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Major General J. R., Thurman




General William C.


Editor in Chief
COL Rose Stauber

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Art and Design

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Military .Review


of the US Army
SERVICE NO i! 1977


ARTICLES Peasant Participation in Revolution of North Vietnam Soviet Airmobility: An Overview . . The Spanish Civil War and Sowet Aid . . Oaily Life at Fort Atkinson–on the Missouri–1820.27 Part I . . . . . . . . . . . Soviet Ground Forces and Conventional Operations Austria’s Defense in Transit . . Guerrilla Politics in Argentina . . Military Art and Science: A Place for It? . Military Leadership in the PRC . . . America’s Revolution and its Legacy . .

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. , Roger Darling MAJ David A. Bramlett, USA . . Peter 1. Gosztony .

3 14 26

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COL Virgil Ney, AUS, Ret 36 . John Erickson 49 . Dennis Chaplin 57 . Peter Janke 62 BG Edward B. Atkeson, USA 71
W 82

MAJ Karl p. piotmvs~,


MAJ Lynn L. Sims, USAR


Reader Articles Others Military Military

Forum . oflnterest in Review Notes . Books .

DEPARTMENTS . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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COVER A soldier on patrol from Fort Atkinson pauses to survey the Missouri River from his promontory near Council Bluffs, Iowa, 1824. Cover art and illustrations for the accompanying article on the historic fort were done by the Military Review’s Features Editor.
MILITARY REVIEW is publlshed monthly m English, Sparrlsh and Portuguese by the US Army Command and General Staff College, II Leavenworth, KS 66027. Use of funds for pmrfirrg this publication aprrroved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 23 Oecember 1975 Controlled circulation postage pa!d at Leavenworth, KS 66048. Subscription: $8.00 per year US and APO/FPO; $1000 foreign, Single copies $1.00 US and APO/ FPO; $125 foreign Address all mail to Military Rewew, USACGSC, Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027 Telephone (913) 684.5642 or AUTOVON 552.5642. Unless otherwise stated, the {Iews herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department Of Oefense or any element thereof. Basis of official distribution is one per general officer and one per five field grade ofbcers. US ISSN 0026.4148

This is not correct. The brigade was. also has a good article with W. The knuckle guard should be facing forward. However. Johnson mentioned several times. While I enjoyed the article. The Civil War Times Illustrated megasine. My first reaction wee that they vmre from Ogden originals. For example. For references to Colonel W. 2 Dull Saber The reprints appearing in the July Military Review of soldiers representing militia or Regular Write from the 13 Original Colonies. June 1976).. USAR . “Until Forrest Is Dead” by. But costs bahrg what they are. Colonel William R. of all places. Review . The knuckle guard end quillon are 180 degrees reversed. Volume 4. on the cover picture. end there is indication that the artist was familiar with the other equipage used by these troops. The prints indicate many muskets with top and middle barrel bands but without lower berrel bands and othem without the middle bends. Closer examination of the “attic” reprints reflects some errors in accuracy. was an infantry officer and was at the time in Virginia. 1956 edition. Stephen DArrigo Military . B. under Colonel (later Brigadier General) William Arthur Johnson. I noted with interest” the article. just north of Petersburg. it was obvious they were not done by Ogden. having recently taken part in the Battle of Drewry’s Bluff. after examining my prints. Btooksher and Captain David K. A. appeared femiliar to me. I am afraid it is not totally accurate. Wyeth’s Life of Forrest. in fact. April 1968. General Bushrod Johnson. see Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. muskets were either threeberrel lxmd or barrel-pinned stncked. the guard of which faces the direction of the back of the blade or the quillon of which faces the direction of the cutting edge of the blade. they were of great interest to me.( m Confederate READER Great Grandson FORUM Alabama to join Forrest in time for the battle. “As a matter of interest. For a reference. Snider (MiIitary Review. on the Battle of Brice’s Cross Roads between Union General Sturgis and Confederate General N. also in Confederate service. the brigade was made up largely of the 4th Alabama. I appreciated even the black and whites. In looking over the materiel recently supplied for use in the US Army corn. Bsrton Campbell. Phase III. the position of the blade at the carry is correct with the track of the blade against the shoulder seam and cutting edge forward. They made a forced march from north . see John A. p+ges 196 and following. The most glaring inaccuracy appeared. In other words. . Forrest. Reference was made several times to Johnson’s troops under Forrest. my great grandfather.’ Jr. MAJ J. Johnson and hk part in the Settle of Bnce’s Cross Roads. A. and it is regrettable they could not have been reproduced in color. pages 397-418 (reprinted es That Devil Forrest and referred to in the notes of the article). A. However. I believe the authors confused the proper brigade commander with General Bushrod Johnson. I know of no saber or sword. in the picture. at first. while having served some time in the Tennessee campaigns. and these were identified as belonging to Colonel Bushrod Johnson’s brigade. mend and General Staff College Nonresident Course.

We are a professional journal catering to a well-defined segment of society. We give no prizes for using four-syllable words or verbosity. The real test of an article is whether it has a message and is readable. One faction believes that all articles appearing in iVfR should reflect extensive research with appropriate footnotes to document the text. Our dual role. they are studies and term papers. we receive many fine studies and term papers. Another detailed author’s faction wants footnotes eliminated entirely and the more articles replaced by ones reflecting only the individual thoughts and concepts. And vice versa. If you are one of these. as part of the US Army Command and General Staff College. these are not articles. Since we rarely use two-part articles. Our articles normally run from 6 to 20 double-spaced. Perhaps there is a Clausewitz or a Liddell Hart out there waiting to be discovered. However. There is a place in A4R for both types of articles.For Writers Only The Military Review occupies a unique position among periodicals in general. length is a consideration. Let us have a look at your manuscript. however. Do it before the postaf rates increase again!!! . we take on the responsibilities of an academic journaf as well. We have found that returning these papers to the authors for revision rarely motivates them to attempt a second try at getting their works published. Over the course of a year. has been the object of some comment among our readers. your article appearing in the Milita~ Review may spark the recognition you so richfy deserve. A timely essay on subjects of professional interest is just as important as a scholarly piece examining another aspect of the military profession. while not mutually exclusive. Slang and colloquialisms do not win gold stars either. We have missed some potentially significant material because our authors have been unwilling or unable to transform their documents into article form. typewritten pages excluding endnotes and artwork.


. . In order that this story not be corn-... . It M not commonly known that this peasant participation.:” . The precise nature of these processes. and its importance not adequately appreciated. rL3 1!)77 by Rtwm January 1977 3 ..::~k: +. Peasant Participation . or at least hardly ever mutinied. North I’ietnam demonstrated unique capacities in achieving widespread peasant participation in South Vietmtm..“ of North Vietnam. 1 It is generally understood that peasants become hostile and revolutionaryoriented when their life-c irc L1mstances become intolerable.. This significant story \vas largely overlooked.v lost :tmi{l the contemnororv ~]rerlilection to h(iry and for~et ail things Vietnam.:t ~$j ~: in Achieving .The Unique Capacities . and the processes of achieving the motivation that stimlllated such involvement. constituted the basic strength of the North Vietnamese revolution. or it results in a continuing undercLIYrent of resentful acquiescence to those conditions. Roger Darling URING its revolution.. as a result of public preoccLlpation with tbe more colorfLil and dramatic military events of the conflict. . except for higher pay.. Someone “once said that the glory of the British Navy was that its men never mutinied. At the core of revolution is conflict Darn. in Revolution .. s. It is perhaps the most remarkable story to come from tbe Vietnam experience. Much the same car) be said of peasants.’ -.. . should be studied in depth. True revolution is concerned with both of these elements. this article provides a partial glimpse of those unique North Vietnamese capacities.’.. Co~yright D ]]letel. A ferment takes place and results either in organized opposition to the government causing the onerous conditions. and the manner in which the North Vietnamese achieved this success.

very broad. but actual peasant participation was purposely geared for a later time. Strategic differences arise not so much out of diverse national characteristics. partment’s Agency for International Developnzent. The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the autlto~ and not necessary those of the Agency fw International Development. the Moncada strategy was psychological—the use by Castro of a close personal following to launch a program of excepMilitaryReview Rooer Davlinfl is with t]L@ State De. At the other extreme is the slow. therefo~e. plodding revolution or insurrection typified by a homogenons blend of revolutionary leadership and peasant interest—all moving toward a common goal of true social change consistent with both the realities of the traditional and modern world. The particip~tiun of peasants in such processes is the sto~y of most of the developing world in this century. volve ~easants in their quests for power. It is noteworthy that Castro’s strategy for revolution did not start with comprehensive peasant participation and work upward to Peasant interests national power. It is dispute about social status. and ltas traveled e.society should be and what values shoo Id link him to other men. but out “of the degree that revolutionary leaders truly understand that their efforts are inextricably involved in bringing peasants into modern society. of course. He wceivwl a B. controversy over what a man’s place in. from Whittier College and an M. These localized peasant actions constitute a process which is taking place within the even larger social-change process of bringing peasants into modem society—of imposing modern ecOnomic systems on ‘archaic social organization. He has served with tlte Central Intelligence Agencg and witil the Depavtmenf of the Anag. were. but for the November 1956 landing at Niquero and \he guerrilla actiohs that followed. At one extreme is the abrapt revolution and power change arising from elite groups grabbing or losing power. The methods used by revolutionary leaders throughout the world to in. specializing in Vietnam. 4 . ganization. with peasant interests more or less a side attraction. Bnt this”is only part of the total. This strategy held generally true not only for the 1953 Moncada action. Southeast Asia and tlie Far East. The range of sophistication in utilizing peasant force in revolution is. Tufts University.A.A. social cohesion and access to political power. It is the grafting of the traditional world of the villages onto the modern world of the cities. The peasant involvement is more a ~ropaganda element than a participatory reality. however. front Fletcher SclLool of Lam and Diplomacy. and the recent revolution of North Vietnam as being at the latter extreme. cultores and politics. are by no means as consistent as the fact of revolution itself. We ca~ consider the Cuban revoluYtirm und~r Castro as being near the former extreme.rtensivelg as a Departtitent of State spol<esman for US foreign policy. Broadly speaking. very math in mind.NORTNI VIETNAM ov’er opposing ideas about social or.

Its sty fitegy is merely used to exemplify points of ~evolLttionary theory. The strategic genlns of Castro wss not in his daring guerrilla activities but. It was clearly a revolLlt]on at the top. The perpetuation of this strat egY resulted in the increased unleashing of that pentup hostihty ~vithin popular sentiment until peasants In number openly supported the grmving guerrilla forces and created a “national” movement. a closer view of the fine instruments used by North Vietnam is worthy of our attention. It was such a ekillful cotlcer)t~l:~lizatiorl of the key elements of traditional and modern societies. For these reasons. not built into a politicai strLlctLlre wherein clear. Because of its patient and qualitative implementation —that is. charisma and rigid determination to sacrifice heroically and risk all for the Llltimate god-power. . The “revolution” up to 1’359 was in many respects undefined. rather. [ the] Cuban ?’yolut{on [lras] hrld togrthcr mom bg prrsanal tics thatl IJ!I idco[og~. There was simply vast trust that Castro would produce something betJanuary 1977 ter than existed before. .:IS felt. and reflected such a profound understanding of the peasant psyche. finely honed and meticulntisly calculated as a thr~ist of social change. . authority was immediately personal and dictatorial.sidcratians K-WC zcnlilcel~ to lead to Iofficrr] niutiny . Unfortunately. in h]s uniquely keen perception of the already existing attittldes and cultural patterns of the . This view is confirmed hy the observations of Neil Macaulay \vho took part in the gLlerrilla activities: . J?y contrast. i Vietnam Revolution. they stood to gain. This contention is sustained by the fact that.1’ NORTH VliTNAM tiomdly audacious Consmanship vis-&vis the Orthodox Party. lxcaww the great majoritu of o/jiccrs were not propertierl mrt). . theory in practice-it also represents the ultimate in revolutionary threat. It was !vell-conceived. ‘ One might then legitimately say that the real CLlb3n “re}wlution” actunl]y CIILI not begin until 1959 when Castro assllmed power and the political and institutional impact of his ideas J. once power was achieved. ideology and national objectives were broadly shared and understood. with the significant politiml. This strntegy could be described as sequential. It was psychological at the core. social and institutional elements reserved in the mind of its leader and to be implanted when all opposition to him had ceased. What is significant to observe is that the strategy did not start with a finely conceived program of simultaneoLlsly building power with peasant participation and understanding. . ~ The IX} rpose here is not to evaluate the Cuban revolution. the military drama and other superficial aspects of any revolution are the elements that are 5 . .“ . Cubnn populace rural and urban w h i c h he so skillfully explolted throLlgh a combination of heavy-handed guerrilla perseverance. the revolution in Vietnam is another situ: ttion entirely. Material con. Anyone taking part stood to be better off if the rebels won. coupled with modest initial m]litant activity which V*X designed over time more to tap the latent popLllar hostilities than to achieve military gains. . that it stands perhaps as the epitome of the revolutionary form. MU matter what course the Rewlutian w i g h t take wlen it arliic Lwi power.

in national political power and gaining access to the attributes of modern life. Its strategy for social change. to understand tbe North Vietnamese revolution fully. . In this sense. That is why. we must drift back briefly in historj to the late 1940s. Ho recognized that guerrilla power as an avenue to sovereign power waa insufficient and temporary in itself. The value of this new perspective is that it reveals how poorly understood were the real forces behind a highly qualitative revolution and why revolution in the future may be even more tenacious and successful. perspective. offer them a means of sharing. . . in the longer term. Instead of tke extremelv limited participation in palitics characteristic of Vietnam’s Confucian kingdoms. but relevant to its traditional ethos. the military activity ie not the critical procees. organizational. historical and cultural factors confronting him. Ho Chi Minh.NORTH VIETNAM popularly reported and publicly observed. . combined with political objectives.a’isting institcttiotzs to assimilate them. villageys must become participants in a revolutionary movement which would transcend the momentary glow of revolfj and. he created the framework for a new spirit of communit~ based on totall~ new values. Ho saw that. Ho Chi Minh generally accepted what Professor Huntington describes as the political essence of revolution: The political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of neto groups into politics at a speed a. His purpose was to link the villager to a new sense of Vietnam as a nation b~ making theiv traditions relevant to participation in the modern politics of revolution. . to be successful in his total strategy. persisting concepts.anted mass inuoleement. Ho a. and to get it he had to persuade villagers to accept new ualues bv linking th~?n to familiar traditions. There is much more to a qualitative revolution. policy and motivational thrusts that gave it strength. The secret of North Vietnam’s strategic conceptualization can be stated in a word-relevance. To see this in propei. was relevant not only to the circumstances then confronting the coLintry. measure of how revolutionary a revolution is is the” rapiditv and scope of the expansion of political participation. community beuond the vill~ge. we must dig deeper to see what actually was taking place beyond the military scene. ~ Peaaant Participation At the core of this concept of revolution was peasant participation. In doing this. Military Ravlew 6“ . . The substance of his perception and its resulting conceptualization was as follows: Ho found this secret in the peasant’s continuing senss of belong$ng to a la~ger. The.hieh makes it impossible for e. And yet. He realized that durable and lasting power for North Vietnam would arise only from linking the rural villager to a new sense of Vietnam as a’ people and nation. B~ using old. it is possible to get a completely new perspective of this exceptional undertaking and to see more clearly the unique strategic. political. carefully contemplated the diverse array of social. as strange as it may sound. They are also the factors to which the haraesed government normally responds. Revolution is the extreme case of the exploeiorz of po2itical participation. as a goad strategist shoLlld.

But what was uniquely different about North Vietnamese strategy is that the concept of “force” it embodiecl had an explicit social and not a military content. the military element does not e~. the North Vietnamese con7 . is felt to be the main determinant of the security status of that village or area. contest the urban areas and gain victory in the rural areas through a worker-peasant alliance—was pursued. Both were designed to advance a “just Cause’’-but. it resides somewhat outside the standard conceptual framework Westerners are accustomed to in viewing both revolution and the social-change processes in developing nations. In Communist writings. was so uniquely social and political and was so consistently followed over the years. motivation is determined by interest and cannot be created hy compulsion. It is noteworthy that the Vietnamese Communists formed their own brand of socialism and did not merely erect a fa$ade. History records the unhurried. Its dominant element is patience.NORTH VIETNAM In this sense. the revolution was a stage-by-stage social process—it was managed social conflict. In the Communist view. They addressed the country’s traditional ethos and linked it pragmatically and rationally with a more modern future social structure. the social strategy was dominant. plodding perseverance of North Vietnamese stra. Because it was conceptualized so well at the outset. In the Communist view. The strategy Mao Tse-tung prescribed for a backward agricultural country—that is. though not the exclusive means. What are soma of the specific elements that K?ke ‘he January 1977 North Vietnamese revolution unique and which explain the unusual motivation that propelled it? SocialStrategyDominant To the North Vietnamese. force is cOnceived as a group of people capable of acting so as to determine the actions by persuasion. Ho chose the better parts of both ‘Marx and Lenin. The revolution’s true nature. The social strategy was designed to motivate forces. tegic implementation over the years wherein there appears no significant instance of haste or lagging fortitude. of others.en constitute a force aa defined. He required the total class participation of the people (Marx). Noteworthy also. whether coercion or by other means. and he made the party the means. For the North Vietnamese. or guarding an area. has been understood poorly to the present day. force is linked inextricably with motivation. What is basic here is that North ~ietnam had both a social and a military strategy. They w. Further. and perhaps the most important aspect of their strategY.ere dealing realistically with the situation as it truly existed in the social and political milieu of Vietnam. the revolution was always a social and political process of long duration. ~ This concept runs counter to the Western view of force (power) which is basically military—for $xample. This long-term strategy was effective against the French in the early 1950s. therefore. and it essentially was unchanged as applied by North Vietnam against the Americans and South Vietnamese. in pursuing this goal. of ultimate participation and authority (Lenin). the military strategy was designed to apply forces. was that it did not rely on military force powerful enough to overthrow an incumbent regime and its allies. a “military force” in a village.

motivate them not to provide informfltion to the government troops. This is why it was counterproductive for the government to hold “secure” ~~illages—the people provided no useful information and were indolent in cooperating. such key elements as the landless and middle peasants. communism. North Vietnam gould. The strategy was preemptive in that it was to create an environment in which tbe majority of the population chose either to fight against the government in defense of its own interests or chose at least not to fight against tbe North Vietnamese elements. quite logicall# have # “victory” in a village occupied by government troops ! Why? Because the presence of the troops could not determine.NORTH VIETNAM ‘‘ cept of victory was tied in with this concept of force. rather. and which formed the basis of his motivation. Not only did the go~fernment fai 1 to see the social process taking place. The strategy purposely excluded the small number of rural landlords. . but.” Ho’s conceptualization of strategy for revolution. Which of these efforts was relevant to the ricepaddy view of the rural peasant. nationalism. it was uniquely comprehensiy$ and modern. therefore. Military Iieview Preemptive Strategy Tbe primary purpose of North V~etnamese strategy was preemptive. in terms of invasion. all failed to interpret the true facts adequately. corruption. The government saw this insu~rectionary activity as an attempt to overthrow the Saigon Government rather than what it really was—an at. the key geographic units of social significance for the targeted rural population. Tbe genius of this strategy lay in its relevance to local interests—structuring a new social system of values and political programs (not economic or administrative programs) that were of importance to tbe peasant’s daily life. while the lone Communist party member could apply bis concept of force and control the actions of tbe ~illagers— that is. terror. This strategy was not designed to set aside a geographic area or a group of people. tempt to overthrow the existing social (value) system. Clearly. hut its attempts to explain events. Most of these were successfully influenced by North Vietnamese policies to remain 8* . is now obvious. as well as the weaIthy peasants. therefore. and so forth. simply to deny the government tbe mind and full physical cooperation of the peas= ant.. overlooked tbe key element of peasant personal interest and succeedingly resorted to suppression. nentral or to cooperatd positively with North Vietnamese elements. The careful conceptualization of this strategy provided for the inclusion of the majority of the target population—that is. The key organizational criterion of the North Vietnamese lay in answer: ing the question of how well an activity contributed to the political effort. We might let Mao judge the government counterstrategy with his words of scorn for approaches wherein “weapons decide everything. the Communists were manipulating the social forces while the government was manipulating the military and economic forces. inadequate aid. in responding to it. and its ineffectiveness against them. the actions of the resident villagers. was not only relevant to peasant values. They were conceded willingly to the government. It was to achieve a superiority of force in the hamlets ancl villages. The government.

Rather than letting political authority stem from a power base in a distant city or office. It extended all the way to the Central Committee in Hanoi m a continuous chain of authority. Organization was hased on the principle of local authority. peasants who had never before been confronted with such outlets had an opportunity to perform and demonstrate talents wh]ch were to prove not only remarkable. and this structure was relevant to that tradition. but also the political organization as well. as well as responsibility and opportunity. This started at hamlet level and worked up through not only the military. This entailed not only administering local tax. represented a unique organization—one addressing not only North Vietnamese military and political needs. but military activity as well. nor was tbe position occupie[! by a stranger. win promotions and exercise authority stood in stark contrast to the rigid obstructions the government social system had placed in their road to personal advancement. power 9 . but simultaneously serving the real needs of the peasantry in South Vietnam! Its strength was sincerity. to reach down to the lowest village citizen. L Promotion System A promotion system by echelon also was established. Local youth were able to serve politically and militarily in their own village area—something very important to the rural Vietnamese sense of home and family. the North Vietnamese allowed authority to emerge automatically through a simple political system at village level. There was no gimmickry or artificiality about it. therefore. land. It simultaneously preempted personnel from government use while offering them to the service of North Vietnam. justice and January1977 NORTH VIETNAM simple economic matters. With authority and power thus vested in local apparatus. constructing facilities and maintaining the conventional paraphernalia of an established social syst~ the North Vietnamese deferred the building of conventional economic infrastructure and concentrated instead on creating a social-polit]cal system which addressed local interests and preempted rural peasants from government allegiance and service. While the government was thus preoccupied with programs. Status. while the former is deeply involved in a “POlitical” and “social” undertaking oriented more t o w a r d traditional values and the rural areas. Local authority was a tradition in Vietnam. .. The system provided for an indigenous outflow of aspirations and interests conforming to the needs of the immediate area. and the one at which binding decisions were made. but extensive. ~ This was not a position imposed from the outside. family and friends in the local area. Widespread opportunity for local participation thus was provided. The tremendous impetus for peasants to serve. This structure. Local personnel filled all positions thus putting down deep political and social roots. The system allowed power.’ A basic difference between the Dosture of a revolutionary and the government he opposes is that the latter is deeply involved in an “administrative” program oriented basically toward modern values and the cities. Promotion in this chain was thus a mark of prestige in the eyes of one’s peers—that is. The village Chi Bo (Communist part y political leader) was the most important echelon.

by contrast.. This meant that. . senior officials live with the peasants. Hanging over thq 10 . was the h:frd reality of tbe eventual return of North Vietnamese forces or party ~ersonnel and the restitution their presence wouid bring. enthusiasm and motivation.Not having the baccalaureate and other poiitical amenities to advance ivithin the government’s social system. what were perfectly logical actions by the government actuaiiy served to disturb rural social norms. under the North Vietnamese. Thus. Combining the many opportunities for local participation with impressive systems of promotion. The naturai personai incentives to sustain such a system are obvious. North Vietnam tapped deeply into iocal interests. Landlords merely paid the modest Inml tax—the peasant paid the i:Lrge use and consumption tax. Success kIy in the (development of social policies leading to superior motivation. lagers recently “freed” from North Vietnamese control. The government in trying to re-establish the old land and tax system only aggravated the situation. . the peasant pniti n tax p e r h a p s onetwenty -tifth of what he wus force{i to yield to the Ian{llord under the go\lernment system. were true realities which could be acquired by predictable means. it disrupted the functioning of this beneficial system and injured the peasant in unseen ways.ever. This goes far in explaining why South Vietnamese Government “cadre” corn. The government found it difficult to.’ it had “liberated” the area. understand the attitudes of vii. vast numbers of the rural population were precluded from meaningful p:lrticipation and uppm’tunity in that system. North }rietnam.ing a deep sincerity for peasant social and status needs tbroagh snch devices a< having. In this respect. Statns policies offered alternative routes to valued roles for those who had been excluded from the existing social order. It ran head-on into a natural peasant resentment and his reticence to clarify his true interests even though. head of the peasant. ing into a rural area were considered MilitaryReview Secret of Success The secret uf North Vietnamese success in Vietnnrn wus not. With such a startling system of new social valnes. ‘ IIeOnOmic policies w~re’ impOrt:mt in that they addressed the agricultural base of the 14urhl area and hence touched the broadest common Iivelihnod interests.. its strntegy or its organization.NORTH VIETNAM and advancement. the strategy of North Vietnam was uniquely designed to work on a principle simikar to judo-that is. The largest such excluded element was the rural peasantry—the very group targeted by North Vietnam. it is little wonder that the “simple” peasants cooperated with the North Vietnamese strategy. in government eyes. how. North Vietnam undertook land distribution nnd pYovi[ieci a tax baseci on the ability to pay rather than on the regressive tax formula Imsed on use and consarnption used by the government. when the government drove North Vietnamese elements from a given area. made class origin the very key to its recruitment-giving priority to the rLirnl peasantry and offering it both power (ability to inflaence) and >Wtas (prestige) in countless small ways. &en if he desired the government’s new presence. . and otherwise shom. having your opponent’s actions work to reinforce your own moves against him. “In this way.

it cnn be seen that it ~vas a potent instrument in Nnlocking reservoirs of inner rnotit.t nf artificiality. the :lcqttl~tt]on of :I[ltht)r’lty.t> as III!l. the cnntinum[.tl Ii ith the g<. Ill c.In(. c I. New t{) r’e[luve the IICC(Ifor military sectlr.lml)ly t hc homes [If the pm)ple ~)h.lmer Vietminh... l’oltcies th. f[.l ch:lnged his ulltlook or left the alc.) u (Irked \vtth North Vietnam. these prmgrums contained u lu~tur.s.i< (“{)mmllnr. This bond not o1lIYaccounted for’ the preservation of those archaic values thut rnr’al People are not prone to abandon hastily.shccr’ m]llt.]mlltt<.ew hnsed on iricetitive. :tlheit ~lw’.ven ecun~mlic {Ievclupment programs brought in by gtlvernment personnel were not only irrele. In vie!v of the many fine attribute..>ld the Snuth Vletl):irne. Consequences of System ants strug- Thus.. The diswntcr (I) the North \’]etname. )le. in terms ~.iew thl}+ e]th~.s. “rhese v. and. “ The empha.—that Is.I)IC’< ml!lds :Lnylvhcre Its IwoIIICcx]stetl. I%n(led by the L’nlted States.n I.LIY. sin.WXI ]nterwts were rwmm[)n!y sh:lretl. the whole v<.I [Ieal \\ith PI>I. it cnahlwl the (’<)mmun)sth t.. tion vh:kin and pre(iictnble xcce.I(x](lire(l en[i . b~lt :Llien it.ver!!mcnt--—the [Joliries !tvye WVY .<t :Iwa . get )masant rl(lrlcof}ljer.e t.tti.)ther SO L1i:li reject. statu. in Vietnamese character.tlr’c(wflll...mr. concentmti~.. in t h. IVOIIIII treutwl the lead tts rvIr:Il these the tuxv.s t~) ]mlitical power and stattls thtts forged z rl~trable bond l)et\veen revrrlutionary leatlerxhip and the trwditirrnul pe!want ethos.tintry !v.> grmup as a wh.e ArmY SerVICC and . I.!ve+t peafi nelv]y an (If .c as thL>YWnfo?med and cO]ltrli)utml It) Its etForts.tt cnablml f. vant to indigeno!ls I)(]litic:il interw t+.+ nam Ivcre t. NORTH VIETNAM as ol]tsiders.V J{Ith <It[tp<wt.is t. defend gains.] r’ interwts tn do M.w [Itltca.s to .N.ystem. this system unlocked skill and talent that astonished the world and shocked those who trmfitional]y have felt the peaaant was only capable of simple farming. N. n<)t milch r. It w:i..glr:il elements.Ireas.t.thlng mow f[illy >hmvs the ]mp[)tencc {If .)rth Yiet nam !!twld help the. were .il eleme]. of UIIIYW.(.lry force In [Ic:tiing I! ith . They [lid IIOt :lrise from lt)cal initiatives 01’ stren~ths.]l)ing to av... ity fnr<es to prwt~cl (“{mmtlnlst .cvIIlkvIvcQ of sllch a .) 610 . Thus. Secon{lly.!rxl l.. N.l.t<l~North Vietn:lmese obJevt]ve.atatus and power.Juh. ])n.n:)l oririn.rm~llate[l. Ollt]m.e It CVUII. it can be seen that the disciplinary and pnnitive twJanuary 1977 The ctJ]I.... origin.)om f. n nf :~<hth<)rltyat low levels.r]l)e(l here \l.f the t.~i.. youth h. Ii:lving the {)]q)orllinlty to take actions of cial gled SOCI:II that bel]]g to elements.enw.(. Tht[.:ll ant] 1).)r the pe:lsunt \vh[) NONI[]not tit i]] \v]t h Ih.]:LI.se+sur ! (-onsidering th:it this system of advancement ~vho had Wtls never created before among had true a people acces.rth Viet. there )va...u.. m$!. to get Ivilli]ig pc:is:lnt s[ll~lh]rt Ur t{.r’y I)r’lclly. bnt it enabled those people to reach out simnltaneonsly for those elements of personal advancement that 11 .. kind and frulitic:tl oi)tmrtunity Ii as lngenit)usly llnked \vith the nee{[ to l)resemw it by the pns..atlon and a’mbition. wwrk !~lth N..

. But we won tke people’s war. The peasant acquired a new and personally< satisfying role in the activities of his community. The government then wou Id have lost the “force” contest with the most significant part of the population. put by his own qesponses to positive external stimuli. enabled the revolutionary leadership to harness the valuable talents of the peasants without these people having to understand the complexities and confusing aspects of Communist ideology.- Military fkwiew . . Further. . the peasant was being changed. This entire program of activity was not expected to win victory quickly. ‘were natural to their natures and which were relevant to their desires. ”in a slow and protracted way. attempts to understand the Vietnam conflict in military terms is an exercise completely outside the conceptual frame~york used by North Vietnam in formulating its strategy and programs. making it more firmly rooted politically and more consistent with the patient strategy of North Vietnam. Hence. There was no need for haste. I tkink we didn’t do it right.NORTH VIETNAM . not by outside forces. Simple explanations such as nationalism or communism wpre unable to account for the enthusiastic behavior of the peasants in supporting N’orth Vietnam. worked to build loyalty to itself through political participation by the peasants. in turn. North Vietnam. But 1 think we could kave done it. The community. if not stunning. Hie change was gradual. }2 . to note and compare the perception of the former American Director of Central Intelligence on this contest for peasant participation and also why $uccesa eluded the United States in Vietnam: America got into Viet Nam and then decided that tke~e ave some tk{ngs we carz’t do. . serves national interests because the continuous vertical career structure and promotion system assures loyalty to the objectives of the Central Committee in Hanoi. Well. In view of such facts about what was really happening ‘in the rural area. The genius of the strategy was not only in enabling North Vietnam to function effectively for years in the rural areas in the midst of hostile enemY forces. economics or the structuring of a modern state.. only through this unusual conceptualization of the social and political elements of the revolution. the ability to intfuence. at his own pace.. The final stages of the war constituted a situation of total government frustration with attempting to administer the countryside and a total dependency on its city supporters. .. . Tke military equation didn’t too?Vc.. This SIOW erosion of willing support for the government would result eventually in the government’s losing the ability to exercise meaningful authority over the populace outside of the cities. The peasants were thus unwittingly molded into a force that simultaneously served both local and national interests. but. it ie interesting. Unique Combination The North Vietnamese revolution was a unique combination of revolutionary leadership and peasant vaIues and interests wherein the leadership was imbued with a desire t’o establish power based on a broad peasant role of political participation at every level. The Communist concept of victory was based on its unique concept of force— that is. . This is precisely what hfippened. in a broader sense. . In this way. the actions of others.

.S. CO. 4 John T... . TkL.hem. P 629. as modern political science appears to indicate. political participation is the szne qua non of trae revolution sion and mu+ modernization. Tnm. H\>\.1.~Achufi. 261L .. .. Lrn. er. n 17. n G!o. The Ies.. P 1 S. In Vietnam.Y Won ‘... Center for Intro .<.s Mucl.. tz.....tm. CI. York Bo.ry 1910.mud :{74. n.titute of Technc.son of revolution in Vietnam is in its being the epitome of social revolution —it is that the opportunity for predictable access to political pow’er by village people is a more ])otent form of power than a primarily mditary force arrayed the against it.. 1 I McAlf>tvr D 166 January 1977 13 .. p 24.l Sturl!m M:. but extensive... Fdcl (k. thought a peasant North down Americaa the from it the is It North not what is not Army. P 126. . in so doing. . knlnx “ml 19 J$in”. .t..< t. capacities of the “lesser” peoples of the world.. ... This is because that period of the Cnban story was not a true revolution at all. 1$170. values and ospiratimrs of the people involved.<1 Pad ?4. A Rcbd !. ..!l 0?1!.1. CL. The North Vietnamese revolution prowdes an excellent example of hm}. ‘. cw. Tsme.ros In.ol. p 647.t HdPeI m. accomplish the difiicu]t task of bringing peasants into modern eociety via the participatory route.. values and political. M. .kre. Cmnbvt.... New ‘I H. <. [kzd * R“.. The North Vietnamese revolution stands as a sobering dem’orrstration of the exceptional power of inspired motivation in unleashing heretofore hidden. t . Yletnamese guerrilla S o u t h military Vietn:Lmese North Vietnam has discovered heir to achieve its implementation in a developing nation. technological NOTES P Hu. 1970.mtnw t..tmrton.. po!ver of the West had its we:!kness exposed by the political power of peasant peoples. Yale Haven.. z. it is fair to say that the North Vietnamese revolution was not tom. Vietnamese it is a lesson aided slowly of by revhow.. parable to Castro’s “revolution” from Moncada to his takeover in 1959.L.. TIM V. perceptive revolutionary leadership can conceptualize its program to harmonize the forces and their \vill to continue the conflict.f r. Z... .J. the nnd wore popularly to be.. s rb>d. Considering that the real Cuban revolution started in 1959 when institutions. their differences in approach to achieving n modern society are noteworthy. We.’mci{]l sYstems began to change..e aud Tkctr Rcudritwn. P 70. t. ]1 therefore. it must also be based on the fundamental interests.rame.) /&.. It further illustrates that qualititative revolution is not based on such popular explanations as nationalism and ideology alone-rather. 19:0. force. o. o]...:!t.. If. I“c..<. su.>< .. If there is a b:wic lesson to be derived olution... . AlktQr J. w A. Cttbn.. t. a comparison with the North Vietnamese revolution quite naturally raises the following evaluative questions: Which revolution recognized the need of bringing peasants into modern society ? Which revolution embodied the critical modernizing element of popular participation ? Which revolution resulted in the abrupt implantation of new institutions ? While both have been Successful.. P NORTH VIETNAM . J> 67x $! Ern. . ~“ Returning to our comparisons with Cuba..ntinm’..r. NY.ku?y. . Ha.ks/Ne$v :{ Nd MIImukw. NY.. . CT.~ Road to 180WV. 190S. IM that the conclu� realitiw of both traditional and modern society and... The people /oere all on the government’s side. oncl Mus. I. per & RUW L’ubli.. Fit.mlmnde In Intm’v.lt.

the Vietnam War. NATO threat in Central Europe and an appreciation of the lethal. his legacy is secv re. The Soviets currently possess a potent airmobile threat that retlects a working appreciation for the tactical applications of helihorne forces in all levels of warfare intensity. In fact. the Soviet perception of the US. the Soviets cite US experiMilltaryfteview .Soviet Airmobility: An Overview’ Major David A. The Korean Conflict was the firet combat shOw. Marshal Grechko recognized the importance of enhanced and potent donventiomd forces and directed the dramatic Soviet improvements in these areas.er the helicopter. &amlett. . airmobility has made perhaps the most significant advance during the Grechko era. modern battlefield. These influences changed the Soviet percep. and the Soviete bore witness to US innovation in both logistical and tactical employments. case f. the Soviets were seriously considering the tactical delivery of troope by helicopter in special situations. 14 suited for the rigors of the modern battlefield. From here. been occasioned by a ~ariety of discrete and continuous fact~s during the post-WorId War 11 peribd. I Curiously. even at this early stage. Among the many sectors of conventional warfare. events and factors contributed to this change in perception: the Korean Conflict. Graham Turbiville contends that. US successes in medical evacuation and othW logistical usee probably precipitated much of the emerging Soviet interest in helicopters during the 1950s.wareness has. United States Army HOUGH the recent death of Marshal Grechko removes the architect of the present imposing Soviet military posture. Reasons for Heightened Current Interest T tion quately that the and helicopter logistical was asset an adminnot ade- istrative This posture of airmoblle +.

He received a B. The second historical factor is the Vietnam War with the highly publicized role of US airmobile operations. US Awn ~ Infantry School. Kentuck~. the Soviets began to write publicly in comparative detail and in afhrmative fashion regarding the uses and applications of airmobile warfare. and Soviet commentary moved toward a more positive objective evaluation of the various US doctrinal and tactical practices in Vietnam. there appeared numerous articles in Vam?nvi Vextni/c (MilitarU Herald) dealing with ths \.ne doctrine softened perceptibly. probably the most comprehensive treatment on Soviet airmobility by Soviet writers. Certainly.(. The moat dramatic recent example is the Soviet adoption of the helicopter as a considerable antitank weapon and the consideration of using a tank-helicopter team.A. in 1974. However. the Soviets generally were reserved in their commentary regarding the ultimate viability of the helicopter on the battlefield. this overriding interest motivated much of the Soviet attention directed to US airmobile initiative in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Soviets closely observed the US-Federal Republic of Germany tank-helicopter teste.it}Ltkc 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The Soviets are acutely aware of tbe marriage of doctrine and technology in the development of military power. Lyutov and P.SOVIET AIRMOBILITY ences in airmobile operations in the Korean War as examples of airmobile potential in Tkc Motorized Riffe Battalion in a Tactical Airborne Landing by I. an M. B~am/ett is. T. Sagayctak. sion and has been an instructor at the Florida Ranger Camp.S. ~ This citation of relatively obscurs operations. from the USMA. This 1969 publication. from Duke University and is a 1976 graduate of the USA CGSC. would seem to corroborate Turbiville’s contention of early Soviet awareness of tactical potential for the he}icoptet. discusses October 1950 and September 1951 air assaults of modest proportions. This shift in the public forum of Soviet journals daring the latter \stages of the Vietnam experience is hardly coincidental. mobile operations. Concurrently.arious facets of air- ~ M=j~T David A. ing’ a matter of historical record. S. Fort Campbell. notwithstanding an apparent embryonic intereet stemming from the Korean Conflict. He has served two tours in the Republic of Vietnam with the tbth lnfantr~ Division and the 10lst Airborne Divi. The third external factor is the Soviet perception of the thrent posed by NATO forces deployed along its western frontier. USMA. Such interest continued Ilntil. and US advances in helicopter development are monitored by the Soviets. analysis of the US helibol. and the apparent willingness of the Soviets to profit from US experiences is becom. particularly in the panorama of extensive US alrmobile activities in Vietnam. and clearly they have endorsed the employment of an15 January 1977 . Though obviously aware of US heliborne operations and the reported successes garnered by the increased mobility. in 1968. and the Department of English.

h Tbe earlier reservations about helicopter survivability such as its vulnerability to small arms. Soviet assets can be examined in four general areas though the lines of demarcation are not always clearly defined: Ligh ti Utilit y Helicopters. Utilit~/Medium Helicopters. tlteir air transport and ae~iat capabilit~. This the the conclusion battlefield factors to of history on the nature interof with modern external combines recent produce the current Soviet endorsement of airmobility as an integral part of contemporary warfare.” :) The Soviets also must grapple with the paradox of the nuclear battlefield that considers both dispersion and massing to be essential for success. the Soviets now view the helicopter as an asset that militates against the lethality of the battlefield and offsets the “disproportion between the capabilities of new weapons and the mobility of troops. resulting from tlte increased combat potential and mo16 . The Soviets are nearing completion of their transition from the piston-driven helicopter to m all-turbine force. is being replaced by the larger turbine-powered Hoplite. the Soviets pondered the helicopter as a possible addition to the mobility inventory when Major General Bochkarev cited the necessity to attack at high tempos and advantageously i? tanks.produced by the Mil (Mi) Design Bu rean. This characteristic f ea. Additionally. when the Soviets modified existing airframes to function as armed helicopters. combat actions ave now conducted on a broad fro t with airborne r landings [botk bII parachute drop artd air landing ]. ture of moderm combat is baeed on ite extent in space.SOVIET AIRMOBILITV titank guided miseiles ( ATGMs ) from helicopter platforms. the Soviets have steadfastly applied their general technological principle of upgrading and modifying when possible rather than arbitrarily tooling for a new asset.rten7 sive use of Helicopters. This pointcounterpoint approach to advancements on the part of the perceived threat is both practical and economical. and tlte e. armored transport and helicopters. Military Review . its relative slowness and the technical limitations of noise and vibration 6 seem to. have been overcome gradually by the exigency of mobility on a lethal battlefield. . * As early as 1965. Colonel V. the Mi-1 Hare and Mi-2 Hoyiite have been the standard carriers in the class. Savkin. During this transition phase. Used for administrative and liaison purposes. introduced to squadron service in 1948. The expanded capabilities of the Hoplife make it somewhat comparable to the US utility class of helicopter. the noted Soviet military theoretician. The oldest representative in this somewhat arbitrary class is the Mi-4 Hound. . This principle was most vividly apparent during the period preceding the introduction of the Hind attack helicopter. and it seems to provide a prod to Soviet development in the field of airmobile operations. The Hmre. national Assets and Technological Trends The significant assets in the Soviet helicopter inventory that support the land forces in airmobile operations are those . may well summarize current Soviet thinking of Me role of the helicopter on the modern battlefield with his comments that: . The Mi-24 Hind ie the fulfillment of the Sdviet requirement for a helicopter gunship and/or attack helicopter in the tradition of the US AHJ Cobra series. bi[it~ of tlte troops.

ed in the interim as gunships.ersion.24 Hind addition capability.llly \v. .Nil[l be plaue(l under the uper:ition. first Introdllced in 1960.il cow trol of II i. the Hind can carry ATG. the Soviets feuture three considerable assets. a T:wtiu. Rather. has date a machinegtln an infantry and squad.Ms and rockets.rm.~vy) helicopter regiment can lift all organic personnel and eqllipment of the mntorized rifle battalion (MRi3 }. ~rho. elthev ulmies nr {Iivl. the Ifo IInd was the standard troop-carrying helicopter until its replacemerjt by the Mi-s Hip.~zruds and Hips that hnve ser~.8Hip .SOVIET AIRMOBILITY first introduced ]n 1951. At the end of the airtransport phase of the operation.ets of a mixed ( mecli[!m and he. Forces regiments which form it part of the Tactical Air Army. the Soviets rlty craclle-to-m:ltll Designed for a variety of nrmed helicopter roles. I)llri!lg li:irtlme. in tttrn. The Ffomcr ~vith four engines has nu near equi~wlent and shmild he precminel]t in HLH development )n the foreseeable future. 1“ Though the Soviets may not ha~e Though there are rumors that the Soviets may be experimenting with airmobile units-those incorporating organic helicopter assets and troops in a single organization ~—the trend has not been in that direction. The Hoolr fentures clamshell doors and folding in romps to to accept a slingoutsized lo:)d cnrgo Mi. The lfi-6 IfmJL’. With the introduction produced armed of the their helicopter.!!t comm. the helicopter units revert to their parent organization in ‘aviation channels. Hind first series. \voul(l nllocate the helicopter regiments to hub[jrclinate utlits. the Soviets maintain separate helicopter units that are assigned as needed to troop units. The Hnr/re is a flylng crane with both a long-leg and short-leg ~.l[lns. fur s]wc]tit c)pcrntiom. Hwzr~ Lift Hclici)ptrrs (f{LH).ltld?~. k“ &[*a ~d .. A piston-device aircraft. The world’s learier in HLH development. those modified ?f. has prov]derl the technological basis for the subsequently rleveloped . A/ mei Helicopters. can accommo- This aircraft will supersede the existing armed helicopters.il Air Army ni.tfi-10 Harl<e and M1-12 Howrr. the as. The helicopters’ are organized into January 1977 Mi. a transition process still ongoing. “ Generally s])e~iking.

. Samo?Ienko. “ This philosophy underwrites much of the current Soviet interest in the application of their considerable airborne assets in an airmobile role.12 Homer ML1O Harke hmuyht the practice of the aircraft landing metkod of assault operation. As early as January 1968. Soviet interest in this area focuses on the airborne and motorized tifle battalions. This makes it possible for the fowe to immediately go into action. Chaplygin. landing. and P a r a c h u t e-landing (or’ mixed) . rscently recognized such a dual Capability when he announced that “depending on the way the airborne troops reach the ground. Additionally. the assault can be called parachute.2 Hoplite any specifically designated airmobile units.“ II Chaplygin’s remark would seem to formalize much of the Soviet thinking on the use of the helicopter as an attractive alternative in the employment of airborne forces. The use of airborne forces would appear attractive to the Soviet planners as these are the only infantry units lacking organic transportation. they contend that existing units with a modicum of training can be used effectively in heliborne operations.. Lieutenant General P. argued: The a d u e n t of helicopte?w has w’ Mi. as a podrazdeleniye [subunit].SOVIET AIRMOBILITV borne Troops. Colonel Ya. Mi. what’s more important with its arms and equipmetif. an articulate advocate for the use of airmohile operations. Iekich has great adva~tages over the parachuting method: the landing fo~ce is set down compactl~. and. V.. the airborne forces could be tnined with a minimum of disruption in their existing routine. The MRB is the unit most often cited and discussed for use in airmoMilitary Review 18 . Deputy Commander of Air- ‘.

ss higl! firepower and woneuuerability. The netw’ork of river~ in Central Europe further underscores Smvet interest in the me of airmobile forces to breach the integrity of an enemy de fen>e anrhored along suc cessi~.a deception measure.SMcb podrazdeleniye are armed with cambat eqaipafent wbicl[ can be lifted into the enemy rear by air tran.ith an objective selected to facilitate the uninterrupted udvance of the main force. any MR!3 is considered a potentiul airmobile force. Again. and the various missions envisioned reveal considerable thought and analysis. Most airmobile operations prescribe that the uir-hfted unit remain tinti] linkup. cud [’ortion. sach au eql[ipped llnit could sustain itself effectively in prolonged. si[. as a ?wle.ifll waferial weans which are rleces. The following missions include ckpsu]e discussions of the distinguishing feature of each operation: Seizure of Riuer-C? os.VR13 units in th?s case] are assigned as tactical ai?borne Iairmubile] fuvces !chirlz pasae. n. Seizure Launched in conjunction with nn amphibious assault. independent or semi-independent operations.e river lines.vpa?’t and ave supplted u.vbo endorse the kRB in ~n airmoblle role \vith the following: To arcamp[isb such rariwi n!{s. Generally.?. The Soviet viel~r mly be best summed up by Lyutov and Saguydak . the Soviets do not feel that any significant amount of training is needed by the troops to conduct an airmobile assault. ] ! The considerable lift caf)abilities of their existing helicopters allow for these serious consider:lt ions of displacing mechanized transport nlong with the troops.ard of a main uttack $\.s . the unit can displace with its impressive transport aud firepou’er assets. this oPeration of% requires the attachment of a number of helicopters for the duration of the operations. the airmobile force either may be extracted after the blocking mission or await linkup. This task tvould be essentird to the Soviet doctrine of an aggressive Offense that must rely Un uninterrupted momentum. . and. the!! displace an armnved pcvsonnd carrier. The Soviets argue that the MRB equipment is air-transportable. sary for file conduct of prIJangPd batfle. this operation could isolate the beachhead. Thus. a relatively quick Iinkup between the airmobile forces and the main element is essential. of Bcaclfl. but there are also special raid missions that conclude with helicopter extraction rather than Iinkup. Their range of Projected uses includes the traditional and January 1977 the innovative. the missions feature a beliborne assault foru. Oriented on an enemy force rxther than a terrain objective. These assets would transport ammunition and cas Ilalties among the dispersed units. 19 . The MRB is particularly suited for the variety of roles and missions envisioned for the airlanded force. Usually oriented on a key pass that can be defended after seizure. Sci~u? e of Key Mountain Areas. seize o key partion of the beachhead areu or be used .>ing Sites. 1$ Employment Soviet employment of airmobile forces reflects a sound appreciation for the advantages inherent in a mode of operation that capitalizes on mobility and surprise. dependent upon the success of the main f(mce attack. thus.a. thus eliminating the traditional !veaknesses of the light infantry usually associated with airborne and alrmobile operations.SOVIET AIRMOBILITY bile operations. 1“ Delay KnfrU of JN[cat!I Rese~vm. podrazde]eniye [.

Tactics Soviet tactical applications of airmobile doctrine are deliberate. Significantly. the Soviets conducted tbe air assault llnder fire.rcwe of Road Junctions in Polar Re~ions. Prompt Reconnaissance After Nuclear.SOVIET AIRMOBILITV Disrupt{on of Enemy Withdrawal. Sei. and generally wellconceived. 1? This willingness to field-test concepts and employments of airmobile forces reflects a trend to increased reliance on the assets and capabilities of helicopters on the modern battlefield. Linkup with a larger force would seem to be the natural conclusion of this operation. During the famed Exercise Dnieper of 1967. during the thaws makes the road junction an important military objec. Relying on speed of entry and exit. This operation also relies on exact intelligence and a]s~ would be conducted as a raid \vith helicopter extraction terminating the mission. this operation probably would conclude with a linkup though the same force might be lifted again behind the withdrawing enemy to continue the harassment and interdiction. Peculiar to desert operations.SVstems. in 1971. but exact details have not been forthcoming. The emphasis is on the determination of exact locations. trot Facilities. Again. accurate reconnaissance and damage assessment after nuclear or chemical attacks. this mission recognizes the criticality of roads in the extreme northern regions during the thaw period. The ifnpressive variety of tasks considered for airmobile forces indicates a significant awareness and appreciation for its capabilities and potentials. the airmobile force could conduct immediate. Destruction of Nuclear Weapons ‘ . Also oriented on the enemy force. An obsession with the Soviets. Seizure of these choke points 20 could have many applications during various phases of the battle. The tasks could include determination of radiation or toxicity levels and terrain analysis for subsequent operations. the Soviets commenced the operation with the airmobile insertion of forces along a river line. Destructwn of Com?nand and Con. the Soviets have been including ai rmobile Operations as integral parts of their major field exercises. tive. the Soviets dropped an airborne force by helicopter 1“ with the implications that helicopters may have played an additional role in the exercise. The resultant impassability of off-road terrain. The exactness and detail related to their writings on airmobility suggest that the Soviets have been diligent in the testing and evaluation of many of their employment concepts. the Soviets apparently used helicopters during the operation. the destruction of an enemy’s nuclear systems by precisely targeting airmobile forces into the area is a frequent topic in Soviet publications. Later in Exercise Dvirta in 1970. the largest field exercise since World War H. The mission of seizing a Military Review . perhaps conservative. Another area-peculiar tack. and the deployed force may be company or platoon size. this task envisions the airmobile force landed at a key oasis to control and deny this essential resource. Landing and extracting a three-battalion landing force of airborne tfoops by two helicopter units. Perhaps the best approach to understanding Soviet airmobile tactics is to discuss< a typical operation as it reflects the various tactical principles common to most airmobile operations. Ck emical Attacks. Seiztwe of Water Suppl~ in Desert. during Exercise l’uo.

of force an is and ad. the fundamental question is how far’ forward should the force be employed.eration. This factor is measured hy the prescribed or accepted Iinkup time—this parameter is key to Soviet airmobile planning. most encompasses representative site attacking most forward main of the or. one may conclude that the Soviets ~vou]d most likely use the airmobile thrust during periods of uninhibited success such as during the exploitation and pursuit. The latter figure is tied to a desert operation with dispersion of forces permitting extended time distance factors. Soviet views vary on the time allowed for Iinkup. and the determination is tied to a variety of factors such as the enemy situation. When considering the employment of airmobile forces forward of the main force. discussed bile tactics. The airmobile operation designed to seize a river crossing ahead of the main force may be examined by the and practiced Soviet airmo. Given the Soviet &ttention to the necessity for a rel<~tively quick Iinkup. the it commonly 3-hour period to a 24-hour period. However. the Soviets could estimate accurately the key Iinkup times nnd thus employ the airmobile “leapfrog” forward with assurance that linkups would be timely.. the estimate ranges from a 2 to January1977 21 . During these phases. the defensibility of the objective terrain and tactical necessity..WJlt in conjunction with an armorattack duringSoviet Exercise Ovina river-crossing vancing. SOVIET AIRMOBILITY Airnrobile aSS.

The individual soldiers would be taught the techniques of loading and unloading combat equipment. the buttaliou commander makee the detisions on sII key matters. company and platoon. ‘1 This order would be based on a thorough reconnaissance. the helicopter unit commander enters lnte in the planning and preparation sequence.pal data. The troops may well be conducting the airmobile training while their leaders prepare and plan for the assault. � Landing zones (primary and alternate). usually oral. guided by the chief of staff. most training for heli borne opemtions should be conducted st company level. Training is considered essential. given personally to all subordinate leaders. political indoctri no= tion and finalization of the command and control. provides for and implements the details. From the earliest Soviet writings on airmobile operations. bile unit during the preparation and planning phsse inclade the insistence on secrecy. . and the operations order for the conduct of the air assaalt and subsequent seizure of the objective reflects an appreciation for the complexity of the operation.SOVIET AIRMOBILITV phases characteristic of most airmobile operations. SLIPPIY matters. Additional concerns of the airmo. � Target designation for aviation. ‘r’ characteristics instvnction audience. Generally. These would be a part of his order. asually with the assistance of a terrain model prepared by a higher headquarters. stresses directed 2 7 1“ 8 to hours and to 3 10 hours of dedicated the helicopters to zone the the particular pickup (LZ) subjects instruction to the and zone operaare hours of landing T h o u g h teamwork. Training. Though the Soviets regard the MRB as the basic potential airmobile nuit. P~cparat{rw and Plannin{!. ‘H The unit should receive with G to ( I?Z ) tions. � D&traction of aerial targets after landing. Force St?wcture’Contposition. Flight paths. and the chief of staff ensures a workable seating plan in consonance with the commander’s concept. ‘lluiniug also could include practical exercise with mockups and the actual helicopters. the n uit commanders would learn the SLIpervlsory techniques associated with airmobile-re} ated these functions. and the staff. to the devoted � Priority of suppressing enemy antiair defenses. The battalion commander considers the following factors to assist him in the control of the operation: � Assembly areas (primary and alternate). and be assists in the finalization of the existing plans thoagh his role becomes more prominent once the loading at the PZ commences. This pha~e is time-dependent. the combined arms Military Review “22 . � .Method of identifying friendly troops. r � Identification signals.. if available. The Soviets stress the planning phase. c Readiness time. the embarking and disembarking from the aircraft and sctions upon landing. . ‘: The battalion commander assigns units to helicopters with emphasm on unit integrity.. the Organization for loading.. � Sig. but the amount of training prescribed suggests that it is not among tbe most important or indispensable aspects of the operation. The order also would contain the ground tactical plan based on the objective of the operation. ‘:) Apparently.

They do not compromise on their insistence that the combined arms force is most suibable and the reinforced MRB as the most acceptable force. Command and control features inciude the use of both r~dio and signal 23 4 . � Combal engineers. The force ueaaily inciudes ground forces. Covering Grow. ‘“ The ground force> and helicopters complete their finmi coordination immedistel. Tbe Soviets further ta~k organize th”e MRFi along functional lines for the particular river-crossing operation. If the situation does not permit ian(iing in the dispositio!l arem.. remains umier the centmiized rontroi of the bnttaiion communder. Prior to boarding the helicopters. � Artiilery forward observer team for main force artiiieyy. � Tacticai air contl. � Antitank weapons.srrrr. The size of the group is determined by the requirements to seize tbe objective. Whiie in this posture. � 120mm mortar bsttery. � Radiation chemicai teams. Supp[lrting ami Fire Suppovt GN)UP. The importance and frequency of this operation probably have contributed to this refinement into taskoriented groups. given tbe inberentiy risky aspects of operating behind enemy iines.oi elements. The Soviets place great importance on the need for this poiiticai Inspiration. � L’ndemvater demolition team element ( for seizure of river-crossing sites ).v before commencing the oper:Ltiml. artiiiery. � 122mm artillery battery. The force is organized into four distinct groups: ‘~ Seizure Group. A sapport grOIIp. the reserve may be attached to any of the above gruups Ishou]d the initini task nrg:inimtion prove ineffectual. reconnoiters the enemy nnd terrain. ~. The Soviete endorse the taiioring concept in depioying the force for a fmrticuiar operation. Such requirements are based on the enemy presence on the objective. tions and relying aimost exclusively on \Yire. consisting of the artiile~y and mortnw not in tbe covering group.. � Helicopter units. Somewhat of a security force. Security is rnnintuineci ciuring the preimration and PZ activity phase by restricted comrnunicr. enemy. Tbe fire supiwrt groLIp.n R.SOVIET AIRMOBILITY principle has been st resserl. The troops ioad the helicopters some 5 to 10 minutes before takeoff. the helicopters Jviii proceed to neaL’by landing nreas. The units move from disposition areas to loading areas and commence loading the helicopters under crew supervision. The cilspersion may be more thnn 10 square kilometers. usufil]y one to two piut nuns :Ind :L1l Cllgineer eiement. the units complete their last-minute preparations. but initicdiy surprised. The imposing size of the force enhances its cfipabiiity to sustnin itseif for a prescribed ijeriod of time ag:Linst a relatively strong. mortars and engineers. ~LIU1lWS and visual signais. the troops are dihiwr~ed thrOLlb~houttbe PZ srea in locations called disposition areas. The reinforced MRB might be compose[i of the foiiowing units: “ � MRB [~vith seieeted motorized trmsport). the physical featnres and any speciai considerations that distinguish the objective area. IJsualiy pintoon size. to include the exhortations from the political officers. Bczttati. this group is a function of the enemy strength and capabilities January 1977 ———— in tbe objective area.

come increaelngly more prominent m Soviet tactical planning and training. The remm-kable development of the H!’nd series portends a capability for rapid techno“ logical development once the doctrinal decision has been made. both helicopter and tactical aircraft. ::1 Usually. Their airmobile threat is limited only by their assets. The assaulting units should [Inload their accompanying equipment m)d assume attack positions within 10 to 15 minutes. the immediate objective is the seizure of the crossing-site nrea. The timing of these multiple lifts would be keyed to enemy resistance and the responsiveness of the helicopter assets. :x The individual soldiers are encouraged to fire on the enemy during the flight. the initial lift will contain the entire MRR with appropriate supporting weapons sufficient to o>rerwhelrn the expected enemy force. :{c1 During this defensive phase. if not dramatically. Subsequent lifts may bring in heavier equipment sllch as B. particularly in the case of the Soviets with their maseive land army. The capability for heliborne forces to leapfrog ahead of rapidly advancing gmand forces and to disrupt the integrity of forming enemy defenses is one }vell-recognized by Soviet tactical and strategic planners. defense to place mines along likely avenues of approach.UFS. The helicopters are linked to the escort tactical aircraft by a common frequency. and the trans. The helicopters use ultra-shortwave radios for control of the air move. a nuclear preparation also may be employed. an independent com. trucks and ammunition. helicopters can carry engineer elements to the periphery of the .. helicopter asset development should continue to keep pace. . apon landing. Airmobile employment is almost completely assetdependent. With the heightened public interest in airmobility operations. airmobile forces s ould be9. However. ~~ ‘ Soviet tactics clearly address the unique problems inherent in the air24 mobile operation though they do not lose sight of the basic tenet that the ground tactical plan is still the essence of the entire operation. but only under the supervision of the leaders. munications channel will be established between the airmobile force and the main force driving for linkup. Given the current Soviet surge in the area of conventional weaponry. missions are monitored by ground control points. the Soviets can be expected to increaee steadily. In support of this defense.SOVIET AIRMOBILITV rockets for communications. there can be little doubt that they will continue to develop and upgrade those forces compatible with that doctrine. the unit will rely on the antitank defense consisting of company strongpoints and integrated antitank systems. The landing is immediately preceded by a preparation fired from the escorting aircraft. The Soviets will continue to improve their helicopter inventory and should systematically widen the airmobile training experience in the airborne and motorized rifle divisions. ‘]1 During the entire operation. A Forecsst With the Soviet en~orsement of a violent ground attack of undiminished momentum to achieve quick victory on the modern battlefield. Accordingly. the subsequent objective is the defense of that area until relief and linkup with the main force. Soviet intereet in the HLH should MilitaryRe)iew . The apparent thoroughness in planning an air assault in no way dilutes the Soviet interest in ground operations. their helicopter inventory.

tie+ of Airterviewed by Ye.bhcxtm. nom Dew>. 31 S. . w. The versatility of the }Iitzd with regard to armament and troop-carrying capability m~~kes it pnrticalflrly saitable for a vsriety of armed helicopter tasks. P 205 ..! w.. .] . October 19.” So. Chc. e A.. ..f Modem ComHc. 01. VW. II 210.. 13 Lyutov a“d Sasaydak. P 63. c%lendod ?1 Se. t?....v. ?7 Much of th s “Icki.0. m. T<Lctical A srbor. C. 10 Sev. C:t.. t.5... As the role for this helic{)pter becomes more clearly defined. .m. PD 29-$4.SOVIET AIRMOBIIITY increase. t V<. Chtm@n .t . kmditw plnn in conwdernble . V. DP 20-21. p and PP Swwdok. . the hekc. 7 Colo. PP 7-8. . .. and Ly”tov s. VO. Dccanbm Detachment 8.taw R<v.witsev.te LII. 41 . det8d. t% [ Coor. U 2.1. ]) 3. ”.. P ZO.epo..brulll’y 1!)74.s by s single ment of the moto!’med rifle battalion the assets moyed by hebcopter u. JUIY 19?. Taeti.. .w Factor. 1969. D 6. so the Soviet intentions with regard to the extent aarl boldness of airmo bile ~ipplicntiuns should be correspoadiagly more apparent. I>. - 1. Majol V.wtov J{ Tjwhko. n 83. 22 I. 11<4. Their avowed belief in the MRB and its organic assets as the most potent and viable a]rmobile force will drive further applications of the HLH in a tactical role. Tnkt. bed. >.A Hcl. 1374. (M. Swtml.d~ lain? a mm of rn. o. J<c?. !I Ibid.. ret.Mw F’al. 4 The US qumwlam of dcfm.ldi. ([t.. as in11 Lieutenant General P.>n f“ .t>t.ttal!.s an analoxoua prublem.?d.pter unit. 2!0 Gomwmhk 07J.... January 1977 25 — . frcmtnge.lot lSOborne TI’OODS Dem’.>.. um and heavy l>ft h:licomem..ht.t Militaw Dwm+.al Lnnd. FoI cc W dh Advanced Airborne ). K.I’home Lo” J.. uf Kokha”ov.A ff..iet D. nt ElTo. Cit..... as repmtcd m Forci”.WZ lrctit trilc (Mditar. . Jun.ted . X.htarv <... x Howe.’Ts@t~al V. Smnwdenko. 82 Goryachkin. or..cuwmn .rbor. P 203.zct MdtlwII Rwmw.s baaed o“ Lyutov a d Snmwdnk.. PP14.?.Z... 30 March 1975...dsk. August 1971.... A. borne @ndt O“eratwns. . Hcr<dd). Sww. op. ckc..c.vduImwnt of Modern A nnics . Hwrddl Dec. USSR. NOTES i Graham H..? . Me.$.et Vwv of Md<tcm.ville.1..l Sm. 1968. Hehcc@ers m “0. . o. Airborne fMdztwI cit. “ 10.t BY nnrdwins that lt con.15....Mvloaln 1 KCWJII Btztal’c. ( The Motorized Mb.nx discuss the move. P 33.(I 07. mt 2!1 Urtluw.mtiu. W Vmt.. <.. vc”f!?clc (Mdttflrti ‘Tm.. The employment of the Hind will be the barometer by which to measure Soviet airmobility. Again.. 30 Lyfltov 31 Ibid... Savkm.. dmc. >.. ctt I> 10 Su@yduk. 16-17.8.k bat. 1S Colonel Ye..t. V. Milltc. DP 21-22. OP. Cmp+bd.mbiw Ill..>].U.nk Lending Forces. C d. Dum&? a Tadtmal A.mwds. Sc. Tutbiv.. C. PatvtotJ.tch.m<.el V.” 20. Vom.. “. one can concl..e LW.nd P. Lwto.wdt Ltmdi”x.vIJ H<rcdd). m> mt 1974. Mr. k :M>Iz1<. t. The considerable lift capabilities of their existitm assets permit them to falfill this doctrinal principle which also negates the traditional complaint that armoblle forces have all the inherent weaknesses of light infantry...d’orn VozdI@lI. d.. OP. !3!.k. fl<lttrtk”z. ” Hwold).N...v. nYak.67.0. the D<.arr).+11.s the OP.W Ve. PP 89-00. March the Troop Rem. 8 Turb.6. ?4 As ..commu”$cat! on.. D 44.rtld). ..lle. V. d. T. 0 M Il. 3 M. ..mow..<[ S“x. Sot.]. Sovtt’t Md. ctt .ryadlkl”.0”..ry l>.ylenko.wdak.res IM. LwItov and Sr.’ January f’J68. . ctt .BY Jo.

1 However. He tried to overthrow the Popular Front government in Madrid as quickly as possible and to establish in tbe country an authoritarian. at the most to diversionary raids while the rebels took up the attack. After the unexpected death of General San jurjo (he died in an airplane crash 20 July). planned as a result of the Popular Front victory. Gosztony ORTY year: ugo. nationt Military Fleview . Tbe rebellion of the various. a previously littleknown general—Francisco Franco— took over the leadership of tbe insurgents. this resistance was limited to the defensive. Hitler and Mussolini F The war began with “the revolt of tbe generals” which. garrisons against the legitimate government in Madrid did not produce the immediate success wiiicb tbe ex26‘ reme right desired. The Spanish Republic put up a defense: a mi]itia army was raised. Only in this way did rebels have any chance to conquer all of Spain. The war lasted two years and 254 days. France. was incited by Generals Sanjurjo and Mola. It began as a conspiracy by the generals. a war began on the Iberian Peninsula which really formed the prelNde to World War II.. degenerated into a civil war and shortly thereafter became a theater for military intervention by foreign powers. It claimed over a million dead and determined the course of events and the fate nf the country for a long time to come.Peter 1. on 18 July 1936. Tbe resistance began to take shape. and it became apparent that not all army units agreed with the rebels and declared themselves ready to defend the democratic achievements of the Republic with wwapon in band.in the Cort6a elections of 16 February 1936.

Italy and the Soviet Union ) declared their \villingness to do all in their power to support the activity of the committee. Great Britain and France tried to skay out of the war. On 28 November 19S6. He studied at “ the Univemitu of Zurich. Thereafter.olunteers” fought on the side of the Spanish Republic. 52 other military specialists (among them sev. 222 general military ad\. Sn. military advisors. a similar agreement was made with Berlin. Franco continued to receive aid from the German and Ital. and the German Ll{fttcajfe helped the rebels transfer their troops f com Africa to the mainland. On 2 August 1936. and so forth).suggested signing a treaty with the other big powers for nonintervention in Spanish affairs. over 2000 Soviet “\. the Moscow Communist P a r t y leadership strongly opposed any commitment of Italian and German troops to Spain. Januaw 1977 . the policy of nonintervention in the Spanish Civil War proved to be a farce. Finally. Exact figures and information concerning these shipments. Hitler and Mussolini had no intention of keeping the international commitment. the Paris Government officially . the rebels concluded a secret treaty of collaboration with Rome. 351 tmk officers. ~ The rebels enjoyed the materiel and moral support of National Socialist Germany as well as Fascist-ruled Italy. eral members of the Soviet counterintelligence and intelligence services). ” The Sbviet Union no longer felt bo~lnd to the guidelines of the London “Nonintervention Committee. GosztonU is c!mrently Head of the Stoiss East European Library in Berm. 120 armored recon27 Peter I. Although the head of the French Government—Soci~ list Lb Blum—did manage in London to form a nonintervention committee under the direction of Lord Plymouth and although the most important European countries (including Germany.ents in Spain.it. even if these units wrere disguised as “volunteers. Among them were 722 members of the air force. ian Go\rernments. Switzerland. SovietIntervention The Soviet Union closely watched the e}. 77 members of the navy. on 20 March 1937. 362 tanks. 100 artillerymen. 130 skilled workers and engineers.isors and instructors. His article “S11 ield and Sword: Thoughts on the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the Warsaw Pact” appeared in the Decent be~ 19?5 MILITARYREVIEW. \vere officially released recently. Subsequently. wlt ere he graduated in 1962. war materiel. 156 radio-telegraph operators and communications specialists as well as 204 translators. France’s troops were supported with more and more weapons and military advisors.SPANISH CIVIL WAR ally representative regime based on a national party. which reached Spain via 23 sea transports between October 1936 and the fall of 1938. The Soviet Union delivered the following supplies and equipment to the Spanish Government: 806 combat aircraft.” Beginning in the fall of 1936. the Soviet Union supplied the Spanish Republic with various forms of militsry support (weapons.zerlnnd.

Batov. It saw the civil war as a fight between democracy and fasciem and assumed a posture in favor of the national independence of Spain. torpedoes. By the end of 1936. therefore. vehicles and fuel. carrYing out a private war nrith the diverse Communist but anti-Stalin opposition on Spanish soil. SPANISH CIVIL WAR naissance v e h i c 1es.. Orlov of the NKVD ( Peopl’s Commissariats of Internal Affairs). J. and the Trotskyists were bandied with particular severity. way be rated as an unselfish act on the part of the Russians. The top advisor of the Republican army wss General G. A. who as a general rule served under false names Iso-called “war names”) on the staffs and with the troops of the Republican army. France’s Triumph The most important military events during 1936 and 1937 occurred on the Spanish mainland eince the col~nies of Madrid and the overseas territories either kept out of the war or were already in the hands of the Francoists. and A. the Soviets made preparations for. 500. Y. even during the heavy fighting. Viewed militarily. Schmuschkevitch ( Douglas) served in a similar capacity in the Republican air force. 3 Politically.. K. The anarchists were fought. N. \V. about 3. 1500 tons of ex. A.4 million rounds of artillery. I. The otlkers of the Red Army. 340 grenade launchers.he Soviet support (which was much less than that given by Hitler and . I. Malinovsky ( Comrade Malo ) was active as an advisor in Spain. They profited at various levels from their aid. Madrid was deMilitary Review .000 party members ). was more dynamic and. G.Minister and Soviet Marshal R. about 500. Even the future Defense . whkh wae responsible for guerrilk training and 28 espionage. In the continual left slide in the Republican g o v e r n m e n t. radio stations. which had a considerable membership (abOut 250.000 bombs. General J. Meretskov—who dedicated a whole chapter in his memoirs to his service in Spain. General J. 15. Kolpaktschi and N. In June 1937. P. ~ T.Mussolini to France) ~ can in no . took care of intelligence matters as well as warfare.000 small arma. the Spanish Civil Wai. Gu?yev— to name just a few—belonged to the staff of the Soviet advisors in Spain and were able to prov& their worth as troop commanders later in the war against Hitler. 1. about 110. Kuznetsov. the Spanish Communist Party was the dominant party on the Republican side—and Stalin had every reason to hope that the Spanish cpmrades could retain or even expand fhei r position in postwar Spain. 862 million rounds of small arms ammunition. W. also more successful than the other parties in Spain. were just as involved in the evente @ Spain as the future Soviet Marshal and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army K. Schtern ( General Grigorovitch) . M.Military Intelligence\. was an ~xcellent chance for the Red Army to test its new weapons (especially the BT2 through BT7 tnnks ) under conditions of modern war.113 machineguns. plosives as well as torpedo boats. The Spanish Communist Party. Rodimtsev. the Soviets (and here we can make no distinction between government and party leadership) endeavored to gain a foothold in Spain.000 grenades. Bersarin (later Chief of Soviet Defense and . P. Of course (and this also belongs in the history of the civil war). they saw chances to bring to power the Spanish Communist Party under its leader JOS6 Diaz. 1555 artillery pieces.

greete Soviet tank crew January 1977 29 .SPANISH CIVIL WAR * N. 1. G. Krrznetsovand General & hf. head of the Spanish Government. Batov ! largo Caballero. Schtern P.

it did not provide the Madrid Government any substantial or effective help. Chief of State and Party Chief Franco received the full support of the Spanish church. Besides many idealists and true anti-Fascists. The International Brigades were organized at the national level. MilitaryReview . the tober 193’?). Franco was strengthening his power. The Spanish episcopate directed an official communication on that subject to the bishops of the world. formed a new Popular Front government. namely Stalin. These acts of terror by the government subsequently had a strong influence pn the political countenance of the Interbrigadists ! Stalin first had to be convinced of tbe necessity of the volunteers before he gave the Communist International the order to take the organization of the combat troops in hand. the “Commune of Paris” Battali&. the “Interbrigadists” participated in the Spanieh Civil War. the French and Belgians. Basque town of Guernica was leveled by German aircraft on 26 April 1937 —and Europe was given an example of how a total war could be fought in the future ! At this time. Socialist Juan Negrin. viewed the formation of the International Brigades with mistrust at first. the “Garibaldi Brigade”. Of course.However. held leading rolee in the East European people’s democratic countries.. for “it was clear from the start that the command of the International Brigades could not lie exclusively in the hands of the Soviet Corn.SPANISH CIVIL WAR fending euccesefully againet the four rebel assault columns: heavy fighting broke out in February-March 1937 on the Jarama and Guadalajara fronts. it promoted tbe formation” of so-called International 30 Brigades which origin~ted in the fall of 1936 at the behest of French and Belgian . The International Brigades Although the democratic world public stood on the side of Republican Spain. A great many volunteers from many countries in Europe and America reported for duty to fight with weapons in hand “in the Spanieh arena” for democracy and agaitmt fascism. With the vigorous support from Germany (“Legion Condor” ) and Italy (Mussolini cent an entire expedition corps to the Iberian Peninsula). munists. the Poles. on 19 April 1937. he was made Chief of the Spanish Falange Party. the “Mfity4s R&kosi” Battalion. after 1945 (if they survived the war and the bloody purges of Stalin). Two months later (in June 1937). but the former Finance Minister. Six months before in Burgos. the “Dabrowgkl Bat. He feared strong Trotskyist currents and an anti-Stalinist attitude among the volunteers. the Hungarian. For almost two years. The Germans formed the “Thiilmann Battalion”. there was “a large number of Communist functionaries (“professional revolutionaries” ). . the Republicans did not give up-in spite of the front eituation and the internal difficulties of the government. through the fusion of the two meet important rebel political movements (the Carlists and the FaIangists). the Italians. The Caballero cabinet resigned in May 1937. ‘1 The Kremlin leadership. he had been named head of state with full authority. The notoriously f a m o us proceedings against the alleged opposition or against the old guard of the Leninists were staged in Moscow from 1936 to 1938.Communists. the Francoiets were able to roll up the Republican north front ( “Vizcaya campaigns” from 31 March to 21 OcIn the process. and. who later.

it.. SPANISH CIVIL WAR “lnterbrigadists” takinga break A Soviet T26 tank occupies a positionin Azai[a do.yourself vshicle of the “Thalmann Battalion” January 1977 31 ..

0 Frsnco’sVictory The year 1939 brought victory of the Falanges to the Iberian Peninsula. about 800 in number. However. It was a bad decision. who hzd commanded the 15th Republican Division for a time. had their unit in Spain. Jan Berzin who had acted as chief military advisor in Madrid under the narpe “Grischin”. it was acknowledged in Moscow that the ship of the Spanish Republic was on the verge of sinking. the NKVD also intervened in Spain. after Franco had formed at the beginning of 1933 a government which officially received aid from Berlin and Rome.000 men fought in these brigades. and. From mid-1 938. T However. into the trap.SPANISH CIVIL WAR talion”. ~ Some leading Communists in the International Brigades shared the same fate. Noted among them was the Zurich Communist Otto Brunner who was a major in the International B r i“g a d e. in November 1938. was ordered to Moscow in mid-1937 and disappeared there at the beginning of 1938. As a result of the political trials in Moscow and the further purges. The corps of Soviet advisors was decimated: many were ordered to Moscow where—with or without trial—they were abruptly liquidated. never to be heard from again. Even the Swiss volunteers. Alexander . and so forth. Altogether. Orlov also received orders to return to Moscow..000 to 30. 25. the old Cheklst. they proved themselves in many battlea. it was not so . thanks to their discipline and the military experience of their commanders.Lenin” award in a speciaJ ceremony in the Kremlin for distiriguished service in the Spanish Civil War. This fate befell—to name only a few—the Brigade Commanders Kolev and Valua who had organized the tank troopa of the Spanish Republic. for. in which he also rendered an account of his Spanish activity. the Spanish Government dissolved these international units in order—in the last phase of the civil war—to fend off foreign interf erence (even if unilateral). and General Gorev who was arrested two days after President Kalinin had bestowed upon him the “Order of . the fate of the civil war had already been determined. At the beginning of 1939. He made a timely departure to West Europe and later wrote a unique documentary report entitled The Secret His t o r y of Stalin’s Crimes. such as the Hungarian Jhos Golf. The nonintervention policy of the democratic powers had hampered the internationalization of the civil war and indirectly helped the Popular Front government dig its own grave. Stalin had nothing against the dissolution of the International Brigades. the Soviet Union no longer showad any interest in conMOitary I’teview . 32 “1 ‘s Dolores I!x%ruri easy to lure him.

zt!ctaco Fmnco. ]stcd fmm the Italian. comrmre the excellent book h= Dr. Madrid also had to he given up.8.8.sic Mm estflb[iel{edf 1{> Militarily.damst..e same time. NOTES 1 For a detmlecl hiatm’y about the Simrtish Civxl W.ckcf. Mrs. with the victory of the Republicans. mke BWW+WO..1. for the strengthening of the Communist position in tbe West of Europe. Tin”.vztkon.. 1968 n.t Germany. SC-. Cr. cIm H!$torv of tke SP. t. the war in Snain came t: an end.zlomt.. on 28 March 1939. Helhnuth Gunther Dahnm. In a sentence: the Soviet commitment in Spain during the civil war had in the end brongbt to none of the participating parties Iasting advantages—one can even say that.. 2. Z.. political XO. The Snanish –. t. its intrigues and the etTect of the Moscow “purges. The Communists made no secret of that. their people from the danger zones in time. Dolores Ib&- ruri. the Soviet commanders saw the Spanish battlefields us a realistic area fur maneuvers. & Locnin~. De. The lessons for the Soviet Union Certainly.” finally brought the Communists into disrepute in Western Europe.. The Russians were able to evacuate all.. see H.fio.. 2 About Franco pem. there were the victims of the acts of revenge of the Francoists.y 9 See Jiinos Gilts curricula wt. 1972. VeFlas ullstein.ysh ip of the workers and far?ners... that of dissolving the antonomonsxtank units and dividing them lip as support weapons for the infantry ) were nnt uhvays right. Kom. . d..<. 1962: and G. Besides the war dead. G. V. el>a. At \th. SW.w Long.1 OJ Stalin>” Random HOUW Inc.. it was a disaster for the international Communist movement. he wanted to tie UP Hitler’s war machine far away from Eastern Europe or from the borders of tbe USSR. and. 1976.>. After the battle at Ebro ( November 1!)38) came the campaign of tbe Francoists in Catalonia. and the gold National treasure of the Spanish Bank was “rescued” by ships to Odessa.>. 1970.at. Nwnbe. Fmmkfu. Even Stalin’s decision to leave the Spanish Republic alone in its agony ( because he was already seeking an agreement with Hitler) must also be recorded aa a negative aspect.lS.th Kimd6.. fuv dw SD. 1963.Hdf. D.0W6 Cwd War. Even if they profited from it.% RAlexander 0. Their numbers must range into the ten thousands. who later became President of the Spanish Communist Party. Fr. Jackson..n. D 190 and fo90wi. That was the last act in Spain..“ sPANISH CIVIL WAR tinued existence of the Republic.. t<r. Soldat und Muste!nchmidt Verhw.ttmse. t. VcrlnK St. B. Wc. Riitten a L“. Barcelona had fallen.. John Day Co. Stalin did not want to withhold aid initially to the Popular Front government: he hoped for the defeat of the rebels and.. i“ the volume Mu. in some respects.to.M.. The work of the A’KVD in Spain. NY.. H. of fhc sntall and tke medium f)ourueoi. ?%. 3 ‘-UdSSR.. A Co!. Januaty 1977 33 .me.. Emt Uerh.b and h.6. Thonxw. 12wmb1ik. In Arnil 1939. rtd?toti I.W.<g. said: Spain was therefore the /ir8t cotdnt vu ah e?e in t!)e couree of figlz ting against fascism tit e de?uacr atic dicta. West Germany.dkmrnw....akamozo. P 7.. NY.x Dlwes. 1974. . people paid in blood.$”l. their decisions ( for ~ example. Hungary.

but a conetant struggle for survival against a backdrop of boredom and loneliness. Retired Lhwing the CWI’lLI part of tke l!)tl! CerIt R?y. Life at a f?ontie~ fort for a soldier was not the martial . . the 6tk In fantrg. Colonel Henru Leavenworth took over command of t?te Oth Infantry and Fo?t Atkinson shortly after its completion.Dmar in the February 1977 MJitaw CJ 19’/7 by I%lmwl Virgil NeY.rploring the vast untamed regions west of tli e Mississippi and cond?wting pwnitive raids against kostile Indian tribes in tke new temitories.—Editor. Arnw of the United State.glory he might have envisioned. lie directed that a fort be constructed near the site of present-da~ Council Bluffs. Rcuicw. Copyright 36 Mititary Review .Daily Life at Fort s Atkinson F 7 J ~— ~ 1820-27 Part I on the Missouri L’-N - Colonel Virgil Ney. In 1820. Aptly named Fvpt Atkinson. Louis. His old unit. tke United States Armg on the frontier spent its meager resources e.’ � Part 11 of this article will . completed the fort in 1821. Army of the United States. Iowa... wken Atkinson tww appointed head of tke Amy’s Weste?’n Department i?t St. it was tke first US Army post zoest of tke Missouri. Retire<!. . Colonel Henrg Atkinson’s expedition up tke M/ssuuri River in 1819 was one such excursion..

anntlfm mll call a. the daily life of the gurrison was regulated by the drum. the daily activities were traditional and routine. presented arms in salute. with the regimental band playing. He Ilas written and lectured e. tifea. or t’our-puunder was fired by the guard detail. Broadly. be~lten by the drummers. or carried. prom ulgti tedby the commanding ufficer. dvill. rmd tl?o men i}i resp(.. the sick !vere marched. Silver Spring. Tecllnical Operations. they fell under activities such as post and unit administration. at nine o’clock. the morning gun. Mar~land. Sleepily. Ale. c muj{. He bolds a P1l. ‘Roast f3ee~ was the signal for tile cucnitt!l meal. At Fort Atkinson. drill receiced its sltorc of at fwttirm. This flinctiun over.lj. and Chief. when available. Social Sciences Division. fatigue (work) parties. ‘I’cas Upllnttbe TreNcbe> . Incorporated. floors su’ept and the qu. F’aiiguc drua[ beat agai>! nt one o’clock.~undcr. is Theses Director for tke Natzonal War College. the 6th Infantryman cleaned his n’enp(m. pulling on uniform. he made himself an[l uniform presentable.D.shin!l i!’//ltc Sergeant or other favorite murches. In accordance with a dai Iy schedule. polished his brass belt plate or cleaned other equipment. At the field piece.as made. After breakfast. tl.u. helI}ed to (tsher in the new day with stirring martial mi]sic such as T//. then fell nut for parade at the troop. eaten in the compa~ly Iwrracks. genemlly ~ six. At n. bugles and the hand.nxe t<. cottnnvywd log barrw=ks.qil Neu.r part of tbe tJ7en’s tinle 7rL7s uccapied with tbe U(I1 icalfaml activities of the post or with ?epai~ing barracks nnd otbcr str7<rturcs.FORT ATKINSON T A US ARMY post of the 1820s. He bas been Senior Military Analgst with the Combat Operations Research Group. fell into stroightenin~ ranks in front of the rough. the national colors were raised to the top of the garrison flagpole as the troops. irters readied fur Inspection by the first sergeant or a company officer.’ sat douw tu eat. stables.ttensivel~ on militarv and historical subjects. IJC. to the surgeon nmier the supervision of the cumpany first sergeants. Incorporated. Colonel Vir. ila. After ru]l c+III. Research Associates. T Altl{oagl. fife and b[tgle. 2 A At reveille. or s mess building. guard duty. Ava7v of tl!c United States. every individual in a duty stfltus complied \vith its requirements. sick call. Reti?ed. Was}i ington. from Georgetown Un{versitu whew he Jias taught history and political science.bunks were made. orgmlized and unorganized. When the cnmpanies ~vere formed on the parole. DrUm. instruction and recreation. or aired. January1977 31 . weapon care.randria.[. the soldlers tumbled frum their hay-mattress wooden bunks and. senfling thunder-like reverberations rolling tu the north and west where they spent themselves against the hills. During this period. Virginia. tl)c $i![nal.

a review of the troops.orlied kard. supplemented by privately owned violins or fiddles. and go . there was but the hard work of the farm. It is true the Soldiers hav u. carrots. in addition to the ordinary ?’ation tkey are supplied witk a variety of vegetables. geese. asparagus. However. cabbage. Yet. gambling with dice and a game called “Hustle Cap” .in the woods. not only in the company gardens but in the larger post farms. ~ At Fort Atkinson. there were certain days set apart for recreation. for what they had sought to escape by en. Only a few years before. TkeV are clothed well. Wken they haue leisure. \vell. the troops not on other details assembled and marched to the farm fields. For many. There they plowed. Lieutenant Colonel Willoughby Morgan. $ After horse racing. Snndays or holidays. Louis the following: . regardless of the crowded routine of drill (when possible). Card playing forbidden by garrison order was at the risk of punishment. the soldier found that. of the 6th Infantry. tbe hard work on the post farm kept them occupied. 5 Horse racing had the additional advantage of offering the opportunity for wagering-with the post gamblers taking a heavy toll of the eoldiers’ cash. fed well. the commanding officer. The soldier musicians of the regimental band. dancing was the chief group recreation. they are allowed to take tkeir guns. one gun for each state—the soldiers ~vere dismissed and were free for the day. beans.fed and healthy. cards. After the appropriate military ceremonies—that is. the schedules \vere similar to usual Armv routine except that. . Washington’s Birthday and the Fourth of July \vere observed as holidays by the troops. wheat. instead of martial glory and adventure at Fort Atkinson on the frontier. instead of’ drill. listing was the drudgery and loneliness of the farm. hundreds of their fellows had died of scurvy at the post because of the failure of a civilian contrwtor to deliver the proper food. f~tigue and gnard duty. wrote General Atkinson in St. Tbe troops had very little time for idleness. Cus38 ~ I MilitaryReview ~ . All national holidays such as Christmas. for crowds and spectators. who w. ~ Farming was so important to the survival of the garrison that all military activities except guard duty were suspended for many months at Fort Atkinson. turkeys and otket’ fowl. the troops were marched in review before . horse racing was the most popular form of recreation. farming.FORT KTKINSON f%s.s in f?eview March command.e tt is not tke wisk of tke Government tkat t }[ey should be idle. These excursions usually took place on Saturdays. made the stockade area resound with rhythm and Iaugbter. New Year’s. For many. potatoes. this was ironic.here tltev amuse themselves in killing ducks. turnips and hay. for many. Thus. They are someti?aes permitted to nzake excursions to a considerable distance from tke Fort for tk e Purpose of killing deer and enc. this took tbe form of hunting and fishing short distances from tbe post. a.. and a national salute. What they did to amuse themselves and their companions was divided into t~vo general classes: for small groups in barracks. sowed seed and cultivated corn.as in command on 31 October 1821. but I beliet.

A band house was bt~ilt outside tbe walls of Fort Atkinson. horse racing became the real passion + of the garrison. (T)lis latte~ a~as a bass wind inst~ament. Tbe SergearLt -Majar was responsible for tbe accuracy of tbe calls and tbe fimt signals a. received fifteen cents a day for di?’ecting tile band. now obsolete). The horse. It was to ma?tial music that the soldie?s awakened in the 7nurning. tbe music coordinated all activities and duties of tbe men within tbe post. The Musicians’ accounts ae~e alwags’ settled generoaslu. i?zcluding a set of B clarinets. GeneralHenry Atkinson tumarily. But many were not dancers. The scarcity of women partners. mas{cal instruments u:ere purcltased.ere jimt sounded by the o’rde?lg at his ?’oom and then repeated by tke police gua?d and conlpaxies. At various times nea. two C flutes. Na nie~e decorative brancli of the Scrt. made the dance not much more than a spectator event for the balk of the troops. lea) ned to march. and paraded. at a military dance or ball. so they grouped around the dance floor. the commanding ufiicer and his lady led the first dance. The horses entered were usually the mounts of the officers of the regiment. 7 At the post on the Council Bluffs. Se~geant Riovdan. ice. race was especially attractive to those officers . one trztntpet. presumably at a distance where tbe ?ebearsa[s (could not interfere with tke lCo?’kof the garrtson. and men with a strong penchant for gambling. and one serpent. except for the ~vives of the oliicers and the civilians attached to the post and the laumlresees. ” The following is an account of the band activities at Fort Atkinson: An important adjunct to tbe garrison aws tbe reqin7ental band. enjoying the music and watching their more fortunate. then the otTicem. two B flutes.. were in fovn?ed of tkeir duties each hour. Tbe chief ntusician. and here tbe men practiced daily. particularly those of the January 1977 39 . followed by the troops. sophisticated friends “swing their partners.

The officere indulged in hunting as they . George Washington’s Birthday and the Fourth of July. New Year’s Day. II He also possessed a mtisic box which w doubt entertained his guests. Another very minor event.took to the field with their flintlock fowling pieces and rifles and helped enrich the garrison larder. a target was set up near the guardhouse.. Troops could swim in the backwater’s sloughs and small inlets. was very social and delighted in entertaining the commanding officer and others at dinner. especially the large channel catfish and the highly edible carp and sturgeon. which offered a wagering base to the soldier. Whiskey-inspired exuberance sometimes required the guard to restore order by removing disorderly participants. libraries 40 # Military Review . Other times were arranged at the desire of the command. But for the hunting skill of certain members of the Rifle Regiment. was the unloading of the weapons of the old guard as it went off duty. s The Missouri River was a great source of fish. Customarily. with careful regard for their hunting rights. the military community held dances at Christmas. This minor gambling event helped to relieve the monotonous daily routine of the simple private soldier of that day. James Kennerly. The loss of six men by drowning in the 1823 campaign against the Rse Villagee would seem to indicate the unfamiliarity of the troops with the dangerous currents of the “Big Muddy. How well ~ the troops at the post were trained in swimming may be adjudged by the fact that drownings were of frequent occurrence. The soldiers would wager on who would come the closest to the bulls-eye. Fort Atkinson contained within its walls one of the first public. This was a nuisance operation. for a specified period of time. and the old guard discharged its loaded weapons at the mark. Hence. the soldier making the high score was given a pass from all duty. artillery as the infantry officers were not mounted. prior to the advance of the main body up the Missouri. the withdrawing of the load (rather than firing it out of the barrels) was accomplished by means of a worm screw attached to the ramrod. Usually. except the field grade officers-that is. those. after which there was dancing for those who remained. II) Officers and their ladies were occupied with a social life of dining out among their neighbors within the post and down the river at Cabanne’s and Lisa’s Trading Posts.” ~ Money was wagered by the men of B Company that their representative in the guard mount would be selected over the men from C and D Companies. the detachment on Cow Island. The sutler. by the commanding officer. would have starved to death due to the breakdown of the civilian contractor’s transportation. very much disliked by the soldiers as it could be dangerous. above the rank of captain. In the days of muzzleloading muskets and rifles. Whist was a favorite card game for whiling away the long winter evenings.FORT ATKINSON —. The area surrounding Fort Atkinson was a sportman’s paradise—to be shared by the local Indian tribes. Turkey in tk e Stracu and Mo?zewn USIC were played along with the favorite minuet and waltz tunes. Amateur theatrical also were important entertainment for troops of the garrison and the officers and their wives as they participated as players.

Gentlenzen’s Magazine. . IZ Bachelor officers and those whose families were not present often gathered at each other’s quarters for a session of conversation. Louis Republican. Lieutenant Pentland’s court-martial was a long-drawn-out affair in which Colonel . In one year. American Repository. travels and voyages. Lieutenant Joseph Pentland. One of the most unusual episodes in Colonel Leavenworth’s service at Fort Atkinson was his preferring of charges and arresting his adjutant. the sum of $500 was appropriated for the purchase of books. for disobedience of orders in connection with such a party. North A mericarr Review. Scott’s Poems and Redgaunf/ef. newspapers and magazines. Amateur Magazine and an agricultural journal. the sutler received a copy of Cooper’s Pilot and was a subscriber to the National Irrtelligenrer and the St. romances.%tkznrf. Careful rules were formulated. The enlisted men’s literary tastes were catered to by the purchase of “light reading’’—that is. Among the magazines were Edinbur’gli Review. social drink. An officer vws detailed to serve as librarian. The latter activity. In addition. The Post Library was under the direction and support of the Council of Administration.Leavenworth was both a witness and prosecutor! The Lieutenant January 1977 41 . London Mrmtl!ly Review. especially after “lights out” at 10 o’clock. and frequent inspections m~de. was apt to become a bit too noisy for the commanding officer. ing and singing.FORT ATKINSON Mkmson pTivateshad to take turns sokliermg and farming north of the Platte River and west of the Missouri River. Post officers were fined for failing to return books on time. The library contained Brackenriclge’s Views of Louisiana. Edinburgh Magazine. a book of Montesquieu. Nea. Gibbon’s Dcclzrze and Fall of the Roman Empire and Robinson’s Historu of .

FORT ATKINSON took the stand in his own defense. Connecticut. ‘G Sergeant Mumford is shown on !f’he Descriptive Roll of the 6tk Regiment of U. ford was granted an extra ration (one gill) of whiskey a day. 1~ The following extract explains how the Post School at Fort Atkinson began: On January 24. and it was so eloquent and’ able (and so replete with the mannerisms and verb] age of the times) that he was acquitted and resumed bis sword by the unanfmous verdict of the courtmartial. 17 The Council of Administration. as today. 18 In addition to the pay indicated. Mum ford.S. Classes began at 9 :A. dear to ever~ chihls heart. 7uere not to be deprived of their opportunity to receive an education.M.M. WI1Othough far from tlte settlements. which acted in place of a school board. will never be known. black eyes. or for the daily reinforcement of his courage. as well as those children of the laundresses and other civilians attached to the station. there were the children of the sutler. But. regardless. Officers were to pay him 50 cents a month for each of their children under his tutelage. In addition. dark complexion. lnfantr-~ as having enlisted in the Army at Hartford. began in June and ended in September or October. No classes were held on Saturday afternoons or on Sundays. on 31 August 1813. age 19 years. At Fort Atkinson. and Colonel LeavenlLW’th was ‘compelled to order those having the care of children to do what the sfrongest principles of nature dictate—to send their children regvlcrl~ to echool. 1822. and it was the first public school in what was later to become the state of Nebraska. the adjutant was instructed by Colonel Leaven woyth to select a proper.’ Summer vacation. Whether this extra ration was a reward for his bravery in assuming the task. the Indian agent and the farm superintendent.non-commissioned o~cer or private to teach the children at the post. and were dismissed at 8 :P. I~ The student population of the post was made up of the officers’ and ncmcommissioned officers’ sons and daughters. The problem of educat42 MilitaryReview ‘.. the young noncommwsioned officer dld function as the first school teacher at Fort Atk]nson. ~$ Sergeant Thompson Mumford was appointed the teacher by publication of the following order: Head Quarters 4 Feb 1822 6th Inf Fort. He was described as 5 feet 10 inches tall. Atkinson Orders: The school room being completed a school will commence on Wednesday next under the direction of Sergt. The Council inspect ed tk e class t’oom and reported its condition to the commanding oficer. children played hook~. who has been appointed teacher and mill be respected accordingly. there was a Post School for the children. Then. voted to pay Sergeant Mumford the sum of 15 cents a day in addition to his pay. . recessed for an hour at noon. Sergeant Mum-. This was a full-time duty for him. His occupation was listed as a distiller.

there is now an oppo?t unity to descend the river in the Sutler’s bocf and should it be convenient with the nature of the Service I solicit tile favor of an indulgence (Fur’lough) to accomplish tile above object.Gerz’t Comdg. Brevet Z3rig. How the Post School and its soldier-teacher met the challenge can only he judged by the reports of visits to the Post School by the Council of Administration. ing the children at the frontier poet was a most serious one for the parents. It is of interest to note that Major Daniel Ketchum. an otlcer of the 6th Infantry Regiment. addressed the following letter to the commanding officer: Fcwt Atkirsaorr 24 Sept 1822 Colonel Henry Atkirzsmz. 43 . Such target practice was often the only marksmanship training they received. Servt. and ‘o remain absent until the 1st of May shouid it meet your approbation but will do me the favour to lay nsg ( applicatioti before the Generrd for his decision.. Sir: 1 am desirous of establishing mu fanlr’1~ at Franklin [Missouri] fov the purpose of educating m g c{(ildren.FORT ATKINSON --Soldiers discharging their weapons after leaving a tour of guard. I have the honor to be Sir with respect YouT obt. D. USA ‘g January 1977 . Ketchurn Major.

. On ~ February 1824.. It had been in operation for at least six months before Major Ketchum decided to place hk children in school at Franklin. zo Atthe beginning of theschool year in 1825. 44 .. Kentucky.had . Berry. been a distiller incivifian life. --- Fort Attdnaon Colonel Atkinson approved the request and forwarded it on to Major General Edmund P. The beet inducement the Council could advance was the offer of 2 gallone of whiskey to a soldier who. Sergeant Mumford could not be lured by the promise of more epirits. We may assume that his request wae based upon an opinion that the Post School could not educate hie children as he desired them educated. Sergeant charges Murnford into the checks his reluctant schoolroom ==s. and a new teacher. Saturday afternoon excepted. one can vieualize the sergeant and private facing the children and imparting instruction. not in the same manner as MilitaryReview . was’ assigned as his replacement. that the Post School had begun in February 1822. in connection with tbe above letter. It should be noted. Missouri. the Western Department Commander. The Post School wasvis{tedby tlte Council& they fonnd that some of the scholar-s had made improvements during the last month & they resolved that studies here after would commence at 1 o’clock & dismiss at s o’clock on ever-v week dug. at Louisville. They also find that Drum Major Sergeant McClements & CorpL Martin neglected to send their children to school. zl With a bit o~imagination. the Council reported its inspection of tbe Post School in the following: The Council tken examined the Post SCkool &find it conducted to their satisfaction. Perhaps the children of the family were too advanced t be enrolled in the sergeant’s classes. . Sergeant Mumford decided not to teach the Post School for that term. Private Bunnell P.’ . Gaines.

63 Orders: The Council too. Towheaded boys in knee breeches and girls in their pinafores sit on the crude cottonwood benches. but with the discipline of the Army tempered to the child’s size. These latter wrere in the form of the old-fashioned camp meeting or small-town revival. tbe troops were left to shift for themselves. when the 6th Infantry Regiment moved dowm the Missouri River to Jefferson Barracks. BII ozder of Lt. the commanding officer was of the opinion that the Post School to be established there should have a paid professional teacher. the wind howle across the parade ground from the frozen Missouri River below the bluffs. a highly successful teacher of the Fort Atkineon Post School. The Council of Administration visited the Post SChool and find it tinder good regulations and tlte scholars progressing fast. as a schoolmaster met the requirements of the Council of Administration and was. or to help pay a minuscule salary to the soldier-teacher. quill pens and slates for the Poet School. Rervy Teacl!er of the Post School amounting to $10.’s The children of the soldiers were educated at no expense to their parents. were required to pay thesumof 50cents amonthto the Councilof Administration for each child atfending the Poet School. 6th Reqinzent Fort Atlcitzmm 23 April. ink. Sergeant Mumford’e replacentent. Woollev’$ In 1815. Oficer be accordingly re?uested his warrant for that amount. Qrs. during the reduction of the Army. ScbOO1 teacbere and leaders at various religious gatherings. paper. 1827 Extract No. However. the Council made tbe following commentary: “ .20 and find it correct and resolve tl!at the same be paid and the Comdg. Private Bunnell P. These funds were used to buy books. in every military unit. men and attached civilians served as volunteer preachers. ?~ In April 1827. Fortunately. there were religiously inclined officer~ and men who saw to it that the spiritual neede of the soldiers were not neglected.’z On 8 January 1826. MUkipliCatiOtI. Outside. writing—all are recited in turn. ~nt~ coneide~ation a communication from Lt. COL Woollsyon the subject of emploginga person as an instructnv and for other purposes.FORT ATKINSON with soldiers. Sunday. and the Gth Infantry was no exception. addition. because of higher pay. H. from all reports. and recommend that the further consideration of the subject be deferred till the Regin?ent isperntarzetitlg eettled at Jefferson Barracks. the officers. Col. Spiritually. Officers. Supplemeriting these dedicated efforts was the appearance at frequent intervals of Januaty1977 45 . The Council examined the account of B. subtraction. the office of chaplain was abolished as an economy measure. spelling. Berry.

Quartered on the post in their houses or huts. In a large command of almost a thousand men. a bount~ of four cents per pound was offered for any grease satied that could be made into soap with lye leached from the ashesof the fireplaces. z8 Obviously. hut were part of the military organization.every non-commissioned oficer and soldier. a Catholic layman of the command usually acted as a lay reader. tbe missionary prieste en~oute to their stations with the tribee said Mass when paseing through.” As members of the command. Generally. Some of the 7oomen in camp Loere hard-working. industrious. ~” These women were carried on the Tables of Organization and as such accompanied the troops. for the times and the manners. the competition for romance was great.ate. have clean linen. gg ~ > Forthepri. as were the people. ufficer-s paid seventg-fitie cents per dozen p{eces or only sixty -tu. but. The lack of feminine companionship in the frontier Army poet was solved partially by the traditional institution of the “laundresses” whose duty waato wash the clothing of the troops. there was na way to romantic attachment exaept perhaps with an Indian maiden of the tribee to the east acrose the 4s ~ ‘ MilitaryReview ~ I . and the Council established the rate of pav. “ Perhaps thegr-eatest probleme forthe Counci~ [of Administration] mere those involving the lacmdresses a. who lived quietlv with tlzeirhusband sandmadehornesas best the~ could under crade fronti~r ‘ conditions. at the same ~me. eince it enabled them to follow the Arm~. If no priest was available. The system was crude and rough. good uibme?z. Each woman washed for seventeen men. The positioti. perfectly acceptable. copied from the British Army. Soap being comparativel~ scarce.ZT The regulations provided that soldiers would deliver their linen to one specific laundress and pay pro rata the weekly or monthly laundry bill. they drew their whiskey rations and were subjected to military law and discipline when they devoted too much of their time to matters other than those associated with the waehtub. the sergeants with more pay courted and eventually married them. They’ were not %ampfollowere’) in the sense of unattached women of questionable morak+ following the troops. the presence of these women did lighten the burden of the lonely soldiers. they were known as the inhabitants of “Soapsuds Row.. served as a means for the low-ranking soldier to secure a modicum of female companionehip aid.FORT ATKINSON a missionary circuit rider or an Indian missionary.o and one-half cents if the oficer provided the soap. the institution of the laundress. Other laundresses were a source of contention and tronble. attracted many of tke wivesof the men in the ranks. At one time the allowance was jifty cents per month for. who could nof compete with the sergeants for the affections of the laundresses. According to the customs of the times and the Army regulations.hose function was to wash the clothing of the oficers and enlisted men. For the Catholic membersof the garrison.

’ Following one pag day 15’6 persons were court-mavfialed. who had a daughter by Nicomi.FORT ATKINSON Missouri River.’ Trae genius. character. for many of the soldiers. Tke sutler. so~e of them had them revoked or suspended!!! 31 Some commanding otiicers.9~ In addition to the punishment others such as: adjudged by court-martial. . however. become bored in s~iteof what is done to make their lives more bearable. there were . wem-ing a Vail and chain. :lo But there were dangers i. life at Fort Atkinson was almost monastic in its. In one of tkem Leavenworth said. and stoppage of whiskev rations. From the time of Lewis and Clark. But “men in barracks. as they were at Fort Atkinson. numerous orders concerning its sale and corwumption were is. thirty-eight of tkem for drwtkerzness.sfander-. @ivate Josiah Elkircs drew twenty-four gills of whiskey for a wood chopping party of six and kept it all himself. Thel complication led to the bottle and too frequent access to the charms of alcoilol as an aid to escape. . the commanding officer was faced with a serious situation of the payday “spree’’-type activity.’ or 8I stand for. others were dallied with at the risk of life or infection (spread through some of the tribes. an Iowa Indian woman. . wearing a placard inscribed ’1 stand for theft. and.1 47 January1977 . solitary cortfinewtent. the trysts with the daughters of the prairies. police duty. wearingan iron collar toith projecting points.sued. ‘The men are caroming and getting drunk almost et. The rum ration was considered by the Army as a privilege to be retoked for bad conduct or “drunkenness”! At Fort Atkinson. and standing on a block in a conspicuous place. Hence.rcept Foote and Rider. court-martial and so forth. tried to solve this serious morale and h+th problem by resorting to strict measures of punishment—that is. the surgeon.recorded on a certain day that allkis men were drunk e. The following extract will explain: ‘ . .~~ . years before.” ]solated . Obviously. both officers and men of the US Army were not immune to the physical charms of the dusky beauties.er~ night. friendly tribal chieftains offered women to visitors as a token of hospitality. The lack of female companionship tends to complicate the situation. fine. John Gale. Colonel Leavenworth endeavored to stop the introduction of whiskey from other than ofiicialorsutler sources. by the trappers and traders). and those at Fort Atkinson were no exception.esses “drew” their rum rations. wine and rum at the sutler’s was the fact that rum was issLled to the troops as a Government “contribution” to the fact of their hazardous “hardship’’-type service. More ingentovs purrishments werer iding tke wooden korse. reduction in rank. . One such individual at Fort Atkinson was Dr. even the Iaundr. presided in tbe court-when one deserter was ordered to be drummed out of camp with his coat on backwards and with a straw halter about his neck. Compounding the availability of whiskey. on the record. Customarily..

. See SIM Lcttrr Book. Johnson.tain.zn cit..1823. Johnson. 2 AuE.&O. t. 8. 1928. 6 )... M!smb. VO1un)e111. VI.””?. c... of tke M. p 21% Book.aDhs ‘S...ic. 1!759.vi VIIlleY.i.. 3’2. te.su.dd>-Fott Blufib. D 22.z 2 Marti..lcy.. The Sixth.t:.. Volume 12 WC.. KY. 1 June 1819..axranh 2.t. 33 Ibid. 8 January dfdttar.. AffctIm.u. .sso..... o”. 0 Letter 7 Kwctt Book.rY ctt.. awl (r. H.2.m Colonel Leavenworth to Mawr F. 3. to. Atki.. 17 The Dmcnj>t?te Gth Infa”tm. 1929.i...wh ~. CI’t “amg. Number Book Book 12 September 1823 to 3“”.h. Article ra.~ *~k. Ext..o.~~z ~. 21 Juhn.%ldwte I Row.r D 208.dc. c:t.l. 03. Numb.)> mt.. D 211.rictd Socmty.. Western Dqmrtnmnt. 1S24. OkbInfantry..20. DD 864-65. 11 Tl. Lou.. of Ma.mv.... l!)l :!.. Book. d storim EIw.be~ wb.tkmcJ Archives..mr... w 100-7.. G March 180.. 1823.nrn.CO. K. F.. 28. Fo. 22. . tlw Armv. L Nichols.ol /..hmo.~i.d by tbe ArmY-that i.. of Ma..t. c f7tarf[ Loui. pp by EdgIIr B. P 23.. cit. . Fort Atki.lat. A. BoO~. PD 203.Y.c~ 26 Ame.l. *828 volume2. tk.Life at .WZZZ! of tlw Anun..+.th I“ft”try... Chi- 14 S@. 3Gc.. Letter fr.cd C. 1Tj7. ”” of N. 32 WeaIW.. \ 28 Kivett 201 b.t.16. of JcL. March 16 [bid. to 29 December SWtcmS ~ M....f ~.1. 1827..llY A. Cantonment . Gth Infantry. 1824. Mart.n Stat.11cF OP. W. ona for and f. 22 Order 230.v 1.st 1819 m 31 In frytry. Sheldon. we 40 Witary Ileview . .eral R<gtd<ttmwa SIIIIY A..Y 8 October to 2 Fcbrumy 1823 Numb.n f%licr..te wounded.t. Johnson. December 1620.... OZ.x privates dt’owned . MO.rw. ri H{. OP.. Book. to 24 October 1S24. at.1! 326.i.. s. 6th op. Fall 1971. OP. end Gth Infantry.tmm 10 Kivett and J.. ArrnY Ar?!culturiht~ in the M. I. F.. Volume cm. P 13 18 28 J... 1822 to 6 October 1823... St... and 95 Mfmo.2rTrmr. Contuntnent. IWoliti.ol Law. au. 1% [r. 30 Sbeldom 31 Order w 175-77.. Cmnxd A.1 one I). r.rmms.. ”[ Lam.skw lsu”dresses).. l>olicc the n. f. 10. Numb. 13 Addiw.. We.. ~~ ~eg[me.. pa..c ArmIJ. D 477.. 1820. 1s1!. DAmwicnnStat. . 6th Pczrers F’wld S.tq. 15 M“rch 1%21. 28 JIIn. mm. IRuIIs. cit. IL.! 27.lititry Estddi. 7:. c:mw. . on. .t.vctt Hbtoru..rz Hk+m.hrncnt.ktaw 1. [as.. tmtin~ Colonel LeavcnwcwtWs report .?r POW: Fot’t Atkmwm.VCbrmka if. tl.. Palm-n MddanJ Rwd. I>p 19..wI/ Af?. Book. N~.~.mkn.t.. Kc.wIv... Jfd. d S. 1824.. W.. Z: Order 0P. Nvbt’c. o. Ill Order Book Number . Edtited Numbr. nP 16-16.u. March 1959. ”!! the C<.ll. t. Baa. 1827.. Xol.d Rcyr.. toru. h Edg8~ B... D 22. JO. r. U“lver*itY Atkmw” on Pt!blisb. D 51...FORT ATKINSON NOTES 1G.. 21 September 1823..on Stat. ” os Fe.mter. W. l!l Letter 200rder Bo”k Book. Roll of the 17tk Rec)tnwnt OJ US.f the R*.~a. 2* Amo. r..c(t S. 1826 SWtmn.. 1817 to 7 SopmmbCr 80. D 22. A.... D 222. to a“d P 23. o.lq. Sergeant StnckD<dc and ..o.>vr. d Pofw. Hmxkumrtem. Orders.ttwwr . 8 JmnmrY pnrasr. .1.. c. WCb).nzek. df. 26.nte.11110..4. ctt. J. PD 984-36.ticke 84..wl$tmn and the small Io.. Erwin COXO. ‘.t.t. . lnfantI’Y.Fort of I.9. A. 207. Pane.d.

or possibly that collection of papers and studies ProrIIv podgotow lennoi oborony strelkouumi soedi?etiiyanri emanating from the Frunze Condensed June 1976. Copyright 1976.from Soviet Ground Forces and the Conventional Mode of Operations John Erickson GAINST a background of growing Soviet interest in and preparation for large-scale and et. January from the Journal @ of the Roysl United A Academy. This is the very juncture at which to renew a reading of General Eike Middeldorf’s 7’akfik im Rtms/arzdfe[dzug 1 for the Iight it throws on the evolution of Soviet breakthrough tat-a tics. but one of the prime rules for studying Soviet military organization and operational practice is simply to follow the Soviet lead. company and section level. in other words. to do what the Soviet military itself is doing. it is pertinent to turn to one of the latest soviet military publications. In this context.’ A fifth volume covering division operations will appear shortly. a four-volume set of tactical studies deallng with wartime ( 1941-45) operations at regimental. This is not the pluce for lengthy historical disquisition.en snstained conventional operations in the European theater. perhaps a brief refresher course is in order—if only because the Soviet military command is launched upon just such a program itself. there can be no doubt that a serious and prolonged appraisal (or Services Institute for Defence Studies (Great Britain). battalion.’ Certainly. 49 1977 .

Note the significance of “relatively.SOVIET GROUNO FORCES . Soviet views do combine elements of the blitzkrieg but are even more deeply rooted in and dependent on prewar. Edinburgh University. to render any initial resort to nuclear weapons on the part of the defender fruitless by virtue of being too late. along with others. however. leading (as I hope to indicate) to no small amcmnt of controversy. there w. On the contrary (and again by way of reference to historical evolution ). The Soviet use of nuclear weapons would depend largely upon the degree to which its own strategic objectives had (or had not) heen attained by conventional operations. serious Soviet interest in and attention to improved conventional capability has increased steadily since the late 1960s.” I Judicious though that formulation is. he has been in the vanguard of suggesting in the ground forces journal voennyi Ves/nih a more flexible approach to Vactical forms and some revision of accepted. rather. represent a switch in strategy. Military fleview “7 Initial Phase While theater nuclear forces continue to comprise a major element of Soviet war-fighting capability. in this instance. This suggests the ~elevance of pursuing systematic “microstudies” of Soviet tactical performance though the. Scotland. t h e shock army.erall framework of their theater capability and the restructuring of the ground forces. This does not. not to say stereotyped. the same cannot be said for the overly generous references to the “Sovi et blitzkrieg. FY 1977. This is an observation \vith which Colonel Vinnikov might \vell agree since. Looked at in these terms.ould be the greatest irony in the 50viet command embracing that very war-fighting style whose ruination it professedly contrived on the battlefield.< reappraisal ) of conventional capability and rapid breakthrough techniques has been in train for sometime.Erickson is with the Department of Defence Studies. and is CoDirector of the RUSI/RMAS Research Centre for the Study of Soviet Affairs.’ udamaua armi~a ‘—is undoubtedly based on . His article “Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe” appeared in t!ze January 1976 MILITARY REVIEW. first problem here is to set present Soviet preoccupations with conventional operations into the o~. wartime and late postwar concepts of 4’battlefield annihilation” ( “neutralization”podaulenie—to be precise) and the P~ofessoe. Rnrnsfeld in his Annual Defense Department Report. Donald H. ” a term which can be somewhat mishmding for all its d~a. with a rapid operational breakthrongb designed to inhibit any effective military response from the adversary and. invnlving principally . practices. Tbe Soviet concept of shock power-witness. Recent Soviet developments do not mean embracing a “conventional option” in its own right but. must be understood in terms of admitting a conventional mode in the initiul phase of operations and sustained for some considerable period50 . this increased capability largely embodies the attainment of that dual capability which was predicted as far back as the mid1950s.tbe primacy of the offensive and the exploitation of surprise. for example. matic impact.wtbzt nit pt?formance and effectiveness. “a relatively prolonged conventional campaiffn. Strictly speaking.” to use the phraseology of Mr.

armed with a new 122mm smooth-bore gun whose barrel length suggests that armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding-sabot projectiles can be fired accurately up to 2000 meters. In similar style. The tank battalion organic to a motor rifle regiment has now 40 tanks. e). It is equipped with an automatic loading system (thus redueing the crew to three). The more modem of these machines must be classed as fighting vehicles in their uwn right. Not unexpectedly. eliminate the track-shedding shortcoming of tbe T62. All this gives critical significance to the initial stage of any mujor to military involvement or coll]sion. Both the tank division and the motor rifle division have increased their manpower. designed to uccomp:my the tanks up to and beyund the immediate ub. The most striking change has occurred within the motor rifle division whose tank strength has now increased from 188 to 266 (an increase of 41.500 to 13. This .SOVIET GROUND FORCES “battlefield norms” governing levels of manpower and w e a p o ns ‘developed largely during the final two years of World War II. u crew of three and can take six riflemen fighting fully closed up since both gun and engine gases are exhausted externally.— .62mm PKT machinegun co:lxial with the main gun. a laser range finder and a diesel engine of some 1000 horsepower supplying a gOod turn Of speed (43 miles per hour) to this 40ton machine. the n u m b e r of 51 Structure and Armaments Changes in the structure and the “armament norms” of Soviet theater forces Obvionsiy must he seen against this background. new troop-carrying fighting vehicles copable of moving the inffintry with the armor have made their appearance. conventional opernt ions even in the initial phase are now admitted to be of great significance. In addition to this reinfnrcernent of and improvement in the Soviet tank forces.000 and the latter from 10. the tank and motor rifle divisions have increased their towed artillery strength. and the irrdependerzt tank batta[ion recently added to the division disposes of 45 tanks. o The Z’72 chassis is new. is tvhere the sLltJstantini change hw occurred. weighs some 10 tons.%gfler ATGW missile. which must now be added the vita} importance attached to the tactical breakthrough in conventional terms. with 40 rounds nvailable for the main gun. To put it m briefly ns possible. Weighing 12 tons and with a crew of three PIUS eight riflemen.yould appear that. the BMD1 has full nuclear. Like Its bigger BMP brotber. the former from 9000 to 11. it . The latest 2“72 tank is also being introduced. here mobility is assigned to assist and nug ment firepower: Mobility plus firepower translates into immediate superiority. January 1977 . Soviet tank strength has continued to grow. rising by some 2000 in EastCentral Europe over the past five years.4 percent).500. The lighter airborne combat vehicle. with six road wheels and four track support rollers which may. while the Soviet command places grent emphasis on mobility and high-speed operations (the nonstop offensit. in fact. The BMP76PB doubles very effectively as n light fighting vehicle or us a truop transporter. mounts the same 73mm gun and . biological and chemical protection. the BMDI. the BMP76PB mnunts a 73mm high-anrl-lowpres<ure gun firing eight rounds per minute as well us a Sagfler antitiank guided \veapon ( ATGW) ii combination and a 7.jective.

000 men are transported. meters to their existing stocks af 480 meters of bridging. oil and lubricant supplies being held forward. their equipment does not have to be moved since it is there on the spot (in glaring contrast wit! the depletion of war reserve stocks underlined by Mr. The latest addition is the SA8. and the six assault bridging regiments have added a further 120 . The new 7ton truck.made in Soviet-Polish railway links to ameliorate the gauge differences w’hich could impose bottlenecks of rail traffic. this is heavily underscored by the biyearly “rotation” of Soviet troops in East-Central Europe. both designed for defense against low and very low-level air attack. with a rise in the number of tubes from 192 to 720. all covered by self-con. supplement the 70 or more SA2S. Th~ bridging battalions have acquired more heavy amphibious vehicles and GSP ferries. 60 percent in armored personnel carriers and 50 percent in artillery in US Army holdings in Europe).?--4/ Shilka gun system. using Aeroffot as well as military transports ( Voennotransportnaua aviatisya). SA3S and SA4S and the regiments of SA6’S. Unlike the men. nonetheless. but recent attempts have been . Thus. upon which the Soviet command places great reliance. a system more recent than the SA!7 short-range surface-to-air missile with its quadruple ramp on a small turret and utilizing a missile heavier and hwger than the SAT. tained and mobile battlefield air defense systems. impressive as it is.itzer mounted on a SA4 transporter vehicle. The SA8 is mounted on a three-axled vehicle and appears to be air-transportable for a system which could well be comparable to that of the l?a~ier or Crotale. r This is in addition to the ubiquitous ZSUZ. No less significant has been the introduction of modern self-propelled guns. The range of this improvement. Added to this increase in artillery has been the huge expansion in the number of multiplerocket launchers” held by divisions.SOVIET GROUNO FORCES pieces in a motor rifle division rising from 105 to 165. plus a growing number of petroleum tankers and supply vehicles. n as well as its logistical capability. and in a tank division from 36 to ’70pieces. Modernized mine-sweeping “plows” and high-speed mine-laying vehicles also have been brought into service. must. Over a period of 14 days. The East ELI ropean/Soviet rail network. indicates that the logistics gap has been closed even further. with more thad. Rumsfeld who pointed to ‘ a shortfall of almost 70 percent in tanks. the 122mm D7. The SA8 and the SA9. all without seeming to inconvenience Aeroflot and its civilian schedules. ” As for the significance and scope of airlift and reinforcement. is obviously adequate in terme of volume of traffic. one month’s ammunition and substantial petroleum. be related to Soviet perceptions of and Military ‘Review Logistics The Soviet command has not neglected to improve (and expand) its assault bridging and field engineering resources.4 gun on a seven-wheeled modified PT76 chassis and the 152mm D30 how. a round total of 100. Additional PMP “folding bridge” stocks have been provided. Soviet artillery is being equipped to keep pace with the armored strike and motor rifle assault formations. As for logistics—often pinpointed by many as the consuming weakness of the Soviet theater forces—the present stockpiling belies that.

Antitank defense has been a focus of debate and rlivi>ion though Soviet antitank defense has emerged strengthened and.perf ormance arising from this etiate of affuiys. the peredouyi otr~ad. with the increase in range and performance. particularly in breakthrough operations on a narrow sector against prepared defenses. The motor rifle division is now only slightly smalker than the tank division in tank strength.er how the Z?MP should be empluyed “)--in the Februari 1976 issue of Voennyi Vestnik. the marshal could give no definite answer.SOVIET GROUNO FORCES attention to the more obvious shortcomings in their force structure and the deficiencies in tactical . At the same time. Marshal Mosktilenko had to face this question.ithout some controversy and ‘demarcation disputes. has been to raise that availability figure for artillery preparation from its previous two-thirds to augment artillery support for attacks “off the march. if not the most important—the skortage of rifle anits on tke main axis or a. and-perhaps most striking. There has also been (and there still is) some diversity of view o~. Not surprisingly. Regulations supply due prescription for turning from cOlumn into line. for example. He argues. The first was clearly the vulnerability of’ Soviet attacking columns. but this makes sense only under conditions of weak resistance. that the most effective combat deploy merit of the tmk company should be in two lines—with two sections in the first combat line and one section plus the company commander’s 53 . tanks—in the subunits committed to the actual assault. On the other hand. the addition of infantry to tbe tank forces committed to the main line of advance is seen clearly in the assignment of motor rifle troops to a tank regiment.” The tank troops \h:ve embraced the presence of motor rifle umts (though the latter cannot have been too pleased at this subordination). Flank cover fnr the attacking column has been increased as has organic air defense and the defensive nntitank component reinforced with the tankfighting capability of the newer ffMPs (the antitank element is well forward in any action). and it might be (as I hfive suggested elsewhere) that the Soviet Army will solve this simply by a kind of “military Dar\vinism. there has been a clnse and technical exchange over the role of the L3J2P. The total effect. ~olonel Vinnikov has :ilso referred to the need for greater tactical ingenuity and effec- tiveness. a motor rifle cmnpany has heen added to each tank regiment. confirmed in its specialized f{)rm. The logic of this surely must be ultimately to turn the motor rifle divisions into genuine combined arms formations. and Colonel Vinnikov believes that a sound case can be made for the echeloning of fighting vehicles—above all.ves of adoaace where Soviet armor nvas to make the push.” Finally.” turning loose these and other military beasts and seeing who and what survives. A quick review of recent changes shows this process of self-correction at \vork. while the tank divisiou has increased its artillery component for direct fire support and has added a rifle element to its forward detachment. January1977 Controversy None of these actions have proceeded w. in Asense. the second involved artillery strength as the redt~ced availal>ilit~ of gItns fer artillery preparation. The strengthening of Soviet artillery speaks for itself with new self-propelled gun regiments at army and divisional level.

SOVIET GROUNO FORCES tank in the second. particularly the resort to nuclear we~pons on the part of the defender. These two concepts are linked. with artillery preparation lasting for some 30 minutes.lerrie (neutralization ) and pora%henie (annihilation). may be used to operate with agents already emMilitary “Review lactical Conventional Breakthroughs But let us now return to the main issue of the tactical breakthrough managed in conventional terms. covering the flanks or eliminating small enemy groaps left in the rear. which in all probability would be some 50 kilometers from the “Iron Curtain” itself. involving both podat. (It must also be recognized that special Soviet and Warsaw Pact air commando units. However. tbe Soviet objective is by conventional means to “neutralize” any effective response. which is useful for exploiting success. Here is but one example of a rliscussion of tactical performance. This arrangement also allows the first combat line to be reinforced within some three to four minutes and some two to two and one-half minutes for the second combat line to close on the assigned objective. for. what follows ie merely a r6sum6 Of 54 . the battalion can hnld a company ]n reserve. The coordination of air and artillery strikes is nf major importance. For these parposes. and with the area of the first echelon stretching back some 30 kilometers. keeping the intervals between the tanks at 100 meters. the battalion in three combat lines. The first precondition is a high rate of advance in operations pursaed day and night (thOugh the true effectiveness of night operations may be restricted to battalion level).. cry. the third 600 to 700 meters from the second (and thus up to 950 meters from the first ). all with the purpose of amassing a superiority of some 50 to 1 along the line of the main thrust. in this instance expressly Iinderlined by the editors of Vuermui Vcstnih as “interesting but in some respect controvew sial. giving the company greater freedom of maneuver.of tactical nuclear deliv-. From the starting point. II principles rather than an actual case study ~hough that might be done subsequently with reepect to the 3d Shock Army presently deployed in the Magdeburg area or the 8th Guards in the Weimar region. The tank company should fight in two-line formation. the Soviet division will occapy a frontage ranging from 2 to 8 kilometers. as I have said. The rate of advance in a conventional mode seems to stand presently at some 30 kilometers per day (as opposed to 50 kilometers in nuclear conditions). concentrating on enemy artillery.. strongpoints and command posts. The frontage of a sabanit (where nuclear weapons are not employed ) would imply 500 meters for a tank company and 1000 to 1100 meters for a battalion. For obvious reasons. It may be assumed that Soviet aircraft will strike at NATO airfields and also at the means . in the two-line array. Soviet helicopter-borne assault units (17 battalions of which can be lifted at one time) would be used tO SeiZe &dCtiCally Vital CrOSSirIg points. all preceded by heavy electronic mmntermeasu Yes and ant iradar measures. acting under both military and KGB (Committee of State Security) control. 1: with the advanced groups (peredovi otryari) of regiment 01: battaliOn groLlp size at divisional level striking oat to join these assault forces. The second combat line would be disposed some 200 to 250 meters from the first.

SOVIET GROUND FORCES Lwdds,with the immediate task of joinulaced, and this does not Drechlde the wider employment of airborne forces ing up with helicopter-borne assault proper. ) troops. The task of the leading unite is The division will have two, if not to open gaps for the regiments and divisions following, the main Soviet three, regiments in its first echelon, with regiments sending their advanced objective being the exploitation of a group in battalion strength for reeon. p a r t i c u 1a r breakthrough sector nuissance purposes and to cover the achieved by attack “off the mnrch. ” m:~in deployment. The reconnaissance The leading regiments advance with thus rolls into the sttnck though this artillery support for attwk “off the is not to belie the careflil presttack march,” deplaying their sir defense registration of txrgets: 1:{ elements und enfpneer units well to the . . . they [eommandevs] will cavcfront, \vith column speed maintained wconnaissan.e of t},c full~l oryani2e as high as possible, There ure three enenig and es fablis~z tl>e e.rort location special feat[}res of this ndmitted]y ef I/is stronq pnints, antitank weaprude hcenario: the Soviet exploiti~tion ens, obscrpaf ion pasts, artillery Jirin!l of the successful brwkthraagh sector, pnsitims and clecfronic means af Yadin dq,loyrnent for the “meeting engagecu!lnter-lit caszlres. ment” SS well as control of that crucial The type of forwa7d edge ,,f the batencounter and the introduction of the f[e area (FEBA ) attack is also a matsecond echelon, even ns Soviet forces ter of some debate with due recogniforward “ride out” a small number of tion that a battle formation for FEBA nocleur strikes directed against them attack does not necessarily suit that w’ithout resorting to nuclear weupons \vhich is needed for operations in the themselves. It follows, conversely, that the prime consideration for the defen. depth of the defenses. .The close cosive forces must be to smother or stifle operation of all arms (often woefully inadequate in wartime) is essential. the initial breakthrough, to deny the Soviet command any ewy swing into Commanders of attached and supporting nrtillery subunits are to be COIIO. the meeting engagement and, above all, to disrupt the concentration of the cated with the commanders of all-arms second echelon. By the same token, the anits, while artillery fire is to continue %viet command seems to concern ituntil the tanks come within minimum self with achieving moxim urn sllccess safe distance, so that there will be no in the initial breakthrough phase, pause in shifting fire into the depth managing and mastering the meeting of the defenses. Motor rifle units will engagement and not so much “passing advance some 150 to 200 meters behind through” divisions in complex movethe tanks with the object of preventing the enemy from delivering aimed fire ‘ ments between echelons, but, rather, just piling them on, if I might use at the attacking force. The principle that phrase. Disruption of these phases of the counterattack against enemy —particularly the meeting engageforces is to maintain aimed fire on the ment, with its very fluid form—coald move. 1a severely disconcert the Soviet comThe light lead units, with reconnaismand at all levels. sance troops in the van, will precede To sum up whqt has been of necesthe tank/motor rifle strike forces sity a very brief survey, the Soviet though both will advance at maximum interest in “relatively prolonged” conspeed along (or parallel with ) main January 1977 55

SOVIET GROUNO FORCES . ventional operations must be eontirmed. The present modernization and expansion program has gone a long WaY to eliminate the tactical deficiencies of, say, five years ago. The con. cepts of podaulenie and porazhenie are assuming the form of preemption, with increasing emphasis on “blinding” the enemy through electronic warfare. The initial stage of the tactical breakthrough is crucial, hut there seem to be reservations ~vitbin the Soviet command about uresent levels of tactical flexihiliW and thus the ability to engage and fully exploit the available resources for shock power. And, formidable as it may all seem, there is a limit to piling equipment on equipment. The armament norms now more or less meet the stipulations of doctrine, and the gap will close still further, at which the Soviet command will have to concentrate fiercely on the men and their performance,

.WO. cimcm for or, tice.1 target t,,,, of lb, radar a.sembly, tmckmz cm the

K Amo. K :, con. dr-rable Soviet literature. . . . V. Y., Plwtakin et nI ,, lvz!Lw,ro<, obo*r><@L<,,ttc olJsl, t,hcvo!.k.oo bova, Second Edlti. n, Voe. IzIIat, M... WW. USSR, 1972, and subsequent ed~tio”s. Also, see Colonel General ( Engmeem 1 S. Azanov, ,. .Unaelo mekat - adacb, i,,d,e, <ewogo obo,,,ecke,<!1,,, bow,,,, Vow ,,w Ve.t>z d,, Numb,, 11, 1975, ,,” 45-4V. General Ax.””” conmm”d, the e“xi”eer t,ot>m !7 TrIkttkc u born@ prim, ml,k, Vuen,z,lot, M<,sCOW. USSR, 1974. Poll< ( Rm+,nmnt) Ed,te<l by Army Gcneml A, 1, Radzit-vski,, BatczVcm ( IItit. ta]io. ) and f?ota ( CmnDan Y ), Edited by Limten. ant General E. T. M.mhenko, and I,*ToII I sm. ticm ), Edm?d by A. M. Ads.mo. et al, The volume cm the divia, on ie due to e.DIIcar shortly. 4 Secretary of Defert,e Donald H. Rumsfdd, An,tual D<fmwe D,mwtme>,t ReWTt, FY US Department of Defense, S.peri.tmdent of Document,. US Gwernme”t Print, ”E Office, Wmb. ,ngton, Dc, 1976, P 118. ‘1 Reportedly. two railway lines ,“ no~thcm I’olan<i w,I1 be co””.?rted to the %“iet x“”ze Tki. ,, ,18. out of cu”stdemtio? vf the .weak”e+s ,,f the Poh, h mad network wh, cb has ],ttle stratw,c “.1”,.


$ Group of Sovi.t Forces m Gmnmrw ( GSFG ) includes one %h.rk army,,. the 3d deDloyed m the Maxdebu,g area. At the Dresent tmm. 3d Shc,ck— s-v. Udamnva-m for all Dt’nctical WNDOW$ a tank armY, with Its five diviwons, There t,re two tank s.nni.m (Zd Guard, and I.t Gumrds), “1”. Sth G.. rd6 and 20th ArmY. That is, more or le... a full ,, Front command.,, As the Gmtnan. WA, tc P=n<V jrJ75 {1976 points ont, these 20 dwis~ons have the ecmiwdent ,tsnk Dowcr,s of 26 di.!.,ons , f viewed f mm St re.gth levels of some Ii.. years ago.

11 Colon.d V. Vinniko., ,<Atczk,z u d.. i tvi bcx-vve linti,-Voe,wJ, VmItmk, Number 12. 1975, DD 51.54. 1? Sowet a,rbornc troops consist of se.e”.plus airborne dxvi.io”a ( w,th p..awmmmndo units in tbe GSFG and two rurborne &,vision. i. tbe Baltic and Le”ingra~ Mi]!t.ry Distmcts. Soviet .ombat helimmer rwmnmts are .t.tio”ed i“ parcbim and Shmdal .S main bases. Tbe Soviet command ha, raised “o special elite .ir-mmma”do force, but mmably a h.”d.picked mmwmy of each ml. mmment {. earmarked for this asm.lt rule. Sm-cial Par.trooP units include botb non-Soviet “nits such .S the E.a.t Germ.. 6th Parmb”te B.ttali.” end Soviet .“lt+, Tbe Polmb 6th Airborne Di.isio” would .1s. be ,“.olved i“ these operations which now need much .1.8.? ,“mection and investig.tm” ) . 13 See Cbvia Do”n.lly, ,, Soviet Reco”naie,.n.e of tke ROW1 Uttited .%-ut.c. Inati. —ll,,S tt,tc for Dcfe,,ce Stud,.?. March 1976, DP 6S.76 ( and P. H. Viz... %wet Reco.n.im.nce: Part 1,,, Joumml of tk., ROW[ Uwtted SWWC.8 I,mtituta f.. D.f.n.. December 1$7.5, PP 41.46).


7 The SA8 mobile surface-to-e.fr missile system (four missiles) bas a radar assembly with II Iarge circular, dish for target t.acki”g, mmvedla..e a.te.n. on top of the launcher. Tbe two small diahe. could be for missde tracking m for cuidanm command (or both?). There aDDe.r8 to h, a t.]+.



14 For a general di.cumio”, see M.>or General (T.nk Tro.m ) A. ZYrr.”ov, .<Tbe Reg”lntio”s and Comma”dm% l“itiative,}O Sovidt dfditmy R..iet.. Number 2, 1976, w 26-27.




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~Austria’s Defense

in Transit

Dennis Chaplin

Europe which is significant to NATO security planning. At a glance, one can see how Austria effectively separates Italy from the other Eur~pean ~ATO countries, and, since it shares a border with both the Balkans and Czechoslovakia, it is clear that Austria could one day become an Achilles heel in NATO defenses. Acting as a territorial wedge separating northern and southern NATO areas, Austria presents a particular security problem in terms of its neutrahty and mditary weak. ness. H could be overrun easily by sudden Warsaw Pact operations, and the Russians would then be able to effect a rapid fait accompli by stationing forces in an area which would isolate Italy, subject it to Soviet influence and push Warsaw Pact forces farther westward. One must remembef that, until 1955.56, the Russians stationed forces in Austria quite legally, and, given Austria’s weakness, it is conceivable that they might again exert pressure on Austria to reacquire such rights. The danger of ‘Austria’s position and neutrality is the way in which this gives the Warsaw Pact a means of outflanking and separating NATO forces, as well as enabling a Soviet military buildup deep within Central Europe. This is an unpalatable idea, but, with piecemeal, sudden and low-intensity operations, the Russians could achieve these ends without allowing the West sufficient justification for severe military reactions or danger of provoking the dreaded nuclear ex. change. The crucial problem in a nuclear world is always: “IS it worth it? Are the ikues involved that essential?” It is this kind of dilemma that the Russians hope to exploit in piecemeal aggrandizement. January 1977 57



a neutral problems

country, of NATO



Austria should alwavs be considered m connection arei in southern It covers a geographical

It is feared that Austria will remain a military and political vacuum as far as NATO security is concerned. National servicemen cannot be trained to perform effectively in this space of time. another awkward “gray zone” in NATO calculations. Austria cannot be relied upon to resist such Soviet em croachments due to its unpredictable neutrality anti its military weakness. passed in July 1971. e’ d’. it negated the whole purpose of conscription. England. h Military Review . the opportunities for ensuring such adjustment were removed. envisages a “peaceful occupation” of Austria from the Moravian area in the direction of Croatia. and this in conditions where the young conscript is aware that his normal being interrupted for a few weeks and that it is merely a question until the ordeal is over. Although young Austrians no doubt rejoiced. Norwich. literally a sitting target for any one determined to march in and use it as an additional base of operations. Austria is in a state of fragmentation and transit.AUSTRIA’S DEFENSE . He received his B. those responsible for security planning despaired. This short period of national service no doubt won many young votes. in military terms. basic drill and how to pull a trigger. psychologists agree that a young civilian cannot adJust to and come to terms with the peculiarities of military life in less than 12 months. The law fixing national service at only six months. trainers’ time being more or less limited to acclimatization. A curre~t Soviet Army war game. Dennis Chaplin is a researcher from the lJniuersitv of East Anglia. In other words. and Ph. of civic service is cannot be instilled way of life is only of knuckling under In July 1971. but.D. at the School of European Studies. Moreover. any shorter period prevents him from resigning himself to the army as a temporary vehicle for self. 5a \ .. preferably in a context of stimulated political unrest in Yugoslavia. The defense forces could not even engage in a successful “stopgap” conflict despite the reforms being made by General Spannocchi. Militarily. The process of adjustment to the idea and full implications perhaps the most important aspect of national service. there is evidence that the possibility of a move against Austria is being considered seriously by Russia. has caused a Iongterm debilitating effect on the Austrian defense system and is still obstructing improvement plans today. the Polarka plan. specializing in militarupolitical analysis. expression. Unfortunately for NATO.A. and his article “NA TO’s Defense in Depth-Conundrwn or Challenge ?“ appeared in the December 1975 MILITARY REVIEW. He lorites for various international defense and political journals.

AUSTRIA’S DEFENSE for the move threatened to undo all that the previous 16 years of hilitary develop ment had created—and this at great expense to a relatively poor republic. the reforms also threatened to introduce in creases in administrative complexity and cost forcing even greater staff shortages. the Bundesheer degenerated over the next five years into an anemic shadow of its former self despite the efforts of military leaders to make the best of a bad job. for the Bundesheer soon found chaos growing in its ranks. training personnel and esprit de corps were too difficult to muster. ens ing the availability of enough and attractive urltforms and equipment. The money. By 1974. barely a single full+trength battalion was available. providing ade ! uate transportation.000 Iongterm volunteers who could undergo intensive and consistent training to develop a nucleus force capable of leading and controlling a larger con. luckily. modernization. The cost of Austrian defense was admittedly only five percent of total expenditure (compared with 39 percent in neighboring Switzerland). Although the reforms were initiated on paper. improving training facilities. but it has now become clear that such a goal remains a pipe dream.000 men and a financial investment of nearly $2 billion over that period was to be wasted away. script force in emergencies. two Defense Ministers (Generals Freihsler and Lilgendorf) managed to soothe dissenting voices. The training of 720. There was considerable opposlfion to the reforms among officers. but it still represented a considerable investment. By General Staff calculations.000 in 1971. the immediate layout alone demanded at least $1. To effect this involved improving existing living conditions and facilities in barracks. . accommodation was wasted and maintenance of equip ment suffered through neglect. Apart from the structural changes. These involved reorganizing the armed forces into a Landwehr and a permanently prepared Bereitschaftstruppe (alert force) of 15.8 billion. Many officers pointed to the need to prepare the ?menities for the projected alert force to make that setting attractive enough to attract dedicated career soldiers. but. increasing firepower and mobility and offering carefully planned career lines in the armed ~ January 1977 59 . This was only the beginning of the difficulties. To offset this blow to manpower and training programs. the Austrian Government offered thd compensation of “very extensive reforms in the military sector” in an attempt at rationalizing the resources available. and the reforms were pushed through by late 1971. Manpower shortages meant that many units had to be disbanded. operational battalions ant! reserves of 118. From 50. There are indications that planners originally intended the alert force to be modeled on a tightly knit professional force like the British Army. the government was unable to offer sufficient money to support the reforms as envisioned.

Even in the face of such necessity. The alert force is supposed to have 27 poised battalions. many are inaccessible to anyone wishing to reach them at short notice. perhaps two of these battalions are usable. emergency resources. transport. But even he’could work no miracles with the minimal resources available. General Sparmocchi forces. ~ z . Even the traditional eht are not permitted to use their special footwear for everyday service because of the shortage of replacements and repair materials. but. with the other 15 having a total strength of only 6600 men. This figure is worsened by the fact that these are predominantly short-termers who have barely emerged from basic training and who have been channeled into this force for appearance’s sake. By operational standards. They cover important pplies.5 percent in 1973.: i ~ ~ ‘c -G . indicating the government’s inability to match intentions to reform with practical efforts. 60 Militery-Review . spares factors like weaponry. Apart from there being an enormous number of such points. The opacity of intention and advance as witnessed in August 1968 would certainly not allow Austrian hoteliers and farmers to activate the myth of “natural defenses” in good time. The list of deficiencies remains a headache for Spannocchi. the Austrian Army remains something of a military enigma. munitions.AUSTRIA’S DEFENSE . 12 are mere references on paper. the military budget fell to as little as 3. J of the Bundesheer—the Gebirgsjager— and even clothing. Spannocchi hopes for combat groups at all fortifications and natural obstacles to harass invaders and make them “pay a high price for staying. Although he is optimistic enough to suggest that another three years will produce results. There were hopes of rapid improvement when the energetic General Spannocchi took over the new army command in July ~973. Even arguments that the modern highways can be quickly neutralized by destroying the antilandsiide barriers above many crucial routes presupposes a permanently ready squad of demolition men at every point. If the Wehrmacht found little difficulty motoring into Austria in 1936.” but some cynical observers have already sug gested that the only people likely to do so in the long run are the tourists. they would ‘have found the situation luxurious today. at present.

AUSTRIA’S DEFENSE Even the Larrdwehr is still far short of its target of 100,OOOafter mobilization, and, if Spannocchi is serious about using this territorial force in wide.scale partisan harassment tactics. his actual manoower requirement would. in fact. be nearer the 400,000 figure. Th/s marmower ixoblem is his immediate concern. There is still a 40.percent- shortage of nancomrnissioned officers (NCOS) and junior officers,” and even the number of reserve officers available for periodic training stands at little aver 350 compared with 1450 in 1969. Of the conscripts who do their mini.stint in the forces, very few are interested enaugh to volunteer for NCO training courses. Since the alert force remains dependent on the canscript intake, this means that all sectors af the defense forces suffer fram taa few chiefs and too few Indians. Nor can Spannocchi hape ta offset human weaknesses by automated means of infantry support. Apart from an unimpressive array of light armored vehicles, the troops cannot even be assured of effective air support fram the 38 Saab.105E fighter bombers intended for defense of Austria’s air space, Due ta prablems of aircraft age, spares, munitions, maintenance crews and pilot training, barely 10 of these can be considered operational. There is a critical lack of missile defense systems, antiaircraft batteries and infantry rocket systems. Spannacchi offers the, following universally accepted ideas: The infantryman with an anti-tank weapon costing 4,000 Shillings can destray an enemy tank costing 12 millian withaut excessive risk to himself. An enemy aircraft costing 100 million Shillings cannot find targets because the defense forces will be barely visible fram the air. No effective antitank systems are available to the Austrian troops, and it is unlikely that air attack will figure prominently in Warsaw Pact operations against Austria. So the prospects for Austria’s defense remain bleak. Althaugh it is NATO’s implicit policy ta favor a self-sufficient Austrian Army capable of securing the territorial neutrality of that part of southern Europe, even on a short.term basis, it looks as if this potentially impartant area will remain a military question mark. According to Spannocchi, it will be 1978 when the improvements begin to show, but, by present standards of development, Austria’s military capabilities will remain negligible at least until the turn of the decade unless more pasitive steps are taken to rectify the situation. Already, the Russians have been from their Austfian affices and have tensions between Slavs and Austrians in the Tyrol. Austria, it seems, could NATO reactions to Saviet maves. removing pro.Western diplamats and officials tried to invalve themselves in the increasing in Carinthia and between Italians and Austrians become the first European testing ground for Wlt
January Kr77 !, 61




Politics in Argentina

Peter Janke

This ar’ticlc dates from before the euents af Mavclc 1976 in whiclt the military seized power in A ?gcntina. That takeover was a logical development of much tl)at Dr. Janke has written here. He provides an ad?air’able anal~sis of the frujidr.tp of a gue?rilla campaign wltic}t remains z,altrf despite the collapse of President Isabel Penin’s gowv?rwent.-Erfitor, British Army Review.

modern history of guerrilla movements in Latin America dates from Castro’s Cuban victory in 1959—because that victory made guerrilla warfare appear successful. On this basis, a number of campaigns were launched in Guatemala, Vene. zuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Brazil. They failed—mainly because counter’guemilla action in the field !vas successful and the guerrilla movements themselves were not united. Revohltionary intent can never be entirely eradicated; it merges with the grumbling of dissent and manifests itself wh$n general dissatisfaction grows. Sometimes, as in Venezuela, prosperity can take the motive out of revolt; the government suddenly has enough patronage to buy loyalty from all classes. Elsewhere, in



countries not blessed with oil revenues, ne~v conditions arose or were felt to become increasingly intolerable, as, for example, in Uruguay which IVaS confronted with a major insurgency from the Tupa maws in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This campaign could never have reached the stage it did without the economic depression and inflation which afflicted that country, well-known, incidentally, for really good government in Latin terms. It was led, as are all Latin-American revolutions today, by young middle-class students and professional people. It was suppressed only by the ruthless curtailment of democratic government and trade union rights: The cost to the average Uruguayan of the insurgency in human liberties bas been very high.
Copyright @I 1976 by Her Majesty’s Stationery Mifitary Office. Review


Condensed 62

from Brdish

Army Review,

August 1976.

The next 12 months will show whether this cost has proved intolerable, for there are indications that the Tupamarws are re-forming abroad alongside Argentine revolutionary forces and they. may yet find the broad support at home which so signally


a power base that looks secure. Castroism also enjoys a certain popularity because of its home-grown South American qualities-qualities which may be more apparent than real, for Cuba has not ceased to be an economic hostage of the Soviet Union. The second ideological strand to be distinguished is revolutionary Peronism, a much more elusive movement which has moved a long way from the romantic image of “Che” Guevara toward hard-nosed communism. If Peronism ever represented anything, it was org?nized trade-union power—the only power of its kind in South America—and it opposed the naked authoritarianism of thut continent. During Per6n’s exile in Spain, the tensions within Argentina produced a Marxist Left from what, in some ways, was a National Socialist Movement. In order to return to power, Per6n supported the violence of a new generation of militants who bad never known the leader before he was ousted by the military in 1955. In this way, mountguerrilla disturbances ing urban helped pave the way for Per6n’s return in 1973 as the only political force to which the military could hand over power after their co plete failure to solve the country’s e x nomic and social problems—of which the chief was inflation. ‘ One of those early Peronist movements wa k the Fuerzas A wnadas Permristas (FAP) active in 1969 and 1970. This is only one example of a number of groups which split and reformed. Membership of one did not exclude membership of another. But the Peronist group that has outlived them all is the Montoneros. They first surfaced as a commando group in 1970 when they kidnapped the former President, Aramburu, on 31 May and subsequently murdered him. The Mon63

escaped them.
from To Caatroism understand to Peronism

Argentine guerrilla politics, the roots of the present strwggle must be clearly distinguished. There was in Argentina, as elsewhere in Latin America, a Castroite attempt to export revolution by infiltrating guerrilla columns from southeast Bolivia into Salta Province. The group concerned was captured in April 1!)64. Nevertheless, Castro has continued (despite the hostility which Moscow has at times displayed toward guerrilla warfare and armed struggle) to support such endeavors, to a greater or lesser extent, throughout the past decade. In mid-1968, a relatively large number of individuals returned to Argentina from guerrilla training in Cuba and abandoned rural tactics for urban guerrilla warfare. One of the groups formed was the F u e r’z as Armadas de Liberaci6n (FAL ) ; another was the Fuer’.ras Arrnadrts Retioktciorzar’ias (FAR ), both of which staged a series of small attacks on banks and military establishments throughout 1969 to raise money and steal arms. Although today nothing is heard o! the FAL or the FAR, the Cuban interest is, still present, behind all the noise of Peronist and Trotskyite violence—and Castroism is the one ideological strand which has Dr. Peter JanIce is a member of the staff of tlte Institute for the Study of Con ffict and a leading autltority on guerrilla warfare.
January 1977

olutionary Peronism. Some of had already been trained its militants in Cuba two years earlier. This Wras the famous Fourth International. Each of these groups has money from the ERP. was the activity at this hmelof members of the Third World Priests Movement founded in 1968.GUERRILLiS POLITICS toneros took their name from a traditional rural vigilante group-rough riders of the past. many hundreds favored armed struggle. From the start. an interna-. accused of complicity ]n the Arambartl kidnapping. tional revolutionary coordinating command was established. The journal of the new command is called Che Guevara. From the start. the most recent development has been a de facto alliance between the ERP and the Mowtonevos altho{tgh differences. there Both are have still now ideological been declared illegal. the third. Scattered throughout Suuth America. In this way. Irrtsrnational Once this Command a fact that because it is unCastroite influence derstood. This linked the moribund Castroite Bolivian Ejdwito de Ltbemci6n National (ELN ) (sup. sustained these and ~vere afforded immense publicity in Havana) and the Macirrrie?zto de lzqaierda Rcwducmnaria ( MIR ) in Chile which was also a pro-Castro movement. the Montoneros seemed to have abandoned their dream of winning military support or at least neutrality in the political struggle to assert re\. to be distinguished from Lenin’s Third International. indicating Its Castroite sympathy. Trotskyism broke away from the Stalinist line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by holding an international meeting of supporters in France in 1938. Historically. it supported Castro’s guerrilla war tactics on the mainland. there had been contact and exchanges between the Castroite and Peronist groups. needs to be highlighted tends to be overlooked. With the development of the Sine-Soviet split in the 1950s. The Trotskyist Partido Reroluciorcq?’io de 10S T~abajador’es ( PRT ) set UP an armed branch known as the Ejircito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) in 1970. Castroism had a seminal influence on both Trotskyism and Peronist guer6* rills violence in Argentina. But no action has yet occurred outside Argentina— for the moment. Trotskyism leaned toward Peking. in the Catholic University of C6rdoba from ~vhich some of the guerrillas had graduated. A few were active in Argentina. Yet another ingredient. countries). which Stalin led in 1!)19. The final and fourth element in the guerrilla ideologlc~l spectrum is Trotskyism. the new development which emerged in February 1974 should not sarprise us. of cotlr se. After the I?RP had proved their success in the field. part rereived of a $14-million ransom for tbe Exxon oil executive Samuelson. both of which elected the vloIent road toward a Socialist revolution. without being C’astroite. it }vas subject to crmstant splits and only involved tiny groups of people. By attacking the military for the first time in October 1975. foreign nationals are content to operute as guerrillas inside Argentina. Among the better known priests were Father CarlrIs MIigica \vho ~sas killed in May 1974 and Father Alberta (’arbone. Finally. The principal vehicle for collaboration between the two groups was a splinter group called the ERP-22 de Agnsto which welcomed Per6n’s return in 1973 when the ERP Military Review . posedly important strategically because it had frontiers with so many the Tupan!a? m (who. In the 1960s. for example. teaching.

it has been couched in political terms ~hich boil down to a Left and a Right. nothing of this nature is permanent. Brazil and the Dominican Republic. revolutionary Peroniem and the Third World Priests Movement. troism. but it represents a distinguishable pattern of events. The 22 de Agosto group has since returned to the parent body but has remained a bridgehead between the two movements. seizing the Paraguayan consul and ex-President Aramburu. Urban guerrilla groups first resorted to this in March 1970. the head of intelligence in the Defense Ministry. particularly to revenge 16 guerrillas killed at Trelew Naval Base on 22 August 1’372 whds allegddly escaping. for the vast majority of guerrilla arms are stolen. They had been recaptured after a jailbreak a week earlier when six had managed to flee to Chile and then Cuba on a hijacked airliner. to enforce changes in industrial policy. the guerrillas are clearly in a position to challenge the state with military hardware bought abroad. Cuba is. The victims have mainly come from foreign companies in Argentina although the kighest raneom paid so far was by the Argentine consortium Bunge u Born to the -< ‘Ianuary 1977 . Since then. being part of a traditional fight to control union elections. bat the example had already been set in Guatemala. million). from the four original strands in Cas. Trotskyism. It was the Castroite FAL and the Peronist Montorzeros who made the first etrikes in Argentina. Vice Commodore Rolando Sileoni. This gangsterism was not new. who was blown up while boating. kidnapping has become the principal source of raising funds. Kidnapping has now replaced bank raids as a source of finance but bay not yet been Ilsed as a lever to extract political concessions from the government. These remain. Most of the politically motivated murders in 1973-74 were the result of factional fighting within Peronism —the left wing against the right. what is perhaps uppermost in people’s minds IS the escalation of kidnapping in Argentina. Ironically. and. The violence increaeed after Per6n’s death in 65 Profitable Kidnapping On the guerrilla front. They are also able to subsidize groups in other countries. Assassination has been used by all gTOLIpSto settle old scores. Alberto Villar. It amounted reputedly to one-third of the’ Argentine defense budget ({27.i 1 GUERRILLA POLiTiCS proper did not. and the new situation is far from a firm lineup. With these amounts In hand. despite the government’s swing to the Right under ex-President Isabel Per6n. Obviously. The MrInfonrms demanded the reinstatement of 200 dismissed workers as one of the conditions for the release of Heinrich Metz—the West German production manager of the Mercedes Benz subsidiary near Btlenos Aires. in any event. partly because of pressure from the Soviet Union to abandon support for guerrilla warfare (which Cuba has never entirely done ) and partly from the good relations which Per6n established with Cuba on his return from exile. the recent past has seen the gradual development of a coalition which tends to favor the Castroite banner. Assassinations have been highly selective in character and iuclude the Chief of Police. there has been no public recognition of this fact from Cuba. Yet this does not seem to have occllrwd. always in a position to give clandestine help. last year. Increasingly. It has been useal. To earn up: On the ideological side. however. ‘Montoneros in June 1975.

a ~uerri]]a unit seized an ~d..J!lne 1975.. an[l this n’as sue.kwk Ilrig. This snrt c)f ngly reavtlon .’ ‘%4$7. j ‘> ~“-i.attack was made on ~in explosives factory near (’6rdoba.t. Nbile only 38 Lelonge[l to the Right. nf the to but c:llled credit have a..e Triple been . tJy nO meaus for the sity iug by h./i//. . The i]]tention had been to kidnap senior ofikers. 15 \vere captured and the remaining 50 fled into the hills where they ]Vere subsequently 66 ro[!nde(t (III. (’nt~. 190 were ]eft-\vingers.] <o.t~.ltl(]]ls h:ive surf>{ced stfch :M the Glir!l’d. retired of to the new the in their intenA tak. In the first stages. ful escal:ition. betn een 60 and 100 g(lerr]llas attacked Az(!1 Garrison. At 2 a.loining mt)tel \vhere they set up a liaison unit with radio equipment.men. The numbers then grefr. Hov ever..July ]974.irx has I)een Its succe+.ces. Shortly after. Tr]pie it dcclttrerl a tr{ice in .. ammunition and 200 uniforms were stolen. Nineteen guer- .m. on the same day.a ‘and facilities. .stol(! ado] a A . mlinitions and equipment.! . it s]mtlltaneo~ls .. there was an attack agmnst the 17th Airborne Infi~ntry Regiment qlmrtereci in the Catamarca barracks. There were over 1000 denth< last year which compapecl \vith o~’er 200 in Ulster. On 24 March.i{le.January 1974. Les~ A re- were u ho Lopez hladrld.. But an attack by 40 guerrillas on Rosario army barracks on 13 April lasted an hour in full daylight. attacked and escaped with arms. Ilable t.sfl l]. l’alhwly stat ion. 60 guerrillas.(tr ye. In . ing [Illicei’ N’as killed. The cause !vas the il]creasillg activity of right-v ing pi~ramilitary groLIps. Of the 433 oot of 500 bodies which conld be identified in the period JtTly 1974 to .w ( entiy first mo. but other tleofmci~t organix. attacked factories.). 8RAZIL / 1. kisti])g two to three years.. f~]se the (Ib>el~er :1)1(I{Iistrnct his iitte]ltion fr{lm the csficntial contlict \vl]lch h~l: been the c{)ncern of the poIICC {illtll I~el~r\l.1 { FALKLAND maws TTIERRA DEL FUEGO rillas were killed. aml the I.iry 1975 Jvhen the milit.’ BOLIVIA . O!I 11 Angust 1074.lvisur.ibout the g~lerrilkt uam]w{gn o~er the p:l+t f[. and a quantity of arms. I a gro!II) thou~ht Pertin’> since he:ird l~ec+tll. blit resistance foiled the plnn although the command. in army nniform.il R(.!ry ..<t Isabel ha> been time...J(Ily 1973.. On W June. group+ of 6 to 1’2. .P. --. ]ncl[ld]ng f!{. there was an at- MiJitsry Review .s~.. 70 guerrdlas attacked the police headquarters of V]lla Constituc]6n and withdrew after 10 minntea’ heavy fire.juined the se~{!rity f~)r~es In rliv:il jnierrilla operations. Similar operations w’ere undertaken in 1975. ‘) ~. The overri~ling point ..aNd members protected Rega.

It took place at 9:45 p. and helicopters and even a Ca)lherM bomber \vere on the scene. but there may have been as many as 300.. nonetheless. repulsed by the guards who shot and killed 56 inside the garrison. while seven members of the security forces lost their lives. s m a 11e r actions continued throughout the year. on 16 July. It involved a combined operation of military. board the hijac. The attack on the barracks w’as repulsed lmt with the loss of 11 soldiers.. an equally well-planned nrban operation was carried out by the ERP in the sprawling suburbs of Buenos Aires. GUERRILLA POLITICS tack with heavy caliber weapons on the headquarters of the Argentine Army First Military Region. the guerrillas were. A Hercules troop carrier with 114 men on board was sabotaged by an explosion 67 . Both attacks were repulsed so that. Some managed to reach the airport. They scattered nails -on the road to prevent pursuit. diversionary attacks were made by smaller units seizing the bridges whiqh connected the suburb to the capital.atirms battallon immediately afterward. bombs in railway stations and at foreign embassies (the British included). The loss of so many guerrillas in one action did not prevent their hunching an attack on a communic.ked plane and escape by landing on a cattle ranch 400 miles away where cars met them. All told. or attempting to make off with helicol]ters from a police academy on the outskirts of the capital. Alongside these large-scale operations. POIIW2 and border guards under the command of the military—as are all countergllerrilla operations now. Within half an hour. machinegunning two police January1977 stations and an army garrison and setting fire to as many m a dozen buses. and thefts of weapons from arms factories and ambushed military trucks. The security force response was massive but reasonably quick. Qnite the most spectacular action of 1975 occarred nn 5 October when a small unit hijacked a plnne from Ruenos Aires to the city of Formosa while the main group attacked the barracks of the army’s 29th Infantry Regiment and yet a third unit took over the airport. Two days before Christmas. Fifteen guerrillas w’ere reported to have died. Fire bombs went off in department stores in C6rdoba and Buenos Aires. and the shots were fired from a nearby constriction site. Outside the building.m. many of \vhom were teenagers of both sexes.k’13 tanks xvere used on the streets. consulates and the otiices of the Communist party in C6rdoba. There waa also a letter bomb sent to President of the Senate Luder. 85 guerrillas. Estimates vary as to the number of guerrillas involved. Targets included smnll-towm police stations. Armed with grefiades and heavy and light rnachineguns. This heavy response \vas repeated in January 1976 in the city of Rosarlo where French AM. the guerrillas have failed in larger groups to match their success in small units. Those “ who failed to make the airport took to the countryside where most ~vere canght. and 10 attackers were reported wounded. a large cordon was thrwvn arnund the area. to date. The main group of about 130 rammed the gates of the Domingo Viejobapno military arsenal in Monte Chingolo drove with through a stolen track and afterward in a convoy of vehicles. were reported to have died in the conflict. Ten civilians Nere nlso killed in the cross fire. A simultaneous attempt to break Into the local jail failed.

Greater proof of this emerged on 5 June 1975 when a dozen arrests were made of people working in the iron and steel industry in Zirate and Campana. An action at the end of May indicated the scale of guerrilla logistics when the military ambushed a convoy of 32 ERP vehicles. Thus. supply routes and refuge. tcho.—-— . sabotaged production and murdered opponents. . However.-———— . A frigate was dynamited and damaged in the Rio Santiago shipyard on 22 August. On ’26 May 197. It was largely because of this new rural threat that the military was called in to take over these operations from the police in February 1975. from government control.. radicalized its demands. Marrtoncro gunmen murdered—or as they put it “executed”a 43-year-old Fiat executive in C6rdoba. sparked union agitation and tke implementation of systematic measures of force. IndustrialSubversion Parallel to these military actions. intimidated workers. All had allegedly engaged in violent terrorism since November 1973. .. recruited among the most hothearleti and extolled subversive and violent actions as tbe only way to achieve social justice.5.. Finally. and the movement was known as the Revolutionary Workers’ Power Organization.e appeared a pro!iferafion of agitators and pr’ouocateurs. the results of a long-term campaign of industrial subversion manifested themselves. they do not report this.. An earlier report by the Minister had this to say: To a. Rural Warfare ERP guerrillas set up a rural front in Tucurnin Province in a bid to elevate the insurgency into its finaI phase. . Tbe armed branch kidnapped industrialists. on 28 July. The inspiration was Trotskyist. said: “Several factories are employing subversive workers because of fear of threats they received and.. the Minister of the Interior.” The tactic is to win over the natnral labor spokesmen to a violent and disruptive campaign.—. –. Tbe object was to paralyze tbe productive capability of basic industries. what is worse.GUERRILLA P~LiTICS on the runway in Benjamin Matienzo Airport in Tucum&. The principal target was the industrial belt around Villa Constituci6n... a third level of insurgency— the larger actions—has been imposed upon the second. They chose the same areas as did those who emulated Castro in the early 1960s—very difficult terrain for security forces to operate in.. The political branch maintained the level of discontent in the work force. Alberto Rocamora.———.. and 380 guerrillas had been killed or captured.— . The firm had closed the plant on 20 October because of threats against executives although the government compelled it to reopen. Witbin three and a half months. actually claiming to have liberated areas—liberated..haf at tbp begin >7i>7g could kut. with the loss of 22 soldiers.. it is expected that a new MilitaryReview . that is. Tbe population is scattered and works on sugar plantations. a raid in Buenos Aires uncovered a card index of 200 company executives. 30 camps had been located in Tucum&n. On 29 October. with complete reports on their movements.—-. was added tke conviction that all tkis was part of an elaborate infiltration supported by a solid f~arnework of material ele68 ments and carefulh] planned substantial investments. offering plenty of cover and bordering on other states with all the possibilities this gave for infiltration. using various iwe[evant pretexts.

” and foreign exchange transfers were to be stopped.GU. Ricardo Balbin. anti-imperialist and democratic. Mario Firmench. sought a popular mandate to govern by giving tacit support to the extreme left Frente Arwptio (Broad Front) coalition in the November 1971 elections. would put an end to the wave of violence. There is no reason to think that the ERP or the Montoneros would even equal that percentage if they ever resorted to elections—which. The Monfoneros chose to go underground and were only outlawed last year when it became clear that. It proposed calling a Constituent Assembly with “full popular participation” to set the foundations f~r the country’s pacification. they. too. for such a policy would achieve nothing of the kind. because it is a bourgeoie practice. they would not do on principle. Not even he tried to effect a reconciliation other than by failing to pronounce for one side or the other.” One might wish politics were so simple. to death and indicated that the principal opposition leader. In addition. in August.” He. Tax policy was to shift income distribution in favor of the “small and medium size artiean and agricultural operations” and to the state.LAPOLITICS rural front in Salta Province will be announced before long. deceived by the apparent ease with which they flourished in chmdestinity. Very few guerrilla groupe in Latin America have put up alternative programs as substitutes for the societies they attack. Foreign trade was to be reeetablisbed with the “Socialist countries. This new dimension to the conflict had nothing to do with the violent struggle for power between tbe Left and Right of the Peronist movement itself— from which the army could stand aside —so it intervened. No further details were explained (the Argentine Congress is elected democratically. Still. The new National Liberation Front government was to include the ERP and the minuschle pro-Moscow Argentine Communist Party. ignored the fact that the Argentines had just done that. was unacceptable. instead of toward the “oligarchic agricultural system. he encouraged the guerril69 . small and medium size businesses and by stabilizing the real wage.. Prospects Per+n movement different Long Struggle left an Ahead legacy—a two utterly impossible contained which wings which were agreed on only one thing.” On 11 August 1975.ERRII. In June 1975. Lopez Rega. Furthermore. like the ERP. It received less than 20 percent of the vote. called for the resignation of President Isabel Per6n and for elections “so that the people can freely express themselves. and no party questioned the results of the previous presidential elections which returned first Campora and then Per6n to the presidency). the kforztorzeros somewhat expanded on their economic policy. the return of Peronism. he arbitrarily condemned the President’s advisor.” A statesupported credit policy was to consolidate the new income policy by promoting the “development of national companies. the ERP offered a t uce in exchange for the releaee of #olitical prisoners and the lifting of the han placed upon it two years ago. except for the payment of essential raw materials. the ilforztonero chief. would wage war against the state by attacking military targets. The Tupamuros. FirJanuary‘1977 mench added: “the installation of a Popular Government. A moratorium was to apply to all foreign obligations. too.

the longer the conflict. the more professional they become. With the exception of the terrain which is favorably to them. Thirdly. much of the battle ]n the rural areas depends upon sociopvliticul measures. Tttpamaros have been involved in Argentine extremism for several years and have been caught operating out of A&ntina across the river. in a country as huge as Argentina. On 3 June. and they contributed to the demise of the former military regime under President Lanusse. in fact. Uruguay. It was outlawed on 25 December 1975 although it seemed unlikely that it would develop into a credible politicnl alternative. The military has. On the other hand. until recently rising at a rate of about one percent a day. consisting of s hearts-and. to help with the grape harvest. if gucrri]la recruitment among Argentines themselves drops. the pattern of ransoms and protection money upon which the guerrillas rely for their funding has taken hold of society. Next. the imposition of restrictions on recruiting is not going to be easy ei~her. To attempt the hard line now would prove almost impossible politically. the military has to rely enormously on police support and cooperation. So. a failure to take proper security precautions. Paraguay and Bolivia —and they can be encouraged by the failure of the Tupamaros. and it seems improbable that Argentine society will be any the more just for having undergone such a harrowing experience. especially for intelligence. Six thousand Chilean refugees fled to Argentina in September 1973. the . Lastly. there must come a point beyond which the conflict cannot escalate. This is more dilficult to develop when tbe ruling Ideology is split. The great divide within Peronism will continoe with a vengeance since an “Au. thentic Peronist P~rty” was formed on the Left under ex-f+esident Campora. with no political channels open to them. there is an ample reservoir of willing foreigners. been increasingly drawn into the fray. they are amatea rs and unlikely to stand up as well as professionals to prolonged stress. for transit. and the police force has recently proved motinous and unreliable.GUERRILLA POLITICS las from exile. a group of Paraguayans were 70 arrested. In balance. the guerrillas must continue to fight the army. the security forces can rely upon friendly governments around them— Chile. But can the military eliminate the gLlerri]kl+ ? First. So. The cost in terms of Iiberty will be high. The Tupamaros put their own defeat down to four factori: underestimating the military after having run circles round the police. finally. and there is a constant seasonal flow of labor in Mendoza Province. bankrupt of ideas and unable to stop inflation. it may be that the Argentine guerrillas make the same mistakes. minds campaign. On the other hand. unsuitability of Uruguayan cattle lands for rural guerrilla units and. unlike Vietnam. one might argue perversely that. This provides cove. to their concept of the struggle as a battle between t~vo armies. 8000 police detained 5000 Chileans in April. MC Military Review . a long struggle might be predicted with victory of a sort eventually going to the security forces because. it is not difficult to find safe ground for training. To screen the flow. Fundamentally. and there is always the possibility of facilities backup from Cuba. It now considers that a state of “total war” exLsts between them. Secondly. for example.

can be called ‘militar!j at t and science. The academic discipline undcv[ying OUT pvogr. as a national center for contemporary military thought. Brigadier General Edward B. It incorporates stud~es in t[~ose fields . the Department of Defense Excellence in Edacation CoWmittee (Clements Committee) stated: The . .”:] More recently. tlt?ough which o~cers can develop and 71 . Pennsylvania. .cs fwm our purpose and mission. tion of selected military and civilian students. .Seroice Colleges should be wellsprings of pwfessiona/ thought. reputation . such questions have tended to Jsnuary 1977 T j groLIp themselves around the notion that the Army War College should strive to become the leading center in the United States concerned with intellectual efforts directed toward those aspects of national security affairs related to land warfare. ltighlg individual huntun beings. focusing upon what it should be rather than what it should do.nls dci it. and other interested officers. have raised questions which transcend the functions of the institution. Generally.’ I HE US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks. a wide on~. This body of knowledge. The second element encompasses the conduct of studies in areas of professional concern which is at least implicit in these remarks. In one instance. however. commandant of the College. is charged by the Department of the Army with a dual mission. . The first element relates directly to the educa. ~ At various times. United States Army The Awuu War College is dcdicatcd to the l(igltcst professional militar~ education of care full~ sclcet cd.)f academic and pvactical endeauar 7u/fich constitute the militorv profession.Militapy Art and Science: -7 Is There a Place in the Sun for It? . A tkeson. the concept was framed as a “respondeveloping an earned sibility for .Seniar . .

. Atlceson is Director. His two-part article “The Relevance of Civilian-Based Defense to US Security Interests” appeared in the May and June 197’6 issues of MILITARYREWEW. Washington. The range of elective courses has been steadily broadened over the years to meet the demands of increased opportunity for pursuit in depth of Army career specialties under the Officer Personnel Management System ( OPMS). Penns~lvania. broad understanding and ameptance have been slo~v to emerge. Curricular changes in the first half of the current decade have transformed the Army War College from an essentially single-program institution into an educational center man. lack of unanimity of view has not inhibited the cfevelupment of important collateral ad~. Military Review . ! As frequently as the concept has been enunciated. and is.Stafl at the Centra/ Inte/tigence Agency. however. He received a B.panddtheir teckn ical and ptmfessional military e. ment of Corresponding Studies) was established in 1’368.B.ances in the man. Fortunately. US Army War CoUege. from the USMA. from Sgracuse University. The entire intellectual ambience has been upgraded through the expansion of a wide range of separate concern other aspects of the institution and Its qualifications for recognition and excellence of reputation. relate many directly to the curricu- The curriculum itself has been restructul”ed to provide for a broad common overview of essential professional subjects daring the first half of the academic year II and for a period Of appropriate study and research into matters of individual importance during the latter half. NO less significant developments have occurred external to the curricula. pmacloxically retarded primarily by those lvithin the military profession who either disngree on philosophical grounds or fuil to grasp its significance and spirit. DC.a graduate of the USACGSC and the Army War College. Cavlisle Barracks. an M. of soch electives now exceeds The advances which have been made in recent yean at the College are both apparent and substantial. aging a complex array of courses based upon the varying requirements of different student situations and needs and different career objectives.ner in which the Instigation has approached its mission. A department of nonresident instruct ion (subsequently renamed Depart. and as Deputy Commandant.A. . Progress number 50. offering a twoyear program paralleling the regular course. n . While a number lum. 5 The 72 Brigadier General Edloard B. Ofice of Policy and Planning..S. He haS served with the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Militavg Opsrat ions.rpertise./-MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE e. The result has been the emergence of a far more sophisti: cated range of intellectual opportunities than previously offered by the College at any time since its establishment in 1901. Intelligence Communit~ .l. for selected correspondence students in both the Active Army and the Reserve components.

the Strategic Studies Institute. Goodpaster. Taylor and General Andrew J. the research arm of the College. following a three-day visit by a specially constituted group of educators. ~ Paralleling the compilation of professional books has been an effort to extend the intellectual reach of the College through in-house publication of military issue research memorandums addressing specific issues of professional importance and conversion of Paranzeters—Journal of tlte US A rvay War CoUege from a biannual to a quarterly publication. The ACE statement immediately 73 . Most hold graduate degrees relating to their specialties and are graduates of one of the senior service colleges. 8 The totality of these programs for improvement of the Army War College was formally recognized by the A m e r i c a n Council on Education ( ACE) in January 1976. ~] No mention of accreditation of the War College itself was made. as such would have exceeded the charter of the group. the implication is clear enough: US Army War College students. including the assembly of a three-volume work on management and its various applications to the military sphere. In addition.but mutually enriching activities. the College has sought to develop links with a number of civilian colleges. Tbe findings and report of the group essentially equated the College curriculum to an academic year at the graduate level and recommended acceptance of virtually any part of the resident course for transfer credit by civilian universities offering graduate degrees which require similar course credits. DC. the Middle East. the Soviet Union and the Far East in pursuit of Januarf 1977 better and areas of understanding their of geographic concentration. Faculty members have t r a v e 1e d throughout Latin America. A number of other important projects are under development. The compendiums of papers from the first two symposiums have been published as books. However. Equally as important has been a formal program initiated in 1974 to enha~ce the expertise of the faculty through a more careful selection process. in the main. Still others have attended the Advanced Management Program at the Harvard BusiIWSS School and the Management Program for Executives at tbe ~niversity of Pittsburgh. universities and research institutes through attendance at and sponsorship of many symposiums and academic “workshops” and by encouraging its faculty and students to publish their works in respected journals. Europe. expansion of opportunities for sabbaticals and a retention program. A number of officers have been recruited to join the faculty after serving as fellows at such institutions as the Hal<vard University Center for International Affairs. with forewords prepared by General Maxwell D. This text” was written hy members of the faculty and the student body. initiated an annual assembly of senior military and civilian officials in a strategic issues symposium to address papers on topical matters prepared by members of the War College faculty. PUrsue courses which are essentially the equivalent of one full academic year at a graduate institution. In 1974. Africa. of their and Military subjects functional mem- bers have been detached for periods up to a f u11academic year at Shippensburg State College and the Foreign Service Institute’s Senior Seminar in Washington.

Awarenessin Academic World Over the years. it includes officers \vith advanced degrees )n a numbey of other ayeas. political. to all a of wide which spectrum of disci. In instituting its program.sage of the National Defense Act in 1916 established the R es e r v e Officers’ Training Corps for recruitment and training of potential officers at cOlIeges and universities throughout the country. econnmic and btrategic imperatives shaping its structure and orientation. . the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.” but so they must ap~ear to those who wtppOrt the concept of military art and science in the framework sugMilitaryReview . It is this unifying tie to which the commandant of the College was referring when he identified the body of professional knowledge as military art nnd science. 11 While it is apparent that some progress has been made by the alleged “discipline” of the military profession in gaining legitimacy and recognition. what is the principal academic discipline under pursuit ? Notably. and psycllmocial ele. tltc studu af the develapmen. The pw.e disciplines of extreme importance to the viabillty of any society. however. its legul and ethical bases.. One department staff seems particularly strong in the social sciences but. development. Certain weakin military have a bearing on the common overkiew.rces iri peace and war and of tlte tntcr ) clati(. und the complex skein of political. No particular pattern is readily apparent save the unifying tie of broad and extensive familiarization with the formulation. initiated a request for recognition and accreditfltion by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools to grant related degrees at the master’s level. the College provided its own definition of the field: . there has been a glacial drift toward awareness of the existence of this body of knowledge in the academic world.rrships of the ecorrora{c. and sup~ort of military fl. Authorization for tbe action was established by act of Congress in 19G3. the faculty displays significant expertise and holds well-recognized credentials related plines. together with both its obvious md more hubtie intltiences on wxiety. but the central focus is ill-defined. its role in naticmsl POIICYdevelopment and execution. the principle of military school14 nesses in the program. Following World War 11. opmation. Kansas. Organization and utlllzatinn of military force. the College suggested that: . Militar~ art and science is tlt e scholastic discipline of the n)(litaru profession. MeanwhiIe. While the training has had varying acceptance for undergraduate credit. led to its gradual deterioration and practical demise in 1963. like the others.MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE raises . ?<) In s{tpport of its program. It is a combination of subjective and objectii.a key question: If i ndeecl the War College operates at the graduate level.4 distlrcguishing cllaracteyistic of a rcrogr!iwd pr’afession is its ~elated scholastic discipline. the University of Maryland experimented with a program offering a baccalaureate degree with a major science. It is a gross oversimplification to characterize critics of the discipline as “traditionalists. geographic. a strong body of opposition has coalesced Ibehind a set of arguments Ivhich have served to make that progress tenuous at best. metits <if natianal pawer with the application af milifa~y fame {n order to acl[ieve national objectives. ing as an academ”ic endeavor h& enjoyed some success.

. constitutes the intellectual underpinnings of the Armed Forces of the coantry. traditionalists argae. The praduct is not expected to be a tlteoriet. The Traditional School The most fundamental tenet of the traditional school appears to be a belief that the military profession is aniqae.. to enshrine it in academic terms.. The notion of a military art and science. 75 . Any resemblance of a military career to life work in medicine. which plans pravide grist far which pragrams and by what means the current administration pravides gnidance to the military services for shaping their forces and budgets.an ambience af crisis that clear limits must be established beyond \vhich subordinates cannot be permit. He need not be an innovator. The military draws upon the arts and sciences of all the others and molds them into a coherent whole which. The traditionalist holds that the ideal pradaet at any of these educational Ievele is ane wha can immediately step inta a position in a military unit ar departmental bareau and perform at a high level of efficiency. are the appropriate docnments to attest to saccessfal completion of the courses becaase of the lack of relevance of the work to any field outside the military service. Not directly tied to the basic traditionalist argnment. exist and. is a second tenet which holds that the proper area of emphasis within militm-y educational institutions is the realm of the “teal world. At the Io\vest and simplest level. in turn. he is a functionary. they argae that diplomas and certificates. There can be no single academic ptlrsait \vhich prepares an officer for any bat his mvn particalnr specialty within the military comma nity. While virt~lally all concede the importance of an officer’s exposure to the broad spectrnm of subjects offered at the higher military colleges. ted to operate-either physically or intellectually-—withoat’ endangering the sawessful achievements of org~~nizatiannl adjectives. restrictive and pedagogic. implies a body of thonght which does not. same~vhat more discretionary in application but. Tbe battlefield (ar the military logistical trnin) is held to be of such camplex natare and overlaid with sach . .” This approach tends to January 1977 focas unoa the imrwrtance of acaaainting students with the wny things are rather than the way they might be. nccepting the instruction as n basic teal so that he may falfill his assigned rqle and perform his assigned fanct]ons. We should examine the traditionalist point of view. it manifests itself in the impartation af set or established tactical doctrine as approved by appropriately cansti tated authority. rather than academic credits. nevertheless. law or any other civil profession is deemed specious. in fact. it reveals itself in the form of dactrinal cancepts. It emphasizes the training of tbe strident to assume his place in mllitacy satiety. They see the stady of militarf affairs (to the extent that they recognize the term ) as of significance only within the profession and not an endeavor of intellectual value in its own right. gested by the Command and General Stiaff College. bat exhibiting high correlation with it. componnds the error. At the highest military educational level—within the senior service colIeges—this viewpaint is manifested in argaments for emphasi~ apon instruction in how the military departments aperate. Higher ap in the educational system.

seasoned professionals who appear to value short-term gains over the longer. while not necessarily hostile to any specific program cited among the recent advances noted above. they tend to be satisfied with things just about the way they are. To the progressive. Traditionalists tend to be no-nonsense group of a practical. we may group and label those with somewhat different views about the military profession and about its intellectual underpinnings. principles and theory merit greater attention than do standing operating proMilitary Review . are incompatible with the idea that the institution should aspire to become a national center for contemporary milita?y thought. he might aver. would be the devotion of the College’s full talents and attention to pursuit of the dual mission of teaching and research without incurring risks of distraction by “peripheral” activities. . On the whole. progressives attach greater importance to the impact. With probably only slight injustice..-— Root Hall. Under the pinch of austere military budgets. By and large. TheProgressive School Again. A third general characteristic of traditionalists is a lack of enthusiasm for the notion that a military educational institution should be concerned for what it is as well as what functions it performs.l p —-. ..MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE . . and generalize to some extent concerning their thought processes.headquarters of the USArmy War College he needs to be a well-rounded executor of policy and orders.V. the traditionalist would suggest. sab. baticals and writing for intellectual 76 fulfillment. with some oversimplification. Mach better. w’emay call these men the progressives. Traditionalist views of the Army War College. of ideas on human endeavor than do traditionalists. the Army can ill afford the “niceto-have” frills of symposiums. tangible issues over the intangible and proven methods over the unproven.

Rather. while the administration of business is certainly an interdisciplinary pursuit. complishment of the overall mission). tbe haven where the fruits of today’s intellectual process are to be found. skirting the present except as it constitutes a springboard from which “that which might be” can be launched. promulgation and en- forcement of professional standards by members of the profession themselves and balance between art and science—are stronger than those aspects which tend to set it apart from the other professions. The progressive views a military career as a legitimate calling similar in most respects to medicine. civilian institution+ have given little thought to the comprehensive and logical marshaling of these studies into coherent programs as is done in the service colleges. he asks. a Senior Lecturer in War Studies at Sandhurst wrote: . academic specialists on a. political scientists or sOciok@fs. of the military profession. [are more limited by their baflcgrounds than are milita~v Oficers] wltetlle~ they are historians. he asserts. man~ of whom aye unable to tkink bewmd fheir original academic discipline. the progressive draws strong parallels -. In sum. thus far. business administration is a well-recognized field of study at both the undergraduate and graciuate Ie\rels. He tends to view tbe present as a time of intellectual opportunity which. He sees the present as n burden imposed by yesterdxy’s ideas to be borne until tomorrow comes. the progressive reverses the traditionalist’s view of the present as the environment of action and the future as the environment of theory. firm basis in de.ar today. Why. that the profession is unique. He is quick to point out that. and more interested in wh~ it is done and what alternatives there may be for its execution (or how the function mny be avoided if it seems to make only marginal contribution to the ac. He looks backward for historic analogy. he contends. . he woald argue that the similarities— dedication to service. In pointing out tbe inadequacies of the civilian academic community in dealing with military studies.cedures. J. for examples of what has been applied in the past. will yield a sounder environment of action cm the morrow.’ 71 . He tends to be somewhat more iconoclastic than his traditionalist colleague. veloped theory. it is that military erluc:ltlonal instigations have held a near monopoly over the military discipline—or orchestration uf di+cipiines-and that this cloisterization bus Inhibited its recognition and acceptance. is the only real difference between militi~ry studies nnd others. economists. but then be tends to shift into the future. l! Ho~vever.! ding and acceptance. The future is his natural domain. Lack of understa. He tends to be somewhat less interested in ho to a task is accomplished under present circumstances. Indeed. January1917 With respect to the pursuit of formal curricula in service colleges. there are many studies related tu military art and science which be can point out in graduate and undergraduate school catalogs throughout the land. with similar activity in civilian professional educotion. law and the clergy. While he recognizes a somewhat broader core discipline lying at the heart. . if usefully exploited. has the study of military art and science lagged behind ? It i+ not. hence less preoccupied with the way things are.

The. One estimate of the number of “Candidates of Military Science” in .MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE >. There Military Review . other departments and components of the College tend to offset those views with regard to most practical issues. 1° auo Vadis? What is to be done in the face of the traditionalist and progressive cogent and germane as arguments. one may ask. of the form of recognition granted upon graduation. Scholar and former Commander in Chief. While certain departments may reflect a tendency toward one or the other of the primary philosophical views identified. he contends. The he-. R. the progressives say “yes.progressive argnes that a military-centered curriculum is every bit the intellectual equal of one focused upon smother profession and points to sach testimony as that provided hy the ACE with regard to the Army War College to battress his argament. stowal of a degree. its value iies in its puh]ic acclamation of achievement.) runs into the hundreds. Un“Iike the general diploma. the concept of the advanced degree in military science is well-established elsewhere. Beyond that. the Soviets award a “Doctor of Military Science” which signifies’ that the officer has defended a dissertation and is a recognized authority in his field. The degree to which disharmony impacts upon the curriculum is a matter of continuing concern to the faculty but hardly constitutes a serious threat to the students’ learning profess. 14 and Rhodes General C. Korea. Accordingly. It is peculiar to the academic world but eujoys. ultimately.the Soviet Union (roughly the equiva78 lent of the Ameri~an Ph. It has no more inherent worth than a title or decoration. is the normal and proper manner of recognizing academic accomplishment. this point has been underscored by some of the Army’s most gifted senior officers. he levies a demand for broader recognition and acceptance of undergraduate and graduate degrees in military art and science. the progressive argues. LTnited Nations Command. the traditionalists have been preeminent. How. The traditionalists say “no”. Johnson. has the institution managed to come this far with such internal contradictions if they are as they appear ? Some of the answer may lie in a baiance within the structure of the CoIIege itself. such as the Army War College. including Geaeral Harold K. oniversal acceptance. It is not intended to have any particular transferability to other parsuits but does normally carry a sociaI value as a badge of intellectual achievement. progressives argue. One question which does appear to lend itself to solution through analysis of its merits is that of the academic legitimacy of military studies and the propriety of the establishment of graduate degree programs at the College in the professional military field. they both appear ? Both ostensibly support the fulfillment of the College objectives 17 while clashing over issues of emphasis and approach and. In one form or another.” For as long as the issue has existed. to adhere to the practice of granting a parochial diploma in lieu of the more universal degree for essentially the same level and extent of acade’mic pursnit. providing a nominal balance and stability if not always a harmony. it is a fundamental error for an institution. D. it signifies both the level of accomplishment and the area of spec]alty. Thus. Bonesteel. 13 Finally. former Chief of Staff.

There is much truth and \visdom in the traditionalist argument. � The existence of a selective Program for a master’s degree in mihtary art and science at an institution below the senior service college level. how might such a program be structured. the student should be eligible for consideration for a master’s program if he holds a vnlid baccnhtureate degree from an accredited institution. seems to be an unwarranted commitment to a point of view that may have no better chance of being correct than fifty-fifty. the 10-month limitation of the resident program indicates that few students could expect to complete both the necessary course work and the appropriate research and writing required for a gradaate de79 . and wh. Certainly. If this is true. The merits of the opposing points of view. At Carlisle. program for recognition of academic achievement in the conventional mode. lH Possession of a master’s degree in military art and science. Consideration of these factors indicates that the Army War College should probably offer to certain students with high academic interest in national security affairs opportunities to futtlli requirement for either graduate or undergraduate degrees while in residence. considering the student’s particular educational background. The limits of a 10-month academic year. The traditionalist view has not just prevailed. however limited. no matter ho~v selective it may he. � A definition of military art and science. Some. . Short of this. business and public administration). as \ve have reviewed them. That is not to say.has been no serious consideration of an effort to secure academic recognition of the College beyond the type of assessment provided by the ACE. depending upon their particular backgrounds and previous educational achievements. would not seem to justify in operation the absoklte supremacy of either view over the other. � Recognition by the American January 1977 Council on Educntion of the academic quality of instruction at the Army Wflr College. should be a bawc prerequisite for entry into a doctoral program. or in a related field. or how structured. Those few who may be without degrees should be afforded the opportunity for completing requirements for one at the bachelor’s level if a compatible program can be developed. it has enjoyed exclusive control. nnd it would protmbly be a mistake for the Army Way College to allow degree programs to become a central point of focus. But one is styuck by the zero-sum game flavor of the traditionalist-progressive debate as it applies to this issue of academic degrees. would seem to make senee. however. considering the probable locus of balance for the College between the two extremes. Tbe total exclusion of any sort of degree program \vithin the College.it would he the most important factors shaping it? Probably the most important factors we have identified in the foregoing discussion are these: � The existence of analogous academic programs in other professional areas ( for example. if the stadent also has credit for graduat ion from q mi Iitary staff college. there seems to be no place in the san for military art and science as a scholastic discipline. that it should offer no such programs at all. on the other hand.

the presence in the regular seminar discussions of students pursuing advanced research in the . Federal legislation is required as is full investigation and assessment by the appropriate associa80 tion of colleges aid secondary schools. It would seem likely that those few who do not hold degrees upon entry into the College wOuId be able to earn sufficient credits (as recognized by the American Council on Education) to graduate with ba~ca]aureltes. perhaps witli specialties such LLS “strategy. They are a valuable adjunct to the basic Army War College resident course but in no way substitute for an advanced program in military art and science. the gradual ev&Iution of a group of serious scholars in the military field. Considering the selective nature of the student body. There are at present lively cooperative degree programs at the Army War ~ollege which afford students opportunities to earn master’s degrees in public or business administration or communication at Shippensbucg State College or The Pennsylvania State University. to the quality of the total educational experience of the whole student body. encourage or recognize advanced scholarship in the core discipline of the military profession. an important segment of the faculty at tbe Army W?r College would probably come to be composed of officers who had pursued the more thorough educational experience. For all. core discipline of the profession would serve to further enrich the total learning environment.. tbe conclusions and recommendations of studies produced by these institutions have been drawn without consideration of many of tbe factors which compriee tbe heart of MilitaryReview . upgrading their basic credentials and professional expertise.MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE gree while in residence. Or “military management. Today.elOpment. In a broader sense. ‘~ They do not. The programs are designed to contribute to the fulfillment of important requirements in the Army for officers with advanced degrees in particular specialties. it would seem appropriate to permit the student the customary five years after completion of the course work to deliver an acceptable master’s thesis and an indefinite period to complete a suitable dissertation. the rewards show considerable promise of net benefit for the modest number of individuals who might choose to pursue it and. All too often. Over time. the arduousness of such an undertaking.er.” “force de~.” would alter the intellectual landscape. Experience with the design and inauguration of the master’s program at the Command and General Staff College indicates that the administrative road to full operation and accreditation of formal programs of study at an Army institution is a long and tedious one. howe~. these men w’ould begin to make a contribution to a broad spectrum of intellectual pursuits related to tbe public sector. bowever. Also. many academic institutions are engaged in the study of topics related to national security affairs and to the multifaceted ramifications stemming from them. Research institutions with current programs in related areas are abundant throughout the country. in time. It is very likely that. Many of these institutions have considerable weight in the deliberation of issues affecting tbe expenditure of public resources and the execution of public policy. While completion of course work and a substantial portion of the research for a thesis or dissertation may be a realistic objective. more Importantly.

t of the Army.tudcnt and to the stml a“d f“c”ky. C.. t ho.ry mstr”cmn....Ic Un!’m. two or three cre.to.pnlmnmtcd wtth w.”c [A S. Of the civil. The continued deprivation of the intellectual community of the contribution which advanced military scholars might make seems particularly u nw’ise from the points of view of both the military and the civil community. Wmnhmzton. In. AdditmnnllY. 76-76 Catalom Fort Leavenworth..n.o.m .. 89.titutiom.dlm Inmi+.rc.1. NY. Tran. are stated wtth r.snd up to six cred.seven members of the..t.. the Army .WUC8 z...IIprw imamly “f rl!t?t< d SoY”t cc.o.DDroximatel~ S5 Lwrce”t hold Ph. t l~wto).l. January 1977 81 . as it depends upon the health of the intelleetu~l Llnderpinnings of the Army. to Lhc U. Army W. mental CO”C.d...<.10... 8 M. Odicc of the Corn.1. J. S. 1976. ”. nl Scm. Conmimrd wd Gmmml Staflp CollWC.ollml m a wJoLleI’ntive U“dorurnduotc m qzrmn.ltwa ( for example. one w. Pm’tm. by educators \vith an interest in public affairs. w.zo”t<..t Annutd NationiIl S. by the administration of the Army Way College. “o degree 6... c“ko. The public interest.cmce to the rmhtmv prof. 14 July 1975. degr?es.tb GL. Om.. 3 ... 7 NC-W DW. c.cer. e.. n The Anmrim... P VI-1.d by three m’hn. .mno! St.. S The faculty ( in.zl D. lators and by members of the informed public. The Pr<>f<. 1!375.r. College clam of 1!776 were mv”lb?d in three PI’oKram.D.t(. P 27.JunQ 1976. .nulation 1&44.t..tie”. in. DC.ty Smn.n in.IIL rmov. N. ..di”z the Strc.tuted .tt C.nt of Dommm”t. 1d A.m..eet. mn.1. at c. held full pm feswmshin.?. in fnntm 2.. D vi.m for fiecord V... <1 comptmllm’. 1$1E.. PA...r< S0.ctond G.rt.uh. 1972 The f“nda. . and Nat. 127. G The comnm” overview at the Army War College K. 17ctmtc.fc>.. Cmnma”d and Man. Strategy.1. r..t.W. US ArtnY war Ccdlme Lettev.. of 1976 were: d. m.. US G.. DD 6-7. .<d 1.h. 1Ma.le. D.tm”s..asw s..J72..sement a“d 16ditm’Y and OPemtm”s. the om. Gme..L1 I?o.the military scholastic discipline.hsle ffm’racks...c k. Office...”. 17 US Army War College oh.1 Planmw 17 M.(1.1.. law 2.n”l sy. t.... Thonm. US Arnw war Cc+l. t W.ghty.r Pmmon”el Mmaremmt SY+C!I! w.. of A{ . PA..E.d. for D.. C“l... 1.mct.. Cmwdf Co.ou. S]. NIV.. .. G. Fiye h.te staff) is commxsed of 23 civdian~ and 64 nmhtary officer.. Collc O. .nar.. 2 ArmY R.s knowl+e of his snceialtlw.... the .des for each officer to dtw. Affair.! of t!.l o..ve.cn. dest=ned to cnhanc. Baird) .. KS.ernment Pxt”tm!x Oak. I:< Kmth It Sinn... Da...Jo.dY 3 ‘l%. Cn.. 18 SeDtmnber 1872. p) The Army mlucat. s. It would appear that some action is called for. United Stmtcs Army War Colle!m Philo..l Sm”rity Studies. 1 R H.. Dwernbe. NY..lat..d and mddt.. held hy the Army WaI..m for rescmch paper. nl 17rnnkkn M. in many . work don.. to bring about uppropri:tte authcwization for institution of intellectually rigorous degree programs at the Army War College..nizto”.... t. 1976. :8 J<. . US Army War COIICRC. DC. A. t dqzre...hml “ndcr the mlswces of the US AIr Force..n Council o“ Education recorn nmnded up to 24 graduate cted~ts for the common overview. would seem to de: mand it... Sub>cct. ts for each elective course . Thomas Y.. NOTES Smith Jr B.... master.<l.1 >1>..d. .”ow”twu and FwLctio>z8 U... tv and Y.vnomvd. a<. study d. ..tezic St. W.n two cnrmr specu. I...t<. ( Colonel May 1973. on mtdrem to the 21. Crmvell Co. 10 US Artq.cwhy nnd Ob>mtives.+ ... t.tttcd SLatcs Ann IJ W..... 1070. department?: Nattonal a“d Interne.t other mstm.m!o. m. Tho Ofl.. by legis. P !. Imchdor...vthe.mml Stm<tmTV TILC P(znmfoc of l%. Super: htcnd. both within the Army and outside..

It is evident that PLA militnry leaders play an important Military Review a definite need for a c[)ntirluing analysis of the cap~bilitie~ and limitations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ). The must distinguishing characteristic of current PLA leadership “is their membership in the second military generation-—the group who entered the Red Army from Jnne. Piotrowski. through November.llly and technolngicnl]y trained and !vho possess a more international! strategic vielv. 1928.”1 With an average age of 65. These moves. half of the key riecisionmaking positions in the political infrastructure fit the province level and above. The military ]n China has main. on the average. power position in the overall scheme of Chinese politics. tbe m]litary has occllpierl. In the past 20 years. Their influence ranged from a low of 45 percent in 1956 to a high of 74 percent in 1968 ~ and is cnmently believed to be at or near that peak.Mil~tary Leadership in the People’s Republic of China Major Karl P.f China ( PRC }. There is tM’Y ~ f urmtd ed~!uttt inn. point to a need to m-examine the entire spectrum of military leadership in the People’s Republ!c . St:lnding in the wvng-s is a cast of third :md f m rth-generat ion leaders who are more professional. The recent resurgence of the Chinese Cultural Revolution has brmlght fvtth it significant shift> in top PLA leadership. Umted States Army fOrc@ of more th:m fnur milllou is a potent fiictor in the international b:dnnce of po~ver.. 1931. mnre form. coupled ~~ith the i]lcmasing We of present military Ietiders. thoog-h tloctnatil]g. tained a significant. these ofticers’ coll@ive experience is one of limited 82 . demon stinted superior abil]ty as ground commanders md nnly rudimentary knowledge of sophisticated s t r n t e g i c .~veaponry.

These : shifts. “’ Of the six rernaini]]g members. an M. Tht+ article w.S.. in International Relations front Indiana State Unirxrsitu and is a oraduat. Maj(>r I<ad P. death —Editor. in Economics frwm Ripen Crdlefte. and fhe 20tlt Engineev B~igade.B. Seven of the 11 powerful military region cnmm:~ndem \vere transferred to new posts. long acclaimed as Chou En-lai’s successor. at the Ministry of Niltional Defense reception mmrking the 48th anniversary uf the PLA. the US Militarw Assistance Cammand.tfcmtcr’rg. Fo~t Bragg.ifh Armored Division in Germany. w Lang]/agc Institute. Chnu Emlai’s death In J:mu~iry 1076 was the third death \vithin the ninemember St:mdlu!g Committee of the PRC Polit!mlro in the last year. when viewed in the context of the unexpected eclipse of the rising star of Teng Hsiao-ping. He has scrwd a%ifh the . In December 1973.idence of a massive reinstatement to powfer of numerous former high-ranking military officers.PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP role in the nolitical urocess of allocat ing the resources w:ithin the governmental Recent struture Personality of the Changes PRC. Vietnam. :ilsu hake dieti in the past year. Mm. Two of the five Vice Chairmen wf the Chinese Commllnixt Party \CCP ). i.. He received an A. nut m(wc than t!vo #till are active in day-to-thy pnliticill df:lirs.e of the Armed Force. m. many of whom had not been seen publicly for more than 20 years. He is a member of the Foreign Area Of)icers’ SpecialfU Prwgvam. >1ma.! Staff COliege. Calzfarnia. written prior to Ch. Piatrowslti is a Cl/inese-lan{jwwe stwfenf at tile Drfm. In Aogust 1975. 83 January 1977 . As a res[llt.. there was e~. SIX of the qeven had been holding the top civili:m position in their regions concurrent }vith their military duties. the organiza- tion chart of the PRC is unriergolng change brought on by the metamorphosis nf age as well ns internal st roggle. No~tlt Carolina. The official line of the CCP con- . attest to the volatility of tbe current state of military affairs in the PRC.lor shakeup of military region commands resulte(l in an important realignment of leariership w’lthin the third find fourth military generations.. .

the v~lrious pt.tmpaigns huve been a re:~l suuwe of frustration for many PLA otficers. However. There is little cioubt “that the PLA had come out Military Review :Ind the debacle of the 1958 Great Leap Forward campaign.stres.zcessive ammlnt of time and re. in v?arc}lirzg and in fighting..PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP > This point of vi>. Many China anulysts muint ain that the: . ” c Ostensibly. 7 A cyclic trend in tbe role of military ufficers as polltical f(lnctiunaries seems quite evident in PRC history.’ I. however.. It is. The periodic setbacks which have occurred :. military officers appear in key civilian politlcnl positions. As tension subsides. although “political power grows out of tbe barrel of a gun.A efforts to ptirticipate in.”’ ‘ In the aftermath of the Cultarul Revolution. a national martial arts mmpetitiun was held in China. the recent rekindling of the revollition~ir’y flames offers the military at least a shortterm reprieve from the iisuol decllne in its political power. As a resu]t of the Kore:m experience Maoist doctrine of the supremacy of man over weapons. this was a triumph. We must ?mderwland and rnastcr’ (:hairman Mao’s principles of strategy and tar. a result uf diversions uf PI. the PLA W’:W wt a zenith of politictd intiuence. Civilian control of ths Military Early in his reign as the ruler of the PRC.scs and strains !rl!iclt wrist haue rrdaccd its effectiz. at least in the name of national unity. The following illustrates this counterpoint: Mean while-. During times of increased ]nternal tension.imited saccess In the etfnrts to divorce military tra]ni]lg from political inclurtr ination lvas evident in early 1974.litlcul c. tics. a task that is still Ilnder umy and still not fully accomplished. still quite evident that the historic Chinese characteristic of avoiding direct confrontation s t i 1I functions within the military. Mao Tee-tang laid down the edict that. It was reported that “. for the first time since 1964. aneasg rclatiansl lip brtw~cn tlie Armu and tlte Pa~ty has rcs?i[ted in the PI. of military professionalism over tbe pure 84 . A ne~v emphosis on purely mihtary training wus proclaimed at the national level. these officer’s are replaced by civilian appointees.A suffering a series (If internal . a fine mill tar~ art is also one of the important facta~s for our arm~’s fi~htino poaw. there has been a continuing t!uof old drive twvard regu. ~ As in other armies of the world. is counterbalanced by other articles which place greater stress on the purely technical aspects of the military profession. Landle skillfully the weapuns in olt~ ha}zds. a move that is hampered by what they ~~r)nsiderto he tbe e. This phenomenon hus heen ~.crzess and combat preparedness at various rritical peri. flc.t{s d//7 infl tlfe past twerrt~ vears. In A1igust 1974.lewed by msn y Chins watchers as an indication (If the C(~P’s Continuing “efforts to bring the military back under civilian control.rilrly ripply t.Army commanders }velcomed a redistribution of emphasis bet~veen political indoctrination and military training. It seems that China’s younger military leaders see u need tu mi][lernize their force. . and be good ix bot]f offense and defense. and or si[ppress. ” the gun must at all times remain firmly within the controlling grasp of the Communist party. iInd the cycle of removal of the military from civilian posts began.urcw thot must be tiiverterl to purwly pulitical work.s[. Iarization and morlernizatiun of the PLA.arimls tech niqz[rs. .

]es far beyond the Ilnw of uuth~]rity depicted on the rek. nul v(]mm:tnd’s or’gunuatlun chart. form a cohesive political g?oup across the spectrf(m af issaes. 1> aesign party’s :1 menns heavy to reliance malutam PLA population is tl. nat?{rall~j. Thus. it is mum of a special intcrwat grcmp than a paliticrd factian. The younger. The learlership of the PLA also: .mplex structure of personal Ioy:tlties devel. unstable world environment which dictates ‘“that the cornerstone of a modern army is s professional [Iffiuer corps.xtreml ties of central party prrlitlcs force l(wal millt:try commanders to tlssame piditicnl func timw fur reasnns of psrty expetliency.pe(l g.ns t. leased for public scrutiny.” as it IS termed in the current Chinese press. ers. \vere retives. A umque insight into the extent of th]s problem and its resalting itltern. Among these is the party’s acknowledged and often demonstrated authority to re- Regional Warlordism Recurrent regiuntilism also enhances the abihty of the CCP central nnthorities to control the PLA. altl{oa(lh mm rwiwcntal commanders m{(st know l[UIC much poa.’ 1t The apparent reluctance of the military to exercise its power fully may be due to several factors. 13~ its natl<re. coupled with the party’s political ability tn control the allocating of the nation’s resources as well as its mantle of legitimacy derived from its role as the keeper of the sacred ideolngy.diral sala tif. internal stresses in the CCP appear to have dictated. does not. . The u. This procesh is assisted Ivhen the e. ardcr. manders to build their own “mullntaintnp.. a return to the themes of the Cultural Revnlutinn to direct mass attention elsewhere while an inner party balance is being struck. tends to mitigate ngninst the military making an open break with the party. now rising military generations are more militarily professional in their outlook and do not seem to aspire to political power. This tendency toward ‘%arlordism” is ns old it> recorded Chinese history.” 1“ Military In on the Self-restraint view’ of the as contr~: strikitlq and relieve military command. prwlJ/?ms. . It Is quite natural for local military cum. and m ct hf. the military presently has a rare opportunity to consolidate the political power it was given by the party to bring under control the rrverzealous Red Gunrds and other rnnaway participants in the party-initiated mass movement.stirr~ufsltcd generals of sabartfirraticj?z ta local political leadership. It is argued that the younger generations of Chinese military leadership see a role for a modern military force in a hostile.” ~)Before this power could be attenuated. c rrctefltancc by the coantYu’s most di. ” l’! The Wnhan Incident of Jaly-August 85 lanuary 1917 . whose members make the art of war their vowti on. This power. There is evidence that the older generation of PLA leadership eagerly sought such political opportunity.~ PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP of the Cultural Revolution with unparalleled political power.f(ld . it tends to be conserrat ice in outlfmk and to fauor stability.i~.er theg C<.scizc ‘aith the w}jif of gcapeshot.il disruption wws provided in 1963 when several captttred secret PLA direc\vritten in 1960-ijl. These drlcuments provided “cuncrete evidence of secti(aml and factional strviggle for power.. owing both to personal rivalries and palicy differences. both in the province< and at the center.

if this p(. One month is spent in “productive Iahor” ot the company level as “ranlsand-file soldiers. by not erupting into open warfare. as well as be severely ego bruising.7. ” 1:’ In the case of the 196th Division cited above.licy of personnel turbulence continues.f rising young ofti~ers between military regions W>W initiated to reduce the localism of military region affiliation that so strongly ties the older military generations. Chen Tsai-tao.PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP 1967 further illustrated that “warIordism” does still exist in the PRC. division and regimental commanders snd that ‘(they learn modestly from the ordinary fighters. officers at the regimental level and above are required to devote two months of their time each year to special duties. even minimal participation must seriously disrupt a busy military officer’s schedule. Peking Wras forced to deploy four army divisions to suppress open defiance of party control by the Wuhan mi Iitary commander. “A burea[lcrutic functional system of rival loytilties may replace the system based (m military regi{mh” 1The Economic Challenge of Leadership Another aspect of the functioning of military leadership in the PRC that runs counter to the drive for grefiter professionalism is the continued use of the PLA in an economic stabilization role.” ~’J HDW well Military Review . Indications are that these assigned economic tasks conflict with military training priorities. In July 1967. is equipped not only with guns.” 10 The div]sion is said to produce over 5. Peking boasts “this division is able to supply nearly all the vegetables and part of the food grain and meat it needs” by requiring that “some companies devote most of their time to farming with the provision that they fulfill military training requirements. a second month eaeh year. but not before the fallibility of absolute party control wxs revealed to the world.” and. A continuing progmm of transfers t. served to demonstrate the PLA’s capability to avoid damaging internal te~ts of mihtary power and “pblice” its INVnhouse.5 million kilograms of fresh vegetables yearly as well as tending to 2. but. ‘~ More significantly. The heavy commitment of troops to such nonmilitary missions m farming and construction projects is resented by the younger professional ofiicers who maintain that training in 86 the use of new weapuns with their complicated technology should be fuRtime duty. negotmtions led to the capitulation of Chen and his relief from cnmmand. Peking claims that the PLA 196th Division “like other army units. the incident. Since I!)(. As an example. there hxs been a COnwrted pitrty effilrt to weaken the imp~wt [If regional]>m on elite groupings within the PLA. It always has been the case that the common “soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army have had to devoie considerable time to raising a portion of their own food. hoes and tractors for agricultural production.800 pigs.”’7 It is reported that those who participate in this program include corps. but with sickles. It is believed that. these snme officers must work as manunl laborers to “solidify their empathy with the proletariat. To confuse fllrther the continuity of military dedication. The use of the PLA as a ready labor force has created a serious challenge for PRC military leaders. surely. After x month of stand-off artillery duels and limited probes.” ‘“ Tbe true extent of this participation is difficLl]t to judge.


“TO eay that the command structure of the PLA ia in a state of flux is a masterpiece of understatement. it mag not be too misleading to argue relations in that the civil-military China will undergo a change in the future. One outcome of this interaction may be a changed civil-military relationship. This younger generation of PLA leaders w. . . Despite the part~’s effort to impose functionally difluse roles on the military. Profeesor Myung Cheng summarized the changing state of affairs as follows: Although the PLA may continue to play its participant role.ill rise rapidly to power as the PRC’S present aging party leadership fades from the scene. the schism between political dedication and m i 1i t a r y professionalism will widen. and artillery. . The outcome of this strategy is still not clear. however. and be skilled in the logistics demanded by the new tools. An increase in CCP internal stress is likely to result.. la~ the seeds of a long and bitter conflict within the PLA—the conflict between ‘ce# and ‘expert. Their more proThe recent tural Revolution 88 military Review . not jxst a semiliterate enthusiast. The PLA seems subject to the same economic constraints that control military spending in other nation-statee. Whiting. These new leaders are Paced with the same type problems found in any modern military force. . Z2 The CCP has attempted to retard this emergence hy a series of “musical chaira” reassignments of regional mi]itary commanders. In this new accent on professionalism. This state of affairs is neatly summarized by Kenneth R. the military and offer an opportunity for the PLA to consolidate and expand ite political power base. antiaircraft guns. The militwy felt the impact of the e c o n o m y most fully when strength reductions we~e ordered in 1974 and the military budget was reduced by at leaet 25 percent in what appeared to be a reaction to the spiraling coats of sophisticated weaponry.’ and one that is still going on today.PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP thk t~aining can be accomplished is questionable when viewed in terms of the technical nature of modern warfare. tanks. Professionalism will become a salient feature of the PLA with the technological advancement of modern warfare. However. . the PLA will continue to articulate its interests in order to emerge as a reliable autonomous profession. Conclusion It wouid seem that a new. generation of military leaders is emerging in the PRC. kowever brave and determined. In a detailed study of this relationship. more professional and more international in their world view. In short. *Z resurgence of the CUlwill again weaken party control of. With the changing attitudee of the new generation. It seems probable that the PRC’S new ruling class will emerge from the third and fourth-generation military officers presently active in the regional military commande. as well ae a set of problems unique to China. he should be a trained professional with technical competence. for the party to curb the gro?uth of military professionalism among the PLA officer corps.” 23 Many scholars feel that the military has been the most important factor in the shaping of modern Chinese history. if not impossible. tt is dificult. a noted PLA analyst: The new officer must have the abilit~ to supervise the use atid maintenance of such weapons as aircraft. it is verv unlikely that it will appear as a military oligarciz~ or take over the government and operate it directlg.

PoM..te Plains.. P 265.!0.t hf. ty P. 1. 1+1<. fm. the Amn~ has neitker tile weapon~y no~ logistics sttpport to engage in large-scale operations be~ond its frontiers.. 1966. Leo Good.. May 1974. The Rand Corn . File Soldiers.>.s Rmnk. <Lt. Pc. ctt...lmo.. 01. /zemud Poht.). 10 . Air War Collfzfe Reserm.”.t.WW Red Arm LI H.hski.zgR. MIIItm I f?.Eust 1967.iyaity Doc. c. P 74. . Pr.. TIM R.me. Chestar ChenE.l Arts & Sciences Prom. NY. “. fh. P 6.:.blmm of Cl.. million NOTES 1 Willittm W. tow of Co. Whitwm and HuanF.<The Dynamic. tadt.C . S..uJ A.n..rmd.’.. Inc.. 1949..u. P . to Cht.vfv. Awl 1976. . m.. T!. r. . It appears that: Tke Peking government is not offensive-minded..o<l.1 Swtom. C).]>. 1978..nwmnm Books.. Force Base. TAc Pcwvl&a Lzbcratzrm Arnw rtnd Cl.?.t. mt .tie”. -. 11 G. . m. 1976. 29 Novem- Pcl. 1974. L. For a mom d.. n Pt’oduct... M8xwell AI. 1 May 1972. 1!) Wmbcrfc Chai. P. Chen. G. 20 .tmt&-Lfzuld.”.. 01). >. i?)em Cmnrnt’?z #et P. d.. 7 Gerard c.unt of tbm .Juno 1!164.fcmnt. p 2:1.ati.ccd A. D 165. D 31. D :34 nnd follmvins.. I’ut”mn% Son.....n vzc w. but even if U were. . Air U. 8. tbc CA. 12 Poirmr. Harvard MA. P<k. The PRC has over 100 young men who.vi.. Sung... IL. cm.n AnnII Dad.. R. ve Force.. AL.t...lysis of thi.... 1S27. <ne% N. P 32.(.?-89.Ol%c.. Cnmbm<lKc. .Mgm Pub. professional and potentially a!wressive. Fe. Army in China. D 204. D 64... 2* on. Hz”!. D 31. Dismrtc..nn. Partv . “uoted i“ Kr..d Control 1949 -1!764.mII Pr. UP 22-2-! 17 Ib.. ~6~h Study. Santa Mom. Potrier. . A.PLA a. COmm.. <w... Ll 38.wdiam D 69. lntcrnztm.PLA as n Pmdu?t.. Cor.c.ta] led o... 1973. Command A H{. Wh. co.cc<. with attendant disruptions of the army’s training programs.. D 366.. ‘. 01.nx. The mud Poictms Sm. :>1 Whiting.ncidmt.. 10 Ellis JoRe... z more Actailml . 4 Red F(w. October 1976. Schocken NY. Quoted m Ks.16G6 -AILPA.. CA... Un. 162. NY.. s.. tmn. 4 January 1977 89 . of lIhnms. ““ 7. Re. vew. for a Not. Chmtcr Ch<. Party nnd Unlvms*tY 22 Myun!J Che”g. S. Urbana. professional leadership... .71. tIIdt. ..?r8 Se! . PuttinE l?cowmtc lhe Army i.m!c Htstoru OJ the Cl. 1970.. A C. 1:< J....mm Political Awdw.. 12 Scmwnber 1975. CA. TIM Chi.ve Form.. n Job” T...mnd.. could be quickly mobilized to form a potent offensive force in spite of the initially limited industrial baee that presently exists in China proper to support the deployment of such a force. Pcdner.beratmn Army: Remdm imtion and Revolutionizati..nis! Chinese Pohltc. J. AL. o. at. .n Rc- s Kenneth LL Whit{”s.we Commu?wt Armed Forma. 3 Ltbm’ati..icw. 0/.. m 141-42.. 1 R . Its lh. A Dtormqd... U. cit. W. cit....h Report Summary. OJ MJitq. given dedicated. to emerge as a vinble force with a rising set of lwders who are dedicated....c8..w. of tbe Chrome People<./..tti. LeaderShip i?t CA. .. PRC MILITARY LEADERSHIP fessional military attitude and more . Maxwell A. D 662. 23 Wbitinx. the Sm’r<4 Military Pruxw. Force Base. Inc.. D 809 see 14 F.D.e. cmnm. It is clear that the PLA has survived numerous p u r g es and various political campaigns. tration. i+t Lmdersh!i. 2$ In view of the changing outlook of the PRC military leadership.. 2 George C. strategic world view bear careful watching by all of China’s potential adversaries.ficcr CO.tcww ber 1014. o . P 28. CIL. it would be dangerous to assume this condition will endure.. 1$49-59. 14 November 1076.. Surt. D 40. Place.. 1921-1973.r.!. Hshers.The Dynamics of Ph. NY... Ymz-nmo...z. 1974... T/tc S.

New values in a frontier setting created a different attitude toward life and a fresh look at associations among people and relationships between government and governed. It exiled those who had raised penetrating questions. From the first shipload of Englishmen that sailed for America to the last that arrived prior to 1775. .w America’s Revolution and Its Legacy . America’s distance from England in space and time was quickly translated to distance in perception and understanding. but tkey-d not be Englisk agairt.kite covn kernels.. Sims. the English systematically stocked the Colonies with dissenters from all aspects of English life. 90 . Such a direction of growth was encouraged from the beginning of English colonization hy the philosophy that supported that movement. England used its 13 Colonies as a dumping ground for those who did not fit into society at home. parched in the sun and tlteu knew it not. Also forced out were Military Review Major Lynn L. England was intellectually bankrupt because it had forced out the religious dissenters and second and third sons with no inheritance but unfulfilled dreams of land ownership and influence. Perhaps Stephen Vincent Ben& touched on the essence of the conflict when he wrote: And tkose who came were resolved to be Englishmen. HAT caused the American Revolution ? A concise and unimpeachable anawer is not easily foand in the years before 1775. and they ate tke a. United Stetes Army Raserva . but Englisk euerv one. the answers to which cOuld have served as the bases for progress. Gone to the World’s end.

. a country would sue for peace and the war ended. . Americans had. England had the opportunity to ask itself. Spain began colonizing 100 years before the English. to become a colonist. such as headstrong. But a revolution is for keeps. For 175 years. By the 1769s. It is an ideological struggle that cannot be 91 .. Spanish and Portuguese settlements. At that point—perhaps in 1765 with the unified front presented to the Stamp Act—the revolution was complete. which seemed to have solidified American opposition. troops were sent to America. The Towrnshend Duties were dropped. This was probably a better way. “Why have they taken directions for more than 160 years?” This approach to colonization was qpposite to the philosophy that drove French. In a war.. then withdmwn.. several words spring to mind. especially an 18th-Century war. independent. the fact would be recognized. the victor \tas one who could bring his opponent to a place where the losses were no longer commensumte with the issues at stake. When it became obvious that England was trying to subdue a continent not merely punish Boston.------. thereby avoiding a collision but America. prostitutes and criminals. January 1977 leaving Americans more united than before. it was necessary to pass tests and take oaths of fidelity to the mother country. this process continued and England survived. To describe these people who would no longer listen to England. and thereby postponed the inevitable outcome for six years. Men would die to decide the question when. During the fighting. On the British side. and its colonies remained faithful for 30 years after American independence. In those countries. For tbe first year of the fighting..eated erroneously by the government of the mother country nnd historians since as a war. “Why won’t these Englishmen in America take our directions any longer ?“ Perhaps a better question might haye been. if too many men were killed.. to the great surprise of the English and themselves. actions were characterized by indecision which only confirmed ~vhat Americans had grown to believe about the English anyway-not fit to lead or follow The American Revolution was ti. if too much territory was occnpied or if too much money was spent.. not if. These were’ gathered up by the sbiplond and carried to the dumping ground- This Stamp Act. dangerOLW and rebellious. come to the place in their development where they were willing to stake their lives on the principle of being autonomous. rather than the rebellion it was.. but did not change for there were few to challenge the system.-----. . the English people wavered \vhile King George 1II stiffened and continued to follow m unsound policy. omhans. those who were debtors. was repealed by England in 17GG. most Americans persisted in their determination for self-direction. If too many cities were destroyed. British generals tried to fullow the impossible dual policy of conciliation as well as victory on the battlefield. Only the most loyal could colonize.

England could have gone on for another six years winning battles and never have won the’ war because they faced a revolution. If there had been no consolidated army under Washington fighting England. he was the father uf the united country—or. it was a single conquest usually on a small scale. as a symbol of unity for Americans. 13 state armies. For that reason. the United States of America. despite what can be snid against him. In that sense. Perhaps it can be suppressed for a time. not a war. In fact. the camwaign was a failure. England may have tired 92 .oltltion until today it stnnds opposed to the practice. saw the most fanatical support by Americans. The British were fighting n war of attrition with overlvhelming resources when compared to the Americans. more quickly tryirig to conquer 13 forces rather than just one ! No ‘one state could say. the United States has grown steadily a\vay from rei. tbe outcome of the American Revolution never “hung in the balance” as some have tried to show by pointing to crucial events in tbe struggle.oiution.AMERICA’S REVOLUTION defeated in the conventional sense because territory. Americans never really made any fundamental changes in institutions or attitudes. on fire for the ret. Needless to SLLY. ardor waned and interest in exporting the revolution lost popularity. the longer the combat kwted. zealous patriots.” Washington’s role was indispensable in that he kept a unified front that greatly facilitated establishment of a single government after the revolution. but. Washington’s task was to endure. The King was replaced by a President. when the Americans did gain an advantage. independence still \vould have been won. The American people i ecame tired of the conflict. Many have shown that Washington was not the greatest tactician. This “hanging on” by Washington was evidenced by the fact that he fo~ ght no major battle from June 1778 0 the last battle at Yorkto\vn in Oc ber 1781. Truly.” In that year. but the English people became even more weary. as it has become known. hut. The first yew of the rebellion. blit. and. and the fighting was a struggle for independence to practice what was already happening in America. The British had an almost unbroken string of victories. he did preserve the Continental Army. but that is not like being defeated. In that year. invaded Canada to bring it to its senses as the 14th colony. the House of Lords and House of Commons were turned Military Review Even George Washington’s part In the action was not critical to independence. the more costly it became in terms of destruction and loss of life. 1775. Why does the United States serve as the great object lesson of a people who went from radical revolu tlontwies to antirevolutionaries in one lifetime ? The radical nature of Americans in 1775 was tempered by tbe mild changes actually brought to life after independence. the greatest contribution Washington made was keeping the states from fragmenting into many di~ections. money and even human lives are not the issues. once revolution had served thqm and their needs. rather. Since then. “Our army beat the British.

not as in the United States’ case. for the United States has had no interest in the success of revolutions since that time in other parts of the world or at home.AMERICA’S REVOLUTION into the Senate and House of Representatives. Americans did find something useful about the revolutions in Texas and California all areas that found the culmination of their revolutionary process within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. In 1911. In the case of the French Revolution. m the process. That may he. Under the guise of a prorevolutionary banner. in part. The United States horn in revolution. the responsibility of world revolutionary leadership was shunned by Americans and picked up by other nations. and. The wealthy and well-positioned still ruled. Ry the 20th Century. Surely America would respond with sympathy and even material support. the legacy of a successful rebellion. and slavery was not touched as an institution. sympathy with North Americans was not the criteria for obtaining help from the United States. not unlike what the United States had done a quartei-century earlier. The French broke violently with the past in the last decade of the 18th Century. 93 of the Latin 19th America in the process of breaking away from their pother countries of France and Spain. Jsnuary1977 . One might expect the United States to ignore the RLlssiSn Revolution. The American Civil War confirmed the hatred against the South’s right to revolt in order to farm a more tolerant government. totally unnecessary in the American experience:. excesses were committed that were wrong in the eyes of the Americans. The rebellion did prodace a new base from which the United States had since developed. Mexico went through a re~. the Cubans. has cooled considerably to the very process that gave it life and a separate destiny. but not radical change. were beginning people in Later in the 19th Century. By the Century. Still.olution without the United States’ interest being greatly aroused. for the sake of Americun commerce \shich would move throagh the proposed WLUd. Ilowever. In recent times. It was too radical. not for the sake of Panama’s self-determination but. against a government across the ocean. the United States was unsympathetic to botb revolutions. but in the development has turned its back on revolution as a means to an end or an end in itself. but the Mexican Revolution was closer to home and different in nature from the Russian. commerce had influenced the United States’ value system and the realization that trade flourished best in iL setting of peace and tranquility not revolution and unrest. For 175 yeare after freedom. But no aid was forthcoming from the United States. the United States dld encoamge and speedily recognize the Panamanian rebellion from Colombia. and. It was not until 1823 that the United States became interested. and the United States’ neutrality wns a cool condemnation of the whole sordid blood bath. the strife was among countrymen. six years later. the Russians did the same thing. rather.

It actually feared the process and had no empathy with the men in revolt because America never went through n radical change that seems to have been necessary in all subsequent revolutions. After’ using revolution to create self-government. from Wkcaton College a?rd an M.recutitw Director of tke Rfch?nond Independence Bicentennial Commission in Virginia and u ?nernbe~ of the Consulting FaccrltU. is tire L’. It hua only been since World War 11 that the nature of the Americnn Revolution hns taken a “radical” turn as the changing position of tbe blacks and women in America indicate.A. when a revohltiurr succeeds. it becomes conserwrtive. 94 Militsry RevieN . His Bicerrtcnn<al Featcr~e “Crime Does M Pay” appeared in the January 19Y6 MILITARY REVIEW. How can we understand American attitudes to the world revolutionary movement in light of its past? The world through the 19th and 20th Centuries seldom noticed that America was a “paper dragon” espoosing the right of self-determination but not willing to become in~. Sims. The American Revolutimr was so successful arrd so mild thzt the vaccination turned America to nltraconservatisrn in a generation. USACGSC. He omsPrOfessO~Qf History at TkeKin# sCollegeandtlle US Military Historian at tke USA- -f CGSC. from New York University. Americans reverted quickly. US ArmO Reserve. \ -. to conaerwrtism w a means of orderly growth and development. and Ph.AMERICA’S REVOLUTION Peruvians. What generalizations can we glean from nll of this? Orre of history’s uses is that it should be able to serve as an iqdicator for the future. He received a B. Chinese and a host of Af ricrrn countries have taken their turn in the headlines as the revolutionary leader.D.A. maintained an archaic policy that is only recently receiving a closer lorrk? f-. Has America. like its mother country 200 years ago. Majo~ Lynn L. US Army Training and Doctrine Conrmand.olved in the revolutionary process necessary for self-determination. American history has shown that. His mobilization aseigrrment is with tke Historical Division.

July-August and September 1976 (Switzerland) c Commtmicating network. ders. . Against parties and organizations. Lieutenant General Markus Wolf heads the more than 500 members of this agency who specifically conduct espionage against the FRG. confi. there have been 120 known cases of espionage involving 200 people.Wilhelm Schlomann ASMZ. pressure and coersion.m Espionage By Dr. The eight subdivisions of his group work in the following areas: . . military supply installations and allied and FRG au forces. at least in part. This article cites methods and examples of Eastern esPionage not because only the E. ideologically engrossed with no loyalties to West Germany and highly esteemed politically in the East. .500 officers and noncommissioned officers and 1. there is a military intelligence service called the Administration for Coordination. Against NATO armed forces and military bases in the FRG.. zone bor. well-equipped.600 civdians. Following the Soviet example. Other agencies include part of the Institute for Politics and Economics responsible to the German Democratic Republic Cabinet and some Soviet intelligence agencies such as the well. This agency has 1. The Ministry of National Security in Be. . Friedrich. Sometimes. The typical East Berlin spy is well-educated. Recruiting new military contacts in the West takes various forms –some times money.Against Western embassies and to NATO policies’.-lirt. . DiYision C is directed ‘against NATO troops and facilities. cafly with Eastern ideology and radical left students. Lichte”bt. but because Lt has probably the most extensive network of agents. � For gaining access for agents into the FRG. known KGB (Committee of State Security). � Evaluating. public of Germany (FRG) and other Western European countries. Other methods include approaching those in the West who agree. Division T has three groups dkected against chemical and armament industries. There are various types of agents such within the agent Since 1948. Against science and technology. Division A is in charge of defense ministries. in Switzerland. � .rg ‘overs the Federal Re.. allied troops. the FRG border patrol.ist conducts such activities. politi. dent. � dkrupt 34 Military Review . ‘~ ARTICLES OF INTEREST . Against the FRG Government and ministries. the new contacts do not know they are engaging in espionage –just answering a few qtfestions for a survey conducted by a nonexistent research center supposedly based in a friendly country. very self. the ~undestuekr. blackmail and other types of threats.

1975. the Montotieros. (7ke author is an editor with the German radio network Deutsche WeUe. The army waited. GcIIcrai Vidcla. With both guerrillas and right-wing extremists doi~g the shooting. the influential agent planted high in the structure or the East. The Eastern bloc countries pay all their spies. pressive measures.used. No official endorsement of the views.000 political nations. In agent assigned tO certain pickup pOints transferring information to and fro. These synopses ace published as a service to the readers. the violent death rate has risen co 100 a month. The new President. . for more derailed accounts. putting dOwn One revolt in the air force. suspending party and union Activities.ippropriate and then took over the government in March 1976. From both ends of the political spectrum. The 6uerriUas have mdde contact with revolutionary groups in Chile. L Y. —— .——. Urban guerrilla activity arose from left-wing Pcronist youths.. The Cuban succcss in Angola has given them hope. USAR ‘The military ruled Argentina from 1966 until Aprif 1973 when the govern.July 1976 (France) Translated and condensed by COL John W. or factual statements ! in these items is intended or shmddbe inferced. The country moved rapidly toward political and economic chaos. with some going underground. the equivalent assassiof a decentralized civil WJI. The Peronists then split. ment was ousted and the charismatic Pero’n returned. whether they are pressured into service or ideologically agreeable. ehminating the guerrill~s will require re. However. the two are condemned to work together.West gOvcrnment truck-driver ARTICLES OF INTEREST Guerrillas bec~me strong enough to attack army garrisons. as the prospective agent prepared years in advance for his mission. finally establishing a base in the northern province of Tucumin as the People’s Revolutionwy Army. When he died in July 1974. The West’s best protection rcqlains alert awareness of the potcntids. opinions. He faces two big problems: The economic austerity measures that must bc taken are certain to make the workers restive. The hope for the genuine d(tente wc all seek must not duU our defense readiness either militarily or politically. Uru.-?%eEditor.ary 1977 Jan I 35 —. Price. has the reputation of being a liberal. tintil the time was . fer to the original articles. guay and Bolivia.. many now realize that the Argentina of this generation cannot be governed without the labor unions or the hrmy. and military tribunals will be . He established a police state and conducted mass arrests and assassinations of leftists. This gets them accustomed to the financial rewards. Every effort is made to ensure accurate translatmn and summarization. his widow tried to carry on with the aid of Rasputin-like Lopez Rega. The double problem of leftist guer. ) Time for the Military in Argentina: End of the Illusions By Alain Rouqu16 D#fense /Vatior?a/e.. rillas and economic chaos (inflation at one percent a day) is forcing Argentina toward the eventuality of asking for US aid. there were 1. readers should re.

it is simple in design. Former Defense Secretary Laird.“IS America Decadent?. In purely technical this may be true. ofcourse. andwidcspread anta onismto the businessman and all he represents. aMonologue by the on American Affairs. The authot says that the erosion and collapse of American credibihty may well be attributed to many foreign policy i}sues that the Secretary of State has maria eddurin hk term inofflce. Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze and Senators McIntyre and Mathias all agree that. “Who’s First in Defense. is attributed to t R: e Unite States’ handJing of the Israeli clientele relationship inthe Middle East. however. -American Enterprise Institute P~mpMet. the United States or Russia?” In a round-table discussion. Selection of a forcigndmigncd weapons system for deployment with the US battlefield forces has made the Rokmd an object of much discussion in the American defense communit However. quality-engineered and uniquely capable o ? doing the job. Jenuary 1977 95 . four defense policy experts assess our country’s military strength in comparison with the USSR. Theoverridhg factor. “Roland Meets the Challenge. Berger says a regeneration of the beliefs and values upon which our society was buift is still possible but not through Government fiat. “Has the Middle East Conflict Overturned the Superpower Balance?. –Middle East Revietu. Summer 1976. Roderick. hfilituryCh~pkins’ Review. AsianSecuritya ndt heSoviet Factor. 1976.. July-August 1976. “China. Berger. has his own motivations for the judgment. The reduction on the and the terms. Each.” Peter L. -N7utional De~ense. Spring/Summer 1976. or at least by large segments of the Iatter. Yet nearly all Americans bene PIt from this economic systcm every day. the United States stiJl cannot be considered as number two.” Bernard Schechterman. There has been a marked decline in the esteem in which capitalism is held by the American people.” Robert L.’’ Joseph Schiebcl. despite a vast difference in size of forces. Roderick (who incidentally is the project manager of the R&mdmissile program) thinks we definitely made the right choice in opting tousethe German airdefense system. 1976. but are we prepared to substitute mifitary force forthc prevention of national confrontations so effectively checked now by political relationships? –China-~e 7’zuning Point. aired on CBS television 3 June 1976. future existing Council of US political relationships with the Republic of China is dcfcndcd grounds that it may besafely considered since American military power ability to project it into the area wifl remain constant.

out the first XV75 et she Arlington tilt-rotor for Research to combine transportation. is” expected best features to civilian be Ah conducted Mobility of helicopters will over and military the Research and conventional initially years to by Labfast point-to-point the application and Research at Moffett operational Center Field.-The opinions.“- MILITARY NOTES UNITED STATES XV15 f+ESEARCH AIRCRAFT Bell aircraft The planes Helicopter Textron.S. is intended. as a service to the readers. the views. Two will of tha aircraft be producad missions. with The the US Army first hover and the National tilt-rotor flight research is scheduled Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). earl y this year. 96 Military Reviaw . next few and Development investigate Technical NASA/Ames oratories of tilt-rotor technology research and the US Army California. working Flight under a joint Center the contract has rolled in Taxas. for accuracy or factual of information statamants in the Ml LITARY No official Editor. are printad Army Command contained and General Staff College NOTES andorsem assume sec on nt of ( no responsibility of this publication. The Ml LITARY REVIEW Items and the U.

ammunition designated in addition XM200. commercial ‘substitute for the vehicle. howitzers This waapon improved now employs and The in to the a “soft howitzer that rear. Programad XM204 capabla externally The recoil’’-type reliability in the fiald.4 the procured Marina Congressional Marinas 14151A2s requestad but. service “expeditiously Corps buys of unlike ita M151A2 had trucks. in currant 105mm charge. Air only howitzers.1 hut Congress cut the figure full funding. standard charge. truck of its for has evalto find The 5. I I-vintaga artillery Weighing in the M707A / and the M102 whose 4657 or Iargar organization pounds. that could The to future The 1. weapons significantly comparable substantially in appearance conventional recoil artillery it has a single trail extending the tuba and no trails extending to replace will of and baing the World to War battery.. @1976. ARMY TO BUY COMMERCIAL In granting $347. NOTES Wlt VEHICLES saying units amount. mercial reduced also may K-ton million Army.686 the sama ba number of corm with the directive $14.transportable recoil firing system stability to than forward bettar differs 105mm provida from under towed greatar howitzer.212 by $3 million. to a new single provides increased XM204 all current propelling be fired incremant. XM204 “SOFT RECOI L’: HOWITZER The XM204 is a helicopter. apply to buy received vehicles.stal support the %-ton over 90 percent Year 1977 request Congrass program million for vehicles. requested $43.. 97 .miOion tacticel uete” a Army %-ton and recommended the Army Fi. This fialded renge and cannot Ianuary 1977 howitzera. contains XM204 aircraft tha the a is and ba organic a field battalion C723 headquarters headquarters transposed internally Force by mediurmlift firas supar helicopters.-DrtfS /nte//igerrce. range.9.

. US as the Subcommittaa Secratary Self-Defense Japan previous Japan Treaty and US forces United to States study of an amergancy. when Michita Agancy. Dafanse former Sakata. The 9s mission of tha subcommittee is to for body. A dry membrane water purification development reverse units. an advancement Tha system in the state. proposed James in tha event The was naw first STUOIED conduct tion.the-art is capable certain of producing membrana pollutad water from fresh water It can and sea water avan ramove and of removing chemical and radiological aided with contaminant.Nlt NOTES MULTIPURPOSE WATER PURIFICATION UNIT -7.gallon. consultative tha scope and modalities including to ensure guidelines coordinated Forces and the cooperation measures to be known Cooperation. arrangements Article Defense %chlasinger visitad Japan last year for talks with Ganeral of tha Defense Director nated actions althmsgh in the event of armad 50fthe calls for them. viruses and bacteria JAPAN SPECIFICS Japan zation ativa for .–l~pan /?epoti.of.per-hour military Command. Military Review . This 600. OF DEFENSE States REACTION heve agread on organiof consult. taken studies and consultations of USJapan for actions concerning coopen+ to be by Japan’s in the event heve their attack Joint had no coordiupon Security and the United dafanse attack the establishment an armad of a joint on Japan. postchlorination. osmosis The unit will replace Equipment four previously used purifiar is the smallest Research in a serias under and Davelopmant by the US Army Mobdlty element is the heart in reverse potable when of the osmosis unit and represents technology.

Ventilation tha halmet. early but. sinca they vessels will Until then. within sound commander earphones is achieved ensure by maans of The air adequate electronic system at ranges and microphones. not be ready axisting hirad civilian surveillance vessels backed L7riorr.carrying sized helicopters medium. armed futura forlongranga sion white about An patrol million) have The new service with will patrol ba boats aquipped and with helicopter. attenuation from and effective artillery communication.NOTES Wlt NORWAY ‘ COAST GUARD SERVICE PLANNED the huge under has papar. report paper initial boats on surveillance. tha A new coast guard sarvica to patrol offshore Norwegian baan Raplacing aarvica. building costing million surveillance aspartoftha istentatively notyatbeen untlltha fisheries auggeated.type naval aircraft craft will be used. protection fragmants 99 . hasdweloped anew helmat noise and usa by artillaty the hearing spacificaliy tosuppress raduce Communication an interior system circulation in addition the halmet tiles. dwices and comfortable to providing also provides naws item. loss common betwean The institute helmat in artillary for Armament is designed craw mambers. which makas Unlike thacommis. and projec. POLAND Tha for Polmh Militar yTechnological gunners. designed. howavw. –AFSTC January 1977 is affective tha gun crew composed up to 30 temparaturas considerable ballistic and battary of miniature maters. by these 1980s. forces. aea araas expected in tha to jurisdiction the itwillbe axisung organized near come white it builds. no detailed program 735 recommendation of saven kronar new ($134 proposad in a government fishwias tha final size of the service.

of PP to the rank of lieutenant established prowdethe and bagantheirsarvice Munich isnd tfamburgin includes schulen der Bundeswehr were 1973to -Bundeswehr Aktuell. summer. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY GRADUATES This from system ENTER I CAREER cadets to PHASE graduate academy The Hoch. the first West Germany’s were promoted new with service troops. 100 . of military 9495. to a series of four Hydraulic thus facditating to provide 50 each of which center difficult to allow of graui~ terrain wheel drive is . or foucwheel Series production dubbed information Sewice. the vehicle’s and making onto either its belly two tactical hour. as desired. can be lowered operateson kilometers change and. under pressure. ‘ . of the usual new system months 1974. drives steering Institute The hasdeveloped vehicle pumps. If desired. The Swedish National vehicle gasoline run Defense by engine Research hydraulics. the vehicle situations. motors. a prototype with pumps a These crosscountW 65-horsepowr supply powers to is powered which twohydraulic hydraulic allows backing obvious per oil. one of !he wheels.m NOTES sWEDEN CROSS-COUNTRY HYORAULIC VEHICLE .. The and has ‘uncertain. in same academic iancsdlegesin four. MOitary Review . be shifted manuevers. in military prototype. speed of X-Mouse. years program (See as equivalent instead forthis 15 Jun dffl. a top -Swedish road advantages. civil.) The officer opportunities three overall training training.

101 . compared with the Sherman L33? 20. rl148 and M60. estimated tha at $514 antiaircraft missiles from Cost of the pachage is million. to upgrade ebout 510.–DMS Irrtelligance. in tha 1977 for TOW missiles and five mobile the country 250 M16 tanks and co. the prototype represents mounted a great 155mm improvement gun which over the previous was based on the frontal traverse.built uses an adapted Centurion umt. said Arabia which had worked out details with the US Government.360 Hughes radar systems. @1976. the and to program.round traverse that is suitable for almost any tank of 40 tons or over. Earlier this year. Jordan’s King Hussein had balked at the price for the 14 batteries of. biological or chemical to the in the A new self-propelled mount 155inm gun is now in prototype turing a turret with all. PURCHASED which had approached the Soviet I Union for new missiles because the US price tag was too high. combat REPUBLIC OF KOREA DEFENSE The record The the increase increased north. 1975 this F4 and and 10 imMcIn Colt period Government next more year than million forces their acquisition has rapresants military weapons defense of a 30-percent allocated enemy Facing to. included Northrop Sikorsky proved Donnell addition. for US. the prototype hull although the turret is said to be equally suitable for the M47. government announcement deal would be financed by Saudi aircraft flying at no:mal to treetop level.5 kilometers. programs been Raytheon 120 a new five-year submit Much defense January modernization budget contained the HAWK Douglas Korea dafense money Harpoon missiles. the South $2. Ammunition is loaded through a door next driver or through two small side ports hull. The gun fires all NATO standard 155mm ammunition and carries 34 rounds in the turret. 24 acquisitions equipment Fiscal Years Oouglas Rockwell three during and hard. Designated modern M72 Sherman and has a limited and designed system to provide self-propelled at a fraction the cost of a purpose. tensions connaissancelnight observation helicopters. as well as a cupola armed with a . ordered Plerrrred the F5 HH3 defense between McDonnell fighters.500 with WILL RISE 30 PERCENT will for seek a defense.50-caliber machinegun for air defense.manufactured ware 1977. forced country’s major Republic in 1976.NOTES Wlt ISRAEL NEW 155MM SELF-PROPELLED GUN for Israel’s stages.030 total over SPENDING Korean million the $1. The turret appears unusually roomy despite stow age.produce will help country pay riflas. For simplified logistics. 0V70 reaircraft. The gun is the newly developed L39 which M72 can be sealed in the event of a attack . @1976. internal brdlistms of the L39 are identical to the US self-propelled M1L79A 1.5 kilometers. missile battalions. surface-to-air a homing missiles system which are equipped them altltudes with down enabling to zero in on The brief.+lrmor JOROAN US ITJAWK Jordan. has announced it will buy 14 batteries of HA W the United States. Total shell capacwy is approximately 60.000 intends almost the largest of the budget 1977 in its history. Feahas a range of 23. T!re nuclear. Thare ara two large side doors and three a of roof openings.

s11 John I. he completed the work ti \ gs through “1rnnside” Cromwell’s during 30 year’s <If his life from the victory at Illar’stun Moor and the esend of the last century to 1920 when b~blishing of the New Model A~my.Napoleon to 1870 when the Crito compress the first GOOyears of the military tristo~y uf I?ngkmd from the mean War was over and the Charge of Battle of Hastings to the Battle of the Light Brigade already legend. His aswork was interrupted by World War sessment of battles. the final volumes N ere printed. < bc ci. These latter’ volIl:t<mill. He cnntinues with tbe Duke of Wellington’s battles with and final victory SIr Juhn said that his intention was over . MilitaryReview . He taining a competent cartographer to !. and. that is often lacking in this subject. in particular.{ unm as after H:wold’s defeat at Has\vr]tten. Thus. Throughout the work..akl not “leave the Pe]linsukr and %he author’s descriptions cover the p rids from tbe Corlquest of the Norfl’uterltx> unf[}t!~ht’’-nor could he leave the campaign in the (’rime.lject. concisely and with an interest history La 1802. Sir John has Naseby. Peninsula War and ending with Wellington’s victory at Waterloo was He confirms again Cromwell’s cre102 . the printing of and his tactical appreciation are all Volumes IX and X dealing with the the more remarkable for a chronicler who himself never served in the army. pr. subsequently expanded t The history itself bas been written four. shown a great understanding of the and then went on to complete his task and bring the history up-to-date. in hl. his diary of events I. He achieved this admirably. and.s hihtory for publication by com])lete the maps. o~~n \vor’ds. These volumes only brottght th cle:trly..k~an hl.’ortescue \\:ts Ii brurian at {Ielayed due to the difficulties in obWlndsor Castle frum lflOL to 1!)26. His British soldier and his officers.m of Lcnrdon as a one-volume es \rere not printed until 1920.

B?itiah Liaison OflceY. though not in fact.’. . COL JOHN S. . . and perhaps he was deliberately provocati}. Although the Anglo tide has ebbed. . . the AMS Press h+w now republished this valuable work. . of the NeN’ Model Army by discipline and regimental pride. USACGSC ation. .1 . . the comJanuary1977 103 . and his political comments are. and the bravery of British troops is very much within living memory. The price for the complete works may be considered high.” . in every part of the globe. FOWLES. the British had controlled areas as vast :is North America and China. navy and civil services had brought the English hmguage. For more than two centuries. bined efforts of the army. ~. its cultural presence is still felt. Marlboroagh’s genius in administration and Welhngton’s clarity of mind and swiftness of decision. &rot all will agree with everything he says. and individual volumes may be purchased.:. In short. all the while maintaining a balance of power in EUrope. the study of world history in the 18th. l!lth and part of the 20th Centuries must deal with the British Empire. . Firat and most obvious is the British presence. His description of the American militiamen in 1813 may not be taken kindly. in fairness. but this record of history is so wellwritten that it most remain available on library shelves. Today. no stadent of European civilization can afford to ignore British military history for two very practical reasons. At one time or nnother..e. choosing to stimulate his readers with thoaghts and comments that would create discussion. matters of opinion and not fact..:. administration :md commercial ways to strategic parts of Asia.. by invitation or intrusion. .. an often repeated boast was literal fact: The sun never set on the Union Jack. BY the beginning of World War I.. .i . . bat this does not affect his description of the battlee. Fortunately for many.. Africa and the Pacific..

D. Press 303 Pages. 317 Pages Hippocrene Books. He not only explains the details of training and deploying 18th-Cen104 Obscured in this year of national celebration is the fact that 1976 marks the centennial of Custer’s defeat at Little Big Horn. Young University 1976.95. All told. and Captain Keough’s horse. battle drill and equipment of all the major European forces. The Art of Warfare in tAe Age of Mariborougb effectively and thoroughly covers its subject. It corrects a lot of misconceptions about the days of shoulder-to-shoulder fighting and thereby clarifies the professional lessons of the past. OUCHby Oavid Chandler. The circumstances of that battle long have been the subject of speculation and controversy.1976 $1750. He provides the kind of background information that makes the reader’s own generalizations and comparisons more accurate. David Chandler’s new book. before his death in 1925. His new book gets inside the deceptively neat unit symbols of the textbooks to reveal the complex workings of the military bodies of that time. Another Custer MilitaryReview . Careful research supports the book. now presents ‘a wider examination of the military art at its basic levels in tury armies. two messengers sent back before the battle. as is so often the case. units. such historical situations abhor vacaums. Biographies and operational histories. there was a lack of eyewitnesses.$10. Brrgham Edited by Kenneth Hammer. MAJ L.t41t BOOKS THE ART OF WARFARE IN THEAGE. With the-exception of Curley. HOLDER JR. Also. . and. lays out the social. Chandler. Comanche. He discusses cavalry. Best as an authoritative reference to augment tactical studies of the period. L7S’ACGSC CUSTER IN ’76: Walter Camp’s Notsa on the Custer Fight. Like nature.OF MARLBOR. One of the most ardent Little Big Horn aficionados was Walter Mason Camp who. the Crow scout. TAe Art of Warfare in the Age of McsrlborougA.. it is far more than a dry catalog of facts. already known for his study of Mar] borough’s generalship. but also relates how the foo~ soldier tried to preserve his bright uniform in the field and where the cavalryman learned to aim his saber stroke. made nine visits to the battlefield and interviewed more than 60 survivors of Major Reno’s command and 150 Indian participants. technical and organizational background of a very difficult period of military history quite impressively. Chandler comments on the men. although he does not speculate on developments beyond his chosen period. the technically dynamic. there were no survivors from Custer’s force. Unfortunately. he never strays from the significant issues. but Chandler’s skillful blending of lively anecdotes and pertinent con-” temporary views with the cold facts sustains his narrative on an enjoyable level. Part of the trouble was the personalities of two of the major figures-Custer and Reno. Real understanding of the accomplishments and ideas of earlier soldiers requires an appreciation of the fundamental circumstances which shaped and limited their work. helpful as they are. and historians and buffs alike have spent the last 100 years filling this particular gap. infantry. Instead. hardly tell the whole story of soldiering. strategically inconclusive years from 1688 to 1745. artillery and engineer matters separately and does not limit himself to the British Army by any means. Camp never got around to writing his book.

ment Printing June 1975. He questioned and cross-examined intensively. The book divides NATO into eight subject areas. maps of the battles. KLEBER. This. on D Day 1944 Scribrrer’s. Curley. coverage of the German side nf the battle was inadequate. defense posture.$8. US Govern. inclilding 7th Cavalry muster rolls und lists of various categories of Indians involved in the battle. is the ease with which General Cronkenden has captured the airborne spirit and locked it into print. kowitzand Jack Roberts. but it will provide the ideal starting point for the student or the researcher interested in the issues and problems confronting the Alliance. has published Camp’s interview notes along with other Camp material.50. makes the reader feel as “if he were there” from the beginning. . Pages. Their mission was to secure the vital flanks of the landing area at Normandy ahead the massive Allied January19i7 of Literature. these notes go a long way in answering detailed questions about the battle. especially when the reader is not inclined to foilow the operation closely. Much of the controversy hinges on the question of whether or not the impetuoue Custer disobeyed the orders of his superior. Although some words and abbreviations are difficult for the civilian reader to understand. Kenneth Hammer. the history of the American (82d and 10lst) and FJritieh (6th) airborne divisions from their buildup in 1041 until their final battle at B6nouville. tail. 1975. The author describee. for example.65. in great de-. with whom he talked three times. As a result. BaOOKS E. US Awn~ Truining and Doctrine Command DROP ZONE NORMANDY: can and Sritiah by Napier 1976. The Story Aasardt 304 of the Ameri. integrated structure. Camp’s interviews must have been effective indeed. there is a glossary at the end of the book which provides some explanations.$12. amphibious force and to contain the ‘ enemy until the bridgehead had been established. However (and the author himself admits it ). France. Thie analytical survey of NATO Literature is not meant for the average military reader. L)escriptlone of operations at all levels are based upon personal uccounts from the survivors. Airborne Crookenden. LTC GIiRALDO P. The book’s most salient feature. however. The author’s style is clear and direct although the personal accounts of the participants occasionally make the reading a little tiresome. Survey Mos. Office. 106 . The book closes with General Terry’s instructions to Custer on 26 June. Lieutenant G e n e r a I Sir Napier Crookenden has written a fitting tribute to the tough and highly disciplined paratroopers of World War II. Brmiliarr Arw?y NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANO NATO: Analytical Prepared by Harry 546 Pages. said he was the most painstaking man who had ever interviewed him.. ALMEIDA FILHO. in June 1944. I heartily recommend thie fine book to “legs” and paratroopers alike. That was enough. combined with n valuable bibliography. photographs and the author’s own experience as a participant in the campaign. Camp thinks that he did not—neither the letter nor the spirit. What Custer did do was divide his command into three parts and engage in battle with a faulty plan based upon fragmentary and faulty intelligence.authority.

HANSON.” If the reader chooses to see these too familiar realities through the impressionable eyes of a plebe.weapons and technology and so forth. only the most strait-laced can fail to laugh. “It is well that war. WAR The Citadel Richard Wheeler.in any military—or academic or corporat+structure. in light of the very serious cheating scandals of late. even alumni of the Long Gray Line can be gratefully refreshed by a worthy book which pokes more fun at the author than at the inetitutirm. Americans have tended to forget how terrible General Lee’s war was and have grown fond of a romanticized.” In the hundred years since. Descriptions of formal hops. there is an appendix which provides details Of tbe armed forces. Surveying the battlefield at Fredericksbu rg. relax. Crowell Co. still keeping the best. economy and politics and one which provides information on the strength of the Communiet party. The authors have selected 800 extracts from several thousand periodical articles. Lee observed. Canadian Liaison Oficer. Now comes the reader’s reaction. Each of these is then divided and subdivided until the entire military spectrum of NATO has been covered. Here is a collection of “memos. 261 Pages Dawd McKay 1976 $895. G. For each NATO country. 1976.$14. of trips to wicked New York City. one which gives background information on the geography. These are arrangdd according to subject. Although not a book that tbe average military reader will want to include in his collection. Robert E. anesthetized version of that bloody struggle. LEON. Department VOICES of English. still strong. PHILIP W. ring-knockers. anecdotal attempt to describe a unique experience. with college instructors unsure of themselves or their subjects or with a very special kind of nit-picking: “three demerits for pubic hair on soap. We are all familiar with bootlicking junior officers. studies and documents held by the Army library. In Voices of the Civil War. it is a must for all military libraries. or we should get too fond of it.” a montage of experiences which will be interpreted more by the reader’s personal inclinations than by any single element the young author puts in his book. Jaime Mardis entered the US Military Academy in 1969 and left after his first year. The dialogue of the characters combines street talk of the late Sixties with military clich& and a good measure of Holden Caulfield tough-guy talk inherited from Z’lZe CritcAer in the Rye.“ to cauture the “types” that can be found. Thomas Y. and each identifies its source. USACGSC MEMOS OF A WEST POINT CAOET: The Inside Story That You May Not Want to Believe by Jaime Mardis. But. largely because of and the “tin soldier” degradation humiliation of the fourth-class system.95. of walking punishment tours and all the associated memories and miseries that are West Point will find the old grads nodding in pleasant reminiscence. Richard Wheeler has attempted to strip away the gauze MilitaryFleview . OF TtiE CIVIL by 492 Pages. is so terrible. LTC D. It is this second group of readers that will delight in Mardis’ comic timing and his abitity 106 . or why? Those who opt to question the author’s motives for resigning from the corps will enjoy tbe book’s entertaining. The corps is still there. probably one of two basic types: good riddance to the bozo. books. And.

the humanity of individual soldiers intermingled with the callousness bred by the enormity of the holocaust. I)epaytmrnt . Collins Jr. the reader must recngnize that firstperhon accnunts are not nlways reliable. Glory there ~va. in abundance. While the collection includes diary entries by civil lxns. newspaper stories and postwar analyses by ranking officers. Finally. Wheeler’s presentation is inadequate for understanding the ~i~ri] War In its entirety. logist ius. Votccs is at its best when the editor turns to the soldiers. 268 Pages. the courage and sacrifice of many which overshadowed but did not obliterate the cowardice of a few. The result of editor Wheeler’s montage of battle—with its hunger. quent]y assume prior knmvledge on the reader’s part. The book is composed of firsthand accounts.er. but it existed in the midst of the horrors and gruesomeness of cnmbat. this I 107 . Nforeo\. Houghton Mdflin Co 1976. CPT ROBERTC. while his editorial commants fre.” He has succeeded admirably.of romanticism and “to give the reader an idea of what it must have been like to be there when these events occurred.1918 by George C Marshall Foreword srrd Notes by Brigadier General James L. maiming and death. occasionally semiliterate and most often down-to-earth words of enl]sted men and junior officers. written by General Marshall in the 1920s. USAF’. connected by editorial comments to fill ix gaps and which attempt to explain the relationship of particular battles to the overall war situation and provide continuity between events. USAFA GEORGE C. 1917. the book suffers some defects.f Hisfmy. General Marshall’s strong aversion to tbe publication of his personal memoirs is wellknown—thus the discovery and publication of a heretofore unknown manuscript. including strategy. However. the editor occasionally uses e x c e r p ts from inappropriate sources in an effort to provide authen. The numerous maps are welldone. the evening camaraderie across the lines contrasted with the ferocity in the heat of battle. he foclises almost exclusively on battles. Voices is excellent for its portrayal of the war from the perspective of those \vho lived and died in the j:!ws of death. In sum. EHRHART. that they are rarely complete find that they sometimes provide distnrted pictllrm.$1000 To say that this book is unique is to belabor the obvious. is an’ important historical find. Mechanically. Through the sometimes eloquent. politics and diplomacy. On the other hand. MARSHALL: Memoirs of My Services in the World War. economies. Aside from its uniqueness. the full panoply of the war and its impact on the participants is laid before the sensitive and imaginative reader. Only by breaking through the romanticism and by understanding the real war can our generation appreciate the true valor nnd coilrage of our military forbearers in blue and gray. and the frequent pen-and-ink sketches give flavor to the work. The paradoxes that characterized the Civil War are all here: the grandiose declarations of the leaders juxtaposed on the stoic resolution and grim determination of the troops. lanusry 1977 ‘ ticity through persrmai remembrance. Wheeler is to be cnmmenrted for the strong emphasis he places on the carnage and the destruction of human life. its psychological and physical strain—is a revealing insight into what the war meant to those caught in its vortex. In fact.

They already have a certain glow of and they embellished recollection. Pogue. General Marshall’s place in the military hall of fame is undisputed. we miss the personal flavor of Marshall’s own account. would inevitably fall short of the mark. As a literary effort. a man of few \vords. as far as American military history is concerned. leave out many of the revealing personal anecdotes disclused in this book.”’ President Truman. book deserves & special niche in milit+ry a~chives on three counts. at.Major Marshall? A few words. it gives us an understanding of the troop-level perceptions of the American Expeditionary Forces ( AEF) in World War I ( the World War. there has been a void in our understanding of the young . said to Marshal] “. Future students and researchers will be eternally indebted to General Collins for his yeoman services in producing meaningful history. Educafion of a General. Finally. . 108 could anyone sum up a great How historical find. Thus.Mnrshall. First. aside from Marshall’s own account of his wellknwvn role in the young nnd struggling AEF. has discussed this period in GeneraI Marshall’s career in a few chapters in his authoritative work.filt BOOKS Pogue was able to capture some of the latter’s memories of this period. But. George C Mardld. But as an insight into the life and character of the greatest military Military Review . Collins Jr..ice than you. pay adequate tribute to the character of its author. Dr. 1939. and. the great mili. the same time. Dr. however well-chosen. Pogue is forced to deal with Marshall in the third person. What was he like as a young officer? Can \ve detect in his development and his later rise to high command and great responsibilities any indication of the personal characteristics that were to contribute to his later high stature? Thanks to this short summary of his experiences in Wor]d War I. there is a side of the young Marshall not heretofore revealed. G e n e r a 1 Bradley said of Marshal]. “He was my ideal of the best type of ufficer. But Dr. up to now. General Marshall wrote it. as they called it )—the soldier’s vieuq>oiut so noticeably lacking in most of the high command-type memoirs published about this confiict. Moreover. we can.” Students of military leadership are Yvell. personal perceptions to be found on almost every page. tary and political leaders of his time have paid tribute to his attributes and accomplishments. General Collins has performed a monumental service to the reader by clearly identifying each of the principal characters in the cast. Pogue had to rely largely on secondary sources for his research. Chief of the US Army Center for Military History. Second. this book is not likely to attract much attention. no man has ever given his country more distinguished and patriotic serk. To tell the story of the memoirs in detail would be to rob the potential reader of all the joy of discovering new. The young Marshall is hLlman (a side rarely revealed in later years). It is true that Marshall’s distinguished biographer. most without exception. aware of General Marshall’s leadership qualities. But these memories are of events more than 30 years after they occurred. But. Dr. it gives a rare i~sight into the character of General Marshall as a young field officer. A feature worth noting is the inclusion of a foreword and a series of biographical notes compiled by General James L. 1889. In a series of personal interviews with Marshall (1956-57 ). Al. perhaps the find of the century.

that. Edited by [lien T Crowley 757 Pages Gale Research Co 1976 $3850. parelse has this been demonstrated more ticularly ~vben viewed in the context dramatically than In military commu of the accepted moral vnlues that ruled nicntl on. acroeditor. The first edition in 1960 governing and of an officer corps incontaiued n mere 12.-RM 11 . of an army that it has more than 130. capable to command.BOOKS Wit .J. But and by uur research stuff. GE?J TIIEODORU . the reader other alphabetic de. Cuban Army and the nation’s experiand :ibbre\.irmy created by the direction of one political party?” In sum. N’o\vhere States were highly enlightened. through the very arguments thrived in tbe techn[)lr. Acronyms his efforts Pall and instead. bath in 1907. this is the central theme that the au. 109 turned against its milsters nncl ini“ tiuted a p r o c e s s that eventually brought Custro to power. to the responsibilities for the Pailure of the publisber nud reader. Perez’ literary honesty results From the purely mech~fiical vie~~point in a series of contradictions that. Armp I’f. At long last. thor attempts to substantiate as he This is an extremely tlscf!ll bunk. but. its leaders bad heeded the \varnings of Americnn military wlvisers who opp(. From the auare a source of confusion and obfuscathor’s arguments emerges a picture of tion. Its fulfillment lies in the enjoyment and understanding it will bring to the render interested in military history und especially in military leadership. General Marshall speaks for himself.sed the organization of & regular army \vbile :wking. for an “imperial phere f]f tbe 20tb (’entllry.lilics it~ Cuba is an interesting book that [Ieservw the titte]ltion of zII >tudents uf L:itiu-Americ:ln :iRairs.md printer. Gale Research’s dictionary helps a small nation that becomes the victim clear things up tind bns been doing so of ambitious politicians incapable of for 16 years. in of the ~vriter .s have discovers. exposes the real cnuses and lot of time and space. But Cubn’s history may have fullo~veci n di Ifcrent path if. iations nyms. it is likely to be unchallenged. Pages 1898. ” the policies of the L7nited t!vo decades in particwlur. “IS the fllti!re of (’ubn to be trusted to an .Ieader of our time. CONWAY. Dr. At least DICTIONARY. evolution and and one u’hich lvus ~~rected ~~ith cheem final demise of the (’uban Army. it NW respon~ible for its collapse in 1958 and the subsequent ACRONYMS. it sates a the end.000 terms-today. of the author. the past power. 1976 $995 The rea{lers of this bo[~k \vill lemm before they finish the two-p~tge introduction that since the United States supervised the organization of tbe Cuban Army. initinlisms ment with democracy. Retired ARMY POLITICS Perez Jr 240 IN CUBA. and shortened versions of international relations at the turn of Iucubrat[jry terms and descriptions are the century. AND ABBREVIATIONS rise to puw’er of Fidel Ca~tro.signation. USA. INITIAIISMS. nmv tbe rule rutber th:ln exception. This book is beyond a mere critic’s praise or blame.1958 of by 10UIS A Pittsburgh Unwerslty Press. describes tbe creation.gir:ll atmf)~. The United States was so deeply involved in Cuban uffnirs that it must inescapably share sume uf the responsibility for the tragic events in that country.000 and is an inwas the tool of the politicians until it January 197.

Korb maintains that the JCS will resist major modification SUC. addresses planning and operational contributions a n d provides sketches of the men who have corn. hae had little impact on the budget because of inadequate linkage between planning and budgeting. In operational matters. the reader will find that the book sheds some light on the role of the JCS. that JCS members will most likely be service academy graduates and have served in key command and staff positions in their services. but nevertheless annoying. Harvard Universit~ MiJitary Review . Tbe author quickly establishes that JCS parochialism is rampant. His stud y examines JCS responsibilities and relationships within the defense decisionmaking process. COL WILLIAM M. posed the JCS. several thousand entries cover terms from R a ss i a n. there are frequent errors with regard to names of documents and organizations. Although new technologies have brought with them a proliferation of acronyms. the JCS has been intimidated by civilian leaders. 1976 Korb 210 $1095 Korb contends that much of the misunderstanding concerning the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS ) can be traced to the relative newness of the structure and lack of scrutiny by academic analysts.WIC BOOKS dicator of how the use and invention of these appellation have grown. Korb looks at its performance in terms of planning. is the author’s inattention to detail. but the reader mast ask himself if the aatbor has supported all of his rather bold assertions with adequate analysis. budgeting. German. Less important. Spanish and other major languages. The new edition’s expanded coverage can practically assure every type of user that no condensed “term genre” has been omitted. for example. W/e Years by Lawrence Umversity Prsss. enhancing the value of this useful aid even further. concluding that staff procedures are so eoneerned with the Chiefs’ own service 110 interests that the JCS “has become addicted to the status quo and has never been a’source of innovation in the na.Stati contains some historical information of in’terest.” A third of the study is devoted to an assessment of the men who have served on the JCS. for those of as who grope with this sort of communication on a daily basis. procurement and operations under varioue administrations. Korb argues. While the emphasis of AIAD is on terms that are associated with the United States. What emerges from these pages is a superficial analysis which suggests. To assess JCS contributions. for example.-JWW THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: The Fwst Twenty pages Indiana . Flaws notwithstanding. but noted and cross-referenced. The ~oitzt CII iefs of . Obsolete entries from previous editions have not been excluded. cessfully in spite of planning inadequacies and the parochial views of ite members. he concludes. French. but. STOKES 11. that the nation would have been better served if the JCS had resigned rather than support President Johnson’s Vietnam policies. if history ie any indication. tbe cost of the dictionary is high. Tbe JCS. AIAD also includes items that have heen with us for thousands of years. The study also provides a smattering of organizational history. tional policy-making process. tbe volume pays for itself quickly. Admittedly. The future? Well.

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