TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY.

PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014

TORTS CASE DIGEST SET 3 PAZ FORES vs. IRENEO MIRANDA [G.R. No.L-12163. March 4, 1959.] Reyes, JBL, J.: FACTS: Morning of March 22, 1953: The Accident - While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. - One of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga was respondent Miranda. - 5 passengers were injured, including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. - What happened to Miranda after the accident? o taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment o later was subjected to a series of operations:  May 23, 1953 (1st) - when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place  2nd - effected to insert a metal splint  3rd - to remove such splint  * At the time of the trial, it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm. - Luga the driver charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly (sa CFI Manila ito as far as i understood sakalatna details sa held) - Appellate court: o It rejected Petitioner’s contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the identity of the vehicle as that belonging to the petitioner because of the ff:  Appellate court found, among other things, that it carried plate No. TPU-1163, series of 1952, Quezon City, registered in the name of Paz Fores, (appellant herein) and that the vehicle even had the name of "Dona Paz" painted below its windshield.  No evidence to the contrary was introduced by the petitioner, who relied on an attack upon the credibility of the two policemen who went to the scene of the incident o Petitioner’s important contention: that on March 21, 1953, or one day before the accident happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman - Hence initial problem raised in this appeal was formulated  "Is the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same?" ISSUE/S: A.) WON the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same? B.) WON moral damages can be recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation HELD: A.) Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the Court of Appeals answered the query in the affirmative. The ruling should be upheld.
CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO

and until the approval of the Public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is. alienation. 146): "SEC. as the transportation of freight from one point to another. Ignacio. 3108). . By virtue of the provisions of said Act. but also full jurisdiction and control over all public utilities including the property. The law was designed primarily for the protection of the public interest. or any part thereof. still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the records of the Commission which the public has a right to rely upon. which means that the operator thereof places it at the disposal of anybody who is willing to pay a rental for its use. The phrase "in the ordinary course of its business" found in the other proviso "or to prevent the sale. supra). and the property rights and franchises enjoyed by every individual and company engaged in the performance of a public service in the sense this phrase is used in the Public Service Act or Act No. the vehicle independently of his rights under the franchise. or lease by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary course of its business. merger. like junked equipment or spare parts. a TH truck. lessee or operation thereof. . have to this date been considered — and they cannot but be so considered public service property. is not effective and binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. is necessarily a public service property. alienation. however. franchises.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY.The case of Indalecio de Torres vs. to the effect that nothing therein shall be construed "to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval". the operator did not convey. merchandise or any other cargo from one place to another. could not have been intended to include the sale of the vehicle itself. . or any part thereof. by lease or by sale. if it be shown that there are just and reasonable grounds for making the mortgage or encumbrance. the date on which the same is to be consummated shall be fixed in the order or approval: Provided. and. by reason of its own nature. certificates. 20. franchises. or lease by any public service of any of its property" as correctly observed by the lower court. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 . o The provisions of the statute are clear and property.Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. privileges or rights.The line of reasoning of petitioner (contending that in those cases. Ignacio: that a transfer contemplated by the law. encumber or lease its property. The approval herein required shall be given. privileges or rights. after notice to the public and after hearing the persons interested at a public hearing. it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner. with those of any other public service. equipment and facilities used. but at most may refer only to such property that may be conceivably disposed or by the carrier in the ordinary course of its business. or rights. mortgage. VisenteOna explains: "Under the law. alienation. when he desires to transfer or carry his effects.The proviso contained in the aforequoted law. for liabilities of more than one year maturity. motor vehicles used in the performance of a service. privileges." Interpretation of the aforementioned was in Montoya vs. alienate. franchise. if made without the requisite approval of the Public Service Commission. the Public Service Commission has not only general supervision and regulation of." - CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale.Subject to established limitations and saving provisions to the contrary. without the previous approval and authority of the Commission previously had — (g)To sell. or the sale. lease. or consolidation to be approved and the same are not detrimental to the public interest. or merge or consolidate its property. means only that the sale without the required approval is still valid and binding between the parties (Montoya vs.) does not find support in the law. in contemplation of law. and in case of a sale. or any part thereof of the owner or operator of the public service without approval or authorization of the Public Service Commission. certificate.

"  The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger. and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO .000 also awarded to the respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of First Instance did not provide for the same. but such outcome cannot prejudice rights intervening in the meantime. xxxxxxxxx ART. Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. 2220." It is well to note further that respondent was a painter by profession and a professor of Fine Arts. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 - In Bachrach Motor Co.e. it was allegedly error for the Court of Appeals to award them motuproprio.Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1)A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Civil Code of the Philippines). descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" But the exceptional rule of Art. 2219. B." By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a)In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus). Zamboanga Transportation Co. and (b)That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the description term "analogous cases" used in Art. i. is essential to justify an award of moral damages. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. 2224 and 2225. and since no appeal was interposed by said respondent. It appears that no such approval was given by the Commission before the accident occurred. such damages are justly due.Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. Civil Code of the Philippines). moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith.Whoever by act or omission caused damage to another.  SC think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier..TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. under the circumstance. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. but because the definition of quasi-delict in Act. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach. if there is no proexisting contractual relation between the parties. 2.) As to Moral damages. there being fault or negligence. is obliged to pay for the damage done. since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare statement that his expenses and loss of income amounted to P20. (2)Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. so that the amount of P2. "it cannot be denied.) As to damages: 1. not only because Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties. vs. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. Such fault or negligence. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die. that entitles the spouse. The attorney's fees in the sum of P3. 2208. 2176. Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damaged under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it just and equitable (Art. On the other hand.000.) Actual damages in this case:  CFI Manila 10k award was reduced to 2k by CA on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial court's appraisal. 2219. which provide as follows: "ART." the lower court said. in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. "that appellee (respondent ) did incur expenses.SC ruled that same must be discarded." "ART.000 awarded cannot be said to be excessive (see Arts. 2206. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.: that there may be a nunc pro tunc authorization which had the effect of having the approval retroact to the date of the transfer.  SC sees no reason to alter these awards.

the carrier. "ART. unless the prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in article 1733 and 1755. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. These doctrines were predicated upon our former law of damages. may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees . the suggested theory that a carrier's violation of its engagement to safety transport the passenger involves a breach of the passenger's confidence. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.Upon the other hand. and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 such malice to support the award of moral damages for breach of contract. as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence. 2220 IS UNTENABLE  for under it the carrier would always be deemed in bad faith.Moreover. without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant. 1170-1172). it is to be presumed. and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in bad faith. as required by Art. and Art.In case of death of or injuries to passengers. and it would be never accountable for simple negligence. 1756. Points by SC in this part: . o In case of fraud. the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequence of the breach of the obligation.The difference in conditions." o The distinction between fraud. and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove the it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure . but the amount of damages shall be equitably reduced. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed. 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier. in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary. that latter is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the carrier. nor is there on record any averment or proof that the driver of appellant o THUS. bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. and actions quasi ex delicto. the aforesaid rulings are now inapplicable. 103 of the Revised Penal Code." .The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries.  CA’s invoking other cases was wrong.In contracts and quasi-contracts. while under the law (Art. defenses and proof. and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. justifying recovery of moral damages under Art. before judicial discretion in fixing them became limited by the express provisions of the new Civil Code (previously quoted). compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu. since the responsibility is not alleged to be subsidiary. or of his employees. unlike in suits for quasi-delict. the limitation imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery. malice or wanton attitude. Neither liability under Art.TEHERFORE. 2201. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonable foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. 1756) the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently (and not maliciously). It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . "ART. 1762. Hence. therefore. to some extent. bad faith. the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of transportation explains." "ART. would be to violate the clear provisions of the law. it the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier. 2220. The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger.

On December 5. 1984. vs. from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.respondents. Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check. Lim Sio Wan instructed So to roll-over the placement for another 30 days.35 for a term of 31 days to mature on December 15.[G. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 amount to malice. To clear the check and in compliance with the requirements of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Rules and Regulations. upon the maturity date of the first money market placement. Later. FCC demanded the payment of the proceeds of the placement. the manager's check in the name of Lim Sio Wan was deposited in the account of FCC. and to give the check to one Deborah Dee Santos who would pick up the check. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. 1984. 133179.158. the manager's check was deposited in the account of Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC) at Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. acknowledging receipt of the placement. 1983 of Santos addressed to Angie Lazo of FCC. realizing that the promise that her money would be recovered would not materialize. FCC had deposited a money market placement for PhP2 million with Producers Bank. She denied giving any instructions and receiving the proceeds thereof. 1983. March 27. representing the proceeds of Lim SioWan's money market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan. 1983.with the forged signature of Lim Sio Wan as indorser." The check was sent to Allied through the PCHC. Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second money market placement to mature on January 9. 1983.The bank issued Manager's Check No. The check was cross-checked "For Payee's Account Only" and given to Santos.00 by way of moral damages. 1983 as evidenced by a Letter dated October 25.49. 2008. Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a manager's check to be issued.The placement matured on October 25. Lim Sio Wan. 1983. which reads: "All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed. a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So. Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it. On December 9. sent a demand letter to Allied asking for the payment of the first placement. On December 5. Thus. and instructed the latter to pre-terminate Lim SioWan's money market placement. on September 21. In other words.597. When the placement matured. 1984. ** ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION. On December 14. 000. the Allied check was deposited with Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers Bank's payment of its obligation to FCC. 035669 for PhP1.R. LIM SIO WAN. 1983. as payee. Thereafter. Earlier. Santos was the money market trader assigned to handle FCC's account. **CA decision modified by eliminating the award of P5.. 317568 and a Letter dated September 21. and PRODUCERS BANK. So called Lim Sio Wan to ask for the latter's instructions on the second placement. the judgment is affirmed. to issue a manager's check representing the proceeds of the placement.. No. the same date that So received the phone call instructing her to pre-terminate Lim SioWan's placement. but that fact must be shown in evidence. In all other respects. She was then informed that the placement had been pre-terminated upon her instructions. Such deposit is evidenced by Official Receipt No. Allied refused to pay CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . On January 24. petitioner. Allied funded the check even without checking the authenticity of Lim SioWan's purported indorsement. the amount on the face of the check was credited to the account of FCC. 1983 and was rolled-over until December 5. 1983. Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied Banking Corporation a money market placement of PhP1.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. She desisted from further complaints when she was assured by the bank's manager that her money would be recovered.152. an officer of Allied. When Lim SioWan's second placement matured on January 9. purportedly representing the proceeds of FCC's money market placement with Producers Bank.] Facts: In November of 1983. Lim Sio Wan described the appearance of Santos so that So could easily identify her. Upon the presentment of the check. 1983.648.

Upon his request. petitioner. Clarita lost her credit card. With the paymentof FCC‟smoney market placement and interest in Producers Bank’s indebtedness to FCC was extinguished. In fact. as creditor of the bank for her money market placement. or upon maturity of the placement. claiming that the latter had authorized the pre-termination of the placement and its subsequent release to Santos. Given the relative participation of Allied and Metrobank to the instant case. and was accorded. LUNA. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 Lim Sio Wan. fees  Allied Bank’s cross-claim against Metrobank is DISMISSED. the trial court correctly found Allied negligent in issuing the manager's check and in transmitting it to Santos without even a written authorization. In August 1988. 1995. Until any such event. Both actions could have prevented the whole fraudulent transaction from unfolding. Considering however that Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of Lim Sio Wan. thereby benefitting the former. Clearly. Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. February 23. Producers Bank should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the amounts the two latter banks are ordered to pay Lim Sio Wan. or until the bank is released from its obligation as debtor. LUIS A. its negligent and cavalier indorsement contributed to the easier release of Lim SioWan's money and perpetuation of the fraud. along with the principal CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . When Metrobank indorsed the check in compliance with the PCHC Rules and Regulations without verifying the authenticity of Lim SioWan'sindorsement and when it accepted the check despite the fact that it was cross-checked payable to payee's account only. 108164. Luis A. CAUSE OF ACTION: Civil action for damages NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review. Allied's negligence must be considered as the proximate cause of the resulting loss. the obligation of Allied to Lim Sio Wan remains unextinguished.to meanwhile so record the lost card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. Luna. Luna applied for.Lim Sio Wan. No. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. In the instant case. both banks cannot be adjudged as equally liable. RTC’s Decision:  For Allied Bank to pay Lim Sio Wan plus damages and atty. the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S. the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to be. In cases of this nature.R. respondents. however. a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. [G. vs. FACTS: In October 1986.  Metrobank’s third-party complaint as against Filipinas Cement Corporation is DISMISSED  Filipinas Cement Corporation’s fourth-party complaint against Producer’s Bank is DISMISSED Court of Appeals’ Decision:  CA Modified the decision by making Allied Banking Corporation to pay 60% and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company 40% Issue: WON Allied Bank should be solely liable to Lim Sio Wan Held: Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank for the amount of the check which Allied and Metrobank are adjudged to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a proportion of 60:40.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. In order to replace the lost card. must be upheld. the60:40 ratio of the liabilities of Allied and Metrobank. LUNA and CLARITA S. The liability of Allied. Hence. Allied did not even ask for the certificate evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at her residence or office to confirm her instructions. as ruled by the CA. is entitled to payment upon her request. Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of the other.] FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY. is concurrent with that of Metrobank as the last indorser of the check.

However. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. a Fil-Am. Luis Luna.13. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 card. as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract.In a letter. (b) P50." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo. FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review. Luis felt embarrassed by this incident. it failed to inform him about its security policy. Regional Trial Court of Pasig: Ordered FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila. such damages are justly due. Adrian V. Most importantly. in any case. it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. Concededly. dated 11 Oct. Bad faith. Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. In culpa contractual. The Civil Code provides: Art.00 attorney's fees. F&B Manager of the Intercon. Court of Appeals: Affirmed the decision of the trial court. its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Since the card was not honored. moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. expressed the bank's apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost.The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court. under the circumstances. a VP of the bank.00 moral damages.00 exemplary damages.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. it should be observed. and (c) P20. HELD: NO. Exceptionally.000. negligence. Article 21 of the Code. CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use to protect its cardholders. Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must. can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. 2220. 21. Luis tendered a despedidalunch for a close friend. William Anthony King. however. through counsel. To pay for the lunch. moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier. Naturally. Furthermore. the unfortunate incident occurred). Thus.000. give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith. Festejo. Still evidently feeling aggrieved. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.000. Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.On 06 October 1988. Luis filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC. the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. in a contract of carriage. includes gross. but not simple. Article 21 states: Art. 1988. in this context. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a ―very valued clients" of FEBTC. an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been him who was presenting the card at that time (for which reason.

but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. xxxxxxxxx Art. But the exceptional rule of Art. To award moral damages for breach of contract. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach. 2220. cannot improve private respondents' CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . is obliged to pay for the damage done. their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on torteven where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine. and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees. in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary. that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art." Art. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. under the circumstances. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code.e. malice or wanton attitude.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus). The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger. is essential to justify an award of moral damages. 2219.2220. we quote: Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice. that entitles the spouse.. the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. In contracts and quasi-contracts. bad faith. 2219. Mirandaexplained with great clarity the predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 Fores vs. but the fact must be shown in evidence. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die. 1170-1172). and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the parties. in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. would be to violate the clear provisions of the law. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. therefore. unfortunately. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. Art. 2206. 2176. 2201. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In case of fraud. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant. such damages are justly due. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. if there is no pre-existing contractualrelation between the parties. and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. i. which provide as follows: Art. Such fault or negligence. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. the same must be discarded. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. there being fault or negligence. The distinction between fraud. as required by Art. It is to be presumed.

exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. the plaintiff. they came all across to Mr.000.Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager]. such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining. In criminal offenses. in its stead.00 by way of moral damages. 2221. P10. but at Bangkok. DISPOSITION: The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents..R. through its authorized agent. the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort. many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class. to honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: Art. the bank's failure. September 28. temperate. P393. which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. Exemplary or corrective damages. oppressive. these various amounts with interest at the legal rate. J p: FACTS: Plaintiff. plus P3. 2208. Civil Code). Cuento. without a pre-existing contract between two parties. Luna an amount of P5. reckless. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below. 2230. there was a 'white man'. from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid. even perhaps inadvertent. refused. Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art. an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself.Air France. 2232. in the words of the witness Ernesto G. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat. fraudulent. issued to plaintiff a 'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. 2229.00 as exemplary damages. AIR FRANCEvs. a civil engineer. petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. had a 'better right to the seat. may be vindicated or recognized. are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral. a commotion ensued. the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because. 1966.Carrascoso and pacified Mr. and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. as was to be expected.000. We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court. Inc. plaintiff traveled in 'first class'. Nevertheless. SANCHEZ.00 for attorneys' fees.000. Here. From Manila to Bangkok.000. was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30. CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . the Manager alleged. Civil Code). when they found out that Mr. Cuento. 1958. No. Civil Code). the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case.00 by way of nominal damages. In quasi-delicts. who. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract.and the costs of suit.L-21438. and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Philippine Air Lines. CFI Ruling: The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25. In all other respects. without such agreement. liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. or malevolent manner (Art. according to said Ernesto G. in turn. and. In contracts and quasi-contracts. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome.Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man' and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane. the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton. Civil Code.

the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393. must answer. So it is. then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. CA CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . with costs against petitioner. PSBA vs. amongst others. On the issue of award of damages The foregoing. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed. On CA's decision Air France charges that CA failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues presented. Issue: Whether or not Carrasco is entitled to the 1st Class Seat and to award of damages. SC says that so long as CA's decision contains the facts necessary to warrant its conclusions. resulting in moral damages. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. As provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ―Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. Its business is mainly with the travelling public.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10). the court applied the foregoing legal precept. On Quasi Delict. But. Damages are proper. and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects". petitioner. therefore. the Bangkok-Teheran leg. generates a relation attended with a public duty. indignities and abuses from such employees. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees.Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. the inference of bad faith is there. and. wounded feelings and social humiliation. that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. serious anxiety. to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket. Second. That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok.And this. Contract of Transportation A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said. substantially aver: First. and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. courtesy and due consideration. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager. The contract of air carriage. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness.10. Such is the case here. Held: YES.In parallel circumstances. by reason of which he suffered inconvenience. thereby causing him mental anguish. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees. injurious language. respect. adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. could give ground for an action for damages. moral damages are recoverable. embarrassments and humiliations. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. naturally. a written document speaks a uniform language. and Third.20 to P383. Civil Code. there is nothing wrong in withholding any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense. On the seat issue If a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat. because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. his employer. That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 CA Ruling: On appeal. is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. as a rule. it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class. that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. in our opinion.

during and after the attack on the victim. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security). However. the petition is DENIED. At any rate. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. such as the PSBA. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 205 SCRA 729 PONENTE: Padilla. The suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. During the proceedings a quo. unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier). no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. Benjamin P. This would be for the trial court to determine. M. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. A contractual relation is a condition sine qua nonto the school's liability. Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. Lt. For its part. There is. Lim (President). means and methods before. The respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law ofquasi-delicts. CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . This material situation does not exist in the present case for. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school. are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article. The parents of the deceased filed a suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment. Carlitos Bautista was stabbed on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA). resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. J.Also denied motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA and the school authorities can be held liable under Art. the foregoing premises considered. the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA. Manila. as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.2180 for quasi-delict. as earlier indicated. Col. WHEREFORE. recklessness and lack of security precautions. the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. RTC DECISION: Denied motion to dismiss. 1985. On the other hand. the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. The parents of Carlitos Bautista sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case. Paulino (Vice-President). the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage. M. Antonio M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school. alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. HELD: NO. Defendants a quo sought to have the suit dismissed. does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow. as yet. FACTS: On August 30. for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. In all such cases. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract. Br. CA DECISION:Denied motion for reconsideration. At the time of his death. there is established a contract between them. it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. The court of origin (RTC. establishes the rule of in loco parentis. the complaint states no cause of action against them. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista. Article 2180.2176 and Art.

Held: (1)Finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney. where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict. Calalas. Petitionershould have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. 2000 Facts: Eliza Jujeurche G. In such a case. 122039. May 31. But. there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in theperformance of the contract of carriage. Issues: (1)Whether or not the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates the liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. Her attending physician certified she would remain on a cast for aperiod of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. Passenger Sunga who was sited on wooden stool as extended seat alighted to give way to another passenger alighting from the inside and in the process he was bumped by an overtaking truck owned by Salinas. On appeal to the Court of Appeals. the owner of the Isuzu truck. Sunga. filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena. filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva. Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. No. it is the parties themselves who create the obligation. and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. (3) Whether or not the award of moral damages to Sunga is supported evidence. holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability.R. a college freshman at the Siliman University. Hence this petition." at the rear end of the vehicle. not in actions involving breach of contract. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 CalalasvsSunga G. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. Calalas’ jeep was improperly parked with its rear portion protruding from the board shoulder of the road (violation of LTTC). took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. (2)This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. Sunga sued Calalas – breach of carriage. The jeepney was not properly parked. for quasi-delict. and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle and that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. Sunga was injured and confinement in the hospital. alleging violation of the contract of carriage. its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway. (3)In this case. the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. Just as she was doing so. the obligation iscreated by law itself. It took cognizance of another case. CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . (2) Whether or not that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Calalas sued Salvas – Tort As a result. Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned. should be binding on Sunga. the ruling of the lower court was reversed and dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. on the other hand. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas.

—Where both parties are guilty of negligence.SUCCESSIVE NEGLIGENT ACTS. 1918 CRITERION FOR DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF NEGLI-GENCE. AMADO PICART v. fright. As Smith neared the bridge. San Fernando. FRANK SMITH. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet. L-12219 March 15.80 meters. FACTS: Picart was riding a pony halfway through the Carlatan Bridge. mental anguish. Moral damages cannot be award in the absence of any injury or factual basis. Picart was thrown off the horse. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. The limb being broken. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.R. it turned its body which caused its hind leg to be hit by the flange (bumper yata to) of the car. the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences. that being the proper side of the road for the machine. the defendant guided it toward his left. there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side. As the automobile approached. La Union when Smith Jr.—The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man. it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident. Jr. wounded feelings ad similar injury. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright. and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. No. instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down. but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time. approached from the opposite direction at the rate of about 10 to 12 miles per hour (16-20 km/hr). Picart being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach. TRIAL COURT RULING: From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has appealed CA: Same! ISSUE: WON the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was then standing. He blew his horn again twice as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 If at all. The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4. Neither is the defense of caso fortuitous where it is attended to by negligence which in Calalas case were overloading and parking improperly which are violation of the LTTC. he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. the defendant. for emphasis: Defense of proximate cause is not available in breach of contract of carriage: only in tort cases. in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed. he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. G. continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. There must be pleading and proof of moral suffering. This however frightened the horse. When he had gotten quite near.

But as we have already stated. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away. without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. As the defendant started across the bridge. CELERIAN-COMINES-GONZALES-MANALO-PRADO-SALAZAR-SUACO . the defendant was also negligent. and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. NO. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side. and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault. for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done.TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge. PAJARITO 1ST SEMESTER 2013-2014 as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done WON the plaintiff's contributory negligence should absolve the defendant of liability HELD: YES. and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences.

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