this case. He is not held to the same degree of care that he would otherwise be required in the absence of such emergency but must only exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person would under like circumstances. CA affirms. pursuant to the contract with SMC. & Roco 3B . G. Ammen Transportation Co. March 19. (TCTSI). passengers. having due regard for all circumstances.L. the court attributed it against the broker‘s improper handling. the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be taken into account. were unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator. Issue: Whether TCTSI is liable. Issue: is: Has the common carrier observed extraordinary diligence or the utmost diligence of every cautious person. G. The cargo was insured by UCPB General Insurance Co.R. Said innovations are found in Arts.. In its defense. Inc. Thereafer. L-9671. Reposo. SMC collected payment from its insurer (UCBP). as subrogee of SMC. a common carrier. Isaac brought an action for damages against defendant alleging that the collision resulting to his injury was mainly due to the gross incompetence and recklessness of the bus‘ driver. or injury to. who found that 15 reels of the semichemical fluting paper were ―wet/stained/torn‖ and 3 reels of kraft liner board were likewise torn amounting to 93K. the pickup was at full speed and running outside the proper lane. brought suit against Calvo. On the other hand. TCTSI claims that the damage took place while the goods were in the custody of either the carrying vessel ―M/V Hayakawa Maru‖ or the arrastre operator.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty.

he is not relieved of liability for damage resulting therefrom. MERALCO justified its demand on the ground that the electric meter of the petitioners was defective. episodic or unscheduled basis. Pursuant to Art. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both. and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. (slight dents. water. are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them. Manila. & Roco 3B . Art. in this case. 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both. she does not indiscriminately hold her services out to the public but only offers the same to select parties with whom she may contract in the conduct of her business. and the preliminary injunction granted. including such methods as their nature requires. but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition. 1735 holds. 126074. The injunction was later made permanent. the defect/s in the container. There is greater reason for holding TCTSI to be a common carrier because the transportation of goods is an integral part of her business . 15. It must prove that it used ―all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for [transport] and that [it] exercise[d] due care in the handling [thereof]. Petitioners refused to pay. No proof was proffered to rebut this legal presumption. it is clear that the shipment was discharged from the vessel to the arrastre in good order and condition as evidenced by clean Equipment Interchange Reports (EIRs). by land. the CA reversed this. Reposo. Buan. they received a demand letter for P415. TCTSI accepted the cargo without exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans. without any report of damage or loss. and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Jess Lopez Held: YES.1735. On appeal. and filed for a preliminary injunction to prevent disconnection with the RTC of QC. G. 10 months later. their driver. the general community or population. that is. Ricardo Nazarro.66 worth of unregistered consumption.e.‖ i. The Service Contract provides that. or air for compensation. In Civil Case 13879 (July 1992) another demand letter was received for P89. the Customer shall be billed for such period on an estimated consumption based upon his use of energy in a similar period of like use.R.. carriage and delivery. immediately delivered the cargo to SMC‘s warehouse in Ermita. This was granted. according to all the circumstances of each case. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional.‖ TCTSI claims that after withdrawing the container vans from the arrastre operator. and ordered petitioners to pay the amounts. February 24. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the ―general public. TCTSI contends that it is not a common carrier but a private carrier because.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. TCTSI is presumed negligent. Issues: Whether or not Ridjo is liable to pay the unregistered electrical service in the absence of evidence of tampering Held: NO. as a customs broker and warehouseman.58 on the same grounds. the presumption of negligence as provided under Art. offering their services to the public. Ongchuan. v. To prove the exercise of extraordinary diligence. ―Common carriers are persons.317. For failure of TCTSI to prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods or that they are exempt from liability. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and ―to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment.. corporations. Ridjo filed another case to enjoin MERALCO from suspending its services. Thus.‖ TCTSI did not present any evidence on what precaution was performed to prevent the said incident. 1733 of the Civil Code provides: Common carriers. Cusi. Court of Appeals. unless there is proof to the contrary. Under said article. However. or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale. from the Survey Report. Art. The rule is that if the improper packing or. and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage. which is a mere 30 drive from the Port Area where the cargo came from. Navarrete. the two cases were thereafter consolidated. the damage to the cargo could not have taken place while these were in her custody. No. 1998 Facts:Two cases are involved here. Anzures. petitioner must do more than merely show the possibility that some other party could be responsible for the damage. it shall be presumed that the loss (or damage) was due to his fault. Ridjo Tape & Chemical Corp.701. 1990) Ridjo applied for and were granted electric service by MERALCO. paint scratches on roof panels) The cargoes were withdrawn by the TCTSI from the arrastre still in good order and condition as the same were received by the former without exception. ―In the event of stoppage or the failure by any meter to register the full amount of energy consumed. is/are known to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation.‖ 25 Agas. Extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to . In Civil Case Q-92-13845 (Nov. Whenever the thing is lost (or damaged) in the possession of the debtor (or obligor).

having violated a traffic regulation. impelled by youthful curiosity. The stipulation was intended to cover these situations. Ongchuan. Fulgencio Dacara. respectively. Corollarily. Dacara. son of Fulgencio P. QC insists that they placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a roadside construction. G. JR rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St. They picked up all they could find and hung them on a stick and carried them home.R. Thus. Dacara. none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. 16 Phil. Navarrete. the boys. B. While walking across the premises. It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Failure constitutes negligence. Finding that said employee was not available. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on city streets with light traffic. it is only to pa y the estimated consumption on a three-month average prior to the dispute. who started to run away as they were about to put a match on it received a cut in the neck. Ridjo‘s liability is thus limited by reason of MERALCO‘s negligence. as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. & Roco 3B . 8 (1910) Facts: The power plant of Manila Electric Railroad (MER) is situated at the eastern end of a small island in Pasig River known as Isla del Provisor. and records show that MERALCO examined the meters regularly. They met 9 year old girl named Jessie Adrian along the way. Cusi. David was struck in the face with several metal particles one of which injured his right eye which had to be removed. David Taylor. amounts to inexcusable negligence . Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. An explosion followed causing injuries to all 3 of them. . MERALCO‘s failure to discover the defect. etc). These matters were. as there is no intent on its part to donate electricity. Anzures. . However. which we quote: ―nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. June 15. By virtue of the length of time that the conspicuous defect existed. gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade. 15 year old son of an MER engineer. As a result. Sr. Jess Lopez Ridjo disclaim liability by stating that stoppage or failures refer only to tampering on the part of the customer. As David held the cap. Held: YES.. If indeed signs were placed thereat. MERALCO is deemed to have constructive notice of the same. MERALCO has the duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of the apparatus to ensure that they do not malfunction. and owner of ‘87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan. Jr. having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. however. Buan. none was found at the scene of the accident. and that his own negligence was therefore the sole cause of the incident. Dacara sued the city for damages on the ground of negligence. with 12 year old Manuel Claparols crossed said footbridge to visit an employee of MER. petitioners assert that Dacara. Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. 2. considering this. Dacarra Jr. They made a series of experiments with said caps (thrust the ends of the wires into electric sockets. Manuel‘s hand was burned. it is unbelievable that they were not aware that stoppages or failures can result from inherent defects or flaws. 26 Agas. and due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. 150304. Reposo. That the negligence of Dacara was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower court‘s finding.‖ Petitioners belatedly point out that Dacara. which was then being repaired by the QC government. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. Quezon City Government v. was driving at the speed of 60 KPH when he met the accident. Negligence as proximate causes 1.. tried to break it with a stone. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs. The 2 unpaid periods covered 3 month (Nov-Feb) and 9 month (July-April)duration. While driving the said vehicle. 2005 Facts: At about 1:00 A. they found some 20-30 brass fulminating caps (detonators for dynamite). Said power plant may be accessed by boat or by crossing a footbridge. David‘s father sued MER for damages resulting from negligence.. who was more mature than the average boy of his age. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time the violation in their MR of the CA Decision. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement was the proximate cause of the dispute. Taylor v. not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. No. how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted again. when not designated through streets. Quezon City. They then opened one of them with a knife and saw yellowish substance inside. Jessie. They argue that the driver was over-speeding. On one Sunday afternoon. spent time wandering about MER‘s premises. should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code. and not mechanical failure or defects. In its defense. Issue: Whether or not the QC government was negligent.M.

therefore. It is clear that the accident could not have happened had not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found. was guilty. Buan. and take precautions accordingly. followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer. In the case at bar. and take precautions accordingly. independent of it. Where. he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. as one of its determining factors. (2) negligence by act or omission of which defendant or some person for whose acts it must respond. he had been to sea as a cabin boy. and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents. When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act. and under all the circumstances. he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury. if such injury were attributable to the negligence of MER. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.Torts & Damages 2013 Issue: Whether MER can be held liable? Atty. Children.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman 30 days after the injury was incurred. The test is simple. more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence. plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15. and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises. and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the cap. therefore. must establish by competent evidence the ff: (1) damage incurred. and. without other fault on his part. and those acts of the victim not entering into it. & Roco 3B . Navarrete. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that. which therefore was not attributable to the negligence of the defendant. and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary. less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. for his own pleasure and convenience. must calculate upon this. but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not. Jess Lopez Held: NO. despite his denials on the witness stand. entered upon MER‘s premises. but contributing to his own proper hurt. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. admit of no other explanation. or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play. as described by the little girl who was present. and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the MER. he cannot recover. is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them. he contributes only to his own injury. and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. in view of the fact that the little girl. Cusi. show clearly that he knew what he was about . But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon MER‘s property without the latter‘s express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. he cannot recover damages for the injury. Ongchuan. or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place. and that the MER. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury. became frightened and ran away. Anzures. and from the place where they were found would seem to have been discarded as defective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap. Plaintiff. whereon things attractive to children are exposed. between the event itself. Reposo. 9 years of age. we think that the discovery of 20-30 of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on MER‘s premises fairly justifies the inference that MER was either the owner of the caps in question or had these caps under its possession and control. must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been lying there for a considerable time. and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this. The owners of premises. in an action for damages due to negligence. Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen. No measures seem to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended even if they were aware that children in their play crossed the footbridge to the island. 27 Agas. on the other hand. we are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity. in conjunction with the occurrence. we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the MER in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion. without which there could have been no accident. and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with. they should expect that liberty to be taken. who was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap. wherever they go. was able to earn P2.

probably. 181 (1957) Facts: A bus of the Medina Transportation operated by Mariano Medina left the town of Amadeo Cavite on its way to Pasay City and driven by Saylon. she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors. Had he changed the tires. The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. They claim that the city‘s negligence in maintaining the septic tank was the proximate cause of their heirs‘ death. 2179 that the defendant‘s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. his widow filed the present suit to recover damages. by the driver and the conductor themselves. the issue is to what degree is his liability since the trial court found that the proximate cause of Bataclan‘s death is not the overturning of the bus but the fire that burned it. and the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire. However. gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus. some men came to help. or at least. It would also be natural that the said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. He must prove under Art. the CA reversed itself and dismissed the complaint. Apparently gas leaked out and permeated the ground. 102 Phil. specially over a large area. Calls and shouts were made to the houses in the neighborhood. telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old. this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled. it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Before Bascon could start re-emptying the septic tank. As a result. & Roco 3B . as we have already stated. Upon investigation. Davao has not been cleaned for 19 years. Anzures. the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. Held: NO. and in the course of his visit. it was Feliciano Bascon who won. the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. it was found that the victims entered said septic tank without clearance from the City government nor with the knowledge and consent of the Market Master. but did not do so. one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch in the side of the road and turned turtle. carrying a lighted torch. To add further. Cusi. Trial court dismissed. the court held that the overturning of the bus as the proximate cause of the death. The trial court held defendant carrier liable for breach of contract of transportation for hire. 4. the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was. However. Bataclan died as a result. and coming as they did from a rural area it is natural that they would only be carrying a torch. Reposo. The driver and the conductor are also guilty of negligence. was hospitalized. An autopsy was performed and it was found that the cause of death was asphyxia due to diminution of oxygen in the body caused by intake of toxic gas. can be smelt and directed even from a distance. Court of Appeals. They. In other words. At 2:00AM while it was running in Imus Cavite. and while in the hospital. Apparently the bus was speeding at the time of the tire blowout. because of the injuries suffered by her. despite his speeding. This is for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. the Market Master initiated a request for the re-emptying of said septic tank in the Davao City Treasurer‘s Office. Bataclan v. they were merely on the road walking back and forth. CA reversed and awarded damages. They also held that there was negligence on the part of the defendant through his agent driver Saylon. If this be true. Some passengers were able to leave the bus but the driver and 3 passengers (Bataclan included) were unable to get out. According to the witnesses. with new ones. Buan. almost immediately after approaching the bus. the blow out would not have occurred. made not only by the passengers. one of the passengers who. Among the passengers were Bataclan et al. Jess Lopez 3. and that because it was dark the rescuers had to carry a light with them. Ongchuan. Navarrete. Issue: Whether Davao city‘s negligence in maintaining the septic tank was the proxima te cause of the injury suffered. Held: PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS THE OVERTURNING OF THE BUS. the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus . In the present case under the circumstances given. So. After some time. she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina. An invitation to bid was issued to 5 people. a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. a fierce fire started. 28 Agas. especially those in front. The heirs of the deceased brought an action against Davao City for damage on the ground of negligence. Issue: While there is no question that Medina is liable. Fernando v. Medina. and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. another bidder Aurelio Bertulano and 4 others were found dead inside the said septic tank was now almost empty. To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another. but most probably. Upon MR. 208 SCRA 714 (1992) Facts: The septic tank to the toilet in the Agdao Public Market. as he had been instructed to do.

an accident of this sort would only happen if someone removes one of the lids. On Nov. Hence. produces the injury. Jess Lopez Proximate cause has been defined as that cause. The evidence merely confirms that the wound." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. such negligence was not a continuing one. Buan. Cusi. Issue: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death. produces the injury. Reposo. & Roco 3B . Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant. Under these circumstances. 5. The Urbano reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal A quarrel ensued and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo causing an incised wound and again on the leg.. The motion was denied. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. Thus. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and the CA. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events . When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury. Hence. Proximate cause is that cause. the city immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ongchuan. Urbano v. however. An ordinarily prudent person should have been aware of the attendant risks particularly since it was one of the bidders. and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after 2 weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. which. "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. Also. Javier was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. ACQUITTED. On Oct 27. their failure to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. despite the city‘s failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956. in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill. The case involves the application of Article 4 RPC which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended . Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market." And more comprehensively. he was declared responsible for Javier's death. which. As such. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. 1980. It was also found that warning signs regarding the existence of noxious gases in addition to the ―Men‖ & ―Women‖ signs in the toilets were needed. In this case.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. this petition. he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. He died the following day. there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident. Urbano paid P700 for medical expenses of Javier. the accident occurred because the victims on their own conduct and without authority from the city opened the septic tank. and without which the result would not have occurred. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. However. While it may be true that Davao has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually. people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed (said tank was covered by 3 airtight lids. in natural and continuous sequence. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the 29 Agas. that Dr. where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties. the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. and without which the result would not have occurred. Later. Thereafter. it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder. Anzures. somehow got infected with tetanus." The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his rice field. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury. one used to this kind of work. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Brgy Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on Nov. who fell victim to the toxic gas. Navarrete. 5.. However. Held: YES. 157 SCRA 1 (1988) Facts: On October 1980. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. no report of an gas poisoning). unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.

accompanied by 2 other persons by the names of Fausto and Elias. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric & Ice Plant of J. A short incubation period indicates severe disease. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. therefore. that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. Doubts are present. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. 30 Agas. As such. Skimming through the facts. Ongchuan. Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days . Here. Tacloban Electric was sued for damages on the ground of negligence. 54 Phil. unrelated. A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible." The incubation period of tetanus or the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. while not criminally liable. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. Child died that same night. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. medically speaking. Anzures. however. Urbano‘s hacking was not probably the proximate cause of the death. Reposo. successive. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. It does not necessarily follow that the Urbano is also free of civil liability. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. may still be civilly liable. The medical findings. After 22 days. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. such condition was not the proximate cause. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant. however. an automobile appeared from the opposite direction which so frightened the child that she turned to run. therefore. After the procession was over. We must stress. Cusi. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. an interval referred to as the onset time. Buan. for failure to take necessary precautions. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from another municipality to attend the religious celebration. 327 (1930) Facts: The procession of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. November 15. However. Dr. over 80% of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100%. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. Consequently. 3rd Degree. distinct and foreign to the crime.‖ and contributory causes were ―Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen. Whole Body. 1980. The following day. This incident took place on October 23. only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. V. The infection was. Therefore. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the Urbano. ranges from 2 to 56 days. Reflex spasms usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom. died on the second day from the onset time. the Court found that based on the nature of the tetanus vis-à-vis the facts of the case. lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. natural. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. Bernal v. the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. Jess Lopez cause which first acted. House. If. 6. Leyte. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant. 1980.. She was found with her face downward in the hot water. the wound of Javier inflicted by the Urbano was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. & Roco 3B . Javier. Benitez certified that the cause of death was ―Burns. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. however. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. with the result that she fell into the street gutter. with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. the onset time should have been more than 6 days. and efficient cause of the injury. Ltd. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. The wellsettled doctrine is that a person. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. the woman and her daughter. Navarrete. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. he died.‖ As such. Ltd. . passed along a public street.

Proceso Gayetano. nearly a year after the death of the child Purificacion Bernal. Issue: Whether Araneta is liable for Gayetano‘s death. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta. The driver (Pagnaya) replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. that the cause of death was other than the hot water. and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. While such is true. Owing. had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk. the horse was conducted to the curb and that an appreciable interval of time elapsed — same witnesses say several minutes — before the horse started on his career up the street. Be that as it may. Basilio llano. After going a few yards further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk. and that he had taken up the 2 passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment. which he did. 252 (1921) Facts: In Iloilo City. the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig. Counsel for appellees point out that there is no satisfactory proof to establish the pecuniary loss. The latter was the mother of Purificacion Bernal and the former was the natural father. & Roco 3B . Basilio llano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata to go to a cockpit. Navarrete. to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made. if any. became disturbed and moved forward. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother. in order to fix the bridle. Reposo. recovery should be permitted the mother but not the father. After Pagnaya alighted. Gayetano‘s widow (Gabeto) sued Araneta for damages on the ground of negligence. and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital. Ongchuan. J. however. the Araneta jerked the bridle. Issue: Whether Tacloban Electric is liable for the death of Purificacion. Thus. Under these facts. being free from the control of the bit. and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died. Ltd. Mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street. Cusi. 42 Phil. upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street. 7. 31 Agas. Trial judge ordered the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. which caused the bit to come out of the horse's mouth. Anzures. the mere fact that the Araneta interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse in the manner stated would not make him liable for the death of Gayetano because it is admitted by Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of the carromata and went to the horse's head to fix the bridle. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water . at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The daughter lived with the mother. but the other. House was granted a franchise by Act and only transferred this franchise formally to the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant. Jess Lopez Defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street with the knowledge and consent of the authorities. in cases of this character the law presumes a loss because of the impossibility of exact computation. The stopping of the rig by Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. and laying his hands on the reins. had unfortunately retained his seat. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated. As to the defendants. Held: YES. V. but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. they are J. and Julio says that at that juncture the throatlatch of the bridle was broken. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. V. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb. J. The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets. does not operate as a bar to recovery. House and the Tacloban Electric. There is not enough money in the entire world to compensate a mother for the death of her child. Gabeto v. in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. They both say that while yet in the middle of the street. stopped the horse. The evidence for the plaintiff on this point consists chiefly of the testimony of Julio Pagnaya and of Basilio llano. Buan. the horse. Araneta. in order that the vehicle might pass on. there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunate enough to fall into it. by one or the other — it makes no difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle. the bit came out of the horse's mouth. The plaintiffs are Tomas Bernal and Fortunata Enverso. Agaton Araneta stepped out into the street. V. and presumably was supported by her.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. While he was thus engaged. who had never legally recognized his child. House is solely responsible. Held: NO. and it became necessary for the driver to get out.

The former would be predisposed to be associated with Galang. The first prayed for damages for Jose Koh‘s death.m. Jess Lopez By getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse. in his mind at that time. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. and wit hout which the result would not have occurred. Buan. and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off. Hence. Navarrete. Proximate cause has been defined as ―that cause. this petition. it was Pagnaya who jerked the rein.‖ 32 Agas. since this happened only because two boys darted across the road. and entered the truck‘s lane. No credence was given to the testimony of Soliman. which conditions degraded their credibility. According to the witnesses for Araneta. it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence. 3 people were killed (Jose Koh. In reversing its decision. physical injuries. Araceli Koh McKee). This is unwarranted. started to go away as previously stated. traveling at moderate speed and obeying all traffic rules and regulations. We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal. feeling himself free from control. In any case. ― Considering the sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car. Applying the above test. after alighting. In Picart vs. this was reversed. Galang testified that he stopped when the car was just about 10 meters away. Held: YES. He turned on his headlights. while the 2 civil cases were dismissed. Galang was held guilty. and George. Galang was charged with Reckless Imprudence resulting to multiple homicide. assuming arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent. Smith. McKee v. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person mi ght probably result therefrom. applied brakes. it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. and damage to property .Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. while Galang was in the right.. & Roco 3B . Araceli. said that the truck stopped only after the collision. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. 211 SCRA 517 (1992) Facts: Between 9 and 10 a. Araceli McKee testified that the truck did not slow down even when their headlights were switched on. however. and they say that Pagnaya. decided more than 70 years ago but still a sound rule. and attempted to return to his lane. Loadstar. a greater peril — death or injury to the 2 boys. therefore. the second. He tried to call the police but his phone line was allegedly dead. Galang admitted that he was driving at 48 kph. 2 boys suddenly darted into the car‘s lane. with injuries to 3 others (George Koh McKee. The IAC held that the inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the proximate cause of the mishap. when the horse. all passengers of the Ford Escort. Christopher Koh McKee. In the criminal case. then he is guilty of negligence. in natural and continuous sequence. led the horse over to the curb. (still guilty) whereas the civil cases were reversed. We held: ―The test by which to determin e the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not. and proceeded to fix the bridle. while the latter did not assist the injured persons. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent. nor to Dayrit. produces the injury. that they never asserted the defense of the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. Ongchuan. thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth. Further. and a Ford Escort driven by Jose Koh. 8. The criminal case was affirmed. Reposo. In the civil cases. it was concluded that the same was the proximate cause of the collision. Koh swerved to the left. On reconsideration. owned by Tayag and driven by Galang. A police investigator found that there were no skid marks behind the truck. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was. and Araneta cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. which. Also. the truck‘s passenger. All the said cases were appealed. for Kim. the IAC held that Jose Koh was presumed to be negligent in invading the lane of the truck. On the basis of this presumed negligence. And more comprehensively. that the law presumes negligence on the part of the employers in the selection and supervision of Galang. Loida Bondoc). as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person. Tanhueco. but it was to o late. (employers civilly liable) The criminal case was affirmed by the Supreme Court. respondents alleged that Jose Koh was at fault for being on the wrong lane. Intermediate Appellate Court. Anzures. all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. a head-on collision took place on Pulong Pulo Bridge between an International cargo truck. who was one of the first to be at the scene. Issue: Whether or not the owners of the cargo truck are liable. When the Escort (Koh) was 10 meters from the bridge. The decision in the civil cases was anchored on the finding that it was Galang‘s inattentiveness which caused the accident. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. an impartial eyewitness. Kim Koh McKee. Cusi. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. who supposedly lived across the street. Two civil cases were filed in consequence against the employers of Galang.

Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. Buan. which was the actual cause of the tragedy. Navarrete. Jess Lopez Applying the above definition. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. Applying the foregoing doctrine. He himself said that his truck was running at 48 kph along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. In such cases. the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code. Clearly.5 meters away from his car. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident. Ongchuan. not juris et de jure. Cusi. it is not difficult to rule. in width.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the CFI Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on. there are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful 33 Agas. Furthermore. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 65295. facing the oncoming traffic. in law. Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars. the negligent act of the truck driver. Reposo. was the initial act in the chain of events. Anzures. however. he was violating any traffic regulation. while under the influence of liquor. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3. the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent. when his car headlights suddenly failed. witnesses testified that the truck was moving at around 50-60 kph and only stopped after the collision. was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i. Again. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7. There were neither lights nor reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck.m. No.R. although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh. As a result of the collision. He switched his headlights on ―bright‖ and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2. The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck. have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party.50 meters wide while the car measures 1. without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.661 meters to spare. a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap. & Roco 3B . v. it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event. its regular driver. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the EMERGENCY SIGNALS given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. with the permission of his employer Phoenix.286 meters. as We now rule. 1987 (WTF) Facts: At about 1:30 a.. DIONISIO‘S WAS ONLY CONTRIBUTORY. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. 2.e. Intermediate Appellate Court. Held: YES. The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was. As employers of the truck driver. the proximate cause of the collision.. That presumption. G. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might. is only juris tantum. Phoenix Construction. the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where Dionisio had taken ―a shot or two‖ of liquor. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. therefore. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel. which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances. the private respondents are. in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning.598 meters and the truck. on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding). Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road. Neither did they attempt to prove it. The dump truck. partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. March 10. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and proceeding down General Lacuna Street. Inc. directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. if at all negligent.. The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. a ―nervous breakdown‖ and loss of 2 gold bridge dentures. it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident. Issue: Whether the proximate cause was truck‘s parking position. Before resolving such. owned and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction. 9.

The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. Worse. Jess Lopez night. Dionisio. the truck driver must be held responsible. He also offered a certification issued by one Major Libarnes who was said to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. We hold that Dionisio's negligence was ―only contributory. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk. Reposo. Last Clear Chance Doctrine: The theory here of petitioners is that while the truck driver was negligent. First: No curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car according to the patrol man who took the unconscious Dionisio to Makati Med. nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. on the other hand. was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. Cusi. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. This certification did not. or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances. Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries. Fourth: There is the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious condition. HOWEVER the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked — in other words. the negligence of Carbonel. specify any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. however. although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident. and that Dionisio having failed to take that last clear chance must bear his own injuries alone. and to the nurse who took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along with the contents of pockets together with the patrolman. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. he offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass. Buan. he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane. Navarrete. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut. This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that night.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Anzures. (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision. the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident. and (d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. An automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous. rather than reflective. Third: Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. because of failure to guard against it. claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 KPH and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place.‖ that the ―immediate and proximate cause‖ of t he injury remained the truck driver's ―lack of due care‖ and that consequently Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts. Foreseeable Intervening Causes. In summary: Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck. Dionisio's negligence. The collision between the dump truck and the Dionisio‘s car would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices . The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. & Roco 3B . 34 Agas. the defendant may be negligent. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated. among other reasons. Ongchuan. This certification was to the effect that Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. Instead. Second: Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. The testimony of Cuyno was therefore admissible. as it were.

in technical terms. Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. as it has been in Article 2179 of the CC. is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. As a result of the collision. Of more fundamental importance is the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. We agree with the respondent court in its observation on the petitioner‘s culpability: ―That he had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and [this] should not relieve him of liability. the task of a court. Flores. Jess Lopez The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule — that of contributory negligence. which caused the Austria to lose control and collide with the rear of an improperly parked cargo truck trailer driven by accused Rolando M. only show that he was driving much faster than 30KPH.‖ The negligence of Austria as driver of the Ford Fiera is the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. Navarrete. 2000 Facts: At around 7:00 P. Austria v. One of the vehicle‘s tires suddenly hit a stone lying in the road. Bacani. G. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.M. is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Buan. without any warning device. taken together with his claim on cross-examination that he saw the trailer only when he bumped it. as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate. Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. L-40570. Under these circumstances. 133323. In Phoenix. during which several banana plants near the transmission line of Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises. Court of Appeals. has itself been rejected. No. one end of which was dangling on the electric post and the other on the ground under the fallen banana plants.R. The trial court. G. It is difficult to see what role. & Roco 3B . 35 Agas. However. he should not be held responsible for Flores‘ negligence. we ruled that the driver of the improperly parked vehicle was liable and the driver of the colliding car contributorily liable. while thus cruising. Anzures.R. if any. Austria asserts that the other driver‘s negligence in parking his vehicle caused the collision and that said truck driver (Flores) negligently parked his trailer truck with the rear end protruding onto road. January 30." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff ‘s and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions. Issue: Whether Austria should be civilly liable Held: YES. As a result. Austria admitted that he saw the trailer at a distance of about 6 meters but at the same time stated that the distance of the focus of the vehicle‘s headlight in dim position was 20 meters. Umali v. the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff. the live wire was cut. 11. Ongchuan. While we note similarities of the factual milieu of Phoenix to that of the present case. is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff s or the defendant's — was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. Assuming that he was driving his vehicle at that speed of 30 kph. the Austria did not exercise the necessary precaution required of him and is therefore considered negligent. 5 passengers suffered varying degrees of injuries. This being so. Cusi. 1976 Facts: A storm with a strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent. No. There was no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused to private complainant Armin Manalansan considering that the latter filed a separate civil action against accused Alberto Austria. we are unable to agree with Austria that the truck driver should be held solely liable while the petitioner should be exempted from liability. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning. finding accused Alberto Austria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries. Reposo. Under Article 2179. Austria would have not lost control of the vehicle after it hit the stone before the collision. even if the plaintiff‘s negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. These inconsistent statements. the Austria was driving his Ford Fiera with 10 passengers. March 9.. 10.

On October 1989. Reposo. Buan. then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University. Ongchuan. In this type of suit. No. Instead he left the premises because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line. Issue: Whether Umali. Baldomero. did not take the necessary precautions to prevent anyone from entering the area. confinement. 122039. Sunga. Lucas v. Tuaño. Clearly. 2009  See above Doctrine: Tuano‘s position. is liable for negligence. Baldomero told Bueno that he could not do it but he will look for the lineman to fix it. took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. the patient or his heirs. alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. A series of negligence on the part of the Alcala Electric Plant‘s employ ees were determinative of their responsibility for the damage caused. May 31. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved 36 Agas. a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant and notified him of the broken line. Petitioner‘s liability for injury caused by his employees is defined in Article 2180. Calalas. realizing the danger that the broken line posed. Tuaño‘s negligence in his improper administration of the drug Maxitrol. In this case. As a result. Calalas filed another civil case against Salva and Verana for quasi delict. it was apparent that there were tall banana plants that could have posed a serious threat to the lines constructed by the plant. he would not have died that morning where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched . the patient must similarly use expert testimony. in order to establish the proximate cause [of the injury] by a preponderance of the evidence in a medical malpractice action. Cusi. Court of Appeals. Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat. got electrocuted and died. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan. filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva. as owner and manager of Alcala Electric Plant. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. They did not undertake the necessary precautions to have them removed. the indispensability of expert testimonies. got in contact with the broken line wire. the owner of the Isuzu truck. Stated otherwise. No. However. wandered in the place. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due care.R. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers. Sunga was injured (fracture. He also saw Baldomero. Bueno saw the wire and warned people not to go near the wire in order to avoid injury. the expert‘s role is to present to the court a realistic assessment of the likelihood that the physician‘s alleged negligence caused the patient‘s injury. 13. Jess Lopez The barrio captain. Negros Occidental. 2000 Facts: At 10AM of August 23. care. The father of the child filed a complaint. Second. even if the child was allowed to leave the house unattended due to the parents' negligence. The court cannot also ascribe to Umali‘s that it was the parent‘s negligence of allowing their child to wander around that constituted the proximate cause of the victim‘s death. and that as a proximate result of such failure. the present controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based on the latter‘s professional negligence. realizing the danger that the storm could have brought on the lines. after the two left the place.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Meanwhile. G. April 21. Third. private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas. on the other hand.R. a small boy named Saynes who lived across the road and who was only 3 years and 8 months old. the court held Salva and Verana jointly liable to Calalas." a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Art. in order to prevail. the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. hence. & Roco 3B . because the question of whether the alleged professional negligence caused the patient‘s injury is generally one for specialized expert knowledge beyond the ken of the average layperson. G. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians or surgeons stems from the former‘s realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. 12. Held: YES. First. the patient or his heirs suffered damages. However the court finds that the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property on that morning due to the series of negligence adverted to above committed by defendants' employees and which could have killed any other person who might by accident get into contact with it. Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same. 178763. Navarrete. the employees of the plant did not cut off the power pending inspection of the lines to see if they were cut or damaged. Just as she was doing so. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle. had to wear a cast for 3 months). is required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill. is that his glaucoma is the direct result of Dr. It was only after the electrocution that the wire got fixed. Anzures. 1989. using the specialized knowledge and training of his field. the plaintiff may recover damages. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory. in sum. Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession. an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. Calalas v.

but also. Art. breach of contract or culpa contractual. did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide. it is undisputed that the driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga. finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner‘s jeepney. is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. 1756 CC provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. First. 3490 and in the present case the same. while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. Jess Lopez Calalas of liability. not in actions involving breach of contract. On the other hand. & Roco 3B . Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. it is the parties themselves who create the obligation. 1755? We do not think so. the obligation is created by law itself. Navarrete. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. Cusi. where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In the case at bar. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. quasi-delict. Several factors militate against petitioner‘s contention. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and. the issue in this case is whether Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage. No. has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. ‖ Second. the Court holds that it was not. and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen. We find it hard to give serious thought to Calalas‘ contention that Sunga‘s taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable. But. Anzures. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned. Therefore. though foreseen. a violation of §32(a) of the same law. obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the highway. Consequently. was inevitable. the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. The first. or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. the principle of res judicata does not apply. nor. In such a case. The issue in Civil Case No. whereas in breach of contract. Reposo. Issue: Whether Calalas is liable to Sunga for breach of contract of carriage despite the ruling in the separate civil case or is the separate civil case (2176) binding on the present case (breach of contract of carriage) Held: CALALAS IS LIABLE. the jeepney was not properly parked. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor‘s will. On appeal to the Court of Appeals. upon the happening of the accident. no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver . 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to Calalas‘ jeepney. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. the presumption of negligence at once arose.A. and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. or which. 3490 in absolving Calalas from liability. 3490. which provides: ―No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle. In case of death or injuries to passengers. should be binding on Sunga. the CA reversed. There is. ‖ The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. thus. the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action. The second. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual. This is a violation of the R. 4136. It took cognizance of Civil Case No. some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the Isuzu truck was a caso fortuito. its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. Ongchuan. and it became the duty of Calalas to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. therefore. As to the contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. Buan. (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his 37 Agas. in quasi-delict. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence. Now. It provides: ―No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict. as amended.

This was not the first time that the 3 brothers had gone to said natatorium. 38 Agas. to the end of making them reasonably safe for visitors.. & Roco 3B . some boys who were in the pool area informed a bathe that somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time. resulting from lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety. Buan. in any sense deemed to be the insurer of the safety of patrons. Sections 1. Ongchuan. Held: NO. 397 (1958) Facts: Defendant owns and operates 3 recreational swimming pools to which people are invited and for which a fee of P0. At about 1pm Dominador Ong. and Ruben Ong that when Eusebio Ong and Hagad . Appellants had striven to prove that appellee failed to take the necessary precaution to protect the lives of its patrons by not placing at the swimming pools efficient and competent employees who may render help at a moment's notice. 2 and 3(d) 1. 104 Phil. a 14-year old boy. C. detected that there was a drowning person in the bottom of the big swimming pool and shouted to the lifeguard for help . and upon arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil. towing line. Navarrete.20 for children is charged.. The male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance. Jr. toy roof. Cusi. After the injection. Upon hearing this. saving kit and a resuscitator. The present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence. Upon autopsy. he is not. Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same happening and Abaño immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador from the bottom . Jr. Ayuyao arrived with another resuscitator. Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. The doctor ordered that the body be taken to the clinic. and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Armando Rule. Appellants tried to prove through the testimony of Andres Hagad . Metropolitan Water District." There are diving boards in the big pools and the depths of the water at different parts are indicated by appropriate marks. went to defendant's swimming pools. Issue: Whether the death of minor Dominador can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages. Between 4:40 to 4:45 p. At about 4:35 p. is attributable to appellee. they applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted. Although defendant does not maintain a full-time physician in the swimming pool compound.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty.m. There is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic. Abaño continued the artificial manual respiration. This negligence of Abaño . and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines . The person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed . The main pool is between two small pools of oval shape known as the "Wading pool" and the "Beginners Pool. Jess Lopez obligation in a normal manner. There were 2 lifeguards on duty in the pool compound. Abaño immediately applied manual artificial respiration . Defendant has provided the pools with a ring buoy. Ong v. Dr. and 6 lifeguards who had taken the life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross. they contend. Calalas should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. lifeguard Manuel Abaño did not immediately respond to the alarm and it was only upon the third call that he threw away the magazine he was reading and allowed three or four minutes to elapse before retrieving the body from the water . but the same became of no use because he found the boy already dead. Reposo. a male nurse. Anzures. They ascribed such negligence to appellee because the lifeguard it had on the occasion minor Ong was drowning was not available or was attending to something else with the result that his help came late. After paying the requisite admission fee. The death of a patron within his premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from any presumption of negligence. followed by sanitary inspector who after being called by boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit. Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Defendant has also on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. it was found that the death was due to asphyxia by submersion in water.50 for adults and P0. however. The care and supervision of the pools are entrusted to Simeon Chongco as chief. Proof of Negligence Rules of Court o Rule 131. it has however a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise. and when this failed to revive him. Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr . or of one of his employees. they immediately went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. one of which prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without any attendant.m. Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron. Owners of resorts to which people generally are expressly or by implication invited are legally bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the management and maintenance of such resorts . without the fault of the patron.

The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. As a boy scout he must have received instructions in swimming. Their owners.5 feet deep. Cusi. The 2 witnesses admitted in the investigation that they narrated in their statements everything they knew of the accident. Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee and it appearing that lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life. the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. it failed to do so. We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. as to the alleged failure of the lifeguard Abaño to immediately respond to their call may therefore be disregarded because they are belied by their written statements. the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Ongchuan. 1. He knew. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses. but. still appellee may be held liable under the doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason that. 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station. Appellants now switch to the theory that even if it be assumed that the deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate incident. sued Caltex Philippines and Mateo Boquiren. There are two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury. When the body of Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool. The swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. nowhere in said statements do they state that the lifeguard was chatting with the security guard at the gate of the swimming pool or was reading a comic magazine when the alarm was given for which reason he failed to immediately respond to the alarm. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent. as a consequence of which he was stunned. Anzures. The testimony of Ruben Ong and Andres Hagad . oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. or should have known that it was dangerous for him to dive in that part of the pool. Presumption of Negligence (i) Res ipsa loquitur This applies where. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency. & Roco 3B . the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of Caltex. including the personal properties and effects inside them. among them petitioners here. Issue: Whether or not. Further. Buan. What Ruben Ong particularly emphasized therein was that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for help. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. D. the latter immediately dived into the pool to retrieve the person under water . Africa v. The only thing the record discloses is that Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened. and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead against the bottom of the pool. and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Reposo. toy roof. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck (driven by Flores) into the underground storage. as found by the trial. (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant‘s negligence. and which to his drowning. is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. The last clear chance doctrine can NEVER apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously . there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee. expert evidence showed that Dominador Ong might have dived where the water was only 5. and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. 16 SCRA 448 (1966) Facts: In the afternoon of March 18. Caltex. Navarrete. 39 Agas. Jess Lopez The claim of these two witnesses was vehemently denied by lifeguard Abaño . Jr. right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of. towing line. having the last opportunity to save the victim. without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire.

Issue: Whether or not res ipsa loquitur is applicable to hold FF Cruz liable. it affords reasonable evidence. is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care. The CA affirmed. without fault of the injured person. strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. to request for the construction of a firewall. Efforts to put it out were futile. fire is not considered a fortuitous event. v. and then instituted an action against petitioner.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The CFI held in the Mable‘s favor. Philippine Power and Development Co. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. the defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence. Sometime in 1971.‘ And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence . He said: ―Before loading the underground tank there were no people. Cusi. in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken. a railroad crossing and very thickly populated neighborhood where a great number of people mill around throughout the day until late at night. 2. this motion for reconsideration. hence. in the absence of the explanation. or culpa aquiliana. In the case of Espiritu vs. those waiting for buses or transportation. Whatever be the activities of these people smoking or lighting a cigarette cannot be excluded and this constitute a secondary hazard to its operation which in turn endangers the entire neighborhood to conflagration. 1988 Facts: FF Cruz owned a furniture manufacturing shop in Caloocan city. adding another risk to the possible outbreak of fire at this already small but crowded gasoline station. This was repeated several times. & Roco 3B . Held: YES. FF Cruz and Co. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.‖ Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants. The Mables collected insurance. having been submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal observation of the facts reported. adjacent to the residence of the Mable Family. may be stated as follows: ―Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who 40 Agas. In the report submitted by Captain Mariano of the Manila Police: ―The location is within a very busy business district near the Obrero Market. those waiting to cross the streets and others loafing around have to occupy not only the sidewalks but also portion of the gasoline station itself. and while he had his back turned to the ―manhole‖ he heard someone shout ―fire. G. Court of Appeals. The cause of the fire was never discovered. No. In 1974. These facts. FF Cruz plant manager. On the other hand. It is also a recognized principle that ‗where the thing which caused injury. equipment and employees. Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who. Reposo. Gregorio Mable approached Eric Cruz. but was left unheeded.‖ The foregoing report.. A petition for review to the Supreme Court was denied. and both the shop and house were razed.‖ He added that when the tank was almost filled he went to the tank truck to close the valve. as it arises almost invariably from some act of man. Buan. Jess Lopez Held: YES. descriptive of the location and objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question. Gasoline is a highly combustible material. the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the defendant . with all its appliances. 52732. Navarrete. Ongchuan. may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. whose application to the instant case petitioner objects to. The passersby. that the injury arose from defendant‘s want of care. The court said: In case of noncontractual negligence. there were people who went to drink coca-cola at the coca-cola stand which is about a meter from the underground tank. This gasoline service station is also used by its operator as a garage and repair shop for his fleet of taxicabs numbering ten or more. was under the control of appellees. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The gasoline station. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees. Anzures. was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out. This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself). The CA overruled the defense under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.. their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances. Inc.R.. fire broke out in FF Cruz‘s shop. alone and without assistance. August 29. namely. but while the loading was going on. but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever.

v. therefore. William Lines did not previously apply for a permit to do hotworks on the said portion of the ship as it should have done pursuant to its work order with CSEW. while in the process of repairing the steel plate. & Roco 3B . On February 16. During the pendency of the appeal. Save as provided in Clause 10. with more reason should FF Cruz be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and the Mable‘s res idence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The contracts were denominated as ―Work Orders. Cusi. it affords reasonable evidence. resulting to its eventual total loss. hence this petition. a luxury passenger-cargo vessel insured with Prudential for P45M for hull and machinery. 1991. and ordered CSEW to pay Prudential and William Lines. varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.000.‖ The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine. An arrival conference was held between representatives of William Lines and CSEW to discuss the work to be undertaken on the vessel. While this Court finds that FF Cruz is liable for damages as found by the Court of Appeals. Buan.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. the Contractor shall not be under any liability to the Customer either in contract or for delict or quasi-delict or otherwise except for negligence and such liability shall itself be subject to the following overriding limitations and exceptions. it caught fire and sank the following day. and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop. In the instant case. Ongchuan. The CA found that FF Cruz failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the Mable residence as required by a city ordinance. The Hull Policy included an Additional Perils Clause covering loss of or damage to the vessel through the negligence of. combustible material such as wood chips. that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette. 1991. William Lines brought M/V Manila City to the Cebu Shipyard for annual dry-docking and repair. that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop.00 should be deducted from the amount awarded as damages. Reposo. CA affirmed the appealed decision. at the level of the crew cabins. Jess Lopez have its management or control use proper care. Navarrete. Anzures. William Lines filed a complaint for damages against CSEW. oxygen and welding torch as seen by the Chief Mate 41 Agas. Contractor shall replace at its own work and at its own cost any work or material which can be shown to be defective and which is communicated in writing within one (1) month of redelivery of the vessel 11. Insurer Prudential on the other hand. On the basis of which. It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of FF Cruz or its employees was not merely presumed. According to CSEW. 20. after subject vessel was transferred to the docking quay. Inc. among others. had more than adequate basis to find FF Cruz liable for the loss sustained by the Mable Family. William Lines. 12 using acetylene. The Complaint was amended impleading Prudential as co-plaintiff. that the accident arose from want of care. the CA ordered a partial dismissal of the case insofar as CSEW and William Lines are concerned. asserts that the fire was due to the negligence of the CSEW workers who were cropping out steel plates on Tank Top No. Prudential was subrogated to the claim of P45M representing the value of the said insurance it paid. When M/V Manila City capsized.. sawdust. the fact that the Mable Family have been indemnified by their insurer in the amount of P35. after the latter had paid William Lines the value of the hull and machinery insurance on the M/V Manila City. Inc. CSEW and William Lines had an amicable settlement. considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop. FF Cruz‘s failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence. On February 5. Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. paint.00 for the damage caused to their house and its contents has not escaped the attention of the Court.. Hence. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence. MR was denied. Trial court ruled in favor of William Lines. 3. The CA. According to CSEW.‖ Pertinent stipulations therein are as follows: 10. ship repairmen.000. smoke was just noticed gathering on the ceiling of the passageway along the crew cabins but did not see any fire as the crew cabins on either side of the passageway were locked. the Court holds that in accordance with Article 2207 of the Civil Code the amount of P35. 306 SCRA 762 (1999) Facts: William Lines is the owner of M/V Manila City. steel and angle bars were noticed to have been newly welded along the port side of the hull of the vessel. alleging that the fire which broke out in M/V Manila City was caused by CSEW‘s negligence and lack of care. namely to the sum of P1M only. The insurance on the vessel should be maintained by the customer and/or owner of the vessel during the period the contract is in effect. Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works.

the vessel‘s crew members were forced to withdraw. William Lines retained control over the vessel as the ship captain remained in command and the ship‘s crew were still present. CSEW claims that contrary to what the CA found. the Court did not uphold the validity of such provision because to allow CSEW to limit its liability to P1M notwithstanding the fact that the total loss suffered by the assured and paid for by Prudential amounted to P45M would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short of what is ordinarily required. No. the following conditions must concur : (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. In other words. save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety. Also. Between the testimonies of the fire experts who merely based their findings and opinions on interviews and the testimonies of those present during the fire. The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that CSEW was really negligent.M.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses. Maria. There were witnesses who were actually on board the vessel when the fire occurred. filed complaint for damages against the employer. CA affirmed. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower. Navarrete. Crew members were assembled to put out the fire.and place. Issue: Whether or not CSEW was correctly held liable under the res ipsa loquitur. there is no need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence. In the case under consideration. the fire that occurred and consumed M/V Manila City would not have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised. the agency charged with negligence is CSEW which had control over subject vessel when it was docked for annual repairs. If from the facts and evidence on record. which was merely inserted. Ongchuan. Investigation disclosed that ―at the given time. while Juego with 2 other workers were doing their work as carpenters at the elevator core of the 14th floor on board a platform made of channel beam (steel) with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its 4 corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block. 137873. date . some negligence must have occurred. & Roco 3B . CSEW maintains that it did not have exclusive control over the M/V Manila City and the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Buan. Consunji. Pasig City to his death. D. 4. His widow. a conclusion is readily ascertainable. 42 Agas. Under the circumstances of the case. Anzures. the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform. Juego was crushed to death when the platform they were standing/sitting on fell. Even without applying res ipsa loquitur. The trial court found direct evidence to prove that the workers and/or employees of CSEW were remiss in their duty of exercising due diligence in the care of subject vessel. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow. Held: YES. Although they may have probative value. when the said vessel was under the exclusive custody and control of CSEW is accordingly upheld. construction worker of D. to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Witnesses also saw smoke coming from Tank No. the ineluctable conclusion is that CSEW was negligent and consequently liable for damages to the Williams Lines. Inc. He pronounced DOA by the attending physician of Rizal Medical Center. G. while it imposed certain rules and regulations on William Lines. Reposo. Consunji. and (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence. Neither is there tenability in the contention of CSEW that the CA erroneously ruled on the inadmissibility of the fire experts‘ testimonies CSEW introduced on the probable cause and origin of the fire. The finding that M/V Manila City caught fire and sank by reason of the negligence of the workers of CSEW.R. April 20. Cusi. it was in the exercise of due diligence and not an indication of CSEW‘s exclusive control over subject vessel. reception in evidence of expert testimonies is within the discretion of the court. Second. prompting him to scold the workers. the latter are of more probative value. the falling of the platform was due to the removal or loosening of the pin.‖ According to the report. First.M. 2001 Facts: Jose Juego. The rubber insulation wire coming out of the air-conditioning unit was already burning. 12. when suddenly. For the doctrine to apply to a given situation. When it was too hot for them to stay on board and seeing that the fire cannot be controlled. However. Court of Appeals.. got loose x x x causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall thereby crushing the victim to death. They claim that they did not have management and control over M/V Manila City. the testimonies of the fire experts were not the only available evidence on the probable cause and origin of the fire. Note: CSEW claims that their Work Order contains Clause 11 which limits their liability to P1M only. Issue: Whether or not res ipsa loquitur is applicable to hold DM Consunji liable for negligence. The facts and evidence on record reveal the concurrence of said conditions in the case under scrutiny. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. in light of the direct evidence on record. Jess Lopez of M/V Manila City. DM Consunji v.

DM Consunji does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. the last requisite is also present. Reposo. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee‘s deceased husband.. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and. however. that necessary evidence is absent or not available. in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable. 43 Agas. the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible. Moreover. which means. Cusi. the second requisite is also present. Thus. Thus. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. may outweigh the inference. Defendant‘s negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant‘s part. & Roco 3B . literally. The company apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. All the requisites are present in the case at bar.e. the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. another court has said. and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. or. One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity. Thus. As explained earlier. and direct proof of defendant‘s negligence is beyond plaintiffs power . such as that of due care or innocence. or some other person who is charged with negligence. reasonable evidence. What DM Consunji takes exception to is PO3 Villanueva‘s testimony that the cause of t he fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it ―proved that it exercised due care to avoid the acciden t which befell respondent‘s husband. The doctrine. under res ipsa loquitur. Anzures. it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part. there is sufficient evidence. the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use. According to Fabro‘s sworn statement. under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption. While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed. As a rule of evidence. the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant. No worker is going to fall from the floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent. Jess Lopez Held: YES. is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. whether culpable or innocent. and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care. provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. the thing or transaction speaks for itself. the doctrine is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence . Subject to certain exceptions. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. is a rule of necessity. The doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge. the first requisite for the application of the rule is present. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause. Navarrete. Ongchuan. loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur. i. Buan. and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption. without knowledge of the cause. or that the party to be charged with negligence had superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident. Another requirement for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply is that it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident. reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause. or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. as sometimes stated. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements. The company‘s contention. It has been said that the doctrine furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff. Where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant. that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant‘s want of care. (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence. the company enacted rules and regulations for the safet y and security of its workers. for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. DM Consunji cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police investigator as evidence of its due care.

comes to fore. Each of which was leased out. The Abdullahs (respondents) were owners of fishponds sitting along the Lake Lanao shore. Hence this appeal by NPC. They spent substantial amounts to construct. 2005 Facts: Sps Sarangaya constructed and own a building in Isabela known as the ―Super A Building. Anzures. & Roco 3B . 398. 14 years old) used in covering different towns within his area of supervision. unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. October 25. and for Other Purposes. This fact. Cusi. Perla further subdivided the space into 2 wherein one part was used as an office while the other side was used as a garage for a company-provided vehicle (Ford Cortina. The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of the Abdullahs. NPC failed to do so. Issue: Whether or not NPC is liable for the damages endured by the Abdullahs Held: YES.R. G. The trial court and the CA held that the data contained in NPC‘s records collapse in the face of the actual state of the affected areas. Fabro‘s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. 44 Agas. Spouses Sarangaya. Jess Lopez It is ironic that the company relies on Fabro‘s sworn statement as proof of its due care but. 5. including those of the Abdullahs. it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC to maintain the water level of the dam within the benchmarks at the maximum normal lake elevation of 702 meters. DM Consunji. National Power Corporation v. They blamed the inundation on the Agus Regulation Dam. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. all these were washed away when the water level of the lake escalated and the lake shore was flooded . No. but also on the commonly known fact that.. Perla Compania de Seguros.‖ It instructed the NPC to build the Agus Regulation Dam at the mouth of Ag us River in Lanao del Sur. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court where representatives of both parties were present. The company does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence. that the accident arose from want of care. resulting in the inundation of the nearby estates. cannot use said statement as proof of its due care.‖ It was a 1-storey commercial building subdivided into 3 doors. However in 1986. To Enforce the Reservation of Areas Around the Lake Below Seven Hundred And Two Meters Elevation. alleging that NPC failed to increase the outflow of water even as the water level of the lake rose past 702 meters due to heavy rains. the benchmarks as pointed out by the NPC representative. alleging that the water never rose beyond 702 meters. could not be seen nor reached because they were totally covered with water. At that time. through its branch manager Pascual. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. Perla Inc. at a normal maximum water level of Lake Lanao at 702 meters elevation. Petitioners constructed the said dam in 1978. Inc. In the case at bar. alleging that the negligence and inexperience of NPC‘s employees assigned to operate the Agus Regulation Dam were the proximate causes of the damage caused to their properties and livelihood. In 1988. damaged. constitutes an unyielding proof that the water level did rise above the benchmarks and inundated the properties in the area. it was only after many years from the time the dam was built that NPC installed said benchmarks. Buan. it affords reasonable evidence. despite the clear mandate of Memorandum Order No. They were thus constrained to file a complaint for damages. the thing speaks for itself. Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. it was established that in the subject areas. Additionally. Court of Appeals. Reposo. generally. also assails the same statement for being hearsay. In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam. both the CA and the trial court uniformly found that it was such negligence on the part of NPC which directly caused the damage to the fishponds of private respondents. 6.R. 124378. No. March 8. the NPC ought to release more water to the Agus River to avoid flooding and prevent the water from going over the maximum level. An application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Navarrete. They wrote letters to the NPC which was ignored. G. And yet.. therefore. in arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of DM Consunji‘s employees. many farms and houses were already swamped and many fishponds. 2005 Facts: The Office of the President issued a memorandum entitled ―Prescribing Measures to Preserve the Lake Lanao Watershed. by itself. maintain and stock their respective fishponds with fish fingerlings. v. Ongchuan.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. When the water level rises due to the rainy season. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule. an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant‘s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant. The fishponds of the Abdullahs were inundated and damaged when the water level escalated in October 1986. 147746. leased the first door of the Super A Building. The 2-storey residence of the Spouses was behind said building.

The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will. Thereafter. Ongchuan. Buan. v. & Roco 3B 45 . No other person. Spouses filed a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property against Pascual but was eventually withdrawn by the prosecutor. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old car. 2005 Agas. complaint for damages based on quasi-delict was filed against Perla alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while Perla lacked the diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff. without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident. November 25. They had no access to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a building they owned. To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Child Learning Center. Jess Lopez Pascual left for Pampanga without bringing the car. Tagorio. The fact that Pascual. he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Cusi. its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire. from it. the incident was accidental. He failed to overcome the burden to prove that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident from happening. when it is switched on. the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. While the Perla does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position. in this case. Startled. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and. CA affirmed. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking . there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident. He did it again but to no avail. was charged with that obligation except him. (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident. Held: YES. destroying all their belongings. During trial Spouses presented a witness testifying that Pascual was seen buying gasoline and placed the container in the rear compartment of the car. someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the accident. constantly used in provincial trips. is obviously not a normal event. The car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual. Anzures.. It provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. it is the defendant‘s responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part. Trial court declared Perla solidarily liable with Pascual and that despite the failure to prove the precise cause of the fire. When he switched on the ignition key. in the normal course of events. fire spread inside their house. Thus. having no knowledge thereof. 150920. where the circumstances which caused the accident are shown to have been under the management or control of a certain person and. Hence. it was impossible to avoid. fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Meanwhile. the Spouses were watching TV when they heard 2 explosions. (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso fortuito or. Based on this report. Pascual was deemed negligent via res ipsa loquitur. ―ordinary‖ refers to the usual course of events. (2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and. 7. G. Issue: Whether Perla is liable for the alleged negligence of its employee (Pascual) based on res ipsa loquitur. if innocent. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. he returned. Flames spewing out of a car engine. His report also disclosed that Perla had no fire permit as required by law. the following requisites must concur: (1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of. In such instance. According to the city fire marshall. alighted. He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. in no time. Being its caretaker. he decided to ―warm-up‖ the car. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face. not even the respondents. Under the SECOND. Inc. the incident would not have happened had that person used proper care. as the caretaker of the car. Upon checking his schedule. the inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care. was definitely prone to damage and other defects. Three days later. failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked revealed his negligence. Reposo. and arms. we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand. and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. and started to push it out of the garage. No. if it could be foreseen.‖ It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff‘s prima facie case. Under the FIRST. the engine made an odd sound and did not start. Navarrete. Pascual claims fortuitous event. Under the THIRD. In his defense.R. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means ―the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. Suddenly. legs. he turned it off.

(CLC). a grade 6 student. and (2) failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from. In its defense. because of Capili‘s (principal) gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter. 1991. However. first. Cusi. however. CLC‘s liability is under Art. In this case. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door. Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the door. Timothy entered the boy‘s comfort room at the 3F of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. Timothy went right through and fell down 3 stories. CLC. a resident of the barangay. 2176. Anzures. reported on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. that originated from CLC‘s own negligence. Cardana allege that as early as December 15. (2) the fall was due to the kid‘s own negligence and (3) it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. the fact is that such window. was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Capili was negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardaña . both the RTC and the CA had a factual finding that the lock of the door was defective. 1992. et al). Held: YES. she did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of her 15 teachers inform her that the tree was already rotten. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. the door. as principal. would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out. premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained. she denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting. should have anticipated that a student. negates CLC‘s other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy‘s own negligence. CLC claimed that: (1) the door was not defective. Capili v. the fact. so that it was within reach of a student who finds the regular exit. Considering all the circumstances. to see to its disposal. & Roco 3B . Navarrete. Timothy was a Grade 4 student at Marymount School. She presented witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting and assigned Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale . The doctrine applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant‘s negligence . 8. Tagario contends that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been notified of the problem. Jess Lopez Facts: During the school year 1990-91. therefore. November 2. shows that something was wrong with the door. under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. Palaña. The fact that a student had to go through the window. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Despite her physical inspection of the school grounds. Held: YES to CLC but NOT TO LIMON. Lerios. Issue: Whether . found himself locked inside and unable to get out. G. Inc. Ongchuan. No. the members of its Board of Directors (Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon. CLC contended that there was no such requirement under the Building Code. unbroken by any intervening cause. A tort case under Article 2176 was filed by the parents against the CLC. 46 Agas. Capili asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she had assigned her next-in-rank. The RTC and CA held CLC liable solidarily with the Limon spouses (since they were the ones managing the school). As to the absence of grills on the window. (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of. He. however. Buan.5 meters from the floor. that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. an academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning Center. CLC‘s argument that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Second. Reposo. causing her instantaneous death. Also. Nevertheless. CLC claims that no direct evidence was presented to prove that the door knob was indeed defective on the date in question. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help. 157906. there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on CLC‘s part. Spouses Cardaña. was approximately 1. Capili denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. locked in the toilet by a nonworking door. Also. In the afternoon of March 5. Issue: Whether CLC and Spouses Limon should be held liable for Tagorio‘s injuries. instead of the door. not functioning. as CLC themselves point out. with the due diligence of a good father of the family. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence. 2006 Facts: Cardaña. CLC is clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working condition. In the process of opening the window. if not the door knob. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180. Her parents filed a case for damages.R.

Capili was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. in the same or similar circumstances. That respondents‘ daughter. Philippine Hoteliers Inc. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. No. the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. literally. Ongchuan. Jess Lopez Respondents insist that petitioner knew that the tree was dead and rotting. as sometimes stated. yet. Simply stated. there is sufficient evidence. that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant‘s want of care. and that the occu rrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care. which means. reasonable evidence. Jasmin.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. G. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents‘ daughter was a result of petitioner‘s negligence. Capili is expected to oversee the safety of the school‘s premises. this doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. Reposo. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her position. The presumption or inference may be rebutted. (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant‘s negligence. Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites. the doctrine applies where: (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant‘s negligence. 9.R. It is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. Buan. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means ―the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. Cusi. 2012  See previous Doctrine: Res Ipsa Loquitur is not applicable in this case. December 5. Further. 1992. to the time the incident occurred. (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position. being in charge of the school. Anzures. (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of. More than a month had lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaña on December 15. Where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant. or some other person who is charged with negligence. or. 47 Agas. she did not exercise reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have done in the same situation. she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had been removed. would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner. we cannot accept her defense of lack of negligence. under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school‘s premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioner‘s negligence is presumed once respondents established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. the thing or transaction speaks for itself. If there is sufficient proof showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred . in the absence of explanation by the defendant. & Roco 3B . Under Article 2176 plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff.‖ It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause ther eof or establishes the plaintiff‘s prima facie case. Navarrete. and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Even if Capili had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher . Huang v. she exercises supervision over her assignee . then the creative reason for the said doctrine disappears. As school principal. the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption. 180440.. Clearly. While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed. Thus. As the school principal. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor‘s position. and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

and although Dr. The piece of rubber allegedly found near Villegas' uterus was not presented in court. Batiquin‘s prenatal care. Batiquin v. all the above documents were allegedly prepared by persons other than Dr. this Court cannot acquiesce to her theory that her case is one of res ipsa loquitur as it was sufficiently established how she obtained that ―bukol‖ or ―hematoma. Kho's testimony. Kho's positive testimony to definitely establish that a piece of rubber was found near Villegas' uterus. however. in her open court testimony. However. Buan. an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus. Thus. Aside from Dr. her assertion was. Cusi." This statement. On examination. the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on Huang‘s head had she not lifted the same .‖ The trial court ruled for Batiquin. and she merely affixed her signature on some of them to express her agreement thereto . a mass in her abdomen was discovered. Jess Lopez In this case. Not even the Pathologist's Report. an Anesthesia Record.5000 ―professional fee. she found whitish-yellow discharge inside. Dr. regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay. A week later. and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a pathologist. Kho's testimony and. Nurse Diones. paying Batiquin P1. Kho described as a "foreign body" looked like a piece of a rubber glove and which was also ―rubber-drain like. even without admitting the Villegas‘ documentary evidence. particularly during cross -examination. could alter what Dr. and other student nurses performed a caesarian section on her. the folding wooden counter top did not fall on Huang‘s head withou t any human intervention. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital from 1978 to 1989. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. When Dr. leading it to conclude: ― There are now two different versions on the whereabouts of that offending rubber — (1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr. she took medications.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Villegas is a married woman who was under Dr. Records showed that she lifted the said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her head. 2 inches by 3/4 inch in size. She agreed to surgery. as she asserted before the trial court: Q 48 But you are sure you have seen [the piece of rubber]? Agas. She was likewise the Accounting Head from 1987 to 1989. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other than first hand knowledge for. This Court is not unaware that in Huang‘s Complaint and in her open court testimony. Furthermore. she was issued a Medical Certificate. certifying her fitness to return to work at the Rural Bank of Ayungon. 258 SCRA 334 (1996) Facts: Dr. And this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Villegas after her delivery. The CA reviewed the entirety of Dr.‖ However. She then consulted Dr. she began suffering abdominal pains coupled with fever. Although the folding wooden counter top is within the exclusive management or control of respondents PHI and DTPCI. Issue: Whether or not Batiquin can be held liable for negligence Held: YES. This piece of rubber material which Dr.‖ The trial court deemed vital Batiquin's testimony that when she confronted Dr. Except for the Medical Certificate. Kho answered that there was rubber indeed but that she threw it away. the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber were the Medical Certificate. Kho regarding the piece of rubber. Court of Appeals. the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. "Dr. and a piece of rubber materials on the right side of the uterus embedded on the ovarian cyst . Kho saw a piece of rubber in private Villegas' abdomen. ―while she was passing through the counter door. Respondent Mrs. Sy. she was suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object. deemed Dr. The phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr. On consultation with Batiquin. she checked out of the hos pital. Reposo. even granting that respondents PHI and DTPCI‘s staff negligently turned off the lights and locked the door. the falling of the same and hitting the head of Huang was not due to the negligence of the former . Kho. On the other hand. Ongchuan.‖ In view thereof.‖ It could have been a torn section of a surgeon's gloves or could have come from other sources. Kho stated that ―I have heard somebody that [sic] says [sic] there is [sic] a foreign body that goes with the tissues but unluckily I don't know where the rubber was. Dr. the trial court noted. and a Physician's Discharge Summary. she confirmed that she made such statement that ―she lifted the hinge massive wooden section of the counter near the swimming pool. Navarrete. Batiquin. which turned out to be the folding wooden counter top. dirt and pus behind the uterus. Anzures. She gradually lost her appetite. & Roco 3B . a Progress Record. Kho opened her abdomen. Kho at the Holy Child‘s Hospital in Dumaguete City. a Nurse's Record. Kho saw . The trial court. delivering her 1st child. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. was never denied nor disputed by Dr.‖ 10. Kho and (2) that Dr.‖ Soon after leaving. the pains and fever kept recurring and she rapidly lost weight. although devoid of any mention of a piece of rubber. Kho. As found by both lower courts. and a blood count showed an infection in her abdominal cavity. it was not mentioned in the pathologist's Surgical Pathology Report. with the assistance of Dr. In the meantime.

Batiquin. i. As such. Dr. Buan. thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr. Kho's trustworthiness. Second. in most cases a physician. since aside from the cesarean section. they will employ such training. Four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty. Dr. Garcia-Rueda v. Dr. or their improper performance. Medical Malpractice with Res Ipsa Loquitur Discussion In order to successfully pursue such a claim. Antonio and Dr. Kho's credibility. Jr. Issue: NOT RELATED TO TORTS. And even if we were to doubt Dr. Batiquin. While the Batiquin claims that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. G. an ―investigative pingpong‖ thereafter transpired where the case was reassigned or transferred several times. is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. Kho as to what she did to the piece of rubber. The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. Navarrete. The rule. Leonila filed graft charges against the involved prosecutors. Kho handled the piece of rubber. I was not the only one who saw it.‖ Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. Jess Lopez Batiquin emphasized that the Villegas never reconciled Dr. Batiquin confronted Dr. Batiquin's statement cannot belie the fact that Dr. Batiquin's claim on the witness stand that when Dr. Although hearsay. the same is admissible but it carries no probative value. Leonila requested the NBI to conduct an autopsy.e. Domingo Antonio. Cusi. who was the surgeon while Dr. 1997  See previous Facts: Florencio V. it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by Dr. however. all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. No. The NBI recommended that Dr. Kho found a piece of rubber near Villegas' uterus. Reposo. the Villegas were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into Villegas' body.Torts & Damages 2013 A Oh yes. husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda. The NBI ruled that Florencio‘s death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when. Kho about the foreign body. in this regard. The trial court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. Rueda. Dr. 11. when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 118141. whether she threw it away or sent it to Cebu City. Atty. care and skill in the treatment of their patients. the latter said that there was a piece of rubber but that she threw it away. direct evidence is absent and not readily available . Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. Antonio and Dr. Aggrieved. The breach of these professional duties of skill and care. Kho's testimony with Dr. which. a patient must prove that a health care provider. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law. Batiquin's claim was not objected to. First. In the instant case. no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. Dr. September 5. or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done. Batiquin. it was not prepared to doubt Dr. needless to say. During the preliminary investigation. Kho. the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.. Ongchuan. a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr. Kho as a credible witness. But see discussion below. the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. The Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint. In accepting the case. either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done. does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. He was attended by Dr. and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient.R. and hence. having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field. Petitioner now faults the Ombudsman for grave abuse of discretion as the successive transfers from one prosecutor to another were not sufficiently explained in the Resolution of the Ombudsman. failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof. Anzures. but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience . injury and proximate causation. Florencio died of complications of ―unknown cause. & Roco 3B . by a physician surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health. Nevertheless. under the circumstances involved. Pascasio. we are not justified in distrusting her as to her recovery of a piece of rubber from Villegas' abdomen. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care . constitutes actionable 49 Agas. breach. assuming otherwise. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Reyes in effect represented that. Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus. They have a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. In this light. 6 hours after the surgery. Furthermore. Kho's testimony.

Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. However. According to Rowena. Bartolome Angeles. (3) the patient‘s chart which is a public document was not presented because it is only there that we could determine the condition of the patient before the surgery. Rowena Umali De Ocampo. Ongchuan. The operating staff then went inside the doctor‘s clinic to take their snacks. Navarrete. Also. before her mother was wheeled into the operating room. Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already o/o. Ercillo reoperated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. To be sure. (4) sister of the deceased wished to postpone the operation but the patient was prevailed upon by Dra. But at around 10:00 P. the necessity of expert testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff. Cusi. and (2) a showing that the physician in question negligently departed from this standard in his treatment. the NBI deduced that the attending surgeons did not conduct the necessary interview of the patient prior to the operation . she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. 282 SCRA 188 (1997) Facts: Lydia was examined by the Dra. accused Dra. Why these precautionary measures were disregarded must be sufficiently explained. Consequently. if confirmed. Rowena then noticed her mother. Some 30 minutes after. she was wheeled into the operating room and Dra. gasping for breath. Court of Appeals. The attending physicians summoned Dra. 12. They bought type ―A‖ blood from the St. While they were waiting. The following day. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. After the lapse of a few hours. Lydia informed Rowena that the doctor told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. the patient died. Her unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. Because of the untidy state of the clinic. There was no showing that before the operation. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. Cruz who found a ―myoma‖ in her uterus. a causal connection is discernible from the occurrence of the victim‘s death after the negligent act of the anaesthesiologist in administering the anaesthesia. Rowena and her husband. Upon Lydia‘s arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital. Angeles arrived. in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia. While Dra. Cruz informed them that the operation was finished. Essentially. Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. Moreover. Dra. Anzures. Cruz and Dra. (2) the manner and the fact that the patient was brought to the San Pablo District Hospital for reoperation indicates that there was something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery. have been applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient under excessive or improper anaesthesia. Cruz conducted the operation. Cruz was sued for negligence. her sister and 2 aunts waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. Rowena asked Cruz if the operation could be postponed. Buan. However. a fact which. The oxygen supply had run out and Rowena‘s husband together with the driver of Cruz had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived. the allegation of negligence is not entirely baseless. Jess Lopez malpractice. The death certificate states ―shock‖ as the immediate cause of death and ―Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)‖ as the antecedent cause.M.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. MTCC found the ff circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that she was indeed negligent: (1) clinic was untidy. & Roco 3B . we cannot ignore the fact that an antidote was readily available to counteract whatever deleterious effect the anaesthesia might produce. and (2) whether these were the proximate cause of the patient‘s injury. It appears that the cause of the death of the victim could have been averted had the proper drug been applied to cope with the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia. Lina 50 Agas. Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two inquiries : (1) whether the doctor‘s actions in fact caused the harm to the patient. Cruz v. Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and Dr. it requires two-pronged evidence: (1) evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical community in the particular kind of case. should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal case. the transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital was without the prior consent neither of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. when Dra. Indeed here. lack of provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for any contingency that might happen during the operation. (5) with respect to Dra. accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for negligence. Reposo. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena‘s sister immediately bought. head of the OB-GYNE Department of San Pablo District Hospital. Cruz was closing the abdominal wall. in the event that any injury results to the patient from want of due care or skill during the operation. and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 1991. who was attached to an oxygen tank. Cruz asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Moreover.

Held: NO. In litigations involving medical negligence. properly typed and cross-matched. no prepared blood. they were again asked to procure more type ―A‖ blood. Whether or not a physician has committed an ― inexcusable lack of precaution‖ in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings. Anzures. there is no evidence to indicate that she should be held jointly liable with Dra. Navarrete. Ongchuan. and other circumstances regarding persons. that after surgery. there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon. Jess Lopez Ercillo. and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender. but was elective or pre-scheduled. which was not emergency in nature. there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients. and no sufficient oxygen supply. Jr. that Cruz was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon. a matter of expert opinion. In accepting a case. this conclusion is still best arrived at not through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen. (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence. together with a driver of Cruz. the plaintiff has the burden of establishing physician‘s negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence. For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is. (2) that after an hou r. Expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. she had no ready antibiotics.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by Cruz do indicate. the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient. Floresto Arizala and Dr. and (4) that the son. Elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act. it nevertheless shows the absence of due care and supervision over her subordinate employees. Cruz who actually did the operation. the anaesthesiologist. but such was not anymore available from the source. Reposo. arising from an alleged medical malpractice is supported by the evidence on record. they were also asked to buy type ―A‖ blood for the patient. When the qualifications of a physician are admitted . The fourth element of reckless imprudence : that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence is lacking. a doctor has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. All these conclusively show that the petitioner had not prepared for any unforeseen circumstances before going into the first surgery. taking into consideration his employment or occupation. This could only give rise to the presumption that she has nothing good to testify on her defense. Nieto Salvador. in the generality of cases. including judges.in-law of the patient. The Court noted the absence of any expert testimony of the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. physical condition. (3) that the oxygen given to the patient was empty. degree of intelligence. but she opted not to testify. CA ruled: ―While we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the clinic may not by itself indicate negligence. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician‘s conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. which is sadly lacking in the case at bench. Buan. no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused Lydia‘s death. Did this unsanitary condition permeate the operating room? Were the surgical instruments properly sterilized? Could the conditions in the OR have contributed to the infection of the patient? Only the Cru could answer these. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion.‖ Likewise undisputed were the ff: (1) that the accused asked the patient‘s relatives to buy Tagamet capsules while the operation was already in progress. & Roco 3B . as in the instant case. of the NBI only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that Cruz should have exercised. The alleged ‗unverified statement of the prosecution witness‘ remains unchallenged and unrebutted.‖ Issue: Whether or not Cruz‘s conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. time and place. The prosecution‘s expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary. (3) that it be without malice. Cusi. but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. had to rush to the San Pablo City District Hospital to get the much-needed oxygen. CA echoed similar observations. Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic. unless the contrary is sufficiently established. even without expert testimony. the lack of provisions. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury the 51 Agas.

Hermina focused on what Dr.‘ Proximate cause of an injury is that cause. She eventually noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds on the left hand of Erlinda. Herminda Cruz for moral support. Cruz was acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but was ordered to pay the heirs of Umali 50. & Roco 3B . and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Hosaka finally arrived. Nevertheless. wherein they agreed on the date of operation at the Delos Santos Medical Center. for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt.‖ He testified further that the cause of death was dissimulated Intra Vascular Coagulation or the DIC. Herminda was allowed to stay in the operating room. Gutierrez was doing. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against herein respondents alleging neglicence in the management and care of Erlina Ramos. The CA however reversed and ruled in favor of private respondents. Court of Appeals. Ramos v. which as attested t o by an expert witness. Erlinda was being prepared for the operation. Ongchuan. as likewise testified to by the expert witnesses in open court. the patient was released from the hospital. Lydia‘s death. The testimonies of both witness doctors establish hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death. 321 SCRA 584 (1999) Facts: Erlinda Ramos was experiencing discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder. Gutierrez attended to her. She underwent a series of tests and was found fit for surgery. Jess Lopez negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury . ‗negligence. Hosaka approached Erlinda and called for Dr. no matter in what it consists. For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. major hemorrhage occurs. After 4 months. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care. the findings of all 3 doctors do not preclude the probability that DIC caused the hemorrhage and consequently. It is simply a recognition of the postulate that." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury. (2) Whether res ipsa loquitur applies Held: YES. cannot be attributed to the petitioner‘s fault or negligence. Erlinda became irritable due to the delay. Thereafter. She heard Erlinda say ― ang hirap ma-intubate nito. Hosaka & Gutierrez are liable for negligence. Anzures. The probability that Lydia‘s death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner‘s guilt. Bu C. According to Hermina (who was in the operating room). When Erlinda was taken to the operating room. it will happen to anyone. taken with the surrounding circumstances. Buan. Issue: (1) Whether Drs. They eventually met with Dr. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or 52 Agas. Navarrete. Dr. they incurred medical expenses. On the other hand. Reposo. Eventually the operation started. may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence. Dr. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.‖ Because of that. only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability. she saw Dr. Gutierrez reached a phone to look for Dr. 13. this Court finds Cruz civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali.000 as civil liability + moral and exemplary damages. Expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense witnesses substantiate rather than contradict petitioner‘s allegation that the cause of Lydia‘s death was DIC. Dra. Dr. Calderon. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. She sought professional advice which recommended that she undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. anytime. hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock during surgery may be caused by several different factors. and without which the result would not have occurred. Dr. Hosaka who was not yet in. it affords reasonable evidence. or make out a plaintiff's prima faciecase. DIC which is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding tendency and when massive DIC occurs as a complication of surgery leaving raw surface. cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. another anaesthiologist. Eventually the patient was taken to the ICU wherein Erlinda stayed there for a month.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. However. O lumalaki ang tiyan. Along with her is her sister-in-law. as a matter of common knowledge and experience. The RTC ruled in favor of herein petitioners. mali yata ang pagkakapasok. she was in a comatose condition and suffered brain damage due to the lack of oxygen. For. the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. several nurses and Dr. in natural and continuous sequence. that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. defense witness. Hozaka. Cusi. Castro said hemorrhage due to DIC ―cannot be prevented. which resulted to hemorrhage or bleedings and that there is no fault on the part of the surgeon. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient (Erlinda). Because of these. produces the injury. At the day of the operation. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. which. After 2-3 hours. and was in constant need of medical attention. In totality. the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. Petitioners appealed. However.

In order to have the benefit of the rule. Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results. Navarrete. that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage. & Roco 3B . mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Ongchuan. this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Thus. and relieves a plaintiff of. Thus. It is regarded as a mode of proof. despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged. the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence . Hosaka & Gutierre were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. Thus. Normally. Jess Lopez common knowledge. it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. a plaintiff. In fact. Instead. were all under the exclusive control of private respondents. and that the injury or damage was 53 Agas. negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. The doctrine is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied. Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious. and (3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. without undergoing surgery. whenever it appears from the evidence in the case. Buan. Anzures. produces injury. which Erlinda sustained. Hence. she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct. must show a situation where it is applicable. It is simply a step in the process of such proof. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. The court is inclined to believe Ramos' stand and after the evidence and testimony presented that it was the faulty intubation which was the proximate cause of Erlinda's comatose condition. res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. the fundamental element is the "control of instrumentality" which caused the damage. if negligence attended the management and care of the patient. Proximate cause has been defined as that which. and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. In other words. does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. (2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants. the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine. permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. in addition to proving injury or damage. who are the physicians-in-charge. is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act. or a mere procedural of convenience since it furnishes a substitute for. Nevertheless. Moreover. Cusi. or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: (1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence. creating an inference or presumption of negligence. The court holds that Dr. Thus. in natural and continuous sequence. Still. Furthermore. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. and without which the result would not have occurred. Upon these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say. In the above requisites. During the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. However. res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. Obviously. Reposo. a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed . res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. Likewise. brain damage. depending upon the circumstances of each case. including the endotracheal tube. before resort to the doctrine may be allowed. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say . as such.

Dr. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of. Ongchuan. thus. another anesthesiologist. The same goes for the hospital. Upon these facts and under these circumstances. Gutierrez liable. The nailbeds of the patient remained bluish.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. 1985. Erlinda Ramos. & Roco 3B . at the very least. Thus. Upon the request of Erlinda. the failure to observe proper medical procedure. she was placed in a trendelenburg position — a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet. Due regard for the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. res ipsa loquitur is applicable. On appeal. DLSMC. that the consequences of professional treatment were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. As Dr. It is the dominant. Hosaka instruct someone to call Dr. Cruz noticed a bluish discoloration of Erlinda‘s nailbeds on her left hand. Also present were various doctors from public and private institutions serving as amicii curiae. Cruz then heard Dr. ―the captain of the ship‖) It is the surgeon‘s responsibility to see to i t that those under him perform their task in the proper manner. The Philippine College of Surgeons also filed a Petition-in-Intervention claiming that the SC erred in using the captain of the ship doctrine to hold Hosaka liable. The operation was scheduled for June 17. 380 SCRA 467 (2002) Facts: Sometime in 1985. CA reversed. failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. Ramos filed a complaint for damages due to negligence in the RTC. The same goes for Dr. Hozaka as the head of the surgeon team (or as the court would call it. 1985 at 9:00 AM at De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). (2) YES. who was then Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center. Issue: (1) Was Dr. Ramos v. Cusi. Dr. Calderon attempted to intubate the patient. her sister-in-law. she saw Erlinda being wheeled to ICU. Hosaka recommended to them the services of Dr. She was referred to Dr. Their work cannot be placed in separate watertight compartments because their duties intersect with each other. doctors and hospital were held liable. 1999. They now seek reconsideration. Hosaka can be held liable by virtue of the Captain of the Ship doctrine. the court holds Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at the hospital at around 12:10 in the afternoon. after seeking professional medical help. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. Gutierrez was having a hard time intubating Erlinda. By 7:30 AM. Herminda Cruz. As she herself admitted. Gutierrez. 14. The doctors explained to Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm. RTC found the doctors and the DLSMC liable. She was released from the hospital only 4 months later or on November 15. The injury incurred by Erlinda does not normally happen absent any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube. Hosaka. was allowed to accompany her inside the operating room. From the facts on record it can be logically inferred that Dr. Gutierez negligent and whether it was the faulty intubation which was the proximate cause of Erlinda‘s coma? (2) Whether Dr. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. failure to verify and conduct an evaluation of the patient for the administration of the intubation (so as to determine the anatomic variations in patient‘s neck and oral area). Reposo. Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died on August 3. a surgeon. due to the faulty intubation conducted. Anzures. Dr. oral arguments were heard. It has been sufficiently established that she failed to exercise the standards of care in the administration of anesthesia on a patient. Since neither Erlinda nor her husband Rogelio. one hour before the scheduled operation. (3) Whether DLSMC is solidarily responsible with the doctors. (3) Drs. who agreed to perform the operation on her. Since the ill-fated operation. a layman would be able to say. she did not check the patient‘s airway. supervision over the procedure then being performed on Erlinda. At almost 3:00 PM. Hosaka and Gutierrez worked as a team. When he arrived. she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself. moving or producing cause. Here. Navarrete. 54 Agas. (2) He was the attending physician of Erlinda and gave instructions to call another anaesthesiologist to help Erlinda. Jess Lopez either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. She did not perform a ―preoperative evaluation‖ of the patient before administering anaesthesia. Court of Appeals. or more than 3 hours after the scheduled operation. On March 2001. Particularly. Buan. Calderon. was advised have her gallstones removed. Upon petitioner for review before the SC. She went out of the OR to inform the husband that the operation was not going well. knew of any anesthesiologist. apart from a general denial of its responsibility over the physicians. (1) He recommended Gutierrez thereby representing to Ramos that she possessed the necessary competence and skills. That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Erlinda was already being prepared for operation. Held: (1) YES.

On that day. 55 Agas. Apolinar Vacalares. Marvie Blanes. 1987. Antibiotics being the accepted treatment for typhoid fever. As held in Ramos: Although generally. Jess Lopez Moreover. expert testimony is essential. Like Dr.‖ but also of Article 19 CC which r equires a person. They basically claim that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. Dr. Fourth. Sisters of Mercy Hospital. a hospital does not dismiss a consultant. 341 SCRA 760 (2000) Facts: Five days before Jorge Reyes‘ death on January 8. At around 1:00 a. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive for typhoid fever. Dr. while for the hospital. Issue: Whether or not the hospital and its physicians are liable for medical malpractice. It is breach of this duty which constitutes actionable malpractice. Dr. Rico indorsed Jorge to respondent Dr. Respondents were thus duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarity liable under Art. As her shift was only up to 5:00 p. Jorge Reyes‘ condition worsened as he experienced severe nausea and convulsions.. her impression was that Jorge had typhoid fever. First. As to this aspect of medical malpractice. and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Jorge replied he did not. Reposo. Navarrete. it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the consultant‘s fee for services rendered by the latter. Blanes whether he had a previous heart ailment or had suffered from chest pains in the past. the equipment and facilities necessary for the treatment of the patient. Ongchuan. The parties presented their own expert witnesses: for the Reyes‘.m. a hospital does not hire or engage the services of a consultant. Rather. However. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science. the patient was asked by Dr. (3) NO. the nutritional diet and medications prescribed by the doctor. She also took Jorge‘s history and gave him a physical examination. Anzures.m. Buan. In the present case. as well as the services of the hospital staff who perfor m the minist erial tasks of ensuring that the doctor‘s orders are carried out strictly. giving th em always his best talent and skill. 2180. the convulsions came back and he died at around 2:00am. the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. From the test results. Marlyn Rico. Reyes v. when a doctor refers a patient for admission in a hospital. instead. 15.m the next day. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around 6PM. The cause of his death was ―Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever. they claim that it was due to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. In line with this. Believing that Jorge could be suffering from Typhoid fever. to act with justice and give everyone his due. expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act. When he regained consciousness. Cusi. accredits the latter and grants him or her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients in the hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he or she possesses the necessary qualifications.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Dr. not only of his duty as a physician ―to serve the interest of his patients with the greatest solicitude. There is no employer-employee relationship (see 4 fold test in labor) between DLSMC and Drs. & Roco 3B . Jorge had been suffering from a recurring fever with chills. it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. Rico. the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof. she ordered that a compatibility test with the antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. but rather. who gave Jorge a physical examination and took his medical history. Panopio. there are some cases wherein there is no necessity for expert testimony: when Res Ipsa Loquitur applies. A second dose was administered on Jorge about three hours later just before midnight. in the performance of his duties. Gotiong and Dr. Dr. no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment. Hosaka‘s irresponsible conduct of arriving ver y late for the scheduled operation of petitioner Erlinda is violative. Held: NO. Second. As no adverse effects were observed. Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge. Dr. Said test was administered by nurse Josephine Pagent. there is no doubt that a physician-patient relationship existed between respondent doctors and Jorge Reyes. as this was then prevalent in their locality. Dr. A few minutes later. But. He was attended to by respondent Dr. he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic. it is the doctor who prescribes the treatment to be given to said patient. Rico ordered a Widal Test a standard test for typhoid fever. Dr. Other tests were made. Third. The hospital‘s obligation is limited to providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation.‖ Reyes‘ family thus filed a complaint for damages against Sisters of Mercy et al. Blanes ordered the first 500mg of said antibiotic to be administered on Jorge at around 9:00 p. when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff. the latter may lose his or her accreditation or privileges granted by the hospital.

We are not persuaded. Anzures. Jess Lopez Hence. based on his findings during the autopsy. who performed an autopsy on the body of Jorge Reyes. and ambulant when he went to the hospital. Cagayan de Oro City. Gotiong‘s statements. the Widal test is normally used. The results of the Widal test and the patient‘s history of fever with chills for five days. he died after only ten hours from the time of his admission. complications of the disease could not be discounted. On the other hand. Chief Pathologist of the Northern Mindanao Training Hospital. Rico. Resort to res ipsa loquitor is allowed because there is no other way. respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately apparent to a layman so as to justify application of res ipsa loquitur. although he did not encourage its use. According to him. Third. his impression would also be that the patient was suffering from typhoid fever. Jorge Reyes did not die of typhoid fever but of something undetermined. Marlyn Rico. he corroborated all of Dr. as a matter of common knowledge and observation. Marlyn Rico. in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable. Marvie Blanes. Second. Vacalares‘ autopsy should have included an examination of the brain. on the issue of the correctness of her diagnosis. all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. As to the treatment of the disease. Petitioners contend that respondent Dr. Basically. Thus. where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Petitioners asserts that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present case because Jorge Reyes was merely experiencing fever and chills for 5 days and was fully conscious. Res Ipsa Loquitur DOES NOT APPLY in this case. However. As regards Dr. when a case of typhoid fever is suspected. Apolinar Vacalares. Peter Gotiong is a diplomate whose specialization is infectious diseases. He also explained that despite the measures taken by respondent doctors and the intravenous administration of two doses of chloromycetin. Panopio who is also a big time doctor/ pathologist. Apolinar Vacalares as an expert witness. Petitioners contend that all requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur were present. no presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr. Dr. Furthermore. Reposo. Respondents also presented the testimony of Dr. Petitioners presented the testimony of Dr. the same may not always be grossly visible as they may be microscopic. we do not find him to be so as he is not a specialist on infectious diseases like typhoid fever. Though the Widal test is not conclusive. the 2 doctors presented by respondents clearly were experts on the subject. However. Vacalares‘ finding during the autopsy that the deceased‘s gastro-intestinal tract was normal. when the issue revolves around the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. Marlyn Rico‘s diagnosis. and if the 1:320 results of the Widal test on Jorge Reyes had been presented to him along with the patient‘s history. When the doctrine is appropriate.) at around nine o‘clock 56 Agas. Yet. coherent. Marlyn Rico did not depart from the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as she in fact observed the due care required under the circumstances . Here. Ongchuan. thus expert witness is necessary. he recognized that the Widal test is used for typhoid patients. greater accuracy through repeated testing was rendered unobtainable by the early death of the patient. was negligent in ordering the intravenous administration of two doses of 500 milligrams of chloromycetin at an interval of less than three hours. that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. while hyperplasia in the payer‘s patches or layers of the small intestines is present in typhoid fever. Navarrete. the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient. taken with the fact that typhoid fever was then prevalent as indicated by the fact that the clinic had been getting about 15 to 20 typhoid cases a month. according to medical books: The dosage likewise including the first administration of five hundred milligrams (500 mg. Petitioners claim that Jorge Reyes died of anaphylactic shock or possibly from overdose as the second dose should have been administered five to six hours after the first.e. who took over from Dr. As held in Ramos. Nonetheless. Also. Buan. Cusi. preponderant evidence to support their contention is clearly absent. he had already treated over a thousand cases of typhoid fever. Ibarra T. Dr. Also. without the aid of expert testimony. Dr. it remains a standard diagnostic test for typhoid fever and. As they failed to present expert opinion on this. While petitioners presented Dr. Res Ipsa Loquitur is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. he stated that chloromycetin was the drug of choice. per instruction of Dr. he noted that since the toxic effect of typhoid fever may lead to meningitis. under usual and ordinary conditions. First. & Roco 3B . by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. which could be due to allergic reaction or chloromycetin overdose. They vouched for the correctness of Dr. He stated that. it DOES NOT APPLY when what is at issue is BEYOND AN ORDINARY PERSON‘S COMMON KNOWLEDGE: i. Rico explained that. were sufficient to give upon any doctor of reasonable skill the impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever. Vacalares testified that. in the present case. Petitioners contend that the doctors erroneously applied the Widal test and in administering the antibiotic chloromycetin. The burden of proving that Jorge Reyes was suffering from any other illness rested with the petitioners . The question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of the standard of care required by the circumstances. Dr. Dr.

While confined there. Ampil. injury and proximate causation. Fuentes was asked to perform hysterectomy on her. Ongchuan. on January 1995. Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. Buan. Jess Lopez in the evening and the second dose at around 11:30 the same night was still within medically acceptable limits. After a series of medical examinations.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. causing stool to excrete through her vagina. Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina — a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1. Ampil breached both duties. assisted by the medical staff of the Med City. Upon being informed about it. medical negligence. Enrique Agana also filed with the PRC an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. training. (PSI). as the lead surgeon. such as gauzes. there is no need to expressly require of doctors the observance of ―extraordinary‖ diligence. In addition to state regulation. Ampil and Dr. as we have already noted. (3) Whether PSI is liable. The Board held that the prosecution failed to show that Fuentes was the one who left the 2 pieces of gauze inside Natividad‘s body and that he concealed such fact from Natividad. Given these safeguards. The operation appears to be flawed. Dr. breach. Fourth. the practice of medicine is already conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence. When he failed to do so. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy. Ampil. (2) Whether Fuentes is liable for the same. Instead. a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done. diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. As it is now. However. On appeal. Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC Quezon City a complaint for damages against the Professional Services. Such breach caused injury to Natividad. 513 SCRA 478 (2007) Facts: In April 1984. Ampil took over and closed the incision. or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done. the elements are duty. had the duty to remove all foreign objects. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1. Agana. & Roco 3B . Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. be revoked by the government. Two weeks after her return. Dr. Anzures. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice. That Ampil‘s negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad‘s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. And. she was still suffering from pains. Dr. Fuentes was exonerated but Ampil was required to reimburse all payments that PSI will make to the Aganas. Dr. On November 1984. since the recommended dose of chloromycetin is one (1) gram every six (6) hours . She consulted both Ampil and Fuentes about it. In 1993. owner of the Med Cit. Issue: (1) Whether Ampil is liable for negligence and medical malpractice. 1984. her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. surgery on Natividad. Ampil. at any time and for cause. That they were later on extracted from Natividad‘s vagina established the causal link between Ampil‘s negligence and the injury. they assert that since the law imposes upon common carriers the duty of observing extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers. This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately. and Fuentes. Dr.‖ After a couple of days. the pains intensified. It is a right earned through years of education.. the standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good physicians.5 inches in width. v. and by first obtaining a license from the state through professional board examinations. Fuentes. Meanwhile. the conduct of doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath. physicians and surgeons should have the same duty toward their patients. Cusi. the attending nurses entered these remarks: ―sponge count lacking 2‖ and ―announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure. Inc. Ampil and Dr. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish. As the cancer spread to her left ovary. it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. They were held solidarily liable. like the business of a common carrier. The Record of Operation dated April 11. is affected with public interest. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze inside Natividad‘s body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas. Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Med City) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Simply put. 16. Moreover.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. from Natividad‘s body before closure of the incision. Professional Services. She died during the pendency of the case. finding PSI. After Dr. So. Navarrete. necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another surgery. To successfully pursue this kind of case. Ampil. the PRC Board of Medicine rendered its Decision dismissing the case against Fuentes. prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals . Petitioners correctly observe that the medical profession is one which. Such license may. Reposo. Held: (1) YES. Inc. she went to get further treatment in the States but she was told she was free of cancer. 57 Agas.

he was the ―Captain of the Ship. it affords reasonable evidence. While in the recovery room. Cantre‘s counsel admitted the existence of the same when they were formally offered for admission by the trial court. He was informed it was a burn.‖ Her blood pressure wa s frequently monitored with the use of a sphygmomanometer. close to the armpit." It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury. a ruling on 58 Agas. Ampil considered his work to be in order and proceeded with closing Natividad up. It was held that Ramos v. (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant. her husband. PSI failed to perform such duty. Jess Lopez And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family. Abad (medical director). Her movements now are also restricted. Her children cannot play with the left side of her body as they might accidentally bump the injured arm. a baby boy. may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence. Court of Appeals that for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases. (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things. 160889. While Cantre was massaging Nora‘s uterus for it to contract and stop bleeding. In fact. Issue: (1) Whether additional exhibits are admissible in evidence. In the present case. (2) Whether Cantre is liable for the injury suffered by Nora Go. the pain in her left arm remains. given the particular circumstances of this case. April 27. Cusi. Hence. At 1:30 a. Milagros L. As stated before.5 inches in the inner portion of her left arm. without the fault of the injured. the doctrine will not lie. The questioned exhibits consist mostly of Nora‘s medical records..Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. the most instrumental is the ―control and management of the thing which caused the injury. (2) NO. In other words. an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. 17. she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. Cantre is a specialist in OB-GYNE at the Dr. Navarrete. Nora gave birth to her 4th child. Unfortunately. Dr. it was duly established that PSI operates the Med City for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public. Literally. Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case against Fuentes on the ground that it is contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. the opera ting surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. SC not convinced. Aside from the unsightly mark. Nora suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were not completely expelled from her womb after delivery. which aches at the slightest touch. 2007 Facts: Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital. and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself. and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. at around 3:30 a. she has to cradle her wounded arm. Nora‘s injury was referred to a plastic surgeon for skin grafting. Ampil was the lead surgeon. Accordingly. Held: (1) YES. who was admitted at the said hospital. However. Go noticed a fresh gaping wound 2. where the thing which caused the injury. Nora suffered hypovolemic shock. resulting in a drop in her blood pressure to ―40‖ over ―0. According to them. No. Their duty is to obey his orders. in the absence of explanation that the injury arose from the defendant‘s want of care. G. Under the ―Captain of the Ship‖ doctrine. From the foregoing statements of the rule. and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Go. spouses filed a complaint for damages against Cantre. Buan. after Fuentes performed the hysterectomy. the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury. Of the foregoing requisites. She was the attending physician of Nora S. is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not have occurred if he. Stated differently.‖ Ampil and not Fuentes had control. Ongchuan. or make out a plaintiff‘s prima facie case. it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. Reposo. John David Z. However. taken with the surrounding circumstances. having such control used proper care. Therefore. Anzures. In any case. Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which have gained acceptance in the determina tion of a hospital‘s liability for negligent acts of health professionals.R. He asked the nurses what caused the injury. and the hospital.5 x 3.m. the fact that the 2 pieces of gauze were left inside Natividad‘s body is a prima facie evidence of Dr. Go. & Roco 3B . When sleeping. Cantre v. which were produced by the hospital during trial pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.‖ We find the element of ―control and management of the thing which caused the injury‖ to be wanting. Fuentes‘ negligence. would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care. (3) YES.m. Nora‘s arm would never be the same.

Arizala. CASTILEX contends that the 5th paragraph of Article 2180 should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Buan. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. 321 SCRA 393 (1999) Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 am. As testified to by the medico-legal officer. Issue: Whether or not CASTILEX is vicariously liable. the use of the droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within Cantre‘s exclusive control. Further. Cantre‘s defense that Nora‘s wound was caused not by the droplight but by the constant taking of her blood pressure. bills. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury .Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Third. for which petitioner cannot escape liability under the ―captain of the ship‖ doctrine. the 4th paragraph should apply. He drove the company car out of a parking lot. that the Castilex did not have the burden of proving that Abad was not acting within the scope of his duties. Instead. agreeing to pay hospital. and carrying only a Student‘s Permit to Drive. CASTILEX‘s interpretation of the 5th paragraph is not accurate. and later to the Cebu Doctor‘s Hospital. following the normal flow of traffic but without a helmet and goggles. causing severe injuries to Vasquez. The phrase ―even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry‖ found in the 5th paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the 59 Agas. Abad was not acting within the scope of his duties outside office hours. & Roco 3B . Vasquez was driving a Hondo motorcycle around Fuente Osmena Rotunda. Castilex argues that the 4th paragraph of Article 2180 should apply. Otherwise. far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth. Jr. First. the senior consultant in charge during the delivery of Nora‘s baby. CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD. Abad brought him to the Southern Islands Hospital. could only be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. (ii) Respondeat superior 1. A Criminal Case (Unspecified) was filed against him. the gaping wound on Nora‘s arm is certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby . the medical practice is to deflate the blood pressure cuff immediately after each use. professional. the gaping wound on Nora‘s left arm. it can be logically inferred that Cantre. by any stretch of the imagination. have contributed to her own injury. that even though he was using a company vehicle. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the ―captain of the ship‖ doctrine. Abad signed an acknowledgement of Responsible Party. the inflated band can cause injury to the patient similar to what could have happened in this case. ev en if the latter was necessary given her condition. Second. Ongchuan. and made a shortcut against the flow of the traffic. Jess Lopez the negligence of Cantre may be made based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine even in the absence of such additional exhibits. Abad was a manager of Castilex. Vasquez died. but was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Such injury could not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere. The 2 vehicles collided. if Nora‘s wound was caused by the blood pressure cuff. Hence. This Civil Case for damages was initiated against Abad and Castilex. provided that the following requisites concur: (1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone‘s negligence. (2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants. Reposo. In this particular case. The CA held that Castilex is only vicariously liable. Nora could not.. Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Dr. and (3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. the registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pickup. Held: NO. then the taking of Nora‘s blood pressure must have been done so negligently as to have inflicted a gaping wound on her arm. (2) YES. etc. the presumption that Cantre was negligent in the exercise of her profession stands unrebutted. Based on the foregoing. but rather as a measure to prevent complication does not help her case. Hence. The RTC held them solidarily liable. petitioner‘s argument that the failed plastic surgery was not intended as a cosmetic procedure. Navarrete. It does not negate negligence on her part. Thus. does not absolve her from liability. Anzures. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeon‘s control. Cebu Doctor‘s intervened to collect unpaid balances. by its very nature and considering her condition. The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Cusi. and not the 5th. Vasquez. exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight and the taking of Nora‘s blood pressure.

As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact. Anzures. ABAD. Buan. USE OF VEHICLE OUTSIDE REGULAR WORKING HOURS: An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter‘s personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee‘s negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use. in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed. nevertheless. however. to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. employees oftentimes wear different hats. and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work. are still within the call of duty. to employers in general. are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task. he was driving a companyissued vehicle. The CA cannot. Both provisions apply to employers: the 4th PAR. and not a part of his services to his employer. Ongchuan. even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. The 4th PAR. to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks . Evidence that by using the employer‘s vehicle to go to and from meals. it was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work. covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions. Reposo. presumably. the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his emplo yer‘s motor vehicle. who was presented as a hostile witness. They perform functions which are beyond their office. A distinction must be made between the 2 provisions to determine what is applicable. testified that at the time of the incident. The employer may. title or designation but which. the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. USE OF VEHICLE GOING TO or FROM WORK: In the same vein. and the 5th PAR.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer‘s vehicle. This court has applied the 5th par. an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. It was enough for CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties. while the 5th PAR encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer‘s vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and. which the court a quo and the CA resolved in the affirmative. & Roco 3B . traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee. 60 Agas. registered under the name of CASTILEX. Negligent acts of employees. and the employer is not liable for the employee‘s negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employee‘s duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. However. Hence. the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident. Jess Lopez employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. the courts have frequently applied what has been called the ―special errand‖ or ―roving commission‖ rule. be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 to this case. admittedly. it has been held that he has not resumed his employment. For. Navarrete. whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry. Even where the employee‘s personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept. Cusi. the mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge CASTILEX with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer‘s liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer‘s motor vehicle : USE OF VEHICLE GOING TO or FROM MEALS: It has been held that an employee who uses his employer‘s vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. However. therefore. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence.

collided with a red Ford Escort driven by Macarubo along MacArthur Highway in Valenzuela. registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the ―authorized driver‖ of Juanita Macarubo. Thereafter. Anzures. Macarubo. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. were seriously injured. From the damages shown in the picture. ABAD‘s working day had ended. Bus 203 driven by Armando Jose. 2. Ongchuan. who then shouted: ―Daddy. The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby hospital where Macarubo lapsed into a coma. G. neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. at around 6AM. a sidewalk vendor. or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours. which caused him to be hospitalized for a week. & Roco 3B .m. he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face. and drug pushers and addicts. Navarrete.‖ had no connection to CASTILEX‘s business. The car started to run only after 5AM. justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. At the Goldie‘s Restaurant. Abraham‘s father instituted an action for damages against MCL and Armando Jose in the RTC. and its exercise of due diligence in seeing to it that no recklessness is committed by its employees and drivers. Moreover. ABAD was with a woman in his car. There were pictures taken which clearly show that the MCL bus was at its proper lane and not in an overtaking position while the car driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a diagonal manner and crossed the line of the MCL. Macarubo failed to recover and died 5 days later. testified that Fuente Osmeña is a ―lively place‖ even at dawn because Goldie‘s Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Thus. Court of Appeals. his overtime work had already been completed. which is about 7 km away from his place of business. Cusi. It was then about 2:00 a.m. but he became blind on the left eye which had to be removed. it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the CASTILEX‘s office. CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Buan. the strains of a party still on their bodies. After the party at 11 p. Juanita Macarubo in turn filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage to her car. the car encountered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as its cross-joint was detached. 1985 at 6:15 a. The accident happened at 6:15 a.. way beyond the normal working hours. not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Abraham. His being at a place which. as expected. These cases would later be consolidated MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo. pimps. while both Rommel and John were on their way home to Valenzuela. which is an indication of an overtaking act. While parents of Macarubofiled their own suit for damages in the same trial court against MCL alone. and the attention to the repair coupled with the wait until the car was ready to run: potentials in a driver for possible accident. using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position. and its lone passenger. Nos.m. Jose v. coupled possibly with the desire to be home quick for the much needed sleep could have prompted him to overtake the preceding vehicle.R. and drug addicts littered the place. which was located in Mandaue City. Cebu City. 118441-42.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer‘s business or within the scope of his assigned task. In addition. In the case at bar. A witness for the Vasquez. Daddy!‖ This woman could not have been ABAD‘s daughter. Despite surgery. The court was convinced of the close supervision and control of MCL over their drivers . he went to Goldie‘s Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña. On February 1985. prostitutes.. There was no sleep for them and the service of drinks cannot be totally discounted.m. not too fit for the driving as he could not anymore control the car. Jess Lopez The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. With lack of sleep. To the mind of this Court. January 18. for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time. when the physical and mental condition of the driver Macarubo was. of 28 August 1988. Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-lessee of a public utility bus (Bus 203). Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence. Rommel Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party. 2000 Facts: During the night previous to the accident of February 22. was known as a ―haven for prostitutes. as petitioner put it. the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the impact. As a result of the collision. it can be clearly 61 Agas. pimps. If it were the bus that was overtaking at the time. Abraham survived. Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him. Reposo. Rather. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That same witness for the respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident. the left side of the Ford Escort‘s hood was severely damaged while its driver. ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. Court noted the respective damages of the 2 vehicles especially the point of the impact.

This fact is not disputed by private respondents. Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant‟s brief in the CA a sketch of the scene of the accident alleged ly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale. causing its driver to lose control of the vehicle. and third-party defendant Juanita Macarubo then appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court‘s ruling. there was a traffic jam on the “bus lane” while traffic was light on the “car lane. it necessarily had to accelerate. took the injured driver and passenger of the Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital. Trial court dismissed both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo. the likelihood is that while the Ford Escort might not have been overtaking another vehicle. Appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the ground that the photographs were taken an hour after the collision and that within such span of time the bus could have been moved. just enough to enable Abraham and Macarubo to reach home. ma‘am. Bus 203‘s conductress. However. which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford Escort‟s lane. The photograph shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. the Ford Escort‘s rear cross-joint was cut/detached. Since trouble in the cross-joint affects a car‘s maneuverability.‖ by simply welding them (instead of replacing the spare parts) just so they could reach home. Abraham testified that it was the bus which was on the wrong lane and thus hit their car. the records of this case do 62 Agas. the positions of the 2 vehicles. It was filled with passengers. she and bus driver. His testimony indicates that the rear cross-joint was hastily repaired and that. with its 2 front wheels occupying Bus 203‘s lane. Rommel Abraham. Rommel Abraham testified that on the night before the accident. it actually strayed into the bus‘ lane because of the defective cross-joint. Vasquez. Abraham‘s explanation as to why they did not reach Valenzuela until 6AM of the next day when the accident happened indicates that the Ford Escort slammed against Bus 203 because of a mechanical defect.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. However. The 3 photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally on the highway. If it was overtaking another vehicle. Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the collision happened. & Roco 3B . In this case. the photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford Escort which usurped a portion of the opposite lane. he and Macarubo went to a friend‘s house in La Loma where they stayed until 11 p. In this case. it encroached on the opposite lane occupied by Bus 203. at most. which was on its right and correct lane. Reposo. It was the car driven by Macarubo that hit the MCL . Given such fact. immediately after the collision. the matter should have been treated as a serious mechanical problem. Held: (1) YES. Buan. physical evidence should prevail. As Rommel Abraham himself admitted. Petitioners relied mainly on photographs. however testified that. Anzures. the Macarubo spouses. when asked if they were able to repair the cross-joint. The photograph shows however that the Ford Escort‘s smashed hood was only abou t one or two meters from Bus 203‘s damaged left front. As shown by the photograph the portion of MacArthur Highway where the collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as the center line separating the right from the left lanes. Armando Jose. Hence. Cusi. Navarrete. According to the CA. and it was considerably heavier and larger than the Ford Escort. Issue: (1) Whether or not Jose Macarubo is liable for damages (2) Whether the parents of Jose Macarubo are liable. This is correct. the fact remains that when the Ford Escort finally came to a stop. this petition for review on certiorari.m. occupying the lane without any traffic. showing the position of the two vehicles after the collision while private respondents offered the testimony of Rommel Abraham to the effect that the collision took place because Bus 203 invaded their lane. Jess Lopez deduced which vehicle did the bumping. Indeed. would overtake and traverse a heavy traffic lane. Constancia Gerolada. Contrary to Abraham‘s testimony. where the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses. In People v. Ongchuan. This mechanism controls the movement of the rear tires. as shown in the photographs taken by MCL line inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen minutes after the collision.” It is therefore inconceivable that the car. disputes Abraham‘s self-serving testimony that the two vehicles collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly the opposite of what he claimed happened. the kind of repairs made thereon were merely temporary. The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham‘s testimony which was obviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence. The acceleration of its speed and its heavy load would have greatly increased its momentum so that the impact of the collision would have thrown the smaller and lighter Ford Escort to a considerable distance from the point of impact. Abraham said ―Ginawaan ng paraan.

their educational qualifications. No evidence on record exists to show that Dr. 3. That John Macarubo was the ―authorized driver‖ of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission of Juanita Macarubo. & Roco 3B . Court of Appeals. and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. Ongchuan. Armando Jose. The allegation that John Macarubo was ―the authorized driver‖ of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo was the son. He had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. he is normally required to attend clinicopathological conferences. evidence of fellowship in most cases. Hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of work within the hospital premises. However.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Anzures. In addition to these. For failure to discharge its burden. Hosaka shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda‘s condition. The responsibility of employers is premised upon the presumption of negligence of their employees. The burden is upon MCL to prove that Juanita Macarubo is one of those specified persons who are vicariously liable for the negligence of the deceased John Macarubo. In its third-party complaint. for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital. Hosaka‘s responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner. and was in fact over 3 hours late for the latter‘s operation. MCL‘s third-party complaint should be dismissed. While the allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence against driver Armando Jose who. Cusi. the failure to prove the employee‘s negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employer‘s vicarious liability. before the presumption of the employer‘s negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees can arise. Dr. visiting or attending are required to submit proof of completion of residency. is clearly deducible from the last paragraph of Article 2180 which provides that the responsibility therein mentioned shall cease if the employers prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages Therefore. where the negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to be the negligence of the employer. This is the presumed negligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities. The theory of presumed negligence. Dr. the unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting ―consultants. In the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. Hosaka failed to exercise the proper in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate).‖ it is the Dr. presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases. the Court held that proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not required. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Jess Lopez not show that such a sketch was ever presented in evidence in the trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him. (2) NO. Under the circumstances of this case. interns and residents. and 63 Agas.‖ who are allegedly not hospital employees. It is such a firmly established principle that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. the negligence of the employee must first be established. conduct bedside rounds for clerks. Article 2180 makes the persons specified therein responsible for the quasi-delicts of others. Doctors who apply for ―consultant‖ slots. Hosaka verified if Dra. After a physician is accepted. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlindas cholecystectomy. generally. either as a visiting or attending consultant. Dr. Ramos v. the physician‘s performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics. Reposo. in fact. in contrast with the American doctrine of respondent superior. and references. employee or pupil of Juanita Macarubo so as to make the latter vicariously liable for the negligence of John Macarubo. 321 SCRA 584 (1999) Doctrine: As the so-called ―captain of the ship. In this case. MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered owner of the Ford Escort car and that John Macarubo was the ―authorized driver‖ of the car. 2180. Buan. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital that either accept or reject the application. Navarrete. The CA also ruled that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver. Furthermore. ward. the difficulty is only more apparent than real. was acquitted in the case for criminal negligence arising from the same incident.

It previously ruled thus: ―Anent private respondent DLSMC‘s liability for the resulting injury to pet itioner Erlinda. a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient‘s condition. teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. is normally politely terminated. the control exercised. holding DLSMC solidary liable. Jess Lopez feedback from patients. the equipment and facilities necessary for the treatment of the patient. an EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP. While the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs. a hospital does not dismiss a consultant. 4. apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians. Private hospitals. hire. and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. technically employees. Cusi. it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the consultant‘s fee for services rendered by the latter. a hospital does not hire or engage the services of a consultant. failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. FIRST. evidence of fellowship and references. hire. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. it was held here that there is no employer-employee relationship between DLSMC and the phycisians. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the CC which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former‘s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. it is the doctor who prescribes the treatment to be given to said patient. the hiring and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. Gutierrez and Hosaka which wouldhold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180. with the exception of the payment of wages. there are four grounds that DLSMC maintains in order to disclaim liability. Ramos v. instead. guardian. Ongchuan.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. technically employees. we held that respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors therefor under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. & Roco 3B . accredits the latter and grants him or her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients in the hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he or she possesses the necessary qualifications. or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee. Gutierrez and Hosaka: Private hospitals. fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting ―consultant‖ staff. There is no employer-employee relationship between DLSMC and Drs. with the exception of the payment of wages. x x x the control exercised. DLSMC argues that when a doctor refers a patient for admission in a hospital.‖ Here. In neglecting to offer such proof. interns and residents. nurses. For the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases. The court in this case does away with its ruling in the 1999 case. exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. Reposo. FOURTH. Anzures. the hiring. 64 Agas. once negligence is shown. or proof of a similar nature. in effect. The Court finds that respondent hospital‘s position on this issue is meritorious. but rather. Court of Appeals. SECOND. Having failed to do this. Buan. A consultant remiss in his duties. the nutritional diet and medications prescribed by the doctor. Navarrete. While ―consultants‖ are not. THIRD. the burden shifts to the respondents (parent. since there exists an employer-employee relationship between private respondent DLSMC and Drs. such as accreditation by the appropriate board. Respondent hospital. The hospital‘s obligation is limited to providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation. While ―consultants‖ are not. the latter may lose his or her accreditation or privileges granted by the hospital. respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda‘s condition. as well as the services of the hospital staff who perform the ministerial tasks of ensuring that the doctor‘s orders are carried out strictly. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists. 380 SCRA 467 (2002)  See previous Facts: Unlike in the 1999 case. fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting ―consultant‖ staff. the control test is determining.

that the admission of a physician to membership in DLSMC‘s medical staff as active or visiting consultant is first decided upon by the Credentials Committee thereof. Jess Lopez As explained by DLSMC. Estrada to use its facilities when she was about to give birth. it had to be intubated and resuscitated. In the labor room. Nogales v. Because of her age. Buan. In the process. one of the best hospitals at that time (1976). Her blood pressure dropped considerably.‖ Despite Espinola‘s efforts. The employer (or the hospital) must have the right to control both the means and the details of the process by which the employee (or the physician) is to accomplish his task. a piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn (yuck). For failure to file an answer. and other people involved in the care of Corazon. it was Estrada who attended to Corazon. in cases where a disciplinary action is lodged against a consultant. Others were able to so the trial ensued. Moreover. When the baby finally came out. Further. & Roco 3B . There was no showing that CMC had a part in diagnosing her condition. Thereafter. Navarrete. Pediatrics. This exception is also known as the ―doctrine of apparent authority. the same is initiated by the department to whom the consultant concerned belongs and filed with the Ethics Committee consisting of the department specialty heads. Issue: Whether CMC is vicariously liable for Estrada‘s negligence. Estrada. Rogelio signed a ―Consent to Operation. Surgery with the department head of the particular specialty applied for as chairman. Corazon was immediately asked to be admitted to CMC. Dr Oscar Estrada was exclusively in charge of her prenatal care since her 4 th month of pregnancy. 2006 Facts: Corazon Nogales. Estrada was adjudged to be solely liable for damages due to his his incorrect and inadequate management and lack of treatment by misapplying the forceps in the delivery because it resulted in a large cervical tear which had caused the profuse bleeding. (Espinola) was apprised by Corazon‘s condition. CMC was charged with negligence in the selection and supervision of its physicians and staff. After 11 years of trial. On appeal. Held: YES. Thus. she gave birth in a clinic.R. The Credentials Committee then recommends to DLSMC's Medical Director or Hospital Administrator the acceptance or rejection of the applicant physician. 5. Ongchuan. They mainly contend that the defendants were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon. Throughout the pregnancy. Anzures. A ―Consent to Admission‖ and ―Admission Agreement‖ was signed by Rogelio (husband). Corazon was under the exclusive prenatal care of Estrada. the Head of the OB-GYNE Dept. Reposo. After a thorough examination of the voluminous records of this case. Rogelio sued for damages against CMC. such fact alone did not make him an employee of CMC. Estrada then ordered a blood transfusion but it took the CMC Lab 30 minutes to match the blood type and deliver the blood.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. In her past pregnancies. Capitol Medical Center. CMC disclaims liability by asserting that Estrada was a mere visiting physician and that it admitted Corazon because her physical condition then was classified an emergency obstetrics case. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to the patient. and said director or administrator validates the committee's recommendation. Also. 37 years old. Espinola ordered an immediate hysterectomy. Nogales now appeals to further impose liability against CMC. Cusi. a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services rendered by the latter to their respective patients. Villaflor applied low forceps to extract the baby. Similarly. was pregnant with her 4th child. no single evidence points to CMC‘s exercise of control over Estrada‘s treatment and management of Corazon‘s condition. 142625. After giving birth. around 6AM. spouses Nogales decided to do it in Capital Medical Center (CMC). Corazon died at 9:15 AM due to hemorrhage. At the time of her admission at CMC and during her delivery. which is composed of the heads of the various specialty departments such as the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology. When the cervix was fully dilated. CMC merely allowed Dr. No. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the ―ostensible‖ agent of the hospital. In general. G. There is. Corazon showed signs of vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse. however. After experiencing labor pains around midnight of May 25 1976. While Estrada enjoyed staff privileges at CMC. The question now is whether CMC is automatically exempt from liability considering that Estrada is a mere independent contractor-physician. while the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient. an exception to this principle. Estrada assisted by a Dr. December 19. no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment. CA affirmed. Estrada was declared in default. the contract between the consultant in respondent hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent hospital and said patient.‖ 65 Agas. The medical director/hospital administrator merely acts as exofficio member of said committee. Estrada refused the services of anesthesiologist (Enriquez).

2) hospital and the patient. a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital. Issue: Whether a hospital may be held liable for the negligence of physicians-consultants allowed to practice in its premises. Said ―Holding Out‖ does not require an express representation by the hospital that the person alleged to be negligent is the employee. 126467. Held: YES. Cusi. Likewise unconvincing is CMC‘s argument that petitioners are estopped from claiming dama ges based on the Consent on Admission and Consent to Operation. Besides. the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital. that the physician is an independent contractor. Agana. CMC impliedly held out Estrada as a member of its medical staff thus clothing him with apparent authority leading Nogales to believe that Estrada was an employee/agent. Such a person is literally at the mercy of the hospital. 2010 Facts: PSI filed a 2nd MR on the Court‘s decision holding it vicariously and directly liable for damages to Enrique Agana and the heirs of Natividad Agana (based on an employer-employee relationship). or should have known. (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority. & Roco 3B . being in the nature of contracts of adhesion. For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority. A hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine.. Rogelio‘s consent in Corazon‘s hysterectomy to be performed by a different physician. he cannot bargain on equal footing with the hospital on the terms of admission and operation. HOSPITAL‘S MANIFESTATIONS It sometimes described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital . Inc. Such release forms. (3) Estrada‘s referral to the Head of OB-GYNE gave the impression that Estrada was a member the CMC staff. are construed strictly against hospitals.. Inc. There are 3 legal relationships that crisscross : 1) hospital and the doctor. and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent. Reposo. Professional Services.. would be contrary to public policy and thus void. When a person needing urgent medical attention rushes to a hospital. Asian Hospital. Anzures. not under the principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employment relationship with Dr. a plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital. acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. in reality it utilizes doctors. consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In this case. a blanket release in favor of hospitals ―from any and all claims. PSI is liable to the Aganas. 513 SCRA 478 (2007)  See previous 7.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived employment relationship with CMC in accepting Estrada‘s services. 6. Jess Lopez Under said doctrine. Neither do the consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability for Corazon‘s death due to negligence during such treatment or operation. 126297. The doctrine essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent contractor physician. (2) Signing of Consent Forms signed did not indicate that Estrada was an independent contractor. Manila Medical Services. or its agent. Instances: (1) CMC granted staff privileges to Estrada.. and Private Hospital Association of the Philippines all sought to intervene on the common ground that. rather a representation may be general and implied. 66 Agas. Professional Services. v. 3) patient and the doctor. Nos. In this regard. 127590. v. Buan. surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of its business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment. February 2. G. namely Espinola. Ongchuan. Agana. pro hac vice. Ampil but under the principle of OSTENSIBLE AGENCY for the negligence of Dr. PATIENT‘S RELIANCE It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent. Said doctrine is also a species of the doctrine of estoppel. unless the patient knows. Ampil and. Inc. is a clearindication of Rogelio‘s confidence in CMC‘s surgical staff. Inc. under the principle of CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital. The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to Corazon due to negligence during her treatment or operation. the assailed decision and resolution will jeopardize the financial viability of private hospitals and jack up the cost of health care.R. consistent with ordinary care and prudence. the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them. unless modified. Navarrete.‖ which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence. regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor.

By its inaction. Ampil for he believed him to be a staff member of a prominent and known hospital. Regardless of its relationship with the doctor. Ampil been affiliated with another hospital. the hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation. and that the hospital staff was prepared to carry them out. Reposo.indicates that it was Enrique who actually made the decision on whom Natividad should consult and where. bringing the matter to his attention. PSI‘s duty to initiate the review was non-delegable. PSI claimed no reason for it to act on the report on the 2 missing gauzes because Natividad Agana showed no signs of complications. PSI defined the standards of its corporate conduct – that it had a corporate duty to Natividad even after her operation to ensure her safety as a patient. the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 or the principle of apparent authority . second would have been to pinpoint any lapse in procedure to prevent a recurrence thereof and to determine corrective measures that would ensure the safety of Natividad. he ―asked [his] wife to go to Medical City to be examined by [Dr. The excuses are totally unacceptable. PSI is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil whom it expected to inform Natividad. that the medications and treatments he prescribed were necessary and desirable. it shirked its responsibility and passed it on to others — to Dr. Dr. PSI excuses itself from fulfilling its corporate duty on the ground that Dr. Ampil‘s role in it. PSI virtually reinforced the public impression that Dr. Cusi. PSI imposed upon itself the separate and independent responsibility of initiating the inquiry into the missing gauzes. PSI failed its own standard of hospital care. PSI had the power to review or cause the review of what may have irregularly transpired within its walls.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Ampil assumed the personal responsibility of informing Natividad about the 2 missing gauzes. and to Natividad herself to complain before it took any meaningful step. Enrique looked upon Dr. PSI pointed out in its memorandum that Dr. 67 Agas. PSI could not simply wave off the problem and nonchalantly delegate to Dr. Court cannot speculate. the hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 or respondeat superior. consistent with ordinary care and prudence. Ampil. Ampil may have had the primary responsibility of notifying Natividad about the missing gauzes . The record taken during the operation of Natividad which reported a gauze count discrepancy should have given PSI sufficient reason to initiate a review and should not have waited for Natividad to complain. There are 2 factors that determine apparent authority: 1) hospital‘s implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital‘s agent. he would still have been chosen by the Aganas as Natividad‘s surgeon. That Dr. Ampil negligently failed to notify Natividad did not release PSI from its self-imposed separate responsibility. PSI had the duty to take notice of medical records prepared by its own staff when these bear earmarks of a surgery gone awry.‖ The decision made by Enrique for Natividad to consult Dr. Ampil regarding the condition of his wife and as advised by Dr. Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent. While Dr. Rather. Enrique testified that he consulted Dr. Enrique decided to consult Dr. Ampil was a staff member of Medical City. Jess Lopez The exact nature of each relationship determines the basis and extent of the liability of the hospital for the negligence of the doctor. Ricardo Jocson. PSI could not have expected that purpose to be achieved by merely hoping that the person likely to have mislaid the gauzes might be able to retrace his own steps. he said ― I have known him to be a specialist on that part of the body . Buan. The purpose of the first would have been to apprise Natividad of what transpired during her surgery. testified that the group talked about the missing gauzes but Dr. There is ample evidence that the PSI held out to the patient that Dr. therefore. In the ―Consent for Hospital Care‖ signed by Agana. Ampil was its agent. Ampil conducted the surgery. Ampil] . While PSI had no power to control the means or method by which Dr. By its own standard of corporate conduct. Ampil the duty to review what transpired during the operation. Given the standard of conduct that PSI defined for itself. PSI took no heed of the record of operation and consequently did not initiate a review of what transpired during Natividad‘s operation. because he is a neighbor. The purpose of such review would have been to pinpoint when. Ongchuan. Navarrete. Ampil assured them that he would personally notify the patient about it. the inquiry is whether the hospital measured up to it. Ampil as its ostensible agent. Ampil‘s hospital affiliation was not the exclusive basis – that had Dr. & Roco 3B . Anzures. how and by whom two surgical gauzes were mislaid to avert any jeopardy to Natividad‘s recovery. Ampil was significantly influenced by the impression that Dr. When asked what impelled him to choose Dr. and correcting his negligence . and 2) patient‘s reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor. Ampil not as independent of but as integrally related to Medical City. Where an employment relationship exists. The corporate duty was not limited to having its nursing staff note or record the 2 missing gauzes but it extended to determining Dr. Ampil. rather than one independently practicing in it. Ampil was a physician of its hospital. A staff member of the Medical City which is a prominent and known hospital. Under the circumstances at that time. who was part of the group of doctors that attended to Natividad. I expect more than the usual medical service.

Anzures. initiate a review. 1105 of the old CC on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art. and then final judgment was entered therein. Subsequently. both Maranan and defendant Perez appealed to this Court. In Gillaco. The failure of PSI to fulfill its duties as a hospital corporation gave rise to a direct liability to the Aganas distinct from that of Dr. Here. Found guilty. although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. PSI‘s hospital liability based on ostensible agency and corporate negligence applies only to this case. Perez. filed an action in the CFI of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the CFI of Batangas. Devesa's assault cannot be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. 2 hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains. did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. Simeon Valenzuela. the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier mentioned. Manila that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. Maranan v. the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee . Unlike Gillaco. and take corrective measures. Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. ruled for Maranan and awarded her P3. the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. where the deceased was riding. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different. G. Gillaco was decided under the provisions of the CC of 1889 which. When Devesa shot and killed Gillaco. in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. unlike the present CC. 1967 Facts: Rogelio Corachea was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver. No. Ampil. ‖ 68 Agas. The duties of the hospital are distinct from those of the doctor-consultant. the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability. Such wretchedness could have been avoided had PSI simply done what was logical: heed the report of a guaze count discrepancy. Ampil and an admitted corporate duty to Natividad. 1759 which states that ―Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees. The agony of Aganas has gone on for 26 long years with Natividad coming to the end of her days racked in pain and agony. Buan. and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban. The ruling is unique to this case.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. pro hac vice and is not intended to set a precedent and should not serve as a basis to hold hospitals liable for every form of negligence of their doctorsconsultants. The claim against Valenzuela was dismissed. the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties. however. L-22272. since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger. They asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense. From this ruling. Jess Lopez The corporate negligence ascribed to PSI is different from the medical negligence attributed to Dr. While appeal was pending in the CA. Rogelio's mother. for the liability of PSI arose from an implied agency with Dr. after trial. Cusi. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the train. Unlike the old Civil Code.R. The death of the passenger in Gillaco was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. 1174 CC of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. Ongchuan. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the CA.000 as damages against Perez. Antonia Maranan. Held: YES. the new CC expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers. Issue: Whether Valenzuela is liable as the employer of the taxi driver who killed Maranan. Also. Art. June 26. & Roco 3B . Reposo. 8. Ampil. Navarrete. he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The court a quo. by the wording of Art. Valenzuela relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v.. When the crime took place. PSI is liable for P15 million. His tour of duty was to start at 9AM. during the pendency of the herein appeal.

FIRST. Accordingly. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a party thereto. thus facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person. it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. unlike in culpa aquiliana. said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers is the result of the carrier‘s confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger. has power to select and remove them. since the carrier. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. to their total personality. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law. the carrier must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the its employees against passengers. Ongchuan.C. and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a family. The basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person. 23 Phil.‖ For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence. the CC evidently follows the rule based on the second view. 1759. At least 3 very cogent reasons underlie this rule. Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case. Traffic rules (Memorize Articles 2184 and 2185) 1. and THIRD. which is the minority view. September 11. & Roco 3B . Under the FIRST. there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. including their patterns of behavior. there is a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. 8791. Diaz‘s savings account. Anzures. SECOND. No. Diaz and. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees. Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility. In the present case. Navarrete. but also. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders . 2003  See previous Doctrine: Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence. they would be clothing that person presumptive ownership of the passbook (as provided in the savings deposit agreement). The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of Article 1980 on simple loan. Cusi. or culpa contractual. no less important. but above all. Although RA 8791 took effect almost nine years after the unauthorized withdrawal from L. Article 1172 states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract. From Art. once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract. L. the lower court rightly adjudged the carrier liable pursuant to Art. The dismissal of the claim against the driver was also correct. It is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability. 138569. Reposo. Buan.C. as between the carrier and the passenger. and social attitude. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual. Juanillo. G. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L. Solidbank failed to discharge its burden to rebut the presumption by failing to present to the trial court the teller and failing to prove that the teller indeed verified the identity of the person who retrieved the passbook. therefore. the bank is liable to its depositor. United States v. Section 2 of RA 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000) prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks – that banks must observe ―high standards of integrity and performance‖ in servicing their depositors.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Under the SECOND. moral fibers. Jess Lopez The CC provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. In culpa contractual. (iii) Violation of rules and statutes a. the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety. Article 1172 provides that ―responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law.R. CA. 1759 of the Civil Code. 212 (1912) 69 Agas. jurisprudence at the time already imposed on banks the same high standard of diligence required under RA No.C. thus. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. 9. inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers. and not the passengers. Solidbank‘s tellers must ex ercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative.

He put on his brakes but could not stop right on the spot. Neither Latoja nor Labrila heard the blowing of the horn or any other warning until the machine was so close that Latoja and Labrila barely had time to make their escape. According to the witnesses for the defense. putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel on such roads.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose. as well as all others. why did you run 3 or 4? A. Where the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary. Q. They were then going about 10 MPH. of which the Juanillo was the chauffeur. All the witnesses for the defense testified that the middle of the road was clear at that place and time and that the deceased. horses. Iloilo by being struck by an automobile. the man on the right side started to run across the road. The operator of an automobile is bound to exercise care in proportion to the varying danger and risks of the highway and commensurate with the dangers naturally incident to the use of such vehicle . In view of all the admitted facts and circumstances. The prosecution presented 4 witnesses and the defense 6. while the deceased. Held: YES. I should say. Latoja heard a noise behind them and turning around he saw an automobile approaching. The defense introduced the testimony of the members of the party riding in the automobile. when on the highway. and Miller) and that of the chauffeur. the brakes were applied with such force that he and his companions were all thrown forward. While they were walking and having a conversation. were in perfectly safe places and that the deceased would not have been killed if he had not at tempted to cross from the right to the left side of the road . and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. it is his duty to adopt some other or safer method if within reasonable care and prudence he can do so. did not have sufficient time. when they were about 25 feet away from the natives. He called out immediately that an automobile was coming and jumped to the left. Reposo. whereby such other person suffers injury. and son of Leal). sir. yet the machine still continued running. Automobile drivers or the drivers of animals are not to use the means of locomotion without regard to the rights of others having occasion to travel on the highway. Cusi. and each must exercise such care and prudence as the circumstances demand. Rimmer. Agraviado. being on the left. was seen lying on the ground. I was going about 8 miles an hour. They ran about 3 or 4 brazas more when the automobile stopped. In determining the degree of care an operator of an automobile should use. Leal on the other hand. hitting the deceased under its own momentum for about 150 or 200 yards. He is obliged to take notice of the conditions before him. it is proper to take 70 Agas. At the time they hit the man they were going about 6 or 8 MPH. he noticed up ahead about 80 or 100 brazas some men walking in the road and that when he got up to within about 40 or 50 brazas of them he closed off his gasoline and kept blowing his horn. Dean. Ongchuan. Labrila. Leal. It makes an unusual noise. Its use as a vehicle for traveling is comparatively recent. and its application depends upon the situation of the parties. Anzures. and the unreasonableness of the stories told by the defendantappellant and his witnesses we are fully satisfied that the trial court was justified in accepting the testimony of Latoja. that it can be driven at a great velocity—at a speed many times greater than that of ordinary vehicles drawn by animals. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care. colliding with Labrila and knocking him into the ditch. According to the witnesses for the prosecution (Labrila. It is generally held that the rights and duties of pedestrians and vehicles are equal. According to Juanillo. having been knocked down by the automobile. and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country roads. that courts will take judicial notice that an automobile makes an unusual noise. precaution. & Roco 3B . and Latoja were walking along the road toward Santa Barbara that afternoon. When they were within about 2 or 3 brazas of the men. Buan. I don't know. and Agraviado as to how the collision took place. It has been held. Latoja. Some part of the automobile hit him. and that it is highly dangerous when used on country roads. and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. While an automobile is a lawful means of conveyance and has equal rights upon the roads with pedestrians. Labrila. its use cannot be lawfully countenanced unless accompanied with that degree of prudence in management and consideration for the rights of others which is consistent with safety. It is a relative or comparative. Hardwood. Latoja was in the middle of Labrila (left) and Leal (right). He also placed his foot on the exhaust so he could make a noise. Owners of automobiles have the same rights in the streets and highways that pedestrians and drivers of horses have. and carriages. Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. Issue: Whether Juanillo is liable for reckless imprudence. Each may use the highway. If you could stop going at 8 miles an hour within 2 brazas. including the Juanillo. (Becker. It can be and usually is made to go on common roads at great velocity — at a speed many times greater than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals. The prosecution contends that the death of the deceased was due to the reckless driving of the Juanillo while the defense insists that the unfortunate occurrence was purely an accident. and if it is apparent that by any particular method of proceeding he is liable to work an injury. Jess Lopez Facts: Ponciano Leal was killed on the public highway while going from the town of Pavia to Santa Barbara. Navarrete. not an absolute term.

Reposo. Just before reaching the scene of the accident. but it is well to understand. was bound to use a high degree of care to avoid injuring these native farmers . under such circumstances. Underwood. that the automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. and the amount of noise it makes. the entrance being from the front or the rear platform. Cusi. the one the Chapman at tempted to board. after he saw the deceased and his companions walking in the road ahead of him to continue at so great a speed. with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other. except on the two or three occasions on which they testify they have visited Iloilo. that is. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding. there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran. He had no right. he immediately. and somewhat hurriedly. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car. is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals. in front of whose house the accident happened. facing toward the rear platform. the speed of the automobile. he followed along behind it. went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. The negligence of Juanillo in the case at bar consisted in his failure to recognize the great injury that would accrue to the deceased from the collision. 2. as above described. Jess Lopez into consideration the place.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. manner of movement. who had a common right to the highway. These are propelled along fixed rails and all the traveling public has to do to be safe is to keep off the track. capable of doing great damage if not skillfully manipulated. Juanillo was aware of and is chargeable with the knowledge that the deceased and his companions were simple country people and were lacking in the capacity to appreciate and to guard against the dangers of an automobile driven at a high rate of speed. The quantum of care required is to be estimated by the exigencies of the particular situation. was almost in front of Underwood‘s automobile. But the automobile can be turned as easily as an individual. or walking. by the place. whereas. Chapman attempted to board the front platform but. presence or absence of other vehicles and travelers. G. A driver of an automobile. 1914 Facts: At the time the accident occurred. and thus caused an error of judgment by which the boy ran in front of the automobile. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person get out of the way in the best manner possible. When one comes through the highways with a machine of such power as an automobile. passed from the gate into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. Thereupon the Underwood no longer followed that street car nor went to the left. Creveling. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the Underwood‘s automobile. the degree of care required to be exercised varies with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. No. An automobile is much more dangerous than a street car or even a railway car. Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching. 71 Agas. and anything that indicates unusual or peculiar danger. Also. appearance. and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. where an auto mobile came up on him under circumstances which produced fright and terror. Underwood entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur. presence or absence of other travelers. it is absolutely under the power and control of the driver. its size. counsel for the Juanillo says: ―Two native farmers who all their lives have seen nothing that moves faster than a bull cart. if this course is adopted and an accident occurs. He desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an accident. it has been held not to be negligence per se in a boy of 6 to play on the highway. and he was bound to enlarge to a commensurate extent the degree of vigilance and care necessary to avoid injuries which the use of his machine made more imminent. seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion. but either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. and for this reason is far more dangerous to the traveling public than either the street car or the railway train. Buan. or even a fast horse. and furthermore. driving. In his brief. it is incumbent upon the driver to use great care not to drive against or over pedestrians. for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction. at the eminent hazard of colliding with the deceased. March 28. Chapman had been visiting his friend. Navarrete. the street car which he was following took the switch — that is.‖ Under such conditions Juanillo being in charge of the powerful machine. Chapman v. The testimony of all the parties in the case at bar as to the surrounding conditions of this occurrence was to the effect that the road on which they were traveling was dotted with simple rural folk. The car was a closed one. & Roco 3B . An automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances. stopped beside the car. One of these switches was located at the scene of the accident. A street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana being immediately in front of him. The car which the Chapman intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which Underwood was going. train. Ongchuan. Great care was due from him by reason of the deadliness of the machine he was propelling along the highway. his driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the Chapman. Thus.R. Anzures. 9010. cannot be expected to give an intelligent idea of speed of an automobile. it seems to us.

David. Chapman. whether present or not. or little to the right of the center of the street instead of on the left side thereof. according to the law of the road. Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a competent driver. As we have said in the case of Johnson vs. without any effort to stop him. after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom. Bill and Rabonsa brought the injured man to the hospital and gave an account of the incident to the authorities. An owner who sits in his automobile. on seeing him. if the driver. for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. accompanied with loss of memory. is not responsible. Reposo. The physician described him as incurable and hopeless imbecile. Ana to Manila. Underwood‘s driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the Chapman. having seen the Coombs crossing the street at a certain distance in front of the automobile. if that was necessary. at a speed of 60 MPH. Third and last. becomes himself responsible. we do not now decide. Jess Lopez Held: NO. Cusi. and was being driven at the time of the accident in furtherance of the owner's business. the machine was almost at a standstill. Crame. no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car. or other vehicle. 72 Agas. the driver does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the CC for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. becomes himself responsible for such acts. At the same time. The vehicle was passing from Sta. sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. by a SUDDEN act of negligence. and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts. as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. On the other hand. as owner of the car. Although in David the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver. It does not appear from the record that. both criminally and civilly. the owner of the automobile. he was induced to reduce his speed to about 10 MPH. would be responsible. first. in coming out to board the car. Anzures. He knew that. One of the cars was driven by a certain Stuart. was not obliged. for the negligent acts of his driver when the automobile was a part of a business enterprise. 30 Phil. Second. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. Underwood. 1 (1915) Facts: At around 11-12 PM. under the facts and circumstances of this case. although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so. The interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. therefor. he altered the course of the automobile as much as possible in order to avoid collision but was unable to do so. & Roco 3B . Coombs (victim of the accident and a US private) was rendered unconscious and remained in a state of mental debility. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right. Thereafter. The trial court convicted Crame of the crime of producing serious physical injuries by imprudencia temeraria (reckless imprudence). is liable. for his own protection. Crame.Torts & Damages 2013 Issue: Whether Underwood. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta. It found that the accused. however. the same rule applies where the owner is present. from the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury. He alleged that at the time the automobile struck the man. in that the accused was driving in the center. Crame. by his acquiescence. Ana from Manila. Atty. did not reduce the speed of the automobile sufficiently. Crame alleged that the car driven by Stuart (a Cadillac) had high powered electric lights and because of such. to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand. is not responsible for the negligence of his driver. unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. Navarrete. nor attempt to stop the machinery entirely. either civilly or criminally. a duly licensed chauffeur was driving an automobile along with Bill (a sailor) and Rabonsa. in that it does not appear that the accused sounded his horn or whistle or used his voice to call the attention of the person who was crossing the street or notify him that he should stop and avoid being struck by the automobile. to avoid an accident. Because of the accident. injures a person or violates the criminal law. United States v. makes his driver's act his own. Buan. 3. Ongchuan. He asserts that he suddenly saw a man in front of his car and that. it coming to a complete stop within 6 feet where the injured man lay. for example. although present therein at the time the act was committed. and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance. there were 2 automobiles heading to Sta.

the accident would have been avoided (considering that the speed would have been around 10-20 MPH) Second. testified that the automobile at the time of the accident was traveling on the right-hand side of the street. Bill. the burden of proof was on defendant to establish that the accident occurred through other causes than his negligence. he did not sound his horn or give notice of his approach in any other manner. the court cannot sustain the allegation of accused that he was driving at about 10 MPH only. and such a place should be approached guardedly . at the time of the accident. Furthermore. First the accused claims that he was unable to stop his automobile. According to the law of the road and the custom of the country he should have been on the left-hand side of the street. with the machine under control and with ability to stop with reasonable quickness. The mere fact that he was run down by an automobile does not signify that he was negligent. Accused could have stopped his vehicle immediately if he saw the soldier at about 20 feet. Third. accused failed to sound his horn and arrest the attention of the soldier who was crossing the street. Additionally. if true. the automobile was being driven on the right-hand side of the street. This story is not corroborated by any other witness in the case. The defendant was aware of these facts. in the an action to recover damages for having been run down by defendant's automobile. & Roco 3B . There is no allegation or proof offered by the accused. the area where the accident took place is a place where many persons habitually wait to transfer and where as a matter of fact many persons stroll about waiting for cars . on the right-hand side of the street where he had a right to be and where the law fully protested him from vehicles traveling. Cusi. There is no building on either side of the street. although the street at that point was brilliantly lighted. that. Instead of that he chose to take what appears from the evidence to have been almost the extreme right-hand side of the street. was being driven on the wrong side of the street. that the rails of the street-car track made it difficult for automobiles to cross or pass over them and that keeping to the extreme left-hand side of the street would endanger the safety of the automobile and the passengers. Moreover. speaking from the direction in which the accused was driving the automobile at the time. first declared. the accused alleged that they were unable to pass along the left side of the road since there was a ditch and that the road was uneven which would have brought greater danger on Crame and his passenger. The accused intimates in his testimony that a carromata was approaching him just before the accident occurred and that it obscured his vision to such an extent that he did not see that soldier until the very moment of meeting the carromata. he testified himself that the street at that place was not level. Atty. it appeared that the automobile. According to the evidence there was abundant room for him to drive upon what may properly be called the left-hand side of the street and still be free from danger or risk. since there still remains the center track. The accused did not see the soldier whom he ran down until it was too late. There is nothing in this story of the accused which. Additionally. At the time he was struck he was. Ongchuan.Torts & Damages 2013 Issue: Whether Crame is liable. The court upheld the findings of the trial court. Anzures. Jess Lopez Held: YES. All of these are facts which require care and diligence on the part of an automobile driver. Negligence cannot be attributed to Coombs. he would still have seen Coombs crossing since the carromata would have only momentarily obscured his vision for a moment. Buan. Given that there was even a carromata. who testified on the trial that the accused was driving on the left-hand side of the street. Navarrete. They found that there were 3 grounds for the negligence of Crame. The fact that the accused did not see the soldier until the machine was very close to him is strong evidence of inattention to duty. The street at the place where the accident occurred is wide and unobstructed. The testimony showing that the accused was driving on the right-hand side of the street is corroborated by the fact that the witness Rabonsa. Reposo. It appears clearly established by the evidence that the accused was driving on the right-hand side of the street when the accident happened. he was traveling on the wrong side of the street at the time of the collision. However the court found that this view is unsustainable since there were 2 street car tracks that and that accused would not need to bring his automobile to the left side track near the ditch. if he did not see that soldier until 73 Agas. he did not apply the brake or make any effort whatever to stop. Thomas M. in his statement to the prosecuting attorney. relieves from the charge of negligence under the other facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. who was a passenger in the automobile which ran down the soldier. at the time the injury was produced. However this was refuted that had he begun to stop the machine upon seeing Coombs. While it is true that the law does not draw an inference of negligence from the mere showing that there was a collision between a man and an automobile on a public street but that negligence must be proved where. There is no place from which a person desiring to cross the street can dart out so suddenly and unexpectedly as to give a chauffeur no opportunity to protect him.

Caedo tried to avoid the Cadillac but it was too late. if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. prevented the misfortune. as he claimed later on at the trial. 26 SCRA 410 (1968) Facts: A vehicular accident occurred injuring Marcial Caedo and several members of this family. the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar. Caedo v. could have. 2180 as owners of an establishment or enterprise. CA affirmed. the owner is solidarily liable with his driver. it only applies to owners of vehicles who are not included in the terms of Art. Also. a presumption arose that Luna‘s employer. The CFI ruled that Bernando was negligent. taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. Inc. The mishap occurred at about 530AM of March 24. and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers). The carretela was provided with two lights.. Luna was convicted with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and physical injuries while the jeepney driver was acquitted. only 8 meters away. if the former. With regard to DLBC‘s defense under Art. private respondent Angeline Steen (16-yrs) suffered an injury wherein her left arm had been scraped bare of flesh from shoulder to elbow. Having established the fact of Luna‘s negligence through the judgment of conviction that was presented as evidence. With them in the car were Mrs. Court of Appeals. Caedo and 3 daughters. De Leon Brokerage Co. 4 SCRA 517 (1962) Facts: DLBC owns a cargo truck which was driven by Luna. he drove back to Manila. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son. considering the condition of the road and the absence oftraffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 KPH. Issue: Whether DLBC is solidarily liable with Luna. Yu Khe Thai. Held: YES. There is something wrong when a chauffeur runs over a man who is in plain view of the automobile for a long distance before the point of the accident is reached . Held: YES & NO. Buan. 5. after unloading its cargo in Pampanga. by the use of the due diligence. This petition alleges that Luna was not in the discharge of his duties at the time of the accident and. The trial court held Luna solidarily liable with DLBC. And even if he did not notice the lights. Luna was instructed by DLBC to go to Pampanga and. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai. 74 Agas. On his way back. there were casualties. Leopoldo Steen (father) reserved the right to file a civil action pending the criminal action he instituted against Luna and the driver of the jeepney. with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel. Caedo et al filed the present complaint for damages against Yu Ke Thai and Bernando. Ongchuan. and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. 1958 on Highway 54. As a result. Reposo. Bernando tried to avoid a carretela (going in the same direction) in front of him by suddenly swerving to the left lane where Caedo was driving in the opposite direction. Julian Bautista. On the day in question. v. Luna figured in a collision with a passenger jeepney. Moreover. thus. It is of no moment whether he is drunk or not since it was not proven and that it would have contributed to the accident. Jess Lopez too late to stop. DLBC should be held liable. 2184 of the CC which states that — In motor vehicle mishaps. proceed to Nueva Ecija.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. the burden is on him to show why he did not. from there. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. in the absence of determinative proof that the Luna deviated from his employer‘s instructions. The 2 cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds. and that he is solidarily liable with Yu Ke Thai. After said conviction. Issue: Whether Bernardo was negligence and whether Yu Ke Thai can be held solidarily liable. & Roco 3B . Anzures.. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent. DLBC was not able to prove that it exercised the required diligence. 4. who was in the vehicle. Navarrete. for unknown reasons. Ahead of the Cadillac. the court cannot ascribe to accused‘ defense that the soldier was drunk. In other words. Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Lastly. going in the same direction. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in QC to the airport where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. Steen filed an action to recover damages under quasi delict and presented the judgment of conviction as evidence for his claim for damages. DLBC. Cusi. was a carretela owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. DLBC also claims that it cannot be held liable pursuant to Art. one on each side. However. 2184. Bernando was guilty of negligence. DLBC cannot be held solidarily liable. was negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him.

Dahl-Jensen. An owner who sits in his automobile. He was Yu Ke thai‘s driver since 1987. Bernardo. Court of Appeals. & Roco 3B . by a sudden act of negligence.R. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact. Negligence on the part of the latter. Bernardo is an experienced driver. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence. And even when he did see it at that distance. The road was wide and open. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. G. (FILCAR). Reposo. tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right. is not responsible. makes his driver's act his own. 118889. under Art. FGU sued Dahl-Jensen and 75 Agas. where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone. the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. if the causative factor was the driver's negligence. The thought that entered his mind. was at the center lane. Thus. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant. must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident. Jess Lopez In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. if any. and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance . for he was not himself at the wheel. a Danish tourist. 1998 Facts: At 3AM. FGU Insurance. It was a thought that. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. Inc. and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street. the basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondeat superior but rather the relationship of pater familias. FGU Insurance Corporation v. paid the latter P25. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. but was unsuccessful. after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom. within the meaning of Article 2184. the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. necessarily subjective . that is. decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela. Thus the Court declared that no negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him. owned by respondent FILCAR Transport. 2 vehicles (Lancers) cruising northward along EDSA figured in a traffic accident. to a great degree. By way of subrogation. if the driver. As he did so the curved end of his ear's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel.20. reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. The test of his negligence.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. becomes himself responsible for such acts. either civilly or criminally. Caedo. It was a risky maneuver either way. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own Lane. judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. veered to the left in order to pass. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. Cusi.382. instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear. there is no question as to Bernardo‘s negligence. of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped. did not possess a Philippine driver‘s license. Ongchuan. The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. he slackened his speed. and before that served another master for 10 years as a driver. March 23. Buan. however. obliquely to the other lane. and devoid of traffic that early morning. 2184. The car owned by Lydia F. confronted with the unexpected situation. Navarrete. injures a person or violates the criminal law. and the risk should have been quite obvious. 6. connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune. by the performance of negligent acts. say. and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee. therefor. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 is. was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. The other car. No. by his acquiescence. As to Yu Ke Thai‘s liability. Anzures. On the other hand. he said. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it. although present therein at the time the act was committed. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner. or else squeeze in between them in any case. in view of its insurance contract with Soriano. What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part. Bernardo. wise or not. the owner of the automobile. left of the other vehicle. or other vehicle. Thus.

CA affirmed but on a different ground: only the fault or negligence of Dahl. de Caldo that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another. Jr. and also against BULLETIN. 76 Agas. and. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates . FILCAR did not have any participation. In that case. Sr. Anzures. Jr. Sr. Netherlands Insurance Company. the former not being an employer of the latter. fault or negligence of FILCAR. could have by the use of due diligence. Reyes. FGU‘s insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling. prevented the misfortune. considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven by Alfredo Mallari. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the death of Israel Reyes was caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers . Hence. Jr.. if the former. he was later dropped from the complaint. consequently. that the driver was not its employee but of the lessee. 7. TC dismissed for failure of FGU to substantiate its claim of subrogation. Correlating par. Likewise. filed a complaint for damages against Mallari. FGU failed to prove the existence of the 2nd requisite. Navarrete. the following are the requisites: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff. The court was not persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the burdens and responsibilities of an employer. Reposo.‖ Such is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Thus. The points of collision were the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van of BULLETIN. and Alfredo Mallari. 2180 with Art. Art. Vda. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. It was driven by Felix Angeles. 2176. FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen. and the N. and Mallari. To prove quasi-delict under Art. Ongchuan. its driver Felix Angeles. because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established. the trial court ordered BULLETIN and Felix Angeles to pay jointly and severally the widow. Before he passed by the Fiera. FGU insists rely on the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. The summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given address. FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. who was in the vehicle. the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused injuries to several persons and damage to property. its claim against FORTUNE can neither prosper. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver of the Bulletin delivery van.Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of FILCAR. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle. the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. Intending to exculpate itself from liability. 5 of Art. 324 SCRA 147 (2000) Facts: At around 5AM. The liability under Art. i. The damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was due to the fact that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle he was driving was at the center lane. the widow. Mallari. There is no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries. Cusi. Claudia G. Mallari v. & Roco 3B . testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the right lane. Court of Appeals. Issue: May an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and. the corporation raised the defense that at the time of the collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle? Held: NO. The 2 right wheels of the delivery van were on the right shoulder of the road and pieces of debris from the accident were found scattered along the shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger jeepney. Jess Lopez FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance. Sr. FGU has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict.. Jr. 2184 which provides t hat ―in motor vehicle mishap. Buan. he saw the van of BULLETIN coming from the opposite direction. collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin Publishing Corp. negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen and must be his personal liability . It also dismissed the complaint against the other defendants Alfredo Mallari.e. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari. and. Jr. the passenger jeepney driven by Alfredo Mallari. Jr. the owner is solidarily liable with his driver. 2180 is not applicable.V. The sketch of the accident showed that the collision occurred after Mallari. (c) connection of cause and damage.

Ongchuan. Pleyto tried to overtake a tricycle. 432 SCRA 329 (2004) Facts: Philippine Rabbit (PRBL) is a public carrier. the widow. that the collision occurred immediately after Mallari. servicing various routes in Central and Northern Luzon. Held: YES. unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Issue: Is Mallari Jr. smashing head-on into the Mitsubishi Lancer. who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier. Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway.. Felix Angeles and N. Reposo. pars. 1755. Navarrete. Netherlands Insurance Company. It found Pleyto negligent in its disregard of the other car. based on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities which were not disputed. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve. the same petitioner himself testified that such fact indeed did occur. Sr. As found by CA. Mallari. The proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes. a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees by the contract of carriage. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5AM mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook 2 vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. and any injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.V. and it was drizzling. filed an action for damages against PRBL and Pleyto. Pleyto v. Contrary to their allegation that there was no evidence whatsoever that petitioner Mallari. it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former‘s employees. He stepped on the brakes. in case of death or injuries to passengers. liable for the accident. the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari. the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages sought by the passenger. Jess Lopez On appeal the CA modified the decision and found no negligence on the part of Angeles and consequently of his employer BULLETIN. he swerved to avoid the trike. Jr. A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. and was inspected prior to the trip. unless there is proof to the contrary. (a) and (b). CA ruled that the collision was caused by the sole negligence of Alfredo Mallari. & Roco 3B . Buan. The RTC held petitioners solidarily liable. 8. only to collide with the Lancer. Under Art. 2185 CC. when it suddenly stopped in the middle of the road. Jr. it found that Pleyto clearly violated traffic rules 77 Agas. Under Art. Pleyto‘s bus figured in a head on collision with a car. It absolved from any liability respondent BULLETIN. PRBL and Pleyto argue that the bus was running slowly. It was 11:30 am. Mallari. Pleyto was merely following the trike. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage. Sr. According to one of the bus passengers. but hit it instead. it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Under Art. Cusi. 1756. It believed the passenger‘s testimony as against petitioners‘ self-serving story. Further. otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances.. In this case. Carmela and Maria. Jr. Mallari failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. a passenger of the jeepney. but the bus still skidded. was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney. there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. by his own admission. Pursuant to Art. The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against Mallari. Jr. He swerved to the opposite lane. killing Ricardo Lomboy and injuring Carmela Lomboy. Lomboy. Pleyto was one of its drivers. The CA correctly found.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Anzures. of RA 4136 as amended. 41. overtook a vehicle at a curve on the road at the time of or before the accident. 1759. resulting in the above hassles.

Ongchuan. Buan. but that of its co-defendant SUGECO since it was SUGECO. Navarrete.. and then proceeded to collide with the incoming car with such force that the car was pushed beyond the edge of the road to the ricefield. v. employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications. was not its employee.. Jess Lopez and regulations. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. The speed of the bus. including Pleyto. The speed at which the bus traveled. repeated demands were made by UCPB for payment of the aforesaid amounts. and the proximity of the car coming from the opposite direction were duly established by the evidence. he was violating any traffic regulation. petitioners failed to present any convincing proof rebutting such presumption. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve. Defendant-appellant‘s claim that he was driving at a mere 30 to 35 KPH does not deserve credence as it would have been easy to stop or properly maneuver the bus at this speed. Inc. The negligence and fault of appellant driver is manifest. Indeed. Gonzaga. He overtook the tricycle despite the oncoming car only fifty (50) meters away from him. Under Article 2180. was traversing the Laurel Highway in Lipa City when the car. in the selection of prospective employees. the driver Gonzaga continued on his way to his destination and did not bother to bring his victims to the hospital. no documentary evidence was presented to prove that PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees. With respect to the supervision of employees. As found by both the CA and the trial court. and thus was negligent under Article 2185. PRBL was liable under Article 2180. there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent. The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in an explosion of the rear part of the car.. The CA found PRBL liable for Pleyto‘s negligence pursuant to Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 . Anzures. These facts must be shown by concrete proof. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. Held: YES. Plaintiff-appellee paid the assured UCPB representing the insurance coverage of the damaged car. & Roco 3B . Reposo. inappropriate in the light of the aforementioned circumstances. then driven by Flaviano Isaac with Conrado Geronimo. it is not enough for the employer to emptily invoke the existence of company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. is evident from the fact despite the application of the brakes. In fine. and not petitioner. that was the actual 78 Agas. Manager of said bank. It was held that ―in order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible.. UCPB General Insurance Co. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies without anything more is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. Inc. including documentary evidence. the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee. PCI Leasing and Finance.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Regarding PRBL‘s negligence. since the driver of the truck. The driver and passenger suffered physical injuries as well. (SUGECO). having failed to present any proof to the contrary. experience and service records. when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties. there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. Cusi. Thus. defendant appellant Renato Gonzaga. the Asst. A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. and driven by its employee. Inc. monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. PRBL presented several documents in evidence to show the various tests and prequalification requirements imposed upon petitioner Pleyto before his hiring as a driver by PRBL. The CA affirmed the decision. 9. However. Issue: Whether or not Pleyto was negligent. the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. interposed the defense that it could not be held liable for the collision. Pleyto violated traffic rules and regulations when he overtook the tricycle despite the presence of an oncoming car in the other lane. Article 2185 lays down the presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap. 557 SCRA 141 (2008) Facts: A Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by UCPB and insured by UCPB General Insurance Inc. Worse. was hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck owned by PCI Leasing allegedly leased to and operated by Superior Gas & Equitable Co. As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing. the drizzle that made the road slippery. the bus still bumped the tricycle. employers must formulate standard operating procedures. PCI Leasing. No payment was made so UCPB filed the present case.

Anzures. there is more reason. in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE of motor vehicles regislation: (1) Identification of the vehicle and of the operator. it would be easy for him. but he PCI Leasing has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the UCPB. which apparently tends to favor absolving financing companies from liability for the consequences of quasi-delictual acts or omissions involving financially leased property and adds that these developments have been legislated in our jurisdiction 79 Agas. Petitioner. The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its use is well-established in jurisprudence. This being the case. The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving him of liability. if unregistered. because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway. In contemplation of law. the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver. does not even involve a transfer of title or ownership. which is to protect the unwitting public and provide it with a definite person to make accountable for losses or injuries suffered in vehicular accidents. Cusi. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens. for the damages caused to third parties. a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is. and in accordance with such proof escape or evade responsibility and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle? NO. has no effect as to the right of the public and third persons to recover from the registered owner . by collusion with others or otherwise. A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint. Should not the registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who the actual and real owner is. but the mere use or enjoyment of property. In case a separate civil action is filed. with respect to the public and all third persons. in case of accident. jointly and severally. Jess Lopez operator of the truck. it considered a financial lease or financing lease a legal contract though subject to the restrictions of the so-called Recto Law or Articles 1484 and 1485. It is also important to emphasize that such principles apply to all vehicles in general. Reposo. or 2) solidarily. Ongchuan. In this case. & Roco 3B . in this instance to uphold the policy behind the law. even if a sale has been executed before a tortious incident. the PCI Leasing. Issue: Whether PCI Leasing. with the driver thereof. responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual. PCI Leasing presented a lengthy discussion of the purported trend in other jurisdictions. or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. unlike a sale. such as a lessee. is primarily responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of UCPB. For damage or injuries arising out of negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle. and may sue accordingly. or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways. including the negligence of the driver. the long-standing principle is that the registered owner of a motor vehicle is primarily and directly responsible for the consequences of its operation. however. the registered owner. MR was denied hence this petition. Buan. The public has the right to conclusively presume that the registered owner is the real owner. In earlier cases. and (2) As a deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the rules of conservative and safe operation. The registered owner. but a mere lease. against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. admitted that it was the owner of the truck in question. the sale. Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred. as in land registration cases. Since a lease. said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to comply with the registration that the law demands and requires.delict that gave rise to the case. which remained unregistered up to the time of the occurrence of the quasi. RTC ruled in favor of UCPB General Insurance. therefore. Navarrete.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. pursuant to a Contract of Lease signed by PCI and SUGECO. CA affirmed. as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in a quasi-delict may be held liable. if the aggrieved party seeks relief based on a delict or crime under Articles 100 and 103 of the RPC. not just those offered for public service or utility. Held: YES. with the actual operator and employer. the registered owner may be held civilly liable with the negligent driver either 1) subsidiarily. being considered as merely the owner ‘s agent. to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person. The registered owner of the vehicle driven by a negligent driver may still be held liable under applicable jurisprudence involving laws on compulsory motor vehicle registration and the liabilities of employers for quasi-delicts under the CC. Court recognizes that the business of financing companies has a legitimate and commendable purpose. if the complainant seeks relief based on a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180. there is not even a sale of the vehicle involved.

Añonuevo‘s petition .A. notwithstanding developments in foreign jurisdictions. Trial on the civil action ensued and RTC rendered judgment against P &G and Añonuevo . machinery or other property leased to a third person or entity except when the motor vehicle. Añonuevo was ―umaarangkada‖ or speeding as he made the left turn into Libertad. as amended. which needs to be registered in order for it to bind third parties. which necessitated his hospitalization several times and forced him to undergo 4 operations. PCI Leasing pays the price for its failure to obey the law on compulsory registration of motor vehicles for registration is a pre-requisite for any person to even enjoy the privilege of putting a vehicle on public roads. & Roco 3B . He also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo . Nor was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. as required by the same ordinance. Villagracia sued for damages against P&G. in fact. traversing the opposite lane. 80 Agas. Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. its employees or agents at the time of the loss. Thus. The car was owned by P &G. claims or judgments‖ arising from the latter‘s use of the motor vehicle. Añonuevo proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his part . CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto . No. A lease such as the one involved in the instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation of law. lease. do not supersede or repeal the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration. P&G and Añonuevo filed their respective appeals . Añonuevo points out that Villagracia‘s bi cycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell. or financial lease. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. No. Añonuevo‘s arguments are especially fixated on a particular question of la w: whether Article 2185 should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles. in order to be valid against third parties must be recorded in the Bureau (now the Land Transportation Office). aircraft. damage or injury. No part of the law expressly repeals Section 5(a) and (e) of R. They may resort to third-party complaints against their lessees or whoever are the actual operators of their vehicles.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. P&G‘s petition was denied by this Court . (e) Encumbrances of motor vehicles. Ongchuan. damages. The non-registration of the lease contract between petitioner and its lessee precludes the former from enjoying the benefits under Section 12 of R. the new law. suits. but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge . attachments. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result. was given due course. Court of Appeals. Neither is there an implied repeal of R. for that matter. He posits that Article 2185 applies by analogy. for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave on his bike . Reposo. CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC. 4136. vessel. damage or injury caused by a motor vehicle. was driving his Lancer . R. 4136. Añonuevo insists that Villagracia‘s own fault and negligence serves to absolve the former of any liability for damages . aircraft. However they are not without recourse. 8556. on the other hand.. care and diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided. Jess Lopez in RA 8556 which provides that ―Financing companies shall not be liable for loss. equipment. Anzures. Jonathan. 441 SCRA 24 (2004) Facts: At around 9PM. Buan. Compulsory registration of motor vehicles.A. vessel. 5. Whether petitioner would act against SUGECO based on this provision is its own option. and other encumbrances of motor vehicles. to wit: ―Sec. and Añonuevo before the RTC . foot break or headlights. equipment or other property is operated by the financing company. otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. thus causing a comminuted fracture. nor does he dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the CA. that as testified by eyewitness . that Añonuevo‘s vehicle had actually hit Villagracia‘s left midthigh. still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents. Cusi.A. Navarrete.A. In the case at bar. and that Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution . The burden of registration of the lease contract is minuscule compared to the chaos that may result if registered owners or operators of vehicles are freed from such responsibility. In the same vein. a provision in the lease contract between petitioner and SUGECO to the effect that the latter shall indemnify and hold the former free and harmless from any ―liabilities. Among them: that it was Añonuevo‘s veh icle which had struck Villagracia. Añonuevo had enough warning to control his speed . 8556. that considering Añonuevo‘s claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing his path as he made the turn . while Añonuevo . as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance. the rule remains the same: a sale. the employer of Añonuevo‘s brother . No. —Mortgages.‖ However.— (a) All motor vehicles and trailer of any type used or operated on or upon any highway of the Philippines must be registered with the Bureau of Land Transportation for the current year in accordance with the provisions of this Act. No. Añonuevo v. there is. 10. that is not registered with the Land Transportation Office.

Navarrete. Ongchuan.‖ A driver of an automobile. As far back as 1912. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. Reposo. such would not exonerate Añonuevo from payment of damages . a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an accident. negligence per se or negligence in and of itself. 2185 which presumes negligence on the driver of a motor vehicle if he was violating a traffic regulation should apply to non-motorized vehicles. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles was significantly lower than as it stands today. the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has ―inescapably become matter of public concern‖ so as to expand the application of the law to be more responsive to the times. it is obvious. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the Code. (2) NO. and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromota. assuming there was contributory negligence on his part. Anzures. it is a legal cause of the harm. which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. At the time Article 2185 was formulated. Art. There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle. putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel on such roads. Held: (1) NO. unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from humanpowered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles. when the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition.motorized vehicles or for that matter. negligence as a matter of law. ―and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country roads. or. it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap. in Juanillo. Villagracia does not dispute these allegations . Unless there is proof to the contrary. Añonuevo points out that modern -day travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted. the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable of great speed. for reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the 2 vehicles. Issue: (1) Whether Art. failure to conform to such standard is negligence. is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals. scooters. the number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of then. Jess Lopez Article 2185. whereas. but directs our attention instead to the findings of Añonuevo‘s own negli gence. doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be injured thereby . & Roco 3B . and. Villagracia also contends that . Its applicability is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only. according to the decisions on the question. motorized vehicles are more capable of inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision. that more is required from the former to fully discharge the duty than from the latter.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. 81 Agas. it is absolutely under the power and control of the driver. as it has been otherwise expressed. Buan. At the same time. which he admitted during the trial . or. such argument contradicts historical experience. when the standard of care is fixed by law. Cusi. it is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent . Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction with the adoption in New CC. (2) Whether Villagracia‘s negligence negates his claim for damages. is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non. greater than that of ordi nary vehicles hauled by animals. for the reason that non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe. and furthermore. While the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle. Motorists are required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision with bicyclists. yet the framers of the New CC chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term ―motorized vehicles . the legislators ―must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be specifically mentioned. he was violating any traffic regulation. A motorized vehicle.motorized vehicles. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent. Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed a municipal ordinance requiring the registration of bicycles and the installation of safety devices thereon. pedestrians. These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today. in the absence of a legal excuse .‖ If Añonuevo seriously contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles. and there is no ground to presume that the law intended a broader coverage. then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to include non. If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle. but rather. The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence.‖ yet today. under such circumstances. for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction. negligence per se.

At this juncture both were moving obliquely to the left. but in their character and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence. Hiceta. Clearly. produces the injury. upon reaching Brgy. Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights. After having supper and imbibing a bottle of beer. without that left turn executed with no precaution. was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. in the manner in which it happened. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for. instinctively veered to the left but it was also the moment when Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned to the left towards the side road. intervening cause. The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident. However. the jeepney was travelling in the same direction but made a sudden left turn. Heirs of Rey Castillon. but imperative to examine Villagracia‘s behavior in relation to the contemporaneous circumstances of the accident. However the same is misplaced. or cyclists. The doctrine (and Article 2185. That case also involved a motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle. Jess Lopez The fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward an injury intervened between the violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the result so remote that no action can be maintained. and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Apparently. The incident resulted in the death of Ray Castillon and injuries to Sergio. Held: YES. and without which the result would not have occurred.‖ In Raynera. Ongchuan. 11. Reposo. This reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone within the path of Añonuevo‘s car as it turned into the intersection . 452 SCRA 285 (2005) Facts: Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother and borrowed his motorcycle. Nino. & Roco 3B . He then invited his friend Sergio and went to a roadtrip around Iligan City with Ray as the driver and Sergio as the backrider. It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events or agents. unbroken by any efficient. they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney owned by Lambert and driven by Reynaldo. who was following closely behind. When Reynaldo Gamot was approaching the side road. he slightly veered to the right for his allowance. as the trial court correctly held. the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo. Sto. Proximate cause is defined as that which. Navarrete. and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles ―who bump the rear of another vehicle‖ are presumed to be ― the cause of the accident. Cusi. which would then be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result . At face value. ruling that the proximate cause of the accident was due to the negligence of Reynaldo. The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. Lambert v. in the natural and continuous sequence. it is not sufficient to rely solely on the violations of the municipal ordinance. but such negligence is without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. Lambert relies on the court‘s ruling in Raynera v. Buan. the mishap in all probability would not have happened. the death of the victim was solely attributable to his own negligence in bumping the rear of the 82 Agas.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Anzures. However . But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. such lapse on the cyclist‘s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn. was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Castillon. Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of the jeepney throwing the driver forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the left front door of the jeepney even as the motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney veered back to the right and sped away. Such failure alone is not determinative of Villagracia‘s negligence in relation to the accident. Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident was due to Raynaldo‘s negligence. unless contradicted by other evidence. for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability. for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. pedestrians. To determine if Villagracia was negligent. This was also backed by testimonies that Reynaldo did not even stop for a second nor check for any following vehicles before turning left. whether they are fellow motorists. The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part. Ray Castillon. it was proven that Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn. Villagracia‘s mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated . It is but indicative of Villagracia‘s failure in fu lfilling his obligation to the municipal government. without first establishing his right of way.

and 3) Mamador was notoriously negligent for violating the employer‘s prohibition against laborers riding haulage trucks. On April 30. Workmen‟s Compensation Commission. being the driver of the rear vehicle. Thus. allegedly to protect it from theft. Macunat was convicted but could not pay the indemnity to Mamador heirs. Buan. Inc. Cipriano v. 23. (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer. at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed. upon the heir s‘ claims before the Workmen‘s Compensation Commissioner. And the Commissioner correctly considered this violation as possible evidence of negligence. Thus. 1991. as it took only 6 hours to complete the process of rustproofing. Also. On Aug. For the last part. it turned over and hit a coconut tree. Issue: Whether MIMA should pay said referee‘s award to the Macunat heirs Held: YES. 1991. and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. was specified. Jess Lopez trailer truck which was traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 KPH. brought a 1990 model Kia Pride to petitioner‘s shop for rustproofing. "no danger or risk was apparent.. 2) Since Macunat was convicted and made to pay indemnity. which we have interpreted to mean the same thing as "gross" negligence implying "conscious indifference to consequences" "pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury" "utter disregard of consequences. 263 SCRA 711 Facts: Elias S. it ordered MIMA to pay referee‘s award of compensation to said heirs. he boarded a haulage truck owned by MIMA with other employees and driven by Macunat. which is engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles. Cipriano claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle. private respondent Maclin Electronics. (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney. The fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant. 1951. but it declared that under the circumstances. For this reason. b.. however. It was established that Ray. which Cipriano also owned. the criminal case was not a suit for damages against a third person which would bar the claimant from claiming under the Workmen‘s Compensation Law. Anzures. the same has been sufficiently contradicted by evidence. The trailer truck therein did not make a sudden left turn as in the case at bar. Nevertheless." Getting or accepting a free ride on the company's haulage truck couldn't be gross negligence. According to the Cipriano. Cipriano is the owner Mobilkote. because as the referee found. while trying to overtake another truck on the company road. Also. even granting there was negligence. Statutes and ordinances/administrative rules 1. The vehicle was received in the shop under a Job Order which showed the date it was received for rustproofing as well its condition at the time. the theory that drivers of vehicles ―who bump the rear of another vehicle‖ are presumed to be the cause of the accident. 480 (1956) Facts: Mamador is an employee of MIMA. Ongchuan. The law permits the Commissioner to take testimony without notice provided that ex parte evidence is reduced in writing and the adverse party is afforded the opportunity to rebut. which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision. This prohibition by MIMA could not be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or board. violation of a rule promulgated by the Commission or board is not negligence per se but it may be evidence of negligence. Marinduque Iron Mines Agents. although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio. including the Kia Pride. Inc. MIMA questions the order of the Commissioner on the grounds that 1) MIMA was not given opportunity to crossexamine. In the afternoon of May 1. the car was brought to his shop at 10AM of April 30. Cusi. Reposo. the laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence. Mamador died. Raynera. it surely was not "notorious" negligence. unlike 3 other cars which had been saved because they were parked near the entrance of the garage. a claim is barred based on the Workmen‘s Compensation law. As a result." 2. Court of Appeals. adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release. there was simply not enough time to get it out of the building. On its way to their place of work. there is no doubt that mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. 83 Agas. Castillon is also guilty of contributory negligence but only serves as a mitigation of the damages awarded. through an employee. v. in this case. However. The car had been kept inside the building. 1991 and was ready for release later that afternoon. contributed to the same result. These circumstances. had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant. 99 Phil. Navarrete. & Roco 3B .

Sanitary Steam Laundry (SSL) v.. Ministry Order 32 provides that consumer mechanical/industrial equipment stored for repair/service in the premises should be covered by an insurance policy for risks like theft. One of those who died was the driver. As a result.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The RTC found SSL‘s driver to be responsible for the vehicular accident and accordingly held SSL liable to private respondents. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence. Issue: (1) Whether Cipriano was required to insure his business and the vehicles received by him in the course of his business. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders him liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron. No. a statutory duty imposed on Cipriano and it is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to Maclin. The other passengers were family members and friends whom they invited to an excursion to the beach after the visit to the construction site. 1572. No. Cusi. FF Cruz‘s failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence. (4) The material s and chemicals used for rustproofing are not inflammable and thus he could not be made to assume the risk of loss due to fire. & Roco 3B . Cipriano is required to register with the DTI. and (2) Whether his failure to do so constituted negligence. FF Cruz and Co. 1572 and to insure it as required in the rules implementing the Decree. The panel truck was on its way to SSL‘s plant in Dasmariñas. It alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the negligence and imprudence of Cipriano. thus. since it was Cipriano‘s negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss. 1991 and that it was Maclin‘s delay in claiming it that was the cause of the loss. At about 8:00 p.R. the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by SSL‘s panel truck. The driver. Jess Lopez This prompted Maclin Electrinics to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against Cipriano. No. (2) He was not negligent. this circumstance cannot exempt him from liability for loss. Anzures. fire. Finally (5) he also claimed that he was not required to register his business with the Department DTI . 84 Agas. Batangas. The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management Consultants. No. 1988  See previous Doctrine: Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 3. which caused the death of 3 persons and the injuries of several others. In the instant case. Cipriano invoked the following defenses: (1) he alleged that the loss was due to a fortuitous event. which was traveling in the opposite direction. 52732. flood. 300 SCRA 20 (1998) Facts: This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of SSL and a Cimarron. Ministry Order 32 of the DTI requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. citing his failure to register his business with the DTI under P. Under PD 1572 and its IRR. his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane. CA affirmed. Ongchuan. Cavite after delivering some linen to the Makati Med. The Cimarron was owned by Salvador Salenga. While the fire in this case may be considered a fortuitous event. Cipriano‘s negligence is the source of his obligation.D. Court of Appeals. The group stayed at the beach until 5:30 PM. rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured against.D. August 29. claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. And as a condition for such registration. (3) He further averred that private car was ready for release as early as afternoon of April 30. Reposo.m. because he was not covered by P. Buan. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite on its way back to Manila. Herman Hernandez. Held: YES. G. Inc. (PMCI) who just visited the construction site of a company project in Lian. and loss.. when they decided to go back to Manila. v.. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. There is. Court of Appeals. 4. as he employed an electrician who regularly inspected the lighting in his restaurant and rustproofing shop and he claimed he had installed fire-fighting devices. It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to Maclin was due to a fortuitous event. Navarrete. father of one of the employees of PMCI.. RTC and CA: failure of Cipriano to comply with P. with more reason should FF Cruz be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez.D. Inc. We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.

Jess Lopez The driver of the Cimarron. There is nothing in the testimonies of the passengers of the Cimarron. another passenger who was seated in front of the Cimarron. there was ―decreased visibility. Be that as it may. such as the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus. even if both headlights of the Cimarron were lighted. Nor is there any basis in fact for SSL‘s contention that because of overcrowding in the front seat of the Cimarron there was ―decreased manueverability‖ which prevented the Cimarron driver from avoiding the panel truck. He tried to correct himself when asked by SSL‘s counsel whether the panel truck speedometer indicated miles or kilometers by saying that the speedometer measured kilometers and not miles. which petitioner invokes. There is absolutely no basis for this claim. The police investigator did not state in his report or in his testimony that the Cimarron had only one headlight on. Private respondents filed this civil case for damages before the then CFI of Rizal against SSL. but on cross examination his testimony got muddled.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Issue: Whether SSL is liable as an employer Held: YES. cannot apply to this case. SSL says that ―driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident. is only 50 KPH. Indeed. Anzures. SSL has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. particularly Charito Estolano. Reposo. namely. he would have had no difficulty bringing his panel truck to a stop. Clearly. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Jason Bernabe and Dalmacio Salunoy. given the suddenness of the events. The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of SSL‘s driver. Nicanor Bernabe III testified. he invaded a portion of the opposite lane and consequently hit the Cimarron. the overcrowding in the front seat was immaterial. the swerving of SSL‘s panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that SSL‘s driver was running the vehicle at a very high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well. There was no swerving of the vehicle in that case but skidding. SSL‘s contention that because of ―decreased visibility. and two of his passengers. the road was dry and 85 Agas. Hence. Rolando Hernandez. As the trial court noted. the panel truck driver testified that his vehicle was running at the speed of 60 MPH.‖ that because the Cimarron had only one headlight. Thus. died. & Roco 3B . Cusi. its driver failed to see the Cimarron is without any basis in fact.‖ and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded ―decreased [its] maneuverability. Ongchuan. Indeed. Navarrete. SSL‘s driver claimed that the distance between the panel truck and the passenger jeepney in front was about 12 meters. That no ―maneuvering‖ which the Cimarron driver could have done would have avoided a collision with the panel truck. The case of Bayasen. Only its driver claimed that the Cimarron had only one headlight on. CA affirmed. which suggest that the driver had no elbow room for maneuvering the vehicle. it appears that the d river of the Cimarron tried to avoid the collision but because of the emergency created by the speeding panel truck coming from the opposite direction he was not able to fully move his Cimarron away from the path of the oncoming vehicle. from the testimony of some of the witnesses.77 kilometers per hour) or 60 KPH. It is very probable that the driver did not really apply his brakes (which is why there were no skid marks) but that finding the jeepney in front of him to be in close proximity. Several of the other passengers of the Cimarron were injured and taken to various hospitals. the fact remains that the panel truck was over-speeding because the maximum allowable speed for trucks and buses on open country roads. In the process. there was no way either driver could have avoided the collision. however. whether the driver meant 60 MPH (which could be 96. The panel truck driver‘s testimony is consistent with the testimonies of private respondents that the panel truck went out of control and simply smashed into the Cimarron in which they were riding. In this case. The foregoing testimonies show that the driver of the panel truck lost control of his vehicle and bumped the Cimarron. similarly testified that they just saw the panel truck hurtling toward them. Buan. Based on the evidence in this case. To the contrary. Cavite.‖ Mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury. he tried to avoid hitting it by swerving his vehicle to the left. If this was so. RTC of Makati awarded the damages incurred by the SSL as proved in the trial. and it was caused by the fact that the road was wet and slippery. it would have been bumped just the same because the driver of the panel truck could not stop despite the fact that he applied the brakes . It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. who was seated in front. Charito Estolano.‖ caused by the fact that the Cimarron allegedly had only one headlight on.

He fired it at Araneta. had an opportunity to avoid the collision but he ignored the signals from the other vehicle. Manuel S. while removal of the scar on the face obviously demanded plastic surgery. The CFI found Arreglado‘s father negligent in allowing his son access to the pistol. They must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by law.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty.943. The others called Dario and talked with him. David Bautista. Because of his good conduct. It likewise contends that the CA‘s position that it failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees by not requiring its prospective employees to undergo psychological and physical tests before employment has no basis in law because there is no law requiring such tests prior to hiring employees. 104 Phil.000 as compensation for the "permanent deformity and — something like an inferiority complex" as well as for the "pathological condition on the left side of the jaw" caused to said plaintiff. there was no such opportunity given the Cimarron on the night of the mishap. In that case. Araneta. Furthermore. Jess Lopez safe. Arreglado. With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical tests prior to his employment. He survived. SSL‘s reliance on the McKee is also misplaced. The Aranetas appealed. (iv) Dangerous weapons and substances Civil Code o Article 2188 (Memorize) 1. the vehicle had been bumped by the truck. for which the doctor's charges would amount to P3. they were sentenced to Pay P3. Ongchuan. said that it has a policy of requiring job applicants to submit clearances from the police and the NBI. Buan. driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Indeed. Navarrete. passed by. expenses and medicines. the operation. exclusive of hospitalization fees. Araneta v. Accordingly. What the CA said was that SSL‘s policy of requiring prospective employees to submit NBI and police clearance and to have at least 2 years experience as driver prior to employment was not enough to prove the exercise of due diligence and that even this policy petitioner failed to prove by its failure to present the driver‘s NBI and police records during the tria l. licensed in the name of his father.000. His friends took him to the infirmary and later to the Singian Hospital. wanting P112. Diño. SSL‘s failure to require submission of these documents does not mean that it did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. who was hit in the lower jaw. The only explanation for this occurrence was human error. Arreglado pleaded guilty to frustrated homicide. but was inhibited and became morose. Issue: Whether or not the damages awarded was proper Held: INADEQUATE. but being only 14 years old and pursuant to Article 80 of the RPC. The CA did not say that SSL‘s failure to submit NBI and police clearances of its driver was proof that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the selection of its employees . although no law requires it. would have allowed himself to wait for the outcome of this case in order to secure funds to bring his son to 86 Agas. Anzures. But the supposed company policies on employment were not in writing . We are not impressed by the reasoning of the court a quo in refusing to consider the cost of plastic treatment as a proper element of the indemnity for damages. the Social Welfare Administrator discharged him and quashed the criminal case. Nor did Bautista show in what manner he supervised the drivers to ensure that they drove their vehicles in a safe way. he was committed to the care of Mr. would probably have to be repeated in order to effectuate a complete cure. It argued that ―if this was really necessary it is peculiar that the father. seated atop a low ruined wall bordering Dakota Street in Manila. surgical intervention was needed. a truck. the driver of the vehicle at fault. & Roco 3B . it behooves employers to exert extra care in the selection and supervision of their employees. In the case of applicants for the position of driver they are required to have at least 2 years driving experience and to be holders of a professional driver‘s license for at least two years. Everything happened so quickly that before the passengers of the Cimarron knew it . Lerma. such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due diligence. Arreglado. Arreglado resented the banter and pulled out a Japanese Lugar pistol. according to Dr. In allowing not more than P1. a former Atenean. to slow down and allow it to safely pass the bridge. In this case. Reposo. Cusi. they twitted and made kanchaw him on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in De La Salle. 529 (1958) \ Facts: Araneta was talking with other Ateneans. the office manager of SSL in its Dasmariñas plant . a car.000. the court below overlooked the clear evidence on record that to arrest the degenerative process taking place in the mandible and restore the injured boy to a nearly normal condition. An action was then instituted against Arreglado and his parents for damages. There was no reason for the vehicle to swerve because of road condition. In this case.

and further considering that a repair. CA promulgated its resolution affirming in toto the original decision of the lower court. The father's delay. Moreover. and to take all requisite measures to prevent minors and other unauthorized parties from having access thereto. September 12.000. That the injury should be treated in order to restore him as far as possible to his original condition is undeniable. and a permanent scar on her cheek. an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.R. legs and face. who shall answer in solidum for the payment of the indemnity. The accident which befell he Spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of PLDT. The damage to the jaw and the existence of the scar in Benjamin Araneta's face are physical facts that can not be reasoned out of existence. It is also the hope of the Court that the award in the present case will remind licensed possessors of firearms of their peremptory duty to adequately safeguard such dangerous weapons at all times. Both PLDT and Spouses appealed. and Mrs. Still. and ordering Barte to reimburse whatever amount paid by PLDT. should not be allowed to prejudice the son who has no control over the parent's action nor impair his right to a full indemnity. Issue: Whether PLDT is liable for negligence. or even his negligence. if it was necessary. it would not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND. it is admitted that plaintiff is a man of much more than moderate means and no father in his position would have let pass the present situation. Buan. Records show that: First. the pain suffered by the injured party. we are of the opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court should be increased to a total of P18. and the fact that he has waited and waited in the opinion of the court would prove that after all plastic surgery was not and is not very necessary. Cusi. Navarrete. Ongchuan. PLDT contends that the injuries sustained by Spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible. have taken his son to America. CA reversed holding that Spouses were negligent and consequently absolving PLDT from the claim for damages. 57079. since their own experts asserted that the operation could be competently performed here by local practitioners. Evidence shows tiremarks that the ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep 87 Agas. Estaban‘s jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson S treet. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. Jess Lopez America. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte. III. Barte claimed that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site. taking into account the necessity and cost of corrective measures to fully repair the damage.000. PLDT v. Barte and Company. Court of Appeals. Anzures. G. as well as the voluntary character of the injury inflicted. No. is never equivalent to the original state. If it had remained on that inside lane. Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. Held: NO. however skillfully conducted. Plaintiff‘s negligence is the proximate cause of injury Civil Code o Article 2179 (Memorize) 1. an independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit system. Thereafter.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. is L. the windshield of the jeep was shattered. & Roco 3B . with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of excavations. the decision appealed from is affirmed with the modification that plaintiff Benjamin Araneta shall recover damages in the amount of P18. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of Spouses ordering PLDT to pay. Competent observers have recently called attention to the fact that the growing teenage hooliganism in our society is principally due to parent's complacency in and neglect of their progeny. Juan Arreglado. pursuant to Article 2194. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms. while her husband suffered cut lips. if at all.‖ The father's failure to submit his son to a plastic operation as soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is not called for.00 from defendants Dario Arreglado and his parents Mr. 1989 Facts: The case is about an action for damages instituted by Sps Esteban (private respondent) against PLDT for the injuries they sustained in the evening of July 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench. his feelings of inferiority due to consciousness of his present deformity. cost what it may. DEFENSES A. he would without loss of time. Wherefore. We do not believe that plaintiffs-appellants should recover the cost of a plastic operation and surgical treatment in the US.R. Reposo.

Buan. Estabans already knew of the presence of said excavations. and were placed in their seats to which they were strapped. 2. Furthermore. such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Before the plane Mabuhay was put in condition for the flight. If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. in which he was to make the flight. swerving from the inside lane. As a resident of Lacson Street. Fourth. November 24. Inc. Philippine Aerial Taxi Co. the plane Taal arrived and it was decided to have Kim make the flight therein. Second. 39309. Kim saw how it was started by turning the propeller repeatedly and how the man who did it ran away from it each time in order not to be caught by the said propeller. By exercising reasonable care and prudence. Cusi. . otherwise his action must fail. in front of Iloilo. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested. notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT. Kim v. The plane landed on the waters of Guimaras Strait. 88 Agas. he would not have seen any warning sign either. and to prevent the sudden cooling of the engine which might cause serious damage. No. having seen it many previous times. entering the same by the rear or tail end. The pilot shut off the gasoline feed pipe. they were shown how the straps could be tightened or loosened in case of accident and were instructed further not to touch anything in the plane. Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident. They cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger. & Roco 3B . Ongchuan. even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of Esteban. He knew of the existence and location of the ACCIDENT MOUND. At that speed. The omission to perform a duty. there is insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. Navarrete. they would not have been thrown against the windshield and they would not have suffered their injuries.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The absence of a police report of the incident and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where Spouses were allegedly treated have not even been satisfactorily explained. Third. Later. but not in such a way as to allow the outer lane to be freely and conveniently passable to vehicles. Anzures. Kim had to wait for some time. however. Therefore. This operation was necessary in accordance with the established practice of aviation in order to avoid danger of fire which would exist if the pipes and carburetor remained full of gasoline. he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. especially to the valves. but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there . hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence. and taxied toward the beach until its pontoons struck bottom.The engine of the plane Mabuhay. Spouses‘ jeep was not running at 25 KPH as claimed.. Evidence shows that the ditches on Lacson Street north of the ACCIDENT MOUND had already been covered. but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time.R. Lastly. G. permitting the engine. With the drizzle. That Spouses‘ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND. Reposo. Spouses Esteban only presented the self-serving testimony of Esteban and the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the scene of the accident. With ordinary precaution. The above findings clearly show that the negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the mishap and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The situation could have been worse to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason no picture of the ACCIDENT MOUND facing south was taken. 1933 Facts: Teh Le Kim bought in Manila a passenger ticket for a flight to Iloilo in one of the PATCO's hydroplanes. If he was running on the outside lane at 25 KPH his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car even on dim lights was negligence on his part . The ditches along Lacson Street had already been covered except the 3 or 4 meters where the ACCIDENT MOUND was located. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. was not working satisfactorily. to continue to function until all the gasoline was drained from the feed pipe and carburetor. It would not have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the tiremarks. he should have driven his jeep on the night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND. it must have been running quite fast. Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act. Thus. The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs. Kim and his companion were carefully carried from the beach to the plane. While the engine was being tested. when the plane stopped. If the jeep had been braked at 25 KPH. Jess Lopez swerving from the left that is. he should not have run on dim lights. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and visible.

while the banca. respondent refused. emerged from behind the counter and informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. pursuant to the procedure observed under the ―Inspect Airwarn Support System‖ (IASS). This. Kim ought to know that a propeller. ashore. they shouted frantically and motioned to him to keep away from it. & Roco 3B . once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. were on the beach to meet the plane and to make arrangements for the disembarking of the passengers. Kim. he had to wait for a banca to take him ashore. Buan. caused him embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was done in front of his family and the other customers lined up at the check-out counter. is so clear that it is not necessary to cite aut horitative opinions to support the conclusion that the injury to his right arm and the subsequent amputation thereof were due entirely and exclusively to his own imprudence and not to the slightest negligence attributable to the defendant entity or to its agents. Jess Lopez At the moment the pontoons touched bottom and while the pilot was signalling to the banca (to stay away from propellers because it was dangerous). not being a man of ordinary prudence. Sometime after. be it that of a ship or of an aeroplane. Petitioner appealed. Held: NO. went down the ladder to the pontoon and walked along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller. is dangerous while in motion and that to approach it is to run the risk of being caught and injured thereby . v. American Express International. Hence. as he threw up his arm.. G. 2005 Facts: AMEX is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to its customers which the latter uses to purchase goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide. Noel bought some goods and handed to the sales clerk his AMEX extension card. He ought to know furthermore that inasmuch as the plane was on the water. Ongchuan. hastily left the cabin of the plane. place them in a banca. The propeller first grazed his forehead and. Noel Cordero. Bohn and Garrett of Warner. was not yet in a position to take him. Susan Chong. In order to do this. October 14. By sheer common sense. Its representative said he wants to talk to respondent in order to verify the latter‘s identity. Inc. The pilot in charge of the plane has had 14 years experience. placed his card under the IASS (a system used by AMEX to protect both the company and its cardholders from fraudulent use of their charge cards. otherwise the card is revoked or confiscated. Due to respondents‘ refusal. He alone should suffer the consequences of his act.). then turn the plane around by hand so as to have the rear or tail and thereof towards the beach. according to respondent. they went to Watsons Chemist Shop. take the passengers out by the aforesaid rear or tail end thereof. Kim acted with reckless negligence in approaching the propeller while it was still in motion. turn the rear or tail end of the plane towards the shore. it was necessary to wait for the propeller to stop. Kim unfastened the straps around him and. Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own AMEX card. she cut respondent‘s AMEX card in half with a pair of scissors. The usual procedure in discharging passengers from a hydroplane is to wait until the propeller stops . 89 Agas. The sales clerk verified the card by making a telephone call to the AMEX Office in Hong Kong. If the true identity of the card owner is established. That Kim‘s negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident. Anzures. Reposo. and take them ashore. the card is honored and the charges are approved. respondent together with his wife and relatives went on a holiday trip to HK. not even waiting to put on his hat. However. safe and sound. Nila Cordero. which was to take him ashore was still some distance away and the pilot was instructing the boatman to keep it at a safe distance from the plane. walked along one of the pontoons and directly into the revolving propeller. consignees of the PATCO in Iloilo.R. and then take the passengers to shore in a banca. but the Kim took no heed of them. Issue: Whether PATCO is liable for negligence. Cordero. Nilda called up AMEX‘s office in Hong Kong where it was learned through the Senior Authori zed that a person in HK attempted to use a charge card with the same number as respondent‘s card. Notwithstanding the shouts and warning signals given him from the shore. Navarrete. Upon seeing Kim walking toward the propeller. the store manager . Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against AMEX. Barnes & Co. it was caught by the revolving blades thereof and so injured that it had to be amputated. 138550. The HK AMEX Office called up respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and not in HK. Cusi. An extension card was also issued to her husband. Thereupon. No. The RTC ruled in favor of Cordero. wife of respondent was one such holder. 3. During the trip.. The plane arrived at the destination with nothing more left to do but to take Kim and his companion. and when the banca. the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. climbed over the door to the lower wing.

she was discharged the next day on July 31. enabling the latter to determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Issue: (1) Whether mode of appeal was correct (NOT IMPORTANT) (2) Whether Dr. Reposo. common sense. AMEX representative requested that he talk to Mr. To prove these. Manalo claimed that the raspa procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Ramolete‘s uterus which resulted to the hysterectomy. Furthermore. no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to AMEX . 2008 Facts: Editha Ramoleta was 3 mos pregnant. Stated differently. AMEX could not prove then that he is really the real card holder. (2) NOT LIABLE. Proximate cause is that cause which. a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done. 1994 with instructions from Dr. where tort is that which breaches the contract. As such. the contract can be said to have been breached by tort. Ramolete was brought to the hospital as she suffered from vomiting and severe abdominal pain. Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally. In the present case. If at all. Ramolete did not show up on said date. and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. authored and co-authored various publications on the subject. proximate cause. Lasam failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done. to constitute quasi-delict. Ramolete did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that Dr. No. As a result. 1994. breach. & Roco 3B . Lasam presented the testimony of Dr. 4. Filed an administrative case with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for gross negligence and malpractice. Ongchuan. he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. the cause of respondent‘s humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to AMEX‘s representative. Manalo. (1) RULE 43 was proper. Respondent anchors his cause of action on Article 2176. Laksa to return for a check-up after 4 days. produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Upon the latter‘s appeal to the CA via Rule 43. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract. Again the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to AMEX‘s representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. Cordero but he refused to talk to any representative of AMEX. it was revealed that her fetus had a weak heart. Lasam‘s license. the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. AMEX can revoke respondent‘s card without notice. PRC can be considered by analogy. she can no longer bear a child. and in like surrounding circumstances. on appeal. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. On the other hand. As explained by respondent himself. Buan. There may be an action for quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties . Lasam is guilty of medical malpractice. Cusi. G. when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability. expert testimony is required. there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. December 18. On Sep 16. Due to the persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding. there was no negligence on the part of the AMEX. 90 Agas. But there are exceptions. After undergoing a pelvic sonogram. Clearly. this appeal. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic. another sonogram was conducted and showed no fetal movement. it was dismissed because PRC was apparently not enumerated as one of the quasi judicial agencies in Rule 43. 159132. according to the terms of the Cardmember Agreement.R. Lasam. Additionally. She was brought to Lorma Med Center in La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Hence. Cayao-Lasam v. thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. The following day. It was later found that there was a dead fetus in her womb. In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise. she was admitted. Atty. This could have been accomplished had respondent talked to AMEX‘s representative. PRC dismissed the case but.Torts & Damages 2013 Issue: Whether or not AMEX is liable to Cordero for the humiliation suffered by the latter. Anzures. in natural and continuous sequence. Navarrete. Augusto M. it reversed itself and caused the revocation of Dr . policy and precedent. The 4 elements involved in malpractice suits are: duty. Clearly. she was made to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or raspa. under similar conditions. Upon advice of Dr. After the procedure. There was testimony to that effect which showed that when Watson Company called AMEX for authorization. In order to successfully pursue such a claim. and is a professor at the UP. her uterus had ruptured and had to undergo a hysterectomy. Spouses Ramolete. Jess Lopez Held: NO. who was clearly an expert on the subject as he specializes in gynecology and obstetrics. injury.

Lasam could have conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine her health condition and applied the corresponding treatment which could have prevented the rupture of her uterus.m. This being the case.m. Mrs. AMEX‘s Manila office finally transmitted the Approval Code to AMEX‘s Amsterdam office.m. Also. the store manager informed Pantaleon that AMEX was asking for bank references. which. AMEX responded by explaining that the delay in 91 Agas. thus. based on the evidence presented.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Lasam advised her to return 4 days later. Ongchuan. the Pantaleon family proceeded to the US. in natural and continuous sequence. The immediate cause of Ramolete‘s injury was her own act. Pantaleon decided to purchase some diamond pieces worth a total of $13K. Pantaleon v.. Where the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff‘s own act. Manalo testified that assuming there was in fact a misdiagnosis. the chain of continuity as required in order that the doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was interrupted.. Coster had not received approval from AMEX for the purchase so Pantaleon asked the store clerk to cancel the sale . 2010 Facts: In October 1991. Inc. The group began their sightseeing at around 8:50 AM with a trip to the Coster Diamond House (Coster). The raspa procedure having been conducted in accordance with the standard medical practice. 5. Pantaleon experienced delay in securing approval for purchases using his AMEX credit card on 2 separate occasions. the respondent could have examined her thoroughly. in defiance of Lasam‘s orders. In this case. with the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. Had Editha returned. it appears that after Pantaleon‘s purchase was transmitted for approval to AMEX‘s Amsterdam office at 9:20 a. Pantaleon presented his AMEX credit card to the sales clerk to pay for this purchase. Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured. To have enough time to take a guided city tour of Amsterdam before their departure scheduled on that day.. AMEX still had not approved the purchase. American Express International. and that there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha. when Ramolete was discharged after the raspa on July 31. Had she returned. Medical malpractice is often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of which proximate cause between the negligence and the injury is one of the requisites that need be proven. After the trip to Europe. Ramolete omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have avoided the injury. is the proximate cause of the injury. Dr. was referred to AMEX‘s Manila office at 9:33 a.m. and without which the result would not have occurred. However. it took AMEX a total of 78 mins to approve Pantaleon‘s purchase and to transmit the approval to the jewelry store. Manalo testified that the raspa procedure was conducted in accordance with the standard practice. Reposo. at the latest. 45 minutes after Pantaleon presented his credit card. He did this at around 9:15AM. Jess Lopez Further. Since the city tour could not begin until the Pantaleons were onboard the tour bus. At around 9:40AM. August 25. whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage. The store manager. Pantaleon sent AMEX a letter demanding an apology for the humiliation and inconvenience he and his family experienced due to the delays in obtaining approval for his credit card purchases. No. While at Coster. Coster decided to release the purchased items to Pantaleon even without AMEX‘s approval. the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Ramolete‘s injury was her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up. he cannot recover damages for the injury. G. it is clear that her omission was the proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a contributory negligence on her part. concurring with the defendant‘s negligence. however. she failed to do so. 1994. together with his wife and kids went on a guided Euro tour. produces injury. Again. and was approved by the Manila office at10:19 a. Again. Pantaleon responded by giving the names of his Philippine depository banks. the tour group planned to leave Coster by 9:30 a. Navarrete. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. Proximate cause has been defined as that which. in which no negligence can be attributed to the Lasam. Anzures. & Roco 3B .R. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about her own injury. 174269. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act.. which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors. Cusi. Subsequently. she cannot recover damages from the injury. Pantaleon. convinced Pantaleon to wait a few more minutes.m. Buan. In all. and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.. At 10:38 a. the same would have been rectified if Editha followed the Ramolete‘s order to return for a check-up. Upon return to Manila. From the records.

AMEX. As such. Issue: Whether or not AMEX was negligent. we generally adhere to the 2nd view. Buan. namely: the sales contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment which accepted the credit card. A card membership agreement is a contract of adhesion as its terms are prepared solely by the credit card issuer. The CA reversed. We have to distinguish the contractual relationship between the credit card issuer and card holder with the creditor-debtor relationship which only arises after the credit card issuer has approved the cardholder‘s purchase request. Held: NO. to protect the interest both if Amex and Pantaleon. Pantaleon filed an action for damages against the AMEX. Second view: the card membership agreement itself is a binding contract between the credit card issuer and the card holder. The first relates merely to an agreement providing for credit facility to the cardholder. (c) the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment. Reposo. but in Pantaleon‘s case. a necessary question in a legal analysis is – when does this relationship begin? There are 2 diverging views on the matter. Dissatisfied with this explanation.‖ Based on the evidence on record. The SC then affirmed the RTC decision and held that AMEX was guilty of mora solvendi. we have uniformly held that contracts of adhesion are ―as binding as ordinary contracts. 92 Agas. Since AMEX has no obligation to approve the purchase requests of its credit cardholders. AMEX now files an MR questioning the said decision. AMEX made its position clear that it has no obligation to approve any and all charge requests made by its card holders. RTC ruled in favor of Pantaleon. when cardholders use their credit cards to pay for their purchases. Court found that AMEX failed to timely act on Pantaleon‘s purchases. the loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder. does not render the agreement void. and (c) the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor‘s performance. In more concrete terms. they merely offer to enter into loan agreements with the credit card company. (b) the loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder. The 3 requisites for a finding of default are: (a) that the obligation is demandable and liquidated. This view finds support in the reservation found in the card membership agreement itself which clearly states that AMEX ― reserve[s] the right to deny authorization for any requested Charge. had an obligation as the credit provider to act on Pantaleon‘s purchase requests. however. In our jurisdiction. and lastly. E-credit card transaction involves 3 contracts. with ―timely dispatch.‖ By so providing. First view: each credit card transaction is considered a separate offer and acceptance. The decision was based mainly on the testimony of AMEX‘s credit authorized personnel who testified that the approval time for credit card charges would be 3 to 4 seconds under regular circumstances. This circumstance. Only after the latter approves the purchase requests that the parties enter into binding loan contracts. it took AMEX 78 minutes to approve the Amsterdam purchase.‖ The only effect is that the terms of the contract are construed strictly against the party who drafted it. Anzures. it was only in line wit hthe extraordinary diligence required of banks that it conduct such inquiry. and thus the mere issuance of a credit card did not create a contractual relationship with the cardholder. whether to approve or disapprove them. & Roco 3B . the contractual relationship begins to exist only upon the meeting of the offer and acceptance of the parties involved. as debtor. Ongchuan. Jess Lopez Amsterdam was due to the amount involved – the charged purchase of $13K deviated from Pantaleon‘s established charge purchase pattern. When a credit card company gives the holder the privilege of charging items at establishments associated with the issuer. From the loan agreement perspective. This contract provides the rights and liabilities of a credit card company to its cardholders and vice versa. Cusi. the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely. Pantaleon cannot claim that AMEX defaulted in its obligation. or debtor‘s default. Navarrete. recognizing the relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder as a contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership agreement. Amex claims that the transaction necessarily required the carefully review Pantaleon‘s credit history and bank reference (because of the large amount of the transaction and that it deviated from Pantaleon‘s usual spending practices). with the cardholder merely affixing his signature signifying his adhesion to these terms.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The latter involves the actual credit on loan agreement involving three contracts. (b) the debtor delays performance. namely: (a) the sales contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment which accepted the credit card. and the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment.

When Pantaleon made up his mind to push through with his purchase. good customs or public policy. Pantaleon himself testified that the most basic rule when travelling in a tour group is that you must never be a cause of any delay because the schedule is very strict . We also cannot turn a blind eye to the circumstances surrounding the Coster transaction which. there is no provision in this agreement that obligates AMEX to act on all cardholder purchase requests within a specifically defined period of time . In acting on cardholders‘ purchase requests. as in all contracts. xxx an asking with authority. Jess Lopez Clearly. Before the credit card issuer accepts this offer. foreseeable consequence of his decision to make them all wait. by the express terms of the credit card agreement. Apart from the lack of any demandable obligation. as demonstrated by his past spending. Pantaleon insists that AMEX had an obligation to act on his purchase requests. payment patterns. is not obligated to approve Pantaleon‘s purchase request. AMEX had always approved his charges in a matter of seconds. we also find that Pantaleon failed to make the demand required by Article 1169. must be based on fairness and reasonableness. Moreover. in our opinion. and (b) in his twelve years of using his AMEX card. even if he is not negligent in doing so.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Even the law makes no requirement that the bank must act on purchase requests at a defined period of time . Navarrete. there can be no finding of default. no obligation relating to the loan agreement exists between them. Reposo. this does not give AMEX an unlimited right to put off action on cardholders‘ purchase requests for indefinite periods of time. Pantaleon knew even before entering Coster that the tour group would have to leave the store to have enough time to take the city tour of Amsterdam before they left the country. despite the knowledge that he had already caused a 10-minute delay and that the city tour could not start without him. much less a period of a ―matter of seconds‖ that Pantaleon uses as his standard. Nevertheless. Cusi. In light of the foregoing. Pantaleon‘s son. this view is untenable. he agreed. AMEX is neither contractually bound nor legally obligated to act on its cardholders‘ purchase requests within any specific period of time. 93 Agas. The standard therefore is implicit and. is a necessary implication of AMEX‘s right to deny authorization for any requested charge. Ongchuan. Without a demandable obligation.m. Edgardo Jaurigue. This right to review a card holder‘s credit history. On the other hand. This was the natural. As Edgardo Jaurigue clarified. a demand is defined as the ―assertion of a legal right. every time Pantaleon charges a purchase on his credit card. as will be discussed below. claiming or challenging as due.m. either to approve or deny. It is an elementary rule in our jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging it. AMEX must take care n ot to abuse its rights and cause injury to its clients and/or third persons. However. ]It would certainly be unjust for us to penalize AMEX for merely exercising its right to review Pantaleon‘s credit history meticulously. we find no evidence to suggest that it acted with deliberate intent to cause Pantaleon any loss or injury. Significantly.‖ Pantaleon impresses upon us the existence of this obligation by emphasizing two points: (a) his card has no pre-set spending limit. Pantaleon tried to cancel the sale at 9:40 a. Buan. However. although not specifically set out in the card membership agreement. This doctrine is wholly applicable to this case. As borne by the records. read in relation to the CC provisions on human relations. who had boarded the bus ahead of his family. Even assuming that AMEX had the right to review his credit card history before it approved his purchase requests. or acted in a manner that was contrary to morals. the use of a credit card to pay for a purchase is only an offer to the credit card company to enter a loan agreement with the credit card holder. explained that having no pre-set spending limit in a credit card simply means that the charges made by the cardholder are approved based on his ability to pay. when Coster‘s sale manager asked him to wait a few more minutes for the credit card approval. justified the wait. credit card companies fall under the supervisory powers of the BSP. & Roco 3B . returned to the store to inform his family that they were the only ones not on the bus and that the entire tour group was waiting for them. the reason why Pantaleon had to wait for AMEX‘s approval was because he had to go over Pantaleon‘s credit card history for the past twelve months.‖ A demand presupposes the existence of an obligation between the parties. in ―a matter of seconds‖ or ―in timely dispatch. As financial institutions engaged in the business of providing credit. the credit card company still has to determine whether it will allow this charge. because he did not want to cause any inconvenience to the tour group. Anzures. As previously established. A person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting injury. After 9:30 a. Although it took AMEX some time before it approved Pantaleon‘s three charge requests. AMEX‘s credit authorizer. based on the credit card membership agreement. based on his past credit history.. and personal resources. he must have known that the group would become annoyed and irritated with him. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger. However. the first requisite is no longer met because AMEX.

Issue: Whether Atlantic is negligence for the injury of its nigga laborer. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired. in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains. While the method of construction may have been known to the men who had helped build the road. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track. In 2 particulars is he charged with carelessness: First. Held: YES but RAKES IS CONTRIBUTORILY LIABLE. rather than a fair inference from the testimony. The foreman testified that he knew the state of the track on the day of the accident and that it was then in good condition. Each car carrying 7 rails (560 lbs each). The most controverted question in the case is that of the negligence of the Rakes.000 pesos for damages ($2. Reposo.500). loss without injury. Rakes v. Cusi. it could not have been known to Rakes who had worked at this job less than 2 days.a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. and Second. CA: ―We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. there is a material distinction between damages and injury. The claim that he must have done so is a conclusion drawn from what is assumed to have been a probable condition of things not before us. A man may easily walk along a railway without perceiving a displacement of the underlying timbers. Navarrete. barring his recovery. nor upon the necessity of Rakes putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to get hold upon the car. It was alleged that Atlantic‘s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. Buan. However. hurt. or harm which results from the injury. damage is the loss. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In such cases. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards . Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won. 359 (1907) Facts: Rakes was a negro working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. The depression in the track might indicate either a serious or a trivial difficulty. However. and while Rakes was beside one of the cars. The sagging of the track Rakes did perceive. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. he was awarded 5. Contributory negligence Civil Code o Article 2179 (Memorize) 1. but that was reported in his hearing to the foreman who neither promised nor refused to repair it. but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so. Ongchuan. As we held in BPI Express Card v. or damages without legal wrong. contributing to the accident. Rakes did not know the cause of the one rail being lower than the other" and "it does not appear in this case that heknew before the accident occurred that the stringers and rails joined in the same place. The Atlantic.‖ B. he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff . the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. Jess Lopez AMEX did not violate any legal duty to Pantaleon under the circumstances under the principle of damnum absque injuria. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. One day. A witness for the Atlantic. 7 Phil. Thus. & Roco 3B . the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Rakes and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way. to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. both the officers of the company and 3 of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the 94 Agas. Thus. swore that he never noticed the depression in the track. that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work. The track where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. either before or behind it. Anzures. In other words. Gulf and Pacific Company. they were working in the company‘s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. FIRST POINT: nothing in the evidence to show that Rakes did or could see the displaced timber underneath the sleeper.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty." As regards the SECOND CHARGE of Negligence against the plaintiff: that there is no specific finding upon the instruction given by the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded. and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.

or is it to be taken only in reduction of damages? American States adhere to the doctrine of comparative negligence . dead. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of the Heirs. This produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is. the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might. The cause of the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it . Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. there being a lack of extensive burns. they related an incident where a boy was nearly electrocuted. The heirs filed a claim for damages before the RTC. 165969. the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails . In March 1995. which stated the present rule of law which is: Although the defendant's negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of. which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors. and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. They cut 2 bamboo poles. Casionan. the amount fairly attributable to his negligence. 16 Phil. provided his negligence was slight as compared with that of the defendant. he contributes only to his own injury. They wrote the Area Manager to make immediate repairs. The Municipal Health Officer determined the Cause of Death to be cardiac arrest caused by electrocution. and that some poles sank due to pocket mining. Itogon. without which there could have been no accident. we deduct therefrom 2. and Jimenez saw Noble fall to the ground. No warning signs were present. although it was an element of the damage. After the incident. fixing the damage incurred by the plaintiff at 5. less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence. however slight. have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. NPC denies negligence. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty.000 pesos is modified. 3. Taylor v. he can not recover. The test is simple. reiterating the dangers posed to small-scale miners during the wet season. Navarrete. on the part of the person injured which is one of the causes proximately contributing to his injury. Ives. Itogon made verbal and written requests to NPC for the institution of safety measures. However. and identified a possible rerouting scheme. in conjunction with the occurrence. Anzures. 2008 Facts: Sometime in 1970. November 27. No.500 pesos. in Dalicno. The preponderance is in favor of the Atlantic‘s contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. Jess Lopez gang against walking by the side of the car. NPC repaired the lines and put up warning signs. yet an action for such injury can not be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured. 3 months later. but contributing to his own proper hurt. 95 Agas. & Roco 3B . independent of it. Where. he can not recover damages for the injury. The tip of the pole he was carrying touched one of the wires. although not as its primary cause. 8 (1910)  See previous Doctrine: When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act. that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident. Police found wires hanging 8 to 10 feet from the ground. the overwhelming weight of adjudication establishes the principle in American jurisprudence that any negligence. Buan.R. the Area Manager wrote the Itogon Mayor that NPC installed 9 additional poles . The theory of proportional damages which reduces the award. and those acts of the victim not entering into it. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. for which he would have been responsible. In Grand Trunk Railway Company vs. were at Dalcino. the leaders of Ampucao. The disobedience of Rakes in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate. As early as 1991. between the event itself. The judgment of the trial court. by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence. according to the American rule. Ongchuan. . Some of the lines sagged and dangled at a height of only 8 to 10 feet. Cusi. Rakes‘ act in walking by the side of the car did not contribute. the other side was a precipice. G. Noble and his co-pocket miner. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury . However. he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury. Noble carried the shorter pole and walked through the abovementioned trail towards their workplace. as one of its determining factors.allowing a recovery by a plaintiff whose own act contributed to his injury. It averred that it could not have been electrocution. averring that danger signs previously installed were stolen by kids. The trail was the only viable way. NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines (69 KV) traversing a trail leading to Sangilo. bars his recovery. What effect is to be given such an act of contributory negligence? Does it defeat a recovery. Jimenez. 2. Reposo. National Power Corporation v.

The determination of the mitigation of the defendant‘s liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. owned by Estacion and driven by Gerosano. An Isuzu cargo truck. this it was ruled that the violation of a statute is NOT SUFFICIENT to hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. In sum.R. He would not have been electrocuted. The cargo truck smashed Noe against the Fiera 96 Agas.Torts & Damages 2013 Issue: Whether damages should be deleted in lieu of Noble‘s contributory negligence. which is prohibited by the DENR in the area. (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. owned by Cecilia Bandoquillo and was seated on the extension seat placed at the center of the Fiera. Also. at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed. Negligence is the failure to observe. If the transmission lines were properly maintained by NPC. Atty. pursuant to Rakes v. the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence. it was established that Ray. 2179 CC provision that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the injured party. There is contributory negligence when the party‘s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. Ongchuan. In other words. Hence. Noe hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. These circumstances. 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents. Reposo. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. so Noe offered his seat. Since the Fiera was already full. for the protection of the interest of another person. No. & Roco 3B . Bernardo. Navarrete. the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner. The Fiera began to slow down and then stopped by the right shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Instead. February 27. Moreover. In this case. 4. Heirs of Rey Castillon. NPC is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability. CA. Anzures. Buan. whereby such other person suffers injury. contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered. which was traveling in the same direction. there is no contributory negligence on Noble‘s part. AG & P. although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio. This is especially true because other people traversing the trail have not been similarly electrocuted. then it is proper to reduce the award for damages . the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires . It insists that Noble was negligent when he allowed the bamboo pole he was carrying to touch the high tension wires. The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. hit the rear end portion of the Fiera where respondent Noe was standing. Lambert v. concurring with the defendant‘s negligence. precaution. which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence. is the proximate cause of the injury. contributed to the same result. the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. Cusi. G. Estacion v. it was Noble‘s negligent carrying of the bamboo pole that caused his death. (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer. contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. that degree of care. This is in consonance with Art. If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim. the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community . and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. NPC further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining. In said case. 144723. On the other hand. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which. the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Jess Lopez Held: NO. 452 SCRA 285 (2005)  See previous Doctrine: The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. In Añonuevo v. 5. the allegation of contributory negligence on the part of the injured party who violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon was struck down. NPC makes an absurd contention that the mere presence of the high tension wires above the trail did not cause the victim‘s death. As established during trial. 2006 Facts: Noe Bernardo boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeep driven by respondent Geminiano Quinquillera. An old woman wanted to ride. In the case at bar.

Photographs taken after the incident and the testimony of Gerosano as to the extent of damage to the truck. the truck‘s windshield was broken and its hood was damaged after the impact. Noe filed a complaint for damages arising from quasi delict against Estacion as the registered owner of the cargo truck and his driver Gerosano. Gerosano admitted that his truck was at a distance of 10 meters prior to the impact. precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand. which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. MCTC found him guilty of the crime charged. their distances from the shoulder of the road and the skid marks of the right front wheel of the truck measuring about 48 feet. or mudguard. it showed that Gerosano was driving at a fast speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 feet as shown in the sketch of police investigator of the tire marks visibly printed on the road. further suppor t the finding of both courts that Gerosano was driving at a fast pace. it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body . there was only one tire mark of the right tire of the cargo truck during the incident which. Buan. A passing vehicle brought him to the Silliman University Medical Center where his lower left leg was amputated. Based on the sketch report. & Roco 3B . Held: ALL ARE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE. Cusi. Quinquillera was negligent in allowing Noe to stand on the Fiera‘s rear portion. The sketch of the accident showed the relative positions of the two vehicles. The distance between the two vehicles was such that it would be impossible for Gerosano not to have seen that the Fiera had pulled over to pick up passengers. Also. there arises a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party. It has been held that ―to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries. It was alleged that it was the reckless imprudence of Fiera driver and his clear violation of the traffic rules and regulations which was the proximate cause of the accident and asked for indemnification. Navarrete. Police investigation reports showed that Noe was one of the 11 passengers of the Fiera who suffered injuries. Under the law. Driver of the cargo truck. Quinquillera failed to observe that degree of care. no driver shall allow any person to ride on running board. Also. meant that the brakes of the truck were not aligned otherwise there would be two tire marks impressions on the road. Gerosano. Noe‘s act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous to his life and limb.e. It was also found that faulty breaks (only 1 tiremark) caused the truck to hit the Fiera. which made him fall to the ground. From the way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes. respondent Bandoquillo. Also. Trial court (in this case) ruled that Gerosano‘s gross negligence and reckless imprudence had been confirmed by the Judgment in Criminal Case No. They filed a third party complaint against the owner and driver of the Fiera. If the Fiera was not overloaded. It was alleged that the proximate cause of his injuries and suffering was the reckless imprudence of Gerosano and Estacion‘s negligence in the selection of a reckless driver and for operating a vehicle that was not road-worthy. Ongchuan. Issue: Who should be liable. i. in supervising her employees properly. step board. 463 and such negligence of Gerosano is the direct and proximate cause of the incident and of the injuries suffered by respondent Noe. Reposo. Jess Lopez crushing his legs and feet. Quinquillera should not have taken more passengers than what the Fiera can accommodate. Estacion and his driver Gerosano denied the allegations.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. it is the negligent act of petitioner‘s driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast speed coupled with faulty brakes which was the proximate cause of respondent Noe‘s injury. tiremarks showed that the truck had been driving fast. he had more than enough time to slacken his speed and apply his break to avoid hitting the Fiera. 97 Agas. Such presumption was not rebutted at all by Bandoquillo. Noe would not have been standing on the rear carrier and sustained such extent of injury. there was overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and regulations. Anzures. contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered. was charged criminally for reckless imprudence resulting to multiple physical injuries with damage to property. The truck was running at a fast speed because if Gerosano was really driving at a speed of 40 KPH and considering that the distance between the truck and the Fiera in front was about 10 meters. It has been established by the testimony of Noe that he was with 4 or 5 other persons standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera since it was already full. that only 1 tire mark from the front right wheel of the cargo truck was seen on the road. Indeed. Noe‘s act of standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself negligence on his part. CA affirmed. Noe‘s act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of the Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger . Since respondent Quinquillera is negligent. Quinquillera‘s act of permitting Noe to hang on the rear portion of the Fiera in such a dangerous position creates undue risk of harm to Noe. as testified to by police investigator.

November 2. and found the truck operational. Buan. and clear warning signs strategically posted on the sides of the road before the railroad crossing. there was no record of such inspection. and that the flagman or switchman was only equipped with a hand flashlight. unaware of the railroad track up ahead. Moncada. Eventually the sedan collided with the train. The underlying precept of this article on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. (based on the Phoenix Construction v. Philippine National Railways v. & Roco 3B . Ongchuan. Estacion‘s liability should be mitigated in accordance to Art. and that it has no legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing. 98 Agas.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. These clearly established that petitioner did not exercise due diligence in the selection. Gerosano testified that petitioner was his first employer in Dumaguete and that he was accepted by petitioner on the very day he applied for the job. Jess Lopez For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee. he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications. Reposo. alleging that the death of Rhonda. Estacion failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of his employees. The testimony of driver Gerosano in his cross-examination showed the non-observance of these requirements. A PNR Train driven by Alfonso Reyes was also departing from La Union station. They also aver the negligence of PNR in supervising its employees. (2) Whether Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence. It insisted that there were adequate. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. PNR meanwhile claims that it had the right of way on the railroad crossing in question. Hence she filed a complaint. The demands of substantial justice are satisfied by distributing the damages on a 20-80 ratio excluding attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses. While Estacion‘s mechanic driver testified that he made a routine chec k up one day before the mishap happened. his experience and record of service. The fact that petitioner‘s driver Gerosano was driving in an efficient manner when petitioner was with him in his first two trips would not conclusively establish that Gerosano was not at all reckless. Tarlac. Case law teaches that for an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of employees. No. Cusi. there was no proof that he exercised diligence in maintaining his cargo truck roadworthy and in good operating condition. and Mercelita (the driver) were riding in a Mercedes Benz sedan en route to Baguio. experience and service records.R. an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee. Since there was contributory negligence on the part of Noe. Mercelita was driving at approximately 70 KPH and drove past a vehicle. Furthermore. 2179. 6. In the supervision of his driver. Ethel Brunty (herein respondent) demanded for damages against PNR but the same remained unheeded. Garcia. Mercelita and Garica were the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad in Tarlac. petitioner must show that he had formulated training programs and guidelines on road safety for his driver which the records failed to show. Rhonda Brunty died thereafter. he should not be satisfied with the applicant‘s mere possession of a professional driver‘s license. Brunty. It could not be considered as due diligence in the supervision of his driver to exempt petitioner from liability. he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. that his driver‘s license was issued in Mindanao where he came from and that while petitioner asked him about his driving record in Mindanao. the whistle blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given by the guard. Petitioner failed to show that he examined driver Gerosano as to his qualifications. They pointed out that there was no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who were about to cross the railroad track. (3) Whether last clear chance is applicable Held: PNR IS NEGLIGENT. 169891. visible. Navarrete. MERCELITA GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. instantly killing Mercelita and gravely injuring Rhonda and Garcia. particularly the driver and operator of the train. At 2PM. Issues: (1) Whether or not the accident was due to Mercelita‘s negligence. The driver disregarded the warning signs. Mercelita et al. 2006 Facts: Rhonda Brunty. IAC case) Petitioner and respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera are jointly and severally liable for the 80% of the damages as well as attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses. G. were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal. he did not present any document of his driving record. Anzures. It countered that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelita‘s negligence. and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.

it was found that Mercelita was then driving the Benz at a speed of 70 KPH and. Reposo. The Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar. which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. they nevertheless do not negate PNR liability (which according to the court. while his acts contributed to the collision. Issue: Whether Alberto del Rosario was negligence such that MECo can be exonerated. 7. the finding of contributory negligence on the part of Mercelita. However. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of PNR. they were all curious as to what it was. Immediately. flagman or switchman. In a legal sense. said father told them not to touch it. Ongchuan. he phoned MECo and apprised the latter of the incident. although not proximate. PNR‘s negligence is likewise beyond cavil. at an unholy hour as 2AM.Moreover. even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR. Manila Electric Co. (2) inadequacy of the installed warning signals. it was bereft of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty. at 4PM. The latter promised to send an inspector. it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public. he fell to the ground. does not apply). Jess Lopez It was clearly established that respondents sustained damage or injury as a result of the collision. and not simply a condition for its occurrence. Upon being taken to the hospital. Anzures. Cusi. Thus. After a while. despite being informed about the wire. is chargeable with the loss. in fact. Del Rosario v. or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since one‘s view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. A vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that there is an approaching train because of the slight curve . the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so. Stated differently. it is still necessary to establish a causal link. Upon seeing the wire.. the place was not properly illuminated. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party. which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. put his index finger on the wire. or semaphores. even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries. Hence. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other. had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track. The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply. in Dimasalang St. Thus. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. the wire parted and one of its ends fell to the ground. and Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Thus. the antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant. which generally has the effect of mitigation of liability. between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury . 478 (1932) Facts: Around 2PM on Aug 4. more so.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss. The presumption of negligence on the part of MECo from the breakage of this wire has not been overcome. he was pronounced dead. As such. a school had just been dismissed and children. Navarrete. But since Alberto was still curious and challenged and was walking ahead of his group. CORP IS LIABLE. The MECo inspector came only after Alberto fell victim to the wire.To prove contributory negligence. Buan. His parents now seek to hold MECo for negligence. Despite all that. It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings . An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada. One of Alberto‘s companions was with his electrician father. it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body. the above doctrine finds no application in the instant case. 99 Agas. it took MECo more than an hour an a half before it could send its inspector. one‘s view was blocked by a cockpit arena. 57 Phil. Meanwhile. it would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead. Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did. negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury. contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered. including Alberto del Rosario (9 years old) and 2 others. It is established that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks. the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportation. Held: NO. were on their way home. a 6 triple braid weather proof wire commonly used by MECo to conduct electricity for lighting was noticed to be burning. Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR itself would yield the following: (1) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars. and (3) lack of proper lighting within the area. & Roco 3B . 1930. Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident. and MECo is responsible for the accident. or signal light.

Plaintiff seeks to hold Spouses liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code. Spouses‘ liability is made to rest on article 1905 CC. the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker. Hisole. and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage. the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault. Wading in waist-deep flood. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for any damages it may cause. owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary. is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act. however. Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Assumption of Risk 1. the complaint contains no allegation on those points. Here. who was paid for his work as such. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be a veritable accident of labor (Manresa) which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905 CC. The present action. but fear dissuaded them from 100 Agas. the deceased Isabel Lao Juan. that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure. Antonio Yabes and proceeded towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium. he was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries. it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone . whatever that might be. Anzures.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. to look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged. Suddenly. But. The complaint alleges that the now deceased. C. Obviously. the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong and by Linda. 2. or the one who uses the same. Buan. The 2 girls attempted to help. Cusi. Afialda‘s counsel contends that the article 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. As already stated. which reads: The possessor of an animal. of which she was the owner and proprietress. it is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased . is liable for any damages it may cause. After the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede. the deceased screamed ―Ay‖ and quickly sank into the water. ventured out of the house of her son in-law. however. and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not alter the case. that while tending the animals. (1989) Facts: In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29. Navarrete. if action is to be based on article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is therefore no authority for a case like the present where the person injured was the caretaker of the animal. and that Afialda is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support. not having been the determining cause of the accident. This opinion. Held: NOT LIABLE. 179 SCRA 5. This liability shall cease only in case. Reposo. including himself. & Roco 3B . the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it. there being no allegation that. 67 (1949) Facts: This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the Spouses as owners of the animal that caused the damage. On the other hand. among other things. was employed by the Spouses Hisole as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation. Afialda v. Jess Lopez Moreover. Spouses‘ business. 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name ―Gening‖ buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte. had a gross income of P20. Claiming that the lower court was in error. Issue: Whether the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker. In a decision of the Spanish SC. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the RISKS OF THE OCCUPATION which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences . Ongchuan. yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case. 85 Phil. But action under that article is not tenable for the reasons already stated. Loreto Afialda. appears to have been rendered in a case where an animal caused injury to a stranger or third person.000. Court of Appeals. Spouses were absolved by the lower court because above provision was interpreted to mean that the owner of the animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger and that for damage to the caretaker. But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the de ceased. The distinction is important.

he acted immediately. on that fateful date. The deceased. appears only in a live person. they raised as a special defense that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO. can speculate as to the real cause of death. Proceeding to the INELCO office. He decided to make an inspection. since burns caused by electricity are more or less round in shape and with points of entry and exit . derived from the photographed burnt wounds on the left palm. It claimed that although a strong typhoon struck the province of Ilocos Norte putting to streets of Laoag City under water. About 4A. An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. because cyanosis. no doctor. only a few known places in Laoag were reported to have suffered damaged electric lines. On the left palm.in-law had been electrocuted. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother. Upon the request of the relatives of the deceased. He found that the skin was grayish or.‖ 101 Agas. cyanotic. Jess Lopez doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. The dangling wire he saw was no longer there. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting. The service lines. Cyanosis could not have been found in the body of the deceased 3 hours after her death. On the left palm of the deceased. He passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INELCO) to cut off the electric current. As he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal. not even a medicolegal expert. A witness in the person of Dr. INELCO then conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent must have been left on. Fabico Abijero testified that in the early morning before 6 am on June 29. devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No.‖ Having learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan. Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. he met 2 linemen. It was shown that the deceased died of electrocution. hence. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the fact that the deceased had clutched a live wire of the INELCO. he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across the street ―and the other end seemed to play with the current of the water. charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. Defendant had installed safety devices. he decided to go to the INELCO Office which was still closed. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman. Upon their shouts for help. thus. Using the resuscitator. Antonio Briones was presented by the defense to show that the deceased could not have died of electrocution. & Roco 3B . Ongchuan. the doctor found an ―electrically charged wound‖ or a first degree burn. 1967. Without an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. Castro stated the cause of death as ―circulatory shock electrocution‖ Defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and employees and sought to prove that on and even before June 29. he tried to revive the deceased.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The certificate of death prepared by Dr.M. Anzures. Castro examined the body. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased. he saw grounded and disconnected lines. without INELCO‘s knowledge. (2) Whether INELCO may be held liable for the death. he did not see any cut or broken wires in or near the vicinity. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off. He went on a 3rd inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of power. Buan. Power Plant Engineer of the NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant. On the way. Engr. which indicated death by electrocution. In INELCO‘s Answer. What he saw were many people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan. Navarrete. He told them about the grounded lines of the INELCO. the laceration in her palm would have been bigger and the injury more massive. which means lack of oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering the color of the skin purplish. noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Held: (1) YES. His efforts proved futile. Jovencio Castro who actually examined the body of the deceased a few hours after the death and described the said burnt wounds as a ―first degree burn‖ and ―electrically charged. he passed by the house of the deceased to which the body had been taken. Reposo. causing the deceased‘s electrocution when she tried to open her gate CFI found the facts in favor of INELCO and dismissed the complaint but awarded moral damages and attorney‘s fees Issue: (1) Whether deceased died of electrocution. Juan noticed a hollow wound. but at 4 meters away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Dr. This was corroborated by the testimony of Dr. 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. Rigor mortis was setting in. The presence of the elongated burn in the left palm of the deceased is not sufficient to establish her death by electrocution. The body was recovered about 2 meters from an electric post. Cusi. had 12 lines-men charged with the duty of making a round-theclock check-up. Had the deceased held the lethal wire for a long time. in medical parlance.

not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga. Such is mere speculation. The INELCO Office at the Life theatre on Rizal Street was still closed. electrical engineer. Under the circumstances of the case. Furthermore. he saw grounded and disconnected electric lines of the defendant but he saw no INELCO lineman. was faced with an impending loss. Navarrete. a source of her livelihood. not on what they actually did or failed to do on the date in question. Ongchuan. which was electrically charged by an electric wire she herself caused to install to serve as a burglar deterrent. and lineman to show exercise of extraordinary diligence and to negate the charge of negligence. The negligence of INELCO having been shown. Cusi. INELCO claims that the CA gravely abused its discretion and erred in not applying the legal principle of ―assumption of risk‖ in the present case to bar private respondents from collecting damages from INELCO. 2000  See previous Doctrine: The fact that Sunga was seated in an ―extension seat‖ placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. & Roco 3B . the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.‖ As such. Conrado Asis.R. 3. As testified. Buan. this theory was abandoned‖ by the INELCO. 1967 . were on their way to the latter‘s grocery store ―to see to it that the goods were not flooded. ―each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. an emergency was at hand as the deceased‘s property. the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission. if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Therefore. The finding of the lower court. the deceased. it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim‘s death was solely due to a fortuitous event. May 31. Anzures. Engr. testified that he conducted a general inspection of the franchise area of the INELCO only on June 30. Reposo. injury is not done) relied upon by INELCO finds no application. Defendant called to the witness-stand its electrical engineer. accompanied by Aida and Linda. at the time the fatal incident occurred. chief lineman.‖ and there was nothing else in the street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn To escape liability. Calalas v. On the contrary. The evidence does not show that INELCO did that. It was through the intervention of INELCO‘s negligence that death took place. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner‘s contention that Sunga‘s taking an ―extension seat‖ amounted to an implied assumption of risk. The maxim volenti non fit injuria (to a willing person. the day following the typhoon. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. nor even manning its office.‖ In fact. if such was really the case. however. was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to INELCO‘s consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. private respondents. (2) While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible. was ba sed on what the INELCO‘s employees were supposed to do. as heirs.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be. The reason he gave for the delay was that all their vehicles were submerged. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas 102 Agas. they tried to render some help but were overcome with fear by the sight of an electric wire dangling moving in the water in a snake-like fashion. extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. G. shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by INELCO‘s negligence. The witnesses testified in a general way about their duties and the measures which defendant usually adopts to prevent hazards to life and limb. In times of calamities. 122039. ―during the trial. The lower court made a mistake in assuming that INELCO‘s employees worked around the clock during the occurrence of the typhoon. the deceased. evidence discloses that there were no men policing the area. it was not the said eventuality which directly caused the victim‘s death. INELCO ventures into the theory that the deceased was electrocuted. when she tried to open her steel gate. The nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no other conclusion than that they were ―burns. not backed up with evidence. Lower court found that the electric lines and other equipment of INELCO were properly maintained. Hence. Antonio Juan of the NPC affirmed that when he first set out on an inspection trip. Clearly. but also. Court of Appeals. INELCO was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public considering that the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. No. Jess Lopez Witnesses Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong added that after the deceased screamed ―Ay‖ and sank into the water. and not on the occasion of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon. For it has been held that a person is EXCUSED from the force of the rule — that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences . When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury.

It will be noted that the negligent acts of the 2 parties were NOT CONTEMPORANEUS . Joel and Dominador. Ongchuan. the rails slid off. The court found that the defendant company was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was. or which. At the time of the accident. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its track. Additionally. (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. Estranas and Ben Saga. and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. Buan. the alternate driver of the train. At certain spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road bed. sustained serious physical injuries.R. The defendant company had there employed the plaintiff. No. The ―Stop‖ signage was already faded while the ―Listen‖ signage was partly blocked by another signboard. Navarrete. Look and Listen‖ signage was poorly maintained. suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger jeepney. with his companions. at about 3AM. While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong. Smith. Gulf and Pacific Co. The car was in consequence upset. D. and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. Crispin Natividad. 2004. It appeared in evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had dislodged one of the supports of the track. It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor‘s will. where the defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which caused the damage. They pointed out that in the railroad track of Tiaong. Philippine National Railways Corporation v. February 15. Cresencio Vizcara. lighting equipment or bell installed to warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the approaching train. Samuel Natividad. Vizcara. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. and Samuel. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen. The survivors of the mishap. was inevitable. The decision in the case of Rakes vs. Reposo. The rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. On the other hand. In this case. since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an APPRECIABLE INTERVAL. Quezon. the ― Stop. Anzures. Dominador Antonio. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the damage according to the degree of their relative fault. together with the heirs of the deceased filed an action for damages against PNR. at the moment of the accident. The collision resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo. Atlantic. as a laborer. 37 Phil. & Roco 3B . G. Cusi. there was no level crossing bar. and Joel Vizcara. Picart v. It was held that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account of the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. Estranas was driving the train at a moderate speed. 2. This is also true of petitioner‘s contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. a PNR train. The respondents alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and serious physical injuries sustained by the victims of the accident was the PNR‘s gross negligence in not providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury to persons and properties. though foreseen. Cresencio. Crispin. PNR claimed that they exercised due diligence in operating the train and monitoring its roadworthiness. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery. then being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas. 400 meters away from the railroad 103 Agas. They asseverate that right before the collision. As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops. it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. 190022. Dominador and Joel. there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing. Last Clear Chance 1. Jess Lopez should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. 2012 Facts: On May 14. and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. 809 (1918)  See previous Doctrine: It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault. Quezon where the accident happened. But as we have already stated. guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. should perhaps be mentioned in this connection. the defendant was also negligent.

That in utter disregard of the right of way enjoyed by PNR trains. The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other . A reliable signaling device in good condition. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident. His failure to maintain a safe distance between the jeepney he was driving and the truck ahead of the same prevented him from seeing the PNR signage displayed along the crossing. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Held: NO. the PNR failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so. the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter. Cusi. he started blowing his horn to warn motorists of the approaching train. The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable. G. Buan. PNR maintain that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and recklessness of the driver of the jeepney. The responsibility of the PNR to secure public safety does not end with the installation of safety equipment and signages but. Thus. which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to the maintenance of the crossings. taking into consideration the nature of its business. Look and Listen‖ signage installed in the area was poorly maintained. To begin with. Likewise. However. September 29. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. still blowing the train‘s horn. inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger. he failed to bring his jeepney to a full stop before crossing the railroad track and thoughtlessly followed the ten-wheeler truck ahead of them. Ramos. Thus. Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings. at least. not just a dilapidated ―Stop. There was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents.. They were not even aware of the forthcoming danger. who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. filed a Complaint for damages under Article 2176 against Cresencia Achevara (operator of passenger jeep). is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. the proximate cause of the collision was the PNR‘s negligence in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. Ongchuan. the passenger jeepney being driven by Reynaldo suddenly crossed the tracks. PNR. & Roco 3B . including the right of way accorded to trains at railroad crossing and the precautionary measures to observe in traversing the same. they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their own safety . Injuries sustained by Arnulfo 104 Agas. In particular. Elvira Ramos and her two minor children. Reynaldo had no reason to anticipate the impending danger. It was alleged in the complaint that Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep heading north on the national highway in a reckless. Both courts ruled that the PNR fell short of the diligence expected of it. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar. Stated differently. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies. hence. a stoplight or signage to forewarn them of the approaching peril. with the upkeep and repair of the same. When the train was only 50 meters away from the intersection. 2009 Facts: Arnulfo Ramos died in a vehicular accident that happened at the national highway along Candon. Reynaldo is presumed to be familiar with traffic rules and regulations. Achevara v. absent preceding negligence on the part of the respondents. CA affirmed. the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied. that he tried to overtake a motorcycle. As held in Cusi v. No.R. if warning devices are installed in railroad crossings. the travelling public has the right to rely on such warning devices to put them on their guard and take the necessary precautions before crossing the tracks. when the train was already 10 meters away from the intersection. with equal measure of accountability. MR was denied by the CA hence the present petition. he carefully proceeded at a speed or 25 KPH. 175172. Estranas noticed that all vehicles on both sides of the track were already at a full stop. to forestall any untoward incident. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Alfredo Achevara (husband of the operator and as administrator of the conjugal partnership properties of the Sps Achevara) and Benigno Valdez (driver) for the death of her husband Arnulfo Ramos. Look and Listen‖ signage. the ―Stop. causing his passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. There was no crossing bar to prevent them from proceeding or. Ilocos Sur. careless. The jeepney carrying the respondents was following a 10-wheeler truck. and negligent manner. relying on his faculties of sight and hearing. Jess Lopez crossing. Estranas immediately stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney but due to the sheer weight of the train. Navarrete. is needed to give notice to the public. Thus. To reiterate. Anzures. it did not instantly come to a complete stop until the jeepney was dragged 20 to 30 meters away from the point of collision. It bears noting that the prevailing circumstances immediately before the collision did not manifest even the slightest indication of an imminent harm. the truck they were trailing was able to safely cross the track. Reposo. 3. that as a professional driver. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have any participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them.

when its right front wheel got detached and the owner-type jeep bumped the left side of his passenger jeep. it was found that Gamera went to the Police Station in Candon. Anzures. He stated that nothing impeded his view of the incident o known respondents‘ witness. of April 22. o testified that a passenger jeep encroached on the lane of the northbound owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos. He also saw a southbound passenger jeep. It did not slacken speed. Candon. o he was about 100 meters from the place where the vehicular accident occurred. but returned to the house of Gacusan by tricycle. with its right wheel removed. who was his barangay mate for 20 years. & Roco 3B   105 . 1995. Doctor testified as to cause of death  PO3 Baltazar de Peralta (for Achevera) o testified that at about 9:00 a. Navarrete. causing the owner-type jeep to turn around and return to its former position. Ilocos Sur. he and his wife were seated at the waiting shed along the national highway in Candon. 1995. When they reached a bridge. He was about to go southward. Reposo. Herminigildo Pagaduan o testified that at 7:00 a. o speed of the passenger jeep was about 70 kilometers per hour. an employee of the jueteng joint. o saw a motorcycle. but waited a while to let a southbound passenger jeep pass by. which resulted in the collision. Buan. Ongchuan. It was alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep. o next day. driven by Police Officer 3 (PO3) Baltazar de Peralta. Then he followed behind the passenger jeep. while Arnulfo Ramos and the others sat on the rear seat. Pagaduan sat beside Gacusan. Agas. 1992. o owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner. o collision occurred on the lane of the passenger jeep. While Pagaduan was waiting for Barangay Captain Gacusan.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. o accident happened on a straight part of the highway. he heard from Gacusan that the jeep they had used in their aborted trip to Tamorong met an accident Benigno Valdez (for Achevera) o driving the passenger jeep of his aunt. Gamera did not mention in his sworn statement that his wife was present during the incident *wife also testified as to the damages incurred. of April 22. 1995. on the national highway in Tablac. Crescencia Achevara. of April 22. o On cross-examination.m. Ilocos Sur heading south. Alfredo Gamera. the latter made a phone call requesting for a vehicle to take them to Tamorong o Not long after. which was driven by Arnulfo Ramos. All of them rode the jeep o Barangay Captain Gacusan was on the driver‘s seat. waiting for a ride to the town proper of Candon. but there were many holes on the eastern lane. o When the passenger jeep was about 75 meters away from him on the western lane of the national highway. but it suddenly wiggled. about two feet away from the center line of the road. o the group headed west to Tamorong via Darapidap.m. driven by Benigno Valdez. o Gacusan stopped the jeep. a yellow owner-type jeep arrived. o point of impact was on the lane of the vehicle of Arnulfo Ramos. PO3 De Peralta spotted an owner-type jeep coming from the south on the eastern lane of the road. while the passenger jeep veered to the right lane. while the owner-type jeep of Arnulfo Ramos was heading north. he was at the house of Barangay Captain Victorino Gacusan o Gacusan was then the overall monitor of the jueteng joint o Pagaduan and Gacusan had earlier agreed to attend the wake of an army captain that morning. Jess Lopez Ramos caused his death.  Alfredo Gamera (for Ramos) o working as a jueteng collector at the same joint where the deceased Arnulfo Ramos was also employed o testified that at about 10:00 a. Cusi. 1995. He declared that he never saw Gamera at the waiting shed or at the scene of the incident on the morning of April 22. he was on board his motorcycle at the waiting shed. and they all alighted from it o did not proceed to Tamorong. o owner-type jeep was running in a zigzag manner as it went over the many holes on the road. Ilocos Sur to execute his sworn statement only on May 30. coming from the interior part of Tablac and proceeding south toward the town proper. Barangay Captain Gacusan tried to increase the speed of the jeep. causing the jeep‘s front wheels to wiggle. before it bumped the passenger jeep coming from the north. while that of the owner-type jeep was about 30 kilometers per hour.m. that wanted to overtake the motorcycle of PO3 De Peralta. one month after the incident and after respondent Elvira Ramos talked to him o at the preliminary investigation.

surrendered himself to the Police Station Alfredo Achevara (for Achevera) o declared that before they employed Benigno Valdez to drive the passenger jeep. When the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep. they required him to drive from Metro Manila to Tagaytay City. as it bumped a post. Ramos‘ negligence in driving the owner-type jeep—despite knowledge of its mechanical defect. and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. but the defendant—who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so—is made liable for all the consequences of the accident. Since foreseeability is the fundamental basis of negligence. Benigno Valdez maneuvered his vehicle towards the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. who testified that the passenger jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since he was the one following behind the passenger jeep. Valdez realized the peril at hand and steered the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. but the owner-type jeep driven by Ramos continued to move to the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. It was Ramos alone who fully knew and could foresee that an accident was likely to occur if he drove his defective jeep. and that it was Valdez who had the last opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the passenger jeep towards the right shoulder of the road. Cusi. Gamera also testified that the collision took place on the lane of the owner-type jeep. When the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep. & Roco 3B . However. a prudent man would have had the owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped using it until it was repaired. Valdez could not have foreseen that an accident might happen due to the mechanical defect in the vehicle of Ramos . CA affirmed. It was the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep. However. to prevent damage to life and property—did not only constitute contributory negligence. he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. as contended by Ramos. Court also found Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway . the former exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting. that the vehicular accident occurred because the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez tried to overtake the motorcycle driven by PO3 and encroached on the lane of the owner-type jeep. Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. was applicable to this case. It was at this point that it was perceivable that Ramos must have lost control of his vehicle. Buan. the proximate cause of the vehicular accident was the negligence of Ramos in driving a mechanically defective vehicle. He passed out. Ramos‘ negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. and then back to Metro Manila for a day. which indeed happened. The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence. Ongchuan. Issue: Whether or Achevera are liable to Ramos. o Trial court held that the doctrine of last clear chance. o For apprenticeship. the doctrine does NOT apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously. which resulted in the collision. SPO2 Marvin Valdez. notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff . Reposo. Held: Ramos version of the vehicular accident was rebutted by Acheverra. Even if it can be said that it was Benigno Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western lane of the passenger jeep. The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical defect . Hence. An ordinarily prudent man would know that he would be putting himself and other vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk for driving a mechanically defective vehicle.Torts & Damages 2013 o o  Atty. but to no avail. about 2 meters east the center line of the national highway. Under the circumstances. It is undeniable that the collision took place on the western lane of the national highway or the lane of the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. who investigated the incident. The time the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds . 106 Agas. while Valdez did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos —perhaps because it still kept to its lane and Valdez did not know the extent of its mechanical defect. and investigated his personal background and training/experience as a driver. and his failure to have it repaired first before driving. found both vehicles on the western lane of the national highway. training and supervising the latter o required Valdez to show them his professional driver‘s license. was refuted by PO3 Baltazar de Peralta. Navarrete. Testimony of Alfredo Gamera. Anzures. Jess Lopez Valdez swerved the passenger jeep to the western edge of the road to avoid a collision.

Reposo. respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article 2179. However. extraordinary diligence demands that BA should have ascertained from PRCI the authenticity of the subject checks or the accuracy of the entries therein not only because of the presence of highly irregular entries on the face of the checks but also of the decidedly unusual circumstances surrounding their encashment. in the event there was need to make use of the checks. In order not to disrupt operations in their absence. Navarrete. As noted by the CA. it is highly uncommon for a corporation to make out checks payable to ―CASH‖ for substantial amounts such as in this case. PRCI‘s witness testified that for checks in amounts greater than P20. viz: ―ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND PESOS ONLY. Hence PRCI filed the complaint. while both parties were guilty of negligent acts that led to the loss. each with an indicated value of P110. Issue: (1) Whether or not the proximate cause of the wrongful encashment was due to the negligence of BA or the practice of PRCI in pre-signing the checks and leaving it with his employees. Hence PRCI demanded payment from BA which fell to deaf-ears. These checks were among those pre-signed by the authorized signatories of PRCI. Both of them were scheduled to go out of the country sometime later in connection with the corporation ‘s business. the confluence of the irregularities on the face of the checks and circumstances that depart from the usual banking practice of PRCI should have put BA‘s employees on guard that the checks were possibly not issued by the respondent in due course of its business. Philippine Racing Club. They have the obligation to treat their client‘s account meticulously and with the highest degree of care. 150228. the accountant would prepare the corresponding voucher and thereafter complete the entries on the pre-signed checks. BA had the last clear chance to avoid the loss . G. Neither was there a transaction by PRCI that calls for payment of P220. Nevertheless . Cusi. On the space where the name of the payee should be indicated (Pay To The Order Of) the following 2-line entries were instead typewritten: on the upper line was the word ―CASH‖ while the lower line had the following typewritten words. Conversely. considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. However. BA‘s subtle sophistry cannot exculpate it from behavior that fell extremely short of the highest degree of care and diligence required of it as a banking institution. Anzures. Ongchuan. the bank‘s employees might have been justified in ignoring them. In instances where both parties are at fault. The court however agrees that PRCI‘s practice of pre-signing its checks should be deemed seriously negligent behavior and a highly risky means of ensuring the efficient operation of business. 107 Agas. it turned out later that a John Doe (later found out to be Clarita Mesina. This was not rebutted by PRCI. this Court has consistently applied the doctrine of last clear chance in order to assign liability. Indeed. These checks were entrusted to the accountant with instruction to make use of the same as the need arose.000. they pre-signed several checks relating to their account with BA. The intention was to insure continuity of PRCI‘s operations by making available cash/money especially to settle obligations that might become due. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular accident. In the case at bar.‖ Despite all these irregularities/infirmities and the substantial amount involved.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. an employee of PRCI) presented to BA for encashment 2 checks of PRCI. Jess Lopez Both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Buan. All these circumstances should have alerted the bank to the possibility that the holder or the person who is attempting to encash the checks did not have proper title to the checks or did not have authority to fill up and encash the same. Not even a verification process or a phone call was made.00 it is the company‘s practice to ensure that the payee is indicated by name in the check.000. BA never even verified or confirmed the legitimacy of the checks.000. 2009 Facts: PRCI maintains several accounts. one of which is with petitioner BA. July 30. If each irregular circumstance in this case were taken singly or isolated. Under that doctrine. 4. is more than that of a good father of a family. (2) Whether or not BA had the last clear chance in preventing the unauthorized encashment of checks. and it is their duty to protect in return their many clients and depositors who transact business with them. BA could have made a simple phone call to its client to clarify the irregularities and the loss to PRCI due to the encashment of the stolen checks would have been prevented. BA will still emerge as the party foremost liable in this case. The diligence required of banks. The internal arrangement was. & Roco 3B . The authorized joint signatories with respect to said account were PRCIs President (Antonia Reyes) and VP for Finance (Gregorio Reyes).R. Held: BA‘s NEGLIGENCE was the cause of the loss. No. the one who had a last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. The 2 checks had similar entries with similar infirmities and irregularities. Bank of America NT & SA v. It is well-settled that banks are engaged in a business impressed with public interest. therefore.

The truck‘s tail lights were also left on. and instructed the latter to place a spare tire 6 fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. He also testified that no turning signal was seen from the pickup. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss . a Datsun crewcab owned by LADECO and driven by Deocampo collided with a Chevy pickup owned by Angala and driven by Borres.R. Pedro Arriesgado lost 108 Agas. Pedrano left his helper. Daanbantayan. He applied the break and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. Angala. G. Both parties were found to be negligence in this case. they were the only vehicles in the street. compared to running straight ahead. The driver. Borres slowed down prior to making the U-turn. On the other hand. It was about 12mn. he alleged that he tried to avoid the pickup but he was unable to avoid the collision. Angala filed an action for quasi-delict and damages against LADECO & Deocampo. Among its passengers was the Spouses Arriesgado. Angala testified that since he was seated at the back. Here. The passenger bus was also bound for Cebu City. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving fast before the collision. he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. 6. Both vehicles were running along Castillo St. The impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle. just as the truck passed over a bridge. Anzures. CA affirmed in toto. Held: YES. 437 SCRA 426 (2004) Facts: At about 10PM. he could see a blinking light indicating the signal to turn left as well as the speedometer. Borres (Angala‘s driver) was at the outer lane when he executed the U-turn in violation of RA 4136 regarding the rule on turning at intersections. of March 1987. RTC held LADECO & Deocampo solidarily liable. At about 4:45 AM. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle. Upon reaching Compostela. Arriesgado. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision. It claims that his pickup was slowing down to about 5-10KPH and was making a left turn when it was bumped from behind by the crewcar who was running at around 60-70 kph. the doctrine of LAST CLEAR CHANCE applies . Laspiñas saw the stalled truck. The complaint also contended that the crewcab only stopped after 21 meters from the point of impact.. Cebu. Issue: Whether Angala is entitled damages awarded. This docrine states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other. Tiu v. Jose Mitante. Since both parties are negligent. Failing to make the necessary verification due to the volume of banking transactions on that particular day is a flimsy and unacceptable excuse. A passenger bus with plate number PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising along the same national highway. Davao City heading towards Lanang when the accident occurred. LADECO is solidarily liable wth Deocampo for failing to prove that it exercised due diligence. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning. June 21. He should have stayed at the inner lane. Deocampo was equally negligent. 153076. Jess Lopez BA had the final opportunity to avert the injury that befell the PRCI. the bus rammed into the truck‘s left rear. Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. 5. 2007 Facts: On May 1993 at 2:45PM. Buan. considering that the ―banking business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and confidence of the public in g eneral is of paramount importance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must be a high degree of diligence. about 700 m away. Moreover. In fact. the cargo truck was loaded with firewood and left for Cebu City. Deocampo was not only driving fast. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. No. He also said that he did not apply the breaks because the collision was inevitable. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. if not the utmost diligence. traffic was light at that time. Ongchuan. Cusi. Hence. Jr. & Roco 3B . Cebu. then parked along the right side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop. As such Deocampo should have also slowed down especially since he noticed the pickup as far as 20 meters away. this petition. Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO) v. Moreso. On the other hand. But it was too late. Deocampo claimed that wen the pickup was about 10 meters away from the crewcar when it made a Uturn towards the left. which was then about 25 meters away. As the bus was approaching the bridge.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. and had come from Maya. Sergio Pedrano. Navarrete. Reposo. one of its rear tires exploded. he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up.

a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap. and that third-party defendant Sergio Pedrano. and that no early warning device was displayed. Indeed.m. He also admitted that he saw the truck which was parked in an ―oblique position‖ at about 25 meters before impact. there were no oncoming vehicles at the opposite direction. it is easier to believe that Laspiñas was driving at a very fast speed. 109 Agas. 4136. Jess Lopez consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right collar. it was shown that there was still much room or space for the Rough Rider to pass at the left lane of the said national highway even if the cargo truck had occupied the entire right lane thereof. Cebu at a speed of 40 to 50 KPH before the collision occurred. Laspiñas could have swerved to the left lane with proper clearance. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code. & Roco 3B . further. Since he saw the stalled truck at a distance of 25 meters. Laspiñas claimed that he was traversing the two-lane road at Compostela. defendant driver of the Rough Rider was in a vantage position to see the cargo truck ahead which was parked and he could just easily have avoided hitting and bumping the same by maneuvering to the left without hitting the said cargo truck. – (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed. 35. (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. As shown by preponderance of evidence that Laspiñas failed to observe extraordinary diligence as a driver of the common carrier in this case. they claim that during the vehicular accident in question. Anzures. as correctly pointed out by the trial court. was brought to the Danao City Hospital. nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead . and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life. However. Held: SOLIDARILY LIABLE. he was violating any traffic regulation. the (sic) causing damages not only to herein plaintiff but to the cargo truck as well. Ongchuan. Republic Act No. but despite his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on the passengers. Arriesgado alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast and high speed along the national road. the damage sustained by the truck itself supports the finding of both the trial court and the appellate court. damages and attorney‘s fees before the RTC. With its headlights fully on. the width of the highway. would have prompted him to apply the breaks to avert the impending disaster which he must have foreseen when he caught sight of the stalled truck. Laspiñas on May 27. It is not true that if the Rough Rider would proceed to pass through the left lane it would fall into a canal considering that there was much space for it to pass without hitting and bumping the cargo truck at the left lane of said national highway. Laspiñas promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on. They alleged that Laspiñas was negotiating the uphill climb along the national highway in a moderate and normal speed. are jointly and severally liable to the third-party plaintiffs for whatever liability that may be adjudged. against the Tiu (bus operator) and his driver. that is. Cusi. and thus. Issue: Whether the driver/owner of the bus are liable with the driver/owner of the parked truck. It is quite hard to accept his version of the incident that he did not see at a reasonable distance ahead the cargo truck that was parked when the Rough Rider [Bus] just came out of the bridge which is on an more elevated position than the place where the cargo truck was parked. could have avoided the truck. And. the hour of the accident. petitioner Laspiñas also violated Section 35 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. and tried to avoid hitting it by swerving to the left. the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo truck‘s left rear. Finally. They further alleged that the cargo truck is owned by Benjamin Condor and was left unattended by its driver Sergio Pedrano at the time of the incident. and. as amended: Sec.. Laspiñas‘ negligence in driving the bus is apparent in the records. he had just passed a bridge and was traversing the highway of Compostela. having due regard for the traffic. Besides. Reposo. Cebu at a speed of only 40-50 kphr before the incident occurred. Laspiñas had more than enough time to swerve to his left to avoid hitting it. It was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted manner. thus. 1987. as driver of the cargo truck and Benjamin Condor. Instinct. The records. By his own admission. and that Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures to avoid the accident. As found by the CA. limb and property of any person. Navarrete. showed that there was no incoming vehicle at the opposite lane of the national highway which would have prevented the Rough Rider from not swerving to its left in order to avoid hitting and bumping the parked cargo truck. and or any other condition then and there existing. PedroArriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage. She was later transferred to the Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly thereafter. Buan. even in the absence of expert evidence. Felisa. par. since at 4:45 a. at the very least. if the speed of the bus was only 40 to 50 KPH as he claimed. Restriction as to speed. His wife. But the evidence showed that the Rough Rider instead of swerving to the still spacious left lane of the national highway plowed directly into the parked cargo truck hitting the latter at its rear portion. as the registered owner who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pedrano. its rear portion almost in the middle of the highway.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. third-party defendant was clearly violating Section 34. that the passenger bus driven by Laspiñas was traveling at a fast pace. The maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 KPH. not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper.

has itself been rejected. August 23. Cebu at a speed of 40 to 50 KPH before the collision occurred. This was opposed by petitioners. Laspiñas‘ negligence in driving the bus is apparent in the records. further. E. and that such failure created the presumption of negligence on the part of his employer. for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. who was then a passenger therein. 1975. & Roco 3B . Reposo. Dennis Pfleider. It is quite hard to accept his version of the incident that he did not see at a reasonable distance ahead the cargo truck that was parked when the Rough Rider [Bus] just came out of the bridge which is on an more elevated position than the place where the cargo truck was parked. and Mrs. Ongchuan. and without taking the necessary precaution and as a consequence the pickup car was overturned.R. on this score. causing physical injuries to Annette Ferrer. The motion of the Spouses was denied. their son. his employee.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. On June 26. only Ferrer and counsel were present. he had just passed a bridge and was traversing the highway of Compostela. 1975. It was alleged that at about 5:00 pm of December 31. and thus. Prescription Civil Code o Article 1146 1. Buan. Dennis Pfleider. Thus. 1974 but actually filed on January 6. Besides. Ferrer v. At the pre-trial on May 12. Navarrete. In this case. was allowed by his parents to operate a Ford pick-up car and because of his reckless negligence caused the accident on July 21. By his own admission. 1978 Facts: A complaint for damages dated December 27. Jess Lopez Contrary to the Tiu‘s contention. without due regard to traffic rules and regulations. 1975 was filed against Mr. Ericta. without proper official authority. Cusi. No. showed that there was no incoming vehicle at the opposite lane of the national highway which would have prevented the Rough Rider from not swerving to its left in order to avoid hitting and bumping the parked cargo truck. 1970. The Spouses filed their answer. if any. Indeed. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations . The records. As shown by preponderance of evidence that Laspiñas failed to observe extraordinary diligence as a driver of the common carrier in this case. On the same date. who was then only 16. The maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 KPH. G. it was shown that there was still much room or space for the Rough Rider to pass at the left lane of the said national highway even if the cargo truck had occupied the entire right lane thereof. as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of 2 colliding vehicles. 110 Agas. consequently. drove the above-described vehicle. but were merely joy riders and that. which injuries paralyzed her and required medical treatment and confinement at different hospitals for more than 2 years. Sps Francis had no obligation whatsoever to Ferrer. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so . Anzures. finding that the minor. the common law of last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff. Spouses filed a motion to ―set aside the order of default and subsequent pleadings‖ on the ground that their failure to appear for pre-trial was due to accident or excusable neglect. the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case. It is not true that if the Rough Rider would proceed to pass through the left lane it would fall into a canal considering that there was much space for it to pass without hitting and bumping the cargo truck at the left lane of said national highway. defendant driver of the Rough Rider was in a vantage position to see the cargo truck ahead which was parked and he could just easily have avoided hitting and bumping the same by maneuvering to the left without hitting the said cargo truck. Francis as owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car. Accordingly. Tiu cannot escape liability for the death of Arriesgado‘s wife due to the negligence of Laspiñas. With its headlights fully on. they causing damages not only to herein plaintiff but to the cargo truck as well. it is difficult to see what role. both the trial and the CA failed to co nsider that Pedrano was also negligent in leaving the truck parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices to alert oncoming vehicles . 1975. as it has been in Article 2179. Spouses were declared in default and Ferrer was allowed to present their evidence ex parte. alleging that Ferrer and the other persons aboard said vehicle were not passengers in the strict sense of the term. But the evidence showed that the Rough Rider instead of swerving to the still spacious left lane of the national highway plowed directly into the parked cargo truck hitting the latter at its rear portion. Judge Ericta rendered judgment against Spouses. putting up the affirmative defense that Dennis Pfleider exercised due care and utmost diligence in driving the vehicle. L-41767.

but such rule does not obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which plaintiff‘s co mplaint is based is already barred by the statute of limitations . Jess Lopez On September 1. taking with it its fish catch. 1970. In a case. Court of Appeals. the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent TransAsia Shipping Lines. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29. this Court sustained the dismissal of a counterclaim on the ground of prescription. On May 30. 1975. Issue: Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by Kramer against TransAsia arising from a marine collision barred by statute of limitation. There is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of prescription. even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Cusi.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. 1970‖. this Court sustained the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription. the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. although such defense was not raised in the answer of the plaintiff. Reposo. Kramer v. 1975. Hence. Whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by the Spouses‘ failure to allege the same in their answer. 1985. Issue. 2.‖ The fact that the plaintiff‘s own allegation in the complaint or the evidence it presented shows clearly that the action had prescribed removes this case from the rule regarding waiver of the detense by failure to plead the same. this petition for mandamus. 1963. the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent. and the action to recover damages based on quasidelict prescribes in 4 years. therefore. 178 SCRA 518 (1989) Facts: In the early morning of April 8. & Roco 3B . In opposition. Navarrete. It is undisputed that the action for damages was only filed on January 6.1975. The F/B Marjolea sank. After the mishap. ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED. 1981. Where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates involved in the defendant‘s claim of prescription. Held: NOT WAIVED. Held: BARRED. The TransAsia filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause. Dioso. it was said that while it is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants had been declared in default. a fishing boat (owned by Kramer) figured in a collision (en route from Marinduque to Manila) with an inter-island vessel. Ongchuan. it was explained that the defense of prescription. In another case. As early as Chua Lamko v. or after the lapse of MORE THAN FOUR YEARS from the date of the accident on December 31. it was patent from the stamp appearing on the first page of the complaint that the complaint was actually filed on May 31. Inc. the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasidelict like a maritime collision is 4 years. Spouses filed an MR of the decision and of the order denying the motion to set aside order of default contending that the complaint shows on its face ―that it was filed only on January 6. The 4-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the accident. He maintained that the Kramer should have filed their Complaint within 4 111 Agas. the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within 4 years. He argued that under Article 1146. is not deemed waived UNLESS such defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading. the action has already prescribed. Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court that ―defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. On October 19. among others. the Ferrer maintained. although such defense was not raised in the answer. that the defense of prescription had been waived because it was not alleged in the Answer. his failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does not constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription. 1976. Judge Ericta issued an order absolving the Spouses from any liability on the ground of prescription since the complaint was filed more than 4 years after the date of the accident. 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended. The complaint alleged that the accident occurred on December 31. Anzures. Buan. likewise appearing from the complaint and.

Such civil liability may consist of restitution. training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. Cusi. was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.R. & Roco 3B . Viron moved to dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons. Held: NO. Notably. July 29. The RTC dismissed. The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action. agents or personnel of the other vessel. and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. and that the 4-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. On account of this reservation. Viron Transit. the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. notwithstanding the reservation. 151452. He was convicted and sentenced to 2 years. the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final. as amended in 1988. prescription. 1985. that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages.. Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. the Complaint filed on May 30. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30. and THIRD. and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause. 1985. the Kramer contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. Sibayan was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries. namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created. Petitioners opposed as the right to file a separate action prescribes in 10 years. The prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place . an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. the court correctly found that the action of Kramer has prescribed. petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The CA dismissed their petition for Certiorari for being the wrong mode of appeal. The Kramer argued that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29. 4 months. and defective certification of non-forum-shopping. 1976 when the maritime collision took place. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. laches. 1982. they seek to recover private respondents‘ civil liability arisin g 112 Agas. did not make any pronouncement as to the latter‘s civil liability. Jess Lopez years from the date when their cause of action accrued. the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff. Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners. The Viron Transit Bus driven by Sibayan collided with a Lite Ace. G. the same was seasonably filed. the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. In this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels. Thus. which consists of 3 elements. 1976. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry. Ongchuan. Viron Transit and its President/Chairman. when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case. as well as the reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Buan. Anzures. petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan. reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential damages. SECOND. Reposo. as actions based on quasi-delict prescribes in 4 years. from April 8. which governed the institution of the criminal action. the MTC. 2005 Facts: In an Information dated 25 April 1994. On October 2000. Santos v. 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. a separate civil action was reserved. and its President/Chairman pursuant to their reservation. The petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was filed on May 30. No. Pizardo. when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused. For their part. which is the time when the cause of action arises. i. However. subject to 3 notable exceptions: FIRST. that is. killing the driver and 3 passengers thereof. and that accordingly. b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right. Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil action made in the criminal case.e. 3. When a criminal action is instituted. Issue: Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed. Navarrete. in its decision convicting Sibayan. 5 passengers were injured. no civil liability was pronounced. The collision occurred on April 8.

the prescriptive period is 2 years. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit. Petitioner contends that under RA No. petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation. under Article 100 RPC. Ongchuan. since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived.. intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34. This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.. the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code . final in character. Respondent moved to dismiss as petitioner‘s cause of action had prescribed as the case was filed more than 6 months from the date the vehicle was sold and/or delivered. & Roco 3B .e. and (2) independent civil liabilities. G. petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty. the surviving cause of action ex delicto. Nonetheless. RTC denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration hence this petition for certiorari. 4. Cusi. insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners‘ claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33. based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint. 113 Agas. Once there is a conviction for a felony. considering petitioners‘ allegations in their complaint. and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176. Since no warranty card or agreement was attached to the complaint. 141480. such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony.g. However. 1999. petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. 1998. 7394 (Consumer Act of the Philippines). We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Seen in this light. (1) civil liability ex delicto. Jess Lopez from crime. 2006 Facts: On November 27. there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. from the time of the accident. in cases of negligence. No. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. Unfortunately. the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees . Buan. Besides. or any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer. 1997. Anzures. the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.. declaring that petitioners‘ cause of action was based on quasi delict and should have been brought within 4 years from the time the cause of action accrued. The case is REMANDED. i.e. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee. Toyota Cubao. Reposo. This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil actions. the contract of sale of the subject pick-up carried an implied warranty that it was free from any hidden faults or defects.e. On October 18. e. the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed.R. Navarrete. the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. the trial court dismissed the same. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender.. considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint. RTC granted respondent‘s motion and dismissed. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted. i. On April 20. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31. De Guzman v. The vehicle was delivered to petitioner 2 days later. Issue: Whether or not the action has prescribed.. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case. i. petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent with the RTC. Petitioner asserted that Toyota should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied warranty. The prescriptive period thereof is 6 months under the Civil Code (Art. November 29. 1571). but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits. such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict. Inc.

All actions or claim accruing under the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe within two (2) years from the time the consumer transaction was consummated or the deceptive or unfair and unconscionable act or practice was committed and in case of hidden defects. The two (2) year prescriptive period under Art. his cause of action had become time-barred.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. both will be of equal duration. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent . Applicable Law on Warranties. petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with defective engine. Any other implied warranty shall endure not less than sixty (60) days nor more than one (1) year following the sale of new consumer products. cancel the contract and recover from the seller so much of the purchase price as has been paid. Such being the case. Under RA No. Cusi. 67. as in this case) shall endure not less than sixty days nor more than one (1) year following the sale of new consumer products (Art. 68 because the latter is the specific provision on the matter. the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. household or agricultural purposes. Reposo.. 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle). the provisions of the Civil Code on conditions and warranties shall govern all contracts of sale with condition and warranties (Art. Jess Lopez Held: YES. once an express warranty is breached. Petitioner cites Article 169 of Republic Act No. so as to make his suit come within the purview of the 2-year prescriptive period. as in this case. drugs. Under Article 1599. Lina went to see the movie ‗Mother Dear‘ at Superama I theater. —In addition to the Civil Code provisions on sale with warranties. or reject the goods. 169 cannot prevail over Art. including damages. that respondent should replace either the vehicle or its engine with a new one. Tangentially. and devices. but not limited to. even if the complaint is made to fall under the Republic Act No. Petitioner contends that the subject motor vehicle comes within the context of Republic Act No. Petitioner specifies that in his complaint. cosmetics. 7394. petitioner should have exercised this right within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold. which was an action based on quasi-delict. he neither asked for a rescission of the contract of sale nor did he pray for a proportionate reduction of the purchase price. 7394. Chatto. Anzures. 7394. The seller and the consumer may stipulate the period within which the express warranty shall be enforceable. Additional Provisions on Warranties. f) Breach of warranties—x x x xxx 2) In case of breach of implied warranty.‖ (Emphasis supplied. Since petitioner filed the complaint on April 20. petitioner also justifies that his cause of action has not yet prescribed because this present suit. 7394. 68. had likewise lapsed. owned by Gotesco Investment Cor poration. Fortuitous Event Civil Code o Article 1174 (Memorize) 1. from discovery thereof. 210 SCRA 18 (1992) Facts: In the afternoon of June 4. family. What petitioner claims is the enforcement of the contract. Gotesco v. which is one year. which shall include. & Roco 3B . The duration of the implied warranty (not accompanied by an express warranty. If the implied warranty on merchantability accompanies an express warranty. 67). [e]). the consumer may retain in the goods and recover damages. Buan. that is.) ARTICLE 169. Hardly 10 minutes after entering the theater. The following provisions of Republic Act No. 7394 as the applicable provision. 68. Chatto. Article 1495 of the Civil Code states that in a contract of sale. the allegations in petitioner‘s complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforceme nt of an implied warranty against hidden defects. —The provisions of the Civil Code on conditions and warranties shall govern all contracts of sale with conditions and warranties. Article 4 (q) of the said law defines ―consumer products and services‖ as goods. 7394 state: Art. By filing this case. Shocked and hurt.e. or more than 19 months counted from November 29. par. i. Art. 1982 Gloria E. the same should still be dismissed since the prescriptive period for implied warranty thereunder. that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective. the following provisions shall govern the sale of consumer products with warranty: e) Duration of warranty. Chattos managed to crawl under 114 Agas. Consequently. the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale. Ongchuan. debts or obligations which are primarily for personal. prescribes in four years. The Civil Code set forth the available remedies of a buyer against the seller on the basis of a warranty against hidden defects. Prescription . Petitioner relies on Article 68 (f) (2) in relation to Article 169 of Republic Act No. 1999. Navarrete. Pandemonium ensued. food. Petitioner‘s argument is erroneous. F. and her 15-year old daughter. services and credits.

What is significant is the finding that the collapse was due to CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS. 115 Agas. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. CA affirmed.‖ That presumption or inference was not overcome by the Gotesco. Held: NO. It was the burden of defendant-appellant to prove that its theater did not suffer from any structural defect when it was built and that it has been well maintained when the incident occurred. there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. it behooved defendant-appellant to conduct an exhaustive study of the reason for the tragic incident. It could not have collapsed without a cause.S. and dizziness. As gleaned from Bouvier‘s definition of and Cockburn‘s elucidation on force majeure. incompetent. Due to continuing pain in the neck. it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. but an architect who had not even passed the government‘s examination. the post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings . There was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater‘s cei ling. Buan. It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. there were no results with respect to said investigation in connection to the cause of the collapsed. the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure. Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer. which the trial court denominated as gross. i. for one to be exempt from any liability because of it. he should not have been guilty of negligence. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. Even assuming for the sake of argument that. Considering the collapse of the ceiling of its theater‘s balcony barely 4 years after its construction. He literally could not give any specific reason therefor.. CA held: ―The lower court did not also err in its finding that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater‘s balcony was due to construction defects and not to force majeure. The ignorance of Mr. The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident in question.e. During the trial. However. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is. its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. He also testified that an investigation was conducted. Gotesco maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. (PROBABLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE WASN‘ Trial Court ruled in favor of the Chattos. Ongchuan. as the CA impliedly held. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated as an act of God. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued DO NOT AT ALL PROVE that there were no defects in the construction.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Louie (sic) University in Baguio City. Jess Lopez the fallen ceiling. Mr. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. It was not shown that any of the causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Cusi. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. IMPLIED WARRANTY has given rise to the rule that: ―Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured. especially as regards the ceiling. Anzures. Verily. for about 3 months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital 5 or 6 times. Navarrete. He is not an engineer. and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant. Having interposed it as a defense.‖ Issue: Whether or not the incident was due to force majeure. headache. The real reason why Mr. They walked to the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for 1 day and subsequently transferred to the UST hospital. Gotesco could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. & Roco 3B . employee of Gotesco. testified that he personally inspected the buildings whenever he could (but did not give specific dates). Gotesco would STILL BE LIABLE because it was guilty of negligence. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence. That Mr. Reposo. plaintiff went toUSA in July 1982 for further treatment. She stayed in the U. he must have exercised care. Ong. Ong. He is a graduate of architecture from the St. Gtesco tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only Gotesco exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises.

Torts & Damages 2013

Atty. Jess Lopez

2. Servando v. Philippine Steam Navigation Co. , 117 SCRA 832 (1982) Facts: Servando & Bico loaded on board Phil. Steam Navigation‘s vessel for carriage several cavans of rice and cartons of colored paper, toys and general merchandise. A bill of lading was issued by PSN which contained a peculiar stipulation: Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire. Upon arrival, the cargoes were discharged in good order unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. However, on the same day, the warehouse was razed by a fire, destroying Servando‘s cargoes. Bico was able to take delivery of a certain portion of his goods. Their claim for the value of said goods were rejected by the PSN. The lower court ruled in favor of Servando & Bico, holding that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736 which imposes upon common carriers the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are unconditionally placed in their possession "until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. Moreover, since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the Servando & Bico, the loss is chargeable against the PSN. Issue: Whether PSN is liable for the loss. Held: NO. The court upheld the validity of the contractual stipulation. Servando‘s contention that the same did not bind them since it was printed in fine letters on the back of the bills of lading and was not signed does not persuade. The agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1174 of the Civil Code: ―Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.‖ Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. The Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines 'CASO FORTUITO' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers. There is nothing in the record to show that PSN incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that PSN had not only notified Servando of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse. Nor can the PSN or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by Servando was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no control whatsoever over the same. Caso fortuito in the ―Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola - In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics : (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner ; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor." In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the PSN. The latter could not have foreseen the event. The lower court relied in the ruling of Yu Biao Sontua v. Ossorio wherein in that case, the defendant was held liable for damages arising from a fire caused by the negligence of the defendant‘s employees. Unlike in this case, there is no shred of proof to prove that the fire that broke out was attributable to the negligence of PSN‘s employees.

3. Edgar Cokaliong Shipping Lines v. UCPB General Insurance Company, G.R. No. 146018, June 25, 2003 116 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Torts & Damages 2013

Atty. Jess Lopez

Facts: In Dec. 1991, Nestor Angelia & Zosimo Mercado each delivered to Cokaliong Shipping (CS) cargo (carton of Christmas decors, sacks of plastic toys, assorted goods) to be transported on board the M/V Tandag on its voyage from Cebu to Surigao del Sur. Both were covered by a bill of lading. Also, each were considered as the shipper and consignee of their respective cargo. Said bills of lading were insured by a certain Feiciana Legaspi with the UCPB General Insurance Corp against all risks. While in transit, after the vessel had passed the Mandaue-Mactan bridge, fire ensued in the engine room and, despite earnest efforts of the officers and crew, fire engulfed and destroyed the entire vessel resulting in loss of life as well as the cargo. Thereafter, Legaspi filed a claim under the Marine Risk for the loss of the cargo covered by the bills of lading. UCPB paid the claim. Then, as Legaspi‘s subrogee, UCPB filed a complaint based on torts against CS to collect the amount it paid to the subrogee. UCPB alleged that the loss was due to CS‘ negligence. RTC ruled for UCPB. CA affirmed and said that CS failed to prove that the fire that consumed the vessel was caused by something other than its negligence in the upkeep, maintenance, and operation of the vessel. Hence, this petition. CS argues that the cause of the loss was force majeure and adds that its exercise of due diligence was adequately proven by the findings of the Coast Guard. Issue: Whether the cause of the loss was force majeure. Held: NO. The uncontroverted findings of the Philippine Coast Guard show that the M/V Tandag sank due to a fire, which resulted from a crack in the auxiliary engine fuel oil service tank. Fuel spurted out of the crack and dripped to the heating exhaust manifold, causing the ship to burst into flames. The crack was located on the side of the fuel oil tank, which had a mere 2-inch gap from the engine room walling, thus precluding constant inspection and care by the crew. Having originated from an unchecked crack in the fuel oil service tank, the fire could not have been caused by force majeure. Broadly speaking, force majeure generally applies to a natural accident, such as that caused by a lightning, an earthquake, a tempest or a public enemy. Hence, FIRE IS NOT CONSIDERED A NATURAL DISASTER OR CALAMITY. In Eastern Shipping Lines it was said: ―This must be so as it arises almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. It does not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lighting or by other natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. Article 1680, which considers fire as an extraordinary fortuitous event refers to leases or rural lands where a reduction of the rent is allowed when more than one-half of the fruits have been lost due to such event, considering that the law adopts a protective policy towards agriculture. As the peril of fire is not comprehended within the exceptions in Article 1734, Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that in all cases other than those mentioned in Article 1734, the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law.‖ Where loss of cargo results from the failure of the officers of a vessel to inspect their ship frequently so as to discover the existence of cracked parts, that loss cannot be attributed to force majeure, but to the negligence of those officials. The law provides that a common carrier is presumed to have been negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised extraordinary vigilance over the goods it transported. Ensuring the seaworthiness of the vessel is the first step in exercising the required vigilance. CS did not present sufficient evidence showing what measures or acts it had undertaken to ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel. It failed to show when the last inspection and care of the auxiliary engine fuel oil service tank was made, what the normal practice was for its maintenance, or some other evidence to establish that it had exercised extraordinary diligence. It merely stated that constant inspection and care were not possible, and that the last time the vessel was drydocked was in November 1990. Necessarily, in accordance with Article 1735, we hold CS responsible for the loss of the goods covered by Bills of Lading Nos. 58 and 59. G. H. Diligence (see cases under Article 2180) Mistake and Waiver

1. Gatchalian v. Delim, 203 SCRA 126 (1991) Facts: At noon on 11 July 1973, Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, Arsenio Delim‘s ―Thames‖ mini bus. On the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, ― a snapping sound‖ 117 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

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was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, Gatchalian was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead etc. While there, Arsenio‘s wife Adela Delim visited and paid for the expenses, hospitalization and transportation fees. However, before she left, she had the injured passengers including the Gatchalian sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit constituting a waiver of any future complaint : ―That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.‖ However, notwithstanding this document, Gatchalian filed an action Ex Contractu to recover compensatory and Actual Damages. Delim denied liability on the ground that it was an accident and the Joint which constitutes as a waiver. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the waiver and the CA affirmed. Issue: Whether the waiver was valid. Held: NO. There was no valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by Gatchalian. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person . The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported waivers is illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit , where the Court in reading and rejecting a purported waiver said: ―It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte Provincial Hospital, appellees were asked to sign as, in fact, they signe d the document Exhibit I wherein they stated that "in consideration of the expenses which said operator has incurred in properly giving us the proper medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to waive any and all claims against the operator of the Samar Express Transit. Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned above will readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said document proves is that they expressed a „desire‟ to make the waiver — which obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right. A WAIVER of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of July 8, 1887) — which is not the case of the one relied upon in this appeal.‖ If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, we would have to conclude that the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in ―clear and unequivocal‖ terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by Gatchalian need to be considered. Gatchalian testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Conside ring these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether Gatchalian understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent. Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy. Sub-issue: Was Delim negligent? Yes. 118 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

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Atty. Jess Lopez

We have already noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common carrier. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence, i.e., the diligence of a good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary relations between members of society. Thus, the question which must be addressed is whether or not Delim has successfully proved that he had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the mishap involving his mini-bus. The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that Delim had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously, he did not even attempt, during the trial before the court a quo, to prove that he had indeed exercised the requisite extraordinary diligence. Respondent did try to exculpate himself from liability by alleging that the mishap was the result of force majeure. But allegation is not proof and here again, he utterly failed to substantiate his defense of force majeure. To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to avoid. Elements of force majeure: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the "caso fortuito", or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of Delim‘s common carrier. In her direct examination, Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the vehicle went off the road and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers, an old woman, cried out, ―What happened?‖ The driver replied, nonchalantly, ―That is only normal.‖ The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus. Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same ―snapping sound‖ had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of Delim and his driver. 2. Theis v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 167 (1997) Facts: TCT Nos. 15515 (parcel no. 1); 15516 (parcel no. 2); 15684 (parcel no. 3). The above lands are situated in Tagaytay. Beside parcel no. 3 is a vacant lot (parcel no. 4). Calsons constructed a 1-storey house on parcel no. 3. Parcel no. 1 and parcel no. 2, remained idle. In a survey conducted in 1985, there were ERRORS IN THE DESIGNATION OF THE LANDS: a) parcel no. 3, (where the two-storey house stands) became TCT No. 15515 (parcel no 1) b) parcel nos. 1 and 2 were mistakenly surveyed to be located on parcel no. 4 (which was not owned by Calsons) and covered by TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684 Unaware of the mistake by which Calsons appeared to be the owner of parcel no. 4 as indicated in the erroneous survey, and based on the erroneous information given by the surveyor that parcel no. 4 is covered by TCT No. 15516 and 15684, Calsons sold said parcel no. 4 to Theis. Upon execution of the Deed of Sale, Calsons delivered TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684 to Theis who immediately registered the same. After returning from Germany, they went to Tagaytay to look over the vacant lots and to plan the construction of their house thereon, they discovered that parcel no. 4 was owned by another person; that the lots actually sold to them were parcel nos. 2 and 3 covered by TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684, respectively. Parcel no. 3 however, could not have been sold by the Calsons as a two-storey house, the construction cost of which far exceeded the price paid by the Calsons, had already been built thereon even prior to the execution of the contract. Theis insisted that they wanted parcel no. 4, which is the idle lot beside parcel no. 3. However, Calsons could not have possibly sold the same to them for it did not own parcel no. 4. The mistake in the identity of the lots is traceable to the erroneous survey conducted in 1985. To remedy the mistake, Calsons offered parcel nos. 1 and 2 covered by TCT Nos. 15515 and 15516 , respectively, as these 2 were precisely the 2 vacant lots which they owned and intended to sell when it entered into the transaction with 119 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

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Atty. Jess Lopez

Theis. Theis refused and insisted on taking parcel no. 3, covered by TCT No. 155864 and upon which a 2-storey house stands. Such refusal of Theis prompted Calsons to offer the return of an amount double the price paid by Theis. Latter still refused. Calsons was then compelled to file an action for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance . Trial court annulled said contract of sale after finding that there was indeed a mistake in the identification of the parcels of land. Trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, held that — ―When one sells or buys a real property, he either sells or buys the property as he sees it, in its actual setting and by its physical metes and bounds, and not be the mere lot number assigned to the same property in the certificate of title or in any document. And, when a buyer of real property decides to purchase from his seller, he is ordinarily bound by prudence to ascertain the true nature, identity or character of the property that he intends to buy and ascertain the title of his vendor before he parts with his money. The foregoing precepts and precautions were observed by the parties. Both brokers of the sale brought defendants to the vicinity where plaintiff‘s 3 adjacent parcels of land are locate d and pointed to defendants the 2 vacant parcels right beside plaintiff‘s house. When defendants intimated to the brokers their desire to buy the vacant lots pointed to them, they were brought to plaintiff‘s representative where the parties discussed the terms of the sale. It is clear that defendants did not intend to buy the parcel of land where plaintiff‘s house stood as defendant Betty Theis declared in her testimony that they wanted to buy the parcel at the right side of plaintiff‘s house where she and her husband would construct their house. Neither can this Court accept the hypothesis that plaintiff intended to sell that parcel where its house was already constructed for if this was its true intention, it would not sell its two (2) lots at the price of P486,000.00 which is way below the costs of its construction of P1,500,000.00. Consent of the parties is one of the essential elements to the validity of the contract and where consent is given through mistake, the validity of the contractual relations between the parties is legally impaired. When defendants bought the properties of plaintiff, they intended to buy the vacant lots owned by the latter. As the sale that was finally consummated by the parties had covered the parcel where plaintiff‘s house wa s constructed even before the sale took place, this Court can safely assume that the deed of sale executed by the parties did not truly express their true intention. The mistake on the subject of the sale appears to be substantial as the OBJECT of the transaction is DIFFERENT from that intended by the parties. This fiasco could have been cured and the pain and travails of this litigation avoided, had parties agreed to a reformation of the deed of sale. The defendants refused, insisting that they wanted the vacant lots on the right side of plaintiff‘s house, which was impossible for plaintiff 3 to do, as said vacant lots were not of its own dominion.‖ Issue: Whether Calsons is liable. Held: NO. According to Art. 1390, contracts are voidable/annullable, even though no damage was done to the contracting parties where consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. Also, according to Art. 1331, in order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract . Tolentino explains that the concept of error must include both ignorance, which is the absence of knowledge with respect to a thing, and mistake properly speaking, which is a (1) wrong conception about said thing, or (2) a belief in the existence of some circumstances, fact, or event, which in reality does not exist. In both cases, there is a lack of full and correct knowledge about the thing. The mistake committed by Calsons in selling parcel no. 4 to the Theis falls within the second type. Such mistake invalidated its consent and as such, annulment of the deed of sale is proper. Calsons obviously committed an honest mistake in selling parcel no. 4. It is quite impossible for them to sell the lot since he does not own it. The GOOD FAITH of the Calsons is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it immediately offered 2 other vacant lots to the Theis or to reimburse them with twice the amount paid. That Theis refused either option left the Calsons with no other choice but to file an action for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of mistake.

Theis cannot be justified in their insistence that parcel no. 3, upon which Theis constructed a two-storey house, be given to them. The cost of construction for the said house P1.5m far exceeds the amount paid by the petitioners (P486,000.00). Calsons‘ witness, Atty. Tarciso Calilung clarified that parcel no. 4, the lot mistakenly sold, was a vacant lot. To allow the Theis to take parcel no. 3 would be to countenance unjust enrichment. They intended at the outset to purchase a vacant lot, their refusal to accept the offer of the Calsons to give them two (2) other vacant lots in exchange, as well as their insistence on parcel no. 3, which is a house and lot, is manifestly unreasonable. I. 120 Emergency Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Torts & Damages 2013

Atty. Jess Lopez

1. Gan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44264, September 19, 1988 Facts: At about 8:00 AM, the Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car. There were 2 vehicles, a truck, and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the other about 2 to 3 meters from each other. As the car driven by the accused approached the place where the 2 vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another, which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the Gan. To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parked truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front parts, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old man who was later identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival. An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against Gab. The trial court rendered judgment finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. She appealed to the CA, which modified the conviction to homicide thru SIMPLE imprudence. Issue: Whether or not Gan is criminally liable. Held: NO. A corollary rule (to the test of negligence – WWPD) is what is known in the law as the EMERGENCY RULE One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. The CA in finding the Gan guilty said: ―The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite direction followed by another which overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should not only have swerved the car she was driving to the right but should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she would not bump into the pedestrian who was crossing at the time but also the jeepney which was then parked along the street.‖ The course of action suggested by the CA would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded Gan to react to the situation she was in. The suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for Gan to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to others. Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect to the relative distances of Gan to the parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that she did have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the right without stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the prosecution on this point is her statement to the police. Under the circumstances narrated, we find that the CA is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Gan certainly could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. The danger confronting her was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerful instinct of self-preservation. Moreover, she was driving her car within the legal limits. The EMERGENCY RULE enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently absolve Gan from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under consideration. We set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of the claim due them, had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto. 2. McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517 (1992)  supra Doctrine: Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril — death or injury to the 2 boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent. Considering the sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Using the test of negligence (WWPMD) , it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence. In any case, assuming arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.

121

Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Torts & Damages 2013

Atty. Jess Lopez

The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the EMERGENCY SIGNALS given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on. The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 48 kph along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. It was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximat e cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages . 3. Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 115024 & 117944, February 7, 1996 Facts: According to the PLAINTIFF, At 2 AM, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi Lancer travelling along Aurora Blvd. with Cecilia Ramon heading towards the direction of Manila when she noticed something wrong with her tires. She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li and registered in the name of respondent Alexander Commercial, Inc. Valenzuela was thrown against the windshield of the car of ACI, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under ACI‘s car. Plaintiff‘s left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and muscle connected to the rest of the body. She was confined in the hospital for 20 days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. According the RESPONDENT, Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph. Considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with ―full bright lights.‖ Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped Valenzeula‘s car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of Valenzuela‘s car was protruding as it was then ―at a standstill diagonally‖ on the outer portion of the r ight lane towards Araneta Avenue. Li confirmed the testimony of Valenzuela‘s witness that after being bumped the car of the Valenzuela swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Li counterclaimed for damages, alleging that Valenzuela was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver. Trial court found Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176. The trial court likewise held ACI., Li‘s employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. MR denied. On appeal, CA affirmed and found that there was ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial court‘s finding that the Valenzuela‘s car was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant‘s car, and dismissed defendant‘s argument. CA however, absolved ACI from any liability towards Lourdes Valenzuela. Issue: Whether Valenzuala was contributorily negligent. Held: NO. 122 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

Li‘s failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors : 1) that he was driving at a “very fast” speed as testified by Rodriguez. it in effect guarantees that it is. behind a Toyota Corona Car. Ongchuan. For large companies . Physiological ―fight or flight‖ mechanisms are at work. satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Navarrete. Jess Lopez LI‘S LIABILITY: Valenzuela‘s version of the incident was fully cor roborated by an uninterested witness. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger. Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremeties. Rodriguez declared that he observed Valenzuela‘s car parked paralle l and very near the sidewalk. like every good father. contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making. to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Reposo. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. ACI‘S LIABILITY: When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee. & Roco 3B . the visibility of the street. clear and at a convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan throroughfare like Aurora Boulevard. hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant‘s Mitsubishi Lancer. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party. Under the ―EMERGENCY RULE‖ adopted by this Court in Gan. when he saw the car hit Valenzuela. the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care. but by the OVER-ALL NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. drowsiness . about 1 1/2 feet away. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk. the owner-operator of a beerhouse (Lambingan sa Kambingan) located just across the scene of the accident. and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Given a light rainfall. is a double lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted white paint . Rodriguez further added that he was standing in front of his establishment. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. she did what was best under the situation. Buan. the privilege serves important business purposes either related to the image of success an entity 123 Agas. the investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuela‘s car was parked very close to the sidewalk. exhaustion. Equally important. Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. ON VALENZUELA‘S LACK OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence. from where she eventually fell under the defendant‘s car.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. etc. is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. As narrated by CA: ―She stopped at a lighted place where there were people. Rogelio Rodriguez. he crossed the street. alcohol. noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted from the offending vehicle in order to survey the incident. which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. CA noted. It was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the ―oncoming car‖ considering that Aurora Blvd. Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert—as every driver should be—to those conditions. Cusi. since her car was running at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao. provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs.‖ In fact. Felix Ramos. and there is plenty of space for both cars. The sketch showed Valenzuela‘s car partly straddling the sidewalk. Pfc. or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Under the circumstances described. Anzures. contrary to Li‘s allegation that Valenzuela‘s car was close to the center of the right lane. Spontaneously reacting to the incident. an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought.

. he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office. to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel. it hit the deflector wall constructed by C&A. he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours but he did nothing until 8:35 AM of October 21. The trial court ruled that DLTI was not guilty of negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident . C&A Construction. C&A filed a complaint for damages. Reposo. v. was engaged by NHA to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas. Jusep who is a duly licensed and competent Master Mariner. based on the principle of bonus pater familias. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li. To avoid collision. Inc. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. ACI has not demonstrated. as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients. October 1. DLTI claimed that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event. when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor. said company. ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Valenzuela during the accident. Delsan Transport Lines. the vessel could have sought shelter. it absolved DLTI of liability because the latter had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening situation. Tondo. 1994 before transferring the vessel to the North Harbor inasmuch as it was not shown that had the transfer been made earlier. As early as 12:00 MN of October 20. Jess Lopez intends to present to its clients and to the public in general. 1994. Captain Demetrio T. Cusi. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express (owned and operated by DLTI) received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about 8) hours . 1994. 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge.. He succeeded in avoiding the power barge. In his testimony. CA reversed. Capt. but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern. in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company‘s image. The service car assigned to Li by ACI therefore enabled both Li —as well as the ACI—to put up the front of a highly successful entity. The latter demanded payment of the damage from DLTI but the latter refused to pay. G. DLTI filed the instant petition contending that Capt. the company exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. increasing the latter‘s goodwill before its clientele.R. 1994. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. Inc. Applying the ―emergency rule‖. Ongchuan. the managerial employee or company sales agent. the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car . & Roco 3B . (2) Whether DLTI is solidarily liable under 2180 Held: (1) YES. providing a company car serves both purposes. As such. but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances. At around 12 MN of October 20. Capt. which unfortunately was already congested. Jusep was not negligent in waiting until 8:35AM of October 21. a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. Complaint filed by C&A was dismissed. that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. DLTI claimed that it cannot be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of because C&A failed to allege in the complaint that DLTI was negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees and in fact. Issue: (1) Whether Capt. to our satisfaction. In fine. Li was an Assistant Manager of ACI. 4. These meetings. Navarrete. Inc. Here. or —for practical and utilitarian reasons— to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to reach clients conveniently. Buan. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. He decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth. Anzures. Capt.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. clearly. No. Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises. 124 Agas. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of negligence in the present case. meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. were not strictly confined to routine hours because. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested. In most cases. Jusep was negligent. 2003 Facts: C & A Construction. 156034.

is way past sunrise.m. The RTC erred in applying the emergency rule. an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. 2012 Facts: In 1990. Buan. despite Antonio stepping on the brakes. de los Santos. It cannot disclaim liability on the basis of C&A‘s failure to allege in its complaint that the former did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence. it was held that it is not necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees. one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger. it became inevitable for the Isuzu truck to crash into the Pathfinder. if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method. according to him. that Antonio had been all along driving with care. They claimed that Sonny had exercised the expected diligence required of an employer. The Pathfinder had no way to avoid a collision because it was about to pass the truck when suddenly blocked. The minor orphaned heirs of the Mangalinao spouses demanded compensation from the truck owners (Sonny and Orix) which was ignored. When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm. G. Under this rule. Just when the Pathfinder was about to overtake the Fuso. it was not very cloudy and there was no weather disturbance yet. Cusi. Reposo. Mangalinao.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. January 25. Lucilo. Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situatio n. Jess Lopez Despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours . 5. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the Mangalinao spouses. was reckless when he caused the swerving of his vehicle directly on the lane of the Pathfinder to his left. 3 vehicles were traversing the 2-lane northbound NLEX. he had no way of preventing his truck from hitting the Pathfinder. The hour of 8:35 a. Anzures. negligence. Whenever an employee‘s negligence causes damage or injury to another. All the passengers in the Pathfinder were killed. So. (2) YES. Nos..R. On the other hand. he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because. and imprudence on the truck drivers for the deaths of their sister and parents. Edurese was driving a Nissan Pathfinder with other passengers (including the Mangalinao spouses). They filed a claim based on quasi-delict against the truck drivers and the owners. he could have had greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they docked was very near North Harbor. It is not enough that the employees chosen be competent and qualified. imputing recklessness. Allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasidelict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Furthermore. The Pathfinder hit the Fuso‘s left door and body which caused both vehicles to stop in the expressway. In Viron Transportation Co. he complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction. while it was raining at night. and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. Ongchuan. Before them on the outer lane was a Fuso 10-wheeler truck driven by Loreto (accompanied by truck helper Charlie). that with the abrupt and unexpected collision of the vehicles before him and their precarious proximity. unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. 125 Agas. & Roco 3B . The Fuso was moving in an erratic and swerving motion. the driver of the Isuzu truck was likewise reckless. Sonny and Antonio countered. who was driving the Fuso truck. Inc. DLTI presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored compliance therewith. Such emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Capt. What immediately followed was a pileup wherein the Isuzu 10-wheeler truck crashed into the rear of the Pathfinder. the Isuzu truck was practically tailgating the Pathfinder on the dark slippery highway such that when the Pathfinder collided with the Fuso truck. Navarrete. there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. The truck drivers escaped serious injuries and death. while alleging that Sonny and Orix equally liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their respective drivers. and. inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees. is not guilty of negligence. holding that both truck drivers are at fault and should be held liable. 174089 & 174266. attributing fault for the accident solely on Loreto‘s reckless driving of his truck which suddenly stopped and slid across the highway. the Fuso suddenly swerved to the left and cut into the Pathfinder‘s lane. Had he moved the vessel earlier. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee. inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by operation of law. Behind the Pathfinder was another 10-wheeler Isuzu truck driven by Antonio (accompanied by Rodolfo). Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of the difficulty of traveling at night.

upon noticing the irregular way of driving of the Fuso truck. the ‗Emergency Rule‘ invoked WILL NOT APPLY. Board of Liquidators v. Thus. prevent such extensive wreck to the vehicle in front. and that he was 3 cars away. he obviously failed to exercise proper care in his driving. Antonio was also guilty of the mishap that occurred. to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person. emphasized that government concerns faced the same risks that confronted private companies. a collision was imminent. & Roco 3B . Jess Lopez Held: YES. the court made the conclusion that. With the glaring evidence. Antonio. Warehouses were destroyed. the Isuzu still suddenly smashed into the rear of the Pathfinder causing extensive damage to it. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale. Reposo. is not guilty of negligence. that NACOCO was recouping its losses. slowed down his speed to about 50-60 km/h. 1948. Such principle states: [O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger. President Roxas made a statement that the NACOCO head did his best to avert the losses. Copra production decreased. Meanwhile. and that Kalaw was to remain in his post. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. Furthermore. No action was taken on the contracts. on January 30. Quick turnovers became impossible. Coconut trees throughout the country suffered extensive damage. Buan. August 14. there is no doubt that the driver was negligent. Bocar. Cash requirements doubled. With regard to the FUSO TRUCK. Antonio should have been prudent to reduce his speed and increase his distance from the Pathfinder. which Orix rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party complaint against the owner of the Fuso. and Orix are liable. Then. Maximo Kalaw sat as its General Manager and board chairman. Kalaw made a full disclosure of the situation. 1967 Facts: National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) was a chartered as a non-profit governmental organization. Based on the testimony given by Antonio. Had he done so. Not long thereafter. if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method. Anzures. unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger. He opened himself up to a major danger and naturally. However the smashed front of the Isuzu strongly indicates the strong impact of the ramming of the rear of the Pathfinder that pinned its passengers.R. it would be improbable for him to have hit the vehicle in front of him or if he really could not avoid hitting it. the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that they may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff. L-18805. Because of 4 typhoons that hit the country. by collusion with others or otherwise. as well as hitting the right side of the Fuso. Kalaw. Navarrete. that is. the court also found fault on their part. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. Instead of slowing down and moving towards the shoulder in the highway if it really needed to stop. Deprivation of export facilities increased the time necessary to accumulate shiploads of copra. NACOCO was unable to fulfill its obligations under the numerous contracts it entered into with several buyers. it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused. Manuel. that he had slowed down. or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. it was very negligent of Loreto to abruptly hit the brake in a major highway wherein vehicles are highly likely to be at his rear. Prices spiralled. Garcia and Moll in attendance. in charge of all transactions involving coconut and its by-products. J. the board met again with Kalaw. on the part of the ISUZU TRUCK. financing a problem. Cusi. Neither did the board vote thereon at the meeting of January 7. Atty. The Pathfinder had absolutely no chance to avoid the truck. Antonio . Clearly. Besides. They unanimously approved 6 contracts but were only partially performed. Damnum absque injuria 1. Testimonies stated that the Fuso had lost control. apprised the board of the impending heavy losses. Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180. Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that night. It has already been explained that where a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is. it would be easy for him. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. indeed. No. These militate against Antonio‘s claim that he was driving at a safe speed. 1948 following. Ongchuan. Orix cannot also escape liability since he is the operator of the Fuso truck. on January 11. the Isuzu was not within the safe stopping distance to avoid the Pathfinder in case of emergency. A meeting was then held. 1948. skidded to the left and blocked the way of the Pathfinder . which was about to overtake. Antonio admitted that despite stepping on the brakes.Torts & Damages 2013 Issue: Whether Sonny. 126 Agas. G.

BOC claims that the products are of higher class considered as polypropylene film which is restricted by LOI. it means breach of a known duty thru some motive or interest or ill will. Kalaw was not remissed in his duty. Result: Copra production was impaired. at its regular meeting. NACOCO had 90 buying agencies spread throughout the islands. Kalaw invariably consulted with NACOCO's Chief Buyer. This shipment arrived in December 1981. Issue: Whether Kalaw and the rest of the Board were guilty negligence and bad faith and/or breach of trust for having entered into the unprofitable contracts." or "some motive or interest or ill will" that "partakes of the nature of fraud." and that "it had never been the intention of the contracting parties in entering into the contract in question that. Kalaw as acting general manager of the corporation. Acting Customs Commissioner Farolan and Parayno (acting chief of Customs Intelligence) did not release the shipment. Quick turnovers could not be expected. & Roco 3B . NACOCO was abolished by EO 372. Stock accessibility was no problem. The various contracts involved delivery of but 16. or the Assistant General Manager. would seem to be supported by the fact that even as the contracts were being questioned in Congress and in the NACOCO board itself. we find that there was no "dishonest purpose. A series of exchange of correspondence between the BOI and the Bureau of Customs ensued. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here absent. It is alleged that while the by-laws required prior approval of the board. Reposo. Solmac Marketing Corporation. and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of what is technically known as polypropylene film." or "conscious doing of wrong. In fact. Kalaw entered into the contracts alone as general manager and without the board‘s prior approval. giving the Board of Liquidators the function of settling and closing its affairs. with bigger f acilities. with ease. The typhoons were known to BOL. As the trial court correctly observed.). He could not be expected to predict the coming of unpredictable typhoons. Kalaw as General Manager of the National Coconut Corporation. Subsequently. It is this sum that NACOCO. NACOCO was not alone in this misfortune. transferee. experienced. at a time when the contracts had already been openly disputed. on January 7. old.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Anzures. On December 27. NACOCO could have. President Roxas expressed his desire "that the Board of Directors should reelect Hon. G. the defendant should buy the copra contracted for at exorbitant prices far beyond the buying price of the plaintiff under the contract." Indeed. were it not for the typhoons. ‖ And. 83589. prices spiralled. extensive damage was caused to the coconut trees in the copra producing regions of the Philippines and according to estimates of competent authorities. this is a case of damnum absque injuria. 1991 Facts: Solmac Marketing Corporation was the assignee. also suff ered tremendous losses. Ongchuan. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. Applying this precept to the given facts herein. Thus. Farolan v. No. Kalaw could not have been an insurer of prof its. in the event of a sharp rise in the price of copra in the Philippine market produce by force majeure or by causes beyond defendant's control. 127 Agas. it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. Held: NO. 2. Navarrete. To what then may we trace the damage suffered by NACOCO. Sometime after. it will take about one year until the coconut producing regions will be able to produce their normal coconut yield and it will take some time until the price of copra will reach normal levels. warehouses destroyed. it partakes of the nature of fraud. the board. Jess Lopez The aggrieved buyers who were parties to the said contracts threatened to bring damage suits but most of these were settled except for one who actually pushed through with the suit (Louis Dreyfus ltd. Despite the typhoons. March 13.3M.R. Of course. through the Board of Liquidators. All the settlements sum up to P1. Cusi. met its contractual obligations. appointed Maximo M. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting . Four typhoons wreaked havoc then on our copra-producing regions. Kalaw died and the suit was brought against his estate. The record discloses that private traders. were not spared. NACOCO resisted the suits filed by Louis Dreyfus & Co. That Kalaw cannot be tagged with crassa negligentia or as much as simple negligence. Kalaw's acts were not the result of haphazard decisions either." or "breach of a known duty. Sisenando Barretto.500 tons over a five-month period. 1947. Parayno first wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether or not the subject importation may be released. and there vehemently asserted that ―as a result of the said typhoons. The dailies and quotations from abroad were guideposts to him. charging the latter with negligence and bad faith/breach of trust for having approved entered into the aforementioned unprofitable contracts. Buan. NACOCO was still able to deliver a little short of 50% of the tonnage required under the contracts." or "some moral obliquity.000 tons of copra a day. President Roxas defended the actuations of Kalaw. by pleading in its answers force majeure as an affirmative defense. 1948. It could purchase 2. The facts yield the answer. now seeks to recover from GM Kalaw and the other 2 directors. And even as typhoons supervened. Maximo M.

DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA: mistakes committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing of malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Farolan and Parayno had already released the said shipment ‗without drilling of holes‘ so they found no reason to appeal the decision. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Navarrete. As public officers. Solmac appealed since no damages were awarded. vice chairman.e. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. It is supported by substantial evidence on record. ‗Damian Farolan‘. CA granted the claim of Solmac for damages. It was on the strength of this finding that the Farolan withheld the release of the subject importation for being contrary to law. it can be gathered that even the highest officers of the BOI themselves (chairman. prudence dictated that Farolan first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines regarding the disposition of the various importations. Bad faith was not substantiated. was faithfully complied with. They acted in good faith. based on the testimonies of the witnesses. THIRD. Farolan then wrote the BOI requesting for definite guidelines regarding the disposition of importations of Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) then being held at the BOC. and attention which careful men use in the management of their affairs. This resulted in the inevitable delay in the release of the Clojus shipment. Anzures. etc) were not in agreement as to what proper course to take on the subject of the various importations withheld by the BOC. the they had the duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to implement. After all. the BOC sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject importation might be released. Thus the RTC‘s finding that the Farolan acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the Clojus shipment pending a definitive policy of the BOI on this matter is correct. can they be held liable in their personal and private capacities for damages suffered by Solmac. The conflicting recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted the Farolan to seek final clarification from the former with regard to its policy on these importations. claiming that Parayno and Farolan acted with bad faith in not releasing the shipment..When a public officer takes his oath of office. and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. evidence shows that there was indeed confusion with what course of action to take on the said shipment. i. Ongchuan. caution. Lozada. Reposo. the Farolan testified that. as the letters of BOI Governors ordering the release of the subject importation did not clarify the BOI policy on the matter. Cusi. Jess Lopez Bureau of Investments had a different view. Parayno also testified during the trial that up to that time (of the trial) there was no clear-cut policy on the part of the BOI regarding the entry into the Philippines of oriented polypropylene (OPP). SECOND. LOI 658-B. in the discharge of his duties. In other words. independent of the presumption of good faith. on many occasions. Buan. The RTC granted the petition. However. there was the report of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) that the subject importation was not OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene. the shipment was held by the BOC for more than 2 years). Thus. if any at all. which as stated earlier. In this case. contrary to the evidence submitted by the NIST that the same was pure oriented OPP. It is the opposite of fraud. FIRST. he is to use that prudence. 128 Agas. BOI said that the goods should be released ‗without the drilling of holes‘. was not successfully rebutted. one of the several of such importations. Issue: Whether Farolan acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the questioned importation. even under the law of public officers. Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation. (In short. Solmac sued Farolan and Parayno (in their official capacities) for Mandamus and damages. it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Such is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lays. But even before that time. he binds himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. But even granting that the Farolan committed a mistake in withholding the release of the subject importation because indeed it was composed of OPP film scraps. whose importation to the Philippines was restricted under LOI 658-B. as it called Ramon Farolan by a different name. in fact. we defined good faith as refering to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. The BOI Chairman replied on Feb 1984. Held: NO. nonetheless. This is irrelevant but just in case Sir asks). & Roco 3B . The confusion over the disposition of this particular importation obviates bad faith. In Abando v. the acts of the Farolan are protected by the presumption of good faith. (take note here that the CA made a mistake. Bad faith was not proven. Also. is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. negating Solmac‘s claim of bad faith. and its absence should be established by convincing evidence.

Navarrete.000. & Roco 3B .000 which would include his future bills. Confident that he had settled his account with the issuance of the postdated check. paid the bill by using her own credit card. Held: (1) YES. to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and that said check be returned to him because he had already instructed his bank to stop the payment thereof as the defendant violated their agreement that Marasigan issue the check to BPI to cover his account amounting to only P8.R. finding that BPI abused its right in contravention of Article 19. However. in order that his credit card would not be suspended. Buan. Albano called him inquiring as to how the matter can be threshed out extrajudicially but the latter said that such is a serious matter which cannot be discussed over the phone. 120639.00. He was informed by his secretary that BPI was demanding immediate payment of his outstanding account. was a complimentary member of BPI Express Credit Card and was issued a Credit Card with a credit limit of P3. otherwise he will file a case against them. The he oftentimes exceeded his credit limit but this was never taken against him by BPI and even his mode of paying his monthly bills in check was tolerated.84 on the condition that the defendant will not suspend the effectivity of the card. Ongchuan.987. his membership will be permanently cancelled. he did issue a check for P15. disputable though it may be. 1989. (2) Whether before the suspension of Marasigan‘s credit card. Marasigan. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. Issue: (1) Whether BPI had the right to suspend the credit card of Marasigan. (2) YES. 1989 which was received on November 23. In a letter addressed to the BPI. the head of the collection department of BPI was formally informed of the postdated check about a week later. a certain Atty. 1989. the parties entered into an agreement where the card could still be used and would be duly honored by accredited establishements. A check is only a substitute for money and not money. His statement of account for October 1989 amounting to P8.000.000. and for an explanation within 5 days from receipt thereof why his card was dishonored despite assurance to the contrary by defendant‘s personnel-incharge. otherwise the necessary court action shall be filed. When he presented his credit card to Café Adriatico for the bill amounting to P735. One of his guests. Court of Appeals. BPI served Marasigan a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List. There is no showing that Marasigan received this letter before December 8. On November 28. on the following day. he requested that he be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15. the presumption. BPI Express Card Corporation v. He alleged further that after a few days. by itself operate as payment. Marasigan issued Far East Bank check in the amount of P15. was for the immediate payment of the Marasigan‘s outstanding account. was requiring him to issue a check for P15. 129 Agas. postdated December 15. ordering the defendant to pay damages but also ordering plaintiff to pay defendant its outstanding obligation.987. (All things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done. 1998 Facts: Marasigan. G. including stipulated fees and charges. Under the terms and conditions of the credit card. any card with outstanding balances after 30 days from original billing/statement shall automatically be suspended. 1990 reminding the latter that he had long rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with defendant and requesting for his correct billing. Cusi. 1989. 1989.000. The purpose of the arrangement between the parties on November 22. Plaintiff sent defendant another letter dated March 12. His membership was renewed for another year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was increased to P5. Reposo. in a reply demanded BPI‘s compliance with his request in his first letter within 3 days from receipt. Marasigan admitted having inadvertently failed to pay his account for the said month because he was in Quezon province attending to some professional and personal commitments. Jess Lopez In the same vein. a lawyer.) It was Solmac‘s burden to overcome this juris tantum presumption. No. and was threatening to suspend his credit card. said card was dishonored. He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. the check was postdated 15 December 1989. Anzures. Marasigan filed a complaint for damages against BPI. less the improper charges and penalties. No reply was received by Marasigan. Mary Ellen Ringler. CA affirmed.32. signed by the private respondent. Trial court ruled for Marasigan. 1989. the delivery of such an instrument does not. As agreed upon by the parties. Marasigan invited some guests on December 1989 and entertained them at Café Adriatico . (3) Whether Marasigan can recover damages arising from the cancellation of his card. that an official duty has been regularly performed applies in favor of the Farolan. 3. September 25. within 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action and also to replace the postdated check with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.84 was not paid in due time. BPI served its final demand to the Marasigan requiring him to pay in full his overdue account.

The application contained the stipulation that BPI could automatically suspend a card whose billing has not been paid for more than 30 days. there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded. As an access to P. on November 28. Navarrete. 1989. As early as 28 October 1989. Aside from the Marasigan‘s bare denial. INJURY is the illegal invasion of a legal right. the consequences must be borne by the injured person. it is about 26 meters. DAMAGE is the loss. In passing thru said passageway. Taking P. Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging it . In fact upon cross-examination. a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length. BPI had even notified BPI of the impending suspension of his credit card and made special accommodations for him for settling his outstanding account.R. Burgos Street as the point of reference. & Roco 3B . 1996 Facts: The Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains. going to Mabasa‘s property. 130 Agas.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff — a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. When said property was purchased by Mabasa. In such cases. This notwithstanding. No. The action of BPI belies the existence of bad faith. Reposo. Such path passes between the previously mentioned row of houses. On the right side is that of defendant Morato and then a Septic Tank. Jess Lopez This is especially true in the case of a postdated check. Burgos St. Court of Appeals. G. As such. Anzures. Marasigan admitted that he did receive the letter notifying him of the cancellation. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. 116100. on the left side. He can not now pass the blame to the BPI for not notifying him of the suspension of his card. Burgos Street. Buan. (3) NO. Thus. This. has to be traversed. Burgos Street from Mabasa‘s property. Cusi. Nowhere is it stated in the terms and conditions of the application that there is a need of notice before suspension may be effected. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went to see the premises. he failed to present evidence to rebut the presumption that he received said notice. BPI could have suspended Marasigan‟s card outright. Thus. Custodio v. 4. the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendant spouses Custodio. we find the award of damages by the respondent court clearly unjustified. Burgos Street. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters far fr om Mabasa‘s residence to P. he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. BPI sent a letter by ordinary mail notifying him that his card had been temporarily suspended. February 9. There is a disputable presumption that letters duly directed and mailed were received on the regular course of mail. (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Marasgan failed to do. the issuance by Marasigan of the postdated check was not effective payment. and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. To find the existence of an abuse of right under Article 19 the following elements must be present: (1) There is a legal right or duty. hurt. We therefore DISAGREE that the dishonor of the credit card of the Marasigan by Café Adriatico is attributable to BPI for its willful or gross neglect to inform the Marasigan of the suspension of his credit card. or harm which results from the injury. Marasigan suffered damages. Ongchuan. BPI allowed private respondent to use his card for several weeks. It was Marasigan‘s failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dish onor at Café Adriatico . The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa‘s residence to P. Thus. there were tenants occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by him as tenants. the day of the suspension of Marasigan‘s card. Instead. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. (2) which is exercised in bad faith. and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. BPI cannot be said to have capriciously and arbitrarily canceled Marasigan‘s credit card. there is a material distinction between damages and injury. As it was his own negligence which was the proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience. It did not comply with his obligation under the arrangement with Miss Lorenzo . then that of defendants spouses Santos and then that of plaintiff Mabasa. However. there are 2 possible passageways. BPI was therefore justified in suspending his credit card. However.

30K as Moral Damages. petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. Thus. and Morato. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners. Thus. that is. Plaintiff (Mabasa) represented by his heirs. etc to pay plaintiffs-appellants 65K as Actual Damages. the lot was not subject to any servitudes. Anzures. herein private respondents. incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway . a person sustains actual damage. If. that act must be not only hurtful. (2) The acts should be willful. A decision was rendered by the trial court. Held: NO. that is. Jess Lopez Said adobe fence was first constructed by Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. to the public street and ordering the Mabasa to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8. The fact that Mabasa had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. The CA rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification ordering Custodios. and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. or harm which results from the injury. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria. there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded. Cusi. the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages . To warrant the recovery of damages. or damage without wrong. Wrong without damage. Pacifico Mabasa. there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. DAMAGE is the loss. Contrary to the claim of Mabasa.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering . Navarrete. either by law or by contract. there was no legal injury. hurt. At the time of the construction of the fence. INJURY is the illegal invasion of a legal right. There was no easement of way existing in favor of Mabasa. but wrongful. Buan. he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff — a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects. without sustaining any legal injury. the Santoses.000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. & Roco 3B . and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. Ongchuan. 131 Agas. It was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. good customs or public policy. went to the CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. In the case at bar. harm or loss to his person or property. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. prior to said decision. Mabasa filed a civil case for the grant of an easement of right of way against the Custodios. However. it is essential that the following requisites concur : (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals. although there was damage. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. Reposo. Defendant Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains. ordering Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access — ingress and egress. and 10K Pesos as Exemplary Damages. There must be damnum et injuria. as may happen in many cases. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff. and DAMAGES are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury. does not constitute a cause of action. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Issue: Whether or not the grant of right of way to herein Mabasa is proper and whether damages should be awarded. Hence. It was only that decision which gave Mabasa the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right .

Reposo. 2001 Facts: The case had its roots in a Special Proceeding for the settlement of the estate of one Julio Cantolos re: 6 parcels of land in Tanay. Gutierrez had their house. was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. Held: YES. the demolition of respondents' house by Amonoy. was completed the following day. LIABLE. The CA also found. while the CA granted damages. The Pasamba and Formida then executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the 2 lots adjudicated to them to secure the payment of his fees. It likewise belies his allegation that the demolitions had already ceased when he received notice of the TRO. 1986. However. Included in those sold was the lot on which the Sp.R. 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. By then he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition. is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. ―On a twin musiyun (Mahigpit na Musiyon Para Papanagutin Kaugnay ng Paglalapastangan) with full titles as fanciful and elongated as their Petisyung (Petisyung Makapagsuri Taglay and Pagpigil ng Utos). Issue: Whether or not Amonoy is liable for damages. a temporary restraining order was granted on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the petitioners' houses. The foregoing disproves the claim of Amonoy that the demolition. based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server. In other words. They thus filed a complaint for damages in connection with the same against Amonoy. Although the acts of Amonoy may have been legally justified at the outsset. that a copy of the TRO was served on Amonoy himself on June 4. Amonoy. but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4. True. was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2. G. The mask of a right without the spirit of justcie which gives it life. Over and above the specific precepts of postive law are the supreme norms of justice.600 as attorney‘s fees.‖ ―Artilce 19. and secured a judgment in his favor. The aggrieved parties then filed a petition with the Supreme Court. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case. 132 Agas.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The RTC dismissed it. Ongchuan. A Project of Partition was submitted and approved. Said fees were not paid. to give everyone his due. he wantonly violated this Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents. despite his receipt of the TRO. Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person's rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque injuria — for which the law gives no remedy. Rizal. & Roco 3B . Cusi. but this was dismissed. respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Jess Lopez 5. and Amonoy was the highest bidder for both. and payment was ordered. Amonoy commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May 30. No. and the Writ of Possession and demolition was reversed. Amonoy v. We reject this submission. which Amonoy charging P27. Amonoy was counsel of the heirs. otherwise. 1986. Gutierrez. one who merely exercises one's rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages . the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 and results in damage to another. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another. 140420.‖ Clearly then. and it disappears when it is abused. Indubitably. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents' house well until the middle of 1987. enjoining the demolition of respondents' house. He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC . which allegedly commenced only on May 30. did not heed the TRO of this Court. his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right. their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. house. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. For this reason it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others. A Writ of Possession as well as an order for demolition was issued. especially to the prejudice of others.‖ The petition for Certiorari was granted. the house had already been destroyed. Amonoy invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents' house. however. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Verily. ―The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears. Hence. Amonoy filed for foreclosure. This is clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrez's testimony. In insisting on his alleged right. recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise. the present appeal. They were.These standards are the following: to act with justice. Navarrete. Buan. the lots would be foreclosed. The estate was then closed. 1986. February 15. The heirs tried to annul the sale. 1986. sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. and he who violates them violates the law. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. Anzures. his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition.

Rodriguez introduced himself to Checkered Farms as Africa‘s successor­in­interest and informed it that he was taking over complete possession and absolute control of the subject land. pipelines. & Roco 3B . And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby.44 and incurred expenses of P91. 133 Agas. G. and overhead cable proppings. acting under the direct supervision of Epelepsia who has been working directly with the instructions of Bulaun. DOLE introduced on the subject parcel of land several improvements: plantation roads and canals. Rodriguez. all performing under the administrative and operational responsibility of Murillo. In the ultimate analysis. it has the right to remove them after the expiration of its contract with Africa. Buan. Rodriguez manifested his interest in DOLE‘s banana grower‘s program. much less abated. a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right. the latter demanded from the former an accounting. Instead. stealthily. 174646. RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Africa. Amonoy cannot invoke damnum absque injuria. 6. CA affirmed and likewise upheld Africa‘s legal standing. Reposo. That it was a valid exercise of its rights as owner of the irrigation system and an exercise of the right to dismantle and remove the same under the Exclusive Purchasing Agreement with Checkered Farms. v. Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. making DOLE solidarily liable. it offered to grant the same terms and conditions as those given to independent small growers in General Santos City. Checkered Farms asked Rodriguez that it be allowed to operate the banana plantation until February 1992 to fully wind up the operational activities: Rodriguez denied the request. Amonoy‘s liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one's act or omission. In the same letter. Africa ceded and assigned the 17-hectare subject land to Rodriguez as payment and in full satisfaction of the former‘s obligation to the latter.973. Africa entered into a Farm Management Contract (FMC) with his Farm Manager Yuchenco for the purpose of planting and growing bananas and/or other crops and of marketing the products and fruits thereof. liability cannot be obscured. (Stanfilco). Since he was interested in its corporate grower‘s contract. Inc.564. this petition. treacherously and ruthlessly raided the subject plantation destroying the facilities therein which makes them liable for damages. whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.48.2 DOLE rejected Rodriguez‘s proposal for the company‘s contract growing arrangement . Hence. Rodriguez sent a letter demanding the payment of the bananas harvested during the interim administration of Stanfilco and protesting the ―unwarranted and wanton destruction of the farm: Stanfilco refused to heed demand. Rodriguez requested for reconsideration of the denial of his application for the company‘s contract growing arrangement and asked DOLE to desist from dismantling the improvements thereon. footbridges. DOLE alleged that he was the owner of the irrigation system on the subject plantation. Checkered Farms requested for a 10-year extension of the contract due to expire : request was not acted upon by Africa. Rodriguez demanded for the accounting of fruits harvested from the expiration of their contract. Navarrete. Checkered Farms entered into an Exclusive Purchasing Agreement with DOLE (Stanfilco) who bound itself to purchase all the acceptable bananas that would be produced by the former on the lot subject of the FMC. DOLE eventually dismantled and removed the improvements in the plantation. Africa filed a Complaint for Recovery of Sum of Money and Damages against DOLE and its officials alleging that its staff. Rodriguez allowed DOLE to assume temporarily the continued operation and management of the banana plantation. Checkered Farms on the other hand undertook to allow DOLE to introduce installations and improvements on the land and to dismantle and remove all non-permanent installations and improvements it has introduced upon the expiration of the period of the contract provided that DOLE has the option to leave them on the land without cost to Checkered Farms.R. DOLE Philippines. Yuchengco assigned his rights as farm manager to Checkered Farms. As no agreement was reached between DOLE and Rodriguez. irrigation pumps. Jess Lopez Obviously. Checkered Farms claimed that the plantation produced 382 boxes of exportable fruits equivalent to P8. hoses. No. Over the years. Inc. Ongchuan. Thus. Africa also demanded indemnity for damages suffered from DOLE‘s act of depriving the former from using the water facilities installed in the plantation that resulted in the spoilage of Africa‘s plants. Cusi. Anzures. 2012 Facts: Africa is the registered owner of a banana plantation.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. August 22.

The witnesses for DOLE likewise admitted that they had the responsibility to cover the diggings made but failed to do so after the pipelines had been retrieved. though legal by itself. While we recognize DOLE‘s right to remove the improvements on the subject plantation. nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. Buan. Ongchuan. ARTICLE 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain here as petitioner was perfectly within its right to remove the improvements introduced in the subject plantation. why did it not take into consideration the banana plants and fruits that would be destroyed by reason thereof? Africa would not have been unduly prejudiced had it waited for the bananas to be harvested before removing the pipes. a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right. The act is willful if it is done with knowledge of its injurious effect. Navarrete. banana plants were uprooted and scattered around the plantation. He even added that the destruction of the ground was extensive. exercised such right arbitrarily. Anzures. damage to the plantation would not be avoided. Reposo. or an act which though not constituting a transgression of positive law. evidence presented by Africa shows that as a result of the diggings made by DOLE in order to remove the pipes. and failed to cover the diggings which caused ground destruction. DOLE removed the pipes with knowledge of its injurious effect which is the destruction of the banana plants and fruits . & Roco 3B . When the right is exercised arbitrarily.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. that is when he acts with prudence and good faith. Witnesses and pictures also showed that indeed. Abuse of right under Article 19 sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one‟s rights but also in the performance of one‟s duties. This qualified right should have given DOLE the necessary warning to exercise its right with caution with due regard to the other structures in the plantation and most especially the banana plants and fruits therein. Undoubtedly. Under the principle of DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. It points out that it removed only the removable irrigation facilities refraining from exercising said legal right with respect to the drainage canals. Held: NO. it is not required that the act be done purposely to produce the injury. As found by the CA. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another. The exercise of a right. unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another. therefore. Jess Lopez DOLE asserts that the resulting injury to Africa arose from the removal and dismantling of improvements that it undertook pursuant to the provisions of the Exclusive Purchasing Agreement with Checkered Farms is damnum absque injuria. the roads and the overhead proppings which covered the entire length of the farm. ARTICLE 21. The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. however. This principle. the Damage Report submitted by Angel Flores stated that there was ground destruction because diggings were done indiscriminately without concern for the standing banana plants . Cusi. however. even if it causes loss to another. After the removal of said pipes. does not automatically result in an actionable injury. If it was able to consider cutting the pipes underneath the roads within the plantation so as not to destroy said roads. the legitimate exercise of a person‘s rights. DOLE abused its right. it. especially to the prejudice of others. unjustly and excessively resulting in damage to Africa‘s plantation. The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. on the other hand. be liable for damages. DOES NOT APPLY when there is an abuse of a person‟s right as in this case. The act is within the article only when it is done willfully. It is settled that DOLE was given the right to dismantle the improvements introduced on the subject plantation as clearly provided for in its contract with Checkered Farms . The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears. If permanent structures were allowed to be removed. Some of these plants in fact had fruits yet to be harvested causing loss to Africa. Thus. Though not specifically stated in the contract. Clearly. banana plants were uprooted. and it disappears when it is abused. refers to acts contra bonus mores. DOLE failed to restore the plantation to its original condition by its failure to cover the diggings with soil. must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. the reason for said qualification on DOLE‟s right of removal is the imperative need to protect the plantation from unnecessary destruction that may be caused by the exercise of the right . DOLE insists that it cannot be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by Africa based on the principle of damnum absque injuria. Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 21. It should. On the basis of the contractual provision. a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. 134 Agas. In this case. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the legal principle of Damnum absque injuria considering that it found the removal and dismantling of the DOLE installations and improvements to be in mere discharge of a contractual right. The Court does not agree. It is noteworthy that DOLE was given the right to remove only the improvements and facilities that were ―non­ permanent‖ instead of giving it the unqualified right to remove everything that it introduced to the plantation.

And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it. is obvious. José Rizal upon instruction of the city school 's supervisor. 135 Agas. It is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. In the circumstances. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage . for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno . & Roco 3B . gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation". Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno are jointly and severally liable for the damages. Capuno. Buan. could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law . father of Dante. 221. 101 Phil. was not with his son at the time of the accident . and. jointly and severally with his son Dante. with other students. 843 (1957) Facts: Dante Capuno. VICARIOUS LIABILITY Civil Code o Articles 2180 to 2182 (Memorize) Parents and Guardians Family Code (as amended by RA 6809) o Articles 219. Reposo. 236 Atty.Torts & Damages 2013 IV. Father is held vicariously liable. on the other hand. it should be Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident. The jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers . Issue: Whether Delfin Capuno (father) can be held civilly liable. nor the city school's supervisor.00 for the death of her son. Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña. José Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante. Head of school/school not liable It is true that under the law. Ongchuan. He attended a parade in honor of Dr . he was a minor and was then living with his father. Sabina Exconde (mother of Isidro) filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2. Held: YES. --she reserved her right to bring separate civil action Exconde contends that Delfin Capuno (father) is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim. the accident occurred. Cusi. The defendants failed to prove this. educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means ". in case of his death or incapacity. 15 yrs old. died as a consequence. Capuno set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña . He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher. Father liable The civil liability which the law impose upon the father.959. he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. Navarrete. Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. keeping them in their company. and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed. the mother. boarded a jeep and when the same started to run. nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody". supervision and custody of the latter. while. but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Dante Capuno was found guilty of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon. Lower court sustained the defense and only Dante Capuno was required to pay the damages . the civil liability of the father is evident. Jess Lopez A. Plaintiff appealed to CA but the case was certified to SC (only involves questions of law). - 1. was a member of the Boy Scouts and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School. Exconde v. he attended the parade in honor of Dr . It appears that Delfin Capuno. the former was not under the control. it is clear that neither the head of that school. Anzures.

there can be no responsibility. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Art. Ongchuan. and not the father. J. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him. And if there is no authority.. in case of his death or incapacity. Issue: Whether Sps. J. The parental dereliction is. 1903 does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments". the school authorities would provide adequate supervision over them. the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Jess Lopez There is no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones.Torts & Damages 2013 REYES. was instructed by the City School Supervisor to attend the Rizal parade. dissenting: Atty. Navarrete. re-enacted this rule: 136 Agas. It would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher. the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. The adoptive parent and natural parents of Tamargo filed a complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc. Bundoc are indispensible parties to the case. where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts. & Roco 3B . 209 SCRA 518 (1992) Facts: Adelberto Bundoc. Tamargo v. anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law. Cusi. parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. in other words. B.. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads: This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability. Under the Civil Code. Tamargo meanwhile countered that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents. Court of Appeals. 2. 2176. Rapisura) were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed . of course. Prior to the incident. for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom. a minor of 10 years of age shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle killing her. Held: YES. Upon the other hand. Reposo. the school authorities are the ones answerable for that negligence. they were not indispensable parties to the case. and not the parent. controlling and disciplining of the child. only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. the latter. Parental liability is. Thus. Anzures. the parents exercise supervision and control. The same was granted after the incident. The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them. then he should be the one responsible for allowing the minor to drive the jeep without being qualified to do so. There is no question that the pupil. and that the adopting parents (Sps. the law presumes. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. the mother. If a teacher or scout master was present. the law imposes civil liability upon the father and. If no teacher or master was at hand to watch over the pupils. the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. Respondents Bundoc alleged that because of the adoption proceedings. The respondent‘s argument that the decree of adoption that was issued in favor of the Rapisura spouses vested parental authority to them as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption (before Bundoc shot Tamargo) is unavailing. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? The words "arts and trades" in Art. Dante Capuno. The father had every reason to assume that in ordering a minor to attend a parade with other children. but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. Buan. L.

Reposo. & Roco 3B . would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. SECOND. at the time the air rifle shooting happened.) As a defense. Held: Conclusion was correct but the liability imposed was wrong. it was established that Cresencio owned the gun in question which he kept in a locked safety deposit box in a drawer inside their room. The court does not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child . 2180. another one rang out 5 seconds later. Libi liable for vicarious liability. Navarrete. Manolo climbed the fence to see what happened. to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Put a little differently. Trial court dismissed. In the instant case. Manolo explains that the ―shadow‖ the other witnesses saw was actually him and not the unknown killer. The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists. his mother admitted that on the night of the incident. Manolo and his sister Malou were waiting for Julie when they heard her scream. IAC reversed and adjudged Sps. the Rapisura spouses. the lovers were found dead inside the Gotiong residence in Cebu. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. On December 1978. Libi rejected this and claimed that an unknown party whom Wendel may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) killed the two. shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage: Art. within 8 hours after the killing. To avoid him. Each died from a single gunshot wound from the same firearm. While it was never seen that Wendel ever used the gun. Cusi. of the instruction and supervision of the child. the testimony of Libi‘s witnesses that they saw a ―shadow‖ of the supposed killer a few moments after the incident was rebutted by the testimony of one Manolo Alfonso. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Anzures. Sps Libi claimed they execised the diligence of a good father of a family. Julie Gotiong & Wendel Libi were sweethearts. Ongchuan. Issue: Whether Art. however. However. On appeal. Julie broke up with Wendell (ganun talaga eh) after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. which was also recovered in the crime scene. No witnesses to the incident. Article 221 of the Family Code has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Lubi subsidiarily liable. the Rapisura spouses. Sps Gotiong alleged that Wendel killed Julie and then shot himself. doer of the tortious act. Sps. as Julie‘s parents. 137 Agas. 221. FIRST. there was a possibility that smokeless powder was used which would thus not produce any gunpowder when subjected to a paraffin test. Also. the fact that they could not find gun powder residue (as seen in the negative paraffin test) in the Wendel‘s wound does not automatically rule out suicide. Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a result. Julie stayed with her best friend from Jan 7-13. no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents. Gotiong. On Jan 14. Jess Lopez Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. Libi v. Sps. 3. could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed under Cresencio Libi‘s (father) name. to a large extent. All these were known to Wendel. Each spouse had a key and the wife‘s key was always in her bag. Thus. 214 SCRA 16 (1992) Facts: Two years before their deaths. (Emphasis supplied) The court do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents. This prompted Wendel to resort to threats against her. filed a Civil Case against Wendel‘s parents to recover damages arising from the latter‘s vicarious liability under Art. Buan. This is because. 2180 was correctly interpreted to make Sps. the bodies were already brought to the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes and dried. moreover. Wendel kept pestering Julie with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal. (Not really important but in case he asks: Libi‘s contention that an unknown party killed them both was found to be unavailing. During the first 2 weeks of January 1979 (still within the 3 Month Rule). When he heard the first gunshot.

then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part. purchased an automobile and 138 Agas. respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. as contemplated in Article 2180. the mother. Reposo. that is. whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi. 30 Phil. Litonjua.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. the Fausta Litonjua. this time. Anzures. but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who. the mother. the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code. if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary. B. Ongchuan. as so modified. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell. Jess Lopez Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son . upon the guardian. who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age. disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. in case of his death or incapacity. in case of his death or incapacity. despite his minority and immaturity. However. upon the mother or. in case of her death or incapacity. We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi delicts of their minor children. the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. & Roco 3B . in this case the minor and the father and. Navarrete. Ramon Ramirez was the owner and manager of a garage in the city of Manila known as the International Garage. therefore. or even drug users. this civil liability is now. so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell‘s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio‘s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. by applying Article 2180 but. Owners and Managers of Enterprises/Employers 1. and not primary. are solidarily liable. the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the conviction of his son. that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense. On the other hand. the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and. To hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent In Exconde. Bahia v. hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that ―(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. in Salen. not subsidiary. 624 (1915) Facts: This is an action to recover damages from the defendant s for the death of plaintiff‘s daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant‘s servant in driving an automobile over the child and causing her death. Petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding the parents liable. His mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and. where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence. Under Article 2180. in case of his death or incapacity. in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a family.‖ We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary. with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof. is primary and not subsidiary. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors. primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of frustrated homicide. but on the authority of Article 2194. may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers. the persons responsible for the act or omission. the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary. Just like the rule in Article 2180. in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors. under the Family Code. for all they know. Now. such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary. Buan. In fact. but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. However. In the case at bar. Cusi. without such alternative qualification. The same liability in solidum and. If the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary. Accordingly. holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm. sometime before the accident from which this action springs.

ran across the street and into the wall of a house against which the daughter of plaintiff was leaning at the time. Leynes has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. No. and. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage. the chauffeur who was driving the machine was a servant of Leynes. G. Held: NO. This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. driven by Pangalangan. Jess Lopez turned it over to the garage to assist her son in the business in which he was engaged. Balingit was PAF‟s manager. as we have seen. and consequently. From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of a law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee. and the defendant Leynes was to pay him therefor P20 a day. According to the arrangement between them. either actual or constructive. 139 Agas. Balingit. that the death of the child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rules and regulations .R. Issue: Whether or not Leynes. This is the notable peculiarly of the Spanish law negligence.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. LC held: Litonjua is not liable. at the time of the accident. and the burden of proof was on him to show that he had exercised the care of a good father of a family. were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling. this fact is not conclusive in making him responsible for the negligence of the chauffeur or for defects in the automobile itself. The bus was disabled for 79 days. In the case before us the death of the child caused by a defect in the steering gear of the automobile immediately raised the presumption that Leynes was negligent in selecting a defective automobile or in his failure to maintain it in good condition after selection. Reposo. the evidence shows. Ramirez rented the said automobile to the defendant Mariano Leynes. Phil-American Forwarders. It is. L-25142. Pineda recklessly drove a PAF freight truck along the national highway at Pampanga. As to SELECTION. It was caused by a defect in the machine as to which Leynes has shown himself free from responsibility. While it does not appear that Leynes formulated rules and regulations for the guidance of the drivers and gave them proper instructions. or both. It bumped PRBL‘s bus. under whose direction and control the automobile was being operated at the time of the accident. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was. Navarrete. v. chauffeur. It follows necessarily that if the employees shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. and apparently thoroughly competent. & Roco 3B . Inc.. Leynes having shown to the satisfaction of the court that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family is relieved of responsibility with respect to the death of plaintiff‘s child. On the 16th of May.. as a consequence. together with a chauffeur and a machinist. by reason of a defect in the steering gear. of course. The action was brought against the mother of Ramirez. to be used by him for a short time to carry persons living in Balayan to and from the fiesta which was about to take place in Tuy. Inc. in good condition. and Leynes. 1962. of the defective condition of the steering gear. On the 14th of May. but also provides when that liability shall cease. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice. designed for the protection of the public and the passengers. or in supervision over him after the selection. 1975 Facts: Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines (PRBL) and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American Forwarders (―PAF‖). and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure. nevertheless. Buan. who bought the automobile. Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence. Anzures. 1911. in striking contrast to the American doctrine that. 1911. in as much as the profits derived from the trips of the automobile belonged to him and the automobile was operated under his direction. in relations with strangers. and he suffered injuries. while passing from Balayan to Tuy. and Pineda. While it may be said that. is liable under Art. may be rebutted. 2180. Cusi. Leynes is liable. so far as appeared. the negligence of the servant is conclusively the negligence of the master. the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. and machinist. the lessee of the vehicle. the automobile. They alleged that on November 24. 2. Ongchuan. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. March 25. Ramires was to furnish the automobile. The font of the machine struck the child in the center of the body and crushed her to death. Ramirez was not made a party. From the commencement of the use of the machine until the accident occurred sufficient time had not elapsed to require an examination of the machine by the defendant as a part of his duty of inspection and supervision. refused to obey the direction of the driver in turning a corner in the streets of Balayan. It says: The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damages.

which requires that the employer be engaged in an industry to be subsidiarily liable for the felony committed by his employee in the course of his employment..200.000 on their subscription. a private car owned by Ernesto Martin. under the allegations of the complaint. Buan. or of law. may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in that article.25 and P25. The facts proved. It was not raised in the lower court. the plaintiff must show. arising from its usual connection with another which is known. Issue: Whether the employer of the driver is liable. the ownership of the car and the circumstances of the accident. Inc. Navarrete. Meralco sued Ernesto for damages in the RTC of Pasig. Rodolfo Limjuco. the driver of the car at the time of the accident. Held: NO. Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40. hence.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Cusi. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed . respectively. Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250. Nestor Martin (driver) was not impleaded. Anzures. no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the MERALCO to show that the Ernesto was the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. In other words. They argue that Phil. It is either a presumption juris. no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders. (Side Issue) The bus company and its driver.American Forwarders. Issue: Whether or not the terms ―employers‖ and ―owners and managers of an establishment or enterprises‖ in Art icle 2180 include the manager of a corporation. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the employer-employee relationship and held that the MERALCO had not refuted that presumption. The CFI granted dismissal. to hold the employer liable. Inc. in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer. namely. is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41. providing in part that: ―Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. There is no law directing the deduction made by the courts below from the particular facts presented to them by the parties." A presumption is defined as an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known. Held: The complaint for damages was filed by MERALCO against only Ernesto Martin as alleged employer of Nestor Martin. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Inc. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer". Martin v. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry. which is a reasonable deduction from the facts proved without an express direction of law to that effect. the employer under Article 2180 is liable for the torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task. The RTC decision held in favor of the plaintiff. it is not a presumption juris. That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders.. Once this is done. in their appellants' brief. We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. Neither is it a presumption hominis. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. It noted that although the defendant alleged that he was not Nestor Martin's employer.000 and they paid P10. & Roco 3B . while the other incorporators. The action was based on tort under Article 2180. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality.‖ The above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-employee relationship although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in any business or industry. viz. Affirmed. as the employer of Nestor Martin. "he did not present any proof to substantiate his allegation. It differs in this sense from Article 103 of the RPC. Such deduction is not among the conclusive presumptions under Section 2 or the disputable presumptions under Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. 205 SCRA 591 (1992) Facts: At around 2AM in the morning. or not denied. Ongchuan. We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. Court of Appeals. Phil-American Forwarders. or of fact. as employer. But it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. it crashed into a Meralco electric post. this appeal. while being driven by Nestor Martin. as he was not Pineda‘s employer. 3. Jess Lopez Balingit filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him for lack of cause of action. It is only then that the defendant. Hence. In the case at bar. or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course human affairs ordinarily take. injected a new factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. are not enough bases for the inference that the 140 Agas. Reposo. or a presumption hominis. which was affirmed by the CA. Inc.

His parents did not allow him to join due to short notice. Held: NOT LIABLE. If at all petitioners are liable for SFHS. you did not tell him anything more? A No more. sir. As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed . Ongchuan. and even if they could. Jess Lopez petitioner is the employer of Nestor Martin. It also held that the matter of permission on the part of the parents is irrelevant to the determination of negligent behavior. Many cannot afford this luxury. Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic? A Yes. but he drowned. 4. alleging their failure to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of a family in preventing Ferdie‘s drowning. I am going to the picnic. No. he did not answer. sir. Anzures. The above observations make it unnecessary to examine the question of the driver's alleged negligence or the lack of diligence on the part of the Martin in the selection and supervision of his employee. persuaded him to go to the beach. At the outset. 141 Agas. the more plausible assumption is that Nestor Martin is a close relative of Ernesto Martin and on the date in question borrowed the car for some private purpose. but absolved the school of liability for lack of evidence to show that the picnic was school-sanctioned. he answered. SFHS are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of the negligence of those under them. did you not ask him where he will bring this? A I asked him where he was going. The RTC held the teachers solidarily liable. however. Quezon. 13. Castillo on cross exam. Most male persons know how to drive and do not have to employ others to drive for them unless this is needed for business reasons. may consider it an unnecessary expense and inconvenience. you did not know that your son join the picnic? A No. I did not know. In the instant case however. sir. two other persons drowned. they did not even test the depth of the water. Testimony of Dr. sir. one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. sir. Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of March 20.R. The CA. Nestor would probably not have been accommodated if he were a mere employee for employees do not usually enjoy the use of their employer's car at 2AM. sir. the male supervisors were somewhere ―having a drinking spree‖. Cusi. 1991 Facts: Ferdinand Castillo. however. In the present case. Buan. when your son asked you for money to buy food. Francis wanted to join a school picnic by 1-B and 1-C at Talaan Beach. that is why I was not able. Court of Appeals. It absolved the two latecomers since they were attending to an entrance exam as part of their duties and had no participation in the negligence of the others. Q Did you not look for your son during that time? A I am too busy with my profession. as will be shown hereunder. they did allow him to bring food to the teachers with the directive that he should go back home after so doing . It was enough for the Martin to deny the alleged employment relationship. found the school liable. Francis High School v. for he was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ferdinand attempted to come to her rescue. Navarrete. and when I asked him where. It also held liable two teachers who arrived after the drowning. February 25. Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was drowned in the picnic came to you. sir. 82465. sir. a freshman student of Section 1-C at St. it was necessary for the MERALCO to establish it by evidence.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. His parents then filed a complaint against the school and the teachers. it should be noted that parents of the victim Ferdinand allowed their son to join the excursion. Issue: Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendant pursuant to Art. 1982. is that correct? A Yes. since ―it cannot be gainsaid that the same was held under the supervision of the teachers employed by the said school‖. Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the picnic? A Later on after 12:00. While they were in the water. G. Q You did not ask your wife? A I did not. & Roco 3B . Flores Q Now. 2180 in relation to Art 2176. Reposo. Q And after giving the money. The verbal precautions were insufficient. He could not be resuscitated. this is because of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them. by Atty. However. The teachers. St. without more.

but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. pp. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P. Ongchuan. Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child. testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency. a picnic. Dr. employers would forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties. Finally." (p. If we were to affirm the findings of CAt on this score. (TSN. Buan. the teachers were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was the one who personally cooked the adobo for her son? A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient herself. sir. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C. Anzures. 4 states that: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. 19. even respondents' witness. Cusi. Jess Lopez Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire whether your son have joined that picnic? A Yes. 85. I don't know if she actually permitted her son although she said she cooked adobo so he could join. Testimony of Dr. the section where Ferdinand belonged. you approached the boy and claim also having applied first aid on him? A Yes. par. Reposo. Furthermore. Article 2180. Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity. hearing of April 30. & Roco 3B . is a sign of consent for his son to join the same. She was very sorry had she not allowed her son to join the excursion her son would have not drowned. mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same.E. CA committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering SFHS liable for the death of respondent's son. In the case at bar. (Emphasis Supplied) (TSN. In fact. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. Moreover. Ferdinand Castillo. Navarrete. no negligence could be attributable to the teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. 1984. not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair. Lazaro — witness). Q And when you saw the boy. p. Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination. 1984 witness Romulo Castillo) The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be held . sir.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal. Lazaro on cross examination: Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination? A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself She even felt guilty about the death of her son because she cooked adobo for him so he could join the excursion where her son died of drowning. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. 16-17. Segundo Vinas. Under this paragraph. The incident happened not within the school premises. did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. 142 Agas. hearing of April 2. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. As earlier pointed out by the trial court.

Q You were rattled at that time. Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition? A Yes. sir. with the help of Mr. Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your application of first aid? A Yes. Reposo. Cusi. sir. sir. because we were attending to the application of first aid that we were doing. Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy? A About 10 seconds. was I applied back to back pressure and took notice of the condition of the child. Q What about Mr. the record clearly shows negligence on the part of the teachers. that the aforementioned petitioners may not have been negligent in finding ways and means to revive the young Castillo AFTER the drowning incident. Rollo) With these facts in mind. I may concede. DISSENT. for 15 seconds. Navarrete. I applied the back to back pressure and started to massage from the waistline up. sir. 143 Agas. This concession. Q You have never been disturbed. is given with hesitation. particularly myself. we changed the position of the boy by placing the child facing upwards laying on the sand then we applied the mouth to mouth resuscitation. hearing of July 30. where the feet were on a higher level than that of the head. All this aside. Despite awareness that the waters in the area were deep. sir. for there is indication in the record that peti tioners may have tarried too long in securing immediate medical attention for the deceased. sir. In my opinion. FLORES: Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the child? A Myself. is it not? A No." (TSN. sir. Ongchuan. sir. sir. Their application of first-aid measures may have failed to revive him but the petitioners had fully exhausted their efforts to save the deceased. and would like to emphasize the demonstrated lack of diligence on the part of the petitioners-teachers BEFORE the unfortunate incident took place. sir. sir. Vinas? A Almost the same a little longer. sir. what did you do? A When we noticed that the boy was not responding. Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy? A The first step that I took. albeit with reservation. petitioners-teachers did not take concrete steps to make sure their wards did not stray too far and too deeply. the children were covering you up or were surrounding you? A Yes. that of the head of the child. pp. Anzures. no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondentsspouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages. Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back pressure? A From 9 to 11 times. petitioners-teachers should have first “tested the waters”. Buan. 1984) Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination ATTY. what did you do next? A The first thing that we did. J. with the exception of Aragones and Jaro. Padilla. then the face was a little bit facing right and doing it by massaging the back of the child. was that after putting the child in that position. Even if they were not actually informed of the possible dangers which the area posed. however. Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you claimed the boy did not respond. sir. sir. We placed the feet in a higher position. to ensure which parts thereof were safe for swimming purposes. 32-35.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your body on the body of Ferdinand Castillo? A Yes. "nababahala" in the process of your application of the first aid on the body of Ferdinand Castillo? A No. Luisito Vinas. 92-93. sir. Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position. Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of back to back pressure? A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards. so to speak. but I noticed that the boy was not responding. & Roco 3B . Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding. Jess Lopez Q And while you were applying the so called first aid. were you not disturb anyway? A I was disturbed during that time. (pp. I am really disturbed about. sir.

―they admitted that they did not even go to the water to check its depth although they were aware that some parts of it were deep. 144 Agas. Negligent acts of employees. For. The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer‘s liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer‘s motor vehicle : USE OF VEHICLE GOING TO or FROM MEALS: It has been held that an employee who uses his employer‘s vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. 321 SCRA 393 (1999)  Supra Doctrine: The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. & Roco 3B .‖ At best. The phrase ―even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry‖ found in the 5th paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. Castilex Industrial Corporation v. CASTILEX‘s interpretation of the 5th paragraph is not accurate. 5. the steps taken to revive the deceased may be considered adequate. employees oftentimes wear different hats. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. presumably. The CA cannot. it was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. while the 5th PAR encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. Instead. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Evidence that by using the employer‘s vehicle to go to and from meals. However. A distinction must be made between the 2 provisions to determine what is applicable. nevertheless. CASTILEX contends that the 5th paragraph of Article 2180 should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Ongchuan. the mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge CASTILEX with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. the 4th paragraph should apply. Vasquez. and the 5th PAR. admittedly. even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer‘s vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and. CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise. It was enough for CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties. Cusi. USE OF VEHICLE GOING TO or FROM WORK: In the same vein. be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 to this case. an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions. to employers in general. but the over-all lack of diligence on the part of petitioners-teachers suffices to put them within the standards set by this Court in determining the existence of negligence. the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer‘s motor vehicle. title or designation but which. therefore. are still within the call of duty. and not a part of his services to his employer. They perform functions which are beyond their office. whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. however. testified that at the time of the incident. he was driving a companyissued vehicle. to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. it appears that only oral safety instructions were imparted to the young excursionists. It thus appears that the petitioners-teachers failed to exercise the proper diligence or what I may refer to as DILIGENCE BEFORE THE FACT. Hence. This court has applied the 5th par. Jess Lopez However. Navarrete. The employer may. which the court a quo and the CA resolved in the affirmative. traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee. are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task. Buan. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed. ABAD. despite my reservations. this was not the case for as testified to by petitioner de Chavez. registered under the name of CASTILEX. Both provisions apply to employers: the 4th PAR. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact. As earlier mentioned. Anzures. The 4th PAR. Reposo. who was presented as a hostile witness.

the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident. he went to Goldie‘s Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña. Thus. Rather. and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work. & Roco 3B . His driver‘s license had been confiscated because he had been previously apprehended for reckless driving. Both vehicles figured in an accident in Taguig. 172122. Moreover. under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. USE OF VEHICLE OUTSIDE REGULAR WORKING HOURS: An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter‘s personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee‘s negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use. and the employer is not liable for the employee‘s negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). which was located in Mandaue City. justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. That same witness for the respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident. and drug pushers and addicts. ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was then about 2:00 a. coming from the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig. when the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car. weighing 1. The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost. for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time. Thereafter. Where the employee‘s duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work. However. it has been held that he has not resumed his employment. ABAD‘s working day had ended. June 22. The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Navarrete. Cusi. which is about 7 km away from his place of business.058 kg. G. a sidewalk vendor. Huang. the courts have frequently applied what has been called the ―special errand‖ or ―roving commission‖ rule. Reposo. Stephen Huang was paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. was known as a ―haven for prostitutes. or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work. No. and drug addicts littered the place. In the case at bar. and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver. using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position. weighing 14. Spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan. Stephen Huang was driving the car. the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. Ongchuan. Anzures. even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer‘s vehicle.. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. Jess Lopez spending more time at his actual duties. Daddy!‖ This woman could not have been ABAD‘s daughter.m. The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right. 145 Agas.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church. Buan.R. even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. ran over the car and zigzagged towards. it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer‘s business or within the scope of his assigned task. del Rosario as driver. as petitioner put it. it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the CASTILEX‘s office. while Del Rosario was driving the truck. Cebu City. 2007 Facts: Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a 6-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck. testified that Fuente Osmeña is a ―lively place‖ even at dawn because Goldie‘s Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. of 28 August 1988. Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence while driving. To the mind of this Court. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. his overtime work had already been completed. Both were traversing the C-5 Highway. 6. neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. who then shouted: ―Daddy. pimps. A witness for the Vasquez. or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours. not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. way beyond the normal working hours. CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle.‖ had no connection to CASTILEX‘s business.450 kg. ABAD was with a woman in his car. Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him. spun around and landed on the opposite lane. At the Goldie‘s Restaurant. His being at a place which. The truck also hit a lamppost. Even where the employee‘s personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept. Mercury Drug Corporation v. At the time of the accident. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence. prostitutes. pimps. north bound.

at its right. He was not suspended or reprimanded. and psychological examination In the case of Del Rosario. Jess Lopez Mercury Drug claims that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of all its employees. visual attention. Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for long trips. With respect to the SUPERVISION of its employees. the automechanic who repaired the truck and authenticated the photographs. Petitioners tried to show the damages that the truck sustained at its front right side. 4. Reposo. Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. The truck. perceptual speed. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction and at the same speed of about 85 to 90 kilometers per hour. Anzures. is more difficult to move as it is heavier. and enable the truck to catch up and hit the car again. both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties. which bumped the right front side of the truck. Ongchuan. Thus. instead of a truck during the driving tests. Mercury Drug‘s liability The liability of the employer under Art. Two vehicles collided. the truck was at the left inner lane and that it was Stephen Huang‘s car. He testified that he reported the incident to his superior. CA affirmed. Given that 1. before running over it. he opined. It was also admitted that Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle. was held twelve years ago in 1984. Daza. Dr. the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications. the lighter vehicle. but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man. or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. Dr. more massive than the other. Held: YES. the impact allegedly caused by the car when it hit the truck could not possibly be so great to cause petitioner to lose all control that he failed to even step on the brakes. which occurred in 1996. and Rogelio Pantua. Navarrete. experience. without any alternate. it was admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination when he applied for the position of Delivery Man. petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars and the only seminar he attended before the accident. Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its employees. Cusi. The photographs presented were taken a month after the accident. The evidence proves petitioner Del Rosario‘s negligence as the direct and proximate caus e of the injuries suffered by respondent Stephen Huang. At the time of the accident. monitor their implementation. however. in accordance with the testimony of Stephen Huang. To be relieved of liability. Dr. which would move to the right of. including documentary evidence. & Roco 3B . employers must submit concrete proof. Trial court found Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally liable. an expert in the field of physics. Daza testified that if the lighter vehicle hits the right front portion of the heavier vehicle. Considering that the car was smaller and lighter than the six-wheeler truck. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee. Issue: Whether Mercury & Del Rosario are solidarily liable. and service records. and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. on the day of the accident. No NBI and police clearances were also presented. The court took note of the testimony of Dr. Del Rosario was driving without a license. the employer should formulate standard operating procedures. No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. but nothing was done about it. In fact. Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. Driver‘s negligence Evidence does not support petitioners‘ claim that at the time of the accident. admitted that there were damages also on the left side of the truck. Lastly. In this situation. Marlon Rosendo H. not the other way around. The attempt does not impress. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost left lane. the middle island against which the car was pinned would slow down the car. while the lighter vehicle was at its right. in the SELECTION of its prospective employees. applicants are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests. 146 Agas. Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than 13 hours.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. and away from the truck. Buan. Daza also gave a further study on the basis of the same assumptions except that the car is on the left side of the truck. It is also joint and solidary with the employee. Daza concluded that the general direction of the car after impact would be to the left of the truck. No tests were conducted on the motor skills development. It is the car. eye and hand coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. One vehicle is ten times heavier. 2. 2180 is direct or immediate. 3. depth visualization. the general direction of the light vehicle after the impact would be to the right side of the heavy vehicle. To establish compliance with these requirements. According to the Recruitment and Training Manager of Mercury Drug.

7. its driver failed to see the Cimarron is without any basis in fact. It cannot be said that these circumstances affected the maneuverability of the Cimarron. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. no maneuvering could have avoided the outcome. it was shown that the driver of the panel truck lost control of his vehicle and bumped the Cimarron. Hence. the court was unsure) wherein the speed limit was only 50 km/h. he had a rosy future ahead of him. Petitioner raises the defense that the driver of the Cimarron was negligent and was guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations at the time of the mishap (overloaded car. Private respondents filed a civil case for damages against herein petitioner. The court disagrees with the petitioner. Buan. Sanitary Steam Laundry v. Hence. stating that the driver of the Cimarron had the last clear chance when the truck driver braked and swerved as a consequence. Negligence. At around 8PM. having just passed the entrance examinations of the University of the Philippines. He wanted to embark on a banking career. a go-getter. He was looking forward to his college life. like any other negligence. and the car only had one headlight functioning). It agrees with the CA in ruling that that petitioner‘s policy of requiring prospective employees to submit NBI and police clearance and to have at least 2 years experience as driver prior to 147 Agas. Anzures. & Roco 3B . He excelled both in his academics and extracurricular undertakings. Also according to the testimonies given. On the other hand. He also contends that there was no need to conduct a psychological and physical test on its employees since there is no requirement under the law to do such. consisting in whole or in part. is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Indeed. and the University of Asia and the Pacific. as testified by Francisco Lopez. Held: YES. Only its driver claimed that the Cimarron had only one headlight on. petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Without doubt. it asserts that its employment of Herman Hernandez as a driver means that he had passed the screening tests of the company. He had shown very good leadership qualities. There is also no connection as to the overloading or the number of persons sitting in the front seat. In order to avoid hitting the jeepney.‖ caused by the fact that the Cimarron allegedly had only one headlight on. Had the accident not happened. He is intelligent and motivated. It argues that there is no law requiring employees to submit NBI and police clearance prior to their employment. while the Cimarron was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus. Issue: Whether or not Sanitary Steam Laundry is liable as an employer of the negligent truck driver. the court took into consideration the ff: Atty. It was traversing at what appears to be 60 (mph or km/h. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. De La Salle University. petitioner‘s failure to require submission of these documents does not mean that it did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. It was shown that because of the swerving of the truck. Court of Appeals. Jess Lopez ―He was only 17 years old. Petitioner maintains that the presumption is that the said driver submitted NBI and police clearance. Employer‘s Liability Petitioner contends that the non-submission of the NBI clearance and police clearance of its driver does not mean that it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Reposo. of violation of law. The police investigator did not state in his report or in his testimony that the Cimarron had only one headlight on. 300 SCRA 20 (1998)  Supra Facts: A collision occurred between a Mercedes Benz panel truck and a Cadillac Cimarron which caused the death of 3 persons and injuries of others. Navarrete. Petitioner‘s contention that because of ―decreased visibility. This eventually caused the collision. including submission of the aforementioned documents.in chief of the school annual. Ongchuan. They also invoke the last clear chance doctrine. and a member of the school varsity basketball team. nearly 6 feet tall and weighed 175 pounds.Torts & Damages 2013 In awarding damages. Tomas even offered him a chance to obtain an athletic scholarship. Cusi. The University of Sto. the front seat was occupied by 4 (wth) persons. He was in 4th year high school. even if both headlights of the Cimarron were lighted. it would have been bumped just the same because the driver of the panel truck could not stop despite the fact that he applied the brakes. respondent Stephen Huang‘s godfather and a bank executive. He was also class president and editor. The driver of the truck claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. he was an exceptional student. the driver stepped on the brakes which caused the vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. Additionally it was found that the truck was at a speed above the acceptable limit. but the accident prevented him from attending the basketball tryouts.‖ The mother was talking about the irony of it all: Mercury Drug caused the injury and yet they have no choice but to buy the medicines for the injury from Mercury Drug. get married and raise children. the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner‘s panel truck. Cavite on its way back to Manila.

No on-the-job training and seminars reminding employees. Nuval argues that Darwin was not an employee but only a casual who had worked with Nuval for only 5 days but was thereafter terminated. it was not shown that he was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the incident happened. Moreover. he claims that Darwin was not authorized to drive the vehicle. at the time of the accident. Moreover. As the 2 cars were about to pass each other. were conducted on their would-be employees. The theory of Nuval that Darwin must have stolen the keys as well as the vehicle is rather farfetched and not supported by any proof whatsoever. as revealed by the testimonies of the witnesses presented during trial. The only proof proferred by Nuval to show that Darwin was no longer his employee was the payroll in which the latter‘s name was not included. Issue: Whether Nuval can be held liable for the negligence of Darwin. While this may be one of the assigned tasks given him. That he had been hired only to bring Nuval‘s children to and from school must be rejected. Held. On the other hand. With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical tests prior to his employment. All these could only mean failure on the part of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. There was even failure on the part of defendant to present its concerned employee‘s 204 file. Darwin immediately fled from the scene. Ongchuan. physical as well as mental and emotional. it behooves employers to exert extra care in the selection and supervision of their employees. Buan. Zac claims that Darwin‘s recklessness was the proximate cause for the injury he sustained and. both Nuval and his employees who testified did not act as if the vehicle had been stolen. According to the trial court: ―No tests of skill. Giving credence to this outlandish theory would enable employers to escape their legal liabilities with impunity. Nearby residents pulled Zac out of the car and was brought to a hospital by a government agent who happened to be passing by. driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. having been merely hired for a few days. No. Zac suffered multiple fractures on his left leg and other injuries in his body. On the opposite side of the road and on the way to Paranaque. Also. of road courtesies and road rules and regulations were done. facts established in the case show that Darwin was acting within the scope of the authority given him when the collision occurred. Jess Lopez employment was not enough to prove the exercise of due diligence and that even this policy petitioner failed to prove by its failure to present the driver‘s NBI and police records during the trial. as the Nuval‘s employee. is inconsistent with his other argument of due diligence in the selection of an employee 148 Agas. & Roco 3B . Carticiano v. Navarrete. Anzures. Such loophole is easy to concoct and is simply unacceptable. assuming that he was. Cusi. such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due diligence. although no law requires it. There were no instructions given to defendant‘s drivers as to how to react in cases of emergency nor what to do after an emergency occurs. 8. Reposo. Nuval offered 100k as compensation for the injuries caused by but was refused. He had not reported the alleged theft of his vehicle. Nuval had other employees working for him who were not listed in the payroll either.R. It is obviously an afterthought concocted to present some semblance of a defense. Darwin was driving an owner type Jeep owned by Nuval. a civil suit was filed against Nuval as owner.‖ Indeed. Darwin veered his vehicle to the left and thus occupied a portion of the other lane. Zac initiated a criminal complaint against Darwin. he testified that his employees had told him that the keys and the vehicle had merely ―probably‖ been stolen by Darwin. Furthermore. September 28. YES.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. The rather easy access which Darwin had to the keys to the vehicle of Nuval further wea kened the latter‘s cause. First. Accordingly. In fact. the latter was liable for not execising due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee. Consequently. Nuvali‘s defense that. nobody questioned the fact that the former had freely entered Nuval‟s house where the keys to the vehicle were kept. Darwin was no longer his employee. However. 2000 Facts: Zach Carticiano was on his way home t o Imus Cavite while driving father‘s car — a Ford Laser. Neither did he search nor ask his employees to search for the supposedly stolen vehicle. G. Thereafter. His authority was to drive Nuval‘s vehicle. CA exonerated Nuval on the ground that Zac did not present evidence showing that the driver was actually an employee of Nuvali at the time of the accident. a head on collision between the 2 vehicles occurred. They must go BEYOND the minimum requirements fixed by law. Nuval. 138054. no convincing proof was presented showing that it was his only task. Third parties are not bound by the allegation that the driver was authorized to operate the jeep only when the employer‘s children were on board the vehicle. especially drivers. As such. Second.

giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. It is settled that an employer's liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created. Rule 2 defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Inc. Buan. maladjusted individuals who staged a strike and disrupted its business operations . Inc. Q. (labor union) picketed. 2000. Its essential elements are as follows: 1. Also. A thorough reading of the allegations of the Complaint reveals that Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the strike effected by the employees of Resources. It operates a chemical plant in Antipolo City. Filamer Christian Institute v. G. An employer incurs no liability when an employee‘s conduct. no evidence was presented that Zac could have evaded the jeep had he been more diligent under the circumstances. Capocyon and 36 other union officers and members of Obrero Pilipino.. Held: The Rules of Court makes it clear that failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint warrants the dismissal thereof. 2007 Facts: Universal Aquarius. delivery and distribution of chemical products in Metro Manila. Universal forged an Agreement (To End Labor Dispute) with Obrero Pilipino. G. beyond the range of their employment. barricaded and obstructed the entry and exit of Universal's Antipolo City chemical plant and intercepted Universal's delivery trucks thereby disrupting its business operations.R. as a proprietor under the name and style of Marman Trading (Marman). at the time of the damage or injury. Jess Lopez Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages. Issue: Whether the complaint states a cause of action. Human Resources Management Corporation (Resources) is engaged in supplying manpower to various establishments. Section 2. 9. 2000. On January 8.C. This made it difficult for Zac to avoid the impending injury. Universal and Tan filed a Complaint against the strikers and Resources before the RTC for breach of contract and damages suffered due to the disruption of their respective business operations.. Q. the same was lost upon dismissal of the case against the individual defendants. is engaged in the trading. The allegation of contributory negligence is also unavailing because the accident was caused by the fact that Darwin‘s jeep suddenly veered towards Zacarias‘ lane when the vehicles were about to pass each other. v. 12. Human Resources Management Corporation. 1990 Agas. which adjoined Universal's plant. the strike which affected the business operations of Universal and Marman ended. when Resources' employees staged a strike. 10. Thus. the law presumes the vehicle owner equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving proper selection of employee as a defense.C. On December 19. (Universal) is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of chemical products in Metro Manila. and that Resources violated said contract by supplying it with unfit. October 16. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. & Roco 3B 149 . On December 27. the Court is convinced that the Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against Resources. Marman's depot. 155990. The question then is whether. and 3. It is only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises . Anent UNIVERSAL'S claim for breach for contract and damages. Resources cannot be held liable for damages caused by the strike staged by its employees . Resources filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. Sep. Universal Aquarius.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. act or omission is beyond the range of employment. in that of his own. 2001. Universal and Tan then filed a Notice of Dismissal as against the strikers. suffered a similar fate. Cusi. Reposo. assuming the existence of such cause of action. Conchita Tan (Tan). and lack of jurisdiction. On January 3. the Court finds that she has no cause of action against Resources. with a depot in Antipolo City adjoining Universal's chemical plant. or is in the course of. Unquestionably.R. However. No. 75112. It is the delict or the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff. independently. Ongchuan. 2. The Complaint alleged that Universal had a contract of employment of temporary workers with Resources. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right. with regard to TAN'S CLAIM for damages. It supplied Universal with about 74 temporary workers to assist Universal in the operation of its chemical plant in Antipolo City. 2001. that. the employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer or. his employment. Navarrete. Anzures. they were acting on their own. Thus. Court of Appeals.

He was accompanied by Allan Masa. Funtecha was a student at the school who was assigned work in exchange for free education.. 2180 applies to FCI as regards Funtecha. and driven by its alleged employee. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a. In other words.to drive despite not having a license. His duty was to sweep the school passages for 2 hours every morning before his regular classes. Sr. Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer. Roxas City. Funtecha only had a student permit. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a. Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused. is to read into the law something that was not legislated there in the first place. It must be recalled that Allan was never impleaded in the complaint for damages and should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's judgment is concerned . Held: NO.m. Sr. colleges or universities on the other. Zenith Insurance Corp. & Roco 3B .m. is an 82 year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased) who was hit by a Pinoy jeep while he was walking along Roxas Ave. The RTC found Filamer. but the latter‘s appeal was dismissed for non -payment of docket fees. Rule X of Book III which reads: Sec. to 6:00 a. Funtecha was not included in the company payroll. 14. Kapunan filed a criminal case against Funtecha alone for physical injuries through reckless imprudence. at the time of the injury. it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. Cusi. Funtecha. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. they both fled the scene. Buan. Evidence establishes that only one headlight was functioning at the time. but he convinced Allan Masa – the authorized driver – to allow him to drive. as espoused by private respondents. including such facilities as may be reasonable. classes . Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed . at 6:30 p.m. But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha. — There is no employer-employee relationship between students on the one hand. 7 specifically Section 14. Kapunan also filed a civil action for damages before the RTC against FCI. Kapunan was brought by a tricycle driver to the hospital. Issue: Whether or not employer in Art. It is axiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. where he stayed for 20 days. but for some purpose of his own. Anzures. Working scholars. The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocatio n. The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate an erstwhile gray area in labor relations and seeks to define in categorical terms the precise status of working scholars in relation to the learning institutions in which they work for the privilege of a free education. provided the students are given real opportunity. was likewise ordered to pay FCI. 150 Agas.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. To dismiss the implementing rule as one which governs only the "personal relationship" between the school and its students and not where there is already a third person involved. FCI and Zenith appealed. Ongchuan. The jeep was owned by Filamer Christian Institute (FCI). Reposo.was being sued in his personal capacity for allegedly allowing Funtecha – his houseboy . Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code. Funtecha worked for FCI for 2 hours daily for 5 days a week. It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law. But under the present set of circumstances. Funtecha. Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and primarily answerable to the injured party under Article 2180 of the Civil Code would have prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa. Agustin Masa – the president and director .. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition. Jess Lopez Facts: Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan. where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge . even if the trial court did find Allan guilty of negligence. still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to FCI for the plain reason that at the time of the accident. Funtecha. In disclaiming liability. the authorized driver of the Pinoy jeep and undisputably an employee of petitioner. It was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels of the vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha which set into motion the chain of events leading to the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court. such conclusion would not be binding on Allan. he reserved the right to file an independent civil action. necessary to finish their chosen court under such arrangement. and Allan Masa (a non-party) solidarily liable. and Masa – Allan was not included.m. and schools. Funtecha was found guilty. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. Navarrete.

Cusi. by a legal fiction. Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code. the school president. Funtecha requested the driver. Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic. they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle. negotiating a sharp dangerous curb. the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian. under Section 14. to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him). Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the FCI. for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. The school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. At the time of the incident (6:30 P. and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who. 1992 RESOLUTION: In the 1990 decision. An employer is expected to impose upon its employees he necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer. Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The school president also had knowledge of Funtecha‘s possession of a student driver‘s license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms. The p lace where Allan lives is also the house of his father. 75112. the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master‘s business. Reposo. He was. makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14. thus. it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute. August 17. or in the supervision over him. There exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person ―whose acts or omissions are imputable. in relation to the school. it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the FCI of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee. a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. and hit him. an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only 2 hours in the morning of each school day. & Roco 3B . Navarrete. He need not have an official appointment for a driver‘s position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act. Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road. Funtecha was a working student. Allan Masa. in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.R. Rule X. 151 Agas. was promulgated by the SOLE only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Section 14. The Court. the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act. Court of Appeals. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a ―frolic of his own‖ but ultimately. Ongchuan. Even if somehow. Filamer Christian Institute v. G. The clause ―within the scope of their assigned tasks‖ for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer. Upon swerving. the SC ruled that the FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable. No. The Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act FCI cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner. Allan‘s job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. Rule X. on which the petitioner anchors its defense. Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself. Having a student driver‘s license. Agustin Masa. and was allowed. Jess Lopez 11. According to Allan‘s testimony. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Buan. Actually.‖ Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. but they did not stop to check. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan‘s house. to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. the jeep had only one functioning headlight. he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle. Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the FCI. and viewing that the road was clear. Moreover. Anzures.) in Roxas City. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon. includes any act done by an employee.M. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. being a part-time janitor and a scholar of Filamer. Supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. Rule X.

requiring an employer. in Taguig. a Training Officer. and was confined for 24 days thereon. Ongchuan. was concerned. even without the presentation documentary evidence.m. Custodio was thrown onto the pavement. the findings of the CA and the trial court are contrary to each other. they failed to slow down nor blow their horns. birth certificate. 6 a. MMTC averred that its bus was driven prudently and carefully. and that said positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the field. & Roco 3B . Cusi. that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings. Calebag the jeepney driver was declared in default. work certification. and not merely be satisfied with the possession of a professional driver's license. Navarrete. in order to arrive at a correct finding based thereon. Lamayo alleged that MMTC and its driver should be liable. 223 SCRA 521 (1993)  See p. it was the jeep that was driven recklessly. 1979. it was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to drive . Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. This is quite understandable considering that as far as the injured pedestrian. traffic rules. The CA modified this by holding MMTC likewise liable. Issue: (1) Whether or not documentary evidence is needed to support the positive testimonies above. to carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications. tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment. it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business of his employer. The first two issues raised by petitioner shall be correlatively discussed in view of their interrelation. unconscious with serious physical injuries. Potenciano Kapunan. the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff. diploma. primary and solidary. MMTC presented Garbo. Camarote. Its Transport Supervisor. When as in this case. and that since the jeep hit the bus. checks with other companies. She boarded a Jeep driven by Agudo Calebag and owned by Victorin Lamayo to go to work. In the absence of evidence that the FCI had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. Jess Lopez In the present case. i. In its present petition. Anzures. the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees . (―MMTC‖) bus driven by Godofredo Leonardo was also traveling quickly along Honeydew Road. was not made a party defendant in the civil case for damages. et al. the FCI has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver. Allan Masa. the jeep ramming the left portion of the bus. under Article 2180. Reposo. – Nenita Custodio was a machine operator working for Dynetics Inc. She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness one week later. this court may scrutinize the evidence on record. The RTC found both drivers and the jeep owner solidarily liable. xrays. to present the requirements for its divers. final interview. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short while. As both approached the intersection of both roads. Buan. being a minor. also testified as to his duty of monitoring the daily operations and to enforce compliance with its guidelines concerning uniform. being the sole cause of the accident. The liability of the employer is. MMTC insists that the oral testimonies of its employees were presented as witnesses in its behalf sufficiently prove. 791 of textbook Facts: 28 August. a Metro Manila Transit Corp. NBI clearance. but absolved MMTC for showing diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. psycho-physical tests. Court of Appeals.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. interview.. in the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. Custodio then filed a complaint for damages against everyone with the assistance of her parents. (2) Whether or not their testimonies may be disturbed on appeal (3) Whether or not the evidence presented re: diligence of MMTC in the selection and supervision of its employees is sufficient Held: NO. (Typical Filipino driving. and a Constabulary Highway Patrol Group seminar. Bautista. vs.e. and fitness. license. The actual driver of the school jeep. et al. experience and record service. However. 152 Agas. 12. FCI has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances. It underscored the fact that it had indeed complied with the measure of diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees as enunciated in Campo. 1.) They thus collided. They denied all allegations and pointed fingers at each other. Furthermore. While it was traveling at a fast pace along DBP Ave.

both of whom were solidarily held liable with defendant Lamayo. checked employees to determine whether they were positive for alcohol and followed other rules and regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation as well as its company. Our view that the evidence for petitioner MMTC falls short of the required evidentiary quantum as would convincingly and undoubtedly prove its observance of the diligence of a good father of a family has its precursor in the underlying rationale pronounced in the earlier case of Central Taxicab Corp. The trial court. 1988. Coming now to the case at bar. must be corroborated by documentary evidence. It is rather strange. holds that defendant MMTC be totally absolved from liability and that the complaint against it be dismissed whereas respondent court was of the opinion that — It is surprising though that witness Milagros Garbo did not testify nor present any evidence that defendant-appellee's driver. where we held that: This witness spoke of an "affidavit of experience" which a driver-applicant must accomplish before he is employed by the company. to hold sway. Having successfully proven such defense. were not presented in court despite the fact that they are obviously in the possession and control of defendant-appellee. Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence. which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. et al. & Roco 3B . the owner of the jeepney. or even subject evidence for that matter. On the part of Christian Bautista. The contrariety is in the findings of the two lower courts. object or documentary.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. the bus driver of petitioner MMTC.. with regard to the liability of MMTC as employer of one the erring drivers.n. The Court has ruled that due diligence in (the) selection and supervision of employee(s) are not proved by mere testimonies to the effect that its applicant has complied with all the company requirements before one is admitted as an employee but without proof thereof. if any. pp. therefore. the transport supervisor of defendant-appellee. we are spared the necessity of determining the sufficiency of evidence establishing the fact of negligence. 4-5). April 29.. Cusi. a written "time schedule" for each bus.. briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty. notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial court and the opposing counsel. Jess Lopez A perusal of the same shows that since there is no dispute as to the finding of concurrent negligence on the part of the defendant Calebag. Instead. set amidst an almost identical factual setting. defendant MMTC therefore. 153 Agas. The clearances. Reposo. and co-defendant Leonardo. yet no attempt was ever made to present in evidence any of these documents. despite the fact that they were obviously in the possession and control of the defendant company. defendant Godofredo Leonardo has complied with or has undergone all clearances and trainings she referred to. It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. while there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence. Albert also testified that he kept records of the preliminary and final tests given him as well as a record of the qualifications and experience of each of the drivers of the company. defendant MMTC was able to prove that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings but also strict (and) diligent in supervising its employees by seeing to it that its employees were in proper uniforms. the driver involved in this case. The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any "record" or other documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses. we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities. the Court now. Having reached this conclusion. Buan. the driver of the passenger jeepney. to see to it that bus crew follows written guidelines of the company (t. argues strongly against its pretensions. but when asked to present in court the alleged written guidelines of the company he merely stated that he brought with him a "wrong document" and defendant-appellee's counsel asked for reservation to present such written guidelines in the next hearing but the same was (sic) never presented in court. and which is the subject of this present controversy. vs. he testified that it is his duty to monitor the operation of buses in the field. this Court finds that based on the evidence presented during the trial. Anzures. Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Co. Ongchuan. it resorted to generalities. to countercheck the dispatchers' duty prior to the operation of the buses in the morning.s. that he failed to produce in court the all important record of Roberto. result of seminars and tests which Godofredo Leonardo submitted and complied with. and a record of the inspections and thorough checks pertaining to each bus before it leaves the car barn. cannot be held liable for the accident. in absolving MMTC from liability ruled that — On the question as to whether defendant MMTC was successful in proving its defense that indeed it had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of defendant Leonardo. A thorough and scrupulous review of the records of this case reveals that the conclusion of CA is more firmly grounded on jurisprudence and amply supported by the evidence of record than that of the court below. Navarrete.

that witness Garbo neither testified nor presented any evidence that driver Leonardo had complied with or had undergone all the clearances and trainings she took pains to recite and enumerate. applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship. the pertinent parts of which provides that: The basis of the employer's vicarious liability has been explained under this ratiocination: ―The responsibility imposed by this article arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible under the article. there is no doubt that considering the nature of the business of petitioner. to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff. that it is not representation. These statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence. and for failure to submit all evidence within its control. It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180. in relation to Article 2180 provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are present. Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observe d by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly established. nor interest. With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC in this instance. therefore. if true. petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference. Anzures. . to hold the employer liable. The above rule is. derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. the employer under Article 2180 is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. thus. assuming the putative existence thereof. It is clear. and thereby its incredulity. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff. Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field. is more often honored in the breach than in the observance. through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo. The supposed clearances. it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. caused damage to another. as its training officer. But. . (R)educing the testimony of Albert to its proper proportions. therefore. In any event. which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate. may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. which forms the foundation of such responsibility. we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. We are of the considered opinion. then they were obviously in the possession and control of petitioner. couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. to use an oft-quoted phrase. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry. as employer. that the believable evidence on the degree of care and diligence that has been exercised in the selection and supervision of Roberto Leon y Salazar. & Roco 3B . we do not have enough trustworthy evidence left to go by. Reposo. Buan.. the plaintiff must show. Navarrete. . . although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry . Cusi. Once this is done. of course. The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177. Negligence is imputed to them by law. (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond. both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC. the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180 When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties. and the training conducted consisting of seminars and actual driving tests were satisfactory otherwise he should have not been allowed to drive the subject vehicle. results of seminars and tests which Leonardo allegedly submitted and complied with were never presented in court despite the fact that. .Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. As earlier observed. it would not let any applicant-drivers to be (sic) admitted without undergoing the rigid selection and training process with the end (in) view of protecting the public in general and its passengers in particular. and Christian Bautista. nor even the necessity of having somebody else answer for the damages caused by the persons devoid of personality. unless they prove the contrary. It then concluded with its sweeping pontifications that "thus. the last paragraph of the article says that such responsibility ceases if is proved that the persons who might be held responsible under it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family (diligentissimi patris familias) to prevent damage. but it is the non-performance of certain duties of precaution and prudence imposed upon the persons who become responsible by civil bond uniting the actor to them. Thus. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. there is no doubt that applicant had fully complied with the said requirements otherwise Garbo should not have allowed him to undertake the next set of requirements . Jess Lopez We are fully aware that there is no hard-and-fast rule on the quantum of evidence needed to prove due observance of all the diligence of a good father of a family as would constitute a valid defense to the legal presumption of negligence on the part of an employer or master whose employee has by his negligence . The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the public. Ongchuan. there 154 Agas. It is only then that the defendant. is not legally sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against the defendant company. as its transport supervisor. respondent court could not but express surprise.

2005 Facts: ―Exposé‖ is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo Mel Rim a and June Alegre. & Roco 3B . directly and solidarily liable for damages and it is immaterial that one action is based on quasi-delict and the other on culpa contractual. teachers. G. . they cannot help but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways. While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are.R. as appears to be the fashion of the times. the very size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers. It‘s is aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network. the employer is likewise responsible for damages. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Rima. On the matter of selection of employees. To this. 13. they are not the only persons that the law seeks to benefit. Jess Lopez arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent. his experience and record of service. Buan. Ongchuan. These steps appellant failed to observe. the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence. AMEC and Angelita Ago (―Ago‖). the passengers and owners of the cargo carried by a common carrier.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Gutierrez. Inc. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. Navarrete. 17. Inc. ‖ Due diligence in the supervision of employees. the drivers and owners of the said vehicles shall be primarily. and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. we have consistently held that where the injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the colliding vehicles . Jan. Paying lip-service to these injunctions or merely going through the motions of compliance therewith will warrant stern sanctions from the Court. and thereafter. rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. is decidedly not sufficient to overcome presumption. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies. the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. taking up all subjects including those they have passed already. as the solidarily of the obligation is justified by the very nature thereof. In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against them. we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses. We emphatically reiterate our holding. 141994. he has therefore. as Dean of AMEC‘s College of Medicine. Campo vs. Filipinas Broadcasting Network. As early as the case of Gutierrez vs. filed a complaint for damages against FBNI. acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions. on the other hand. it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer.. Alegre allegedly said: ―Let us begin with the less burdensome: if you have children taking medical course at AMECBCCM. Anzures. Cusi. lays down this admonition: ―In order that the owner of a vehicle may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family. since the non-observance thereof actually becomes the basis of their vicarious liability under Article 2180. without anything more. AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from students. advise them to pass all subjects because if they fail in any subject they will repeat their year level. particularly Rima and Alegre. he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license. he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory. supra. v. that (t)he mere formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It should be borne in mind that the legal obligation of employers to observe due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not to be considered as an empty play of words or a mere formalism. and Alegre. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible. Reposo. of course. xxx Second: Earlier AMEC students in Physical Therapy had 155 Agas. the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. Camarote. For if common carriers carefully observe the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of their own passengers. failed to exercise all due diligence required of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of driver. AGO Medical and Educational Center. (FBNI). as a warning to all employers.

AMEC Science High School and the AMEC. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime. The truth is this. AMEC is a dumping ground for moral and physically misfit people. so long as she has money to buy the ingredient of beetle juice. [which is] an institution imbued with public interest. Rozil Lozares.‖ Rima and Alegre. isn‘t it? On the other hand. May I say I‘m sorry to Dean Justita Lola. or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor. real or imaginary. and chairman of the scholarsh ip committee at that. Ongchuan. It found Rima‘s statement within the ―bounds of freedom of speech. There is a McDonald Hall. through Atty. trial ensued.‖ CA affirmed the trial court‘s judgment with modification. as the family name implies. and of the press.‖ CA held that FBNI failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees for allowing Rima and Alegre to make the radio broadcasts without the proper KBP accreditation. garbage of x x x moral and physical misfits‖. that you are no longer fit to teach. Rima and Alegre failed to overcome the legal presumption of malice. In absolving Rima from the charge . discredit and contempt. FBNI. Third: Students are required to take and pay for the subject even if the subject does not have an instructor — such greed for money on the part of AMEC‘s administration. or any act or omission. filed an Answer alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.‖ Thereafter. The elderly can get by— that‘s why she (Lola) was taken in as Dean. Rima and Alegre hardly made a thorough investigation of the students‘ alleged gripes. If you will take a look at the AMEC premises you‘ll find out that the names of the buildings there are foreign soundings. Issue: Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with its broadcasters Allegre and Rima Held: YES. However. As an aviation. expression. not merely of moral and physical misfits. a dean. She is too old to work. condition. But this is the truth. Anzures. Rima and Alegre‘s remarks such as ―greed for money on the part of AMEC‘s administrators‖. Don‘t insist. Neither did they inquire about nor confirm the purported irregularities in AMEC from the DECS. (Former teachers of Aquinas University but were removed because of immorality) AMEC is a dumping ground. It is a public knowledge that the AMEC has survived and has been surviving for the past few years since its inception because of funds support from foreign foundations. these circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of the broadcasters‘ claim that they were ―impelled by their moral and social duty to inform the public about the students‘ gripes. The reason is practical cost saving in salaries because an old person is not fastidious. or of a vice or defect. As hosts of a documentary or public affairs program. Rima and Alegre failed to show adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in airing the supposed gripes of the students. CA made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. CA upheld the trial court‘s ruling that the questioned broadcasts are libelous per se and that FBNI. Jess Lopez complained that the course is not recognized by DECS. That is a very concrete and undeniable evidence that the support of foreign foundations for AMEC is substantial. Rima and Alegre merely gave a single name when asked to identify the students. the broadcasts suggest that AMEC is a money-making institution where physically and morally unfit teachers abound. discredit. being an old woman. the CA ruled that the broadcasts were made with reckless disregard as to whether they were true or false as it failed to present in court any of the students who allegedly complained against AMEC. your case is zero visibility. Finding no factual basis for the imputations against AMEC‘s administrators. Alegre 156 Agas. Probably they only qualify in terms of intellect. Cusi. It is likely that the students would be influenced by evil. they had sufficient time to verify their sources and information.‖ Hear ing the students‘ alleged complaints a month before the exposé . The Dean of Student Affairs of AMEC is Justita Lola. On our end our task is to attend to the interests of students. When they become members of society outside of campus will be liabilities rather than assets. There is no question that the broadcasts were made public and imputed to AMEC defects or circumstances tending to cause it dishonor. You are too old. the administrators of AMEC. or contempt of a natural or juridical person. According to the CA. & Roco 3B . Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious.Institute of Mass Communication in their effort to minimize expenses in terms of salary are absorbing or continues to accept ―rejects‖. and AMEC students who graduate ―will be liabilities rather than assets‖ of the society are libelous per se. Taken as a whole. Rima and Alegre should have presented the public issues ―free from inaccurate and misleading information. Reposo. Alegre testified that he merely went to AMEC to verify his report from an alleged AMEC official who refused to disclose any information. Navarrete. the trial court ruled that Rima‘s only participation was when he agreed with Alegre‘s exposé. What does this mean? Immoral and physically misfits as teachers. Buan. garbage. ―AMEC is a dumping ground.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel except Rima . Is the AMEC administration exploiting the very [e]nterprisi ng or compromising and undemanding Lola?‖ While Rima allegedly said: ―My friends based on the expose.BCCM. Why did AMEC still absorb her as a teacher. Rima and Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report the ―goings -on in AMEC. status.

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Atty. Jess Lopez

simply relied on the words of the students ―because they were many and not because there is proof that what they are saying is true.‖ There was reckless disregard of whether their report was true or not. The broadcasts were not ―the result of straight reporting.‖ Significantly, some courts in the US apply the privilege of ―neutral reportage‖ in libel cases involving matters of public interest or public figures. Under this privilege, a republisher who accurately and disinterestedly reports certain defamatory statements made against public figures is shielded from liability, regardless of the republisher‘s subjective awareness of the truth or falsity of the accusation. Rima and Alegre cannot invoke the privilege of neutral reportage because unfounded comments abound in the broadcasts. Moreover, there is no existing controversy involving AMEC when the broadcasts were made. The privilege of neutral reportage applies where the defamed person is a public figure who is involved in an existing controversy, and a party to that controversy makes the defamatory statement. FBNI‘s reliance on Borjal is misplaced. In Borjal, the Court elucidated on the ―doctrine of fair comment,‖ [F]air commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. When the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. True, AMEC is a private learning institution whose business of educating students is ―genuinely imbued with public interest.‖ The welfare of the youth in general and AMEC‘s students in particular is a matter which the public has the right to know. Thus, similar to the newspaper articles in Borjal, the subject broadcasts dealt with matters of public interest. However, unlike in Borjal, the questioned broadcasts in the present case are not based on established facts. Defendants have not presented in court, nor even gave name of a single student who made the complaint to them, much less present written complaint or petition to that effect. The broadcasters, contrary to the mandates of their duties, did not verify and analyze the truth of the reports before they aired it, in order to prove that they are in good faith. 1. Alegre contended that plaintiff school had no permit and is not accredited to offer Physical Therapy courses. Yet, plaintiff produced a certificate coming from DECS that as of Sept. 22, 1987 or more than 2 years before the controversial broadcast, accreditation to offer Physical Therapy course had already been given the plaintiff. Defendants could have easily known this were they careful enough to verify. 2. The allegation that plaintiff was getting tremendous aids from foreign foundations like McDonald Foundation prove not to be true also. The truth is there is no McDonald Foundation existing. Although a big building of plaintiff school was given the name McDonald building, that was only in order to honor the first missionary in Bicol of plaintiffs‘ religion. 3. Defendants did not even also bother to prove their claim, though denied by Dra. Ago, that when medical students fail in one subject, they are made to repeat all the other subject[s], even those they have already passed, nor their claim that the school charges laboratory fees even if there are no laboratories in the school. 4. Dr. Lola was observed by this court not to be physically decrepit yet, nor mentally infirmed, but is still alert and docile. Had the comments been an expression of opinion based on established facts, it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. However, the comments of Rima and Alegre were not backed up by facts. Therefore, the broadcasts are not privileged and remain libelous per se. The broadcasts also violate the Radio Code of the Kapi sanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, Ink. (―Radio Code‖) 4. Public affairs program shall present public issues free from personal bias, prejudice and inaccurate and misleading information. 7. The station shall be responsible at all times in the supervision of public affairs, public issues and commentary programs so that they conform to the provisions and standards of this code. The Radio Code is a voluntary code of conduct imposed by the radio broadcast industry on its own members. The Radio Code is a public warranty by the radio broadcast industry that radio broadcast practitioners are subject to a code by which their conduct are measured for lapses, liability and sanctions. The public has a right to expect and demand that radio broadcast practitioners live up to the code of conduct of their profession, just like other professionals. A professional code of conduct provides the standards for determining whether a person has acted justly, honestly and with good faith in the exercise of his rights and performance of his duties as required by Article 1937 of the Civil Code. A professional code of conduct also provides the standards for determining whether a person who willfully causes loss or injury to another has acted in a manner contrary to morals or good customs under Article 2138 of the Civil Code. III. Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for moral damages, attorney‘s fees and costs of suit (RELEVANT ISSUE) 157 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

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FBNI contends that it is not solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for the pay ment of damages and attorney‘s fees because it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI maintains that its broadcasters, including Rima and Alegre, undergo a ―very regimented process‖ bef ore they are allowed to go on air. ―Those who apply for broadcaster are subjected to interviews, examinations and an apprenticeship program.‖ FBNI further argues that Alegre‘s age and lack of training are irrelevant to his competence as a broadcaster. FBNI points out that the ―minor deficiencies in the KBP accreditation of Rima and Alegre do not in any way prove that FBNI did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising them.‖ Rima‘s accreditation lapsed due to his non-payment of the KBP annual fees while Alegre‘s accreditation card was delayed allegedly for reasons attributable to the KBP Manila Office. FBNI claims that membership in the KBP is merely voluntary and not required by any law or government regulation. FBNI‘s arguments do not persuade us. The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its cause of action against FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180. As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay for damages arising from the libelous broadcasts. As stated by the CA, ―recovery for defamatory statements published by radio or television may be had from the owner of the station, a licensee, the operator of the station, or a person who procures, or participates in, the making of the defamatory statements.‖ An employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the employee within the course and scope of his or her employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies the defamation . In this case , Rima and Alegre were clearly performing their official duties as hosts of FBNI‘s radio program Exposé when they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their work at that time. There was likewise no showing that FBNI did not authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts . Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI merely showed that it exercised diligence in the selection of its broadcasters without introducing any evidence to prove that it observed the same diligence in the supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show how it exercised diligence in supervising its broadcasters. FBNI‟s alleged constant reminder to its broadcasters to “observe truth, fairness and objectivity and to refrain from using libelous and indecent language” is not enough to prove due diligence in the supervision of its broadcasters. The following are ways of showing diligence in the supervision of broadcasters : (1) Adequate training of the broadcasters on the industry‘s code of conduct; (2) Sufficient information on libel laws; and (3) Continuous evaluation of the broadcasters‘ performance. No clear and convincing evidence shows that Rima and Alegre underwent FBNI‘s ―regimented process‖ of application. Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima and Alegre had deficiencies in their KBP accreditation, which is one of FBNI‘s requirements before it hires a broadcaster. Significantly, membership in the KBP, while voluntary, indicates the broadcaster‘s strong commitment to observe the broadcast industry‘s rules and regulations. Clearly, these circ umstances show FBNI‘s lack of diligence in selecting and supervising Rima and Alegre. Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay damages together with Rima and Alegre. 14. Jayme v. Apostol, G.R. No. 163609, November 27, 2008 Facts: Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight. The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway. The collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. He sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma and diffused cerebral contusion and had to be airlifted to Davao for more intensive treatment. He died after 6 days. Parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents. They prayed that all respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss. All respondents denied liability for Mar vin‘s death. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up truck without their consent. Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvin‘s sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. Defendant Municipality of Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages incurred by other defendants (being an agency of the State performing governmental functions). 158 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

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Atty. Jess Lopez

Trial court held Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor Fernando Miguel jointly and severally liable. Mayor Miguel interposed an appeal to the CA. Ma yor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in ruling that he was Lozano‘s employer and, hence, solidarily liable for the latter‘s negligent act. Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not exercise due care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano. CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for damages for the death of Marvin Jayme. CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of a vehicle who is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of the vehicle. Hence, this petition. According to Jayme, the element of direct control is not negated by the fact that Lozano‘s employer was the Municipality of Koronadal. Mayor Miguel, being Lozano‘s superior, still had control over the manner the vehicle was operated. Issue: Whether the mayor should be held vicariously liable Held: NO. Employer is the MUNICIPALITY. The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in the present case. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. To make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions . The employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant evidence. To determine the existence of an employment relationship, we rely on the four-fold test: (1) the employer‘s power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the employer‘s right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the employer‘s right of suspension or dismissal. CA correctly held that it was the Municipality which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. Municipality remains to be Lozano‘s employer notwithstanding Lozano‘s assignment to Mayor Miguel. This Court has, on several occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists. Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least supervision and control over Lozano and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up during the time of the accident. They, however, failed to buttress this claim. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. Moreover, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle‘s operation. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver‘s negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability. Handley v. Lombardi is instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability: ―In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well-settled both in this state and elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate employee or subagent is not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent, but only to the master or principal.‖ In Swanson v. McQuown, Supreme Court adhered to the general rule that a public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates on a vicarious basis since the relationship is not a true master-servant situation. The court went on to rule that the only exception is when they cooperate in the act complained of, or direct or encourage it. Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano‘s employer nor the vehicle‘s registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin‘s death. Ma yor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. The failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter‘s negligent acts. The driver‘s duty is not one that may be delegated to others. 159 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

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Atty. Jess Lopez

The true and lawful employer of Lozano is the Municipality. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. ―It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.‖ The liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. ―Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident (sic) to its operation‖ The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the driver‟s employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle . 15. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999)  16. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 380 SCRA 467 (2002)  Supra Issue: (1) Was Dr. Gutierez negligent and whether it was the faulty intubation which was the proximate cause of Erlinda‘s coma? (2) Whether Dr. Hosaka can be held liable by virtue of the Captain of the Ship doctrine. (3) Whether DLSMC is solidarily responsible with the doctors. Held: (1) YES. It has been sufficiently established that she failed to exercise the standards of care in the administration of anesthesia on a patient. She did not perform a ―preoperative evaluation‖ of the patient before administering anaesthesia. Particularly, she did not check the patient‘s airway. As she herself admitted, she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself, one hour before the scheduled operation. The injury incurred by Erlinda does not normally happen absent any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube. Upon these facts and under these circumstances, a layman would be able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional treatment were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is applicable. (2) YES. That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. From the facts on record it can be logically inferred that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the very least, supervision over the procedure then being performed on Erlinda. (1) He recommended Gutierrez thereby representing to Ramos that she possessed the necessary competence and skills. (2) He was the attending physician of Erlinda and gave instructions to call another anaesthesiologist to help Erlinda. (3) Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez worked as a team. Their work cannot be placed in separate watertight compartments because their duties intersect with each other. Moreover, Dr. Hosaka‘s irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for the scheduled operation of petitioner Erlinda is violative, not only of his duty as a physician ―to serve the interest of his patients with the great est solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill,‖ but also of Article 19 CC which requires a person, in the performance of his duties, to ac t with justice and give everyone his due. (3) NO. There is no employer-employee relationship (see 4 fold test in labor) between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarity liable under Art. 2180 . First, a hospital does not hire or engage the services of a consultant, but rather, accredits the latter and grants him or her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients in the hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he or she possesses the necessary qualifications. Second, it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the consultant‘s fee for services rendered by the latter. Third, a hospital does not dismiss a consultant; instead, the latter may lose his or her accreditation or privileges granted by the hospital. Fourth, when a doctor refers a patient for admission in a hospital, it is the doctor who prescribes the treatment to be given to said patient. The hospital‘s obligation is limited to providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation, the nutritional diet and medications prescribed by the doctor, the 160 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

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equipment and facilities necessary for the treatment of the patient, as well as the services of the hospital staff who perform the ministerial tasks of ensuring that the doctor‘s orders are carried out strictly . As explained by DLSMC, that the admission of a physician to membership in DLSMC‘s medical staff as active or visiting consultant is first decided upon by the Credentials Committee thereof, which is composed of the heads of the various specialty departments such as the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Pediatrics, Surgery with the department head of the particular specialty applied for as chairman. The Credentials Committee then recommends to DLSMC's Medical Director or Hospital Administrator the acceptance or rejection of the applicant physician, and said director or administrator validates the committee's recommendation. Similarly, in cases where a disciplinary action is lodged against a consultant, the same is initiated by the department to whom the consultant concerned belongs and filed with the Ethics Committee consisting of the department specialty heads. The medical director/hospital administrator merely acts as exofficio member of said committee. Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services rendered by the latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the contract between the consultant in respondent hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent hospital and said patient . The FIRST has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to the patient, while the SECOND concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient. Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment. 17. Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, G.R. No. 142625, December 19, 2006  Supra Issue: Whether CMC is vicariously liable for Estrada‘s negligence. Held: YES. CMC disclaims liability by asserting that Estrada was a mere visiting physician and that it admitted Corazon because her physical condition then was classified an emergency obstetrics case. The employer (or the hospital) must have the right to control both the means and the details of the process by which the employee (or the physician) is to accomplish his task. After a thorough examination of the voluminous records of this case, no single evidence points to CMC‘s exercise of control over Estrada‘s treatment and management of Corazon‘s condition. Throughout the pregnancy, Corazon was under the exclusive prenatal care of Estrada. At the time of her admission at CMC and during her delivery, it was Estrada who attended to Corazon. There was no showing that CMC had a part in diagnosing her condition. While Estrada enjoyed staff privileges at CMC, such fact alone did not make him an employee of CMC. CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilities when she was about to give birth. The question now is whether CMC is automatically exempt from liability considering that Estrada is a mere independent contractor-physician. In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the ―ostensible‖ agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the ―doctrine of apparent authority.‖ Under said doctrine, a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is an independent contractor. For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. Said ―Holding Out‖ does not require an express representation by the hospital that the person alleged to be negligent is the employee. The doctrine essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent contractor physician. HOSPITAL‘S MANIFESTATIONS It sometimes described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be general and implied. Said doctrine is also a species of the doctrine of estoppel. In this case, CMC impliedly held out Estrada as a member of its medical staff thus clothing him with apparent authority leading Nogales to believe that Estrada was an employee/agent. Instances: (1) CMC granted staff privileges 161 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

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to Estrada; (2) Signing of Consent Forms signed did not indicate that Estrada was an independent contractor; (3) Estrada‘s referral to the Head of OB-GYNE gave the impression that Estrada was a member the CMC staff. PATIENT‘S RELIANCE It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived employment relationship with CMC in accepting Estrada‘s services. Rogelio‘s consent in Corazon‘s hysterectomy to be performed by a different physician, namely Espinola, is a clearindication of Rogelio‘s confidence in CMC‘s surgical staff. Likewise unconvincing is CMC‘s argument that petitioners are estopped from claiming damages based on the Consent on Admission and Consent to Operation. The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to Corazon due to negligence during her treatment or operation. Neither do the consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability for Corazon‘s death due to negligence during such treatment or operation. Such release forms, being in the nature of contracts of adhesion, are construed strictly against hospitals. Besides, a blanket release in favor of hospitals ―from any and all claims,‖ which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence, would be contrary to public policy and thus void. When a person needing urgent medical attention rushes to a hospital, he cannot bargain on equal footing with the hospital on the terms of admission and operation. Such a person is literally at the mercy of the hospital 18. Professional Services, Inc., v. Agana, 513 SCRA 478 (2007)  Supra 19. Professional Services, Inc., v. Agana, G.R. Nos. 126297, 126467, 127590, February 2, 2010  Supra Issue: Whether a hospital may be held liable for the negligence of physicians-consultants allowed to practice in its premises. Held: YES. PSI is liable to the Aganas, not under the principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employment relationship with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of OSTENSIBLE AGENCY for the negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the principle of CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital. A hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine, in reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of its business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment. There are 3 legal relationships that crisscross : 1) hospital and the doctor; 2) hospital and the patient; 3) patient and the doctor. The exact nature of each relationship determines the basis and extent of the liability of the hospital for the negligence of the doctor. Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 or respondeat superior. Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 or the principle of apparent authority . Regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation. There is ample evidence that the PSI held out to the patient that Dr. Ampil was its agent. There are 2 factors that determine apparent authority: 1) hospital‘s implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital‘s agent; and 2) patient‘s reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. Enrique testified that he consulted Dr. Ampil regarding the condition of his wife and as advised by Dr. Ampil, he ―asked [his] wife to go to Medical City to be examined by [Dr. Ampil] - indicates that it was Enrique who actually made the decision on whom Natividad should consult and where. When asked what impelled him to choose Dr. Ampil, he said ― I have known him to be a specialist on that part of the body ; A staff member of the Medical City which is a prominent and known hospital; because he is a neighbor, I expect more than the usual medical service.‖ The decision made by Enrique for Natividad to consult Dr. Ampil was significantly influenced by the impression that Dr. Ampil was a staff member of Medical City. Enrique looked upon Dr. Ampil not as independent of but as integrally related to Medical City. In the ―Consent for Hospital Care‖ signed by Agana, PSI virtually reinforced the public impression that Dr. Ampil was a physician of its hospital, rather than one independently practicing in it; that the medications and treatments he prescribed were necessary and desirable; and that the hospital staff was prepared to carry them out. PSI pointed out in its memorandum that Dr. Ampil‘s hospital affiliation was not the exclusive basis – that had Dr. Ampil been affiliated with another hospital, he would still have been chosen by the Aganas as Natividad‘s surgeon. Court cannot speculate. Under the circumstances at that time, Enrique decided to consult Dr. Ampil for he believed him to be a staff member of a prominent and known hospital. PSI is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil as its ostensible agent. 162 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

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While PSI had no power to control the means or method by which Dr. Ampil conducted the surgery, PSI had the power to review or cause the review of what may have irregularly transpired within its walls . PSI defined the standards of its corporate conduct – that it had a corporate duty to Natividad even after her operation to ensure her safety as a patient. The corporate duty was not limited to having its nursing staff note or record the 2 missing gauzes but it extended to determining Dr. Ampil‘s role in it, bringing the matter to his attention, and correcting his negligence . Given the standard of conduct that PSI defined for itself, the inquiry is whether the hospital measured up to it. PSI excuses itself from fulfilling its corporate duty on the ground that Dr. Ampil assumed the personal responsibility of informing Natividad about the 2 missing gauzes. Dr. Ricardo Jocson, who was part of the group of doctors that attended to Natividad, testified that the group talked about the missing gauzes but Dr. Ampil assured them that he would personally notify the patient about it. PSI claimed no reason for it to act on the report on the 2 missing gauzes because Natividad Agana showed no signs of complications. The excuses are totally unacceptable. PSI could not simply wave off the problem and nonchalantly delegate to Dr. Ampil the duty to review what transpired during the operation. The purpose of such review would have been to pinpoint when, how and by whom two surgical gauzes were mislaid to avert any jeopardy to Natividad‘s recovery. PSI could not have expected that purpose to be achieved by merely hoping that the person likely to have mislaid the gauzes might be able to retrace his own steps. By its own standard of corporate conduct, PSI‘s duty to initiate the review was non-delegable. While Dr. Ampil may have had the primary responsibility of notifying Natividad about the missing gauzes, PSI imposed upon itself the separate and independent responsibility of initiating the inquiry into the missing gauzes . The purpose of the first would have been to apprise Natividad of what transpired during her surgery, second would have been to pinpoint any lapse in procedure to prevent a recurrence thereof and to determine corrective measures that would ensure the safety of Natividad. That Dr. Ampil negligently failed to notify Natividad did not release PSI from its self-imposed separate responsibility. PSI had the duty to take notice of medical records prepared by its own staff when these bear earmarks of a surgery gone awry. The record taken during the operation of Natividad which reported a gauze count discrepancy should have given PSI sufficient reason to initiate a review and should not have waited for Natividad to complain. PSI took no heed of the record of operation and consequently did not initiate a review of what transpired during Natividad‘s operation. Rather, it shirked its responsibility and passed it on to others — to Dr. Ampil whom it expected to inform Natividad, and to Natividad herself to complain before it took any meaningful step. By its inaction, therefore, PSI failed its own standard of hospital care. The corporate negligence ascribed to PSI is different from the medical negligence attributed to Dr. Ampil . The duties of the hospital are distinct from those of the doctor-consultant. The failure of PSI to fulfill its duties as a hospital corporation gave rise to a direct liability to the Aganas distinct from that of Dr. Ampil. PSI‘s hospital liability based on ostensible agency and corporate negligence applies only to this case, pro hac vice and is not intended to set a precedent and should not serve as a basis to hold hospitals liable for every form of negligence of their doctorsconsultants. The ruling is unique to this case, for the liability of PSI arose from an implied agency with Dr. Ampil and an admitted corporate duty to Natividad. The agony of Aganas has gone on for 26 long years with Natividad coming to the end of her days racked in pain and agony. Such wretchedness could have been avoided had PSI simply done what was logical: heed the report of a guaze count discrepancy, initiate a review, and take corrective measures. PSI is liable for P15 million. C. The State

1. Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916 Facts: Merritt was riding a motorcycle going towards the western part of Calle Padre Faura at a speed on 10-12 mph. While he was crossing the intersection, a General Hospital ambulance moving in the opposite direction turned suddenly, unexpectedly, and without any whistle or horn, to the right, towards the wrong lane, and hitting Merrit. He was severely injured. He was entirely unconscious, had multiple fractures, and his brain had suffered material injury. His right leg was broken, and showed a contraction. He became slightly deaf and mentally weak, particularly when he tried to use his money for mathematical calculations.  He was one of the best constructors of wooden buildings, and now he could not work even at half capacity. A partnership wherein he was a partner was dissolved, and a contract for building the Uy Chaco building was given up. Issue: Whether or not the Government is liable for the damages sustained by the Meritt as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur. Held: NO. The collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. 163 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B

" we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No. the court said: ―No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. 1915. The Government having been "modeled after the Federal and State Governments in the United States. and render judgment accordingly. without any fault on his part.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. laches. As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government. effective February 3. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital. find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff. reads: An Act authorizing E.075. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. who was at the time an employee of the defendant. As to the second. thus: 164 Agas. 2457. E. the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal injuries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair. "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs. to which Mr. Act No." In the case of Melvin vs. would not prevent recovery for the whole time. Anzures. that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1. "The Government. if any. and to advance by such means the material interests of the state. In the US the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs. 2457. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes. the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home. The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages. & Roco 3B . Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. State. 1915. it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent. if it exists. Reposo. It is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. E. In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents. the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not. 915. and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision." says Justice Story. or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents . and to determine the amount of the damages. difficulties and losses. is well settled. by reason of the misfeasance. however. since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments. the record shows. Buan. All admit that the Insular Government cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. limited the time to two months and twenty-one days. if any. February 3.741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5. Did the defendant. in enacting the above quoted Act. E. we must look elsewhere for such authority. Jess Lopez The two items which constitute a part of the P14. which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital.000." These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. the award awarded for permanent injuries. is P18. then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized. Navarrete. and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands. and the trial court so found. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part. Cusi.. The court. and (b) the P2. being objects similar to those sought by the public school system. In this we think there was error. We. which would be subversive of the public interest. to which Mr. the rule is stated in 36 Cyc. Enacted. to defendant said Government at the same. SECTION 1. a state institution created by the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries. because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months.000 per month.‖ As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract. simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former. Ongchuan. except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. therefore.666.

jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained. vs. Cusi. In determining the scope of this act. which authorized the bringing of this suit . but would have done so in express terms." It being quite clear that Act No. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state. Ongchuan. on the contrary. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. Navarrete. of the town of Summit. relative to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher. by virtue of such provisions of law. subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized. read: SECTION 1. State decided April 16. & Roco 3B ." with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. all in the county of Waukesha. it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference. because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents . or create any cause of action in his favor. we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers. whether at law or in equity. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff. is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office. Buan. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. 165 Agas. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. or its duly authorized officers and agents. Reposo. In Sipple vs. but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. Commonwealth (152 Mass. or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. State. It did not pass upon the question of liability. where the board of the canal claims had. A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth. 28). and employees. more than remove the state's immunity from suit. in Murdock Grate Co. to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of Wisconsin. by the terms of the statute of New York. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Jess Lopez By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said: It follows therefrom that the state. no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants. Wisconsin. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law. but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit . or was intended to do. agents. and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake. the Act of 1913. only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability. therefore. or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated. Anzures. Waukesha County. In Apfelbacher vs. the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark River. the court said: Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers. In construing this statute the court. 1915.. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Between these latter and the state. It is difficult to see how the act does. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher. said: The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities. Wisconsin.

must be presumed to lie with the state. and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. Fontanilla v.R. regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence. because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. 1976. guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise. in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case. As a result of the impact Restituto Deligo was injured while Francisco Fontanilla died. 55963. for the acts of its agents. That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers. Ongchuan. It thus becomes necessary that before Fontanilla‘s claim for moral and exemplary damages could be resolved. therefore. and whereas in the first article thereof. except when it acts through the agency of a special agent. Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited CA case. and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility . officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903. December 1. This legal presumption gives way to proof. Buan. son of herein petitioners. where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence. the trial court rendered judgment which directed NIA to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. a pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration then driven officially by Hugo Garcia employee of said government agency as its regular driver. book 4. No. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. supra. is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission. Navarrete. in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease . among others. because. Solicitor General that contends that the filing of the instant petition is not proper in view of the appeal taken by respondent NIA to the CA against the judgment sought to be reviewed. duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim. and Restituto Deligo. At the time of the accident. he executes the trust confided to him. however. caused by an official of the second class referred to. and among these persons. Maliaman. bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla. in the sense in which these words are employed. That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent." That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision. of the 18th of May. has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The focal issue raised in NIA‘s appeal to the CA involves the question as to whether or not the driver of the vehicle that bumped the victims was negligent in his operation of said vehicle. which is the original basis of this kind of objections. 1904. It is. Jess Lopez That the Civil Code in chapter 2. the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage. reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage. title 16. foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. the fault or negligence. the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a SPECIAL AGENT. NIA appealed said decision to the CA. Cusi. 1902. G. evidence that the State is only liable. 2. yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official. responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. In this regard. at Maasin. the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages. in a damage case. acting in the exercise of his powers. The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not negligence caused the vehicular accident involves a question of fact which petitioners should 166 Agas. Garcia was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of NIA after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by NIA authorities. & Roco 3B . are found. Reposo. 1989 Facts: On August 21. but not always. the state. After trial. No. Anzures. Fontanilla filed the instant petition with this Court. shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. doubtless because and only in this case.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner. Consequently. according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. the Solicitor General alleges that the trial court decision does not categorically contain such finding. as held in the last paragraph of article 1903. there should first be a finding of negligence on the part of respondent‘s employee -driver.

The State‘s agent. in which case what is provided in Art. the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent. the decision of the trial court has become final as to the petitioners and for this reason alone. At this juncture. Issue: Whether or not NIA is liable to petitioner for the acts of its driver Garcia. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. however. the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents. but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. 2180. Jess Lopez have brought to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. On the other hand. 3601. The sole legal question on whether or not Fontanilla may be entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney‘s fees can very well be answered with the application of Arts. are more or less generally agreed to be ―governmental‖ in character.” The liability of the State has two aspects. 2180 read as follows: “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. by express provision of Rep. Held: YES. Act No. Anzures. In this jurisdiction. then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent‘s tort. If the State‘s agent is not a public official. 5 of Art. is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver. Hence. under Par. and (2) Its PRIVATE or BUSINESS aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. Reposo. 167 Agas. 2176 shall be applicable. Buan. This assumption of liability. Certain functions and activities. it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which. must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official‟s usual governmental functions.” “The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent . Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions. it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. the petition should be dismissed. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. namely: (1) Its PUBLIC or GOVERNMENTAL aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. Indubitably. Cusi. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision. avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages because it is an agency of the State performing governmental functions and driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle. as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment. the function is considered a ―proprietary‖ one. is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of NIA . The NIA is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions (to collect fees for the continuous operation and to transact business as may be necessary to attain objectives). a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation. if a public official. not a special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been established that NIA is a government agency performing proprietary functions and as such.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such. it becomes answerable for damages. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task. the liability for the tortious act should not be borne by respondent government agency but by driver Garcia who should answer for the consequences of his act. and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions. Ongchuan. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of NIA in exercising due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. & Roco 3B . 2180. Navarrete. In this particular case. and particularly when it collects revenues from it. NIA however. Hence. 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code. the matter of due diligence is not an issue in this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent but a regular driver of the vehicle. and so the State is immune from tort liability. which can be performed only by the government.

55963 & 61045. 1991 RESOLUTION: In its MR of the 1989 decision. 552 and the case of Angat River Irrigation System. or in supplying telegraphic.‖ The court. those purposes may be likened to those of a city which is operating a waterworks system. thus showing imprudence and recklessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group. et al. and hence the district was responsible in damages for the negligent construction or operation of its canal system. it is found appropriate to consider certain doctrines from American jurisprudence. through the SolGen. Buan. in the administration of its business. vs. Evidently. Ely Salonga. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered dents on the right side of the radiator guard.) yet it is certain that the functions performed by such enterprises are basically PROPRIETARY IN NATURE. control its affairs. such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped. which are as follows. who was not its special agent.‖ ―Municipality in contracting to provide water supply acts under its proprietary power and not under its legislative. there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. as shown by the investigation report. on the strength of PD No. this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee. No. 2152. et al. and alone are benefited by its operations. the opinion is that irrigation districts in the US are basically identical to our irrigation systems under Act No. etc. Maliaman. We agree with the former Chief Justice Concepcion in saying that the same purpose such as public benefit and public welfare may be found in the operation of certain enterprises (those engaged in the supply of electric power. maintains that. ―the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions. and must assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership. the owner of its system in a proprietary rather than a public capacity. still if he ratifies the wrongful acts. Because of such similarity.‖ Although the majority opinion in the cited case of Angat System declares that the Angat System (like the NIA) exercised a governmental function because the nature of the powers and functions of said agency does not show that it was intended to bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit . organized.R. the employer would still be liable. A driver should be especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the highway. Anzures. or in furnishing potable water through them. Angat River Workers‟ Union. A water improvement district can do nothing. but held that the construction and operation of its irrigation canals and ditches was a proprietary rather than a governmental function. the NIA. in keeping them in repair. Fontanilla v. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory.‖ In this connection. municipality is not performing governmental function but is engaged in trade. and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia. but are only incidentally so. Navarrete. conceded that such a quasi public corporation possessed some governmental powers and exercised some governmental functions . public or governmental powers. ―In undertaking to supply water at price. there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group. or take no step to avert further damage. or in the production and distribution of prime necessities. there is a strong dissenting opinion penned by then Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and concurred in by then Associate Justice J.. Jess Lopez It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City. for the administration of the sovereign government. an urban area.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact. Significantly. G. Ongchuan. the fender and a crack on the radiator. the hood. after a careful review of the authorities defining an irrigation district. Cusi. Quoting from said dissenting opinion which cited McQuillin‘s The Law of Municipal Corporations. the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line to be traversed constitutes negligence. telephonic.‖ Functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. Its officers 168 Agas. and the fact that the NIA group was then ―in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible‖. a water improvement district is in no better position than a city is when exercising its purely local powers and duties. and is liable first as private company would be for any negligence in laying out of its pipes. & Roco 3B . Primarily. it has and furnishes no facilities. failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Reyes which held the contrary view that the Angat River System is a government entity exercising proprietary functions.L. to wit: ―An irrigation district is a public quasi corporation . February 27. It is. or an irrigation system. and radio communication. Reposo. They are members of the corporation. Its general purposes are not essentially public in their nature. as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction. however. to conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits. Under the situation.B. 3.

they argue that since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time ). They quarreled over a ―pitogo‖ (piggybank made from an empty nutshell) which resulted to Augusto Mercado wounding Manuel Quisumbing on the right cheek with a piece of razor. NIA may also sue and be sued in court. and duties which would entitle the district to the exemption raised by the common law as a protection to corporations having a purely public purpose and performing essentially public duties. the NIA was not created for purposes of local government. or collect taxes other than those assessed by the district. 108 Phil. rather it performs proprietary functions. However. rehabilitating.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the latter. He thought it was the "pitogo" of Benedicto P. Teachers and Heads of Establishments Family Code o Articles 218 and 219 Cases 1. Anzures. Benedicto ran away to get a basket ball with which they could play. Jr. They have no more power or authority than that of the officers of a private corporation organized for like purposes. Manuel Quisumbing. D. and an analysis of those objects and purposes discloses that they directly benefit only the landowners who reside within and whose lands form a part of the district. but this characteristic is only incidental to the primary and chief object of the corporation. Jr. The fight started then. improving. Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the "pitogo". so that when Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from Renato. was likewise unaware that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto. Undeniab ly. Buan. Navarrete. it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. Jess Lopez have no power or authority to exercise any of the functions of the general government. NWSA Consolidated Unions. Therefore.. that the purposes and duties of such districts do not come within the definition of public rights. Jr. Issue: Whether Lourdes Catholic School is liable. which is the irrigation of lands forming a part of the district. such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a ―government. including all communal and pump irrigation project s. The story was narrated thus: ―it was Augusto Mercado who started the aggression. which propounds the thesis that ―the NAWASA is not an agency performing governmental functions. Lim.function‖ corporation. petitioner herein. purposes. After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel.‖ Quisumbing was awarded damages. Ongchuan. through no fault of the father. Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. to the exclusion of all other residents therein. Reposo. NIA was created for the purpose of ―constructing. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government. and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines. Like the NAWASA. Manuel. which is the irrigation of lands. Quezon City. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare. Additionally. The state and the general public are greatly benefited by the proper operation of the district. & Roco 3B . Renato was not aware that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto. was in a helpless position. thus is governed by the Corporation Law. and to that extent its objects and accomplishments are public in their nature. Augusto seeing that Manuel. Jr. The primary objects and purposes of such district are of a purely local nature. Court of Appeals. In NAWASA vs. It has its own assets and liabilities. Providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of government even though the service rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. It is obvious. the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. or to enforce any of the laws of the state or any of its other subdivisions. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. 414 (1960) Facts: Manuel Quisumbing and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon. and the latter was clutching his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto's anger.‖ These functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency. It is therefore concluded that NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. 169 Agas. Cusi. cut him on the right check with a piece of razor. Mercado challenged the award of damages. then. Augusto resented Manuel. because right after Benedicto gave it to him. for the district is created and operated for the sole benefit of its own members. Mercado v.'s remark and he aggresively pushed the latter.

which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. such that the control. 2176 but absolved Brillantes et al. in turn. 2. which motivated the assault. They were taking up automotive mechanics. brain) due to the fistblows and the fall. are not involved. Ongchuan. none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Trial court held Daffon liable under Art. Cruz and Daffon were working on a machine while Palisoc was merely looking at them. Parents of 16 year old Palisoc sued Daffon. apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy .Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Cusi. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages. the reason why Mercado was incensed and pushed Quisumbing who. Brillantes (members of the school‘s Board). 41 SCRA 557 (1971) Facts: Palisoc. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar. since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. It is. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. He never regained consciousness and finally died. be held to be without merit. Palisoc stumbled on an engine block causing him to fall face downward. Offended by said remark. head. also pushed Mercado. which authorizes the grant of moral damages. using the case of Mercado v. The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must. The Court holds that under Art. In Exconde. and teacher is liable under Art. There is no question. Buan. 2180: Lastly. Daffon remarked to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman.‖ It is possible that the CA may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty. stomach. It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody. according to the decision appealed from. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher. ‗teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. Held: ONLY THE HEAD and TEACHER are liable. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180 for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school premises. direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents . 2180 because. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply. Brillantes. Thereafter. Issue: Whether the school‘s Board Member. However. and Quibule (teacher) for quasi delict. CA as basis. Daffon. The latter retaliated by giving him fist blows to the face and stomach. therefore. 2180 and whether the interpration of the court of said provision was correct. nor does paragraph 2 of said article. so long as they remain in their custody. Reposo. Anzures. 170 Agas. and Cruz were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute. Palisoc slapped Daffon on the face. they went to the laboratory room located at the 2nd floor of the school. the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. Jr." This is. it was held that: ―It is true that under the law above-quoted. Navarrete. for liability under Art. the parents of the student at fault. that the school involved is a non-academic school. of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries. Palisoc v. While exchanging blows. was occasioned by the fact that Manuel. Valenton (head of school). Jess Lopez Held: NO. As a result. & Roco 3B . either. On March 1966 at around 2-3PM. yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment. the Manila Technical Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school." contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute are liable jointly and severally for damages to Palisoc‘s parents for the death of their minor son at the hands of afellow student within the laboratory of said school. within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. 2180. is as follows: ART. Daffon. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato. Here. it claimed that what the provision contemplated was a situation wherein the pupil lives or boards with the teacher such that control or influence on the former supersedes those of the parents‘. During recess. Cause of death was found to be hemorrhage of internal organs (pancreas. he became pale and fainted. therefore. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. ‘ but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable. was shown to have existed.

as erroneously held by the lower court. confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a 171 Agas. hence. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended. 3. in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 by “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. They include teachers in educational institutions of all kinds. Pablito Damon. Additionally. ‖ The school itself.‖ In the law of torts.L. in loco parentis and are called upon to ―exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. Navarrete. a teacher must not only be charged with teaching but also vigilance over their students or pupils . and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied. is that they stand. the deceased Palisoc. Plaintiffs failed to do so. Tolentino expresses a similar opinion: “Teachers:—In order to be within this provision. the herein petitioners. or the body. to a certain extent. as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated. it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students‟ activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school. its former single proprietor. should have been brought in as party defendant. Buan. said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. and the physics teacher.B. teachers. 1972. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students. Amadora v. As tersely summarized by Mr. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it. Jess Lopez No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the school‘s board of directors . The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided. filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs‘ request for admission had expressly manifested and made of record that ―defendant Antonio C. (2) IDENTITY OF THE GUN: It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde. Cusi. the spirit. including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. 160 SCRA 315 (1988) Facts: On April 13. while they were in the auditorium of their school. likewise. the latter. Jr. since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant. and not the parent. must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of the ‗Manila Technical Institute‘ which is now a corporation and is not owned by any individual person. by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes. and those in correctional institutions. At any rate.. Justice J. whether for the intellect. Reposo. the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents. the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school. together with Daffon and two other students. & Roco 3B . the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents. ―the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. Sergio Damaso. and hence. etc. the lower court found that it had been incorporated since August 1962. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. as to their pupils and students. teachers in institutions for deficient or abandoned children. Anzures. a classmate. Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter‘s having caused the death of his cla ssmate. 1972. even in their own homes. he was then under the custody of the private respondents. Disputed facts: (1) On the CUSTODY OF THE SCHOOL OVER THE VICTIM: The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation. so long as they remain in their custody. its rector the high school principal. Ongchuan. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority‖ and ―where the parent places the child u nder the effective authority of the teacher. as the victim's parents.‖ In the light of the factual findings of the lower court‘s decision. including recess time. fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo Amadora (a graduating student ). the dean of boys. whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. the dean of boys. The complaint against the students was later dropped. has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article. teachers who give instruction in classes or by individuals. as thus incorporated. and therefore the school itself. had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm.‖ There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach. Court of Appeals. through their respective parents.

Ongchuan. and (3) that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and (4) finally. is invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The parties herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades. such that the control. following the first part of the provision. as it happens. Moreover. he said. In other words. Unlike in Exconde and Mercado. direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents. Mercado . The RTC held: respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable because (1) Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved at bar is a non-academic school. academic as well as non-academic. the head thereof and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. and. was imposed on (1) teachers in general. and unlike in Palisoc. Held: YES. This is the general rule. however. as erroneously held by the lower court. it is the head thereof.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. 2180 applies to ALL schools. if so. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers. and only he." (c) Palisoc case Although the wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not boarding in the school. when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody. the custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher. in a footnote. Anzures. This decision now is being appealed in this case. Buan. the question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised. it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to ALL SCHOOLS. to wit: Exconde ." (b) Mercado case (1960) The Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued that the school was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts and trades. In the case of establishments of arts and trades. (a) Exconde case (1957) This decision exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades. that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo. & Roco 3B . The respondents say. that in any event the defendant. After an exhaustive examination of the problem. and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. (2) it also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended. Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180 which. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows: Lastly. the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school. Following the canon of 172 Agas. and Palisoc . who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody. had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. Navarrete. 2180 is applicable. Jess Lopez report to the principal or taking any further action . and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied. the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. In Palisoc. Issue: May a student be under the custody of a school even though school hasn‘t started yet/has already ended and whether Art. the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180. Justice Teehankee reasoned that the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" — means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature. (1) Discussion on past jurisprudence on the matter. in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted provision. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach. Justice JBL Reyes dissented arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held liable Liability under this rule. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature. As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo." And this is the case. Cusi." (2) Based on the foregoing. must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. Reposo. including recess time. Art.

beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof. By contrast. It is conceded that the DISTINCTION NO LONGER OBTAINS AT PRESENT in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades. the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher. In its present state. Indeed. the consequent increase in their enrollment. In the view of the Court. it is clear that while the custody requirement. only the head is held liable. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty.B. the period before the commencement exercises. (3) The Court explained why in schools of arts and letters. sees fit to enact the necessary amendment. the defense of due diligence is available to the teacher. If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his students. Thus.L. Nevertheless. From a reading of the provision under examination. and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right. under the present ruling. Cusi. This does not necessarily mean that such. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision. and excluding the time before or after such period. the head of the school of arts and trades. does not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities. while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students. it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Moreover. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher? The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school . In this sense. however. There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. In this connection. but the diligence they have to prove is LESS than that of parents. could be so blamed. in the Palisoc Case. & Roco 3B . The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause violence. (5) In any case. Consequently." The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J. Reposo. Jess Lopez reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices. custody be co-terminous with the semester. he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180. Article 2180. even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school. because of his closer ties with them. while in ordinary schools. Reyes in Exconde.technical school. taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated. and in the case of graduating students. any teacher may be held liable. remains unchanged. (4) The student is under the custody of the teacher as long as the student is under the control and influence of the school within its premises. supervision and influence. the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the schoo l and within its premises. it does signify that the student should be within the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury . who will be liable only if his child is still a minor. it is not the school that will be held directly liable. the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature. 173 Agas. the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students. whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students. Unlike the parent. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective. why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or non. Buan. in the exercise of a legitimate student right. such as the period of registration. Anzures. it should be repeated that. the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age. who usually even boarded with him and so came under his constant control. and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege. Ongchuan. liability attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. Navarrete. the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its employ.

the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San JoseRecoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. At that moment. Celestino Dicon. In this respect. the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the TEACHER or the HEAD OF THE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND TRADES is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. spending 23 days in the hospital. She nevertheless lost sight in her right eye. The rector. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. Cusi. if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he has reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's control. They were assigned with 3 other classmates to weed out grass. While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here related. And if it is also considered that under the article in question. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody. the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer. On the contrary. and tossed it to Cuadra. She rubbed her eye and treated it with powder. under the law they have invoked. for which he deserves sanctions from the school. the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13. Monfort found a plastic headband. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. it became swollen. or (b) their non-observance. as a balm to their grief. While this was clearly negligence on his part. it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. In sum. She underwent surgery twice. Cuadra turned. Reposo. As previously observed. Buan. No. Monfort. it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed. it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. At any rate. Jess Lopez The teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under his influence. Cuadra v. the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor — then there should all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury. While weeding. & Roco 3B . even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities. Finally. and the object hit her right eye. L-24101.R. G. Navarrete. After all. there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of the student. She joked aloud that she found an earthworm. in maintaining that discipline. 1972. 1970 Facts: Cuadra (12 y/o) and Monfort (13 y/o) were Grade 6 classmates at the Mabini Elementary School. we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek. Anzures. (6) Conclusions: At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot. the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence. the parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. Obviously. The parent can instill more discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher for a tort committed by the child. Ongchuan. the next day. assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge. there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he (a) had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school. 174 Agas. 4. September 30. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. as previously observed. through the enforcement of the school regulations.

or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon plaintiff child. Anzures. or the act which caused it. the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren. which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. she was hurt. Being their teacher-in-charge. to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented. also after classes. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. BARREDO. however careful. Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging. Aquino called 4 of the original 18 pupils to continue the digging.Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Ongchuan. this appeal by Monfort. tossed the object at her. the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Ylarde v. He was able to bury ten of these blocks all by himself. July 29. Held: NO. but only the moral compulsion of good conscience. 1988 Facts: Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School. 175 Agas. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering. No. and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child. which resulted in a favorable award. the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180. As to the liability of appellant as father. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180." it was likely that something would happen to her friend. G. after class dismissal. as he had the right to expect her to be. liability is. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible. Reposo. under the care and supervision of the teacher. L-33722. Edgardo Aquino gathered 18 of his male pupils. Buan. as in Article 2176. there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. The work was left unfinished. such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. fault or negligence. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated. aged 10-11.R. I prefer to hold that there being no evidence that he had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates. Pangasinan. although primary. & Roco 3B . And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned. 5. would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity. The following day. dissenting: I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in holding that the act of appellant's daughter does not constitute fault within the contemplation of our law or torts. Issue: Whether or not Mr. Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde. She was 13 years and should have known that by jokingly saying "aloud that she had found an earthworm and. Deciding to help his colleague. where it was his duty to send her and where she was. his child was at school. The victim. no doubt. a public educational institution located in Tayug. The basis of this vicarious. especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable.. Jess Lopez Cuadra‘s parents then filed suit based on quasi-delict against Monfort‘s father. On the contrary. J. deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. he can be liable under Article 2180. Cusi. At that time. as in fact. or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage. These 4 pupils—Reynaldo Alonso. he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. in the different cases enumerated therein. evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl. Monfort is liable for the act of his minor child. At this point. Francisco Alcantara. Navarrete. In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care." it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case. which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. dug until the excavation was one meter and 40 centimeters deep. Private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. hence. The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission." Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense. another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one. Aquino.

Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone. so long as they remain in their custody. Novelito Ylarde died. 3 of them jumped