CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No.
14355; 31 Oct 1919]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed
for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditionsimposed by the general authority.Issue:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into. Agusan del Sur. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation toexercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. In 1989.
Moday vs Court of Appeals
Municipal Corporation – Eminent Domain – Disapproval by SP of SB Resolution
Moday is a landowner in Bunawan. the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Moday’s
. and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred. it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority.
The courts have the power of restricting the exercise ofeminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law.
land. the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case. Hence. the expropriation case is valid.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. or order invalid is when such resolution. or order is “beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. other public entities and public utilities. digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8. HELD: Yes. private property for public use or purpose. the power of eminent domainmay be validly delegated to local governments. Inherently possessed by the national legislature. PLDT. the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 2011
26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain. the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. ordinance. For the taking of private property by thegovernment to be valid. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution. ordinance. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. Eminent domain. in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State. Just Compensation)
. Expropriation. It is government’s right to appropriate. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings.
Cebu vs Heirs of Franco Pastor
Municipal Corporation – Eminent Domain – Expropriation – BP 129
In 1997. HELD: Yes. subject to the payment of just compensation. San Roque. hence. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129. Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected title to real property. Talisay. in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain. the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require.FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT. ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.
Brgy. Concluding that the action should
. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems. So Brgy. the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such cases. so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT.
and findings of. . HELD: Yes. “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned. if this be ordained. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before. and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. too. would be a final one. for thereafter as the Rules expressly state. the commissioners would be final. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case. . if not of dismissal of the action. . too.
What are the two phases of expropriation cases?
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. . and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. .” The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. . Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129.000. So. . for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. in the proceedings before the Trial Court.” An order of dismissal. It ends with an order.
. of course. upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of thecomplaint.” The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain. since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. would an order of condemnation be a final one. which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit. .
the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. VDA. 2011
GR # L-20620 August 15.It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. 1974 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain.
REPUBLIC VS. and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain. are not present. In the main. DE CASTELLVI. and the observance of due process. the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959. the necessity of the expropriation. ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse. the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain. Hence. the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation. digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7. namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period. the courts determine the authority of the government entity. a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
. Elements of Taking) FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease. HELD: No.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensationof a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property.
City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT. QC justified the law by invoking police power. (4) devoting it to public use. morals. (3) and under warrant of legal authority. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease. or the general welfare of the people. or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. safety. In the case at bar. to be determined by competent City Authorities. MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”. good order. (2) for more than a momentary period. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health.
1958 No. 1950. during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. A fee of not less than P2.
104 Phil 443 G. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above. 3.. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1. ET AL. JUAN F. he and his son in-law. Camarines Sur. filed a written
. P. the city passes the burden to private cemeteries
People vs Fajardo Case Digest
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 4.paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Recs. (Orig. before constructing or repairing. 2. it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. SEC. appellant Babilonia. shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both.. obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. this ordinance. plaintiff-appellee. vs. EFFECTIVITY — This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. 3) Four years later. the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: SECTION 1. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao. defendants-appellants.00 for each repair permit issued. after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired. L-12172
FACTS: It appears that on August 15.R. SEC. August 29. at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property. SEC. FAJARDO.
ISSUE: Whether or not ordinance no. 1954. and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. which affirmed the conviction. 7. but again the request was turned down by the mayor. in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property. E). hence. appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao. 3). On January 18. Camarines Sur." From this decision. series of 1950 is a valid exercise of police power? HELD: the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance. defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare.
. in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza. and in its pursuit. their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit. because they needed a place of residence very badly. On January 16. and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs. but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name. for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. the request was denied. On February 26. Whereupon. it oversteps the bounds of police power. as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao. for violation of the ordinance in question. D). 1954. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. 1954.
To legally achieve that result. being urban in character. YUNITA TUAZON. every structure that may be erected on appellants' land. The appellants would. beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. NO. BRION. As the case now stands.R. 22 JUNE 2011. under the guise of police power. 193023. the State may not. be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS.) SUBJECT: DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION. stands condemned under the ordinance in question. it is plain. the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. J. The only substantial difference. is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation. between restriction and actual taking.Rafferty. (BRIEF TITLE: NAPOCOR VS. permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. in effect. TUAZON) ============================ SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST DIGEST:
. in such case. because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. 32 Phil. 580). regardless of its own beauty. An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes. while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. ROSAURO TUAZON AND MARIA TERESA TUAZON (G.
heavily relying as it does on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.
Maria Bagui. THE FORMULA PROVIDED IN NAPOCOR’S CHARTER IS NOT BINDING ON THE COURT. has no merit.A.. IT IS ONLY A GUIDE. Section 3A-(b) of R. 6395 on just compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines.A. No. et al.A. we categorically held:
Moreover.NAPOCOR’S TRANSMISSION LINE TRAVERSED ON RESPONDENT’S PROPERTY. IS NAPOCOR CORRECT?
NO. 6395. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
. RESPONDENTS DEMANDS THAT THEY BE PAID FULL VALUE OF THEIR LAND AS JUST COMPENSATION. R. In National Power Corporation v. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts. as amended. NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT IT SHALL ONLY PAY EASEMENT FEE PURSUANT TO SECTION 3-A(B) ITS CHARTER. THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. NAPOCOR’s protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez. is not binding on the Court. WHICH PRESCRIBES A FORMULA FOR EASEMENT FEE. 6395.
Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation.) The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts. In National Power Corporation v.function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.A.. or such market value as determined by the assessor. et al. we noted with
approval the disquisition of the CA in this matter: The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property.
Santa Loro Vda. and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. whichever is lower. de Capin. To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as useless the
. This judicial function has constitutional raison d’être.
Article III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. Mr. Tuazon’s failure to oppose cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents’ right to just
. Tuazon’s failure to oppose the instillation now estops the respondents from their present claim. In the present petition. IS NAPOCOR’S CONTENTION CORRECT?
NO. HIS PRESUMED WAIVER IS A BAR TO HIS ACTION TO DISPOSSESS THE COMPANY. This insinuation has no legal basis. NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr.
That the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. OR FOR INJURIES DONE HIM. SUBJECT: NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT RESPONDENTS MAY BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO SUCH VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BECAUSE THEY DID NOT OPPOSE THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSMISSION LINE ON THEIR PROPERTY.protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9. HE IS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR THE VALUE OF THE LAND.
In such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation. he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land... And Whitewater Canal Co.. Julien v. 35La. or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road.Ann. His acquiescence in the company’s taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance. we ruled:
“The owner of land.. Morgan etc. can not.. In Rafael C.. or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence. Manila
Electric Railroad & Light Co. Railroad Co. reclaim the land. who stands by. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the company. and sees a public railroad constructed over it.. cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it.compensation.) “One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint. 169.18 Ohio St. if he ever intended to set up illegality. Cin.” (Goodin v.)
. will be considered a waiver.” (St. without objection. et al. or enjoin its use by the railroad company. de Ynchausti v. 924. after the road is completed.