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EMOTION: WOMAN’S STRENGTH OR FRAILTY? Maybelle Marie O. Padua Far Eastern University, Philippines mpmaybellepadua@gmail.

com The thought of Edith tein on !oman brings out the fuller sense of the metaphysical notion of the being of !oman. tein"s position is that !oman"s nature as biological mother affects her !hole being. #oman has t!o essential characteristics$ attraction to the personal and attraction to !holeness. %t is !oman"s emotions that account for these distinctly feminine traits. #oman is distinguished by her empathetic perception of persons, an intuitive grasp of a person"s being and value as &person'. tein describes empathy as a clear a!areness of another person, not simply of the content of his e(perience, but of his e(perience of that content. %n empathy, one ta)es the place of the other !ithout becoming strictly identical to him. One does not *ust understand the e(periences of the other, but ta)es them on as one"s o!n. tein reinterprets traditional readings of !oman, challenging claims to the !oman as the &!ea)er se(' and to the emotions as inferior to reason.
Abstract:

Keywords$ Edith tein, emotions, !oman, empathy, intuition, person INTRO !"TION The in+uiry into the essence of !oman has its logical place in a philosophical anthropology. Philosophers !ho thin) that !omen and men are intrinsically different hold that for biological, psychological, intellectual, or spiritual reasons, the se(es are meant to be different. The though of Edith tein on !oman brings out a fuller sense of the metaphysical notion of the being of !oman. tein offers us an important position on !oman"s nature as biological mother as affecting her !hole being. The fact is that !oman"s monthly reproductive cycle prepares her to nurture a ne! human being !ithin her very body. ,ut even if she does not become a biological mother -because she is single or a consecrated celibate., her psyche is naturally designed for the greatest of intimacy !ith others. %n her philosophy on !oman, tein brings to the fore t!o essential characteristics of !oman$ attraction to the personal and attraction to !holeness. #hether it is an a!areness and sensitivity to!ard her o!n personal being or that of others, it is the centrality of a wo#a$’s e#ot%o$s that is responsible for this feminine )ind of holistic )no!ledge and discernment. Through emotions, !oman grasps the relationship of another being to herself. This leads us to thin) about !oman"s emotional life as an important hallmar) of feminine nature. Moreover, !oman is distinguished by her empathetic perception of persons, an intuitive grasp of a person"s being and value as &person'. tein offers us a rich bac)drop of insights against !hich !e can interpret more traditional readings of !oman, challenging claims to the !oman as the &!ea)er se(' and claims to the metaphysical inferiority of feelings. E ITH STEIN

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Edith tein, a 0erman 1e!, born in ,reslau, 0ermany in /23/ and a convert to 4atholicism before she died in 5usch!it6 in /378 is significant for three innovations in the history of philosophy$ the reconciliation of Thomism !ith phenomenology, the integration of psychology and philosophy in the particular study of empathy, and the consideration of &!oman' as a fundamental category for philosophical research. Edith tein studied and trained under Edmund 9usserl, the founder of phenomenology. 9usserl had considered tein his best student. 9istorically, Edith tein ran)s among those humanistic pioneers !ho !ere involved !ith the uni+ue nature of !oman"s psyche. 5 lasting importance is attributed to her essays in the history of :ifferential Psychology. Pedagogically, in her !or) as instructor, Edith tein !as assigned to an educational system !hich !as totally oriented to the intellectual needs of the masculine psyche. The efforts of the educators then !ere not concerned !ith developing a young girl"s uni+ue nature but rather in forming her as a suitable companion of man. Perceiving the uni+ue character and the intrinsic value of !oman, tein asserted the fundamental necessity to give a girl an all;round education suited to her feminine uni+ueness. This position enabled tein to challenge the e(isting system of girls" education of her time. he !rites, &One;sided development should be replaced by an emotionally formative education, the different sub*ects of the curriculum should be so selected and handled that they advance the girl"s spontaneous approach to living reality and to the individual'- tein, /33<, p. /=.. Thus, tein paved the !ay for educational reform that !ould incorporate at least three concepts from her pedagogical theory$ first, a concern for a proper understanding of our human, feminine or masculine, and individual natures> second, the need for a harmonious education !hich develops our emotional, intellectual, and physical capacities> and finally, the religious foundation of all formation. THE NAT!RE IF WOMAN’S EMOTIONAL LIFE Emotion is stronger in !oman in that she e(periences more po!erfully the value of a human being as person. ,eing person;oriented, the ob*ect of her emotions is persons. % turned to 5nthony ?enny, @obert olomon, Ma( cheler, Edmund 9usserl, and 1ean Paul artre for their theories on the intentionality of emotions to elucidate Ste%$’s c&a%# o' (erso$s as t)e ob*ect o' wo#a$’s e#ot%o$s+ These theories sho! that as a matter of logic, every emotion has a particular ob*ect. 8. The ob*ect of the emotion or that to !hich an emotion is directed or targeted tells us !hat !e value. #e only respond emotionally to ob*ects that are important to us. For tein, !oman comes to understand persons not *ust through reason, but also more po!erfully through her emotions. W)at #a,es Wo#a$ Woman #ithout undermining the e+uality of the se(es, tein brings to the fore t!o distinctive characteristics of feminine nature. First, she claims that !omen have an orientation to!ard the personal, !hereas men are more ob*ective, and secondly, she claims that !omen are directed to!ard the !hole, !hereas men tend to compartmentali6e -,orden, 8AAB, p. 22. he says of man, &it is natural for him to dedicate his faculties to a discipline

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-be it mathematics or technology, a trade or business management. and thereby to sub*ect himself to the precepts of this discipline” - tein, p. 8==.. %n contrast, !oman is oriented to!ard people and the personal> her concern is for living things, especially her o!n personal life and that of others. he focuses on the living, concrete person, and involves her total being in her !or), not dividing the various aspects of her life. %n Essays on Woman, tein !rites,
5ccording to the intended original order, her -!oman"s. place is by man"s side to master the earth and care for offspring. ,ut her body and soul are fashioned less to fight and to con+uer than to cherish, guard and preserve. Of the threefold attitude to!ards the !orld C to )no! it, to en*oy it, to form it creatively C it is the second !hich concerns her most directly$ she seems more capable than man of feeling a more reverent *oy in creatures> moreover, such a *oy re+uires a particular )ind of perception of the good, different from rational perception in being an inherent spiritual function and a singularly feminine one. Evidently, this +uality is related to !oman"s mission as a mother !hich involves an understanding of the total being and of specific values. %t enables her to understand and foster organic development, the special, individual destiny of every living being. - tein, pp. DB;D7.

tein believes that it is !oman"s emotional life that is the source of her attraction to the personal and to !holeness. 5ccording to tein, !ithout the emotions, the soul of a !oman !ould never )no! itself or others in their totality. Each !oman perceives her o!n being in the stirrings of her emotions. That is, through her emotions, each !oman comes to )no! !ho she is and ho! she is. %t is through her emotions that a !oman also grasps the relationship of another being to herself. E#ot%o$ as Wo#a$’s Stre$-t) %n earlier years, !oman"s emotions !as loo)ed upon as her frailty. #oman !as often referred to as the E!ea)er se(" in that having greater sensitivity, she is more li)ely to be !ounded than man !hose po!er of abstraction often shields him from negative feelings. Fot only do !omen cry more easily than men, but also they are not ashamed of their tears, !hereas men !ould generally rather die than be tearful. &#ea)' !as al!ays used to refer to !hat is fragile, delicate, brea)able, vulnerable, and sensitive. #ith physical strength glorified !ith patriarchy being the dominant form of societal order, !oman"s physical !ea)ness versus male strength !as loo)ed upon as an indication of inferiority. 9istory sho!s that civili6ation gradually institutionali6ed assumptions about gender that have po!erfully affected the development of history and human thought. One such assumption is$
&Men are Enaturally" superior stronger and more rational, therefore designed to be dominant. From this follo!s that men are political citi6ens and responsible for representing the polity. #omen are &naturally' !ea)er, inferior in intellect and rational capacities, unstable emotionally and therefore incapable of political participation. They stand outside of the polity.' -Gerner, /33B, p. 7.

Metaphors of gender emerged constructing the male as the norm and the female as deviant> the male as !hole and po!erful> the female as unfinished, physically mutilated and emotionally dependent. Out of this thin)ing arose a functioning system of patriarchal hegemony resulting in comple( hierarchical relationships !ith the !oman"s place and B

condition as &lo!er' to man in social, economic, political relations, and in systems of ideas. This e(plains !hy feminists have resented being referred as the &!ea)er se('. 5s !omen have become victimi6ed by this distortion of the hierarchy of values, tein"s philosophy on !oman may yet help to restore the proper hierarchy of values. tein"s vie!s recogni6e the .$%/.e 0a&.e o' 'e#%$%$%ty and its crucial mission in the !orld. #oman"s emotions, loo)ed upon as her frailty, can in fact be her very strength. #e see this clearly in the follo!ing passage from tein"s Essays on Woman$
The strength of the !oman lies in the emotional life. This is in accord !ith her attitude to!ard personal being itself. For the soul perceives its o!n being in the stirrings of the emotions. Through the emotions, it comes to )no! !hat it is and ho! it is> it also grasps through them the relationship of another being to itself, and then, conse+uently, the significance of the inherent value of e(terior things, of unfamiliar people, and impersonal things. The emotions, the essential organs for comprehension of the e(istent in its totality and in its peculiarity, occupy the center of her being. They condition that struggle to develop herself to a !holeness and to help others to a corresponding development, !hich !e have found earlier to be characteristic of !oman"s soul. - tein, /33<, p.3<.

The importance of her emotions stems from the fact that the !oman"s monthly reproductive cycle ma)es her a potential bearer of a ne! human being !ithin her very body. ,ut even if she is single or celibate and does not become a biological mother, her psyche is naturally constituted for the greatest closeness and affinity !ith others + Furturance comes naturally to her> she more easily responds to the neediness of all men. This thin)ing is corroborated by psychoanalysts !ho e(plain that a !oman has facility for inner communication !ith other persons by virtue of her capacity for motherhood. %n maternity, there e(ists an &infantile preconceptual communication !ith the mother' - tern, /32=, p. 28.. This flu(, according to feminine psychology, is by no means a one; !ay affair. The mother herself participates similarly in the communication !ith the child. Gong after the umbilical cord is severed, there persists an invisible cord. #hat e(ists is a deeply knowing relationship bet!een child and mother ; &a mode of )no!ledge !hich precedes the advent of reason and, in a sense, transcends it' -p. 28.. This notion has led e(perts in psychology to thin) the &male' component of intelligence does not participate in this. The father does not have the same inner relationship to the ne!born child as the mother. The )ind of inner communication that the mother has is not shared by the father until the child himself communicates by signals -p.B8.. E(perts hold that the man ; even !ith all his sharing in parenthood ; al!ays remains Eoutside" the process of pregnancy and the baby"s birth. %n fact, in many !ays he has to learn his o!n Efatherhood’ from the mother (Mulieris Dignitatem, no. /2.. #e see that psychology substantiates tein"s claim about the !oman"s greater capacity -than man. for a!areness of, sensitivity to, and empathy for persons. To be feminine is to manifest such +ualities as !armth, tenderness, care, empathy, s!eetness, responsiveness, and intuitive !isdom. %n conse+uence, her &a!areness of the needs of the living being benefits not only her posterity, but all creatures as !ell. %t particularly benefits a man in ma)ing her a companion and helpmate appreciative of his aspirations' - tein, p. D7.. ,ecause of her intuitive !isdom, !oman is more easily able to ponder over the realities of life. tein elucidates this as follo!s$
This is closely related to the vocation of motherhood. The tas) of assimilating in oneself a living being !hich is evolving and gro!ing, of containing and nourishing it, signifies a definite end in itself. Moreover, the mysterious process of formation of a ne! creature in the maternal organics

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represents such an intimate unity of the physical and spiritual that one is !ell able to understand that the intimate unity imposes itself on the entire nature of !oman. - tein, p. 3=.

,ecause of this natural inclination to !holeness and self;containment, tein suggests that !omen tend to aim more to!ard a holistic e(pression of personality, !hile men tend to aim to!ard the perfecting of individual abilities. he argues that !omen have a natural tendency to!ard empathy in that they see) to grasp the other person as a !hole being. This characteristic manifests itself in a !oman"s desire for her o!n !holeness and in her desire also to help others to become complete persons. &#oman,' tein !rites, &is psychically directed to the concrete, the individual, and the personal$ she has the ability to grasp the concrete in its individuality and to adapt herself to it, and she has the longing to help this peculiarity to its development' - tein, pp. /AA;/A/.. #hether it is an a!areness and sensitivity to!ard her o!n personal being or that of others, it is her emotions that is responsible for this feminine )ind of holistic )no!ledge and discernment. ,ut does this mean that !oman is less capable of abstract thought and less oriented to !hat is ob*ectiveH arah ,orden ans!ers this +uestion in an essay entitled Woman and Women’s Education$
%n saying that !omen are more personally and less ob*ectively;oriented, tein is not claiming that !omen are less capable of abstract thought> rather, as Mary 4atharine ,aseheart puts it, &characteristically !omen are not content to remain on the level of the abstract' - tein, /323, p. 8DB.. There is a drive in the feminine to relate the conceptual bac) to the concrete, the psychological bac) to particular psyches, and the theoretical bac) to the !orld of e(perience. Thus, the orientation to!ard the personal and the concrete need not be a denial of the abstract and conceptual, but it does indicate a dissatisfaction !ith the merely abstract and conceptual, and an unhappiness !ith only a part !hen one can be oriented to the !hole -,orden, 8AAB, pp. 22;//=..

This leads us to sum up tein"s arguments about a !oman"s emotional life as a distinct property of the female species in one !ord$ motherliness - tein, p. 28). #oman tends to the &mothering' of all she meets. The feminine is characteri6ed by &feeling, intuition, empathy, and adaptability' !hereas the masculine is characteri6ed by &bodily strength, the ability for predominantly abstract thought and independent creativity.' / #omen are made to love and cherish all living things and to desire their full development. The feminine is characteri6ed by a responsiveness to the real. Psychologist and neo;feminist 4arol 0illigan concurs !ith tein on this vie!. %n her boo) oncepts of the !elf and of Morality, 0illigan !rites about !oman differing fundamentally from the man in that she is less political and more interactive, relating t!o sub*ects$ spea)er and listener, as opposed to a sub*ect and ob*ect, seer and seen. Man associates )no!ing more !ith spea)ing and listening, than !ith seeing. #hile masculine vision lends itself to stages, steps, positions, and levels, mar)ing differences !ith fi(ed boundaries, establishing connections about space, the feminine vision is grounded on love, friendship and the recognition of needs -4arol 0illigan in :avid, p. D.. %n her /328 boo), "n a Different #oice, 0illigan further asserts that even in ethical reasoning, men differ from !omen in that !omen tend to an &ethics of care' and men, to an &ethics of *ustice.' #ithin an ethics of *ustice, men are more li)ely to reason by reference to abstract and universal principles, treating relations !ith colleagues and strangers in such a manner that they are
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&governed by rules and conventions !hich abstract selves from particularities of circumstance and are driven by the imperative to formulate universal principles' -p. D../
#omen, on the other hand, e(ercise an ethics imbedded in life !hich &inclines one a!ay from the tendency to reduce morality to a matter of obedience to abstract la!s or principles, moving one instead in the direction of preparedness to change the rules, or even to forsa)e entitlements, if by so doing e(tremely meaningful, though faltering, human relationships, stand a chance of being rehabilitated'.8

0illigan contends that the fundamental characteristic that differentiate the ethic of care from the ethic of *ustice stems from a vital sense of personal imbeddedness !ithin a !eb of ongoing relationships.
#hereas the typical man !ill tend to do!nplay and even deny the value of intimate, particular relations, focusing instead upon relations and actions in accordance !ith universali6able ma(ims for action -*ustice, fairness, rules, rights., the typical !oman !ill attend more closely to the daily e(periences, !ants, need, interests, and aspirations and moral dilemmas of peoples imbedded in relations and friendships that are +uite fluid and often presuppose and re+uire a trust and imaginative engagement for !hich there are no rules. -p. D.

4ontemporary 4hristian thin)ers li)e 5lice von 9ildebrand, 0.?.4hesterton, and ?arol #o*tyla, share this position. 5lice von 9ildebrand contends that &Female interests are centered on the human side of their lives$ their family life, their relationships to those they love, their concern about their health, their !elfare and, if they are 4hristians, the spiritual !elfare of their children"s souls> in other !ords, about human concerns. Most men spea) about the stoc) mar)et, politics, and sports> some spea) about intellectual and artistic concerns -9ildebrand, 8AA8, p. /AD.. 4hesterton declares, &#omen spea) to each other, men spea) to the sub*ect they are spea)ing about' -4hesterton as cited in 9ildebrand, p. 7D. THE INTENTIONALITY OF EMOTIONS %n his boo), $o%e and &esponsi'ility, ?arol #o*tyla, !rites about emotion being stronger in !oman than in man because Eshe e(periences more po!erfully the value of a human being"I, !hile sensuality, !hich is oriented to!ards the Ebody as an ob*ect of en*oyment", is in general stronger and more importunate in men -#o*tyla, /33B, p. /DD..8 This vie! on emotion in !oman, understood !ith the theories on the feminist thin)ing on morality, helps us better understand tein"s claim about ho! emotion in !oman can in fact be vie!ed as her strength, rather than her frailty. &5t the heart of every emotion is a set of fundamental ontological and evaluative commitments, ' !rites @obert 4. olomon in his boo) (he )assions* Emotions and the Meaning of $ife -/33B.. 5ll emotions are intentional, because they are a'out something, ultimately both &about' ourselves and our !orld. One is never simply in lo%e> he or she is in love with someone. %t is impossible to fall in love !ithout falling in love with someone. Follo!ing recent phenomenological tradition, this feature of emotions called intentionality tells us that all emotions are a'out something. That !hich the emotion is about is called its intentional o'+ect, or simply its ob*ect. 5s a matter of logic, every emotion has its particular ob*ect. Furthermore, it is
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this particular ob*ect !hich constitutes the emotion. %n his boo), olomon gives the e(ample of someone being angry, the ob*ect of his emotion being that a person, 1ohn, had stolen his car$ &% am angry that ,ohn stole my car.' The ob*ect of one"s anger is irreducibly that-,ohn-stole-my-car. To sho! that the emotion is determined by its ob*ect *ust as it is the emotion that constitutes its ob*ect, olomon e(pands his e(ample as follo!s$
9aving long !anted to get rid of my car, % may also be relie%ed that 1ohn stole my car. Of course, the fact !hich stands at the base of my anger is identical to the fact !hich stands at the base of my relief. ,ut my anger and my relief are not separate feelings or acts or attitudes !hich are directed to!ard one and the same ob*ect. The ob*ect of my anger is an offense> the ob*ect of my relief is a boon. Thus the ob*ect of my anger is not the same as the ob*ect of my reliefI.. There are not t!o components, my anger and the ob*ect of my anger - olomon, p. //D..

olomon stresses that an emotion is not distinct or separable from its ob*ect> the ob*ect as an ob*ect of this emotion has no e(istence apart from the emotion. To understand an emotion, therefore, it is necessary to understand its &ob*ect.' 5n emotion is not distinct or separable from its ob*ect> the ob*ect as an ob*ect of this emotion has no e(istence apart from the emotion tein argues, ho!ever, that !hile an emotion is not separable from its ob*ect, it is distinct from its ob*ect. For e(ample, the ob*ect of a mother"s *oy is her baby smiling at her. The mother feels happy and relieved of her tiredness from !or) upon beholding her baby"s lovable and angelic smile at her. The ob*ect of her *oy is that-the'a'y-smiled-at her. #e see in this e(ample that the emotion is determined by its ob*ect !hich helps us understand the intentionality of emotions. Emotions are directed to!ard some intentional ob*ect. ,ut !hile the emotional and intentional ob*ect are not separable, they are certainly distinct. The emotion is ho! % am related to the ob*ect. ,ecause that to!ard !hich one directed and the being;directed itself are distinct, one can *udge that one"s emotional response is too strong or !ea), given the ob*ect C and thus one is led to as) !hether her lifepo!er is depleted and she is too e(hausted to feel very intensely, or !hether there are factors in her life ma)ing her particularly sensitive to this type of thing. This vie! is corroborated by 5nthony ?enny in his boo) .ction, Emotion and Will !here he presents his theory of the ob*ect;directedness of emotions -?enny, /3<B.. For ?enny, emotions, unli)e sensations, have an intentional structure. 9e !rites, &Emotions, unli)e pain, have ob*ects$ !e are afraid of things, angry !ith people, ashamed that !e have done such;and;such' -p. /7.. 9e calls this feature of emotions their Eintentionality."B ?enny analy6es the intentionality of emotions employing the scholastic notion of a formal ob*ect -that to which a thing is directed) . Emotions, ?enny e(plains, are mental states and mental states are specified by their formal ob*ects, and not by their material ob*ects -that 'y which something came to 'e) or by their causes. Mental states can have material ob*ects and be caused by, or in some other !ay be related to, material ob*ects> but mental states are not specified by their material ob*ects or by their causes. To understand an emotion, and conse+uently, to understand !hy persons e(perience certain emotions or to comprehend !hy they react emotionally to certain situations, it is not sufficient to )no! !hat caused -material ob*ect. an occasion that gave rise to the incidence of the emotion. One needs to )no! to !hat the emotion is bound or directed.
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For instance, it is not enough to )no! that the onset of dar)ness causes one to fear !al)ing home alone. One is afraid of someone !ho or something that arises during the dar)ness of the night such as an assailant or a robber attac)ing himJher. The formal ob*ect of the emotion fear characteri6es the directedness of the emotion in such a !ay as to specify the emotion itself. %f the same person, on another instance, e(periences delight instead of fear, it !ould be because hisJher emotion is directed to that !hich inspires delight in him and not fear. %n other !ords, the formal ob*ect of an emotion restricts the emotion to be of a certain emotion and not another. ?enny"s e(ample is, &One cannot be afraid of *ust anything, nor happy about anything !hatsoever. %f a man says he is afraid of !inning K/A,AAA in the pools, !e !ant to as) him more$ does he believe that money corrupts, or does he e(pect to lose his friends, or to be annoyed by begging letters, or !hatH %f !e can elicit from him only descriptions of the good aspects of the situation, then !e cannot understand !hy he reports his emotion as fear and not as hope' -p. /38.. #e see !ith ?enny that the formal ob*ect of an emotion is inseparable from the emotion itself. &One may say !ith ?enny that the formal ob*ect of an emotion is conceptually connected !ith the emotion. Or, !e may say, that its formal ob*ect is part of the concept of the emotion' - ayson, /337, p. =.. %f !e are therefore to e(plain the behavior of persons, it is helpful to discover the ob*ect to !hich their emotions are lin)ed. To be able to identify the ob*ect of emotions is to say that emotions have logical connections !ith something real. Emotions lin) us to concrete ob*ects in our !orld. %f !e are to understand our !orld, it is of vital importance that !e understand the nature of the ob*ects that affect us and ma)e us emotionally responsive to them. The cause of an emotion may help e(plain ho! the emotion came up, but it has nothing to do !ith the intentionality and nature of an emotion. %n ?enny"s terms, the cause of an emotion needs to be distinguished from its ob*ect !hich can be thought of as the target or &the concrete particular at !hich the emotion is actually directed' - ayson, p. <.. To illustrate this, % may be angry at a certain student at this moment> !e might say, my anger is caused by a change in the chemical reactions and neurological changes in my body> the ob*ect of my anger, ho!ever, is that this student of mine is not listening in class and is uselessly tal)ing !ith his seatmate, thus is distracted from his lessons and performs poorly. My anger may be caused by certain physiochemical processes, but that % am angry at this particular person for this particular reason is !hat circumscribes my emotion of anger. #e are elucidated further on the distinction bet!een causes and ob*ects of emotion in this passage from ?enny$
Iemotions are specified by their ob*ects. That is to say$ if someone betrays the mar)s of emotion -as fear or embarrassment.!e may see) to find the ob*ect of his emotion, by as)ing &!hat are you afraid ofH' or &!hat is embarrassing youH' 9aving learnt the ob*ect of his emotion, !e may then go on to as) such +uestions as &but !hy are you afraid of the dar)H' or &but !hy do ba!dy *o)es embarrass youH'> and the ans!er to these +uestions may, though it need not, assign a cause for the emotions thus specified. %n such cases, !e are see)ing a cause for a general tendency to e(perience certain emotions in certain situations, or at certain ob*ects. %n other cases !e may see) a cause for a particular emotion at a particular time$ as !hen !e as) !hy the manager has been so irritated this morning at small things -ob*ect. and learn that it is because he is suffering from dyspepsia -cause.. 4auses are sought for emotions;regarding;particular;ob*ects, not for emotions simpliciter$ !e loo) for the causes of a man"s fear of mice, or disli)e of stra!berries> !e do no loo) for the causes of his fear, or his disli)e$ for this !ould be to as) the

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+uestion &!hy does he have fearsH' or &!hy does he have disli)esH' to !hich the only ans!er seems to be$ because he is a human being -?enny, p. <..

#ith ?enny as !ith olomon, !e see ho! emotion is intentional. The ob*ect of an emotion is never the same as its cause. The cause, !e may say, is o'+ecti%e, !hile the ob*ect is su'+ecti%e, a part of the !orld as one perceives it, !hether or not it is in fact the case or not -as in a case !herein % am angry that my student is tal)ing to his seatmate and conclude that he is not listening to my lecture, !hen, in fact, he may have been listening intently and is clarifying a point !ith his seatmate, !hich is !hy he is tal)ing.. #hile psychological and physiological theories e(plain brain functions, comple( factors in the upbringing of a person such as childhood traumas, or chemical constitution to be the causes of emotions, !e reali6e that they have nothing to do !ith sub*ectivity and individual e(perience. - olomon, p. /87.. %f !hat characteri6es an emotion is its ob*ect, !e can appreciate that our emotions reflect our !ay of seeing the !orld. For phenomenologists li)e Ma( cheler, the notion of intentionality denotes that all feelings &possess Ea lived reference to the % -or the Person.." The intentional correlates of the feelings of life are the values closed !ithin one"s o!n vitality> those of the spiritual feelings are the self;value of the Person' - trasser, /3DD, p. 27.. Emotions, for cheler, are self;involved in that they are about ob*ects that are important to us. To understand cheler"s notion of intentionality, !e must first distinguish bet!een the /feeling of something” and &feeling states.' %n his boo), 0ormalism in Ethics and 1on-formal Ethics of #alue, cheler !rites that there is original emotive intentionality in the /feeling of something” as opposed to &feeling states' - cheler, /3DB, p. 8=<..
5ll specifically sensible feelings, are by their nature, states, and may be more or less &ob*ectless.' They include moods, !hich may have causes but are not directed to any ob*ect in particular. For e(ample, one may feel sadness and as) !hy he or she is in such a mood today, the cause being that the s)y is do!ncast and the !eather is damp and cold. %n itself, the feeling of sadness is not related to an ob*ect. %n cheler"s !ords, &%t does not Eta)e" anything, nor is there anything that Eapproaches me." There is no Esignifying" in it nor is there any immanent directedness in it' -p. 8=D..

#ith intentional feeling, ho!ever, there is a connection bet!een the feeling and !hat is therein felt. cheler !rites,
There is here an original relatedness, a directedness of feeling to!ard something ob*ective, namely, %alues. This )ind of feeling is not a dead state of affairs that can enter into associative connections or be related to them> nor is such feeling a &to)en.' This feeling is a goal;determined movement, although it is by no means an acti%ity issuing forth from a center -nor is it a temporally e(tended movement.. %t is a punctual movement, !hether ob*ectively directed from the ego or coming to!ard the ego as movement in !hich something is given to me and in !hich it comes to &appearance.' This feeling therefore has the same relation to its value;correlate as &representing' has to its &ob*ect,' namely an intentional relation. %t is not e2ternally 'rought together !ith an ob*ect, !hether immediately or through a representation -!hich can be related to a feeling either mechanically or fortuitously or by mere thin)ing.. On the contrary, feeling originally intends its o!n )ind of ob*ects, namely &values' -pp. 8=D;8=2..

%n the passage cited, cheler tells us that values are genuine -phenomenological. ob*ects of acts of intentional feelings. & uch value contents of intentional feelings are, according to cheler, pre;given to any other act of consciousness' -Frings, Ma2 !cheler, 1on3

0ormal Ethics in our (ime, Philosophy Today, vol. 3J87 -U. .5.$ :e Paul University, /3<=., p. 2D.7 Moreover, in every e(perience, there is al!ays an e(perience of values. #e are, either &attracted' or &repelled' from that !hich !e are e(periencing. Or, to put it in other !ords, !e are &dra!n to!ard' or &pushed from' all ob*ects in any )ind of e(perience. Manfred Frings elucidates us on cheler"s notion of pre;give intentional feeling in the follo!ing passage$
cheler ma)es the follo!ing comparison. 9e argues that in the same !ay as colors are given to the sense of sight, sounds to the sense of hearing, and concepts to acts of reasoning, values are given in intentional feelings as their intuitional correlates. cheler can, therefore, say that a being !ho !ould have only intellect and !ill, but not intentional feeling, could have no e(perience of value at all. uch a being !ould be comparable to someone born blind, never having had colors given in sense e(perience. 5cts of intentional feeling are, for cheler, an original intentionality to!ard their proper ob*ects$ values. %n practical life, such a value e(perience is most conspicuous in acts of love, upon !hich all intentional feeling ultimately rests - pp. 2D;22..

%n his essay, 3rdo .moris, cheler !rote, &Man is, before he is an intellectual being and before he is a being of !ill, ens amans' -literally meaning man is a loving being or a being !ho loves.. 5n analysis of the e(pression &love at first sight' may help us understand !hat cheler means. %n many customary e(periences of love -not &love at first sight'., the ob*ect of one"s love -the person !ho is loved. is thought about, *udged, or assessed before heJshe is loved. %n &love at first sight' ho!ever, love is there first even before any assessment or analysis about the ob*ect of one"s love has been made. Luoting ,laise Pascal !ho said, &The heart has its reasons that reason itself does not understand,' cheler holds that &Ithere is a type of e(periencing !hose &ob*ects' are completely inaccessible to reason> reason is as blind to them as ears and hearing are blind to colors' -p. 8==.. %f for 5ristotle and ?ant the significance of the emotional !as hardly recogni6ed, for cheler, the emotional sphere of man has a place of importance side by side !ith all la!s of logic and reason. The emotional sphere of man occupies a fundamental place for cheler, a sphere !hich he called, together !ith Pascal, the & ordo amoris' !hich is &the harmonious structure of emotional intentionality and intentional feeling together !ith immanent intuited ob*ects$ values. Man, therefore, is the ontic place in !hich values occur' -Frings, p. 23.. Edmund 9usserl li)e!ise recogni6ed the intentional character of feelings, even though he assumed that they -feelings. !ere founded in )no!ing intentionality. Fran6 ,rentano had maintained that the movements of the heart represent a &special mode of the relation of psychic activity to a content'-p. 23.. 5t this point, it is important to recogni6e 1ean Paul artre"s contribution to the anthropology of emotions to appreciate the conception of emotion as intentional phenomenon. For artre, &feelings and emotions, according to their very essence, belong to the e(istential turning of a sub*ect to persons, things and circumstances of the environment and the !orld. 5s ob*ects of feeling;consciousness, something is true of them that is not in consciousness. Therefore, the movements of the heart, according to artre, are determined upon ob*ects and situations'-p. 23.. 9e
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illustrates his notion of intentionality through an analysis of a &happy' reunion. 9is analysis assumes the standpoint of a positivistic;scientific ob*ectivism !here there is indeed no ob*ect called &friend,' !hich causes happiness, nor a happiness;producing event li)e a &reunion.'
The advocate of a natural;scientific approach !ill simply establish the at;handness of a particular e(ample of the species homo sapiens and its spatial progression in a certain direction. Factually, this is the ra! material out of !hich one !ho is a!aiting his friend ma)es the ob*ect of his happiness. That the emotionally aroused imagination plays a dominant role in the formation of this hyle is indeed incontestable. Moreover, this is also confirmed by empirical psychologists. Emotion is thus not only a passive being;graspedI, but also an act%0e %$te$t%o$. The intention releases in the e(periencing sub*ective formative po!ers !hich besto! upon reality a particular physiognomic e(pression$ one that is happily;!inged, one that is fear; inspiring, one that is hopeless, and so forth -p. 8/=..

artre sho!s that emotions cannot be conceived of as Estates of e(citement," or as confused reactions to some Estimuli," nor as Eaccidents" of human e(istence. They are actually !ays of seeing and living in the !orld. %n emotion, !e &open ourselves' to others, allo! ourselves to share their e(periences and opinions, their !orld vie!s, and ultimately, their other emotions -p. 8/=.. ince !oman is naturally inclined to nurturance, close personal attachments, and emotional response to others, it is easy to understand !hy persons are logically the ob*ect of her emotions and that her emotions are indistinguishable from their ob*ect. For tein, this is simply a conse+uence of her innate capacity for motherhood -be it cultural or spiritual., !hich includes a spousal dimension, the role of companionship. This role involves sharing the life of another, entering into it, and ma)ing that person"s concerns one"s o!n. One might argue that this is a vocation for both men and !omen, and it is unli)ely that tein !ould deny that it is. ,ut it may also be true that !omen generally possess a special genius for friendship, because of their natural orientation to the human and personal, and because of their greater capacity for e(ercising empathy. This thin)ing tells us that !omen have a richer conception of persons and that they can more easily imbue human relationships !ith care and affection. Gife is enriched and softened by the moral perception of !omen !ho respond to others !ith empathetic engagement rather than detached application of abstract principles. ince morality for the typical !oman, &e(presses itself in activity directed at the concrete, specific persons !ho need to be loved, cared for, sho!n compassion,' !omen then tend to be better attuned than men to care thin)ing !hich enforces a duty to care for and empathi6e !ith the members of the human community -:avid, p. 2.. #hile this )ind of moral reasoning has been dismissed as &irrational,' it has fashioned a clearly ethical tradition of )indness and benevolence in an other!ise violent !orld. 4ertainly this standpoint is +uite unli)e the legalistic contractual thin)ing of men stressing individual freedom and arms";length relation !ith others. %f !omen"s &different voice' of emotion, care, responsibility, concern, and connection is essential to human living, then !hat traditionally has been regarded as !omen"s defective and deficient moral *udgment ought to sho! forth as a sign of their strength. 5 !orld hardened by &autonomy, discontinuity, and aloneness !ith domination and maleness' may yet be a better place to live in !ith the gentleness,

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relation, understanding, concern, empathy, in short, the &mothering' of femaleness -p. /A.. tein"s dissertation on the sub*ect of empathy !as completed some years prior to her lectures on !omen"s roles, but one can see its influence on that later !or). he describes empathy as a clear a!areness of another person, not simply of the content of his e(perience, but of his e(perience of that content. %n empathy, one ta)es the place of the other !ithout becoming strictly identical to him. %t is not *ust understanding the e(periences of the other, but in some sense, ta)ing them on as one"s o!n. "ON"L!SION The contention of this study has been to reaffirm the thought of Edith tein on !oman and the strength of her emotions. 4ertainly, tein offers us a rich bac)drop of insights against !hich !e can interpret more traditional readings of !oman, challenging claims to the !oman as the &!ea)er se(' and to the metaphysical inferiority of feelings. tein"s argument for emotional life in !oman as an important hallmar) of the female species, !here !oman"s emotions prove to be her strength rather than her frailty, can be vie!ed as an unambiguous philosophical frame!or) !ith !hich !e can dispute long;standing claims to the !oman as &inferior' to man. tein"s philosophy helps us to appreciate ho! motherhood is the sole privilege and uni+ue advantage of !oman. Every human being"s first e(perience of love comes about through motherhood !hich involves a &special communion !ith the mystery of life, as it develops in the !oman"s !omb' -Mulieris Dignitatem, no. /2.. %n e(ercising her motherhood, !hether biological or spiritual, !oman can imbue human relations !ith empathy, delicateness, nurturing care, in short, !ith love. %n a fast mechani6ing !orld !here automation is designed to bring about impersonal efficiency and productivity, !e come to the conclusion that feminine presence is necessary to build a civili6ation of love. %nfluenced by Edith tein"s ideas on !oman, 1ohn Paul %% !rote in Mulieris Dignitatem,
The mother is filled !ith !onder at this mystery of life, and Eunderstands" !ith uni+ue intuition !hat is happening inside her. %n the light of the &beginning', the mother accepts and loves as a person the child she is carrying in her !omb. This uni+ue contact !ith the ne! human being developing !ithin her gives rise to an attitude to!ards human beings ; !hich profoundly mar)s the !oman"s personality. %t is commonly thought that women are more capable than men of paying attention to another person4.' -/322..

%t is only to !oman that !e properly ascribe motherliness from !hich ensues the empathy that arises naturally from her feminine ethos and !hich this !orld so badly needs to counterbalance a culture of cold abstraction, anonymity, and distancing. 5s tein"s theory of empathy sho!s, intuitive intelligence is more intimately tied up !ith love than analytical intelligence. The &intuitive grasp of the living concrete, especially of the personal element' is !oman"s strength. & he has the special gift of ma)ing herself at home in the inner !orld of others.' %n short, !oman is endo!ed !ith uni+ue and e(clusive +ualities !ith !hich she can contribute to the common good in no !ay that man can since he is short of those +ualities or possesses them on a lo!er scale. Thus in these times, the +uestion of !oman"s position or standing in society ta)es on ne!

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significance in the light of her feminine singularity. 4onsider !hat ?arl tern !rote, &%f !e e+uate the one;sidedly rational and technical !ith the masculine, there arises the ghastly spectacle of a !orld impoverished of !omanly values' - tern, p. <.. #ith the recurrent +uestion and controversy on the importance and value of !oman, tein"s defense of the nature of !oman presents itself as a remar)ably deep source of enlightenment.

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NOTES
:avid notes that &the paradigm for this, of course, is %mmanuel ?ant"s self;legislating moral sub*ect, for !hom the most distinctive thing about ethical reasoning lies not in any effort at consultation !ith others, but in the ability to deploy +uasi;mathematical approaches in stating, defending, and applying universal principles' -p.<..
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?arol #o*tyla, $o%e and &esponsi'ility, - an Fransisco$ %gnatius Press, /33B., p. /DD. ,eing the giver of the sperm in a se(ual act, se(ual arousal happens faster in man than in !oman -see #o*tyla p. 8D8., the arousal curve being shorter and more violent in man -see p. 8D=..
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?enny uses Eintensionality" in his boo). % !ill employ Eintentionality," a more familiar usage.

REFEREN"ES ,orden, . 8AAB. &#oman and #omen"s Education.” !tein* Edith !tein. Gondon$ 4ontinuum Press. :avid, G. 8AA/. Women’s !tandpoint, the 5endering of Moral #oices6Moral !el%es, and the #iew from 0oucault, ocial cience :iliman, 1anuary; 1une 8AA/, vol. 8, no. /. Philippines$ University of the Philippines. Frings, M. /3<=. Ma2 !cheler, 1on-0ormal Ethics in our (ime, Philosophy Today, vol. 3J87. U. .5.$ :e Paul University. 0illigan, 4. /33D. oncepts of the !elf and Morality. U. .5.$ 9arvard Educational @evie! 7D. 9ildebrand, 5. 8AA8. (he )ri%ilege of 7eing a Woman. Michigan$ Meritas Press. ?enny, 5. /3<B. .ction, Emotion and Will. Gondon$ @outledge N ?egan Paul. Gerner, 0. /33B. (he reation of 0eminist onsciousness -- 0rom Middle .ges to 89:;. Fe! Oor)$ O(ford University Press. Pope 1ohn Paul %%. /322. Mulieris Dignitatem,. @etrieved 1uly BA, 8AA7 from ! !!.vatican.vaJ...J*ohnPpaulPiiJapostPlettersJdocumentsJhfP*p; iiPaplP/=A2/322Pmulieris; dignitatemPen.html. ayson, 1r., 4. /337. &Emotions and their 3'+ects ”unpublished ms. University of Massachussetts, pring. olomon, @. /33B. (he )assions* Emotions and the Meaning of $ife. <.!...* =acket )u'lishing ompany, "nc. tein, E. /33<. Essays on Woman trans. Freda Mary Oben, 8nd edition, revised,

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#ashington, :4$ %4 Publications. PPPPPPPPPPP /323. &Philosophy of #oman and #omen"s Education' in =ypatia. . ,ournal of 0eminist )hilosophy, 7$/. trasser, . /3DD. )henomenology of 0eeling. Pittsburg$ :u+uesne University Press. cheler, M. /3DB. 0ormalism in Ethics and 1on-formal Ethics of #alue. U. .5.$ Forth!estern University Press. #o*tyla, ?. /33B. $o%e and &esponsi'ility. an Fransisco$ %gnatius Press.

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