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Tulane University

Westview Press
A Member of the Perseus Books Group

All rights wserved. Printed in the Uttited States of America. No part of this publiation may or mechanical, inbe reproduced or tmirsmitted in any form or by any irzeans, electri~~tic cfrxciiirg photocopy, recnding, or any inh>rmatiortstorage and retrieval system, without permissiim in writii~g from the p~~blishel: Copyrigl~t O 201N3 by Weswiew Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group Pubiisired in 2 1 1 1 1 0 in the United States of America by Westview Press, 5500 Central Arrenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the U ~ ~ i t e Kizrgdom d by Westview Press, 12 Hid's Copse Rc~aodd,Cumnor Hill, Oxfisrd OX2 9fJ Find us on t l ~ e World Wide Web nt www.wes~iiewpress.c~~m Library cof Congress Cataloging-in-PublicatioirData Gaus, Gerald F. Political concepk and political theories / Geraid F' Gaus. p. cm. Il~ciudes inclex. lSBN 0-8133-3331-8 l. Pc3litical ~ i e ~ ~ c l. e Title. .

The paper used i-tt this publiation meets t11e requiremen& of the Amet-ican Natioiral Standard for Pemartence of Paper for Prittted Library Materials Z39.48-1984,

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Socialism. 71 3 . Defhitions.5 Summary.2 Wads.4 Summary 43 Notes. 36 2. 7 1. 46 3.4 .1 Essentially Contested Concepts. 12 1 Wittgenstein and Conceptual Investigations. 22 Notes. 3 1.sfsQuestion. 3 Political Ideologies.tndividuaZism/Collectivism. 23 2 Canceptual Disputes 2. 60 3.3 Wittgenstein's Later hat)rsis. and Conservatism.1 Liberalism. and Things.2 Ratio~~alism/Antirationalism. 70 Notes.5 Summary. 33 2-3 Political Philosophy m d Political meories.3 neories of Hzrman Nature. 44 Pofiticaf Theories: Conceptual Structures and Enduring Types 3. 52 3.Part One: Conceptual Analysis 1 What: Axe Political Cancepts? 3 1. 16 1. 66 3.1 Socral-t. 26 3 .

iberty and Equnljty Connict? 158 7.12. 178 Notes.2 Chssical Liberalism: tiherty and Basic Equality 159 7-3 Revisioz~isf Liberalisms.4 Freedom. 129 6. 124 Equality and the Grounds for Equal Treatment. 136 6. 82 4. 179 77 5 6 127 7 . 7 '7 4. 101 5. Power. Pawer and Freedom 105 5 3 Freedom.alitJi. 178 7.1 Negaljve L.5 The Consernative Criticjtte of Equ. 86 4. 116 5. 127 6.iberty: Some Ordinary Langtrage Considerations. 155 Equality and Liberty in Political Theories 7. 97 Notes.4 Equality of m a t ? M5 6.4 auestioning the PositivdNegative Distinctionf 94 4. 164 7. 3 1 5 4 Notes.3 Why Equality? Arguments from Fundamental Human Equality.1 E ~ a l i t y 6 2 Why Equality? External Arguments for the Importance of Equaliv. and the Law.3 Two Concepts of t.174 7-6 Summary.Part Twe Political Concepts 4 Negative and Positive Liberty 4.5 Summary 3 1 2 3 Notes.1 Do t. and Property 110 5.5 Summary. 98 Liberty and Power 5.iberty. Power.2 Positive Freedom.1 Positive Freedom as Power to Act.5 Summary.4 A Socialist Reconciliation Proposal.

251 10. 182 8. and Community 9.2 Classical 1.ym d the Mmagement of Collective Affairs.1 Marx on Societies and Their Justice. 210 9. 246 10.2 Socialism and the Democratic Co 9.4 Summary 233 Notes.5 Summary. 223 9.2 art Being "hAuthol-ity. 257 Notes.3 Three Conservative Appmaches to Justice.1 The EIeme~tts 8.8 Justice and Liberalism of Justice.4 Democratic Atr"cEr0rit. 237 10. Society. Conservatism and Political Authority. 206 Notes. 194 8. 258 9 10 Concluding Remarks: From Political Carrcepls to Political Theories .3 Monistic Revisionist Liberalism: Social Justice and Cortt~butions to the Common Good. 199 8.3 Liberal l"o1itical Authority.iberdism: Rutes for Equaliy Free Peoptc. 207 Justice." X1 10.5 Summary.4 Pluralistic Revisionist Liberalism: A Revised Social Contract Among Free and Equal People. 188 8.1. 234 Political Authority 10.

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dfsanalysis of liberties and claims I-lohfeld" sanalysis of powers and immunitie?.Decreasixlg margirtal trtiliv Different utility functions: Healthy and hmdicapped Conditio~ans for effectkc.i:butims of income A. coordhatian problem . The prisoner 'S ddemma Two possible distl. choice and coaperati\ic.equality Hohiel.

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: Ihave presented much of this material to my students-both first-year and more adva~ced-at the University of Queer~sland in Brisbane. some of the most interests politic& theory occurs in this no-mm%-landbetkveen the rigorous scholarly book and the elementary texfbook. we write sophisticated ar~d complex into two classes. h the second. if you unperhaps t-he best er~try derstmd these questions. we present our arguments forljfied by all our defenses and qualifications in order to withstand the scmtil7y and criticim of our colleagues. I seek to present my own view of the analysis of political concepts. to illterest our readers without overwhcrlming thern with defenses. m the other. To present our views witl-rout their full fortifications. ( works that c m only be grasped by graduate students (perhaps only advanced graduate students) and fellow academics and. I confess. and the answers that have been proposed. X r t the first sort of book.tbly. one that I hope will be inkresting to the expert and useful to the novice. I think. also provide point for the study of politic& Ifiou@t. my own) too fretftlentSy falls 3 1 the one hand. My thanks to all of them . Acadennics' writb~g (including. Aust r a l i a . Ihis book is h ~ t e ~ ~ d for ed both sorts of readers: those who have already asked these conceptual questions and those who seek an jntroduction to political theory. Understandi. to introduce while challenging our readers and invitislg thern to disagre+a%l of these are fl-aughtwith obvious dangers. we rehearse the familiar and achawledged posi"cons.Ihe first great vestion of political theory was posed by Socrates: "Mikat is justicelf7t has beer1 joimd by otkrs.and the University of Minnesota. we write tex-ttnooksfor b e g k ~ i n g students that are of little interest to anyone else ( m d perhaps not even to them). Dnluth. suCh as. you understand the main debates and issues in the lnistory of political theov. I have tried to write a hook that is intermking to those who have a l ~ a d y thought about these mtters. we arc reluctant to bridge these safe shores. Yet. In this book. as well as accessible for those with little background in political theory. "What is liberty?'" "Vtrhat is equality?" and "What is political authority"" Anyone with political ideals sooner or later will face these sorts of ~ e s t i o n sThey .

d forth across Ihe I'acif-ic. but what academic life is all about.a p p e e d y interest and support. From him 1 learned not just what political. chap mar^. Last. Richard Dagger m d Michael Freeden provided extremely helpful comments for which 1am most grateful. I Ifiank them not oniy for their m u . but for their patience in the face of delays brought &out by my too-f~quent movements back a7. .X ~ V PRE~CE for letting me think things through in front of them. my o w r ~ teacher. theory is about. I wodd also like to express my appreciation to Westview Press. 1wodd like to express my profound debt to John W. and in this case most irnpartant. and for their reactions to my ideas.


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I shall try to get a bit clearer about what sorts of questions these are. power. Part I1 of the book will explore some of the enduring answers that have been advanced in political theory.1 In this imaginary conversation among a group of Athenians. and authority. one of the great legal theorists of the twentieth century called this "the eternal question of mankind. and especially the Republic. "What is justice?" Unless we know what we are asking for. From Plato onward. "What is justice?" The first proposal in the Republic is made by Cephalus. political theorists have asked-and have provided conflicting answers to--questions such as "What is justice?" "What is liberty?" "What is power?" and "What is equality?" In the first part of this book."* We all wish a govenunent that is just-but what is justice? To a large extent. and if so what constitutes a good definition?Or do we seek something other than a definition when we inquire. Are we asking for a definition. Socrates poses what may be the most fundamental of all questions in political philosophy: "What is justice?" Indeed. Three Definitions of Justice Let us return to the beginning: Socrates's inquiry. equality. the study of political theory is an exploration of different ways of understanding core political concepts such as justice. After this clarification of what sort of question we are asking. liberty. I Socrates's Question Political Theory and Political Concepts Western political philosophy begins with Socrates and Plato. who has had a long . we shall not be able to distinguish good from bad answers.I .

Socrafes: But does not harmkg a horse or a dog mean making it a worse horse or dug. Socrates concludes that "if the just man is good. and if it is not rigbt. Thus. must mean makhg him less just. is not the mad friend due his weapon? It is. his weapon. Socrates also rcjects this view. after all.. Polemarchus. asks Socrates. Ptllemarchzls: I suppos soso. But Socrates immediately casts doubt on whether this is all there is t o justice. though his argument against it is not as straightforward as his criticism of Cephalus's definition (that is.1 among i h e Grwks. just-ife is a skaightforward matter of telling the tmtb and paying one's debts-a view. W u M i t be right to if? Cephalus ilfSrees o do so. he believes that he clan provide an account of justice that rescues the cmx of Cephalus's definition while also showing why it would not be just to retun1 the weapm. Socrates: To h a m a mm. speaks up. Soemitis: Isn't that also true of human beings-that to h a m &em means. so that each will be a less perfect creature i n its own way? Polenzarchus: Yes. it cmnot be what that it would not he right t is required by justice. that justice demands doing goad to friends (since that is what is due to friends) and harmhg enemies (since that is what is due to enemies). that justice is simply repaykg one" debts): Socrates: Gal it really be a just man's business to harm any h u m a ~ being? Palemarchus: Certainly. the tmnjust. and it w u l d harm him to retun7 the weapon. that a friend from whom you hiwe loaned a weapon has gone mad and now &mm& the return of the cveapm. To Cqhalus. that has guided his owl1 life. it cannot he just to do so. must betong to his opposite."3 . Thus. no dnubt. making &em worse men by lrhe stmdard of human excellence? Polemarchus: Yes. it wodd not be appropriate to return the weapon becatrse it would not be giving him what is his due. another Athenian. the business of haming people. At this point. But. whether f r i e ~ ~ or d s enemies. since the madman is a friend. Suppose. He suggests an abstract defi11itiox-r of justice---giving each man his due. S x m t e s : And is not justice a peculiarfy human excdence? Polemarchus: Undoubtedly. says Socrates.and hmorable life in business. then. Polemarchus invokes a view that was commor. it is right to harm bad men who are his e~~emies.

TI-rrasymacusreplies by scvitchiw his notion of a "ruler"': if a ruler m a k s an error and proclaims a :law that does not promote his interest. he is rejecting a populilr Greek view (that a just person does good to his friends and harms his enemies) by appealing to (what he sees as) a necessary connection between being just one who does good and and doing good.Socrates.sat. but howledge of their craft. then this widely held Greek view of justice must be wrong. h the appropriate way. in so far as he is worthy of the name we give him. n~rasymacus jnsists that he sees the hard truth that the stronger make the laws. Suppo" the stronger make a mistake and pass a law that is not in their interest. and at that moment he is no craftsman. when he ~ C X a S sum wmng and just in so far as he gets the wrung result? Of course we do commonly speak of a physician or a mathematician or a scholar having made a mistake. m d "'justicef?s simEtty fhe name we use fctr what these l w s require of us. Lhen justice would require action Chat is not in the irtterests of the stronger.] are all for being precise-no one who practices a craft makes mistakes. So strictly speaking-and you [. when exercishg their skill they are s e e h g the good of others. but witb superior h o d e d g e . If justice involves obeyil7g tfie law. but Socrates quickly pojnts out that the howledge that they must possess is not howledge about how to advmce their own interests. As a man of the world. or a mathematician. rather than a philosopher. aIthougb they b m f i t from Lhe exrnise of their crilft because they al. but really none of these. rather. then at that point he is not redly a ruler: Would you say a man desrves to be called a physician at the moment when he makes a mistake in treating his patient and just in respect of that mistake. these laws serve their interests. Socrates immediiitely points to a problem.e paid.s an appare~~tly hardheaded and skeptical definition: ?ustice" i s whatever promotes tile interests of the stronger. 1 should say." mrasymacus now depicts a ruler as someone not simply with superior force. A man is mistaken when his knowledge fails him. as physicians seek the health of their patients not their own. bowever. the "mferf?is one who.ion. seeks the good "f the szllrjects over whom he exercises arnthority*Socrates thus . T%isleaves him having to explain what type of h o w k d g e is required for a (true) ruler. Thrasymacus acivar7cc. If this is the case. If a just persol1 is inhere~~tly who never makes others less just. Thrasymacus is a teacher of rhetoric-eKective public speaking-and questions whether all this philosoyhicai argument really makes sense. At this point. Thras>~macus breaks in on the conwn.It is important to see that Socrates is not appealing to a nlidely accepkd definition of justice. is ever mistaken. mrasymacus has compmd a ruier to a mathematician or a phy"cian.

Polemarchus relies on a commozrly accepted view (among the Greeks).1 justice servir~g 326s last move by Socrates leads to the suhject of the rest of the Repzdhlil. it does not seem to explain why it is not just to return the weapon to the mad friend. Last. It is clear. One can imagine Polemarchus saying to Socrates that "doing good to friends and harm to e~~emies it. then. a r ~ d conditions that renders them just."Yoocrates points out. Since this fir~x conviction about just-ice is inconsistent with the widely held view Socrates believes that we must reject the widely held view. Socrates shows here sists in doir~g that traditional or widely accepted views c m be. "'What is justice?" he provides a definition (justice as repaying debts) that is based m his own experienre and is easily &own to be inaddeiinitio~~. which is concerned with the nature of the ideal state and the tasks of rulers and citizens in such a state. cus was content to say that talk of justice is simply nonsense or b. hut when asked. As an hoz~orable person. hdeed trsually are. that relying on shared. even wmse. and bp vjrtue of shasing it are cases of justice. Socrates. he has acted justly throughr. His first proyosal-giving each his due-is a vague formula. what we Greeks mean by "justice. Cephaius. those such as Thrasymacus If Thrasymawho insist they are sirnply masks for power or dominatio~~. Socrates shows the inconsistencies of those who analyze concepts such as justice by debunkirlg them-that is. To clarify it. common views is objectionable because they c m be inconsistent or incohermt.tbble . ture or pmperty of actio~~s.ut Etis life. Socrates. is seeking neither examples of justice nor popular defhitions about what "we IhinkU". that justke congood to friends a r ~ d harm to enernies. What Socrates is Looking For We shall retznrn to Socrates's own proposal in Section 9. Lhe hor~est merchant. however. defective. the sake of justice. is not interested in parequate as a ge~~erill ticular examples-he is searchhg for that common element: that all instances or examples of justice share. and true harm to mother makes the other a worse mm. and Sacrates is unclear what it means.:he is seekb~g the c o r ~ c definition t that locates that common feapeople. though. Right nolv.3. illustrates what Socraks takes as our nor~xal condition: he c m identify hstances or examples of justire but confuses this with an understanding of what justice (itselffis.5 Polemarchus does better at providing a general account.turns mrasymacus% concception of justice upside down: rulers rule for tbe interests of lfie rulers. that a just man does not make others less perfect. Socrates says. rather tha3. I want to draw attention to the sorts of critkisms Socrates makes of others" answers to "What is justice?" This will help show us the sort of answer he is seekiizg.

the first ilnpnlse mi. As soon as we take it seriously. he ignores it. Ordinary conceptions can be confused and contradictory * "Justicerris a meaningful and important term." such as jnterests. 1."' Simply put. efforts to expbi.2 Words. m a t e v e r we mean by "justiceff%e surely do not mem that which promotes the hterest of the stranger. nrasymacus finalv :Learns this lesson and walks away from the conversation. he seeks that c o m o n element that all just thhgs share. In another dialogue. ''What is justice?" ':he seeks to answer it in a hardheaded m y that rduces it to the pursuit of inkrests. however. Definitions. we camot arrive at it s k p l y by rehearskg what "'we sayff justice is. view that I shall call ""conceptuirl. Plato believes that conceptunl terms such as "justice" refer to a special realm in which the concepts themsekes exist.1~3 explains ail gex~uine examples. square things. we can ide~~tify three basic cox~victions of Socrates about concepts such as justice: * Ralrher Lhan examples of justice. the Mn.(as. Socrates wants to discover that propeAy shared by round things. we see that it is not plausible to d&unk it by showing that it reduces to something hardheaded or more obviously ""ral.to. some have indeed claimed. and Things Plato's Conceptual Realism me three convictions listed at the end of the previous section led Plato and Socrates (it will be recalkd that Plato wrote the Socratk diaiogues) to a distinctive. see Section 1.ghl. oblong thhgs. As Plato put it. unahle to explain what justice is.he to point to exam. our conceptuirl. oblong. But as we saw in the case of Cephalus's defir~ition of justice.22. let us focus on an example outside of politics. as soon as one accepts that terns like ""justicc'dakesense. 7b sum up.terms refer to the world of '"formsff-pm inf the concepts. he could the avoid Socrates" criticisms. Instead he tries to show that ""adva~cing interests of the stronger" is what ""jusMceM means-rather thm ignoring the question. stmces o To better see what Plato has in mind.itr.n that sense in terns of mere intefest or power lead to muddles and inconsistencies. and so on. this will. and so . tben. it is because it possesses that element that anythivlg c m rightfully be said to be just. not do. if not especiatly plausible.ples of shapesround. * The correct accour~t is coherent. realism. As Socrates shows. square. ""What is shape?'' Now. we shall see. Socrates asks.

for ahhough being rnortal is necessary to make a creature a h u m (one can he human only if one is mortal). ""justice"-that is. then W is a r ~ appropriak description. Socrates is convizlced. Although it is true that there are not too many strict Platonists around today. recalf also that Plato is convinced that notions such as justice make sense. we arcept (2) &at if a word m&es sense we shodcl be able to give a defkition of it. and Oblong thhgs i l l lshapes. A dejrritio~ of shape would icfentify this "shnpemaking"' fcature. somehow. then. "fb say that con&tion X is ~ecessary erly usil-tg word W is to say that on4 gcondtion X applies to a case c m we properly descl-ibe it by Mi. Thus. and his theory of definitions leads him to co~~clude that it must refer to thnf essence! that cammoll thing s h a r d by all examples of justice.: to say that condition X is szificie~zfis to say that if a case has X. In particular' many of us believe (1)W r d s such as "justice""make sense and are impartant. Thus. : I naddition. not debunk them*Thus.e concept m d c m group cases together as sharing the essence. The essence &at is s h r e d by all cases of justice must. A defi-nition . he is out to explain them. that the essence mtrst in some sense exist. be some feahnre &at makes round things. exist. Socrates ultirnatell. "is mortal" is not a definition of hurnan bejngs. square thhgs. if "justice" i s sensible it must refer to something that actually exists. it is not szgflrtent.on." There must. proposes this definition: "Shape is the o~lly thinfjr that always accompanies cotour. the pure essence shared by all hstances of just-ic xists only in what he calls the realm of ""foms. somewhere. we had direct access to the world of concepts and mtain in our p ~ s e n world t a more or less hazy rrcollection. a d e f ~ t i o n identifies an essence-a shared feature of many otherwise diverse examples. on Plato" view if ""justice" i s a sensible term. for example. A defkihn. definitions of this essellce me often wrol~g. let us say." a re& of pure c o ~ e p t sPlato . Now. AS Plato sees it.te ar~d Why Plofo's View Is Nof os Alien os If May Appear It might seem that Plato's conceptual realism is implatrsible and alienno one thinks that way today. it nzzrst refer t o sonzetilirriy. three of the convictions that led Plato to his conceptual realism are still widely shared.ceFor Plato. people like Cephalus c m generally recognize examples of justice. But because our recollection of the world of conhazy. iljms at pmviding a set of conditions for use of a term that is both necessary and sufficient for for prop(properly) ushg the w o d . such that all can he said to be "&apes. as he has some recolkction of th. ~ seems to believe that at some point before we are barn. cepts is incomplt."'e Plato is seeking a similirP definition of justj. It would seem ta follow however. as all other animals are marhl too. it is 110t always the case that if one is mortal one is also human.

in which a collision bet-vveen two cars would be examined by using toy cars and toy people to recreate the accident.enstein's PhiEosvlziczls cvas that our language provides pictures of the world. and so provides proper definition of " J U S ~ ~ C ~ . then. Rrasymacus would not seek to prnvide a debunking account of "house'kr "horse": they obviously refer to real things in the world. (3) Last. Xnterestingly' 'MiitQenstcin tells us that this basic picture theory of language was suggested to him by L h e Paris traffic courts.. none of these convictio~~s seems outrageous. s " m a t is justiceTbounost people seek to provide a definition of '*justicerr that provides the essentid feature (or features) that governs the proper use of the word. . M e n asked.WI"l"it. the toys must stand fir things in the real cvorld. a l h u g h in one way cynical. which identifies the essence. He seeks to dehunk "~ustice. When we are most comfortable using the fer to somethit~g least so it seernewordls refer to *lin.gs.'bshe douibts r/vhetrher ""justice'bealty refers to al7ythiq at all. his proposal that it refers to cvhat is in the i n k ~ sof t the stmnger. their ~ l a t i v e positims and movernmts must also comespond to the positiox~s and movemmts of the real things they stand for. The recreated accident. Ihose who approach ihe study o f political concepts based on these two convictions oficen dmw their inspiration from the early work of I. mmy US share the conviction that if a word makes sense m d is importmt.of hunnanity aims at identieing that feature that is distinctive of humans---that d l h u m a ~ ~ and only humans have. the cmcriai thing was the way In we connect m o v a the toy cars and toy peoyie to the real accide~~t. or parts of the world. But t a k n together. that is. and that sensi:ble terms refer to things. at least does seem to show that "justice" ~ f e rto s something that is real. provides a picture of the world.tg. and is not about fiction or fmtasy it must at least purport to rereal. and the arrnngements of the toys pictures t-he arrangement of real things. mmy af us are convinced that to understand a term is to grasp its definition. for his conceptual realjsm explahs all three of these convictions: it shows that the word "justicef"is semible because it refers to a real thing (the concept of justice).1" For Wittge~~stein. " Words and Things Many people arc. they lead us to a new appreciation of Plato" proposal. i\ttracted to some version of claims (2) and (3) above. the placement of the toys forms a pictorial representation of the real world: each toy stands for a certain thing in the world.udwrig as the Wttgerrstein (3889-1"351)8 and a group of phi1osopher"onown basic proposal in his Traclutzis Logicological positivists. MOre thm that. That is. have. Taken singly. some smse.

In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that language does the same job: our language rrrirrors the world by givi~lg us pictures of it. Roughly---and I c m only give an approximate account of his complex theory her Wittgenstc.in mahtains that the world is composed of objects that are related (or arranged) in such a way as to fomfacfs; lar~guage is composed of rutords that name objects; when these words are arranged in sentences they mirror facts, Simple sentences mirror simple facts (that is, si.mple sente~~ces arrange n a m s is such a way as to mirror the arrmgemmt of objects that for~x facts), whereas complex sentences are composed of a nurnber of simple sentences mirroring a complex fact in the world.," It is important to stress that on the picturc? theory, languqe is not just a catalog of names that refer to things; the names must be arranged in such a way as to mirror the way objects are related in the kvorld. As Wittgenstein says, "What corrsfitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one mother in a determii'late wayff12C d f course, Wttgenstcin realizes that sentences do not % o Ll? i~ k the world-they are not pictures in that stsnse. His point is that they model the world hsofar as the relations between elem e ~ ~of t sa s e ~ ~ krepresent ~ ~ c e the arrangement of facts in the world. Now, to say that language presents pictures is not to say all these pictures actually comespond to facts, "A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or klcorrect, true or false."= "us, "in order to tell. whclther a picture is true or fillse we must compm it to reali,ty""""it is irnpossiblc to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false."ls Language, we might say, is m attempt to describe the world; if the picture is m accurate on if it corresponds to the arrangement of objects into facts-it is a true sentence; if it does not accurately picture the world it is a false ser.ltence. Roughly, W can say that sentences make sense when they seek to mi,rror the world, and are true when they actually do nlirmr it (false sentences are thus meaningful). This led the logical positiwists-----who adopted a very similar theory of lirnguage-as well as Wittgenstein fiinself (at least for a tiune) to adopt a uerificationi,i;ttheory of meming.Ib Semible or meaningful sente~~ceri can he verified in the sense that we can imagh~e a test that would allow us to dekrmine whether or not the sentence presented a true or Mse picturc? of the world. We need not actually conduct the test; in fact, we may not at the present time have the eyuipmmt to carry out such a test. The importmt claim is that if the n priflciple, c o d be sewence is meaningfd, it presents a picture that, i tested to see whether it is or is not accurate,
The Picture Theory and Political Concepts

We have arrked at a crucial junchre. Many of the se~~tences in which we are interrzsted seem in princi_pleunatole to be tested in this way; Consider

(1) It is not just to return a weapon to a madmm. (2) Justice is that which is in the interest of the stronger. (3) Masic?income for all is necessary for social justice(4) Liberty is the suprc?mepolitkal value. (S) We ought to have more equality in our sociev (C;) All authority should be illbolished.

Sentences (1.) to (6) do not seem verifiable by any test, because they contain terms ("just,'" "Ijustice," ""social justicer")that do not name any objects we couln ever observe. To be sure, Plato eho~gSll there were such objects, but not only are most of us skepticd that "justice" xfers t o any such object, but even if it did, it is impossi:ble to imagine a test in which this object plays a part, Sentence (4) has an additional problem: not only does it refer to the abstract value ""libert~'9butit also asserts that this value is ""spreme." H w codd we verify the supremacy of libery? Last, (5) m d (6) da not picture the way the world is, but the way it ozkglzb:to be. Mrheretas descriptive statements seek to fit themselves to the wodd-they seek to conform to the way the world is-ethical claims such as (5) and (6) seek to fit the world to them-they advise us to chmge the world so that the world fits "the picture"' they draw. Wittg"n&eir"t drew a similar cox~clusion. fn the Trachfus, he held that because these sorts of ethical statements do not even seek to descrijbe the world, they are without sense. In this he was very close to the logical positivists, who Fnsiskd that moral and value statements were "nonsenseff because they could not, in pril-tciple, be verified, Wittgenstein's view was more subtle. AIthough he agreed that ethical statements do 11ot describe the world m d so are without sel"tse, he does not deny that ethics is important and he does not think it should be abandoned. Rather, he believes, ehic-Sis mystical: it cmnot be taked about because it cmnot be conveyed in language since it does not seek to mkror the world. ""There are inked," says Miittgenstein, "&@S that c m o t be put into words. They make themsel:ves manifest. They are mystical."l7 Recall the three common convictions about the meaning of political concepts that I noted above:
(1) Words such as "justice" m m a k e serrse and are important. (2) If a word m k e s sense we should be able to give a definition of it, (3) If a word makes scnse and is important, and is not about fieiior~ or fmtasy; it must at least purport to refer to something real.

For all its problems, Plato%conceptud realism it; attractiw il7soiar as it makes sense of all three convictions. If, howeverpwe take a more madern

view m d refuse to accept that there is a realm in which value-laden conconviction (I), cepts exist, our devoticm to (2) and (3) tends to undermk~e m e logical positivists, accepting (2) and (3),thus denied that value conceptmake sense and that they are important; in the Tractlatzrs Wittgenstein accepts that t h y m important, but still denies that t h y make sense. h either case, it seems clear that if we combine a commitment to a close connection between sensible words and things to which they refer while rejecting I'fato~~ic conceptual realism, it will be hard to make sense of puliltjcal concepts such as justice or affir~xations of the value of liberty Perhaps if we eliminate any reference to goodness or vdue, we might still be left with s m e "value-neutral" plitical concepts. Clr p a h a p m e should say, we might be left with the value-neutral remnmts of our concepts such as justice, libertlr;, and equality Some philosophers, inspired by Wttger~stein'sTractaf~ks, have argued that W can separate out the ""value"ccompment oE concepts such as li.berty from the "descsiptivc'" compment, allowing conceptual. analysis to focus on the latter,'" shall m t pursue this passibility fi,r two reasons. First, even if "value-~~eutral'~ understanding5 of concepts such as liberty and equality are possible, m d even if they have their uses in s o m technical or social scientific Iheories, these vitlrte-neutral explicatiom are silent regar$ing our main interest in studying political concepts: we wmt to know, for example, not only what liber@ is, but why it is or is not important, and whether it is something some concepts-the. best exampie of vvhich we should strive for. Seco~~d, is jlzstice-seem to h v e very little purely descriptive components. An analysis of justice that left out of the account why it was to be sought, or why it s b u l d guide our actions, would tell us very little about justice. what justice is so that we can b o w what Like Socrates, we wish to h ~ a w sort of political and social life to strive for.

1.3 Wiugtgenstein's Later Analysis
Wittgensfein's Rejection of the Picture Theory

Miittgenstc.in begins his most impormt work, Philosophical Investigatiom, with a quote from Csnfessiotzs, in which Saint Augustine (35440) tells us how he learned to speak a language:
When they (my elders) named some c~bject, and aca>rdingfymoved towards something, X saw this and 1 grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant tct point it ctut. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of aft peoples: the expressions CIF the face, the play CIF the eyes, the movements of other parts of

the body, and the tone ctf voice which expresses ctur state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what ctbjects they signified; and after 1 had trained my motrtl-r to form these signs, I used thern to express my own desire.1"

Miittgenstein comments that this gives a particular "picture" of the essence of language. "lt is this: the indi\iidual words in language Inam objects-entences are crombi.rtali.ons of such nanzcs."zVhe waning of words, then, is the olbject for which they stand in the world. This view of course, is not simply Saint Augustine's---it is ihe view of Wittge~~stein M"ittge11stc.h thus begins the hinlself in his "I'raef-utzts Lclgico-Plz%los~pIzie~_~s. Philrtsophicul I1.rvesfigalionsby showing why hjs earlier picture theory of lmguage is wrong. Tb better undersmd the shortcomings of the naming t . l t e q of fallguage, WiHgenstein explores a simple language in which it seems correct.
Let us imagine a language for which the description gl"venby Augustine is right. The language is meant to wrve for communication beween builder A and an assistant B, A is building with buitding-stones: there are blocks, pilltars, slabs and beam. B has tc3 pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs thern. For this purpose they use a language a>nsistingof the words ""bcock," '""pillar,"dab," """barn." A calls out;--B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a calt,<onceive this as a complete primitive language.et

326s seems to be the sort of language one might be able to learn in, the way Saint Augustine describes: it is a methad that takes namkg objects as the most basic use of language. But two considerations show that even in this e x t ~ m e t y simple lmguatge, the assistant is not being trahed simply to comect words with things.

What is fhe Thing? Categorizing Under Concepts
Just what constitutes a ""slab" has to be learned by the assistant, 1 1is easy to svppose that when a buil.tler poi"t0o a piece of stone -and says, ""Sab," the assistmt will then connect the object to the word "'slab." But this seemingly easy coalnection presupposes a gxat deal. Suppose that the assistant knows n o t ~ n of g building or what the mater builder is trying to do; the builder simply pokts m d says, "'Slab!" The assistmt must know, first, what pointing is. If you try to point a bit of food out to a dog, the dog will sniff your finger; Che assistaM must have aiready l e a d that mems that he should look in, a certain direction. Havbg accom-

plished that, he must decide just what is be* pointed to, d shape? A color? A rock? Do all slabs have to be the same color, the same ~"tick~ess, the same shape? Be made of the same material,? What is the thing to which the builder is pointhg? Clne of the points W t t g e ~ ~ s kstresses in in bis later work is that we only h o w what is the thing that the word names as we come to use the word i n new sihations and gradually come to differentiate, for example, slabs Iblew a very from a variety of other Chings. Another exmple may help. : bright tkvo-year-old, and as with most children beginnixtg to learn language, he began by namiTlg favorite animals-in his case, it was "dogAugustine, had pointed to the g i e . " 'H i s parents, i17 the ma3.11"terof Sai~"tt say, various dogs in the neighborhood, to which he would c o r ~ c t i y "Doggie*"Had he learned what a clog was? Well, one clay we cvere looking at a picture book, and pointing to a picbre of a cow, he said, "Doggie.""I corrected himf saying, ""No,cow." Ful- a moment he looked puzzled, and then suddenly he exclaimed, "Oh! Cow-daggie!" When his parents pointtzd to the things they caIlcd "dogs," were they pointing to the object "animal," ""four-legged a~~imirl,"" ""furry walking Lhing,'" or what we call a "'dogM"?nly by ush3g the word in. different cvays in new situations could the two-year-old come to identify the thing we call a dog. Wittgenstein observes that Saint Atrgustine's account of how he learned his (first)language "describes the learnhg of human language as if ehe child came into a strange country and did not u d e r s t m d the language of the comtry; that is, as if he already had a lmguage, only not this oneem'"2 A Germar~ arrking in t-he W k d Staks, hlowil-tg no English, already has distinguitihed dogs from cows a"td cats----wecan say that she akcacfy has the concept of a dog. AB she has to learn is that the thing she calls ""hnd" i s what we call "dog." :It is importalit to stress here that Wttgenstein is not denying that trbjects are real, ancd so exist qtrite apart from language-C)f course, those twn tfiings that wake me up in the morning by jumping on my bed and licking me are real apart from any language. But our i m ~ a g groups e these things together trnder the same concept-"'Boxers." Learning to use the word "Boxer" i s to learn what thisrgs are hcluded and what are not; and when one has learned that, one has learned a good deal of the concept of a "'Boxer." It is importmt to note here tha"rdifferent languages may group n different ways, reflectiw different interests and conthiTlg~ logether i cern. Whereas, f-or example, we have one word for ""sno~.:" Eskimo languages have a variety of different cvords that pick out digereat types of: snow-falljng snow, packed mow, frozen snow, and so on-which, are identified as differex~t tl^Lhgs,reflecting the importance s m w has in the lives of Eskimos-25

Naming Versus Language Games

Recall again our builders7language. Suppose the assistmt; havbg mas&red the art of pointhg, h a d e a m d the concept of slab to the extent that he c m correctly identify t%(e ehir"tgs in the world that the word links up with. Even in. this ridiculously simple language, "slab!" i s not just a name o grasp the meaning of "slab!" the assistmt must not only for a thing; t know what one is, but what to do whet ehe master builder says, "Slab!" If, when the master builder said, "'Slab!," the assistant went to a slab m d danced a jig on it or broke it with a sledge hammer, he still would not h o w w h t "slab!"" meant. Througbut his later work, Wittgensteil7 insists that languqe is m t simply-indeed, not primrily-about snami~g things, but: about doing thjngs. The lcey idea here is that of a "lmguage game." m c builder m d his assistant are weaving togetkr words and actions": to know the meaning of a word is m t siznply to know what tbings it picks out in the world, but to h o w what to do with it-how it fits into our activities m d relations with others. The idea of a ""game"suggests a key featurt. of our language; it is about rules that govern the moves we can sensibly make. mink, for example, of the rules of chess: h e y tell us what constitutes a how we can respond to tlte moves of others. To know, for "move"" a r ~ d example, what is a queen is not to b o w simply (1)the name of a certain, chess piece, but to know d s o (2) the mles &at govern its movements. Someone who only car7 pick out fhe queen in a box of chess pieces has not really mastered the concept of a "'queen," for she has not mastered the rules that govern its use i n the g a m . T h i s would. "oecoxne ckar if she podaimed that she knew what a queen was, picked out the queen, and used it to crush the other queen, declaring, "My queen beat yours, I'm the winner!" :If to master a word for conceptual tern) is to master its use or funtrtio~~, we might want to press Wittgenstei,n to tell us what, &er all, is the fmctj,n of language. But this is to ask the wrong question, for there is no single functio~~ that all words perform: " 'i ~ ~ l i n k of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot; glue, nails, m d screws,-The fmction of words are as diverse as the function of these objects.'"*"Consider the num:lber of differctnt lnnguage games: Giving orders, and obeyistg them Describing the appeamwe of an object or giving its measuremernts Constructing an ohjiea from, a description (a drawing) Reporting m event Specdathg &out an event

and tellkg it Asking. Wittgenstein beiieves. I &all go for a walk??"'" I h e alswer.2"~r us. "Well. Because of this. al?d expectations that constiwhjch ~ f l e c t the s c o m o n jnte~rr?t. because mear7ir1gs are p a t of a Imguage. Wittgenstein asks. They thus share an understandjnff of what this activity is and what their roles am in it. In our builders' language game. is no. To understar~d gues. the builder expects the assistant to bring a slab when he says. he insists. In response to Socrates" question. say.ztions tutc a form of life. Because lmguage is a game-or rather.gzb Forms of Life and the Public Character of Language One of the charactefistics of most games is that those with whom we are w i n g also understar~d tkmselves to be playhg the game. gr*eeting. language is hherently public a word (or a co~~cey tual term). ihankb~g."27 A lmguage is part of living. '"lab!"' and t-he assistant expects the builder to use the slab to build with rather than. " m a t is justice?" people often reply with somethhg like.prayi. The players have a shared w~derstandir"tg of the rules and sirrrilar expectatio~~s about what sorts of responses are appropriate and which are not. what f mem by . many different types of games-that is an element of a f o m of life. is necessarity a social act: one c m only understmd a cvorcf insofar as one is a member of a Ihguistic community. to understmd the words of that language onc must understand the ways of living of r/vhich that laquage is a part.Foming and testing hypotheses M a h g up a story and rcading it Play acting Makhg a joke. it makes no sense to appeal to prhate meiu~ir~gs-whatyrm (idiowcraticalty) mem by a word. the importa~t point is adamantly denies that one can have private meanings that Wittge~~stein for terms that are simply in one's head. Wittge~~stein arand shared. attack the assistant with it.4 Wittgenstein and Conceptual investigations 326s last point is important. We need and what is k~vollkred not go into these compk?x matters here. "Can I say ' b u b u b u k d mean 'If it doesdt rain. cursing. This idea leads Wittgenstein into complex investigatio~~s into just what is meant by ""understanding" i n following the rules of a lmguage game. Iheir w~derstanding oi the lanpage is thus ernbeclded in what Wittgenskin calls a "form of li(-e. 1.

he recalled." but they appear to have the right idea. Chat justice consists in doing good to one's friends and harm to one's enemies. valuable contribution. Socrates finds that this definition does not explain the injustice of rebrr~ing a weaporl to a m d friend. even Thrasymacus makes a.Cephalus. As Karl Marx pok~tcd out (see of fhe Section 9. Wittgenstein sees it. it will. Socrates" criticisms are based on three convictions.Moreover. Wittgmstein" later philosophy suggests that Cephalt~s and Palemarchus are an the right track: they seek to explain what "wefr (Athenims) mean by justice. It is. "What do 1 mean by 'justice?')"'than "'What is justice?" Indeed. was a tradit i m l Atherliiarli view.question""'he does shed light on one function of justice talk. If our interest is in unlterstnlnding our language games (which. all of which Wittgenstein disputes. conceptuiri go for a walk. talk about justice can he employed as an insh-ume~~t powerful to protect their own inte~sts. to say. allowing fhat others may meal someehing entkeiy different."hough no one agrees with me or uses the word that way" makes no more sense than to proclaiq "Vtrherl I say "bububuffit meirns 'If it doesn't rain. Although he is no doubt w o r ~ g that ""justice'km~ulzs "in the interests of the strongerff-in this respect he is not really ilnswering Socrales's r. Ceph"lUq Polemarchus. you content yourself with explairnkg your meaning. and the answers given by Cephalus and Polemarchus (Scsctior~ 1. after all.'" If language is inbere~~tw investigahn cannot be about individual reports clf private meanings. it seems that you c ot be ~ ~ r o about n g what you mean-it is head when you talk about sirnply a matter of reporthlg w h a t is in YL~ZIT justice. Socrates seems the most confused of the discussants. 'This is what I mean by 'justice. . Of course. as : I pointed out.From this perspective. 1shall p"b1ic and shared. this may seem more tollerant. Recal again Socrates" question. This. To explicate justice is to explain the way justice enters into the Athenim form of life. . and nrasymacus all make importmt abservations. however.justice is . tells Socrates that justice is payhg one's debts and keephg one's word. :If one takes seriously Wittgenstcin's :later view of :language. they do not expfaixl all of the 'ljustice lanwage game. If doing good to onc's friends and harming me%enemies is fundamental to Athernim justice." h response to our deep disagreements about justice.1). then Cephalus and Polemarchus pmvide the right sort of answer to Socrates's questions. much tempting to resort to private mear~ings easier to answer. having spent a r ~ honarable life in bushess. rather than praclaimhg what justice is. includes the role or function they pI"y). it is or definitiol~s. so Polernarcrhus replies with a more general definition. . A?.1).

one may have the Gaus height. OIympic games. however.Socrates-and 1have suggested that many of us concur-wants a defiinition in the sense of identifyillg that trait that has it. What i s common to them all?-Don? say: There t ? ~ l i sbe t something common. or that they would not be called "$"gamesu""but look l a ~ d see whether there is anything common to all. how can one justify a claim that "Sacrates is a just man" or "Athens is a just cityf? ?us. Da all games involves rules-kvhat of a child throwing his ball at the wall and then cakhing it again? m a t we see is "a ccomplicakdi network of similarities overlapping and criss-cr0ssirTg. one c m never h o w whether one is correctly ascribing justice in particular cases.. ailrhough he admits that his interlocutors plausibly identify g some cases of justice. every just thing has and that. Wittgcznstein's point is that none of these farnily traits are likely to be shared by each and every Gaus. As we have seen (%&ion I .'" shared by many. There is a "Gaus nose.q Wj. by a variety of crisscrossing traits. and that the aim of cmlceptclal inquiry is to discover the nature of that thirlig. and ears. in the senscs of rnilcus all aim to show that they have not d~firzed identifyixlg the necessary and sufficjerlit conditions for properly calling something "just" "ctian 1.3)! in many ways the guid-ing ajrn of Wittgensteln's :later philosophy is to show the inadequacy of this naming tln. but not a X 1 .2).ttgel?steia calls these relations "family resemblances. if a~ything That is. mother the . makes that thing just. and so on.If one does not h ~ o w what makes something just. Socrates" criticisms of Cephalus. he insists that they fall far short of b o ' ~ v h what justice is (and so they cannot really be sure about their cases). But what about solitairc? Perhaps aII games are musing-but war games are not at all arntxshg. and mrasyjustice. l00k!31 :It might seem that aII games involve a whmer and loser. Second. Wittge~listein. and the shape of the Galas face.Gauses-and similar things can be said about complexion. And a whole series ctf them at that. Polemarchus." h e a n boardg m e " card-games. relatirtnships. there are 'Gaus ears. and by virtue of sharhg it are cases of justice.eory of laliguage. members af the same family because they are united. nose.'' We c m identify. &Ifs us that it is misguided to search for a definition that provides the essence of a concept: Consider for example the proceedings that we call ""gmes." but not all Gauses have it. To repeat: drm't think. Socrates is convinced that "justice" names a thing.-For if you Xook at them you will nctt see something that is common to nff. Socrates is convinced that if one does not know the essence.First. he seeks a defi~liitioll that identifies the essence of justice: that common thing all cases of justice share. height. but sidlarities.

ge"s a third criticism of the Socratic approach that c&s for closer examj. we will undergames~onstellations of actions stmd our concepts as parts of languaf~e and utterances related in complicated and crisscrosskg ways. sharc?d essences that are the focus of Socratic pt?ilosopf-ty. Rather. however. for he seeks what is commorl to alf cases.nation. the search for essentialist defhitions is doomed to failure. and face. complexion. Socrates" sawn attempts to formulate such definitions seem testimony to this. m d we should not find the ""t-hng" k~ be seeking a shared essence of all appropriate uses of the conceptual. justice i n . But the very abstrachess and formality of his pmposals lead us to question whether the search for essences is really what we are interested in when we ask. The interest in conceptual investigations is not tru see what at1 the members of this constellation share. but to chart out the relationships among them and to see precisely how the constellation hangs together to f o m our concept of justice. to these furmalistic and highly abstract definitions. a third the face. The first two criticisms that Wttgenstein might make of Socrates seem sound and promise a much more fruitful patb when analyzing political concqts: our task is not to which the conceptual term refers. We already have seen that he defines s h p e as that which always follows color." e' : can see how %crates is Icd. Socrates defkes justice as a proper ordering. this idea in the next chapter. and height. tern. the rope is composed of overlaypillg threads (traits). we shall develoy. More basic than conceptual realism and the search for definitions is Socrates's conwictim that our actual practices are co~~fused ar~d contradictory. :If the w~ity of our concepts is best explained by farnily resemblances. What fo Do Abouf Conceptual Confusion? GZiJttgrnstei~z'sApproaclz to Cttrzfusion. yet it still may be quite obvious that they are members of the same family (once we consider their relations to the others). su~i. yet we c30 not question the unity of the rope. No sbgle fiber runs through the entire rape. and the aim of philosophy must be to make them rational and . a man is a just ordering of the parts of his soul. In &is list.nose. whereas a just city is one in which each class pmforms its appropriate function. the first and last share no common traits. nose. Wittgez~stein. "What is justice?f' If we take Wittgenstein's later philomophy seriously. 'This :looks much m m promising than i h e search far the sorts of formal. and yet a fourth the face and complexion. Wttgenstein sometimes uses ar~other metaphol-: that of a Lhread or a rope. i n which each part performs its appropriate task. after a long analysis in the Republic: he s e e m to suggest swerai formulations of the concept of justice.

hmousty proclaimed that "'each member of society has an inwiolirbility founded on justice whjch even the weifarc. be left to enjoy their Eft. Now it cannot be the case both ( 1 ) that justicre derives from our commitment to social kvelfare and (2) that it is independent of our commitment to social welfare.."v If so.trhat people will. limits what c m be done to advmce it. Polemarchus.7)---is to ens. giving back what is owed) but then deny it (it is unjust to return a madman" weapon). once agak.in might suggest that the job of individual. the very incomistr-mcy or incoherence of a language game may help it serve its f'tmction. Socrates. is the task of the philosopher: Wittgenstein suggests a different understanding of philosophy. T%us. 'That indeed. Consider. justice is independenl: of social welfare and.l'est that insofar as our actual practices arc? co~lfused tory. in a preement of juslice-(see Sectio~~ dictabl.. rights-a crucial el8. others have insjsted. A theory that asserted both would be inconsistent. Even if it would advance the social good. W show them to be defective. they must be erroneous. Socrates takes it or contradicas manj. e especially n the utilitarian tradition. m d to act on inconsistent or erroneous views cmnat make sense.e way. codd not accept such a theory: we must either embrace (1)or (2)or try to show how to reasomlably mcond. that the demmds of as we shall see j justice are constrajnts on promoting the social good: John Rawls. of cowse. of everyone c m o t override. a philosopher inspit-ed by MCittgenstc.le them (pern some ways justice derives from lfie social good haps by showing that i and in other ways it does not).corzsistent. to accept such a view of justice requims having hcmlsistent beliefs about justice.35 have insisted that "justice" picks out those i lhose things that are crucial for advancing the social good. ancd insofar as they m erroneous t h y c m not guide the actims of rational agents. S o ~ philosopf~er. but to explain why our language games appeal to inconsistent beliefs. Because Imguage games are to be understood in terns of the frlnctjons they serve. however. rather than deriving from our commitme~lt to advar~cing social welfare. our notion of justiceq34 Philosophers have long d i s a g ~ e d about the rdatio~l of justice to the social good or overall welfare of sockty." But n Chapter R. and so in need of revision. for example.For example. crucidly. m d Thrasymacus are all criticized or confusiolls: they asbecause their proposds end up in co~~tradictions sert that justice is one thing (for example. . Cephalus. Tlnd pmperty as they see ft.. we camot justly sacrifice some people to m k e others better off. Socrates takes it: as given that when we show the confusions and inconsistencies of our actual views and Iangwge gmes. Ijberty. As rational people. suggests that the aim of conceptual investigation should not be to cnsure our conceptual commitments am consistent. we want our actions and beliefs to make sellse. Wittgensteixn. justjce is thus always a way to promote lfie social good or the welfare of society.

for jusit generaiiy must be consistent tice to be widely supported and e~~dorsed. then they cannot serve as an effective gUide to action. it was widely believed that they would be sent to camps . to see why we are confused. and someeiunes to decide on life m d death. people would not be committed to it. to educate. It is. say. People. demanded that the prisoners be returned to the Soviet Union. to guide votir. %crates's basic conviction is right. and property. we need to believe that justice is good for society Thus. with the weifare of society: if justice really m d e society worse off. W o would support justice if it was believed that it stood i n the way of what is good for society? Individual rights rwst thus be seen as a m y to advance the social welfare. there is nothing left for the Wittgerrstejniitn phjlosopher to do. Altltough it is enlighte~~hg Why We Need to Try to Clear U p (70~1fasior. but not all of whom. to justify interference or refraining from interfering with the lives of others. If our beliefs about justice are confused and cont-radictory. a d these cannot be taken away eve11 if it wouid advmce the welfirre of society to. Yet. some. we thus say. we must understand justice as quite independent of the social good. to reward.lg and pubtic policy.r~. the case of Atlied statesme11 in World War I X *The British held Russian and ZThainian prisoners of war. deprive s m e irttensely di. a sign of ghilosophiwconhsion to then go on to ask. Once we understand this character of justice-as simujtitneously blocking and deriving from the social welfare-we can underdefe~~ded these hcompatible t-heories stand why philosophers have lor~g of justice. liberty. and why both ways of see@ it are crucial for it to effectively function: that is itll there is to say about it. and why some conf~~sions persist and are even useful. We employ noti. the salne Witlgensteinian may insist. the Soviet dictator. it is zrs#tdt to f l r i ~ k and ray cuntradicfury sorts of treatmer~t filings about if. had fougJ-tt in support of the Germans. It is not the proper task of philosopks to "'fix" our lmgunge for us. t o do its job. Co~~sider. for justice to efkctively perform its function of securlirmg certain for individuals. to tax. Josef Stalin. the Wittgensteinim rrright say.at least within wide limits. have rights to life. How could justice effectively block propmills to advmce the social w l fare if ever)rone saw jusljce as kriving from the social welfare? So. As mtional believers. we c m o t rest contcfnt with the thought that we entertain irrconsistent beliefs about: justice. To ensure commitment to justice. and so give it the standing to effectively block that good. "Is justice really derivative of social welfare or indepertdent of i t ? ' V e have seen how it both i s and is not derivative. for example. we must vjew it as il7deper1&11t of social welfare. If justice is to perform this joh of blocking appeals to social w a r e . But havkg thus explained our concept of justice. our Vu'ittgenstehi a would ~ say.sliked minority of lheir liberty and property.ons of justice to cf-tange our societyf to punish.

Because we wish not only to mderstand the bvay concepts are used but to employ them to guide our own decisions and actions. Socrates is searchjng for a definition that shows what all cases of justice have in cornmoxl. h d as soon as we seek to clear up conceptznal confusion. by bringing about peace. the examples of justire we see in the world i s m e way relate to or insta-rtiatetkese concepts. and is not about fiction or fantasy. we encomter conceptual disputes: competing proposals as to the best way to clear up our concepts. but deeply confused. were convhced that the prospects for world peace after the war depended on securing the friendship of Stalin. and the prisoners were r e t u r x d and executed. . Socrates and Plato ultimately hold that notions such as "'justice" refer to a realm of "'forms'7n which pure n cases of the concepts exist. I have explored three approaches to the analysis of political concepts. Platorlic eonceptzial realism makes sense of three common convictions about languilge a d concepts. and (3) if a tern makes sense m d is iunportant. Non: in making this &cision. (2) if a word makes scznse we s b u l d be -able to give a definition of it that reveals the essence of the idea to which the word refers. (1)words such as "jjusfice" make sense m d are important. in which Socrates is searnhing for a definition of justice. we need to go beyond uderstanding confusions. the relation between justice and the social goad was crucially iIxsportant. the statesmen w u l d have far more rc?asoll to sacrifice sorne for the sake of such a great good as worid peam".and killed if returned. we must try to clear them up. it must at least purport to refer to something real. we seek t-o understand justice because we w m t to $0 the righl: t h g a ~ we d wish to have a just society. W saw that Socrates thinks that most peaple" ideas about justice are partly right. :More generdy. and bloclcs attempts to secure the good of many at a cost to the few. 1 began Section 1. As Socrates realized.o th" extent that justice is indepenkr~t of the social good..1with a discussion of Plato" Repzdblic." Both British m d American statesmen were caught ha conflict bet-vveen the demands of justice and the ability to secure social and world good. they had strong reasons to resist the temptation to accede to Stalin" demar%&. p~ssured the British to return to them to StaliJr.e marrifest injustice to these prisoners. We turn to such disputes in the next chapte~: In this chapter. The British acceded to the pressure. and so. however.TOtell them that justicre both is and is not derivative of the social good does not assist them irt makiclg thc right decision. To the extent that justice serves the social good. The Americans. They had to make a cJecisio11. &spite th.

.4. (2) and (3). tice" is used artd to mderstmd the ways in which it fumtions in diverse settings. Last. retain (2) and (3): they insist that kvords c m be defhed in terms of the objects to whi& they refer and that meaningful sentences seek to somehow picture or describe the w r l d . 1. naming is one. And though m a y are reluctant to accept Plato's theory of foms. Athough this view rescues our political concepts from the charge of realism-and senselessness-witlout resorting to any sort of col~ceptual in that respect is a great advmce on the first two views we considered. but in a mystic& way that transcends meaning. 1957). We nlant to h o w what is just. 20 [I. telling jokes. 'To understand a term is not to grasp what it naxnes. and trans.It . Ibid.lactuf.ly as implausible. Wtwt is Jzistice? (Berketey: University of Cafifcjrnia Press. .c. as the main evidence we have for Socrates's positions are the dialogues written by Plato. ed. and most language is not about naming objects. Neither leaves any room for rational maXysis of our most importmt political concepts.. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 'The: Republic. they are also reluctant to abmdon convictions (2) and (3)"As we saw in Section 1.3 and 1. and poetry.). But rejecting the idea that concepts such as justice we part of the world. t h y ultimaely reject cowiction (1):that such corrcepts are meaningfzll and irngortal7t.Although it makes sense of these three key convictions. Elans Kelsen. Language provjdes a wide range of functions. pp. Francis MacDmald Cornford. He did not leave any writings. Conceptual investigation. 3. but so are commanclir~g. %?crates (470-399 B.) was the first great Western philosopher.zis. Plato. we want a well-supported and coherex~t cox~cept of justice to guide our dctiberatio~~ and action. making complakts. p. I turned to the later work of Wittgenstein Here he gives up both col~victions in his Philosophical f~zuesfigafioi~zs. in S c t i m s 1. but his philosophical views are reported-albeit in an edited and modified fc~rm-by his student. 4. Wittgenstein" early work in the 7i. 1945). Plato (ca 42tF-347 B. 2. then. it seems to have skayed too bar ham Socrates" ((andour) interest in underWe do not wish to simply k " t o whow ""jusstanding political ca~~cepts. Platonic concephtal realism strikes mar.2. The logical positivists hold that these coneepts are neither mear1ir"tgful nor importal~t. 334-3351. but how it is used in a form of life. praying.is thus impossible fully to disentangle the views of Sctcrates and Plato. 33-14 [I. p. and the logicai positivists. l. 34G3411.asking questions. seeks to understand lrhe uses of a tern-why we use it in different ways in different contexts to perform different functions. Words cannot be defined. Wittgenstein thinks they are important.c.

. 19. 18. See also Hannah Pitkin. 199Sj. Witfgenstez'n b Ci>nct. Wittgenstein.chap. 13. for example. D. T. 2. 32. Fann. Xbid. 22. sect. See Ludwig Wttgenstein..G. Ibid. 6. This movement was important in the years between the First and Second World Wars and in the 1950s. The E n n s of PolifimfDiscourse. 21. p. J. 22ff. Iff-tiIosoplzicnE In~?esfigatir>ns. (Princetcm: Princeton University Press. 1983). Xbid.5. Raciafus. S. Wittgenstein. PIzifosoplzica1I~vestigatr'ouzs. See Pitkin. tram. pp. 221 1 1 7 5 B]. Connolly. G. see the Meno and the Republic.ytion of Pllilusopfty (Berkeley: University of Califc3rnia Press. 102-105. W.. See Hans Slugs. 27. the Metzo.. trans. trans.. 11. Prr7tagoras and Me~zo.chaps. sect. 117. 14-15. 2. 28. Wittgenstein. 1"322). 15. 23. See Pitkn.pts: A Reconstrttciio~z(Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wilkge~ste-ilz and jzrstice. 24. 2.UK: Penguin. Meno keeps giving Socrates exampies of virtues.E. 1. (Harmondswortt-\. sect. sect. 8. Ibid. note to sect. p. 2. 8-9. For a very helpful account. pp. Cuthrie. Xbid. bliticnl Ct>nct. sect.622. Plato's views about the forms seemed to undergo change. 18n. 7". 12. Xbid. Tractatus. Saint Augustine. P!zilmoylzicol Itzvestigalb~zs. (New k r k : Macmillan... 10. Wiffgenstez'n and just ice (Berkeiey: University of California Press.. The British philosopher A. See Plato. Fitkin." in Hans SIuga and David G. Anscornbe. Socrates makes this point even clearer in another dialogue. See. 1'E'-l"i7.24. 1961). 20. 6. 1958). For a criticism. pp. Fur useful discussions. chap. Wittgensteil-zS Concepfio~z qf Plzilosaplzy. p.M. 32.. PFzz'losoplzicnl Inz?esfigafions. 19. I. chap. ""udwig Wittgenstein: Life and Work. 25. 8. 3rd ed.224. 31. 1981). 7. he seems more skeptical in the firtneg ides. 30. Stern. sect. F701itical Colzcepfs. see Wiltiarn E.K. eds. chap.23.23. p. 66. 2. Tracfladzishglsu-Pljilosuphkus. in which he is searching for a definitirln of virtue.. see K. sects. but Socrates seeks the common element that ""permeates each of them" and explains why each is an example of virtue. Wftgezisteinnzid fzkstice. sect. 119 174 A]. Ibid. sect. Ibid. 1956). (tondctn: Routledge and Kegan Paul. . Ayer (191&1"389) was one of the leading logical positivists. McGuimess. 11. 26. For more classic statements. 2nd ed. Wittgenstein. pp. sect. sect. 221. esp. Ibid. The Cambridge (?ompanit~illn fo Wii"fgenstez'n (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See Oppenheirn. F. sect. Pears and B. 9. Witfgenstein. Plato. 20. 23. F. see Fann. 4 29.. 19691. Wiftgenstez'nafaB lustice. 14. Felix Oppenheim. sect. Ibid. as quoted in Ludwig Wittgenstein. 16. Metzu.

chap. p. 37. Benn and G.m. lW"i71. See. pp. 298-315 [IX.. John Rawls. "The creed which accepts as the foundatirtn of morals %utility1or the "greatest happiness principle3hoXds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness. A 77~mry ofJzistice (Cambridge.1. Plato. pp. Sharpe. 2)." h S . eds. 12tt-143 [IV. . Public afaB PrimEe ilrz Social Lfe (New Ycfrk: St. NE": M. 35. chap. Utl'lifarinnit. 7. I.33. E Gaus. See Mill. pp. See my Socinl PJzz'lusupizy (Armonk. M A : Haward University Press. 34. far example. 433-441. para. wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happinessr' (John Stuart Mill. E. "Public and Private Morality: Clean Living and Dirty Hands. Martin" Press. chap. The Ryublie. 3. in jczhn G r a ed. Benn. 4. 85ff. 1983). 5'92-587'1. 38.. Utl'lifarinnism. 1999). Hannak Pitkin makes the same point with a different example-knowledge. 36. 19413. ~ Otr Libert-y a ~ Ollzcr d Essnys [New Ycxk Oxfc>rdUniversity Press. See S. See her Wittgenslei~z and justice. 5. 2.chap.

some way revise our understanding of justice. our social life-kve cannot remain content with contradictov and confused ideas. utilitarian phihsophers such as John Stumt Mitl (1806-1873) have tried to show how justice derives from consideralions of social welfare.1 Essentially Contested Conrepts The Politics o f Political Concepfs I argued in. whereas others have sought to demmstrate how svcial justice is enl-irely &istinctfrom soagents. To retznrn to our example of justice m d the social good ot be the case that jusftice is both (1)entirely inde(Section U). Philosophical mflection. This process of "'clearil7g up" inevitatabiy il7volves decisio~~s about whicrh uses-parts of the co~~cept-weWjll stress and continue to affim. when we examine disputes abmt the best way to interpret a political concept. Thus. then we must in. but we wed to try to clear them up. for example."Vo many philosopher. m d is nof something independent of it. but parti. we emcial welfare. parti.sm and chmged conflicts. Socrates understoocf this and was constantly seeking to get beyond the confusions of our normal wnys of thinking.2.cipmts often denying that their opponenb even make sense. and to change. especidly socialjsts and . the notion of social (or distributive) justice that has been described as the '%bsession of our tine. and which we will revise or reject. with. As ratior~al ploy cortcepts to make sense of. codd clcar up these conceptual confusions. we typically do not find dispassionak philosophers engaged in a disinterested pursuit of the truth. ancf camot be derived from it. the first chapter that not only do we need to tmderstmd our concepkral confusions. Consider. all.1 Yet. he believed. they insist. And m n y contemporay philosophers agree: philosophical i~livestigatior~.if it c per~dent of considerations of socid welfare and (2) simply a way to promote the social good. can clarify and systematize our cmcepts.

it is an &use of language to talk &out whether it is just. or as if the particular benefits or harm difkrent persons derived from the market were determined by particular acts of the will. Nielsen is aware of?but rejects. to have an understanding of what morality requires. Hayek co~~cludes.ing it as if it were an indhictual that codd act.3 . or the ""treatment" of individuals and groups by society ought tc? possess.~ In contrast. . Hiayek maintains that this is to personify society. It is a sign of the immaturity of our minds that we have not yet outgrc~wn these primitive ccmcepts and still demand from an impersonal process . . . there has to be redistrib~tion. insists that given the moral lanthat the social sptem distribute goods guilge game. . defevlder of milrkets and opponenf: of wonomic planning. Since society is the realrn of impersonal forces. that it conform to the moral precepts men have errotved for the guidance of individual actions. treat. . even where these were never foreseen or intended.defenders of the contemporary wdfare state. This ccmception of ""sclcial" "justice is thus a direct a?nseqtrence of that anthropomorphism or personification by which naive thinking tries to account far the xjt-ctrdering process. . As primitive thinking usually does when first noticing some regular process. What needs to be altered is the social system. insists that "social justire" k an "abuse"'of the word "~ustice": It is perhaps nett surprising that men should have applied to the joint effects of the actions of many people. Hayek"s dismissal of social. and so could violate rules of morality.justice. Hayek (1899-1992). . E A. It is not so much demands placed on individuals within an unjust system that are crucial but a commitment ctn the part of individuals tct alter the social system. the results ctf the spontaneous orderkg of the market were interpreted as if some thinking being deliberately directed them. the conception of justice which they had developed with respect tc3 the conduct of individuals towards each other. whereas the socialist. Morally speaking. . a Noble prize-whning economist. . and could therefore be guided by moral rules. when sharing it could be done without any serious inconvenience to oursefves? . ""Social'" justice (or sometimes "economic" justice) came to be regarded as an attribute which the "%ctions" of society. . say E starving person. Kai Nielsen." Thus. we need to understand that we camot be indifferent to the suffering of others. Sometimes we are morally compelled to redistribute. social or distributive just-ife is a fundamentai maral imperative: To have an understanding of the moral language-game. social justice ~quirc3s in the way required bp morality. . . . Are we justified in holding onto c m d which could be shared with a even a mkzdscztltr bit of our property.

6 GaUie expiains bis idea of a thmugh t-he example of championship. we are aIl fitmiliar with the idea of a c h q i o n s h i p . Each team stresses some aspect of the gam peed. As Gallic points out. Each side has its devoted supporter" as well as less loyd "floalifig" fms.'r (S) Every team" supporters insist that it is the champion. considers a different sort of competition. some teams specialize in speed. who hsist that this is trhe truly crucial aspect . a team can be the champion today and dethroned tomorrow. (4) The competition has no officiaf judges. nor does it retain the title for a fixed period. Typically there is m m u a l competition. Since there arc. ihe ' E & 'chantpion. El. continuous games. ol. Gallie." W. Ratlner than being an ivnpartial dispute about the best way to char up our confused thhking. Even if one team tends to win the ""true"or the ' most. this dispute seems intractable: Nielsen believes that Hayek's view is based on a misur~derstandil-rg of the moral language game. though. and the permon or team selwted by the rules is desipated the "'champion" for that year. that the champio~~ is the tearn that "'pfays the bestatf (3) There is no one point at which a team becomes the champion. jn which each side steadfastly trpholds its jnterpretation. because their team excels i n Ihe styie of play that is most importmt. and ge~~erally remains the champion until the next season's competition is concluded. however. wifh some UTIusual f e a t u ~ s : (1) Each team has a distinctive style of play. Gallie tries to explain the intractable nature of disputes about political con1 1 'kssa~tiallycor~testedconcept'" cepts. power. or "the champicrns" in a sport. lfie conflict is more akjn to a political disptrte. others in power or "trategy (2) T%echampionship is not akvarded according to some settled and agreed-upon body of rules. strakgyand is supported by its fms. the supporters of other t c m s will insist that their tearn is the true champion. but rather i n virtue of the style and level of play. equality and so on-ti-tke on this politicai character? In m h p o r t m t essay titled "'Essentially Contest-edConcepts. who endorse the team as " h e best. Why do our conceptud disputernabout justice-and liberty.In many ways. kvhereas Hayek insists that Nielserr" socialism mistmderstands the concept of justice. Ewryone agrees.

at1 contestmts must maintain. one liberal or individualist. W would never expect the dispute to be settled: who was champion would always be contcrsfed.of the game. right. "or of the gewral p"i""p1e""hat should govem the distribut-ion of goods in a civilised and humane society. In this sense. Based on this model of the champior~ship. and so on can be expained in different ways. (XI%) 'Just why the achievement or condition signified by the complex concept is good. the other socialist or coUectivist. Gallie claims. good. t-hey claim. The liberal conception builds on the idea af fair dealhgs between hdividuals and s t ~ s s e thats just rewards should reflect merit or contribution (see Sections 8. m d each party has some understanding and agpretliation of opposing uses on which they are based. a d so 01%is not manifest. right.possible to show what so which team is aspect of the game is truly the most important. the championship is essentially contested. worthy."" There are. righh-ress. Each No party to the dispute team wants to clajrn the title of ""chmpior~. its goodness. and so on. intractable dispute about who i s the champion. Gallie's poht. is that such a competition would be characterized by constant. (V) Parties to the dispute recognize that their olvn use is disputed.The cmtral case for this view is fair market relatior~s: in fair Crzla~sactims people are rewarcfed differently m d this reflects the meri. a U must defend heir claim h a t the aspect (or aspects) of the concept on which they focus is the most importa~t and try to argue agahst those who stress other aspects. one of r/vhich is the concept of social justice. though. for it seems ian. (IV) The cor~cept is open to new h~terprctations. Gallie lists the conditions a concept must fuliill to be essentialfy conksted: (X) The concept must be evaluative or "'appriaisive"': it must indicate or signify something that is valuable. (11) The nature of the concept must be complex? so that d i f f e ~ nast pects of it can be stressed.es of the .More importmt.3). their own use af the concept in the face of other uses. and the aspects of the cor~cept Because of (V). Clearly. a r ~ d truly the champion. of course." would be willlng to let another team decide on how ""campion" is to be used. two rival interpretations of social justice. An Example: Social Justice Gallie provides several examples of essentii-rllycontest4 cmcepts. So each side sees its team as the best because it expresses that part of the g m e that. is lrhe most important. depending on which aspect of the complex concept a supporter focuses.2 8. it seems in prhciplle impossible to resolve the dispute. worthy.

: I n such a condition. from this standpoirzt. . Suppose that meritorious inditciduals make free and fais contracts in whjch they serve each other's ijntertlst. for his pmducts or serviccts. m d that they are honest and always keep their contracts.s m d provide a proportionate service t o the other. as Gallie But which is notes. Thus.ible uses of the term "justice. nolio~~s it is hard ta accept Hayek's claim that the sociafist-couectivisl is misushg the km or &using the concept. in which both sides hanor their commitmf3nt. Cephalus (Section 1. Gallie tells us."mis has somethes been called com~zz-rfaeatz'z jz~sfice-its ~r? model is a free and fair ifldividual conkact.1a society.individuals and the products they offer. there is no real d i s a g ~ e ment about such concepts. of course.""Vocialjustice looks at the justj. : I ncontrast. Perhaps the contendhg parties are not really . perhaps. 8. of course. may accumulate great wealth while the unskilled or unindustsious may be left behind. that is one aspect of justice).4. does not rest on any claims that hdividual or groups have ever made on one mother in respect of fair rewards and returns for work donc: rather it is an ideaone aspect of a r ~ ided picture of human living. Importantly. to most it w d d be desirabk to achiwe both. would insist that the resralting distribuicjm of income would be unjust. a society that focuses on commutative justice may not achieve distributive justice. Gallie holds that liberals m d socialists will not be able to resolve their diBerences over social jus~ce." says GaHie."' and distributive. "hfine. t-he skilled anrt industrkut. his . social justice consists of those arrmgements whereby the meritorious individual shall1 receive back. "Sociai justice. the socialist or collectivist insists that justice is not so mu& &out fair dealings between free individuals (though. .3. these two ideas of justice can conftict. a d because both commutative of justice are inteiiil. Concepts and Conceptions Gafiie considers fhe possibility that. however. not the fairness of individual transactions.1) focused m commutativejustice.7). "from the liberal or inllividuatistic standpoint. 9. Commutative justice is achieved. Because the idea of justice is so complex. but if we carnot have both. does the "truly just society" (the "real &ampion"') stress the commutative or the distributive aspect of the "justice g a m f f ?Just a w e mm& see how the different terns could ever resolve their dispute about who is the champion. "cmBicting facets of m y advanced social morality"~f" most importmt? To be sure. Nielxn. but about the best way for society to distribute its goods to help humms live the best lives possi:ble (see Sections 8.ce clr fairness of the overall distri:hution of goods ir. just as it s e e m wrong to say that acceptutative justice is based o r ~ a (clear)misw~dersta~dhg of the utative m d d~tribzxtive justice are. due.

The idea of a society in which each perso11 is alwap treated fairly is an ideal shared by a wide range of liberals and so- . To show that liberals and socialists are really disagreeingpGallie provides two more conditio~~s for esse~~tial contestabihty. both liberals and socialists typically accept that justice concerns the fair treatment of individuals. we mig:ht say that inditciduafists are the acfvocates of co whereas collectivists are the advocates of distributive justice. The liberal m d swialist thought they about justice. Furthemore.lnough speed. and strategy were all characteristics of the exemplar team. Yet nothing seems clearer than the fundamental difference between liberals and socialists about the demands of justice. According to condition WI. when once the confusions are expo=& we will see that the liberal and the socialist do not reaIly disagree about the demands of justice. in the end. of course. the liberal and the socialist do not really disagree about justice becauscl they are usixzg lfie same word 0-u-s-t-i-cr-e)to mean diffemnt thillgs implies Lhat these central political dispMes are simply confusions based on ambiguous words. the supporkrs of the speed team clairn that t. in the case of justire. l%us. We want to understand this dispute-we wmt to understmd precisely what liberals and socialists are &sagreeh"tg about when they &Spute the true meaning of. according to Gaitic's seventh CVfl) condition. the connicting parties agree on m "exemplarM-a sort of perfect case-that embodies all the importmt fcaturcs of the concept. hut it turned out that they were simpIy using were a r w h ~ g the same ward to describe different things. In the chmpionshig exirmple. power.'hnthat one team's supporters mair~titin other team" declare it is the ""polver champion. it was its speed that was crucial to its greabss. clairn that their team is closest to the exemplar. and that in a just society indkiduals would receive their fair share of tbe socid resources.justice. But if that is so. In t-he case of social justice. we might say that it is the '"peed champio~~. Conditions V1 and V11 ensure that the disputants are really disagreeing: Accepting the s a m exemplar. each team" supporters claim that their tearn is the true inheritor of the exemplar" achievement and is developing that achievement in the best way." Oar.'' m d a third group supports its team as the "strategy champim. If we were more careful.h l k h g about the s m e thing at all. and that is why the speed team is the true inhcritor of the exemplar's aclrievements. there really is no disagreemat. To claim that. Each team" supporters. we might think of some past team that everyone agrees is the best team ever-the one that perftlctly exemplifies all the aspects of Ihe sport. all claim that their tearn is closest t o it and develops it in the w y s truest to why everyone values the exemplar. But that seems wrong. then. The p w e c and strategy teams. will stress that it was other elements of the exempiar that made for its greabess.

it competes with other co~~ceptions. identifyjng the crucial landmarks and showing h w they all relate to each other.uk ihe c m of the concept: unless one cxplah~s this core. then.ng diferent accounts of a constelfaljon or cluster'%f the ideas. . A conception. One way to trnderstand Gallie" point is to distinguish between a concept m d various crlnclptiofzs of it. but insofa as each conception pr0vidt.s an interpretation of Lhe complex of vaIues. and can show that in same way one" account is the best interpretation of this core. ':To employ a metaphor.sl'zowi~zg which are most il?zportatzt. hut still insisted that it was Lhe for the competition is champion. otherwise holv could we justifiably claim that the contests were about the same concept?"Q A team that ignored the qua:iities of the exemplar. A good map tells us how to move around the terrain. beliefs. would not be part of the competitio~~. are after all. while insisthg that other elemnts of ihe cluskr are of less importance. . which every conception must seek to explain and develop. that a conceplion nvgavzizs fhc cllister o bell+. about the best analysis of. and actions (related by family resem:blmce). then. to have provided m account of that concept. then. falls into the s m e error as did Socrates: the assmption that there must be an essential comxnon core to all. But Gallie's claim that all the disputants accept a commm exemplat and the related idea that all the competing c o n c q t i o ~ ~ errrhrace s a comm m core. but look and see whether there is anythhg c m man tru all. z ~ ~ l u nlzd m actiiirify. Instead of understmding vafious cmceptiom as all developint. the exemplar.&at we undertitar~d each co~~ception -as provi"Jing an interpretation and development of the core-the concept. a coma11 core. .""We need not posit a common core ehat is shared by afl: the uses of a concept such as justice (or libert-y or equality). . we c m Lhink of a conception as a sort of map of the terrajn. and actions that make up the area of conceptual dispute. contests over something: esserrtially contested concepts must have some common core. and some perhaps shoufd f be elimbaled. m d development of. their debate is about how that ideal is best actualized in our world. identifia some parts of the cluster (or language garne) as crucial to uderstanding the coazcept.lLme characteristi~~ of the exemplar constit. We c m call each of these i n t e ~ ~ t a t i o of n s the concept a conception of it.4: "Dan't say: There must be something common . There may be no one eleme~~t of the constellatior~ that all agree is a part of the concept. "Contests .better to see ehem as providi. one camot be said. Recall Wittgenstein" directive from Section 1. .by virtue of which we see each of those uses as an instance of C. beliefs. and how they am all rclaft~d trt ilze another. it it. the uses of a concept C. Gallie's analysis suggests. covered by the concept.cialists. We might say.

2. conceptions of it. A team's fms support a team as chmpion just because it. his esserrtial corntestability pr")~)oml recommend iL. liberalism. its interpren examining the tatioln of eyuality. In an important sense. Liberals m d socialists. he is less clear why we fight so hard about political concepts and why we are so averse to adopting our oppoxnentfsconception.e what Freeden classes as "ideologies. supporting a disthctively liberal understanding of authority an$ democracy. It seems odd to t h k of peoy. muttiple facets. Why do they see their conceptual disputes i Michael Freeden goes far toward explaining the nature of our disputes colntested concepts." comprehensive systems of ideas that provide the basis for explanation and criticism of political life. onc. in which gettii. Thus. harr. t. with an -allied undcrrstandilng of equality and justice. socialism. say. His m i n thou&ht seems to be that because a corncept such as justice is apprasive it is somehow a valuable weapon or trophy ir. But: although Gallie does a lot to help explain horu corrceptud disputes arise. which allow us to formulnte d i f f e ~ n t essentially . A concept such as social justice.2 Political Ideologies ideologies as Systems of Conceptions Gallie beljeves that political concepts are essentially contested. do not typicauy see their disputes like this. on his view.iberalism. the case for. of liberty. contested. and so onnal. justice. they see themselves as engaged in a deeply important dispute. are the basic buildkg blucks of our thhkixlg &out poitics.lg the answer wrong leads to all sorts n this way? of pr"blcms. i . however. and is supported by. he claims. the choice of one%favorite k m is just a preference. and colnservatism are all ideologies built up from an interrelated series of interpretations of political concepts.le coming to =asoned conclusions about what team they will he a fan of." m a t is constructed from these buildkg blocks-conceptior-rs of liberty. centered on a certain conception then. power. Freeabout "esse~ntially den polnts out. the champimship d e r s t d justjce i exmple seems to mislead us. Zn this regard. Gallie's hndiwidualist liberals m d collectivist socialists believe that it is vitally important to unn their p r e f e r ~ d ways."' Our political conceptiolns. For example. like a taste for ice cream or pizza. constitutes a system uf corzccptiof~s. eyuality justice. Insofar as Gallie shows how disputes about political concepts can themselves behas much to come political disputes. is tfrcir twm. aulhoriiy.1 our political battles and can he used aggressively agailrst our poiitiral opponents. and authority. its interpretation of liberty supports. Surely there is more behind our disputes than that.l"t is importmt to stress that on Freeden" view liberalism (and the same c m be said about other ideologies) is not sinlply a group of politicai conceptions: it is a system of interpretation of political concepts.

we must expect that it . If Mill is a typical liberal. of achieving non-constraint through space for individual expression.1liberals and socialists have two key feahnres. and the point of poliiicaI life. it should he no suqrise that t-hese de$ates seem so intractable. but kis idea that political ideologies m systems of inteqretatioms of concepts. merty. for example. the accountable and educated exercise of political choices and decisions.~~ that constitutes liberalism. it follows from everything else she believes about eyudity. If we understand political views in this way WC can see why. hut uitimately one's overall understanding of political. X t is a crtre structure in a dual sense: the removal of any one of the concepts would change the peculiar pattern created by their joint intermeshing.%views about social justice that are beil'lg challe~~ged. A socialist's devotion to her favorcrd account of social. the great rtineteenlh-century liberal.'c My concern at present is not the accuracy of I. and is in a slightly looser sense dependent on. Section 2. lifefjc.1) the liberal individualist could convhce her that the cornmutarcive notion was superior to distributive justice. causing the a x e to a>llapse. and a further range of adjacent and peripheral concepts derives from. it is not simply ant. and limited use of political power is the chief institutional corollary of liberty. it complements Mill's specific crtnceptictn ctf liberty. and political life. and perhaps nonpolitical. liberal ideofc3gy places the protection of Individual capacities at the core cof its programmatic concerns and its arrangements are primarily geared to emuring that free individuals will be able to develop their rational and sociable attributes. equality. as E'reedel~ fects the interp~tation of others. with the adjacent concept ctf democracy that attaches itself to l i d t e d power. this w o d d chailenge her notiol~s e entire socialist of eq~~ality. justice is not at all like a devotion to a sports team.if our view about one political concept is greatZy influenced by our wiews on others. these disputes run deep. Tlnd so m d e m h ~ her ideology. and involvhg so much of our overall view of politia and society. Fxeden u21covers a mutually sustaining crtre structure of political concepts that holds Mill's ideology together. that core. if (to revert to Gallie's exanzple.reede2lfsspecific ana[ysis of the system of col~ceptior. disputes betwer. A diffused. responsible. hut her system of cmceptions-her entire idearwes.1~3 authority Just because the d&ates covm so much ground. It also a>mplementsthe avoidance of sectional privileges and. ar. powcsr. our arguments about justice lead us to furlher disagreeme~~ts about the nature of liberty. In dispute~about social justice. Because.cond.lheory of John Stuart Mdl. liberty. the interprtltatiol~ of one col~cept afology. First. To challenge her views on social justice is not simply to challenge this one political concept. Ruming so deep.

Freeden emphasizes three m a h ways that political concepts are linked. to m a t e u r as well. M a t combhations of interpretations are accepted as ' " g o i n g together" in such a way as to form an ideology is as much a matter of histmy and culture as it is of I. and they have to do so i n lmgmage accessible to the m s s e s as well as intellectuals. as professional thinkers. as to precisely what he mems by ways of organizjng the jnterpretations. or what he often calls '"logic. we can say that a rational person's beliefs hang together in a coherent m y . As a whole. are not simpl_)i organized by reasorl. that ideafogirr. these are inconsistent belie&. (2) Freeden stresses. C3tn the face of it. seemed to shultm~eously maintain that all. and indeed all of philosophy.18 An ideolugy may be organized in a way that is rationally flawed. you then proceed to criticize. which you do not share m d which. Icieolclgies. (l)Freeden allows that reason. however." organizes our beliefs. to the masses who desire to be Zed by their superiors m d yet yearn for equality-they both may he important parts of m ideology. Freeden emphasizes that ideologies are &aped by culture m d history. (3) More generauy. We need to be cteilrer. Because '5deo:logies have to deliver conceptual social maps and political decisions. are attached to social gmoups Tlnd shaped by political and social connicts about m) . This. on his view.'"t:hey freely mix appeals to rmson a r ~ d emotion. 2 9 . the beliefs of a ratior~al persm make sense. of course.our disputes about political concepts. she replies with an argument that v e s t i o ~ ~ i anothczr" r~g relies on her theory of equality. but emotionally appealing. A ration& p e r s d s beliefs must be consistent-more generally. Fascism. includii7g one's promise to retun1 what one has horrowed. one's beliefs must be consiste~~t.will be very hard to make headway*In the face of your good reasons for sview of justice.casolI. however. An emotionally appealing ideology m y cntertaisl inconsistent beliefs. individuals should be subservient to the collective group m d that same individuals were superior and should lead m d &ape the collcrctivity. then one must reject (c) the claim that justice always requires keeging o11e's word. is the heart: of Socrates" method. Reason and ideology Freeden" nrtotion of an i&ology aa a "cornbhation of political concepts org"l7ized in a particutar way'"l7helps us to explain the ~ ~ a t u of r r . but if they are emotionally appealing-say. Hence the familiar feeling that our disagreein circles. if one accepts that (af it is always right to do justice and it is kvrong to keep one's pmmise to retur11 a weapon to a mactxnan. As Socrates reminds Cephahs (Scctim 1 . but are continually leading to 11ew m e ~ ~not t s only go i\l-ow~d disagreements rather thm producbg agreement. for instance. and they support each other to form a sensi[ble and coherent view of the kvorld.

d For the most part. sociatism. a particular kvay-but it seems illegitimate to try to "dear up" the interpretatims.-ut as of permanent critical value to one's own use m hterp~"~"tati~fl of the co~~cciipt in quest. or by abandonhg same parts of it that do not fit with the others. and their character is dependent on thc requirements of these conflicts as w d as the relations betwee11 ideas. be that an ideo:iogy will not be hlly consistent.onsin. is to ignore that the glue holding m ideology together is an emotive-politicalway^ cuftrural-rational mis." the configurations of concepts they produce are ones that have arise11because they serve these purposes. we a r p e d .lq The upstnot of Freeden's analysis is that It-re student of ideologies should not engage in a "quest for a good usage of a concept. Glvcn this.ies recognition of r i d uses of it (such as oneself mpudiates) as not only. but also emotive. orderhg. movements.ation. the various contedws all have n l . but nevertheless (indeed. Consicacr. such ils legitirn. of m essentially cmtested col~cept. it seems that "there are no c o r ~ c t of d e f b k g conceptsaff21 Gallie arrived at if not the same then at least a broadly similar conclusion. u artjculate elelnents of the concept. simplification. After all. the political movemer~t k ~ o w as n ""iiberalissrr" shodd turn out to be in some w y rationally fiawecf. reason is not the sole. organizing principle of an ideology.icallJr possibk and humanly 'likely."~We cm try to ~llzderstaszdideologies-to u~lderstmd how they organize politic& concept-i. it will be important a r ~ d interesthg if. And he seems suspicious because he a p p a ~ n t i y doubts that there is such a thin. albeit i n differing ways. And thus it may well. Stanley Bern and my work on the liberal conception of the public a ~ private.ion. Thus. Gallie believed that recog1"tizing"a given concept as essentially contested imp. as the C I I Y R C ~ inte~retation 2. To revise an ideologfs inkrpretation of a concclpt by making it better conform to reasolI. a r ~ d conservatism can be viewed as systems of conceptions organized on partly rational.power. perhaps not even the primry. Gallic too seems suspicious of those who would dismiss rival uses as wrong and who claim that they alone have the correct interpretation. for example. cultural. say. For s t u d e ~ ~ ofbpolitical thinking. perhaps because o f that inconsistency) it c m serve to legitimate and orgmize political. and historical grounds.3 Political Philosophy m d Political Theories ideology Versus Political Theory: The Example of Public and Private Freedex1 is certai~lily carrect that liberalim. the liberal conception of the privak and the ptrblic presupposes an individualist theory of social life: .loe.'QUs Gallie perceives it. and action-orientation. Because ideologies "perform a range of services.

ought to yield to the public interest. liberals often make appeals to the public interest or the public good. and one that cmnot be reduced simply to a collectim of individuals. very &\/v of our appeals to the public interest really are appeals to the interests of &solutely each and every person in the c o m m nit8 but neither do they reduce to appeals to the interests of tfie mere m"jority Riltber. A library is puhlic because it is open to any member of th. . or the interest of nobody Individual interests are the only real interests. may result h m its ability to scvitck from its prr.e class of residents. we find this an ertliglteniq insight: we find that the p w r and persuasivex~ess of liberiliism.without distinction. as oppaw"dto puimfef is that h i c h has no immediate relation tru any specified person or persons. as Rentham recognized. So.'Tef: Bentham is quite right that political discourse often treats "tthe public" as a sort of giant perm"": the puhlic int-erest is not the int-erest of everyone. It is necessary to take them all into account. it represents nothing but the mass of individual interests. we might say. and others as nctthing.inant . but may directly concern any member or members of the communi. the interest of everybody is sacred. however. the only sensible meaning of the "public interesl" cvould be the ""interest of everyone. After all. Jn a word.$om. On this view. h the basicdly liberal individualist world. instead of considering sorne a s ail.society can he reduced to individuals (see Section 3. assipable individuals. whereas the public centers on gex~eral classes and can refer to nlzyone or eucryone in that ciass.4)." considered as an eMity in its own right. which you introduce as a person. Both these concqtions---of the pu:blic and ake perfect sense in a world composed simpty of individuals. such as the public interest: The interest uf individuals.ty.24 In Bentham" thoroughly individualistic world. But as Jemmy Bentham (174GIS32) recopized. whereas a private house is only open to the specific iTldividuals owning it or invited into it. the idea of the private focuses on specific.""2 h contrast. is only an abstract t c m . NOW. it is said. as outsiders trying to u n d e r s t d liberal ideology. or the society as such. . ox~e who speaks of ihe pubfic interest typically has in mind sorne notion of the hierest of the community as a whole. but the interest: of '"the community. this idea does not fit into an individualist mderstaxliding of society. what is priv&e is that w:hich can be assiped to a specific perso11 or group. . this purely individualist way of looking at sociey makes less sexlse of other ideas. But what does this mean? X s not one individual a s much a part of the public as another? This public interest. "Pzkblic. Allhough.

After nine hours.ualist theory to a nonindividualist view of community when malking certain sorts of political appeafs. the liberal could not have faith that however. simply composed of indkiduals. one thing a ratio~~al agent wants is a consistent m p . it must be illternally consistent. socialism. it does not even begin to help you make sense of your fcmcephnal)world. and inconsistent beliefs camot help us do that. Should a liberal confmt the sort of inconsistency reveilled i n liberal concepljons of the public and private. this would be the psefect map for Australims to give to their invaders! One thi~lig such a map will not do. :If liberalism is not sirnply an ideology-a social or poliiical phenomenon that merits study-but a polificnl theory that contends for our allegiance and that seeks to guide our actions. as same Roman Catholics accept the mystery of the Trhity (but. your map has two cliffere~~t.individ. if you loak a first sheet you are almost in Melhoume. and it certairdy cannot in any seme he correct. Imagke that you are visiting Atrstralia. Consider. the same c m he said of cozIsel=. m d to be plausibk. TO thus canr~ot coz~tinue adherence to the liberal conception of the public and private would be an act of faith. The analysis of the lberal conception of the public and psivate implies that the liberd conception is ratio~~aily flawed: it camot be sow~d. it must be plausi"ule.. . this mystery will he resohed in itr.As rational agez~ts. m d is not. Where me you.Until the entire map makes sense and all its directims are corrsisknt with each other. but if you check the second. Now. Freeden and others have comto maps (Sections 2. inconsistent parts. we seek beliefs that make sense of the world. so as to make it consiste~~t. what a lfieral-someone who accepted liberal ideas and conceptions as her guide in politics-would make of this.2 afterlife).2): they pared systems of political col~ceptior~s help us nalrigate around the political world by highlighting same features and showhg how one feature is related to others. however. utlnllike the Catholic. and in which direction shouid you go? Clear@ an inconsistent map is no help at all. vatism. is to help people make sense of the locations of Australian cities. The liberal conception of the public and private he justgied. you have gone ttntirely in the wrong clirectim m d will soon be in Brisbane. Consider again the metaphor of a map. From the kside-from within liberatism-could one reasonably coz~thue to affirm i h i s doctrfne bowing that one was appealkg to hconsistent views of society? It seems not.1. you stop to consult your map to see just where you are. m d so on.r liberalism or reconstmct it And of course. U n h t u t the mtely. Of course. because it supposes an impossibility-that society both is. even such inconsistent maps may have their uses: if Auskaiia was invaded by a foreign power. m d you wish to drive from Sydney to Melbourne. 2. however. the rational liberal must either albando1.

dernocrxy. e ~ d i t yjustice. . Because political theories seek to justify rather than merely persuade. Justification is a matter of sound belief. . and so on. Rational adherel-rts of a political t-heory mtxst suppose that the view is justified. but they also may be emotional appeals.Jvsfificafory Political Theories We c m thhk of a political theory (as opposed to an ideology) as seeking to jzistih a specific organization of different intevretations of political cox-rcepts. m d policies for its adherents: it seeks to induce them to afcegt or approve of the conceptions m$ arrangements. To say that a political theov justifies a particular conception involves 1 ) A justification does not seek simply to confour important claims. Viewed from the inside. is consistent with known facts. ( vince or persuade: it provides reasons* A justjfication.on. Furthermore. justice. But insofar as the packzlge of considerations involves unreasox-red entotional appeals or relies on incox-rsistenl:claims or Mse or weakly gromded theories. then.A political view is justified if it is supported by good reasons.the ideology has legitkized the concept-i. they are bound by reason to respect consistency and logicality No matter holv persuasive. ungmunded cultural prejudices. see Section 3. A political ideology m y legitimize a conception of. :It will justify each interpsetation of the chief political concepts by appeal to other interpmtations. R may be useful here to distinguish jzl-st$cntio~z from legifimatiotz. the justifications offered by the political theory will place some politicai ideas at the core of its concerns. and pushing yet others to a nnarginal place or even entirely rejecting them.People view it as legitimate. if it is not supported by good reasons. p w r . then. The consideratiox-rsadvanced by the kgitimizing ideology may be good reasons. and inconistent docthnes: what mtters is that the package of consideratiox-rsadvitr1cec. then adherence to it is not rational. If the package of considerations actually produces widespread support for the conception or povides consideratiox-rs that lead people to conclude that it is the best concept-i.on.4).l by the ideology actually induces people to accept or approve of its conception of justice. Although related. while putt* others in a secondary position. for its adherenls insofar as the icieology actvances considerations that lead its aetberents to approve or accept that coxzception. an appeal to cankadictory considerations camot count as a justification. is free from inkrnal inconsistency. A political theory will provide linked argu""ntdor cox-rcept i ~ n of s Eberty. the ideology seeks to legitimize certail7 concegtiom. the idea of legitimation is distir-rct. social armgements. and so on. auel-lority. say. the pachge fails to justify the arrangement. individualism or collecti\rism. as well as other fur~clamental values and claims (for example. cims not appea1 to mere emotions or prejudices.

h d becatrse our conceptions follow from the other things we see as iMpoctmt. for example. bstjfying a specific conception is. for the considerations that matter to us will not necessarily be compelling in their competing politicd Iheory.no correct answer to conceptual disputes. if liberaljsm is an incmsistent or confused political doctrine it can still legitimize (and so m y be a perfectly good ideology) but it camat iT'rterestingly. A raliomal dherent of ljberalism (or socialism or conservatism) must see it as more than a way to legitimize certah socid arrm-rgements-as a way to induce people to approve of tltose social arrangements. our conception will not seem justified. (3) This explains t%ie intractable nature of politjcal disputes to which Gallif. not at all Ijke becoming lrhc fan of a sports team. however. we must suppose that the political doctrine that guides us is not merely a legitixl-tizing ideology but a justifieatosy poli'E. political theov. This is an important point. A po:iitical theory identifies some considerations as important.Thus. nor is it a decision to ""stamdby"' one hterpretntion rather than another. say' justice. As a cox-rtcmporarypolitical phiiosopher observes. it provides good reasons to adopt the liberaf view of politics. our arguments-our justifications-"are our connection with the considerations that ultimately matter to us. &at is. Hmce we may well find Irhal:even our very best argumex-rtsdo m t move those with kvhom we disagree." and it is those considerations that lead us to favor ox-reway of seeing justice or Ilherty rather than another.26 W cannot anskver Socrates's question-"What is justice?"-t~ntil we b o w the thhgs that really matter to us. and havhg done that. in the end. It is certahly true that given the . it is led to seeing s o m aspects of.2). insofar as you and I are rational agents. it does not fo:llow f m this that none of the parties is correct and there it.cal theory. for that would be to give up muCh of what we hold importmt. z5 MW. rather thm mother. and the way h which we understand society 'Thus. The rational adherent must suppose that liberalism is a justified. has called our attention. Conceptual analysis is not about "'choosing""how to "clear up" our incmsistcnt or confirsed concepts. (2) To say that: political theories justify an interpretation of a political concept is different from saying that a themy "chooses. justify (and so is inadepate as a politjcd theory). If we c m only justify a conception Lvithin the framework of a pdiljcai theory."" or "prefers" a specific conception. we will find Lhat our jwstifjeationshowever convinckg they are to us-will not move those who are ern@a@g a competir-rg political theory From lrhcir poil7t of view. we are not apt to m r n ~ " " i xor back down in these political disputes. (4) In contrast to Freeden and Gallie" view (Section 2. justice or liberty as more important than others. onty withir-r a political theory can we justifgr one conceptim of." '""adopts.

and our ability to think things through. per. we h c . is. but to do that emtive appeals arcr likely to be more effective Lhan arguments about ""What is liberty?" or " m a t is justice?" If we h o w there could never be a correct answer.:limits of time.ne an intolerant fmatical belief:that one's p&li. the Gallie seems to t h i d that (a) is fhe superior assumptio~~. or fb) that some theory could perhaps make out such a claim if we thought long enough and hard cmough? As he sees it. tct submit oneself tc3 the chronic human perit of underestimating. will tend to undermi. whereas to regard any rival use as anathema.verse. we cannot resolve betweer. then." but as of permanent critical value t c o one's sown use ur interpretation of the concept in question. But how can we know that? Ali W c m say right nnw is that given the impmfect m d :limited reasoners we are. why kvaste the time arguing and debating? Rather than promoting a tolcsrallt debate. or equality is best. and so have a tion that one's opponer~ts valuable critical contribution to make to the debate. We cannot k ~ o w in the differe~~ces advmce. The ve"ion. we disagree about wtRtich conception of libertyt justice. or completely ignoring. what is the point of argument? We might hope to win converts. assumption that there is no shgle correct answer induces a tolerance of the views of others: Recognition of a given concept as essentially contested implies recopition of the rival uses of it (such as oneslf repudiates) as not only logically possible and humanly ""likely.1 the major politicai theories. bestial or lunatic means.cal opponents have nothing wort%lwhil. Why argue when no .. In the end. Gailie believes that r e c o p i t i o ~ tially contested nature of political concepts leads you to be more tolerant and appreciate of other conceptions. however. whether this is becatrse none of the theories is better than all the others or because we have not yet ciiirried on the argument far enough and thoroughly cnough to discrover which trheory is the best. w in advance t-hat m pasition can be show11 to be superior to the others. in many cases. the value of one's opponentsr p c ~ s i t j ~ > n s ~ ~ ~ Recognition that there is no miquely correct answer. both Freeden and Gallie claim that they h o w what the result would be if we carried out a rational dialogue to its completion-they know that in the end no theory can be show"lo be the best. which should we assume: (a) that no theory can ever lay claim to being the best. while emouraging m appreciaalso see an aspect of trhe concept. Gallie believes.eto say. Becatrse your favored conception of an essent-ially contested concept cannot be shown to of ~the essenbe the uniyuely correct one. If. accepting that them can be no correct or best al1swer makes ratioml defense of one's p u sition m d critiqtre of the other" position polintless. however.

a menace (not because they are wror. because they are sure that it is false. a skeptic cannot clajrn that competing views are false or m n g . Alll-rough the fallibilist hekves that there is a best mswer but is always abvare that her own position may be wrong. Recognition of our failibility leads us to a p p ~ c i a t r the potential vdue in the c d j c t i n g opinioms of others and to constsuctively engage them mther than repress or ignore them. Gallie" position suggests a sk~pticisn? correct answer to be had. his skeptical view of political concepts provides him with no reason to xfrain from silenrhg others.28 But there is still no point arguhg with the good alterm t h e s to your view-and it would seem that it is precisely those that we most wmt to confront and question.~just because they disagree) m d so should be silenced. however. an opinicm. . l4ews. The spirit of tolera~t debate. the fallibilist will not wish to silence oppo"ii7g v j. Of course. To refuse a hearing tc:. and exclude every other person from the means ctf judging. All silencing of discussion is an assumption ctf infallibility. to be avoided. fanaticism and intolermce arr. Those who desire to suppress it. after all. Thus. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind. says the skeptie. and it is the best mswer the fallibilist seeks. mare tolerant. it would be a foolish person d e e d who djd not appreciate her own fdlithat there is any bility. no less should he not star~d correct than other.29 :It is far less clear why skepticism would lead to toleration of compeling views.11.one can he right? Perhaps some point remains: even if there is no correct answer. is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as abscllute certainy. If part of the skeptic's ideology is that those who disagree with him art-. systems of concepts. involving as they do entirt. ""there are no correct ways of defining concepts"). but neither c m lrhe skeptic hope to learn the truth from his opponent (becatrse. we shoutd not seek to repress a view that competes with our own because it may possibly be true. h d given the compllzxity of tbe issues. Why up for his intolemnt ideology? It is. fn contrast. there d g h t be some that are fiomughly wrongheadedperhaps debate is simply about showing that your position is not one of the wrong ones. but they are not infallible. the skeptk questions whether there is a best amwer. value in the cornpcting posiIt is clear why Lhe fallibilist sees poter~tial tions of othcrs: perhaps t h y have the best mswer. As Jobn Stuart Mill arped. is not fostered by a co~~viction that there is no right anskver to be had (for that mdermhes the spirit of debate) but by a recopition of our ownfallibiliy-recognition that we all easily fall into error and we c m never he certain that we possess the truth and others am in the grip of error. True.ws. of course deny its truth.

The chapter concluded with a contrast between two ways of understanding political theories: as ideologies and as justificatory. aspect of the concept. As we saw in Section 2. Consequently. In Section 2. In contrast. according to which parties to a conceptual debate favor conceptions that place importance on different aspects of a complex concept. she thinks it the best view. The second assumption.1. liberty is not freestanding. I argued. make claims that they are in some way correct." says Freeden. Justificatory political theories.1. they must make sense by providing a reasoned and coherent view of the world."30 I concluded the chapter by considering whether tolerant debate is best supported by the assumption that (1)none of our views can possibly be the correct or best view. but valuable and important. and claims about society. and there is no way to adjudicate which is the superior. and we are so apt to error. We saw that although a student looking at a political view from the "outside" can see it as an ideology. liberals and socialists disagree about the nature of justice: each not only favors her own view. In some sense. .. If we follow Freeden.2. In Section 2. Both Gallie and Freeden suggest that this is a mistakethere really is no true or correct conception. I examined Gallie's essential contestability thesis. debates about one political concept lead to our interpretationsof others. one must place it in a political theory-a system of such conceptions. but linked to her favored conceptions of equality. the different conceptions each stress a different.4 Summary This chapter has considered several explanations of the nature of conceptual disputes and the reasons why they run so deep and are so difficult to resolve. for political theories to be understood as genuinely justificatory. we should not suppose we are certainly right and our opponents wrong beyond a doubt. justice. those who accept it and use it to make sense of the world and organize their political action must see it as justificatory. gives us reasons both to pursue debate and to conduct it in a tolerant way. we shall understand these systems of conceptions as held together not only by reasons. but by emotional and cultural appeals that may lead to inconsistent yet engaging political views. If. I argued that a person's favored conception of. say. I argued. Gallie seems to be arguing. I inquired into why the participants in these conceptual debates are so wedded to their positions. or (2) although there may well be a best answer to our disputes. then. "is couched in terms of truth-assertions. one wants to understand a particular political conception. and so on.2. "The language of ideologies. but ideologies . values. . to give way to our opponent on one concept may lead to undermining our entire political outlook.do not attain truth-value status. because they are so complex.

By the French political philosopher." p. Gallie. See Fefix Opgenheirn. 157-191. A. 113831. ?Q. 2. B. Law. quoted in Stanley 1. EqflaliCy mid Liberty: A Defe~zse N J :Rowman and AllenheEd. 18. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. 16. ""On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts. Jererny Waldron. vol. 2996).. 14. 7". 5. l . XdeoEogz'es a d Political Tjlcory: A Conceptzinl Apymach (Oxfcjrd: Cfarendon Press. chap. p. 62. Ibid. p. p. Xbid. p.. chap. pp. Conncttly. see Christine Swanton. Tfze Right: to Prz't?ateProperfy (Oxford: CIarendctn Press. 53. vol. 144. p. 1 1 8 1 . pp." htftical Tlzeory" vol. p. For discussions of this idea. 188. I argue in my ""Lberalism at the End of the Centuryf" "urncal ofPolificnl Ideologies. Gallie.'" see Wifliarn E. chap. Nielsen. p. IN: Hackett. Steven tukes." in his Ptzilosuplzy alzd the Historical Ulzderstattdirzg. 45-65. 5 f2000). See ibid. 253-154. 24. 32. p. F". 30. 6. 2nd ed. Ibid. The Terms of Political Disconrse. p.. p. 433. trans. 19831. John Gray. Public afaB Priz~~le irz Social k f e (New York: St. Bertrand de Jouvenel. 317. 22. 2nd ed. 19921. Fwedonz: A Coherence Theory. Benn and Gerald E Gaus. 1871). 1985). 2nd ed. (London: Triitsner. Michael Freeden.Legislation utzd Liberty. p. ""Essentially Contested Concepts. P o w e ~ 13. 12. A Radical View (New York: Macmillan. 4. 1.. edw. 1"34). 1988). Polllicnl Cuncepks: A Reconstrz4clion (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 19811. p. 3313-48. 26. Mir~ge of Suci~l jzlstice (Lc~ndon: Routledge. 15. Ibid. Callie. 5 (August 1977). (New Ucxk: Shocken Books. Suvereiglzt!j: An 112quz'ry infu the I>ulificalGood. "Essentially Contested Concepts. Ibid. 2982).. 3. Eqltatity n ~ t~ ib de r f for ~ example. 22. ". 4. 2. 8. 23. Kai NieZsen. ibid. 9. pp. 9. ""Te Liberal Conception ctf it-re Public and Pri\rateP5islrBenn and Gaus. that the incoherence of liberal ideology may well account ftx its wide appeal.1( hdicnl EglaEitfirit~~zism (Totowa. Martin's Press. 182.. j . 20. . 14561. On the idea ctf a "cluster concept. 25. Freedorn: A Collewnce Tlzeuqj (Indianapofis. chap. E Huntingtun. p. Ibid. pp. The TJ'lzwy of legisfatioiclrz. 75. 11. chap. Ibid. p. Sir George Cornewall Lewis. see Swanton. 17. 19. f-iayek. 10. 187. 1. Jeremy Bentham. '%ssentially Contested Concepts." p. 14681.1.. %id. 21. For a very helpful analysis. (Princeton: Princetcm University Press. 197. W.

"Tssentiaify Contested Concepts. p. 29. 1981). chap.. 30. chap. Gaflie. 1. John St-uart Mill. para. 2. 3. 187-188. See here Swanton. 94." pp. Freedonz: A Collerence Tftmry. Xdenlogies a d Political Tl~eory. Qtz Liber+. 28.27. . in John Gray ed. Freeden. O z z Liberty nzzd Other Essap (New York: Oxfc~rd University Press.

but their appeal over h u d r e d s of years to sizable groups of thjnkers and citizens m k e s t-hern of special importmce in.scheme. eqt~ality.onsof liberty. These enduring types unite concept-i. m d one ilspect of that entet-prise is drawing new conceyhail maps. justice. . n e s e endtrr. There is no formuia for the creation of a political theory m a t said. Socialism. m d political authority. whereas others will be accorded supporting mles or a periphaal status in the overall. power.! Liberalism. The construction of such a system of concepts will often involve cmativity. have sought to improve and modify. for example. .THEOR COIVCEPTUA L STRUCTURES AND ENDURING TYPES TlCAL 3. advance a catain col~ception of liberty.3. which logically relate political concepts in hitherto unthought-of ways. appealing to values and visions of society that propolitical conduce a cofnmnt and compelling view of these fundamer~tal cepts. the political theory will order these concepts-same will be given pride of place. the history of political theory reveals endurhg types: systems of interpretations that traditions of thinkers have embraced and. producing novel combinations of interpretations. Political theorizjng is an ongoing enterprise. I argued that political theories hvolve systems of interpretations of political concepts. which helps justify a view of equality.A political theory will.ing political theories are by no means the only rczasonable ways to arrange political conceptions. whi& in turn supports (and is supporkd by) a conception of justice and aut-Xlonty-And as Freeden rightly contends (Section 2. our debates about political concepts. withi11 limits. and Conssrva~isrn Enduring Types In the last chapter.

In his championship example."UAll fiberai theories.To understand liberty. In what is perhaps the. as we pmceed we will have occasion to corrtrast these three enduring theories to other political theones. most famous paragrayh in the li:beral tradition. We shaii see that these are by no mearls mor~alithicviews: within each there are varieties. Mill explains the aim ol On Liber&: The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle.?.3). equality justice.When describing political theories as systems of political conceptions. accordiing to Gallie's conditjon Vf.Also. socialism. rights. Justice focuses on eyual liberty rights.. power.1 that. must always remember Wittgenstein's insight that language is not merely about words. to a large degree. indeed. notion. a s entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of sociew with the individual in the way of . We shall see that fibera1 devotion to freedom leads to a view of justice that gives pride of place to expansive liberty rights while m a h g equality a more limited. certail7 things: w y s is not just to think ar~d to work for certain sorts of just arrangemms. in the liberal tradition fohn Stuart Mill's On fibrrty (1859) approximates the stiltus of an exem. so irrnportant is Ijberty to Eberals that. but about actions and practices (Section 1. potiticai theories arc. Now. debaks h u t the nature of liberty are debates within the liberal tradition. The liberal tradition and its debates about the nature of liberty approxconimates one aspect of Gallie's description of an essentiaIIy co~~tested cept.plar. secondary. It will be recalled from %ction 2. The focus of this book i-vill be on liberalism. which arrmge political concepts in different i-vays. complexes of words and actiom. opposing solne sorts of govemental actions while supporting others. they are ususee the auLhority of goverr~mer~t ally suspicious of it.berals are highly crioical of On tibcrtyPto an amazing extent it is seen as the pintessential liberal text. it was perhaps same past team that everyone agrees is the best team ever-the one that perfectly exemplifies all aspects of the sport. Like language itself." i t has been said. place h & viduitl liberty (or freedom) at the heart of politics 2. and conservatism-three enduring political theories and arguably the tlhree most important of the past two hundrt"d years. but to dr. "'a liberal is a man who believes in liberty. W "By defhition. Because liberals typirally as a limitatior~ of freedom. Allt-tough a few li. the conflirting parljes agree on an "exemplaru-a sort of perfect case-that perkctly ernbodics the concept. regardless of Iheir disagrecmer~f. and authoriy in certain talk in certak ways. and so on.

obtahs much more: for the naturd activity of hurnan naturt-. for which kre is amenable tt3 society is that which concerns others. Because M 1 1 piaces so much vdue 01%the individual" ssovereignv over her own life. in m y tolerable circumstances.express fu~rdamental liberal thcmes. First. These are good reasons for remonstrating with hirn. is to prevent harm to others. will exparrd itself in useful ones. Tr3 justify that. wrongfulily limiting her liberty. but not for compelling him. or visiting hirn with any evil. over his own body and mind."" lhese pass%@. because it will make him happier. becaus. Mill defends own ' s fife---tl~e freedom to lead ox?re"sown life one's sovmignty m r o ~ ~ e in a way that one sees fit" Yet. M a t m o&en cdled "'cassicalrYiberals ftzllowed Mili in insist- . in case he do otfiewise.1)---threats to get people to do what you want them to cJo (see Sectior~ "is to enforce upon everyone the conduct necessary to give all other persons their fair chance: conduct which chiefly consists in not doing them harm. a ~ mt d impedjng them in ar7ytl-thgwhich withoul harmin$ others does good to themselcres-" And Mill adds. His own good. liberal theory split into iwo camps. ""Demanding no mare than this.) %ward the cnd of the ninekmth century. to do so would be wise.. in the opinions of others. shut out from ail ~~ortious directions. over the individuals. the plmper rok of c o e r c i o ~ ~ employing ~of 4. Over himself. of right. though liberals insist on the prhacy af freedom. or persuading hirn. whether it-re means used be physical farce in the form of legal penalties.. Mill is explicit that ot be limited to protect me from my own choices: what 1 do with my life is up to me exccpt insofar as it harms others.2. or even right.(Compare Freeden" descriptio of the Milliian conceptual m p i nSection 2. He carnot rightfully be compelled to dct or forbear because it will be better for him tc:. do so. or reasoning with him. h d although Mill was a proponent of democratic g o v e m n t . his independence is. That principle is. the a>nductProm which it is desired to defer him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. or the moral coercion ctf public rtpinion. In the part which merely concerns himself. that the sale end for which mankind are warranted. hcluding government.compulsion and control. absolute. or entreating him. society. The only part of the condud of any one. is not a suffjcient warrant. they recognize the necessity of limits m freedom. he was dways worrid that democratic mjorities may tyrannize over the individual. the individual is sovereign. hie places severe limits an the atrthority of others. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized cc3mmmity against his will.? As Mill says in another work. individually or a>llectivelyin interfering with the liberty of action of any of their numberr is xjt-protection. My freedom may be lhited if f use it in a way that harms others. either phpicaf or mural.

Elelng wary of all government. including the force of govemnnenl. . . they are cautious advacates of kmocracy. they suppart it."7 Hobhouse also SW himsdf as developi~~g teaching of Mill brings us close to the heart of Liberdim. towards which every argument unfolded in these p"ges directly cowerges."Vn all this. For classical libernls. 1". both freedom and justice are closely bound to the protection of the market order and private property rights. . to drasticdly limit coercio~~ or force. and the necessiw in the interests of frtiedom. which in turn provides the basis for strongly egalitarian conceptions of social justice and cJemocracy. yet their common stress on liberty m d their Millian heritage firmly identiq lhem both as parts of the liberal tradition.ing c m the central role of freedom.cidism.'"" placing strong ideals of eyualiv at the core of their political outlooks. but.~:"The grmd. is the absolutely a d essentid importance of humm development in its richest diversity*"B Co~~trasting to the classical liberals are '%revisionistuor ""new liberalsfff : l : Hohhouse f 1864who sc. distancing it from private property and moving it closer to a full embrace of the democratic welfnre state. ag"in foilowing Mll. one of the preernhent classical liberals of the twentieth century. because it is our only protection . writes of democracy that it "is an ideal worth fil. Mayek sees himself developing Mill's liberalism. A%thoughcritical of sume of Mill's speciiic views. "AB socialisms as5el. Insofar as democracy pmtecb liberty. mough democracy itself is not freedom . Because liberals have developed Mi:tl%exemplar in such profoundly different bvays. and justice. Hmce ctassical liberais have been advocates of limited govemme~~t and free markets. 1 will disthguish throughout betkveen classical and revisionist liberalism.\l. L. "fhough incfividual liberty remains at the coref their fmored conception of liberty harmonizes with an extensive democratic bvelfare state pursuing social justice and regulating market relations. against tyranny. they oppose democracjes that overly restrict Lhe freedom of some of their citizens.t ihe equality of human beings.hting for to lfie utmost. Socialism As Freeden notes. . A. ' 19291. WC shall see that classical and revisionist liberals defend markedly differe~~t conceptio~~s of liber% ewaiit. Hayek. F-layek concludes one of his mast irnportmt works with the s m e quote with whi& M 1 1 1 htroduced Qn Libert. a leading new liberal. theory is between propomnls of m e r e and of equal- .u$ht to move liberalism closer to sc."" Hobhouse and his kllow revisionist liberals reinterpret liberty. \vent so far as to advocate a ""Zberal SocialMill's doctrine: "The ism. the :leading principle. it is one of the m s t ixnportant safeguards of frcedom. It has often been said that one of the great debdes in political.

Edmund Burke's (1729--1797) RepTections on the Rm~ll~ifirrn ilz Fra~~ce (1790). Because of the complexity of society and the limits of our reasor. occurred between democratic socialists and the followers of Vladimir I3ich Lenin (1870-1924) as to whether a nondemocratic state. Attempts at such revoltx- . socjaists pave the way far claims that strongly egalitarian democratic governments en:hance frcedom. and directed towards the defense of a lirmited style of politics.'"3 At the core of conservatism is a conception of politics as a limited and difficult activity that is vpicaily misun&rstood. another contemporary socialist insists that "'freedom and equality. committed to the idea of h i t s .4. Altln. One such disagreementl which we will consider in Sectior. fn contrast.lteory to endorse a h i g w inegalitarian view of po1iticd authority? Conservatism Orze mcent political theorist has charwterized conservatism as "a philosophy of imperfectim. they insist. e relegating equaiity to secondary status. Could the values.0l"' Fundamental to most recent socialisms is the ciaim that given lfie proper interpretatio~~s. socialists kvould simply reverse this priority upholding equality over liberty. Eke liberals.ough this m y well have been a characteristic of early socialist tl-leories. '*Liberty deserves almost fanatic support horn democratic socialists. 'kequires equalil-yI""l in particular.ive wnrks.3 10. an quality of power. liberty and ewaiity are mtxtuaUy supportkg. fndeed. lrhc conservative stresses that politics cannot k i n g about great. markets-are the enemy of freedom. The Fre~~ch Revdutior~ of 1789 was the spur for tl-le greatest of all conservat. of equality. controlled by a socialist elite.2 to the g d poiitical projeek of first liberals and then socialists to bring about revolutionary changes in support of their key political values: liberty and equality. disagree on impartant issues. it m y seem that as standard bearer. actualty coincide.2. of social and economic equaliv justify m authoritarim state that was devoted to those socialist aims? And what feature of the socialist conceptual map coutd lead an othwwise egaiitarian politicai t. according to one contemporary scxiillist. beneficial. Socialists. could be a justified means to socialist egalitarian values. although some simpIification is helpfui in understanding complex poljtical theories. Now since liberals place liherty in a s u p ~ m positim.. it is not a feature of recent socidism. priv"te property-hased markets-perhaps all.ity. In a simi:iar vein. says an importmt contemporary socialist philosopher. far h m be* oppoed ideais. Z.&erty. revolutionary changes. we must be careful not b be too siMII)tistic.. Again. Co~~servatism arose as a reactior. produckg irtegalitarian concen&ations of properly and power."12 In arguing far a cojncidence of iiherty m d equalxty.

tioalary chmge almost a h a y s bring about disasters-witrzess, says the cox~servativc., the great fiberaf and socialist rwolutims, France in 37139 and Russia in 1937. As Bwke saw it., "A man full of warm speculative benevolence may wish his society otherwise constituted than he finds it; but a good patriot, and a true politician, always considers how he shall make the most of the existing milferial of his counky. A cfisposj,tion to preserve, and an ahiljty to improve, would be my standard of a As we shall see, the conservative typically stresses that polities is a practical and complex activiw. Indeed, says the coalserviltiv+alld Plato has been the inspiraticm of many conservatives on this point-it is lfie art of govemillg people a r ~ d ru~u~in ag state. The main justification for some rather than others possessing this authmily is that some, and not others, have practicral howledge of the art of politics, filing, like medicine or cavenh-y, is an art. It requires a prc)F)erknowledge of the techniques of the art, its tools and its ajms. And like any art, it should be performed by lhose who are best equkped to parljcipate. If one wodd not trust one's body to a doctor who has 210 practical knovviedge of medicirne, but o d y has read a book, why would one trust one's ssociety to a group that has no practical knowledge of politics? Because the conservative insists that most do not understand the lintited possibifities of the art of politics, conservatives offer a view of political authority that stresses the irnportmce of expertise, and so is criticd of egalitarian (dcmocralic) values, The attitude toward liberty is more complex---it is not so much a rejection of the idea as an attempt to control and limit its revolutionary potential, stressing not a gepleral, expansive notion of liberty, but a defhed enumeration of important traditional potitical liberties. And it is clear that the corlservative rejects the socialist's attempt to reconcile liberty and equality: "There is no prhciple more basic in the conservative philosophy than that of the inherent al?d absolute incompatibiuy between liherty and equalityff Again, within the co~~servative tradition &ere is variety and suhtley* S o m cmservatives stress the limits of politics, whereas others grant great political authority to political experts, and yet others give governm n t the role of cmfnrcing traditional virtue and morality. One of our system of ideas aims will be to discover what parts of the co~~servative justify these different understamdings of justice and aul17orily.
Three Enduring Political lssues

ALt-hough political theorics are systems of mutually supporting inttzrpretations of politic& c o ~ ~ c q tour s , enduring political theories have oeber elements as well. As we have just seen in. our sketch of conservative political

*inking, one of its roots is a skepticism about the powers of human reaand control sockty. Liberalism, for exampk, can be son to unGjerstar~d understood as havhg positions on the nature of howledge, humm society m d psychology, reasm, m d ideals of lj.fe.1" lIlhcral%position on these nnattws helps justify her il7terpretatiom of politic& concepts and the policy proposals that follow from them. An entire political theory; then, is a highly complex structure, involving claims about moralivf the nature of society a r ~ d persons, reason, libery, eyuality, justice, a r ~ d so on. TO fully gm"" the justificatiort for a liberaf, conservative, or socialist analysis of a political comepc we wodd have to take account of the relevmce of the politic& Ifieorist" ppositions on d l these other matters. That, thougl~, wodd be a daw~tirrg undertaking, and one outside the scope of the book. Although we c at consider all these other elements, we c m identify three crucial issues on which liberals, swialists, and conservatives have long disagwed and that art.crucial to understanding their dis(2) ag~ements h u t pol.iticd concepts: (l)rationalism~a~~tirationalism~ theorjes of human nature, and (3) individualism/collecti~ism~ Again, these three issues are by no means the only relevmt ol3c.s; but they are fundamentill, m d they explain a gseat deal of the differences in. the socialist, liberal, and conservative outlooks. Throuighout this book, we shall 1 7 these three basic issues often resuit in very differsee that differences 0 ent hte~retations of our main political concepts.


An endurbg issue in.political theory is the role of reason in humm affairs. A rationalist is one who stresses the power of human reason to understand society to enlighten us about what is good and right, and wide society almg the best path. The rationiJlist is g n c r d y suspicious of custom m d &adition, for people follow them without knowing why they do so or d are the best options whether the actions dictated by custom a ~ tradition open ta US. M e n confronted with a customay practice, the rationalist malyzes and questions it: does E a s m point toward a better way of doing: things? A rationalist is thus apt to look to scie~~cc? rather &an tradition for guidmce, for science is the syst-ematiceffort to apply reason to ~mderstmd naturt-.and stciety: For shilar reasons, rationalists are apt to be suspicious of rdi@or~ insofar -as it asks us to accept beliefs on faith rather than rctaso1.1.

Fundamental to most conservative political theory is a criticism of rationalism in politics. Michael Oakeshott (1901-19YO), the foremost recent

conservative polifical philosopher; tells us that a rationalist in politics is characterized by the foflowing traits:lT A rationalist believes that thought should be free from any obligation to itny authority and should follow the dictates of reasor1 alone. A rationalist is the encmy of tradition, authority, custom, and prejudice. A rationalist feels herself free to question any ophian, belief, or habit. A ralionalist trusts the power of reason tru deternine truth ancf value. A rationalist believes that the pokver of reason is common to all humms, A ratior~alist finds it hard to believe that others who think about a problem in a clear and honest bvay will arrive at an answer that differs horn her own, A ratior~alist does not pay cnough attentiar~ to experience; he idways wmt S to rely on his own, reason m d begin, afresh the solution to every prdlem. When a rationalist does learn from experience, he wants to transform its lesson into a rational formula that can be conveyed to all. A rationalist does not-grasp ihe mysteries of Iife. (9) (10) A rationalist uses theones to understand events; hence she only recopizes the large outline of experience.

As Gdakeshatt sees it, this sort of thinking has characterized much of modern life, and especially political theory since the Middle Ages. Liberof politicai values alism and socidism, with their strong declaratior~s aramd which politics should be orgmized, are, in. Oalkeshotl" eyes, mmifestations of the rationalism that has characterized modern European politics.M These rationalislic theories ignore experience m d seek to r e p late the life of complex societies by abstract concepts invented by political thhkers, Oakeshott does not claim that such theodes are useless, Butr he Ifiough, does insists, they capture only a part of the truth. The ratior~alist, not see this; she mistakes part of the tmth for the whole truth. Oakeshott builds his case around two types of knowledge: what he calls "technical k%ovvledgeff ar~d "'practicd hIovvledge.""The firstkchnieal knowle$ge-invotves knowledge of techrrjquc:
In every art and science, and in every practical activity, a technique is involved. In many activities this technical knc>wlledgeis formulated into rules which are, or may be, deliberately learned, remrsmbered, and, a s we say put

into practice; but whether or not it is, or has been, precisely formulated, its chief characteristic is that it is susceptible of precise formulatirtn, althaugh special skill and insight may be required to give it that formulaticm, The technique (or part of it) of driving a motor car on English roads is to be found in the Highway Code, the technique ctf cookery is contained in the cookery book, and the technique of diwavery in natural science-or in l-ristcxy is in their rules of research, ctbservation and verification,l9

Cbakeshatt contrasts this sort of knowledge to practical bowledge, which cannot be formulated into rules, :It is knowledge one gains through actual experience, as a cook h a w s m a y things that are not witten in cookbooks, but can only be learned by being a cock. As Cbakeshott puts it, techica) kno'~vledge wilt. te13 a person what to do, but practical knowledge will tell him how to do it.2" Techical. bawledge c m be written down. It can be codified ar put in, the forln of rules. Practical knowledge, C)&eshott believes, c m o t be. TThis does not mem that practkal knowledge camot be taught; a master craftsman teaches his appre~~tice his skills. Rut all that he teaches cannot be reduced to rules and put down in same book- The typical expression of such practicd bowledge, Oakeshott writes,
is in a customary ctr traditional way of doing things, or, simply, i n practice. And this gives it the appearance ctf imprecision and consequently of uncertainty, c~ofbeing a matter c~fopinion, of prt~babilityrather than truth. It is, indeed, a knowledge that is expressed in taste or connoisseurship, lacking rigidity and ready for the impress of the mind of the learner.21

Now, says Oakeshott, ""Rationalism is the assertion that what 1 have called prackical knowledge is not knowledge at all, the assertion that, poperly speaking, there is no h o d e d g e that is not techl7ical knowledge-"" That isI Oakeshott thinks that ratimalim equates knowledge with what can be systematized, cast in the form of a gerreral tl-reor~ and witten down in books. "The sovereipty of keaso11,9for the Rationaljst, mems the sovereignty of techiqueeff23 :It would appear that both liberal a d socidist lfiinkinfjr are rationaljst insofar as they are attempts to rethink the nature of poijticd life f m the begbb~g and aim to codify all this h t o neat, logical.systems of &ought. :In place of the practical knowledge that one needs to engage i n politicshoLvledge that c m 011ly he gained through experience-the liberal and the socialist give US the equivalent of political. ""coakbooksm-""f-tw to" Thus, books that simplify palitics by reducing it to technical k~~owledge. to Oakeshott, tt7e great works oi the liberal and socialist traditions---for exmple, Mitl's CZtz Lihevfy and the writings oC Kart. Marx (1818-1883) and

Friedrich Engels (382E)--1895)-manifcst the rationalist urge to equate all political knoMJledge with technical lu~owledge that car1 be writtell down liberalism and socialism, he suggests, arose as far all to read." "Koth guides for a politically inexperienced class that was comk~g to power. These 1lew classes-first flte middle class ard later the workcjrs-gained power, but were without the necessary practical political bowledge. So they sought political "cribs": they needed a book to tell them what t o do. As he sees them, liberal and socialist political theories might be aptly subtitled "political rule made easy" or "'a layunm" guide to politics." If all political knowledge is reduced to technical knowliedge, it can be taug:ht to t-he hexperienced.
B u r k e u t t a c k on Rationalism

Burke" attack on the French Revolution shares mtxch with Oakeshott's criticism of rationnlism. Throughout t-he Reflections, Burke calls attation n which the French Revolutim was be@ guided by ""metato the way i physicsf%d "phil~sophy,'"~~ """They[the Frencf-t Assel-nblyj commit the whole to the m c ~ of y untried speculations; they abandon the dearest in&rests of the public to those loose theories, to which none of them would chuse [sic] to tmst the slightest of his private co~~cer~~s.'"%at so appalls Burke-and every other conservative who has followed hh-is the way in which. the rrvolutionaries in Frilnce sought to create a whole new social and politiml order based on Lhe ahstract theory of the rights of mm. In place of the political &aditions of France-traditions that had grown and developed over many generations-the :Leadersof the French Revolution sought to remold h n c h society and politics on the basis of a philosophic theory of natural rights (see Sections 8.1,8.2). As Burke sees it, this view of politics places far too much faiZlh i n the powers of hurnm reaso1.l to undc.rsta"~d society. Writing to a supporter of the Fre~~ch Revolution, Burke kvrites, in defense of the English,
You see, Sic that in this enlightened age T am bold enough to confess, that we [in England] are generally men uf untaught feelings; that instead of casting away ail our old prejudices, we cherish thern to a very considerable degree, and, ta take mtlre shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prcrjudices; and the longer they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid tct put men tct five and trade each upon his own private stock of reason; becaus we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of natiom, and ctf ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of explrsding general prejudices, employ their sagacity tc:, discover the latent wisdom which prevails in thern.27

Thus, whereas the ratimaljst grounds her theory i n the power of reason in each individual, the. conserwative places his faith in fie accumulated practical howledge embedded in custom m d tradition. T%us, to Elurke, the rationalist "scirnce" that would attempt to datroy all traditim and start afresh is no morc? than a "presumph;rous ig11orance.~'28
Socialism and Rationalism

The conservative characterization of rationalism seeks to show it in a negative light-in Gurke" words, as a '"presumptuous ignorance." We should m f expect that a n y liberal or socialist wouid concur with that characterization of their doctrfne. Neverthekss, it seems ge~~erally correct that lfieralism sometimes, and socialism trsually; tends toward something akin to Oakesholt" notion of rationalism. Especially since the writings of Marx and E~~gels, socialism has tended to stress the powes of h m m reason, the ilccomplishmentsof sciences ir.r understanding burnms and societ~ and the ability of rational people to control their societies. Fclr Xl'riedrich Engels, Marx's collaborator, the great triwmpfi of Marxism cvas to t-ransfotm socidi,sm into a science.29 According to a contemporary socialist, rathalism is one of the basic tendcmies of socialism:
The human race, rationalism maintains, has now grown up and at last has freed itself from the age-old yokes of iporance and superstition. We have in our possession ""science," the rational, ordered kmcjwledge of the laws of nature: we can progressively dctmesticate, mould nature as to make it serve our own ends, and we can apply this knowledge tc:,human society, Since it is primarily material wealth (objects gained through the process of subjugating nature) that conduces to our happiness, we shctufd ctrganize our lives, our relatic2nships as to secure the maximum technical, economic and administrative efficiency in a13 our social activities. The rationalistic critique of capdecries most of the CJZOC)S and zufistt" involved in capitalist italism, it-rerefc~re, production, and its cmtinued enthronement of ignorance and superstition, . . . Socialism, the rational organisation of society, it holds to be the selfevident crowning of the values and aspiraticlns of the Enlightenment: it needs only common sense and the right kind of education tt3 make people accept it and work towards its realization.%

Liberalism's Complex Rejotion to Rationalism

Liberal Xafz'a~zalisjt~z.Like socialism, liberalism has its roots in the h~tellectual period known ils the Enlightenment. This era-the heart of whjch

insisted the philosophers of the Enlightenment such as Voltaire (1694 1778) and Denis Diderot (1713-1784). which is called. one of the most famous liberal works of the twentieth century. being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary. to insist that we follow custom is to stifle liberty. Why should he forgo the use of his reason . England. first and foremost. improvement in human affairs depended on the free exercise of human reason. Mill repeatedly criticized "the despotism of custom. Scotland. . in the sphere of social policy and trust to vague and obscure feelings and impulses?"33 Liberal Antirationalism: Value Pluralism. among others. not only are liberals identified with rationalism. The most famous liberal criticism of rationalism was advanced by Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997). We cannot hope ever to discover the ultimate and most profound secrets of the universe. but its critics often associate them with "hyperrationalism": Rationalists are said to believe that human reason is powerful enough to construct a workable blueprint for the best possible social order and that people can be led by rational argument to accept this blueprint. Although drawing on the Enlightenment's faith in reason. or that of progress or irnprovement.34 Liberals seldom embrace hyperrationalism. As one contemporary liberal has pointed out. which is always questioning tradition and custom. The critics of such hyperrationalism argue that reason is too feeble for such a task. reason. As the great classical liberal Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) argued. but its limits: "Our powers of comprehension are limited."32 As Mill saw it. the standing hindrance to human advancement. Liberalism thus asserts the primacy of reason in conducting human affairs. was the key to progress and scientific discovery. given the complexity of social life. and America-insisted on the power of individual reason. whereas custom codified superstition and error. was. and progress." Von Mises asserts not only the importance of being guided by reason. Reason. John Stuart Mill was to make this a key theme of On Liberty. Plato and M m . liberalism also displays skepticism about--or at least a cautious attitude toward-the powers of human reason. .31 From this followed the supreme importance of individual freedom. "All that man is and all that raises him above animals he owes to his reason. a criticism of the highly rationalistic philosophies of. the spirit of liberty. according to circumstances."36 Indeed. ..was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France. . According to Berlin. especially freedom of thought. Karl Popper's (1902-1994) The Open Society and Its Enemies.

Berlin insists. in the end. . the use of human reason would reveal the best way to live. then the possibility of conflictand of tragedy-can never wholly be eliminated from human Xife. in the pronouncements of history or science. . Cln Berli1Ifsview. socialism. '*What is best in Ijfd" or "'Whieh is the most worthy end for our society to pursue??"'The ratimalist seeks to answer a question that cannot be answered. and how those values should be ordered i n our lives. a rationally best way for us all to live. are hfarlxed by a monistic tmderstmdhg of life: the application . As Berlin sees it. and there is no rational basis for concluding that one is best. tell us how to live and what to strive for. advocaks Bedin. in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinkex.38 Berlin thus contrasts his notion of pluralism (according to which there is no rational answer about how to resolve basic: conflicts of values) to murzism. the ratimalists of the Enlightenment believed that. the ermr of rationalism is its failure to grasp that there is no fjnar answer to the questions. the realization of some of which must inevitabXy involve the sacrifice of others. in principle. and there is.57 For Berlh. and nctt all ctf them are in principle compatible with each other. or the sacred mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class. is responsible for the slaughter of individuals ctn the alters of the great historical ideas-justice or progress ctr the happiness of future generations. application of humm reason would. it is essential to ensure each has liberty to arrive at: her own answer: co~~trast. The necessity ctf choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic nf the human cc3nditic?n. there is a final solution. This is the [ratirtnalistic] belief that somewhere. or even liberty itself. thh~kers. If. in the past or the future. a ~ much d of revisio~~ist liberalism. more than any other. it would show us what values we all should follow. or that some combinatio~~ The world that we encowter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate. . is best.One belief. which demands the sacrifice of individuals for the freedctm of society. a rationalistic doctrine that jnsists that a rationally correct answer to d u e disputes can be discove~d. T%ey were convinced that. drawing 0x1 the tradition of antiratiox~alist "value pluralismft-the doctrine that there are many values or goad lhings in life. the ends of men are many. as X believe. and her effort to mold society to conform to her mswer is no more than sanneone trying to live out m illusion. ultimately. and claims equally absolute. true liberalism rests on pluralism: because there is na sbgXe correct answer as to holv each should live. albeit at great:costs to others. either persrtnaf or social. Says Berlin. or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted gclod man.

This constructivist theory of sociG@is thus highly rationalistic: the applicalion of the powers of humilr~ reason is what altows for ordered social life. these theorists believe. our important and cherished ideals c m he h d simultaneously. constructivist] view holds that human institutions will serve human purposes only if they have been deliberately designed for these purposes. can show us how all. eliminating the need to sacrifice some good amd important things so as to achieve others.of buman reason. unplmned order of a marke"lsociet.r-rtl'ratz'olzalIsm: A~z-ttz'eonsCruc~iiir~sm.y. As Lord Robbins observed. consciaus plaming is the only way social order cm be achieved. . often also that the Pact that an institution exists is evidence of its having been created for a purpose. ."""" On the first view of sock@-implicit i nthe whtinga of revisionist liberals such as f o b Dewey (M59-1952)-humm reason can grasp the purposes plan society so arr. to fulfil1 this purpose. there will arise spontaneous retationships also deserving the name ""order" but which are self-sustaining and. indeed. The other view. which has slowly and gradually advanced since antiquity but for a time was almost entirely overwhelmed by the rntlre glamorous constructi\~istview was that the orderliness of society which greatly increased the effectiveness of individual action was not due solely to instituticms and practices which has been invented or designed f ~ that r purpclse but was largely due to a process described as ""growth" m d later as "evoXutirtn. The essence of Classical Liberalism was the belief that. on this of society ar~d view. within a suitable system of general rules and instituticms. Liberal A. within the limits prerjcribed by the rules. anticonstructivist l4ew characteristic of much . need nct detailed and specific regula tion.3" l'l-rc most sophisticated artfedation of this conception of liberal society two and institULims is to be found in the work of Hayek. . Liberals have defended two opposing views of the liberal order-one s t ~ s s i n g the spo~~taneous. The former has been of fundamentd importance to classkal liberahsm. who cor~trasts "rvays of tookhg at the pattern of humm activities which lead to very different conclusions concernhg both its explanalion and the possibilities of deliberately alkring it. and always that we should so redesign society and its imtitutions that all our acticlns will be wholly guided by known purposes. the ather stresshg btentional design. Cln the alternative." The first [that is.

those such as Berlfn insist that reason c m never tell us the one best way to live or harmxrize liberty and equality. am profoundly divided on rationalkm in politks." h the wider sense.1 egalitarimr society?ff and "Wow much can juastjce demmd of pe~ple?'"~et us briefly consider . And dthough revisionist liberals such as John Dewey have endorsed the power of reason to understand and pZm societ-y. many disptrte kvhether there is really such a thhg as human nature. Conser~~atives typically strongly disagree. because liberais & s a v e on the basic issue of the place of reason in politics.classical liberal thought. Socialists. Human Nature and Polifical Theory The notion of ""humar~ nature" h s been used in narrower and wider senses. "Why do we value tiherty?'" "Are we suited to al. hsofar as a theory of hmmm natznre tries to tell us what humms are really like. Liberals. freedom and equality al. Although many revisionist liberals have believed that reasoxr can reveal the true good for h u m a r h d and the best sort of society (see SecLicm 4. they fmdamentally disagree as to the limits of this rationalistic tndcavor. liberalism fractures into divergent political doctrjnes and inlcrpretatims of political concepts. h its narrower sense. properIy undastood. Nor do ihey beliwe that politics is properly understood as the attempt to rationally reconstmct society. it seems that any poIitical theory must include some picture of human nature. Socialism." this will be of obvious relevance to questions such as. we have seen. hsisting that reason camot show US how to avoid conflicts between commitmen& to liberty a d the promotion of equillity. When the term is trsed in the narrower sense. As we shail see Irhrougbut this book. jnstincts can be trnderstood as one view of human nature-a view rejected by many h the wider sense. since many doubt whether we have natural instincts or drives.classical liberals such as Hayek insist that m such comprehensive planning is possible. Although all libel-als believe that we shouid seek to apply our reason to better understand society and reform it. Rutkaalism and Political Thmvies. ""human nature" i s much the same as "psychologym-explaxrati~xrs of humar~ hehavior and characteristics. is c o m i t t e d to s t m g forms of rationalism. closely ljnk freedom with reason -and insist that.3) that zznites freedom with equality. the social order is so complex that husnan reason cannot grasp it-it cannot understmd and coxrtrol society. we will see. as we will see. however. the clairn that humms are moved by powerful.e consistent. then. humm nature is about: human "hstkctsPf or "drives. hrdeed.

eth centuries embraced a view of humans as self-developers. has repeatedly argmcl that X-lomo econumz'cus explains political as well as economic behavior. that peaple o promole lheir own self-interest. will serve but ta demtlnstrate and confirm it. in a13 we say in all we tit-rink: every effort w e can make to throw off our subjectirtn. another Nable Prize-wil711ing classical liberai economistr. the critical figure?. . certainly in politics. this seE-interested theory of human action has had great influence in classical liberal thought. James Buchanan. Because of the close tie betweell classical liberalism and economics. as well as to determine what we shall do. Mill argues that freedam is necessary for individual sel6deveXopment and growth. argued that the f l a w conservatfves. a r p i n g that in -all amas of life each person purmxes her m 1 pieasurea a ~ -avoids d her own pains: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters. that every man must be supposed a have. In On I. talents. people are basically n all. They govern us in all we do.four theories of human nature that have played impartant roles in liberal.4? lhis co~~ception of human nature has had great influence in ccronodcs.= : I n many ways. ."% that is. Again. l h e divide betwee11 clwsicai and revisionist lfberals is nowhere sharper than concerning their views of human nature. pain and pleasure. aspects of their lives. It is f t x them alone to point out what we ought tc? do. Jererny Bentharn went will always act t a good &a1 further. .4 This lheory also has been a favoritc target of criticism by revisionist liberals. and socialists who hawe strel~uously i n classical liberal capitalism is its view of humms as seff-inte~stcd consurners with infinite appetites. ma~-can be t-he n o t i o ~ of~Wonzo ecunun4ic~as co~~omic traced back to Bentharn.ibert!/. . and abilities. focused not on promoting their i n t e ~ s t hut s on developing their capacities. economic m m acts to pursue his own hterests and plans m d is not dirnctly cmcerned with advancing the goals and int e ~ s t of s others. According to one familiar view of human nature. h the place of the basically (if not entirdy) self-interested cmception of persons that dominated classical liberal ecommic t h h ~ h gliberals in tt7e late nineteenth and twenti. Mill it. self-interested-if not i David Hume (1711-1776) famusly argued that it is "a just politic& maxim. socialist or co~~servative theories.

according to Grem. says the revisionist liherai. Grt?err'snotjon of the comdevdopment. it is merely a rncrans to satisfy needs exter~~al over. Macpherson repeatedly insisted."so Morethe world]. not merely as a means to fiat better state. ITather than the expsession of the distinctively humar~ capacities."" K u s . Moreover. C o ~ ~ s e q e twe . The worker bvorks k order to eat: "It is . The development of others stimulates m d completes one's own: one cannot be a developed. Green (1836-1882).ionist liberdsm. . has also been influential i n socialist thought. L. becomes under capitalism s k p l y a means to meet one"s most basic needs. revisionist liberalism comes to advocate a cooperative and sociable view of t-rumm beil'lgs as parbIers in each other's self-developmmt. are not moved simply to advmce their i n t e ~ s t s m d consume or satis@ their appetites.lzctive:ly h u m capacities of the . not the satisfaction of a need [fiat is. . couid use their pokvers and abilities for his own purposes." it dominates revisionist liberalism. central to rcrvir. or on the way to the best. de~relopingthe disti.'This criticism c m be found in the early works of Karl Marx. A worker" labor is not a way for her to express her humanity. C."49 T%eproblem for ~visiol2ist Ijberalism. Later liberals such as 'E H.. realized. seli-development is a cooperat& activity: only by participating in a communiw of self-developers can one best develop o11e~s talents.. and interests. Individuals.st Ifherals. abilities. individual in a world of undevely . but as slnaritlg it with him. far from. work is reduced to being a mere mems for animal surbsistence. B. according to revisionj. Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923). M mon good. witl-toutcontemplating others. maintaining that under capitalism workers were -alienakd from their work-they sabv their work as controllkg them rather than as lheir own cxalion.""" Although this view of humms is by no mems absent from dassical liberal theory. stunted people. "Man cannot cmtemplak himself as in a better state. have a r ~ interest in each otherfs oped. revising instead that workers m s t sell their lahor to t-he capitalist so that hc. Macpherson (1911-1987)-a Marxist philosopher ard a harsh critic of ihe wlf--1Rterestc. Mobhouse. Work.d conception of human n a m e that looms large irt clnssicaf liberalism-was much more sympathetjc to the revisionist liberal view of the human being "as exerter and en~oyer of his own powers." Hohhouse insisted. T. In his analysis of the "Heart of Liberalism. and John D e w q developed this idea.only if a person is allowed great scope for choosing a life of her own will she find a life that suits her talents. it is the way for the capitalist to make the worker reflect his aims. T%is idea was crucinl to T. as Marx saw it. in which he developed his theory of alienation. bvas that liberal capitalism did not allow people to direct and develop their powers and capacities. T%eideal of self-devetapment. but to develop and refine their capacities and talents. the human need to express oneself by c-ing to it. "The f o w ~ d a t i o of ~Iiberty ~ is the idea of growth.

Thus. Marx argued. after labor has become not only a meam of life but life's prime wmt. Marx believed that in a communist society that does abvay with private property and the market. and therewith also the antithesis beWeen mental and physical labor.onmenfa/ism Although the self-developmental ideal looms large in both revisionist liberal and socialist theories. peoplc are formed by their history and culture-the characteristics of people in one country or epoch will differ fudammtally from those of of the others." On this view. m d the sort of people who would embrace this rrew conception of: . A social mthe ways in r/vhich our envimnmex~t zilinjnmenfulist conception of human nat-ure stwsses that pcofle's characters are largely pmdttced by the c u l t m in which they live. in socialist theories it is very nearly always complcme~~kd by a concreptio~~ of M a n n a t m that lays great stress on shapes our pammfiities.ss of of capitajist society: a changed humans in capitatist society is the c ~ a t i o n society will produce radically different types of people with radically different concerns and nnotivatims.worker. to each according to his needs. Capitalists do m t emphy machhery to lighttln t-he load of workers. Social Envir. for exampk. Now. has vanished. and all the springs of cooperative wealth FIow abtxndantty-only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banner: From each according to his ability. Sociaiists have long maintained that the selfishnc. after the emlaving subordinaticm of the individual to the division of labor. they have also put great stress on the makability of h a a n nature?. although socialists have emphasized the individual's capacity for self-development. after the productive farces have also increased with the all-rt~und development of the individual. IThe personaljty of an nlnerican liv. and symbols by which one defines oneself and generates what we think of as "'personality. hut to get more out of them. work trnder capitalism is dehumanizh~g in the sense that it starves higher huznm capacities and molds humans Fn the image of machines. In a higher phase of communist society. individuals will no longer see work as drudgery that they only perform if rewarded. labor under capitalism destroys those capacities.51 a l e ' s culture provides the raies. Consequently. categories.52 Marx" point was that this transformation in our tmderstandkg of justice.ing at the beginninfi~ n the h/verrty-first century will be radicallJr different from that of a Greek i third century sec.

Simply put. MI are creafrures embedded i17 a particdr time and a particula place. lrhe antisocialist claim that people are too sell-interested to mbrace commmist society fails to a p p ~ c i a t e that selfishess is not a trait of humans as such. the traditions in which she has been broul. by throwing our weight upon the foot which f t x the time being is most firmly placed. 'Thus. Conservatiries too see humans as essentially beings of a parti. The Masai. To take these away-to embark on the rationalist project of startislg out from scratch-is to attack the "oasis of our persmiities. her affections.justice. Oakeshott makes this point in an essity entitled 'Qn Being : Conservativerf Change is a threat to identity. It is not a fortress into which we may retire. our traditions constitute our nature: what we are is to a large extent determined by our customs. and so '"heir naturt. when they were moved frtlrn their old country to the present Masai reserve in Kenya. but of humans under capitalism. traditior-ral political arrmgements. humms are essentially historical creatznres: to be a person is to he an Englishman of a certain locality at a cerlaisl time or an hericar-r at the turn of the twer-rty-firstcenlury.cular time and place. each at the mercy ctf circumtances and each sipificant in prt~portion to its familiarity. but: it is not Sjmp1y to be "a human. would only arise &r the corrupting influences of ca~pitalist culture had been elisninated. by cleaving to whatever familiarities are not immediately t h ~ a t e n e d and thus assihlating what is new without becoming unrecognizable to ctursejves. and so on. and her attachments.the conservative view of humans as essentially constituted by their history and tradition leads to the conservative" deep concern about change: change undermines our very identity." Far the conservative. and the only means of defending it (that is. and every change is an emblem of extinction. took with them the names of their hills and plains and rivers and gave them to the I-kIls and plains and rivers of the new crtuntry.53 T%us.) is nothing more than an Wbroken rehearsal of contingencies.ht up. m a t a person is deper-rdsvery much 0x1 her history. But a man" identity (or that of a community. And it is by such subterhge of conservatism that every man or people a>mpelledto suffer a notable change avoids the shame of extinction. and that is why the conservative so stresses tradition m d locality . traditior-ral religious beliefs. on this point cor-rservatkestend to agme with socidists. :Interestingly. ourselves) against hostile forces of change is in it-re open field of our experience. traditional ways of doing things." is to a large extent a product of swiety and its tradition. Because sociitlism insists that many of the traits of "'capitalist mn" will n kvhich our socinot be traits 01 "socialist mm:' it emphasizes the ways i ety shapes our personality.

. it also has an instinctivist strain. . that conservatives such as Oakeshott and Burke deny that we c m have such k ~ o w l edge illbout.. gwat chmge is a leap into the dark. Because she c m look forward to new sorts of people i n the new society. their wilt controlled. people llr~der But the conservative fears change just because our personalities are shaped by our historical and cultural heritage.ing. In gmeral. We saw that Mamim sacialism ( m d it is not at all unique in this regard) contibjnes a se)f-developmentalwith a social mvim entalist view of human nature. For the conservative. where we will becme. tain way. their passions brought into subjection.We are cmfrmkd with a puzzle. are kmate propensities far humans to behave in cerl l times and culhrres.y and how it c m be altered. Conservatives such as Burke combine social e~~viro~~mentalof humm nature. the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted. How can the same theory of hunit1. s . Acism with what c m be called m insl"inefiuistt l n e a ~ coding to one of the most farnous instinetiriist psychologists. propmsitics that are relitthew constant in a Although. differat sorts of people. for the socialistf that our characrter is shaped by our society is an opportunity to bring &out the right sort of character in the right sort of society. 'The humm mind has certain innate or Fnherited tendencies which are the essential sgrhgmr motive powers of all thought m d action. Conservatives such as Burke and Oakeshott insist that we are hherently passionate creatures." And these h a t e tendencies are the basis of the ""caharacter md -will of individuals and of nations"'. since thew hstistcts have a "stable mQmchmghg character.. as I have said. subject tc:.5' . the motives and shortcomings of liberal capitdim need not carry over into socialist society."%I n s ~ ~ c tthe^^. in ways W c a ~ n oeven t wess. that will and to those pas"ims which it is its offjce to bridie and subdue. This can ctnly be done by a pozuer out ofthemselves. socialists are rationalist. our s0ciet. Socialists have faith in our ability to control changes and through reasoned plax~ing produce the sort of soGiety that will creak desirahle human beings. and control of. however. It would seem that the socialist is attracted to a social ernivirox~mentalist view of h u r n a ~ nature because she supports and bvelcomes great chmges. and not. thus the cbracteristics of peclf?lefrom one era to the next are largely mchmg. that the passions of individuals should be subjected . in the exercise of its fwcticm. S~ciety requires . . We have seen. Accordhg to Burke.1nahre be employed to welcome and discourage change? We mtxst recall that whereas conservatives are antirationalist. conservatism stresses the way in which hmmans are the product of their history and culture. .

1. to deflate. Now.And to Oakeshott. althougl"l. These constraints puts severe constrai~lits were emphasized by the psychologist Sigmtxnd Freud (18561939)." Gdlie nevertheless is right that debates about the proper interpretation of concepts such as liberty. to reskaisl. ."M A number of differat senses of individualism and collectivism c m be W e hawe already c o n s i d a d one in our examination of disthguished. our death instinct-our destmctive and a g g ~ s s i v e nature-is always threatening to undermir~e civilizatior~. not to stoke t-he fires of desim. be going too far to say that conservatives adopt Saint A~tgustine'scharacterization of th. their shared conception of humans as passimate.ed to the perfection of hurnms. to pacify and to recox~cile. who envisages grand projects to reconstruct humans and society to achieve a community in which all cooperate and thrive.Although Fxud is not typically associated with conservatism. hdeed.~~ human nature: it. for the conservative the possibilities of politics are much more limited. according to Bemard Basanquet-m important revisionist: liberal-'The relation of the individual to society is the root of every social proklem.e political r d e as one of jailer to shful cxatures." Thus. this is far too simple. but to inject into the ilctivities of all-cady too passionate rnen an ingredient of moderation. ewality. It will be called that Gallie arglted that liberals and socidists advanced competim. who canm t obtain p e r k d i m on this earth. hut to d m p them down. no douht. flawed creatures.of course.I\s F ~ u understood d it. his book C k ilization and its Disccrrtfenfs---writtell late in his Me (1930)-paix~ts a deeply pessilnistic picture of what c m be achieved by civilization. wherclas socialists uaderstand society in a "col1eccti:vistic" way.itics is properly focused on controllisrg their destructive urges. rather than being devot. Arthough it w u l d . Thus. : I n Sectiox~ 2. and justice inevitably involve &bates about persorls and society.tg conceptions because they have different ideas about the relation of individuals to society: liberals.human personality largely the result of culkral and social influences (as the social environmentalist maintaiurs) ar the conse- . Galtie argued.d one of Galiie's exmples of an essentially conteskd concept: social justice. we exan7inc."56 The tie betkveen consernative and Clhristim thlinking is evident in. favur an "'individualist" view. a m m of conservative "disposition understands it to be the bushess of gwernment not to inflame passion and give it new objects to feed upon. in contrast to Lhe socii\list. poi. and although political theorists have often meant very different thhgs by "individualism" and "'collectivism. the inherently passionattz and flawed nature of human beings on what politics can achieve.

says the collectivist.who are real. traits. and institutio~~s acteristics of individuals-their beliefs.derecf as constituting as it were its menzbeus. but the beliefs. culture. Although a "first lookf' may seem to m e a l independat indi\iiduals living next tru each other in society' a deeper understandkg kvould show the extent to which hdividu& are expressions of their swiety and their place in it. A metlnodological inctividualist believes that people" actions.""" Rather. c o q a s e d of t-he hdividual persolls who are consi. socialists. W h e ~ a as s ""at. amd dreams ori." or ""people" i s much m r e than a grouy. for example. Lhe ""community"'is simply a name we use to describe the actio~~s. a society is a system of organized life. In contrast. m a ~ of these pditical phjlosophers insisted that individuals i n s0ciet.gregationf9s simpiy a cdection of parti.cdars. this comes down to a simpk question: what is more basic-the individual or sockty? Jeremy Bentham (Section 2.1-Jacylles y Rousseau (1712-1778). h ~ n the g ninet e e ~ ~cemry. th however. the average American citizen. a wide variety of political thirkers----including many conservatives. a ""sitciety. in the selfinterest or instinctivist views)? Two additional individualism/collect-ivism disputes shodd be ibricfly merttiomed: (I) the metfurldologid dispute about the hest way to understand hurnans-in-society. desires. and revisionist liberals-began to questjon this individdist understanding of society. They do not just live next to each other-society is not simply an agg~gatioxt or "'heap of individuals. a d (2) the mortal dispute &out the relative moral claims of tfne illdividual and commt~nity.tfui to explaiyr facts about individuals by appeal to more basic facts about their society.y share a common life. of individuals: it has a culture and custom that shape the inhiduals born into it. and hteractions of indivici. social cusam ultimtely best explahed in terms of the chartoms. one .Q Followhg the French political philosopher Jeit1. actions.uals." "'"nation. system in which people fhd themselves. and effects on each other. The coUectivist believes that it is generally far more fruj. actions. Any useful accomt of social life has to start off from what is real-hdividuals. hdividuals are a refiection of this comman life ard culturc: ""Every mind is a mirror or hpression of tlte whole cmmunityf'@Individuals arc thus held to be reflections or exyressions of the essence of their social order."" For m i~~dividualist such as B~IItham.@Often. and will.quence of factors arising out of individuals (as. are to be explained by the social and other characteristics of i~~dividuals. If one wants to explain the hope$ fears. a methadological collectivist believes that not only the workings of society and its institutions.3) had no doubts: "The commurGlry is a fict-itious body.

Man is in the mast Xiteral sense of the word a zoon yolitikon [political animal] not only a social animal. the welfare of the whole society c m ~ ooverridemff66 t Of course. there arc exceptions-some socialists have emTypica'iy. Bosmquet maintains that the indikridual's e may have Me expresses the c o m o n will of society and in e x t ~ m cases to be sacrificed for the good of her socicty In cor~trast. . and traditions.r-halre been at the core of political theorizi~ag for the past two hundred years. ."bWince individuals arc exyressims of eheir societies. Thus. morality is the.r-blst. as always. it is more enlightening to think of a continuum of positions. in ""bourgeois sacietyr3hat the different fcjrms of sociat union confront the Individual as mere means tct his private ends. customs.1 individualfst comeptio~r of morafity that stresses oniy what is good for individuals. As Marx wrote. as a moral collectivist. as an oulward necessity. disputes between jndividualists and collectivists-whether individuals are or are not more basic than sociev.~ cialists have been critical. expres"i"" of social pupox* inindidual lives. Rather than two stark alternatives. or r/vheeher individual person40 or do not have mord priority over social purposes and the good of societ?. from radical individuaiism at one end to radical collectivism at the other. seems to depend on and constitute a part of a larger sociat whole. Politicai lfieorists hawe sou@t to articulate jntermediate positions. with ar. a revisionist liberal collectivist. . we are not cmfronttzd with simply the stark alternatives of radical individualism (of either the methodological or moral sort) or radical co11ecti\rism (of either sort). but an animal that can only develop into a n individual in socliew. As we shall too. the producing individual. It is but in the eighteenth century. of what has been described as '*liberal. Bernard Bosanquet. .eives as well as sobraced forms of hdividualjsm). sociaiists. Nevertheless.f'' ""caf)italisticI" or "boourgeojs" kindidualism. . Pro- . see in the io11owing chapters. moraljty "consists in the social puvose working by TOa moml arlk?cli. The further back we ga into history. and. moral individualists such as S o h Rawls put at the very center of their political theory the principle that "each person possesses an inviolhility founkd. giving weight to both individual and social factors.must first understand the nature of America and its life. explicitly contrasted this "socialistic'konceptim of morality whi& fimly focuses morality or7 social purposes and the sociai good. conserva. its own force on the individual wi1l. and in general cor~servatives have been attmcted to positions toward the collectivist end of our continuurn (though. the more the individual.. on justice that even. . therefc~re.

Debaks about the relatio1"tsof individuals to their societies are jndeed fmdamerrtal to political theory Mether irrdividual personalities are in some basic way shaped by society. . . in both the metrhodologicat and moral senses. on the one hand. liberals such as Basmquet insisted that the dassical :liberals had an overly indkidualistic view of humans and society. and socialism as m endurkg political theory. it puts too much weight on individual choice. Amy Gutmann observed. a l t h o s h liberalism has often been equakd with individualism. Should we add it as a fourth endurjng political theory? I think not. d political doctrine-or rather. a distinct a"td important wiew. classical liberals and. Silnce the ninetee1"tthcentury----andright up w"tCil todapthere have beer1 persiste~~t attempts to move liberaljsm w a y from. Some observers maintajn that communitarianism it. conservatism. stronger forms of individualirsm to the middle of the individualist-collcctivist continuum.rnmur"titarian. individual self-interest.(& hteresthgly.h9As Galtje incticaes.s of various forms of individualism and collectivism. Like the critics of the 1960s. on the otherf more collectivist views such as socialism and much revisio~~ist liberalism. whether individual facts can be best expkhed in terms of social facts. or even toward the colrcctivist ernd. taking its place next to liberalism. this has had significant impact on the ways concepts such as jusMce are understood by. and whether the moral ciaims of the community are j n some way superior to those of the hdivicfual are. ljherds tkmselves have been &@plydivided about the merit.duction by isolated. a loose p o u p of diverse ipoliticd views----knowx"tas 'kcummunitaria~~isnn'" has thus arisen as a challenge to what is seen as the overly hdividualist-ic nature of li:beral political theory. and individud m o d rights and pays too little attation to the ways in which inclividuals are members of a community and how group. "We are witnessing a revival of communitaian criticisms of liheral. those of the 1980s fault liberalism for being mistaker~ly A number of critics and ir~parahly irTdi\ridualisticIff7Q have insisted that liberalism is too individualistic. cultural.individuals outside ctf society . and ethnic identities shape individuals." Witing in 1985. political theory. Revisionist liberals expiicitrly sought to bring collectivism-bo& methodological and moral--into liberalism. The past two decades have witnessed a renewed hterest in collectivist analyses of sociev-though the km "collectivist'?~ abjured in favor of "cc. As we saw above. . is as great an absurdity as the idea of development of a language wilhrtut indirriduals living together and talking ta one another.

it it. d i c h stresses hummshability to plan and control their society and the importmce of equality for a healthy community is vastly different from conservative communitariarrisun.1. h sctions 3.1. stresses tbe iYnportance of tradid way this e~~dorses an tions and habits in the life of a commur-tity. tends to stress the ineyua1it)l of rights and &ties ~ IaI well-ordered society. limi2. 10.4). Nevertheless. Of course. human nature. Socialists. insisting that it is at odds with individual liberties..2. it will thus loom large irt the analysis of this book. authority is a core idea of mast conservah e accomts of politics. liberalism puts individual liherty in the pride of place. liberalism fin both its classical and revisio~~ist versions). enduring political questions. 1have conside~d three enduring political theories. socidists. only when ernbedded in a ystem of interlocking theories and inkrpretations of poljsjcal concepts docls communitarianism yield a political doctrine.4. we examked these three debates a d the positions on each that liberals.without doubt. Conservatives are dcepiy skegticd of eyuality. Communitarian cmvictims in themselves have no clear political implications. in.jticd theory than is rali.3. that it is a crucial eleme~~t of socialism m d co~~servatism (as well as much revisionist liberalism). we saw that each has a disthctke conceptud structure. however. 10. important to he a there are disputes m d diversity.ing the importance of equality and tyhg justice closely to the protection of liberty. these fmilies do have their h~temal resemblances trhat disthguish thern from the others. Again. however. 9.onnlism alone or a theory of human nature alone. In %ction 2.a ~ the inegalitarian socid order (see Sections 9. Alone. and coalserviltives w m &at w i t h each tradition tend to take. In this chapter. Communitarianism as part of a socialistic rationalism.2 to 3. although our three cnduring politic& theories have different conceptual structures. answers to a politic& theory----they are simply one these questiclns do not col~stitute type of issue with whieh a comprehensive political theory must deal. and conservatism. contrast. socialism. Political. almost always insist that libesty and eyuality are consistent and mutually reinforcinl. :l: have tried to draw attention to important differences within each. their justifcations of these different structures depend significantly on their positions i n three enduring debates in political theory: tl-te role of reasall in politics. Because there is no essential core to lib- . Cornmunitxianism illorre is no more of a po. which. conservative justice. WC shall see. we S h d see. and democracy is close to the heart of most socialjsms. all three enduring political theories are complex familics of doctrines. justice is tied very closely to equality. and Lhe rntatio~~ of individuals to society.

htic~t~nlisrn in Politics. Zafta. Corzservatism (Milton Meynes. Wilhelm van Hurnboldt. p. para. 3. M. p. 8.. Michacl Oakeshott. 19681. See Michael)Freeden. 18. 19817).. Bernard Crick. UM: hnguin. This chapter draws on the work of John W. L. Koerner in Liberalisurr n~zdits GP"itics(London: Croom Helm. Richard Norman. 7. 2.p. 3965). 13. pp. or conservatism.p. 84. 16.p. p. (Irrdianapalis. MJ: Rclwman and AIlenheId. Robson. ideologies and Political Tfzeoy.edul. This fist is given by Kirk F. 14. expanded ed. Ibid. RePeetions on ffie Rez~olufion i~zFm~zce(Harmondtjworth. 12. On Liberty. 6. Socialism (MiXton Keynes.p. UK: Open University Press.. UK: Open University Press. 397. Freeden. John Stuart Mill. chap. 3: The Political Order ofa Free People (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1991). S t ~ ~ ~ E~tcyclopedia ord 17. 1(386). Ibid. John Stuart Mill. 1992). Edmund Burke." in EEdward N. in the course of our analysis the family resemblance ( S c t i m 1. 133. 62. On Libertjj mzd Otlzer E'says (New York: Oxford University Press. 9. T. ed.. E A. p. 4. 267. 87. quoted in E A. we shall encounter versions of conservatism that ernbrace a type of rationalism. Robert Nisbet. p. The Encyclopedl'a of PFzifosoplzy (New York: MacmilXan and the Free Press. 1967).stanft>rd.eralism.4)within each type of theory should reveal itself. 47. Hayek. 196Q). 334. S. Lam. "%iberalism. 12. "Political Theory: Logical Structure and Enduring Types" in L"d4e de pfzilosuphie politiqzre: Antzales de philosnplli"(X. Maurice Cranston.. Co?zservatism(Ltmdon: Dent. socialism. ed. 2985). 1963). for example. 4.. p. 19.alogicsatzd PoliiFic~ZTIzeo~y." in Pmuf Edwards.. ed. Compare Freeden. 394. Nevertheless. 1985). 10. . ~ d vol. pp. The CofEected Works of Johtz Stuart Mill (Toronto: University ctf Torontct Press. IN: LJ1"berty Press. 19"i76). 5-42!. 5. chaps. 10. Legislatio~x n ~ Liberty. in J. Tfze o f PIzilosoplay [online at http:/ /plato. my essay on ""tiberafism. 1979). 1964).p. 1. p. Eqliafity mzd Liberty: A Befelzse of Radical Egalitfiritz~lism ( Totctwa.. 15. Kai Nielsen. Nog1 OTSuivan. in John Gray. 4 and 5. 1987). vut. 12. sociatisms that aclvocate inequality m d liberalisms that are collectivist. Augusfe Conzde and Positivisnz. p. Hobhouse. Hayek. See. 201. 1996). 11. 272. 1. Ideologies n~zd Political Tlieory (Oxfc~rd: Clarendctn Press. p. Liber~fisnz (New York: Oxford University Press. 430. The Couzstifzrtion of Liberty (Lc~ndon: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ed.aris: Presses Universitaires de France. Chapman. p. Free n~zdEqual: A Phr'losqhicaf Examiittaiiiouz ofhlitiml V d ues ((Oxf a d : Oxford Universit_rsPress. 57-96. Idco.

Tfze Mnrx-E~zgelsReader. 32. Socialism (Londrm: Dent.20. 1475). "Two Concepts of Liberty. 2nd ed.e ( N e w k r k : E. Manning. Ibid. 1%A).. Political and Literary (Oxkjrd: Oxford University Press. Van Mises.'?n N~tzii.74). pp. p. UK: Penguin. 277.. 1993). J. 700.. Berki. "Of the Independency of Parliament. 8-9. Martin" Press. P. Jonathan Benthat]. 7.fFTt~ma-~z p. B. 1984). 2%. Isaiah Berlin. 21.. 13. 3: Xctztles n~zd Chicago Press. 7'hc Limits o f Likrdy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hobhouse. p. Ibid. 3. David Hume. Muml. p." in inhis Four Essays un Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Libemlism. 3. 36. p. 37. $6. Lord Robbins.p. U E Liberty. 1975). ed . 1 have explored this theor~lr in my iVEoden2 Lib(New Vc>rk:St. 168--169. Xbid. p. 29731. lntrodzlction to tlte Priitzcip1es of Momls a d tegisl'atiarz. 66. Maepherson. Xbid. N. Ludwig von Mises. M A : Harvard University Press. chap. For more on the influence ctf the Enlightenment on liberal thinking. 1983). $2. Legislatic~t~ and Liberty: A New State??zentq t f i e Liberal PriuciOrder (Chicago: University of ples of Justice a d hlitical Economy. 43. ed. "The Nature of Human Nature in Hobbes and Rousseau. "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. eral T l ~ e o ojrvla~z ~y . 14621. pp. Hayek. The I>oliticnl Tfzeory qf Possessive Ittdividualism (Qxfcjrd: Clarendon Press. 197"7). pp. 24. 9. 19?4).p. TfteLinzifs t. 17. See Tames Buchanan. p. Frederick Engels. 35. (New York: Norton. Stephen Holmes. pp. see John Gray. lsclinfl Berlin (Princetan: Prince-tan University Press. p.. 27... pp. 33. chap.185. 1996).. Xbid. 7. 31. in Alan Ryan. This aspect ctf the fiberai tradition is stressed by D. 30. para. Mill. vol. chap. 23. Ulilitarknism and Other Essays (Harmondsworth. 27-28. C. 167. R. p..2317." in Robert C. pp. 15. Tucker. p. 26.. Xbid. 25. Ibid. Xbid. 29.. 19. $4. 19871. p. Dtxtton.2(San Francisco: Cobden Press. 5. Libemlism in the Classical Tradit-iol. Alan Ryan. The Atantomy of" Atztilibernlis~~i (Cambridge." h his Essays. Law. Liberalkm in the Classical Tradifl'clrz. Ibid. Polificuf Econonzy: Past ~ n Present d (London: Macmillan. 1978). Far a good account of the antirationalist roots of Berlin's pluralism see John Gray. 34.244of Burke" Repections un the Revolutk~z iz Fra~zce. 183. 4. Jeremy Rentham. 29-30. 16. for example. Libeual&m (Mjlton Keynes.43-50. 153.171. 39. See. UK: Open University Press. 1485). 28. 1969). 40*Ei A. Liberalism (Londr3n: Dent. 247. p. pp. 65. 38. 22. p. ed. 42-43. 41. 45.

Introdzacfiouz to tlte Principles ofhX~rals mzd Legz'slatz'nuz. see: j. 4. 51. Tucker. See. Ttte Philosopllictzl Ttteory I. Ritchie. Dcnzocmlic lJllliticnl Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press. A11 Xntrod~cfiouz to E C 1 2 r l Mnrx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 534. 3. St-evenLukes. 111.chap.4". is a methodological individualist and a Marxist. sect. On Christianity % doubts about perfection. 4973). An Jlrtmdt~ctic?tz do Social Psychofon (Lr3ndon: Methuen. (New York: International Publishers. socialist approach.1(the Sta te a~zd dianapofis. IldfJk)." in the Mnm-Engels Refider. 4-10. "The Antithesis of Individ-ttafism and Socialism. Jeremy Bentham. Kart Marx.1( the State a~zdRellnted Essays. Ion Etster. p. See D. ""Critique of the Gotha Program.EB.p.." p. Macpherstsn. 1977).'3in Tfze 1~hikosophicaITFl:t@ory 66. 1934). chap. Burke. 54. G. 197"1). 51. The Philosopl~ical Theory of the State. Pmlrgomena to Ethics. 1912).p. X L : Open Court.Augustine Press. Democm tic Theory: Essays i1. for example.t Refriez~al (Oxford: Clarendctn Press. The Perfectibility $Man (Lctndon: Duckworth. p. C.4 above.. Tf-ris term derives from Maurice Mandelbaum. (Oxfrjrd: Clarendon Press. History. 1973).'>n his &tl. 210. But his is a fairly n e y and somewhat unorthodox. Stie his IrztroCO F(iZrI Marx. 56. 19641. Gbucfl. p. Williarn McDougalf. IN: St-. Econornz'c n ~ Philosophic d Ma-lzuscwts o f 1844. 2. p. I~diztidldalism (Oxford: Basil Bfackwelt.See Sectirtn 1. Phifosophi1. "On Being a Conservative. 200Q). p. 57. p. ""On Being a Conser.Ol"l 68. 13. A. SO. For very useful overviews. Inkrt~"Cldctic~tz to the Critique o f Politicat Eeotlotny.pp.o-lznlism itz h l i tics. Alienniiitjn: Mnrxb Gonceptiotz of Mn-lz in Cayitalisi" Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ibid.vative. Xndiztidzrals and their Rigtlts (La Safle. See also his life and Tinzes ufkibeml Democraq (Oxfcjrd: Oxford Universiq Press. 55. H. M. 61. 329. B. 1 6 6 .chap. 62. 1980). see Son EXster. Martin Mllligan. Bosanquet. eds. chap. Karl Marx. 1890). p. For an analysis of Mam's theory of alienation. trans. 19"i71). 1-7-18. 49. 66. 58. 63. 65. Oakeshutt. The Plzilosophical Tlfeory f:)f the State. Green. John Rawlt. 1983). 33. 151. . 2. Bosanquet. 197'1). 52. Marxisria and I ~ d i v i i (Oxford: t Blackwelt. 59. pp. Reflectio?zson !lie Revolzitic~tz in Franw. Bradfey.. 142ff. 48.47. caify Considered. 1. 19792. For a useful introduction. for example. 53. 4332. quoted in D. A 7"hcufy of justim (Cambridge. see John Passmore. in Gerald E Gaus Rerfated Essays (Inand Will iam Sweet. C. see BertiT OIZman. 4. Tibor Machan.Bernard Bc->sanquet. Michaei Oakeshott. p. Roland Pemctck. ed. Karl Marx. 3 . p. iGlarz n~xdReasouz (Baltimore: Johns Pllopkins University Press. The Prilzcif?leso f S k t e I~teqerezce (tondrm: Gearge Allen. p. 13470). p. 79. 67.. M A : Harvard University Press.

. NOMOS X X X X V : D~enzocrakic Conztnrrlzity ((New York: New York Universiq Press. See Altan Qan.. 34 (1985). 70. 308. eds. Pzibfic Afla. Amy Gutmann." in Jahn W Chapman and Tan Shapiro. p.vol. 19533).s.az'. 91-114.. 'Tommunltarian Critics of Liberalism.pp.653." Phitosopfly 6 . " " T h e Liberal Community.

PART TWO POLITICAL CONCEPTS Z* m - -- 79 T S % . ? ^ % W .M " ! " 9 W v --7- W . l .-W .

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tt7e simplest answer is that he is locked in a cell and cannot leave i t For mamas Mobbes (1588-1679). He shakes the bars but cmnot get out.jberty is the absence of . hball moves h e l y down a hill until something stops it.1 Negative Liberty: Some Ordinary Language Considerations Freedom a s the Absence of Qbshcles Let us begjn by focusing on a simple case: fJllse 9: Btf is a political dissidex~t and has been jaifed by trhe govcmment m d locked in a cell. . impediments t o action. We immediately come to a crucial question: do all exter~~al impediments to action or obstacles invalve a loss of freedom"?ansider the f o t b w h g cases: Cnsc 2: Alf is hiking across the Rocky Moluntains and encounters an avalanche that bbcks his way. . .NEGATIVE AND 4. '%l." AS Hobbes w~derstood it. . Cnsc 3: Alf is hiking across the Rocky Moluntains and encounters an avalanche that blocks his my. :If we ask why AII is unfree. Betty wanted to get across first so she used dynamite to cause the avalmche. The avdmche occurred mturally. AJf moves freely across his cell until the locked cell door stops him. something that is not p ~ v e n t e d from m o v i ~ ~ by g an exten~ai obstacle is free: if something stops i l :from moviclg it is ttnfree.

but deliberate inlerventions in an other"^ life."^ Case 3 is clear: not only does Alf confront an obstacle. it is not senseless to say that people are not free to jump mofe than ten feet in the air. by Betty who was s Berlh."Vh-tns. but it must be a ddeberate or intentional obstacle to a person's activity. The avalmche was accidentally caused g kli the higher reaches of the mountain. at least sometimes. but it is one that was created by another person. According to :Isaiah Berlb. perhaps. . If someone accidentally parks her car in front of your driveway. says Berlin. many have been reluctant to depict Case 2 as a limit.Wn the other hand.'' the obstacle must not only be created by humans. then a complaint about lirniting y o u freedom kvould be pmfectly sensible m d not at all odd. Eletty. and only if. . Thus. but it woutd be smewhat odd to appeal to the value of freedom in your complaint against your neighbor.78 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY :In each case. Here Berlin seems to . if she deliberately blocked yom path. the way of another. But insofar as our i n t e ~ sis t political and morai discours those moral and political language that focus on peoplefwomplaints and challe~liges to orlie person creating obstacles in the path of others-it does indeed seem that what Berlin calls ""plitical liherty" 'involves humanly created (or.What. . If someone gels in my w q I may point out to her that she is blocking mef but I am not likely to complain that she is limithg my freedom until 1see her as deliberately or h o w h g l y blockng me. that does not make you ul-tfree. We may dispute this.ilCion of Alf's liberty. since no human created the obstacle. is not simply about one person accidentally getting in. In anotrher essay. the most likely and appropriate cmplaint would be that she is inconsiderate or thoughtless. a person is u n h e to do an actjon if. indicates that Case 4 would not involve a lack of f ~ e d o mTo . collistitute a iirnitatio~li of freedoq Berlin suggests in his famous essay. "You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prwezlited from attaining a goal by other humm beings. howeveq about Case 4: Alf is h&kg across the Racky Mamtains m d encounters m avalmche that blocks his way. even modern followers of Hobbes are more Xikely to adapt the view that "'bmilcfly s p e a h g . Berlin suggests a diff'ereM derstarlidirlig of what sorts of obstacles are relevant to freedom. after ali. his doing that action is redered impossible by the acticrrz o f another per so^^. '*TwoConcepts of Liberty. Yet. Alf meets an Ohstacltl that prevents him from gojng further. maintained) obstacles. Liberty talk. one of the most famous of modern philosophers of freedom. on Berlin's view. and so wouid seem unfree in Hcibbes's sense. even though gravity is an obstacle to your jumping higher than ten feet in the air. it is true that you are not free to drive away. however.

Bet9 limits Alf 'S freedam in Case 5. a ~ if Hobbes sees it. though the cost would have been a broken arm. the obstacles that stop me f m going to the moon could be overcome (by supplying me with a spaceship). though. Since she did not p ~ v e nAll t from conlhuing. he can choose whethier to keep his boots or have a broken d he c m choose what to do. Consider.6 0 x 1 this view. one is free trnless m obstacle renders the action impossible.If we take a more moderate \4ew. but now we confroz~t with explainhg what we mean by "'feasible. accordhg to Mobbes AIS is stifl. it kvould seem that All%freedom is limited in. After all. the obstacle to me living the life of ease easily be ovcrrome: they could pay ack ot:money-odd for my pleasures. Cnsc 6: Alf is hiking through the Rwky Mountains m d comes upon Betty. 'Give me " not a murderer. On Berlin's alternative conception. So if my freedom is limited every time 1 confront an obstacle that cazatd be remved by hurnans. but passes no one's fault.You choose. Does this mean that X am trnfree? Coercion and the Ineligibility of Options Thus far we have been exyloP-ing Hobbes's idea that one is free unless an obstacle p ~ v e n t one s from acting. m stuck in the snow. and say that one" freedom is limited i-vherever one conlronts m obstacle that could feasibly be removed by others. As arm. be is free to do so (though the cost wiff be a broken arm).f to perform. but not that much. so that's your boots or 171 break your arm! But I A l f likes the boots. The avalanche was natural and was j . She says. it seems that we are never really free.arguc that if ( 3 ) Alf is blocked by an obstatrle that (2) could be removed by someozle (3) who fails to do so. the complex action of continuing-waIkig-with-his-boots- . if enough money was spent. a thief who wants his new hiking boots.. then (4) Alf 'S freedom is limited. If we adopt this notion of kedorn. Cnsc 5: Alf is hiking across the Rocky Moluntains and encounters an avalanche that blocks his way. Bet$ however. my frecdom is ITOW dril~tiCitI1y lin7ited. he could tlaz~e chosen to do that. sees h by without helping. deep problems things become more mamgeable. it would seem that he is free. free. it is z~ow impossihIe for A1. after all." A hands them over* Bet9 did not prevent Alf h n n walking by with his boots."7 If other people did not want BMWS and beach houses. Of course. so he all 1% 10. And since it is not impossible for Alf to keep his boots.

after all. A. Advocates of the ineligibility view h a w been reluctant to take this path a ~ generd aUy have argued that judgmeMs &out freedom should be graided by how a normal or typical person would view the threat. So he hand..ay that although coerciox~ does not entirely black off an option (for example. becatrse the alternatives before me have been so manipulated that the conduct: the cmcer wants me to choose becomes for me the least p"inful one. ralher. Most philosophers have thus rejected Elabbes" claim that you are free to do what no ohstacle prevents you from doing. '"Coertrion implies that 1 still choose but that n7y f i n d is made someone" else's tool.As F. Charlie arrests Alf. a threat that renders an optim ineligible to Alf may not have the same effect on Charlie. i n which case it does seem that perhaps his frtiedom was limited. possible to choose that option-neither is he perfectb free to choose to keep his hoots.under the circumstmces. it is stiil 1 who decide which is the least evil. boots and keeping his arm in one piece. so concludes that Betty" threat has rendered the option "don't turn over the mmey" ineligible for choice---the costs we just too high. Considel. W e n he explains what happened to Charlie the police officer." Althougf-1this seems to accord much better with. All's freedom is infrk~gcd if either (If another person has intentionally httxkcd off an opeim or (2) mother person has ernployed coercion against Alf to render an option ineligible. She passes Alf. '"Ali keeps his boots").~ inetigihle. Alf had a possible complcx a c t i o ~ ~ ~prekrrcd his artion f keeping hit.lity view. for hstance. Still. Alfs arm is bmkatrm) to choosing it. over the money. ordinary usage than does Hobbes's simple impossibi.Betty has provided an obstacle that has rendered that action impossible. But ii we accept that co~~clusiun. it raises mul-nber of additional prctblems. you a nasty name!" Gilf hates to be called names.10 According to &is izcligibillfy uiez~? o f freedom. Most of us would say that his freedom has been limited by Betty's threat. it seems that: although Alf is not compLetely u ~ ~ f r e to e choose tru keep his boots (md have a brokm arm)-it is.80 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY a. we will not be able to say when a person's freedom is limited without howing a great deal about that person."~ We might .8 Before B e y arrived. most have argued that ctwucion----threats to do you hwm----limit your freedom. Hay& says. and whether such a . the teller. ALf may be telling the truth. Most important. Aithougb coerced. such as what sorts of thillgs he realty fears. a note.rzd-not-having-a-broken-am.. "Give me all the money or 1 will caii. Casc 7: Betty is a mild-mamered bank robber. insisting that the threat was not sufficiently great as to r e ~ ~ dthe e r optior.. it makcs the option "less eligible" for choice-it renders an option not a real option by attaching a severe penaIty (for example.

hut s i q l y making an option somwhat less attracthe is not enough to rerlider you (as Hayck says) "'someone else" tool" and so unfree. n o s e cvho believe that offers can be coercive typically argue that they should be cownpa~d to the ""starrdard" options In Case 8. Realizhg (a) that the well is lawfully owned by me and that I: m entitled to all its watel. option-part of the. howwer. and so on. dard option might be that a person in desperate need can expect help from others at no or rninirnal costs. Negative Freedom os on Opportvnity Concept n u s far we have been considerhg ALIf mfree when he confronts an obstack to what he w n t s to do or when someone rmders ineligible an . drags hhself to my well m d begs for cvater. and so limit freedom. Even though it is not a desirable offer. In such a case. Unlike a threat-in which someone says that he is gohg to jnflict pain on you. or take away somethiXlg that is yours. we need an accoumt of what: are one's "standard opo difkr by locality econornic prostj. it seems hard to see how the offer resfricts your options: it seems that all offers exyaszd your options. it gives you an additiond option. normal hackgromd----wemight say that Lhe person makhg the coercive offer not only is making an offer. Co~~sider a l i example horn J. a stanthat a person would normally expect in this situatio~~. G." something that would seem t perity cdtum. nearly dead from thirst. thus dec~asing our options."a 326s is an offer. and (b) that the thirsty man's predicamenl: is no h d t of mine . But many have believed that an offer c m be coercive if (1)it allo~vs you to get somethhg at a terribly high cost.1 Case 7 that r e d e r the o p t i o ~ ineligible.lTo apply this noticm of freedom.ns.normal or typiral person would see the thrc3at as sufficimtly severe as to It: is important to ohserve il. A man. I say " h i l l s e l l you a glass of water d y if you s i p over to me i l l lyour worldly goods. hut at the same h e i s blocking that standard option (""low-cost help"') offering instad mly high-cost help. tastes. but because of your circumstance (2) you cannot afford to turn the offer down. There has been considerable debatc among philosophers whether oflcus as well as flzreafs cali be coercive. If we accept t h i s as a standard. or somehow make you worse off than you now ar-an offer gives you the opportunity to get something you need or want. ." On the other hand. ~ everyone would agree that Betty" threat made the option ""dn't hand over the money" "ss aftmctivc or k s eli'yiblc. many hawe believed that the option of reject ing the offer is ineligible: "You have no chaice. Murphey: Cusc 8: Suppose I own the only water well within a two-hundredmife radius of desert. ..

as long as you wear your seat belt. He is contented. Unfortunately. she lives in a state with oxdy ox-te law: mndatory seat belts. even Irhough in Case 9 Alf is doing what he wmts to do. slaves. " 0 1 the t Different %rises of 'Freedom' as Applied to the Wll and the Moral Progress of :Man. "'What luck. then. Case 9: All is in jail. there is one. is free. He thinks. T.But co~~sider."M Mf is not free to take mmy roads-there is not rwch he mn do. but free. Think about fJllse 10: k t t y is not in jail. is a strmge klXow. this is what I've aiways wa~-tted!~' Berlin."x the English libtral 'K H. fn fact. however. even happy. In fact. even i l she does little. Vou car1 do anything you wmt. as Autonomy In a famous lecture. though in fact he it.Green begins his famous lecture by achowltedg- . this prohibits the thing Betty most wmts to do. We may say. conlented. or h-tkrlerex-tcewith. is a negatiz~t. He is tied to the wall m d has duct tape over his mouth so that he cannot talk.. proponents of what has been called ""positive f ~ e d o m "seek " a much more intimate tie between Betty being free and doixlg what she wants to do. kvhereas in. but who has few paths rendered ineligible by others. cofzccpfionof liberty: liberty consists in the absex-tceof obstacles to. he tells us. Case IQBetty camot do what she really wmts to do. is "the absmce of obstacles to possible choices m d activities-absence of obstructions on roads which a m m can decide to walk. actio1-t. everythil7g he wnlzts to do. Betty is a thrill seeker: she likes driving witl?out a seat belt. Alas. H. the preeminent theorist of negative liberty. Well. she dislikes this promition more than any other one she c m hagine. then. not what one actually does. freedom. Alf. are not free: there are mmy obstwles placed in the path of possi:hie choices. Betty really has no significant mstraints on her. mis. As we are about to see. Green developed a conception of liberty that closely lillks beh-tg free to doing what one truly desires. Green and Liber?. doini.1" ppcsson w l o does little. slaves who cherish their chahs. In this scnse. that negative liberty is m oppovtzanify concept: one's freedom depends on what me has an opporkrnit)l to do.82 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY option of his. would insist that Alf is not free. Proponenls of negative liberty such as Ber:lin maintaisl that Betty is much freer than is AIf in Case 9.

But &SO.ing that. The real. . m mtonrtnzot~s do anrt is mt the slave of impulses. not his om. Green said. exgrc?ssitself: the foreign impulse takes over. It always implies .NOW. then. her lmg-tern plans and goals."" Green is suggesting here that th.you cannot be your own master if there we internal restrair-rts:these too prever~t you from being a free person-frm leading a self-directed or autonomous life. a free person is whal is d e n person: someone who can decide for herself what to called. On this view. ignormce. some exemption from compuitiion by a~other. Now if we view the self h that sets itself up in opposition t this way. the idea of afret?" We all agree that: an unfree person is one Mi'ho is in some sel-rse in bondage: he is a slave m d c at do as he kvishes. She is. and advocates of negatke liherty are right about Ehat. Green achowledges &at this is certainly if others are p~venting him from acting. "It must be of course admit ted that every usage of the term [that isl frcledomj to express anythhg but a social and palitical relation of onc man to another involves a metapbor.she really rl~antsta do---what ber real self wmts-and so the free person does not wish to give in to the impuSse. . past col-rditioning. . and ptans that: really make up this person.l" htrunomy can be Iimited both by internal and exfertzaf restraints or obstacles. As he says. . C)ne part is someljmes called her "real seliU'---those values. to namotics. further assume that a person has an addictiol-r. s not free: she is a slave to her addiction. We . A person who is str"nject to some irnptrlse or craving Ihat he camot control. m d so on. then. Now. in a sense. is "hthe condition of a bondsmm who is carrying out the wifl of another. f i a t she cares for. or addictiom. But Gree1-r wants to explore another case: where one is unfree because one is subject to an impdse or craving.'"T But Green wants to explore an extension of this usage. T%e second part can be an htrusive impulse or addiction o the real self. is one rolza does liotzaf. one that centers on persarz. The person in such a condition is not really free: she is a slave ot her impulse. Atlvwtes of negative liberty are sensitive to the importan" of external restrajwlts: yau c ot be your own master if others are interkring with your actions and restrainhg you. we can cox-rsider the 'keal self'" as being e~wlaved by the imptrtse.e basic m d e l of negative liberty-the relation betwwn an actor and someone trying to make h i ~ n or her a "toolM+an be applied witE\in the individual psycho:iogy of a pertion. reen's proposal. the negative conception of political liberv is basic to our understanding of freedom. which ilnpeis her to satisfy her craving regardless of the harm it does to alZ the other things she cares for. Ijterdy.say. A h e person. error. self (uzifct) d e d (nornos). . interests. A s s m e t-hatwe idel-rtifya person's basic personaiity-Lhe sort of things a person ljkes to do. suppose that a person c m sometjrncs be considered as being split into two parts.

I h e o1111y satisfying life for humans is a life in Mi. Accordimg to Joseph Raz. and seeking it . according ta the law of his own being. hdeed. given human natznre. Some abocrates of autonomy reject of one's capacities Grtten's claim that only a life devoted to the ~ a l i z a t i m is truly free.#. philosophers have come to distinguish a number of different senses h which one can be self-mled. even in Green" writings we can discern OR than one notion of being scif-&d. the valuable capacities a person possesses . that in conkast to negative liherty. . described the life of freedom as one in which one%real self ruled over irnpulses and passions.20 Arkto~~orny as a Self-Chosrurz I. Under the inthe idea of hcedom moves awity from a Awnce of this way of thir~kir~g.3). wrote Green.A person pursuing a life that cannot satisfy his capacities. we have seen. His will to arrive at self-satisfaction not being adjusted to the law which determines where this self-satisfactic~n is to be found. Ofher Senses of Autonomy Green provided a classic case for freedom as a self-ruled life. self-di~cted r/vhu is not under the sway of external or internal compulsions.84 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY see here. . .91 The basic thought is that according to the ideal of autonomy. Green. then. the positive conceptiol~ sees liberty as m exerciite concept: one is free when one exercises one's capacities for self-control and self-direction m d so does what one really wan& to do. focus on jntergersanal relations-who is b l o c h g or contralhg whom?person to a characw ideal. he believed that. From this bondage he emerges . r/vhereas ""self-~alization consists in the development to their fullest extent of all. he may be considered in the ccmditicm of a bondsman who is carrying out the will of another. m d so that is the only life a free persnn will h e . But in developing this general idea.hiclh one's distinctiy human capabiljtjes are develuped. Auto~zomyas Dajelopnzent of Orze's Cnpcities.in them because he believes i t shoutcl be found in tlfiem. h addition. or all. not his own. satisfaction of himelf is not to be found. . lhis involved a life in which one developed one's capacities (Section 3. the aut~)nomous person is one who makes his own life and he may chooscl the path of self-realizatior7 or reject it. but by making its fulfillment the ctbject of his will. not by overcoming the X a w ctf his being . A free person is a self-controlled. . which makes liberty an opportwity concqt.into real freedom. is not free. by seeking the satisfacticm of himself in objects in which he believes it sltould be found. it is not crucial . because the objects tc3 which his actions are directed are objects in which.

if she has &ought through ali of them. Ark f o~~orny ns a Second-Order Desire. by impulses. even if a person does not create her commitments. many proponents of atrtonomy have adopted a surgrisbgly similar division of the person. @ r?f Reason. grounkd and which ought to be rejected. A firstorder desire is a desire the object of which is m action or evmt: a person desires to be rich or s k h y . lower. and so forth-md a nonrctal. she is not the slave of iglorance or past conditioning. but who necessarily oxlie Mrho c ~ a t e her subjects all aspects of her life to critical scrutiny. passions.cnnfs. Perihaps an autonomous person is not s life.. many of his desires. Nwv. fl-iends. By the time a person reaches adulthood. G i ~ e n this. A desire not to have the desire to be skhxly is a second-order desire. her life is ru:ied by rmson.r" and "secod-order" &sires. or to win the Nobe1 Prize. more generaliy. Our personalities and choices are deeply influenced by our naturai taie~lits m d propensities. values. but that she decides rul~ether to develop her capacities and. and acts on those delfierrztions. well.22 Thus. Contemporary philosophers are skptical &out Gree11"s ctailn that a person car1 be divirled into a "real sell""-which concerns the person" true kvmts. goals. is whether anyone really ever chooses his life. and ignorance (see Section 4. however. A U ~ O Fas I flze O~ l . in what sellse can one say Ihat one creates oneself? Even if cultrural and intellectud heritse. to eat.that a person develvs her capacities. m d always acts according to her understanding of what she has the best reasons to do. All these are first-order desires. into "first-0rdfi. sonzc advocarcjs of autonomy have ilrgued that an autonomous person is m e who exercises her capacity to rehct on her first-order desires in terms of her second-order desires. If one is raised a Cathok and rejects that life because of one's so mmistic philosophy. and aims have been learned from parermb. how to live her life. T%eworry about this notion of atrtonomy. 'The fully autonomous person is one who leads a life of her olvn chaoshg-who makes decisions about her life on the basis of the thirtgs to which she is committed.3). and teachers. it seems one" deliberations and decisions draw on aspects of onesell: that one did m t create. believes imd valuesbut those too h o s t surely have been learned from someone. goals. or "actual">& that is ruled. kvhere did one get that humanistic commitment? No matter where one turns. A second-order desire is a desire the object of which is a first-order desire. and co itme~lits. and deliberated about whjch seem. and rejects or amends first-order desires in the light of her second-order desires"23 . our culture and our upbringixlg. one one decides to reject s m of ~ n e ' s will make that decision because of other things onc. Although Green" idea is out of favor today.

she sees that the best thing for her life would he to rid herself of the desire to be s k h ~ yIn . When we are acthg on good. That is just the sort of intcrventio~~ that J o h Stuart MiKs H a m Princifle prohibited: "The only purpose for kvhich power c m be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized c o r n u n i t y agahst his will. the ideal of positive liberty clashes with the ideal of negative liberty. mflective. when we use our reason to choose our lives for ourselves. that Green's view of positive rant" (see Section 3. on the issue of pater??alisnz. for example. t~at-ing :like children: it is forcing them to do things for their own good. then we are trdy free.it woulca seem. She is but aiso think that this desim is silly a ~ is a healthy weight and enjoys eating. The life of h e d o m is the life of reason. although she kvimts to lose more weight and become skinny. :If we accept Green" view. Even this brief survey of differe~~t senses of autonomy demo~~strates the relation between positive liberty and rationalism (Section 3. ~ ~ . is not a sufficie~lit warNOW. when we refiect on our firstorder desires." baiah Berlin attacks positive liberty and argues that it is fundamentally opposed to negative liberty Three cfainzs made by Berlin stmd out. This cllash comes out most clearlq. on this view. are reasoIIs and arc. and so is not free. she is s e e h g satisfaction where she does not think it c m be found. 4 . Thus. roughly. Legal paternalism involves the use of legal sanctiox~s to make someone do what is good fir hiru or prevent him adults from doing what is bacf fir him. either physical or moral. dinkrkring wieh her Me. Green" terms. an autonomous person seeks to make her first-order desires c o ~ ~ f o to m her second-order desires. of the case for negative liberty Berlin. it would seem that lfie ideal of positive liberty as autonomy is simply m elaboration. 3 Two Concepts of Liberty Berlin3 Attack on Positive Liberty In his famous essay. is to prevmt harm to others. "Two Concepts of Liberty. Paternalism is. or at most m extension.1). when shc reflects on this. wants to show that far from being an cxtensiotz o f the case for r~egative ii$erty. His own good.86 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY Thus.2): we can only achieve true freedom if we am rational. . a persm m y have a first-order d e s k to be skinny. lli pursllif o f positive liberty can lead to infri~~gir-lg rzegative liberty. are m t ruled by custom or t r a d i t i ~ and not the subject of craving5 or impulses or arbitrary hterference. however.

torture them in the name. Green himself was deeply concerned with alcoholism among members of the working class in late-nineteenth-century Britain. attacks precisely the freedom that Berlin cherishes." with the self which calcutates and aims at what wiXI satis@ in the long run.ilcliberty splits not nn(y itzdividzcnls blsl also sclciclJc?sitzfo the higher and lazueE Berlin advances another criticism of positive liberty: its split betweal the "'hil. he interferes with my negative liberty). swept by every gust of desire and passion. Berlin. it adds insdt to injury by callkg this interferexlice '"freedom"? Berlin depicts the argumex~t for posin the following way: tive IibertJi. this kterferexlce can promote my positive liberty 'f." albeit oAen submerged and inarticulate. all this is done in the name of freedom! 12)Pt>siti. of their "real'>sefves.. H. my ''l~ower'' nature. .24 For one person to take charge of the life of alotkr. a just society. uncantralled desires. My "empirical" ctr ""hteronctmous" self.:liberty supports paternalism as a way to achieve fzlllcr freedom. because doing so would promote positive h-eedom. seff. self-fulfilllment)must be identical with his freedom-the free choice of his ""true.i The dominant self is . and on the behalf. Green would allow laws designed to limit or prohibit the consumption of alcohol. t h i s addictio~~ was impeding their freedom. . li-. 1 am in the position to ignore the actual wishes ctf men or societies. ctr with my self "'at its bestU". needlsf . in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happinem' performance of duty.""or "ideal. ta be rigidly disciplined if it is ever ta rise to the full height of its ""real nature. And ta make lhings worse. t h y were slaves to alcohol. with my ""ray. Berlin argtres. the liberal tradition from J o h Stuart Mill onward has opposed paternalism because liberalism rejects the legitimacy of one person or a group "f pea* imposing their way of lking on others. Moreover. . .hermand the ""lower" self is often transferred to a division in society between those who are enlightened m d those who are not: . Other people are h p o s ing same bvay af Xiivhg on you. to bully. identified with reason. allow paternalism that limits freedom. oppress. As he saw it." ar ""autonomous'helf. the pursuit of immediate pleasures. .hich is then contrasted with irrational impulse. arguing that t%le other by her own ""false'kor "low&>self hstead of her "hjg:herfF is co~ltrolled self. If I act in w y s that make me less autonomous---if I act in ways that will make me ignorant or give into impulses-then if sameone renders these autonomy-haming options ineligible for me (that is. Once F take this view. . . such paticr~~alism is a great despotism: the state is interferirlg with your freedom to make you a better persol%. with my "higher nature. wisdom. not only does Green's notion of positive freedom.

hut rrndermilzes it. sunk in our ignorance and our passiom.horityof another-the very essellce of being restrained-is. it s e e m that these are two fundamentally opposed ways of looking at freedom.ons of a single concept.ltaloppositior. C)n the negative mderstmding of freedarn. sirnilarly (the fatal transition from individual tc:. it may turn out that hCase 1All is being forced t o be h-perhaps he is in jail to stop him from getting drunk. Kerlil-t condudes. being locked in jail is a core and Ohvious case of unfreedom. social concepts is alrntxt irnperceptible) the higher elements in socliew-the better educated.88 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY The reason within me. (3) The yclsitiw ctlnceptintz is lznt an a f e ~ ~ s i oo f t zthe negatiw ctmccplirtr. must elidnate and suppress my ""lower" instjncts. Points (1)and (2) support Berlin's third. claim: those who depict positive liberty as simply m extensiczr~ of negative Il:herty are wml~g. "'nese are igno~d not two different intevretati. but not Case 1. As (1) and (2) demo~~strate. some of our other cases may pose puzzles for nc. my passions and desires.) freedom-enhancing condition. But on the positive conception.25 Ihus.gati\re liberty. conwerted into a sort of freedom (see Sections 5. For . Because a"td t ~ itm ~ positive freedom takes a bask case of (negative) w~freedom into a possible (positivl. . wards who require a guardian. we have to go back to the contrast . Monism and Pluralism Ib u ~ ~ d e r s t a why ~ l d Berlin insists on the func[amer. but two profoundly $iwergmt and irrecolwilable attitudes to the emis of life.~ bet-vveennegative m d positive freedom. or the People-mpresents what is higlzer and rational. ex tlypofltesi [by hypothesis] within every human being who deserves the name. by obeying the rational man we obey ourselves: not indeed as we are.r. being subjected to tlte aut. to obey the higher and control the lower is freedarn. the Great Dictator. and in some ways most basic.4. Because the '*otherf'-the King. Berlin argues. those who " p ~ s s e s s the highest insight ctf their time and peoplerr-may exercise compulkon to rationalize the irrational section of socliew. but is in the n m e of liberty itself.5. Thus. . the mare rational. weak creatures afRicted by diseases that need a healer. if it is to triumph.2. but as we a>uldbe i f we were rational. 10. which render me a slave. as we could be nowt if we wotrXcl listen to the rational element which is. 20. whereas what you wmt mmifests lfie lower m d irratio~~al. Lhe propoxlcnt of positive &be* entertains a cortception of liberty according to which the most basic kature of negative :liberty---to be free from restraint in order to live your life as you see lit-is not ody ignord.4).'"b Consicier again Case 1 in %ction 4.

Nthough I trhink RerliIl is correct in arguing that a rationalistic monisnt informs the ideal of autonomy and. Such a conception of the good life is much less opm-ended than the ideal of a u t m m y . stressing simplicity.nesq and ilbso1ut.say. The ideal of autonomy is certainly less monistic than. .2). There are certainly degrees of ratiol~alism and monism. some religious understandings of the and ratiol~aiistic good life. smeone who forces others to live their lives as you see fit). it insists that our reason cannot provide a single. As a form of a~tirationalism. Green's is based on a rationalistic. trhe ideal of a r ~ auto~~omous life justihs each person living a d i f f e ~ nsort t of life. Nevertheless. monistic view of life: a developed. pluralism leads to mderstanding liberty as a n e g a t h concept. the ideal of autonomy pohts toward an ideal of a good. as it recognizes that ""hmm goals are mmy. Anyone who forwho lives a life that does not develop her capacity for sakes this goal ar~d choice is not seeEng the one. life that can identify a "red selff' that seeks the cultivation of its capacities and is "w~free" when the lower self pursues a lffe incoz~sistent with that ideal. Guaranteeing each a measure of negative liberty is. otSler~lorldti. says Bedin. m s t lead a specific sort of lifec. truth. in just the right measure." will. stressing different vallles m d interests.between monism and plzrralism (Section 3. m t a contingat. for exmple. answer to the questim.Basic to the ideal of autonomy is that one should choose the life that fits one's capacities and talents. This is much more accommodating to pluralism than. positive liberty. Berlin aques. so m a ~ ~ y things that are worth pursuing-it is necessary to ensure that no one needlessly raises Obstacles to the possible choices of others. or the set of good lives. h contrast. is a form of r&ionaiism: our =ason can be employed to reveal the one type of life. agreed-trpon. but they c d i c t m d we often camot decide among them. just because masm cannot reveal. true humm end. b l u e pluralism. what is the best r/vay of living-just because there are so many h u m n gods. and because our capacities and talents differ.28 If you arc to avoid behg a despot (that is. regardless of his or her capa"tiies. in conkast. As Berlin says. so." and no one c m make a choice that is right for all people. things. you must grmt others freedom to make their own decisions.eobedience t o God. that best suits everyone-perhaps the one sort of life that combhes. autononnous person is the true goal for everyone. According to the value pluralist. the most humane ideal. stresses the diversity of the ends of life. "That we cmnot have everything is a necessary. all good. Berlin col1vincir7gly argues that a notion of positive liberty such as ' I : H. a ~ l i g i o u ideal s accordiislg to whiCh everyolxe. it will he recalled."27 Monism. it is importmt not t o push the point too far. "What is the best way to live?" There are imumerabie ways of living that appeal to each of us.

and if that is why negatiwe liberty is a good thir~g. One misses Berlin" message if one mderstmds him as simply arguing for a certain. accepted by proponents of compethg conceptions of liberty (Section 3. Many political theorists note Berlixl" distinction bet-vveen negative and positive liberv.1. ITathcr. and rejecting the positive.d his or her grow& and developme~~t.3).1). But-consistent with the idea that Mill's On Liberty is sornelhing &in to GaIliefs notion of an exemplar. posieive liberty must be a good lhixlg too. notion of liberty* Liber?. Mill" case for liberty cJepel7dec. on that gm&. and Human Nature: Mill a s an Exemplar Not only does it seem that positive liberty draws on what Berlin calls ma~~ism. may not have realjzed it. say sorne advocates of the case for negative liber% po"itive liberv. Mill believed. If each is guaranteed liberty to our capa"ty for grow& a l ~ d make his or her own choices. as m exelnplar of Ihe case for negative liberty (Section 3. a pluraljst.1)-proponents of positive liberty have also looked to Mill. Mayek look back to Mill. On the other hand. some pMosophers have concluded. As X noted earlier (Sectjons 3. he is arguing for a certain sort of po:iitical Irheory.heories reflect opposi"$ politic& theories ar~d vkws of =ason and values. . will stress the way in which liberty provicjes opportclrTities for choice. one devoted to plwalism: if we adopt this politic& theory Berlin believes. believes that a commiment to mmism supports positive their will in such a way as to lead the truly huliberty: those who e x e ~ i s e man life are free. not only was he prewnti~lig but he was lnyislg the foundatkns for devebpment of the positive concept. but it also is supporkd by what E deslrribed (Sectim 3. indicates that this supports negative freedom: he wished to show that we should not place needess obstacles in the paths of others. beiieving that there is no uniquely or truly human manner of livhg. I also pointed out that classical liberals such as E A. If the development of such people is indeed a then. good thing. negative conception of liberty.3. each person would exercise that freedom t o find ways of life that suited his or ber unique ciiiyacities h On Liberty. then. seems superior. but faif to grasp his broader point: that these two t.90 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY Berlin. the positive conceptic)n of freedom can explain why this is so and. If only M y developed people are free people. Although Mill. Mitl and e11couragt. as an inspiration. John Stuart Mill" case for individual liberty was based on hvelopment.3) as fhe '*self-. and so be attracted to the negative concept.lon the desirability of autonomous people who &ought for themselves and developed their natures and so were not ruled by custom or prejudice. we will afso be comitted to acceptkg the negative.developmental"theory of human nature. as this may limit their development.

"Why do we vaiue liberty?'" m d ""What sort of liberty is most importmt to us?'""" T%us. those that interfere with dmlopment or are not 17~?cessary for development. is free when others are not erecting obstacles in his path or rtraderhg some of his options ineligible. that is. Liberty and Liberalisms Liberty. (l) If we want to understmd what freedom isr we have to understilnd why it is imyortar~t. And some negative frecdoms." To many advocate?." A person. without asking leave. (2) And Mill" answer to the q~~estion is.We can now see. the condition in which God created humms-was one in which each has "as a claim to act as he chooses without interference from others. ""1E"eedomis important because it promotes choice m d self-development.""?" This to lfie &Smtio1. I have said.1 of a persol13 naturai freedom or lihertp is fundamer~tai sical liberal tradition. Classical liberalism is "oat on a negative conception of freedom. within the bomds of the Law of Natznre. According t~ Locke. "Vtrhy is freedom important?" it So the answer Mill gives to the westior~. has been argued. that different conceptions of liberty can lead to divergent understandings of liberalism. so lol~g he respects the freedom and property of others." (3) But once we see that choice is at the heart of the value of freedarn. positive ideal of freedom. and Persons as they think fit.it has been argued. is at the heart of ail li$eralisms (Section 3.of positive hedom. may not even be very valuable.Thusl according to one contemporary pfopment of positive :Liberty if we why Mill vaiuecl ffeedom-why he thought it was someehing to be prized and cherished-we will be led to embrace positive freedom-freedom understood. The natural condition of humans-in Lacke's case. then we will also see that negative freedom is not enough. though. J o h Loclke" Second Treatise of Goverpznzcrzt (l689) in many ways remains Lf-reclearest statemmt of the classical liberd's $Cvotion to each individual" liberty (and property-see %ction 5. the orighal cmdition of humm beings is a "'Sfatc @perfect Fwedonz to order their Actiol~s.1). or depending upon the Wll of any other Man. on the negalive conception. leads his theory beyond negative freedom to a fuler.lopmcnt and self-perfection supplies what is missing from theorjes of negative liberty: an mswer to the questions. as the ability to make choices that dev e l ol~e's ~ naturt3. ar~d dispose of their Possessinns.3). Mlll's stress on self-devt. An implim"tion of this .

If to he free people must be autonomous. atrtonomous individuals. any loss of freedom. some people may not even try to respect the frtiedom of others. G m n was indeed himself active i n the Liberal Party in the tinjted Kingdom. only if they agxe to its creation.st liberafism. Even if others try to respect our freedom.31. G o v e m e n t imposes obstueles and restrktians in the forms of laws. 'Thus. disputes wifl arisef and unless same authority exists (see %clion 10. Under the burdexl of Lheir circumstance. Thus. we are always in dmger of havit~g our freedom Zhited by others. they mtxst be educated: education provides the basic tools . and shelter-are unfrce in the positive sense of freedom. But if goven~ment is a limitation on naturai freedom.3). is somehow artificial. In the absence of government. and so on. and one of its pillars was T. and that ixlcludes government. f govemerrt. sees freedom as the absence of restraints). A gover~~mer~t on people without the consent of the people woz-tjd. only if people consent to the creation of governmen&that is. and that was the party (at the time) ure.n the basic necessities of food. it c m be argued that those who m in e x t ~ m waM-those e ttnable to gai.'" or ""revisionj. Consequently. the collllection of taxes.be tyrannical. But according to the classical liberal. is a state in kvbich each is perfectly free to do as he wishes as long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others. Greexl was an educatiollaf reformer. being instead constantly concerned with o b t a h i ~ ~ the g daily necessities of life. Grc3en's positive conception of liberty T. and life under government. there will be no easy way to resolve them.licb it was primarity designed. it limits freedom (notice.ing reform. And of course. a conkmporary follower of Locke.' : I n the late nineteex~t%r century. why would myone ever consent to it? Why voluntarily limi. It wodd invade the natural liberv of the people. H. t-he "'new liberalism. accept the limits on freedom that government requires for the sake of better protecting our freedom itself. and this has been the general classical liberal answer. the state is essaltially ' 3 a ""prateclion agency. h d if Che natural state is one of perkct freedorn. can that s o u e t to impose its will g o v e m n t he legitimate. requires special justifjcation. The upshot of this is the d o c t h e that government is only legitimate if it is consented to by ail citizens (Section 10. the chief task o is the prokctim of indkidual liber@ (and properv). The orighal. Now. arid so lrhey pose a real threat to everyone else. the state that does not stand in need of m y justification. is that wc. the job for wl. H. then. that the classical liberal. any departure from this natural state. For similar reasolls.$ 5 2 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY view is that social life.'" arose to challe~~ge this mhimalist theory of gover~~ment. no one has the right to interfere with t-he natural freedom of allyone else. To use the phrase of Rohert Nozick. natural state of humans. lrhey are unahle to develop into self-directing.t your own negative freedom? Locke" answer.

and (4) a supportive welfare state has been a coherent enduring political theory. it had tru provide citizens with the coz~ditior~s achieve autonomy. Yes. Never&elcss. they agreed with the classical. 1 ) . "What is lrhe function of the state?'?nstead. (2) a pluralist theory illbout the values people pursue. the maixr job of government was to protect freedom.necessary for people to act rationally and develop and understand their long-t"'m plans and goals. but it also must provide for the conditions necessary for the development of autonomous people.liberals that the main job of the state was to protect freedom.helping to justjfy (4) a state the most essential functiox~ of which is to protect individuals from il7terfere~lce by others. constructing political theories is a complex and creative matter for wkch there are no formulas (Sectioz~ 3 . (3) the endorsement of a self-development d view of human nature. and this has been the crux of the mo~~istic revisionist liberal theories that arose in the United Kingdom and the United States at the end of the nketeestth cent-ury In contrast. So in contrast to socialists and Marxists. C)-nceagain. but now that freedom is undastood in this positive. These revisionist liberals agree that the liberal state is devoted to the p'ote"ian of liberty and that the great classical liberals such as John b c k e and John Stuart Mill were quite right about that. we need to be camful. (3) posithe liberty. T. these revisionists insist that the protection of liberty is a more complicattzd foh than the great early liberals t h o s h t . So those liberals who came to embrace Gree11" positive conception of freedom begm to see t-he task of protecting freedom -as requiring wide-ranging positive state action.Lic view of values.3"s I remarked earlier. Liberal educatio~~. these revisionist liberals we= not advocating a mdiberal a n s w r to lrhe question. then. aims to develop autonomous hdividuals-those capable of &inking for themselves and not tied to custom or prejudice. But given their more complicated notion of freedom. way. We can find some Marxists who adopt negathe liberty and some classical liberitis who advocate a sort of positive liberty. H. the liberal state must ensure na~~h~terfere~~ce. I do not wish to imply that everyme who embraces r~egative liherty must be a classical liberal or all those who embrace positive lfierty must embrace revisionist liberalism and some notion of a welfare state. classical liberalism can be uz~derstood as an ellduring theory based on (1)a Lockean moral individualism. rather than a negative. Green and his fabwers thus could argue that they w r e true to the traditional liberal doctrine of the functions of the state. If the lihcral stat the state devoted to libto erq-was tru do its job. (2) a mux7it. m d (3) a negative conception of libervf all. . the job of protecting freedom is a much more demandkg one. includhg at least a primary education.

. "Pason X is freehot free from restrajrtt y to &/not do z. Alf is free horn Betty" hhadcuffs to run away Betty is free from the constraint of too little money to attend a university. uses of liberty conform to the same schema. MacCallum" bask point is that d l ascriptions of freedom dways refer to three different elements: (1) an actor (X). or not becoming something.d the dislinction. or not become something. As Maccallurn sees it. restricticms. has q~~e"i~nl.l? . 8crl. not becorn) z " ranges ~ over agents. or barrier to dcting. MacCallum argues.fiotn something. m a t sorts of entities are ascribed liberty (X)? M a t sorts of restraints are identified as po1i~call. not do. For instance. expli"tlly or implicitly.Gerafd C.. Taking the frjrmat "X is (is not) free From y to dct (not do. For example. interference with. it is always freedom from some constraint or restriction on. All ascriptions of freedom collcem a claim. accepting that negative m&positive libof freedom. we can say.k tells us that negative liberty is 'Vreedom from"' restraints. Such freedom is thus always ofsomething (an agent or agents). According to r\AacCallum.4 Quertioning the Positive/Negutive Distinction The Triadic Analysis Thus far. become. The fw~damental questions that separate differe~lt political theories are how the three variitbles are iden~fied. 1have followed Berlh. become. and s ranges cwer actions or conditions of character OF circumstance."326s has been called a triadic malysis of freedom: any intelligible use of "ffreedoxn"' i n political discourse always refers. MacCallum erty are two opposed w~derstmcJings Jr. however. that someolle isfree bnth fionz s m e t h h g m d to do something. Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question. y ranges over such "preventing conditictm" as ccmstraints. t o say that "fseedom fronn"' f liberty. f u do. Charlie is free from his addiction to develop his capacities. to these three elements. interferences. So. and barriers.94 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY 4. insistkg that all.35 To simplify. action (zi." a d this is to be cmrasted with positive freedom that emphasizes "freedom to" do things or act in a certajn rational way MacCaLIum says this is a mistake. becoming. the debate between proponents of negative m d positive liberty rests on a confusion. not doing. Not only is it wrong. (2) some restraislt (y).y What sorts of actions does most objectionable @. and (3) somc.'" but he holds fiat lookand "freedom to"' are distinct "col~cep ts o ing at liberv through the negativelpositive distinction leads us to ignore the really importu7t political issues.

insistkg that someone i-vhois chained simply wants to he free from her chajns: ''A m m struggljng agaimt his need not consciousfy aim at any chains or a people against e~~slavement definite further state. We have been t-empted ta ask such questions as ' ' w d who is right? Whose concept of freedom is the correct one?" or ""Which kind of freedom do we really want after all?" Such questiom will not help reveat the fundamental issues separating major writers on freedrrrm from each other. stood in the way of this approach. at least. are for example about what persons are. Bridging Negotiv~ and Positiv~ Liberty? We have seen that those advocating positive liberty tie freedom very close to reason. and about what can count as an obstacle to or interference with the freedcjm of persons so conceived. says MacC:a:ilurrr. The distincticm between positive and negative freedom ha$ however. and that the differemes. Although many have thought that the positive conception is simply an extension of the negative conception.n is that a theory o f humm m e r e that begjrns with tke first question will. no matter hour the various writers are arranged into ""camps. Berlisr tells us that it is a very diffemnt approach to the analysis of liberty.lii. A m m need not h o w haw he will use his freedom.witr reveal the real basic diiferences in vlilrious defenses of liberty offered by polircical theories. he just m t s to remove the yoke.1is not to provide an analysis of ordinary language and analyze the structure of freedom sentences. rather than being about what freedonz is. Berlin's crucial claim is that certain theories of liiCaerty which he identifies aa "positive" cconeptims." It w d d be far better to insist that the same concept of freedom is ctperating throughout. seen as liberty infringing-by a theory that stal-ts with the second question. passion?" k r l i n kvimts to impress on us that these are very different questions from those that move proponents of negatke liiberty: "How way to much am I governed? What do others stop me from doing?"" understand Bel.""" As E understmd Berlin. of the triadic relatio~~ the eleme~~ts Berlin replies to MacCallum. lead to policies and political program that will he rejected---or. He adds. though. his main concen. It has encouraged US tt3 see differences in aca>untsof freedom as resuiting from differences in a>nceptsof freedom. fa""Who governs me? A ratior~al will of an il-riltimai cus 0x1 the ~estior.1.a political theory indicate that we should be free to do ( z ) ? Looking at these differences. a free person must be a person who acts according to . This in turn has encouraged the wrong sorts of quesliom.37 So MacCalIunr wants us to abiandoxz talk about ""negative" and "positive" freedom and instead focus debate on the ways vasious theories identify (X) yf z).

even those attracted. Because stopping him from walking on the bridge does not stop him from doing what he really wants to do." He cannot. because she has not chosen to cross the street. even in the ncgatke sense of freedom. superstition. In contrast. we do not consider it an interfere~nce with her liberty to stop her from crosshg a busy street. for liberty consists in doing what one desires.4~~ Accordbng to Mill. what harr. or be a chooser. she is derstand the context of her action that she does not h o w what she is really doing (as in Mill" bad bridge case). (2) she must b o w what sbe is doing. Ilobbes" sown account applies to the movement of natural objects as well as peaple: whatever moves unobstructed is free. 11 either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting tc:. Free action. without any reat infringement of his liberty." msometbir7g that he has not chosen. been catled pure negative liberty seems to understand freedom without any ~ f e r e n c to e what it i s r a h n a l for a person to do: it does not concern itself at all with why a person acts. to negative freedom have thought that freedo~n invokes something more than mere mavement. or custom or out of igmrance. The action open to him is "try t o cross the bridge and. stopping him does not override any decision t-hat he has made. perform that action: he is lacking crucial idormation that would show the impossibility of that act. if a person is sleepwalking. and there was no time to warn him of his danger. I(ou are only stqping him from "tryiulg to cross the bridge and inskad i a l h g into the river. To choose voluntarily ((I) the p e m n must not be so subject to cravistgs that she is literally compelled to act. and (5) she must not by others to the extexnt that what she thinks of as have been co~nditioned . Thus." m d that is not an action he has Chosen to perform. presuppose the wrcise ofa capacity: the capacity far voluntary choice. (4) she must not be so greatly influenced by drugs or psychological distmtions that she does not h o w what she is doing or is unable to control hersclf." you are not stopphg him from doing anything that he has chosen to do. one must be capable of choice. after all. (3) she must not so mjsmnthe act (for exilmplc. only whether this act is obstructed. and he does not desire to fall into the river. the man chose trhe action " c r m the bridge. and one must exercise that capacity. however.96 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY reason rather than through impulse.end up falling into the water. Shce you are not stopping him from ""crossing the bridge. A free act mtxst in some sense be chosen. they may seize hirn and turn hirn back. John Stuart Mili writes. In Cln Liberty." "Indeed. thus does. Yet. b n the sense that sbe intends to perform slcepwalkhg). cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be msafe. To act freely.

that one does not infringe the libertlJ of a person crossing lfie bridge bmause t-he persolli does not wish to fall into the river is '*h germ thc doctrine of the 'real witl. freedum cannot be understood purely i n terns about eder~lial restraints."'" As soon as m advocate of negative liberty acknowledges that a free person must he a chooser. This idea is central to Be various notiorlis of m l i autorliomous life that we examined.uided by rr.2 t u m d to positive freedum. A person must have. so too can internal obstacles. Advocates of negativr. Mitl's claim. Nevertheless. observes an advacate of positive :Liberty. Green believed was of negative freedom. I also considered whether offers c m be coercive and limit freedam. a mliu\imalIy effective will. do not accept this. we saw that one's freecfom c m be limited when a possible course of action has been made ineligible by thfeats. the pmponent of posithe frctcdom can insist that a better chc-toser is freer than a worse chooser.m. Sction 4. will. a series of examples and tried. dam. she must not be "brainwashedff). though. 01%this a development of the ~liotion view.. For Green. such a perwn was necesmlily concerned with the dwelopmerlit oi her capacities. but threats of force.on this view.42 The crucial point. even if it is stil posNot just force.her choices actually have been progmmmed into her (that is.at. can be free. Thus. fully rational. I considered. the capacity to choose. . T%us. m d desires. is one guided by her real will-her settled aims. ~liegative liberty beliberty p ~ " ~ " m p p ominh"lly gins to move in the direction of positive liberty. As one contcmporar)r philosopher has put it. Iiberty of course. to develop a conception of freedom on the basis of ordinary w u a g e . is that insofar as negative ew competent chooser. insofar ils defenders of negative lirberty are concerned about obstacles to choice. Only a persm i.. A free person is a cboser whose opportunities for actim are not made ineligible by others.44 T%is chapter has focused on the distkction between negative m d positive li:berty*In Section 4. RIIhctugh extersrd obstades c m prevent one from being guided by reason. T%ese are all complex conditions and I have dealt with them in. although negative freedom is by rlio means to be equated Lyith autonomy it does presuppose the exercise oC a more modest capacity. goals. if not a real will. limit freesible to perfom t-he actio~li.1. Begirlining with the simple idea of freedom as movement that is m t blocked. allowing us to accurately describe what he does as his own choice. which 7: H. more length elsewhere. T%ey deny that a free person is ~ e r e n t l y a good choose%or one who follows her real. crtctavchy. A free person.

A person. 2. Isaiah Berlin. I foltc3w normal philosophical practice in treating "liberty" and "freedom'hs synonyms.on4. p. C-. Emphasis added. on different. In this book. 1840). since even adwocates of negative liberty must corlcen fiemsclves with the internd conditions for genuine choice. 3. podtiv ture. 273. although the distinrtion is not quite so stark as some have thought. Gerald MacCaliurn tries tcr show that all ave a t%lree-partstrucfrtiedom chims-~~egativeas well arr. Mence the importance of negative lirberty. Thornas Hobbes. and has tended to stress m o d indivitluafim and @ralism. 1969). In %ction 4. Only choosers c m be denied political liberty Nevertheless. An Essay un R~~I'IGs (Cambridge.. understmdil-tgs of value. Because there are many good things in life and we cannot have them all. but if does not Seem that any one choice is demankd by reason. 4 (Londctn. is grounded on monism-the belief that all values ultimately are harmanious s d that a s i ~ ~ ganswer le can be uncovered to the question. a conviction that the ends in life are many m d conflicting.Berlin has made out a powerful. X extended Berlin" ppoint.' comept of liherty. "Two Concepts of Liberty" in his For. reasall.3 then examined Isaiah Berlh" salysis of the difference un$er:iying positive and negative Ilherq Positive libaty.98 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY %cti. Berlin -argues. it seems that. p.. E~zglkh Wo&s [of Thorms Hobbesl. E argued that we should be careful not to overstate the differences between negative and po"tive liberty. 2994).tr Essnys un Libert'y (Oxford: Oxford University Press." hSir WlIiarn Molesworth. vol. indeed competing. 'What n ccontrast. we must choose. 122.. a ~ human d nahnre.ol7alism and self-development views of h u n m 11ature characterized much of the ""new liberalism" that arose at the beg. Berlin believes that negative Iiberty m a k s life worth living?" I is supported by pluralism. k hSjsts there is but 0111. p.:In contrast. 1. 4. showhg how positive liberty reacts rationalism and ailegiance to a self-development& view of human nahnre. This combination of rati. "Of L1"bertyand Necessity. Last. . WiXlel Steinel. he would not be said to "take freedoms'hwith it. case that the different interprcltntions of libere am grounded. f t x instance. MA: Blackwell.4'1 examked two challenges to the stark contrast betkveerr negative and positive liberty. though they have slightly difkreltt uses in English. might be said to "take liberties" with the English language. C liberal tradition has been far less prone to accept either rationalism or self-developmental views of human nature. ed.inning of the Wentieth century thus helping to explah why new liberal theorists h e classical tended to adopt positive conceptions of liberv.

Day. (Princetctn: Princeton University Press. F. For the Pull lecture. 66-86. p. 942. which link interfering with freedom to moral responsibility for obstacles. 4. see Joel Feinberg. p. 2. Offers. Berlin. p. This lecture has been reprinted in several places.Tbid . 51ff. pp.onafAufiorzomy: Beyorjd Negntive nrjd hsitive Liberty (Lctndon: Croom Helm. see KristjBnsson. 19. 1. 21. See S. 80 (1971). See Charles Taylor. Autolzonzy atzd Seq-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.. xxxix. Isaiah Berlin. p. 1%A). 41 ff. vol. Thamas E. Joseph Raz. 133. pp. 36." "Ethics. for example. 365ff. 15. 22. 170. 7: H.. Ibid. 1964). pp. N Y M. I ) . 26.. chap. E." Mil. p. 11. 27. 375. p. pp.. 1946). Green. 150. 6. Green's Leclzdres on the Principles of Political Obligakiorz (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiv Press. 2nd ed. Benn. pp. I. ""Bing Free to Act. 18.. 17. 204-210. A Theory qf Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quoted in Joef Feinberg. Green: PoliCimE Tfwoty (New Ycjrk: AppletonCentuly-Crofts. ed . See J. p." p 222. X3ers. 197!9). 3391). Ibid. 19831. Green. "Two Concepts. Social Fretadorn: The Responsibility New (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 39861.i. 94 (19831. pp. 3 32-233. . xxxix-xi. ed. chap. Sucinl Fredonz. 39881. 10. see John R. ""On the Different S n s e s of Freedom. ""Constraints on Freedom. pp." pp. Rights. ""Xtroduction. Tfze Idea o 16. 228. 1986).. 13. "What" Wrong with Negative Liberty. Berlin. 1986). 2 66. Ibid. 20. Mristj6n Mristjiinsson. 1986). 228. The TIfeury and Practice qf Azifonsmy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williarn E. 1." p.f Liberty (Princeton: Princetan University Press. See. 375-194. 8.. f Freedom (Oxford: Ciarendon Press. see David Miller. 3990). p. 35ff.""p. Connolly The Temgs of hlitiml Disconrse. 23. A. 19921." i n inlan Qan. 9. see Robert Ycfung. Far a good discussion. Social Freedom. 12. pp. For some useful selections. 68-69. Ham to Self (New York: Oxftord University Press. See KristjBnsson. Hill Jr. p. ""lltroductictn. see Paul Harris and John Morrow eds. See S." in his Four Essays orz Liberty." America?$ Philosophical Quurtcrty. pp. 25. . Gerald Dworkin. For drrrubts about the idea of coercive offers. T/w Morality ofFreedom (Oxfc3rd: Clarendon Press. Jzlstice and the Bofrnds 0. Sharpe. ""On the Different %rises of Freedom. 250. Susan Wolf distinguishes freedom as following the real self from freedom as living acccrrrding to reasctn in her Freedom FZritlzin Reasorz (Oxford: Oxford University f3ress. "Threats. 263. For different analyses ctf cases such as these. pp. and Being a Free Man.zd. Benn and W. Opinion and Liberty.y ((London:Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1999). 202-203. pp. vol.Social Freredorn. L. 1%0). Hayek. 7. vol. Woracio Spector' Aufonorny and Riglzfs: The Moral Foundations oftiberalism (Oxford: Claredon Press. 14. For different views on the relation of positive freedom and autonomy. Emphasis added.5. The GonsGitzltlon qfLiberf.. Rodman. Weinstein. 14 (1977). see my Soclrnl Plzilosoplzy (Armonk. On the option view of freedom. 1"38&).My references are to the latter. See Krisl-jjdnsson.chap. Law. 24.

5.s. 42. IN: St. Four Essays 072 Libe~tj/~ p. 40. 315. See my Social Philosopfzy. note. ed. Benn. 30. I-farnz fu SeV (New York: Oxford University Press. Press. 43. 197'4). 5. 376. Orx Liberty. Social Freedom. Augustine Press. 38. A TI-~oqj f:$ Freehrn. 47. $4. pp. Part 1. W. Richard Norman. 8. 1991). sect. Free arzd Equal: A Pltilosophicnl Examination of Political Vafut2s(Oxford: Oxford University Press. MacCallurn. especially chap. Berlin. p. The Philosoplliml Tjleo~y 1. eds. p. Berlin.. Secouzd Treatke of Cozjemmelzt. MacCatlum Jr. Pfzilosoph?~.." p. ""Negative and Positive Freedom.. and Quentin Skinner. 2 9601. Runciman. ed. 39. p. G. 5. 29. p. chap. The Pfjilosop?ziml Theory offhe Slate and Related Essays (Indianapofis... See Taytor. 33. See Robert Nozick. 314. chap. Anarc/ty. 19721. pp. 202-205." p. John toske. p. Spector. Two Eeatkes of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.. chap. 32. Autollotny and Rig121.100 NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY 28. See Richard E. .Press. Benn. 35. 3987). in Cerald E Gaus and Wi11iam Sweet. 4. ""Negative and Positive Freedom. 32. A T11eory ofFreedam. eds. 181. 2 9238). 36. 1986). The Plzilosoplsy alzd Pofitics of Freedonz (Chicago: Universiv of Chicagc:." Libertarian Idea (Pl~iladelphia: Temple Uniriersity 31. 41." in Peter Politics alzd SociLadett. 127. in Peter taslett.1( f?te Slate. "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty. 2000). para. p. Gerald C. See Jan Nrzrveson. 1987). 36-37. State a~zdU t o p i ~ (New York: Basic Books. in JohnGray. Xbid. I am following Joel Feinberg. 4th series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. See KristjBnsson. 37. Flathman. 8. Bernard Bosanquet. xfiii. 34. ety. 171. "Two Concepts. John Stuart Mill. O n Liberty land Ollzer Essays (New York: Oxford University Press.

universities and colleges in the United States. a free person can do what she desires to do. universities and colleges in blacks many southern staes in the United States we= legrrlly segrt?grrt. According to this second conception of positive freedom. someone under the infiuence of alcohol did not have the power to act accodiing to her true preferences.'' h e a n skills. Tawrrey (1880-1962) put it. At one poj. Or as the British swialist R. Green (Section 4. AIthough distinct.ed: were legally barred. mrough the 195Os. and well into the 19hOs. segregation wits declared illegai by federal authorities and no longer is practiced today. I . from atteding all-white universities. iiberty implies "the ability to act. By "effective power. i n Crc. Such. resources. or whatever one needs to perform @. but the ability to perform the actions a person's dc.5. H. This sort of positive fomulation of freedom locates freedom in not simply the absence of impedime~~ts to action. 'f. rational. autonomous action. the latter behg trnderstood as autonomous.2) was concerned with one's piiwcr or ability to acf. but later theorists develop a different conceplion of positive freedom.s..'"? To see how freedom as power differs from negative liberty consider the case of segregated. Positive Freedom as Power to Act Freedom as Being Able to Do What One Desires The prc.sil-c.enfs mind this idea is allvitys lirlked to the concept of freedom arr.In short. We now must consider a different cmception of positive liberty---one that is often co~~fused with freedom as autol~omywhich I call liberty us paw tn act. or self-conkolled action. someone is free to perform act if sbe has the efictctiwe power to Q.G ~ e actually n d e h e s mm's freedom as "the power of acting according to his true will or prefcrence."l Now. H.27f. Many blacks are still trnable to attend these formerly all-white .vious chapter focused on the distincrtim between negative and positive Illbere. freedom as power to act is conceptually tied to liberty as autonomy.

A poor person. negative liberty and liberty as p w e r ihhihlighted in the debate whether it makes sense to distinguish a pawn%liberty from lfie worth or value of that liberty. or buy a Mercedes. asfree as whites to attend universities.berty maintajn that as long as blaclc students are not threatened for attending. geographically new or culturally new. a r ~ d weR. blacks wert. one is not. Libaais -almost always insist tha"r"overty and ignorance. Now OUT vestion is not. not free to attend schools like the Universjly of Mississippi (Oxford). To be sure. or excluded by racist admissions poliries. and secondary schools are often pomly funded cornpmd to the scbols whites attend. so they because black are less able to send their children to any university. blacrks are often less well. engage in difkrent activities or pastimes-new worlds. is not free to go to a university.ionsis monetary wealth. however. a r ~ d elernentar?.1 02 LIBERTY AND POWER universities. Family incomes are lower among blacks.Voor the socialist. efforts by bhck studex-ttsto attel-td would be. The connection with freedom lies not in the greater material comforts or enjoyments. but in the increase ctf possibilities-the greater scope f ~ choice."W~'ot too surprising. a proponent of freedom as power will insist & i a l l person who is not able to go to a tmiversity simply is not free to do so. The (1'~e&liC"11 cor-tcernsLhe present: are blacks BOW free to attend t-hese ul-tiversities? Advocates of negative li. prepared for college. poorer black st-udents-like poorer white students re nol"able fo use Illis liberty. would agree that prior to the desegregation of southern colleges and universities. are opened up for me. In conkast. and a lack of means generally" are not constraints that limit one's freedom.' r . new opportunities become available tt>me which were previously inaccessible: I can travel to different places. human emancipation is inherently linked to material well-bring: In contemporary society .whether this is jusethat is a wider query that is relevant to Chapters 8 and 9-b& w h e t k blacks art. m a t one is not able to do. get a new job which will provide me with a larger income. but that does not mean they do not have it. A liberal defcnder of negative fx-eedom. If X inherit a fortune ctr win the pools or. black students are free to attend these univerdics. . the rnctst obvious example ctf the liberating character of mat-erial conditit. socialist wrilers tend to reject this distimction. on this view. Freedom and Material Well-Being me debate between advocates of liberal. . The option of attending was made ineligible. but affect ''the worth of liberty. less spectacularly. blocked by *rests and force.free to do. take the Concorde to Europe.

So understood. Thus. . cultural. The cclurtier living in the tap of luxury but at the beck and call of his prince may be much less free than a poor peasant or artisan. to make costiy mistakes. to freedom must provide thc conditions for autonomy. health care. less able to five his ctwn life. Greeds autonomyenhancing regime. Writes F. housing. Liberal advocates of capitalism thus reject this conception of freedarn. and althou& this may include some provision of basic educatio~~al.2). or to run mortal risks. Whether 1 am my own master and can follow my own choice and whether the possibilities from which X must choose are many or few are two entirety different questiom. it is a distinctive good that needs a distinctive name. rfi> make citizens free. The task of ensuring freedurn becomes the job of providing a multitude of resources: income.(> Nofrice that just as Isaiah Berlin appealed to plwalism (Seclrion 3.To be free to do soxnethingpone needs both to be free from restraint and to of~liberty have the rwources to do the thing. and to chctose his own ctpportunities for usefulness. And because capitalism leads to inequality of resources. . on this view. According to freedarn as power to act. . This confusion of liberty as power with liberty in its original meaning inevitably leads to the identificatic~n of liberty with wealth. this c o n c q t i o ~ tremendously hcreases the scope of state action req~rired to ensure freedom. Hayek. a state devoted. educatio~~. and welfare goods. they still rernah different. and this makes it passible ta exploit all the appeal which the word "liberty" carries in the support of the demand Ear the =distribution of wealth. It is true that to be Free may mean freedom to starve. In the sense in which we use the term. however. Liberty drrres not mean all good things or the absnce of all evils. the responsibilities of the freedomenhanci~~g state go far beyond even that of T. A. H. the state must provide them with the resources necessary for action. every *crease in material resources that increases your ability to pursue your desires necessarily increases your freedom. t-he aixn oi equalizing freedom is inherently linked to equalizing material resources (see Section 724). But i f liberty may not therefore be preferable to other goods. Obviously.2) in his $efense of negative liherty against ljberty as a u t o ~ ~ o m (Section y 4. the penniless vagabond who lives precariously by constant improvisation is indeed freer than the conscripted sotdier with a 1 3 his security and relative cornfc3rt. it does not ixnply Ehat all resources increase freedom. . it necessarily involves w q u d freedom. and so on. Yet. For according to freedom as atrtonomy. though freedom and wealth are both good things which most of us desire and though we often need both to obtain what we wish.

according to which people's wants are formed by their society. like Berlk. But the proyonent of freedom as effective power does not have a clear answer: a persol1 can be h e to do this or free to do fiat. howfree. ever. some way their wmts were limited and modest.3). it has a serious prcrblem t-hat Green's lrheory does not. Athough freedom as power is i n m m y ways a m c h more straightfoward notion of positive libery than that p ~ s e n t e d by "f: H. or in. auto~lomous. Sbce freedom requires resources. may have to choose. Green c m argue that a libert-yenhmcing swial policy ought to aim at encou~aging the dcrvelopment of people. Including all of these good things in the concept of liberty belies a mollistic beiief that they all are part of the same ideal and we can avoid the necessity of choosixlg ilrnollg &em. but the ideal of a fret. then everyone might to do. capitalist societies are endlessno matter what we have we always want some2rlnhg more-it does not follow that people living h a socialist socjety would be ""limitless consumers. under socialism. Grceds theory helps us make sense of the ideal of a free person. freedom over security. although peaple" svmts in. if we take this second coxlceptioxl of positiwe freedam as basic. or freedam over material well-being. Green. lfie collception of frcredom as effective power switches the focus of Ereedom discourse f r m th. perso?? appears to evaporate." If. The or~ly cile freedom as power with the idea of a free penon is to rely on a social environmentalist theory of human nature (Section 3. people only wmted what they needed.1 04 LIBERTY AND POWER Hayck too appeals to pluralism.others. Green has an awwer: someone who can act atrtonomously. But Hayek. m d since no one will ever have all the resources to do everything she wants. say. material wealth aid security art. and then everyone have the power to do everythil7g they war~ted could be called a free person. and so is not a slave to passions or prejudices. people will way to reconalways be free to do some things and not others. the general idea of a free person becomes lost. the pursuit of freedom and other good things can col~flict. What is a free person? The proponent of ncgative liberty has an answer: someone who is m t being restrained by others. and they too are important if we are to achieve our aims and purposes. In the absence of such a radical change in the nature of people's w n t s . to the value of being able to do this thing (go to university) or do that thing (take a vacation). jnsists that it is a mistake to include all these good things in the concept of l&and one erty. As m m y socialists have argued. That is. we will no longer be committed to the idea of a free .e general value of freedom. however. According to freedom as effective power. Freedown is just one of the good things in life.

m d resources.7 The discussion in Section 5. power itself seems essentially contested (see Section 2.2. it has been said that it distracts us and tempts us to pmwe "If-indulgent. developing such criteria is apt to lcad us back to freedom arr.1 relied on what might be called the Hobbesian conception of power. then we need criteria to disthguish valuable freedoms from silly freedams. or freedom as seli-realizatim (Sections 4. but ultimatczly not self-satisfying. Suppose. to obtain some f'trture or apparent good. and so on. for example.3). and some frcedoms (that is. free life. but must focus on particular sorts of freedom.. information. the advcxate of freedom as power could now say what types of freedom (abilities) are necessary for a satisfying. lack of powers) are not to be regretted. that great wealth is act-ually an obstacle to self-development. We can distinguish important from trivial liberties if.2 Pewer and Freedam "F)Ower t o " and "Pawer averN I h e noti011 of positive freedom as power to act has k d us into one of the enduring disputes in flitical theory-the relation of freedom and power. . UrTforb~~ately like other important political cox~cepts. We cannot really understand freedown until we grasp its relation to power. power b e h g s to a person if he has the means to achieve his goals. But if that is so. desires. "The power of a man . mother: Xf n person pos~(3sses ""powerover" others.person. not simply a life rich with effective powers. accepting an ideal of self-realization or self-developmentlwe can distinguish those liberties (powers) that are critical for achieving self-realization from those t-hat do little to advar~ce it-indeed. powers) arc not to be pursued. autonomy."%~ounderstood. &e's power is ox?re"sa$iijty to do what one wishes. he can typically make them do things they w u l d not o&erwise have d m e or believe thir~gs they would not have otherwise b e l i e ~ e d . he can somehow affect their interests and lives. All these could be employed by Rohinson Cmsoe alme on a desert isl a ~ dm .11. Equipped with a theory about. Such poruer fo depends on one's natural capacities. which freedoms me innportmt.Why are some powers essential and other pokvers unimportant? Somewhat surprising. kcording to Thomas Hobbes. But: note that at this point k e d as ~ pokver has collapsed into freedom as self-realization: the free life is a self-realized or autonomous life. lives. perhaps even are impediments to it. .4. Should you be free to travel to the moon? Are we to w o r 7 if people are unfree in this sense? Clearly same unfreedoms (that is. a t he couid not have w~til another person a p p e w d was powr over. 5. is his present means. ~ .

Some.rof krsos Effect Theories of ""Power over" Political theorists have long debated precisely what is involved in one person having pawer over another. Having power aver athers is one way. the president withheld crucial. indeed in ways that go against their interests. for we see that a person may possess a great amomt of "power to"' do th-s that trcmendousiy affect people. but simply persuading vokrs that you will do what they wazt you to do har$ly seems a way to control Ihem. "Control" is to be distinguished from influencing another through reasoning with her or exchange with her. A bull in a china shop greatfy ahcrts the owners of the shop. A person can have the power to do things for many differerzt reasons. Cont. This is important. however. even if you decide to join up.iberties Union. Alf has power over BetSy's dream if he can i n some m y corztrol her drems. when I offer the car dealer $20. It has been rxraintahed by Felix Oppeheim that control was exercised by President Eisenhower when he persuaded voters to ekct him by promising an end to the Korean war. then. olze of which is that he has ""polver aver" others. if &ere redly is such a thhg as "'hidden persuasion" in the form af subliminal advertishg. certain ways. that wodd indeed be a type of contrd. fn ~ z e i t k case r do I have power aver the other in the sense of control. even greatly affect her.001). 1 do not control you. If we adopt the c o n t d view. to possess power over others evinces an ability to colztrol fihern. and so have power over you. but o d y one way. an the other hand. say. have denied this. If." A persm who has '*power aver" anather necessarily has "'poolver to" affect that person in. that '"power overf"is a subset of '"power to.rcise corrtsol. But if I hfluence your decisions by brainwashing you or by coercing you.1 06 LIBERTY AND POWER It would seem that '"ower to" is the more general idea. W e n I try to convhce you to join the American Civil 1.I do m t control her. Skplifqri. to be sure. even if she takes up t-he offer. yet still not have ""power over"' t-hem in the selzse of controll. according t o cuntml theories of power over. but one c m have the power to. then I do ext. it does not seem that Alf has power over Betty just because he can affect her. buifd one" own house w i t b u t having power over anyolze. information so as to maniyulate the people." Although. in ways that he cannot control.g a cmplex debak. Let us say. he has powcsr over her desires if he can control kvhich anes she adopts. but tt7e bull does not exercise p w e r aver the owners. of being able to secure what one desires. thm we may well see him as exercising control. he has power over her actions if he c m control what she does. we can distinguish two broad farnilies of theories. .l"lf is thus said to have power over Betty when Alf can control some aspect of Betty" life.

Ma21y have disputed that for person A to hawe power over 13 with regard to @. perfoms action @. . m d could have done olherwise. "'A exercises power over B when A affecb B in a manner contrary to B's interests." To many. of course. brat it is hard to see how in any way it exhibib a conk01 of them."lTContrt. you do But unless you can g e ~ ~ e r dmake not control her. for example.if X were to attend carefully to the consequences ctf my actions. It has been said that "power may be defined as the production of intended. The employer has great power to do things. this looks morc like a bull in a china shop that an exercrise of control over people. this case is that because the white employer holds a ""srrategic poktion with regad to empioyment chances. I fail through inattenticm and habit tc3 consider candidates for employment other than lower-class white mates. adverse e&ct on the interests of the blilcks. ihe advocate of Ihe control t h e q . . as a white emplrsyer in control of important and xarce job opportunities. For sorne. m d that is why he holds power over them. In that case. permn A has power over person B if person A (systematically) acts in ways Chat ildverseiy a:fect the interest of B while advancing his own. contributing thereby tt3 the high unemplrsymcnt of minorities. 1 could do cltherwise . the following story p s e n t e d by William Connelly: Suppose . is responsible for m Obstacle confronting B. you cannot lose i h n d cause an unhtended outcame. but X don?. On this effect view of power over. some insist that he is exemising power over her.'"l7 The core idea is that the mployer's actions have a systematic. They thus piace gm& stress on the way in which power is tied to intentional or conscjous pttrposes. efiects.l of another =erns to imply that one wishes person A to cfr. according to Steven L.Cmtrol theories explajn the notion of power over in terns of one person being subject to the will of another. A must intend that N @. l y lfie other do w:hat you wish. the heart of power is the ahility to adversely affect the interttsts of others. and because one has control one is able ta make it the case that person A. h one way. what is also salient in. .1" li-."lVonsider. m d his exercise of this "'pawer to" has effects on others. To be sure. this is cmcial: if person A. lrhe owller is clearly d i f f e ~ nfrom t the hutl in the & h a shop: he is respmsible for his actiOns. According to effect theories o f poulcrv over. her control of the game led to a resdt she did not intend or wish. And ur~less you haue control (can guide things to do what you wmt them to do)." he can reasonably be said to "'exercise power over them. usually in a way t-hatbenefits the power holder*" Thus.trkes%famous account. one who has control. c m accidentally use it-my daughter may accidental:iyhit the cox~trol button on her video game and make it turn oK when she does not wmt it to.

then. an especially important consideration will be the jvldividualist ar collectivist commitments of the theory. or actually does. collectivist believes that i n t e ~ s t of s individuals are to be explained by the the beliefs. and actions of anather jndi- .ming a person's life and its conditions.selves. In contrast. Of course. ar~d social system jvl which they find them. There go tct its making ideas derived from the most disparate sources. say that the essence of its attack [on liberalism] derived from the realization that the liberal idea secured to the middle-dass its Full share of privilege. desires.4.1 08 ~~BERT AND V POWER What is not irnportartt to effect Ulieories is that the power holder controls peofle in the sellse of making them do what he wants them to do. Laski. inclines strongly to effect thee ries of "'power over. control the belliefs. when malyzing what is involved in one person having power over others. Consequently. Not surprising. a methodological. socialism is not a movement the summary ctf which is simple. liberal indivicfualistsidentify relatio~~s in LVhiCh one person is able to. while it left the proletariat i n chains. They mderstand society in terms of the beliefs. ar~d individuai agents. as is the case with my essentirslly contested concept. one of the twentieth century" foremost socialist political theorists."' ar~d tt7e owning classes have power over them. Which conception of "'power over" a theorist thinks best will. and desires of individuals and the relations between them. classical liberaiis adopt s o m version of methodological individuaiism. Wi& respect to theories of power. not lfie aims.l" The core of socialjtjm's criticism of liberal capitalist societfi is that its basic n this arrangements leave some welI off vvhile others are impoverished. Political theories that: combine a collectivist melhod imd a view of sockty t h t stresses codicts of jvlterest thus tend to place effect theories of "power over" dose to their core. turn on the rest of his political theory. Laski daes not mean either that: the workers are literally in chahs or even that they are consciously controlled by capitalists: how it disadvanhe is pointing to their place in the ecorlomic system ar~d tages them. the way the social system systematically disadvimtagesome interests aver others.io~ls of of one%piace i17 the swiill system. artions. allowjng some people to thrive m d others to be dominated. AS we saw in Sction 3. X think. socidist analyses of capitalist society are apt to m& t-he most of this collception of power*For example. i seme the workers are in "chains." To use Connolly" term. the colkctivist insists on the prirnary importance intent. then. accordhg to Marold. But it is not. then. desires. inaccurate tc:. Such collectivism. it is the ""srategic positionrr i n the overall social m d economic system t h t gives one persm power n one agent's abiljty to make ar~other over another. We locate power not i da what he wishes. but in. actions. In expla.

but her freedom is limited. say-you also get more of the good." If. Let us call a good a cnmmcllz good if ollc person's shart? of it cmnot detract from other people's share-it is ""not diminished by sharirrg.'Te are now in a position to appreciate one of the kvorries raised by such conceptions: because one f o m of "power b" do something is to have "power over" others. then Butty's freedom necessarily limits Mf's freedonn. and if ALFs having power over B e y implies that Bey's liberty is limited. NOW. should you want to do otherwise. you could not. then according to freedom arr. an hherently competitive good is one in. which the only way for you to increase your amount is t o decrtlase the m o u n t of someone else. both Aif and Betty car1 gain m m of at the same time. whereas in other cases Alf gains more by diminishing Eletty" share. one's freedom may be enh n c e d by havir~g power over others. or-reperson's liberty irherel-rtlylimits mother person's."21 Listel-rhg to a concert together is such a good. saqi. and Competition Mic began the chapter by examin-ting the conception of positive liberty accordir-rg to vhJhich freedom is eyuakd with "power to. make much sense to say that 1 controlled you. The good of '(being bestf"on a team is such a g o d . in some cases. 1 cmtrol you. the core case of *'power overrfis one person intentionally controlling mother. gain through taking the wealth of others. tfie only way you cm get it is to take it away from someone else- . my liste~ling does not diminish the amour-rtof concert open to you to hear. if to have freedom is to possess power. power to act. then your artions respond to my wishes.llale costs. if one way to have polver is to have polver over others. cwrcrior-r lirnits your liherty because it makes you "sameone% else" tool. And if I get mare of the good-the performer does an encore." That too is the right metaphor for being controlled by mother: if you exercise power over me I am to some extel-rtyour tool. We c m distinguish three vpewf ggods. If Alf h s power over Bet@ he is free. In productive m t e ~ r i s e sthe . however. Last. or could only do so at co11sider.I). Exercising power over anotherd however. but you were perfectly h e to act against my wishes-h what sense do 1 then control you? Kecail that for Haycsk (Section $. 1 think. pluderers. and so not free. but if freedom is power. her hedown shows that his power idimited. inherttntly limits that person's liberty. It would not.'" Liber?: Power. coopesating partks both increase their weal&.vidual. Weal& is such a good. freedom thus becomes an inhex~ztly cunzptifz'uegc~od. Insofar as fmcdom invotves having power over others. A partinlly eompetitivc good is one that. Although classical liberals arc? likely to achowledge that rules and institutions are usually employed in this p o w r r&tior-r. If Alf does not have power over Betty.

but I also c m increase my wealth (or freedom) by takixlg some of your wealth (freedom qua power to).110 LIBERTY AND POWER Insofar as freedom is sought through power over others. however. as s o w as they ernplop their freedom to do fhil~gs. even negative freedom is a partially competitive good. The only way E can achieve such freedom is by limiting your liberty (that is. his ""sare" of nonintemention does nitself decrease her share. 5 . It is then a good like wealth (indeed. The absence of obstacles t~ n l f i way necessitates obstacles for Betty. a condltiomz in which each was free to use her freedom in m y way she wished-a "sta. ?'his suggests that as a practical matter. they have . or to block his path when walking down the street. and Pn'vofe Proper?. Belly it.sf Defenses o f Freedom." where this does not imply "power overfU t k pursuit of freedom is m t inherently competitive. we must give up the liberty to "b p into each other" in crertab~ ways-say by attacking each other. Is it possibZt.1). -as classical liberals have long not i recognized.te of 17abre"-would he characterized by cro~~flict and illsecurity (Sections 43. Freedom thus mderstood can be r e d i s t r i t e m o v e d from person to person-but its at be *creased. Alf is negatively free insofar as no one acts in such a way as tr. we understand freedom as "power over"' others. Since ill least the seventeenth century liberals have not only upheld liberty as their core value. liberals have argued.: Classical Liberal Views Irzstrzrmcnluli. freedom becomes very closely lhked to wealth). is the best basdaX1 playtlr. 3 Freedom. We can all simultaneously increase our wealth (or freedom). Power.2). render o p t i m h e i b l e for him. it is inherently competitive. she lirnits his freedom. Thus. The problern. and Property Liber?. is that although there is no ~ e r mcodict t beween Alf m d Betty's negative freedom. we camot even contemplate the ideal of a society of free peopk. If. then. free hsofar as no one r e ~ ~ d eoprs n no tions ineligible for h a (Section 4. we restrict freedom as power to the notio~?~ of "power to.itive insofar as my share of freedom does not in itself diminish yours. as it w r e . Should Bet-ty use her freedom to capttxre Alf. power) to da as you please. to understand freedom as a common good-one that is not dimhished by sharing? Negative liberty seems to render fmedom noncompet. bump into each other hways that limit each other" negative freedom.ibling for a concept it seems to undernine the very ideal of a free sock@ Ef. We can no more imgine a society in which everyone is free (in the sense of havbg power) than we c m imagine a society in which everyant. As soon as we begin to use our negative freedom.8. Classical liiberals have clfen insisted that to ensure a generally free sociely. it is very hard not to. they may end up limiting earh other's freedom." It is certahly trol.

According to what we mi. it is. Liberals. As Hayek argues. is necessary to protest us horn each other.'"2 Another. (2) Right L?~EXGILCSZ(IIZ: Others (including B e y ) map use P i f and only if Aff e~x~sex~ts. have p~sentecl two marhdly difkrexlt accounts of this relation. then.ty% freedam to use P. None of this constitutes a dt.. 110 freedOm of assennhly if the needed are ur~der rooms are so controlled. to cou~~teract liberais recognize that government.anskrthe rights in rules (1)ar~d (2) to specific persms by conse1lt. (3) Right C?f:Tratzsfer: Alf may permanently t-t. it is. skitar cJefense of properv insists ody tfiose with property have lfie i n d e p e ~ ~ d enecessary ~~ce for a free socievt because they do not depend an the state ar others for their :livelihood.insisted that private property is necessary for liberty. ensuring that private people have the ~ s o w c eto s oppose the state. Property provides individuals with the power to resist government. they also insist that the power of governmcnt is the chief threat to liberty.ffs ushg P. other trhings being equal. no freedom of movement if the means of trimsport are a government monopoly. not wrong for others (irtrludir~g Betty) to use P. other things being equal. Liberal defrtnses of private property do not deny that All" property limits Bet. "There can "o no freedom of press if the instmrnenb of printing gover~~ment control.nial that Alf's property limjts Betty's freedom. Mthou$h. as we have just seen. that is. including desires that the goven~mexlt opposes. a d (b) It is wrong for others to interfere with Al. power is to limit someaxle else's freedom. After all.ght call liberty-prot-ecfitzgcasesfor pmperfy. (a) If Alf consents. Consequentlyr liberals have insisted that only an ecommic system based on private property disperses power and ~sourccs. see property as irtvolving " p o m to": if I have property E have the power to act orz my desires. wrong for athers to use P. "fb exercise. since government is the mast pokverful shgle actor in society. he has a "bundle of rights" ~rcgarding it.2" Ihe right of exlusion---(2)-clearly limits Rcrlty'ui Iiberty: Mf's property right to P limits Betty's liberty to use it. (h) If Alf does not consex~t. it poses the greatest lhreat to freedom. all 0fAlf"s rights limit the f ~ e d o m of others: Alf's Sight not to he . most important of which are (1) Right Of Use: Alf has a right to use that is. private property is justified because it supplies individmls with the power they need the power of goven~ment. however. they can afford to speak their mind and oppose those who w u l d use thejr power to dominate society+2"jibc. ff P is AXf% property.rty-pr~te~ting dekmses of property. (a) It is not wrozlg for Mf to use 1D.

that A l f has property does not imply that he exercises "power over" Betty. in order to obtain those goods and services that will better allow them to pursue their aims. People enter market transactions. then his property clearly is the basis of his power over them. It requires a diversity of ends or goals. they trade. He uses his property to control them by making some options ineligible. for then we will voluntarily cooperate to attain the thing we all desire. we pursue different things. then. the trick is accommodating all three. For classical liberals. it is only because we want different things that exchange is possible.112 ~ I B E R T YAND POWER mugged limits the freedom of others to mug him (see Section 8. It is easy to see how two of these can be combined. The market thus allows free. the market has the unique virtue of producing (1)an orderly system of social cooperation (2) among people with diverse ends while (3) respecting their freedom. Consider a different case: Al£is a rich entrepreneur who offers Betty a low-wage job. Everything depends on precisely how Alf employs his property.1).1). After all. you do not exercise power over the person behind the counter. when you order a hamburger at McDonaldfs. And of course. we can produce order even with a diversity of ends if we do not care about freedom: an authoritarian can take charge and command us to cooperate (see Section 10. Classical liberals would insist that he is not exercising power over her. More than that. she is not controlled by Alf. If Alf uses his property to hire thugs to intimidate his neighbors and get them to do what he wants. This being so. says the classical liberal.2). And it is relatively easy to respect freedom while allowing for a diversity of ends if we do not care about social cooperation and are content to live in a condition of anarchy (see Section 8. although Betty agrees to obey Alf's instructions. allows for all three.26 But. the classical liberal insists that neither party controls the other-exercises power over the other-and so neither limits the other's freedom. cooperative behavior without any agreement on ultimate ends. that is. Because it is a free exchange. even though he does what you want him to do-he gives you a Big Mac. for example. He is not limiting her options: indeed. noncoerced. as we have seen. . in the eyes of classical liberals. And because our aims differ. even if Alf has a great deal of property and Betty has little. he does not exercise power over her: he has increased her choices. insists the classical liberal. The market order. since offers expand one's options. many liberals insist that they can never render options ineligible (Section 4. because he is not controlling her.4). to produce a system of cooperation that respects freedom if we all happen to value the same thing. Since she is free to not obey him and to quit her job. It is relatively easy. a private property market order is absolutely necessary for a free society. If everyone wanted the same things-if we all valued everything in the same way-exchange could not occur.

"Liberty is Property. bluntly aaserts. uniike freedom. So. or indeed as identical to libertp. and others cannot interwho has property can do what she war~ts fere. Property as Freedom. (I)your proyerty rights do necessarily limit the freedom of others insofilr as they exclude others from using your property. As Hayek sees it. it can be used to acquire power over others. each person '"intrmzds only his own gairz. (2) Property. Property defines this zone: a person with it. (3) The use of property does not inberclnlly iwoJve the exercrise of "power over" others. a nunber of variatims on this clain. As a resource giving one power to do what m e wmts. Property is necessary for a free society because it is essential that private citizens have the p w e r to do things wi&out a s h g the approval of government. as in many other cases. Jan Narvesm. 5.The market thus coheres with classical liberalism" pluralism (SecCion 3. a possibility of exchange occurs because you and McDonald" have different values: they would prekr h a m g your money to keeping their burger.1.2) and its self-interested view of humm nahnre (Section 3. led by an invisible har"td to promote an end which was no part of h3s inte1"ttion.3).'Vhe main idea. it is just the sort of positive freedom that classkd liberaiis such as Haycsk stmngly and explicitly reject. for the classical liberat the markct order is the only way for people to freely coordinate their actions. If that is a sort of freedom.~~27 According to the liberty-prokcting defcnses of property then.iberals have not only insisted that property is a rnems to pseserving liberty. the great accomplishment of the market is that it allows peogle pursuing a tremendous diversity of aims to cooperate in such a way &at they assist each other in their pursuits dovithout havbg any intention of doing so. as Adam Smith (1723-1790) put it. and he is hthis. . a d you would p ~ f e havr ing the burger to keeping your money."" There are.1). is that one's freedom is a "zone" or "space" hwhich one c m act without interference fmm others. though. for instmce. 7i. When you go to McDonatdk and ask for a Big Mac. the zone defined by one% property is simply a manifestation of one" ffrcedom. or as a type of liberty. but such power is not the norm in free exchmge. fndeed. T%us. it seems much more at home in soci&st political.be free is just to be free to use what is yours-your property+30 Although advocates of this view typically see thennsehes as advocating negalive libcrm their argumcnt seems to confuse negative liberty and liberty as power (Sectiom 4. -as I arped. gives one "'power to" do dovhat one wants. This view is popular among many contemporary classical liberals. once again. 1. they have often conceived of it as an embodime2"tt of liberty. theories. A person With properv is a permn with the resourc-es to t r d a t e her d e s i ~ jclto s ~alirty.

is not only that it increases. is the non-owner's ability tc3 labour. it heightem that ctf some men over ctthers. then. . those with private prapert-y systematically employ the pmductive pawers of the workers to enrich themselves. to tra~sfer ""power to" from the producers (workers) to owners. H. and of ithe financial arrangements associated with it. The ability. The ctwner purchases that ability for a certain time and puts it ta work. consequently. He. Under capitatism. Some socialists such as R. during the time contracted for. He also owns the product. is transferred. But in a very real sense the actual work is owlzed by the owner of the capital. capitalism is a systematic redistribu to" fr.e.pr. . of the land and capital). Foll0win. . power ~ l a t i m hetwem socialists have often trnderstood private propere as a mechanism that a X :lows capitalists to extract the productive powers of the worlcers and use them for the benefit of t-he capiCalist class. whereas the liberal sees private pmperty rights as providing every property owner with the power to do as she wishes.g Karl l:Marx.o labour.e. the owner of the means of labour (i. Mtsst simply. by ctrganizing and concentrating it. including the value added to the materials of the work.. Macphersol~.to use his own capacities productively. it is argued. according to C.rfy and "Power OWT. The actual work is perfornged by the non-owner. Marxists such as fvXacpherson insist that because capitalism is based on the sale of liabor power by the workers to t-he owners. Tawney employed the narrower mtio11 of *'power over" as 'kcontml" to make this point: For the characteristic of modern industry. having purchased the other's abiliq tt." A core t-heme of socialist writings has been that private propere constitutes the capitalists"+"power over" the working class.i. It concentrates it because it normally involves the ccmcentration of ownership.. . but that.~~BERT AND V POWER Privafe Propery and Power: Sociolisf Views P~imte P Y O ~ Cand Y ~ fhe ~ 'Ilmngfer o f ''Poruer lit.m workers to capilalists. B. by its technological triumphs. what is transferred. the labour-yozuer. . the r/vh& point of privak p r ~ e r t p it. his ability. in the absence of deliberate restraints imposed by society.?" n u s . . What is transferred. is both the ability tt3 work and the ownership of work itself. from the non-owner tc:. man" power over nature. has the rights of ownership in the labour that is actually performed. and therefow of the rights which ownership con- . m tbis view. tion of '*"p'~ver Prr.'3oci&sts have long insisted that capitalist private property inevitably and crucially involves s the owners a r ~ d workers. .

who direct and plan. does not m a k much of the way in which Rockefeller's "'eapitaljst property rights" alllowetit him to intent. legislation that protects workers c m check the power of cont. protecting the ljberty of the cvorkers rcqui~d constrainhg the power of employers.r.t. well as rwisionist liberals such as fa.T. To the classical liberal.""since coercive restraints in the form of gove ent regulation~orcerning. so that those who control a key service can impose their t e r m on it-re rernainder. types of eccmomic activity interdependent. for . say. or nearly all. Nielsen stresses how Rockcfeller's decisio~ls p d u c e d "unintended" pbIic cor7seyuc. Instead. And because the capitalist's p w e r runs so much deeper. "mere is no intrinsic and inevitable conflict betwcsen liberty and compulsion. o ~ ~the elimination of the capitalist system will free the workers by eliminathg this power over them. workh~g hours. factory conditions. because its method is mass-productictn. whether intended or ~~"tir~te~ has ~ dfar-rearhing ed. who execute. a socialist mitght say constitutes a p w e r stmture insofar as the holders of property rights systematically act in ways that advance their i n t e ~ s t s while adversely affecting Lhe interests of workers and other non-property-owning classes.5" Capitalists have power over workers because they c m direct the workers according to their plans.fers. effects throughout the econorny that work to the disadvantage of the working class. hthe eyes of Tawne)i arr. by small groups.ionally conkol. Ihus.for the entire SOciet).t. of private property m d the socialist criticism clash on the nature of power. to the socialist they are arenas of intense competition and conflict. The power of a capitalist such as Rackdeller is not locakd in his abitity to control m d manipulate his workers or goverrnrnent officds. his workers or consumers. they also deeply disagree m how markets are to be understood. hsofnr as t-he capi.:" Capitalism. Nielsen. Rockekller (2839-1937). because it makes all.alistfs " p w e r over'kthers col~sists in his power to consciously control his workers. I h e reader mi\y have noticed that not only do the liberal defensc.rcc. controlling it reyuises much more radical action.01. Sacialists. in col~trast to Tawi~ey. and mass-production involves the control of large armies ctf workers. Hobhouse. This second criticism of the power inherent in capitalist pmperty relations goes much deeper than Tawney". but his ability to act on his interests in a way that. In commenting on the power of the farnous capitalist John I ) . But if &e power of capitalism resides in the ly tremendous effect of owners' decisions on the entire economy. m d wages-are necessary to protect the workers from the power of capitalism*s3 T%e contemporary socialist philosopher Kai Nielsen employs m effect account of powes in his critjcism of capitalism. markets are r e a h s of freedom and mubal benefit.

we create the power of government. people would. me~~ .2) indines them to insist that although security is a good. Low. there is no need to assume that the cm~l. since it takes from some to give to others." Law is thus t-kvo-edged:it pratccts us ft-om coercion by coercion. ""btrmp" into each other in ways that would limit each other's freedom. we construct a power over us: the governus with coercim unless we obey. in order to protect ourselves against the coercion of private individuals.l)-lhat is. Law provides scczlrif!/ for m s t of our freedom bp linniting some of it. and the Low: A Basic View Recall from Section 5. a system of laws that protect the freedom imd property of each (see Section R. almost always see profits as deriving from exploitation of the wrkers: that the capitalist gains mans that others lose. most classical liberals have held that each lawf at least insofar as it threatens us with coercrion (see Sectim 4. and Morality: Kmt's Liberal Rotiono/ist View hma11ue:i Kant (1724-1804) agreed &at rat-ional. ment can control: us by thl-eater~i~~g T%us. P ~ w r and . And that is why socialists jvlsist that the capitalist system must rest on power. 4 Freeclon?. to gain the good of secrnrily we must give up some of another good-in this case. lawless" heedom of the state of nature-in kvhieh . some of our freedom. moral people w u l d abandon the "wild. pufiishme~~t-is itself a limitation of our liberty Thus. defenders of liberal capitalism insist that profits are the result of muhnally beneficial activity Because both owners m d workers gab from their market relations. To prevent us from linliting each other% frtiedom in this w q . In contrast.37 Freedom. it checrks your a r ~ d my liberty too. as I put it. h short. in creating a system of laws. But of course.1 Tb LIBERTY AND POWER instance.35 5 .Of comse.3 that according to a lypical classical liberal arguift each was free to use her negative fiberty in any way whatsoever. it is not the same good -as fnzwdom. governxnent chrcks not o q the libesv of others. to check the power of other people. to provide that securiy we institute a power that c m block those who would limit our liberty*But the pluralism of classkal liberals (Section 3. we accept some coercion by the state. we re+rc_. fhe Law Negative Liber?. it protects our liberty by taking some of it away. we would often use our freedom to construct obstacles that limit thc freedom of others.Z). Because government uses its power to constmct obstacles to our action.e edifice rests on pawer rather Ulim free choice. h d -as the flufalist tells us is usually the case. Peopie wish their freedom to be secure from attaCk. and the limits m liberty it implies.

if a certain use of freedctm i s itself a hindrance to freedom according tt3 mivcrsal laws (that is. Although law does indeed restrict " " w i l d "freedom.2). inasmucb a s it is the prevention of a hinthe use of coerci~~n drance to freedom. they would. f ~ e d o m is itself unjust.000. argtEes Kant. (4) T%eprevention af such a hindrance to freedom is consistent with heedam according to rdes of justice.of an effect promotes that effect and is ccmsistent with it. Thus. in other words. Consequently. however. But she may not tell them-that is.one person can use her freedom to harm others-and agree to live under laws of justice (Sction 8. them is no corliflict betwee11law. then to a)unteract it.2. just freedom. but have never done so. wt-rich teits us to live according to just :laws that protect the h e d m of everyone. Consequently that others .38 Kitllitfsargument seems to be that (1) If a person employs his freedom in a way that coerces others (2) h d which cannot be justified by universal laws of justice. someone who has thousands of loyal followers may have great power. this use of coercion is just. But what of Alf's mme ppasscssiorl of power over her? A person can possess power w i t b u t actuai:ly using it. (S) merefom. and accept a rational frcedm. though refuscld to see this as b o l v i n g any loss of freedom.. it is essential for ""just" fscledom. alid reasolli. being interfered cvith by others. however: Any oppogition that cowters the hindrance. to have power is to have the ahilifcy to control or affect others. freedom. is a hindrance or opposition tct freedom. acts uphotding universal justice are not opposed to (JLIS~) freedom. Freedom as An tipower Alf 'S exercise af power over Betty hherently limits her freedom. Coercion. a person is free i f she is not. Kmlit. Now.to freedom according to universal laws. Si17ce "ozdd she tell her followers to do somethhg.4. then (3) 'That perwrlifmseof his.3): true freedom must confom to the dictates oC reason. i s consistent with freedom according to universal laws. everything that is mjust is a hindrance. Note the ratiorlialist claim (Sectiorlis 3. that is. Properk unkrstood. &coding to most liberal advocates of negative liberty. but not everyone who has m ability actually uses that abifity f: have the ability to count to 1. when we enter society we give up our wild lawless freedom. under the rules of just laws. she may not exercise that power. it is unjust).

Accordimg to thit. trdy free. education. neulralizes the power possessed by some citizens that. if left w~checkd. (2) The iaw regulates the way in which ihe powerful may employ their resources. Pettit does not believe that the law takes away some of our k e d o m to better protect other part" rather. Pettit jnsists that the rule of law jn no way detracts from our freedom. Petrcit insists that his view is distinct from liberal. in the republican n legislatradition.e freednm." If All has power over Betty i none kvay but she had power over A:l i n anothel. regulation of economic decisiom by corporations protects the liberty of employees and shareholders. Thus." Because being subject to arbitraly interfere~~ce is t-he m r k of an unfree life. The law says Pettit.because it provides citizens with mtiipower. Perhaps she merely is lucky that so far ALf has not mticed her. Thus. Thus. Philip Pettit has criticized t-his understar~ding of freedom. of their fellows. "the employer who can fire his employees as kvhim inclines him" "possesses power that limits the hberty of his employees. freedom is closely bound with popular participation i tion and the prevention of the arbitrary use of power. or p e r h a p ~ h e ingratiates hersell with Alf to protect krself from his pokver. nonarbitrary legislation does not limit the freedom of citizens. (3) Government provision of transportation. "republican'"tt7eory of government. for not o17Iy is each not interfered with. and conservative conceptio~~s of freedom. But none of this. Betty is not free if. Each can resist the power of the other.h as a milller of fact she is left alone. As Pettit sees it. the . althoue. like Kant. at any moment Alf could constrain her choices if he wished to. but both are secure from having power exercised over them by the other. says Settit. would limit th. their mutual power might nullify the power of either to interkre. socialist. making them less vuherable to t-he mare powerfui members of sociev. h this respect.118 LIBERTY AND POWER possess great power does not in itself limit yom freedown*Recently. for she lives under the constant possibility that Alf may decide to tirnit her liberty. systems of nonarbitrary law making-systems based on widespread participation by citizens in the creation of general laws that apply to all-do not constitute limih on freedom. and other opportunities empowers ordinary citizens. Unlike classical liberals. makes her free. each the11 it. for example."" Pet-tit argues for m alternative view: freedom as "antipower. Specit"ical.1Cy.Pettit: q u e s that the law promotes antipower in three ways: (1) T%e crimjnal law deters hdividuals with power from jnterfering with others. for Pettit. even if he should never choose to use that p~wer.

2). And if so. The Social Confmct. This idea of freedom is a version of freedom -as autonomy (Section 4. laws seem to be a f o m of seti-imposed restraints. there would only be persmal dependency and so siavery (see Section 10. Rousseau. For Rousseau. stresses the way in which a system of law secures each citizen agajnst perwnd dependence on tt7e wills of others. that is. emphasizes between beil'lg sukject to lfie will of specific people a r ~ d bethe differe~~tre ing subject to ilnpersonill laws. those who vote against the law. such personal dependency is avoided by makhg each person subject only to the laws he had a part in making. This idea was central to the French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. then. (2) Tlze milzorify arr. like Mmt and the republican tradition..According to Rosanquet and others. m e crucial sort of unfreedom for Rousscau is when you are foxed to &ey the will of mother individual: when ar~other has control over you. since it is not a self-imposed restraht: they voted agakst it. and the republican and to some extent the socialist traditio~~s. C3tn the face of it. as ane desires to act on them*So those who really will a law who wish to have the law.4). . i"could . The theme of paw11"l dependence runs very deep in fCousseatt's writings.fiee if Cflqj loo can som&ow "wifl'9fhelart? The problem is the dissenthg minority. the idea was mast completely developed by later political philosophers such as Bernard. restraints that you irnpose on yourself do not b i t your freedom. In a democracy. the law seems to genuinely rest.Abstracting from the specifics of their particdar treatme~~ts. and the laws apply to all. saps Rousseau. f i e General Wll: taw and Positive Freehrn Perhaps the most radical pmposal for reconciling labv and freedom has been proposed by those upholding the ideal of the "general wilf. Without af people in a ""sate of natureM")freedarn trnder the rule of X the rule of general laws. Selfimposed restrajwlts. do not have their freedom limited by it: they remain free. then. Rousseatr believed. A person is free w h n she c m do what she really wants to do: if she imposes a restraint on herself-if she kcides that she does not want to $O s~mc"f:hi~-----Ihe restraint does not interfere with her freedom. This. the basic q u m e n t can be broken into four claims: (If Sey-imposed restrailrts do not limit f r ~ d o m . f r ~ a democracy.rict lrheir frcredom. is the only sort of freedom that can (as opposed t-he wild and lawless frctedom be had by humal~s-ir. His great work. Bosmquet. are not a limitation af one's autonomy.l-society i a b v .republican h-adition embraces Kantfs ralionalism: arbih-ar)r interference is hostile to freedom because it is not based on rules of justice and reason. all citizens deliberate and vote on the laws." Although Rousseau is lfie most important theorist of the general will.

a person's red will consists of sods **realu the things he rc. 11 my particular opinion had prevailed against the general will. Even if the minority voted agaimt such laws. apply to all citizens equally and serve the common interests of all citizens. Grt. compelling someme to submit to the gerraal will "means nothhg other thm that he shall be forced to be free. Rousseau agrees. and if the minority really want to act on the general will. According to Rousseau. Now to the extent. . Recall again T. interests. even if they do not know it. . and goals---whereas a person's "aceslal'kwill is distorted by irnpulses and errors. if: the law promotes the common good. the minmity should accept the majority's judgment. If being free is to do what you mally want to do. this proves ctnIy that 1 have made a mistake.lfsdisthction betweell a perm d "actual" will (%ction 4. then that is what the minority =ally will. and so could never be embraced by the minority. and the counting of votes yields a declaration of the general wiX1. and then 1 shauld not have been iFree. When a law is proposed in the people" assembly what is asked of them is not precisely whether they approve of the proposition or reject it. Recall here Green" analysis of freedom: those who act on their '"actual will" rather than their "real will" are unfree. The minority codd will the laws (that they voted against) if the laws were really in the interests of all cilizem. (4) Since the nlinorify will fhc ~ W Sf . but whether it is in confc~rmity to the general will which is theirs. that the minority will the common good. (3) hros that express the genernl will am ~uilledby ewyone.er.aliy cares about-his long-term aims. we might distir-rgwishtwo types of law: (a) Some laws favor the m 4 o ~ t y at the expense of the minority. for this is the necessary condition which . When. as members of the community dcsising the cornmall good they achally do will ehe h s insofar as they promote the generd good. m a t is. however.1 20 LIBERTY AND POWER seem that the law limits their autonomy But if there was some way in which the minority could emhmce the majority's verdict as t-heir own-if they could come to will the result-then they too would be free.41 Once the general w i l has been revealed by the majority those who continue to oppose it are captives of their particular wills. H. t-hen t-he minority act freely when they act on the general will.2). they voted against the law because they believed that the law did not express the ge~~eral will. secures him agahst all personal dependenceef'd2 . and what X believed tc3 be the general will was not so. True. each by giving his vote gives his opinion on this question. but if the majority are c o r ~ cthat t the law articulates the gemral will. therefore. X should have done something other than what X had willed. the opinion contrary to mine prevails. fh) Other laws.h q arefrcf men zut~en f h q arefil~ed to o b q them.

Bosmquet apparently approves of "busseau% observation (Social Crmfmct, Book Itr: chap, ii, n.) that the convicts in &c galleys at Genoa had "iberty-tamped on their chairts- The fetters of the bad self are the symbol of freedom.'f4"gagain, we confront Ber1in"s worry about positive liberty: forcirzg a person to act on his "real will" c m itself he a way of making him free. The doctrine of the general will reconciles law and positive freedom by presupposing a collectivist theory of society (Section 3.4). Rousseau himself expljcitly embraces such a corrception. In The Social Contract, he insists that society is more than an '%aggregationu-it is an "ass~ciation" with a real unity a d shares a genuine "commo~~ good.""" ":lf indi\riduirls are memhers of m association in w:hich the good of each it; bound to the common good, m d in. kvhich each thus wills the cornman good as a crucial constituent of her own good, it is possit;lle to claim that each mally wills t-he generai will, and so is aulonomous when acting on it. Hence Rousseau" ksistence that a society is a ""people" "rather than a collltection of individuals. For if all we have is a collection of individuals, it seems dubious indeed &at all share a gex~eral will, ar~d are free when they follow it.
Conservatism and Legal Liberties

In concluding our analysis of :liberty and the law we should note a m r e modest proposal, characteristic of much conscrwtiwe thought. As I stressed in. Section 3.2, conservative antirationalism leads to valzlb~g traditions, as embodying the accumulated practical knowledge of a political culhrre. Rather & a seeking ~ to develop ar.2 i\bsh.act iheary of freedom--as da liberals and socialists-conservati\~es are wont to stress that our understanding of what ljberties art. h d a m e n h l to political life is determined by our political traditiolls, fn his Reflectiarzs orz fhe Xez)ofzlCinlzi l z Frunce, Burke criticized the liberal doctrine of trniversal m u r a l rights to :liber@.Instead, Burke argued that the ljherties of the English were an '"ir7herita1ce derived to us from our forefathers, a ~ to d be transmitted to our posterity-as an estate specially belonging to the peaple of this kingdom, wilf-tout any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right.-s Mo~over, Burkc., hawing on a typical comepvaf-i~(~1 themy of human nature, stressed the dangers of human passions for politicd society (Section 3.3). Burke maintained,
Society requires nctt ctnly that the passictns of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection. This can only be done by a poiucr ouf

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o f tfter~tsel~s, and not, i n the exercise ctf its function, subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office tct bridle and subdue, In this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights. But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances and admit to infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upctn any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as tc:, discuss them upon that principte.4"

Thus, for Burke, the law-"'a polver out of themselcres"-is needed to identify specific liberties of, and put restrictions on, too-passionate people. No ger~eral law or prhcipie can be laid out in advance, specifying precisely what t-hese will be; they arc. a r ~ inheritance oi a people's political and legal traditionsBurke's account is resolutely antiralionaljst, in m y ways far more so than even Berlin" dcfefense of negative liberty (Section4.3). No philosophical theory of liherty i n general is sound. Specific li:berties, such as freedam of the press and freedom of association are the oukomes of a c m and what such liberties piex legal traditio1.1; wbat liberties are importar~t, imply, is not a matter for a phjlosopt7icd theory of liberty but a historical and legal study of a complex political community. For Burke and conservatives who f d o w him, although there are no "human rights""or ""rights of man," "ere are rights more precious and important: "the rights of Englishmen . . . as a patrimony derived from their forefathers."" Indeed, in the conservative is sure to criticize the liberal e ~ ~ d o r s e mof e~ freedom ~t gemral as destrt~ctive of social traditi.ons, Tlnd ult-imately to heedom itself. Altt-tough some freedoms are central to our traditions, others are not; and liberalism" constant attack 01.1 limits to freedom-its ""lberationist"" proposals-destroys social custams and paves the way for authoritarim leaders,
Where the liberal sees a probable increase in freedom and creativeness the result of these liberations, it-re conservative is more likely to see, or at least fear, insecurity and alienation. The chief accusation made against liberalism by conxrvatives is . . . that liberalism is a kind of Judas goat for totalitarianism. By its incessant Xiberaticmist work on the traditional authorities and rotes in society, liberalism, it is argued, weakens the social structure, encourages the mtrltipjfication of "mass-types" of human beings and thus beckons in its way to waiting totalitarian masters. "By destrclying the social habits of the people," wrote Elliot, "by dissolving their natural collective consciousness into individual constituents. . . . Liberalism can prepare the way for that which is its sown negation."dB



It is interesting to observe here the reply of liberal theorists. "Liberty," says Hayek, "is one. Liberties appear only when liberty is lacking; they are special privileges and exemptions that groups and individuals may acquire while the rest are more or less unfree."49 Conservatism displays a cleavage about the relative importance of economic freedoms. Burke himself harshly criticized the Fmch revolutionaries for praising moneymaking--success in the marketplace---rather than landed property. Landed property, as he saw it, represented society's traditions, whereas the marketplace undermined them. John Gray, a contemporary conservative, continues this tradition; he has been increasingly critical of "market capitalism" and the way that it undermines cultural and natural values.50 Although these latterday Burkeans are not opponents of private property and the market, they stress the way that it can undermine traditional institutions, and so are willing to limit economic liberties to protect cultural traditions. In contrast, what are sometimes called "new right" conservatives-most notably, Margaret Thatcher, the former prime minister of the United Kingdom-put great stress on the importance of economic liberty, as necessary to promote the traditional virtues of self-reliance, prudence, hard work, and care for one's family (see Section 9.3). This difference, then, stems from competing interpretations of the relation of economic liberty to traditional liberties and values-does it undermine them, protect them, or form a part of them?

5.5 Summary
This chapter considered the relation of freedom to power. I began in Section 5.1 by examining a conception of positive liberty that identifies freedom with the power to act on one's desires. Manifestly, this view of freedom greatly expands the task of a "freedom-valuing state": to protect and promote the freedom of citizens requires supplying them with the resources necessary to achieve their aims. Section 5.2 examined in more detail the notion of power and its relation to freedom; we distinguished ''power over" and "power to." Whereas power to can be seen as enhancing freedom, it seems that one person's power over another inherently limits the freedom of the person over whom he exercises that power. Like freedom, power, especially "power over," is a contested concept; we examined the debate between a liberal-individualist analysis emphasizing control and a socialist conception stressing systematic adverse effects on the interests of some while benefiting others. The debate between liberals and socialists carried over into Section 5.3, which examined differing views of the relation of property and freedom. Drawing together liberal analyses of power and freedom, we saw how liberals argue that property

1 24



is necessary to protect freedom while insisting it does not necessarily involve power mer others, w:hereas socialists insist &at it inbermtly involves liberty-limiting power. In Section 5.4, the relation of liberty and law was examined. Stasthg with the basic classical liberal claim that all law, qua cocrcjve restraint, h i t s iiberty, we went or1 to examine several proposals that seek to show how, properly mderstaod, general justified :legal restraints do not :linnit civil freedom. Finally, we briefly examined Burke" co~~scrvative, antirationalist view, w:hich abjures a generai a ~ a l y sis of freedom, localifig the important lherties of a people in their hjstorical-legall tradition.

1. T. H. Green, ""On the Different S n s e s CIF Freedom' As Applied to the Will and the Moral Progress of Man," in Paul Harris and J t l h Marrow eds,, Crt3~?riS Lecizims on flze I"rz'nc@i~s ufl""olz'ticnl OLtligalz't~n (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1486), p, 235, 2. R. H. T a m e y Equality ((New York: Harcc~urt, Brace, 19311, p. 221. 3. J o h Rawts, A Tlteory o f jzrstice (Cambridge, MA: Elarvard University Press, 1971), p. 204, 4, See, ftx example, Kai Nietsen, Eqzinlify and Liberty: A Defcnse o f Rndimt Egalitnria~iism (Totowa, MJ:Rctwman and Ailanheid, 19851, p. M, 5. Richard Norman, Fret?n~td Equal: A Pltilosoplzical ExnmhaCion ufhlz'timl Values (Oxford: Oxfc~rd University Press, 1987), p. 44. 6. F. A. Hayek, The GottsEil.zifionofLiberty (London: Routledge, 1960), pp. 17-18. 3 e Skven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (tondcm: Macmillan, 1974). 7. % 8. Thornas Hubbes, Leviadha~z,Michael Oakeshott, ed., (Oxford: Blackwell, 1(348),p, 56 (Book 1, chap. 10). 9, See S. X. Bern, ""Power," in Paul Edwards, ed ., The E~tcyclopt~dia o f Philosoplly (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1965). 16, See here Felix Oppenheirn, Bimensio;ansof Fre~dorn (New Yctrk: St. Martin's, Press, 196'11, 11. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 12. Bertrand RusseEil, bwer (Lc~ndon: Unwin Books, 1960), p. 25. 13. See Christian Bay, The Structzire o f Frecdanz (New York: Atheneurn, 1"355), p. 257; Williarn E. Connolly, The Terms f:)fI"olidr'cnl Discozirse, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princetan University Press, 19831, chap, 3, 14. Lu kes, Power: A &dial Viezu, p. 34. 15. Comolly, The Rnns ofPolr'tical LZisco~krs& p. 106, 16, See Mristjhn KristjBnsson, Social ic1.er.drsm: The Resyorzsibility View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 150ff. f Political Bisconrse, p. 106. 17, Connolly, The Terms o ~ o f E~uropealzLiberi~lknr (London: George AI3en and 18. Harold J. Laski, 7 % Rise Unwin, 1936), p. 239. 19. Again, we need to stress that political theories are aImplex, and can exernplify different sorts of comectiom, See Kristjbnsson, Socinl Freedonz, chap. 6.

20, See ibid. 21. See Bernard Bosanquet, The Plzilnsoplziclal irhleory o f lfte State, in Gctrald F. Caus and William Sweet, eds., The Philosophical "l"heoryo f ifhe Stndc a d Related Essays (Indianapolis, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2000), p, 46. 22. This claim is disputed by C, B. Macpherson, Democmtic Tfzmry: Essays in Retrieval (Oxfcjrd: Clarendon Press, 19732, pp. 40ff. 23. E A. Hayek, "%LiberaXism," in his New Stz-ldks itz Philosophy, Politics, Ecouzorni c and ~ the Hisimy f:)fldc.las (London: Routledge and Kegan Paut, 1978), p. 149. 24. See AZan Qan, Property (Mifton Keynet;, UK: Open University Press, 3987). 25. I am following here Frank Snare, "The Concept of Property," Anrlrricnlz PIziIosophical Qlrarterly, vol. 9 (April 1972), pp, 208--206.1 have sipificantfy altered some ctf these conditions. See also Lawrence C, Becker, Prqerty Rights (Lcmdon: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 18-14, 26. This claim i s argued for in Cerald F. Gaus and Loren E, Lomasky; ""re Property Rights Problematic"' The Munisd, vol. 1 7 3 (October, 1990), pp. 483-503. 27, Adam Smith, APZ. Itzquiq into the Natzire mid Caztses ";lf the Wealth ";1(Nations. R. W. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, eds. (Indianapolis, IN: LiberCy Fund, 19811, p. 456. 28, Jan Narveson, Tlze Libertarl'att fdea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), p. 66. 29, f have considered these in detail in "Property, Rights and Freedom," "cial Pfzr'losoyhy 6 hlicy, vol. 1 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 209-240. 30, Narveson, The Libcrt~riasl fdetz, p. 64, 31. Macpherson, Denlocrafic Tlzeory, pp. 64-65. For Marx's views on the sate of labor power, see Capital, in Robert C. Tuckex; ed., The ~ C / I R ~ X -Reader, EM~~ 2nd ~ Sed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 19782, pp. 351ff. See Section 9.1 below. 32. T a m e y Equality#p. 214. 33, L. T. Hobhause, Libemlisnz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964 [1911l), p. 78. 34. Nielsen, Equality and Liberty, pp, 234-235. 35. For an examination ctf proA"Es an essentially contested concept, see James W. Child, "Profit: The Concept and Its Moral Features,;,"3ocint Philosclylly & h l i q , vol. 35 (Summer 1998), pp. 243-2132, 36. See Hayek, The Consiiitztdio-rzufLibertcyfp. 21. 37, S 6 3 e Bertrand de Jouvenel, 0 1 2 Z-sozoer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), chap.17, 38. Irnmanuel Kant, The Mefapltysical Elernenfs ojJzisticc~, John Il,add, trans. (Tndianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 39651, p. 36. 39. Philip Pettit, "Freedom As Antipowe~" "Ethics, vol. 106 (April 1996), p. 581. 40, See Pet tit's R e y blicnt~isnz: ~ A Theory of Freedom alzd Guverntncn t (Oxford: CXarendvn Press, 2 997). 41. Jean-Jacques R o u ~ e a u Tlzc , Socinl Go~ltract, Maurice Cranston, trans. (tondon: Penguin Books, 1968 [17622), Bctok 4, chap. 2. $2. Ibid., Book 1, chap. 17. 43, Bosanquet, The PJtilosopl~icait Theory o f the Stnte, p. 150. $4. Rousseau, The Social Conlmcd, Book 1, chap. 5. 45. Edmund Burke, Xefiectiorzs on the Xezwlzativrz in Fralzce (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1968), p. 119. 46- Ibid., p, 1%.

47, Xbid., p. 138, 48. Robert Nisbet, Gorlsert~ntisism (Mitton Keynes, LJK: Open University Press, 1986), p. 50. 44. Hayek, The G ~ ? ~ s t i f ~ ~ ofLibertyr t i o t z p. 19. 50. See, for example, John Gray, Beyond the New Right: firkt*ts, Got?emmerztn~zd Ct>mjuionEnvironment (London: Routledge, 1993).

" h these contexts. that I like chocolate and coffee ice cream equally well. which one person or group af peoplfe is given preference over others. aristocrats) is not to be preferred to another (for example. I am probably saying that I do not prefer chocolate to coffee and X do not prefer coffee to chocolirte.on: one reason far not plr~lferrhg A is that they have a tied score. if one did have a scoring system for ice cream. as the English socialist R. insisted these early egalitarians. yet we often ernploy the idea of equality. for example. I am probably not saykg anything so precise as "on my scoring system for ice cream." 7b he sure. but we mi&t have less numerical. We all h o w .We typicdly do not have scoring systems. This is a broader co~cepA to N or N to ti~n thm the tied score noti. Let us call this the tied scclru cctncqfiol-r ofeqrialify. Other standard uses of equalitr. advoc&es of equality have been oppane~~ts nomic systems in. Tawney observed. "A and B are eyual" means "neither is to "o prefclrred to the other. equality has most aften expressed something akin to the nonpreferential conception. one class of ci. what is meant by saying. however.1 Equality and the Grounds for Equal Treatment In contrast to libere. are less precise. equality seems a simple idea. Later egalitarians extended their apposition to . "Alf and Betty are of equal height" or ""Charlie" and Doxisk weights are equal. fn the ice cream case. reasons as well. chocolate and coffee h v o r s have the same score.6. H.2 In legal matters. As a political ideal. then indeed the tied score conception would be appropriate. the egalitarian program of the eighteenth century opposed legal privileges that gave a select group of citizens legal rights wjthheld from otht. there is a scale of m e a s u ~ m e ~ and ~ t ." Let us call this the nonpreferrnfinf concepFinlz o f qualify.both people have the same score on the scale.tizens (for exmplc."n this sense. for example. mings are equal when they are tied: they have the same score. Thus. commoners). If X say. Throughout the history of political of political ar~d ecothought.rs.

ry is it so importmt to treat people equally-that is. mother although. attacking the econoInic privileges that accompallied property ownerskip as well as the infomai social privileges (for example. C)f course. In many contexts.5 For BabeuC and his bllowers.then. A case fos eqalir"iy. . ad (in the distributiox~ of assistance) to the needy over tfte wd-off (see %ct. arc. in other ways prefere~~ce and diseil~ctio~~ are mtkely accqtabk. ewaiity hirs usudly impiied a criticism of prekren1preferring one person or class to another. (in the distribution of hel2J) to our mighbors over distmt &rangers. Devotion to the political ideal of equality is almost -always an hsistence that in so~~ze irmportarrt ways people shodd be treated as e ~ a 1 e i l -some i irnportalnt matters one person should not be preferred tr. e q d ity was essentially sammxess: the more we are alike. we would do well to begin."4 7b be surcl.ion 3. it "is the origist of quarrels m d complahts-when either equals have mQare awardied uneyual sharrs.atjng those who arc? w~equal-say i n writ-in an uncrquirl way. it is totally unokjectionable to prefer one person to another. detnanded by justice-to give pseference (in the distributio21 of mmey) to the hardwc. Accordhg to the followers of the radicd egalitarian Fransois-NoEl Babeuf (1760--17971. or unequals equal shares. bejng a member of Ule ""rght" eethl~ic group. and (2) provide the grounds. so deeply dicl Babeui hate m y privilege or preference between people that in the hterests of nrraisltaislb~g equality. &ough.d. and so on). not to prefer s o m to others? The main task of EInis chapter is to get clearer about the grounds for equality and the types of eqz~srl treatment that political theorists have thought importmt. wil1iixg to go so far down the egalilarian road. those st-cmming from having attended priv&c schools. of course. as we shall see.) specify the ways i n which people are t o be ttreakd cqually. must (1. (hthe distribu-lion of punishment) to the guilty over the imocent. have also been advanced. " m y price" should be ppaid to achieve ""te equality"'. :Few# however. believe that it is right and proper-hdeed. t that way Ir-r what ways should we be treated for equal t ~ a t m e n in equallyfmQwhy should we be treated equally? tiV1-. then. restrrain those who wodd work extra hard to prtzvent them from having a claim to additional rewarcls. the mare equal we are. some uitraradical egalitarians have wished to &dish all ways in which or~e person is to be preferred to mother. he was willfing tr. such as the tied score conceptio~~. As a political itled.%s Aristotle noted.3). Many people. Mie can immediately appreciate the core prOhlem of equality: equality does not dwitys seem a good thing. for instance. (in the distribution of love) to our family over skangers.rE~g over the lazy.inequality. or justjfying reasons. other understandings of equality. a d iwyuality is not &ways to be 3voidc. having a high-status wcupation. by focuskg on the nonpreferential conception. Aristotle farnously &served that justice demands treatkg those who are equals k~m equal way alld trr.

Now many utiiita~ans have a r p e d that if a society is distributhg a good such as money. roughly. As we saw earlier (Sctim 1. how should we divide up the money? As Figure 6. in Sectior~ 6. the "father" of modem utilitarianism. I examine propasills &out the ways in which it is important not to treat some people better than others. Onc hundred additimal dollars are to be distributed.. or houshg it will usually maximize net happiness to distribute the good eqtmlly. suppose that the Ben&amite ut-ilitarim is trying to decide whefier policy X ur 2/ is required by morality in a three-persm~ smiety composed of Alf. We can see that giving Betty the $100 yields a much greater gain in utility . shows. a r ~ lustrated in Figwe 6-1. In this case. proper goal of political institut.% The ttt. If our ox~ly god is to gex~erak the most possible "utiiity'" for happiness). whether X or V will lead to the greater surplus of pleasure over pak.4). 6.1. if we give the additional $100 to Alf. So for each policy he needs to calculate the billowing: ( M ' s pleasure) + (Betty's pleasure) + (Cll?ariiefspleasure) .:In Sections 6. or for shartness>ake.(AIfrspain) . Suppose that m e is a Berltharnite utilitarian. Betty. The Benthamite's aixn is to maximize net pleasure or happiness..4. T%e best-hown example o f an external argument for equality is utilitarian. to Betty. one must he able to compare the pleasures and pains of different people. This argument rests on the assumpexample of which is iltion of marginal decrtrusiytg ufilifyof these goods.(Bettfs pain) . actio~ is~ ""confomahle to the principle of utility. supreme. the utilitarim traditio~~ in social and pouical philosophy has insisted that the one.ions is to promote the greatest hayphess of the greatest number. if we give it to Betty it will move her utility from Betty.3.ilitarian seeks to maxirnize the overall net Izaypillcss for society as a whole. it will move his overall utility level from Alf. 'That is. Accordiing to Jcremy Benthm.2 and 6. and Charlie.I consider different g r o u d s for cqual treatment. to Alf.2 Why Equality? External Arguments for the importance of Equcrliv Utilitarian Egalitarian ism Our first cmcem is why many politic& theorists have insisted that people fbr quality must be treated equally m a t I shall call extcrrznl argzlnze~rfs main&* that equal trcatmex~t is desirabie because it advances some other good thing or important goal. food. his question is.(Chartie's pain) = overall net pleasure or happiness. TOdo this. Betty presently has $100 m d Alf presently has $ 6 0 . to utility (meaning wifi respect to the community at large) When the krrdency it has to augment the happiness of the community is w a t e r than it has to diminish it. seeking to maximize pleasure and minhize pain.

. because. Betty. because it a f w a y s yields more utility to distrihute a good to those lower on the ueility fmctim than to those further up m it (119 o w case. but. given the d e c ~ a s i n g marginal utility of goods such as mowy.1 Alf does gain some utility by moving from Alf. to Betty rather than Alf). we c m say that lrhe rr+l unit of any good always yields less utility than ctid the nth unit. once again. It is important to stress that more of the good always yields some additional utility: in Figure 6. The value being promoted is not itsejf egalirtrtrim: it is the moral collectivist aim of maximization of utility i n society (see Section 3. This is because of the slope of the zrtilifyfinnrtictr2.the m r e one already has. as it were.l Decreasing Marginal Utility than givhg it to Alf. the less extra happjness an additional unit of the good gives you. argues the egalitarian utilitarian. More formally.4). they get more utility per dollar than do those who are richer). utility increases at a dinzirzishirtg rate.Alf. evayoxle is at exact[y trhe s m e point 0x1 trhe utifity function. It just so happens that given the assumgtion of decreashlg marginal utility. on this assumption. a c e everyone is at the same pojint. until. FIGURE 6 . to Alf. Lhe best way to promote utility is to promote equality* . we will distribute money equally. Alf. that would maximize overall utility. Betty. the distributions of goads that will maxirnize utility will &ays be that w h i c l p m m t e s equality: we should keep on giving to those who have less (sisrce. Note that this argument does not depend 0 1 7 the intril7sic desirability c>f the value of equality. Now.

it takes much more money to rake her to the same level of utility.2. or add additional considerations.7 Notice that at m y level of income. Thus. But consider Figure 6.2 Different Utility Functions: Healthy and Handicapped Just because the utilitarim case far equality daes not depend an the ht-rinsic desjl. in fact. Even at the move from m o u n t $X to $X+?. the healthy person gets more mar@ a l utility than does the handicapped person. the utilitasian c m become a strong defender of inequality. which depicts the utility functions of a healtfny and a handicapped person. it is often impossible for her to reach t-he same level of: utility as the healthy person. Crucial to the uLilitariar1 egditarian argument is that everyone's utility function-t:hc rate at whjch they get utility from a good-is the same. The utilitarian case for equallq is thus highly sensitive to .givifgg nzolzq to the healthy pesm rutller f h a flte ~ handl icapped persorz.AMOUNT OF MONEY FIGURE 6. if we vary the asslamptions a bit. 7his is depicted by the flatness of the handicapped person's utility functisn. the hmdieapped person receives less utiliq thm does the healthy person.ilbility of equality. Given her hmdicap.2 accurately describes the ueifjty (happiness m d so on) that d i f f e ~ npeoy. Add to this that it often takes a lot of money to raise the handicapped persods utility even a little hit: she needs expensive help to even get small increases of utility. if Fipre 6.le t receive from different amounts of money the utilitarian -will advocate m w~equal distribution.

and are free tct enjcly advantages vastly beyond the conditions of mere decency.'"g From the impartial viewpoint. especially important to others. yom Xjfe is special lu ytl: you directly experience your ocvn life. if we take an impartiaf perspective and so corn to value equ"lity.the assumptions made about the rate at whi& people turn money and goods into happinc?ss (or utility). of immense importar~ce. while many others are well provided for pro~ectdcc)r from birth. the life of neither the poorest nor the greatest is to be pseferred. 0 1 1 reflectiol-r. come tct control substantial resources. As was proclaimed in the famous debate at h k y in 16471649. to you. Thtrs. it i s appalling that the most effective social systems we have been able to devise permit so many people tc3 be born into conditions of harsh deprivation which crush their leading a decent life. "impartiality generates a greater interest in benefiting the w r s e off than in benefiting tl?e better off-a kind of priority to the. More than that. it is manifest that governments should be partid in some they should favor the innocent over the guilty w y s : in many cox~texts and perkaps the hardworking over the lazy. furmer over the latter.atest. Alffs life i s na more important &an Betty". government policies should not favor the rich just because they are rich). After all. and the trials and triumphs of your own life are. no more or less important than anyol-reelse's." As Nagel sees it. m d Betty's i s na more important than Alf's. then. or shouid be. EaCtn of us is tempted to lrhjnk that his or her own life is special. from the ""objective point of view"' we can see that each persods life is. argues the "impartialkt egditaria-r. in itself. we cannot condone the vastly unequal disrribution of goods and life chances that results from our economic hstitut. From the objective point of view."'that your own life is in some way more important to you does not show that it is. a commitrncnt to impartiality m d equality leads us to favor those with less over those with mox. But. ""'Thepoorest he that is in England has a life to live as the grc. But. if everyone matters just as much as everyone else. argues Thornas Nagel. it is doubthl that a c t m e ~to ~ tthe abstract ideal of impartiality so qt~ickly leads to social p es that favar less well off over better-off For dthough m objective attitude may well incticate or classes should not be partial toward some citize~~s that goye (for example. Some political theorists have held that we should endorse equalit-y because it expresses a truly impartial or objmtive view of our ~ l a t i m with s others."lQ For Nagel. continues Nagel. To be ohjeclionatzbly parfial- .ians.

The onus of justifica tion rests on whoever would rna ke distinctions. . until grounds for distinction have been shewn [sic]. . respect far a person involves a right to be considered from his own standpoint. ""None shall.w. Formal eqrrality "'requirc3s that if two people are being treated."l4 In itself. it is a presumption against treating them differently. such as a person's innate skills and abilities. Understood in this way. say somc. . asserting the moral arbitrariness of natural endowmer~ts. advantages. It has been arguedby revisionist liberals and socialists-that inequalities that stem from the .'" Frrr~nalEqunEify: Any discriminatory act-any action that provides differential advantages or bur&ns-stands in need of justification. a c(tra1it-y which all men have to the same degree. or are treattzd. a devotion to impartiality justifies a prhciple of '"formal equality.1" As Benn claimed in a latter essay. Formal equality simpiy requires that any differential treatmer-ttbe jlastified. in any respect. for to say that there is a presumption means that no grounds need be shewn. S. It does not assume. she must show that she has good reasons for this partiality."= They cor-tth~ue. any u~~justiiied Fomal equality asserts a "omket moral premmption in favor of equality.or?rew i s k s to he partial to Alf over Charfie. then slne is still acting from the objective point of view. She is not favoring A:lf just becauscl he is Alf (that would be ohjectiollably pmtiai). but for good reasons.partial in a way that mmifests a lack of Objectivity-is t o favor some over others without good rr." which asserts "the presumption in favor of equality. But it takes on a much more strongly egalitarian character when it is combined with a second principle. It appears that rather than leading directly to egalitarian social policies. Presume equality until there is a reason to presume olherwise. discriminatory act is wrorlg. If she has good reasons. differently there should he some relevant difference betrwern them. and opyorhnities).asc. Peters put it. If.be held to have a claim to better treatment than another. for~xal equality does not justify egalitarian social policies of the sort Nagel has i n mir'rd (that favor the poor over the better off i n the distribution of resources.'"" As S t d e y Rcnn and R. hadvmce of good grounds being produced. the principle of equality does not prescribe pc&tively that all humans be treated alike. therefare. which is the ground of the presumption. "Discrimination in treatment between persons r c q u i ~ moral s justification: it is not cnough sirnply to psefer one to anot-fnersince that involves regarding a ~ ~ o t hperson er from the poh~t of view of one's own satisfaction.

are unjust: "A11 Iwequalities of birth constitute undeserved discrirninations. in which people get nahral and social advantage?. it would seem that for Rawls even the extent to which one makes m effort m d tries to succeed is largely a matter of luck. whether one is talented or not is ineleThus. it does not follow that one daes not deserve the fruits of those talents. Some.cmnot be justified lead to (3)the sort of egalitarian-redistrihtio~~ist policks t-hat Nagel adwocates. an impartial government must "redress'" them by giving additional resources to those who have lost out in the lottery of birth: 'Without such special justification all persons. Incommensurobili~ and Equality Mic have thus far considered two types of arguments supparting the hportance of equality."natural lottery" of birth.2 and 8. Indeed. may gain from their good fortune o q on terms that improve the situalion of those who have lost out."" The crucial claim here is that these advantages am u~~deserved. f var~t to an impartial evaluation of principle of justice. whoever they are. to be sure. (l)the principle of formd equafity m d (2) the claim that advantages and liabiliSiczs based on natural gifts and socid advantage?.""' Indeed. or k w tdents in high demand). argue some egalitarians. According to Rabvls."MThis is a matter of deep dispute. are admant that one does not deserve one's talents-they are the result of a natural lottery. then. and in particular equal distributio~~s of the good things in life: the utilitarim argument that such distributions maximize . whether equal or unequal."" 'Vecause these hequalities c be justified.that they do not deserve. ought to have equal shms.3. r m Rawls" pperspective. Taken together. WC shall turn to this dispute &out justice a d desert in Sectior~s 8. John &&. Those Mrho have been favored by nature. Mether this argtrment is persuasive largely turns on whether we believe that advantages flowing from one's natural gifts and social position are morally arbitrary and so carnot be justified. being dependcz~~t on on& being born into a "happy family and social circrumsta~ces. such as the leading revisionist liberal. in h i c h sorne peopie are wimers (they have extensive talents that arc? in &mmd) and others lose (they have few special talents. Although. a widely shared belief about distributi\re justice is t-hat a producer of a good has a special claim over what she has produced-t:hc fmits of her labot: Axld it is widely believed that those who work hard deserve greater rewards thm those who do not. and so w~~ustified. one daes not deserve one's talents. the best principles of justice would represent " m agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be.

Sometimes. conception of equality this is precisely what is memt by equality: A is not preferred to B. We c m grade them with respect to lheir qualities. And as we saw in Section 6.vmpicofficials rank athletcrs according to their performances. she cmnot compare thc importance of the lives of her children-lfiey are literally incommensurable." h the novel Sophie3 CFzoice. CSJ.tszrrnbIe in terms of "'better than" and "worse than. :If I calz say whether A is better than B or vice versa. And in most cases we cm. we cannot compare two things. . others. When I go to the malt shop.mmrr. csihich maintains that people should be treated eqtlalty just because each person is a m@e individual and camot be cmpared to. peope slsorrld be trrrated eqz~ally. overall. m a t we canr~ot do. for each indivicfual is a zznique comthis view. I rank a chocolate malt above a strawberry malt and so I choose lrhe chocolate over th. on as ssti:h.enc. because each individual is tmique.overall happiness. but any such ranking abstracb from their full indkiduality and miguer~ess. we i~~n. teaching ability.e strawberry Indeed. and so are comparhg two differexnt optioxns or valuable things. pop~xlarity. we can rank people for specilic purposes: teachers rmk students in terms of academic merit. This is often what is meant by the clairn that each individual is of "i~nfh~ite" worth: we ca~xnot rank individuals on some overall scale.1.jected. Of course. .y. the Nazis offer a Polish mother a choice: she can choose which of her chitdren will live and which will dir. though. or decide to turn down one date a ~ accept d another-you are making m impiicit rankil7g. focusing 0 1 1 some specific attributes. . and so on. academic talents. it is not e~~tirely clear how it shows that After all. above or belokv others. and so on. Many have been perwuaded by a differe~~t case for ewality. . il A and K cannot be compmd. or r a n k d above or below. to be a grading concqt .lVophie is unable to make the choice. wh. students rank teachers i n terns of their teaching perhmance or poputizrily. and the argumcnt f r m impartiality. every time you buy sosnething at the store. their indin terms of their possession of certair? vidudity. is rantc i~di~jidrruls bkation of traits. 1can compare and rank them. but we make them constantl. We make such comparisons with more or less effort. according to the nonprefcrential. at least roughly. abilities. A and B.ver one makes a reasoned chice-for example. 7il say that two is to say that they cannot be r a ~ k e d things. and B is not preferred to A. Although the argurnent from incommensurability shows why claims to rank hdividuais can he rc. Some think that all individuals are incommensurable: each h~dividtlal is unique and c a ~ n o be t rmked as. speed)."'" We c m rank peoplc i features (for example. . proponents of the view readily admit. But although "it is of the esselrce of merit . the11 they m commensurable. make such comparisons. there is no bvay of gradkg individuals as such. hence only bp abstracthg from.

If: the value of Sophie" chi1dren was incommensurable. and if B is not better than A. then we also cannot say that A imd 13 are equal. we have been examhhg arguments that endorse equal treatment because such treatment is called for by some other value or consideration. It may sholv simply we are tmable to make my comparisons at:all. her problem was m t that she valued them equally. She was unable to choose because there was no way to compare their value. for the imparLiaijst. The nonprrlfel-ential notion is d y egaiitarian on ihe supposition that if we are not to prefer one permn to amCher.we shotlld trelzi:people cqulzlly. we accept the presumption in favor of equality the argument from incommnsurability does generate a case for treating people equally. we will have a good reason to treat A and B equally If. if A is not greater than RI and if B is not greater than A. we should treat them equally: if A > B. If so." because we cannot make any sensible comparison of A arrd B. "External" (or mixed) arguments for equality are thus of the fom: ginerr mlue or principle X . then if A is not better than B. then. If a presumption in favor of "Ieating people as equals is our "default" or "baseline" assumption. we cmnot say '"A is not gmatcr than R"' or "B is not greater ihm A. it follows that A m d B are equal. 3 Why Equality? Arguments from Fundamental Human Equality External Grounds Versus Argomenh from Fundamental Human Equality Thus far. It is here that an egalitarian may well resort to the psurnption in fmor of equaritry ihat we examined above. and so treat people equally. hut that she wits totally unable to make any comparisons at all. then A = R. But according to the incomensurabi1i"ry argument. which have the form: people shaalu' be IreafcIZ ilqrktzlly becurrse they art. Let us contrast such external cases for equal treatment to what I shall call argumex-rts from f ~ t z d a m e ~ t u humal? f equality. In mathematics. ill some important orfgnda- . for the utifitarian egaiitaria-r. and B k A. to treat people impartially and Objectively we must treat them equally. This points to a basic worry about the very idea of nonpreferential cox-rception of equaiity: to claim that neiCher person should be p r e k r ~ d to the oehcr does not necessarily show t-hat tl-tey are equals. Thus. The propment of incomme~-rsurahility maintai~lis that given our inability to compare Lhe vdue of individuals. the ralional thjng to do is to prefer no one.the importance crfeqricizlify. wlzere X is not itseyubouf.then we cannot say that they are equal. equally. 6 . to maximize overall zli-Zlity we oughC to distriibute goodr. The claim to equality is itself a compaison.

Z.. to show that people should be treated equally. then we are equal in our most important trait-being loved by Gad. A13 numbers are equally numbers. this seems to rely on fallacious reasoning.nlerztal rcrspect equal. of us are humans. ." This famous claim :rctm the Declnvutictn pokts to an irnportant tie between egalitarianism and Christian doctri. the Christian-egalitadan response is to devote special attention to their wellarc a11d problems. R.ne. the welfare of each is eqt~ally important. it is not enough to show that in some way WC are e v a l : that a l m s t everyone has an equal number of fingers does not help much in showing that everyone should be treakd equally. Since God loves the poorcst as much as the richest of his children. Of cowse. 1 1 1 the words of the Vivcyilzia Declarafinn Rights. R. Never'thekss. If we are all God's child re^^. : . Any inequalities beWeen people almost vanish when compared to this crucial ecjuality of human heirrgs. shce the poor are in. All humans are equally human. the11 Aristotle" s i c k m indicates that we should treat them equal2y in some relevant cvay A number of argullnents in favor of equal treatment thus have been defenses of the ways in which h u a w are basically eyuai. however. The Americ a L>crcliarnfian ~ $bzdependence declares it to be self-evident that ""all men are cseakd equal.) that in some respect. it: is '*the mutunl duty of all to practise [sic] Christian fotbewance. An argument from fundamental human equality must establish three claims: (1. or our shared nature as h m m kings: all.. All numbers are equal. greater need. this camot be a valid argument. : . As f. and (3)that X is relevant to lrhc case for equd treatment. and if hc loves aif his childre11 eqmaliy. Lucas has pointed out.ucas points out. But.2" All humans are human.d humm nature. .. Equals. shouln be treated equally If in s m e important respect people really are equitl.. A13 humans are equal. it seems wrong to sirnply dismiss arg ents for equal tmatment grounded on the idea that humans are basically equal. . humans am equal: (2) that R is important. and equally so. an argument of exactly the same form is A 1 3 numbers are numbers.. Aristotk said. Shored Humon Nature: The Theological Foundations Perhaps the most important egalitarian argument has called attention to our shart.

"% Cox-rhoxltedwith the obvious ways in whiCh we are unequal. it." says Williams. insist on a purely secular defense of fundamental evality. Xitie in societies. Indeed. etc. follawirrg Wittgenstein (Section 1. arr.love. various situations represnted in perception and thought. The problem with such defenses. mahtains that facts and . This hauence cont-inuesright up to the present day: the liberation theology of the Catholic Church and "social justice" movements t on the %rot%rert-rood'" of in Protestant denominations place g ~ a stress all humms. can interbreed despite racial differences. the statement does not look much better. use tools.C1d ~MOW . can a mere fact about the ways in which people are similar tell us how we o q h t to treat them? How c m facts about human beings lead me to wEue equality? Williams. we should he treated. love for each of us. H. These respects are notably the capacity to feel pain. are also alike in certain respects more likely tt3 be fc)rgatten. one way to defend filndamex~tal 1 7 theologicai human equality is to reiy 0 claims about God's equal. the socialism of :R. if a tautology a useful one. though. mahtains that because we really are equal. and the capacity to feel affection for others. serving as a reminder that those who belong anattlmicalliy to the species honrs sapiens and can speak a language. then. has observed. Tawney-who was a guiding intellectual force i n the Labour Party of the United Kingdowwas pre"iw"dx~ &it.31. a contemporary philosopher. Christian ideal of equality. "we should not seek some special characteristics in respect of which all men are e q u d but merely remind ourselves that we are all me~~. both frcjrn immediate physical causes and from.23 Fundamental Equolify and Ordinary Language An argument from f"tmdamenta1equality."ZWilliams believes that this remkder is morcj powerful than one might think: That all men are human is. and even if some more restricted selection is made of these characteristics. as equals. As we have just seen.26 :Is this acknowledgment of our similarity really importa~~t? Suppose some cruel dictator achowledges this fact of human similarity."Z "alitarian thought has been mu& more deeply influer~ced by Christian ideals than hns thinking about liberty. m s t egalitarians. m d so their basic claim to be treated as equals. is that ""P say that all men are equal b all those characteristics in respect of which it makes sense to say that all m m are equal or w q u d . many egatitarimls resort: to what might be called the we& argument for fundamental equality ""On this bterpretatian. Benlard WiUims. a patent faisehood. but insists that this tells her nothing &out what she shouI. and charity toward each orcher.

Lf-re distributim of medical care in the light of our common humanity.asom.io~~s. we have rc. embedded in our form of life. brute stupidity. 'Xeavh~g aside prevel-rtativemedicine. distributkg medical care. realizes that such c h a ~ e are s false rationalizaf. Basic human ewality is. say. our basic human equalit-y derives from our basic sirnilarity: we have a common nature. Of course. they will be reasons that seek to conflate the fact of blackness with certain other characteristics which are at least candidates for relevance to the question of how a man should be treated: such as insensitivity.for example. what constitutes a relevant reason for doing something is drastjcally constrained by our la-rt_yuage.'yf any reasons are given at all. his point is that a defender of myud tmatmerrt sees lfie need to give some relevmt reasons for discrimhation. and so display basic human needs. y but it does sugge" that those who are equally needy have m evally strong claim to medical care. Cln this view." he argues. ':lb be a speaker n particuof a language is to be committed to certain forms of discourse. And. the answer is clear: medical care should go to those who are in ill health. but are intermixed in our language and the form of life in which our language is embodied. insisting that black people's welfare siwnply does not mtter. and our lmguage does not al:low the m r e fact of skin color as a relevant reason for. and it is my principle to treat black men differently than ctthers. rlis treat people equally . A deknder of discrimii7atior-r must try to advance some relevmt reason for his actions. to use a language. believes. Williams believes that this insight shows that the recognition of our common humanity giv"ws strong reasons to treat people equally Consider. Williams argues.27 Williams. What constitutes a relevmt reason for distrilbuthg medical care? To Williams. is to accept severe constraints on what c m cow~t as a reason for dohg somethir-rg. at bottom. for instance. kvhictrr gives rise to common needs.Cox-rsider. Few can be fcjund who explain their practice [of discrimination] merely by saying "But they're black.l to msure that those who need medical care receive it. Given that we are all husnan. greatly constrains what reasons c m be relevant in.""" His poi~lit i s that our mderstanding of medicai care and health. ineducable irresponsibility! etc. denying medical c m or educatio~~ to a person. someone who denies racial equality. lrhe basic samel-ressof people: we share the same nature. Williams. this arwmer-rtdoes not directly show that medical needs shoulcf be e ~ d satisfied. j lar. "the proper g m m d of dllstribllition of medical c m is ill-health: this is a necessary tmth. which gives rise to cornmost needs.values are not two disthct realm. of course.

l). have been preyaf-cld to identify soxne core." It is simply wro~lig to say that an advocate of the free m r k e t who claims that "Alf should get good medical care because he c m pay for it" i s misusing 1mguage.is to recognize that in their essential charactehstic they are the same and so there is no reason to prefer one to the other. that we are all equally loved by God).bjectifyM themselves. though. M m y secular proponents of fundamental equality. What is crucial is that these comma11 needs be eyually satisfied. Note here tfne way in whjch e ~ d i t as y sajncness is said to give rise to equality as ncl~prflercnlid treatment: because we are basically the same. The diffiicuity with Williamsfsargt. cmnot be settled by proclaimhg that since "it is a matter of X o @ c that particular sorts of weds constitute a rcason for f the free market is receiving pmtimlar sorts of goods.""" the advoc&c o simply misushg languageTwo Eews of Human Essence: Mcrrx and Kanf I h e strength of Williams3 pproosal is that he does not make m y controversial claims &out the way in which we are equal (for example. It is important to stress Irhal:although the basic ground for our equnljty is our similarity. Our lmgmage is remarkably open-textuxd m d allows people to smsil>ly employ terns in opposing ways. argued for the basic equality of humans insofar as all humans sham a common humm nat-ure (Sction 3. then. far example.ume~~t is revealed if we recall the analysis of conceptual disputes in Chapter 2. '"quality of provision is not idenli. AS Tawny pointed out. According to Marx.tical concepts. It: is to be acbieved.ty clf provision. The same lesson applies to notions like ""medical care. others education. One d g h t disagree with him and try to provide an argument that. shared hum m characteristic that defhlies the ""hmm essexlice.3) or essence. needs are more important than ability to pay. but that needs be met in a nonprefe~xlitial way." Karl Marx."'Z" Miilliams.32 To objectify oneself is to turn one" thoughts and plans into . That we share a commoxli hrtmarli nature that givcs rise to common needs does not imply that at every moment each person has the same needs: at m y given time some may r c q u i ~ medical care. and so on. howevex. which generates similar needs. the treatment that is argued for is not that everyone be treated exactly the s m e . not by treating different needs in the same w q but by devctthg equd c m to ensuring b t they are met in the differexlit w y s most appropriak to thern. when distributing medical care. R e issue. h u m s need to ""l. believes that our language provides a secular basis for showing that our shared hummity gives us reason to help the needy. It was Gililie" hsight that Lhe smsible use of language is consistent with great differences &out the best interpretahn of our pol. no one should "o ppreferred to others (see Section ci.

they are ways in which hurnans have changed the world to conform with their aims. it will almost surely be open to some variation m o n g humms. No matter what characteristic cve identify as a c o r n o n . in contrast.ansfoming That. Marx thbks. never conflicts with jusli. a the ability to put aside our impulses m d act according to reason. to rcflect ox?re"saims and htentiox~s. To Mant. their actio11 is conscious: they are seeking to shape the world in. OUT dignity and wmtih stem from our ability to ~ s t r a j n our impulses and act autonomously (Section 4. :In more familiar language.2) on prkci_plesof justice. our impulses and inslead do the right thing is our moml personality: it is the feature that enables us to h e morally and to respect the moral rights oi others. our funnamental human equality is our shared ratiox~al nature (Section 3. it is tl. but not. is what makes the works of htxmans so special. Thus.emselves. Marx il7sisted. accordance with their conscious purposes.. w h e ~ a others break moral rules or act mjustly In what sense.l). I n short. hparticular our equal capacity for moral personality is our fundamatal. humm equaliv. People possess d i f f e ~ ndegmes t of ratiomlity difkrent capacities and desires to "ohjectify" th.cayaciw for moral personaiity? This is actualty a general problem for most clairns &out fur~damental equality. fundamental human characteristic. for Kant. freedom. does morality make any difference to us. conscious plamers. mahtain that our fmdamental humm characteristic is our ability to act morally. then. capitafist sockty stifles this creative ilnyulse for alnlost everyone. it will be recalled. Some people seem to have precious little capacity to do so-they have an extremely h a d time resisting temptation-whereas other people are able to resist almost any temptation. we might say &at we are planners m d doers. s hardly ever Some people are always getting into tr-ouhlc.ce (Section 5-4): to act freely is to act in accordance with rules of jusljce. it dehuma~izes us (see Section 9. -as the world in such a way arr. Thtrs. for no one would pay attention to them l l y because we have h e n they clashed with her passiox~s or impulses. This ability to restrajn.33 The problem is that we do not seem to have an equal moral personality if this means an equal capacity to restrak our irnpulses an$ desires and to instead act 0x1 rules oi lustice. If we did not possess such a moral personillity.32 h d it is this equaLity of moral personality that gives us an entitlement to eyual justicc. A~Gmals are doers. . b r Kant. our lalhar is the way in which our pimaare e x p ~ s s e d in doing.something objective by chmging the world. Kmt argues. differenl needs. c m it be claimed that we are equalIy rational or have an equal. anuel Mant.2). We11 humar~s act on the world. tXlr equal rationality. Marx sees it. Because. there wodd be no poirtt in having rights or rules or justice. our essenc our distinctively human feature-shows that we have basically the same needs: to create and produce.

"" 5 The Second Treatise on Civil Gtlvermulzt. mast people are unequal on this continuous concept. mreshold concepts hold out the possibility for a huge nurnber of ties. small children and psychopaths). we may all be equally capable of trol our impulses ar~d mkirnal moral personality: we are able to usually follow the basic rules of morality. The thirty-year-old person does not better satisfy the criterion than does the twlmty-year-old.3) but also of equaliq. and the use of the same faculties. but such people really mighL be special cases wbo are not-on par with the rest of us (for exmple. fifty.and sixtyyear-old peaple are mequal in ages. Cor~sider. and score each person on the scale. they are equal in satisfying the criterion of bejng old enough to drive. We can apply l l l this snme idea to a fundannmtal equality claim. The great majority of function@ adults am indeed equal insofar as they meet the minimurn conditions for moral pmonillity and thus have a "tied score" 0x1 that threshold trait. model for the Deckvukiv~zo "That all men are by nature equally free and independent. however.for ertample. moral personality or capabity for objectilcication. one of the most important works in liberal political theory. should also be equal . can arguments from ftmcdamental equaiity ever succeed? h interesting response to this problem is to chazrge continuous concepts into threshoM conceptsMFor example. If wt. WC do not all have "tied scores" orz rationality. wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal. are never all really equal. prsmiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature. forty.'" Thus. 'Mie find. that many peoptc beat out others----they have higher ages.and so on." Someone who is fourtee11 years old is ranked below (that is. the concept "'ofd enough to drive. thirv-. forty-. cox~sider a continuous concept such as "'ageM-we have a continuous scale (years old)."It is a condition not only of liherty (Section 4. and sixty are equal: they get the same scor"old enough. fifty. of course. there being nothing mare evident. even though trtvtznty-. Perhaps a few dD not even meet this minimum criterion. John Lock (1632-1704). Equal Freedom The V"igi~zia Declaration of Rights of l V 6 w h l c h in many ways was the f Ilzdlyerzdet?ce-proclaims Fn its first article. Mthough we do not i possess equal moral personality (inthe sense of an equal ability to conact on rewox~). thirty. To tfne extrnt equality requires a tied score (Section 6.l). makes a very similar claim about the condition ""all men are naturally h. "too yow~g'") someone who is twenty (who is ""od enough"") But those who are Iwenly. no one having more than another. than that creatures of the same species and rank.

it seems that we can rephrase HE along the lines of FE": If Gs are being distributed solely ctn the basis of feature F. We are not born under any natural authority (except. . h0wevc. On reflection. shows that ~ustified poliitical authority cmnot be derived from. by nature. and confer on him. Thus.This fundamental equality. i n liberal ity i political. let us consider a version of what X have called the argument from fundamental equality (HE): FE: Afl whct are equally F are equally entitled to G. Two Worries about Arguments from Fundamental E q u a l i ~ Thus far. T%us. again. argues Locke. set one above another. by an evident and clear appointment. but must: be based on the consat of all citizens. then those who have equd needs have equal claim to healtl? care. given the nonp~ferentid conception of equality/ since no one is to be rmked above or bebw any one else in terns of autfnority. those who are equally needy are equally entitled to have their needs met. to say that one person has a stronger claim to C m s t imply one of two things. She fundaxnenhl equality is an qzlnlify c~ffieed~~m. X simply on the criterion of possession of F.r. But Joseph Raz. and if two people are equally F.one amangst another without subordination or subjection. Thus. We will hrPn to the relation of equality and authorn Chapter 10. FE* is not an egaiitarian principle at all-it is a f we are really distributing Gs principle of nonarbitrary distribution. an undc~ubted right to dominion and sovereignty36 For ZJocke-and the entire liberal tradition in political theory-the h d a mental human cqualjv is the absence of any natural rmkistg of iL7dividuals into those Who command and those who obey. unless the lord and master ctf them all should. the natural stabs of some as rulers over others. we am natclrally equal. for p ~ s e n purposes t c h a t i s crucial i s t h t . God"). as mmy egalitarians have argued. gives us reason to wonder whether arguxnmts from fudamenlal equality are redly egalitarian a r g m n t s at all!" Followirrg Raz. if we are distributing health care simply on the basis of need. peogsrie have equal freedom. theory. Locke would add.. a contemporary political phifctsophes. then thase whct are equaly F are equally entitled to Gs. Now. 'Thus. I have been assuming that arguments from h d a m e ~ ~ tequalal ity are the key egalitarian arguments. by any manifest declaration ctf his will.

the grades arbitrarily: he randomly assigns grades regardless of 1 % this case. however. for instance. and we carnot give fra~tions of Gs. addition t o performmce on the h a l exam. in. a true egaiitarian principle-it is m m than a mere statement of nonarbitrary distrihtlCion of G. argument f s m fmdamental equality More i seems to be TrueFE: All thctse whct are equally F are to receive equal shares of G. Lhe teacrher is treating Fs).A in the course. As Aristotle put it. suppose a teacher says that a 90 on t-he final exam. True FE endorses clnirns to eqztal amoztnts o f G.tarianism. If the two stude~~ receive ts dilferent find grades for the course. TrueFE tells the ttzacher to give equal grades to those who have equal F-scores. the teacher is ushg two criteria rather than one. c d it factm E. . For example. a case in which we have nixle indivisible units of G and five people to distribute them to. (2) Alternatively the teacher may assign. is the complett. RuePE is distinct from. after all. 'IiueFE is. This seems to meal that the fundmental egaiital-ian argument does not really depcnd on any commitment to the value of equalityf but simply to nonarbitrary rational distribution of the goods at stake. t-hat FE is not tt7e best statcme~~t n the spirit of egali. the teacber is taking into account class pmticipation. In t-hat case. 'This will not be because the teacher is an egalitarim: it is because the teacher is distributing the good on the basis of the stated. we would not expect those one's xore on the find exam.Perhaps. all of whom are equally F'. and will both recri\ie an A. of the It may well be a r p e d . We can rclilnterp~et TmeFE as TrueFE*: If Gs are being distributed safety ctn the basis ctf feature F. it may be that. all those who arc? equally F and equally E should receive equal grades. But if the teacher is not being arbitrary. Consider. then thase who are equally F are entitled to equal amounts of G. :lf W -are to give those who are equally F equal Gs. and that two students receive 90 on the final. FE. m$ e q u d y (giving equal Gs to) those who are equals (have eqz~als &eating unequally (giving different Gs to) those who are u n q u a l (have differe~~t Fs). In most cases. In our case of the teacher. and if: the teacher has specified all. but only m e gets an A. then those vvho score the same on the criteria have equal claims to an A. for giving grades. Whereas as FE generates q z l a l claims lo G. criterion. thnugh. 1 with equal Fs to ~ c t t j v eyud e Gs. gromds for itwading an .(1)It may show that possession of F was not really the sole grounds for distributing G. the criteria. the same general paint holds for TmeFE as for FE.

people c m have equal liberty Not only do political theorists offer very different reasons why we should treat people eqmlly. Equal Welfare It is platrsible to suppose that if we want to tmly treat everyone as equals. 6 . or should not. so TrueFE requires that they must be left mdistributed. This is important: although one way to promote evality is to give more to those with less. in some fundamental respect. then. we have considered various ways people can be t ~ a t e d equally-goods can be distributed equally. This leaves four Gs wsted. For exarrrple. TrueFE. we should seek to make everyone" life go cqually weif. may he very waskhl and that appears unreaso~~able. dialysis machines). and the only way to satisfy TrueHE is to lower s o m people. often it is impossible to raise everyone to the highest standard. if all who hawe equal health care needs are to have equal health care. m d if we c ot a h r d some very expensive treatment for everyone (say. concludes t-hat pkciples such as FE arc? reasonable principles. but there is no w q to equally distribute them. and have no use for CDs. Irhough. S o w of these peopie. Throughout.3 focused on on utitity impartialiq. Raz. it seems that we shouid give them something that they want just as mtrch as a music lover kvimts a CD. he treated eyaifEi." AAfr all. is not the real paint of giwi"g people goods.. mother m y is simpiy to take away from those with m m until everyoxle has the snme amount. fndeed. or entirely deaf. we examined attempts to ground the case for eyual trcattnent 6. tone deaf. which seems most truly egalitarian. they cJeeply disagree 0x1 the. needs c m be fulfilled equally. such as money or educatior~.then TrueHE reyuires us to give each person m e G. our maixr focus has been on arguments in. . I f W wish to treat the deaf eqmlly. favor of equality In Section 6. On the other hand. but are not really egalitarian. It hardly seems that we are treating equals equally if we give C B to everyone. really equal.2. 4 Equaliv of What? T%us far. and incommensurability. including the deaf. Sectior~ argumentHchat we should be t-reated equnlly because we are. ways in whjch people should he treated eqz~ally~ T%e aim of this section is to brieny =view the different ways in which it has been said people should. to make their lives go betterKonsider an "equal" "distribution of a good such as music compact disks (CDs): everyme in society gets a certain number of CDs every year. then it satisfies TrueFE if no one Rceives the health care. arc.

You getting "hat you want makes my life worse.More generalw. pahaps you ought not to get ir. External preferences raise problems for the egalitarian. level of cvelfare than someone cvho gets only her forty-fifth prefe~nce satisfied. lrhcy may he nasty: if one of my prefere~~ces is to see you fail to get wh& you want. If they are to lead a life that is equal. we often encourage this: we teach our children not to thhk only of themselkres. they will require additional funds (sec F i g m 6. Betty's preferenws will i to her will satisfy her preference and Alf's too. A will be about her receiving goods. So. be likely to have the consequence that selfish peopt" will receive 1 1 the selfish persods preferences m r e goods in an egalitarian system. howsmething he wants: the satisfaction of Betty's prefe~nce. Equality of welfare. the pursuit of equal sati. however. We can then say that a person's welfare (or ratility) level is a function of the number of her prefmex~ces that arc? satisfied and how higbly these preferexlees are someonc who gets her top p~ference sat.skpeople. ever. Alf. let us define a person" wwelfare as the satisfaction of her wmts or "preferences. is open to at least two dbjc~tions.@ satisfying. Indeed."~ (l) Although most peoplgs preferences concerxl how their own liwes go---preferences for nicer housesf cars. Folilobving a standard view in economics m d political theory.2 above).isfied has a hjgher ral7ked. they are h d i capped and require additional assistance to lead a n o m d life-it may seem that givhg them the same income as a healthy person is not really t o treat &em equally. for instance. Perhaps this is not a decisive problem. and so on-all of us s o m of the time. if some people have psessing needs-say.B SoSo. we will equally satisfy cveryo12efs preferences. If so. have pseferences about how other people% lives go.desires or wmts-from those things that she wants most to what she wmts the least. thus mnbcing two people's :lives better off.sfactionof welfare must admit that the very thing that satisks your preference stiRes my prekrex~ce. But even "nice" external preferences cawe problems for the egalitarian. receiving goods. but the unselfish (altruistic) people will have split: preferences-ome of their prefclrences w i l be &out their receiving goads. and some will be about otZner people. If we adopt the view that to treat people equally is to ensure that they have an equdity of welfare. Irhcx~Lhe equal satisfaction of preferences will lead to adcttitiond g o o h for selfi. For mthing." Suppow each person ranks her p~ferences-hel. that people entertain "extct-nal'"references-preferences about other people getting thcir prefc. since ALf is gettjng It w i l l . If ALf has a prekrermce that Betty gets what she n a selrse be "'double-counted"":giving it walits. but to wmt to help others. might have a preference that Betty gets what she wants-this cvould be an external prekrence. and some of us most of the time. We can say then. some to sat- .rex~ces satisfied. includislg presumably selfish people. good heal&.

the equal satisfaction of pscrlerences would l e d to giving more goods to those who have expensive tastes. then. it will raise intractable problems in a host of 0the r s Compare. m a t does equality of welfare instruct us to do? Equal Safisfaction of Needs One way to avoid these problems is to adopt a needs-based conception of welfare. The noli.2).e second person did not voiuntarily choose his now-expensive preferences? But the paralyzed persorl chose to drive i n cars.ior.isfy the preferences of the selfish people and some t o satisfy the external prefererlees of the altruistic peogslIe. it is because we think that the person with luxurious tastes is responsible for having expensive tastes whereas the handicapped person did not choose her exper~sive preferer~ws It seems. We thus are faced with the possibility of m "egalitarim state" that supportsome in a life of luxury.on of a "'need'" points to standard conditions or goods that are required by everyone. we may characterize a person's welfare in terms of the satisfaction of her basic rreeds. A more serious objection to equaliq of welfare is that we choose many of our preferences. since it takes so much more to satisfy tt7e preferences of such people.lto the environmcnt (2) T%e need for food and \vater . Can we say that lfie first person somehow is respmsible for h a costly p~ferences whertras th. The case of the persm with expensive tasks. it should be noted. for example. Now. someow who. is very simitar to the handicapped person we considered above (see Figure 6. The handicapped person needs more goods to give ber the same level of preference satisfaction as that obtahed by the healthy person. others arc! more modest. for example. one political philosopher had advanced the following list of ""curse-of-life needs": (1) The need to have life-supporting re1af. Some people want a life of luxury filled with e x t ~ m e l y expensive things. the person with expensive tastes is in a similar position. and a persm who has suffered paraiysis in a car accidex~t. Instead of understanding a person" wwelfare in terms of what she walks ar~d whetkr she gets it." Thus." Altbough in some cases this distinrtior~ will seem clear. has had an overwheiming desire to be a political leader. ar~d so run tt7e risk of injury whereas our would-be leader cmnat recall ever making any choice t o desperately want to lead others. that a plausible cJefense of equal welfare must develop an ilccount of "freely chosen expensive tastes" and "nnovohntary expenske preferences. If we think there is an important difference between the cases. and some people choose very expenshe ones. for as long as she can Emember.

Equal treatment. or a rationalist insight into the true proper life for humans (Sectims 3.3. regardless of what they W&. these are the things that people need.3. needsbased accounts make authoritative a h o r y of hurnm nature. said Mam. but othtlrs (such as doing philosoplhy) a mere desire.3). Such a theory @ e m basis for deemhg some lhillgs (such as cornpanjonshipf a true need. such as Marx's.stcceptmce and recognition (10)The need for sexual activity (11)The need ta be free from harassme~~t. Needs-based accour~ts of welfare am typicaliy lir~ked to theories of human nature. panio~~ship. h~cludhg not beirrg ~011thually frightened (12) T%eneed for recogni"con42 (3) (4) (5) (6) Such needs do not depend on preferences: on a needs-based account: of well'arcr.The need to excrete The need for exercise T%eneed for periodic rest. something for which she has 1 1 0 desire. wouln entail the equal satisfaction of these basic needs. as one of the drar/v$acks---of the p~ference-based accow~t of welfare is that it makes each individual atrthoritative in deciding kvhat her welfare is. wishing to live (as did Wittge~~stein It s e e m content. then. Suppose. it is up to each person whlfnes he or she wilt use . 6.9. Having rrtceived their equal share of the resources.L each accordhg to his needs" (see Sections 3.h cmpanionshiy (need 7 above).ious indeed to say that we arc? furthering her weifare by providw her wi2. for example.3). they are controversial. ?b the extent necds-based accounts inc[icate that a person's overall welfare does not depend on her own view of what she kvmts. that a person has no inkrest i n cornfor a period) as a hermit. ultimately.2.1).3.43 T%us. that depict humans as having an essence that we must fulfil1 if we are to lead satisfied lives (Sections 3. ixlcludhg sleep The need (beyond what is covered by the preceding needs) for r/vhatewer is indispensable for preserving the body intact in irnportmt respects (7) The need for companionship (8) The need for educatio~~ (9) T%eneed for social. Gtne of the attractions-as well. Equal Resources T%eproblems with equal welfare ixlterpreetions of equal treatment have led mmy egalitaians to defend an equal resource view44 "fu treat people equaily is to give them equal resomes. the ultimate achievement of a communist society kvould be to distribute "".

m d only hclr share. perhaps justifying t a h g a blind. she will pfobabb not be able to satisfy many of them. equal resowce views have developed c0rnplt. but goods are only a means. who would not receive any additional.Although J o h Rawls. he ultimately advoc&es a list of ""primarygoods.goods under a simple equal resource view: shc. and the social basis of self-respect. t-he distributior. is the distributjon of these goods.~ of Rsources. would get her share. rather than either welfare or resources: It is arguable that what is missing in all this .. .lhem wisely to help construct a satisfy* life or waste them in the parsuit of empty pleasures. whether an equal share of such goods constituks an adequate interpretation of equal treament. and so her welfare level will be lower than someolle with mare modest tastes. We may well query however. Thus. which try to accommodate extra assistmce for some in. given how expensive they are. It seems clear that money is a resourcre. In response to problems raised by the handicapped and the ill. 'Thus.47 Basic Capability Equoliv and Needs Sen's own pmposal is to focus on equal capabilities. opportunities. he also as a ""cokcbelieves that a just society treats everyone's natural tde~lts t-ive asset" that should work to the advantage of the poolr. . a person wbo cdtivates expensive tastes will have to use her e ~ a s lh m of the resources to satisfy them. Equal resource theories must identify what is a resource. m equal resource distribution. There would thus seem a case for an equal distribution 1eye from some to transplmt into the of eyes. Some resource theorists have been arnbivalmt r/vheeher body parts and personal traits are to be viewed as resources. The ability to . not an end. for example.x insurance schemes. even though she can do comparatively little with it. for Rawis. then having eyes is a crucial resource. Some people may not: be Ale to use their goods or may require a great deal of addio the tjonal goods for an akquate life. we require liberty. Sen suggests that such a view suffers from a "pods. but what about eyes? If a resource is someehing that is jnstrumental to achieving your purposes. T%e end or goal is that people" lives go well. is some notion of ""basic capabilities"": person being able to d o certain basic things. Amartya Sen draws our attention t har~dicapped persorl." which am -all-purpose resources that everyane must have to pursue their ajms in lile." Although Rawls seems somewhat attracted to such an expansive view of resources. *atever our plan of life is. is explicit that body parts are not to be distributed.. income. fetish""36-its only concern is goods. says Rawls.

Bt:L of the modes of equal treatment thus far examined have employed an extremely wide conception of "'trealmeat. or possessing capabilities are all see11 as ways that people can he tmated.when treatkg people i n these ways puhlic of- . but uses a metric that foctrsses not ctn the person" capabilities but on his mental reaction. To u d e r s t a d '%reatmmtM h this way presupposes that almost all of one's life constitutes a "treatment" of you by your society or government. [bwls's idea of] primary goods suffers from the fetish handicap in being concerned with gmods . Thus. Wnderstandhg treat~nemlt in this way would seem more at home in collectivist accounts of individuals-insociety (Sctian 3.. it should be manifest that insofar as his accow~t has the general rationalist trait of such accounts of presupposing a nation of an adequately or properk functioning person. 5er.satisfaction welfarismj."@ Note here that Sen himself sees his account as a versim of needs theory. but one can consider ctthers. having resources. an '"interptation oi r~eecjs in the form of capabilities.3.e. on the other hand. . Rather than conceiving of needs aa more-or-less pwkive resource requiremmts. if your life has not go11e a w d as other people%.48 Or~ce again citing the case of the handicapped person. There i s still samething missing in the cclmbined list of primary goods and utilities.l concludes that what is reyuired by the egalitarian it. rewards.g. if you have Icss rclsources than others. It thus shouln come as no surprise that the political lrheorists discusscld thus far in Section 6. the wherewithal tct be clothed and shettered. .4).move about is relevant here." Having one's tife go well. and positior~s to others (citizens). e. preference. Sen understands them as active powers or aibilities-apabilities or "'functionings" that one must posess to lead an adequate life. the pawer to participate in social life of the community. you thus have been treated uwqualiy. Although we carnulot go into th. it here. having needs satisfied. . rather than what these gclod things do to human beings. the ability tto meet one" nutritional requirements. A more modest understanding of "treatunentH-md one that is more cor~siste~~t with classid liberalism's individuatist analysis of individuals-h-society (Sctians Z. . . which trnderstand mast attributes of the jndividual i n terms of collective or social facts. According to the notion of civic eqaljt_y. some seem kmpted to say that you thus have not been treat& as 4.4 embrace either socialism or revisionist liberalism.details of Sen's account is needs based.f.4)-focuses on cases in whjeh s m e individuals (officials of the state) are explicitly meting out treatments such as pul7ishments. is concerned with what these things do to human beings.. Ulility [i.

. Of course. sex. ." which include race and national origin. or previous condition of semituude.ficials are not to sixnply prefer some group of citizens to others. nor deny to any person within its juridiction the equal protection of the laws. a d patients. not by one's no~~legal tus. no group of citizens. such -as lm~dlords and t e ~ ~ a ~ doctors t s . The Fifteenth Amendment outl-ight prohibits legal distinctions based on race in matters of voting. No state shall make or enfcjrce any law which shall abridge the privileges or irnmunities of citizens of the United States. gover~~ment officials arc to be concerned only with a person" legal rights. or race. dikrent people have different legal rights-the law creates differenl: classes of pevle. it mtrst be . The Fourteenth Amendment holns that no citizen is to be $enied "equal protection of the law. will be preferred to others. . Constitution: AMENDMENT XIV. been at the heart of Ule li:beral tradition. one" treatment is determilled solely by one" legal stabs (as social stadetermined by one%rights and duties). the Supreune Court looks especially hard at any laws that: emplny any of trhe "suspiciaus classifications. is qzld basic riglzfs o and a general opposition to legal distixzctims based on class. sex. public criteria for any difference in treament. but must employ general. the Supreme Court has developed a doctrke of ""suspicious classifications. color. liberty or property. nor will any group be ranked lower than others. The right of citizens of the United States tt3 vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race. equality before the lnw is consistenf: with gi. A stronger conceptior7 of civic equality and one that has f all citizens. Amendments to the U. AMENDMENT XV: ." E a law invokes such a classification. public officiais and private persons. withaut due process of taw. The ideal of equality before the law is that when being treated by the law. and might plausibly be extended to include homosexuals and women. In itself. Hence they witl he treated ewaily in the sense of the nonpreferential conception. In meting out kgal pu~~ishment. &us aristocrats may have legal ri@s denkd to commoIlers. just becatrse of their group membership. not extralegal considerations such as class. X n evaluathg whether the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated. If alf have equal status as citizens. . or ethnic background.ving some groups legal privikges. One aspect of this equality of civil status is ~"qudity before fhc law.S.""In interpreting this clause. An ideal of equal citizenship is expressed by the Fourteenth a d Fifteenth. . and at times has been illterpreted to incllade status as m dien and as poor. race. nor shall any State deprive any person of life.

1. the way that people sort themselcres out (or are sorted out) to accomplish their goals of production and distribution. however. On =fleckion. one vote. or t-heir praogatives. social egalitarians often favor school unifoms. in whiCh all citizens. in the form of cqudity of resources) and palilical equatity.'"2 Chapter 9. since it wodd be necessary to achieve the goal of the law. Some egalitarians have insisted that the ultirnate expression of the value of equality is social equality. Social equality thus seems to lead to equality as sameness (Section 6. race might be used as a classificatim in a desegregation law.s01% the basis of such ' * s ~ ~ p j C i catews gories. bosses Tlnd bossed. Polificol and Social Equality Advocates of democracy-and the Fifkenth Amendment-have argued politicat equality. but it goes beyond those." arguhg that all such laws tmdermine equal citizenship. we will retun1 to the socialist notioz~ of political equality. equality is usually taken to r e q u i ~ both economic e v a l i t y (say. political equality "'is the demmd to be equally involved in the auehorizati~n of a total way of Me. no one was in dt>ukt about who the leaders were. . Indeed. have lrhc same social statzns and perhaps the same power. for example. and (2) using the ciassificatio~~ fits the public goal perkctly-it is precisely the classia'ieation Chat is required if the g o d is to he achieved51 Thus. and it is the fundamental demmd of democracy. Citrried to i t s extpcme. have opy osed any laws that allot different treatmmt to citize17. Social."" F~cople must not be sorted out according to occupationill status hierarchies or into groups of owwrs and workers. but in most cases th. according to which each that equal citizenship e~~dnrses citizen has an equal say in elections. the pursuit nf social equality can lead to ~gujatiosrs concerning dress and consumption.e court would prohibit use of the &ssifieali. on a smaller scale. is an expression of political equntjty: each citizen is the political equal of any other insofar as the vote of each counts equally.on as a k n i a l of equal citizenship. Thus. .shown that (I)the law serves a legitimate public goal of considerable impartarlee. in our exmk~ation of social justice.ed by the ilbsence of social and occupational hierarclhies. o w e v e t it seems impossible ts really eliminate social hierarchies: although in Maoist China leaders and the led dressed alike. it is necessary to refom the "division of labor itself. for both of these are ways in which some people display their higher status over others. It has sometims been called ""socialdemocracy"-a way of life chacrc!ria. it seems impossible to educate without creating a hierarchy of educa- .1). Some. to one socialist. Thus. The ideal of one perso1. to advocates of social equality. in Maoist China uniform st-yles of dress were mandated. O&er interpretations have been much more expmgve.

An important aspect of civic equiality concerns competition for public positions: in competing for public offices.the rmkings from one field of endeavor will not trmslate into an overall social hierarchy. Like Williams fsction 6.5 fsta~dit~gs)."%By this. Being better at sports will give one high statzns in sports. but will not trmsliate into better medical care. Walzer mews that isl a socially egalitarian societFT. As he is a socialist.awful. more or less praiwwozfi~ n response to and so m. cq~itrlif_zl o f opportznnify rcquircs nonpreferential tseatment in competition for goven~ment positions. I this inevitabiliQ of social r m h g s .nal att. hpossible to have art wi&out producing artistic inequalities. Rather than restricting the ideal of equal citizenship to public qua governmental organizations. e p a l treatme17. according to the Unjted Kingdom Race Relations Act of 1968. Michael Walzer. being a scholar will give one high academic stahls.wi&out creating a&letic hiermhic. The n more recent times to include the treatme~~t of ideal has been expanded i citizens by nongovernmental orgmizations such as busixless corporations and private unkersities. :Elence. One g r o d for this extension is an expanded.tit. and the best medical care.jon. The development of modem civil n which appointments are made services is an expression of this ideal. again. rather t h a ~ quires that they be contajned. Understood in this way. but. i on the basis of criteria relevant to the performance of the posit. has advocated "'complex equali@. there has been a movement in kgislatiorl to include '"private" organkations that we open to t-he public or serw lfie public.t reFor Walzer. citizens are not to be discrriminated against on the grounds of race. national origh.3). m d overall high status. alt%lou@he allows that they are necessary for so that high economic staproduction. Walzer" proposal thus raises a very simitar problem to that we c o n s i d e ~ d i n relation to Williiams" salysis of humm eqt~ality: the diversiv of our lmguage and culkre leads to sensible disagreements about the nature of the practjces of and so disagreements about just what are the cormedicine or educatioz~. not more political status or better medical care. rect criteria far dist-ributing their goods. or sex. t-us does not automatically brhg high political status.W h e r believes that we share socidly agreed upon understa~cfings of what the distributive criteria should be for digerent parts of social life-academic fame should go to great scholars. higher wealth. A h o s t evesy field of erndeavor creates r m h g of Phose who are better or worse. m d mdical care shoulid go to the sirk. he wishes to contain their h~flwnce. elhinating social hierarchies. it is "'unl. impossible to entgage in sport?. view of what comtitutes a puhlic organizatio~~. a co~~temporav egditanm.airzments. the best education.for any . his deepest worry is about economir cqualitks.

:In this chapter. ."" The d care of this latter idea is that social factors such as class.3 examined arguments maintajnkg that we are fundamenhl1. It is importar~t to note that not even equaiity of fair opportunity seeks to guaranopportu~~ity is to hawe some obstacles to tee equal success: to have a r ~ success-such as being a women or being poor-elimhatedl. which endorse equality because it prmotes or expresses some other value. not to be guaranteed success.S7 Mereas the arighal ideal sabv each competition for each position as a differenl compeljtion chat should bc conducted f.3 closed by considerkg some concerns about arguments from fundamental equahty. ethnic or national origka55 The ideal of equaliv of oyportunity as open competition.in. we are again taking m encompasskg m d abstract view of '~reatnrtent"-socz'et.4 t u r ~ ~ e equal treament. of any goods.zirly. People c m be treated equally in an almost limitless vari- . 1distkgwished "external arguments" for equality. : I have explored two groups of questions. equality of fair opportunity extends this idea of a fair cmpetition to life prospects as a whole. facilities or services to discrimhate'kon the grounds of color. most importantly to dmodes of r/vheeher they really are egalitarian at ail. a ~ sex should not affect one% chances to obtain desired pasitions in society. %clion 6. ( 1 ) Why is equaiity to be valued or pursued? (2) In what witys me people to be t-reated equally? In answerkg the first question. is distkct from a more encompasshg ideal af equality of opportunity.onof equality of fair opportunity. if only because the positions "okg competed for are scarce.. Section 6.Section 6. because we share a co on human essex-tce. m d that based an incommensurability. Section 6. a r d arguments from h d a m e n t a l eytnality which hold that we aught to treat people equally because in some deep sense we really are equal. sometimes called "eequaljty of fair opportunity.y equal because we are all human. barring pmfe ~ n l i a treatment t except on grow~ds relevant to the performance of fhe task in question. that the competent poor child stands less af a chance af eventually getling favored positions in our society than does the cqually competent rich chilcl? Is fiat treating ewals eyudly? Note that if we embrace this concept-i. and because we are equally naturally free. race.person concerned with the provision to the public . ask the pmponents of ewality of fair opportu~liity. race.y is tmt. Those equally endowed should have equal chances of success. Is it fair.u people unequally because some are born in positions that do not allow them to effectively compete with others who are no more competent thm they.2 considered three external argum e ~ ~for t s equality: that based on p r ~ m o t h g overall utility that based on impartiality. .

Bedau. Press. W. vaf. (5) equal civic statzns. Soplliek Choice (New York: Vintage Books. NJ: Prentice-Halt. L.ucas." in R. Benn and R. equal satisfaction af needs. "Against Equality. (3) equal resources.. pp. p. 66. 1971). B.16-1132a2].. p. p. See Section 6.. Micotnerehe~tzEklzics.. R. 67. 1941). 19591. 3. 110--. %id. 17. R. 64. Liberty.. 15. . ed. 1931). p. 5. Flxxrnn~tRiglzls (New York: St. (4) equal capabilities. p. 1 987). Benn. 8. The IJlllifics. "Human Rights-for Whcctrn and for Wlrrat?'"n Eugene Karnenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds. The Principl~s o f hlitics (Oxford: Cfarendcjn Press. U l r ' l i t a r i i alzd Other Essays (Harmondsworth. Examined were a r p m e ~ ~in t sfavor of (f) equal w e l f n ~ (2) .ufpolifics.pp.I~ztrudzlcfion to the Princif?leso f Murals alzd Legislation. 10. 1 . Herbert Spiegelberg. 1978>. T a m e y Equality ((New York: Harcc~urt. 145ff. Social Priuciples a d the Denzocratic State (London: Ceorge AltIen and Unwin. 111. in AZan Ryan. 114. 7". Ross. pp. tucas.. Book 5. trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). S. 16. Stanley X. 4. UK: Penguin.. 1992). 139. Equalif!{ ~ n the versity Press. 14. Ibid. Lucas. 1987). William Styrun. "Justice and Equality. 1971). in Richard. Brace. 1 7 4 . Jererny Bentl~arn. ed. Quoted in Bernard Crick. p. ed. p." in Lcctuis I? Pcl)man and Rubert Westmarland. Ibid. Book 3 [1280~1281a). 1WI). pp. A Tfjeoy o f jrastice (Cambridge.s [1131. The Principltrs. D. Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press. NJ: Prentice-Hall.. 19. 101. 251. only a saxnple of the main proposds were discussed. 196&). R. 1987") chap. (6) politicat and social equal*. lustice and Etliialiky (Engtewood Cliffs.111. Social Jt'lrsfice (Englewood Cliffs.ety of ways. 13. This is an alteration of a case given by Amartya Sen. "A Aefense of Human Equalit&" E~ifosoplzical Rer?iew. "The Manifesto of Equality. Franlois-Noel Babeuf and Slpain Marechal. See Rawls. 8." h Hwao A. UK: Open University Press. 1. 49-52. 21. eds. 11. M A : Harvard University Press. Brandt. Martin's p. See Cregory Vtastos. ed. Arititcltfe. 6. S. McKetm. and (7) eguality of ~ p o r t u n i w .4. Aristotle.. 12. 1962). Thornas Nagel. 110. Peters.. 53 (March 19441. " T ~ q a l i cct qf What"??n d Law (Cambridge: Cambridge UniSterling McMurrin. See here J. p. 20. p. Ibid. 243K 2. 9. 1. J. p. ed. H. The Basic Works o f Aristotle (New York: Random House. Soczlnlistn (Milton Keynes. 18. 1987). Equality and Partllality (New York: Oxford University Press.

22. Online at http://www.constituticlnnorg/bcp/\~irgRdur.htm. 23, See Tawney, Equality. See Also Sanford A. takclff, ""Christianity and Equality'% J, Roland Pemosk and J o h W. Chapman, eds., NOMOS IX: Eqziality (New York: Atherton, 19671, pp. 115-133. For an argument that the idea of equal human worth is essentially reli@ous, see Louis P. hjman, "On Equal Human Wtrth: A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism," h Pllojrnan and Westmurland, eds., Eqliafity, pp. 282-299. 24. Bernard Wlliams, 'The Idea of Equality;" in his Problems f:f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 230. 25. Ibid. 26, Ibid., p, 232. 27, Ibid., p. 233, 28, Ibid. p. xx. See also Uavid Braybrooke, iCleeting Needs (J3rince29, kwney; Eyualif?~~ ton: Princeton University Press, 198T), pp. 14-4145. 30. Braybrooke, nifeeting 1Vlseds, pp. 241-242. 31. See here John Plamenatz, K ~ v MarxS l Ptzilosophy o f Mazz (Bxfcjrd: Oxford University Press, 1"35), p, 115. See also jcln Elster, An Infroduction do Karb m m (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986),pp. 44% 32. See Amy Gutmann, Liber~lEqzialify (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19801, pp. 27-41. 33. Rawls, A Thmy t$jzrstice, p. 505. 34. See here Alan Gewirth, Reason n ~ Momlity ~ d (Chicago: Universiq of Chiicagct Press, 2 9781, pp. 121-1 22. 35. Online at http:/ /www.constituticlnnorg/bcp/\~irgRdur.htm. 36. john Locke, Second EeaCisc f:$ Covenzmenf, in Peter Z,aslett, ed., Two Reatises o f Goztlrmnzen (Cadridge: Cambridge University Press, 1(360),sect. 4. 37. The fclllowing discussion Is drawn from Joseph Raz, The niloralifyf:$Freedorn (Oxford: Ctarendttn Press, 1486), chap. 4, 38, 'fhis view is endorsed by Mai Nielsen, Equality n~xdLiberty (Totuwa, NJ: Rowman and Alleheld, 1485), for example, p. 7. 39, This is a very basic view, which requires modifkatirtn. I consider the idea of preference satisfaction in mure depth in my Social Pizilusopirzy (Armontc, W M-.E. Sharpe, 19991, pp. 5@58. $C)-. Much of what J say here is drawn Prom Ronald Dworkin, "What 1s Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare," PPhilusoplzy & Public Agaz'rs, vol. 10 (Summer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 185-246; and Eric Rakowski, Equal J~lsfl'k'e 1(391),pp, 23ff. 1 leave aside here serious objections ti:, the very idea of comparing the degree to which different people have had their preferernes satisfied; 1 discuss these problems in Social Pkilosupfry, chap. 4. 41. Fur a somewhat different view, see James Griffin" notion of well-being as based on certain ""prudential values" that are held to be rialuable by everyone. Well-being: Ifs ~neaz~ittg~ Measuvemerz Mnmf Iunyurta~ce(Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2 986). 42. Braybrc~oke, Meetit18N e d s , p. 36. 4 3 .For ct-tmpl-ications,see ibid., pp. 238ff.

44, See Ronald Dworkin, ""What X s Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resc~urces," PIziIosoph~j t 3 Pz-i.blicAflaim, vol. 10 (Fall 1981), pp. 283-345; Eric Rakowski, Equal jzkstil7e. 45. Rawls, A T h m y t$jzrstice, p, 101. 46. Sen, ""Equality of What?"". 160. 47. See Dworkin, 'What Is EqtraliQ'? Part 2: Equaliv of Resc~urces." 48. Sen, "Quality of What?" p. 160. 49. Ibid. See also Amartya %n, ItteqrfaliCy Reexamined (Cambridge: Warvard University Pressf 11992). SO. See Benn and Peters, Social Pn?zciplfssalzd flze Detnocrgtic State, pp. 122-123. 51. For an excellent analysis, see John Hart Ely, Denzocracy alzd Distrust (Cambridge: f-farvard University Press, 19801, pp. l45ff. 52, Philip Green, Xetrieving Denrocmcy: ln Smmh of Civic Equnliky (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 5. 53. Ibid., p. 9. 54. Michael Miafzer, Splreres oflusticr;. (New York: Basic Books, 1983). 55. For a discussion u C this act, see S. I. Benn and G. E Gaw, "The Il,iberal Conception of the Public and Private," i n in. 1, Bern and G, E Gaus, eds., Public mzd Prkpate in Social L f i (New York: St. Martin", 19831, pp. 3638. 51;. See Rawls, A Tfzeolyjo f justice, pp. 65ff. 57, See Peter Westin, "'The Concept ctf Equal Opportunity;" "Ells, vol. 95 (July 1(385),pp, 837-8511,

7.1 Do Liberty and Equulify Conflicf?
: I n The Sociul Cont~act, Jean-Jacques Rousseau tells us,
If we enquire wherein lies precisely the greatest gcmd ctf all, which ought to be the guai of every system ctf law, we shall find that it c o r n s to two main objects, freeclem and equality: freedom, because any individual dependence means that much strength taken from the body of the state, and equality; because freedctm carnot exist without it.1

For Rousseau, not only are liberty and equality the two chief components of the common good, but eyuality supports liberty-there is no clash between the purstrit of ljherty and ewality. In co~~trast, J. Roland Pennock, are, at a leadlin.g theorist of democracy, insisted that lherty and eqz~ality best, in "tension" with each other; we need to somehow accommodate both, even though they tend to p d l us in opposite directions.2 More radically, many have believed that "'liberty Tm$ equality are in essence contradictozy; From the malyses of Chapters 4 to 6, one reason for these radically differcnt. views about the ~latiorr of ljberty a d equality slnodd be obvious. Both. "liberty" and "equality" can mean m y different things; depending 01%what view is taken of liberty what grounds for equal treament are endorsed, and what type of equal treatment is advocated, a mtxltitude of different relations between liberty and equality c m result. A lheorist who adopts a negative c o n c q t i o ~ of~liberty and see?;eyuality arr; "'social equ"lity" will have a differclnt view of the relation of liberty and equality from a political lheorist who adopts a positive conception of :liberty and mderstands equi-tiityi n Lcrrns of "'czylldity before the law." This, though, is only part of the story, This long-standing debate in. political theory can-


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1 59

not be reduced to a bunch of confused peoyle thinking that they are having an argument about whether freedom and eyuality confict, whe~n acwally they are not having m y argument at all, since they are trshg the words "freedom" and "epality" h very different ways, Recall agairt Gallic." notiorn of essentially contctsted concept (Section 2.1); each side is not si~xply employhg particular understmdhgs of freedom and equality but maintaining that their inkrl~retations of the concepts are the hest interpretations; and so their view of the relatioln between freedom and equality is the mast enlightenhg. To understand the debate between liberals, socialists, and conservatives about the relation between freedom and ewality, we rneed to grasp not only the different conceptions of freedom and ewality they errrploy but why t-hey empioy these conceptior.ns and why they claim that these are the preferred conceptions-

7.2 Classical Liberalism: Liberty and Basic Equoliv
Social Confract Theory: An Example of Classical Liberal Egalitarianism

Although, as; we shall see, classical liherals me apt to insist on the many ways in which liberty and equality clash, itis clearly wrong to understand classical liberalism as devoted simply to libert-y with no concern whatsoever for m y sort of equalityWmt important, libcrals have typically asserted the furndamental equality of each person hsofar as; each person has natural liberty As J o h Locke said, humms are naturally in a ''State of perfect Freedom to order their actions . . . as they think fit . . . w i t b u t asking leave, or depe~ndirng on lfie Will of any other Man"q1Section 4.3). T%us, Locke argued, because each person is by nature equally free, and not u n k r the authoriv of any person, politicd authority can only be justified by the consent of each free and eyual persorn (see Sections 6.3,10.3).
Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out OF this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The ctnly way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and mite into a a>mmtmityfar their ec-tmfurtable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst anctther, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it.6

Now given that legitimate politic& authority must be based 0x1 the consent of all equally free persons, it follows that only if the authority it; impartial (Section 6.2) will everyone agree to it. Any political system that

favorcd some citizens over others would be rejected by those who are disfavored: only an impartial political authority upholding a system of equd rights, could possibly be accept& by all equally free people. T%us, fundamental to social contract theory is that our status as equally free justifies a politic& order that is egalitarim insofar as it trcats all citize~~s impartially: no citisn is to be privileged in relation to any ather. :In classical liberal theory, this fundmental equality requires a regime that warantees the equd citizenst-rip (Section 6.4) of each person. Classical liberal,equal citizenship has three core elements: (1)It requires that all citizens possess e"9"al rights to negative liberty and equal rights to acquire properv m d have their property protected. We have already seen hOw their individualjst and plurdist commitments lead classical liberals to favor negative liberty (Section 4.1); importantly; we have also seen how fmdamental to classical liberalism is the claim that liber@ is only secure when accompanied by privak property (Section 5.3). Classical liberals thus posit a word of cssentialiy seg-interested indhiduals, whose main concern is leading their own lives, while disagreeing fundarnentally on what is good or what makes life worth living (Sections 3.3,4.3). Thus, all are concer~~ed to protect their own ""eves, 1,iberties and Estates.'" ((2) 7b eniorce these rights, hdivitluals quire a syskm of settled law, specify.ing the e x t e ~ of ~ t their rights, and ilnpartial judges, to fairly decide disputes, with the power to enforce their verdicts (see Sections 5.4, 10-3).Equal citizenship thus requires equality before the law: the iunpartial resolution of disputes is the defini~lig featurn of the ctassical liberal state, and this can only be achieved if government officials treat individuals strictly according to their legal rights, treating equally those With equal legal rights. 'This idea of equatity befme the law applies not only to criminal mat-t.ers,but to all the admkistrative ftznctions of the state, m a t has been called the Recl-zfsstmt is the "Xegal statef'' in wh.ch administrative as well as criminal functions express equality under the law."(3) Last, the hdl application of the rule of law to the state requires that its offices be filled on terms that are imparljal and do not h-eat some p u p s of citizens as; privileged over others. Thus, eytnaliv of opportunity, applied f law. to public positiom, is a development of the ideal of the rule o

Mill, Individuality, Utilitarianism, and Classical Liberalism
As 1 have stressed throughout this hook, political theories arc complex and diverse. There is more t h a one ~ form of elas~ical liberalism and mare than one classical liberal argument for civic equality*T%e mast important a1ternati-t.eto the social contract argument is advmced by the classical liberal utilitariar~s. Although mitI.7.ycor~temporary utititarians adopt some form of revisionist liberalism, the early utilitarians (and many econo-


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mists today) employ utilitarian reasorring to endorse classical liberal equal citizenship. J o h Stuart Mill pmvided a utilitarian case for equal libert-y rights (Section 4.3). It will be recaliied that accoriiing to Mill, each person seeks to develop h a owr~ capa"ties each thus =wires freedom to make her own choices about what sort of life best suits her. T%us, says Millr the proper role of coercive legal rules "is to enforce upon everyone the conduct necessary to give all other persons their fair chance: conduct which chiefly consists in not d o h g them harm, and not impeding them in anything which wiihout haming others does good to tlremselves."Us we saw only these earlier (Section 3.1), Mill argues that a society that er~forcres minimum requireme~~ts will spur the developmer~t of human nature (Sections 3.3, 4.3): once human nature is prevented from growing in "noxious" directions by respecting the basic ljberty rights of others, it will "'expand itself in useful ones.'""""us, given humm nature, g m t i n g people libere rights produces overati happiness and developmenl. Assuming that this establishes a case for liberty, does it Lead t o eqtml liberty? Why not give more liberty to those more capable of development and less liberty to those who, in, m y case, are not really capable of much? Mill certahly does not belicve that everyone is capable of equal development: s m e find it very dil'iicult to do s m e peoyie excel at many tfiil7gs a r ~ d mtxch of mything. kVhy should libert-y be distributed equally? Mill relies here on another developmental argumnt based m his theory of human natur,. In chirpter 3 of On Libertyf he explicitly considers what to do about those whose development mi&t seem held back by in,sistin,g on m equal liberty for all, Mitl mswcss,
As much compression as is necessary tct prevent the stronger specimens of human nature frr3m encroaching ctn the rights of ather%cannctt be dispensed with; but far this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human development. The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury ctf others, are chiefly at the expense of the development of other people. And even tc3 himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their clbject.1"

Mill thus advances two arguments for restraking the "'stronger specimens of humm nature." First, controlling them, aids the development of the '"eaker specimens" whose lives they would encroach on. But second, a r ~ d I think mctrt-. interestingly, Mill thinks that L h e "stro~~ger specimens" so restraiwd receive a "full eq2tivaleMr":whatever opportunities

or can prc~duce. frrctm allokvhg people of gmius to develop i The few who do thhk and. comes and must come from irtdividtlals. inzvent are "the salt of the earth: wi&out them. than that it brings human beings themselves nearer tc:. is a "'collective medioctive mass. a ~ dseed. pointed to China as -an example of a civiiizatio~~ that had managed to root out irrdividuality h d hChka. however. the development of a stagnirnt sociel)r. T might here close the argument: for what more ctr better can be said of any crtnditictn of human affairs. fulfilled. The argument based m t%ie devehpment of human natum is. to Mill. he maintains. The u p s b t of Mili's account Ihen. that even this collective mass ber~efits n an atmosphere of freedom. Mill pauses and reflects.ividual. Mill thinks that the argument based on human nature might not be enough.rt>rrghclapter 3. as well as intdlectual improvemen&-at the very least the elite needs freedom. are not those who cherish the ideal of development.for individual development am closed o M to them. of J o h Stuart Mill's whole politic& the core of On Libeey. h e r e a s Lhose who fail to clevelop their r ~ a t u ~ are ? . The questim. well-developed human beings. So. is that for a society to advmce-to increase material abmdance m d the comforts of life.equal rights for everyone. and satisfying lives. "The jnitiahuman lifu would beome a stagna~t t-ion of all wise or nohle things. is whether Mill's argumer~t establishes the need for specialized freedom applyirtg only to the elite or freedom for the . The kmdermining of individuality bad thus resulted in. Mill says. than that it prevents thjs?iz Nevertheless. generally at first from some one ind."lWILlf writing in 1859. :Mill paints a pickre of the e x c e p t i ~ ~hdi\ridual ~al versus the collec.. he thought. Smgress irt societies. Mll t u mto a more mmdane issue: what good arc3 developed people to hose who are uncox~cerned with development? Mill's m s w r focuses on the idea of progress. philosophy . pool. "Ihe mass of s o c i e ~ accordirrg rity": it is composed of people who tend to eonfomz and arcr not intcrestcd ~II new ideas. Having said that Individuality is the same thing with development. depends on allowing freedom so that p e ~ l of e genius can grow. the best they can be? Or what worse can be said of any clbstruction to good.And Mill mmikstly thirtks it is a utilitarian argument: those who develop their capacities lead rich. but hose who do not much care about the ideal."" As Mill sees it. . pmgress had halted. Mill hsists.But about midway th. after giving all these inspirfng arguments about the development of human naturc? and making each pcsson the best beillg she can be.. 1 think. the dcvelopmcnt of their social 11ature is enhanced by a system that secure?. and that it is only the cuf tivation of individuality which prc~duces. lethargic and unhappy. Those who most need convincing. however.

According to Mill. Mill" argument for equal liberty is a concern that social equality is a danger to individuality Mill was greatb influenced by Alexis de i a America. they are ready to admit that the interests of the former are everything and those ctf the latter nothing. The spirit of social equality favored sameness (Section 6A). amid whom nothing rises and mthjng falls. he saw the United States as the country that had g m e furthest down this egalitarian road. Only such a general kecdonz. howwer. he rep0rtc. no one wished to stand out as exceptional.EQUAL~TY AND ~ ~ B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 1 63 society as a whole. individuals seem of less and society of greater importance. "Genius c m ufmosphrrc-: of frcredom."lWqquality thus understood is i uiality and his case for negative liberty. shaped in each other" likeness. or rather every citizen. that: eitber Tocq?levilleor Mill opposed the movement toward greater equality As Tocquevillie put i& '% state of . will lead to progrc2ss. although this case for liber@ stresses the role of lrhe exceptional indhidual in spurring progress. and even those who are not inte~stezt i n liberty or dewelopmex~t will benefit from materiai progress. I perceive mighty dangers which it is possible to ward off. Liberty Versos Equality: The Dangers of Social Equaliy Implicit in.'"" He &served an America with tremendous pressures to coxlform-for each to be like his or her neigt?bor. He kavcled to America in 1831 to study this new regime of social equality His findings we= anzbivalent. it is the latter.'"b Toci-fuevillebdieved that the progress of political m d social equality led to a society of "'a countless mtxltitude of beings.1" This becomes a fundamental theme in classical liberal thou&t: social equality is understood as allied to a moral collectivism. and nothing stands conspicuous but the great and imposing image ctf the people at large. mlghty evils which may be avoided or alleviated. he thinks. He says. lhis is not to say. defying fhe democratic mass: As the conditions of men bect3me equal among a people.'"rs Q ~ l ya general heeonly b ~ a t h e freely in a r ~ darn-a society in rvhich there is a kvide-ranging freedom for citizens to act as they choos-will genius prosper. So. which counts the g o d of the collecthe as "'everything"" and that of the indiwidual as n conaict with Millian individ"nothing. equality. Mill advocates equal liberty for ait.d' "I am full of apprehmsions and of hopes. being assimilated in the rest. This naturally gives the man of democratic periods a lofty opinion of the privileges of society and a very humble notion of the rights of individuals. TwqueviXie (1805-1859) was conTocyueville" Dmmocraey u such as France were developing toward grc'akr p u vinced that cour~tries litical and socjal. is lost in a cn?wd.

N'ozick tells the followhg story about Wilt Chmberlain."X If eq~~ality is understood as equal libert-y for each to :live his own life as he pleases."2V~rMill. Classicai liberds also insist that the pursuit of economic equality is at adds with indi~ridual liberty Or as it is sometimes put. 25g" "written on it and each spectator pays the extra twenty-fie cents. No one is forcing you to act against your will. But following ':lbcqueville"s andysis. and this makes the pursuit of economic egalitarianism objectionable. . . Robett Nozick. But. servitude. it would appear that to sustaill the equd dish. then liberty and cqualiv are in inherent cox~flicrt. w:hereas under others it can destroy it: "Quality may be equal freedom ar equal. but it is more just.qu"ljty is in confiict with liberty and indivictuality insofar ils it takes the form of social equaliSi.25 Some object that that an egalitarim taxation system does not hterfere with people's liberty. the spirit of equality and democracy cm. to :knowledge or harbarism. a star basketball player who is in gre& demand. if the spirit af equality leads to elevation of "the people" aver the jndividual. that hardly cmstitutes a limitation of freedom. under some cmdjtions. Living is a Mly egaijtarian society Wilt decides on a way e will d y ilgrcc to play if a box is put outside to improve hjs salary: M the arena with ""For Wilt. [However) No mar1 0x1 the earth car7 as yet affirm. "The natiox~s of our time cannot prevent the conditiox~s of men fmm becoming equal.ibution the govermmt mu" ti"terffc-?re with free transactiom between Wilt and his fans: the governmcnt must stop the fans from givir-rg hixn the additional quarter of a million dollars. Wilt ends up with $250.y collectkist (Section 3. Now. If oxw milliox~ people go to hame games.6300 more than he was allotted jn the egalitarian distribution. which is both mora1l. So. Nozick argues. people's liberty upsets the pattern of income and wealth that economic equality strives after. say these critics. Versus Economic Equalip I'. it simply taxes them-it alters the relation betkveen their gross and net incmes. Nozick has a strong (and controversial) reply :he mahtains that such tax- . . i\bsolukly m d general:(y that the 11ew state of the world is better than its [hegalitarian] forlner one. To make his point. and to conformity over indkiduality.4) and conformist.equality is perhaps less elevated. classical liberais see no danger in it.y in Anzrrica by observ7i.cquwil:le cox~cluded ing. Ihis position has been upheld by a contemporar)i classical liberal. De71ztrcrac. any attempt t o cmsure ecommic equdity will require interfering with the liberty of citizens to do as they wish. protect frtiedom. m d equal citizenship. but it depends upon themselves whether the prkci_ple of equality is to lead them to servituk or freedom. to prosperiiy or w ~ t c h e d n e s s . ' ~ ~ ~ Liber?.

nor are its products standardized. this ctws not show that it is t~njustified. . that is. the natural differences in human nature. Hayek. but if taxation is forced labar. working so that others will benefit. the. Each man who leaves her workshop bears the imprint of the individual. y ily by ensurir~g that all have equal liberty]. "From the fact that peaple Ethat is. C l a h (2) is crucial. coupled with equal liberty according to the . So. Men are altogether unequal. argues.. Mature never repeats itself in its creations: it produces nothing by the dozen.As E A."24 Ludwig von Mises. ~tal so all endorse same form of taxatio~~. Men are not e q ~ a I . Nozick" s a h point. if we are to llbtain equal results. coercive impo"tions that redistribute property are especially hostile to a system of negative liberty This classical liberal argument against any sort of economic equdity depend" on two claims: (1)Economic equality requires a certairr patter11 of property holdings. hardly an inviting cmclusion. if we seek to ensure equal results-an equal distribution of resources or welfare. But to be forced to work to benefit what is meant by foxed 1a:hor.4). egalitarimism il7trinsicaily limits liberty To be sure. because classical liberals have insisted that property rights have a fundmental role in protecthg indiwidual liberty (Section 5. Moreover. though. Even between brothers there exists the most marked differences in physical and mental attributes. or granted additional favors dellied to others. the unique never-to-recur. indicate that the pursuit of ecmornic equalily inevitahly clashes with negative Iiherty w:hich is the crucid point of Nozick's tale about Wilt Chamberlain. mother great classical liberal of the twentieth century is even mare adamant: Nothing . He reasons that since a person must w r k extra to pay the egalitarian tax. prima^ am very different it follows that if we treat them e ~ a 1 l .EQUAL~TY AND ~ ~ B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 16 . all classical liberals endorse forced labar. Insafar as ecmomic egalitarianism requirtzs coercive transfers of fur~ds . But all classical liberals endorse s m e gover~~me~ activities. slavery. is as ill-founded as the assertion of the alleged equality of all members of the human race. .from some to others. for all laws linlit :liberty. One concern &out others is p e c i ~ l y Nozick"s argument is that it appears to prove too mtxch: it kvould seem to show that all taxation is forced labor. can be less cmtroversially put. however. 2 ~ Thus. result rmst be inequality in their actual positim. It does. 5 ation is essentially the same thing as forced labor-that is. for example-we c m only da so by ixlterferhg with equal l i k r v : some people must be restrained. some proportion of her kvorkkg day is devoted to payhg the tax. and (2) The natural ~ s doft ~~egative liberty is to upset such a pattern.

translate into inequalities in property holdi*rgs.2) and the funconcep$irmc. Only a system of labvs that is impartial.'"f people were thoroughly cooperative. this prc!supposes a liberill tkory oC htxman nature (Section 3.3): it supposes that in the light of the human differences. either because the clffjcials believe that one is intrinsically superior. is not simply that he bases a r ~ arpmernt for equal resources and opportunities on impartiali"iy. C)f course.W Thus far. A nurnber of contemporary liberal philosophers have sought to make equaiity and impartiality f i e very heart of liberalism.interest in Zaworkin" pprposal. this equality derives from pluralism (Section 3. the pursuit of equality need not co~~flict with individuaf fiberty. to treat all individuals equally-cvith equd concern and respect. most classical liberals would concuz But. As Uvvorkin sees it.ntai requiremer~tof being impartial between competir~g tions of the good life (Sctiion. "'a certain. or because one is held by the more numerous ctr powerful gruup. for trhe political system to distribute resources on any other basis would be to "'assume either that the fate of some people should be of greater concern than that of others. for example. another. is the nerve of liberalism. to equdize propertp holdings requircs that some people's libertp he rwtricted. For Dworkin. m d so should be supported mare generously on that ac~ount.onof equality. concept-i. would he agreed to by cqually free persons. howwer. people will wish to pursue their own aims and a c t u a l a t e resources rather than seek to aid each other and maintail? an egalitarian distribution. so far as possible. and thus enshrhes equal :liberty and equal civic status.2): Eqtraliv supposes that political decisions must be. or that the ambitions and talents of some are more worthy.'"z7Dworkin q u e s that at the k a r t of Iiheralism is a comilmenl. Since the citizens differ in their conceptions. According to Ronald Dworkin. independent of any particular conception of the good life. this generates a case not simply for equal civic status.classical liherd.ant egalitarian element. as socialists have noted.for Dworkiur and his followers. but for equality of resources and opportunities. Liberal Egalitarianism: Liberty Reduced to Equality We have seen that: classical liberalim has a sigrific."2~ VVhat is of particulal.6.but that he &n grouncds inditridud liberty rights on irn- . . the guvernmrsnt does not treat them as equals if it prefers one ccmception tc:. or whatever gives value to life.'' which he calls "the liberal conception of equality . .

On the traditional classical liberal view (Sections 4. :It must be wodered wheeher liberalism is rex-rdered more piausibk by. ljherds cizrc-. External preferences. though limited. avoids conflicts betkveen liberty and equality by putting equality on center stage and entirely baIlishing liberty in gemral. liberty is itself always a good thing.y. whereas socialism gives equality a m m dominant role than does liberalism.4). To m& m confom to your external preferences. of course.3. but give eyuality an importmt. h o r k i n suggests that those who adopt this hybrid cox-rceptionare apt to contrast liberalism to conservatism and socialism. arguing that conservatism gives greater kveight to liberty and less to eyuality than does liberalism. second. presurnahly. " o u t from our commitment to evaX concern and respect and the of others (Section need to protect people from the external prefe~nces 6. M a t is important is nut lihert. wotrld not be to treat me with cqual concern and respect. Ilberties such as freedom of speech -and association al. first.4). the United States. the ttnique importmce of freedom. it will be recalled.4). and m sane person thinkti she loses something by giving it up. freedom of religion ensures me protection from your external prefere~~ces. b o r t i i n . role. hut certain civil liberties. fn place of the general cox-rcept of liherty then. Dworkir-r f u k w s the traditional conservative route of identifyhg a list of basic liberties (Section 5.e ways to achjeve equal concern and respect. The liherty to drive on the left side of the street is of no value at all in. he believes that the very idea of a general right to liber@ is cox-rfused. understands liberalism in a monistic way: its core value is equality. i n itself. According to his egalitarian liberatism. which conceives of liberdim as devoted to both libery and equillity as independent values. but. not :liberty. however.deeply for liberty. it seems clear that egalitarian Ijberaljsm is a narrow understandjng of . are a person's preferences that other people act in the way he wants. if you are a Catholic. Indeed."" m a t makes Dworkin" version of liberalism so radical is that he not only dismisses the general concept of liberty but mahtahs that the important civil liberties are grouded i n evality. 5.There is. it is aiw y s better to hawe liberty than lose it.EQUAL~TY AND ~ ~ B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 1 67 partiality Uworkin is critical of a hybrid view of liberalism." fn m y event. he insists. Egalitarian liberalism. On the hybrid view. Uworkin disapes. The equal distributjon o f libertics is m instance of the general case fur m equd diskibution of resources and opportmities. almost entirely removbg its traditional core and. he maintains. deyicthg it as expressing simply one valu+and a value that has traditionally t-rad a complex and difficult place in liberal theory. you might have an cxten-ralpr&rex-rce that everyox-rebe Catholic. then. The special stabs attributed to these basic liberties in herd thought does not dcrive h m . we may give t r p some of it t o secure other goods such as security from altack. no general ""commodity'" liberty that we always value.

people c m constantly interfere with my sell-determhalion by coercing and restraining me (Sections 4. Thus.3. as a theory about how a distributor of good things should distribute them. To the egalitarian liberal. society. social freedom presupposes a system of . if people are to be self-determined in sociely. social freedom. and Equal. hcluding its basic liberty rights. or oppartunities-and provaes an impartial criterion for all these distributions: distribute them in a way that accords with equal concern and respect. the distcributjon of resources. we have seen that classicaf Iiherals endorse a basic requirement of equal treatment-equal civic status-while stressing the ways in which social and economic equality confljct with liberty and individuality Dworkin" segditariar.edM-we might say autonomou+in. But it is at best dubious that the hdividual's real complaint here is that she is not being keated as an equal. though. that her self constitutes a ""harmonious whole. the Common Good. the theory does not adequately q l a i n why an hdividual demands that the distributor-government respect her choices about how she is to live her life. it is much more doubtful that it claim we are equal. Hobhouse advocates a positive accour~tof freedom: a free person is "selfdetermin. Following T." Now. however. assumes that liberalism is essentially a theory to guide m organization that distributes benefits. Interestingly.2). as liberals generally recopize. Green (Section 4.@ l h u s far. HobhouseHevisionist Liberalism: Self-Determination. argues Hobhouse. much more plausible. then. The "new liberal'' theory of L. Hobhouse never denies that libert-y is the heart of liberalism. f think. there must he limits on what others may do to them and what they may da to others. requires constraints. purely on equaljty.""" Hobhouse believes. H. rights. h a state of natznre or anarchy.21. It takes the perspective of a distributor of treatments for a society as a whole-hr e x q l e . Lmlike D w o r b . the individual's demand for respect stems from her right to be treated as equal to others: her objection to r~onrespectfut state interference is that it fails to treat her equally with others. Liberdism cerhislly psesupposes that individuitls are free and equal.2 liberalism seeks to overcom t-he clash betwen libert-y and eq~~allity by groundkg liberalism. The theory.8. 7:Hobhouse offers a different way to reconcile liberty and equality within the liberal tradition. that such internal "moral" freedom needs to be supplemnkd by social freedom-the freedam of "man in. m d so mtxst in some ways be treated as free.:liberalism: liberalism is depicted. is lfie s h p l e r idea that she just wisfrles to live her life as she sees fit-she seeks to be free to pursue a vision of the good life without undue interferctnce by others.

there it. bllowh~g Grecr~. who see law as a system of restraints that takes awity some of our liberly so as to better protect the rest.'"" Basic to I-lobhouse's argument is a strongly monistic view (sctian 3.7. Unlike classical liberals. 4.iberty. For both H&house m d Gree* there is no ultimte cor~flict betwen one perso11's &velopment and the development of others: all persons cm only realize what is best i n themsel:ves by parljcipating in a swial life with other developed pezsmalities. Hohhouse believes that the good for individuais is to develop their personalities. while others are inconsistent?s" Hobhouse3 answer is that the "the liberly of earh . i~~cluding not or~ly tLte traditional liberal liberties but "equal satisfaction of equal needs"% ((Section 6. so that everyorle may develop his or her persol~ality Equd rights.ict of corrrpeting conceptions of the good life in Mobhouse's theory Last.3). then. A free persort "'eomes to reafizo that his true good not in s m e course dictated by self-will but i n a modification of that course r/vhich open"o him a life compatible with and contribratkg to the life of societyerr33 Ihe common good.4)"are implied by liberty. Hobhause sees na clash bet-vveen law and freedom (Section 5-4): 11 Liberq involves restraint. What is gained from the point of view of tiberq by substituting one system of restraints [that is. in no way detmct horn the hdividual's good or his true (positive) I. it may be asked whether its pursuit is not itlusory.3). . It is fi4i. equal rights to coxltribute to the cornmm good. Hobhouse maintah~s. as Hnhhouse ki. the theory is mor~istic insofar as the true good for one person necessarily involves and supports the true good for other people. O n Hobhouse" view. A free person follows his ratioml will. requirtrs equal rigltts for all. the theory is co:llectiviatic (Section 3. no tragic co~~fl.2) mined will that pursuctti its true good. but that such development is only possible in a society of developed individuals (see Section 3.riy obvious how the plausibility of this reconciljation of liberty and equdiy cjepends on accepting a rationalistic m d monistic view of liberty m d a collectivist view of society. In contrast to Ber:lin%ppluralism (Sections 3.EQUAL~TY AND ~ ~ B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 169 social restraints.2) that the good of the kdividual and the c o r n o n good of society necessarily are harmu17i0us. .must.3) insofar as true freedom requires a self-deter(Swtion 3. . be limited by the rights of all. law] for another [that isf restraint by other individuafs]"r'an we find a system of restraints which is consistent with liberty. equal rights are required by true liberty. and a rational person kvills the common good.1good oi his socicty. on the principie of the common good. Libere is rationalistk (Section 4.4): it supposes that the good for one perm11 is intimately bound up with the commof. indeed.mself was apt to point out.

or a barbarian upbringing. liberty and equali. m d see most for~xs of equality as a threat t o individuality. or security or public order are perhaps the must obvictus examples. . ctr a pectpfe". and to advertise are less important than civil liberties and more easily overridden for the sake ol economic and sociai equality 7.ty. .Some revisiox~ist liberals view the madern welfare state as a balancing of the demands of :liberty and cqualjty: civil liberties such as f ~ e d o m of speech. The extent of a man's.1. to sell. Indeed. or even the drrrminant.37 That liberty and eguality clash-that we camot have all of both. or happiness. or justice. liberty to choose to five as they desire must be weighed against the cbirns of many other values. Isaiah Berlin. pmperly understoocf. almost all socialist theories agree in claiming that. devoted to hdividuals and their ends. and religi01.3)' a pluralist political theory need not always choose liberty aver equali. A pluralist liberal might insist that although negative liberty is a crucial social value in a world in which people must choose what values to pursue (Section 4. even in the most liberal sacieties.lgranking of liberty over equalit_y. We compel children to be educated.Pluralism. association.tror.38 Thus. the most prominent expo~~ent of pluraijsm and negative lihertJii is very clear &out this: 1do not wish to say that individual freedrrrm is. Hobhouse" revisionist liberalism concurs).4 A Socialist Reconciliation Proposal As I pointed out in Section 3.1 take p~cedence erties have been secured. and we forbid public executions. criterion of social action. the sole. they typically oppose equality. and so we must weigh them and choose between IhemAoes not itself imply that we must -always choose liberv Because classic& liherals arc. over equality but once those libthe press. of which equality. A very nice example by of a socialist case for the harmony of liberty and equality is prese~~ted . But pluralism itself does m t lead to this t. Liberty.. We justify thern on the ground that ignorance. or cruel pleasures and excitements are worse for us than the amount of restraint needed to repress thern. and Equoliv There is a much simpler route from classical liberalism to a revisionist liberalism that seeks to advance economic equality.ty do nut connict (in this respect. the pursuit of economic equality is justified. at the heart of much revisio~~ist liberal thix~ki~~g is the claim that economic fiberties to buy. These are certainly curbs to freedctm.

to that extemzt.2) with freedom are free in so far -as as p o w r (Section 5. are opened up far me. new opportunities became available to me which were previously inaccessible: J can travel to different places. prmoting the critical capacities necessary for an autonomous life. &out my own life. which combi~~e a view of litsert. increase my capady to make choices about the affairs of the society in vhJhicfi I h e . get a new job which will provide me with a larger income.tcrease one" effective choice. "to suppose that institutio~~al arrmgements whi& give me some degree of political power will. engage in different activities ctr pastime-new worlds. Norman on Effecfive Choice and Liber?.1). In other words. we must add that the degree of freedom is determined not by the sheer number of choices available. but by the range of meaningful choice. and (3) cult-ural conditions. 11 I inherit a fortme or win the pools or. Norman argues that in addition to noninterkrence. effective choice requires (1)political. The comecticm with freedom lies not in the greater material cornfc3rts or enjoyments.'" he wites. (2) material. geographically new or culturally new.3. in which he explicitly CMlenges the claim that liberty and eyuality are at odds. an increase in democracy would seem to be m hcrease in freedom. it is clear how mnterinl conditio~rs ir. "It seems p:lausihle. less spectacularIy.""" As we have already seen (Section 5. As we saw in Sectim 4. for the advocate of positive frtiedom educatio~n is fiberating: it adds to freedom by expandilng the options available.EQUAL~TY AND ~ ~ B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 1 7 1 Rchard Norman i n his "o& Free nlzd Eqzml.y as a self-chosen life (Sction 4.41 N o m m 3 third condition for freedom concerns education and other cultttral opprfznzitics.m e puEitbE colrdifiotzs concern one" ability to participate i n collective decisionmaki~~g. . m d tltereforc. Education also adds to freedom becatrse it seeks to make people into better choosers. but in the increase of possibilities-the greater scope for choice. Accortling to Norman. And here the phrase ""range of meaninghf choice" must refer both to the areas ctf people's lives in which they can make choices and the options from which they can choose. Let us begin by briefly considering Norman" views on liberty.1). "h you are in a position to make choicesrr: In maintaining that freedom consists in being able tt3 make choices.

by nature.He does not mem by this that everyone is to have precisely the same goods. N o r ~ x m thus believes that this cooperative social life is incompatible with capitalism. not one imposed by some of thern on others. E cial ownership of industry that allows the kvorkers to democratically manage their own firms. i n which the ownt requirtrs a soers manage the firm and instmct the workers what to do. socialists typically argue. Normal also cndorses resource eyzlttlitly in the cooperative socic..""" those whom they r e p ~ s e n tso Nomm also thinks equd power r e q u k s economic democracy (Sction 9. he argwdthat "'everyone &odd benefit equally overall from their participation in a co-operative communityW43 There should be ""free communal.21. social creatures. . is a pathhgical psyrrhologicai state produced by capitalist productive relations. this will affect the way they make decisiom. they will try to agree on a decision acceptable to thern all. more inclined to cooperalion than conflict. then each o f thern can make an equal claim on it-re group. .t>i. it is to replace the question. Norman just equal voting rights: is dear that potitical equaiity requirt. If a co-operative group is one in which each person has an equal say. . 'What will benefit me?' with the questio~~ 'Whd will benefit us?'""32If people adopt this collectivist view of our nalure and our projects. . It requires that political representatives should be more answerable to . If they cannot reach an agreement.3)." writes Norman. thfhen. such that the workers. Humans are.EQUAL~TY AND LIBERTY IN POLITICAL THEORIES Cooperation and Equoliv Fundamental to almost all socialist theories is a cooperative view of uncormpted husnan nature and &e ideal society. If possible.4" I h e coopcratiwe socky.5 more thar~ '*It rc?q~ires a shift of the balarlce of power between electors and elected. through represento the mar~agement tatives. is "'to commjt onesela' to the point of view of a shared project. '9'0 enter into co-operathe relatiorrs with otl-rers. political equality. they will at any rate make sure that everyone" view is taken into account. [The seam4 thing that fc3llows from a commitment to a>-operationis that the] set of arrangements which is adopted by the group must be one which can be justified to each of its members. will =quire. have their say. that gex~uine power lies with the latter. manage the firm for t-fiemselkres. therefore. which give some polver over others (Sect-ion 5. those claims. Competitive individudism. Everyone wit1 be able tc:. two things follow: First. or that those with special needs are not to be arcordied more. Rather. first. can properly be satisfied only by a state of affairs in which all benefit equally 0veralt. It will be a joint decision. according to which the grlinciples of majority rule should be applied of the firm.

Cultural Resources The Cu-lgdilk?zsforCuopemtlve Eqzrrality 3. the distribution of wealth in such a way that everyone "nenefits equal:iy overall on the co~~dition that. Equal PoTiticaZ Power 2. overall benef ts. the valt~es worth having . he argues that each person. The Convergence of he Demands for Liber?. Green-whom kexplicitly f ollows-Norman believes that them is a true goal for each of us: to devel')p into good choosers with developed capacities. He thus adopts a positive notion of freedom: to be a free person is to he such a developed chooser. Moreover. Equal Cultural &sources FIGURE 7.""" N o m a n thus appears to allow that those who have special burdens or who work at hard jobs require extra compensation.ty are simply the equalization of the col~ditio~~s for freedom as effective choice! It is worth emphasizing again in what way Norlxan" theory is monistic. if they arc. hsteacf. regardless of his or her capacities. properly understood.ity). from Lhe work of the commu~lity they participate in such work. Last. Norman maintains that lfie cooperative socialist society will pmvide eqzral czllfzdrul opporZzdzifies. Political Power 2. and.1 Conditions for Effective Choice and Coaperative Equality provision of goods to satisfy basic needs. the conditions for cooperative eyuali. his or her capacities. he says. What is particularly important is the equal opportwity ctl each child to develoy. of course. Equal Material Benefits from Cooperation 3. They receive extra rewards to cancel out the extra work they did: in the end everyone should receive something like equal. Norman. cve i l l Ineed these =sources if we are to do what we desire. Like T. H .EQUAL~TY AND ~ ~ B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 1 73 The Corzditio~zsfclr Eflective Clzaz'clr l. is especially important in producing m egalitarian society.1 shows.1 conflict with the demnnds of equality. does not accept the libetd idcd of equal opportunity as the equal opportunity to compete for the best jobs and so climb to the top of society (he c a b this the "ladder"" notio~l of equillity of opportun. Educational equality. riiomm" ccooperative society gives everyone the ihings he or she needs to become such a chooser: because we aII have the s m e general goal. Norman" effort to show that no conflict exists betweell freedom and equality is itself monistic: it manifests a conviction that. He sees this as Aecting a more basic equality. Material Resources f t x De?~elopment 3. and E q u a l i ~ :It now should be clear why Norman thi~liks his notion of positive liberty is rrot ir. should have the opportunity to develop *ern. able to. beyond that. As F i g m 7.

4 7 We can trace the conservative hostility to eqt~allity to its theory of humm nature. all efforts to compensate through law and government for this diversity of strength can only cripple the liberties of those intiolved. calls for equiality are apt to be seen not only as vain but as motivated by pride and envy. and it makes them unof iife. 7. on the relation between liberty and equali v . the conservative is struck by the basic and *eradicable h~eq~~alities between people. Those who are too proud to &it that others are their betters are cmstanlfy insisting on the equality of every- ."4"K~orethan even the classical libcsal. especially the liberties of tlne strongest and the most brilliant. is that of some kind of redistribution or leveling of the unequatty shared material and immaterial values of a communiv. equai in cvery possible dimensio~~ m q u a l i y patriotic. unequal in physically abilities. or mothers. Vu'e cannot be faced with choice between two desirable values. Human Nature and inequolip "Men are by nahnrc unequaf. It is not sod. but nat-ure. The abiding purpose of liberty is its protection of individual and family property-a word used in its widest. It is vain. This is. from Burke on. What is c o r n o n is 1ase. in brief.5 The Conservative Crih'que of Equality There is no principle more basic in the conservative philosophy than that of the inherent and absolute incompatibility beween liberty and equality Such incompatibility springs from the contrary objectives ctf it-re two values. on the ctther hand. unequally good at being fathers. its antirationalism. mequnlly fit for leadership. therefore.ety. havirtg to sacrifice some of one to achieve more of the other."49 NO so for a conservative. Moreover. The iherent ctbjective of equality.1 74 E a u ~ ~AND i ~ vLIBERTY IN POLITICAL THEORIES must go together. ?'hey are unequalty moral. and so on. unequally intellectually talented. to treat them as if they were equaI. :In light of this. or teachers.3) once insiskd that despite the many bvays in which people were different.ely overshdowed by our differences. Hobhouse fSectio116. m d its theory of society. the view which conservative philosophers have unfailingly taken. individual strengths of mind and body being different from birth. their common human nature "lies far deeper than all the differences between them. that makes peopl" uneyual. sense to include the immaterial as well as the material in life.

l?eory. within the family. The Catholic Church the farnily continues t is offirially sexist. t a ~ ifdthey camat have it. and so on. they will h~sist that no one has it.ms is in some way a s o m e o f inequalit5 egaljtarian socialists drmm of reformi. althoul. this ratio~~alist project is doomed to faiture. and to the exasperation of egalitarians. In this regard." the consermlive suspects.h no one can give a complete accounl: of m y complex instituiiion and its functions. universities we intellectually elitist. Michael Oakeshatt observes. As a conservative sees it. atbletic clubs disfmor the physically hancdicapped.yover children. no singlet person or group of people can fulIy understand its workings. as well as providiIlg them to everyone (Section 6. take the complex sytitm of these institutio~~s: What we call a '%ocieVfYis away business corporations. "All men are equal. . some of which are vooluntar)r and some not. the family universities. Nisbet worrics that calls for eyualiv are attarks on the briliimt and talented.ng each and every one of them acceding to m egalitafian plan. people often conte~~tedly remark 01% "tall poppiesf'-those who have stood out and grown too high require cutthg down to size. parsuccessful t h a ~ ents have i7tr"cErorit. those without it w a ~it. says the conservathe.3).and there would be nothing left of American society I h e co~~servative Chargedhat because each of these institutic.4).isfed by denykg goo& to s m e . to produce social and economic equality reyuires a pim backed by power (see hrther Section 10. and the rest.Thus. eequaiit-y may be motivakd by mvy and spite. Furthermore. churches.EQUAL~TY AND ~ ~ B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 1 7' 5 one. &call that equali."" Antirationalism and Social Complexity Because people we so different and unegual. o di:vid. seeing others more successful. have functions hsociety. a distinctly egalitarian country when a public figure or bushess person is disgraced or suffers a social or ecothe &sirability of cutth~g mmic fall. is motivated by a boastful convictio~~ that ""no one is better than me'"itl"~d it is a h o s t certainly false. Ttne instjllation of the family produces economic incqualivf because the children of good parents as a rule are more the childre11 of pwental failures.ty can be sat. these institutiorms. AlterrtaCively.e tasks on sexual lines. seeing their high status and their wealth. for it is often they who have what others want. schaols. Given the complexity of humm society. The economy is divided into those who have wedth and those who do not. But. Of a political authoriy with treme~~dous such colectivism. the conservative might point m t that in Australia. all human societies are characterized by numerous institutions and associations that $isplease egalitarim. and because societies develop over long periods of time m d are thus not plamed. since societies are far too complex to be guided by any rational plan or t.

the perpetual readjustment ctf rations. the French Revolution of 1789. in short. and often in place of it. . Conservative Organicism. collectivism depends far its working upon a lavish use ctf discretionary authority. of custom. All this is. bowevex: Millian liberals. not because it favors sociev over the hdividtral. . and the distribution of privileges and exemption-by the exercise. a collectivist government must enforce its imposed order or allow society to relapse into chaos. And great power is required f ~ the r over-all control of this organizaticm. but becatrse it is based an a . Conservatives. Having discouraged all other means of social and industrial regulation. Many conservatives object to egalitarian collectivism. Collectivism i s indifferent to all elements of our freedom and the enemy of s ~ ? m e * ~ l :It is importar~t to remember that that the first great conservative work.The opposition of collectik~ism to freedctm appears first in it-re collective rejection ctf the whole notion of the diffusion of power and of a society organized by a means of a multitude of genuinely vtlluntary associations . it is not the only such threat: Mill was equally critical. T%e revolutjonaries were willing to sweep away those parts of French political culture that did 110t correspond to their abstract ideas in order to bring about thoroughgoing civic m d social equality Burke kvarned that such a rationalist project could only end in clisastec Egalifcrrion Co!/ectivism. licenses to buy and sell. . see it as a threat to individuality and free choice. of the kind of power most subject to misuse and a>rruption." Milliain lj_kseralsand conservatives have diffemnt objections to such a collectivism. . interventions-conturn: it must keep going by p r r ) m i ~ e ~ oday-to-day trots of prices. and Liberal Individualism Conservatives. arc? defenders oi custom: it reflects pradkal r/visdom that has been slowly accurntxlated over generations m d provides a much better guide to action than a rationalist defense of liberty such as that offered by Mill. Of course. . Burke" Reflections on the RenoEzkficltz in France. but there is mure to f~jI10w. . . was a criticism of the first great egalitarian revolution. as we SW. . . The organizaticm it imposes on society is without any inner momenu~. an impediment tc3 freedom. . . in contrast.2) in heeding Tocqwvitle's warning that social egalimianism is apt to lead to a moral per~wtiwe that counts the good of the collective as "'everythingf' ar~d that of the individual as "'nothing. It is a comprehensive ctrganization. then. The organization to be imposed upon sociev springs from the minds of those who compcjse the government. In addition to the rule of law. clearly. join liberals such as Mill (Section 7. whi& led t o the servitude of women and ofien discouraged individuakty.

and so these practices lhemsclves are inegalitarian. such as a m m m d is composed of: a variety of different parts with different and unequal functions. have differhg views about the p q e r extent of equality. it will inevitably fail. Classical liberals and conservatives. composed of almost identical. in particulal. lhough the eiforts to save it may lead to long periocf" of repssion. m d jndeed a very simple machine.crfere with. sees society as a machine that: c m be designed to work just the way we want it to. horganism. a true cdlectivism will remgnize the importance of custom. Important to the conservative tradition has been the idea that society is better ur-tderstood as an organism or a c o q l e x aninnd. B n d some have controlling fur-tctions.zatim. equal parts. If society is to be understood ir-r this sort of "orgatlic" way. Egalitarian colrecti:vism. the typical conservative case against social and economic e q d ity is Lhat (l) people are naturally uwyual in a variety of ways. w:hirh has been fundi-tme~~tal to British law fttr cmtu:u.EQUAL~TY AND ~ ~ B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 1 77 confused understanding of society. (6) because nn such plan call possibly cope with the full cmplexity of society. we certainly c piar-ts &out what ideal ar1ima1s shouid look me. Conservatism and Liberal Egolifaricmism In s m . sjnce it sees the cdlective as composed of a mass of thoroughIy equal individual units. Classical liherals such as t-layek m d van Mises would agree with essentially all of this. however.sic. the conservative is apt to suggest that there is an odd sort of individualism at the core of socialist egaljtarianism. we c m say that cmservathes favor a more limited h t e ~ r e t a t i o of~civic ~ equaiiCy than liberals ilnd are mart? skeptical of equality of opportmity and political equality Conservatives in the Arrglo-Americm tradition have overwhehin& el-tdorsed eyuality before lrhe law." Oakeshon. must obey if they are to fulfiil their functions (Section 20. and will be wary of anyme's claim to be able to plar-t and drasticaily reform t-he nahre of the organism. charges a certaill sort of conservative.. c m explain exactly how such an o ~ a n i s m ot: alter it to conform to our works. Moreover. Indeed.ct this deep inequizlity. tracfiti.s.1). (2) societies develop institutions and priactices that rclffc. this power constantty will be used to int. ai*ough importmt. na one really.onnl liberties. then. (3) the project of esequality must t-herefore invoive a radicai tablishh-tg social and ecor~orrric restructuring of society m d so (4) must give great power to g o v e m n t . But (5)because equality can only he achieved by rooting out swi. the insli-tutions of a sock@. M a t do cmservatives ta-td to say about liberal egalitarianism? Consematives. but some are not. Most are mcessary. r/vhereas others.al practices a-td negating natural te~~dex-tcies. join in rejecting egalitarim projects. has been insistent that . As a =asonable gmerali. like liberals and socialists.

As Elie I-faI4vy (1878--4937)noted. nor disabi1if.es have expressed resemations about the egaiitarian and r&ionalist tendmcies of alt legislation. the importmce of diffe~ntiated and conceive of liberal efforts to equalke rights as deskuctive to smiai staibility So too have conserv&ivcs been critical of equal opportnnity. ecquat. The existence of ""general facts'bprovides him with a ccmvenient meam of distinguishing. Halkvy points out that gcneral legislation is also inhert?ntl. John Stuart Mill. that individuals can be considered . admittll~g no p o w r or privikge on the one side. was a s t r o ~ ~ proponent g of equal legal rights for women. abstract.1 78 E a u ~ ~AND i ~ vLIBERTY IN POLITICAL THEORIES only a society fomded on the mle of law can secwe freedom m d avoid collectivim. and is rtow one of the chief impedhenb to human improvement.'" Ihis is not to say that co~~servatives are opposed to lcgislaliorr. the necessary from the accidental. . in a rowdabout way. In his discussion of Rentham's liberalism. conservatit. 7. Follow- . 32.34 More generdly.s the existing social relat. sexes. " o u t ewality of :legal rigbts between classes. . As will be recalled from Section. including diffe~ntir-lted sexual roles.6 Summary My unah aim in this book is to show holv m d why the maixr enduring political theories have interpsekd poliSical concepts differentSy.. Writing in 1869.4). he finds it convenient to admit.yrationalist. and he was quite prepared to tmdermine customa~ notions of the family and mamiage to xhieve such civic equality. fiough.y on the 0ther~~5-3 Conservatives. a ~ so d OIT. but it does indicate a cautious attitude &out wickly resorting to legislation to respond to the diSIiculties of social life. and that it ought to be replaced by a principie of perfed ew&fit. 'That said.ions between sexes-tlne legal subordkation of one sex t o mother-is wrong k~itself. the idea that opportunitiescanbe equalkcd arrro~~g ci-tizensof diverse backgmunds is dismissed as mother rationalist dellusion. co~~servafives have been mu& more reluct a t to embrace the idea of civic equality understood as istcluding not s h ply equality before the law. first ctf all. The rationalist is inclined to neglect the particular in ctrder to confine hims e l f tto the consideration of the general. all laws are egalitarian and hdividualist because they tend to treat each person as a distinct. Granted the existence of individuals. advocathg faimess m d effjciencyin selection processes. alIhough. for example. Mill proclaimed &at "'the pkciple Mihich re~1atc. for it cmnot take ac-corn of the partjcularity m d context that often are crucial to an adequate response (see Section 5. legal individual on par with ail the rest. not surprishgly have h g upheld roles.

why classical iiberals. 2.3 and 7. 15 to be free is to have material. 1 considered a positive liberty argument more typical of socialism than revisjonist liberalismNoman's sanalysis &at equates freedom with the conditio~~s for effective choice. Emphasis in clriginal. in fact requires. and culturai resources.ctit. Democmtic 130litical 71jze"ory((Princeton:T7rinceton University Press. I first exarnined Uworkin"s argume~~t that liberalism is based 01%equaiity and basic liberties are derived from m ideal of equal .5 examhed conservative c r i t i ~ e of s both socialist and liberal notions of equality. Erik von Kuehnelt-Ledbib. Finally Section 7.Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Gol~te~npomry Political Philosoyhy: At1 I~trodnctioll (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 16. Liberty or E'qz-lalidy:TIze Chalfenge of Our Ti~nc (Lclndon: Ffotlis and Carter. . and if a cooperative society ~ q u i r c equality of mterial. H. 5. Ibid. sect. and. Ttuo Ecratises of Gozjenzmezit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.ist liberal proposais. an equality of rights. ctassical tiberals insist that ihe protection of negative liberty is incompatible with the pursuit of most f o m s of ewnljty. equal lihertp simply is an egditarian distribtttioln of resowrces. trans.pts to reconcile lihcrty and equiality Section 7. 2979). hcluding rights to have needs satisfied.4 considescld attem. however. second. Chser to the mvisimist liberalism of T. political. 4. a view of liberalism about which Z expressed s o m skepticism.treatment. 2952). Cranston. They are firm critics of social and economic equality. 1960). which they see as threats to the core concept of negative tihery*In general. and because the common good requires an equaliw of rights. sect. political. 2968 [lT62[f). 6.echoice.. 7". In Section 7. and cultural =sources s necessary for efft-. revisionist liberals.3 analyzed revision. p. (London: Penguin Books. 5. true tiberty is necessarily consistent with. 3. 4. bid. Sections 7. Roland Pemcttk. first. Tfze S~~cial C o ~ t m c fMaurice .EQUAL~TY AND ~ ~ B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 1 79 ing on the consideration of the concept of equality in Chapter 6.. J. starting from their assumption of equal freedom and the need for impartial political authority. :how their differing intevretations of the concepts of liberty and equally lead them to competing positions on one of the central questio~~s of poljtical theory: do liberty and equalirty c d j c t ? Sction 7. 21. 1. See Wilt Kymticka. 324.4. positive liberty requires a self-determined will directed to the common goad. p. ed. m d conservatives endorse different types of equal treatment. sect. Green is Hobhouse's claim that true.2 argued that classical liberals. Book 2. Secolzd peat is^ ufC"overnnzet~1~ in Peter Laslett. 95. this chapter examined. 1990). John Lock@.. chap. endorse equdity before t%le law and civic equality. sxialists.

. John Rawls. 1. Ibid. Ibid. 290. for example.. The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1978). 25. "Two Concepts of Liberty. pp. para. Ibid. 1985). Democracy in America. Alexis de Tocqueville. p. 35. 10. chap. vol.. On Liberty. M .. 3. The Collected Wwks of John Sfuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 10. para. 21. 16. Democratic Political Theoy. 1946). 11.. For a survey of developments in understanding the Rechfsstaaf in relation to classical liberal ideals. Tocqueville. in John Gray. Ibid. Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge. Anarchy. 3. 34. 26. John Stuart Mill. chap. MA: Harvard University Press. ed. for example. Self-Ownership. The Constitution of Liberty. 55-57. para. Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 13. 14. See. 127. p. 334. A. 1974). Henry Reeve. 38. p. Democracy in America. See. 13. trans. John Stuart Mill. 1971). para. p. On Liberty and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University Press. 11. Ibid.. 36. vol. Hobhouse. p. chap. 31. in J. 339. 19. State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books. see F. 10.. 24. Tocqueville. 169-170. 17. 1991). See further. 27. 115. 33. 37. 15. 11. Hayek." in his Dissertations and Discussions (New York: Haskell House. Isaiah Berlin. 62.. chap. para. p. Ibid. John Stuart Mill. Self-Owr~ership. 129. 8. 161. "Democracy in America. 12. 3. vol. 3. see G. 2. Robson. Ronald Dworkin. 87. The Elements of Social Justice (London: George Allen and Unwin. Ibid. Sterba characterizes "welfare liberalism" . p. James P . p. ed. Ibid. 1978). 241. L. Ibid. MA: Haward University Press. 1996). 30. 2. 1960). chaps. Freedom and Equality. 332 18. 1995). 1969). 9. 1963). Ludwig von Mises. 111.. T.. p. ed. p. Ibid. 1973). 70. p. Democracy in America. 32. Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge. p... "Liberalism. 2. p. Robert Nozick. Ideologies and Polifical Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press. See Ronald Dworkin. 2 and 3. chap. pp. Auguste Comfeand Positivism. Hayek. See Cohen. 333. p. Pemock. Knopf. 13. p. 106. 20. 9. vol. Emphasis in original. 22.. Liberalism in the Classical Tradition (San Francisco: Cobden Press. For a sustained socialist criticism. p. (New York: Alfred A. p. chap. 26. 3. 59. vol. Ibid. 2. p. A. 29.. 23.. chap.1 80 EQUALITYAND ~ I B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 8." in his Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press. p." in Stuart Hampshire. 12. 28. 1922). chap. Ibid. Cohen. p. Michael Freeden. 29. Ibid. 334.

1987). 2. influential person. %e atso Nisbet. 170. Essays ouz Sex Eqlaalz'ty (Chicago:University.. Sec. 47. pp.~ of Wofnerz. 53.p. 80-84. 54. Corzservatism (Millon Meynes. 46. 108. 414. Dent. IGchard Norman. 53. chaps. 44. p. 114. 1(386).. 34. p.sm. 1997). 55. Victoria: Ctaremont or ruin. of Chicago Press. 39. 1984). see No61 O'SzxlXivan. p. Corzserztntl. (London: Longmans. Etie P-Ialkvy.38. 52. Michaef Oakeshott." k n i e Johansen.9281. 4 vols. IN: Liberty Press. SO. (Indianapofis. p. 113. TIzc Gru'zuZI~ of Philosophical Xadicnlisnz. 42.. p. for example.. trans. 125. expanded ed. $3. 1970). pp. CA: Wadsworth. (London: Farfaer and Farber. $I. 'John Stuart Mill.. Ibid. UK: Open University Press. p. 197&). 47'. "Tnl ppupp: very important perscin. p. 401. "Tarty Politics. 1941). ." in ins Slzort Strtdies ouz Crmf Szlbjects . Free nrzd Eqltal: A P1)lrilosqhicaf ExamiitzafZ'Onof hlitiml VnIE ~ C (Qxford: S Oxford Universiy Press. Mary Morris. p. Hobhouse. who try ta bring about this person" downfall (Rinpood. Ibid. 78. Currserzr?atism (Lc~ndon: J. 95. Ibid. 49. Ratiorzalism iitz 13oliCies nrjd Other Essays. 48. 52. ed. 51. person with statusoften held in contempt by others. Xiglzt Priuciples: A Coizsc~rzantivc Philosclylty of hlitics (Qxfc3rrrdt: BlackweIl. Green.. Robert Nisbet. M . 1492). 4. $5.. 11305-3906).p. 41. Ibid. 40. On the French and German traditions. (Belmcmt. p.. The Iliizklrm Dz'ctiona~>/ Books. p. farnes Anthany Froude (181&-1894). Ibid. 2nd ed. The Sltfbjectio~. p. Ibid . Rossie. 3 and 4. p. Lincoln Allison.. 44. Ibid.in Alice S.EQUAL~TY AND ~ ~ B E R TIN Y POLITICAL THEORIES 181 as a ""lend of liberty and equality'3in his jzkstil7e: Altenznfive Politic~f Perspectiztes. 736 El'ements of Social J U S icef ~ p.

then. liberty.S. 11% 11561----overtwo thousand years after Plato wrote-Job Stuart Mii." As was typical with Mill. Here. as just or as u11just. or m y other thhg which belongs to him by law. his property.l was still searchjng for ""thedistlinguishing charack r of justice. It would.3). "'it is mostly considered unjust to deprive any one of his personal. rat-her than most.I). that is shared by ail notions of justice a d that only characterizes jusljce (see 9cti. Mill begins in a sensible way: he tries to get a rough feel for the conceptual terrain of our uses of justice-our main uses of ""-just" m d "'unjust. the legal rights of any one. Mill icaentifies five ""mdes of action and arran8enzcnl.m 1.s of humm affairs. tmjust to violate. is one instance of the applicatiol~ of tfne terms just and unjust in a perfectly defhite sense. we know that we should not be asswing there is a defkition or a core featurc. investigation of justice. and in partimlar the l a w of tt7e country one is in. ach%owlt.dgk%g than a certairt assumption. can we try to arrange &em on a concephal map f%ctio112. whether ""all modes of conduct" "designated as just or unjust share the same quality. however." The cmcept of justice. however." Only once we understmd thc main features of the concept of justice. has especia11y close ties to the law. namely. that it is just to respect. To answer this question. classed. since he does have a duty to vote. therefore."?(1) "hthe first place. be unjust to punish m A m a i c a n for not voting in a U. for the search for the "coxnmon attribute" has dornhated. for example. by universal or widely spsead opinion.This is an h portant lesson. but it w o d d not seem unjust to for failing to vote in an Australian parliamer~tary pu"itih an Austraiiar~ election. which art. The same c m be said for a . we return to the question with which we began the book" 'a t is justice?" U~dike Plato.'' says Mill. p~sictentid election. because she has a right to abstaiiz. he was more cautious &:hatit wits a questiol~ to be investigakd.C€ AND L Mill's Five Aspects of Justice In this chapter.

who were hunted down in violation of their moral rights. recognizes that (2) "the legal rights of which he is dep-rivedi. W e n it is so." Accodhg to tl-te Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. t-he Crafts." They put one hul71-ed black couple. when a law is thought to be unjust. We may say. would fail to appreciate the intimate relations beWeen the two. on a ship to Eqland.Although in some ways our notions of what is just and laPlfust arc closely tied to our legal and judicial s y s t e ~ f e it n is other w a p jwtice cliearjy tranxends ihat called ""the justice systemfJ----h system and can be used as a way to criticize our current laws and the ways they are applied. namely. threatened to send in federal troops to trphold the law (and property ittee act unjrastly? Mmy insist that a law rights). receives a different appellation. a s it cannot in this case be a legal right. In one case.mat. Preside~~t Fillmart_. opinions will differ as to the justice or injustjce of infrint. may be rights nlhich ought not to have &longed to him. i n other words. hdeed. however. that a second case of injustice camists in taking or withholding from any person that to which he has a moral right.ing it. Lhe law which confers on him these rights. which. Features (1)and (2) point to one of the most perplexhg aspects of our t h i n h g about justice." observes Mill. and is called a mtlrai right. residents of Boston set trp a "'vigilimce committee" to idcntify m d harass these "man-stealers. "it is universally considered just that each person should obtnin that (whc. or when (which is the same thing for our purpose) it is suppoxed to be so.3 (3) "mirdly. and . As Mill observed. slave catchers seized a black man who had worked for nineteen years as a taitor i n Pougbkeepsie. it w u l d "n u ~ ~ j uto s tdeny one that right. a r ~ d rekrr~ed him to his owner in South Cardina. it seems always tt3 be regarded as being so in the same way in which a breach of law is unjust. if there is a law giving one a right. then.Wid lrhc vigilance co that assigns an immoral claim cannot yield a genuine right. lt is Qmpting to simply say that these are just two of differex~t notio~~ s justice-what might be called legal justice and idmI justice. m y be a bad law.. by infringing somebody's right.ther good or evil) whi& he deserves. Mill. Our t h k h g about justice seems torn bet-vveen the actual and the ideal. as a rule. h 1850. slaweskowners had a right to have their fugitive slaves returned ta them. a d so violating such a rule is no ir-rjustice at all. therefore.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 1 83 variety of laws. if legal justice departs in a radical way from ideal justice. as we saw in the case of the Fugitive Slave Law. the *justice was suffered by the Crafts. it seems to lose clairn to being justice at all. h o w e l ~ r immediately . Private slave catchers we= employed to assist them in securing their legal rightt. New k r k .

This is.'-that isf punishment. the ground of the desert claim (what act she has performed that makes her deservhg) was that she put in so much effort. most emr/vhich he does not deserve.. . suppox that a professional killer is looking for his victim and calls you on the phone to ask you wheeher you h ~ o w where the victim is."'4 Claims about what a P deserves some treatperm"" deserves are usually of the form: "Persa~~ ment T nolv because of some act @ that she performed in the past. justice is t ~ a t i n g e ~ equally & and ullcquals uneqrrally (Sction a). is a sacred duty m d hsolutely commmdhg decree of reason. "it is confessedly unjust to break faith with any one: to violate m engagement. This czften-cited definition captures .bliti. Kant insisted that you were r. says 'mank you.e case of the studenl. .. d You reasox1 that he will be more likely to flee if you tell h h that you wilt call the pojice.1124 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S unjust that he should obtain a good. to one prominent political theorist. people can also deserve rewards. criminal. or be made to undergo an evil. perhaps. you call the police and give them his mme and 11urnht. A sturfent might he said to deserve a good grade because she worked so hard. the clearest ar~d phatic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind. he asks you to promise him not to call the police and give them his n a m a ~ number. in most cases of desert one deserves some sort of treatment now because of something that one has already done." Mill maintains. ." Recall that according to Aristotle. or disappoir~t expectations raised by our conduct. "it is. '"~esert .\oughnot involving caller El))." One can deserve both good m d evil. Of course. It then occurs to him that you migf-tt have caller IF).justice is somethes mderstood as giving criminals their "just deserts. (4) ""Fo~rthly.ated to tell the truth to the killer. to show favour or p~ference to one person over another. in matters to vvhich favom and preference do not properly apfly.r. "R be truthful fhor~est) in all your deliberations . by universal admission.'~ as Mill says. either express or implied." "at is.al. Kant.5 In th. Of course. at least if we have raised those expectations bowingly and voluntarilyffheaking promises and contracts is quintessentially unfust behavior. inconsistent with justice to be par(i. T%ese two examples point to the two most common grounds for desert claims: effort and production.""& (5) "Fifthly. disagreed. hdeed. As soon as he hangs up. You do. in the case of the worker. . limited by no expediency. and so h o w who he is. hut you tell him that you do not. though. not. Few think that you have acted unjustly in breakh~g your promise. h a similar case (tE. the desert claim was gmunded on how rwch he pmhced. few think that it is always u ~ ~ j uto s t lie or to break a contract: there can be overriding considerations. as Mill says. so you promise him that you will. Immanuel. or a worker might be said to deserve morcj pay becatrse he has produced so much. For example.

or companion. a disputed ctbject to the one of two parties who has the right ta it. because it is bound to award. w:hich often er~ters as a component part bath into the conception of justice and h t o the practice of it. and no one thinks it unjust to seek one perwn in preference to another a s a friend. Figure 8.1. A person would be more likely to be blamed than applauded for gjving his family or friends no superioriq in gclod ctffices over strangers. and as I stressed in Section 6. and indeed the cases in which they are condemed are rather the excepticm than the rule.d cdled ""opposites" or c o n t r a d c t r i e (Iegal . A tribunal.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 1 85 a great deal of what we mean by justice. T%ere is. a judge who sentaces black defendmts to dea& but gives whites for the same crime is unjust. it leaves much u~~accounted for. Thus. but this is involved in the more general obligation of giving tt3 every one his right. Whot is o Right? Hohfeld's Classic Analysis Justice concerns aur rights and aur duties. however. "allied to the idea of impmtiality is that of equaiity.2).1 sketches part of tlohkld" sa-t-ralysis: sin* lines with an arrow at each end represent what Hah1el. constiLutes its essence. when he could do so without violating any other duty. AS Mill recog~~iZed. much diversity i The m s t famous amlysis of leg& rights was acfvanced by Wesley Hohfeld (1879-4918). each of which is related to the others. must be impartial. it is clear that to some exSent. it is to treat relevantly similar cases equally and to distinguish between those who have tmequal merits or claims (Section 6. and as M X i X achowledges. 1mpartiality where rights are concerned is of course obligatory. people think that equality is fundamental to justice except when they thirrk inequality is called for! Nevertheless." "Mil . although one should certainly give each person what she has a right to-and so should treat eyually those with equal rights-in much of life you shortM be partkl to your friends m d family. without regard tct any other cornideration. connection. To act justly is certajnly to act impartially. we do not always have to be impartial: Favour and preference are not always censurable. and. As Aristotle" famous dirtuvn suggests. as is a teacher who gives a lighter se~a-t-rtence higher grades to attractive st-udents just because they are attractive*But although the ideal of impartial treatment captures m c h of justice. the cowepts of justice and equality overlap. To Hohfeld. almost as n theories of rights as there is about justice i n general. for example. as he saw it. the concept of "a right" hvo1olves several different ideas. 50. in the eyes of many persons. hims e l f seems skeptical.

The classic example is the liberty of r p a dollar bill lying on the sidekvalk.f refrain from doing somethkg (say. To have a claim right. then.1 Wohfeld's Analysis of liberties and Claims statuses that are jnconsistent). she has a . our liberties represent an absence of duties. Alf has ([l1 i (D if and o~lily if ( 2 ) Bctty has no daim agaimt Aif that A:if not <Difi It: also fallows from Figure 8.1 that if (2) Betty has no claim that Alf refrain from G-ing. but no one has a claim to win. :lf you a r ~ d I both have a liberty to Q. neither of us has a duty to refrain from 'P-ing. owed to you. and therefore an absence of restrictions an our freedom. E"or Hohfcld. Your claims. but neither has a claim on the othcrr ta stand aside and let her pick it up. we rnight call them rights i n the strict sense. then ( 3 ) he has no duty to Bctty to not Q. breaking into her o w e ) . we somelilnes mean that he is at liberty to do so. L21 Berry has no claim against Alf that AIE not F31AIE has a duty tc3 Betty not to tl. daim rights limit the freedom of others. he has no duty to refrain.1 86 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S 4 [l] Alf has a liberty with ~ s p e cto t Betty to ct. concern what is you. If Betty has a claim that A1. Sect-ion 1. h contrast.) Claim rights can he either negafiue or positiw. Such ""naked lihertiesf"often characterize competitions.? n Figure 8. . [4] Betty has a cfairn against Alf that All not cf. then. and so he is not (1)at liberty to ( I . In. But merely to have a liherty to do something does not irnply that you have a claim that others not interfel-e. Unlike liberties. FlGURE 8.1 . Neither two pedestrians to pick t has a duty to refrain from picking it up. and so what people are m t free to declirlie givi~lig (Recall here Polemarchtxs%conception of justice as giving each man his due. is ta be able ta demand that others respect your claim: they have a duty to respect i&and so are not at liberty to ignore it. however. whereas lines with sizlgle arrows represent ""correlatives" "tatznses that imply or entail each other). Betty has a (4) clninz rkhf that Alf not (D if and only if (3) Alf has a duty not to Q. people have the Ij_berty to win.1) a l i h ~ v f y to engage in act For Hohfeld. when we talk about a person having a right to do something. claim rigbts imply duties on the part of others not to hterfere. contrast to liber(ies.

If Congress has the power to make such changes. then Congress does not have the power to alter some liberties. claim rights. rights. this immunity held by citizens corresponds to (7) a disability (a lack of power) on the part of Congress to pass such laws.S." A negative claim right corresponds to a duty on someone else's part not to perform an action. and claim rights of American citizens. The First Amendment actually ensures citizens an immunity (8): it bars Congress from enacting laws establishing a religion. Hohfeld would describe this as (7) a disability on the part of Congress to alter these liberties. to say that . or duties."s Someone has a power if he or she can alter other people's liberties. to help when she is in need). citizens have (6) a liability-their claim rights. thus providing citizens with an immunity from legislation. it implies that he or she is not at liberty to perform the action. According to Hohfeld.2 Hohfeld's Analysis of Powers and lmmunities negative claim right. Alf has a duty to perform an action. and duties. liberties. An example of a right qua immunity is the U. Constitution's First Amendment right of freedom of religion. if Betty has a positive claim right against Alf (for example.2) Congress has the legal power to alter the liberties. duties. For example. that Congress has the right to make laws means that ([5]in Figure 8. Alternatively. The opposite of a power is (8) an immunity. It can create new duties. In contrast. rights. I f citizens have an immunity over some area. claim rights. and liberties or abolish old ones. and duties are subject to alteration by Congress. or duties. He is thus not at liberty to abstain from performing the required action.JUSTICE AND LIBERALISM 1 87 [5] Congress has a power over citizens with respect to Q [6] Citizens have a b liability to Congress with respect to Q [7] Congress has a disability with respect to citizens regarding @ [g] Citizens have an immunity against Congress with respect to Q FIGURE 8. the crux of the right to freedom of religion as specified by the First Amendment is an inability or lack of a power on the part of Congress to pass laws establishing a religion. Alf has a duty not to perform the action "breaking into Betty's house. Hohfeld also distinguished between two other legal statuses that are sometimes called "rights. that is.

Zn many ways.twitys: as Ilclhfeld shows. in the next chapter I examine socialist and conservative approaches to justice. is biased on tlne presupposition 6. with freedom being underthat we are equally free (Sectio~~s stood as nega. Accord- . the history of poliLical theory has been &out cornpetillg theories of justice. Most uses of lustice involve the idea of honoring a person's rights.2 Classkcrl Liberalism: Rules for Equally Free People f i e Hobbesian Sfafe of Nabre Classical liberalism. though.Throughout. 7. rights to what she deserves. it will be recalled. tl-tough controversial. be they legal rights. that is. (3) she has ilnmunity rtttatfng to CD. To sketch out the main aspects of our nation of justice and rights. h w they retale to each other. 8. we might mem (1)she is at liberty to @-he has no duty not to Q--(2) she has a daim on others not to intedere with her @-ing or she has a claim on otEters to assist her in cD-ing. I emphasize how each type of political theory advances a theory of justice that coheres with its unrterstal7dir"tgsof liberty a d equdity as well as its positions on the three endurkg issues in. we certainly cannot even begin to analyze them all here*In the remainder of this chapter. A fheouy ofjustice seeks to orgamize. is only the beginning.crc3sts. when we say that a person has a right to a>.21. however. Mobbes depids a "state of nature. Mill ide11tifit. political theory that we identified in Chapter 3. 'l"fiomas E-fohbes presented a classic.lised.1 88 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S Congress has the right to make laws regulathg intclrstate commerce is to say that it has the polcnr to enact laws that alter the legat rights and duties of citizensOrganizing the Elements of Justice :In different ways. justify. 1 will brieay survey some of the main theories popowd by clilssical and revisionist liberals. depicirim of life among equally free people witrbout rules of anarchy in of justice. and explain the various aspects of our concept of justice. is used in differe17. Mill and Hohkld point out some of the main fcatures of justice. moral rights.tive liberty.s some of lrhe main uses of the noof our cor~cept tion of justice. We need to organize the aspects into a explahing why various parts are important and coherent conceptior~. no one has the power to alter her libertylclaim right to @.3.'" cconditio~~ which each permn is free to do cvhatever advances her int. or what you have been pron. or (4) she has a power regatdhg cD that involves the legal ability to alter the liberty and duties of others. The term '"right'" itself.

Without such claim rights. Consequently. where no taw. are in. to say cve have a right to do anythhg is sirnpiy to say that we have nit duties to not do things. jncluding my bady Ely instituting a system of claim. no letters. poor. hopefill as the next of htaining her goals. justice and injustice.it. Not only is this a condi. ind. W e r e there is rlo cornmon p w r Y there is no law." though he did thhk that same non-European peaples lived in such a state. the world.7'. in the state of nature have a right to do anything. s worst of all. limited liberlies ([I]in Figure 8. nasty. More important. continual fear' and the danger of viono soclieQ.liberty to use them-and thhgs that are " " E k ' w h i h you have a claim . The problem underlying the state of nature is the absence of a distrinction between "mine and thinew-there are no claim rights that limit your lihery to use somethhg. brutish and short.10 Hobbes is especially clear that in such a condition there would be no notjon of justire or injustice: "The notions of right and w r o q . rights. no navigaticm. Force. we can create things that are "mineu-things that 1have a claim right to use. :Note t-hatby "right'" Hobbes must meal something very much like HahEe1cf"s '*Xiberty'"%ction 8. and removing. because no one considers herself the inkrior of others.l). il7deed Hobbes himelf bdieved that "it was rlever gewrdly so. no howledge of the face of the earth. no instruments of moving. each is vulanyme else. and which i lent death. war the two cardinal virtues. people might seek to use mything that X possess.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 189 ing to Hobbes. m d fraud. solitary.te freedom. nor co~~cfition this'". no injustice."ll Hobbes" solution to the anarchy of the state of nature is a social contract (Sections 4. and the life of man.3. nor use of the cornmudities that may be imported by sea. Each perm"" is arr..).2).fiun of absolm. no account of time. each person is equal insofnr arr.l). such things as require much force. becaus the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth. as may be "fhought there was never such a time. if two peope both want smethirtg. and so you are not at . Or as Hobbes mare coSorfully puts it. have there m place.3. but it is also one of equality No one is under the aulltority of r e than that.9 Hobbes argues that in such a condition equal liherty would lead us into conflict. over all. there is no place for industry. Habbes's description of life in such a cox~dition is b o a s : In such a ccmdition. we are equal because myone can kiH anyone else. no arts.idual. neither is apt to give n " a and ~ so they arc apt to hecme enernies. Hobbes achowledged that it of war. We have no clairns e hence we have unon each other in the state of nature (E21 in F i ~ r &. m nerable to attack by others. no commodious building. Hobbes tells us that amlyzing life in this state of nahre allows us to understand "what malxler of: life there wozkEd be'' if equally free people lived in anarchy.

The point of departure for formal Hobbesian analyses i s the now-tarnous 'prisoner's dilemma. and nlhich I am not at liberv to use. as well as what sorts of agreements ratiox~al agellts would make to extract themselvm horn it. . Hobbes thinks that only the sort of sovereign he advocates can institute an effective system of claim rights. il7soiar as free and equal people create a gove limited right to legislaCe-it has no disabilities ('71 in. in the sellse that sulnjects have no immunities against their so\*reign. But not even Hobbes marlages to simply identify justice with a society's body of laws.1). Hobbes argues that we must give up our rights F a untimited Hohfeldian liberties to act and give the government rights qwa unlimited Hofifeldian powers if we are lo have m effective syskm of claim rights. The crux of Hobbes" social contract i s that subjects claim no immunities against the government. that is indepcndex~t Neo-Hobbesion Theory: lustice os Rules far Mutual Benefit Cantemporary philosophers inspired by Hobbes have made great advances in fomally modekg the problems in Hobbes" state of nature.2) to legislate anything it wishes. to claim that lfie goverrlment was disabled from making some laws would lead to mdless disputes about these limits m d that. But it is easy to misunderstand I-lobbes here. the sovereign has the right (qua power. indeed.zc?s some notion of "ideal justice" of the law (see Mill's ppoit [21. Hobbes's proposed governmcnt is authoritarian.12 Mow. the Wobhesian conception comes close to ide~ltifyil7g justice with the requirenzcnts of the existir-tg legal system (see Mill"s first point. He does not advocate a political system that denies freedom in the sellse of denying subjects claim rights to act.~e the liberty oP his subjects. indeed. you are at liberty to disobey (and thus do not have a duty to obey). would drive us right back into the state of nabre. Hobbesfssovereign can do no injustice: he has sole autbrity to establish laws ar~d t-he rules of pmperty and so doing set tt7e l h i t s to cJetemil. Even Hobbes-who seeks to equate justice to whatever system of :laws the sovereign creates--recogni.%ction 8. two suspects. In sum.no one can be bound to give up her life. it i s a re~narkably authoritarian conent with the untract. thus even if the suvereign were to commmd you to kill yourself or to let him kill you. Figure 8. Figure 8. Hobbes believes that equally free people in the state of nature wodd rexlounce their unlirnited liberties ar~d apee to obey a "'sovereip. Hllbbes acknowledges that. then.2).]"It0 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S right to use." In this dilemma.3). The somreign determines what i s just. Justice is thus about the creation of pmperty in the very bl-oadest sense: the distinction between wh& I have a ciajm right to imd what you have a clairn right to. Because of this. obviously there i s nothing at all liberal about this social contract. Section 8." a government with unlimited powers to determine the rights of its subjects. Hobbes thought.

fnterviewing each offer to Alf (the same offer is -also separately. they both end up with their third option: seven Fars i njail. I go free. I get ten years. they make the f~l:/awing made to Betty). suspect that t-hey acted togetrhcr to puII off: a really big bank job.Aff has shown that confessing is the dumi~ant sirateCW: no matter what Betty does. but they hope to get confessions. she will conclude t-hat no matter what Alf does. they Keep Q s r iet Ct~nfess FIGURE 8. We'll be honest with you: if neither of you a>nfessto the bank job. we% demand the maximum penalty f t Betty. caught shoplifting a bag to cmry their loot in. In some sense. and get seven years. Of ctlurs. and J keep quiet. if B e y confesses and I confess too. So this is what they do.3 %he Prisoner" Diiernma . we're not going to let you both (>FE: you'll each get seven years. I get a year. if Betty confesses too. ~ so she'll get ten years. But now . receiving ody one year in j d . I do best by keeps qujet ar~d confessing. I had better confess too. Alf reasons: if Betty conftrsses. I get seven years. however. they f this wert. Yet. And BettlJ will reason in a parallel way. have been anested by the police. But if you keep quiet and she confesses. turn state" evidence agaimt Bet@ and we% let you go free. he does best if he confesses. we'll let her go free. the poljce have no eviderrce of this. they seem to have ouLsrnarted themselves: by each dob~g what is ixldividually the best. she does best by confessing. So if Retty keeps quiet. The police. Then we'll proceed with the shctpfifting charge. unfortunately. if Betty : I co~~fess. So I know one thhgr if Betty confesses. ""Atf. There i s a clear sense in which it would have been hetter for both of them to keep quiet. M a t if Betty keeps quiet? All reasons: If Betty keeps quiet and I: keep quiet too. If convicted o charg-and the police can obtaiR a convictiondrrch will get a year in prisa~~.3.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 1 91 ALf and Betty. we won? have enough evidence to prosecute. and you% each get ctne year.'" Their choices can be schematically displayed as in Figure 8. S s they will bath confess. The police have enough evidence to convict them both on a ~iatively minor charge-say. and youY be the one ta get ten years.

We must add to these two basic aspects of justice a third---clairns over our bodies m d protection from hnrm. To live logether i the benefits of cooperative social life. Both.2) thus set the stage for the Hohbesian-inspired classical liberal theory of justice. for unless we m proteded fi-on. which seek to derive justice from a rational bargaixl m m g essentidly equal. they wifl do best by confessing. we are caught in prisoner's dilemmas.1 92 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S will not do that. the relation of liberty and properly (Sectiox~ 5. clear: like the parties i n Hohbes" state of nakre. we require negative claim rights pmtecting our liberty (dairns against others that they do not interfere with our actions) and claim rights to acquire and enJoyproperty. each would gain sor. reject Hohbes" claim that free and rational people kvould create a government with the unlimited right to legislate npeace and t o gain and deternine the content of justice. wtltnout rules of justice. for being ralional individuals they will see that if the other keeps quiet.beiag harmed by others. insist these recent foilowers of Hobbes. to better advance their inagents woutd give up some of their liberty and embrace terests ratior~al rules of justice. Alf m d Betty would benefit iff somehow the option of confessing were not eligibl it could he excluded b m the set of actions they were at liberty to perform. Tnstituting such a systern is therefore mutuaZly beneficial. "'T>o not conksd"). free. They will thus ""dekct"' or "cheat" on the cooperative policy of keeping quiet. If they could bath be convinced that confesshg was not a real option for them.~ from a system of reskaint that mimdaed certain actions (fur example.11. Contemporay foltowers of Hobhes m a i x ~ t a ithat ~ ~ the prisoner's dilemma models a wide raxge of social intcractio~~s of under conditio~~s unconstrained liberty: those who are equaUy free are often urrable to achieve the fmits of social cooperation. and self-interested .7. we cannot bet securr.4).4)*14 In contrast to Habbesim theories of justice. Thus. in which each person3 attempt to ac)"rievehis or her ends lead. they would end up cooperating and b o a "onefit. i n either our liberty or use of our properv (Sectio~~ 5. The classical liberal analyses of hzrmm nature as self-kterested (Seclion 3. The lesit. to a ur~productive conflict. cmtemporary classical Ilberals such as David Gauthier and James Bznchanan'haintain that rational agents wodd agree to rules of justice that protect liberty and property rights. and the fundamental importmce of our stabs as equally free (Sections 6. we require negative claim rights protecting our liberty (claims against others that they d a not interfere with our actiom) and claim rights to have our property protected. then. To live together in peacel respecting each other's stratus as equafly free people..3.3) negalive liberty (Section 4. FIence. These liberals.

general. Classical liberal justice also lays great strcss on the role of pmmising and contracts i njustice (Mill's point [ill. Limb or Goods of ilnother. &erall. peaple would recognize that each had a claim. Once again. essentially. and in. Even in the state of nature. as long as we remember that this takes place against equal basic rights to liberty and property This explains the central place of commutative justice in classical liberalism (Section 2. III some ways. desert is centml to their theory of justice. Sction 8. Equal claim rights to noninkrfereme Tlnd prolecticrn of one's body m d proyerty are the core of Lockean-inspired classical liberal justjce. "'Private property. a legal or political system must respect these basic moral rights to life."I6 These naturd rights are basic elcmcnts of ideal justice: wntd politrical arral~gemerrts must respect them. and it is generally seen as a real virtue oi private property m a r k t systems that producers me rekvardeci for their produclive efforts. Classical libera/ism"smmbafence b w r d Desert Claims Classical liberals are mbivalent about the idea of desert (hilays point p]. m d property.The concepeion of justice inherent in the classical :Liberat market swiety is. for Lockeans."l5 These rights are what Mill called '"mord rights" ((point 121. to be just. classical liberals have been wary about transfoming t h i s Observation . right to his or her life. the state of nature was a "%Cafe qf Liherfy. Sectio~~ 8. then."'because each would recopize that he was not free to attack the "Life. As J o h Stuart of it.c. Librtrty and Estates. Nevertheless. cbssical liberals have believed that one of the virtues of private property a d the market syskrn is that they tend to reward the ~ Mill said.1) and so their jusliiicatiorr does not depend-as they do in Hobbes's theory-on being a part: of the estnln:lished legal system. in every deknse industrious. Lockean-inspired theories insist that legitimate contracb specify: are constrained ing systems of rrrubal ac-fvitntqe and just goverl~me~~ts by the prior moral rights of hdividuals.ocke says. ZJocke argued.%). tends to thhk that Cephalus was basically right in saying that justice is a matter of telling the tmtrh and paying your d&ts (Section l. liberty and property. Health.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 1 93 agerrts.1). we can see that the classical liberal justice is shaped by the pivotal role of negative :liberty and individualism. Indeed. Justice is by and large a characteristic of relations between ewaily free individuals." but '"nota Stntc r?fLice~zt.~'fl 7 e deserves the fruits of one's OWII labor. liberv.1). it is not about whett-rer t-he social whole concducts its affairs in a just or appropriate mmner. Section 8.1). the CJiberty. we have natural rights to "Lives. The classic liberal. Locke thus disagrees with Hobbes. As John L. is supposed to mean tbe guarantee to inctividuals of the frujts of their own labour m d ab~thence. the justice of keepir~g one's agreements witfnin the bour~ds of basic mgatiwe clailn rights to liberty and the rights involved in private property.

3 Manistic Revisionist Liberalism: Social Justice and Carrfributians to the Common Good Desert. Moreover.1). the attempt to apply desert to an indivicaual's overall ecmrrric standing leads to incessanf: meddling cvith the market with no ckar idea of what should result. 1s a doctor more or less deserving than a computer programmer? Is a great artist more or less deserving than a second-rate air traffic controller? Because. and "while. but it is innpossjble to determke a person" overall deservhgness. a cornpetititre m a r k t society c m be just only if its competition Ewards the &serving-those who produce or at least make the effort to produce. cfassical tiberals wodd almost always insist that theories endeavoring to reward. people accor$ing to their overall d e s e r v h p e s are overly rationaiist.2Utthough marry contemporary advocates of the welfare state associate it with an egalitarian needs-based distribution (Sections 6. such as her children. and Distribufive Jusfice Claims about desert have played a much larger role in the revisionist libn L.7.erion of justice. version of revisionist liberalism has been at the forefront of theories of distributive justice that seek to relibward peoyie according to their deserts or merits. it insisting that it be fair and that nobody cheat [see Mill's point ( would be nonsensical to demand that the results for the different players be justeff19 8. as in a g m e . If no one is to have ur~deservedproperty. she wiit be free to give it to undeserving others. its early proponents tried to show how the equal provision of needs was cor~siste~~t with people getting w:bat they deserve.4.ismfl of the first part of the mentie* centwy. says the classical liberal. such as a matrhcmatict. argues. for example.3. .1 94 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S about the generaii kndencks of markets based on private property into a strict criterion of justice-in-holdings. there is no way to make such determination~. In a well-defir~ed co~~text.competitio~~. G ~ e and liheral. we may be able to say cvhn deserves the prize. the so-called 'kew erafim inspired by "f: H. Htbhouse. classical liberals have not maktahed that a person" property holdings are just if and only if she deserves those holdhgs. Any such crjl. the freedom of people to dispose of their property as they see fit must be greatly limited. is incompatible wittl a strong cJefense of negative 1i:berty If a person is to be free to dispose of her property as she sees fit. or even overall economic dessrvimgness. kVith its much stronger rationalist m d e ~ b i x l g sthis . Success in the market is determined by a comhiniltim of skill and luck. ' I : Hobhouse.lVor tt7e mast part. 9. Social Gontribufions. we are right in S ) ] . 7b many revisio~~ist erals. they have insisted.

defective. if he has to do hard and muscular work. he teXl us that the ciwic minixnurn paid to a contributing m m b e r of the c o r n u n i t y must be his "true and full property with unlimited right of disposal.. this was a critical. . he must have ft3t3d and rest in proporticm. frorn the necessities frorn the system itself. old-age pensions (such as the Social Secwity system) and w~employmernt insurmce. were often advocated on the grounds that they were the just rewards of those who had previously contributed to thCS common good. the idler'" cor.1 terms of what one needs in order to contrib~rte to s0ciet.g. . but for the sake of that safety differences must be recognized as wilt ensure that the captain" orders will be carried out. the argun7ent is cast entirely il.~tributors desert for a decent existence f i e r e a s dependcnts "'art? a charge upon trhe humanity of the community" and are pmvided with an allowance "for the speciiic purpose of meelting their needs." Hobhouse explicitly contrasts such conthbutors to "&pndentsm-"the have a claim based on helpless. wishes to recmcile social justice as needs provisim with social justice as desert. educational. thc. In general terms.Hobhouse. if he has a certain political responsibility he must be Eurnished with adequate powers. For example.sions of the welfare? state were deserved rewards was especially important in its expansion in the United I(ingdom and the United States after the Scco~td World War. and so the equal satisfaction of needs must be adjzrsted to what one must have to effectively contribute to society.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 1$ 9 The principle ctf distribution by needs would be generally recognized as broadly a principle of equality. e."""' In thc history of the development of the welfare state.zl We see here I-lobhouse's moral collecti\iism m d his tende~~cy tru tie justice OIT good (Sections 1. however. argument. subject to the adequate maintenance of ur. and a claim to equal consideration. not what one deserves. Every one ctf whom a function is required may claim on his side the ccmditions necessary to its performance. The first elemen& of the modem welfare state.y. the common good is maintained by the xrvices of its members. consequently. . .4).cEul functions. That the provi. m a t one needs depends on one's social function.3. If he is a brain-worker he needs air and exercise to keep him fit. captain and sailors have an equal interest in the safety of the ship. Old-age pensions and unemployment insurance were 11ot charity: they were the just deserts of workers who had made socid contributions. In advocating a "civic minimumm----a nnirtimw level of resources-Hobhouse was jnsistent that this was not charity but the workhg class" just re'iuards fC?r ~ontrthz~fi~zg to the filmmm g130d. and housing assistance were viewed as deserved . We may then define Distributive Justice as equal satisfaction of equal needs. Differences arise in a system in which all have a part.4. Thus far. We have now to consider it-re ground ctf differentiation. . .

we have seen (%ction 7. we must have a socially recognjzed notion of what is valuable. there must be a socially sanctioned idea of what is valuable. I have stressed the collectivism of the new liberal accow~t of social justice: justice mandates that one should receive what one needs to contribute to the common good and be rewarded according to one" cconthat the irtditributio~~ to the cornmon good. and any particularr service will have different value to differen. then. For desert to be the guiding principle of social justice. Mobhouse argued that if we are . and ideas of self-development and positive liberty. is valuable and a collectivist conviction that there is a common gaod and those who contribute to it are especialfy daerving.~ of p~n~ography. Underlyixng the new liberal" desert-based conception of social justice is not only a rationalist suppo&tion that the government can reliably debut a monistic notion of what temine lrhe deservhgness of ir~dividuals.S7eory of social justice (see Section 4. \vater jets. Hayek dismisses the very idea of social justire as rewardhg desert for just this reason.""" For a society to adopt a notion of social jusMce as the systematic rewarding of people accordjng to their deserts. But of course.t: members of the same society. Typicailyf those who employ desert-based ideas of socid justice appeal to what is of value to society or what promotes the social or common good. The good of the inc2ividual (her self-developmat) is thus in harmony with the good of sociely (the self-development of e v e ~ o n e )indeed. emphasizil-rg the classical liberal plwalist position that there is no such thing as "'value to society. large cars.cuh r people (or an organization). . the monistic harmony between individuai and socid good. their poli"es were based on the good of the "sncial orgTmism as a whole" or the inCcrc3sts of "'crrganized society as a wholle.1 96 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S compensations for those who had contributed.3). To =ward a person for doing s o m e t h g presupposes that what he does is a good or valuable thhg. w h a t is valuable is simply productio~~.e. To s o m . are at the core of his new liberal t.'' '*%rvices call only have value to parti. New liberals were usually very clear that in contrast to the inditridualim of classical liberaiism. to the c o m m good by fighthg fascism. Liber?: and Welfare 'Thus far.'"24 Development. not -all productior~ is valued by everyone: many insist that the productior. This gives tt7e impressior~ viduall's rights and duties are totally subservient to the gaod of society* But Hohhouse's collecthisrn is moderated by his conception of the common good asthe harmonious developwnt of human I7atul.3) that for Hohhouse one can ox~ly develop one" s o w n nahnre i na society whclrc other people arc? d s o developing their personalities. or moder11 art is not valuable at all.

education. as Hllbhouse sees it. :Notice that i n this theory of liberal justice. when thf. Because. negative claim r i e t s to nonillterfercnce do not have the c m positio~~ that they occupy iz7t classical lilberal theory The very aim of nourishing development and true freedom requises a complex of negalivc claim rights to noninkrference a r ~ d positive claim rights to income. At least in the most clear-cut cases. however. For J o h Passmore. But to select on the basis of merit is typicallyfirzl~urd Irtctkirzg: the selection aims to pick the person who will. it conceives of socic. then. Although the new liberals do not reject classical liberalism" devotion to negative freedom. Hobhause emphasized.9 as a vast mass of competitions.m r e competent ought always to be prefemed to the less campetent. they stress that much more is required to promote developmmt t h a sirnply ~ e~~suring each citizen her negative liberty. Civil Justice and Facilitofory Social Justice Justice as giving people what they deserve is related to justice as awarding positions on the basis of merit. if someone has worked very hard to prepare herself. of mcessity. but if w e m selecting on the basis of merit we will consider only her competency to play baseball-how well she will do as a member of the team." E This i s a strongly mcritocrufic conception of: justice. Rut. Hobhouse argued. we need to provide the conciitions necessary for development for everyone. we should understand sociev as a cooperative elldewor. Social justice. They are not the same idea. we rnjght say she deserves a dance. in the future. by diligently practicing to make the hascball team. =inforces the necessily of the "civic minimumu-a rninirnal level of income necessary i f a persopl is to develop.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 1 97 to assist each other in dweloping our capacitks. G'tf course. would also guarantee all citiztms have adequate health c m : those who are sick are unable to develop their potential.3). com. do the best job. Ib clairn you deserve somthir"tg is typicatly to focus on some past n c c m piilisl~menfof yours: a person who has given a lot of effort in a good cause desemes some recompense. development of all its citize~~t. desert says "thank you" for sorne past action. 7he f i s t condition for growth is claim rights to basic liberties. concem the equal pmvision of the conditiom for the growth of all citizens. each of which should . A society devoted to the." acccording to which "except by way of pmishcnent or a result o f kapacity. and so on. liberty is not the sole condition for development. This.petition for en& m e to it. no perso11 ought to be excluded from participaeicrr~ in any form of desirabe activi9 tmless there is. Education also becomes a major concern of the state (Section 4. say. we &odd cooperate to assist each other in devdaping our personalities. selection according to competency is the heart of "civil justice.

zfi To see how civil justice can give rise to facilitatory social justice. L V h ys h C ) U L L f not the Catholic Church be free to spend its money as it sees fit? Passmrds ideal of civil justire is allied to rationalism insofar as it unthat posd e r s t d s all of sociey in terns of bureaucratic orl. C)sr the face of it. there will he losers in fair competitions. this seems a mist&. classical liberals have insisti?d that it cmazot be qplied to swiety as a h o l e .. i17 co~~trast. 9. justly.4. Propotypically seek to assist the nents of egditarian social justice. But they go beyond civil justice by demanding that a saciety should take positive steps tofacl'fifate the wider participation of its members in desirable activities and the selection of the potentially most competent persons in any competitive situation.cd e h e d puqoses m d goals. Passmore observes.. for example. however. '*losc. X s it unjust for Ca(Jldic sehoots to hire a malh . To be sure. think about the common metaphor of life as a race. as required by the equality of opportunity (Sectio~~ 6.]"It8 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S be run such that the most connpetent win.4. competence is it-re proper criterion. in some way. In its most moderate form-let us call it facititatc~ry social justice-the advocates of social justice do not reject outright the leading assumptions of civil justice. even though a Baptist candidate mitght be a better math kacher? According to the idea of civil justice.rs"or worst-off mentbers ol society. But if the schools are the property of the Catholic Chur& ant[ it funds its o m schools.anizatio~~s sess goals they seek to achieve. But ai&ough selection according to merit has its place in public irrstitutions with specifi. it seems that the Cat. Such facilitaticm takes the ft>rmof so modifying the socio-economiccircumstances which disadvantage particular individuals that those circumstances no longer act as a shackle. not deny either that some forms of activity are particularly desirable or that when a process of selection is inevitable. If life is a race. the CalXnolic math leacher is really more competent. for socieq as a whole does not share commorl notions of deskirable activities or what constitutes excellence in perfoming them. we can see that civil justice easily endorses a mokrately egalitarian notion of social justice. civil justire appears to be hostile to egalitarian social justice (see Sections 6.holic hiring authorities mtrst show that.teacher just becmse she is Catholic. and so possess standat-ds of coqekrrcy measured by ability to meet those goals.ween the more m d less competent and allows that. Although such meritocratic ideals are often associated wieh classical liberalism. 8. h d again. say the classical liheralsf aIly attempt to apply a me~tocratic nogon of justice t-hrou$uut socie'ry is bow~d to require large-scale interkre~~ces with the liberty a ~ property d of citizens. classical liberals have supported selection accordhg to merit i n relation to campetition for government or public positions. or a series of . They dc:. Consider. On closer inspectiom.1): civil justice stwsses the distinction bet.4). the status of religions scl?ools.

c m we say that we have selected the best? Should m t a fair competilior~ eyuirlly prepare the eyuaily talented? This gives rise to a notion of socriaI. child care.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 1 99 races. If we limit ourselves to those who have had the opportunity to train.4. I have contrasted classical and revisionist liberal-. no reason why ail talents must be equally distributed among all social groups-whether they are or are not is a matter to be investigated. 8 .phasizes a thoroughgoil-rgequality of fair opportunity (Sections 6. say. Pasmore says. of each . we s k p l y da not b o w whether.jwstice that em. Passmore hsists. Giwn this. A Revised Secial Confract Among Free and Equal People Pluralistic Disfinguished from Monisfic Revisionist Liberalism mroughout this book." But he will reject the idea that justice requires that social groups must be ""rtlp~sented in proportim to their numbers in any form of desirable activity. hence he rejects quotas as a violation of civil. At the h e a t ol this type of mvisimist liberalism is a monistic doctrine that the good. The propment of civil just-ife can "protest agab~st any attempt to rule out blacks. Perhaps the person best suited to the job IIever received adequate trajwling. or women. he argtres that civil justice is opposed to the use of quotas in awardhg scarce positions. 8.eenmen and women or between Asims and Europeans.4). Passmore is not enough of a ratior~aiist to claim that he can make such a strong claim to kl~owledge. there must be an unjust competition. a case of civil injustire. men and wornell in a certain occupation am not the same as their proportion in the general population. But if some peopk are unable to train for the race becatrse they are too poor to take time off of work or camot afford good running shoes. 4 Pluralisfie Revisionisf Iliberalhnn. masse to enter any particular occupation. then civil justice demands that the winnes be the best entrantsthose who are best at r u m h g . we camot infer that just because the praportio~~s of. then we might question vvhether the best are really being selectd. Although Passmre accepts that the ideal of civil justice can be extended to include facilitatary social justice and its attendant ideal of equality of fair opportmity. Government provision of equal educatknal opportuxGties. ism. and head start programs all become part of the expanded ideal of rewading people accordhi. justice. The type of revisimist liberalism on which I m i n l y have been focusing might be calied mclnisfic rez?isioni~Iliberalism. ipso facto. to their merit. There is.'"2 For. h l y if one h e w that the competencies for all ocall social gmups coutcl one incupations were equafly distributed amor~g fer that an instance of ""under-" or representation is. as b~competent en. mathematical abilities are equally disthbuted be?t-w. say.

or realize her true self. pursuit of pleasure. a ~ sometimes about what is goad-what is kvorth pursuing in life. notiol~s that reasodlct people have various. As we have just seen. have different goals in life. a right is a recognized power that we need in order to contribut-e to the social."29 We are free in the sense that each person is capable of chooshg her goals i n life and formivrg plans to achieve them. as well as lfie claim that. is impossihlct. : l : H:. and it will reflect my choices. It is this monistic ideal that is the foundation of posi4. :Not only must we recognize that each us pursues his or her own vision of what makes life worth living. Rawls also endorses a strong version of moml individrtlalism (Sction 3. not an hdividual claim that c m block social projects r i g h t against that seek to promote the common good. different plans t h y wish to pursue. Thus for Green 'k a society as such. Nwertheless. tive freedom (Sectio~~ equaliv (qua equal rights) is harmonious with freedom (Section 7. Thus. and others was this ideal of the common good. Hobhause. for mderstanding of moraiity a ~ society d instance. This pf~kralisfi~ mously advanced by John Rawts i n A Theory ofl~istice(7. nobility or kvhatever-that every reasonable person must pursue. advocated a collectivist theory of justice accordhg to which "a right is a p w e r claimed and rrtcowized as contributory to a common g o d .200 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S person is to fully develop her capacities.31. Different people. perhaps lfie greakst revisionist liberal of this sort. this type of ~viaionist liberalism understands justice in terns of what one needs to contribute to the cornmon good. " b r Green.'""~ The h a r t of the liberalism of Green. and what contributors deserve and merit. prhcQles of justice defke the rights of hdividuals. . good. We are eqzlal in that we are owed "eyual col~sideration and respect. be guided bp her real will. Rawls" revisionist liberalism is both more individualistic and more pluralistic than the versiol~ advanced by Green and Hobhouse.""""'For Racvls. person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfnrt-. holding d competing.of society as a whole cannot override. This versiol~ of monism allows that each permnfs true good may be somewhat different. and crucially depend on her choices-my developed personality will not be the same as yours. rights that are so importmt m d . properly ur~derstood.971. liberalism-most fain the past thirty years. this type of rwisionkt liberdim presupposes that there is a good life for humans. Like the classical liberals (Section 8-22). but we also must recognize that "each.3). which only a liberal society can achieve. that is.2). Grt3e11. Bosmquet. Rawis typically illsists that there is r ~ single o goal-such as the.Rawls starts from the supposition that we are f i e and eqztal.)-has closer ties to the class-ical doctlxine.4). Monistic revisionist Iiberalism also tends to be far more collectivist in its than classicai liberalism. RawLs accepts a versim of pluralism (Section 3. Another type of revisionist liberalism has dminated palitical theory reui~iottisf.

Betty wmts resources so that she c m write the Great Americm Novel. Rawls begins from prennises that have much more in common with classical liberals such as Berlin and Hayek.bed's c o m i m e x ~ t to s moral indi\iidualism and pluralism: its aim understood. Rawlsian.ough living together in peace. j"Jot everyone can have all he or she walits. whereas Green m d Hobhouse believed that a wholesale reconstmction of liberal theor~s was requlscd to show this. we confront the complexity of political theory*The "'new liberal" followers of Green and Hobhouse sought to construct a welfare state 0x1 foundations that were strikingly differex~t from the classical liberals m d which borrowed much from socialism. But as Hobbes also stressed. p r ~ e r l y prehensive wel. society. but in its mderstanding of individuals.7. we have competing claim for t-he resources that are prduced by social cooperation. So. pluralistic revisionism stays much closer to the classical li." 2x1 contrast. Because of all this. then. social relations are also competitive: each of us would Itke the resources-the goods and services-that are produced so that we c m achicve our most Cherished goals.fare state along the lines acjvocated by Hobhouse and Dewey The contrast should. and J&xr Dewey in Ammica. supposes that (l) part of a collective er~tity "'society. and morality. then. England. is the nature of social life? Rawls's s s w e r is that social relations are partly cooperative and partly cmpetitive. not he pushed too far: the writing of Rawls and his f ollowers displays mitI. M a t .2): society is an endewor for mutual adwantage and we all can gain thl.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 20 1 strong that even corlsideratiom based on pmmoting the overall sociail welfare or common good are unable to override them. Ulthately.X N~evertheless. and (2) we are not Rawls.'?o whose interests we can he sacrificed. Hobhouse in. Again. we have a choice: we c m resolve our competing .yof the self -devetopmex~tal commitne~~ts that were at the heart of monistic revisionism: the idea that the state should. these commitments lead to a comis to show that. we ~equirc what he calls a "public conceptio~ of~justiceff-some standard by which we c m resolve our competing claims. then. Hobbes was right (Section 8. kvhereas ALf wants to explore Australia. They arc?cooperGoods are prclduced ative because we all benefit from social ir~teraction. and services obtained that would never exist without social cooperation. Rawls says. To a large extent. explicitly sought to move liberalism closer to socialism-x~ot simply in its support of goverx~mer~t policies to help the poor. actively assist in the development of our distinche human capacities is a dominant t-heme in R a d s as well as Gree11. we have different goals.

he is tryunder these conditions.ra1 lottery" of birth. are morally arbibary. and cait for redress.1) and so could be accepted by everyone. Rawls tells us. then.alposition" behjnd a "veil of ignorance. of course. They do. An agxement under the veil of specific facts ignorance would thus be fair. In such a society.) This leads Rawls away from a desert-based theory of social justice. they we arbitrary Erom a moral point of view (Retrai:i here from Section 6. then we must ehil7k about what sort of morality everyone could accept. In such betwee11 citize~~s over the distributio~~ of resources societies. If we are meeting to determine cvbat arc! the best pritlciples of justire. such as its level of economic development. that merits special emphasis is One featurrt of the veil of ig~orance Rawls's exclusion of bawledge about natural talents. Our natural tallents. and so we must think about: what cve wodd accept behind the veil of ignorance. (2) naturaf talents (for example. The aim of the exclusions is to rule out speciSic in. they are not in. Probably the most striking feature of Rawls" col~tract eheory is that the parties to the social contract decicfe on a set of moral pri'7ciple" the "crl:igjn. For most . should not achowledge that those with greater natural talents deserve greater resources. where bias in one's own favor is impossible."' Tlis means that they do not h o w certain facts about themselves. m k e wh.and (4) societ. intefigence). such as the laws of economics and psyclhology. a position to hold out for m agreement that provaes them with extra benefits-how could they. Rawls says. no one deserves greater intelligeme or nakral skills. The alternative is a society that c m agree on a moral code to adjudicate cornpetjng claims. Justice. the cor~flict has been resolved by force. Those with the necessary force-the rulers-hrtve c m pelled others to live according to the l w s set down by the rulers. the veil of ignorance restricts our howledge of our own talents: as h w l s sees them.formation. m d we c ing to impress on us that if we are really interested injustice and fairness. in which people receive mtural and social advitntages that they do not deserve.ytscircumstances. such as their (l) place in socieq. Thus. are unjust. informaEavor her. however.& she gets are fair in the sense that they arc? innpartial (see Mill's point [S]. force accept. know general facts.2 the egalilnrian argument that inequalities that stern from the "nnatu. f r a has been used. (3) "conception of the goodM". it does not favor some sorts of peopk over others-the veil of ignorance is meant to express this.202 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S claims through force or by a public conception of justice that we all can ~ h o s t all-perhaps all-societies that have ever existed. Section 8. no one is but she can see that the rules that deterlikely to receive all she wm~ts. since they do m t h o w INho they are? Rawls realizes. that no one ever met of really forget who we are. tion that would allow a person to propose p'incip1e"Ihrt Justice is impartial. some things are irrelevmtl that is. Because people do not k ~ o w about themselves.

the minilnum you might receive is what you will get if you end up at the bottom of that society. Thus.Consequently. "'How does the bottom of sociev fare under each gmposal?" R w l s calls this strategy "maximin"qou muxlmize the vlirzimum you might receiw. Eor ar~y social arrangemer~t. or past accomplishments. IZawis holcts that the parti. income m d weal&. She witl. you maximjze the minimurn if you select the society in which the bottom or worst-off class gets m m than does the bottom or worst-off class in m y alternative society.3"~awls% veil of ignormce underfor diffe~ntial treatmernt based on spwiat mines all possible argumex~ts talents. "Ef this set of principies is chosen.nt 1 of birth m d other inelcrvant cmsideralions-justiee d c m d s an approximation to equality of resources. competencies. he excludes col~sideratiox~s of deservinpess and merit from his theory of justice.. We observe here a common phenomenon: roughly the same political arrangement c m be advocated trnder the concept of justice or under equali@. and the basis of sdf-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any. Rawls" libem1 theory of social justice is pluralist and indivicfualist and excludcs desert al~nost entire+ Rawls tells us that when evduating each proposed set of prhciples.es to the original position would accept his "General Conception of JusticeH":%ll social values-liberty and opportunity. Thus.. ask. the "highest bottomf'that in which the least well off do as well -as possible.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 203 of the claims a person might make to he specially deserving-her contributim ws m r c important. cayacities. she provided a ill7ique service. by ab- . position. she was a high producer-stem from her natural talents or her lucky social. Shce Rawls wishes to exclude claims based on such talentr. combined with an argument that equal treatment requires a type of resource equality (Section 6-41. If we are to treat people equaily in trhe sense of impartially (see Mill's 5 1 abovef-if our trrratment of them is not to depend on afcidents poi.3) is characterized by monism m d collectivism and stresses desert and selectiox~ according to merit. haw well will X fare if I am the worst-off person in the sociely?" So. a rational contractor will cor~sider each possible position that she may occupy in a society. and circumsta~ces.2. whereas our first version of revisionist liberalism (Section 8. Rawls argues that you will thus select the principles of justice that result in a society with. as a first approximation. or all. of these values is to everyone" advantageeP'33 :Rawis%lfieory of justice is a variation on the a r g m n t for eyuality from impartiality that we examined i n %ction 6. one witr be most congests &at i cerned with the westion. Rawls sugndeliberating &out principles of justice.

If we are distributing a fixed distriamomt of resources-for example. all that remahs is our basic equality.4. under these collditions to be impartial must lead to equal treatment.35 CrttciaUy. sirnce the greater bequalities in (2) do not result b additjonal advantages to the worst ofE. Eeanamies are. arl true tiberdism-as based on equality rather than liberty (Section 7. however. RawIs allows inequality of holdings if the inequality works to the long-tern advantage of the least well off. "smallest'" piece is as large as the '%"biggestw piece. and so on. The above argument supposes an individualist view of burnan nabre (Section 3. Rawls" theory departs from resource egalitarianism.then.Carim distribution of resources. . It is this strong egalitarim element in. 'To induce the more talented to work hard. if: we suppose that people reaXiy are devoted to jwstice these additional incentive payrrrents to work will not he necessav.36 This implies.9:the better off will not work hard-or hard enough-for the sake of the commzlmity or because thcy are committed to justice. it will be necessary to pay them more. Rawls's liberal. Consequenlly. Only if: the more talented will benefit from the use of their talents will they develop &em and work. individualist conception of human nat-ure draws hirn back from endorsing a thoroughly egali. Suppose parties in the origkal position are faced with two possible distributions of resources. which is bex-teficial to the least well off.3). Rawis% "'Cmeral Conception of Justice" selects Distrihutiol~(1) over Distribution (2). that alt%lough society could have the addifioml resources in (2). however. Some sociatist egalitarians have criticized Rawis on just this ground. Rawls" revisionist liberalism that led Dworkin to depict Rawls" liberalism-mdi.204 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S skacting away all our individual characteristics. In two respects. apparently by exte~~sion. and to what degree. Nevertheless. People in the orighal posilion are deliberating not only how to divide a fixed stock of resources. dividing a cak then m ecj~tal the bution will always be selected by the muinnin. h an equal cJivisio~~. as in Figure 8. since all pieces are the same size. When an increase in inequaiity no longer results in gabs to those at t-he bottom of sociew Rawls deems it to be unjust. Rawlsfsegalitarianism would prefer the overall p o m r society cor~sponding to DjstribtlCion (I). the stock of resourcres will grow. dynamic. Thus.3). f l) b w l s ailows inegualities of resourcres if those ineyuditks work to the advmtage to the least well off. holvever. but in what way. it would seem that al:low% some inequality of wealth and income is necessaq to promote the overall illcrease in wealth. Rawls" theory is sufficiently egaljtarian to justify wasting resources to achieve equality (see Section 6. It seems quite certain that the stock of reclsources will not significantly grow under a strict egalitarian distribution. to undertake long trainingJ to perform unpieasant tasks.

aspect of Rawlsfs o f Justheory comes to t%re fore in what he calls the "Special Conceptio~~ tice. At the same time the obstacles to the exercise of the equal liberties decline and a growing insistence n upon the right tct pursue our spiritual and cultural interests asserts itself. in modes ctf social unictn consistent with equal liberty.4 Two Passible Distribulions of income (2) The Iiberaj. one will insist on equal liberties and appartuni"ces. all primary goods-ix\c2uding liberty and opporbnity-are to be distril>u&de y ~ a i f y unless an unequal distributio~~ maximally adva~tages the least well off. This ." According to the General Conception. It . as opposed to the resource egalital-iar~. as the general level of well-being rises (as indicated by the index ctf primary goods the least fitvored can expect) only the less urgent wants remain tc3 be met by further advances. . . But Rawls adds. the extent that they are necessary to prepare the way for a free society The denial of liberty can be defended onXy if it is necessary to raise the level of civilization so that in due course these freedoms can be enjoycd. . Let US note why this should be so. First of all.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM FIGURE 8.37 Rawls insists that Beyond some point it becomes and then remains irrational from the standpoint uf the original position to acknowledge a lesser liberty for the sake of greater material means and amenities of office. they will not exchange a lesser liberq for an improvement in economic wel lbeing. and these restricticms can be granted only t~:. the ends and excellences to which they are drawn.is only when social conditions do not allow the effective establishment of these rights that one can concede their limitation. If the parties assume that their basic liberties can be effectively exercised. X creasngly it becomes more important to secure the free internal life of the various communities of interests in which persons and groupweek to achieve.3" Rawis a r p e s that except if one finds onesdf han impoverished society (in which case s o m sacrike of fiherty for ccronodc advitr~cement may be justified).

and disabilities. %cond Prjnciple: "%cial and economic hequalities are to be arranged so that they are both t of the least advmtaged . and (qualified)equal resources. het. powers. liabilities.ality)and Mohfeld's analysis of the relatims between liberties. these core elements of classical liberalism are unprotected in his liberal theory of justire. the egalitarian distribution of resomes.2 analyzecl classical liberaf theories of justice. liberty. . But Rawls's notion of freedom does not include economic liberty or private property. irnmunities. . claim rights to property and contracts at the heart of justice. claims. and imparti. the principle of fair equality of opportunity (Section 6. combines (in order of priority) equal lirberty. " ~ ~ o the Rawls holds that the first.cc3. pluralism. desert. which specifies his farnous two principles of justice: First Prkciple: "'Each person is to have m equal right to the mast exknsive s y s t m of cqual h s i c liberties compatihie with a siJnilar system of Liberty for all. Section 8. Underlying this theory of justice is the classical liberal's core value of negative liberty and its supposition of equal freedom. and skepticism about our -nbi:lity to know what people really deserve. I focused on. 7. which place equal negative claim rights to liberty. Rawls's theory of jctsti. equal fair opporhnity. agreement.206 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S leads to the Specid Cmceptjon of Justice.4) is similarly prbr to clause (a).3 analyzed a monistic revjsionist liberal conception of justiee. Rawls does m t endorse freedom hgewral. 8. advocating instead the traditional list of specss liberal freedom (Sections 5.3). two well-known sketches of the elements of justice: Mill's five aspects of justice (legalitypmoral r%hts. Indeed.4. Sectio11 8. principle: the first must be met before the second comes into play. as w e l as its cmmitment to individualism. duties.5 Summary : Ibegan in Section 8. principXe is "lexical@ prior" t second. (a) tro the g ~ a t e sbex~efit (h) attached to offices amd positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of o p p o r t m ~ . which puts much greater stress on collectivism and rationalism. Crucial to this understar~ding of social justice is that those who contrihutre to the common good deserve rewards and that people should be given what they need to . Within the egalifarian second principle. giving desert a somewhat ambiguous mle.7 by skctchhg t-he terrain of justic portmt elements of our practiee of ~ustice that a theory otjzrstice must organize and explain. egalitarian. then.

4.. .McPherrion. vol. p. S. S. J. For helpful explications of Hc>hfe1dJs analysis.p. or way of life. C. 29(a1)lchap. Zmmanuel Kant quoted in lames Racheis. Cry 9f Frcedonr (New York: Oxford University Press. chap.%7. 19721. 323-. see his "5ome Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning. 19801. 2 (Summer 3973). p. 7". h a w i n g nothing about their specific natures. TIzc Moral Fozdndatic~tzs ofXi2y. M-ichaef Freeden. Coval.3.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 207 be effective contribubrs. 267-278. C. in John Gray. I s t ~ s s e d that although a lheory of justice emphasizbg merit is often associated with classical liberalism. For Rawls-md here he follows the classical liberal. See Michael Slote.stanford. Consent and Justite." U~zE't?rrsify o f 7l0rofztoLaw Reaiew. chap. 5.'" Edward N. 127.pp.eduj." "cinl fztstice (Qxford: Clarendon Press. 4. For a very good analysis of theories of distributive justice that pays attention to principles ctf desert. Compare Norman's view of ""equal benefitsr' in %etion 7. Zaita. Rights (Mimeapolis: Universiv of Minnesota Press. Wittgerzsteirz mid Justice (krkefey: University of Caiifornia Press.'bccording to which a "man" reward should depend on the costs which he incurs in his work activity.t-radition-justice is comp""w"doi the rulus that free and equal people woulcl accept. 33 (19831. 209. Contrasted to Hobhouse" ccoilectivist desert theory is Raw:is% pplralist egalitarian revisionist lilberal conception of justice (Section 8. "Distrjibutive Justice. ed. especially in the distributior~of wealth. ed. E. vol. 8. 1. Starqord Etzcycloi?edzi. para. W. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 'T11e Logic of Rights. OIILiberty @and'Other Essays (New York: Oxfcjrd University Press. see R.'T/zilos~pilzy and Pzlblr'c Af~~irs. On fastice (Oxford: CXarendon Press. 30. But in :Rawls"s versior~ of the social contract. 1988). Sumer. "'cornpenmation. 1987). 8. values.p. 3rd ed. 23 (39131. All the quotes frorn Mill in %ction 8. a r ~ d opporhnnities. Smith. Robimon. 6. The allied ideas of civil justice and facilitatory social justice werc? also examhed.4). they select p~nciples that stress their equality. p. 5-10." Yale Law Reviere vol. 19911. the ge~~eralizr-ttion of selection by merit to all social positions presupposes a view of society that is much closer to Hobhouse" revisionist liberalism than to Hayek" classical liberalism. The iF3atClc. We now turn. and 5. 197&). incorne. The Elelnezits o f Moral Philosophy. pp. S. 27'. The Marat Fozindatiovzs ctf" Rights. pp. "Desert. I am drawing here on L.zof PI2ifusuyIzy [nnliineat http: / /plato. Lucas.s(Oxford: Oxfcjrd University Press. 8&82. R. and although selection of civil service positions by merit has been edorsed by cfassical iiberals. 3. 1. 103. 2. paras. see julian Lamont. See Jarnes M-.1 are frorn Utilitnritzr-zlzr'snz.. For Hohfeld's classic analysis.lhl. 16-59. 1999). pp. David Miller considers a third principle. John Stuart Milt. Utififariajtisnr.See Hamah Pitkin. 1 am again fc~llowing Sumer. to exambing some leads rronliberal theories of justice. chap. the equality rather than t-he freedom of the parties is salient.

33. p. 11.pp. NY M ..pp. 45-65. p. Rawfs. 13. chap. "Public and Private Interests in Liberal Political Economy. 16. see 13. uf Soci~lJtrstz'ce 19. Xbid." hinobert M. 5 (2800). 1948 fl65lj). A T.. 1960 [1689]). Paul Harris and John Morrow. Old and New. The second is from John Maynard Keynes. 168-169. ""A Kantian Concepticm of EqualiQ. Principles ". David Gauthier. 13.. H. ed. MA: f-iarrrard University Press.. Sharpe. See T. p." in his Essays irz Persuers-iotz (London: Macmillan. 13. On the idea of harm. 39991. 4th ed. 28. Benn and G. See David NjlXer" snow-classic study of social justice. p. 33. Law. chap. ed. E Gaus. pp. Tzoo Pen tises ofGot?enztlzc~zf (Cambridge: Cambridge tinik~ersity Press. 5. I. Green. 26. chap. pp. . revised ed. A. Mt~mls James Suchanan. Hobhouset The Eltvnlcn ts o f Social jzrstice (London: George Allen and Zlnwin. 1922)..yl cchp. p. 6. Hayek. 9.sect. Legislntl. 21. Ibid. 14. 38. 110--111. Cambridge University Press. E Harrcjd (London: Oxford University Press.. p. 3.2. R. see: Gerald E Caus. Compare here Caliie's comments on commutative justice in Section 2. "17% 20. F-fayek.1(Socktaf Justicr. See J. 24. Ibid. p.. sect.iliatl~ar. Martin" Press. " m e End of L. 26. 79. Michael Oakeslhcttt.See Section 7. p. 1950). Lecfztres un the Pritzcz'ples f:$ hlifical Obligation n~zdOf1zer Writittgs. 2: TfzeMirage ". by Agreenrenf (Oxfcjrd: Clarendon Press. Stewart. chap. Phi19755).1. Pzrbfic ~ n Private d ilz Socint (New Uc2rk: St. Passmore. see my Social Philosoplz.71]).l. 1976 [1C-. 1986). For a fuller treatment. in Peter Laslett.zeoryo f fzlsfice (Cambridge. 3). sect.: p.. 2: The M i r n ~ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.r. eds. 75. 17. ""Civil Justice and Its Rivals.. Second Em tkc o f Covenltnenf. 36. " in inugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon k y ...208 JUSTICEAND IIBERAL~S 9. 12.. 30. Ibid. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Thomas f-iobbes. 46. 1983). 19721.. Law.110. Jzlrstl're (Londctn: Edward Amold. chap. E A.Xbid.tf Polifical Ecorromy. Emphasis added. The first quote Is Prom J. 1. Kelley. John Stuart Mill. pp. e d ~(Cambridge: .. 209 (Book 2. C-. See my ""Lberatism at the End of the Centuryf'' "~zirz~al o f Pctlitiml Idmtc~gies. chap." in S. 123. (Fairfield. 1979). Hobson. TIze Science f:f WmElh. 25. vol. para. 1986). 22. pp. para. See Joim Rawls. The Limits cl( Liberfy (Chicago: Unirrersity ctf Chicagct Press. Ibid. Ibid. 15. where he maintains that desert-based theories of justice are especially approprhte to market societies: Social Jusf ice. 23. eds. l986). 1971). 1-88. ed. 29. 27. Le. Sir Williarn Ashtey. Legisindion and Liberttyt vol.. John Loclse. 16.X consider Neo-Hobbesian a>ntractualismin more depth in my Soci~l losophy (Armonk. 1474). 1 95ff. ed. Readilzgs iz Socitzl' a ~d Pat itickzf Philasopfly (Oxford: Uxford University Press. 2'75. MJ:Augustus M. E. A. 18. 1-38-139.aissez-Fajre.o~z nrjd Libertyf vol.

pp. 302-303. For complicaticlns." The Elvrnenfs 0fSoczit. Yet the just was rightly declared by Aristotle is be a farm of the equal. Xbid . pp.. Equality is a word which many fear and detest. pp. 33. see RawEs. 38. 303. "Justice is a name ta which every knee will bow. 35. 39. 1983). 542-543. See C. Xnequaliq and Community. The issue is more complex than indicated here. 94. . and ""Incentives." Tanner LecCzircs on Hrrllgalz VoIues (Salt Lake City: Univergty of Utah Press. Fred Miller Jr.l Jusriice.. and jeMrey Paul. A. eds. As Elnbhouse observed. Gotttecrmporay I>uliliml nnd Suc. A Theoy oflustice. 36. X comider the similarities of Rawis to these earlier theorists in The Modenz Ll'ber~l T!$eojyjo f Malz (New York: St. Ibid.p. Rawls. Cohen.JUSTICE AND IIBERAL~SM 209 32.. ""Te Pareto Argument for Inequality" h EEtlen Frankel Paul. A Tf~eary o f Jusiiice. 160-185. 34. 1495) pp. Martin's Press. p..itrl Pljilusophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Xbid. 37. 1992). 65ff.

one obvious a-rd plausible explan"tior7 is the tremendous il7Ruence exern socialist thinkhg. or the satisf~tion of needs. equality. One of the m a h aims of this chapter is to explain why socialism accords a less prominent place to justice in its conceptual shucture. Ac- . although perhaps putting more emphasis on the egalitarian f e a t u ~ and s criticizing the ways &at Rawls illlows inequality. The Scientific Socialism Answer: The Study of Power Relations The first a~swer-which is short and sweet-takes very sel-lously Marxfs daim that i s theory of socialism is "scientific'%d not moralistic." discussims of social justjce. of course. Now. Insofar as socialists endorse theories of justice.1 Our discussions of equality in Chapter h ar-rd Section 7. 1 1 Marx on Societies and Their Justice Socialism and Justice Socialist justice is often equated with egalitarianism. is the core idea.ce. alrnost nor~exis tent. the line between egaktarim revisionist liberal and moderate socialist views is often murky indeed.3 have covered most of the. ground of '"socialist justice. especially the equal distribution of resources. a cised by Karl Marx i vehement critic of capitalism. based on a claim &at hurnans are fw-rdamntaly equal. '*DoesMarx have a theory of justice?"' Let us exanthe three competing mswers. these are typically dwelapments or extensions of revisiox-rist .liberal theorks. not justice. nlthowgh Marx was." h its conceptual structure. it is ul-tckar whelher he was prepared to employ the cox-rcept of justice ir-r criticizing capitalism or whether he advanced a socialist conception of justj. Particularly striking is the way in which many socialists have come to embrace :RawIsps t k o r y of social justice.9 . welfare.

is tralsfemd. In an essay of his own. to the ruling dass. "The time during which the labourer r/vorks. capitahst private property rights tl-ansfw the "labour power'kf the workers to the owners. Marx's theory is an analysis of the power reiations i n h e ~ ri n capi. with a scientific alalysis of it. the difference betweal what the worker produces and what he gets paid is the surjullads zilalae. Marx is not concerned with the "morals'" of capitalism: he is concerned. not the worker. in. In capitalist systems of procfuction. was that the worker" labor power creates more value than the worker receives . they repeatedly insist. Marx argued.'"" Marx c a k d this process ""expl"'itatim. not by moralistic socialist preaching."4 (_ln this '%scientif"icsocialism" reading. by preference.from the capitalist in wages. The wage contract gives the capitalist all the value that the worker produces in a day. ':To be sure. Engels explicitly contrasts "'utopim socialism" t o the . who "'want to improve the condition of every member of snckty. The actual work is ye$om-rcd by the n011-owner. Capilalism "'expbits" the workers because the surplus value goes to the capitalist. Marx and Engels criticized what they called ""utopianf\socilists. fait to see in it the best possi:ble plm for the best possible state of sociely?"Vhis idea--once they understand that -all mord people will favor socialist pr~posais their jnherent j ustic is not treated khdly by Marx and Engels. he believes that it will be overthrown by the kvorkers. The olvner ptrrchases &at abiZity for a certain time and p u b it to work.cording to this (fairb standard) view. wilf be created by the objective conditinns of thc working class. and ~ t political effects. the labourpororl.wThe key to understandlrrg capitalism. Hence. For how can people. h the Cornmzi~zz'st Mnlzfestn. Macpherson. everything that the worker wrkers a wage. not that of justice. m d Marx no doubt is happy about this. but the worker only gets a part of that back i n wages. Suppod fm this view desives from Marx's owll ctaim that his theory was scientific as well as his criticism of earlier socialists. very simply. and i produces becomes the property of the capitalist. when they once understand their system. "is the time durhg d i c h the capitiilist consums the labour polver he has purchased of It--rim. withoul distinctiorl of dass.r productive power from the working class to the capitalists. Marx was a social scientist investigating b w capitalism malaged to tr. the owrrer purchases the worker's labor p o w r for a certain period of time-thc owner of private property pays the n return for the wage. social.. even the most favored.3 that. the language of C. but what Marx likes or clislikes is not part of his theory.msic. is crucial*According to this interpfetatim. Revoltrtion and socialism. "The ability. The concept of power.tatism and their economic. It will be recalled from %ction 5. nay. they habitually appeal to suciety at large.'Wrote Marx. B. But in a very real sense t-he actual work is i w ~ e d by the owner of capital.

this has been the case only because men have not rightly understood thern.3). . the overall social systern. For' to our three social refc?rmers. . If a persods nature is essentially shaped by her society.6 Engels is echoing Marx" s a n d his argument in the Marzfcsto (but. as Marx said. .2. but by his h~dividual co~~science or will. This interpretation of Marx. . this is entirely wr011g: it is too individualistic. to convince others that sonzcthing is ttnjllst can be politically effective. draws on three fundamental commitments of Marxism: (1) its rationalism (Section 3 ." socialists just because they assume that appeals to what is right or just actually can make a political difference. and Robert Owen (1771-1858): One thing is common to a 1 3 three. criticizing the very idea of Wical. a r ~ d supposes &at people's actio~ls are to be explahed by their individual choices m d values. as we have seen throughout this book. If pure reason and justice have not hitherto ruled the world. "Utopian socialism" employs a iiberal-lfke appeal to an individual's sense of right m d wrong.2). and we are to explain individual facts in terns of social facts. They do not claim to emancipate a particular class to begin with. Far the liberal. his behavior would not be determined by his role in the social system. is quite irrational and unjust. Charles Fourier (2772-1837). as is i n a somewbt cruder way). produced. in the meantime. And in a science. what moves a perso11 to act largely depends 0x1 her own choices.( 2 ) its ""social envirox~me~~talist" view of h u m a ~ nature (Section 3. . . . . based upon the principles ctf these philosophers. the sGientific explanation af human behavior should focus on a person's place in. . Consider what Engels says of three non-Marxist socialists-C1aude Ele~~ri $c Rouvroy Comte de Saint-Simon (1768-2825). but aft humanity at once. . 2 1 . . the bourgeois world. Hence for the liberal. . although by no means the last word. not values (see Sectio~~ 1. not by their . p u t t i ~ ~ itg a soGialism based on claims of "'injustice. If the oppressor-the capitalist-was actuially iTlfluenced by such. Marx is so critical af ""utopian.ltific socialism" that he and Marx devised. For scientific sodalists following Mam. Not one of them appearwas a representative of the interests of that proletariat which historical development had. scjence is about facts. How a person acts will not be detclmined by her abstract views of justice-whih. arc? suppawd to appeal to the oppressor as we(t as the oppressed.). liberalism puts great stress on individual choice and autonomy.'%~s Eng& sees it. w o ~ e about s justice have no place. appeals. with Marxfs work "sacialism became a science"7(Section 3. They wish tc3 bring in the kingdom of reason and eternal justice.4)."sciet.and (3)its colfectivist analysis of pcrsons-in-society (%clion 3.

it: is indeed d a tive in the sense that what is just i n a particulirlr society is relative to the mode of production of that socieq. at m e place Marx suggests pre&i"elythat: "What is a "just distributir." Marx" point seems to he that a trazssaction is just when it is appropriate t o the prevailing "mode of productionH-the cument syskm of power relations. The juristic ft3rms in which these eccmomic transactions appear as rioluntary actions of the participants. it zuould he jlrst. is adequate tct it. Marx says. pmperty rights. The Reiafivity of Justice AccordiIlg to the first interpretation. is one whieh 'conkadicts' the prevailirrg mode. h Capital. which clashes with it or is dysfctnctional dative to it.alist thought is suspicious of all appeals to individual conscie~~ce. what would he say about:the exploitation of the workers under capitalism? Codd that be just? Surprisingly enough. it would seem of justice a p p r ~ r i a t to e capitalism---a capitalist conthat the conceptio~~ ception of justice-kvould hold that exploitation is just. m enduring strand in sod. Thus.'"lW/?ilthough Wood hinself resists cdling this a relativist conception of justice. for instance. If this is Marx" sddersbnding of jrrst-ice. who argues that Mam hetd a c o ~ ~ c e p t i o ~ ~ of justice according to wfiich each mode of production has a notion of justice appropriate to it. Despite initial appearmliees. then. And within the capitalist mode uf psoduction. Xi.n'? Do not the boure. and so of appeals to justice. Marx has no concern (or.eois assert that thc present distribution is just? h d isn't it in fact the only &Skibution based on the present mode of production?"'I"o." "ough. and pocfuctive technotogy. patknee) with the idea of justice. being mere Er~rms. An m u s t action. as expressions of their common will or as contracts that may be enfc~rced by it-re state against a single party. In "The Critique of the Gatha Program. cannot. Marx appears to advocate a different positjon-that "right cm never be higher than the economic structure of society and its culturaf developmnt conditioned thereby."'" This idea has been developed by Aller1 Wood. The justice of transactions which go ctn behiveen agents ctf production rests on the fact that these transactions arise out of the producticln relations as their natural consequence. They only express it. This content is just whenever it corresponds to the rnude of production.is unjust whenever it ccontradicts it. A ""just""action or policy "harmonizes with and perfor~xs a function relative to it.overall role m the social system. the first. by cmtrast. this interpretatio~~ of Marx is not a radical depature from. Both stress Che importance of the collectivist . it w u l d seem. determine this ccmtent.

and much of the rest of his work. Capitdism is unjust because it extracts from t. transhistc3rical ccmcepticm. These are terms that immediately imply that an injustice is being committed. This argument is one important piece of evidence that Marx thought capitalism to be unjust.state justice. this interpretation cJismisses "idea:i justice"' (Mill's second point. the sense in which it is an injustice camot be the relativistic one. one must understand the hmctioning of the ovaall sociaf and economic system. . embezzlement. N o t e how this analysis of justice ties justice very ciosclly to legality (see Mill's first point Section 8 . 7 ) . . More specifically. Sc.1 ecoof justice f m c t i o ~ ~ within s nomic system. Marxfscoz~cept of exploitation it-. we must see how a certain co~lception ar. he frequently refers tt3 capitalist extraction of surplus value as theft. Marx insists that.ng t-he w o r h g s of the whole is prior to mderstamding the individual unit.l) in its "concept-ual mapff3ecausesuch idealizhg suggests the liberal hdividualist ~4ew that a person's actions can be determhed by notions about what is right or wrong that do not reflect his actual social positio~~ or sociely"s co~~ception of justice. and so it is not to be taken at face va1ue. unlike cheating and fraud.or wj-tat might be cailed "offidaf. exploitation.ctio118. Jon Elster.n A number of other contemporary politicill and moral philosophers have argued that Marx did hdeed present an "ideal" theory of justice. and stealing.14 As Elster sees it. Thus. with respect tc3 capitalist conceptions of justice. it has been argued that Marx was satirizjng capitalism in the above passage. .supposition that before one can understand an elernent of a system. As one Marxist philosopher. Moreover. points ouk Quite generally almost any page of Capital. crtnveys the strong impression that Marx is arguing the case in moral terms.he worker what the worker has produced." The legal system witl expfess the n o t h of justice that is appropriate to the mode of productim. if we are to understand qpeals to justice. a moral notio~~. And it is hdeed difficult to read Cupifal wjthout sensillg Mam's . Marxfstheory of trxploitation. is fair: "The sense in which extraction ctf surplus value is unfair must refer tct a nonrelativistic. is filled with a moral fervor and outrage. robbery.12 Marx's Theory of Justice? In response to Woad" hterpre"ltion. Uncrterstandi. We will then see haw the capitalist conception of justice fits into the capitaljst system and plays a role i nit. opened at random. On the other hand. Capitalism is an unjust system because some get more and others less than they have contributed.

makes his living by extracting labor from the wokers: the w o r k r recttjves a wage.st m a r k t order is that it is fmdmentalty unfair. Note that this is essen~all).15 50. consequently#the worker does not receive the fuld product (or value) that he has produced. but. but the capitalist keeps the bulk of what has been produced. resulting in the t-ransfer of the fruits of ehe worker's lilbor to the capitnljst. runs tlne criticism. all o f whjch have the poht that under capitalism the w o r k r does not get what is properly his. Marx and socialists in gewral insist that capitalism is unjust.ikerio~~ of desert a r ~ d that of need. this indicates that capitalism is unjust because workers do not get what t h y deserve. m d becmse under capitalism workers am under the power of capitalists. To a large exte~~t. and so capitalism is Must. Chl this readin. just a s it erBerges from . apparently sees this as an imperfect sort of justice. At the heart of capitaiism lie m y u d power relatiom. the injut. neither can capitalism offer t-he workers positive freedom arr. of powers (Sectim 5.1 for develqint. Marx-ar~d again he is joined by contemporary socialists-arwes that. suited to the trmsirion from capitalist society to a true commmist society: What we have to deal with here is a communist society. and socialism. not a s it has developed on its own fcjundations. freedom as power (Section 5. under capitalism. we might have a much better feel for injustic-for identifying victims a r ~ d unfairnes~~eha3. As we have obser~red. though. a desert-based crificism of cqitalism: workers do not receive the fruits of their productive activities. what is just? The mswer would appear obvious: justice is givjng the worker the fruits of his lahor.stjcesof capitalism. in particulal. it seems that Marx has a theory of i~justice insofar as he advances a variety of criticisms agajnst capitalism. on the contrary. Capitalism. Marx. If capitalism is tmnjust.ice. Marx's "theory of justice'3s a theory about Ihe i~zjrasticc of capitalism. on both the cI. whereas tfne g ~ a t benefits accrue to those-the owners-who do not actually pmvide any useful labor..Some po:iitical theorists have maintained that we miss a great deal by lookkg only at the positive ideal of justice. As Marx" theory of exploitation makes clear. Thus. in germeral: its strength is its account of perceived in_ju. autonorny or self-rute. h fact. is a system in which h s e Lvho actually produce and labor receive extremly meager rewards.moral outrage at such m llnjust economic order. The lirborer produces the product (whi& has value). the most basic sociaiist criticism of the ca@talj.1). thcn. the basic human needs of workers go unfulfilled whereas capitalists have incredible wealth to satisfy their slightest whims.tice of capitalism is its transfcl. The capitalist. a posilivc idea of just.. and so by its nature it cannot secure. We s h o d d s o recall that the socialist insistrs that it fails dismally in terms of freedom.31.I%nd this seems the case with Marx. but the capitalist receives the product.

and people learn to love .e wealth flow abundantly-only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entire5 and society inscribe on its banner: From each according to his ability.h this capitaiist mentality. Beciiiuse capitalism robs the worker of his product.lS 326s higher phase of justice. has vanished. exactly what he gives. alienation is overcorn."' Bnd as others have argued." Recall from Sections 3.1' This princQle of distribution can he summed up as "to each accordinf: to his contributio~~s. expresses the human essence."tto each according to his contributions"kcan be ~ y l a c e d with "from each according to his ability. Mumms still infec&d wit. . c m come about only when htxmans are no longer "'alienated.18 When the higher phase of communism has arhved. after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division CIF liabor. under capitdim we only work he can find no satisfactio~~ i norder to get '*external"%benefits such as pay. after the productive ft3rces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual. Marx suggests. M m insisted that under capitalism this human essence is repressed and its e x p x s i o n distorted: people do not labor in order to express Cheir humnnity. Now.3 and 6. Thus.3 Mam" notion that the human essence is to 'bolbjectify" its ideas into objects. The same amount CIF liabor which he has given to society in one form he receives back i n anctther. working. followed. b m each according to his ability. which is thus in every respect." If this principie it. in work. Marx was not satisfied with this csiterion: In a higher phase CIF commtmist sociee.capitalist society. still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. but for the m s t brutish of reasons-to stay alive. that looks iike a theory of how a just socialist society would distribute resousces." since people corrupted by capitalism will only work if rewarded. expioitatio~~ is eliminated and wnrkrs will get what they deserve. and therewith alst:. after labor has become not only a meam of Life but life3 prime want. arr. economically morally and intellectually. . . would not he ready to live accordir~g to the dictum "to each according to his needs. and all the springs of cooperatib7c. Mam suggests. Yet. in the sense of creating. in our heads a d create real -elningsout of them. to each according to his needs. the first stage of communist justice is to give people what they deserw. Thus. . Accordingly the individual producer receives back Prom society . to each accoding to his needs. Thus. the antithesis bemeen mental and physical labor. We are planners and doers: we take ideas. .

. Does Marx. "Marx also offered an 'external' critique of capitalist exploitation and of the norms and perspective from which it appears just. the pmpectivc of the t7igfic. It: fails to be just even on its own understmdSng of justice. the higher phase of socialist justice can be achieved. . Marx's collectivist ar-td cooperative . of Marx.iom and thus the capitalist system.ealist exploitat.4). Insofar as the notion of justice presupposes individuals in conflict who milke clains on each other. hokvever. answering this question stem from a tension in Marx's own writing between two views of huma-t nature (Section 3. moral vision. communitarian (Section 3. a sign that society is still in its prehistorical phase. It is not the realm of free and fair exchange that it daims to be. he did offer a functional account of the norms by which capitalist exploitation is judged just. These norms .""' (4) Last. Steven lIJtxkes. . 'This vkw-more aypaxnt in Marx" earlier w~tings-points n lNhich peapi" receiw lrhe fruits of tl~eir Lahor to notions of ideal justice. p"evai1 because they sanction and stabjlize capi. offer us a theory of justice? m e problems in. says Lukes." (2) Second. Mnrx offers a criticism of capitalist norms from flWithi~-t.3).2vl) The first layer is the analysis of capitalist norms as they fux-tction in cagitalist society." As Lukes understmds Marx. the interpretations of Marx skessirsg either the scientific nabre of his socialism or the relativity c>f justice seem persuasive. ta each according to his needsw-leaves behind not only capitalid justice. there is no simple and straightforward answer to our query' ""'Did Marx think capitalism unjust. coherenl." " s a y s L. the very attribution of justice and injustice is a m r k of class society. Marx says. cannot live up to its own image of its&. multilayered account. Marx adopts a per~efitive critical of the very idea of justice. which is stressed by the sckntifc and relativist interp~tatiuns "In the first place. (3) "But thirdly. "From that slmdpoht. That c r i t i ~ is e in turn made from the perspecthe of comunism's lowes phase: capitalist exploitation is from this slancdpoint uxljust because it violates the principle 'To each according to his labour and that is contribution. .r phase of cmmunism-"from each according to his ability. Accordhg to Lukes. however. but ihe entirc concept of justice. but a system that enslaves workers and is unfair to them. or didn" he?"20 Lukes identifies four layers of Mam" amount of justice.place it with an emancipatory. has argued that all these different facets of Marx's views on justice form a single.rather than hate :labor.ff Capitalism. the concept of justice fades. If we focus on Marx" social envirorrlnerrtillie and collectivist views. and seeks to re. But Marx idso ac-fvocatesa strong view of hmmm essence that is not determbed by one's ssaiety and one's place in it. i and col-tditionsexist for t-he flourisha of hurnan nahnrc?. then. .ukes.

or whatever. As Macpherson observes. to such a conception of democracy For the socialist. 9.Z .At least as understood by the socialist tradition.2 Socialism crnd the Democratic Community Beyond the Welfare Sfate: Equalip of Freedom and Power :It is terrrpting. tion 5. it is the ineyuality of power d of capitatist disthat is the root causcl oi ail the inequdities a ~ h~justices tribution. It is clear cvhy socialists are dracvn. Thus. freedom and eqt~allity will be urrachievable however much the welfare state undertakes to redistribute resources.iticd power (itself an hgrcrdient of freedom. But more welfare-stale redistribution ctf naticmal income is not enough: no matter how much it might reduce class ineqtralities of income it would not ttmch class inequalities of power. According to effect theories of power (Section 5. But the welfare state cannot secure equal liberty as power to act (Section 5.4) seeks to leave behind the very cmcept of justice. Sectioln 7. a ~ so tive justice are typically assnciated with the modern cvel'are state.1)because. hut real. This.c lines of ~visionist liberals such as Rawls (Section 8. m d some moderate socialists.conception of society (Section 7.$). it cannot secure equality of power. to u n d e r s t d Marx as offerillg a theory of distriibutive justice along th.21. Tme democracy---w:hich alone expresses the equality and real freedom of all citi.zenewould thus =quire the abolition of capidism. opportunities. the core of d e m r a c y is political equality (Section G. then. or a social control of it so thorough as to be riirtually the same thing as ownerhip. points socialist justice toward a radical conceptim of the democratic community in which all are free because ai) equal:iy possess poJ. for which revisionist liberals have been the rnajin advocates.3). The aim of iryualiziq power calls for radical democratic control of social life. capitalist market societies (Sections are constitrutive of. Rawls. weliare.3) and all power is controlled by democratic process= in which everyone has an equal role. It probably does not much matter whether this takes the ft3rm of social omershig of all capital. substantive equality of political polver. only by eliminating the hequality of power can these evils be rooted out. are inn providing principie"hat identify just and u ~ ~ j udistributions st terested i d on. but : Ithi~lik uttimately nnistaken. a fully democratic society requires democratic political control over the uses to which the amassed capital and the remaining resources of the society are put.3). These criteria of distrribuof resources. so long as capitalism endures. inequaZity of power relaa d endemic to. opporhmities. where this meals not simply equd votes. says the more radical socialist.

however.3). the political theorist is overridjng the voice of the people. we should not expect radical democratic socialist political theorists to advance specific principles of justice. Foflowing Cofe.H.4). socialists] associate with liberalism. officiaLIy. Seen ~ Ithis I light. Not only does thjs ideal include the equality of: power that is the heart of socialism. Proclaimed the hglish socialist G. for that e~~tirt. For our purposes. but run democratically. The workers set up fjrms by borrowing from state banks.D. including business corporations. owned sociillly or by the state. Marxfsreluctance to acfvance a theory oi justice is well grounded. Cole (1889-1959): the hdivictual. The workers" council did not undertake day-to-day management but hired mangers did (who earned sig1"tificantly more t h a ~ ~ the workers who were. their employers). a number of socialists have emhraced the idea of hdustrid democracy. hther. The ideal of the just society as one with eguality of power explains the cornmox~ sociaiist enfrhusiasm for exknding democratic decisio11makil7g throughout all social life. then these principles deternine what to these justice requires.Democracy is not simply a political ideal. a just societ-y will not simply be one in whiCh each gets her fair share.Rather than looking for the socialist justire in revisionist-liberal-like principles of distributive justice. the detai:ls of the Vu- . others propose worker management along the lines once p'a"iced widely in hgoslavia. says the socialist: it should inform large organizatrions. from each according to his abilities) say too much. if the socialist embraces Rawls" prhciples of distributive justjce (Section X. the only worry is that even his fragmentary remarks on justice (to each accorcting to his needs. That. a just democratic community must co~lform psinci_ples. it is better to focus on lfie ideal of a fully dewcratic community. a just societ-J. but it is consistent with "socialism as a doctrine that takes human socid or communal existe~~ce more sel-lously than the excessive indhirfualism that they [that is. To endorse any set of principks as t f ~ correct principles of justice is to preernpt the voice of the democratic commtxnity Far example."B Given our nature as communal beings.~~24 Given this picture of the just s0ciet. though. typically all the worker-members &cted a workerskouncil to make the main policy decisions regarding the firm. On this latter model. h m s west.will be a political community in which the basic equality of its citizens results in a democratic life in which all eyuirlly participate in colliective decisiozts. is "most free kvhere he co-operates with his equals in making latt~s. is to set limits on what the democratic commtxnity can decide. for they instruct the dernocratic commul7ity of the future how it is to decide (see Section 20. conceptim of justice has an incfividlzalist slant.y as the fully democratic society.2"ere arc numerous variations of the industrial democratic ideal: some involve trade unions.

Thus. democratic comitments of socialist justice wodd tend to side with t-he people's choice (alLhougb socialists hope that the people would not make such choices). reinforces unequal. Now this volunterist stance seems at odds with socialism's commitment to rationalism and its commitment to social equality. We c m see hercl.8. if a participatory democracy. and p"iv"te property? The w h d if they choose i n e ~ a l i t y volunterist.1. the family itself should mmikst m equality of power (between adult memrate). m d so pmmatbg equal effective freedom. power between the sexes throughout the social order.2" Not only large orgmizations such as corporations. According to procedural justice. whatever is the outcome of a just procedure is itself just.3). E'clminists have often criticized socialism for not paying sufficient attenlion to the hequalj2. the social& roots of much contempobers. i"coes not tell trs h radicd democratic views. based on &eir differe~~t values and ideals. on this ideal. m a t if the people choose to go agailnst reasollcompetition. T%e democratic tendencies of socialism thus =Sleet what might be called a voltiuterist conception of justice: it is the people's voluntarily choosing something-mab~g a democratic decision-that rer~ders it just. provides a case for extensive democratic decisionmaking. much feminist thought i s antiliberal. whereas the rationalis"commitments of socialism and its critique of capitalism as ihumane would lead it to reject the decision of the peopie. &cause of &is. and ewdity of wlfare. and so to equalize power is to equalize the ability to achieve ends. Reconciling Socialism and Democracy We have seen that the aim of equalizing power. they do not endorse e ~ a l i t y of power. if the people. at ar~y rary feminist thought for one of the main themcs of feminism is the jnjuslice of unequal power relations in the family which. follows a just proce- . power. based on real equality of political. but.goslav model are not crucial: the important point is the extension of the dmocratic ideal throughout social life.le (Sction 8. This polint c m also be trnderstood as a possible tension bet-vveen procrdaml anct szrbsturztlve justice. liberal principies of justice provide only the basic ru1es Eor social life between equdly free peoy. then it is just.y of "patriarchyH-male rule---but the two politicd theories have a cornmon core: justice understood as equality of power. quality of resources. people must be free to make their own consensual arrangements i n their prhate "ff'.3irs. c h o o ~ a a l e or policy.4). m d equality of opportunity (%ctjon 6. Moreover. what &ose axis should be. says the liberal. C under conditions of equal paw'. Altl-tough liberal feminists aldorse equirl civic status bet~veen men and women. Given this framework of rules. Power is something to be used to achicwe ends.

a r ~ d in a way that includes the sociaiist col~cepts justice- . Democracy r e ~ i r e s reasoned deliberation under conditions of equal freedom and power. but a ge11uine equality of politic& power (at least m o n g groups). then. equaljty of opgotltmity"2%ll these conditions are said to be part of a genlcirze democratic procedure: there a ~ suhstand can he no conflict between justice as democratic decisio~~s tive egalitarian-socialist justice. ir. And as we have seen (Section 2. consiskncy is necessary fm an adequate political theory Joshua Gohen a ~ Joel d Rogers seek to resolve this teIvi011 in demucmticsocialist theory by expanding the conditions for genuine democracy so as to include socialist economic organization. . true democratic decisions presuppose certain conditions. . l%e pure procedural conception maintaixrs that m outcorn is just if m d only if it has been arrived at by the correct proced u e . substa~tive justice idenl-ifies certah-r cI. such as "'to each accordjng to his needs. public control of investment workplace demncracy. social equality. capacitks uor reasoned social choice] \. . democratic praceduralism and substantive egalitarianism by expading the idea of dcmcracy to include not o q political equality w~dertitoodas one person. and it is precisely this. .""'" But because "the taking of prdits under capitalism subordinates one class of h~dividuals of to another and thus . .dure. distributimal measures of equality. equality. Democratic socialis&. . one vote. .3). and . Although.."" "capitalism subverts demmracy. True democracy presupposes the socialist core vaiues. becatrse truly democratic decisions can only occur in an egalitasian socialist society. thus eliminating any conflict. subverts the conditio~~s equd flleedosn. .41. .iteria for just distriibutions or outcomes. that capitalism makes impossible. i the just procedure may lead to the suhstantively just outcome. . consideratiol~s of justice witl yield hconsistent judgments.vithin m order of equal freedom." they write. of course. and freedom as autonomy. seek to resotve ihe apparmt t e n s i o ~ be~ t-vveen their faith in.tcluding "civil :Liberties. Consequently. that outcome is just i f and only if it ilccords n some cases with the principles of social justice. from each according to his abilities. then whatever the democratic procedure chooses is necessarily just. foreign poliq. k e d o m as power. "is to choose a f o m of social association whicfi manifestly respects . democracy is interpreted of freedom. Gohen and b g e r s argue. We Witness once again the monistic inclinalions of socialist &ought: just as Ijbaty WBS interp~ted to include equality (Sectim 7. . this canm t he guaranteed. M1 empbyment. "To choose democracy. when the two conflict. 01% the other hand. a humanc.'Wf~o~ a thoroughgoing procedural conceptia~ of ~justice cannot be comhined with a purely substanthe conception of social justice. the sukstantive conception hsists that regardless of the procedure that generated the outcome. .

ions characterized by equal voting rights. and therefore also that of the majority. howe\*r: as we have just seen. . be limited.They understand human rights as an expression ctf the savereign will of the pectpfe. In contrast. he indicaks. then..1 contrast to socialism. explahs the contrast thus: The dispute has to do with how to reconcile equality with libere. it is one of the most important safegumds of freedom. liberals give priority to substmtive justice: dmocralic procedures are designcd so as to promote and protect substantive rights. and so m. Liberalism requires that -all power. "'demncracy" d ' oes not describe simply a set of formal kcision procedures " o u t a type of egalitarim community.The Contrast to Liberal Democracy m e especially htimate tie in socialist thought bet-vveen democracy and the just comrnuIlity is brought out by contrasti~~g the socialist-egditarian to liberal understandings of democracy. af equal liberties. with diversiv. conceiving these as rights held by individualized subjects. because it is our only protection . and the constitutional separation of powers enzcrges from the enlightened will of the demtlcratic legisiature. We must be careful here. . however. Advocates of egalitarianism. In contrast. classkal tiberals understmd democracy sirnply as a set of political instit-ut. frequent elections. Jiirgen Habermas. on the other hand.""" Hayek. agahst tyrmny. hprtar~tly. '"iberalism is concerrted with trhe functiox~s of government and particularly with the limitation of all its power. such that it presqposes the essence of socialist justice. a leadi17g conkmpmary exponent of cdcmocratic egalitarimism. and conceive of substantive justice as arising out of just procedures. but a useful instrument for protecthg negative lirberty from opp~ssive governments. human rights enjoy normative priority over democracy and the constitutional separation of powers has priority over the will of the democratic legislature. Democracy is concerned with the question of who is to direct government. ."" It thus follows on the classical liberal view that liberalism is . In their view.. egamarians emphasize procedural justice."""" tmiv As Habermas explains it. reminds us. competitjon by political parties. democracy "is an ideal worth fighting for to lfie utmost. il. the right to form palitical parties. democracy is not itsell a sort of freednm. or the right CIF the majority with the right of the minority Liberals begin with the Xegal instituticinalization. egalitarians such as Cahen and Rogers interprrt true dmocracy in a rich m y . For socialists. Recall that according to Hayek. mough democracy itself is not freedom . conceive the collective practice of free and equal personma" wvereign will-Pormatic?n. .

the right to pmticipate in democratic decisiollis is itself a basic requirement of ~ustice. Suhstnntivc justice thus clearly sets limits on procedural justice in liberal theory. I h e right tru political voice is a complex of liberties. they join their classical counter)l7arts in insisting that Che basic liberty rights of individuals limit Icgitimille democratic choice."incompatible with unlimited democracy. it denies &at "the people""speak with a single voice or have a common interest-individuals speak with a dizzying variety of voices m d often have clasfting irrrterests-and even if it made sense to t a k of "'the peopleff having a voice or a generai will. Revisionist liberals also hold dear the basic liberties identified by the Bill of Rights: even a democracy giving each person an equal voice cannot justly violate these basic rights.caldecisims is necessarily a right to participate in chmghg the rights and duties of other pcopie tfirougb legislatim.~~33 For the classical liberal.and induces people t o *ink about the common good rather than their nanow self-inte~sts. for Ihc revisionist ljberals.4). and Justice: Antirationalist Gonservatism h R e Szabjecfic~l.3 Three Conservative Approaches to Justice Tradition. keeping democracy away from the very core of the liberd co~~ceptclal map. as a right to participate in poli'E. and powers. claims. P e r h a p h e classical liberal view is best s med up in the famous remark of Whstm Churchjll: democracy is the worst form of govenliment. classical. Revisionist liberalism gives a much mare promkent place to demacracy.11 puts political power irr the hmds of the incompetent. Convention. 9.~ cif Women (1869). it can lead to waste and iavor 2. just as it is incompatible with all other unlimited govenlime1lit.1. one vote) in politic& decisions is itself a h n f ~ustiee(see Section 6. Democratic participation eAances self-developmerrt. Given the i~~dividualism and pluralism lyivlg at the core of classicill liberalism. liberals can be deeply critical of the witys in which democracy functions. classicd liberais. the last (powers) is worth not-ing.:hort-run gains over lo11g-term be~~efits. democracy is not a way to reveal the voice of the people.). but what Hohfeld caitls a "pwer" (Section 8. except for all lrhe others. classical liberals have spent great effort showjng that democrairjc hstitutims are especially msuited to reveal what that might be. Although revisionist: liberals are much more enthusiastic democrats than arc. foh~li Srcuart Mill argued for a "perfcct equality'' between the sexes. anrt so valifies not simply as a liberty or claim. the right to equal civic status (understood at least as one person. and it oftt. Democracy is not damental requirement o simply an effective way to prokct basic sdstantlvo rights. Although his focus was on legal rights (md .% Moreover.

Although to some extent reason" deliverances can be conveyed in. Indeed.2)-there are often ""overtol~es. s m e conservatives hiwe argued that the very idea of reasor. the conservative believes. But for Mill. rcvired by intimate association and empathy with the acts of exemflfication in the persons who perform them. for the most part custom a d kaditicm sirnply were trhe rehctior~s of past injustices. individualist society. tradition-independent norms was. Reason. of which can ol~ly scientific.on for it. that men had su'lbjugated women in the past provides no good reason why women should accept an inkrior status today. then custom and tradition must give way. see Sectim 6. genuinely universal. much less twenly-first-century Japan. for exampie. a contemporary conservativecommunitarim (%skion 3. As 1have previdaim ( S ~ t i o n 3. he argued that family relations &odd be a "school in equality-" Mill. the preferred rationalist m abstract principies a ~ rdes d (Sction 3. reasm involves practical knowledge. he sought to push his egalitarian case further. that inequality was uphelcl. and association with those who excel at it. of course.2).4). polit-ical. which attributed differential and hierarchical positiozls within the family.Itwas and is the project of liberal. liberalism. More radically. only the rigorous application of impartial standards of justice verified by reason can tell us *ether these past practices are to be cond Conservative crit of rationalism is in large part a criticism of this rejection of &adition. this is a quintesscmtid ratim~alist Custom and traditior~ are understood as the embodiment5 of superstition. which began as an appeal to the alleged .so equal civic status. or legal hquiry. d m a t is rational or reasonable in. For in the course of history. unfairness. It is ctf the first importance to remember that the project of fc~mding a social order in which individuals could emancipate themselves from the contingency and particularity of tradition by appealing tc:.7). reason itself depends on tradition.4). h d *sight where the principles and rules are imppropriate. ously indicated. task of ~col~structint. is not up to the society hthe light of itbstract principies of justice. C m we say. thirteenth-century England is not the same as in twentyfirst-century England. If custom and tradition opposed reason. be gained through the actual practices. elements of 'tacit h o \ v l e d g e . and the most cogent reasons we have f t x believing that the hope of a tradition-independent rational universality is an iXIusion derives from the history of that prc)ject. say. and is not only a project of philosc~phers.1 depends on traditiol~ a ~ culture."'""n Michael Oakeshott's t e r m (Section 3. that the belief in angels is equaily rational in -all three cultures"!ccording to Alasdalr MacIntyre. m d caprice. ~aiizerf that this view directly opposed tracfition m d custom. wllich are not teachable by articulated assertions but r/vhich arc. bp custom and tradition was no real jwstificati. for e m p k . As Mill saw it.

which in turn allolvs you to do so. by the laws of justice.ationalist view.rfz~~entions. Hume actually ideulges the :lacvs of justice with the laws of one's society: it is the actual laws of one's ssocithat make possibk a settled disth~ction ety that pmvide ihe cox~ventisons between mine and thine. In the last sentence of the above quotation. Cmventions and traditions evnfue.y arise. law has two different souxes. Our property is nothing but those goods.36 C)-n this antj. says I-fume. without first understanding the former. has itself been transformd into a tradition.2). as people disagree on merit and deservhgness*~~ n i s Humean orientation of much conservative thought helps explain the conservative p~ference for the common law over Iegislafion. that is. on the model of a Zmguage.1. he opposes ar7yo11e who wouid employ consideratio~~s of ideal justice based an furthering social utility to overturn current conventions. tn the Anglo-American tradition. 8. there immediately arises the ideas of Justice and injustice. concerning abstinence from the possessions ctf other% is entered into. Lhough. Legislation. A convention. they are not the of a sociresult of one person" rationality but the ongoing developme~~t ety % wisdom. The latter are altogether unintelligible. f i o w i r ~ g &at you accept the conventio~~al mles of properq allows me to act in a predictable and consistent way. as also those of prt~pert'y~ right and ublig~fion. rejects the claim that these rights are established through a social contract. Moreover. the place to look for justice is i none's own traditio~~s and practkes 'T'ktisis not to imply. rather than a once-and-far-all social contract (Section 8. &at Lhe conservative c m say nothhg in general about justice. expresses our common interest in settled ruies and albws us to coordir~ate our actions. tells us that all sociehes require rules of justice. and everyone has acquired a stability in his possessions. 6. a settled way of disthguishing "mhe" and "trl~ine.1~3 [2j. then. Section 8. whose comtant possession is established by tile laws of society. he believes that experience shows such a rationalist criterion is unworkable.37 It is importmt to stress that Hume believes that such conventions arise slowly.4. Hume argues.David Hume. 7. 3'ht.2. although Hurne can see how abstract reason points to the ideal of distributing material goods according to deserts. by ci. Note that the Hurnean conception of justice ties justice to legality rather than to ided justice (see Mill's points [l]itr.1) insofar as they allow for a settled sociai life.principles of shared ratictnality against what was felt to be it-re tyranny of traditictn. agreeing with Hobbes (Section 8-21. After this conventictn."" Hume. with . however. Although Hume believes that rules of justice serve social utility (Sections 1.1).

whereas the vices-injustice. is the result of deliberate efforts of the legislature to enact general laws. forms the precedent for further juciicial reasoning-later courts seek to make their decisions consistent with earlier decisions. withjn the constraint of general laws (see Sectim 5.conthues the narrative. the courts-at least according the ideal of lrhe c o r n o n law----donot seek to ellgage in social engheering or bring about illbstract social goods. the story runs. and in traditional societies. Nobility. But liberalism. aim. a sociev that understands humm life in this way constitutes a community. it has been said. to be a person of a certain. NOW. TO achieve this end. + T h e very idea d general legislation has a rationalist bias: legislators apply their reasoning to bring about certain results. Virtues. deceithhesswere traits of humans that prevented them from achieving that perfection natural to humar~s. m d this ideal united their community. The liberal. Consider an interpretation of the libe r d pmject t-hat has been acivar~ced by cor~serwative-cornmu~~itaria~~s such as MacInvre. Each of thc. ktemperance. Disa g ~ e m e n t wilhh s their comunity-moral. is to develcsp a social morality that does not require that we a p e on what is g o d . oftm with the stated aim of furt-hering lrhe soc i a l good. It has developed over centuries in response to specific problems bought before the courts. upheld. As Aristotle saw it. The other source of law is fhe common law. Virtue and Conservcrfism: Antip/urcrlist Conservatism Libemlism and the Death of Virtzre. temperance. what ends are most worth pursning. couragcl.which we are all familiar.4). In tke ancient world. hut an associatio~~ that shares a common moral life based an a shared conception of what it is to be a human and what ways of living suit humans. for exaunple. the laws of Rather than c h a ~ g e justice change in response to real cases hspecific contexts. or what sort of life is a good life. were those character traits that were conducive to this end or a part of it. confiicts-codd be resolved by calling on this shared understanding of what constitutes a t~irfztous perm"". and fortitude w r e such virtues. then. decisions. " m a t is the best way . arrived at to solve a specific problem. The result is a slow evolution of the laws of justice. was the good for humans. It is not a mere collection of selfseeking hdividuals. sort. In making a kcision. an ideal of what a good person was. to conform to abstract ideals or theories. They respond to specific problem with intevreting specific laws. The Greeks. deskoys such a its lrhem to insist% that there is no community Liberals' plurafism co rationally obvious or right answer to the question. there was indeed agxement on these matters. or specific problems raised by the apflication of the l a w . it has been argued. humans possessed a natural end-a lefos.

in brief and crude terns. A famous exmple of the dvergeme of liberal and virtue-conservative views of justice was the debate betwee11 liberals and co~~servatives over the regu:iation of homosexuality and prasti. Thus. This report-knc. as long as doing so does not harm others.FXusalist: traditions are defined by shared notior~s of excellence. these so-called immoral acts should be decriminalized. people should be free to do as they wish.t o ljve?" The pluralism that the liberal so cherishes destroys the basis for a true moral community. in human ile. In place ol a community bmded together by a vision of what it is to be human. the liberal puts form& a theov of moral chaos. defended by the report and Hart. seeking to r e m i n neutral a m n g ways of living. Sir f m e s Fitzjames Stephe11 (1829-1894).wr~ as the Wolfer~den Report-proposed a r d o m oi the law in Britain relating to certain "victimless crimes. focused on tf7c Report of the Committee on FIomosexual Offences and Prostitutim. not the law" business.'"" T%at is. complained of Mill's prhciple that it would be . an eminenl: English conservative thkker. This inte~ret. hut insists that tradition is inhermtly anti. results in nihilism-110 beliefs are good or bad.1. :In their private lives. and so a society's conceptioln of justice must reflect this. Millan approach based m the harm principle (Sections 3.3): in ge~~eral it advocated that sirlee these acts did not harm others. in h i c h hatewer a person wants is acceptable.96Os. right or W ~ Q X I ~ . he holds that "on the narrower issue relevant to the enforcement of moralify Miil seems to me right. the liberal has no cor~ception of wirtue and vice. As the report said. For since we can no longer say that some ways of livitlg are more h w a n or better than others.A. "There must remain a realm of private moraliey and immorality which is."'"T'Thebusiness of law is to provide a framework for l i v a togett7er' not to make geopie better or more moral* Almost as soon as Mill defended the harm principle. we cannot say that those kaits that promole this way of living are virtues and those that psevent it are vices. T%e Millian approach." " e report adopted an essentially liheral. Hart and the cor~serval-ive Lord Devlh.illion of conservatism continues the strttss on tractition. ~ ~ Ttle Cnfommcnt o f Momls. fndeed. conservatives attacked it. T%ere ensued a famous &bate between the liberal legal philosopher H.ngdom in the 1. maintained that acts that do not: harm others. : M a c I n p and other conser~ratives have charged that the liberal conception of justice. Mart izssisted that so-cdled immoral sexual behavior is not the proper subject of legal regulation. grading by m s t members oi society should not be pw~ishcd Although Hart does not ascribe to Mill" har~x prhciple in every respect. but are considered disgusting or deby the law.tutian i n the United Ki.L. or excellence.4.

and that quite irrespectively of self-protection. A society without a &zed moraljty would dishtegrate-it would f i n d .a d the selling (and p e r h p s the readkg) af pornography.4" Morality. who would reject this in the m m e of abstract pril7ciples. fhcn. 326s ""shared morality" i s part of "Ie historical traditions of a society A rationalist such as Mill. This would condemn every existing system of morals. simply does not understand what a society is. Positive morality is nothing but a body of prhciples and rules more or less vaguely expressed. Dcvlin. It is not pclssible tt3 settle in advance clxceptions to the general rule or to dePine innexibty areas of morality into which the law is in no circumstances to enter.43 Devlin. goes h q o n d merely preventing h a m to others.itfed by means ctf its laws to protect itself from dangers. . Society is ent. by which certain lines of a>nduct: are Pohidden under the penalty of geneml disapprobation. would be wrong in principle. and more or less left to be mderstood. Mill would be one capable of being summed up as ft3llotvs: "Let every man please himself without hurting his neighbor. liberalism is said to destroy the moral bands of society. such as homosexuality pmstitutiol~. T h i s bejrtg so. Societies disintegrate from witKn more frequently than they are brciken up by external pressures. to set theoretical limits to the power of ithe State to legislate against i ity. The ctnly moral system which would comply with the principle stated by Mr. It is not possible. which includes public acrknowledgment of conceptio~~s of virtue m d vice. whether from within or without. . &v2in thus criticizes Mill and the aulhors of the Miolfenden Report for failing to see that a society is founded on not-ions oi what constitutes good and bad people. . D w l k argued. Stephen is arguing. There is a disintegratirtn when no common morality is ctbsenred and history shctws that the loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegration' sc) that saciety is justified in taking the same steps tc:. presents a similar criticism of MiHiar7 liberafism. Put simply. and m y political doctrine that would prohibit samtions except to preve~~t harm would undernine morality itself.preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government and ctther essential imtikrtions. it is the proper office of a government to protect this morality by iegally punishing &we who engage in vicious acts. is arguing that a society is pwtiafly constituted by a code of morillity. in his criticism of the Mrolfenden Report.subtiersive of all that people commonly regard as morality. The suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of subversive activities. either to obtain benefits far society at large other than prot-ecticm against injury or do good to the persons affected." m d every moral system which aimed at more than this.

harming oneself.nduct in isolation from its effect on the moral code. Hart distinguished what he cdls the "moderate" and the "ertreme"' forms of Devh's argume~~t: According to the moderate thesis. and so on. no sense of the shared values that constitute that community. is cornposed of individuals wilo have no sense of the traditiol~s of the community. the conservative maintajns. is the most madera& kteqretation of the conservative argument that a s h a ~ mordify is necessary to the existence of a swiety. So. has ever held that departures irz sexual morality. Qur societp. he says. No reputable historim. withhout it there would be aggregates of individuals but no society. for Dcvlin. harm or endanger ctr corrupt others nor. it is not wrong to enforce a shared morality of a society. it-re cement of society. in fact. ""A recognized morality" is. ultimately. morality is not a "sh~gle such that a break in one area will leave the rest ist tatlers. And of course."" T%is. As Ha& s y s . kad to weakex-rir~g thtr society itsell. breaten sockty's very existcr~ce. one area of morality-*at concerning sexual practicesneed not lead to a b ~ a k d o w n of consensus on other parts of moraliw more semless webrff central to public life. In his liberal =ply. and it does not justiv the . if we remember this. a shared morality is. taking drugs. hdividuals with very few values at all. m d . Faced by the lack of evidence in support of the moderate thesis. that to weaken the & a ~ moraliv d of a society does. and this includes matters concerrTing sexual relat-ions. even when these deviant practices are mgaged in within the privacy of one's home." and society may use the law to preserve its morality as it u s s it to safeguard anytKng else essential to its existence. irz short. and all that remains is a collectiol~ of rootless and cox~fused individuals. says Hart. The d argument is. in Lord Devlin" swords. either shock or give offence to others. we can see that ctne who is "no menace to others" nmetheless may by his immoral conduct "fireaten one of the great moral principles upon which society is based." h this sense the breach of the moral principle is an offense ""agaimt society as a whole. Altowjrtg dlrrergence in. this does not conclude the matter.that the cement that hound it together was gone. Hart argue"Ihrt ccolwervatives sometimes resort to what Hart calls the "extreme thesis": The extreme thesis does not look upon a shared morality as of merely instrumentaI value anatclgous to ordered government. Rut Hart simpIy disputes this supposed fact. that is precisely what the conservatives charge that Millian morality has praduced. For we must not view the cc. when done in private. "as necessary to society1s existence as a recognized government" and although a particular act of immorality may not.

heallhy working of the whole. is a st-rongly anti-Millim. As indicated h the above votation from Stephel-r. Conservatism and Collectivism: "My Station and its Duties" Our analysis of political concepts began with Plato" inquiry into the nature of justice (%cti. powers. correspondingly a just state is leading to the organized so that each part properly fulfiUs its fw-retio~~.we have yet to consider Plato's favored conceptio~~ of justice. .pie . a just man" soul is organized so that each element performs its p r v e r task. Platonic theor?. i s justice. even if immoral acts harm no one directly or indirectly by weakening the morai cement of soclieVdli. then. and so on. "W have hid down as a universaI pri~~ciple. and claims that lrhe individual must passess ii ske is to perfarm her proper social function. then. 1 believe that that prind. Samuel Coleridge (17721834) explicitly ur-rderstood the state as a "moral unit. an antiliberal position.m 1. it is simply held that i oral behavior. Coleridge mintaified that m individual's rights .1). the pu~~ishmex~t of immorality is seen as simply the right and pmper thing to do. an orgal7ic whoie. . the rnilitary class that is to cnforce the decisions of the guardians. Plato thinks that justice involves the corrc-lctofdering or harmonious arrangement of the bvhale. Well. And because societies are complex wholes and not simply aggrcgations of individuals (Section 3. to preserve a society from dissolution ctr collapse."" C~onsequently. mexhants. Each class in a just state. Not everyone has the same f u ~ ~ c t i m . and the economic class of ifarmers.4). ought rightly to be puni"hed.".fi Whereas the above quotation from Devlin seems to endorse the moderate thesis. individual rights i n the sense of clairns that are owed to indi:viduals. hcluding immoral sexual beha\lior. Hart inciicates that Stctphen supports the extreme thesis. ""that everyone ought to perform the one function in the community for which his natznre best suited him. of course.'" says Socrates.punishment of immorality as a step taken like punishment of treascln. Plato thus divides his ideally just state in classes-the guardians who rule.lh Justice demands that one perf o m the duties of one's stal-io1-ror functior~ in the co This. This. m d . of justice has exercjsed g ~ a t influence h conservative political thinking. these functions will be differentiated. indeed. broadly speaking. no claim is made that such behavior has bad consequences by weakenkg society (as the moderate thesis hoids). but those duties. It asserts that the proper office of coercion i n a society is to cndorse a certain way of living and discourage those who would act differently. The focus oC justice is not. will have the rights and duties that are necessary for it to perform its function. those in trades. Instead the enfc~rcement of morality is regarded as a thing of value.

it also seems prone to limiting liberty Plato" theory is infamous in this regard-his ideal. but these rights will.846f924): 'To know what a man is. . T for one have small care about liberty5t .and dut-ies are detennked by his or her piace i n the whole. he lives in a certain society. ':lhomas Carlyle (1795-1881) voiced deep worries about classical liberal concegtj. and that this. It might be said that we equally have claims to those rights we need to perform our social functions.~~So Liberty? The true liberty of a man. then in the middle positicsn a man" s:. and to walk thereon. ""liberty" and the maximum of wellbeing: if liberty be not that. consisted in his finding out.imd each man stmding separate from the other. We must say that a man" life with its moral duties is in the main filled up by his station in that system of whales which the state is. A similar view. To learn. having 'no bushess with him' but a cash account. in a certain state. or being forced ta find out the right path. to set about doing the same! That is his true blessedness. . man is a social being9 :It is a perso113 place in his famity. . . it will not result in a system of equal rights and duties. just state abolished the family in favor of mandatory c o m u n a l marislg of child re^^.cln. he was born into a familqi. community. however. honour. over all. . . . persuasion. We must content ourselves by pointing out that there are such facts as the family. He is one of a people. . you must not take him in isolation. gives him the life which he lives and ought to live. What he has to dc:. . stressing the embedded nature of h u n m (Sectio~~ 3. what his function is.3) and our place i n the social organism. partly by its laws and institutions. classkal Iiberal liberty and the market order. professim. and stiXI more by its spirit. and all that comes from his station in the organism." Not only is this collectivist interpretatio~~ of justice hegalitariar~. . or to be taught.'bll of which mounts to little more than the '"liberty to die from star~ation.wn profession and society and. go all the m y hack to Plato. the larger community ctf the state. Bradley (1. depends on what his place is. SInce the community is a complex system in which difkrent people perform various functions. was offered by F: H. "which hits to purchase itself by socid isolat-i. and state that determines what justice demands of hinl and what is owed to him. we c m tmderstmd the conservative" stipathy to eyuality (Sclction 7. We need not. and since justice requires that one have the rights and duties necessary to perform one" ffunctioxl. Carlyle harshly criticized the individualism behind. much less rights to equaliry of resowes or welfare.ns of a free society. . Giwen this view of society and justice.5). and even compulsion. be different and unequal. you wtlutd say. and then by permission. In short. what work he was actually able for.

atheists-may also be relegated to a secor-rd-class status. rather thar-r liheral capitdim. each fulfills a function. unlike liberal miarkt society. A morally colleclrivist picture of C-hejust society is not unirfuely conselvative. as Carlyle suggests. but liberty itself is not firmly mchored.. those outside the communiQ are. given English some civil and politial liberties are central to society and its traditiox~s. from the perspective of justice. such as to perform their station or to contribute t-o this common good. Second.anic. or public person. groups are not accorded second-class statzns because they do not fit . which leaves a person to sink or swim according to his talents and luck. Catholics. it may come to hold rights and duties against other comuplities.4). citizens not only have duties to other citizens and to the government. Especially in the nketeenth an$ the first half of the twentieth. I h e cdectivity becomes itself a rights holder against citizens. in this sort of collectivist conservatism. (Section 5. centuries. W saw that or-re reason &at cox-rservativesreject equality it. at the periphery of the practice of justice. collectivist liberals seeking to defend culbral diversity-and so who wish to el-rsure that some ethnic or cultural. Jews. and socialists all proposed conceptions of a just sociey that mderst-oad societies themselves as (to use Rousseau" swords) a '"public person" This collectivism led to conceptions of justice that &parted from classical liberalism in three main ways. Moreower. it implies libert-y for the wise with deference from their inferiors. this collectivist:orientation to justice leads to a moritl:iy crucial difference betweer1 those who al. there was a widespsead reaction to the individualism of classical liberalism: conservatives. To be sure.Corrservatives such as C a r v e have been attracted to medkva2 society. 3 ) . Z'hus. and citizens have duties of justice to their society. monistic revisionist liberals (Section & .Foreigners and aliens are not part of the community.5). First. In an ort. eighteenth-century France or twentieth-centz~ry Russia) would not provide a gmeral case for individud freedont. T%e moral and methodological collectivist tendencies of much conservative thought seem in tension with cmservativeskaluinlf of liberty. as the commur-rity becomes a moral. cmmunists. :If justice deper-rds0 1 1or~e~s role in the community. nor do t-hey h m the same claims against it. Third. it is not ckar that t-he cox~servative case is for liberty for everyone. their perception that it is hostile to lilfoerty (Section 7. and society seeks to ensure that a person has bvhat he needs to do his job well. perhaps even entirety excluded. hierarchical order. but a cox-rservativeanalysis of nonliberal tradithat tracfitiox~ tions (say. Jehovah's Witnesses. they do not owe the s m e duties to it.e members and those who are not members of society. subgmups that do not fit into the larger commnity or refuse prifnary altegiance to the common good-for example. h d even i n the An+-America7 tradition. but they have deities fu s ~ c k t y as a ~uhule.

socialism has in general been less ready than liberalism to advance principks of justice. 4 Summary Ihis chaptel. Last. I also argued that because Marx ties justice closely to legality and the nature of society. is socialjsm's deep devot. though.ion to e ~ a l i t y resulting commitment to radical democracy If power is to be equaljzed. it has been argued that the French-speahg e u m m u n i r " y i n Canada hat. lhis conceptiox~ of justice is str011gIy imtirationalist: it places its faith in the n a society rather than gradual evoldion of norms of justice employed i any philosopher% arg ents about justice. The common theme running through these theories is a conceptual connectim bewecn justice and the orgmizatim of society. they appear to presuppose a liberal moral individualism insofar aa people's motivations are not determined k y their place in the economic sytitem but by their individual sense of justice. resources would be distributed according to need. explored of power Tlnd its in %ction 9. Marx does. a r ~ d once the corruption of capitalism had been left beltind. this leads to a democratic ideal of the just society*T%is. J u s t i c e as tmdifirrn or C ( I ~ I ) ~ I C ~conceives ~~Q~PZ of justice as essrmlidy the legal lustice of an existing societqr and is generally critical of appeals lo ideal justice.. %ctio~ ~ co~~si<aered 9. he tends to see justice as relative to economic systems-capitalist justice is thus fundamentally d i i k r e ~from ~ t socialist justice. n/farx seemed suspicious of claims re:lying on ideal justice. We began in Scctio~~ 9.1 by examiHing Karl Marx" views on justice. insisting that the traditio~~s of a sociey are based on c o ~ ~ c e p t i of o~~s virtues and vice. the most collectivist conservative .into the wider community-hold that these various communities have rights against each other.32 9 . We considered at some length Lord Ucvlin" argument for lrhe legal supgrc'sion of hornsexuality m d prostitution as a 2 emmple of this approach to justice. and the nature of the community. Except for its insistence on the abolition of capitalism. however. For exampIe. has exp1orc. 012e reasall for this. give us some CILI~S about ideal socialist justice: he seems to hoSd that it wodd first give workers what they deseme (thus overrroming capitalist exploitation). rights to m a h t a h its cultural identity. so must politic& power.3.3 three cox~servatitie approaches to justice. mQit is crucial to a just society that these notions be enforced by society. : I noted in the discussion of Marx his reluctmce to prt>vide detai:ied prkci_ples of justice to grnide socialist sociev. and so alienation was overcome. implies that the principles of a just society must be a matter of the popular will of the e@itasian cooperative community.d a vafiet_vof socialist and conservalive accow~ts of justice. Jzlstiee as virtue is more rationalist. rights that the English-veakirng commztnifymust respect.

19173). Macpherson. 528). ""Te Concept of Exploitation." h Marx. Narton. p. 136. 1985). p. 2nd ed. involvjng various and uneyual rights." p 5536). Karl Marx. Jon Elster. Jarnes P. . Ibid. 4. Marx and Engels. 1. (New York: W. ""Critique of the Gotha Program. A good example is Kai Nielsen.. See also frVi>ocl%reply in the same volume. For a Marxist effc~rt to account for both official state justice and ideal justice. CA: Miadsworth.KarX Marx. 14. TIze Marx-E~~gels Re~de1. "S~ocialism:Utopian and Scientific. but can be combined in a variev of ways to produce variations of conservative justice. Tucker. I 7 0 0 . Frederick Engels. p. 2 989). ed. Ster. p.IsRe~deiv. 3." in The Marx-EngeZs Reader. p. and do. 15. and Thornas Scanlon. Thomas Nagel. 19W). pp. NJ: Rowman and Alledeld. p. C. a slightly different tramlation is given. AICenzatizle Political Perspectiv~ 2. 534. referring to "fair" rather than "just" (p. perform the dz~firrsnf fljeir stations. and antirationalism. %e. 1 4 " 7 8 ) . Husami. 6. Mfnux. 363. 19861. they are not mutually exclusive alternatives. 13. 131. 1992).r. quoted in Atlen Wt>od. B. Karl Mam. traditionalism. 4.." h inhe Mnrx-Efzgels Read6. 1990). pp.. Shklar. 64-65." " q u o t e d in Wood. fzdstice nlzd Histor~j(Princeton: Princeton University Press. A 1 1 Ilrtrodztcfiun do Xari Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Given the complex nature of society. See Judith N. These three conserviltive a p p r o a c h are variations of the themes of collectivism. See G. 531.." in Marshal1 Cohen. 12. 5. Karl Mam. pp. 16. for example. Equality and Libert'y: A Dqe~zst: ofRi)adicalEg131itariarzism (Totowa. Xnrl Mnrx (London: Rrslutledge and Kegan Paul. 117. A.p. Jtrstice: 2nd ed. 95. Justice n~rdHistory. these stations are differentiated.. Karl Narx.barscomments in his edited volume. 7. eds. 1981). see Millon Fisk. 135-157.pp. 10. 46-47. in The iGlarx-E~zgels Reader.approach to justice is exemplified in the idea that a just socjety is one in which people are able to. 498. Dernucmlic TIzeo~~j: Essays irz Refrkz~aE (Oxford: CXarendon Press. 130-131. Ziyad I. ""Critique ctf the Cotha Program. The Communist f i t r f s t o . W. Cohen. p. The State Jzlstiee: Apz Essay in PolifimZ Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi ty. in Robert C. "Marx on Distributive Justice. Ibid. The Mnrx-E?zgc. Ibid. p. The Faces lttjustice (New Haven: Yale University. (Belmont. Press. 685. 7. 8. 18. Capital. Marx. 11. In Tucker. ""Critique of it-re Gotha Program.p.

111.. see Derek L. see A. however.'5n his New Studies iitz PIliEosqhy. Edward Shils. p. ed. 1979). 3977).A. MA: MfT Press. See David Miller. p. 38.1Q. 39. Marxism a ~ Morality 20. pp. 2.. 247. It is at Kekes. p. p.L. 58. Jiirgen Habermas. Participation in Denrocrntic Ttz~c~ry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For an analysis of Cole's views. 87-97. 35. 23. 1963). chaps. C. All quotes in this paragraph are from ibid. Hayek. Part 2. 1982).19. 77. 1. Legislrlfk~z People (London: Routtedge and Kegan Paul. 147. NY Cornell University Press. 335. 29. 30. 40. E A. p. Emphasis in original. p. 36. 21. Law. Book 3. Uahl. Politia. Afiev Virlzle (Notre Darne. See also John Gray. eds.:Libel-nlism Against Pqulism (San Francisco: W. 25. For a cc7tnservative who embraces a version of pluralism. ""tiberalism. 1981). 41. (Oxfcjrd: CXarendon Press. A 7i. Uavid t-lume. p. Ibid. 22. 3: Tfze hlitiml Order of a Free 31. 27. 33. 14-15. Joshua Cohen and Joef Rogers. 22. 1"385). A. A C ~ s e f o Couzservatz'sm best contentious whether this historical account is accurate. 37. 32. 243. for example. Hayek. C. Hart. See Edward Nell and Onvra OWNe. l989). Alasdair MacIntyre. Ecovzornics n~zd the Flisfory of Idcms (London: Routtedge and Kegan Paul. . p. WI Might. Christopher J. p. E t is important to stress that some conservati\res dissent from this view. 6. p. Ibid. 2983).rual-d a Tra12sfirsnatim o f Axnerz'cnn Suclcrty (Harmondsworth. 59.H. p. 1995). 24. see John r (Ethaca. Phillips! Lookkg Backzunrd: A Critiml Appmisaf @Commzi~zitarinn Tf~owglird (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 5. Quoted in CacoXe Pateman. 1998)." in interba. freemen. For a general discussion. 1978). B-. ""fustice Under Socialism. Martin" Press.Ey ("New YLXK: St.. 1978). 44. Steven ~ d (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3381). 34. For a critical examination. Law. IN: University of Notre Dame Press. p.pp. E1. Cole mid Socialist Denzocracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press. justice: Alflmmtive hlit-ienl Persy?ectivcs. 1979). L. 19881. IN: Universiq cctf Notre Dame Press.. UK: Penguin. A Pr@ce to Emvzornic Bemocr ~ c (krkeley: y University of California Press. p. See. W'Zliam Riker. Compare. Lukes. Macpherson.cafl. Or-2 De~~tocracy: 7i3. 1997). Berry The Idc~laufa Der~ocraticCt>nrfnzr~zi. Alasdair MacIntyre. 28. a ~ Libertyr ~d vol. sect. Soci~l lustice (Oxfcjrd: Ctarendon Press. 197S).sco f Human Natzire. Ibid. EnligfztenmentS Wake (London: Routledge. see Robert A. Quoted in ibid. Nidditch. The Lije and Tinzes of Libeml fimocraq (Oxfcjrd: Oxfcjrd Universiq Press. eds. 26. p. pp. Selby-Bigge and I? H. 148. 1987). WIzuse ]lastice? Wlzose Rationality ? (Notre Dame. 'Topular Sovereignty as Procedure. 166ff.. Beliberatitle Democmcy: Essnys ouz Reasouz nzzd Politics (Cadridge.. Liberlji aand Morality (London: Oxford University Press. W. 1470). 36. Marxisnz atzd MornliQ. Eizditiuuz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press." in Jarnes Bohman and Willam Rehg. 1993).D. Lukes.

$9. p. 82. Patrick Devlin. pp. p. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 12-14. Law. Liberty and Momlify.204. Liberfayaalzd Morality.. Fczr a good selection of essays on this topic. Thornas Carlyle. ed. 137". 48-49. pp. 43. eds. 127 [IV 4-32]. Past and Pvsent (Lc~ndon: Dent. Hart.y (London: Duckworth. p. SO. Ei H. ed. 51. Law a t ~ d Mornlif. . 142"j7. 48. $5. The quoted passages are from Devlin. 51-52. Samuel Coferidge. 1972). Hart. The Rights of Mirzority Czdlttkr~~~ (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 52. 1945). ed. 173-174. 1995). trana (Oxford: Oxford University Press. E~~glislz I>olr'lic~l Tlfazfglzt. Lnw.. 2960). Qtz llze Constitution o f flie Cfzfarchand State. quoted in Lctuis BlomCooper and Gavin Drewey. pp. pp. Elhicnf Studies. 34.. Tlze E'n$?rcenzctzt ojMoreirls (London: Oxford University Press. James Fitzjames Stephen... Tfze Etforcemerit of2llumtsPpp. 1968). 39621. 13. pp. (Lctndon: Dent. 2nd ed.8. Ibid. 211.42. PIatcl.in the Nineteentfi Ceiziiury (New Yctrk: Harper and ROW. see Will Kymlieka. 46. Bradley. See Crane Brinton. Francis MacDsnatd Cornford. 44. 47. Libertyf EqzraEityf Fratenzity. 1976). Tljc Xepriblic. John Barrelt. 204. p.

Ef our core value is auto~~omy or liberty. :It is for just this reasm that many marchists reject the very idea of political mthority.10." She sumenders her judgment to him: she will allow her ncfions to be detemhed by what he decides* 11 we value liber@ and autonomy (Sections4.4. al- . few of zzs have Phe backgrozlnd i nbiology and physiology or the clinical experience. As Ricbard B. when the doctc7r tells you that you have an ailment and prescribes a treatment. The basic purpox o f this sort CIF authority i s to substitute the knowledge CIF one person for the ignorance or lesser knowledge o f another person. we rely on the doctor" judgment. though. few will take that judgment seriously But withh a wide range. :Ingrid Berg~~ tells m Hurnphrey Bogart that he will have to "'dothe thhkk3g for both of us. h a v e s . To be sure. a leading t-heorist of auel-lorgy. WC do not totally surwnder our judpex~t: if the doctor tells us that we need to stilnd on our k a c f h r a w e k to cure our headache. to really make a judgme~~ t . terribly difficult to avoid ever surrendering your judgment. In Caazbluszca.1 Conservatism and Political Authority O n Being "An Authority" The crux of accepting another person as m authority seems to be that you '"urrmder your judg1ne17tff to the aulfiority. we will be suspicious of authority: when a person is guided by another in this way. we may get a secmd opinion.' It seems. it might seem that we should never surrender our judgment to others: we should always have the right and responsibilitJi of acting on our own judgment. she is ather-mled rather than self-ruled. but then we arc fullowirsg another" doctor" oopjnicrn. even if she seeks to cxplajn it to zzs in detajl. Consider a trip to the doctor. To a very large exte~~t. Most of us do not have the expertise to evaluate the doctor%diag~osis and prescription. about we M o w fhe doctor's judgment.1. Of course. what should be done. Friedman.2). because we believe it is superior to our own.

"It is because of the superior insight of some perm"" that he should be ack~owtedged arr. she retains the final decision about what should be done. Toccjuevilile. When 1 go to the doctor. I col7fide~"ttly tell my family and friends that I have "iritis. The authority relati. been employed in political philosophy. however.on does not create this hequaljty. But she does anythi~lig not surrender her judgment to the other. Yet. And Friedman tells us. so she may col~sult another. her own extttnsive k~owiedge. it: =cognizes a prior inequality." Plato . but X do not have the howledge on which those beliefs am based. as Friedman points out. 'on trust and without discrussio~~. though the believer knows not why2 We should distinguish relying 0 1 .' that is.One speciakt may ask the advice of another jn a complicated case. The spe"iaist may want to make sure that she has not overlooked in her deliher&io~~s."" though I am not really sure just what it is or how the doctor h ~ o w Xshave it. I am not merely ask1"igfor advice to supplement my own deliberations. 1 ) . " 1 1 authority" by others: the deference relation is supposed to reflect the antecedent c o n c ~ t e /personal9di"fferencesbetween the partjes." 4 Being %n Aothoriv" and the Art of Politics: Platonic Collectivism I h e idea of being "an authority" has. because X do not rcaUy have the knowledge that w u l d justify those belief!. but "'true belief"" in the sense ctf belief that is indeed justified. a decision that she will make on the basis of suppkmnted by the advice of otkrs. I have "true beliefs" about what course 1should take. Tacqueville n an extended discusson ol this matter that he means ""makesquite clear i beliefs held on the 'principle of authority. the doctor's deliberations suppla-lzt what I originally thought and X take over her beliefs as if they were my own. As far back as Plab. as Friedman points out. political theorists-especidy those who arc? conservatively illclined-have justified political authority because some are "'an arzt-Xlontyon polities.""" ""anazrthurity" wwitl be particulaly importmt to m a c c o m of political authoriey if it: is h d d that the art of poljtics is a special art and those who :know it best should rule. not exist without common beliefs.thaugh what the person who defers thereby comes to possess as a surrogate for his ignorance is nctt knowledge.'" At the heart of this type of authority relation is m ineqrkmlity o bztltsttledge. 1 such authority from m e ~ l y ash"ig for &vice. As Friedman st-resses.held that socjety could. the great: French political theorist of the nineteenth cenhzry (Section 7 .----Icannot achnally replicak? lrhc doctor's reasoning-1 take them on largely trust. "One person defers to another on same matter because he lacks the howledge or insight that he assumes the other posf sesses.

we should not be any less careful with Lhe &airs of government. Politics. society have a wide krariety of different goals and values. for the expert k~fozos the &'.e their authority in these matters. often compared the state to a ship at sea.in befrontkg the ship. But it is often said. says the corzservative. then justice demands that those who hawe the skiil to rule and maxage t-he state have the rights and powers-the atrthoriq-to do so. politics cannot be the art of achievhg that goal. when building a house we take great care to ensure that we find the most skillful builde~ If we take all this trouhle with a house. like Plato himself. Cerhinly. or making us all . Just because there is no single political goal. politics has no goal. ar~d no one thinks that everyone is equally skilled h house buildhg. And it is just because medicine has a goal that exyert knowledge is useful. peaplle in. is not an art like medicine. Those drawing on this conception of pl-iticd ault*lority have." Notice that this is an application of Plato%ccollectivist theory of justice (Section 93). Because there is no political god corresponding to '"ealth. the best route to a goal. and athers should ackrrouilc?clg.f wny to achie~~e the goal. n o s e who are sklltlzrl should run the government. but it aiso needs a capt"in who has the necessary skill amd howledge to safely nwigate the mm): perils cono the aullnority of the capta. Many reject this view of political lift. a ship needs a crew with diverse skills. the skill needed to run a government is greater than the skifl needed to build a house. Hence the politically skilled should rde. we may say. One of the interesting features of C)akeshotifsco~xservatism is that he agrees that politics does not have a goal such as health. and like any art.. the wise deserve to be the maskrs of others. If justice demands "cat each person perfotm his or her rightful function. and have the rights m d powers necessary to do so. The sailors submit t cause ihe captain has the skill and knowledge to preserve the ship. says Thomas Carlyle." we cannot treat the politician as an expert Lvho howl. and s m e sfiodd have authority over others because they are more cmpetent at achieving this goal. such as medicine or carpentry it shouid be practiced by those who have the necessary h o w l edge and skill.insisted that politics is m art. hdeed. a goal-health. for mediche has an aim.. axd others should accept their aulhority and obey Oakeshoft on Political Avthorip: Antimticrnalist and Anficol/ectivist Cctnservatism I h e version of conservatism we have thus far considered supposes that there i s a goal or end of political Efe.in the same bvay citizens ought to surrender their judgment to those who h o w the art of politics. Thus.

equality. The man uf this disposition understands it to be the business of government nctt to inflame passion and give it new objects to feed upon. "Governhg is mderstood to be a secondary activity.those who do not grasp the political tradition are unable to effectively exercise political authority. the poljtically inexperienced sec polities as the way to solve all.vuir of power which inspires &ern to dream ctf what might be made of it. of various d i m s i o n s . which they sincerely believe are for the benefit of mankind. it requires amending. or whatever. Consequexrtl_y. "Pditics. ""government'happears as a vast resr. and exterrding those traditions in the ongoing effort to attenrt to the prOhlems of life among diverse people. he it social justice. to deflate. :hfot understand* the limited possibilities of politics. Oakeshott argues. disposed to recognise government as an instrument CIF passion. alt-3nough it is in this sense a secondorder activity-m activity devoted to regulating other activities without an end of its owl%-it still is a specific art. . . TO a conservative. to restrain. both identijCy pditics as m art that cannot . To some people. the disposition tc3 be conservative in respect of politics reflects a quite different view of the activity. to pacify and to reconcile. He writes. the art of politics is to inname and direct desire. thus. of governing. and to use it for imposing their favourite projects upon their fellows is what they understand as the adventure of gclveming men. and so one that requires practical h~owledge.7 The politically inexperienced. they become disappointed and cpical when they digover that this is impossibte).better people. but is the art of arranging social life so that various goals can he pursued by different people with c o d i c t h g aimsay Yet. . Those who fait to grasp the real naturcl of politics. p r e s e h g . in contrast. Now. not to stoke the fires of desire. nlho think there is some common god to be achieved. They are. but tct damp them down. and to capture this source CIF power. it is those who do not und e r s t d politics-the politicaily naive voters of today%democracies."" This "attending to'9heir affairs requires howledge of their poljtical traditiom."~Politics is not itself directly concerned with promoting goals. for exmple-who fail to see this. But Oakeshott says. Although C)akcshottfsantiratio~~alist case for political expertise diffclrs from Plab's nnonistic cdectivism. of our problems (md. if necessary tcj increase it." says Oakeshott. They have favorite projects. are those Who are :likely to conceive of politics as aiming at some great goal. of course. but to inject intc3 the activities of already tt3o passionate men an ingredient of muderatiljn. are always seeking some politic& utopia. or peace on earth. is "the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a set of peoyie whom chance or choice have brought together.

he may be said to be "haauthctrity. not necBut to accept smeone -as ""in authori'cy"?~ essarily to believe that what she says is correct. But. the vvhole point of recogvlizing is that the validity of her dhctivtts is not another as being "'in autho~ty'" dependent on your agreekg to their somdness. 10. say a command simply be- . Particularly important in this regard is that your obedience to the directives of the autharity is nat dependent on your agreeing with her wisdorn. As Fsiedmm says. there is a clear I'ndiration that the mass. As Friedmm puts it. or status which entitles him to make decisions about how other people a person may be said to be "an authority" on should behave.'l T%e nation of "'an authorityM-which we have been exmhkg-concerrtrates an belief m d howledge.2 On Being "In Aufhority" The Confrast with "An Avfhorifym Friedman tells us. positicm. beliefs about the right and wrong ways of doing things).be successfully practiced by the inexperienced. when one ackplowlcdges mother as being "in authority" "stead of acthg on one's "private juclgment" one acts on the wit1 of another. which continudly threat. The art of political rule involves the art of restraining passior~s and enthusiasms.~. if you accept y o u doctor as an authority on medjcine.cn to engulf pditics. And in most conservative writings. "iou follow the will of mother even if it codicts with your own private jdgmmt: on this matter you say the person ""in aufiority" w w i I I decide what is to be done. or the majority. A person can be said to ""have authctrity'2n Iwu distinct senses. whereas the idea of someone who is "in authority" points t o her entitlement to replate action.3). wither Plab nor Oakeshott-21or any conservative-is enamoed of democracy. The idea being a>ntieyedby such notions as the surrender of private judgment or individual judgment is that in ctbeying. howledge. for it gives political power to those who are bvit%lout political. you believe her when sfie tells you that you have a certah disease and what you should do about it. Indeed. meaning that his views or utteernces are to be entitled to be believed (includingI ta carnplicate matters. If you accept someone as "m autl?rorityU " y o u r beliefs are guided by her judpent. with the result that they Iet loose their passims in the politkal realm (see Section 3. something. For one. to obey herr dimctives." meaning that he cttcupies some office. are prone to such passio~~s. Her will replaces your decisio-. sea>ndlilr. Thus.

If .13 In this case. such as election lottery or hereditary lineage. W ~ as fully justified and theirs as m%even though he regards his ~ I views taken. and instead accept someone to make binding decisions for all.clowing a prescription the fact that it is prescribed by someone acknawledged by him as entitled to rule. it fc~llows that if each insists ctn following his own views. why arc we obeying him? Why should we accept directio~~ of our actions by s m o n e who does not h o w my mare than we do? Equality and Coordination Problems To grasp why we might follow someone who is simply "in authority. he a c c e p t ~a s sufficient reason ftx ft3. and things witl hilrn out better if: pm follow the directivm of a m e howledgeable person. The man who accepts authority is thus said to surrender his private or individual judgment because he does not insist that reasons be given that he can grasp and that satisfy him. the common activity will be made impossibfe. designed to define who is to have the right to make binding decisions upon a~1. ctr to establish some procedure.12 In many y s . But why woutd we ever fdlow the directives of someone who is "in authorip. Rather." col~sider a situation in which a ccrrllection of individuals wish tc:.iW but we each have diffemt ideas about how to go about it.""she h o w s more than you do.cause it comes from someone accorded the right to rule. Since the ccrrst of insisting on faltc3wing one's own judgment is chaos."' given that such authority makes no claim to be ar7y wiser or any mare howledgeable than are \ve"ZAfter all. engage in some common activity requiring a certah degree of cclordinated action but they are tmable to agree on what the substance of their coordinated action should be. it may then appear reasonable for each man to sacrifice his own judgment as it-re basis ctf (some part) of his behaviclr and also tt3 forego pressing his own views on all others. we will find ourselves in constant disagreement as we go about the activity. And because they camctt agree. Our situation is not simpiy a onetirne conflict that might be suhject to negotiation. followhg the directi\res of someone who is "in authoriw" doing what you are totd by "m1 authority" If is much more puzzling thar~ smeone is " m autfnority. if the person with atrIhority does not have special knowledge of political matters. the subject does not make his obedience conditional on his own personal examination of the thing he is being asked tc3 do. as a condition of his obedience. we all want to engage in some cooperative actit.

what is important is that the coordinator instructs everyone on what to do. in which each does his own thing. this type of coorcfinator. In this sort of case. W e can see. W e n we all agRe on what is to be . even if it is m t the side that is most fitvored. ?"he case for a coordirnator is clal-ffied irn Figure 10. Alf drives on the rigbt/Retty on the left. is left-handed and. Her first choice is for evqorre to drive on the left.1point (rightjright. Alf a d k t t y are confronted with four possibilities: they each drive on the right. say. for parallel reasons. fkd ourselkres jxt Hobbes" state of nature (Section 8. m d sc-. in. W e i-vill. M f drives on the le&/Betty drives on the right. 11-tthis case. Both. it is not relevarnt whether the coordinator chooses wisely (there probably is no correct mswer to this problem). Betty has every reason to obey' since she benefits from achieving coordination. w u l d prefer a traffic code that instructs people to drive on t-he left. which is Betty's second choice. Eitkr coordinatior. The nunnbers in t-he cells irndicate how each ranks that optiom. on lrhe right and Betty on the left-a disaster. to options in which they fail to coordinate. however. then. since he finds it slightly easier to sbft gears with his right hand.1. they each drive on the left. the coordirnator selects the right-hand side. of them. since they will eventually crash! What is most important is that they drive on the same side of the mad. would benefit from a coordinator who proclaims h i c h side of the road to drive on. hstead of cooperation we confront endless disputes or chaos.1 A Coordination Problem each insists on the right to decide for herself. AWs first choice is for everyone to drive on the right. left/left) is vastly preferred by both. aciitriv remains uncoordinated. short. Betty m the other hand. then. when we disagree about wh& is best or what we most prefer. A l i is a right-hamded person who has a slight preference for a traffic code according to which he drives on the right side of the road. Thus. Even if. We requirt. we wifl not gain the benefits of cooperation. then. that neither wishes to go it alme and drive on the side he or she most prefers regardless of what others do: that wouid lead to A:if drivint.FIGURE l 0.2).

14 F~edman takes the argument one step further. Not only does the concept of being ''in authoriv" not presuppose that he who is j n authoP-ivis also "m aulhoritpf3ut the two ideas of autfnority involve different PRsuppositions.nated solution. isn't the option that I think is best. There. it does not require (2). (1) "Well. cl. such as superior power ctf judgment or special knowledge (as in the case of being "an authority"") His claim to be obeyed is simply that he has been put "in authority" acasrding to established procedure. we can only continue our cooperative activity if sorne peopIe about what is best act in ways that codict with t-heir perw11""i judgmex~ts to do or what they would most prefer."fiiedmitr~'~ point is that "h authority"' c m e r n s (1). Again. this common case. we m~rst create someone who has authority-someom "in authority"-to resolve our disputes and direct us in what we should do. ratl?er than that his decisirtns are. directly follows from Hobbes's analysis of the state of nature in which each person follows his own private judgments.The argument that we have just examined for havhg an authoritative coordinator of actions starts from the premise that we are equally h e (Section 6. but that's what the coordix~ator says we should do. you do not obey becatrse the authority has the right answer. it:is necessary that they act on the fudgmcnts of the authoritalive coordinator rather than their own judgment about what is best. 'This does not rman. typically we that is rare i each have Merent ~udgments abotrt what should be done. the basis of the claim to obedience made by a person "in authority" i s isof a very special kind. if the atrthoritative coordinator says that is the best waEi."'And that is very different from (2) "Well. but because he gives an answer that allows for a coordi. This case for authority then. that we must accept the authoritative coordinator" opinions about what is best. That is. it must be. on independent grounds.-ing. But n complex activities involving many people. For cooperation to continue. To create a just and peaceful society Ilobbes argues. or superior decisir1ns. the problem is not severe: our individual judgments conver2i..done. In. the w r i t s or demerits of the particular decisior~ are i r ~ k v a nto t the decision to obey in case (1). The claim drrres not derive Prom any special personal characteristics of the person inve&t"dwith authority. meritorious. I guess I was wrorzg to thirtk not-V). Friedman wl-ites. From this standpoint. leading to war (Section 8. which is a case where one thinks that the coordinator is "an authority" about cl. c m be no justice or order in such a co~liditim.3) and are not LVilliftg to defer to fihe judgments ot: . hwevcr. so I'll do it.2). it must he the case that people can say.e. then.

2). they should accept her ophions too. It is because each person has his t>wn opinions.others. He explains what is perhaps the most important feature of potitical au&ority: Irhal:we have Emon to obey even when we think that it is wrong. The government knows i t s business." h contrast. then I guess it must be the best.'" But that wodd seem to u d e m h e political authority entirely L. but you must alter your judgments to conform to its dictates. You must say to yourself. Sa. this might seem to mem that we only obey laws when we agree with them. "I'm not goil~g to abandon my judgment. fiietlmm points to a way out of this difficdy: we are not faced with the choice of either (I) abandonhg our independent judgment and becoming servile subjects. some one thing must be done if thejr activity is to be coordjnated. political authoriv is based on being " m a u t h o ~ v r " tives are apt t accepting the autfnority of the state seems servile. follltowing once agah Habbes" analysis of the state of nature (Section 8. For you must not or~ly accept its directions. "so only if I. denying that is ent could ever have authority over us. m a n d so need someone ta be "'in. however. that the basic pr""biem develops. he argues that the idea of "an authority" involves a basic inequality.t someone to coordinate their actions even though they continue to disagree &out what is best. someone knows better than the others.aws are then little morcj than suggestions put fomard by the government for the evaluation of each citizen. No one thinks that any of the others is especially wiser. Friedmm argues that it is pfecisely because each of e do not recop~ize the natural us considers ourself to be ewally frc superiority of anyolxe to rule over us---that we argue and disagree. atrthority. or (2) adopting anarchism. "If the government says that suchand-such is the best policy. X . WC continue to evaluate government policies as good or bad. So they develop some pmcedum whereby they selc3c. so each keeps to his owl7 opinkm.Each person thjnks that he h ~ o w the s best way to act. and so they should not only accept her directions about how to act. Yet." Most of us. . Still. and because others disagree they fail to coordinate their actions." yyo might say. and does not think that others are especialty wiser than is he. think a law or a poticy is good wilt I follow it. Obedience When You Think the A u f h o r i v Is Wrong Friedmm" aanalysis of political authority is enlightening. as cortservao thisrk. that is. without abandoning one's judgment: m e puts smeone "in authority"' l~ but denies that he or she is "'an a u t h o ~ p ' k politics. are not prepared to say that: we are not prepar(3d to handon our political jdgments. A third aiten~ative to follow the directions of the government so as to achieve coordination.

'Thus. defense. or s m e body of people. SLIppose. we might expect a r increas~ ing nul-nber of cooperators to switch to the nnncooperator camp. however. three-quarters af the population managed to agree to cut emissions. Friedman"~ analysis of the notion of being "in aulhori~'9its w l l with Ilobbes"s theory Recall Hob$esfs account of the state of nature and justice (Section 8. it may well be the case that evayoxre prcfers clem air to dirty air.1 0. Yet. m d so on. the case of c l e m goods""in sufficient ~al7tities. their emissions gab the full benefits of the restrizint by the other th~e-quarkrs: the one-quarter of noncooperators get @Elthe beneiits of clean air. We c m immediately see that the one-quarter who did not. ar drive less.s maintains that we must appoint someone. police. one important liberal l l l bemfit from a coordiargument for political mthorif?/is that cve wodd i .l~ air*Suppose that in the state of natznre. Of cowse.It is importmt for Hobbes that m y rules of justice am better than no rules of justice. they do so. wi. f ul-z!pne gels the c ~ ~ ezferyarze ~ d f else cnn gct if fir free. or in some other way alter their activities irz ways that:cost. also miakes sense of the idea that a crucial task of poli. there will be costs that these three-quarters oi the popuiittion will have to bear: they will have to buy emission controll devices. but all purely volwtmy schemes fail because too many people seek a '"free rides'-they seek to get the kenfits without payhg the cost. Hobbes demonstrates how tmlimited liberties in the state of nature would lead to conflict and istsecurity Thus.tical authority is to pmvide for plablic p o d s such as clean air. he argu"& rational individuals wodd conse~rt to a sovereig~r who would institute rules of justice. cut. some of our cooperators are likely to decide to stop payhg their share af the costs. Thus. Seeing that the noncooperating mev a r t e r of the populatio~r get the clean air without p a w g "ny of thc cost. But to gain the benefits of a syskm of justice----a system of rigbts that distinguishes "mine" and "thineM-we need to coordinate on the same system. Ei0bbc. thus ever)rone can see it would be betlife in Lhe state of ter to live wrder alzy sysf-em qf jzlsfice thaa to co~rtirrue nature. Why should they have to pay when others get it for free? Why not get it for free themselves? Reasoning thus. much cleaner air.thout bearing any c>f the cost! One feature of public goods is that nonpayers c ot be exclded from elljoying the good. for example. with the result that the benefits are not achiewd at all.2). with the result that eventually so fcw cooperate that air quality goes down. and this resulted in. It has long been recognized that a private property--ha~"darket will not supply these ""public Conside3. to be in authorip and thus have the power to lay down common rules af justiceThe coordhation theory of political authorit).3 Liberal Political Authority The Pure Coordination Theory o f Justice and Authority As 1have stressed.

Moreover. It is important. disputes will still arise as to what justice dernmds. it seems to put too much kveight on coordination. however. Kclnf. what is the relation between pinciples of justice and political aul l laccept certain substantive prhcQles of jus&ority? Suppose that we i lice. :If we reject the Hobbesin position that political authority defi~es jrtsflee. Locke. but which cannot be part in a c o ~ e r a t i v e achieved as long as contributions remain purely voluntary If we accept the Hohbesian pure coordination theory of justice and political aulhority political authority is unlimited in t-he sense t-hat all citizens have goad reason to follow any rule laid down by the political atrthority. Hobbes's theory tics justice foa closely to legality.ocke argued. To avoid this "inconvenience.7.8.natior-someone in authoriw-who could direct everJv. and Umpires Although the pure coordination theory is extremely helpful in explahing the puzzle of why equally free people would sunender their judgment to others. not at all to believe what he says. a ~ on in no way supposes that the sovereign is "m atrthority" about mything. People kvou2d interpret these rights differently. since jus8. to which legal justice must conform. it is better to follow even a bad directive of the authority t h a ~ ruin cooperation m d risk a return to the state of nature by followkg different rules than those laid down by the political authoriv. the sovereign" rrulcs of justice or policy always "preemptf"our own views about what is just: you follow the sovereigr"tfs reasonkg to the extent that you exclude your own viekvs about justice when considering what to do. Most liberals have ii7sisted that there are s m moral rights that constitute the basis of ideal justice. Peaceful social life requires an authoritative ii7te~reter of justice. such as the classical liberall rights to life." L. As we saw in.2).lVhe reason for this should be clear: since our overriding aim is to coordinate our actions according to c o m o n rules. :In this case. no one c m reasonably daim that tice is tied to legdity (Sectior~s the rules laid down by political authorify are unjust. Section 8.oneto do his or her scheme that everyorle wmts. i n disputes each individual wodd be likely to inclhe toward interpretations that favor his interests over those of others.2. ar~d so is heif3ful h constructing a liberal theory of political authority. to stress that the sovereign makes no claim to be comect or have the d the Hobbesim account your obedience best views about justice. Immar~uel jKant agrees: . The important thing is to dr! what the sovereip says. liberQf and progerty Locke held that even if everyone achlowlebged these natural rights. it is necessary to appolint m "uumpire"' to resolve disputes about the requirements of justice.

. nations and states can never be certain they are secure against violence from one another because each will have the right to du what seems just arzd good to Ilim. let us focus on a particuiar n the state of nature. kvhich each relies on his own moral judgmen&. priest.21 The sage. are i they disagree about the nature of liberal justire. we ~ g hadd.4). no cowet(?"l j d g e can be found to mnder a decision having the force of law. m a t are they to do? Of course. One possibility is that they will go to a sage: someme who is '%D authority" about justice. ZSetty may mak~tain that the liberal cor~tract (Section 8. To escape the state af nature. in.iondoes not rest on a fact. even if we imagine men tct be ever so good natured and righteous before a public lawful state of society is established. or moral philosopher is. and the same to all Partie~.~ZO Umpires: "In Avfhoriv" or "An AuthorivffB Must the liberal umpire be " m authority" about:justice ar is it enough to be si~nply ""in authority" to make decisions about what we should do? To better grasp what sort of authority is needed.'"lWecause conflict a ~ h~justice d arise if each persol1 aiways relies on his own interpretation of what is just. i one follows his w n judgmer~ts"" and subject oneself to a ""j@. jlldgments &out justice. The necessity of public lawful coercic. hut give11 the comple>tityof political debate. and thus %hen there is a controvmsy concerning rights (jus contrc~mrsrkm). m$ case: suppose two people. individual men. standing Rules. property is subject ta taxation in order to redistribute resources to the least well off along the lines suggested. by settled."Jif Tke liberal theories af Locke and Kant. dder. defirtitive resdutions of conflictini. are first m d foremast justificaor '"judge" ((Kant)whose task is to provicIe lions of an "uunpire" (Lock@) pdlic. especiaily concerning interp~tations ol contest-ed notions such as property and distributive justice. we require rule by an "Umpire. indifferent. All: and Betty. we hope that they will discuss heir differences m d pmsent their arguments. but on an a priori Idea ctf reason. Alf may insist that although li$aal justice makes some provision h r private property rights. for. t Hobbes] teaches us that men live in violence and are prone tct fight one another before the advent of external cornpulsive legislation. it is not experience that makes public lawhf coercion neces-17. 1 gives no significant scope for redistribution. For example. by John Rawls x 1contrast. Kmt jnsists that if one "'does not wish to renomce all n which everyconcepb of justice. then.l7 K a ~goes t on to il7sist that justice is &sent in the state of nahre because each relies on his own judgment about w h a t is just.Although experience [and.'. we &odd expect continued disagreement." one must "quit the state of nahxre. entirely independently of the opinicm of others.

But on reflection. they reject the sage account of political authority-trying to find smeone who is "an authority"habout justic ecause as free and equal people they will surely disagree about who the proper atrthorities are.ject i difkrs from most conservati. they conceive of themselves as disagreeing &out what to do because they disagree about what is right. others advocate a nanower conception.~~22 In terms of Friedxnm" salysis. although sometimes we do seek the advice of those whom we co~~sider more wise. moral authol-ities to whom everyone should or would defer. n political theory---and in this way it radiraily I h e entire liberal prc. the $ispute is simp:iy -about fairly straightforward matters of fact such as whether or not Betty hit the ball in foul territory. then. Consider more carefully ihe idea of an umpire in a game. they require only that someone be "in authority'" to end the practical dispute. makes her practical dettiminations m the basis of her judgments cox~cerx~ing the rules of the game. But: this is not always the case." The boundaries of the strike zone are contested-we might even say essentially contested: same players and trmpires insist that the zone is wide. iike our drking a m p l e in :Fit. Alf and Betty may well.10. Now. Locke's notion of an "unnpire" provides a third alternative. Players require ar. But also. l l lmakes it the Eberal supposition of the basic freedoln and equality of i krribly unlikely that everyone will defer to the s m e sage about justice.ve views-rests on the supposition that there are no natural. 'fhe liheral recopizes ""no high priests of moral~. Neither in law nor in sporting matches do rules apply Lhmselves: they need to be interpreted.1. and the application req~rires practical judgment. Cmsider the concept of a "strike zone'hnd what constjtutes a '"called strike. it seems doubtful they kvould be satisfied with an umpire who makes no attempt whatsoever to track the underlying issue about justice. is just.on this view taken to have superios insight into justice. Often. But players typical%yd o not. conclude that they do not need "an authority" on morals. because Alf and Bet@%practical conh-oversy about what to do is based on a marai dispute about wZlai. It would seem. with no claim that the caordinatar's views are correct or right. that All and Betty mtxst reject the pure coordinator notion of authority-Hriedman"s notion being simply "in authorivf"because it makes no attempt to relate t-he resolution of the practical controversy to the proper solution of the disagreement about justice. then. The umpire.2 umpire because they have practical disputes based on their different views on how the rules of the garne apply to particular sitzlations. In our case. it does not seem that Alf and Retty simply seek a coordinator who tells them what to do. to resolve the former without reference to the latter treats their m r a l dispute as if it were no m r ~ f than a conflict of preferences. and nothing &out . This makes the umpire appear to be somethjng of a sage.. After all.

Allhough we need an urrtpirtr to resolve dfsputes about the nature of justice. Ti> be sure. We can say then. they could not proceed with the game.ocke%Seeu~a" citizn reBins a ri&t to =volt against a political authoriv that has lost its claim to be a judge of justice. we will sooner or later or cormpt. " 'e s e just are not even reasonable calls. At same point. Yet. and that is precisely when an umpire is needed. each ot us must stitj examjrte the merits of the umpire" decisions to see if they are beyond the bounds of =ason. constitutes a mix of expertise (ibeing ""an authority") and practical disectives (bekg "in authority"'). Indeed. But if an trmpire consistently acts in ways that. take the urnpirt. Although the problem is essent-ially a practicd one. have nothing to do with the rules of the game. 'This ump is either blind or has been paid offff Even When we disagree with an umpire. the mpiw%resolution is to he based on her determhations col~cemjng the. there are lirnits. see the umpire as a sage.accepting an umpire rcquixs that they must.'~practicd auLhority even when they are cmfidmt her decision is wrong.'~ decisions -as Players certair~ly reasons to believe: they usually do not see her as "an atrthority" in the sense that they defer to her judgmnts about what to believe. Ihey may a r p e . Unless they are prepared to follow the umpi=" ddecisioazs in these cases. we can usually grasp how smeone seekhg to apply lrhe ruies of the g m e would make that decision. that conclude that she is either incompete~~t the players only accept the practical authority of the umpire for decisions withh~ some r a q e of reasonable decisions. One of Lhe Treatise is his claim that each most controversial ieatznres of Z. Ib accept the auihority of an urnpircl. may. Situations a l w y s arise when plaq'ers reasonably disagree about what is Lhe appopriate thing to do." not " m authority"). facts and the rules oi the games. if the case for governmental authority is based on our need to resolve conflictkg in- . Yet. they expect the trmpire to deliberate about what to do on the basis of the rules and the facb. then. the umpire coulci not do her job. players need only conceive of her as a practical au. the players must accclpt the urnpirt. ils far as we c m tell.l%tonty (they see her as being "in authority. but usually do not. Players usually believe just what Lhey did before the umpire detrided----that is why they so d e n argue with umpires-hut they accept her judgment as a resolution of the practical dispute insofar as they do what she says. is not to accept a tyralit. Unless they were prepared to do so. we say thhgs We. The umpire3 aim is to podurn pmticai decjsions that best track what the ruies r e w r e . I h e differe~~ce between Lockers umpire account and Friedman's coordination theory is fmdarnental: Lockets srmpire view trltimately leaves each citizen the ri@t to judge when m aoufiority loses its claim to be an interpreter of justice a17d hence m longer need be obeyed. Umpireship. but in the end they do w h a t the mpirtr says.

they are critical of equality (Section 7. our understarrding of umpirer. as I have ~ t er~forcle previously remarked. socialjsm's valuling of equalj. many political theorists have concluded that citizens should not decide. Indeed.Q of p o w a (and so of f ~ e d o m as power) leads generally to a privileged place for democracy in socialist thinking about justice (Section 9. :Now. of course. in marly w q s the chief project of liberal political theory has been to show that equally free peaple would consent to rules of justice that constraiut their freedom.4 Democratic Authority and the Mcmugemenf of Collective Affairs Socialism and Anarchism Atrthoriv conflicts with equality. (A baseball umpire who declares. that radical socialist thought-for exaunple.hjp implies &at the umpire must remain within the bounds of reasonable &cisions. is then the ""inco11venier7ctt" of each persorl relying on his own opinio~l not completely removed. that persm is in the position to d k c t or commmd others-that person's judgmcnt "'prcemptsf"he judgment of ihose over vhJhom she exercises aut_hont.tergretations of justice. are not troubled by this.2). vvhcther to obey. by PJIarx-has refused to build its case on principles of justice (Section 9. If authority was me& to end the arpments about what is to be done. To s m e . The core commitment to eyuality has kd some socialists to marchism. as -well as submit to a pditical autrhoriCy to i n t e r ~ > arid justice. seems ahxost impossible to justify political authority. We dso have seen. for one must stilt rely on one's own oplnion as t o whether the political authority is acting within the hounds of reasonable interp~tatio~ls of the princifia of justice. such as Hobbes.1) and embraces a view of the state as the authoritative interpreter of jwtice.If someone has authority over others. some liberal-hlclhed thhkers so value libert-y m d autonomy that they insist on the iltlegithacy of any political . however.y. since . that jnspired. it undoes everylhing that the argument for authority was meant to accomplish. youh out!'" loses his authority to call the game. been a controversial position. Conservatives. on the merits of each decision. a government that no longer is concerned with justice loses its authority fn trhe history of political p:hilosophy this hat. such socialist thought adopts an essentially iiberal theory of politied authority. insofa as it does so. "Strike two.) h d if that is true. It is much more of a pr~b1em for liberals. But T have argued that the Locke m positioz~ does indeed fdlow from the u m p i ~ s h i p model. Nut il: equaiity of power is a core value.5).1). As we saw above (Section 10. much socialist thought is very close to revisionist liberalism (Section 8.This is manifestly inegalitarim. it.2). 10.

Cole in Britain. they argue.attendant political autl-rority are necessary to bring socialism about. rules and a>nditionsof their own association means that they themselves are sover- . socialjsm was an egrrlitarim ethic& ideal and r e q u i ~ d political action to implement it. h his cont-roversy with Bakunb. howwer. to democratic socialists. parliamex~tary democracy and it?. is democracy.ty rather than an interpretat. Under such conditions. the members of the comul7ity car1 detiberate m d debate about "the direction of social life" and "conditions of their olvn associationff: That members of the order together determine the institutions. communist society would abolish political atrthori-ty in the sense of atrtharity of one person over an0 t h . of political authority. ultimately. H w can essary.76)-who fought Marx for leadership of the inter~~ational socialist movement-was adamant that the inequality i n h e ~ nh t ali political authority corrupted it was the mture of h a m s al?d destroyed social cooperation. Marx hinlself s e e m d to accept that.authority In a sirnilar way. Instead.on of it. because Mam places so much weight on economic forces as the true determinarts of a socictL.D. which seeks equdity of p o w r and social equality? 32-10key once again. its tex~sion anything that is intrinsically hegalitarian. Cohcm and Rogers insisted that a genuine democratic community presupposes equal freedom and some sort of equalization of p w e r and resower. some socialists so value equality of power that they too rexlounce all authority Mikhail Bakunin (181&1&". although there still would he a ceelkal administrative authority in a ful:ly commwist state. rather than an interpretation. not simply the destruction of capitalism. such as political atr"cEroritybe a necessary part of a thoroughly egaiitariul. Thus. Democracy and Socialist Authority Anarchists such as Bakunin reject political atrthonty as corrupting. understood i n such a way as to reconrile auCf*Lmi-tywith both freedom and eyuality &call that in their analysis of socialist dlemocracy (Section 9. he tends to d o w n p l ~ the role of political authorip* What became b a w n as ""dmocratic socialism" was a rejection of Marxfs beliefs that socialism was the inevitable result of economic forces.H. argued socialists such as Eduard Bcrnstein (1850-1932) in Germany and G.2"us. socialjsm often takes the form of a rcjectim."" Just as i tiqzre of the ideal of eqwali. As sooal as socialim arcepts political authority as legitimate and necwikh eyuality immediately xises.i. ideal such as suciahsm. but political authority and the state. at which Bakurrin aimed. the ""admistration of things" would replace the n many ways conservatism is a csi"domixlation of people.29. among classes.

but it is often misled. Recall Wousseau's analysir.y" about the general will. T%us.) a free person acts true will. justice. the democratic majority sometimes expresses only "the . of the maj0rit.'"lrhe group deciding what is best for the group.rights m d (7) the law is general and applies equally to all citizens. equality. without conflicts or trac-fe-offs.eign. . afl genttine acts of authority comefrom all and apply Io 1111. it does not involve an inequality between those with political authority and those subject to it: everpne exercises politianafysis cal authority. the democratic sovereign is not nlruays comect about the general will: ''The people is never corrqted. and are recognized a s having. To be sure. of tkc reation of freedom and the germeral will (Section 5. This sovereignky isfiely exercised in the seme participants in it-reorder have.eis subject to it. rtrsides in the co of which everyone is a membec L. then. si~lice of civil and social status because each has the same political. democracy. and everyo17. (3) because desires the general will or common good of lfie the democratic process reveals this common good (4) each person wills the democratic verdict and so (5) each person is free when sine subrnits to (6) the democratic verdict is based on equality the verclict. and aut-hority-can be achieved. . and only then does it seem to will what is bad. the capacity to form reasclned judgments about the ends of social life. ancf so political authority actually expresses both freedom and equality."' tt7e supreme political authority Supreme poli6cal auihorityf then. it "is the will of the body of lfie people. giver1 Lhe proper political arrangemer~ts. argued Rousseau.aws-acts of th acts of the entire cornmuniv (considered in their active role as citizens) legisbting for the entim cornunity (in their passive role as subjects). Cohen and Rogers understand the democratic communiiy as exrcishg political mthority over itself. . Rousseau depicts the authority of the democratic sovereign arr.2"~ such. Criticai to Rousseau"~ is that the verdict of the majority is not simply the will. h actof sovereignty is not. I\lousseaufsIhwry is perhaps the clearest example of a thoroughly monistic view ol political concepts.4). Each member of the cornmuniq. Furt-her. "an auth0rit. is not only a citizen stlbject to the laws but also a member of Lhe '"~oeerign. (8)equdity is mconciled with autrhority Rouseau is so faslrinaling just because he seeks to show that the political concepts we have examined-liberty. the act of a superior talki-ng to an inferiol. If (1. Sovereignty is eqzia11y exercised in the wnse that the views of each member of the democratic order are accorded equal weight in public deliberationez Followhg Rousseau. (2) each w~ity.y imposed on the minority-for that would be yet another f o m of slavery of the general will a r ~ d the common and dependence-but t%le expressior~ interest." As Rousseau puts it.

and provided its members do not have any communications among themselves. the people as a wt-tolc cannot conceivably be wrong . then. &~II. it speaks will." In the face of the pronoumements of such aulhority. the individual citizen has no grounds for objection or complaint. assumes that we possess a substantive tmderstmdhg of a just outcome. holds that insofar as the democratic majority has genuine authority."Z7 Rousseau. Zs. The tension between procedural m d substantive justice in. and democracy is justified because under Lhe proper for the ge~~eral conditions it is a reliable. argues Rousseau. the democratic majority is not ""an authorjustice. uox dei. in the form of a properly constituted democracy. Cohen agrees: follaWing Ro~ssew. But we have seen that: democratic socialism tends to depict democratic outcomt-. each person in the minority shodd conclude. "The general will studies only the commm interest while the will of all studies private h~terest~ and is indeed no more than the sum of individual desires. This. is thtrs ""an authority" on the general will. codronted by the verdict of the majoriv the minority should change what it believes to be right. its will dcfi~zes cratic socialists define justice in terms of the democratic will of the people. Insofar as Rousseau and demoiy'babout justice. its will is necessarily just and rwst always be obeyed.will of all" rathcr than the general will. the balance which remains is the gel7era:i will. and then I should not have been free.'"me people. and democratic decisionmaking is an '"expert" method to achieve this outcome. ihough by no means perfect. democratic socialist thought (Section 9.s as proceduralZy just: a law or policy is just s h p l y bcjcause it has hem anived at by democratic methods. way to arrive at the general will.2) leads to a similar lension in its analysis of political au&ority. ""l my particular opinion had prevailed against the general will. the great rider of small differences will always produce a general will m d the decision will always be good. whose will d e t m i n e s justice. and thus we should ""srrender our judgme~~t'" to it. "The voice of the people is the vojce of Gocf.'T'fhus. I should have done something other than what I: had willed. ""From the deliberations of a people properly infor~xed.But if we take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out. In the. like most authorities (such as doctors) it can sometimes be mistaken. In itself. If: it is the true voice of the peopk. Accodhg to Rousseau. although. Thus. On this view. he insists that people should reason together about the common good of the commmity.. Rousseau depicts democracy as a reliable way to discwer the common good: the democratic:mjority is " m authority" about the general will. passages I have been examhhg. As it has sometimes been put: pctyzlli. the authority of the people goes far beyond mere expert authority: it is more like the authority of God. if democracy is properly functioning.

from cJemocratic egalitarianism to rationalism and hierarchy: "Without revolutionary theory there of socialist rwolucan be no mvolutionary movement. Lenin &us . understanding of the laws of economics was not necessay: those very laws wouid cause the inmasing impoverishment of workers. we s b u l d not expect lay people to really grasp these laws or their implimtions. Recall Lhat according to E~"tgds.itirnak authority. workers we= joini~ligtrade unions and democratic socialist parties."~"f h~owlecfge tio~~ar theory y is necessary for effective political action. hut the h y person is seldom in the position to participate in these debates among aufionties. insoit woutd far as the workers develop any "'sgontaneous" wx~sciousness. Hence the cmservative jibe that in Rousseau" ssociety "each morning the citizen would look into the mirror while hawing and see the face of one ten-millionth a tyrmt and one whole slave*"3@ Rofionolism and Experf Authoriv : Ihave been stressing the egalitarian commitmen& of socialism. one of Marx's great achievements was to base socidism 0x1 a scientilic uncderstandhg of society ralhcr than elhjcd claims (Sections 3. saw this refoming socialism as dellying "the a n t i ~ e s i in s principle betwen liberalism and socialism. science is the realm of expert knowledge.about justice. of course. according to Lenin. toward rule by m elite wl-ro have the necessary understar~ding of society a"td skills to r m it. m e scientist is thus "an authoritypf on her area of expertise (Section 10."3"min did not "oefieve that the workers would spontaneously develop a revolutionary consciousness. But socialism displays a strong rationalist strain that leads in precisely the opposite direction.1). it becme increasingly clear that this rewlutiOClary c~nsciowne~s was not develophg. 9.2. workhg for a socialist revolution without themselves understandhg Marxist theory But -as the ni17eteex"tth cex"tkry progressed and turned into the twentieth. the l a w of economic. Lenin. then political leadership rests in the hands of those who h o w the theory. may be m n g . Marx hirnself apparently believed that explicil. The scjentist has special techniques and has studied a specialized area of knowledge. fsrstead. 'To be sure. :If socialism is a scjence that reveals the laws of capitalist production. seeking simply to reform capitalism and hstitute something like a welfare state. and they disagree with each other. which would lead them to develop a revolutionary consciousness. be the capitalistic ideology that their problems can be solved through trade unionism and some sort of reformist liberalism. and how this Lea& to a thoroughly democratic account of 1eli. and political change. Scientists. with which the average person is not acquahted.1). Now. the leader of the Russian revolution of 1917. Lenin thus makes the proclmation that t u n s socialim away . social.

the Pactar~lrowners simply produce upon the calculatirtns of what will bring them rnost profit and will best enable them to defeat their rivals in the market.tegal^itarimconception of political authoriv couId be johed to socialist equality. . Lenin" extreme rationalism thus leads to a socialkm that rests political authority in those who are m authority on socialist theory and practice. therefore.advocates ieadership by a '"varlguarct" party. competition and wars. kvould be a socially m d economically inegalitarim society favoring the politicd elite over the masses. Lenin thus proposes to combine a high degree of political inewality in a hierarc-hied political structure with a commitmm to social and economic eyuality ( S c r t i m 6. m e tendency of socialism to embrace hierarchical political authority. and Cuba. has deeper roots than Lenin's conviction that left to themselves. ard still remains in8wntia:l in the political cultwes of China. they demo~~stmted marked social inequal* resting orr p a t political ineqt~ality: Lenin" dream that rule by the vanguard party would fade away as the workers developed socialist consciousness was never achieved: the inequality of authority remained a &finjng kature of these societies. controlled by the elite who m d e r s t d sociatist theory and thus are in the position to advance the workrs' cause. in whose interests they were sqposed to rule. The first =ason. And these predicliolrs were largely home out. for the disharmony of capitalist society is the anarchy of production.ionary politics. they predicted.33 . despite its deep commitment to equaliity.on-md this view easily c m be traced to Marx himself-its critics have doIlbted whether this starkly ir. for they are unlikely to be conversant with the socialist theory. . What does this mean? It means that all the capitalist entrepreneurs (or capitalist companies) produce cummodities independently of one another. Instead of society undertaking to reckon up what it needs and how much of each article. This became the official version of socialism in the former co unist states of eastern Europe ard Asia.4). . it is their task to lead the workers toward an egalitarian social state. North Korea. the workers would embrace reformist rather than revolut. . A long-standing criticism ot: capitalim is that the market is chaotic and wastef d. which leads to crises . The result. Accorcf ing to a stmdard Marxist view. Note that few workers will themselves be part of this elite. From its v e v incept-i. Aithough the commtxnist societies were probably more economically egalitarian than rnost (but they were by no means remarkably egalitarian).Mast versions of socialism have been critical of not simply private property but the very idea of rnarkt sock@. . Under capitalism the production and distribution of goods is quite unorganized.

political authority is inegalitarian. . with approximate accuracy at least. and so bave endeavored to kvelop forms of socialism that rely on m r k e t coordination (compare here lrhe classical liberal n Section 5.e again from a book cailed. how and where machines must be provided. it is based on the inequality of h o w k d g e betwee21 those who rule and those Mrho are ruled. economic plmning presupposes specialized economic and orgmizatimal knowledge. this violaks n socialjzed man. democracy. Understood thus. without a general directive system. The ABC crf Comm~r~isrn. there can be nct organization. Section 10.2) contrasts this to political. and this was often put explicitly. it subjects us all to the whim of uncor~tralled forces.1 argued that politicd authority understood as the right of those to ruie who are ""a1 authority'" 0x1 po:iitics is fundamental to most conservative theories. bringing it under the common control.alists have . These and sidliiir details must be thought out befclrehand. We must know in advance how rnuch labour to assign to the various branches of industry. 1 x 1 compxison to conscious plannhg. what products are required and how much of each it is necessary to produce. and justice. which can "'only consist i the associated producers. atrthority mderstood as someone "in atrthort ity": such a person is empowered to give directives that p ~ e m p our . . view i f 0.5 Summary This chapter has examined the concept of political aufhority m d its ties of iiherw equality. exprc?sses socialist rationalim a r ~ d the power of human reason to trnderstand and control society. this rationalist demmd to control and plan requires giving experts the authority to organize and pian the economy Although some soci. cor~cepts man" analysis of the distinction between " m aut-Xlorityf'm d "in authorityf"rovided our focus. rationally regulating their interchange with Nature.The Marxist soIutim.3). Thus. M m y contemporary socialists accept this. .ffTo quot. market coordination seems haphazard. it seems inevitable that efforts to eliminate or even reduce the role of the market inevitably lead to increased political-economic atrthori-ty of experts. there is such a plan.""" "Clearl5 however. Ta Marx. and the work must be guided in accordance with calculations. Btr t in the communist social organization. hoped to combine radical democracy with ecol~ornicp l m ~ i q this hardly seems plausible.34 with market coordinatio~~. Richard Friedto the. and repfaci~~g it with a conUOiTlg its faith in sciously p b e d economy. Without a general plan. was to organize all of society a l o ~ ~ the g lines of an "hmense cooperative workshop. Friedma~ (Section 40. and without careful calculation and book-keeping. not mly =ason. hut freedom.

.. On the one hand. In Defcnse o f AnnrcIlism (New Ucxk: Harper and Roriv. Concepts irz Social n~zdF701ifiml Philose~plty (New York: Macmillan."with being "m authority" on justice. these provide h i t s on what a justified authority may commmd. 142-143. Section 8 . Friedman.. because these deal moral rights are abst.ract and vague. % 3 e Robert Paul Wolff. l ) . 5cticm 10. This is the aulhority of the coor-tor. typical@ propert). pp. Rather than being based 01%-an inequality. socialism" strong egalitarian cornmitm n t s lcad it to be skeptical of the very idea of political aulhority It seems that o d y when such authority is democratic. .4 turned to the problematic place of politrical wthority in socialist thought. and so our disagreemats over how to conduct cooperative arrangements.3 examirzed two accounts of authority associated wi& the liberal tradition: Friedman's coordinator.) rights are fundmental tu a legithate state. is ihe main task of political autf-tority. economic plamixlg.As 1 argued. Precisely because we conceive of ourselwes as equally free. ed. Moreover. and so arises out of the e ~ d i t of y & citizens." in Richard E. ""On the Concept of Authority in Political Philc~st~phy.own decisions about what we should do. Those who are experts on the social good. Yet. 2. given the close rclatim of demwracy to swialist theories of libertyt equality.on of au&ority combines aspects of being "in aauthorirt). have played important roles in liberal political theire model better accow~ts for the relation of libory. Although both modcl?. this conception of authority arises out of our freedom. Flathman. we have lfie paradox of socialism: the pojitical theory that in some ways seems most averse to authority was employed to justify some of the most authoritarian states in history 1. 1970). they need to be inte~retcd and expressed i n legal justice (see Mill's points [l]m d [2]. I arwed that the eral justice and liberal authority. Richard B. model. can sociahsm embrace it. a d equality. Moreover. the rationalism of socialism also draws it to conceptians of authority that share m c h with the conservative views with which we began. d the Lockean umpirt. Sction 10. Thus.That. accord* to the Lockean urnpirr. 19731. Given the liberal position that equal liberty (and. who seeks to umpire? dispuks about justice and moral rights. we require a coordinator to direct our actions to mutually beneficial outcomes. such a concepti. or socialist theory seem to have claims to direct the activities of their less well-informed fellow citizens. who directs our actions but provides no reasons to accept her pronouncements as c o r ~ c tm . and justice. we observed that: the ideal democratic state appear" to hold out: the possibility for a harmonious realization of all key socialist values.

p. p. 431-432. MY:M-.4. This is very dose to the liberal ideal. bid. trans. 1960). "On Being a Conservativer'9in his Ratiorznlism iitz hlifics. chap. ""17oliticat Education. 187ff. p. Book 2. 23.. 122-123. p. X consider the reasuns for this more fully in my Social Pizikmophy (Ammonk. Ibid. Ibid. 48. 196O). Xbid. 7. pp. On Dmnocmcy: Toward a Transfornzation q f Axnerz'c~~z Society (Harmondsworth.. 2. 9. 10. ed. Book 2. A~zarchists(London: Routledge and Kegan Paut. 129.8. 25. 1"31). IN: Roibbs-. Emphasis in original. Delz'bsraiiive Deriilocmcy (Cambridge. Ibid.E. 87. trans. Michael Oakeshott. 24. Thornas Carlyle. 14." in Robert C. Friedman. 11.. 19821. The AuChorif2j of the Stale (Oxfad: Clarendon Press. UK: Open University Press. 4.. 2..2. See Robert Nisbet. John Locke. 545. 76. Jan Narveson. 19681. 212. 149-150.. %id. Watt. p. The Social Co~ztmcf. See E. eds. 3. 1988). For Bakunin" disputes with Marx. Tucker. 143-1124. 143. (Indianapolis. see Paul Thornas." h his Rationnlknr irz iDulitics. p. 241." pp. chap. ed.3. 16. The Libertarialt Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 2. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogcrs. 20. Bakunilz on Atlarcfiy (Lrtndon: Allen and Unwin. chap. 44.p. 12. Metnyhysicial Elenzents qf ju"iice John Ladd.. (Indianapolis.. 5.Merrilf. W. The nilarx-Engdls Rrmder! 2nd ed. Ibid. 8.. On the idea of exctusitlnary reason% see Lcslie Green. p.. 1978). pp. 140. Gotzserzlaiiism (Milton Keynes. 5. 1965). Past and Preserzt (London: Dent. chap... 433.2. expanded ed. 3999). p. 29." in James Bohrnan and VVilliam Rehg. 19981. Xbid. 225. 26. 19831. Book 4. UK: Penguin. p. 17. "Deliberaticln and Democratic Legitimacy. p.3. ''On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosnyhy. "AAfr the Revolution: Marx Debates Bakunin. (Londrm: Penguin Books. Immanuel Kant. Emphasis in original. Maurice Cranstun. Azatliouz'ty (London: Croorn-HeXm. 1980). MA: MIT Press. especially as articulated by the value pluralist. p. IN: Liberty Press. 69. 2971). 21. 19. kid. For a selection of his writings. Krrl Marx and Clill. Second Rentise Covenzmenf. 28. Xbid. 6. pp.. 15. 27. ed. 1986). Xbid. See %ctions 3. chap. (New k r k : W. see Sarn Dolgaff. Jctshua Coken. 6. Shave. D. KarZ Marx. Michael Oakeshott. . 22. pp. Norton. 123. 36. trans. chap. Two Reatises ofGot?enzmerzt(Cambridge: Cambridge Unkersity Press. sect. 1988). p. 13. in Peter Laslett. 18.. Jean-Jacyues Rousseau.

in The Marx-E12geIs Reader. 8-9. I. %id. 1979). 19681. 35. 32. 35. IN: Bobbs-Merrill. pp. quoted in Michaef Ellman. 33. p. 34. p. Bukharin and Pret3bra~hensIk. . N. $41. ed. Connor. Ibid. 32.. Socialist.. W7tat 1s to Bc Butzc? in James E. Vladirnil: llyich Lenin. Leziin a u z Politics alzd Rez?ulrkZion (Indianapofis. p.Plnzi~ri~g (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cgpz'tnl.31.y~ The ABC of C~onrnzzanisnz. 9. p. Mam.

political authority ought to be invested in those who have the expert political knowledge. developed some rough conceptual maps of our enduring political theories. how the notion of equally free people is the basis of its theory of justice. and democracy. which stress how all these political ideals. I have tried to show how liberal. how a classical liberal analysis of negative liberty supports classical liberal suspicions about most forms of equality. authority. with one's rights and duties related to one's place in that collectivity. and views of human nature. "What is justice?" This looked at first as if it was a request for a definition or an essence. collectivism or individualism. I have also stressed how a great deal of conservative thought focuses on the themes of inegalitarianism. of course. justice. if properly understood. antirationalism. we can appreciate that Plato was proposing a rationalistic and collectivist political theory. and socialist interpretations of political concepts are shaped by. as well as to their differing views on some of the fundamental issues in political theory. conservative. the analysis of other political concepts. By now. for example. We have. Think back to our starting point: Plato's query. equality. justice involved the proper ordering of the collectivity. For Plato. W e have also seen the way in which much socialist thought endorses interlocking conceptions of liberty. which have related the analysis of one concept to that of others. first. has little . and how this leads to a certain view of political authority. then. Equality. can be harmoniously achieved.Throughout Part Il of this book. as well as by. second. without the conflicts and tradeoffs that are so central to classical liberal thought. commitments to rationalism or pluralism. and the historical and customary dimensions of human life. We have seen. naturally enough.

Like politicd concepts. but by crisscrosskg family resemblmces (Section 1. For example. whereas the followers of Lenin developed an elitist and authoritarian &ory of political autho~1-y. ancf trhe e n d u m traditio~~s overlap: at times it can be difficuit to distinguish between a revisionist liberal and a moderate socialist. Hence it should not be surprising that cmlceptclal disputes seem so intractabk. duties. Nevertheless. some socialists are radical egalitarians and anarchists. What is at stake is not the memhg of a word. Insofar as freedom hvolves doing what is rational to do. or a resolutely antirationalist classical ll.importance i n such a political theory. and corner vativc tra&tions form enduring. Although I have so~lght to show how the liberal socialist. but a view of the world. and democracy is cntirely wro~~gheaded. the members of such a state are h e . and whether all of Plato" positions on these matters cohere or whether they conflict. ccohe~nt views of politics and society. our enduring theories am not characterized by a common essence. are no less complex: classical liberals stress individualism. we have seen." it illso is highly rationaljst: Plato's "'philosopher h g s " have knowledge of the workings of society and what is best for it. The liberal and socialist traditims. Plato may be right or wrong. human nature. But our inquiry into whelher he is right or wrmg will not take the f o m of an isolatcd analysis of the tarn '*j~~tj. except insofar as we are equally merrthers of the community. . Thus. collectivism. questions about how liberty m d equality relate to each other. Having started out with the a r ~ q s i s of a potitical concept. On all these issues. it should be clear by now that. classical liberals e ~ ~ d mconstellations se of political conceptions that fundarnentdy differ from the sort of conceptuaj cluskrs that have dominated socialist and conservative polizical theories. different ways. we have a sort of rationalist conservatism. a view that is very different from Burke" sand Oakeshatt" conservatisms. as wefl as the value of tiberty and equality. and holv they relate to justice m d politic& authority.4). I have also tried to point to the internal diversity within each enduring theory. although in many ways Plato" account of st~ssing a version of "'my station and its justice is clearly con~rvative. by and large. m d human nature.beral such as Hayek and a conservative such as Oitkeshott. interpretations of p"liti-l concepts c m be combined in. whereas Hobhouse described himself as a collectivist. we will hitwe ended with an analysis of a political theory." It wifl involve wide-ranging e x m inations of his views about reason. As 1have stressed throughout.ce. and the nature of society. political theorizing is not done according to a formufa. as can positions on rationalism.

155 on human felos. 233 ccmservative view of. Wiitliarn.252 and cc~operaticm.257 of law. 255 of umpires mix of '"in" and "an" authority.246. 255 distinguished from advice. 181 Anarchism. 237. G.160 being '"in' authoriv. 237. 251.159. 249 limit of on umpire view. 251 as expertise. 226 on treating equals equally. 10 ""ar'authorivf 237-242.E. 256 liberal conception nut based on expertise. 238 epistemological elements in umpire account. 12-14 characterization of politics. 244. Aulhctrity. 51 and Hobbes's state ctf nature. 92. 144. 245 of experts based on inequality. 249 .252. 247.251. Saint. 24 accomt of language.245 and justice. 238 of experts in socialism. 244 and poitive liberty. 248. 249-254 Elobbesian and Lockean views contrasted. 66. 251 Lenin" view of.257. 253. 23Zf as inegalitarian. 208 Augustine. 242ff and coordination problems. 247..258 democratic. 112 based on consent in liberalism.185 on treating unequals unequally.NDEX Allison.M. 159 obedience when y cm disagree with. 237. 258 and rationalism.252 as surrender of judgment. 256.245. 51 coordinator conception of. Chap. 247 and expertise in socialism. 24 Aristotle. 241-252 ccmservative conception as case of justice. 246251 and anarchism. 239-241 as anti-egalitarian. 245 of the people in Rousseau. 252. 143. 128 AshXey. 242-245 and disputes about justice. 241-245 as way of providing social order.251. 88 and preernptive reasons. Lincoln. 53 anti-rationalist consemalive view of.249.262 Anscornbe. 249-251 not natural in Lockers theory.

73.180 as anti-patemalist. 61 pure individualist conception of public interest. I. 236 Bay Christian. 6&69 as proponent of self-detrelopment. Franqois-Niiel.. 176 critic OF money making. 88ff on libere as non-interference. 65 critic c~f ratirtnalism. Bernard. 72. Lawrmce C. 97' Green" \view of. 82ff and power tt3 act. 87 as critic of rationalism/ 57 as pluralist dassical liberal. 71-73..104. C.155. 72.94. Eduarb.208 on presumption in favtlr of equality. 328. 25. 98 on positive liberq as monistic. S8 critic of positive liberty. 62 on fctrcing tct be free. Hugo A.124. 121 on relation of individuals to society.125 as monistic revisionist liberal. 236 Buchanan. 73 Brandt. 252 Berry. 78ff on negative liberty as pluralistic. 65. 255 Braybrookc. 8445 distinguished from autarchy. 24 Babeuf. 252. 55ff his ideal statesman. lames. 201 critic of monistic rationalism. 124 Becker. Crane. 8586 and self-rule.44. 237 Bohman. N. 235 Blom-Cooper. David. 48 on \values competing with liberty l 70 rejection of triadic analysis.99. 236 Bogart. James. MikhaiX. X.. Edmund. N. 101 and reason. jonathan.155 as a rationalist. 156 Brinton.. Humphrey. Richard B. 72 Bentham. 125 Bedeau.155 Bakunin..10Q. 87 on ccmflict of negative and positive liberty. 255 Benn. 141 as development of capacities.262 anti-ra tional nature of conservative account of freedom.72..259 Barrell.73. 123 his attack on rationalism. 95 Bernstein.236 Bradley. 247-251'258 Autonomy and authority 237 and freedom as power. 83 as acting on principles of justice. 260 Burke. 37 Bergman.259 Bosanquet. Ingrid. l78 as methodological individualist.. 82ff thwarted by internal and eternal obstacles. 84 as w. 62 Bukharin.t. 83 Aye& A. A.208 as proponent of llolno ~couzornictas. Christopher J. 66 Bradley E A. Jeremy 44. C-24 as exercise concept. 86ff critic of real self. 235. 72 Berlin. 105 and po"tive freedom. 36ff Benthafl.. Xsaiah. 85 and second-order desires. R. 300. 231. 124 as central figure in conservatism.. 50 as instinctivist. 200 as moral cc3llectivir.99. 133 on public and private. S. 357. 237 Berki. j o h . 52 on relation between liberq and equality 274 on human passions.100. 5 umpire theory of. Louis.121 .c3lf-chosen life.reconciled with equality in socialism/ 253 Socrates on.192. J. 67 as psychological egoist..125.

58 conception of democrac-3rr.160. 27-28 and human inequality. 325 Choice. 314 Marxist criticism of as socially unecqual. Set. 71. 66.193 and cc3mmutative justice. 192 and self-interest#61. 62-63 socialist criticism as based on power. Winston. 122 on limits of knowledge about society.215 Marx on human nature in.mmensurabi1i@.97 and socialist ccmception of liberq.20.156 Child.nditions far. 79.109 as pluralistic.259 criticism ctf liberal crtnception of liberty 231. 92 on limited role of government in. 116 on private property. 222. 2 Churchill. 262 property as core value of.4. 192 and natural freedclm. 16&243 as anti-constructivist. 143 and egalitarianism. 65 on limits of reason. 110 on markets a s free. 125 Capitalism.223 elements of. 63 Marxfs criticism of prc~perty under. 6. 68 and power. 171 and ina. 213 injustice of in Marxism. 38.7. 41 and protection of property. R. 288--394 Macpherson" criticism of.nservatism. 96.79ff and freedom. 239 Cephalus. 165 and justice as mutual advantage. 55-56 on rationalist science. 192. 164. 193-195 and Lockean justice. 9 6 9 7 of preferences. 93 and pluralism.315. 218 and Marxist theory of exploitation. 164 and state of naturet 91-92 and utilitarianism. 17. 92 on liberty as both a common and competitive good.30. 160 and Hayek's view of social justice. 62 Mill as exemplar' 48-49.. 110-114 on property and powec 112-113 overlapping with anti-raticmalist a.192 and social equality. 112 and negative liberty. Positive liberty and coercion. 373 a. 190-192 and negative rights. 92 on importance of consent. 112-113. 214. Jolm W. W. 232 on the wise as masters. 117 on government as liberty limiting. 211 as just according to Marx. 177 and equatiq of citizenship.. 235 and markts. 49 conceptions of justice in. 3. l70 on freedom and possession ctf power.193 Chamberlain. 13% 175.on law. 91 as favoring control theories of power. nlsu Autonomy. 223 Classical liberalism ambivalence about desert as grc~unds of justice. 123 and individualist nature of. Thornas.165 Chapman. 108. 59 as based on negative freedom.90 not all advclcates endorse negative liberty.232 on hierarchical society. 137. 152 Marxist criticisms of. 74. 147" 9 2 3 Christianity. James W. See also Markets ambivalence of conservatives towards. 236. Wilt. 11Off . 56 Campbell. 108 Carlyle.

234 Cole. 81 and offers. 176 senses of.221 theory of justice based on negative libertyf 206 Coercion and liberq.B. 250 Common good. Samuel. 236 as favoring effect theories of power. 2 77 and the general will. Jorshua. 253ff and socialist view of social justice. 235.222 Cohen. 30 and socialist authority. 68-69 Oakeshctttf"s criticism ctf. Community. 226---B0 .176 and Hobhouse" seeoncilia t i w of liberty and equalityt 169 and mincjrity rights. 232 in tension with c~>nservative commitment to liberty. 232 and desert. Marshal]. 169 liberty as a. 200 and Rousseau" nnot.196 and justice in rerrisionist liberalism. 180. 115 and standard ctptions. 73-81 Cohen. 66 and sociely as an organization. 216 Commtmitarianism. 16%170. 253 on socialism as equal freedom and power. 256 Marx on justice under.justice. 231. 359ff. Marxism.rejection of ratirtnafism. 93. 221. 321 ccmtrasted with competitivc goods. A. 98 relaticm of liberty and equality in.231. 235 as democratic socialist. 195. 63 equallw udder. 232 t~ and organic theory C$ s ~ c i e177. Sr>cialism and justice. G. 218ff and group rights. 175.236 Collectivism.. 256 inegalitarian conceptirtn ctf authority in. 67-68 moral. 6SEf understanding rtf a person's treatment by others. 232 methodological.H. 81 and pawer of capitalists. See also Cornmunitarianim.234 Cohen.llectivism. 308 as foundation of revisitmist iiiberalism. 309-310 and individual good in the new liberalism.254 on democracy and atrthoriq. 230-233 and equality. 158 and revisionist liberalism. 52 and communitarianism. 364 and social. 252 on freedom as lawmaking.231 and Plato. 254 and the general will. 200 importance in 19th and 20th century thought. 69-70 and ccmservative justice. 238. 375.. 80.ion of democracy. %?ciety and democracy. 261 and political authority. 233 and virtue. 121 and utilitarianism. See also Mam. 230. 219 Coleridge. 102 and notion of a typical person. 82 and the law 126 as making options ineligible. 239 and Rousseau. 239 and conservative a. 232 and st>cjaIequaUty. 195 and liberty and equality. t 64-1 65 summary of conceptual structure of. 146 Commtmism. G. 252 on socialist ccmception of democracy. 163-110 Hobhouse's cconceptictn of.209. See also Collectivism. Social good and authority.

232 and sexual inequalitr. 26ff presuppox that there is a correct answer. 7-43 Comolly. Sec also Complex structured a>ncepts. G 5 and socialism. 227 and socialist democratic authority.262 depth of. Chap. 67" Commutative justice.255 Bentham" iindividuafistic view of. 178 and social enviromcntalism.. 19 and the concept/ctmception distinctirtn. 51. 69-70 Community See also Commmitarianism. 26 and what is important to us.11-12 Plato on. 50 and it-re new right. G and instinctivist view of human nature.as form of collectivism. 32 need not have a cclmmon care. 261 Conceptuafism realism as explaining basic convictions about concepts. 38 summary of conceptual structure. 177 and fear of clhange. 43 and language games. 33 not simply semantic. 3535. 66 and collectivist justice. 36 Ccllfie ctn basis for tolerance about.253. SW also Justice.262 fallibilistic versus skeptical account of.233 and democracy. 14 as identifying things. 34-35. 230 Rausseau" ccollectivist view ctf. 31 political nature of. 2 3 % and ccmfusion about. 40. 232 and pluralism.108 Conservatism ambivaleme about economic f ~ e d o m123 . 67 justice as serving. 307. 32 must be consistent. 249 and pluralism. 230--. 262 and conceptual coherence. Witliam E. 252. 17 threshold. 8. 64.224 Ang1c.44. 185 Polemarchus on.PoIiticaZ concepts and forms uf life. 293 and markets. 42 Freeden and GaXfie ctn no correct resoluticm of. 20ff and toferance. 24. See also Concepts. 30 as keeping faith.99. and Christianity. 123 and the organic theory of saclie@ 177' and tradition. 224ff criticism ctf liberalism. SocieQ and justice. l 77 anti-rationalist view of authorit5 239-241 . Political concepts and essential contestability thesis. CoIlectivism. Essentially contested concepts. 176. 2 about views of the world. 41ff as about world views. 19 public nature of. 32 Concepts.124 on power. 41 importance of.l-American. 34-35 Conceptuaf maps and conceptions. Markets and classical liberalism. G 5 and mural experts. 69-7"0 conservative versicms of. 142 Conceptual disputes.262 as clash of political theories. 64 5 and human passions. 41-42 two key features of. 69 not an enduring political thet>ry. 4 Complex structured concepts.241 and equality before the law.

Bernard. Bertrand. 48 as equalization of power. criticism of rationalism/ 55. 252. 7 1 1 as set af necessary and sufficient a>nditions. 44. 19 and pictures of the world. 177 criticism of liberalism. 195 and the new liberalism. 260 relation of wtrrrds and tKngs.241 and deliberation. 119-121. 7ff 2 3 Socrates on. 70 tendemy tct collectivism. 178 summary of conceptual structure of. 71. 171 and freedrrrm as power. 240 a>nceptionsof authority in. 225. 23. 68 three approaches to justice. 221 and freedctm in socialism. 237-241 criticism ctf equality.175 overlapping with classical liberalism.125 Declaration of Independence. 218-223 and the general wifli. C. 48 and social equafiq. 226ff as critical of equality.226 on humans as historical creatures. 51 close connection bemeen law and justice in. 123 criticism ctf liberty in general.as anti-pluralist. 99 de Jouvenef. 49 liberal conception of.18-19 and family resemblances. 3 as necessary for sense.255 and community.232.242 Definitions and essnces. 152 and freedom. 152 socialist conception of. 224 criticism of liberal egalitarianism.253 and the new liberalism. 121. 224ff elements of. 174. See Tradition DahX. 255 rise of and rationalism. 214 and Rawls. 7. 221-223 uttlpian errsrs of. 174-1 78.. 225 collectivism in conflict with liberty.8-9 Plato" error in searching ftx. 225 and Marxist justice. conception of politics in.179 Crick.255 and conservatism. 51 as philosophy ctf imperfection. Francis MacDonald. 6 Democraey and authority. 18. j . Maurice.. 55 social. Robert A.253. 51.202-204 and rewards. P. 121-123 Coordination problems. 222 rejected by teninist socialism.253.164. 122. 262 skepticism about legislation in. 193-195 and conservatism. 218ff classical liberal view of. 137.253. 228 on inequality and human nature. 233 view of law and liberties. 60. 50 attitude tcl liberq. 195 . 172 and socialist justice. 252.8. 122. 255 and equaiiity. 232. 172 and majority tyramy. 240 voting as the exercise of powers. 185 and the a>mmongood. 252. 50 Humean. 71. 182. S. 262 rationalist and anti-raticmalist versions ctf.221 and socialist cooperative sociefy. 64 on importance of virtue. 207 Cranston. 163. 235 Day. 223 Desert ambivalence of classical liberals toward. 50.155 Custom.236 Coval. 134. 222t-f Cornford.. 9 and poiitical concepts.

Michaet. 259 Dominant strateiiry. 101-102 and equal basic rights.1180 criticism of hybrid view of liberalism.184 as rationalist. 204 Edtrca lion. 90-91 DevXin. 55. Dworkin. 225 Desires and autonomous action. 234 as a rationalist. 191 Urewey. 156. 93. 167" criticism of liberty in general. Gavin.201 and social justice. 6. 167 on liberalism as based on equality.124 Eisenhower. See Justice. My station and its duties and conservatism. 101f' and property 113 as blocking positive freedom. Jon. 61-63 as rationalist and monist. 257 Engefs. 223 and harm principle. I 96 influence ctf Mill"s version on liberalism. 58. 7 absence of political. %?cial justice. 49 Workin. 171 and equality of opportunity.241 choosing.251 and Christianity. Sarn. 73. 212 Edigl-rtenment. 62 and positive liberty 84. 134 and presumption in favur of qtraliv. 71. 60 as proponent of =If-developmentp 62 Diderot. in Communist states. 199 and social justice in the new liberalism. See also Autonomy and freedom. 83.234 Ely John Hart. 197 Hume's skepticism about. 72.167 Developmentalism See also Human nature and autonomy 84 and demcjcracy. Lord Patrick. 87" as politically dangerous. 228 of law and morality. 238. 183. 154 and language. 240. 227. 228 on point of law. 255-257 absence ctf social.as central to monistic revisionist liberalism. on relatio~n 227-230 Dewey. 234 and rights. Denis. 151 and equality of opportunityr 153. 161 and human capacities. 146. 198 Distributive justice. 197 Edwards. Ronald. 296 as a theory of human nature. 246 external. Paul. 89ff Green" view of as cc30perativef 62 Hobhouse" sonistic account of. in Commmist states. 260 EXster.56 on socialism as a science. l47 equal satisfaction of. 256 and authority.98 and revisionist liberalism. 166-1 68. 156. 241 and freedom. Friedrich.224. 236 Duty. 157. 368-1 70. 5&58 Equalityf Chaps. 237.138 . 106 EiXman.215. Sec anlso Rights. 133 and property. 186 to socieQ 232. 225 distinguished from merit. 194-196 as element of justice.97. 236 and enforcement of morality 233 criticism of liberal morality. Equality Dolgaff.179 on Rawls" liberalism. 57 Discriminaticm. John and semi-socialist liberalism. Dwight. 201 as comtructivist. Gerald.

and liberty i 168-1 70 and liberty. 143.255 precarious place in Leninism. 206 of opportuniq. 203-206 and revisionist liberalism.164. l77 and Rawfs.349. 339. 299 overlaps with justice. in Cc~mmunist 255 external grounds of. 197-199 of power in socialism. 133. 154 of freedom and power in socialism. 140. 129-1 32 and organic theory of society. 145. 129ff formal.204.170-174 of needs satisfaction. 242-246 and coordinator a>nceptionof authority.177 n Hobhause" theory. 140 not always a good. 361-163.143 and human nature. 2 34-3 36 and cclmmon needs. 17&174. 200. 275 consernative criticisms of. 148. 197 and threshctld concepts. 143-145 as core of socialism. and merit.166-168.177' as the basis of legislation. 336 problems with non-preferential conception. 50. 198 and ccloperative socialist society. 164-1 S8 n of cultural opportunities i socialism. 49 as core of socialist democracy 221-223 as sameness. 168-1 70 and social justice i n new fiberalism. 205. I& of slatus. 160 of civil status.140 and law. 206 of citizenship in classical liberalism.f S4 of opportuniq in RawXs. 185 political. 178 as wasteful. 177 complex. 353. 128 of basic liberties in Rawts.218. and socialism. 137-142 and ina>mmensurabiIi~. 147. 153 conflicts with liberty i n conservatism. 7 and lottery of birtki. 245-247 of basic rights.175. 135 of resources and equal ctmcern.and civil justice. 372 and coordination problems.and liberty 164-166 states. 136-1 45 of liberty in Hobbes's state of nature.205 civic. 173 nonpreferentid conception. 203-206 of resources.245 and freedom.378 and liberalism. 255 presumption in favur of. l36 reconcited with libere in socialism.263. economic. 128 of welf-are. 166 as a>ltapsinginto rationality. 172 political.177. 273 of equal concern and respect in RawXs. 218ff of liberty. 252. 220 of resources in Rawls. 127. 150-152 of concern and respect. 222 . 189 of opportuniq in socialism. 132-134 fundamental human.253. 142. Chap. 202 and marginal decreasing utility. 151 of outcomes. 152 political. 3 1 4 8 of opportuniq. 51 connectictn tct rationalism in conservatism. 251-255 of power and feminism. in democratic socialism. in liberalism and conservatism. 351.201 of fair opportunity.172 of servitude. 174-178 ea>nomic. 342 and tmiqtreness of individuals. 244.

257 liberalism's denial of morai. 256. 5O.relation to liberty in classical liberalism. 18-19 Farm. Joel. 69 . See Liberty French Revolution. 29. 35-36.220. 28ff contrasts to justificatory political theories. Milton. 163. 71.33 example of social justice.. 29ff against a best interpretation of political ccmcept. 159ff salient in Rawls's social contract. Michael.220.. 13%140. and conflict with liberq. 28 idea of an exemplar of features of. 35 Feinberg. Charles.231 Family resemblances and political theory. Richard E.224 and socialism. 129-132 Essentially ccmtested concepts. 180. 127. 144 utilitarian arguments for. 20%" xcondary role in liberalism. Rishard B. 4445. 187 Froude. 45 analysis of disputes about social justice.44. Sigmund. 43 on exemplars. ZSff. Wittgenstein on.257. 43 notion of an exemplar. 99.43 as a skeptic. Anthany. 152. Richard E. 100 Forms of Life and arguments far equality. l81 Fugitive Slave t a w of 1850. W.176 Freud. 47 summary of types of. 33R on conceptual structure of Mill's theory. 237. 153 on the organizatirtn ctf ideologies. l"i". 71 basic idea of.238 on contrast between "in" and ""an'" authority." B-31. 42 Faithman. 47. 207 argument against quest far a good usage of concept' 36. 212 Freeden. 16 Fotrrier. 46 Freedom.. 24 Fascism. 30. B. 26ff. T. 49 on ccmcepts as building blocks of ideologies. 154. 31-32 compared to Socratic essences.164 tied score a>nceptionof. 249. 29ff features of.176 social. 248 Fallibilism. K. 32 on essentialty a>ntestedconcepts. 241ff on coordinator crtnception of authority. 359ff example of "champion. 47-48. 32 Mill as in liberalism. 36. 34 on structure of political theories.245 on inequality as the basis of expert authcltrity 238 First Amendment. Chap.223.183 Gallie.55. 31-32 power as. 234 Flathman. 238 and ccmservatism.90 on importance of individualisma>llectivismdisagreement. 66 Friedman. 105 Exemplars and essentially contested concepts. 142. 31 Gallie on. 258 Family. 2 and conflict of liberty and equaliv..43 on sucialism. 220 Fisk. 249 authority of in socialism..155 social. 90 Experts and authctrity. 100 Feminism and liberalism. 42 championship example. 178.259 on being ""an" authority. 244.

45. 178. 103-104 on dernucrac~ 49. 240 equal treatment by 2 SQ Hobbes's argumrsnt for.169 influence on socialist conception of freedom. 92 as protection agency.L.74. 42 consernative account of. AXan. 86 and classical liberal justice. ~ 44. 259 Green.A. 109 on confusion of freedom and power. 156 Government. 124. 192. Law. 33 Caus. 157 Green. 223 on co~ercic~n.207. 194. 353 and umpire conception of authority.44.. 253.99. 119-1 21 as reconciling authority liber& and equality. 62 as rationalist and monist.172. 104 and paternal ism. W. 101 on positive freedom as a development of negative. 97 on the real self..180. 174 as monistic revisionist liberal. Politics and equality of opportuniv.236 Ha yek.100. 124. ksfie.208.207. 62 Hobhouse follows on positive liberty 168. H.171.157.235 Hal&vy.K. 84 on freedom as power to act.156 Habermas. 222. Stuart.on liberal and socialist notiom of justice.132.73. 208 Hart. 238B as liberty limiting in classical liberalism. T. 131. 66 on possibility of conceptual disagreement. 25.208 and free persons. 201 criticism of social justice. 175 Harm principle and the Law. 140 on the intractable nature of political disputes. 156 Guthrie. 240 G r a John. 150. 22Gr 180. 227-230. 103 as a>llectivistrevisionist liberal. 249-251 as coordinator. 69.C.99. Paul.235 Green.171.181 Hampshire.. Philip. 89Ef cooperative theory ctf human develrtpment. James. H. 241ff as experts. Amy. 24 Gutmam. 403 utopian view of. 200 as prapc2nent of self-development. 126.235. 92-93.125. E A.255 and reconciliation of law and freedom. 142 and liberal view ctf the law. 149. 120 Griffin.255 Gewirth. 200 as educa tiunal refc~rmer~ 92 on equaliv and liberty. 40 on whether conceptual disputes are real.2222 .208 General will and democracy. 161 and paternalism. David. 3Qff problem explaining why conceptual disputes are important. 207 and welfare state. J-iirgen. 48 Harris. See anbsv Authority. 253. 44. 390 tasks under positive liberty. 99.125. 73. E. 380 Handicapped. 373 on freedom as autcmomy 82ff on freedom as development of capacities.123. 8 6 8 7 and semi-socialist liberalism. 208 Cauthier. 262 as pluralist classicat liberal. 30 defense of liberty in general. 80..Elie.172.235 as anti-rationalist. 227-230 and Mill" liberalism. 6 . 100.

96 Hobhouse.70 on liberty and equality. 190. 201 as advocate of positive liberty. 208 Pllohfeld. 90 on Mill's liberalism. 181. l74 on desert and social justice. 168. 194-196 on harmony of equal rights and liberty. 168 on prot-ecting workers from capitalist's powec 1l 5 on sc3ciety as a cooperative endeavur. 1.247 and ordinary language. 169. 27-28 similarity. 148 and society. to Oakeshott. David. Weslcy. See also Developmentalism. 49 on necessj ty.. 262 Hill. 72. 169. 71. 225 on political man as a knave. Stephen. 177 on human inequality. L. 52 . T. J. conceptian of liberty. 60 Hume. 165 on impossibility of planning.185 and Rawls's theory of justice.235 on justice as conventirtn. 206. Tnstinctivism. 105 on relation of justice and law 190. 60 on markets and diversity.180. Social envircmmentalism conservative view as unequal. 113 on Milt as an exemplar. 192. Thornas E. 77ff on freedom as possibiliQ. 61 Human nature. 99 Hobbes.34-136 Individualism. 44 Husami. 185-188 identifies elements of justice. 207-209 as a collectivist. 247 on society as mutual advantage. 169 as proponent of self-develupment. 216 and Mill" case for equal rights.246. 77-82 and prisoner's dilemma. A. 188 Holmes. 201 on state ctf nature. 188--192. 60ff wide and narrow senses ctf. 98. 161 and needs. 137-142 and liberty..208 accowt of social contract.200 as advocate of liberal socialism. 243-245 pure non-impediment account of liberty. 160 as basis of egalitarian liberalism. 90-91 and Marxist justice. 184.. 61 Plluntington.72. Self-interest. 204 theories of.1136 on basic similarity of people.223 analysis of rights. 231 individualist view of.on distinction beween constructivism and anticonstructivism.. 62. 170. of private property 111 on rejection of d e x r t as grumds for justice. 166 Inct3mmcnsurabilitr.. 125. Ziyad. 169 Hobson. 196 on social justice as confused. 175 and equatiw. 252 on pawer. 148-2". 49. Thtlmas. J. 72 Homo econunziczis.207. 234 Impartiality and justice. F. 190 and Hume. 262 as a monist. 202-206 and rule of taw. 225 and justice. 168. 80 on limits ctf justified authorily. 197 on the common good.179 on liberty as it-re core of liberalism. 59 on egalitarianism. Jr.

See also Devef opmentaIism. 113 Is/ought. 226ff and dernucrac?s. 4.ntrol theories u P power. Revisionist liberalism and progress. 246. 185 and utclpian socialism. 134 and mural rights. 226 as giving each his due. 20 liberal and socialist views of. 2 54 inconsistency in our ctlncept of. 193 and liberal justice.201 and socialist egalitarianism.194-199 and mequal treatment.--248. 67-68 moral. 140. 11. 163.210 and freedom in Kant. 230-233 as property rights. 211. 24-30. 244.6 as interest of the stronge~ 17 as mutual benefit. 262 and autonomous action. 164 uniqueness of. 192 civil. 4-5 and Hobbes's state of nature 189 and impartialiq ty inawfs. 150. 383 in competitions. 199 and rights. 225.190. 177 as Pavoring a. 26-28. 246.nceptions.and restricted view of a person's treatment by others. 182t'f Hobbesian account of. 148 as way tct escape prisoner's dilemma.251 and public goods. 182.151 and classical liberalism. 93.184.212 as contientional. 232 cc~nservative approaches.4. 183. 397-1539 and moral arbitrariness of talents. 185. 202 and law. 246 idea of a the017 of. 246.66 and Mill's case for liberty. 90-91 and Raw! S% lliberalism. Milf. 190 as the interest of the stronger. 188 ideal.222 . 183. 1%-192 as my station and its duties. 135 Instinctivism. 117 and harm to others. Chaps. Sec also Human nature and conservative theory of law 122 and conservative thectry of politics.183. 239ff as theory of human nature. 2223-225. 207 classical liberal a. Social justice account of depends on entire political theory. 3 96 conflict with social equality. 227-233 conservative views of and tradition.247 and quotas. 26.193ff and equality. 162. 63 and merit. in the new liberalism. 65-66 Invisible hand. 18S194 collective conception of. 108 xnetl~odological.250.185-188 and it-re common gclod. 200. 8. Jndiv-idualism. 1943 elements of. Lenie. 224 coordinator a.225 and taw in Pllobbes. 183 and need for authority.nception of. 241 and ccmservative virtue. 6&69 Individuality.263 and the social good in the new liberalism. 162 and liberty.21S 2 2 3 and desert. 197-199. 247 and Marxist transformation of human nature.247 disputes about and liberal authority 247-251 distributitre.12 Johansen. 181 Justice. 5 as to each according to his needs. See also Equality.

12fft 23 no single function of. 100. 224 Kuehnelt-Leddih. 220-223 relativity of in Marxism. 21-22 not essentially descriptive. 247. 251 need for ccmsistent conception of. 161 and impartiality.183. 140 picture theory of. 9ff public nature of. 26ff socialist notions ctf. 19. Eugene. 100. 17 as crtnsteXlations. 151 and freedom. 245 and convention%225 and enforcement of mtlraliq. 15 and reasons. 125.216 uses of. 53ff Kcterner. 71 Kristjgnsson. KrisPjBn. 20 not just about naming.17 St. Elarold. 3 Socrates9denitirtn ctf. 235 Kelsen. 210-218 Marx's reluctance about. 39ff Kamenka. 63. 233 %?crateson. 317 Kekes. Wans. 18 and justice. 22 utilitarian versus Rawls. 2205. 236 Labour Party 138 Lakoff. 108 Laslett. 238. Peter.140 and social justice. 179 Kymlicka. 15 Laski. Augustine" aaccowt of. 224 technical and practical distinguished. 20 voluntaristic conception ctf.1. 1179.190. 12 Plato's view of. 262 special conception of in RawXsfs theory. 12ff Language games and distributive justice.10. 248 on truthfulness. 116. 220 Justification. and tradition. 227-238 and equal treatment. 1&. 182. 4. 214 and nonpreferential conception of equalitr.. 208 howledge and authority. 127. 3-6 under communism.262 procedural d istingtrished from substantive. 99. 248 on problems of private judgment. 355. 27 and games.128 and rationalism. 247. 126ff and harm principle. John Maynard.207. 124 on power of capitalists. 240.Lockean. 16 and language games.208 Kant. julian. 385 and justice. 138-1 40 and fctrms of life. Tmmanuel.259 on equal capacity for moral personality 141 on political authority. SanEord A. 6ff. 207 Language and arguments far equality.225. 23 Keynes. 19 diversiy of. Will. 139. l78 and security. 27 as involving wtlrds and acticjnst 47 as naming. 178 . 247 and justice in Marxism. 185 view of law and freedctm. 118 and authority. 15 open-ended nature of. 393 Marx on.208 Law and antipower. 8. 210-223 socialist reluctance ta advance principles ctf justice. 23 inconsistency in. Kirk E. 184.248 on slate ctf nature. 214 social.206 three definitions of. 192. John.241-246 practical. 156 Lamunt. 213. Erik von. 116 and sexual equality.

143 individualist commitments ctf. 245 and commutative justice. 96-97" and constraints in Mobhc~use's liberalism. 8 and limits of justifkd authority. 315. 204 as blend of equality and liberty. 168. 48.177 Hobhause" claim that it does not limit freedom.and the general will. 223 its incamistent ccmception of public and private. 119 Kant's view of. Sir Gectrge Comewall. 255.90 no moral experts in. 169 and doing what one desires. 47 Maclntyrek criticism of. 57 on limits of reason. See also Classical liberalism.5. 167. 180. 57 on distinction between freedom and wealth. 69 conceptual strudure of. 219 as coercive. 255 and tradition. 182. 4. 57 as ideology and political theory.70 ccmservative criticism of. 227 crtmmunitarian criticism ctf. 204 and equal basic rights. 256 rationalist conception ctf socialist authority. Chap. 58 charge that it is nihilistic.7. 201 secondary place of equality in. 224 Mill as an exemplar' 47"-49. Chaps. 47 split between classical and new fiberala48-44 tendencies to towards anarchism. 29-30. 237' and choice. 166-l%. 204 foundational role of equal liberty in.256 Lewis. 92 Liberalism.224 and individualism. 255. 248 not hyperratisnal. 44 LJ1"beral Party.256 as elitist. 222. New liberalism. 260 an vmguard party. 202 on importance of reason. 160 a>mmonlaw distinguished from legislation.127" relation to justice. 122 divided over individualism and colfectivism. 34.253. 119-121. 54.226 a>nservativeview of. 39-40 Lenin. 190 as protecting rights. 223. 101ff . 2(3--30. 169 impersonality of and freedom. 118. 250 and harm principle.623 its conception of democracy a>ntrasted to socialist. 122 and freedom in socialism.&8 and justice. 226. Vladirnir Tlich. 8 and authority. 116 as heart of Mobbesian justice.&6. 30 and different interpretations of liberty 93ff and egalitarianism.52. 177. 2 23 equality before.119 Legitimation. 251 and feminism. 183 republican cc>nceptionof. 237 understood as purely distributive theory. 3Gff liberq at the heart of. 192 and rationalism.194200 and the death of virtue. 3 21.SG-60. 262 as e t r e m e rationalist. 168 Liberty. Revisionist liberalism anarchist textdencies of. 50. 160. 116.227 and umpire conception of political authority 246-251 as antipaternalistic. 48. 86 as based on equality. 49 h o r k i n ' s egalitarian characterizatic2n of. 225.181 as critical rtf custom. 40 Berlin" view of as pluralistic. 227-230 relation beween types of. 57 opposition to the enft3rcement of morality.

247. 165ff and free persons. 259 account of authority. 232 classical liberal view that law limits. 155. 11CF--2 22 based on growth far Hubhouse. John. 219 as natural in classical liberalism. 109-110 as core of liberalism. 98 as the absence of arbitrary intervention.143. 166-1 68 relation to equality in classical liberalism. 62 Carlyte on true meaning of. 60. 50 equality of Rawts" theory of justice. 174. 171ff as lawmaking under socialism.1'. 361 not valued in general by Dworkin. 232 conflict with social equality.23 and verificatic~nism. 7 and f o r m ctf power. 167 priority of in Rawis's theory. Loren E.136 and pluralism. Chap. 248 Logical positivists and picture theory "I) and Sctcrates" three convictions. 51.207 .." "9-116 Mill's case for equality of.205. 117-119 as common good. 104ff.1179. 200. 117-114 economic. 102. 12. and equality. 91ff as power coXXapsing into autcmorny 105 as set ctf libertieti. 163. 11 Lornasky. anti-rational nature of conservative account of. 94-95 two concepts of.72-174 limited by ""power cwer. 121-1 23 civil distinguished from natural. 202. 375 a>nservativestress c m specific liberties. 248 on state uf naturet 9 9 1-92. Lucas. 94ff reduced tc3 equality by Dworkin.368. 123 ectmornic.371 and second-order desiresr 85 and the general will. 122 as the absnce. 206 and reason. 115. 206. 205. 125 Lotte~ of birth. 206 questioning the negativeipositive distinction.206 government as protector cif in classical liberalism. 159ff and properq in classical liberalism.208.and eyualiv? 342. Chap.7C1. 116 conflict with conservative collecti\~ism.of obstacles. 205. 160 triadic analysis of. 5 and property 11Off and Rawls? liberalism. 369 and human nature. 91 as classical liberal. 90-91 and liberalisms. SS and pawer.100.143 on freedcjm and equality. 92.251 account of justice. 250.247. 164 a>nservativeclaim that it clashes with equality. 77-82 as antipctwer. 16 on ethics as nonsense. 166166 endorsed by socialists.393 on natural frcredom. J. R.232 as synonym for freedom. 119-121 and the law 1Zliff. 159 on political authority. 92 harmonized with equaliv in socialism. 86ff Locke. 248 on probtems of private judgment.. 91-92 and markets. 192. 93 on equalivf 342. 85 and resources. 205. 47 as effective power.156.

380. 218 on development of revolutionary consciousness. 73 Maming. 72 Maoist China. 255 on explc. 107 MacCallum. 256 Masai. 210--218. Sociaiisrn and desert.247 and social justice. 155 McPherson. 211 and negative liberty.idsm of liberal individualism.ntrasting views of liberals and socialists of. 112 socialist criticisms ctf. See also Marxism.72.234. John Stuart.160 Machan. Slyain. 152. 225 Macphersrtn. B. 115. 194 and distribution of medical care. Alasdair. Riclhard. 73 Maclntyre. 50 socialist views of as anarchic..124. 217. 212 his theory of justice. 114. 68 criticism of moralism. 62 and morality.211. 64 McDougall.214 on socialism as scientific. 48. 17 and scxial environmentalism. D. '73 McGuinness. 221.. 140. 73. 229. Maurice. 129. 87 . Stex~en. 155 McMurrin. 348 Marxism. 256 law and justice in.tmmunitarian.206-208 and heart ctf liberalism.141 to each according to his needs. 63 as a rationalist.141 theory of human essence and equality. 56. 94-95.218 reluctance tc3 advance principles of justice. 214 view market as anarchic. 257 ccmnict with Bakwin. 256 Marx. Tibor.251 theory of alienation. See also Marx. 224.litatinn.153 Marechal. 232 a. 246. 4473. 161. Sterling. Socialism. Karl. 137 Lukes. F. 214 and developmentalism. 233 on cjbjectification. 210-213. 100..235 on layers of Marx" theory of justice.125. 234. f .225.227 as a fa'atllibilist. 235 as c o n s e ~ ~ a t i cc.227 on liberalism and traditions. 114 Mandelbaum.73. 62-63.. 181. 235 as proponent of self-development. 24 McKeon. 45.. William.on fallacy of egalitarian reasoning.214-218 on justice under communism.260 and justice as interest of tlcie stronger. 62 on capitalism and trawfer c>E powers. 2217. C. 207 Merit. lames M. 42 as a rationalist.86. 155 Marginal decreasing utility. Gerald C. 214218 not a thetlrist of distributive justice. 216 on justice. 116 not necessarily ""power over" in classical liberalism. B. 93 as politically elitist. 112 and public goods. 330. ve 226. 140. See Dewrt Mill. 213. 239 and freedom.259. 218 on power. 29-30 consernative criticism ctf. 55 as anti-paternalistic. 72. 71.141 on relativity of justice. 132 Markets and desert. 55-56 attempt ta do away with markets. 211 on exploitation. 49 and harm principle. 252 critit.

"7ff and exercise of capacity for choice. 1 and ordinary language. "l>-47 on individuality and equaliq. 87-88. SS as foundation of revisic~nist liberalism. 57.253 as form csf rationalism. Jan.224 on social equaliq. 163.208. 95--97" as basic tt3 classical liberalism. 165 characterized. 185 on limits of impartiality 185 on progress. 3 25. 3% on justice and moral rights. 77-82 and paternalism. 230-234. 196 Rousseau as good example of. 96 and ineligibility ctf ctptirtns. 25 identifies elements of justice. 40 not core of new liberalism.2'45 contrasted to doing what one desj res. 288 on danger of social equality.207. 339. 114 Mill's theory of. 34 criticism of custom. J. 98 Monism and Plato's coflception of authority 240 and po"tive freedom. 100. See also Liberty and autarchy. Mary. 93. 81-82 as partially competitive good. 297 . 26 Miller. 43.y choice. William.7 and classical liberalism. 88ff as upsetting patterns.208 Murphey.221-223. 79 and vutmtary choice. 183 and authority. 3723. 81 My staticm and its duties. 183. 82 Green" view of as basic. G..150 Negative liberty. 248 Sen3 skew off 149. 148 eqtraliv of satisfaction. 83 limited by law. "L4 trtili tarian account of justice. 4. 276 definiticln of utilitarianism. 160-1 63 on justice and desert. gL%9'. 86 and removal of obstacfes. 81 and freedom. 193 and cc3ercion. 147. 216 and it-re common gc~od. 195 based on theor~lr of human nature. 176 on h e d a m and vo1untar. David. 99. 181 Morrow John. 209 7 3 Mltligan. 211 Morris. 110 as pluralistic.98 and socialismp373. 61 a>nceptualstructure OS his theory.as classical liberal. 1483 on justice and the law. Thornas. 259 Needs and coercion. Fred. 332-334 Na~veson.185 Miller. 362 on sexual equality. 47-44? 90 as prc3ponent of self-development. 93 as in exemplar in liberalism.124. 246-251 and Marxism. 182. 169 and case far equality.223.194-199 rectmcifiation of individual and social good in the new liberalism. 188-194 as ctlmmon good. 99. l10 as opportunity concept.235 on justice as impartialit-y. 262 Nagel. 253 Moralilry and ju&ice.183 t>njustice as keeping faith. Martin. 155 argument for equality. 140 and socialist justice. 79ff 7 8 and intentional interference. 77-82 claim that it is not distinct concept. 1 Mtslesworth.

"173. 262 Oilman. 71.86 X3aul. 73 Oppenheim. 49 and positive liberty. S. 172 on equality and liberty. See also Socrates.230. 156.24. Rofand. 54. Jeffrey. 181 OakcshotI. Revisionist liberalism and democracy.236 account of justice.. John. 227 Nisbet. J.124 on powec 106 Owen. Derek L. "17. 73. John. 24. 239-241 as anti-rationalist. 182. Phitip.3 2. 118 X3hillips. 91.125.169 and social justice.124. 115 Nihilism. 179 Nozick. 49 and desert-bawd social justice. EIlen Frankel. 166 on states as protection agency. 267 atternpt to reconcile liberty and equality. 126.262 and conceptual realism. 209 Fad. 395. Bertii. Felix. Edward. l74 on equality as attacks on the great.124. 259 anti-rationalist view of authority.180 on tension b e h e e n liberty and equality. 1197-149 X3ateman. 7fft 31. Richarb. 48. 3. 35 as cleaning up a>nceptual cont-usion. S2ff s i d l a r i q to Hayek. 98 and relation of constraining laws and tiberty. 65 on practical knctwiedge. 25. 24. 235 Philosophy and reason. Robert. 209 Pennock. 26 as providing consistency. Michael. Robert.215. 73. l76 on human passions. 117 nut simply about external obstacles. 133 Pettit.10CIf124. 262 conception of politics. R.181. 170 undermined by positive liberty. 212 X3assmure.73. 246 doubts about democracy 241 on change as threat tt3 identity. Caroie. 65. 27-28 on pawcr of capitalists. 175. 235 Paternalism.. Robert.208 on civil justice. 30 criticism of Pliayek on social justice.not limited by others' possession cjf power. 155. 175 Norman.181. H.. 49 elements of. 28. $4. 49 Nidditch. 71. Hannah. 168. 64 on dangers of collectivism. 157 on presumption in favor of equality. New liberalism. 22.181. I ) .179. 234 as colleetivjst.23 as a conservative. 262 .207 X31arnenatz. Nczi+l. 180 on conflict of liberty and econctmic equality 165. 171-1 74 on cooperative society. 88 Nelt.66 on limits s o f knowledge about society. Kai. 158 Peters.261.224 on rationalism. 19ff Pitkin.2159 on basic conflict of liberty and equality. 196 and Mill. 156 Plato.156. 3 00. 235 also Liberalism. 44 a>nceptionof justice not based on negative liberty 197 contrast tct classical liberalism. 92 O5uuHivan.71. 235 Nietsen.44. nut the only value in classical liberalism. Sec-.

57 . 3 and political theoriesy40ff and Wittgenstein"s picture theory 9ff as building blocks uf ideologies. 152 as an art. 112. 43 Freeden" analysis of. 93. 40ff. 3S36 as systems of conceptions. 7 7 0 and rationalism.123 3 8 and negative liberty. 6. 3@32 and exemplars. Karl.lgues.223 change in views about fr~rms. 5 as anti-rationaiist. 46 diversity of structures. 7. 40 and enduring political debates.12 private interpretatictm of. 366 and market wlations. 231 Pluralism and attempts to reconcile liberty and equality. 23S211. 37 may legitimize but nut justify. 53. 11. 36ff creative element in. 227 as foundation for revisionist liberalism. 156 Potemarchuq 4. 43 need to make coherent. 24 doubts about democracy.11 value-neutral anafysis of. 18. 255ff Popper. 57-59 as basis of ctmservatism. 43 debunking accounts of. Chap. 239-241 as destructive of ec>mmuni ty.40 as system of interpretatiims of political concepts. 36 haw incomistertcy of can be enlightening. 46 ccmtrasted to ideolom. 33E function of.. 261 author of Socratic dialr. Concepts. 37. 32 and picture themy? 10ff and political theories. 36ff contrasts to justificatory political theories. 58 Hayek on. 36ff PoIi ticai tf-reory and clearing up conceptual confusion. 33 best interpretation of. Louis P. 39-40 understanding. 370. 7.0 on interference with liberty far the sake of it-re whctte. 21-22. 46-52 justificatory. 39ff#43 must be consistent.199-206 Berlin" characterization of. 262 enduring types.240 Marx" view as essential to humans.20.as rationalist and collecti\rist.186 Political Concepts.9 disputes abc~ut intractable.240. 54-55 as a view of the world. 10 ccmservative conception of. 68-69 Oakeshott" view of. 37 Socrates" three basic convictions about. 51. 66.26 not simply descriptive. 270 and classical liberalism. 5&51. 32 Political ideologies and culture. Language and crtnceptiom. 6. I16 and conservative collectivism. 155. 35-36 and ernution. See also Complex structured concepts. 36. 241 on authctrity. 38 p r ~ t i c a nature l of. 47 Politics and equality. 103-104 Pojman.238-241 authoriq in. 37' realistic aca>untul". 88ff. 33-35 ccmtrasted to political theory. 7 shared understanding of. 262 as framework for the justificatirtns for political a>nceptions. Definitions. ix. 3 5 3 6 and reason. 20ff embedded in system ctf conceptions. 232 and Dworkin" egalitarian liberalism. 239-240 rationalist view of. Essentially contested concepts.

95 influence ctf Mill"s Developmentalism on. 212 as competitive gctod. 101-105 and property. 110-114 government as protector of in classical liberalism. 193 and positive liberty. 5. 105. 1 1 1 as contientional rules. 160 not basic to Rawls"fiberalism. 88 and basic capabilities. 251. 103 and forcing to be free. l94 and equality of holdings. 148.152. 92-93'123 as autonomy 82ff as competitive good. 174 and equality in Hcjbhcouse's liberalism.169 and expansion of the state.116 and property. 109-110 as essentialty contested concept. 106 ""power to'3distinguished from ""over. 91 not limited by self-imposed restraints. 220 and freedom. 183 and freedctm.132-13.96 and the general will. 5 "power to" as more general idea. 112 socialist claims that it is based on pawer over. 8 4 4 5 as undermining negative freedctm. 107ff equality of. 84 as monistic. 6. 152. 190-l 92 Private judgment and authority. 114 as central concept of Marxism. 265 and freedrrrm. 1 1 7 1 and equality. 88ff as =If-chosen life. 50. 252ff Preferences. 119 socialist view of. 88-816.218ff.121 and paternalism. 92-93 and effective choice." 4 05Ef ""power to'3does not imply ""power cwer. 225 basis of. 111 conflict with merit' 198 classical liberal views of..123 capitalism and transfer of.86ff claim that it is not distinct concept. 106ff effect theories ctf. 50.123 and hidden persuasion. Chap.252 political. 113 and slavery. 211 ccmtrol theories of. 218ff. 110-1 16 and justice. See Desires Preobrazhensky E. 150 and ed ucatirtn." 1 0 1 0 6 and antipower. equality of. 32 necessary for liberty in classical liberalism. 190 and tockean justice.195 Power. 113 and real self. 84 as clxercise concept. 117-119 and feminism. 252 and markets. 168. 219-121 and the welfare state. 115. 28. 190 and desert. 218ff. Liberty and authctrity." "212 as bundle of rights. 110ff. 83. 251. private and basis of justice.Positive liberty: See also Autctnomy. 94. 171 Poverty 102. 86 and pawer tt3 act. 114-1 1 6 . 173. 241 problems of overcome by authority 247-251 Property. 206 and justice. 83 and reason.211. 113 as ""power to. 95. 86ff claim that it extends negative liberty. 88 Berlin" criticisms of. 206 not necessarily ""power over" in classical liberalism. 109-110 as development of capacities. 260 Prisc3ner 3 dilemma. 105.

207 Rakowski. 204 general conception of justice. 212 and Plato. 56 and S n ' s view of capabilities. 238ff as comtructivist.206 on special conception of justice. Joseph. 246. 218 and socialist conceptions of justice. 54 and science. 201 h o r k i n ' s egalitarian characterization of. 205 on desert. 36-38 and positive liber& 95-96 and structure of ideologies. 54.176 and expert authority in socialism. Eric. Sec @]so Rationality. 89ff and the republican theory of freedom. 20 and moderate socialism. 203-206 and equal concern and respect.176. James. 99. 36-38. 65 and social justice. 37'5. 52ff of my stiltictn and its duties. 200.248 and ega1. 57 general characterization of.212. 196 and enduring political theories. 299 and socialism.211 Public goods. 141 Rawls.157 Rationalism.73.25&258 and the Enlightenment. 2SL%257 and Kant's theory of freedom. 52 as assertion that all knowledge is technical. 262Rationality. 54 as ignoring practical knowledge. 47 and monism.155-157.201 developmental aspects of. 143-145 conception of autonomy. 55. 349 on priority of liberty. 20ff and crtherence. 207-203.theory. 134 on primary goods. 35 and freedrrrm in Hobhouse" theory 163 and equality. 201-203 as individualist. 149 and social environmentalism. 54 consernative criticism ctf. 144 on veil of ignorance.socialist claims that it is exploitative. Sec also Ra tionalism. 156.156 analysis of egalitarian arguments. 68. 203-205 liberal aspect of. 25. 52. Reason and civil justice.56. Reason and cleaning u p conceptual confusions. 175.itariazlism. 114. 89 and positive liberty. 200 and invidability ctf persons. 119 and rise of middle class. 205.121 . 35 and political . 205. 53. 200.124. 202 Raz. 143-245 and justificatictn. 317 and legislation. 56ff and Marxism. l 98 and desert. 39 and pl-titosophy. 60 and equality.247 Public/private distincticm. 8 4 8 5 Real self and Mill" bad bridge case. 261 and positive liberty. 226 and liberalism. 2211fft 228 distinguished from byperrationalism. 35 as basis for equality. 210 as crtntractualist.47.206 on talents as ccrrllective asset. 53-54 as basis of consenlati\7e authctrity. 23 6. 54.180. 83. 202-204 on maximin. 153 Rachefs. 56ff and tradition. 203 on moral arbitrariness of talents. John.204 as pluralist.

R. 231 Mill's case for equality of. 99 Rogers. 185-188 Riker. 223 Dworkin's conception of as egalitarian. 193 of Englishmen in Burke. l34 Reeve. John D. D. 161 moral distinguished from legal. 189. 55-56 importance of in liberalism. G. 54 and truth about values.134 and positive liberq. 178. 193 and social good. J. 252 . William. 235.143 and rationalism.111. 186. 188 Hobhouse on equality of. New liberalism and cc~lfectivism. 21-22. Lord..160 Redress. 207 Robwn. 280 Rehg. a>nservativecri ticism of. 120 applied t c 7 t society. 253 on socialism as equal freedom and power.119 Revisiclnist liberalism. 133. 186 and groups. 151 human. 232. Henry. 58 conception of democracy.. 200 and desert. 186. 62 monistic versicms. JoeX. 235 Ritchie.187 as personal free space.259 Republicanism. Sec also Rationalism. 139. E. 113 as powers.72 Robinson. 262 pluralistic versions. 169 in f-tobbes" state of nature. 287 as liberties. 87-88 Berlin" criticism of. principle of. 57 liberal skegticism about. 55. 16G168 influence of Mill's devel opmentalism ctn. 194.223. 194-200 not all advocates endorse positive liberty. 247 and democracy 222... 218. 91 Macpherson" criticism of. 166-1 70 summary of conceptual structure of. 187 and Lockean justice. 85 and language.233 and justice. S s 6 0 Berlin" view that it is monistic. 82-93 as rationalistic. William.121. 190 of minorities. 187 as immunities. 71. 246 and liabilities. 186. M.223 and duties.224 that comprise property 111-312 types of.196. 239 of Hobbesian sovereign. 190 inequality of under consenratism. 73 Robbins.lEIO 15 Rockefejler.. 59.223 as positive and negative. 61-63 and moral arbitrariness of talents. 235. Rationality and authority. 5 5 8 Burke on limits ctf. John R.and the general will.183. 187. 200 equal basic. 183 natural. 21-22 as claims. 3 99 of women. Sec anlso Liberalism.122 different senEs of. 199-206 relation of liberty and equality in. 121. 259 on demcrrcracy and authority. 57 and freedom. 93 Rights and authority.206 and developmentalism. 184. 57 Rec/tfssEanl.187 coXXectivist account cif. 242 and custom. 93 overlapping with moderate socialism. 2 Rodman. 87ff Reason.123 of gcttiernmrsnt and authority.

61 and Rawls' thectry of justice.255-257 Selby-Bigge. 119 tendency tct gloriQ the pectple. 74 Shils. 34 Socialism. 253-255 on distinction between civil and moral freedom. 72. 124 Ru~ian Iievoluticm.125. 201-206 relation tr3 individualism and collectivism. 207 Snare. 199 and Nagel" argument far equality. 155.157 basic capability view. 120 on harmony of liberty and equality.232 as monist. 14%2 . 100 Russell. 66 and conservatism. G.160-163 and mural collectivism. Sec also Marx. 155 Rossie. 125. Bertrand. L. C. Revisionist liberalism and under representation of minorities. Marxism ambivalence about principles of substantive justice. 234 Saint-Sirnon. 104 as theory of human nature. 358 on relation csf law and freedom. 66 two key features.179. 125 SIote.llectivist. 212 and reconciliation of freedom as pawer with ideal of free persons. 125 on invisible 'hand. 30. Michael. 160 %n. 235 %If-interest and lzanlo eco~lotnicus. 255 Runcirnan. 207 Sluga.on socialist conception of democracy 221. 27. 125 Social environmentalism. W. W D. E-Tans. 64: and Marxist socialism. 132 and new liberalism. 149. Adam. 61 and markets. !an. 27 collectivist understanding of. Quentin. Alan. A. See also Collectivism.26. 253 on democracy. 113 Smith. Common good.. 34-35 fatilitatory. 67. Jean-Jacques. See nlso Justice. 298. Thomas. 26f&29ff as fmdarnental moral imperative. 160 Skinner.259 as a. 42. 119 on freedom as absnce of perstmal dependence. 52. 235 Shklar. 51 Ryan. Judith. 201 Social justice. l13 as theory of human nature. 392. 210 disputes about.E as essentially contested concept. Francis. 298. 52. 234 Skepticism. 181 Rousseau. 199 and civil justice. 143 on handicapped.56 and socialism.1 5 0 on goods fetish.. Amartya. S. j. A.. 30 convergence ctf revisionist liberals and socialists on..150 Shapiro. Curnte de. Alice S.. 57 Skinner. 37 constrained by justice in Rawls's liberalism. 6 3 4 5 Social good. 56.. See nlso E-Tt~man nature and collectivism. 194f. 155 Scanlon.222 Ross. 20-22. 199 Hayek" criticism of. 254. 212 Science and rationalism. Utilitarianism and justice. 68 and public interest.74. 196 Hobhouse%cconcepticm of. 195 Rawfs9heory of. Edward. 204 in ciassical liberalism. 49. 24 Smith. 219 .

68 and democracy.253. 257 place o reludance to advance principles of justice. 54. 104 on inadequacy ctf the welfare state.66. 256258 and Rawis" theory of justice.218-223 and freedom as resources.304. 27' as system of mutual advantage. 219 as favoring effect theories of power. 60.134 and rationalist planning. 214 and develupmentalism. 21Qff atternpt to do away with markets. 255 tension belween substantive and procedural justice. 102ff and justice as desert. 30. 70. 201 conservative hierarcKcal a>nception. 65. 59 individualist analysis of.176-174 and social environmentalism. 258 anarchist textdencies of. 230. 9 and positive liberty. 251. 197-199 as an organic whole. 115.22-30. 230ff . 56. 258 authority in democratic versions.261 supporters who endorse negative liberty. 21Q and reconciliation of liberty and equality. 175 ccmRict and ccrroperaticm in. 87-88 artificial in ciassical liberalism. 204 defense of hierarcl~y in.212 and social equality.232 evolutionary account of.255 utctpian. 166 on markets as cclmpetitive and a>nflictual. 56. 136 on power c~fcapitalists. 67' 2 2 3 2 complexity and inequality ctf. 65 its voltmtaristic conception of justice.218-223 and desert.252 and collectivismf29-30. 254. 4 4 9 faith in ability tt3 control society. 63. Community.223 and moral arbitrariness of talents.231 as realm of impersonal forces. Individualism and desert. 233 summary of a>nceptualstructure of. 262 as rationalistic. 212.256 limits of wants under. 2163--. 255. 64: as critical of liberal individualism. 252. 50. 216 and justice as equality. 172. Chap. 62 and feminism. 152 and tramformation of capitalist man. 154 and justice. 108 as overlapping revisicmist liberal justice. 220 and equality of pawer. 2&ff. 255-257 as scientific. 30 justice as the proper c~rdering.ambivalence towards authoriq in. 23 2 Society SW also Cojlectivism. 114. 67' justice as organization of. 133. 256 eqtraliv as core. 216 and justice. 210. 218 on property and Ereedrrrm/ 114 f expert autharity in. 27. 257 authoritarian tendencies of. 201 cclftectivist analysis of. 27. in socialism. 50. 211.115. 92 as mass of competitiuns. 93 tendency to glorify the people in.255 Berlin" view that it is monistic. 216 and justice as needs fulfiilment. 5&59 criticism ctf Rawls" account of motivation. 296 and equality of opportunity. 220 Lenin's view ctf. 218 on liberty and economic equality.

24 methad ctf.6. 22 and Plato. 17'6 and conservative account of law. Margaret. 243-245 and prisoner" dilemma. Alexis de.20 R)cqueville.208 Taylor. 229 Sterba. 2240 and ctmservative justice. 17ff criticism of traditional Creek 1 % noticm of justice. 27.229 Socrates.248 Steiner. 3 basic a>ntiictionsand Wittgenstein. 181 Ewney. Josef. 39ff and the idea of an exemplar.355.28. 99. 22 two errors of."' 117. 208 Styron. Herbert 155 Stalin. 5. 5 on clearing up conceptual confusion.260-261 abstractness of his definition of justice.. 32 and westem political philosophy. 6. 207. 338 and nonpreferen tial conception of equality. 66ff undermined by vice. 123 Thrasymacus. 21 State of nature and coordination yrobfen~. 19 and justice as action guidingf 1 1 2 and need for consistent concepts. James l?.24'7.334 "Tall poppies.176 Traditim hfillian criticism of. Horacio. 41-92. Christine.156 and Christian foundations of egalitarianism. W.325 TaXen ts as resources. 114 E y .7. Willel.234. 21 three. 44.organic theory of. 5 on authority. basic convicticms about political a>ncepts. viii. H. 55 relation of to individuals.. Charles.. 7-43 definiticln of virtue.40 account of justice. William.125. 180 and political authority 238 on social equality. Robert M. l43 Hobbesian account of.100 Spiegelberg. 142.. 188-192 Kant on. 91-92 equality in. 380. 17.117'. 35 on adequate definitions. 177 rationalist attempts to remold.1Q0 Thatcher. WitTiam. 133.9. 247. 5 definitirjn of shape. L. 23 and task of philosophy. 124. 224 and conservative liberties. 168 Lockean accowt of. 2 21 . R. 155 Sumer..248 lack of freedom in.S on need for cr>nsistentconceptic~n of justice. 3 9 and cclherence in concepts. 24 Stewart.230.193. 247. 73. 99. 355. 2 22 and conservative account of poli tics. 127 on Freedtjm as power tt3 act.. Alice Erh-Soon. 163. 4 on justice as the interest ctf the strc>nger.235 Stern. David G. 116.445 Sweet. 1912 classical liberal view of. 228. 98 Stephen. 164. 236 as tlclnservative critic of liberalism. 201 on meeting different needs. 16.208 Swanton. 18 on aims ctf a ruler.248 problems of private judgment in. 17ff Spector. 227.100. l40 on pctwer c-tf capitalists over workers. lames Fitzjames. 26 on definitionst 8'22 on justice as giving each his due and paying debts. See nlsu Pbto. l48 moral arbitrarhess of.

137. 2 8 0 on egalitarianism. 52 Tucker. A. 1156 Willjams. Qff.228 Wolff. 12ff on practical nature of language.157 Wattt E. D. Cregory.. 213. 27 e x p m i o n of after Second World W r . Edward N. 153. 57 on limits ctf reason.. 72. 20 Virginia BecXaration of Rights. Peter. 235 Yc)ung. 73 Tucker. 103 and social justice.. 1 1 on fcjrms of life. 86 central to cornervatism. 55 rationalist suspicic3n of. 198f on ethics as mystical.. 12. Jeremlii. 233 and practical knowledge. 248 and conceptual inct3nsistency.. 19-2 1 and social nature of concepts. 14&%147 Welfare state. 71 von Mises. Robert' 99 Yugoslavia.234 might. L. 12ff WoIP. W. W.207' . Susan. 54 as obstacle to positive liberty. 99 Welfare as preference-satisfaction. 155 Voltaire. 160-1 63 and equality. 329 Value statements. 155. 233 conservative. 55-56 consernative delense of. 13 Verlificationist theory of meaning. 258ff Utilitarianism and classical liberal equality. Ludwig. Bernard. 3 3 9 9 and human development.160-4 63 and marginal decreasing utitilit?i. 16 on lack of conceptual essences. 177 on human inequali~. 57' von Humboldt. 171. Robert Paul. 195 Westin. 92-93. 20-26.B. 196 and positive liberty. 47 on St..and justice.234. 17% 23 and Williaxns" case for equality. Rnbert. D. 21fft 1J O Bentham" characterization of. 13S140 Wittgenstein. %?cialjustice and equality of opportunity. 1717. 15ff on language picturhg the world. 129-1 32 as morally ct3llectivistic. 17 and Socrates%basic convictir~ns. 21-22 Umpire theory of authctrity. 219 Zalta. 12 as nonsense. 142 Virtues and justice.125. 13&140 approach to conceptual confusion. 18-29. Augustine's view of language. 157 IIVestmorland. Allen. 165 on importance of reason.F.259 Ukrainian prisoners of war. 146. 226-230 disagreement within comematism about. 99 Willfenden Repart 227. 176 ignored by French revc3f utionaries. See nfsn Revisionist liberalism. 329-132 and justice. 24. 258 Wilod. Michael. Ludwig.32 on language games. 156 case for equality. Robert C.44 Mialzer. 259 Weinstein. Wilhelm. 147 equali'ty of. 57 Waldron. 123 VXastos.

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