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Gould v Curtis.

Image 1 in PDF format. Available for Offline Print In the Court of Appeal. 18 April 1913

[1913] 3 K.B. 84
Cozens-Hardy M.R., Buckley and Kennedy L.JJ. 1913 April 17, 18. Revenue—Income Tax—Deduction—Premium on Life Insurance—Sum payable on Death before, and Larger Sum if alive, on Certain Date—Income Tax Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 34), s. 54. An insurance contract, whereby, in consideration of an annual premium, 100l. is payable on the death of the assured within fifteen years and 200l. if he is alive at the end of that period, is an “insurance on his life” within the meaning of s. 54 of the Income Tax Act, 1853, and the assured is entitled to deduct the whole amount of the premium from his assessment to income tax. Decision of Hamilton J. [1912] 1 K. B. 635, affirmed. Observations in Joseph v. Law Integrity Insurance Co., Ld. [1912] 2 Ch. 581, approved. APPEAL from a decision of Hamilton J. Commissioners of Income Tax. The case stated was as follows:— Gould appealed against an assessment to income tax made upon him, under Sched. D, for the year ending April 5, 1911, and claimed that he was entitled to a deduction therefrom of 11l. 11s. 8d., being the whole of the premium paid by him under a policy of assurance dated March 12, 1908.

upon a case stated by

if he should be living on that day. 1909. equal to the whole premium. and that part only of the premium was applicable to the life insurance risk. The premium was actuarially calculated as on a series of alternative risks dependent on the assured's life. “Endowment policies. Where under such policies the same sum was payable at death or at the alternative time therein mentioned. which was filled up and signed by Gould for the purpose of effecting this insurance. The surveyor of taxes did not object to a deduction in respect of so much of the premium as was attributable to the sum payable on death before March 1. but only as a concession and without any admission of legal right except as to such part of the premium as would be applicable to the sum payable at death. under these policies payment was to be made either (a) at a particular date or on the previous death. 8d. a deduction for the purposes of assessment to income tax. had been in use since 1805. and the*85 premium was calculated in regard to such fifteen chances and on the amounts payable in respect of their respectively happening. was invariably allowed. upon his death. but not exceeding one-sixth of the income. 34 2. they would pay 100l. the assurance company covenanted that. 11s. The appellant admitted that he took out this policy partly as an investment of money. that is to say. as to the alternative amount payable if the assured was alive*86 on March 1. 1923. or (b) on attaining a particular age or on the previous death. About 1840 there first came into use policies under which the right to payment on reaching a certain age was combined with the right to payment on death. his main object being to make provision for people if he died. if the assured should die before March 1. the respective chances of the assured's dying before March 1. 54 of the Income Tax Act. This kind of assurance constitutes more than one-half of the business (other than industrial assurance) of some of the life assurance companies. The form of proposal. in consideration of an annual premium of 11l.. but also a contract for an investment. no payment being made in case of previous death.” assuring sums payable on and in the event of the assured attaining a particular age. under s. 1923. 1853 16 & 17 Vict. but contended that.By the policy. A policy in that form was called a “double endowment assurance” policy. The risk was estimated by actuarial calculations based on a recognized table of mortality. and before each subsequent March 1 up to and including 1923. contained the questions and particulars usual in proposals for ordinary life insurance. The Commissioners decided that the policy was not only a policy of life insurance. 1923. the insurance was not an “insurance on his life” within the meaning of s. or would pay the sum of 200l. c. and that only that part of . 54.

54. it is difficult to see why the section should go on to provide for the Case of a person contracting for a “deferred annuity on his own life.‟ when properly considered. and it is not contended that a mere incident in the contract (substantially a life assurance) would take it out. in consideration of the due payment of a certain annuity for his life. and when once fixed it is constant and invariable. Simon. The Income Tax Acts contain no definition of “life insurance.” and definitions contained in statutes passed for different purposes are not helpful in determining the question now before the Court. 3 exactly applies and is in favour of the contention of the Crown. On appeal that decision was reversed by Hamilton J. Sect. The definition of life insurance given by Parke B. India and London Life Assurance Co. according to the probable duration of the life. If it be so. in Dalby v.-G. Here each part of the contract is equally substantial.J. 1853. The respondent appealed. Finlay. That definition is as follows: “The contract commonly called „life assurance.the amount of the annuity being calculated. who held that by the policy in question the assured had effected an “insurance on his life” within the meaning of s. is a mere contract to pay a certain sum of money on the death of a*87person.the premium could be deducted. .” [KENNEDY L. no doubt. is it not “an insurance on life”?] It is all one bargain. and was entitled to deduct the whole amount of the premium from the profits or gains in respect of which he was liable to be assessed. 54of the Act of 1853 draws a distinction between an “insurance on life” and a contract for a deferred annuity. 54 of the Income Tax Act.” seeing that that would be within the contractual provision for a benefit to himself dependent upon the continuance of his own life which it is contended that “insurance on his life” means. the inference being that a contract for the payment of a deferred lump sum was intended to be excluded. in the first instance. Sir J.. and W. Looking at the whole contract in this case. A contract in consideration of an annual payment to secure a deferred payment of a lump sum on a certain date if the assured shall then be alive is not an “insurance on his life” within the meaning of s. .. for the appellant. the amount being a matter for actuarial calculation. S.

Law Integrity Insurance Co. v. adopted what was said by Holmes L. The history of the legislation on the subject is sufficient to shew that in 1853 the Legislature was well aware of the existence of this kind of insurance.] That was dissented from in the Irish case reported in a note to Joseph v. The decision of Hamilton J. In Prudential Insurance Co. S. v. and St. See also Colquhoun v.[COZENS-HARDY M. Heddon. 7 the company were bound to be defeated if any portion of the business they were carrying on came within the class of insurance on life. 54 only applies to contracts with insurance companies. But the real question for decision in this case turns upon the meaning of s. for the respondent. where Farwell L. The submission is that the Legislature intended the words “insurance on his life” to have the same meaning as they had in 1806. and if it had been intended to exclude it from*88 the benefit of the exemption it would have been plainly so provided in the Act. Danckwerts. . Sect. Law Integrity Insurance Co..J.-G. says a contract of insurance must be a contract for the payment of a sum of money. and although at first sight it seems to be against the contention of the Crown. when they certainly would not have included a contract insuring the payment of a lump sum during the life of the assured. 11 and Godsall v. 8 [BUCKLEY L. Micklethwait. G. J. 12] Sir J.J. Irish Provident Assurance Co. That case was followed in Joseph v. yet.. referred to Prudential Insurance Co. 5. India and London Life Assurance Co. 1891.J. 54 of the Act of 1853. which event must be of a character more or less adverse to the interest of the person effecting the insurance. K. there recognized that a contract of life assurance was not so wide as a contract of assurance upon an event or contingency relating to or depending upon any life.C. 10 [They also referred to Dalby v. Simon. Channell J. Boldero.R. 98 of the Stamp Act. it is really in favour of it. Law Integrity Insurance Co. Inland Revenue Commissioners 9Channell J. when examined. Inland Revenue Commissioners. was right. 4] That case turned upon the definition in s. 6 In Joseph v. This was an “insurance on his life” within the meaning of s. in reply. or for some corresponding benefit to become due on the happening of an event. in Flood v. 54 of the Act of 1853.

This is a case in which. insurance on the life or lives of such other person or persons. 54 of the Income Tax Act of 1853. in addition to any other deductions. to deduct the amount of the premium of such insurance for the current year.C. The meaning of either word is “making something certain. and shipping. 3. is payable in the event of his death within fifteen years and a lump sum of 200l. Hamilton J.” Then there is this provision: “Persons entitled to any income during and depending upon the life or lives of any other person or persons who have made. In the Act of 1799 (39 Geo. if he survives the fifteen years. It is not suggested that there is any difference. and in this section of the Act of 1853 the second branch of exemption means something which is not included in the first. 65): “Persons who have made or shall make insurance on their respective lives. K. in addition to any other deductions. c. 13) there is found in the schedule 13 a provision which entitled certain people to have an abatement in respect of their premiums. This appeal raises an important question upon the true construction of s. administrators. which is often called an endowment policy. What is the difference between “insurance” and “assurance”?] According to the Oxford Dictionary the terms have been used indiscriminately for contracts relative to fire. (except the .J. The question is really whether the right to an abatement in respect of premiums payable by a man on a policy on his*89 life includes payments made by him in respect of a policy. has held that an endowment policy of the nature I have described is within the section.[BUCKLEY L.R. shall be at liberty. no doubt. 54 is limited to the case in which a sum of money is insured payable only to his executors. the language being the same as in the Act of 1806 (46 Geo. c.] COZENS-HARDY M. it is useful for some purposes to go back to the history of the income tax and of the legislation with reference to this particular abatement or allowance. 1870. 3. and I agree with his decision.” The expression “insurance on life” has been used in a chain of Income Tax Acts. referred to the Life Assurance Companies Act. or assigns on his death. shall be at liberty. An “insurance on life” is limited to payments to be made in the event of death. [ Danchwerts. or on the lives of their respective wives. life.. or whether the benefit conferred by s. or shall make. under which 100l. and does not include a contract under which the assured is entitled to receive a lump sum of money during his life.

In the next place there are words here added to the former words: “who shall have made insurance on his life or on the life of his wife. per annum. That was a statute which in no way referred to insurance companies. shall be continued. the income tax having been continued. limited as they*91 are to contracts with insurance companies. or the estate from whence the same arose renewed. First of all. there shall be granted out of the duties so charged a further allowance bearing the like proportion …” That fell to the ground when the income tax was abolished in 1815. or shall have been usually continued. I think in 1853 Parliament was dealing with a perfectly well known. Then we come to 1853. the amount of the annual premium whereon shall have been included in the amount of such income. or any part thereof from which such premiums have been deducted. in or with any insurance company. When the income tax was first reimposed by Sir Robert Peel there was no corresponding abatement allowed in respect of premiums on policies. after the death of such other person or persons on whose life or lives such insurance shall have been made. I do not assent to that. and from 1815 until 1842 or 1843 there was no such thing as income tax. but of other people too on their lives. It was perfectly general. It is important to observe the enactment in the Act of 1853 in two points. 5 in the “General deductions from Income” given in the schedule. as we know. The next one. which had no special reference whatever to insurance companies. it is limited to contracts of insurance with an insurance company.deduction hereinafter mentioned) to deduct the amount of the premiums of such last mentioned insurance for the current year. provided that if.” It was contended on behalf of the Crown that in construing these words we must suppose that that language in 1853 had precisely the same meaning as it had in 1799 or in 1806. No. whereas the old Acts had no such limitation. well established. namely. The words of s. I decline to refer for that purpose to the meaning of those words in the Acts of 1799 or 1806. and that was continued for relevant purposes in the Act of 1806. then and in such case no deduction shall be*90 allowed …” The first provision which I have just read was No. 178 of that Act are: “That in case any person shall have duly claimed and proved his title to such allowance as aforesaid for income less than 150l. or the estate from whence the same arose shall have been usually renewed by the payment of a fine or fines. and in order to consider the meaning of the words used in 1853. and such person shall have made insurance on his life or on the life of his wife. is much wider and seems to give exemption to premiums not only paid in respect of a man's own life or his wife's life. or shall have contracted for any deferred annuity on his own life or on the life of his wife. which I have before me. and very large class of business. 6. . the business of insurance companies which entered into contracts of insurance on people's lives to an enormous amount. the income. from time to time up to that date.

14 I thought it was legitimate to look at works of authority on the branch of law dealing with this matter. although in the other event. or (b) on the assured attaining a particular age or on the previous death of the assured. It is a topic which must have been familiar to any writer of authority who was considering what the meaning of insurance on his life was at that date.” and none the less because in the event of his surviving fifteen years. Mr. of course. and by other people in the year 1853 and onwards? I think the shortest way in which I can deal with this proposition is to repeat what I said inJoseph v.” Therefore the subject-matter with which we are now dealing was one with which in the year 1853 insurance companies were dealing largely. that there is no reason to doubt. therefore. “assuring sums payable on and in the event of the assured attaining a particular age. but it was dealing with what was well known in the insurance world.” Is not that a legitimate thing to refer to.” And “About 1840” . that under the language of that section the policy in question is a “contract of insurance on his life.that is thirteen years before this statute — “there first came into use policies under which the right to payment on reaching a certain age is combined with the right to payment on death. Bunyon's book as a book of authority on this subject. This is based really upon a passage in the judgment of Channell J. having regard to the statements which we find in the special case? “Instruments known as endowment policies. he will receive 200l. Under these instruments sums were contracted to be paid either (a) at a particular date or on the previous death of the assured. no payment being made in the event of his or her previous death. and I referred to Mr. have been in force since 1805. in the Prudential Company's Case. which is a contingency dependent upon the continuance of his life. Law Integrity Insurance Co. It has been suggested that this cannot be a contract of insurance because the continuance of life is not an event which can be fairly said to be adverse to the interests of the insurer. and as far as I am concerned I feel no doubt. It was not dealing with a subject which was then first started. the first edition of which was written in 1853 and published in 1854. It was contemporary with this Act.. Bunyon gives this as a definition of life insurance: “The contract of life insurance may be further defined to be that in which one party agrees to pay a given sum upon the happening of a particular event contingent upon the duration of human life in consideration of the immediate payment of a smaller sum or certain equivalent periodical payments by another. his executors will only receive 100l. This kind of assurance constitutes more than one half of the business (other than industrial assurance) of some of the life assurance companies at*92 the present time.Now what was the meaning of those words “contract of insurance on his life or on the life of his wife” as understood commonly in the business world.” we are told. by insurance companies. in the event of his death before the expiration of fifteen years. 15 He was there . I think.

yet I think the observations made by every member of this Court in that case.dealing with an argument which had been addressed to him by counsel. must now have the force of a decision. with the greatest possible respect to the learned judge. I think those subsequent words were inserted in order to remove any doubt which there might have been as to whether a deferred annuity policy could be considered to be an insurance “on his life. Hamilton J. I think this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. 1853. . With reference to the case recently before this Court. Law Integrity Insurance Co. which justifies us in coming to a different conclusion. he pointed out that a payment made to a man in that class when he attains sixty-five. 8d. If. Dealing with the case of an insurance by a man who was of the artisan class. In my opinion that is right. with small weekly payments. or whatever the age might be. I do not think that is accurate. I do not think it really necessary to consider the puzzle which arises upon the subsequent words of the section. has held that he is.J. either in the prior legislation or in the prior decisions. BUCKLEY L. The respondent could is the holder of a policy under which an insurance company have covenanted with him that if he should die before March 1. 54. although it turned upon the construction of words in a different Act of Parliament. This policy in question seems to me to come within the first words of s. or if he should be living on that day they would at that date pay him 200l. I do not think it is true to say that there can be no insurance except the event covered by the contract is one which is in its nature adverse to the assured. is one which may be fairly said to contemplate an adverse event to the man who probably might not then be able so well to maintain himself and his wife. they will pay 100l. and it is called an “own life policy. The annual premium is 11l.” This document is in the form of an assurance policy on*93 the assured's own life. 16. 54 of the Income Tax Act. are really dicta which in the present case.” It is not a deferred annuity policy. 11s. and there is nothing. on his death. the learned judge intended to lay down that there cannot be a contract of insurance unless the event is of a character more or less adverse to the interests of the person effecting the assurance. Joseph v. The question is whether he is entitled to have an allowance by way of deduction of that annual premium under s. 1923. however. “or shall have contracted for any deferred annuity on his life or on the life of his wife.” or on the life of his wife. as far as I am concerned. though they may be mere dicta.

it is a possible case.” There would. The contingency is death or no death .” I can agree that the phrase “insurance of the life” may as matter of English mean a guarantee of a sum to be paid if the life drops. that when you find the expression “A” or “B” you ought as a matter of construction.The question is one of construction of s. By parity of reasoning an insurance on life is not confined to a payment to be made at death. I think quite soundly. That will be included in the words following the word “or. and that such a payment is therefore excluded from the previous words “insurance*94 on his life. An argument was advanced that the word “on” in the connection “insurance on his life” is confined to a payment to be made at the death.” The words occurring after the disjunctive are therefore words characterized not by the quality of being payable during as distinguished from at or after the death but by the quality of periodicity of payment. An insurance “on” life . It may be a sum payable at death or a sum payable at an earlier date dependent upon a contingency. if you can . 54. a different thing. The life is mentioned as a contingency upon which the insurance is to be paid. No one can say that it is.death or life. Insurance “on” life is an insurance of a sum payable or not payable according as the contingency of life or death is answered*95 one way or the other. It is contended that that principle of construction ought to be applied to this Act. To give full effect therefore to the rule of construction it is not necessary to say more than that the first words do not include periodical payments of that kind. it is plain that an insurance “on” life includes as much an obligation to pay a sum of money if life continues at a date as an obligation to pay a sum of money if life ceases.” and it is argued. to my mind. or commencing in his lifetime and continuing for say ten years after his death. the contingency of living at that time. Insurance “on” it is. that the words after “or” include deferred payments during life. What then is the true meaning of the words “insurance on his life. The contrast of the antithesis of the two phrases may lead to the exclusion from the former of periodical payments. Regarded thus. It may be and generally is an annuity current during the lifetime and terminating on the death. but does not tend to any determination at all as to when the payment of a lump sum as distinguished from a periodical sum is to be made. I suppose. then an annuity “on” the life must equally be an annuity commencing at the death.” But take the case. If that is say that B is an alternative to A and is not included within A.unless driven to a contrary conclusion . It means the insurance of a sum dependent upon it. of a deferred annuity commencing on the death of the assured. be a significant difference if the preposition were “of” and not “on. An annuity “on” life cannot be confined to something payable at death. to my mind. The section commences by specifying two matters between which occurs the disjunctive “or. namely.

because this is altogether an insurance “on” life.” The learned judge was using those words in connection with a policy of life insurance. If that be sound. at p. that the whole scheme of . namely. But for this particular purpose it is not adverse. KENNEDY L. As to that I say nothing. Death cannot for this purpose be appropriately described as an adverse event. The same is not true of a policy of life insurance. The most important thing to bear in mind is. It is an event which some people regard as adverse. A policy of life insurance is not a policy of indemnity. Whether the contingency be the continuance of life at a date or whether it be death. he is to be indemnified by the sum which is guaranteed to him under the policy. an obligation to indemnify. but is a policy upon a contingency. or a marine policy upon a vessel. 664: “which event must have some amount of uncertainty about it. We have had a good deal of most interesting discussion as to the proper construction of statutes in general. I wish to add a word as to something which was said by Channell J. Inland Revenue Commissioners. 54. 54. having suffered a loss by reason of that adverse event. and must be of a character more or less adverse to the interest of the person effecting the insurance.expresses an obligation to pay a sum of money on an event dependent upon the contingency of human life. In insurances of that class I agree that what you look at is to see whether there has occurred an event adverse to the person who is insured. v. and the result is that I think this appeal should be dismissed. it is a policy of indemnity. such as that. in both cases it seems to me that it is included within the expression “insurance on life” contained in s. in the case ofPrudential Insurance Co. The obligation in a policy of life insurance is not based upon any doctrine of compensating the person for the event. I am of the same opinion. and some do not. but what I want to say is this: If the policy be one such as a fire policy. for it is not in the sense that it occasions pecuniary loss. and of this statute in particular. and he gave a reason there why he thought there was in that case an adverse risk. and a good deal of discussion as to what ought to be the meaning of the word “on” when you speak of an insurance or a policy on life. 17 The particular words to which I venture to take exception are these.J. Money is no compensation for death. For those reasons I think that this policy-holder was the holder of a policy the whole of the premiums upon which he was entitled to deduct under the provisions of s. which is what is meant in the case of a fire or marine policy. An insurance upon life is the creation in favour of a person who has an insurable interest of an obligation to pay money in an event. it follows that the whole of this premium is deductible. the contingency*96 of human life.

if he is the only person still living. that there is a great deal of force in the point that was put with regard to construction. of course. In this case I agree that we cannot do better than do what his Lordship did in the beginning of his judgment in Joseph v. and when I say popular I do not mean in a sense different from that which would be understood by commercial and business men who had to deal with this class of business: I mean popular as opposed to a limited and technical sense. It is legislation in regard to life insurance. and never has been limited. or to his family or his creditors when he dies. of a sum of money. to the mere contract for a payment upon death. That is the base principle of such legislation as this. as now. Bunyon's book on Life Assurance and saying that. and by disjoining them assert necessarily a degree of difference between them. The law intended to give the taxpayer some relief in respect of such sum as he was paying as a thrifty person. according to the natural meaning. But I entirely agree with the Master of the Rolls in saying that in this you ought not to look at this matter from a highly technical standpoint. Law Integrity Insurance Co. prima facie you ought not as a matter of construction to include in the first the second which has been disjoined from it. The statute is enacted in terms which had a popular and perfectly understood meaning. I agree with Hamilton J. read as a statute ought to be read.this legislation. in the first instance. the construction of the words. in order to encourage such thrift generally. In order to encourage thrift there is an exemption from taxation to a certain extent. When we come to this particular clause it is contended that although that may be the principle. but at what I may call the popular sense of the words. 18. Life insurance in the year 1853. So approaching the statute it seems that one is entitled. It seems to me that it ought to require some*97 very cogent reason of construction in order to interfere with the plain and universal policy of such legislation as this. by taking Mr. beginning at the end of the eighteenth century and continuing until to-day. whom by law he is bound to support. if you speak . does not allow of the principle being carried out. or himself. which is an exemption in respect of sums of money devoted by the subject who is taxed to assuring at a subsequent date for the use of his family. It seems to me that it cannot matter for that purpose whether the sum to be insured and for which present payment or payment in premiums is made is a lump sum payable in the case of death or a lump sum payable if the assured survives a certain time. that if you disjoin two classes of things. to look without favour upon an interpretation which would arbitrarily limit the form which that thrift should take. and the object of the legislation must be carefully borne in mind as a matter alike of justice and common sense. was not limited. is the encouragement of thrift. when you have to construe legislation which refers to taxation of this kind.

which we generally approved in the judgment in Joseph v. although the earlier phrase might in fact include it. it may be defined to be “that in which one party agrees to pay a given sum upon the happening of a particular event contingent upon the duration of human life. death is an adverse event as regards the family and creditors. Here the contingency. and particularly with regard to the insurances effected by workmen for small weekly payments. apart from death. as to the importance of remembering that the word is “on” and not an insurance “of. in one sense. as was put by the Irish judges in the case which is now reported. I approved that judgment in my own terms. or an “event contingent” (to keep to the exact words of Mr. I will not say in*99 adversity or anything adverse. while it is quite right that in this case it should go forth that there may be question as to “adverse” being universally a proper test. to insure himself. it represents a real and not an immaterial fact. the coming of a time when. but for actual human events that happen in the community). namely. is that of his*98 surviving a certain number of years. will result. that is. In the same way you may use the word “adverse” in speaking of death. or his family or his creditors. In a sense.J. to prevent its being said by any possibility that that was a form of insurance which was not intended to be covered by the earlier legislation. I am not disposed at all to differ from the criticism that has been used. although he is still living. 19. You desire to guard (and I think my brother Channell had that in view throughout) against the happening through old age or death of an event which. and rightly desires. it may well be said that such an insurance against what may happen to the man or to his family in regard to the possibility of wage-earning at a later period of his life is an insurance against an adverse event.” and I should not personally be afraid of saying that the Legislature was anxious in adding the other alternative which is disjoined. of the word “adverse” in the judgment of Channell J. upon which by the contract the assured is entitled to payment of a lump sum. That is a contingency. I have only to add that with regard to the judgment of Channell J. either where the payment is upon that life ending. if we are to construe it strictly.of a contract of life insurance. It is equally true that.” I agree with Buckley L. speaking generally (and we are not legislating in the clouds. and I am still of opinion that. .” It is an insurance on the subject of life. I think as used by Channell J. in the case in the year 1904. Bunyon's work) “upon the duration of human life. and that is why a creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor. but in a position of pecuniary disadvantage against which the thrifty person desires. unless you provide against it by thrift. Law Integrity Insurance Co. upon a life. or. or in reference to the duration of the human life. or an insurance on life. really it may be expanded to being an insurance. it may be more difficult or even impossible for him to earn wages as before.

Appeal dismissed. that the decision of my colleagues for which they have fully stated their reasons is the right one. Pratt. Solicitor for respondent: A.but an event which places a man from a pecuniary point of view in a less favourable position than he otherwise would have occupied. and has no reference to the question of indemnity . on the construction of this particular section. S. was considering.Therefore there is. I agree in this particular case. still I think it was properly used in reference to the policies which Channell J. Therefore while I agree that the word “adverse” may not be quite the right word to use as a universal test. in reference to a contingency relating to the duration of human life. s. B. 54: “Any person who shall have made insurance on his life … or shall have contracted for any deferred annuity on his own life … in or with any insurance company which shall become registered … shall be entitled to deduct the amount of the annual premium paid by him for such insurance or contract … from any profits or gains in respect of which he shall be liable to be assessed under either of the schedules (D) or (E) of this Act … Provided always that no such abatement allowance or repayment as aforesaid shall be made in respect of any such annual premium beyond one-sixth part of the whole of the profits or gains of such person so chargeable as aforesaid …” . . (G. in that sense. 2. [1912] 1 K. Representation Solicitor for the Crown: Solicitor of Inland Revenue. the happening of an event .of course it is not like the burning of a house or the destruction of a ship. E. ) 1. 635. A.