FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO, respondents . G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp
TAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986 Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code

Taboso.P. Manapla. 197 of LGC. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. city. municipality or barrio may be created. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. abolished. other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte. Issue: WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution. divided. Executive (G. E. No. Held: Whenever a province is created. 885. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. Escalante. Sec. divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries.R. effective Dec. filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B. Magalona.Facts: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. (Cities of Silay. which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute.. or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code. 1986. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province). Petitioners opposed. • The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2. the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3. which states that — “Sec. Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava. 3. Sagay. km. Victorias. were not included in the plebiscite. and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO. Pursuant to and in implementation of this law. 3. to wit: . 1985. Paredes vs. An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte. merged.856. the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province). No province.56 sq.R. Rather. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: • The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 93 to 121. the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs. issued Executive Orders Nos. may partake of an administrative nature — involving. Soon after the date last mentioned. 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer. enforcement or administration of a law. 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez. that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed. that. however.R. from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. THE AUDITOR GENERAL G. or on November 10. 1964 the President of the Philippines.“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. as well as his representatives and agents. creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. against the Auditor General. such claim is untenable. in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities. Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. existing at the time of and prior to said transfer. eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners. not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer. 124 and 126 to 129. reads: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. as it does. likewise.” SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. since barrios are units of municipalities HELD: On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan. whereas the power to fix such common boundary. but a mere transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan). Municipality of Binañgonan ISSUE: W/N the President. to restrain him. it is “strictly a legislative function” or “solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power” Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution. carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or . Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void. can create a municipality which is composed of several barrios. 2370. 2370 effective January 1. for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province. who under this new law cannot even create a barrio. to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers. upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. not the creation of a new municipality.” The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. 1965 FACTS: During the period from September 4 to October 29. L-23825 December 24. it is essential. for said case involved. No. instituted the present special civil action. In the language of other courts. It is obvious. purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Hence. petitioner had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of .353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. which is the essence of every law. Indeed. also — and this is worse — to unmake it. make or formulate such policy. in effect. set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction. Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality. Thus. exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution. Hence. but.Quezon. he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power. the President cannot interfere with local governments.O.O. and. they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. there would be no means to determine. the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. without actually creating it. issued E. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. no matter how patently unwise it may be. although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. issued by President D. thereby. by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress. remove any of its officials. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality. insofar as local governments are concerned. Neither may he vote. by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it). with reasonable certainty. even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him. in effect. The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation. not only to make the law. Macapagal. By virtue of E. and. the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. he could. consequently. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. MENDEZ Facts : President C. It was then attacked of its validity. thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides. With respect to the latter. 2 of RA 1515. without the aforementioned standard. the delegate would in effect. for his office would thereby become vacant. The power of control under the provision Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Consti implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass. except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board. bureaus. without a statutory declaration of policy. or offices of the national government. as well as to act in lieu of such officers. so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority.determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Garcia. 174.

Petitioner. wholesaling. cities. and compounders of liquors. which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule listed therein. as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991. Under Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax. Thus. Rizal. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. distillers. importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature . The Secretary of Finance issued a Circular directed to all provincial. rectifiers. Sections 19 and 19 (a) thereof. retailing.E. and any attempt to apply Sec. municipalities and barrios of their taxing and other revenue-raising powers. if not in fact attaining. including brewers. Marcos governing the exercise by provinces. YES Held : The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. or dealing in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code. Presidential Decree No. 2. MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA Facts: 1. another Circular was issued by the Secretary of Finance instructing all City Treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinances enacted before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code on the businesses of manufacturing.O. repackers. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. with its refinery plant situated at Malaya. the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating. Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC for short) is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum product. 3. retailing. Rizal. city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing. PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code. 1515. . except on those for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers. Issue : Whether or not the Municpality of San Andres legally exists. wholesaling. Granting the Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. conducting its business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Pililla. 4. Pililla. otherwise known as the Local Tax Code was issued by former President Ferdinand E. 231. after more than five years as a municipal district. the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years. is also curative statute. Likewise. that the municipality may impose taxes on business. Later. 353. Executive Order No. or dealing in.Sec. On the contrary. 5. that of a de facto municipal corporation. provide among others. 353.

426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed to have repealed Provincial Circulars issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19 (a).D.D. The trial court rendered a decision against the petitioner. retailers. P. fees and charges is valid as it conforms with the mandate of law.D. 426 and no exemptions were given to manufacturers. except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code. the respondent filed a complaint on April 4. said decree did not amend Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P. 1 imposing the assailed taxes. producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986. No. wholesalers. 8.D. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation. 9. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products. if the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers. No. is still liable to pay (a) tax on business and (b) storage fees. bunker fuel oil. unless and until revoked. and granting provinces. cities and municipalities certain shares in the specific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposed on petroleum products. only guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments. No. while Section 2 of P.D. said fee partaking of the nature of a strictly revenue measure or service charge. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products.6. 74). 6-77 was also issued directing all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed under the local tax ordinance of their respective locality. mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. based on Municipal Ordinance No. 057-T against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986. Section 153 of which specifically imposes specific tax on refined and manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels. 6-77. 231 as amended by P. 1158 otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. 7. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on business. PPC. 436 was promulgated increasing the specific tax on lubricating oils.D. Issue: Whether petitioner PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC. it should have been expressly stated in P. 426. Meanwhile. Ruling: Petitioner PPC contends that: (a) Provincial Circular No. There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No.D. were carried over into P. p. as well as those which may be enacted in the future. Hence.D. (b) the above declaration covers not only old tax ordinances but new ones. diesel fuel oil and other similar petroleum products levied under Sections 142. any effort on the part of the respondent to collect the suspended tax on business from the petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized. importers. the instant petition. 10. 1 otherwise known as "The Pililla Tax Code of 1974". But P. as amended. 1986 docketed as Civil Case No. Thus. Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. etc. however. hence. in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy. 11. Rizal. 2673 declared as contrary to national economic policy the imposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleum products as they are already subject to specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code. Provincial Circular No. and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla. or dealers in petroleum products. have already paid the last-named fees starting 1985 (Rollo. the former prevails. Furthermore. 1. P. Enforcing the provisions of the above-mentioned ordinance. 436. Respondent Municipality of Pililla enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No. The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present Constitution. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances. gasoline. and (d) Section 2 of P. 144 and 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code. considering Provincial Circular No. Under Section 5. wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers. (c) both Provincial Circulars (PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective. Thus: . Article X of the 1987 Constitution.D.

the waiver cannot be recognized. Article 1143 of the Civil Code applies. Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor (Western Minolco Corp. Manila for more than 25 years. After several exchanges of referrals. the management of said market represent by petitioner Cruz wrote Mayor Villegas that the management was withdrawing three-fourths of the area of the market “from the direct supervision and control of the City Treasurer’s Office effective on June 15. a permit fee like the mayor's permit. who can make an exemption. 1970. Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. and 40000- . as amended by Resolution No. Inasmuch as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of Pililla. and from said date the withdrawn portion shall cease to function and operate as a public market. 18 SCRA 488 [1966]). it follows that a municipal mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax. The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla's tax ordinance is a fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any flammable. Said law provides that an action upon an obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. Nos. since the Local Tax Code does not provide the prescriptive period for collection of local taxes. v. . No. 124 SCRA 121 [1983]). It was only turned into a public market by virtue of Resolution No. indorsements. 1 prescribing a permit fee is a permit fee allowed under Section 36 of the amended Code. who were likewise notified of such withdrawal. it is the law-making body. Mayor Villegas allowed the withdrawal in the light of the CA’s decision in CA-G. consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy . On May 26. v. 39999-R. However. 406. R. but by petitioner PPC.Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes. and communications.R. Inc. . Provincial Circular No. fees. L-44178 Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine: Supervision of Public Market Facts: Private respondents filed a class suit before the CFI in behalf of the vendors and stall holders in Padre Rada market against the Mayor and petitioner Ricardo Cruz for the annulment of Mayor Villegas’ decision to withdraw the said market as a public market. shall be required before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or occupation under the provisions of the Code.” The respondent-vendors. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 230. The Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection of the tax on business of petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986. Cruz vs CA G. Acting Commissioner of Customs. combustible or explosive substances." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. both series of 1949. and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976. the trial court did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative. As already stated. and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide. As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees. Cruz states that he and his business associates have been the owners and operators of the Padre Rada Market at Tondo. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed in the local tax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC from the payment of storage permit fee. It is an ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority (Esso Standard Eastern. same is obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the same Code. Thus. protested such move. 1970. and not an executive like the mayor. Under Section 36 of the Code. in the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees.

R upholding the right of the operators of the Elcano Market to withdraw their property from its use as a public market stating. 409 (Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The lower court rendered the decision in favor of the City mayor holding that the decision was valid. CA denied the withdrawal by the Manila City Mayor of government-control and supervision “until legal conditions and equitable justification for the withdrawal by private parties obtain. the CA reversed the CFI’s decision.” A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. both series of 1949. The Municipal Board of Manila with the approval of then Mayor Manuel de la Fuente authorized the disputed premises to be operated as a public market under its direct control and supervision as embodied in Resolution No. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Mayor had no legal authority to. ISSUE: WON the City Mayor may validly withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public market. amended by Resolution No. Hence this case. and regulate public stables. laundries. HELD: No. to provide for the establishment and maintenance and fix the fees for the use of. opening. particularly Sec. and closure must be regulated by government. the petitioner contends that the Padre Rada Market was not created but merely authorized to operate as a public market by the Municipal Board. that approval for the withdrawal by the City of Manila is not even necessary. association. thereby also withdrawing it from the city’s constant supervision. The respondent Court of Appeals held that Mayor Villegas had no authority to allow such withdrawal as “it is axiomatic that only the power that created it can withdraw it. and prohibit or permit the establishment or operation within the city limits of public markets and slaughterhouses by any person.” On the other hand. there is nothing in the said resolutions which obligates or compels petitioner Cruz and his business associates to continue operating the said market for as long as the Municipal Board desires it. Accordingly. among others. operations. entity. * its location. The records show that the petitioner wants to convert the major portion of the Padre Rada Market into a private market to enable him to raise the rentals for the stalls. Since the operation of Padre Rada Market was authorized by a municipal board resolution and . 18 (cc) which provides: Subject to the provisions of ordinances issued by the Department of Health in accordance with law. and baths. It is not a question of the petitioner’s right to run his market as he pleases but what agency or office should supervise its operations. 406. By the very nature of a market. or corporation other than the city. allow the petitioner to withdraw the major portion of Padre Rada Market from its use as a public market. It is obvious that he wants to remove the market from the control and supervision of city authorities. The Municipal Board acted pursuant to its legislative powers vested by Republic Act No. On appeal. and public markets and slaughterhouses. 230. by himself. Motions for reconsiderations were denied.

and closure of a public market. Thereafter he sued for damages under Art. resulting injuries upon him . as provided by law.. the city engineer. The CFI Manila ruled against Teotico.approved by the City Mayor. that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general law. Burgos. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. at about 8pm. it follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion from use as a public market must be subject to the same joint action of the Board and the Mayor. G. the city treasurer. The withdrawal from the market’s public status was in fact objected to by the Manila City Treasurer and the Market Administrator in their memorandums and indorsements to the Mayor.R. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter. by himself. Held: Yes. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico. WHEREFORE. looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned. that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law. Upon appeal. Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. No. the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the negligence of its officers is a general law in the . a special law prevails over a general law. L-23052 22 SCRA 267 January 29. It is true that in case of conflict. the mayor. However. and the chief of police. Its conversion into a private market or its closure must follow the procedures laid down by law. The Padre Rada Market is a public market and as such should be subject to the local government’s supervision and control. 1968 Facts: In January 1958. Issue: Whether the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. The Mayor of Manila. Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole. and that the accident happened in national highway. cannot provide for the opening. the CA reversed the CFI ruling and held that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico. the city health officer.2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila. operations. the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

and municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason of the “…defective condition of roads. the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation. As far as Philippine law is concerned. that did not restore his being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or repatriation proceedings. or municipal. 2012 174 SCRA 245 – Law on Public Officers – Citizenship of a Public Officer In 1988. even though it is a national highway. At any rate. city. HELD: No. Even if he did lose his US citizenship.” The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised for the first time in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals. was naturalized as an American. he is not a Filipino. Burgos included. President of the League of Municipalities of Sorsogon. but that participating in the Philippine elections. P. the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s roads. Frivaldo. ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a governor. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo warranto which is already filed out of time. On the other hand. At best. Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. hence it cannot be given due weight. Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces. In his defense. Frivaldo said that he was forced to be naturalized because the then President Marcos was after him. in 1983. There is no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is national. bridges. In the case at bar. cities. He cannot serve as governor when he owes allegiance to a .sense that it exempts the city from negligence of its officers in general. public buildings. streets. Salvador Estuye. Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections restore his Philippine citizenship. Juan Frivaldo vs Commission on Elections on November 26. He lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation because apparently. he has effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant to American laws. and other -public works under their control or supervision. he is a stateless person. it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective conditions thereof. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. provincial. so long as it is under the City’s control and supervision.

R. Petitioner justified his recall request allegation that the appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor. Sec. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments. as in this case. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. De Rama vs. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. Sec. especially if they mistakenly believed. petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. Obviously. Quezon. 15 of the Constitution. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. VII. February 28. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. Issue: Whether forbidden under or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are Art. January 25. 15 of the Constitution . CA G. that the candidate was qualified. this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. VII. as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.foreign state. he must owe his total loyalty to this country only. done in violation of Art. 2001 Sunday. No. pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only thoseappointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired. 131136. Political Law Facts: on the Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao.

applies only to the President or Acting President. .” specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.Held: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments.

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