Interchange, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Fall, 1990), aA. A,A.

Creativity, Discovery, and Science Education: Kuhn and Feyerabend Revisited
Sharon Bailin University of Manitoba

Contemporary education has been very much under the influence of a particular view of the nature of creativity, a view that has its origins in psychological theory. According to this view, creativity is marked by radical novelty, lack of constraints, rule-breaking and irrational processes of thought (e.g., De Bono, 1970; Koestler, 1964). The influence of this view has extended beyond the sphere of arts education, and has had an effect, as well, in the area of science education. Such a tendency is reinforced by certain contemporary views about the nature of discovery and theory change in science, namely those of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Such views, which stress innovation and radical change, discontinuity between scientific products and their antecedents, the violation of rules of method, and the lack of objective criteria for the evaluation of new theories are very much of a piece with the more general view of the nature of creativity. In this paper, the parallels between the views of Kuhn and Feyerabend and this general view of creativity will be drawn. The paper will lay out some of the kinds of criticisms which can be and have been levelled against the views of these philosophers of science and will show that they are really subsets of the criticisms to which the more general view of creativity is subject. Finally, the paper will explore the implications for science education entailed by the rejection of such views of creativity in general and of science in particular.

The Contemporary View of Creativity
The concept of creativity has been the focus of much recent attention. Considerable psychological research has been devoted to investigating the nature of the creative process and how it can be encouraged. In the aesthetic realm, there is continuing interest in the nature of artistic creation and how it might be fostered through art education. And even in the field of science, there has been recent focus on innovation and radical change in thinking about scientific discovery and on divergence and imagination in sciencepedagogy. In fact, fostering creativity has come to be seen as a fundamental educational goal in all spheres of endeavour. Although there are some differences among the accounts of creativity which prevailin the various areas, a fairly consistent picture of the nature of creativity does emerge. There are a number of common features and shared beliefs about the nature of creativity. One common belief is that creativity is closely connected with originality with respect to the generation of novelty. Creativity is seen to involve that which is new, unusual, and disconnected with the ordinary and the accepted. Thus it involves a radical break with existing traditions, and a fundamental change in conceptual frameworks. This discontinuity view of creativity is the basis of the common assumption that the value of creative products cannot be objectively determined. If creativity is characterized by a radical break with past traditions and their accompanyingconceptual schemes, then it appears that there are no standards according to which creative works can be assessed; therefore, their evaluation is entirely subjective. 34

Interchange, Vol. 21/3 © The OntarioInstitute for Studies in Education

the locus of scientific creativity. thus. that activity which takes place according to a fixed paradigm or framework which serves as a guide to research. free and unconstrained. rigidity. Feyerabend's view also rests on the belief in conceptual discontinuity between successive theories. and essentially unoriginal. specifying the problems to be undertaken and the procedures. and such revolutionary developments are discontinuous with previously accepted theories in the area. rule-breaking. He claims that there are metaphysical presuppositions (what he calls natural interpretations) inherent in every theory. and the establishment of a radically new framework. incommensurable with the old paradigm.CREATIVITY. in which old paradigms are overthrown and radically new theories are invented. uncritical of the assumptions of the paradigm. It is either normal science. but involves a radically new way of viewing phenomena and is. Creative thinking. 69). and standards to be used in investigating these problems. strict judgment. and the adherence to previously established rules and patterns. for Kuhn. all scientific practice is of one of these two distinct kinds. DISCOVERY. upsetting the presupposition that centrality and fixity were necessary properties of the earth. of necessity. habit. Revolutionary science. Thus the tenet of the contemporary view of creativity that creative achievements involve a radical break with existing tradition and a fundamental change of conceptual scheme is clearly manifested in Kuhn's account. and knowledge of specific disciplines are thought to be constraining. the theory of relativity. the rules. on the other hand. the suspension of judgment. Thus a prevailing theory will determine the way in which . on the other hand. and the spontaneous generation of ideas. irrational processes. It involves the overthrow of the presuppositions underlying the old paradigm. involving as it did aradical change in our concept of time. is marked by leaps of imagination. The postulation and acceptance of the heliocentric view of planetary organization would be an example of this kind of revolutionary science. Revolutionary scientific discovery is. Likewise. Kuhn and Feyerabend on Scientific Discovery This picture of creativity has held considerable sway in contemporary thinking about creative activity. according to this view. This new framework or paradigm is not simply a logical outcome or continuation of the previous one. involving as it does the breaking of rules and established patterns. Because this creative process is considered to be. For Kuhn. and establishing a whole new framework for astronomical observations and theory. Ordinary thinking. Normal science describes ordinary scientific practice. The views of Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1975) in particular reflect salient features of this view of creativity. but also for theories about the nature of discovery and theory change in science. would also exemplify revolutionary science. These natural interpretations are closely related to sensory impressions and are embedded in observation language. Such normal scientific activity is highly rule-bound. skills. rules. Kuhn draws a sharp distinction between revolutionary science and normal science. or it is revolutionary science. and this is the case not only for theories of artistic creation. in which the implications of a paradigm are worked out in a systematic way and puzzles are solved according to established methods. is characterized by a radical departure from the prevailing paradigm. p. They are "ideas so closely connected with observations that it needs a special effort to realize their existence and to determine their content" (1975. AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 35 A further belief of the contemporary view is that creativity is characterized by a specific mode of thinking or process which is different from ordinary thinking. Both Kuhn and Feyerabend hold views of theory change in science which stress radical innovation and the lack of continuity between scientific products and their antecedents. locking one into the prevailing conceptual framework. is characterized by logic.

There are no paradigm-neutral standards by which they can be judged. in fact.passion: becausethese things opposedreason and becausetheywerepermittedto have their way. they can be evaluated only by criteria inherent in a particular paradigm. that the evaluation of creative products is problematic. and the irrationality of scientific discovery is even more pronounced in Feyerabend's account. This idea is based on the view that ordinary thinking is confined within rigid frameworks. in fact. Theonly way in which progress is possible is by the positing of a theory which is radically differentfrom and unconnectedwith the prevailing theory. and that this is. then. Here the argument is made that the rules which underlie any scientific activity are specific to the particular framework but cannot be of assistance when what is required is the transcending of the framework itself. One of the main assumptions of the contemporary view is that creativity necessarily involves going beyond or breaking rules.(1975. a part of scientific activity: Without a frequentdismissalof reason. Thus theory change. Moreover. Kuhn's description of the acceptance of a new theory as a conversion or gestalt switch emphasizes the non-rational aspect of theory change. with new natural interpretations. seen to be inhibiting to creativity because they tend to keep one locked into the prevailing framework. namely. and appeal must be made to subjective factors in order to explain our valuing of novel products.179-180) What these views have in common is that they offer a challenge to the view that there are objective criteria for the assessment of scientific theories.1 Feyerabend goes even farther. for Feyerabend. Such rules are.reasoncannotand shouldnot be allowedto be comprehensiveand thatitmust oftenbe overruled. and that there does not seem to be any one procedure which can be deemed to be the scientific method. These frameworks are characterized by rules which define the modes of proceeding within the framework. then. According to this view. there are no objectivecriteria for the evaluation of creations.conceit. Ideas which today form the very basis of scienceexist only because there were such things as prejudice. and so it is largely psychological factors and consensus amongst scientists which determine which paradigm succeeds.. Both Kuhn and Feyerabend also subscribe to the tenet of the contemporary view which follows from this discontinuity. pp. but they cannot provide the means to transcend the framework itself. If created works are discontinuous with the tradition out of which they arise.36 SHARONBAILIN experienceis seen and described. and must be. that there are metaphysical presuppositions underlying every theory. thereby emphasizing the subjective aspect of evaluation.that even withinscience. Support for this perspective is derived from the fact that there is not necessarily agreement among proponents of competing theories on the standards of assessment for the theories. and if they break the rules and transcend the standards of the tradition. The notion that rules are inhibiting to creativity can be applied to science as well.or eliminatedin favourof otheragencies. The acceptance of a new paradigm is characterized by Kuhn as a conversion or a gestalt switch. Aspects of Kuhn's theory can be seen as conforming to this view of scientific value. that is. again echoing an aspect of the contemporary view. involves a radical change of conceptual framework.. that subjective factors are evident with respect to theory choice in actual scientific practice. and that irrationality is. to point out that alleged scientific method is constantly violated in actual practice. its defining characteristic. then the standards of assessment inherent in the tradition cannot provide the basis for the evaluation of these products. This would seem to imply that there are no objective criteria for choosing between paradigms. that there do not seem to be any standards of assessment which remain constant over time. Givenscience.reason cannot be universal and unreasoncannot be excluded. He claims that paradigms are incommensurable.We have to conclude. This is precisely what is required in the case of revolutionary scientific .. no progress.

p. does not and indeed could not conform to a method since any rules of method would keep one locked into the prevailing theory. DISCOVERY. Feyerabendcalls this view into question. It is. would actually inhibit scientific progress. saving them by means of questioning the testing methods or the auxiliary hypotheses. of such rigid rules of procedure. anomalies. the CopernicanRevolution. The traditional picture of science involves the idea that the scientific enterprise is characterized by a very specific method. Feyerabend's argument for this proceeds as follows. Because of the natural interpretations which are inherent in every theory. however. a prevailing theory will determine the way in which experience is seen and so will never be refuted by observation or analysis. or becausethey unwittinglybrokethem. unchanging and absolutely binding principles for conductingthebusinessofsciencemeetsconsiderabledifficultywhenconfrontedwiththeresults ofhistoricalresearch. This sort of argument is given support by Kuhn's emphasis on the revolutionary nature of discovery in science.AND SCIENCEEDUCATION 37 discovery. since all theories contain. difficulties which have been pointed out by many philosophers and historians of science.one of themost strikingfeaturesofrecentdiscussionsin the history and philosophyof scienceis the realizationthat events and developments. unconnected with the old one. The old theorycan then be analyzed in the light of the new theory. with its own new natural interpretations. Anomalies do not. The only way the hold of a prevailing theory can be broken and progress can be made is by the positing of an entirely new theory. using hypotheses that are in opposition to established theories or facts. He argues that scientists do not. then. The idea of a method that contains firm. self-perpetuating.CREATIVITY. It is. occurredonly becausesome thinkerseither decidednot to be boundby certain"obvious"methodologicalrules.claiming that there are no rules of method which are consistent and invariable with respect to all scientific practice and furthermore that such rules of method would be detrimental to scientific discovery and progress." Critique of the Contemporary View There are numerous difficulties with these views of Kulm and Feyerabend. Feyerabend claims that none of the methodological rules which are commonlyproposed as characterizations of the scientific method are consistently adhered to in actual practice. The only method which Feyerabend acknowledges as applicable to scientific discovery is "anything goes. irrational and anarchistic. then the rules of one framework would be inapplicable in terms of making discoveries. according to Feyerabend. This sort of activity. He says. Science then. The claim is not. the gradual em~gence of the wave theoryof light. (1975. cause a theory's abandonment. and indeed must contain. If scientific developmentdoes exhibit the sort of discontinuity which Kulm suggests. Another version of the view that rules are inhibiting to scientific discovery is in terms of rules of method. rather. in fact. however. however. 23) His denial of the existence of a unique scientific method is based on an examination of historical instances. however.Indeed. the scientific method. but use falsified theories all the time. the rise of modem atomism. that scientists ought to use good scientific method but are remiss in actual practice. and so rules are constraining to innovation in science. It is rather that the existence of such a method. then. often proceeds counter-inductively. abandon theories on the basis of contradictory evidence. and that adherenceto this method is what gives scientificknowledge its special status and what enables science to progress. as some proponents of scientific method would claim. This is clearly a version of the "rules as inhibiting to creativity" claim. and some of these problems are specific instances of more general problems with the contemporary view of .such as the invention of atomismin antiquity.

for example. A more plausible picture is that scientific products lie on a continuum ranging from mildly to highly original. Hattiangadi. 1970. 312) The above all pose serious challenges to the idea that revolutionary scientific discoveries are discontinuous with the previous tradition. p. Einstein conseionslybuilt his new theory on a foundationprovided by the classicalphysics he was overttmaing. and so science does not seem to be characterized by two radically different kinds of practice. One of the grounds for asserting the impossibility of objective evaluation is the alleged discontinuity between paradigms or frameworks. 1981. This has been shown to be as true for scientific theories as for artistic products and other created works. 301) and he summarizes the implications for the notion of scientific revolutions as follows: The notion of scientificrevolutionsdescribesonly the gross structure of scientificchange. Miller vividly describes "the struggles that constitute some of the fine structure in the transition between the old and new quantum theories" (1984. 257-265). then. Einstein givesreasons why this answeris inadequate and proposes a new solution. Toulmin. This notion of discontinuity has been shown to be problematic. that although there is no one procedure or technique which . Another basis for evaluation can be found in the overarching method of science. p. If new paradigms are not continuations of previous paradigms but are radically different. Numerous historians and philosophers of science have demonstrated that even scientific discoveries of an apparently revolutionary kind have their roots in the problems and the paradigms of previous theories. In the free structure. then they can provide one basis for the assessment of new products.pp. an answer to a question.e. it is argued.g. and that scientific development is more gradual than the Kuhnian model suggests (e. that there are continuities between successive theories. one which may be quite differentfrom the one he rejectsbut whichnonetheless take its departurefrom someof the ideasof the rejectedhypothesis. The sources of such criticisms are many and these are but two examples). p.. 138) And Miller's historical account of the seminal developments in early 20th century physics demonstrates clearly that the transformations of concepts involved in these discoveries were gradual. But it has been argued. The first problem is that evidence does not support the claim that created works involve radical breaks with the past nor that they are discontinuous with the preceding tradition. This argument also undermines the claim of the contemporary view that there are no objective criteria for the evaluation of creative products. resides the fascinating problem of the nature of creative scientific thinking. Feyerabend's view that there are no rules of method which are consistent and invariable with respect to all scientific practice might seem to call this claim into doubt. however. Brown emphasizes the continuity between successive theories and makes the following comment with respect to Einstein's "revolutionary" discoveries: Beginning from an existing theory. the rules and standards of the previous paradigm cannot provide the basis for evaluation of the new one.38 SHARON BAK/N creativity.. Evidence does not seem to support the claim that scientific development exhibits radical discontinuity. (1984. (1977. and if there are continuities. All scientific activity essentially involves working out the problems posed by the history of the tradition. where change is gradual. i. This would apply to the assessment of scientific theories as well as to any other created product. outlines Newton's development of the law of gravitation in terms of entirely logical and cogent physical and mathematical arguments based upon reflection on theories ofthetime (1980. Thus Kuhn's radical distinction between revolutionary science and normal science cannot hold up under scrutiny. one highly original and the other not. Popper. 1970. by Siegel (1985b) for example.

There do seem to be some objective standards by which scientific products can be assessed. The fact that such questions are both possible and meaningful indicates that theory choice is not reducible to subjective factors. in debates between paradigms. To do this. as consisting in. methods and criteria which are continuous between frameworks. . In short. methodological considerations can provide just such standards. and by the overarching methodological recta-criteria of science which transcend particular frameworks. bowerer inductiveinferenceis thought to be best made. but rather a general commitment to such criteria. in actual scientific practice. Siegel states that SM [scientificmethod] can and should be characterizedgenerally. scientific method can be identified in its general principles of appraisal. 237-238) It appears. and potentially fruitful. These kinds of general. Although there may be disagreement. (p. 528) This construal of the notion of scientific method provides some grounds for addressing the argument that there are no standards for the evaluation of scientific theories which transcend the bounds of a particular scientific paradigm. AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 39 Canbe considered to be the method of science. (1987. Methodologicalconstancy does not involve specific construals of various evaluative criteria. subjective factors do often enter into the process of theory choice? This is a claim for which there is ample evidence and one which would. Science. pp. DISCOVERY. and that there are objective grounds for doing so (Siegel. however construed. changesin specificviews about the construal of rations aspectsof SM are not sufficientto show that the aspectsthemselveshave changed. however that adequacy is conceived. about what constitutes an adequate explanation and about how evidence is to be interpreted. that the view that the creative products of science cannot be evaluated objectively but only subjectively in terms of some type of holistic realignment of our perceptions and world view can be seriously questioned. Another argument proposed by both Kuhn and Feyerabend which may seem to challenge the idea of objective standards is that. whether a particular belief is well-founded. an insistence on testing. . . Fox Keller makes the following observations: The intellectual danger resides in viewing scienceas pure socialproduct. It is always possible to ask whether the choice of a particular theory is a good one. whether a particular decision is justified. that assessment of choices and decisions is possible.CREATIVITY. the necessity for explanatory adequacy and empirical support provide overarching standards for evaluation. . in general. problems. and a commitment to inductive support. however testing is thought to be best done. In short. but a constant commitment to the evaluation of theories on the basis of such principles. for example. races. The specific instantiations of such principles do vary over time. it is the existence of such standards which makes debate regarding paradigms possible. science then dissolves into ideology and objectivity loses all inlximic meaning. a concern for explanatory adequacy. a commitment to evidence. then. In discussing the problems in moving from a recognition that science is a social process to a relativistic view of scientific knowledge. is a social enterprise conducted by human beings of particular genders. 2 Indeed. is what characterizes scientific method. and these are provided beth by the rules. 1980). rather than abandon the quintessentially human effort to understand the world in rational terms. this does not mean that science reduces to a totally subjective practice nor is it an argument against the existence of some objective standards. we need to add to the familiar methods of rational and empirical inquiry the additional process of critical seN-reflection. whatever else it may be. But even if we grant the existence of psychological and social factors in scientific practice. not be disputed by philosophers and historians of science. and classes in particular social and political contexts. we need to refine that effort. And a crucial task is to distinguish the objective aspects of scientific theory and practice from the subjective.

deny the distinction between the two. fully endorses the notion that there is a scientific method in terms of a method for the assessment of theories but sees the generation of theories as an irrational process which admits of no logical method (Popper. for example. First. One is the view that there is no scientific method in terms of definitive rules for the evaluation of scientific theories. . 279) This point can be illustrat~ with respect to Einstein's theory of relativity. and would. thus. one must ignore all rules and posit an entirely new theory in an unconstrained manner. moreover. most rules are followed. elements in light of which the new slructure will make sense and be fruitful. 1968). It is sometimes the case that one or more of the rules of the accepted framework must be rejected in the process of arriving at a creation. Some philosophers such as Feyerabend would deny that there can be a method of science with respect to either the generation or the evaluation of theories. in order to break out of the hold of the prevailing theory. Some presuppositions must remain. It rests on the view that theories are discontinuous and incommensurable and that..40 S H A R O N BAILIN The claim of the contemporary view that creativity centrally involves rule-breaking and. (1981. this does not imply that scientific discovery is irrational and not at all rule-governed. For others. and the met. Yet it was Einstein's commitment to the presupposition that the laws of physics are invariant which necessitated his ultimate abandonment of the presupposition of absolute time. Some elements of the previous framework must remain.. Nonetheless. Now it must be granted that there is no logic Of discovery in terms of an algorithmic procedure for creating scientific hypotheses or theories. this distinction is crucial (Reichenbach. Perkins makes this point well: The fact remains that no one can depart from much of thepreselectlonat once andexpect to make progress. however. and fruitfulness exercise control over the possibilities which are generated. The nmthemafician cannot discard the familiar axioms and conventionalnotation and traditions aboutwhichsorts of questions are worthwhile and the usual formatfor proofs. Thus the criteria of justification and the methodological meta-rules which issue from them play a central role in discovery as well. it is clear from our previous discussion that not all rules are broken in light of an innovation. There are no specific procedures which will ensure the generation of successful theories. This assumption has been shown to be questionable. rules are violated in order to solve an outstanding problem. This discovery is frequently cited as a prime instance of the destruction of an existing framework and the overturning of presuppositions. some elements of the existing structure which give meaning to the enterprise and according to which judgments can be made. And even the violation of specific rules is ultimately governed by the kinds of methodological meta-rules which constrain the assessment of theories. p. Popper. But what of his claim that there is no such thing as scientific method7 It is necessary to differentiate two senses in which the claim regarding the impossibility of scientific method can be made. If this is the case.. On the contrary.a-rules which govern the ultimate appraisal of the proposed solution such as fit with data. Even in cases of the creation of radically new theories where some methodological rides are broken. simplicity. in fact. Feyerabend's claim that rules of method would be detrimental to scientific progress is also plagued with difficulties. then the prevailing framework or conceptual scheme and its accompanying rules are important for scientific discovery. however. 1938). the process of discovery is very much constrained by rules. The second sense in which claims are made regarding the impossibility of scientific method is with respect to rules for the generation or creation of scientific hypotheses or theories. In scientific discovery. Only because we focus on the contrast rather than the continuity does innovation seem so much of a departure. What we perceive as revolutionary innovation in a field always challenges only a lime of the preselecdon. This is a view which has been examined and rejected. that rules are inhibiting to creative achievement is also highly questionable.

Now this distinction is an important one in philosophy of science and is necessary in order to properly locate scientific rationality in justificatory principles and to eliminate psychological and sociological factors from the epistemological endeavour. but rather as a failure to be sufficiently critical. discontinuous bodies of information and procedures which are bound by rules which apply within frameworks but not between them. This view creates a picture of traditional disciplines. Thus one ends up with nested contexts of justification. and areas of controversy within every discipline. in this case the rules which govern the assessment of these ideas. AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 41 One reason for the general failure to acknowledge the crucial role of rules in discovery as well as in evaluation might be related to the separation made between discovery and justification. If there were not some initial constraints on the possibilities generated. Rather. Hattiangadi (1980) has. not as a case of being trapped by the critical procedures of the discipline. strictly generative. as static. thinking that is generativebut non-judgmental. There are unresolved issues. in fact. The generation of scientific ideas is very much constrained by n~es.CREATIVITY. is not a product of arbitrary novelty. It is one thing to make a conceptual distinction between discovery and justification in order to rule out psychological factors from consideration in the assessmentof theories. however. they are grounded in critical thinking. The idea that creativity is grounded in such irrational processes is based on the view that thinking normally takes place within fixed fi~maeworks and is analytic and evaluative but non-generative and thus a special kind of thinking is required to transcend frameworks. And even the bodies of facts are not fixed but are in flux. which has both a generativeand an evaluative component inseparably connected. and unconstrained. although it may be the case that considerations related to discovery are irrelevant to justification.rather.of uninformedintuition. cannot be explained by any processes inherent in disciplines but instead requires the postulation of extraordinary. and that is that thinking does sometimes become fixed within frameworks and it can be difficult to transcend a framework. ongoing debates. This can be seen. but emerges. change which is significant. effectivelyargued the impossibility of clearly distinguishing pure contexts of discovery. as are some aspects of the inquiry procedures. He demonstrates. they are traditions of knowledge and inquiry which are alive and open ended. They consist not merely in information but also in questions and in procedures for investigating these questions. indeed crucial to discovery. using as an example Newton's discoveryof gravity. irrational processes which are external to disciplines. DISCOVERY. The idea that the generation of creative ideas does not involve evaluation is completely untenable. then. including science. Thus. to conceive of actual scientific activity as neatly separable into a generative phase which is non-evaluative and a subsequent evaluative phase. This picture misrepresents at a very fundamental level the nature and structure of disciplines. non-logical. We can conclude from this discussion that creativity and discovery are not grounded in a distinctive kind of thinking which is non-rational. Rather. Creativity. both exisi~g and new. the results would not be creation but chaos. It is an error. fixed bodies of information and techniques. out of a deep understanding of the nature of the tradition and of its principles. how any idea which might be considered to be in a context of discovery with respect to a new theory is itself part of the context of justification of a previous idea out of which it has developed. This is not to deny an insight that might be gleaned from the views of Knhn and Feyerabend. They do not consist in static. Traditions evolve and this change grows out of continual attempts to resolve the problems of the discipline. however. (This is the claim that factors relevant to discovery are irrelevant to justification. and any pure contexts of discovery become rare.) But it does not follow that the process of science is characterizedby distinct evaluative and non-evaluativephases. . and these provide the impetus for evolution and change. nonetheless considerations of justification are very relevant. however. Truly creative innovation.

We might well agree.allowhis imaginationto play withthemostunlikely possibilities. and without any encouragementto be critical of the current paradigm3 He supports this position by noting that normal science constitutes the major part of scientific activity and it would be counterproductive for normal scientists to question the paradigm which defines and gives meaning to the puzzles they are trying to solve. 341-342) I would maintain that both these approaches ought to be rejected. 53). without any sense that paradigms rise and fall. .IN The contemporary view of creativity. and so advocate an emphasis on divergentthinking (Getzels & Jackson. Thus he seems to endorse a kind of dogmatism. There is considerable validity in Kuhn's claim that "only investigations firmly rooted in the contemporary scientific tradition are likely to break that tradition and give rise to a new one" (1961a. as well.conversely. (Selyequoted in Kuhn 1961a. then revolutionary science is not so uncritical as Kuhn maintains. brainstorming. 1961a. p. that science would not have exhibited the progress which it has if scientists were not oriented exclusively in a unique tradition. the one goal is to educate for critical thinking in science. and indeed the gap between the two is not nearly so wide as Kuhn suggests. the opposite extreme of abandonment of the rules and knowledge of the tradition. The effective scientist must. and. lack prejudiceto a degreewherehe can look at the most "self-evident"facts or conceptswithout necessarilyacceptingthem. Where he errs is in advocating an uncritical stance towards them. On the other side are those who want science education to attempt to promote the creative activities of scientists. uncreative activities of normal scienceand the highly creative activities of revolutionary science. one of training the non-creative normal scientist and the other of fostering the creative thinking of the revolutionary scientist. as manifested in the views of scientific discovery we have been examining. but neither is normal science so uncreative. Critical and creative thinking are as necessary to the "puzzle-solver" as to the maker of revolutions. analogies).42 Science Education SHARON BAR. 1961b). makes a strict separation between the ordinary. and this is likely the best way to try to promote both effective problem-solving within a paradigm and effective problem-solving which leads to the questioning or rejection of some aspect of a paradigm. There are not two distinct goals.. the extreme of unquestioning acceptance of the dominant tradition. Kuhn. where prospective scientists are initiated into the dominant paradigm without any indication of the history of the tradition. p. with Popper's contention that the normal scientist as described by Kulm is one who has been badly taught (1970. Kulm is right about the importance of the knowledge and rules of the prevalent tradition. The scientist's activity is always a blend of invention and criticaljudgment. on the one hand. 1963) and non-rational processes (e. it is believed. ~ One ought to reject. Rather. Scientific discovery grows out of the procedures and problems of the current paradigm. There is no effortspecificallyto encouragerevolutionary sciencepresumably because it is grounded in irrational processes and could not be fostered through education. revolutionary science has its basis in normal scientific activity in that this type of research reveals the anomalies which precipitate the crises leading to revolutions. and a downplaying of skills and knowledge as these are potentially inhibiting to creative thought. may have a number of differentconsequences for education. in fact. Thus one ought to reject. then. Moreover. 343). on the one side. and advocates an education for the former only (Kuhn. pp. Kuhn claims. Flexibility and openmindedness are considered the cornerstones of discovery. and so it is a repertoire of skills and knowledge which forms the basis for eventual ground-breaking achievement. If our preceding account is correct.g.

3. E. Feminism and science. 4. Chicago: Precedent Publishing. Lateral thinking. Some specific approaches to sciencepedagogy which conform to this orientation are teaching science not as a"rhetoric of conclusions" but as fluid inquiry (Schwab. Siegel. controversial issues. for example. in part. p. (1977). References Baiiin. L W. rather.. of the standards of assessment. University of Manitoba.see Siegel ( 1978 & 1985a). of the method of investigation. Perception. P. been demonstratedthat a consistent interpretationof Kuhn's view necessarilyleads to the radical subjectivity thesis (Scheffler. and of the over-arching goals of the inquiry. getting students to view scientific material as arguments to be critically assessed (Manicas. For a detailed examinationof the implicationsofKutm'sviews for science education. Kluwer: Dordrecht. Harding & J. Kuhn. (1985). theory and commitment: The new philosophy of science. 1980). AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 43 What we ought to promote.g. Kuhn himself does acknowledge this point in writings subsequent to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (e. (1988). Brown. and teaching the history and philosophy of science. Wylie & Okruhlik (1987). Department of Educational Administration and Foundations.(1963). & Jackson.his continual assertion that dogmatic edueafionhas been"immensely effective" and"highlysuecessful. 390) state that his account is descriptive and that he is not necessarilydefending current techniques of science education.. Achieving Extraordinary Ends: An Essay on Creativity (1988). critical procedures. and his claim that science would not have progressed the way it has without an education fostering unquestioned commitment to a unique tradition seem to indicate that he sees this type of dogmatism as valuable. 5. E. London: NLB. One example would be the androcentric bias which many feminists claim marks much scientific practice. CT: Yale University Press. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1962). P. 2. The highly intelligent and the highly creative adolescent: A . H. Manitoba R3T 2N2. a mode of inquiry containing questions which have not yet been answered. 1. In S.). New Haven. 1986). (1987).. DISCOVERY.It has. 1972). (1970). (1975). and. S. is critical inquiry. at one point (196lb. however. Getzels. Fox Keller. Sex and scientific inquiry. Reflections on gender and science. Although Kulm does. W. Harding & O'Barr (1987). 6. Thus criticism must be understood as central to the scientific enterprise. Fox Keller (1985). 1977). involving an in-depth understanding of the principles and procedures of the tradition. Central to this is an understanding that science is not merely a static collection of information. 1982. Winnipeg. on Sharon Bailin's book. but is. And it must be understood that the possibility for creativity in science is afforded by the critical and thus evolutionary nature of scientific inquiry and that it does not require an abandonment of disciplinary skills nor a reliance on irrational processes? Correspondence Address: Sharon Bailin. perhaps most important. Kutm. then.g. E. Kutmhas at times denied that his view is radicallysubjective (e. Feyerabend. Against method. exposing students to competing methods and paradigras (Martin. Fox Keller. De Bone. Achieving extraordinary ends: An essay on creativity. O'Barr (Eds. No~s This paper is based.CREATIVITY. ongoing debates."his claim that there are goodreasons why science education is the way it is. 1977). See. London: Ward Lock Educational.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Indianapolis: Haekett. Siegd. Martin.. London: Heineman. The teaching of science as inquiry. A. (1961b). 28. The logic of scientific discovery. Scientific creativity: Its recognition and development. In I. (1982).(1984). Kuhn. Scheffler. (1962). In C. T. (1981). The vanishing context of discovery. Dorckeeht: D. Conceits of scientific education. Harding. J. (1964). ( 1985a). MA: Harvard University Press. Nieldes (Ed. In C. The mind's best work. In T. 359-375. Scientific change. Objectivity. Siegel.). H.). Crombie (Ed. Hattiangadi. and theory choice. logic. Experience and prediction. 16(3). ( 1961a). The essential tension: Tradition and innov ation in scientific research. H. Educational Theory. The function of dogma in scientific research. New York: Macmillan. and science education. Manicas. (1985b). IL: Scott Foresman. and rationality. Kuhn. H. Perkins. 12-15. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Taylor (Ed. & O'Barr. (1977).IN summary of some research findings. Imagery in scientit'u: thought. T. T. (1970).). (1980). value judgment. Siegd. P. Objectivity. (1986). Criticism and the growth of knowledge.. How not to teach people to be good scientists. Rdativism. In A. British Journal of the Philosophy of Science. (1987). (1970). Toulmln. I. J. K. D. . Honolulu: Hawaii Council of Teachers of English. Scientific revolutions. Sex and scientific inquiry. W. In The essential tension. K. $2. & Okmhlik. (1972). (1987).). Philosophical feminism: Challenges to science. Scientific creativity: Its recognition and development. Scientific discovery. (1962). A. rationality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. W. L (Eds. MA: Harvard University Press. Siegd. Taylor & F. Oxford: Oxford University Press. H. (1978). 31. Science and subjectivity. The act of creation. I$. incommensurability and more. M. New York: John Wiley. Musgrave (E&. Does the distinction betweennormal science and revolutionary science hold water? In I. Reidcl Koestler.). Boston: Birkhauser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hacking (Ed. Cambridge. rationality. 102-105. Miller. In I. Barton (Eds. (1938). Criticism and the growth of knowledge. New York: Harper & Row. A. Popper. Relchanbach. C. T.). S. Schwab.). What is the question eon~rnlng the rationality of sei~ce? Philosophy of Science. S. Resources for Feminist Research. I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.44 SHARON BAH. Lakatos & A. Normal science and its dangers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.). Kuhn. Glenview. K. The structure of scientific revolutions. Cambridge. (1980). Journal of CoUegeScience Teaching. Popper. Lakatos & A. 517-537. New York: John Wiley. Essays on creativity and science. 302-309.). DeLuca (Ed. Popper. K. The rationality of scientific revolutions. In D. (1981). (1968). Wylie. Kuhn. Musgrave (Eds. Kulm and Schwab on science texts and the goals of science education. H.

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