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RED SERVICE UTNIF 2006

RED SERVICE—INDEX
1NC Red Service Shell .......................................................................................................................................................... 3
1NC Multiculturalism Shell ............................................................................................................................................... 15

Links:
Link: Saying Anything But Capitalism Bad ......................................................................................................................... 18
Link: Infrastructure ............................................................................................................................................................... 19
Link: ISAs............................................................................................................................................................................. 21
Link: Ideology (Assumption of Removing Ideology)........................................................................................................... 24
Link: Education..................................................................................................................................................................... 31
Link: the State ....................................................................................................................................................................... 32
Link: Democracy/the State.................................................................................................................................................... 35
Link: Service......................................................................................................................................................................... 36
Link: Political Service........................................................................................................................................................... 37
Link: National Service .......................................................................................................................................................... 39
Link: DADT.......................................................................................................................................................................... 41
Link: Solving Miltiarism....................................................................................................................................................... 42
Link: Cosmopolitanism......................................................................................................................................................... 43
Link: Giroux.......................................................................................................................................................................... 47
Link: Foucault/Micro-Politics............................................................................................................................................... 48
Link: Respect for the Other................................................................................................................................................... 49
Link: Saying Anything But Capitalism Bad ......................................................................................................................... 50
Link: Individual Struggles .................................................................................................................................................... 51
Link: attempting to change society ....................................................................................................................................... 52
Link: Racism......................................................................................................................................................................... 53
Link: Immigration................................................................................................................................................................. 54
Link: Queer Theory............................................................................................................................................................... 55
Link: Feminism..................................................................................................................................................................... 56
Link: Post-Structuralism ....................................................................................................................................................... 57
Link: Economic Collapse...................................................................................................................................................... 59

Bureaucracy Modules:
****Link: Bureaucracy****................................................................................................................................................. 60
The Bureaucracy—Unequal Access ..................................................................................................................................... 62
The Bureaucracy—Roll Back ............................................................................................................................................... 63
The Bureaucracy—Capitalist Rhetoric ................................................................................................................................. 65
The Bureaucracy—Executives.............................................................................................................................................. 67

Impacts:
Impact: Bureaucracy/AT: We Transform System................................................................................................................. 68
Impact: Ideology = Material Practice.................................................................................................................................... 69
Impact: Extinction................................................................................................................................................................. 71
Impact: War .......................................................................................................................................................................... 72
Impact: Calculability............................................................................................................................................................. 73
Impact: Crushes Humans ...................................................................................................................................................... 74
IMPACT: cap bad/at metaphysics bad: ................................................................................................................................ 75
Impacts: All the Bad Things ................................................................................................................................................. 76

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…IDEOLOGY DOTH MAKE SUBJECTS OF US ALL…
RED SERVICE UTNIF 2006
RED SERVICE—INDEX
Alternatives:
Alt: Immanent Revolution (AT: No Revolution).................................................................................................................. 78
Alt: Reject Everywhere......................................................................................................................................................... 82
Alt: Movements .................................................................................................................................................................... 84
Alt: Solves Feminism............................................................................................................................................................ 86
Alt: Solves Other................................................................................................................................................................... 87
Alt: Social Change Solvency ................................................................................................................................................ 88
Alt: Structural Attention Solves........................................................................................................................................... 89

Answers To:
AT: Permutation/No Movement***** ................................................................................................................................. 90
AT: Permutation.................................................................................................................................................................... 91
AT: Capitalism Good / Inevitable (No Alt) .......................................................................................................................... 93
AT: No Alternative************* ..................................................................................................................................... 94
AT: No Movement ................................................................................................................................................................ 95
AT: Theory Bad (also, AT: Chomsky/Zinn)......................................................................................................................... 97
AT: Stalinism / Soviet Terror................................................................................................................................................. 98
AT: But, the Affirmative Does Good Things! ....................................................................................................................... 99
AT: Althusser Wrong........................................................................................................................................................... 100
AT: Transition Wars ........................................................................................................................................................... 101

Affirmnative:
Aff: AT: The Revolution—Marxism Sucks........................................................................................................................ 103
Aff: AT: The Revolution—Not Coming............................................................................................................................. 104
Aff: AT: The Rev—AT: But, that’s not our Marxism........................................................................................................ 107
Žižek = ⊗ Left Coalitions ................................................................................................................................................... 108
Žižek = Totalitarianism....................................................................................................................................................... 109
Žižek’s Alternative Fails—Capitalism................................................................................................................................ 110
AT: Pomo Link/Multiculturalism Link............................................................................................................................... 113
AT: Democracy Link .......................................................................................................................................................... 114
AT: Marxism—Generic ...................................................................................................................................................... 116
Aff: Althusser Wrong .......................................................................................................................................................... 117
Aff: Social Compassion Solves........................................................................................................................................... 119
AFF: Politics of Recongition Solves................................................................................................................................... 119
AFF: Queer Theory............................................................................................................................................................. 120
Aff: Particular Struggles Key.............................................................................................................................................. 121
Aff: Permutation ................................................................................................................................................................. 122
Perm: socialist feminism..................................................................................................................................................... 124
Perm: fem/queer theory/anticap .......................................................................................................................................... 125

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As we gather
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Mr. Speaker, Vice President Cheney, members of Congress, distinguished guests, fellow citizens:
tonight, our nation is at war, our economy is in recession, and the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers. Yet the state of our
Union has never been stronger. (Applause.)

We last met in an hour of shock and suffering. In four short months, our nation has comforted the victims, begun to rebuild New York
and the Pentagon, rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a
people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression. (Applause.)

The American flag flies again over our embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay. (Applause.)
And terrorist leaders who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their own. (Applause.)
America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror. We'll be partners in rebuilding that country. And this evening we welcome the distinguished interim leader of a liberated Afghanistan: Chairman Hamid Karzai. (Applause.)

The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today women are free, and are part of Afghanistan's new government. And we welcome the new Minister of Women's Affairs, Doctor Sima Samar. (Applause.)

Our progress is a tribute to the spirit of the Afghan people, to the resolve of our coalition, and to the might of the United States military. (Applause.) When I called our troops into action, I did so with complete confidence in their courage and skill. And tonight, thanks to them, we are winning the war on terror. (Applause.) The man
and women of our Armed Forces have delivered a message now clear to every enemy of the United States: Even 7,000 miles away, across oceans and continents, on mountaintops and in caves -- you will not escape the justice of this nation. (Applause.)

For many Americans, these four months have brought sorrow, and pain that will never completely go away. Every day a retired firefighter returns to Ground Zero, to feel closer to his two sons who died there. At a memorial in New York, a little boy left his football with a note for his lost father: Dear Daddy, please take this to heaven.
I don't want to play football until I can play with you again some day.

Last month, at the grave of her husband, Michael, a CIA officer and Marine who died in Mazur-e-Sharif, Shannon Spann said these words of farewell: "Semper Fi, my love." Shannon is with us tonight. (Applause.)

Shannon, I assure you and all who have lost a loved one that our cause is just, and our country will never forget the debt we owe Michael and all who gave their lives for freedom.

Our cause is just, and it continues. Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst fears, and showed us the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our enemies' hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design.
We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world.

What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning. Most of the 19 men who hijacked planes on September the 11th were trained in Afghanistan's camps, and so were tens of thousands of others. Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often
supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning.

Thanks to the work of our law enforcement officials and coalition partners, hundreds of terrorists have been arrested. Yet, tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. (Applause.) So long as training camps operate, so long as
nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk. And America and our allies must not, and will not, allow it. (Applause.)

Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United
States and the world. (Applause.)

Our military has put the terror training camps of Afghanistan out of business, yet camps still exist in at least a dozen countries. A terrorist underworld -- including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-i-Mohammed -- operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities.

While the most visible military action is in Afghanistan, America is acting elsewhere. We now have troops in the Philippines, helping to train that country's armed forces to go after terrorist cells that have executed an American, and still hold hostages. Our soldiers, working with the Bosnian government, seized terrorists who were
plotting to bomb our embassy. Our Navy is patrolling the coast of Africa to block the shipment of weapons and the establishment of terrorist camps in Somalia.

My hope is that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own. Many nations are acting forcefully. Pakistan is now cracking down on terror, and I admire the strong leadership of President Musharraf. (Applause.)

But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will. (Applause.)

Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while
starving its citizens.

Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom.

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children.
This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to
blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. (Applause.) And all nations should know: America
will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.

We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. (Applause.)

Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch -- yet it must be and it will be
waged on our watch.

We can't stop short. If we stop now -- leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked -- our sense of security would be false
and temporary. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight
freedom's fight. (Applause.)
Our first priority must always be the security of our nation, and that will be reflected in the budget I send to Congress. My budget supports three great goals for
America: We will win this war; we'll protect our homeland; and we will revive our economy.

September the 11th brought out the best in America, and the best in this Congress. And I join the American people in applauding your unity
and resolve. (Applause.) Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit directed toward addressing problems here at home. I'm a
proud member of my party -- yet as we act to win the war, protect our people, and create jobs in America, we must act, first and foremost, not as
Republicans, not as Democrats, but as Americans. (Applause.)
It costs a lot to fight this war. We have spent more than a billion dollars a month -- over $30 million a day -- and we must be prepared for future operations. Afghanistan proved that expensive precision weapons defeat the enemy and spare innocent lives, and we need more of them. We need to replace aging aircraft and make our
military more agile, to put our troops anywhere in the world quickly and safely. Our men and women in uniform deserve the best weapons, the best equipment, the best training -- and they also deserve another pay raise. (Applause.)

My budget includes the largest increase in defense spending in two decades -- because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay. (Applause.)

The next priority of my budget is to do everything possible to protect our citizens and strengthen our nation against the ongoing threat of another attack. Time and distance from the events of September the 11th will not make us safer unless we act on its lessons. America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from
attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.

My budget nearly doubles funding for a sustained strategy of homeland security, focused on four key areas: bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and border security, and improved intelligence. We will develop vaccines to fight anthrax and other deadly diseases. We'll increase funding to help states and communities train and
equip our heroic police and firefighters. (Applause.) We will improve intelligence collection and sharing, expand patrols at our borders, strengthen the security of air travel, and use technology to track the arrivals and departures of visitors to the United States. (Applause.)

Homeland security will make America not only stronger, but, in many ways, better. Knowledge gained from bioterrorism research will improve public health. Stronger police and fire departments will mean safer neighborhoods. Stricter border enforcement will help combat illegal drugs. (Applause.) And as government works to
better secure our homeland, America will continue to depend on the eyes and ears of alert citizens.

A few days before Christmas, an airline flight attendant spotted a passenger lighting a match. The crew and passengers quickly subdued the man, who had been trained by al Qaeda and was armed with explosives. The people on that plane were alert and, as a result, likely saved nearly 200 lives. And tonight we welcome and thank
flight attendants Hermis Moutardier and Christina Jones. (Applause.)

Once we have funded our national security and our homeland security, the final great priority of my budget is economic security for the American people. (Applause.) To achieve these great national objectives -- to win the war, protect the homeland, and revitalize our economy -- our budget will run a deficit that will be small and
short-term, so long as Congress restrains spending and acts in a fiscally responsible manner. (Applause.) We have clear priorities and we must act at home with the same purpose and resolve we have shown overseas: We'll prevail in the war, and we will defeat this recession. (Applause.)

Americans who have lost their jobs need our help and I support extending unemployment benefits and direct assistance for health care coverage. (Applause.) Yet, American workers want more than unemployment checks -- they want a steady paycheck. (Applause.) When America works, America prospers, so my economic security
plan can be summed up in one word: jobs. (Applause.)

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Good jobs begin with good schools, and here we've made a fine start. (Applause.) Republicans and Democrats worked together to achieve
historic education reform so that no child is left behind. I was proud to work with members of both parties: Chairman John Boehner and Congressman George Miller.
(Applause.) Senator Judd Gregg. (Applause.) And I was so proud of our work, I even had nice things to say about my friend, Ted Kennedy. (Laughter and applause.)
I know the folks at the Crawford coffee shop couldn't believe I'd say such a thing -- (laughter) -- but our work on this bill shows what is possible if we set aside
posturing and focus on results. (Applause.)
There is more to do. We need to prepare our children to read and succeed in school with improved Head Start and early childhood development programs. (Applause.) We must upgrade our teacher colleges and teacher training and launch a major recruiting drive with a great goal for America: a quality teacher in every classroom.
(Applause.)

Good jobs also depend on reliable and affordable energy. This Congress must act to encourage conservation, promote technology, build infrastructure, and it must act to increase energy production at home so America is less dependent on foreign oil. (Applause.)

Good jobs depend on expanded trade. Selling into new markets creates new jobs, so I ask Congress to finally approve trade promotion authority. (Applause.) On these two key issues, trade and energy, the House of Representatives has acted to create jobs, and I urge the Senate to pass this legislation. (Applause.)

Good jobs depend on sound tax policy. (Applause.) Last year, some in this hall thought my tax relief plan was too small; some thought it was too big. (Applause.) But when the checks arrived in the mail, most Americans thought tax relief was just about right. (Applause.) Congress listened to the people and responded by reducing
tax rates, doubling the child credit, and ending the death tax. For the sake of long-term growth and to help Americans plan for the future, let's make these tax cuts permanent. (Applause.)

The way out of this recession, the way to create jobs, is to grow the economy by encouraging investment in factories and equipment, and by speeding up tax relief so people have more money to spend. For the sake of American workers, let's pass a stimulus package. (Applause.)

Good jobs must be the aim of welfare reform. As we reauthorize these important reforms, we must always remember the goal is to reduce dependency on government and offer every American the dignity of a job. (Applause.)

Americans know economic security can vanish in an instant without health security. I ask Congress to join me this year to enact a patients' bill of rights -- (applause) -- to give uninsured workers credits to help buy health coverage -- (applause) -- to approve an historic increase in the spending for veterans' health -- (applause) -- and to
give seniors a sound and modern Medicare system that includes coverage for prescription drugs. (Applause.)

A good job should lead to security in retirement. I ask Congress to enact new safeguards for 401K and pension plans. (Applause.) Employees who have worked hard and saved all their lives should not have to risk losing everything if their company fails. (Applause.) Through stricter accounting standards and tougher disclosure
requirements, corporate America must be made more accountable to employees and shareholders and held to the highest standards of conduct. (Applause.)

Retirement security also depends upon keeping the commitments of Social Security, and we will. We must make Social Security financially stable and allow personal retirement accounts for younger workers who choose them. (Applause.)

Members, you and I will work together in the months ahead on other issues: productive farm policy -- (applause) -- a cleaner environment -- (applause) -- broader home ownership, especially among minorities -- (applause) -- and ways to encourage the good work of charities and faith-based groups. (Applause.) I ask you to join me on
these important domestic issues in the same spirit of cooperation we've applied to our war against terrorism. (Applause.)

During these last few months, I've been humbled and privileged to see the true character of this country in a time of testing. Our enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil. (Applause.)

The American people have responded magnificently, with courage and compassion, strength and resolve. As I have met the heroes, hugged the families, and looked into the tired faces of rescuers, I have stood in awe of the American people.

And I hope you will join me -- I hope you will join me in expressing thanks to one American for the strength and calm and comfort she brings to our nation in
crisis, our First Lady, Laura Bush. (Applause.)

None of us would ever wish the evil that was done on September the 11th. Yet after America was attacked, it was as if our entire country looked into a mirror and saw
our better selves. We were reminded that we are citizens, with obligations to each other, to our country, and to history. We began to think less of the goods we can
accumulate, and more about the good we can do.

For too long our culture has said, "If it feels good, do it." Now America is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: "Let's roll."
(Applause.) In the sacrifice of soldiers, the fierce brotherhood of firefighters, and the bravery and generosity of ordinary citizens,
we have glimpsed what a new culture of responsibility could look like. We want to be a nation that serves goals larger than self.
We've been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not let this moment pass. (Applause.)

My call tonight is for every American to commit at least two years -- 4,000 hours over the rest of your lifetime -- to the service of your
neighbors and your nation. (Applause.) Many are already serving, and I thank you. If you aren't sure how to help, I've got a good place to start. To sustain and
extend the best that has emerged in America, I invite you to join the new USA Freedom Corps. The Freedom Corps will focus on three areas of need:
responding in case of crisis at home; rebuilding our communities; and extending American compassion throughout the world.

One purpose of the USA Freedom Corps will be homeland security. America needs retired doctors and nurses who can be mobilized in major
emergencies; volunteers to help police and fire departments; transportation and utility workers well-trained in spotting danger.

Our country also needs citizens working to rebuild our communities. We need mentors to love children, especially children whose
parents are in prison. And we need more talented teachers in troubled schools. USA Freedom Corps will expand and improve the
good efforts of AmeriCorps and Senior Corps to recruit more than 200,000 new volunteers.

And America needs citizens to extend the compassion of our country to every part of the world. So we will renew the promise
of the Peace Corps, double its volunteers over the next five years -- (applause) -- and ask it to join a new effort to encourage development
and education and opportunity in the Islamic world. (Applause.)

This time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity -- a moment we must seize to change our culture. Through the
gathering momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater good.
(Applause.) And we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace.

All fathers and mothers, in all societies, want their children to be educated, and live free from poverty and violence. No people
on Earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.

If anyone doubts this, let them look to Afghanistan, where the Islamic "street" greeted the fall of tyranny with song and celebration.
Let the skeptics look to Islam's own rich history, with its centuries of learning, and tolerance and progress. America will lead by defending liberty and
justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. (Applause.)

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No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for
the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal
justice; and religious tolerance. (Applause.)

America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world,
because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world
beyond the war on terror.
In this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old rivalries. America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before, to
achieve peace and prosperity. In every region, free markets and free trade and free societies are proving their power to lift lives. Together with friends and allies from
Europe to Asia, and Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom. (Applause.)

The last time I spoke here, I expressed the hope that life would return to normal. In some ways, it has. In others, it never will. Those of us who have lived through
these challenging times have been changed by them. We've come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it must be
opposed. (Applause.) Beyond all differences of race or creed, we are one country, mourning together and facing danger together.
Deep in the American character, there is honor, and it is stronger than cynicism. And many have discovered again that even in tragedy --
especially in tragedy -- God is near. (Applause.)

In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we've been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world
faced a choice more clear or consequential.

Our enemies send other people's children on missions of suicide and murder. They embrace tyranny and death as a cause and a creed.
We stand for a different choice, made long ago, on the day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the
dignity of every life. (Applause.)
Steadfast in our purpose, we now press on. We have known freedom's price. We have shown freedom's power. And in this great conflict, my fellow Americans, we
will see freedom's victory.

Thank you all. May God bless. (Applause.)

<<<GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JANUARY 29, 2002 [“PRESIDENT
DELIVERS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, THE UNITED
STATES CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, D.C.,” OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, WWW.WHITEHOUSE.GOV/
NEWS/RELEASES/2002/01/20020129-11.HTML]>>>

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GEORGE W. BUSH’S 2002 STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS MAKES EXPLICIT WHAT THE AFFIRMATIVE TRIES TO
HIDE BEHIND SILENCE AND GOOD INTENTIONS, THAT IN THE MIDST OF AN ENDLESS WAR ON TERROR THE
1AC’S CALL FOR ALTRUISTIC NATIONAL SERVICE SERVES AND IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTION. FAR FROM
CONSTITUTING A RESISTANCE TO THE LOGIC OF DOMINATION THAT SHAPE’S OUR SOCIETY, THE AFFIRMATIVE
IS MERELY AN EXTENSION OF THE WAR ON TERROR TO THE HOME FRONT. JUST AS PRESIDENT BUSH CALLS
ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO JOIN HIM, THE RESOLUTION HAILS US AS SUBJECTS WHO WOULD HEAR THE
MESSAGE AND ANSWER THE CALLS OF IDEOLOGY AS SUBJECTS. AND THIS IS NOT SOLELY POLITICAL
RHETORIC, THIS IS EXPLICITLY THE CALL OF THE RESOLUTION BOTH AS A PART OF THE DEBATE COMMUNITY
AND AS A PART OF THIS ROUND, AS THE TOPIC BALLOT THAT EVERY HIGH SCHOOL FILLED OUT TO PICK THIS
TOPIC MAKES EXPLICIT

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION (NFHS) SPEECH, DEBATE & THEATRE
ASSOCIATION, AUGUST 9TH, 2005 [HTTP://WWW.NFHS.ORG/SCRIPTCONTENT/VA_CUSTOM/VIMDISPLAYS/
CONTENTPAGEDISPLAY.CFM?CONTENT_ID=677&SEARCHWORD=NATIONAL%20SERVICE]

PROBLEM AREA IV: NATIONAL SERVICE
Resolved: The United States federal government should establish a comprehensive program of mandatory national service by United States citizens.

The mention of the word “service” automatically brings to mind John F. Kennedy’s challenge to “Ask not what your country can do for
you . . .” The concept of national service is one of the few issues on which our last two presidents agreed. The United States has a number of voluntary national
service programs, such as AmeriCorps, Senior Corps and VISTA to name a few. Mandatory national service, it is argued, creates a bridge between socio-
economic groups that have little normal contact, fosters civic and political participation and balances burdens among the more and
less powerful or wealthy. Underlying the debate is the question of whether service is necessary or even something government should be doing. Affirmatives
could specify the type of national service to be performed (major areas being conscription, education, health, public safety, environment); who would participate (18-24
year olds, students, retirees, welfare recipients); compensation (tax credits, educational benefits, stipends, housing); as well as specifying whether service is to be full-
or part-time. The primary focus of the topic is the clash between libertarians and communitarians. Negatives may argue that national service should not replace the
responsibilities of government, that it undermines existing charitable or private enterprises and the benefits of “volunteerism” do not accrue either to the nation or the
individual when it is not voluntary. Disadvantages include cost, diversion from further education and unemployment effects on displaced workers. The debate over
national service concerns what we owe to our country and to each other. Author: Sandy Patrick, Wyoming

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THE RESOLUTION IS NOT A NEUTRAL CALL FOR CIVIC PARTICIPATION, BUT THE MANIFESTATION OF WHAT
ALTHUSSER CALLED AN IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUS, A SPACE OUTSIDE OF THE STATE BUT THAT
NEVERTHELESS SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THOSE WHOSE INTERESTS ARE REPRESENTED THERE, THE
CAPITALIST RULING CLASS.

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION),” LENIN AND
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 100-103]

On the Reproduction of the Relations of Production

I can now answer the central question which I have left in suspense for many long pages: how is the reproduction of the relations of
production secured?

In the topographical language (Infrastructure, Superstructure), I can say: for the most part,12 it is secured by the legal-political and
ideological superstructure.

But as I have argued that it is essential to go beyond this still descriptive language, I shall say: for the most part, it is secured by the
exercise of State power in the State Apparatuses, on the one hand the (Repressive) State Apparatus, on the other the Ideological State
Apparatuses.

What I have just said must also be taken into account, and it can be assembled in the form of the following three features:

1. All the State Apparatuses function both by repression and by ideology, with the difference that the (Repressive) State Apparatus
functions massively and predominantly by repression, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and
predominantly by ideology.

2. Whereas the (Repressive) State Apparatus constitutes an organized whole whose different parts are centralized beneath a
commanding unity, that of the politics of class struggle applied by the political representatives of the ruling classes in possession of
State power, the Ideological State Apparatuses are multiple, distinct, 'relatively autonomous' and capable of providing an objective
field to contradictions which express, in forms which may be limited or extreme, the effects of the clashes between the capitalist class
struggle and the proletarian class struggle, as well as their subordinate forms.

3. Whereas the unity of the (Repressive) State Apparatus is secured by its unified and centralized organization under the leadership of
the representatives of the classes in power executing the politics of the class struggle of the classes in power, the unity of the different
Ideological State Apparatuses is secured, usually in contradictory forms, by the ruling ideology, the ideology of the ruling class.

Taking these features into account, it is possible to represent the repro-duction of the relations of production in the following way,
according to a kind of 'division of labour'.

The role of the repressive State apparatus, insofar as it is a repressive apparatus, consists essentially in securing by force (physical or
otherwise) the political conditions of the reproduction of relations of production, which are in the last resort relations of exploitation.
Not only does the State apparatus contribute generously to its own reproduction (the capitalist State contains political dynasties,
military dynasties, etc.), but also and above all, the State apparatus secures by repression (from the most brutal physical force, via
mere administrative commands and interdictions, to open and tacit censorship) the political conditions for the action of the Ideological
State Apparatuses.

In fact, it is the latter which largely secure the reproduction specifically of the relations of production, behind a 'shield' provided by the
repressive State apparatus. It is here that the role of the ruling ideology is heavily concentrated, the ideology of the ruling class which
holds State power. It is the intermediation of the ruling ideology that ensures a (sometimes teeth-gritting) 'harmony' between the
repressive State apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses, and between the different State Ideological Apparatuses.

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IT IS NO MISTAKE THAT BUSH CALLS ON US TO TRANSCEND POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUT OUR INTERESTS AS
AMERICAN’S IN FRONT OF ALL OTHER OBLIGATION. THE LOGIC OF AMERICA TRANSCENDS SIMPLY THE
LOGIC OF POLITICS, BECAUSE ALL POLITICS IS STRUCTURED TO PROMOTE AND MAINTAIN A BROADER,
IDEOLOGICAL SYSTEM. THE RESOLUTION IS A MEANS BY WHICH THE CAPITALIST STATE MAINTAINS ITS
HEGEMONY OVER US ALL, NOT BY FORCE, BUT BY CONSENT. RESPONDING TO THE CALL OF THE RESOLUTION
AS THE AFFIRMATIVE DOES CONSTITUTES US AS IDEOLOGICAL SUBJECTS OF CAPITALISM

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION),” LENIN AND
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 115-120]

Ideology Interpellates Individuals as Subjects
This thesis is simply a matter of making my last proposition explicit: there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects. Meaning, there is no ideology
except for concrete subjects, and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject: meaning, by the category of the subject and
its functioning.

By this I mean that, even if it only appears under this name (the subject) with the rise of bourgeois ideology, above all with the rise of legal ideology,15 the category of
the subject (which may function under other names: e.g., as the soul in Plato, as God, etc.) is the constitutive category of all ideology, whatever its determination
(regional or class) and whatever its historical date—since ideology has no history.

I say: the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but at the same time and immediately I add that the category of the subject is only
constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of `constituting' concrete individuals as subjects. In
the interaction of this double constitution exists the functioning of all ideology, ideology being nothing but its functioning in the
material forms of existence of that functioning.
In order to grasp what follows, it is essential to realize that both he who is writing these lines and the reader who reads them are themselves subjects, and therefore
ideological subjects (a tautological proposition), i.e. that the author and the reader of these lines both live 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology in the
sense in which I have said that 'man is an ideological animal by nature'

That the author, insofar as he writes the lines of a discourse which claims to be scientific, is completely absent as a 'subject' from 'his' scientific discourse (for all
scientific discourse is by definition a subject-less discourse, there is no `Subject of science' except in an ideology of science) is a different question which I shall leave
on one side for the moment.

As St Paul admirably put it, it is in the 'Logos, meaning in ideology, that we 'live, move and have our being. It follows that, for you and for me, the
category of the subject is a primary 'obviousness' (obviousnesses are always primary): it is clear that you and I are subjects (free, ethical, etc .... ). Like all
obviousnesses, including those that make a word 'name a thing' or 'have a meaning' (therefore including the obviousness of the 'transparency' of language), the
'obviousness' that you and I are subjects—and that that does not cause any problems—is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological
effect.16 It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes (without appearing to do so, since these are `obviousnesses') obviousnesses as
obviousnesses, which we cannot fail to recognize and before which we have the inevitable and natural reaction of crying out (aloud or in
the 'still, small voice of conscience'): 'That's obvious! That's right! That's true!'

At work in this reaction is the ideological recognition function which is one of the two functions of ideology as such (its inverse being the function of misrecognition—
meconnaissance).

To take a highly 'concrete' example, we all have friends who, when they knock on our door and we ask, through the door, the question 'Who's there?' answer (since 'it's
obvious') 'It's me.' And we recognize that 'it is him,' or 'her'. We open the door, and 'it's true, it really was she who was there.' To take another example, when we
recognize somebody of our (previous) acquaintance ((re)-connaissance) in the street, we show him that we have recognized him (and have recognized that he has
recognized us) by saying to him 'Hello, my friend, and shaking his hand (a material ritual practice of ideological recognition in everyday life—in France, at least;
elsewhere, there are other rituals).

In this preliminary remark and these concrete illustrations, I only wish to point out that you and I are always already subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals
of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects. The writing I am
currently executing and the reading you are currently!' performing are also in this respect rituals of ideological recognition, including the 'obviousness' with which the
'truth' or 'error' of my reflections may impose itself on you.

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But to recognize that we are subjects and that we function in the practical rituals of the most elementary everyday life (the hand-shake, the
fact of calling you by your name, the fact of knowing, even if I do not know what it is, that you 'have' a name of your own, which means that you are recognized as a
unique subject, etc.)—this recognition only gives us the 'consciousness' of our incessant (eternal) practice of ideological recognition—its
consciousness, i.e. its recognition—but in no sense does it give us the (scientific) knowledge of the mechanism of this recognition. Now it is
this knowledge that we have to reach, if you will, while speaking in ideology, and from within ideology we have to outline a discourse which
tries to break with ideology, in order to dare to be the beginning of a scientific (i.e. subject-less) discourse on ideology.
Thus in order to represent why the category of the 'subject' is constitutive of ideology, which only exists by constituting concrete subjects as subjects, I shall employ a
special mode of exposition: 'concrete' enough to be recognized, but abstract enough to be thinkable and thought, giving rise to a knowledge.

As a first formulation I shall say: all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the
subject.

This is a proposition which entails that we distinguish for the moment between concrete individuals, on the one hand and concrete subjects on the other, although at this
level concrete subjects only exist insofar as they are supported by a concrete individual.

ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it `recruits' subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or
I shall then suggest that
'transforms' the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing,
and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!'

Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-
hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he [OR SHE] becomes a subject. Why? Because he [OR SHE] has recognized that the
hail was 'really' addressed to him [OR HER], and that 'it was really him who was hailed' (and not someone else). Experience shows that the practical
telecommunication of hailings is such that they hardly ever miss their man: verbal call or whistle, the one hailed always recognizes that it is really him who is being
hailed. And yet it is a strange phenomenon, and one which cannot be explained solely by 'guilt feelings', despite the large numbers who `have something on their
consciences'.

Naturally for the convenience and clarity of my little theoretical theatre I have had to present things in the form of a sequence, with a before and an after, and thus in the
form of a temporal succession. There are indiwiduals walking along. Somewhere (usually behind them) the hail rings out: 'Hey, you there!' One individual (nine times
out of ten it is the right one) turns round, believing/suspecting knowing that it is for him, i.e. recognizing that 'it really is he' who is meant by the hailing. But in reality
these things happen without any succession. The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing.

I might add: what thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes
place in ideology seems therefore to take place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition
outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology:
ideology never says, 'I am ideological' It is necessary to be outside ideology, i.e. in scientific knowledge, to be able to say: I am in ideology (a quite
exceptional case) or (the general case): I was in ideology. As is well known, the accusation of being in ideology only applies to others, never to
oneself (unless one is really a Spinozist or a Marxist, which, in this matter, is to be exactly the same thing). Which amounts to saying that ideology has no
outside (for itself), but at the same time that it is nothing but outside (for science and reality).
Spinoza explained this completely two centuries before Marx, who practiced it but without explaining it in detail. But let us leave this point, although it is heavy with
consequences, consequences which are not just theoretical, but also directly political, since, for example, the whole theory of criticism and self-criticism, the golden rule
of the Marxist-Leninist practice of the class struggle, depends on it.

Thus ideology hails or interpellates individuals as subjects. As ideology is eternal, I must now suppress the temporal form in which I have presented the
functioning of ideology, and say: ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already
interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition: individuals are always-already subjects. Hence individuals are 'abstract' with
respect to the subjects, which they always-already are. This proposition might seem paradoxical.

That an individual is always-already a subject, even before he is born, is nevertheless the plain reality, accessible to everyone and not a paradox at all. Freud shows that
individuals are always 'abstract' with respect to the subjects they always-already are, simply by noting the ideological ritual that surrounds the expectation of a 'birth,
that 'happy event' Everyone knows how much and in what way an unborn child is expected. Which amounts to saying, wery prosaically, if we agree to drop the
'sentiments, i.e. the forms of family ideology (paternal/maternal/ conjugal/fraternal) in which the unborn child is expected: it is certain in advance that it will bear its
Father's Name, and will therefore have an identity and be irreplaceable. Before its birth, the child is therefore always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by
the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is 'expected' once it has been conceived. I hardly need add that this familial ideological configuration is, in its
uniqueness, highly structured, and that it is in this implacable and more or less 'pathological' (presupposing that any meaning can be assigned to that term) structure that
the former subject-to-be will have to 'find' 'its' place, i.e. `become' the sexual subject (boy or girl) which it already is in advance. It is clear that this ideological
constraint and pre-appointment, and all the rituals of rearing and then education in the family, have some relationship with what Freud studied in the forms of the pre-
genital and genital 'stages' of sexuality, i.e. in the 'grip' of what Freud registered by its effects as being the unconscious. But let us leave this point, too, on one side.

Let me go one step further. What I shall now turn my attention to is the way the 'actors' in this mise en scene of interpellation, and their respective roles, are reflected in
the very structure of all ideology.

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AND, THIS QUESTION TRANSCEND THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF THE 1AC TO ENCOMPASS THE QUESTION OF THE
RESOLUTION AND DEBATE ITSELF. THE CAPITALIST STATE’S MOST EFFECTIVE AND DEPENDABLE METHOD OF
MAKING US GOOD SUBJECTS IS EMPIRICALLY THE SYSTEMS OF EDUCATION. AGREEING TO DEBATE THE
RESOLUTION ON ITS TERMS IN THE FIRST PLACE, AS WELL AS THE IMPLICIT IDEOLOGY OF INTERCULTURAL
EDUCATION WITHIN THE 1AC, ALLOWS IDEOLOGY TO MAKE SUBJECTS OF US ALL

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION),” LENIN AND
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 103-106]

That is why I believe that I am justified in advancing the following Thesis, however precarious it is. I believe that the
ideological State apparatus which has
been installed in the dominant position in mature capitalist social formations as a result of a violent political and ideological class
struggle against the old dominant ideological State apparatus, is the educational ideological apparatus.

This thesis may seem paradoxical, given that for everyone, i.e. in the ideological representation that the bourgeoisie has tried to give
itself and the classes it exploits, it really seems that the dominant ideological State apparatus in capitalist social formations is not the
Schools, but the political ideological State apparatus, i.e. the regime of parliamentary democracy combining universal suffrage and
party struggle.

However, history, even recent history, shows that the bourgeoisie has been and still is able to accommodate itself to political
ideological State apparatuses other than parliamentary democracy: the First and Second Empires, Constitutional Monarchy (Louis XVIII and Charles
X), Parliamentary Monarchy (Louis-Philippe), Presidential Democracy (de Gaulle), to mention only France. In England this is even clearer. The Revolution was
particularly 'successful' there from the bourgeois point of view, since unlike France, where the bourgeoisie, partly because of the stupidity of the petty aristocracy, had
to agree to being carried to power by peasant and plebeian journèes revolutionnaires', something for which it had to pay a high price, the English bourgeoisie was able
to 'compromise' with the aristocracy and 'share' State power and the use of the State apparatus with it for a long time (peace among all men of good will in the ruling
classes!). In Germany it is even more striking, since it was behind a political ideological State apparatus in which the imperial Junkers (epitomized by Bismarck), their
army and their police provided it with a shield and leading personnel, that the imperialist bourgeoisie made its shattering entry into history, before 'traversing' the
Weimar Republic and entrusting itself to Nazism.

Hence I believe I have good reasons for thinking that behind the scenes of its political Ideological State Apparatus, which occupies the front of
the stage, what the bourgeoisie has installed as its number-one, i.e. as its dominant ide-ological State apparatus, is the educational
apparatus, which has in fact replaced in its functions the previously dominant ideological State apparatus, the Church. One might even add: the School-
Family couple has replaced the Church-Family couple.

Why is the educational apparatus in fact the dominant ideological State apparatus in capitalist social formations, and how does it function? For the moment it must
suffice to say:

1. All ideological State apparatuses, whatever they are, contribute to the same result: the reproduction of the relations of production,
i.e. of capitalist relations of exploitation.

2.Each of them contributes towards this single result in the way proper to it. The political apparatus by subjecting individuals to the
political State ideology, the 'indirect' (parliamentary) or 'direct' (plebiscitary or fascist) 'democratic' ideology. The communications
apparatus by cramming every 'citizen' with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism, moralism, etc., by means of the press, the
radio and television. The same goes for the cultural apparatus (the role of sport in chauvinism is of the first importance), etc. The religious apparatus by recalling in
sermons and the other great ceremonies of Birth, Marriage and Death, that man is only ashes, unless he loves his neighbour to the extent of turning the other cheek to
whoever strikes first. The family apparatus ... but there is no need to go on.

3. Thisconcert is dominated by a single score, occasionally disturbed by contradictions (those of the remnants of former ruling classes, those of
the proletarians and their organizations): the score of the Ideology of the current ruling class which integrates into its music the great
themes of the Humanism of the Great Forefathers, who produced the Greek Miracle even before Christianity, and afterwards the Glory of Rome, the Eternal City,
and the themes of Interest, particular and general, etc. nationalism, moralism and economism.

4. Nevertheless, in this concert, one ideological State apparatus certainly has the dominant role, although hardly anyone lends an ear to
its music: it is so silent! This is the School.

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It takes children from every class at infant-school age, and then for years, the years in which the child is most 'vulnerable', squeezed
between the family State apparatus and the educational State apparatus, it drums into them, whether it uses new or old methods, a
certain amount of 'know-how' wrapped in the ruling ideology (French, arithmetic, natural history, the sciences, literature) or simply the ruling
ideology in its pure state (ethics, civic instruction, philosophy). Somewhere around the age of sixteen, a huge mass of children is
ejected 'into production': these are the workers or small peasants. Another portion of scholastically adapted youth carries on: and, for better
or worse, it goes somewhat further, until it falls by the wayside and fills the posts of small and middle technicians, white-collar workers, small
and middle executives, petty bourgeois of all kinds. A last portion reaches the summit, either to fall into intellectual semi-employment, or to
provide, as well as the `intellectuals of the collective labourer, the agents of exploitation (capitalists, managers), the agents of
repression (soldiers, policemen, politicians, administrators, etc.) and the professional ideologists (priests of all sorts, most of whom are
convinced laymen').

Each mass ejected en route is practically provided with the ideology which suits the role it has to fulfill in class society: the role of the
exploited (with a `highly-developed' `professional; 'ethical, 'civic, 'national' and a-political consciousness); the role of the agent of
exploitation (ability to give the workers orders and speak to them: 'human relations'), of the agent of repression (ability to give orders
and enforce obedience 'without discussion,' or ability to manipulate the demagogy of a political leader's rhetoric), or of the professional
ideologist (ability to treat consciousnesses with the respect, i.e. with the contempt, blackmail, and demagogy they deserve, adapted to
the accents of Morality, of Virtue, of 'Transcendence, of the Nation, of France's World Role, etc.).
Of course, many of these contrasting Virtues (modesty, resignation, submissiveness on the one hand, cynicism, contempt, arrogance, confidence, self-importance, even
smooth talk and cunning on the other) are also taught in the Family, in the Church, in the Army, in Good Books, in films and even in the football stadium. But no
other ideological State apparatus has the obligatory (and not least, free) audience of the totality of the children in the capitalist social
formation, eight hours a day for five or six days out of seven.

But it is by an apprenticeship in a variety of know-how wrapped up in the massive inculcation of the ideology of the ruling class that
the relations of production in a capitalist Social formation, i.e. the relations of exploited to exploiters and exploiters to exploited are
largely reproduced. The mechanisms which produce this vital result for the capitalist regime are naturally covered up and concealed
by a universally reigning ideology of the School, universally reigning because it is one of the essential forms of the ruling bourgeois
ideology: an ideology which represents the School as a neutral environment purged of ideology (because it is . . lay), where teachers
respectful of the 'conscience' and 'freedom' of the children who are entrusted to them (in complete confidence) by their 'parents' (who
are free, too, i.e. the owners of their children) open up for them the path to the freedom, morality and responsibility of adults by their
own example, by knowledge, literature and their 'liberating' virtues.
I ask the pardon of those teachers who, in dreadful conditions, attempt to turn the few weapons they can find in the history and learning they `teach' against the
ideology, the system and the practices in which they are trapped. They are a kind of hero. But they are rare and how many (the majority) do not even begin to suspect
the 'work' the system (which is bigger than they are and crushes them) forces them to do, or worse, put all their heart and ingenuity into performing it with the most
advanced awareness (the famous new methods!). So little do they suspect it that their own devotion contributes to the maintenance and nourishment of this ideological
representation of the School, which makes the School today as 'natural', indispensable-useful and even beneficial for our contemporaries as the Church was 'natural,
indispensable and generous for our ancestors a few centuries ago.

In fact, the Church has been replaced today in its role as the dominant Ideological State Apparatus by the School. It is coupled with the
Family just as the Church was once coupled with the Family. We can now claim that the unprecedentedly deep crisis which is now
shaking the education system of so many States across the globe, often in conjunction with a crisis (already proclaimed in the Communist
Manifesto) shaking the family system, takes on a political meaning, given that the School (and the School-Family couple) constitutes the
dominant Ideological State Apparatus, the Apparatus playing a determinant part in the reproduction of the relations of production of a
mode of production threatened in its existence by the world class struggle.

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THE AFFIRMATIVE’S CALL IS ALSO INEVITABLY LOCKED WITHIN THE PAROCHIAL CONFINES OF THE NATION-
STATE. NATIONALITY AND IT’S ATTENDANT PATRIOTIC CITIZENSHIP PRECLUDE THE RECOGNITION THAT OUR
FIGHT IS GLOBAL AND THAT WE OWE OUR SERVICE TO ALL BEINGS EVERYWHERE. THIS IS ONE OF THE
CLASSIC RUSES OF CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION: DIVIDE AND CONQUER

SCHOCKET, PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN LITERATURE AT AMHERST COLLEGE, 2002 [ERIC, “FLAGS
UNFURLED,” RETHINKING MARXISM | 14(1), P. ELECTRONIC]
On 18 October, a small group of Hampshire College students, along with several other unidentified people, burned two American flags at an “Assembly for Patriotism”
on the Amherst College campus. Although at least one source claims that these protes- tors refused to engage the assembly in a discussion of their actions, they held
signs reading “This Flag Is Not Me” and “This Flag Is About Bigotry” (Gerety 2001). And they passed out a flyer entitled, “Reasons Why I Do Not Feel Patriotic
Today.” The flyer lists a number of military actions either undertaken or sponsored by the U.S. govemment: the 1973 coup in Chile, the contra war against Nicaragua in
the 1980s, and the military and CIA actions in Grenada, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Sudan, Brazil, and elsewhere. It makes no attempt, however, to equate these
actions with the events of September 11 or to claim that the United States is now getting what it deserves. More radically, the flyer and protest advocate a disaffiliation
from the United States at this moment of high nationalist fervor (that they burnt the flag during the Pledge of Allegiance echoes that message). At a time when
much of the Left is caught up in an argument over whether or not this is America’s “just war” (Falk 2001), these protestors seek to wage
a critique that moves from national self-examination to the repudiation of national allegiance. By doing so, they criticize
nationalism—here in the guise of patriotism—as the best collective reply to mass violence.
The official response to the protest was quick and universally disparaging. Writing on the editorial page of The Boston Globe, Amherst College President Tom Gerety
declared himself to be offended and hurt by this anachronism from the Vietnam era. How could such an action take place at a rally where “[a]ll points of view were
welcomed”? (At an “Assembly for Patriotism”?) How could these protestors be so monumentally insensitive to those who lost family and friends on September 11?
(Why rely on patriotism to articulate this loss?) However, despite his abhorrence of these protestors’ actions, Gerety closes by defending their right to burn the flag. The
value of this right is “the point that our students were trying to make,” a “protected expression under the First Amendment” (Gerety 2001). Thus, in their attempts
to disaffiliate from the United States, these misguided protestors had, unwittingly, displayed the strength of its magnanimity. Though
they may not have felt patriotic, it was patriotism that granted them the space for such feelings. The cooptive machinations of liberal
tolerance are surely preferable here to either sedition hearings or the Gulag, but they serve a similar purpose: to insulate people from
counterhegemonic struggles to disrupt national subject formation.

We need to ask, this protest insists, not simply what is being done in our names (or in the name of our “rights”), but how taking the name of
the national subject (who is victim) already establishes the narrative through which we will comprehend what is being done. Until January
2002, The New York Times, for instance, presented most of its domestic and international coverage of the unfolding events following September 11 in a new section
entitled “A Nation Challenged.” This categorization reconceives everything from the condition of Afghan women under the Taliban to the
pursuit of Al Qaeda in Spain as a national problem, important only insomuch as it reflects on the current concerns of U.S.
administration. More fundamentally, this categorization articulates these diverse global events as challenges to the idea of the nation itself
(a nation challenged)—strikes against the paradigm of nationhood. Like the slogan “America Will Prevail,” it imagines the reader as a national subject whose very
identity is made contingent by the threat to “national stability.” The point of ideological construction lies precisely between these two terms, as if
stability can only be secured by the nation, and as if the contingency of identity itself must be buttressed by a retrenched belief in the
national imaginary. That life is already contingent should, one might venture, be the message of the obituaries that close the “The Nation Challenged” every day.
But by prefacing these “Portraits in Grief” with stories of U.S. military maneuvers, The New York Times makes a different argument: even when a “nation challenged”
cannot serve as the guarantor of life, it is, nevertheless, the necessary point of mediation between personal loss and collective mourning.

What the discourse of nationalism elides, however, is the multinational composition of the victims and perpetrators of these attacks, and
the ways in which the still emerging political events following the attacks already exceed attempts to constrain them within our national narrative of innocence lost.
Though we were quickly presented with the image of valiant firefighters raising the American flag on the rubble of the Twin Towers—in conscious reference to Iwo
Jima—the bodies that lay buried in that rubble came from over eighty nations and worked, for the most part, for corporations, government agencies, and
nongovernmental organizations devoted to multinational or transnational economic activities. Thus, while the firefighters serve as (masculine, working-class)
synecdoches for a heroic nation reclaiming a lost battlefield, neither those who lost their lives in the battle nor the battlefield itself can be so easily integrated into this
national romance. Indeed, a number of the dead were “illegal aliens,” people whose legal status explicitly leaves them outside national constructions— especially given
the new USA Patriot Act. As for the perpetrators, from what we know (which is, unfortunately, very little), they too are multinational in character. “Arab Afghans”
from throughout the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe, North America, and Australia, they are wedded to a broadly regional program of Islamicist hegemony. That
this program insists upon the removal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia and the eradication of the state of Israel does not make it nationalist in orientation. On the
contrary, as Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda conceive of the struggle, it is between two broad entities—the West and the Islamicist insurgency— for control over
strategic territory in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East (Bodansky 2001). Though this narrative is also, of course, a strategic construction, it can serve
to broaden our perspective beyond the narrow confines of the nation. It allows us, at least as an initial step, to conceive of the 3000+
dead on September 11 within the same frame as the yet uncounted dead in Afghanistan (as well as in Iraq and the disputed territory in and around
Israel): as multinational civilian casualties of a global struggle for regional hegemony and access to oil.

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AND, THE IDEOLOGICAL WEAPONS OF CAPITALISM ARE THE IDEOLOGICAL WEAPONS OF DEATH.
SURRENDERING SELF-PRESERVATION TO ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS, LEAVES SURIVIVAL IN THE
INHERENTLY IRRATIONAL NATURE OF IMPERSONAL CAPITALISM, CREATING MASSIVE SYSTEMIC VIOLENCE
AND THREATENING INEVITABLE EXTINCTION

COOK, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR, 2006 [DEBORAH, “STAYING ALIVE:
ADORNO AND HABERMAS ON SELF-PRESERVATION UNDER LATE CAPITALISM,” RETHINKING MARXISM,
18(3):433-447, ELECTRONIC]
In the passage in Negative Dialectics where he warns against self-preservation gone wild, Adorno states that it is “only as reflection
upon … self-preservation that reason would be above nature” (1973, 289). To rise above nature, then, reason must become “cognizant
of its own natural essence” (1998b, 138). To be more fully rational, we must reflect on what Horkheimer and Adorno once called our
underground history (1972, 231). In other words, we must recognize that our behavior is motivated and shaped by instincts, including
the instinct for self-preservation (Adorno 1998a, 153). In his lectures on Kant, Adorno makes similar remarks when he summarizes his
solution to the problem of self-preservation gone wild. To remedy this problem, nature must first become conscious of itself (Adorno
2000, 104). Adopting the Freudian goal of making the unconscious conscious, Adorno also insists that this critical self-understanding
be accompanied by radical social, political, and economic changes that would bring to a halt the self-immolating domination of nature.
This is why mindfulness of nature is necessary but not sufficient to remedy unbridled self-preservation. In the final analysis, society
must be fundamentally transformed in order rationally to accommodate instincts that now run wild owing to our forgetfulness of
nature in ourselves.

By insisting on mindfulness of nature in the self, Adorno champions a form of rationality that would tame self-preservation, but in
contrast to Habermas, he thinks that the taming of self-preservation is a normative task rather than an accomplished fact. Because self-
preservation remains irrational, we now encounter serious environmental problems like those connected with global warming and the
greenhouse effect, the depletion of natural resources, and the death of more than one hundred regions in our oceans. Owing to self-
preservation gone wild, we have colonized and destabilized large parts of the world, adversely affecting the lives of millions, when we
have not simply enslaved or murdered their inhabitants outright. Famine and disease are often the result of ravaging the land in the
name of survival imperatives. Wars are waged in the name of self-preservation: with his now notoriously invisible weapons of mass
destruction, Saddam Hussein was said to represent a serious threat to the lives of citizens in the West. The war against terrorism,
waged in the name of self-preservation, has seriously undermined human rights and civil liberties; it has also been used to justify the
murder, rape, and torture of thousands. As it now stands, the owners of the means of production ensure our survival through profits
that, at best, only trickle down to the poorest members of society. Taken in charge by the capitalist economy, self-preservation now
dictates that profits increase exponentially to the detriment of social programs like welfare and health care. In addition, self-
preservation has gone wild because our instincts and needs are now firmly harnessed to commodified offers of satisfaction that deflect
and distort them. Having surrendered the task of self-preservation to the economic and political systems, we remain in thrall to
untamed survival instincts that could well end up destroying not just the entire species, but all life on the planet.

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INSTEAD OF THE RESPONDING TO THE CALL OF THE STATE EMBODIED BY THE 1AC, OUR ALTERNATIVE IS TO
EMBRACE THE IMMANENCE OF REVOLUTION—THE SYSTEM OF IDEOLOGY IS THE GLUE THAT HOLDS THE
SYSTEM OF CAPITALISM TOGETHER IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND THE REJECTION OF THE RESOLUTION’S HAILING
IN ITSELF OPENS UP THE SPACE OF A REVOLUTIONARY SUBJECTIVITY. OUR ALTERNATIVE IS A COUNTER-
HAILING, AND VOTING NEGATIVE IS TO AFFIRM THE IMMANENT PRESENCE OF REVOLUTION AND REJECTING
THE 1AC AS UNNECESSARY IDEOLOGICAL FANTASY. THE ONLY THING THAT PREVENTS REVOLUTION IS
BELIEVING THE LIE THAT IT IS NOT ALREADY HERE, AND YOU SHOULD SUBSTITUTE THE CALL TO NATIONAL
SERVICE TO THE CALL TO INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN THE CAUSE OF A REVOLUTIONARY HUMANITY.

ŽIŽEK, SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL STUDIES (LJUBLJANA), 2004 [SLAVOJ,
REVOLUTION AT THE GATES: ŽIŽEK ON LENIN—THE 1917 WRITINGS, P. 259-260]
we cannot provide in advance an unambiguous criterion which will allow us to distinguish "false" violent
As Deleuze saw very clearly,
outburst from the "miracle" of the authentic revolutionary breakthrough. The ambiguity is irreducible here, since the "miracle" can occur only
through the repetition of previous failures. And this is also why violence is a necessary ingredient of a revolutionary political act. That is to say: what is the
criterion of a political act proper? Success as such clearly does not count, even if we define it in the dialectical terms of Merleau-Ponty: as the wager that the future will
retroactively redeem our present horrible acts (this is how Merleau-Ponty, in Humanism and Terror, provided one of the more intelligent justifications of the Stalinist
terror: retroactively, it will become justified if its final outcome is true freedom);129 neither does reference to some abstract-universal ethical norm. The only
criterion is the absolutely inherent one: that of the enacted utopia.

In a genuine revolutionary breakthrough, the utopian future is neither simply fully realized, present, nor simply evoked as a distant
promise which justifies present violence – it is rather as if in a unique suspension of temporality, in the short circuit between the
present and the future, we are – as if by Grace – briefly allowed to act as if the utopian future is (not yet fully here, but) already at hand,
there to be seized. Revolution is experienced not as a present hardship we have to endure for the sake of the happiness and freedom of
future generations, but as the present hardship over which this future happiness and freedom already cast their shadow – in it, we are
already free even as we fight for freedom; we are already happy even as we fight for happiness, no matter how difficult the
circumstances. Revolution is not a Merleau-Pontyan wager, an act suspended in the futur anterieur, to be legitimized or de-legitimized by
the long-term outcome of present acts; it is, as it were, its own ontological proof, an immediate index of its own truth.

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**THEIRCULTURAL CRITICISM OF RELATIONS OF DOMINATION AND CLAIMS OF REPSECT FOR THE OTHER
DOES THE ULTIMATE SERVICE TO CAPITALISM BY INVISIBILIZING AND NORMALIZING THE ECONOMIC
BACKDROP AGAINST WHICH ALL OTHER STRUGGLES TAKE PLACE, NAMELY GLOBAL CAPITALISM.

ŽIŽEK, LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYST PAR EXCELLANCE, 1997 [SLAVOJ, “MULTICULTURALISM, OR, THE
CULTURAL LOGIC OF MULTINATIONAL CAPITALISM,” NEW LEFT REVIEW #224, P. 45-47]
The Machine in the Ghost

And, mutatis mutandis, the same goes for today’s capitalist who still clings to some particular cultural heritage, identifying it as the secret source of his success—
Japanese executives participating in tea ceremonies or obeying the bushido code—or for the inverse case of the Western journalist in search of the particular secret of
the Japanese success: this very reference to a particular cultural formula is a screen for the universal anonymity of Capital. The true horror does not reside in the
particular content hidden beneath the universality of global Capital, but rather in the fact that Capital is effectively an anonymous global machine blindly running its
course, that there is effectively no particular Secret Agent who animates it. The horror is not the (particular living) ghost in the (dead universal) machine, but the (dead
universal) machine in the very heart of each (particular living) ghost.

The conclusion to be drawn is thus that the problematic of multiculturalism—the hybrid coexistence of diverse cultural life-worlds—which imposes itself today is the
form of appearance of its opposite, of the massive presence of capitalism as universal world system: it bears witness to the unprecedented homogenization of the
contemporary world. It is effectively as if, since the horizon of social imagination no longer allows us to entertain the idea of an eventual demise of capitalism—since,
as we might put it, everybody silently accepts that capitalism is here to stay—critical energy has found a substitute outlet in fighting for cultural differences which leave
the basic homogeneity of the capitalist world-system intact. So we are fighting our pc battles for the rights of ethnic minorities, of gays and lesbians, of different life-
styles, and so on, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march—and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is doing the ultimate service to the
unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in a typical postmodern ‘cultural
criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as world system tends to give rise to the accusation of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’ and other crimes.

The structure here is that of a symptom. When one is dealing with a universal structuring principle, one always automatically assumes that—in principle, precisely—it
is possible to apply this principle to all its potential elements, and that the empirical non-realization of the principle is merely a matter of contingent circumstances. A
symptom, however, is an element which—although the non-realization of the universal principle in it appears to hinge on contingent circumstances—has to remain an
exception, that is, the point of suspension of the universal principle: if the universal principle were to apply also to this point, the universal system itself would
disintegrate. As is well known, in the paragraphs on civil society in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel demonstrated how the large class of ‘rabble’ (PÖebel) in modern
civil society is not an accidental result of social mismanagement, inadequate government measures or economic bad luck: the inherent structural dynamics of civil
society necessarily give rise to a class which is excluded from the benefits of civil society, a class deprived of elementary human rights and therefore also delivered of
duties towards society, an element within civil society which negates its universal principle, a kind of ‘un-Reason inherent to Reason itself’—in short, its symptom.

Do we not witness the same phenomenon today, and in even stronger shape, with the growth of an underclass excluded, sometimes for generations, from the benefits of
affluent liberal-democratic society? Today’s ‘exceptions’—the homeless, the ghettoized, the permanently unemployed—are the symptom of the late capitalist universal
system, a growing and permanent reminder of how the immanent logic of late capitalism works: the proper capitalist utopia is that, through appropriate measures (for
progressive liberals, affirmative action; for conservatives, a return to self-reliance and family values), this ‘exception’ could be—in the long term and in principle, at
least—abolished. And is not a homologous utopia at work in the notion of a ‘rainbow coalition’: in the idea that, at some utopian future moment, all ‘progressive’
struggles—for gay and lesbian rights, for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, the ecological struggle, the feminist struggle, and so on—will be united in the
common ‘chain of equivalences’? Again, this necessity of failure is structural: the point is not simply that, because of the empirical complexity of the situation, all
particular ‘progressive’ fights will never be united, that ‘wrong’ chains of equivalences will always occur—say, the enchainment of the fight for African-American
ethnic identity with patriarchal and homophobic ideology—but rather that emergencies of ‘wrong’ enchainments are grounded in the very structuring principle of
today’s ‘progressive’ politics of establishing ‘chains of equivalences’: the very domain of the multitude of particular struggles with their continuously shifting
displacements and condensations is sustained by the ‘repression’ of the key role of economic struggle—the leftist politics of the ‘chains of equivalences’ among the
plurality of struggles is strictly correlative to the silent abandonment of the analysis of capitalism as a global economic system and to the acceptance of capitalist
economic relations as the unquestionable framework. [24]

The falsity of elitist multiculturalist liberalism thus resides in the tension between content and form which characterized already the first great ideological project of
tolerant universalism, that of freemasonry: the doctrine of freemasonry (the universal brotherhood of all men based on the light of Reason) clearly clashes with its form
of expression and organization (a secret society with its rituals of initiation)—the very form of expression and articulation of freemasonry belies its positive doctrine. In
a strictly homologous way, the contemporary ‘politically correct’ liberal attitude which perceives itself as surpassing the limitations of its ethnic identity (‘citizen of the
world’ without anchors in any particular ethnic community), functions, within its own society, as a narrow elitist upper-middle-class circle clearly opposing itself to the
majority of common people, despised for being caught in their narrow ethnic or community confines.

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**THE AFFIRMATIVE’S MULTICULTURALISM IS THE PINNACLE OF CAPITALISM’S AUTO-COLONIZATION OF
THE ENTIRE WORLD; THEIR CLAIMS OF RESPECT FOR THE OTHER IS NOTHING BUT RACISM AT A DISTANCE,
THE CULMINATION OF THE IMPERIAL INSCRIPTION OF THE OTHER AS INFERIOR

ŽIŽEK, LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYST PAR EXCELLANCE, 1997 [SLAVOJ, “MULTICULTURALISM, OR, THE
CULTURAL LOGIC OF MULTINATIONAL CAPITALISM,” NEW LEFT REVIEW #224, P. 43-44]
Multiculturalism

How, then, does the universe of Capital relate to the form of Nation-State in our era of global capitalism? Perhaps, this relationship is
best designated as ‘auto-colonization’: with the direct multinational functioning of Capital, we are no longer dealing with the standard
opposition between metropolis and colonized countries; a global company as it were cuts its umbilical cord with its mother-nation and
treats its country of origins as simply another territory to be colonized. This is what disturbs so much the patriotically oriented right-
wing populists, from Le Pen to Buchanan: the fact that the new multinationals have towards the French or American local population
exactly the same attitude as towards the population of Mexico, Brazil or Taiwan. Is there not a kind of poetic justice in this self-
referential turn? Today’s global capitalism is thus again a kind of ‘negation of negation’, after national capitalism and its
internationalist/colonialist phase. At the beginning (ideally, of course), there is capitalism within the confines of a Nation-State, with
the accompanying international trade (exchange between sovereign Nation-States); what follows is the relationship of colonization in
which the colonizing country subordinates and exploits (economically, politically, culturally) the colonized country; the final moment
of this process is the paradox of colonization in which there are only colonies, no colonizing countries—the colonizing power is no
longer a Nation-State but directly the global company. In the long term, we shall all not only wear Banana Republic shirts but also live
in banana republics.

And, of course, the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism is multiculturalism, the attitude which, from a kind of empty global
position, treats each local culture the way the colonizer treats colonized people—as ‘natives’ whose mores are to be carefully studied
and ‘respected’. That is to say, the relationship between traditional imperialist colonialism and global capitalist self-colonization is
exactly the same as the relationship between Western cultural imperialism and multiculturalism: in the same way that global
capitalism involves the paradox of colonization without the colonizing Nation-State metropole, multi-culturalism involves patronizing
Eurocentrist distance and/or respect for local cultures without roots in one’s own particular culture. In other words, multiculturalism is
a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a ‘racism with a distance’—it ‘respects’ the Other’s identity, conceiving the
Other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ community towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by his
privileged universal position. Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive content (the multiculturalist is
not a direct racist, he doesn’t oppose to the Other the particular values of his own culture), but nonetheless retains this position as the
privileged empty point of universality from which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) properly other particular cultures—the
multiculturalist respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own superiority.

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OUR ALTERNATIVE IS TO ENGAGE IN UNIVERSAL STRUGGLE AGAINST CAPITALISM—INSTEAD OF ENDORSING
PARTICULAR STRUGGLES THAT WORK WITHIN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM, WE NEED TO UNIVERSALIZE OUR
DEMANDS AND CRITICISM. THIS DOES NOT MEAN ABANDONING OUR CURRENT STRUGGLES, BUT REORIENTING
ALL OUR STRUGGLES TO UNITE THEM AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY OF CAPITALISM.

ŽIŽEK, LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYST PAR EXCELLANCE, 1997 [SLAVOJ, “MULTICULTURALISM, OR, THE
CULTURAL LOGIC OF MULTINATIONAL CAPITALISM,” NEW LEFT REVIEW #224, P. 50-51]
The Universality to Come

The lesson of all this, which gained actuality in relation to the Western reaction to the Bosnian war, is that there is no way to avoid being partial, since neutrality
involves taking sides—in the case of the Bosnian war, the ‘balanced’ talk about the Balkan ethnic ‘tribal warfare’ already endorses the Serbian standpoint: the
humanitarian liberal equidistance can easily slip into or coincide with its opposite and effectively tolerate the most violent ‘ethnic cleansing’. So, in short, the leftist
does not simply violate the liberal’s impartial neutrality; what he claims is that there is no such neutrality. The cliché of the liberal Centre, of course, is that both
suspensions, the rightist and the leftist, ultimately amount to the same, to a totalitarian threat to the rule of Law. The entire consistency of the Left hinges on proving
that, on the contrary, each of the two suspensions follows a different logic. While the Right legitimizes its suspension of the Ethical by its anti-universalist stance, by
way of a reference to its particular (religious, patriotic) identity which overrules any universal moral or legal standards, the Left legitimizes its suspension of the Ethical
precisely by means of a reference to the true Universality to come. Or, to put it in another way, the Left simultaneously accepts the antagonistic character of society
(there is no neutral position, struggle is constitutive), and remains universalist (speaking on behalf of universal emancipation): in the leftist perspective, accepting the
radically antagonistic—that is, political—character of social life, accepting the necessity of ‘taking sides’, is the only way to be effectively universal.

How are we to comprehend this paradox? It can only be conceived if the antagonism is inherent to universality itself, that is, if universality itself is split into the ‘false’
concrete universality which legitimizes the existing division of the Whole into functional parts, and the impossible/real demand of ‘abstract’ universality (Balibar’s
égaliberté). The leftist political gesture par excellence (in contrast to the rightist motif ‘to each his or her own place’) is thus to question the concrete existing universal
order on behalf of its symptom, of the part which, although inherent to the existing universal order, has no ‘proper place’ within it (say, illegal immigrants or the
homeless in our societies). This procedure of identifying with the symptom is the exact and necessary obverse of the standard critical and ideological move of
recognizing a particular content behind some abstract universal notion (‘the “man” of human rightly is effectively the white male owner’), of denouncing the neutral
universality as false: in it, one pathetically asserts (and identifies with) the point of inherent exception/exclusion, the ‘abject’, of the concrete positive order, as the only
point of true universality, as the point which belies the existing concrete universality. It is easy to show that, say, the subdivision of the people who live in a country into
‘full’ citizens and temporary immigrant workers privileges ‘full’ citizens and excludes immigrants from the public space proper—in the same way in which man and
woman are not two species of a neutral universal genus of humanity, since the content of the genus as such involves some mode of ‘repression’ of the feminine; much
more productive, theoretically as well as politically—since it opens up the way for the ‘progressive’ subverting of hegemony—is the opposite operation of identifying
universality with the point of exclusion, in our case, of saying ‘we are all immigrant workers.’ In a hierarchically structured society, the measure of its true universality
resides in the way its parts relate to those ‘at the bottom’, excluded by and from all others—in ex-Yugoslavia, for example, universality was represented by Albanian
and Bosnian Muslims, looked down on by all other nations. The recent pathetic statement of solidarity ‘Sarajevo is the capital of Europe’ was also an exemplary case of
such a notion of exception as embodying universality: the way the enlightened liberal Europe related to Sarajevo bore witness to the way it related to itself, to its
universal notion. [27]

This assertion of the universality of antagonism in no way entails that ‘in social life, there is no dialogue, only war’. Rightists speak of social (or sexual) warfare, while
leftists speak of social (or class) struggle. There are two variations on Joseph Goebbels’ infamous statement ‘When I hear the word “culture”, I reach for my pistol’:
‘When I hear the word “culture”, I reach for my cheque-book’, pronounced by the cynical cinema producer in Godard’s Mépris, and the leftist Enlightened reversal,
‘When I hear the word ‘gun’, I reach for culture.’ When today’s neo-Nazi street-fighter hears the word ‘Western Christian culture’, he reaches for his gun in order to
defend it from the Turks, Arabs, Jews, thereby destroying what he purports to defend. Liberal capitalism has no need for such direct violence: the market does the job of
destroying culture far more smoothly and efficiently. In clear contrast to both these attitudes, the leftist Enlightenment is defined by the wager that culture can serve as
an efficient answer to the gun: the outburst of raw violence is a kind of passage á l’acte rooted in the subject’s ignorance—as such, it can be counteracted by the
struggle whose main form is reflective knowledge.

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LINK: SAYING ANYTHING BUT CAPITALISM BAD
IF YOU’RE NOT CRITICIZING CAPITALISM, THEN YOU’RE HELPING IT—AND YOU’RE NOT CRITICIZING
CAPITALISM

ŽIŽEK, LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYST PAR EXCELLANCE, 1997 [SLAVOJ, “MULTICULTURALISM, OR, THE
CULTURAL LOGIC OF MULTINATIONAL CAPITALISM,” NEW LEFT REVIEW #224, P. 48-49]
What these leftist advocates of populism fail to perceive is that today’s populism, far from presenting a threat to global capitalism,
remains its inherent product. Paradoxically, today’s true conservatives are rather the leftist ‘critical theorists’ who reject liberal
multiculturalism as well as fundamentalist populism, those who clearly perceive the complicity between global capitalism and ethnic
fundamentalism. They point towards the third domain which belongs neither to global market-society nor to the new forms of ethnic
fundamentalism: the domain of the political, the public space of civil society, of active responsible citizenship—the fight for human
rights, ecology and so forth. However, the problem is that this very form of political space is more and more threatened by the
onslaught of globalization; consequently, one cannot simply return to it or revitalize it. To avoid a misunderstanding: our point is not
the old ‘economic essentialist’ one according to which, in the case of England today, the Labour victory really did not change
anything—and as such is even more dangerous than continuing Tory rule, since it gave rise to the misleading impression that there
was a change. There are a lot of things the Labour government can achieve; it can contribute a lot to the passage from traditional
English parochial jingoism to a more ‘enlightened’ liberal democracy with a much stronger element of social solidarity (from health
care to education), to the respect for human rights (in its diverse forms, from women’s rights to the rights of ethnic groups); one
should use the Labour victory as an incentive to revitalize the diverse forms of the struggle for égaliberté. (With the Socialist electoral
victory in France, the situation is even more ambiguous, since Jospin’s programme does contain some elements of a direct
confrontation with the logic of capital.) Even when the change is not substantial but a mere semblance of a new beginning, the very
fact that a situation is perceived by the majority of the population as a ‘new beginning’ opens up the space for important ideological
and political rearticulations—as we have already seen, the fundamental lesson of the dialectic of ideology is that appearances do
matter.

Nonetheless, the post-Nation-State logic of capital remains the Real which lurks in the background, while all three main leftist
reactions to the process of globalization—liberal multiculturalism; the attempt to embrace populism by way of discerning, beneath its
fundamentalist appearance, the resistance against ‘instrumental reason’; the attempt to keep open the space of the political—seem
inappropriate. Although the last approach is based on the correct insight about the complicity between multiculturalism and
fundamentalism, it avoids the crucial question: how are we to reinvent political space in today’s conditions of globalization? The
politicization of the series of particular struggles which leaves intact the global process of capital is clearly not sufficient. What this
means is that one should reject the opposition which, within the frame of late capitalist liberal democracy, imposes itself as the main
axis of ideological struggle: the tension between ‘open’ post-ideological universalist liberal tolerance and the particularist ‘new
fundamentalisms’. Against the liberal centre which presents itself as neutral and post-ideological, relying on the rule of the Law, one
should reassert the old leftist motif of the necessity to suspend the neutral space of Law.

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LINK: INFRASTRUCTURE
THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS WHAT DETERMINES THE CONFIGURATION OF THE SOCIAL WHOLE

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION)” (1969-1970),
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. P. 90-92]
The second comment is that in order to make this detour, I am obliged to re-raise my old question: what is a society?

Infrastructure and Superstructure

On a number of occasions 4 I have insisted on the revolutionary character of the Marxist conception of the 'social whole' insofar as it is distinct from the Hegelian
'totality. I said (and this thesis only repeats famous propositions of historical materialism) that Marx conceived the structure of every society as constituted by 'levels' or
'instances' articulated by a specific determination: the infrastructure, or economic base (the 'unity' of the productive forces and the relations of production) and the
superstructure, which itself contains two 'levels' or 'instances': the politico-legal (law and the State) and ideology (the different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal,
political, etc.).

Besides its theoretic-didactic interest (it reveals the difference between Marx and Hegel), this representation has the following crucial theoretical advantage: it makes it
possible to inscribe in the theoretical apparatus of its essential concepts what I have called their respective indices of effectivity. What does this mean?

It is easy to see that this representation of the structure of every society as an edifice containing a base (infrastructure) on which are erected the two `floors' of the
superstructure, is a metaphor, to be quite precise, a spatial metaphor: the metaphor of a topography (topique).5 Like every metaphor, this metaphor suggests something,
makes something visible. What? Precisely this: that the upper floors could not 'stay up' (in the air) alone, if they did not rest precisely on their base.

Thus the object of the metaphor of the edifice is to represent above all the `determination in the last instance' by the economic base. The effect of this spatial metaphor
is to endow the base with an index of effectivity known by the famous terms: the determination in the last instance of what happens in the upper 'floors' (of the
superstructure) by what happens in the economic base.

Given this index of effectivity `in the last instance', the 'floors' of the superstructure are clearly endowed with different indices of effectivity. What kind of indices?

It is possible to say that the floors of the superstructure are not determinant in the last instance, but that they are determined by the effectivity of the base; that if they are
determinant in their own (as yet undefined) ways, this is true only insofar as they are determined by the base.

Their index of effectivity (or determination), as determined by the determination in the last instance of the base, is thought by the Marxist tradition in two ways: (1)
there is a 'relative autonomy' of the superstructure with respect to the base; (2) there is a 'reciprocal action' of the superstructure on the base.

We can therefore say that the great theoretical advantage of the Marxist topography, i.e. of the spatial metaphor of the edifice (base and superstructure) is
simultaneously that it reveals that questions of determination (or of index of effectivity) are crucial; that it reveals that it is the base which in the last instance determines
the whole edifice; and that, as a consequence, it obliges us to pose the theoretical problem of the types of `derivatory' effectivity peculiar to the superstructure, i.e. it
obliges us to think what the Marxist tradition calls conjointly the relative autonomy of the superstructure and the reciprocal action of the superstructure on the base.

The greatest disadvantage of this representation of the structure of every society by the spatial metaphor of an edifice is obviously the fact that it is metaphorical: i.e. it
remains descriptive.

It now seems to me that it is possible and desirable to represent things differently. NB, I do not mean by this that I want to reject the classical metaphor, for that
metaphor itself requires that we go beyond it. And I am not going beyond it in order to reject it as outworn. I simply want to attempt to think what it gives us in the form
of a description.

I believe that it is possible and necessary to think what characterizes the essential of the existence and nature of the superstructure on the basis of reproduction. Once
one takes the point of view of reproduction, many of the questions whose existence was indicated by the spatial metaphor of the edifice, but to which it could not give a
conceptual answer, are immediately illuminated.

My basic thesis is that it is not possible to pose these questions (and therefore to answer them) except from the point of view of reproduction.

I shall give a short analysis of Law, the State and Ideology from this point of view. And I shall reveal what happens both from the point of view of practice and
production on the one hand, and from that of reproduction on the other.

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LINK: INFRASTRUCTURE
INFRASTRUCTURE IS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND SUPERSTRUCTURE—THE ECONOMY WILL DETERMINE THE
OUTCOME OF SOCIAL REALTIONS IN THE LAST INSTANCE

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION)” (1969-1970),
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 124-126]
P.S. If these few schematic theses allow me to illuminate certain aspects of the functioning of the Superstructure and its mode of intervention in the Infrastructure, they
are obviously abstract and necessarily leave several important problems unanswered, which should be mentioned:

1. The problem of the total process of the realization of the reproduction of the relations of production.

As an element of this process, the ISAs contribute to this reproduction. But the point of view of their contribution alone is still an abstract one.

It is only within the processes of production and circulation that this reproduction is realized. It is realized by the mechanisms of those processes, in which the training
of the workers is 'completed, their posts assigned them, etc. It is in the internal mechanisms of these processes that the effect of the different ideologies is felt (above all
the effect of legal-ethical ideology).

But this point of view is still an abstract one. For in a class society the relations of production are relations of exploitation, and therefore relations between antagonistic
classes. The reproduction of the relations of production, the ultimate aim of the ruling class, cannot therefore be a merely technical operation training and distributing
individuals for the different posts in the `technical division' of labour. In fact there is no 'technical division' of labour except in the ideology of the ruling class: every
'technical' division, every 'tech-nical' organization of labour is the form and mask of a social (= class) division and organization of labour. The reproduction of the
relations of production can therefore only be a class undertaking. It is realized through a class struggle, which counterpoises the ruling class and the exploited class.

The total process of the realization of the reproduction of the relations of production is therefore still abstract, insofar as it has not adopted the point of view of this class
struggle. To adopt the point of view of reproduction is therefore, in the last instance, to adopt the point of view of the class struggle.

2. The problem of the class nature of the ideologies existing in a social formation.

The 'mechanism' of ideology in general is one thing. We have seen that it can be reduced to a few principles expressed in a few words (as 'poor' as those which,
according to Marx, define production in general, or in Freud, define the unconscious in general). If there is any truth in it, this mechanism must be abstract with respect
to every real ideological formation.

I have suggested that the ideologies were realized in institutions, in their rituals and their practices, in the ISAs. We have seen that on this basis they contribute to that
form of class struggle, vital for the ruling class, the reproduction of the relations of production. But the point of view itself, however real, is still an abstract one.

In fact, the State and its Apparatuses only have meaning from the point of view of the class struggle, as an apparatus of class struggle ensuring class oppression and
guaranteeing the conditions of exploitation and its reproduction. But there is no class struggle without antagonistic classes. Whoever says class struggle of the ruling
class says resistance, revolt and class struggle of the ruled class.

That is why the ISAs are not the realization of ideology in general, nor even the conflict-free realization of the ideology of the ruling class. The ideology of the ruling
class does not become the ruling ideology by the grace of God, nor even by virtue of the seizure of State power alone. It is by the installation of the ISAs in which this
ideology is realized and realizes itself that it becomes the ruling ideology. But this installation is not achieved all by itself; on the contrary, it is the stake in a very bitter
and continuous class struggle: first against the former ruling classes and their positions in the old and new ISAs, then against the exploited class.

But this point of view of the class struggle in the ISAs is still an abstract one. In fact, the class struggle in the ISAs is indeed an aspect of the class struggle, sometimes
an important and symptomatic one: e.g. the anti-religious struggle in the eighteenth century, or the 'crisis' of the educational ISA in every capitalist country today. But
the class struggles in the ISAs are only one aspect of a class struggle which goes beyond the ISAs. The ideology that a class in power makes the ruling ideology in its
ISAs is indeed 'realized' in those ISAs, but it goes beyond them, for it comes from elsewhere. Similarly, the ideology that a ruled class manages to defend in and against
such ISAs goes beyond them, for it comes from elsewhere.

It is only from the point of view of the classes, i.e. of the class struggle, that it is possible to explain the ideologies existing in a social formation. Not only is it from this
starting-point that it is possible to explain the realization of the ruling ideology in the ISAs and of the forms of class struggle for which the ISAs are the seat and the
stake. But it is also and above all from this starting-point that it is possible to understand the provenance of the ideologies, which are realized in the ISAs and confront
one another there. For if it is true that the ISAs represent the form in which the ideology of the ruling class must necessarily be realized, and the form in which the
ideology of the ruled class must necessarily be measured and confronted, ideologies are not 'born' in the ISAs but from the social classes at grips in the class struggle:
from their conditions of existence, their practices, their experience of the struggle, etc.

April 1970

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THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES ARE THE MEANS BY WHICH WE ARE ALL GOVERNED, AND ARE
DISTINC FROM THE AGENTS OF REPRESSION—THIS IDEOLOGY IS THE MEANS BY WHICH WE ARE TAUGHT TO
BE GOOD SUBJECTS AND MAINTAINS THE CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION OF THE STATUS QUO THROUGH
SPONTANEOUS CONSENT

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION)” (1969-1970),
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 95-100]

The State Ideological Apparatuses
Thus, what has to be added to the 'Marxist theory' of the State is something else.

Here we must advance cautiously in a terrain, which, in fact, the Marxist classics entered long before us, but without having systematized in theoretical form the
decisive advances implied by their experiences and procedures. Their experiences and procedures were indeed restricted in the main to the terrain of political practice.

In fact, i.e. in their political practice, the Marxist classics treated the State s a more complex reality than the definition of it given in the 'Marxist theoy of the State', even
when it has been supplemented as I have just suggested. They recognized this complexity in their practice, but they did not express it n a corresponding theory.7

I should like to attempt a very schematic outline of this corresponding theory. To that end, I propose the following thesis.

In order to advance the theory of the State it is indispensable to take into account not only the distinction between State power and
State apparatus, but also another reality, which is clearly on the side of the (repressive) State apparatus, but must not be confused with it. I
shall call this reality by its concept: the ideological State apparatuses.

What are the ideological State apparatuses (ISAs)?

They must not be confused with the (repressive) State apparatus. Remember that in Marxist theory, the State Apparatus (SA) contains: the
Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc., which constitute what I shall in future call the
Repressive State Apparatus. Repressive suggests that the State Apparatus in question 'functions by violence' — at least ultimately (since repression, e.g.
administrative repression, may take nonphysical forms).

I shall call Ideological State Apparatuses a certain number of realities, which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form
of distinct and specialized institutions. I propose an empirical list of these which will obviously have to be examined in detail, tested, corrected and
reorganized. With all the reservations implied by this requirement, we can for the moment regard the following institutions as Ideological State Apparatuses (the order
in which I have listed them has no particular significance):
• the religious ISA (the system of the different Churches),
• the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private `Schools'),
• the family ISA,8
• the legal ISA,'
• the political ISA (the political system, including the different Parties),
• the trade union ISA,
• the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.),
• the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.).
I have said that the ISAs must not be confused with the (Repressive) State Apparatus. What constitutes the difference?

As a first moment, it is clear that while there is one (Repressive) State Apparatus, there is a plurality of Ideological State Apparatuses. Even
presupposing that it exists, the unity that constitutes this plurality of ISAs as a body is not immediately visible.

whereas the—unified—(Repressive) State Apparatus belongs entirely to the public domain, much the
As a second moment, it is clear that
larger part of the Ideological State Apparatuses (in their apparent dispersion) are part, on the contrary, of the private domain. Churches, Parties,
Trade Unions, families, some schools, most newspapers, cultural ventures, etc., etc., are private.

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We can ignore the first observation for the moment. But someone is bound to question the second, asking me by what right I regard as Ideological State Apparatuses,
institutions which for the most part do not possess public status, but are quite simply private institutions. As a conscious Marxist, Gramsci already forestalled this
objection in one sentence. The distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the
(subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its 'authority' The domain of the State escapes it because the latter is 'above
the law': the State, which is the State of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any
distinction between public and private. The same thing can be said from the starting-point of our State Ideological Apparatuses. It is unimportant
whether the institutions in which they are realized are 'public' or 'private. What matters is how they function. Private institutions can
perfectly well 'function' as Ideological State Apparatuses. A reasonably thorough analysis of any one of the ISAs proves it.
But now for what is essential. What distinguishes the ISAs from the (Repressive) State Apparatus is the following basic difference: the Repressive State Apparatus
functions `by violence, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function 'by ideology'.

I can clarify matters by correcting this distinction. I shall say rather that every State Apparatus, whether Repressive or Ideological, 'functions' both by
violence and by ideology, but with one very important distinction which makes it imperative not to confuse the Ideological State Apparatuses with the
(Repressive) State Apparatus.

This is the fact that the
(Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression (including physical repression),
while functioning secondarily by ideology. (There is no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus.) For example, the Army and the Police also
function by ideology both to ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the 'values' they propound externally.

the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by
In the same way, but inversely, it is essential to say that for their part
ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed,
even symbolic. (There is no such thing as a purely ideological apparatus.) Thus Schools and Churches use suitable methods of punishment,
expulsion, selection, etc., to 'discipline' not only their shepherds, but also their flocks. The same is true of the Family . . . The same is true of
the cultural IS Apparatus (censorship, among other things), etc.
Is it necessary to add that this determination of the double 'functioning' (predominantly, secondarily) by repression and by ideology, according to whether it is a matter
of the (Repressive) State Apparatus or the Ideological State Apparatuses, makes it clear that very subtle explicit or tacit combinations may be woven from the interplay
of the (Repressive) State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses? Everyday life provides us with innumerable examples of this, but they must be studied in
detail if we are to go further than this mere observation.

Nevertheless, this remark leads us towards an understanding of what constitutes the unity of the apparently disparate body of the ISAs. If
the ISAs 'function' massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies their diversity is precisely this functioning, insofar as the ideology by
which they function is always in fact unified, despite its diversity and its contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which is the ideology
of 'the ruling class.' Given the fact that the 'ruling class' in principle holds State power (openly or more often by means of alliances
between classes or class fractions), and therefore has at its disposal the (Repressive) State Apparatus, we can accept the fact that this same
ruling class is active in the Ideological State Apparatuses insofar as it is ultimately the ruling ideology which is realized in the
Ideological State Apparatuses, precisely in its contradictions. Of course, it is a quite different thing to act by laws and decrees in the
(Repressive) State Apparatus and to 'act' through the intermediary of the ruling ideology in the Ideological State Apparatuses. We must go into the details
of this difference—but it cannot mask the reality of a profound identity. To my knowledge, no class can hold State power over a long period
without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses. I only need one example and proof of this:
Lenin's anguished concern to revolut-ionize the educational Ideological State Apparatus (among others), simply to make it possible for the Soviet proletariat, who had
seized State power, to secure the future of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition to socialism.10

This last comment puts us in a position to understand that the Ideological State Apparatuses may be not only the stake, but also the site
of class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle. The class (or class alliance) in power cannot lay down the law in the ISAs as
easily as it can in the (repressive) State apparatus, not only because the former ruling classes are able to retain strong positions there for a long time, but
also because the resistance of the exploited classes is able to find means and occasions to express itself there, either by the utilization of
their contradictions, or by conquering combat positions in them in struggle."
Let me run through my comments.

If the thesis I have proposed is well-founded, it leads me back to the classical Marxist theory of the State, while making it more precise in one point. I argue that it is
necessary to distinguish between State power (and its possession by ...) on the one hand, and the State Apparatus on the other. But I add that the State Apparatus
contains two bodies: the body of institutions which represent the Repressive State Apparatus on the one hand, and the body of institutions which represent the body of
Ideological State Apparatuses on the other.

But if this is the case, the following question is bound to be asked, even in the very summary state of my suggestions: what exactly is the extent of the role of the
Ideological State Apparatuses? What is their importance based on? In other words: to what does the 'function' of these Ideological State Apparatuses, which do not
function by repression but by ideology, correspond?

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THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUS IS THE IDEAL PLACE FOR CLASS STRUGGLES, POLITICAL ACTITVITY
AND ELIMINATING THE COERCIVE POWER OF THE BOURGEOISIE. WE CAN ANALYZE VARIOUS SEGMENTS OF
SOCIETY WITHOUT CONNECTING THEM WITH THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY AND ONLY BY STRICT
INVESTIGATION CAN WE REALIZE THAT THE ECONOMY IS NOT A “BASE” WHICH DETERMINES ALL POLITICAL,
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHOICES BUT A TYPE OF POWER THE BOURGEOISIE USES AGAINST THE SUBJECT.

POSTER, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT UC IRVINE, 1974, [MARK, “ALTHUSSER ON HISTORY WITHOUT MAN,”
POLITICAL THEORY VOL. 2, NO. 4, PG 393-409]
In capitalist society, labor was "represented" in the commodity as value, except that this value was not manifest in the commodity
phenomenon. The real "cause" of the existence of the commodity on the market was absent in its appearance. It was systematically
hidden by the structural processes of circulation. No knowledge could be gained from a phenomenology of the worker, the
industrialist, or the merchant because they viewed the commodity from the perspective of their own interests. Since we were looking
for an "absent cause" or a "hidden structure," we had to adopt, as Marx did, scientific structuralism. Here is Ranciere sounding very
much like Levi-Strauss and Foucault:
We are no longer concerned with a text calling for a reading which will give its underlying meaning, but with a hieroglyph
which has to be deciphered. This deciphering is the work of science. The structure which excludes the possibility of critical
reading is the structure which opens the dimension of science.to

Ranciere's decipherment rendered the structure of the economy intelligible not in its inertness but in its articulated complexity. Against
the denigration of unconscious structure by humanists, who viewed it as mere mechanism, the structuralist revealed its opaqueness to
the social subject and lucidly exposed the degree to which it was impossible for the subject to transform the structure. Subject and
structure were systematically and radically out of phase.

Further achievements of structuralist Marxism" came in works devoted to specific structures, like Nicos Poulantzas' Pouvozr politique
et classes soctales (1971) and Althusser's study of ideology." In the latter work, Althusser went so far as to abandon Marx's hallowed
distinction between base and superstructure. The state, traditionally viewed as a segment of the superstructure, maintained an
ideological apparatus, in addition to its coercive power and its bureaucracy, which was, for Althusser, central to the socialization of
workers. For Marx, ideologies were mere illusions; but for Althusser, ideologies with a force and a history of their own,' were a
systematic element of every society and would have to be combatted independently, in the same way that the bourgeoisie had fought
the Church. These ideological state apparatuses, functioning in such diverse locations as the Church, the family, the schools, and the
media, were a central target for the class struggle and for political activity." Thus, Althusser offered a theoretically more sophisticated
Marxism that could analyze various segments of society without reducing them all to the economy. The economy was no longer a
"base" which determined everything and upon which everything rested. However, his complex analysis of ideological apparatuses
came only after May 1968, when the action of the students against the University—an action that Althusser and the CP opposed—
revealed its conservative functions. Also, the "scientific" epistemology that made this knowledge possible served to cut it off from
effective praxis. Marx's injunctions against merely interpreting the world came back to the structuralists as the "absent cause" of their
own theory.

Structural Marxism legitimately grasped the structure-in-itself, more precisely, structure-for-science; but the structures, in their
absence, have a level of existence for-their-bearers, for the people who inhabit them. Part of the structure of the structure is certainly
its existence for the subject. These subjects constitute the structures, although not fully consciously since they are also constituted by
the structures. The unconsciousness of structures could be known from the subject's side through subjectivist categories like
alienation. To save structuralism from reifying the concept of structure it seemed that it would have to combine with some form of
humanism and then situate the observer m his world. Althusser's onginal escape from ideology into science is best viewed as
provisory, as a temporary procedure for the constitution of the scientific subject, valid for limited kinds of study. In the end, the
scientific subject must erase his own bracketing, must rebridge his own epistemological coupure, and must return from withdrawal
into the full daylight of /us subjectivity, acknowledging that the place of return is not a heaven of absolute transparency any more than
is the place of science. One might say that the controversy over structuralism solidified for the French the acceptance of the final lack
of a Hegelian absolute subject, forcing the recognition of a duality or even a multiplicity of partial subjects—scientific and humanist—
whose unity could be found, if at all, only in action. Such a decentered, multiple subject was the vision of Nietzsche: the death of God
must proceed through the dissolution of Man (God's object) to arrive at the birth of men and women.

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THE AFFIRMATIVE’S ASSUMPTION THAT WE CAN SIMPLY PEEL BACK IDEOLOGY AND SEE THE TRUTH BENEATH
IS FALSE, AND MASKS THEIR OWN COMPLICITY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL CAUSE THEY SERVE—CAPITALISM

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION)” (1969-1970),
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 109-112]
Ideology Is a 'Representation' of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to Their Real Conditions of Existence
In order to approach my central thesis on the structure and functioning of ideology, I shall first present two theses, one negative, the other positive. The first concerns
the object, which is 'represented' in the imaginary form of ideology, the second concerns the materiality of ideology.

Thesis I: Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to then real conditions of existence. We commonly call religious ideology, ethical ideology, legal
ideology, political ideology, etc., so many 'world outlooks'. Of course assuming that we do not live one of these ideologies as the truth (e.g. 'believe in God, Duty,
justice, etc....), we admit that the ideology we are discussing from a critical point of view, examining it as the ethnologist examines the myths of a `primitive society,
that these 'world outlooks' are largely imaginary, i.e. do not `correspond to reality'.

However, while admitting that they do not correspond to reality, i.e. that they constitute an illusion, we admit that they do make allusion to reality, and that they need
only be 'interpreted' to discover the reality of the world behind their imaginary representation of that world (ideology = illusion/ allusion).

There are different types of interpretation, the most famous of which are the mechanistic type, current in the eighteenth century (God is the imaginary representation of
the real King), and the 'hermeneutic' interpretation, inaugurated by the earliest Church Fathers, and revived by Feuerbach and the theologico-philosophical school which
descends from him, e.g. the theologian Barth (to Feuerbach, for example, God is the essence of real Man). The essential point is that on condition that we interpret the
imaginary transposition (and inversion) of ideology we arrive at the conclusion that in ideology 'men represent their real conditions of existence to themselves in an
imaginary form'.

Unfortunately, this interpretation leaves one small problem unsettled: why do men 'need' this imaginary transposition of their real conditions of existence in order to
'represent to themselves' their real conditions of existence?

The first answer (that of the eighteenth century) proposes a simple solution: Priests or Despots are responsible. They 'forged' the Beautiful Lies so that, in the belief that
they were obeying God, men would in fact obey the Priests and Despots, who are usually in alliance in their imposture, the Priests acting in the interests of the Despots
or vice versa, according to the political positions of the 'theoreticians' concerned. There is therefore a cause for the imaginary transposition of the real conditions of
existence: that cause is the existence of a small number of cynical men who base their domination and exploitation of the 'people' on a falsified representation of the
world which they have imagined in order to enslave other minds by dominating their imaginations.

The second answer (that of Feuerbach, taken over word for word by Marx in his Early Works) is more 'profound', i.e. just as false. It, too, seeks and finds a cause for the
imaginary transposition and distortion of men's real conditions of existence, in short, for the alienation in the imaginary of the representation of men's conditions of
existence. This cause is no longer Priests or Despots, nor their active imagination and the passive imagination of their vic-tims. This cause is the material alienation
which reigns in the conditions of existence of men themselves. This is how, in The Jewish Question and elsewhere, Marx defends the Feuerbachian idea that men make
themselves an alienated (= imaginary) representation of their conditions of existence because these conditions of existence are themselves alienating (in the 1844
Manuscripts: because these conditions are dominated by the essence of alienated society—`alienated labour').

All these interpretations thus take literally the thesis, which they presuppose, and on which they depend, i.e. that what is reflected in the imaginary representation of the
world found in an ideology is the conditions of existence of men, i.e. their real world.

Now I can return to a thesis which I have already advanced: it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that `men' `represent to themselves' in ideology,
but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there. It is this relation, which is at the center of every ideological, i.e.
imaginary, representation of the real world. It is this relation that contains the 'cause,' which has to explain the imaginary distortion of the ideological representation of
the real world. Or rather, to leave aside the language of causality it is necessary to advance the thesis that it is the imaginary nature of this relation which underlies all
the imaginary distortion that we can observe (if we do not live in its truth) in all ideology.

To speak in a Marxist language, if it is true that the representation of the real conditions of existence of the individuals occupying the posts of agents of production,
exploitation, repression, ideologization and scientific practice, does in the last analysis arise from the relations of production, and from relations deriving from the
relations of production, we can say the following: all ideology represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the existing relations of production (and the other
relations that derive from them), but above all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production and the relations that derive from them. What is
represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the
real relations in which they live.

If this is the case, the question of the 'cause' of the imaginary distortion of the real relations in ideology disappears and must be replaced by a different question: why is
the representation given to individuals of their (individual) relation to the social relations which govern their conditions of exis-tence and their collective and individual
life necessarily an imaginary relation? And what is the nature of this imaginariness? Posed in this way, the question explodes the solution by a 'clique'," by a group of
individuals (Priests or Despots) who are the authors of the great ideological mystification, just as it explodes the solution by the alienated character of the real world.
We shall see why later in my exposition. For the moment I shall go no further.

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IDEOLOGY HAS NOT HISTORY, BUT SPECIFIC IDEOLOGIES ARE WHAT INTERPELLATE ALL OF US AS SUBJECTS
THROUGH THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION)” (1969-1970),
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 106-109]
On Ideology

When I put forward the concept of an Ideological State Apparatus, when 1 said that the ISAs 'function by ideology', I invoked a reality
which needs a little discussion: ideology.

It is well known that the expression 'ideology' was invented by Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy and their friends, who assigned to it as an
object the (genetic) theory of ideas. When Marx took up the term fifty years later, he gave it a quite different meaning, even in his
Early Works. Here, ideology is the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a ban or a social group. The
ideologico-political struggle conducted by Marx is early as his articles in the Rheinische Zeitung inevitably and quickly brought him
face to face with this reality and forced him to take his earliest intuitions further.

However, here we come upon a rather astonishing paradox. Everything Seems to lead Marx to formulate a theory of ideology. In fact,
The German Ideology does offer us, after the 1844 Manuscripts, an explicit theory of ideology, but ... it is not Marxist (we shall see
why in a moment). As for Capital, although it does contain many hints towards a theory of ideologies (most visibly, the ideology of
the vulgar economists), it does not contain that theory itself, which depends for the most part on a theory of ideology in general.

I should like to venture a first and very schematic outline of such a theory. The theses I am about to put forward are certainly not off
the cuff, but they cannot be sustained and tested, i.e. confirmed or rejected, except by much borough study and analysis.

Ideology Has No History
One word first of all to expound the reason in principle which seems to me to found, or at least to justify, the project of a theory of
ideology in general, and lot a theory of particular ideologies, which, whatever their form (religious, !ethical, legal, political), always
express class positions.

It is quite obvious that it is necessary to proceed towards a theory of ideologies in the two respects I have just suggested. It will then
be clear that a theory of ideologies depends in the last resort on the history of social formations, and thus of the modes of production
combined in social formations, and of he class struggles which develop in them. In this sense it is clear that there can )e no question of
a theory of ideologies in general, since ideologies (defined in he double respect suggested above: regional and class) have a history,
whose determination in the last instance is clearly situated outside ideologies alone, although it involves them.

On the contrary, if I am able to put forward the project of a theory of ideology in general, and if this theory really is one of the
elements on which theories of ideologies depend, that entails an apparently paradoxical proposition which I shall express in the
following terms: ideology has no history.

As we know, this formulation appears in so many words in a passage from The German Ideology. Marx utters it with respect to
metaphysics, which, he says, has no more history than ethics (meaning also the other forms of ideology).

In The German Ideology, this formulation appears in a plainly positivist context. Ideology is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure
dream, i.e. as nothingness. All its reality is external to it. Ideology is thus thought as an imaginary construction whose status is exactly
like the theoretical status of the dream among writers before Freud. For these writers, the dream was the purely imaginary, i.e. null,
result of 'clay's residues', presented in an arbitrary arrangement and order, sometimes even 'inverted, in other words, in 'disorder'. For
them, the dream was the imaginary, it was empty, null and arbitrarily 'stuck together' (bricolè), once the eyes had closed, from the
residues of the only full and positive reality, the reality of the day. This is exactly the status of philosophy and ideology (since in this
book philosophy is ideology par excellence) in The German Ideology.

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Ideology, then, is for Marx an imaginary assemblage (bricolage), a pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the 'day's residues'
from the only full and positive reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their
existence. It is on this basis that ideology has no history in The German Ideology, since its history is outside it, where the only existing
history is, the history of concrete individuals, etc. In The German Ideology, the thesis that ideology has no history is therefore a purely
negative thesis, since it means both:

1. ideology is nothing insofar as it is a pure dream (manufactured by who knows what power: if not by the alienation of the division of
labour, but that, too, is a negative determination);

2. ideology has no history, which emphatically does not mean that there is no history in it (on the contrary, for it is merely the pale,
empty and inverted reflection of real history) but that it has no history of its own.

Now, while the thesis I wish to defend formally speaking adopts the terms of The German Ideology (Ideology has no history'), it is
radically different from the positivist and historicist thesis of The German Ideology.

For on the one hand, I think it is possible to hold that ideologies have a history of their own (although it is determined in the last
instance by the class struggle); and on the other, I think it is possible to hold that ideology in general has no history, not in a negative
sense (its history is external to it), but in an absolutely positive sense.

This sense is a positive one if it is true that the peculiarity of ideology is that it is endowed with a structure and a functioning such as
to make it a non-historical reality, i.e. an omnihistorical reality, in the sense in which that structure and functioning are immutable,
present in the same form throughout what we can call history, in the sense in which the Communist Manifesto defines history as the
history of class struggles, i.e. the history of class societies.

To give a theoretical reference-point here, I might say that, to return tc our example of the dream, in its Freudian conception this time,
our proposition: ideology has no history, can and must (and in a way which ha; absolutely nothing arbitrary about it, but, quite the
reverse, is theoretically necessary, for there is an organic link between the two propositions) be related directly to Freud's proposition
that the unconscious is eternal, i.e. that it has no history.

If eternal means, not transcendent to all (temporal) history, but omnipresent, trans-historical and therefore immutable in form
throughout the extent of history, I shall adopt Freud's expression word for word, and write ideology is eternal, exactly like the
unconscious. And I add that I find this comparison theoretically justified by the fact that the eternity of the unconscious is not
unrelated to the eternity of ideology in general.

That is why I believe I am justified, hypothetically at least, in proposing a theory of ideology in general, in the sense that Freud
presented a theory of the unconscious in general.

To simplify the phrase, it is convenient, taking into account what has been said about ideologies, to use the plain term ideology to
designate ideology in general, which I have just said has no history, or, what comes to the same thing, is eternal, i.e. omnipresent in its
immutable form throughout history (= the history of social formations containing social classes). For the moment I shall restrict
myself to 'class societies' and their history.

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LINK: INTERPELLATION/IDEOLOGY
IDEOLOGY INTERPELLATES US AS SUBJECTS OF CAPITALIST IDEOLOGY, MAKING US GOOD SUBJECTS WHO CAN
OPERATE ON OUR OWN WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF THE REPESSIVE STATE APPARATUS

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION)” (1969-1970),
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 122-124]
We observe that the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject is
speculary, i.e. a mirror-structure, and doubly speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology and ensures its functioning.
Which means that all ideology is centered, that the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Center, and interpellates around
it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double mirror-connection such that it subjects the subjects to the Subject, while giving
them in the Subject in which each subject can contemplate its own image (present and future) the guarantee that this really concerns
them and Him, and that since everything takes place in the Family (the Holy Family: the Family is in essence Holy), 'God will
recognize his own in it, i.e. those who have recognized God, and have recognized themselves in Him, will be saved.

Let me summarize what we have discovered about ideology in general.

The duplicate mirror-structure of ideology ensures simultaneously:
• the interpellation of 'individuals' as subjects;
• their subjection to the Subject;
• the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects' recognition of each other, and finally the subject's recognition of
himself.22
• the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave
accordingly, everything will be all right: Amen — `So be it.'

Result: caught in this quadruple system of interpellation as subjects, of subjection to the Subject, of universal recognition and of
absolute guarantee, the subjects 'work,' they 'work by themselves' in the vast majority of cases, with the exception of the 'bad subjects'
who on occasion provoke the intervention of one of the detachments of the (repressive) State apparatus. But the vast majority of
(good) subjects work all right 'all by themselves, i.e. by ideology (whose concrete forms are realized in the Ideological State
Apparatuses). They are inserted into practices governed by the rituals of the ISAs. They 'recognize' the existing state of affairs (das
Bestehende), that 'it really is true that it is so and not otherwise, and that they must be obedient to God, to their conscience, to the
priest, to de Gaulle, to the boss, to the engineer, that thou shalt 'love thy neighbour as thyself', etc. Their concrete, material behaviour
is simply the inscription in life of the admirable words of the prayer: 'Amen—So be it.'

Yes, the subjects 'work by themselves'. The whole mystery of this effect lies in the first two moments of the quadruple system I have
just discussed, or, if you prefer, in the ambiguity of the term subject. In the ordinary use of the term, subject in fact means: (1) a free
subjectivity, a center of initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions; (2) a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority,
and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission. This last note gives us the meaning of this
ambiguity, which is merely a reflection of the effect which produces it: the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that
he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he
shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection 'all by himself'. There are no subjects except by and for their subjection. That is
why they 'work all by themselves'.

`So be it! … ' This phrase which registers the effect to be obtained proves that it is not 'naturally' so 'naturally': outside the prayer, i.e.
outside the ide-ological intervention). This phrase proves that it has to be so if things are to be what they must be, and let us let the
words slip: if the reproduction of the relations of production is to be assured, even in the processes of production and circulation, every
day, in the 'consciousness', i.e. in the attitudes of the individual-subjects occupying the posts which the socio-technical division of
labour assigns to them in production, exploitation, repression, ideologization, scientific practice, etc. Indeed, what is really in question
in this mechanism of the mirror recognition of the Subject and of the individuals interpellated as subjects, and of the guarantee given
by the Subject to the subjects if they freely accept their subjection to the Subject's 'commandments'? The reality in question in this
mechanism, the reality which is necessarily ignored (meconnue) in the very forms of recognition (ideology =
misrecognition/ignorance) is indeed, in the last resort, the reproduction of the relations of production and of the relations deriving
from them.

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SUBMISSION TO THE HAILING BRINGS INDIVIDUALS INTO A STATE OF SUBJECTIVITY. THIS STATE OF
SUBJECTIVITY IS A MISRECOGNITION OFFERED BY THE ESTABLISHED IDEOLOGY TO REIGN SUPREME AND
ESTABLISH SUBORDINATION AT THE PRICE OF SUBJECTIVATION.

BUTLER, PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC AT UC BERKLEY, 1995, [JUDITH, “CONSCIENCE DOTH MAKE SUBJECTS
OF US ALL,” YALE FRENCH STUDIES, NO. 88, DEPOSITIONS: ALTHUSSER, BALIBAR, MACHEREY, AND THE
LABOR OF READING, PG 6-26]
In this sense, as a prior and essential condition of the formation of the subject, there is a certain readiness to be compelled by the
authoritative interpellation, a readiness that suggests that one is, as it were, already in relation to the voice before the response, already
implicated in the terms of the animating misrecognition by an authority to which one subsequently yields. Or perhaps one has already
yielded before one turns around, and that turning is nothing other than a sign of an inevitable submission by which one is established
as a subject positioned in language as a possible addressee. In this sense, the scene with the police is a belated and redoubled scene,
one that renders explicit a founding submission for which no such scene would prove adequate. For if that submission is what brings
the subject into being, then the narrative that seeks to tell the story of that submission can proceed only through exploiting grammar
for its fictional effects. The narrative that seeks to account for how the subject comes into being presumes the grammatical "subject"
prior to the account of its genesis. And yet the founding submission that has not yet resolved into the subject would be precisely that
nonnarrativizable prehistory of the subject, a paradox that calls the very narrative of subject formation into question. If there is no
subject except as a consequence of this subjection, the narrative that would explain this requires that the temporality not be true, for
the grammar of that narrative presupposes that there is no subjection without a subject who undergoes it.
Is this founding submission a kind of yielding prior to any question of psychological motivation? How are we to understand the
psychic disposition at work at the moment in which the pedestrian responds to the law—what conditions and informs that response?
Why would it be that the person on the street responds to the "Hey you there!" by turning around? What is the significance in turning
to face the voice that calls from behind? This turning toward the voice of the law is a sign of a certain desire to be beheld by and
perhaps also to behold the face of authority, a visual rendering of an auditory scene—a mirror stage or, perhaps more appropriately, an
"acoustic mirror"7—that allows that misrecognition without which the sociality of the subject cannot be achieved. This subjectivation
is, according to Althusser, a misrecognition, a false and provisional totalization. What precipitates this desire for the law, this lure of
misrecognition offered in the reprimand that establishes subordination as the price of subjectivation? This account appears to imply
that social existence, existence as a subject, can be purchased only through a guilty embrace of the law, where guilt guarantees the
intervention of the law and, hence, the continuation of the subject's existence. If the subject can only assure his/her existence in terms
of the law, and the law requires subjection for subjectivation, then it may be, perversely, that one (always already) yields to the law in
order to continue to assure one's own existence. The yielding to the law might then be read as the compelled consequence of a
narcissistic attachment to one's continuing existence.

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CONSCIENCE IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE PRODUCTION AND REGULATION OF THE CITIZEN-SUBJECT, FOR IT IS
CONSCIENCE THAT TURNS THE INDIVIDUAL AROUND TO MAKE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE TO THAT
SUBJECTIVATING REPRIMAND OR CALL ENACTED BY THE CAPITALISTIC NATION-STATE.

BUTLER, PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC AT UC BERKLEY, 1995, [JUDITH, “CONSCIENCE DOTH MAKE SUBJECTS
OF US ALL,” YALE FRENCH STUDIES, NO. 88, DEPOSITIONS: ALTHUSSER, BALIBAR, MACHEREY, AND THE
LABOR OF READING, PG 6-26]
Another way of posing this question is as follows: How is Althusser's text implicated in the "conscience" that it seeks to explain? And
to what extent is the persistence of the theological model a symptom, one that compels a symptomatic reading? In his introductory
essay to Lire le Capital, Althusser suggests that every text must be read for the "invisible" that appears within the world that theory
renders visible.9 In a recent consideration of Althusser's notion of "symptomatic reading," Jean-Marie Vincent remarks that "a text is
not only interesting because it organizes logically, by the arguments it develops in an apparently rigorous fashion, but also because of
everything that disorganizes its order, because of everything that weakens it."10 Neither Althusser nor Vincent considers the possibility
that the exemplary status of certain metaphors may become occasions for a symptomatic reading that "weakens" rigorous argument.
But it seems that in relation to Althusser 's own text, a reconsideration of the central religious tropes of the voice of the law and
conscience provides a way to question what has become, within recent literary studies, an unnecessary tension between the reading of
metaphor and the reading of ideology. To the extent that Althusser 's religious analogies are understood as merely illustrative, they are
set apart from the rigorous argumentation of the text itself, offered in pedagogical paraphrasis. And yet, the performative force of the
voice of religious authority becomes exemplary for the theory of interpellation, thus extending through example the putative force of
divine naming to those social authorities by which the subject is hailed into social being. This argument does not mean to suggest that
the "truth" of Althusser's text can be discovered in the disruptive effects of the figural on its "rigorous" conceptualization. Such an
approach romanticizes the figural as essentially disruptive, where it may well be the case that figures compound and intensify
conceptual claims. The concern here has a more specific textual aim, namely, to show how the figures—the examples and the
analogies—inform and extend the conceptualizations, implicating the text in an ideological sanctification of religious authority which
it can expose only through its reenactment.
For Althusser, the efficacy of ideology consists in part in the formation of conscience, where the notion of conscience is understood to
place restrictions on what is speakable or, more generally, representable. Conscience cannot be conceptualized as a self-restriction, if
that relation is construed as a pregiven reflexivity, a turning back upon itself performed by a ready-made subject, but designates a kind
of turning back—a reflexivity—which constitutes the conditions for the possibility of the subject's formation. In this sense, reflexivity
is constituted through this moment of conscience, this turning back upon oneself, one which is simultaneous with a turning toward the
law. This self-restriction is something other than the internalization of an external law: the model of internalization takes for granted
the "internal" and the "external" as already formed. This self-restriction is prior to the subject, constituting the inaugurating reflexive
turn of the subject, enacted in anticipation of the law and, hence, determined in relation to that law, with a prejudicative foreknowledge
of the law. Conscience is fundamental to the production and regulation of the citizen-subject, for it is conscience that turns the
individual around to make itself available to that subjectivating reprimand, but the law will represent the redoubling of the reprimand:
a turning back and a turning toward. How are these turns to be thought together, without reducing the one to the other?

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THE AFFIRMATIVE EXPLICIT USE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE STATE IS EXACTLY WHAT ALLOWS THE STATE TO
CONTINUE ITS DOMINATION OVER ITS SUBJECTS. IT ALLOWS THE STATE TO STAND OVER ITS SUBJECTS IN A
FORM OF TOTALITY.

TEDMAN, GARY, POLITICAL AFFAIRS WRITER, IDEOLOGY, THE STATE, AND THE AESTHETIC LEVEL OF PRACTICE,
WINTER 1999, RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 11 NUMBER 4, 58-9

For classical Marxism it is simple: the purpose of a state "standing above the people" is to guarantee that the ruling class retains power
over the oppressed class, who are exploited by this ruling class. There are details to be added to this: we know that the classic Marxist
idea of the social totality, as distinct from Hegel's earlier concept of an ideal totality, divided the social whole into two elementary
levels: the base, or economic infrastructure and, arising upon this, the superstructure, formed by the politico-legal apparatus of the
state and ideology, art, science, and culture in general. Classical Marxism uses this spatial-architectural metaphor of the upper floors
resting on the base, and we know that it says that in history it is the base that determines in the last instance the future progress of
society. The way in which the base determines this last instance is explained as being due to the economic infrastructure acting as the
keynote to the process of development of the social totality. This concept of a keynote seems simply to denote the lasting effectivity—
on human subjects-- of the uniform structure of conventional economic relationships, which Marx sees as remaining relatively
invariant despite rapid changes, say, in technological capacity in capitalist society, but we shall come back to this idea and try to flesh
it out later using our concept of aesthetics (keeping things in proportion, as Althusser would say).
The problem of ideology and its position in the base/superstructure model has of late been overshadowed by the contemporary focus
on postmodern discourses and the rejection of such ostensibly elementary categories. However, like many Marxists I still feel that
Althusser's celebrated essay on "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"—which has base and superstructure as 6 central focus—
remains one of the most exciting, valuable, and potentially productive works of recent Marxist theory to approach this area, despite
Althusser's well-recognized diversion into a more or less Lacanian-inspired theory of knowledge (Elliott 1987). We are aware that
Althusser himself tested the rather schematic nature of the base/superstructure formula. His concept of reproduction in "Ideology and
the State" poses the question of the traffic between the levels in order to render the metaphor less descriptive. He does this by
emphasizing the social role of ideology within this traffic as the constituent that provides the social interchange (a kind of bonding)
between the base and the superstructure of the social formation.
For Althusser, the state secures reproduction while civil society includes the sphere
of production. Althusser enabled us to see more clearly that the reproduction of the e already existing conditions and relations of
production is achieved increasingly through the production and reproduction of suitable human subjects, subjects that "act correctly"
within these conditions and relations. According to Althusser, this reproduction of subjects takes place in ideology and these subjected
subjects act out their imaginary relationship to the conditions of production. Today's education system has now largely replaced
feudal, religious apparatuses in the production of the necessary states of mind needed to ensure the continued preservation of the
existing state of things. A worker-subject needs to know how to act in relation to his or her position in the hierarchy—in other words,
how to accept his or her exploitation "graciously." Thus, for Althusser ideology (in his sense of systems of illusive ideas) today
functions chiefly through educational institutions or ideological state apparatuses that take part in this process of reproduction.

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EDUCATION IS THE MAIN VECTOR THROUCH WHICH THE IDEOLOGY PASSES, INTERPELLATING THE ENTIRE
SOCIETY; THE PROCESS IS NECESSARY FOR THE REPRODUCTION OF THE RELATIONS OF PRODUCITON THAT
MAKE UP THE CAPITALIST SOCIAL SYSTEM
ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION)” (1969-1970),
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 87-89]
Reproduction of Labour-Power
However, the reader will not have failed to note one thing. We have discussed the reproduction of the means of production—but not the reproduction of the productive
forces. We have therefore ignored the reproduction of what distinguishes the productive forces from the means of production, i.e. the reproduction of labour power.

From the observation of what takes place in the firm, in particular from the examination of the financial accounting practice which predicts amortization and
investment, we have been able to obtain an approximate idea of the existence of the material process of reproduction, but we are now entering a domain in which the
observation of what happens in the firm is, if not totally blind, at least almost entirely so, and for good reason: the reproduction of labour power takes place essentially
outside the firm.

How is the reproduction of labour power ensured?

It is ensured by giving labour power the material means with which to reproduce itself: by wages. Wages feature in the accounting of each enterprise, but as 'wage
capital, 3 not at all as a condition of the material reproduction of labour power.

However, that is in fact how it 'works' since wages represent only that part of the value produced by the expenditure of labour power which is indispensable for its
reproduction: sc. indispensable to the reconstitution of the labour power of the wage-earner (the wherewithal to pay for housing, food and clothing, in short to enable
the wage-earner to present himself again at the factory gate the next day—and every further day God grants him); and we should add: indispensable for raising and
educating the children in whom the proletarian reproduces himself (in n models where n = 0, 1, 2, etc.) as labour power.

Remember that this quantity of value (wages) necessary for the reproduction of labour power is determined not by the needs of a 'biological' Guaranteed Minimum
Wage (Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel Garanti) alone, but by the needs of a historical minimum (Marx noted that English workers need beer while French
proletarians need wine)—i.e. a historically variable minimum.

I should also like to point out that this minimum is doubly historical in that it is not defined by the historical needs of the working class 'recognized' by the capitalist
class, but by the historical needs imposed by the proletarian class struggle (a double class struggle: against the lengthening of the working day and against the reduction
of wages).

However, it is not enough to ensure for labour power the material conditions of its reproduction if it is to be reproduced as labour power. I have said that the available
labour power must be 'competent, i.e. suitable to be set to work in the complex system of the process of production. The development of the productive forces and the
type of unity historically constitutive of the productive forces at a given moment produce the result that the labour power has to be (diversely) skilled and therefore
reproduced as such. Diversely: according to the requirements of the socio-technical division of labour, its different 'jobs' and 'posts.

How is this reproduction of the (diversified) skills of labour power provided for in a capitalist regime? Here, unlike social formations characterized by slavery or
serfdom, this reproduction of the skills of labour power tends (this is a tendential law) decreasingly to be provided for 'on the spot' (apprenticeship within production
itself), but is achieved more and more outside production: by the capitalist education system, and by other instances and institutions.

What do children learn at school? They go varying distances in their studies, but at any rate they learn to read, to write and to add—i.e. a number of techniques, and a
number of other things as well, including elements (which may be rudimentary or on the contrary thoroughgoing) of 'scientific' or 'literary culture, which are directly
useful in the different jobs in production (one instruction for manual workers, another for technicians, a third for engineers, a final one for higher management, etc.).
Thus they learn `know-how'.

But besides these techniques and knowledge, and in learning them, children at school also learn the 'rules' of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by
every agent in the division of labour, according to the job he is 'destined' for: rules of morality, civic and professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect
for the socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order established by class domination. They also learn to 'speak proper French', to 'handle' the
workers correctly, i.e. actually (for the future capitalists and their servants) to `order them about' properly, i.e. (ideally) to 'speak to them' in the right way, etc.

To put this more scientifically, I shall say that the reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction
of its submission to the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to
manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class 'in words'

In other words, the school (but also other State institutions like the Church, or other apparatuses like the Army) teaches 'know-how', but in forms which ensure
subjection to the ruling ideology or the mastery of its 'practice. All the agents of production, exploitation and repression, not to speak of the `professionals of ideology'
(Marx), must in one way or another be 'steeped' in this ideology in order to perform their tasks `conscientiously'—the tasks of the exploited (the proletarians), of the
exploiters (the capitalists), of the exploiters' auxiliaries (the managers), or of the high priests of the ruling ideology (its `functionaries'), etc.

The reproduction of labour power thus reveals as its sine qua non not only the reproduction of its 'skills' but also the reproduction of its subjection to the ruling ideology
or of the 'practice' of that ideology, with the proviso that it is not enough to say 'not only but also,' for it is clear that it is in the forms and under the forms of ideological
subjection that provision is made for the reproduction of the skills of labour power.
But this is to recognize the effective presence of a new reality: ideology.

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THE STATE IS ULTIMATLEY A CLASS STATE, THAT SERVES THE ENDS OF THE CLASS IN POWER — IT’S FORCE IS
DEPPLOYED IN THE INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO POPULATE IT

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION)” (1969-1970),
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 92-95]

The State

The Marxist tradition is strict, here: in the Communist Manifesto and the Eighteenth Brumaire (and in all the later classical texts,
above all in Marx's writings on the Paris Commune and Lenin's on State and Revolution), the State is explicitly conceived as a
repressive apparatus. The State is a 'machine' of repression which enables the ruling classes (in the nineteenth century the bourgeois
class and the 'class' of big landowners) to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter
to the process of surplus-value extortion (i.e. to capitalist exploitation).

The State is thus first of all what the Marxist classics have called the State apparatus. This term means: not only the specialized
apparatus (in the narrow sense) whose existence and necessity I have recognized in relation to the requirements of legal practice, i.e.
the police, the courts, the prisons; but also the army, which (the proletariat has paid for this experience with its blood) intervenes
directly as a supplementary repressive force in the last instance, when the police and its specialized auxiliary corps are 'outrun by
events'; and above this ensemble, the head of State, the government and the administration.

Presented in this form, the Marxist-Leninist 'theory' of the State has its finger on the essential point, and not for one moment can there
be any question of rejecting the fact that this really is the essential point. The State apparatus, which defines the State as a force of
repressive execution and intervention 'in the interests of the ruling classes' in the class struggle conducted by the bourgeoisie and its
allies against the proletariat, is quite certainly the State, and quite certainly defines its basic 'function'.

From Descriptive Theory to Theory as Such
Nevertheless, here too, as I pointed out with respect to the metaphor of the edifice (infrastructure and superstructure), this presentation
of the nature of the State is still partly descriptive.

As I shall often have occasion to use this adjective (descriptive), a word of explanation is necessary in order to remove any ambiguity.
Whenever, in speaking of the metaphor of the edifice or of the Marxist `theory' of the State, I have said that these are descriptive
conceptions or representations of their objects, I had no ulterior critical motives. On the contrary, I have every grounds to think that
great scientific discoveries cannot help but pass through the phase of what I shall call descriptive 'theory: This is the first phase of
every theory, at least in the domain, which concerns us (that of the science of social formations). As such, one might—and in my
opinion one must—envisage this phase as a transitional one, necessary to the development of the theory. That it is transitional is
inscribed in my expression: 'descriptive theory' which reveals in its conjunction of terms the equivalent of a kind of `contradiction' In
fact, the term theory 'clashes' to some extent with the adjective 'descriptive' which I have attached to it. This means quite precisely: (1)
that the 'descriptive theory' really is, without a shadow of a doubt, the irreversible beginning of the theory; but (2) that the 'descriptive'
form in which the theory is presented requires, precisely as an effect of this 'contradiction, a development of the theory which goes
beyond the form of 'description'.

Let me make this idea clearer by returning to our present object: the State.

When I say that the Marxist 'theory' of the State available to us is still partly 'descriptive', that means first and foremost that this
descriptive 'theory' is without the shadow of a doubt precisely the beginning of the Marxist theory of the State, and that this beginning
gives us the essential point, i.e. the decisive principle of every later development of the theory.

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Indeed, I shall call the descriptive theory of the State correct, since it is perfectly possible to make the vast majority of the facts in the
domain with which it is concerned correspond to the definition it gives of its object. Thus, the definition of the State as a class State,
existing in the repressive State apparatus, casts a brilliant light on all the facts observable in the various orders of repression whatever
their domains: from the massacres of June 1848 and of the Paris Commune, of Bloody Sunday, May 1905 in Petrograd, of the
Resistance, of Charonne, etc., to the mere (and relatively anodyne) interventions of a 'censorship' which has banned Diderot's La
Religieuse or a play by Gatti on Franco; it casts light on all the direct or indirect forms of exploitation and extermination of the masses
of the people (imperialist wars); it casts light on that subtle everyday domination beneath which can be glimpsed, in the forms of
political democracy, for example, what Lenin, following Marx, called the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

And yet the descriptive theory of the State represents a phase in the constitution of the theory which itself demands the 'supersession'
of this phase.

For it is clear that if the definition in question really does give us the means to identify and recognize the facts of oppression by
relating them to the State, conceived as the repressive State apparatus, this 'interrelationship' gives rise to a very special kind of
obviousness, about which I shall have something to say in a moment: 'Yes, that's how it is, that's really true!'6 And the accumulation
of facts within the definition of the State may multiply examples, but it does not really advance the definition of the State, i.e. the
scientific theory of the State. Every descriptive theory thus runs the risk of 'blocking' the development of the theory, and yet that
development is essential.

That is why I think that, in order to develop this descriptive theory into theory as such, i.e. in order to understand further the
mechanisms of the State in its functioning, I think that it is indispensable to add something to the classical definition of the State as a
State apparatus.

The Essentials of the Marxist Theory of the State

Let me first clarify one important point: the State (and its existence in its apparatus) has no meaning except as a function of State
power. The whole of the political class struggle revolves around the State. By which I mean around the possession, i.e. the seizure and
conservation of State power by a certain class or by an alliance between classes or class fractions. This first clarification obliges me to
distinguish between State power (conservation of State power or seizure of State power), the objective of the political class struggle on
the one hand, and the State apparatus on the other.

We know that the State apparatus may survive, as is proved by bourgeois `revolutions' in nineteenth-century France (1830, 1848), by
coups d'etat (2 December, May 1958), by collapses of the State (the fall of the Empire in 1870, of the Third Republic in 1940), or by
the political rise of the petty bourgeoisie (1890-95 in France), etc., without the State apparatus being affected or modified: it may
survive political events which affect the possession of State power.

Even after a social revolution like that of 1917, a large part of the State apparatus survived after the seizure of State power by the
alliance of the proletariat and the small peasantry: Lenin repeated the fact again and again.
It is possible to describe the distinction between State power and State apparatus as part of the 'Marxist theory' of the State, explicitly
present since Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire and Class Struggles in France.

To summarize the 'Marxist theory of the State' on this point, it can be said hat the Marxist classics have always claimed that (1) the
State is the repressive State apparatus, (2) State power and State apparatus must be distinguished, (3) the objective of the class struggle
concerns State power, and in ;consequence the use of the State apparatus by the classes (or alliance of class or of fractions of classes)
holding State power as a function of their class objectives, and (4) the proletariat must seize State power in order to destroy he existing
bourgeois State apparatus and, in a first phase, replace it with a quite different, proletarian, State apparatus, then in later phases set in
motion radical process, that of the destruction of the State (the end of State power, he end of every State apparatus).

In this perspective, therefore, what I would propose to add to the 'Marxist theory' of the State is already there in so many words. But it
seems to me that even with this supplement, this theory is still in part descriptive, although it does now contain complex and
differential elements whose functioning and action cannot be understood without recourse to further supplementary theoretical
development.

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LINK: THE STATE
THE IMPERIAL ORDER OF THE NATION STATE CONTAINS CAPITALISM'S CRISIS OF OVERPRODUCTION WHERE
THE STATE NOT ONLY MEDIATES ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS FOR IT’S BENEFIT BUT IS THE MACHINE WHICH
ORGANIZES AND REPRESSES CLASS CONFLICTS. THE ADVANCE OF THE BOURGEOISIE MEANS OF PRODUCTION
COMBINED WITH CHEAP COMMODITIES BREAKS DOWN LOCAL RESISTANCE COMPELS ALL NATIONS, ON PAIN OF
EXTINCTION, TO ADOPT THE BOURGEOIS MODE OF PRODUCTION.

BURAWOY, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AT UC BERKLEY, 2000, [MICHAEL, MARXISM AFTER COMMUNISM,
THEORY AND SOCIETY VOL. 29, NO. 2 PP.151-174]

<Marx and Engels were so overawed by capitalism's short history that they expected it to overrun the world, destroying in its wake all
pre-capitalist modes of production, and eventually destroying itself but not before establishing the grounds for a new, higher
communist order. They thought that the end of competitive capitalism would be the end of capitalism tout court. In reality the early
capitalism that they observed gave rise to the familiar imperial order of three worlds: organized capitalism, state socialism, and
colonized peripheries.

This imperial order is indeed inter-national in that its elementary unit is the nation state, a state that mediates global transactions. As
David Harvey argues in The Condition of Postmodernity, metropolitan states contained capitalism's crises of overproduction in two
ways: first, by expelling them to the periphery, from where capitalism drew its raw materials and cheap labor and to where it
discharged excess commodities and capital. Second, it would postpone crises into the future through public expenditures on welfare
and warfare. States not only mediated economic transactions, they were also central in organizing or repressing class conflict. The
state developed its own coercive machine of police and military and at the same time expanded administrative, legal, welfare,
communications, and educational institutions that reached into the furthest corners of society. At the same time, a more or less dense
civil society of semi-autonomous organizations, such as trade unions, political parties, churches, and so forth, dispersed, blunted, and
mystified class relations. The expansion of the nation state and its extension into society took different forms but it was a signal
feature of the twentieth century, affecting state socialism, fascism, and even authoritarian regimes of the Third World and not just
democratic forms of organized capitalism. Finally, the state, aided by its penetration into society, successfully instilled a national
identity for its citizens, one that could be called upon for sacrifices and compromises.

Capitalism is now bursting the bounds of the nation state, and doing so in ways prefigured in Part I of The Communist Manifesto.
Recall those lyrical passages that describe capitalism unbound: "All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify." 16 Capitalism
resolves its crises not through the agency of the state but by continually transforming itself, and at an ever accelerating pace.
Production and consumption, restless and ephemeral, produce a life of transcience and spectacle. Flexible adaptation is the watchword
of the nineties. Capitalism inaugurates a period of hypermodernity the world over. "It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere,
establish connections everywhere." 17 Established national industries are destroyed by global production, which takes in raw materials
from the remotest regions and turns them into products consumed in every quarter of the globe. Transnational connections shoot
across the globe: "... intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations." 18 A global imagination displaces the limited
visions of the local and national: "National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the
numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature." 19 The advance of the means of production, especially the
means of communication, combined with its cheap commodities breaks down local resistance. "[The bourgeoisie] compels all nations,
on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production." 20 What more apt description of Russia today, of capitalism rushing
over the shallow trenches of collapsing communism, flooding its territories with new wants and cheap products, wrecking industry,
destroying agriculture, creating a new huckster, parasitic bourgeoisie, transmission belt of global capital. After Communism, The
Communist Manifesto becomes the Manifesto of the Bourgeoisie!>

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DEMOCRACY FAVORS THE RULING CLASS AND OPPRESSES THE OTHERS

AVAKIAN, CHAIRMAN OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY USA, 1986 [BOB, DEMOCRACY: CAN’T WE
DO BETTER THAN THAT?,5]
In reality and in essence, democracy, in whatever form, means democracy only in the ranks of the ruling class (or classes) in society.
The other side of this democracy is a dictatorship exercised--as ruthlessly as necessary– over the oppressed classes and groups. The
full force of the state will be brought down on those who pose any serious threat to the ruling class, while those who form a base of
support for the ruling class, or at least don't do any thing serious by way of protest or rebellion, will have a good chance of escaping
direct repression. The loyal base of support will even be encouraged and at times mobilized in political action by the political leaders
of the state–for example, the initiation of "hard hat" attacks on anti-Vietnam War demonstrators by the Nixon administration a decade
ago, or pogroms against Iranians during that "hostage crisis," or violent assaults on abortion clinics and similar services in the U.S.
today, stimulated and at least "winked at" by the administration in office (whether Carter in the case of the Iranians or Reagan in
relation to the abortion clinics). The role and the force of the state is never neutral: it is always an instrument for protecting and
reserving the existing system, for enforcing the dominant relations and class structure, for backing up those who serve and support
them, and for suppressing those who are in any kind of fundamental opposition. This is certainly no less true in a democratic form of
state than in any other.;
Proof of this is everywhere to be found. Besides the international marauding and mass murder carried out by the imperialists, within
the U.S. itself (to cite an outstanding example) there are the continual murders of poor people, especially Black people and other
oppressed nationalities (at least hundreds every year), by police. There are the vicious police attacks and at times the use of the
National Guard, Airborne, and other units of the armed forces (as happened in the U.S. in the 1960s) against protests and rebellions
that seriously challenge the established order or major policies of the government. As the experience of the 1960s shows—as well as
other experience throughout the history of U.S. and every other "democratic" country— such repression, besides indiscriminate
murder and brutality against rebellious masses, will assume a concentrated, systematic form against organizations and individuals that
act as leading forces among the oppressed in revolt. Such organizations and individuals will be targeted for everything from extensive
surveillance and infiltration by the political police (the FBI and so forth) all the way to coldly calculated assassination and massive use
of force directed from the highest levels of government. The experience of the Black Panther Party in the U.S. in the late '60s to early
'70s dramatically illustrates this: more than twenty of its members were murdered by the police, FBI, etc., operating openly as well as
undercover, while thousands of its members and supporters were jailed, harassed, hounded. And what the imperialists have on their
agenda in this period—above all world war with all that implies—can only be attended by the most vicious repression. This is
presently being prepared through the harassment and persecution of immigrants, the sharpening of repressive laws and the legal
machinery of repression, the carrying out of "preemptive strikes" against alleged "terrorists," sweeps against "criminal elements" as
preparation for sweeps against political opposition elements, and other concerted actions by the governments in the Western
imperialist democracies

IN ESSENCE, CLASS DEMOCRACY IS A DICTATORSHIP OF THE WEALTHY

AVAKIAN, CHAIRMAN OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY USA, 1986 [BOB, DEMOCRACY: CAN’T WE
DO BETTER THAN THAT?,65]
It is conventional wisdom in countries like the U.S. that democracy and dictatorship are the complete opposite of each other: where
there is democracy there is not a dictatorship and where there is a dictatorship there is of course no democracy. But in fact democracy
is a form of dictatorship. In any state where democracy is the form of political rule, democracy is really only practiced among the
ranks of the ruling class, while dictatorship is exercised over the oppressed class (or classes). In the present-day self-proclaimed
"democratic countries" this is the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat (and other oppressed strata and groups) 3
Lenin gave this comprehensive and concise definition of what is meant by classes:
Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social
production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social
organization of labor, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the

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SERVICE IS JUST A MEANS BY WHICH TO CONVINCE THE RULING CLASS OF THEIR GOODNESS AND THE JUSTICE
OF THEIR SOCIETY—IT IS THE PARK THAT MAKES THE PRISON OF OUR SOCIETY LOOK TOLERABLE

ADORNO, DIRECTOR OF THE FRANKFURT INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, 1994 [THEODOR W.,
“MESSAGES IN A BOTTLE,” MAPPING IDEOLOGY, ED. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, P. 34-36]
I
Key people – The self-important type who thinks himself something only when confirmed by the role he plays in collectives which are
none, existing merely for the sake of collectivity; the delegate with the armband; the rapt speechmaker spicing his address with wholesome wit
and prefacing his concluding remark with a wistful 'Would that it were'; the charity vulture and the professor hastening from one congress to the next – they all
once called forth the laughter befitting the naive, provincial and petty-bourgeois. Now the resemblance to the nineteenth-century satire has been discarded; the
principle has spread doggedly from the caricatures to the whole bourgeois class. Not only have its members been subjected to
unflagging social control by competition and co-option in their professional life, their private life too has been absorbed by the reified
formations to which interpersonal relations have congealed. The reasons, to start with, are crudely material: only by proclaiming assent
through laudable service to the community as it is, by admission to a recognized group, be it merely a freemasonry degenerated
to a skittles club, do you earn the trust that pays off in a catch of customers and clients and the award of sinecures. The substantial
citizen does not qualify merely by bank credit or even by dues to his organizations; he must donate his life-blood and the free
time left over from the larceny business, as chairman or treasurer of committees he was half drawn to as he half succumbed. No hope
is left to him but the obligatory tribute in the club circular when his heart attack catches him up. Not to be a member of anything is to arouse suspicion:
when seeking naturalization, you are expressly asked to list your memberships. This, however, rationalized as the individual's willingness to cast off his
egoism and dedicate himself to a whole which is really no more than the universal objectification of egoism, is reflected in people's
behaviour. Powerless in an overwhelming society, the individual experiences himself only as socially mediated. The institutions made
by people are thus additionally fetishized: since subjects have known themselves only as exponents of institutions, these have acquired
the aspect of something divinely ordained. You feel yourself to the marrow a doctor's wife, a member of a faculty, a chairman of the committee of
religious experts – I once heard a villain publicly use that phrase without raising a laugh – as one might in other times have felt oneself part of a family
or tribe. You become once again in consciousness what you are in your being in any case. Compared to the illusion of the self-
sufficient personality existing independently in the commodity society, such consciousness is truth. You really are no more than doctor's
wife, faculty member or religious expert. But the negative truth becomes a lie as positivity. The less functional sense the social division of labour has,
the more stubbornly subjects cling to what social fatality has inflicted on them. Estrangement becomes closeness, dehumanization
humanity, the extinguishing of the subject its confirmation. The socialization of human beings today perpetuates their asociality, while
not allowing even the social misfit to pride himself on being human.
II
Legalities – What the Nazis did to the Jews was unspeakable: language has no word for it, since even mass murder would have sounded, in face of its planned,
systematic totality, like something from the good old days of the serial killer. And yet a term needed to be found if the victims – in any case too many for their names to
be recalled – were to be spared the curse of having no thoughts turned unto them. So in English the concept of genocide was coined. But by being codified, as set down
in the International Declaration of Human Rights, the unspeakable was made, for the sake of protest, commensurable. By its elevation to a concept, its possibility is
virtually recognized: an institution to be forbidden, rejected, discussed. One day negotiations may take place in the forum of the United Nations on whether some new
atrocity comes under the heading of genocide, whether nations have a right to intervene that they do not want to exercise in any case, and whether, in view of the
unforeseen difficulty of applying it in practice, the whole concept of genocide should be removed from the statutes. Soon afterwards there are inside-page headlines in
journalese: East Turkestan genocide programme nears completion.

III
Freedom as they know it – People have so manipulated the concept of freedom that it finally boils down to the right of the stronger
and richer to take from the weaker and poorer whatever they still have. Attempts to change this are seen as shameful intrusions into
the realm of the very individuality that by the logic of that freedom has dissolved into an administered void. But the objective spirit of
language knows better. German and English reserve the word 'free' for things and services which cost nothing. Aside from a critique of political economy, this bears
witness to the unfreedom posited in the exchange relationship itself; there is no freedom as long as everything has its price, and in
reified society things exempted from the price mechanism exist only as pitiful rudiments. On closer inspection they too are usually
found to have their price, and to be handouts with commodities or at least with domination: parks make prisons more endurable
to those not in them. For people with a free, spontaneous, serene and nonchalant temper, however, for those who derive freedom as a privilege from unfreedom,
language holds ready an apposite name: that of impudence.

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THE POLITICAL SERVICE OF THE PLAN IS JUST THE WINDOW DRESSING COVERING UP THE DISMANTLING OF
THE WELFARE STATE—THEY REPLICATE BUSH’S IDEOLOGY OF REPLACING VOLNTARISM WITH SOCIAL
WELFARE

BOWRING, PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AT CARDIFF UNIVERSITY, 1997 [FINN, “COMMUNITARIANISM
AND MORALITY: IN SEARCH OF THE SUBJECT,” NEW LEFT REVIEW I/222, MARCH-APRIL, P. ELECTRONIC]

How Fair is Workfare?

The communitarian interest in the importance of social duties inevitably draws them close to the idea of ‘workfare’ programmes and
the enforcement of the obligation to work. [28] In America, the radical reform of the welfare system instigated by a Republican
Congress has given states wide latitude to design their own welfare and work programmes along these lines. The attractiveness of this
policy to the American Right is unsurprising. But the idea of enforcing the obligation to work has also triggered the interest of the
centre-Left in Britain. [29] Unemployment, especially amongst young men, is increasingly regarded as more than a wasted economic
resource—being seen rather as a major social problem. Without the structure and discipline acquired through discharging employment
duties, without a social identity and a formal stake in the society that excludes them, young men, drawn to consolidate their masculine
identities in a street culture of theft, drugs and violence, have become a serious threat to the female-maintained cohesion and civility
of poor communities. [30]

What is most evident is that in our society the experience of work is a crucial component to the subjective experience of citizenship,
and thus to the readiness to pursue one’s projects and grievances in a responsible and civil manner. It is by fulfilling the formalized
requirements of a job that we obtain a social identity as abstract, interchangeable, and above all universal members of society, people
who have paid our debt to society on the same terms and conditions as everyone else, and who are therefore able to fulfil our own
personal interests as free and responsible individuals.

[… (FOOTNOTES ADDED)]

[28] Etzioni favours a year of national service for school leavers to remove the unemployed from the streets, weaken the enticement of
crime, and ‘build up the moral tenor and sense of social responsibility among the young’ (ibid., p. 113). This could be completed in
the armed forces, the Peace Corps, or in organizations dedicated to conservation work and socially useful projects.

[29] For example, Mandelson and Liddle, The Blair Revolution, pp. 97-102.

[30] See Beatrix Campbell, Goliath, London 1993.

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NATIONAL SERVICE IS A BAND AID SOLUTION; THE PLAN IS AIMED AT GETTING THE WRONG PEOPLE
INVOLVED THROUGH THEIR EDUCATIONAL ALTRUISM

DAVIS, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT UC-IRVINE, 1988 [MIKE, “LOS ANGELES: CIVIL LIBERTIES BETWEEN
THE HAMMER AND THE ROCK,” NEW LEFT REVIEW I/170, JULY-AUGUST, P. ELECTRONIC]

IX. Dreams Deferred

‘Or does it explode?’ Langston Hughes

The shattering effects of gang violence and crack addiction upon lowerincome communities pose urgent, and immensely difficult,
problems for advocates of grassroots politics and rainbow coalitions. How to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of supporting the
police on one hand, and ignoring the cries of desperation from terrorized working-class families on the other? The tactical responses
from the Left have so far not been brilliant. Thus, Mark Naison, a distinguished historian of Black history writing in dsa’s magazine,
proposes ‘dramatic measures to break the stranglehold of criminal elements in poor neighbourhoods’. His four-point programme
includes: (1) restored recreational facilities; (2) hiring of inner-city youth to renovate parks and playgrounds; (3) ‘drug-related
offenders should be placed in work camps in rural areas, physically removing them from the neighbourhoods while new youth
programmes are put in place. This should be accompanied by more vigilant law enforcement at the local level, something which
community residents in every low income neighbourhood have been demanding for years’; and (4) ‘a national service requirement
should be instituted immediately sending millions of middle-class youngsters into poor neighbourhoods to staff day-care centres and
clinics, work in schools and community centres, and set up programmes in theatre, music, and sports’. [58] The half-baked character
of these proposals betrays the superficiality of analysis and the scant concern for juvenile civil liberties. Does Naison really think that
the entire population of ‘drug-related offenders’ (from what age?) can be easily interned in rural areas without rampant hardship for
their families and gross violation of individual due process? (Would he like to be deported to North Dakota for smoking pot?) Why
should inner-city youth hew wood and tote water while ‘millions of middle-class youngsters’ get to staff centres and do challenging
work? Indeed, if he is imagining a struggle of the scope required to restore large-scale public employment programmes, why involve
the white middle class at all? And, realistically, what strategy does he propose to cut through the roadblocks of Gramm-Rudman, state
property tax ceilings, and soaring middle-class entitlements, to generate the social resources to reconstruct the political economy of the
inner city? And if that is the real goal, rather than a few basketball hoops and a bigger police budget, why not specifically target the
problem as the crisis of youth employment and services, not juvenile crime?

Similar strictures apply to advocates of bandaids like gun control and the legalization of narcotics (now endorsed by a spectrum
running from social democrats to William F. Buckley, Jr.). In principle their demands may be eminently sensible (what socialist
society would revel in the sale of midnight specials?) but they are almost irrelevant to the scale of the problem at hand. The first and
greatest nightmare of our cities is rampant youth poverty and inequality—the reduction of our children to social refuse. For socialists
this is the ‘deep structure’ of the problem of juvenile crime that must take precedence in every discussion, whether of etiology or of
treatment. Legalizing cocaine will not alter the structure of minority youth employment or turn the gangs into pacifists. By the same
token, to seek immediate palliatives at the level of a ‘left law and order programme’ in the name of the ‘working class’ is probably a
worse delusion. Attempts neatly to balance traditional reform demands with tougher criminal justice will only ensure a hearing for the
latter. Law-and-order coalitions do not become movements for social reform.

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NATIONAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS INCULCATE A PARTICULAR IDEOLOGICAL VIEW OF CIVIC INSTRUCTION
THAT PROMOTES THE VALUES OF THE DOMINANT VALUATIONS OF BOTH NATIONALISM AND CAPITALISM—
ESPECIALLY IN A TIME OF WAR, NATIONAL SERVICE WILL BE REAPPROPRIATED

ABOWITZ, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP AT MIAMI
UNIVERSITY (OHIO), NOVEMBER 2003 [KATHLEEN KNIGHT, “THE DOMINANT DISCOURSES OF CITIZENSHIP
IN AMERICAN LIFE AND SCHOOLING,” PAPER PRESENTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CIVIC
EDUCATION RESEARCH (NEW ORLEANS, LA), CIVICED.INDIANA.EDU/PAPERS/2003/1052315414.DOC]
One of the points of agreement among many civic republicans is on the sociological thesis that America of the late 20th and early 21st centuries is more divided and has
less consensus on moral and political values than the America of the early 20th century, as reflected in Robert Putnam’s famous “Bowling Alone” article (1995) and
subsequent writings. The diminished relational and social networks of American civil society, as seen in declining rates of participation in bowling leagues, Parent-
Teacher Associations, and similar neighborhood, local, and religious organizations erode what Putnam and others call social capital — the communal networks and
norms of trust and value that provide a sense of cohesiveness and can be traced to such social goods as high employment, good schools, and low crime (Putnam 2001).
Barber argues that “without civil society, suspended between big bureaucratic governments that citizens no longer trust… and private markets they cannot depend on
for moral and civic values…, citizens are homeless” (Barber 1999, 21). In civic republican discourse, a weakened civil society results in weak social
capital for our country, and this diminishing social capital as one of the central malaises to be corrected by invigorated civic education.
Governmental organizations like the Corporation for National and Community Service, with its vast array of civil service and
educational programs, focus on building social capital in communities through localized efforts to cooperatively solve problems as
citizens (National Service Resource Center 2003).

Articulations of political community in this discourse focus on commonality, consensus, and unity. Unlike the exclusive club of ancient
Athenian democracy, where only a small group of the adults were actually given rights of citizenship, civic republicans do often communicate an awareness of a
multicultural America. Still, as Oldham (1998) describes, civic republican discourse largely maintains the benefits of exclusivity.3 All discourses of citizenship must
define boundaries (of membership, of benefits, of rights, of duties), but the civic republican discourse draws the sharpest lines of inclusion and exclusion in its
expressions of political membership. “In choosing an identity for ourselves, we recognize both who our fellow citizens are, and those who are not members of our
community, and thus who are potential enemies” (Ibid., 81). Oldham states that this idea of exclusivity, which lies at the heart of the civic
republican tradition, gives priority to political community, when necessary, over universalist or humanist ethics. For example,
particularly in times of war or economic threat, the needs of nation supercede global or cosmopolitan ethics — recall the nationalist rhetoric
that introduced the Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) under the threat of a strong Japanese economy. Similarly, after 9/11/01
Lynne Cheney stated that “the most important civics lessons for American children are found in American history” (2002, p. XX). Civics, it is implied here,
does not involve a study of world history except as a secondary matter — students primarily need to know about difficult
accomplishments of starting and maintaining our democratic society (2002, 14). Otherwise, our democratic society will not be
reproduced in future generations.
Future generations of U.S. citizens are of grave concern to civic republicans, and texts in this discourse emphasize cognitive learning about democracy’s history and
institutions. The civic republican discourse strongly values civic knowledge, sometimes called civic literacy (Milner 2002), as an essential component of citizenship.
Civic education has to do with students gaining the right amount of civic knowledge, virtues, and skills to successfully engage in the process of democracy (Butts 1988;
Milner 2002; Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, 1996). Such civic knowledge would focus on American history, institutions, seminal texts (Constitution, Bill of Rights, etc.),
reserving a lesser place for more humanistic, international, and critical content and pedagogy. Many texts in this discourse bemoan the diminished civics offerings in
high schools, and the diminished scores that U.S. students receive in tests on civic knowledge compared with other nations (Quigley 2003, 2, NAEP report card, 1999).

The civic virtues of central concern are self-sacrifice, patriotism, loyalty, and respect. The civic skills are those enabling citizens to engage in productive dialogue
around public problems, building consensus, and working cooperatively. These virtues and skills are well articulated in the focus on community service in the civic
republican discourse. Community service and service-learning are seen as both a duty to other citizens and as a way to forge a sense of
commitment to community and nation, thus making service to others a prominent tool for civic republican citizenship education (Barber
1992; Battistoni 1997; Zaff 2003). Damon (2001), a developmental psychologist and character education advocate, stresses the significance of civic
identity, defined as: “an allegiance to a systematic set of moral and political beliefs, a personal ideology of sorts, to which a young
person forges a commitment. The emotional and moral concomitants to the beliefs are a devotion to one’s community and a sense of
responsibility to the society at large” (127). While the specific beliefs and commitments may change over the course of one’s life, Damon insists that this
initial formulation in adolescence is a key part of human development. Damon’s concern is not with communal identity as it forms in ethnic, racial, or other cultural
groups; indeed, some civic republicans have waged sharp critiques of multiculturalism’s emphasis on such bonds, accusing them of having a balkanizing influence on
our society (Schlesinger 1991, Ravitch 1993). “Building a nation that is more truly one America,” states one 2003 Democratic Presidential candidate, should be the
goal of citizenship initiatives (Kerry 2003, 44; italics mine).

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The civic republican discourse was in high profile after 9/11/01, which is unsurprising given the nationalistic and exclusive tones
that have historically made this discourse ripe for war-time rhetoric. Civic republican voices launched scathing critiques of public
schools in the wake of 9/11, and their specific ideas are illustrative of their agenda for citizenship education. Criticizing the public schools’ response to the
events and aftermath of 9/11,4 Finn writes that “the curricular and pedagogical advice that many of the [education] profession’s countless organizations … was long on
multiculturalism, feelings, relativism and tolerance but short on history, civics and patriotism” (2002, 4). In a collection entitled September 11: What our Children
need to know published by the Thomas B. Fordham foundation, Rotherham states that “while it is important for schools to teach about tolerance for different people
within this country and around the world, we do students and ourselves a disservice by equating tolerance with a relativist examination of September 11th” (2002, 34).
Rotherham and others in this collection want teachers, parents and the media to teach about the ideals and institutions that make America special and unique — not
without flaws, but with a strong, appreciative focus on the historical and ideological traditions of American democracy that students should cherish.

State civics standards reflect strong influence from the civic republican discourse. In Ohio, as most other states, the civics standards are located within the social
studies standards (see Tolo 1999). These standards give high priority to communal values, civic participation, and the history of American democracy. By the end of
the 3-5 grade program, students in Ohio should be able to “explain how citizens take part in civic life in order to promote the common good” (Ohio State Department of
Education, p. 38). By grade 8 they should be able to “identify historical origins that influenced the rights U.S. citizens have today” (Ibid). By grade 12, students should
be able to “explain how individual rights are relative, not absolute, and describe the balance between individual rights, the rights of others, and the common good”
(Ibid., 39).

Participation is defined by civic republican texts as pro-social, with an emphasis on personal responsibility and the common good. The grade 11 content standards
for Ohio offers a list of ways that we can exercise personal responsibility and active participation in a democracy: “Behaving in a civil manner, being fiscally
responsible, accepting responsibility for the consequence of one’s actions, practicing civil discourse, becoming informed on public issues, voting, taking action on
public issues, providing public service, serving on juries” (Ibid., 93). This list heavily emphasizes participation modes that are cooperative and supportive of the state,
emphasizing conventional ways to support the existing governmental and community institutions. Perhaps the duty of citizenship emphasized most heavily across civic
republican texts on education is voting — many curricular ideas exist for engaging students in and educating them about voting (Youth Leadership Initiative 2003, XX)
and a strong emphasis on voting is found in many state citizenship standards. An emphasis on civic responsibilities, duties, and service to others again underlines the
goals of working towards the common good.

In civic republican discourse, “responsibility” is often set up against “rights.” Following the communitarian critique of liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s
(MacIntyre 1981; Sandel 1982), there has been a strong articulation with the civic republican discourse to put renewed emphasis on the responsibilities that are
incumbent upon democratic citizens if our political community is to reproduce itself and thrive. Among civic republicans, there is some agreement that our rights are
worthless without the strong presence of values that underscore civic responsibilities, and that younger generations erroneously understand democracy to be an exercise
of rights rather than a structure that obligates them to certain duties. Thus, the emphasis on loyalty, service to government, community, and country, and civic literacy
in civic republican discourse aims to promote the desire and the ability to carry out one’s civic responsibilities. Our democracy, according to the civic republican
discourse, is broken because of growing cynicism, apathy, and a selfish focus on individual rights over collective responsibilities. The heroic acts around 9/11/01 and
its aftermath gave civic republicans hope that America can renew its communal ties.

Discourses of liberal citizenship

Liberalism is a discourse of liberty or freedom. “According to the liberal view, citizenship is the capacity for each person to form, revise,
and rationally pursue his/her definition of the good. Citizens are seen as using their rights to promote their self-interest within certain constraints imposed
by the exigency to respect the rights of others” (Mouffe 1991, 71). From the conception of individual rights comes a focus on equality, or the ability of each person —
especially those in historically marginalized and oppressed groups — to fully exercise their freedoms in society. From this historical emphasis on individual freedom
and equality have emerged two predominant threads within liberal citizenship discourses. The first, neoliberalism, will be only very briefly introduced here, since it has
not yet emerged as an explicit discourse of citizenship. Political liberalism, the more prominent thread of liberal discourse influencing mainstream ideas about
citizenship and citizenship education, and will be the central focus.

A combination of market liberal ideology and aggressive individualism, neoliberal discourse is very influential in American culture
and schooling. Neoliberalism merges capitalist and democratic spheres, as Wells, Slayton and Scott (2002) describe. “A careful study of the
dominant discourse of democracy in the United States, especially in the last decade, demonstrates that the democracy versus markets
dichotomy is misleading, as political leaders … have continually promoted democracy for markets” (341). Under neoliberal logic, the
liberty enjoyed by democratic citizens is the same freedom that has helped free-market capitalism to flourish, and democratic
citizenship takes on an instrumental turn designed to serve the growth of capitalistic markets. Citizenship for political membership,
agency, and engagement become indistinguishable from citizenship for economic purposes, or consumption and employment. Labaree
calls this education for social mobility, and identifies it as the prominent reason that most contemporary Americans value schooling (1997). This consumer-based
approach to education has “led to the reconceptualization of education as a purely private good,” Labaree notes (73). Yet educators rarely deliberately or explicitly take
up the neoliberal discourse as a discourse of citizenship, and most political and educational theorists also largely reject neoliberalism as a civic discourse, in part
because the model of homo economicus — human as an essentially economic animal — reflects an individualism so severe as to be incompatible with goals long
associated with democratic public life and common schooling. The recent rise of neoliberal discourse in educational policy and governance is well-
documented, however, as researchers analyze the wave of school-business partnerships, privatization, and choice initiatives that have
been prominent in recent decades of school reform (Spring 1998; Boyles 1998; Molnar 1996). The effects of this influence on citizenship education are
hard to measure, but the pursuit of rational self-interest that is the essence of capitalism emphasizes individual freedom and neglects egalitarian, communal, and public
ideals of democratic life (Barber 1999).

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RED SERVICE UTNIF 2006
LINK: DADT
THE CHALLENEGING OF HETERONORMATIVITY CHANGES NOTHING. BRINING “THE QUEER” INTO THE PUBLICH SPHERE ONLY
FURTHERS ADVANCED MEASURES OF CAPITLAISM.

HENNESSY, ROSEMARY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT SUNY-ALBANY, QUEER THEORY, LEFT POLITICS, FALL 1994,
RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 7 NUMBER 3, 88-9

At the same time that queer-bashing is escalating and homosexuals are hit with state-enforced exclusion from civic life and work,
lesbians and gays are becoming more visible and, to some degree, more "allowed" than eye appearing on T.V. shows, in advertising,
video, and film. Bill Clinton's new "dot ask, don't tell" policy for gays in the military surely has not changed the daily lives of military
personnel very dramatically, if at all, or come anywhere near unsettling the deeply entrenched relationship between militarism and
compulsory heteros uality. Nonetheless, the move to lift the military ban on gays, like the appointme of several "out" gay men and
lesbians to prominent positions in the Clinton administration, can be seen as part of a complex crisis in the public imagination an
assumed natural relationship between heterosexuality and citizenship. Positive depictions of lesbians and gays in the media feed this
faultline in the nation imaginary. Lesbians and gay men have appeared in prime-time T.V. sit toms, to shows, soap operas, and
commercial films more often in the last year and a half th ever before. At the same time that representations of gay and lesbian
identities more permissible, queer challenges to neat sex and gender divisions (male-femalci masculine-feminine, hetero-homb) are
increasingly circulating in sophisticated middle-class urban and youth culture as RuPaul, k.d. lang, Morrissey, and oth-) performance
artists disrupt the once tidy notion that men and women are "members of the opposite sex." Fascination with gender ambiguity, cross-
dressing, air' transsexuality punctuates middle-class urban culture in productions like Kate 130 stein's The Opposite Sex Is Neither,
Sally Potter's Orlando, and Neil Jordan's The Crying Game, and in glossy fashion magazines like Esquire, Interview, and D tails,
where stories like the recent one on "The Straight Queer" and ambiguous) gendered models define sophistication and cosmopolitan
chic in gender-flexible transsexual terms. If closer readings of each of these examples expose not so much the disruption of
heterosexual norms as the fragile limits of cultural crisis and the assimilationist strategies marshalled to manage it, they also point to
the slippe distinction between "lesbian and gay" and "queer" identities in popular culture Taken together, however, they indicate in the
most general way that counter heterosexual identities are increasingly circulating in U.S. culture. However this: sex-gender bending
sorts out in terms of its age-, urban-, race-, and class-specific parameters, it does seem to indicate shifts in the hi torical forces defining
family gender, and sexuality under advanced capitalism.
But having said all of this, what are we to make of these newly sanctioned representations? Does the entry of lesbian, gay, or queer
identities into certain sectors of mainstream culture transform some of the founding categories and divisions in prevailing
configurations of sexuality and gender? Or is it rather an indicator of more postmodern, flexible reconfigurations of them? If the
increased visibility of gays and lesbians is an assimilationist incorporation of difference that leaves heteronormativity's social relations
intact, are queer identities that supposed y defy the pluralist logic of assimilation or separatism doing something different? What is the
place of queer theory in this picture and, specifically, what is its relation to queer chic?...

“TOLERANT” INCORPORATION OF QUEERS IS A HORRIBLE MISTAKE. REPEALING DADT WILL ONLY BE LOOKED
AT AS A “MINORITY DEVIATION,” AND THEN THE QUEER AS A GROUP WILL BE FORCED BACK INOT SOCIETY’S
NORMATIVE LABOR STANCES.

HENNESSY, ROSEMARY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT SUNY-ALBANY , QUEER THEORY, LEFT
POLITICS, FALL 1994, RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 7 NUMBER 3, 89-90

Full democracy, of course, entails more than giving underrepresented groups their civil rights. It also requires eliminating the
inequities between the haves and the have-nots that make tolerance of "minorities" necessary. When practices that disturb the
coherence of the social imaginary or that fall beyond the boundaries of intelligibility are tolerated as "minority deviations," the
propriety of the prevailing symbolic order and the social relations it secures remain unquestioned. Tolerant incorporation of
homosexuals into the democratic state manages the contradictions that these forbidden identities disclose. The effect is to leave intact
an apparently coherent status quo, for the appeal both to the visceral and to tolerance help shore up a naturalized alignment between a
sexed and a social body, an alignment that the bourgeois subject and the liberal democratic state have historically presupposed. At the
same time, as an ultimately conservative strategy, liberal tolerance of lesbians and gays sustains the earitradictory structurings of
gender, including the gender division of labor upon which capitalist patriarchy depends.

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RED SERVICE UTNIF 2006
LINK: SOLVING MILTIARISM
IT’S IMPOSSIBLE TO SOLVE MILITARISM UNDER THE CURRENT ECONOMIC ORDER—MILITARISM IS
STRUCTURED INTO THE HEART OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND ANY DOWNTURN IN PROFITS WILL JUST LEAD
TO THE EXPORTATION OF VIOLENCE TO THE THIRD WORLD

PRASHAD, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AT TRINITY COLLEGE, 1996 [VIJAY,
NUCLEAR TREATIES IN THE AGE OF PENTAGON CAPITALISM,” TRINCOLL JOURNAL, NOVEMBER 21,
HTTP://WWW.TRINCOLL.EDU/ZINES/TJ/TJ11.21.96/ARTICLES/COVER.HTML]
After the passage of CTBT in the UN, the US State Department spokesperson, Nicholas Burns, made the unequivocal statement that nuclear disarmament was not on
the agenda. In point of fact, Burns made it clear that such a quest is in the nature of an idle dream rather than a "realistic" option: "We do not live in an ideal world," he
said prosaically, "we live in a world that exists. A world in which the United States will continue to have nuclear weapons, and Russia, China, Britain and France will.
There is no getting around that." Let there be no illusions among those who believe that treaties such as the CTBT will contribute towards a climate of
disarmament. The nuclear elites are not going to voluntarily give-up their monopoly on the means of total destruction. There appears to
be little indication in the "corridors of power" that Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Paris, and London will relinquish their military
superiority over the vast mass of humanity.
Treaties which relate to nuclear matters have only been signed by the nuclear elites after the value of the regulated issues is superseded by superior technology or after
that particular mode of testing is rendered worthless. When underground testing superseded atmospheric testing, the nuclear elites forbade the latter. CTBT currently
forbids live testing, but the nuclear elites will be able to conduct "sub critical" or computer testing procedures which may render live treaties unnecessary for the short-
term. The treaties are not signed with nuclear disarmament in mind, but in order to prevent non-nuclear states from entry into the nuclear club. The NPT, for instance,
was initiated in 1968 after the five nuclear elites completed their major tests and after underground tests became technologically more effective for measurement and for
containment of radiation. The 1986 Treaty of Raratonga called for an end to testing and the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific: the French signed in
early 1996 after it finished its latest round of tests and the US and UK also joined up after it became clear that nuclear submarines will not be needed to form a security
ring around the USSR (now the submarines are located off the shores of the dispersed targets of imperialism). The CTBT, similarly, appeared on the table after the
nuclear elite found itself secure in the belief that its weapons are well-oiled and ready. Certainly, "sub-critical" tests "are not adequate for new weapon development or
qualitative improvement," but it is certain that these technologies will act as "auxiliary aids to explosive tests" in the short-term (which is the time-frame of some
significance since the nuclear elite is known to break treaties which do not work in its interest -- such as the shoddy treatment given to UNESCO and to the recent US
refusal to pay its share of UN monies) [Praful Bidwai & Achin Vanaik, Testing Times: The Global Stake in a Nuclear Test Ban, Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold
Foundation, 1996]. When the US State Department was asked about its use of "sub-critical tests," a spokesperson said in typical double-speak, "I'm just going to limit
myself today that we've pledged, in voting for the treaty, to not test on a zero-yield basis, which is a key part of this." Those who believe that a system built on such
illusionary ideas as "deterrence through strength" and "strategic military superiority" are welcome to their chimeras -- those who seek to make a world free of
oppression must realize that the route of treaties signed between hypocritical states is hardly the means to produce the beloved community of the future.
Those hands which sign these treaties also sign the sales bills of "conventional weapons" to elements in the Third World where the killing fields multiply daily. There
can be no discussion of nuclear weapons without a consideration of the way in which the nuclear elite operates towards small arms.
Pentagon Capitalism
In 1970, Seymour Melman published Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War (New York: McGraw Hill) which detailed the tight nexus between
the military elites and industrial capital. Melman showed how the military control over national resources narrowed the choices
available for other state programs. Further, he argued that the military-industrial complex uses arms exports as a means to manage domestic
economic problems as well as to push an imperialist policy via proxy [p. 96; a more recent study is by John L. Boies, Buying for Armageddon:
Business, Society and Military Spending Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, New Brunswick: Rutgers, n. d.]. Eisenhower, in 1961, warned the US of the nexus
between the military and industry: "our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society," he said of
a leviathan which he himself had helped in no small measure to build. Aggressive arms sales to the Third World began after the onset of the long
recession from 1973. Arms sales to the Gulf States, for instance, enabled the recovery of revenue spent on oil. The major arms merchants sold
intermediary military technology to the Third World (keeping the latest inventions for the awesome military might of the overdeveloped world). The military-
industrial complex earned major revenues from the exchange which enabled the defense industry to subsidize its domestic production
as well as to keep the companies productive during times of lean domestic demand. Further, arms production enabled states with
flagging economies to keep employment steady [Ann Markusen, et. al., The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991]. The overdeveloped world benefitted from these sales even at a time when its own economies suffered from the burden of
stagflation. The nuclear elites developed a theory to justify their sale of "conventional arms" to the Third World: "conventional weapons," the nuclearcrats argued,
provided a "means to circumvent" the use of the nuclear option by non-nuclear and by threshold states (India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa). If these states receive
adequate amounts of "conventional weapons," this wisdom contends, then they will not engage in nuclear weapons production. In other words, let these folks kill
themselves with weapons which only have local range; let them have neither long-range nuclear devices nor let them have no access to "conventional weapons."
The latter option, total disarmament and non-proliferation of "conventional weapons," is not an option because the arms industry is
structured into the heart of the economy of the overdeveloped world. The Third World buys vast quantities of arms from the
overdeveloped world: India, for instance, imported $17 billion of military goods between 1985 and 1989; Iraq was next on the list with $12 billion (and it was in
the midst of a bloody engagement with Iran at this time). From 1992 to 1994, India increased its arms expenditure by 12% and Pakistan by 19.5%. The major exporters
of arms to India include France, Sweden, UK, USA, Russia; Pakistan is outfitted by PRC, France, Sweden, UK, and USA. The role of the nuclear elite in such
transactions is apparent. The graph shows the volume of arms sales to the Third World controlled by the nuclear elite between 1971 and 1985. From 1983 to 1993, the
US increased its share of the pie to 55% and Russia decreased its share to 10%. Within the past four years, the US renamed its Office
of Munitions Control to the Center of Defense Trade [Mark & Leonard Silk, Making Capitalism Work, New York: NYU, forthcoming]. With the end of
Cold War II (1979-1989), the arms business has become "trade" rather than a matter of "control."

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RED SERVICE UTNIF 2006
LINK: COSMOPOLITANISM
COSMOPOLITAN DISCOURSE REFLECTS IDEALS OF WESTERN ELITES, PROPPING UP CAPITALISM AND SYSTEMS
OF EMPIRE WHICH PERPETUATE COLONIALISM.

CALHOUN, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 2001 [CRAIG , “THE CLASS COUNSCIOUSNESS
OF FREQUENT TRAVELERS: TOWARD A CRITIQUE OF ACTUALLY EXISTING COSMOPOLITANISM”]

Cosmopolitanism is a discourse centered in a Western view of the world. 4 [End Page 873] It sets itself up commonly as a
"Third Way" between rampant corporate globalization and reactionary traditionalism or nationalism. If Giddens's account of the Third
Way is most familiar, the trope is still more widespread. Benjamin Barber's notion of a path beyond "Jihad vs. McWorld" is an
example brought to renewed prominence (and the best-seller lists) following the September 11 attacks. 5 Such oppositions
oversimplify at best, though, and often get in the way of actually achieving some of the goals of cosmopolitan democracy. In the first
place, they reflect a problematic denigration of tradition, including ethnicity and religion. This can be misleading in even a sheer
factual sense—as, for example, in Barber's depiction of Islamism as the reaction of small and relatively homogeneous countries to
capitalist globalization. The oppositions are also prejudicial. Note, for example, the tendency to treat the West as the site of both
capitalist globalization and cosmopolitanism, but to approach the non-West through the category of tradition. More generally, cultural
identities and communal solidarities are treated less as creative constructions forged amid globalization than as inheritances from an
older order. They should be available to people, much cosmopolitan thought implies, as lifestyle choices. As Timothy Brennan puts it,
cosmopolitanism "designates an enthusiasm for customary differences, but as ethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic
culture—a new singularity born of a blending and merging of multiple local constituents." 6 This vision of unity amid difference
echoes on a grander scale that of great empires and great religions, and it underwrites the cosmopolitan appeal for all-encompassing
world government. 7 Cosmopolitanism also reflects an elite perspective on the world. Certainly few academic theories escape
this charge, but it is especially problematic when the object of theory is the potential for democracy. The top ranks of capitalist
corporations provide exemplars of a certain form of cosmopolitanism, though not of democracy. Likewise, a large proportion of global
civil society—from the World Bank to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) setting accountancy standards—exists to support
capitalism not pursue democracy. Even the ideas of cosmopolitan democracy and humanitarian activism, however, reflect an
awareness of the world that is made possible by the proliferation of NGOs working to solve environmental and humanitarian
problems, and by the growth of media attention to those problems. These are important—indeed vital—concerns. Nonetheless, the
concerns, the media, and the NGOs need to be grasped reflexively as the basis for an intellectual perspective. It is a perspective, for
example, that makes nationalism [End Page 874] appear one-sidedly negative. This is determined first perhaps by the prominence of
ethnonationalist violence in recent humanitarian crises, but also by the tensions between states and international NGOs. It is also
shaped by specifically European visions and projects of transnationalism. Nationalism looks different from, say, an African vantage
point. And it is often the weakness of states that seems the most pressing problem, even when tyrants control those relatively weak
states. The cosmopolitan ideals of global civil society can sound uncomfortably like those of the civilizing mission behind
colonialism, especially when presented as a program from the outside borne by global NGOs rather than an opportunity for local
development. In this connection, we should recall how recent, temporary, and ever incomplete the apparent autonomy and closure of
nation is. In Europe, the invocation of nation may sound conservative and traditional (though it was not always so). Looked at from
the standpoint of India, say, or Ethiopia, it is not at all clear whether nation belongs on the side of tradition or developing
cosmopolitanism. Or is it perhaps distinct from both—a novel form of solidarity and a basis for political claims on the state, one that
presumes and to some extent demands performance of internal unity and external boundedness?

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RED SERVICE UTNIF 2006
LINK: COSMOPOLITANISM
COSMOPOLITANISMS ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE NATIONALISM ON A GLOBAL SCALE IS A VEHICLE FOR
REPRESSION OF DIFFERENCE

CALHOUN, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 2001 [CRAIG , “THE CLASS
COUNSCIOUSNESS OF FREQUENT TRAVELERS: TOWARD A CRITIQUE OF ACTUALLY EXISTING
COSMOPOLITANISM”]

Like the earlier vision of cosmopolis, the current one responds to international conflict and crisis. It offers an attractive sense of shared
responsibility for developing a better society and transcending both the interests and intolerances that have often lain behind war and
other crimes against humanity. However, this appears primarily in the guise of ethical obligation, [End Page 883] an account of what
would be good actions and how institutions and loyalties ought to be rearranged. Connection is seldom established to any idea of
political action rooted in immanent contradictions of the social order. From the liberal rationalist tradition, contemporary
cosmopolitanism also inherits suspicion of religion and rooted traditions; a powerful language of rights that is also sometimes a
blinder against recognition of the embeddedness of individuals in culture and social relations; and an opposition of reason and rights to
community. This last has appeared in various guises through three hundred years of contrast between allegedly inherited and
constraining local community life, on the one hand, and the ostensibly freely chosen social relationships of modern cities, markets,
associational life, and more generally cosmopolis, on the other. Confronting similar concerns in the mid-twentieth century, Theodor
Adorno wrote, An emancipated society . . . would not be a unitary state, but the realization of universality in the reconciliation of
differences. Politics that are still seriously concerned with such a society ought not, therefore, propound the abstract equality of men
even as an idea. Instead, they should point to the bad equality today . . . and conceive the better state as one in which people could be
different without fear. 26

This is very inadequately achieved at the level of the nation-state, to be sure, but it seems harder, not easier, to develop in a global
polity. Indeed, the projection of nationality to a global scale is a major motivation behind repression of difference. This is not to say
that cultural and social differences provoke no conflict in villages or urban neighborhoods. They do, but face-to-face relations also
provide for important forms of mediation. Ethnic violence in cities and villages commonly reflects organized enmity on a larger scale
rather than being its basis.

IN PRACTICE, A SOFT COSMOPOLITANISM EMERGES IN WHICH DIFFERENCE IS NOT EMBRACED, BUT MODIFIED
AND “PACKAGED FOR CONSUMER TASTES”

CALHOUN, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 2001 [CRAIG , “THE CLASS
COUNSCIOUSNESS OF FREQUENT TRAVELERS: TOWARD A CRITIQUE OF ACTUALLY EXISTING
COSMOPOLITANISM”]

Even while the internal homogeneity of national cultures was being promoted by linguistic and educational standardization (among
other means), the great imperial and trading cities stood as centers of diversity. Enjoying [End Page 887] this diversity was one of the
marks of the sophisticated modern urbanite by contrast to the "traditional" hick. To be a cosmopolitan was to be comfortable in
heterogeneous public space. 38 Richard Sennett cites (and builds on) a French usage of 1738: "A cosmopolite . . . is a man who moves
comfortably in diversity; he is comfortable in situations which have no links or parallels to what is familiar to him." Yet there is a
tendency for commercial capitalism and political liberalism to tame this diversity. While cities can be places of creative disorder,
jumbling together ethnicities, classes, and political projects, most people claim only familiar parts of the diversity on offer. The
difference between a willingness to enter situations truly without parallels or familiarity and a willingness to experience diversity as
packaged for consumer tastes is noteworthy. While Sennett's strong sense of cosmopolitanism calls for confrontation with deep and
necessarily contentious differences between ways of life, there is a tendency for a soft cosmopolitanism to emerge. Aided by the
frequent-flyer lounges (and their extensions in "international standard" hotels), contemporary cosmopolitans meet others of different
backgrounds in spaces that retain familiarity.

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RED SERVICE UTNIF 2006
LINK: COSMOPOLITANISM
THE AFFIRMATIVES COSMOPOLITAN FOCUS ON THE INDIVIDUAL REDUCES KNOWLEDGE AND THEORIES TO THE CONCRETE,
DISCONNECTING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF RACE WITH LARGER SOCIAL STRUCTURES. THIS COSMOPOLITAN FOCUS DISPLACES
BROADER DISCUSSION OF CLASS AND SOCIETY WITH INDIVIDUAL AGENCY. INDIVIDUAL AGENCY THEN DISPLACES THE
PROLETARIAT, THE PRIMARY INSTRUMENT FOR SOCIAL CHANGE IN MARXISM.
YOUNG, CHAIR @ NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 2006 (ROBERT, “PUTTING MATERIALISM BACK INTO RACE THEORY: TOWARD A
TRANSFORMATIVE THEORY OF RACE”, REDCRITIQUE.ORG)

<At the moment then, the discourse of autonomy displaces the structure of exploitation and, in this regard, I believe one can map out
the ideological collusion taking place in race theory. As I pointed out earlier, the humanists posit the "uniqueness" of black
subjectivity and now we can see the postmodern corollary which posits the "uniqueness" of racial discourse. I refer to these positions
as the "pedagogy of autonomy" because both instruct subjects to value the local. In both instances, the discourse of autonomy provides
an ideological framework for protecting the "unique" against its conceptual other—knowledge of the social totality. The pedagogues
of autonomy assume that the "unique", in its immediacy to the concrete, provides access to the real and therefore grounds knowledge.
These (anti-reductionist) pedagogues reduce knowledge to the concrete and, consequently, mystify our understanding of race because
they disconnect it from larger social structures like class and ideology.

By downplaying the determinate structures of class and ideology, it seems as if one could merely dispense with race because of a
crisis in raciology, as Gilroy suggests in his recent book, Against Race. Gilroy's notion of "post-race" offers a cultural
cosmopolitanism to resolve the crisis in racial representation, but he has very little to say about economics. In fact, he is explicitly
anti-Marxist (336) and in this regard, his text continues his long standing and unrelenting attacks against Marxism. His notion of
"cosmopolitanism" provides the most recent concept for displacing class theory. According to Gilroy, by locating those moments
when race is dispersed into singularities that resist conceptualization, "cosmopolitanism" will take us beyond the positivistic faith of
Marxism and usher in a post-race dispensation. Of course, his caricature of Marxism runs counter to one of the core concepts of
Marxism—class struggle. Recall the opening lines of the Communist Manifesto: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the
history of class struggles" (9). What is significant about this reading of history is that, in contrast to the "cosmopolitan" embrace of the
local and the singular, for Marx and Engels the localities of "history" are never meaningful in themselves—they are not auto-
intelligible—because the meaning of the local always refers back to the broader global relations (totality) from which it emerges. In
other words, if Marxism highlights the historicity of class antagonism, then, contrary to Gilroy, there is very little room for
transhistorical positivistic pieties. But Gilroy is not as interested in seriously engaging Marxism as much as he is in constructing an
ideological alibi for dismissing Marxism.

Gilroy idealist understanding of post-race emerges from his post-Marxism, which he launched in an earlier work. Indeed, it is his
earlier work that clearly shows the link between the discourse of (racial) autonomy and the politics of reformism. Specifically, in
There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack, Gilroy "supplements" class analytics with new urban social movements. However, with
Gilroy the "supplement" operates as a code for recuperating liberal pluralism (what Gilroy calls "multi-modality" 28). Consequently,
we do not get a sustained theorizing of the dialectical relationship between class and race; rather, we get what ultimately amounts to
an abandonment of class theory (245). Here is why he must abandon class theory: the trajectory of class theory calls for revolutionary
transformation of existing capitalist society. However, this is not Gilroy's project, nor the project of the new urban movements.
Gilroy endorses the new social movements precisely because "the new movements are not primarily oriented towards instrumental
objectives, such as the conquest of political power or state apparatuses" (226). Instead, the new social movements desire autonomy
within the existing system (226) and therefore foreground the "sphere of autonomous self-realization" (233). In other words, they do
want to change an exploitative system, they merely want a little more (discursive) freedom within it, and this (reformist) project
signals agency for Gilroy. For Gilroy, the new social movements represent agency, and in this regard, they replace the proletariat—the
historic vehicle for social transformation—but their agency, to repeat, is directed toward reforming specific local sites, such as race or
gender, within the existing system. In short, they have abandoned the goal of transforming existing capitalism—a totalizing system
which connects seemingly disparate elements of the social through the logic of exploitation—for a new goal: creating more humane
spaces for new movements within capitalism.>

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RED SERVICE UTNIF 2006
LINK: COSMOPOLITANISM
COSMOPOLITANISM IS AN ACCOMODATION TO CAPITALISM

THE RED COLLECTIVE, PUBLISHERS OF THE RED CRITIQUE, 2006 (‘THE OPPORTUNISM OF THE
TRANSPATRIOTIC LEFT”, REDCRITIQUE.ORG)
[Nothing represents the contemporary left and the complexities of its shifting opportunism more clearly than Lars von Trier's latest film, Manderlay. The film is, in the
left vocabularies, "radical". Its radicalism, however, is a transpatriotic radicalism whose loyalty is not to any particular nation or state but to
capital itself (Hardt and Negri, Multitude). When this left talks about "anti-capitalism", it actually means anti-corporationism. It has no
problem with capitalism itself. Even left socialism is a market socialism. Through various cultural relays and affective displacements the
transpatriotic left obscures the material inequality among people with a libertarian abstract freedom and, in effect, legitimates the free
market.
Ostensibly, the film represents race as an ideological construction that denies the oppressed a cultural voice. Democracy, the film suggests, is a ruse to disguise the ongoing slavery of the division of labor. The transformation of the "slave plantation" into a "free enterprise" therefore, the film shows, does not change the fact that the
slaves (even though they have a voice in how they are governed) are still economically exploited through the mechanisms of debt and the competitive advantage of older capitalists like the card shark who is hired to subvert the economy of Manderlay. When Timothy says to Grace, who is angered to the point of whipping him for not
using his freedom to liberate Manderlay: "you made us", it is not only to say how can you punish us for what we chose to do with our freedom, but also to indicate that despite the freedom of speech the oppressed still don't have freedom. The film, in other words, seems to offer a "radical" critique of bourgeois democracy, but quickly
that critique turns into a legitimation of slavery!
The film cancels this critique of bourgeois democracy and its inequalities by borrowing a trope from psychoanalysis and turning material oppression into a story about repression—the impossibility of emancipation because of the enslavement of the slave to his own desire for rules and regulations. The slaves of Manderlay, for instance,
are represented as voluntarily subordinating themselves to "Mam's Law" which they, in the person of Wilhelm, actually wrote to mitigate their anxiety about the abolition of slavery. The film, in other words, argues that since slavery and democracy are both rule-governed, there is really no difference between the two. All social
organizations, in other words, are the same because they are all governed by "rules" and "ordered". The radical left critique collapses in a bourgeois libertarian gesture which in essence says that there is no real difference between democracy and slavery because there must always be the rule of law. The film becomes a banal piece of
"post" theory which holds out the "wise" consolation of philosophy that in the end knowledge of the self as the author of things as they are is all that matters.
The scandal of left opportunism has reached such a level that even the leftists themselves cannot ignore it any more. For example, in a recent tribute to Edward Said, one of the icon-tutors of left opportunism, a left writer (whose ultimate purpose is to legitimate Said's practices) cannot help but in a seemingly critical tone ask him:
"What struck me very early and has remained with me since was that jovial ease you seemed to have in the company of the privileged and the powerful.... Remember that time...we talked about Aijaz Ahmad's book...? You wanted nothing more than to toss all printed copies into the incinerator. I said you were wrong to feel that way....
[Ahmad] simply could not fathom how someone could be feted and flattered and, at the same time, a problem to power…. In fact, throughout your career you embodied this very dilemma: Is it possible to be inside and outside at the same time? There is a nobility to absolute noncompliance that you could never appreciate, I think. So
long as they are not of the majority... intractable positions usually lead to ostracism. You, Edward, managed to avoid that reaction, but I was not always clear how you managed it. How did you get away with all those acerbic jabs in conversation, or in some of the more angry confrontations in print with people…? Why didn't these
remarks put you in the camp of the untouchables?…. I am sure that many quietly wonder whether you didn't cheat a little by managing to live comfortably while playing the iconoclast.... There are also people who wonder whether your improbable middle road was cleared by cutting corners, stroking unsavory friends, keeping silent at
opportune times...". (Critical Inquiry, Winter 2005).

It is in the terms of "getting things done" that the transpatriotic left has become such an effective translator of the interests of global
capitalism into "populist" strategies for easier consumption. This is particularly the case in the left's rejection of challenging capitalism
in favor of embracing media and technology as creating a new public sphere of post-class alliances and playful, hybrid identities from
within capitalism. Take, for example, Nicholas Negroponte's "one laptop per child" campaign to create and market $100 laptops to poor nations, which has
attracted significant attention from both progressive intellectuals and transnational capital. While couched in a cyber-ethical rhetoric of eliminating the "digital divide"
between the North and the South, it is not fighting social inequality that has this project so appealing to global media corporations such as Google, AMD, Samsung,
Motorola, and (Rupert Murdoch's) News Corp. Instead, it is Negroponte's argument that the key to the program's success is that "the World Bank make telecom
deregulation a condition of loans" (The Guardian, "Bridging the Technological Divide", 2/15/2005). Similarly, Mark Poster, another "left" theorist who, like
Negroponte, promotes "open source" software and cheap electronic devices as eliminating class inequality by creating the conditions for a post-capitalist consumer
society, now fears that without open and competitive free markets to challenge corporate monopolies the US economy could start resembling the Soviet Union, which,
to be clear, for Poster signifies the absence of consumer freedoms ("Who Controls Digital Culture"? Fast Capitalism). That Negroponte and Poster now sit alongside of
Thomas Friedman and Lawrence Summers in championing "free" competition in the market is not an accident. It is a reflection of the fact that the "progressive"
left has long since abandoned its resistance to capitalism and, instead, has become the more advanced mouthpiece of imperialism by
advancing the idea that it is only by appealing to the same economic principles of capitalism that created the deep class inequalities
now threatening it that can "save" capitalism from its current crises.
*
Instead of a critique of the family as a class institution that reproduces the fundamental private property relations of capitalism (and not merely its status divisions), the
transpatriotic left now celebrates the "new" pluralist family as a place of "affect", "desire" and "choice". Its critical focus is no longer family and class but the shifting
status relations within and among families. Take, for instance, the work of Judith Stacey, one of the most celebrated family theorists of the left. In her In the Name of
the Family: Rethinking Family Values in the Postmodern Age, she writes: "Despite my personal baptism in the heady, anti-family crucible of early second wave
feminism, I, for one, have converted to the long-term cause [of legalizing gay marriage]". In other words, "mature" people, according to Stacey, stop producing
structural critiques and learn how to limit the changes they advocate to the details of existing structures. Even the historian Stephanie Coontz, long known for her
critiques of culturalism in family studies, has now taken the culturalist position that family is no longer an economic necessity but a matter of "love", which explains the
family's "instability", which is ultimately a code for deteriorating material conditions (Marriage, A History). The left reformism and its redistributionism is increasingly
taking the form of a rather vulgar apologism for capital and its family structures. For instance, following Ulrich Beck's theory of "risk society", Elisabeth Beck-
Gernsheim argues that family is now a "do-it yourself" project and thus that the "success" of each family is based on its individual members and their inner workings
("On the Way to a Post-familial Family: From a Community of Need to Elective Affinities" and Re-inventing the Family). This is, however, nothing more than a re-
articulation of the logic of those direct apologists of capital such as Friedman who argue that the world is now "flat" and each individual (read: family) is an
entrepreneur who determines her (or their) own fate.
*
The transpatriotic left is technophilic. It believes that the "new technologies"of globalization "solve" the problems of capitalism by dismantling its oppressive
cultural identities. In his Against Race, for instance, Paul Gilroy claims that developments in biotechnologies produce "a fundamental change of scale in the perception
and comprehension of the human body" which dissolves the presuppositions of racism as "raciology" (the racial typologies active in racist discourse since the
eighteenth century). Global capitalism is, in other words, ushering in a new era of monadic difference and cosmopolitan values that frees
the individual from cultural domination. The very left that regards "progress" to be a myth of the Enlightenment and as oppressive as
"reason", is now opportunistically manufacturing a progress narrative of capitalist globality and, in doing so, obscuring racism—which
is a structural problem of the relation between the sellers and buyers of labor power— by re-writing it as a matter of cultural values. In
fact it is now competing with the Right wing in privileging "values" in its cultural commentaries. By displacing racism as a form of exploitation and representing it as a
form of cultural knowledge ("raciology"), Gilroy substitutes a focus on cultural equality for economic inequality. ]

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RED SERVICE UTNIF 2006
LINK: GIROUX
GIROUX’S CULTURAL POLITICS IS A SYMPTOM OF THE CURRENT FAUX RADICALISM OF POST-STRUCTURAL
CRITIQUE. HIS CRITIQUE MAKES NO PRETENSE OF BREAKING OUT OF THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL
COORDINATES, ONLY OF EMPOWERING PEOPLE WITHIN THEM. THIS FOCUS ON SYMBOLIC CONTESTATION IS
DEEPLY COMPLICIT WITH CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM

THE RED COLLECTIVE, PUBLISHERS OF THE RED CRITIQUE, 2006 (‘THE OPPORTUNISM OF THE
TRANSPATRIOTIC LEFT”, REDCRITIQUE.ORG)
[The new post-9/11 U.S. "left" has grown "wise", has denounced militancy, and has become a faith-based network of hospitality
devoted to what Lenin has called "yielding and getting on with everyone" (One Step Forward, Two Steps Back). It has, to paraphrase
Lenin again, ceased to be ashamed of the praises lavished on it by liberals who have turned opportunism into a way of life.

Left used to mean "radical", when radical meant grasping things by the root. In its cultural critique it argued that the binaries of gender
and race in which the representations of women, people of color, and gays were systematically devalued were necessitated by class
relations, capital accumulation, and the search for profits. Capital needed such cultural hierarchies to legitimate the exploitation of
labor in production. The left argued that exploitation is justified by capital by its naturalizing of differences. The critique of culture
was necessary, therefore, to expose the ideologies of capital and unify the exploited and oppressed peoples of the world to fight back
against the monopolists and owners. Culture was a way of knowing—not avoiding—the class dynamics of capitalism.

Now the left cultural critique has become a diversion from class. The very idea of class itself has, in fact, been turned into a trope of
opportunity and opportunism. In the conciliationist idioms of the left class has come to mean nothing more than a "lifestyle"—not
inequality at the point of production but pleasures in the shopping malls.

What is amusing is, of course, that the left writers (George Yudice, The Expediency of Culture) now claim that shopping, which
actually helps to prevent the fall of the rate of profit of capital itself, is the place of resistance since, according to them, revolution is a
thing of the past. All that we now have is consumption. Culture as resistance assumes that social inequalities are not at root class
questions that have to be dealt with at the point of production, but questions of the ethics of distribution which is really a trope for
consumption and its "surprising" effects of power.

These unforeseen results of power caused by the proliferation of signifiers is what Henry Giroux ("Cultural Studies in Dark Times")
celebrates as resistance to inequalities which he regards to be the effect of lack of access to discourse. For him, democracy is
unfettered access to discourse which is his translation of the bourgeois freedom of speech. He presupposes that material forces do not
produce material effects because they must be mediated through culture which has its own autonomous laws that disrupt objective
causality. Culture, Giroux claims, "offers a site where common concerns, new solidarities, and public dialogue refigure the
fundamental elements of democracy". The cultural in Giroux's writings dissolves politics into the shifting terrain of symbolic
contestation. Such an understanding of culture is itself deeply complicitous with capitalism because it turns culture into a self-agency
free of class forces. Without such a concept of the material basis of culture in class relations there can be no "reconfiguration" of the
fundamental elements of democracy and the status quo is maintained through the practices of mere resistance.]

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LINK: FOUCAULT/MICRO-POLITICS
MICROPOLITICAL PRACTICES CAN NEVER CHALLENGE POWER BECAUSE THEY CAN NEVER LOCATE IT —
ONLY AND IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS WHICH CAN TRACE THE PLACES IT ACCUMULATES CAN BE PRODUCTIVE

ŽIŽEK, SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL STUDIES (LJUBLJANA), 1994 [SLAVOJ,
“INTRODUCTION,” MAPPING IDEOLOGY, ED. ŽIŽEK, P. 12-14]
2. What follows is the step from 'in-itself to 'for-itself, to ideology in its otherness-externalization: the moment epitomized by the
Althusserian notion of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) that designate the material existence of ideology in ideological practices,
rituals and institutions." Religious belief, for example, is not merely or even primarily an inner conviction, but the Church as an
institution and its rituals (prayer, baptism, confirmation, confession . . . ) which, far from being a mere secondary externalization of the
inner belief, stand for the very mechanisms that generate it. When Althusser repeats, after Pascal: `Act as if you believe, pray, kneel
down, and you shall believe, faith will arrive by itself , he delineates an intricate reflective mechanism of retroactive 'autopoetic'
foundation that far exceeds the reductionist assertion of the dependence of inner belief on external behaviour. That is to say, the
implicit logic of his argument is: kneel down and you shall believe that you knelt down because of your belief — that is, your
following the ritual is an expression/effect of your inner belief; in short, the 'external' ritual performatively generates its own
ideological foundation.'

What we encounter here again is the 'regression' into ideology at the very point where we apparently step out of it. In this respect, the
relationship between Althusser and Foucault is of special interest. The Foucauldian counterparts to Ideological State Apparatuses are
the disciplinary procedures that operate at the level of 'micro-power' and designate the point at which power inscribes itself into the
body directly, bypassing ideology — for that precise reason, Foucault never uses the term 'ideology' apropos of these mechanisms of
micro-power. This abandoning of the problematic of ideology entails a fatal weakness of Foucault's theory. Foucault never tires of
repeating how power constitutes itself 'from below', how it does not emanate from some unique summit: this very semblance of a
Summit (the Monarch or some other embodiment of Sovereignty) emerges as the secondary effect of the plurality of micro-practices,
of the complex network of their interrelations. However, when he is compelled to display the concrete mechanism of this emergence,
Foucault resorts to the extremely suspect rhetoric of complexity, evoking the intricate network of lateral links, left and right, up and
down . . . a clear case of patching up, since one can never arrive at Power this way — the abyss that separates micro-procedures
from the spectre of Power remains unbridgeable. Althusser's advantage over Foucault seems evident: Althusser proceeds in exactly
the opposite direction — from the very outset, he conceives these micro-procedures as parts of the ISA; that is to say, as mechanisms
which, in order to be operative, to 'seize' the individual, always-already presuppose the massive presence of the state, the transferential
relationship of the individual towards state power, or —in Althusser's terms — towards the ideological big Other in whom the
interpellation originates.

This Althusserian shift of emphasis from ideology 'in-itself to its material existence in the ISA proved its fecundity in a new approach
to Fascism; Wolfgang Fritz Haug's criticism of Adorno is exemplary here. Adorno refuses to treat Fascism as an ideology in the
proper sense of the term, that is, as 'rational legitimization of the existing order'. So-called 'Fascist ideology' no longer possesses the
coherence of a rational construct that calls for conceptual analysis and ideologicocritical refutation; that is to say, it no longer
functions as a lie necessarily experienced as truth' (the sign of recognition of a true ideology). 'Fascist ideology' is not taken seriously
even by its promoters; its status is purely instrumental, and ultimately relies on external coercion.' In his response to Adorno, however,
Haug 17 triumphantly demonstrates how this capitulation to the primacy of the doctrine, far from implying the 'end of ideology',
asserts the founding gesture of the ideological as such: the call to unconditional subordination and to `irrational' sacrifice. What liberal
criticism (mis)perceives as Fascism's weakness is the very resort of its strength: within the Fascist horizon, the very demand for
rational argumentation that should provide grounds for our acceptance of authority is denounced in advance as an index of the liberal
degeneration of the true spirit of ethical sacrifice – as Haug puts it, in browsing through Mussolini's texts, one cannot avoid the
uncanny feeling that Mussolini had read Althusser! The direct denunciation of the Fascist notion of the 'community-of-the-people
[Volksgemeinschaft]' as a deceptive lure that conceals the reality of domination and exploitation fails to take note of the crucial fact
that this V olksgemeinschaft was materialized in a series of rituals and practices (not only mass gatherings and parades but also large-
scale campaigns to help the hungry, organized sports and cultural activities for the workers, etc.) which performatively produced the
effect of Volksgemeinschaft.'8

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LINK: RESPECT FOR THE OTHER
THEIR EHTICS [OR WHATEVER] OF RESPECT FOR THE OTHER IS NOT ONLY THE VERY LOGIC OF CAPITALISM
ITSELF, IT IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EXTREME, REFLEXIVE RACISM OF TODAY’S WORLD

ŽIŽEK, LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYST PAR EXCELLANCE, 1997 [SLAVOJ, “MULTICULTURALISM, OR, THE
CULTURAL LOGIC OF MULTINATIONAL CAPITALISM,” NEW LEFT REVIEW #224, P. 37-38]
Ideological Underground

What one should do is thus reassert the old Marxist critique of ‘reification’: today, emphasizing the depoliticized ‘objective’ economic
logic against the allegedly ‘outdated’ forms of ideological passions is the predominant ideological form, since ideology is always self-
referential, that is, it always defines itself through a distance towards an Other dismissed and denounced as ‘ideological. [11] Jacques
Ranciére gave a poignant expression to the ’bad surprise’ which awaits today’s postmodern ideologues of the ‘end of politics’: it is as
if we are witnessing the ultimate confirmation of Freud’s thesis, from Civilization and its Discontents, on how, after every assertion of
Eros, Thanatos reasserts itself with a vengeance. At the very moment when, according to the official ideology, we are finally leaving
behind the ‘immature’ political passions (the regime of the ‘political’—class struggle and other ‘out-dated’ divisive antagonisms) for
the ‘mature’ post-ideological pragmatic universe of rational administration and negotiated consensus, for the universe, free of utopian
impulses, in which the dispassionate administration of social affairs goes hand in hand with aestheticized hedonism (the pluralism of
‘ways of life’)—at this very moment, the foreclosed political is celebrating a triumphant comeback in its most archaic form: of pure,
undistilled racist hatred of the Other which renders the rational toler-ant attitude utterly impotent. [12] In this precise sense,
contemporary ‘postmodern’ racism is the symptom of multiculturalist late capitalism, bringing to light the inherent contradiction of
the liberal-democratic ideological project. Liberal ‘tolerance’ condones the folklorist Other deprived of its substance—like the
multitude of ‘ethnic cuisines’ in a contemporary megalopolis; however, any ‘real’ Other is instantly denounced for its
‘fundamentalism’, since the kernel of Otherness resides in the regulation of its jouissance: the ‘real Other’ is by definition
‘patriarchal’, ‘violent’, never the Other of ethereal wisdom and charming customs. One is tempted to reactualize here the old
Marcusean notion of ‘repressive tolerance’, reconceiving it as the tolerance of the Other in its aseptic, benign form, which forecloses
the dimension of the Real of the Other’s jouissance. [13]
The same reference to jouissance enables us to cast a new light on the horrors of the Bosnian war, as they are reflected in Emir
Kusturica’s film, Underground (1995). The political meaning of this film does not reside primarily in its overt tendentiousness, in the
way it takes sides in the post-Yugoslav conflict—heroic Serbs versus the treacherous, pro-Nazi Slovenes and Croats—but, rather, in
its very ‘depoliticized’ aestheticist attitude. That is to say, when, in his conversations with the journalists of Cahiers du cinéma,
Kusturica insisted that Underground is not a political film at all but a kind of liminal trance-like subjective experience, a ‘deferred
suicide’, he thereby unknowingly put on the table his true political cards and indicated that Underground stages the ‘apolitical’
phantasmatic background of the post-Yugoslav ethnic cleansing and war cruelties. How? The predominant cliché about the Balkans is
that the Balkan people are caught in the phantasmatic whirlpool of historical myth—Kusturica himself endorses this view: ‘In this
region, war is a natural phenomenon. It is like a natural catastrophe, like an earthquake which explodes from time to time. In my film,
I tried to clarify the state of things in this chaotic part of the world. It seems that nobody is able to locate the roots of this terrible
conflict.’ [14] What we find here, of course, is an exemplary case of ‘Balkanism’, functioning in a similar way to Edward Said’s
concept of ‘Orientalism’: the Balkans as the timeless space onto which the West projects its phantasmatic content. Together with
Milche Manchevski’s Before the Rain (which almost won the Oscar for the best foreign film in 1995), Underground is thus the
ultimate ideological product of Western liberal multiculturalism: what these two films offer to the Western liberal gaze is precisely
what this gaze wants to see in the Balkan war—the spectacle of a timeless, incomprehensible, mythical cycle of passions, in contrast
to decadent and anaemic Western life. [15]
The weak point of the universal multiculturalist gaze does not reside in its inability to ‘throw out the dirty water without losing the
baby’: it is deeply wrong to assert that, when one throws out nationalist dirty water—‘excessive’ fanaticism—one should be careful
not to lose the baby of ‘healthy’ national identity, so that one should trace the line of separation between the proper degree of ‘healthy’
nationalism which guarantees the necessary minimum of national identity, and ‘excessive’ nationalism. Such a common sense
distinction reproduces the very nationalist reasoning which aims to get rid of ‘impure’ excess. One is therefore tempted to propose a
homology with psychoanalytic treatment, whose aim is also not to get rid of the dirty water (symptoms, pathological tics) to keep the
baby (the kernel of the healthy Ego) safe, but, rather, to throw out the baby (to suspend the patient’s Ego) to confront the patient with
his ‘dirty water’, with the symptoms and fantasies which structure his jouissance. In the matter of national identity, one should also
endeavour to throw out the baby (the spiritual purity of national identity) to render visible the phantasmatic support which structures
the jouissance in the national Thing. And the merit of Underground is that, unknowingly, it renders visible this dirty water.

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LINK: SAYING ANYTHING BUT CAPITALISM BAD
IF YOU’RE NOT CRITICIZING CAPITALISM, THEN YOU’RE HELPING IT—AND YOU’RE NOT CRITICIZING
CAPITALISM

ŽIŽEK, LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYST PAR EXCELLANCE, 1997 [SLAVOJ, “MULTICULTURALISM, OR, THE
CULTURAL LOGIC OF MULTINATIONAL CAPITALISM,” NEW LEFT REVIEW #224, P. 48-49]
What these leftist advocates of populism fail to perceive is that today’s populism, far from presenting a threat to global capitalism,
remains its inherent product. Paradoxically, today’s true conservatives are rather the leftist ‘critical theorists’ who reject liberal
multiculturalism as well as fundamentalist populism, those who clearly perceive the complicity between global capitalism and ethnic
fundamentalism. They point towards the third domain which belongs neither to global market-society nor to the new forms of ethnic
fundamentalism: the domain of the political, the public space of civil society, of active responsible citizenship—the fight for human
rights, ecology and so forth. However, the problem is that this very form of political space is more and more threatened by the
onslaught of globalization; consequently, one cannot simply return to it or revitalize it. To avoid a misunderstanding: our point is not
the old ‘economic essentialist’ one according to which, in the case of England today, the Labour victory really did not change
anything—and as such is even more dangerous than continuing Tory rule, since it gave rise to the misleading impression that there
was a change. There are a lot of things the Labour government can achieve; it can contribute a lot to the passage from traditional
English parochial jingoism to a more ‘enlightened’ liberal democracy with a much stronger element of social solidarity (from health
care to education), to the respect for human rights (in its diverse forms, from women’s rights to the rights of ethnic groups); one
should use the Labour victory as an incentive to revitalize the diverse forms of the struggle for égaliberté. (With the Socialist electoral
victory in France, the situation is even more ambiguous, since Jospin’s programme does contain some elements of a direct
confrontation with the logic of capital.) Even when the change is not substantial but a mere semblance of a new beginning, the very
fact that a situation is perceived by the majority of the population as a ‘new beginning’ opens up the space for important ideological
and political rearticulations—as we have already seen, the fundamental lesson of the dialectic of ideology is that appearances do
matter.

Nonetheless, the post-Nation-State logic of capital remains the Real which lurks in the background, while all three main leftist
reactions to the process of globalization—liberal multiculturalism; the attempt to embrace populism by way of discerning, beneath its
fundamentalist appearance, the resistance against ‘instrumental reason’; the attempt to keep open the space of the political—seem
inappropriate. Although the last approach is based on the correct insight about the complicity between multiculturalism and
fundamentalism, it avoids the crucial question: how are we to reinvent political space in today’s conditions of globalization? The
politicization of the series of particular struggles which leaves intact the global process of capital is clearly not sufficient. What this
means is that one should reject the opposition which, within the frame of late capitalist liberal democracy, imposes itself as the main
axis of ideological struggle: the tension between ‘open’ post-ideological universalist liberal tolerance and the particularist ‘new
fundamentalisms’. Against the liberal centre which presents itself as neutral and post-ideological, relying on the rule of the Law, one
should reassert the old leftist motif of the necessity to suspend the neutral space of Law.

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LINK: INDIVIDUAL STRUGGLES
YOUR INDIVIDUAL STRUGGLES ARE EXACTLY WHAT CAPITALISM WANTS—WE NEED COLLECTIVE STRUGGLES
THAT CAN CHALLENGE THE BACKDROP OF ALL DOMINATION,CAPITALISM

ZIZEK, 2002 (SLAVOJ, SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE KULTURWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INSTITUT IN ESSEN
[AMONG OTHER THINGS], “A PLEA FOR LENINIST INTOLERANCE,” CULTURAL INQUIRY, WINTER, PROQUEST)

Lenin's stance against economism as well as against pure politics is crucial today, apropos of the split attitude toward economy in (what
remains of) the radical circles. On the one hand, there are the pure politicians who abandon economy as the site of struggle and intervention; on
the other hand, there are the economists, fascinated by the functioning of today's global economy, who preclude any possibility of a political
intervention proper. Today more than ever we should return to Lenin: yes, the economy is the key domain, the battle will be decided there; one has to
break the spell of global capitalism. But the intervention should be properly political, not economic.

The battle to be fought is thus a twofold one: first, yes, anticapitalism. However, anticapitalism without problematizing capitalism's political
form (again, liberal parliamentary democracy) is not sufficient, no matter how radical it is. Perhaps the lure today is the belief that one can
undermine capitalism without effectively problematizing the liberal-democratic legacy, a legacy that-as some leftists claim-although
engendered by capitalism, acquired autonomy and can serve to criticize capitalism. This lure is strictly correlative to its apparent
opposite, to the pseudo-Deleuzian, love-hate, fascinating/fascinated poetic depiction of capital as a rhizomatic monster or vampire that
deterritorializes and swallows all, indomitable, dynamic, ever raising from the dead, each crisis making it stronger, a Dionysus-
Phoenix reborn. It is in this poetic (anti)capitalist reference to Marx that Marx is really dead, for he is appropriated when deprived of his political sting.

Capitalism is not just a historical epoch among others; in a way, the once fashionable and today forgotten Francis Fukuyama was rightglobal capitalism is "the end of
history."A certain excess that was, as it were, kept under check, perceived as a localizable perversion, as an excess, a deviation, is in
capitalism elevated to the very principle of social life, in the speculative movement of money begetting more money, of a system that
can survive only by constantly revolutionizing its own conditions, that is to say, in which the thing can survive only as its own excess,
constantly exceeding its own "normal" constraints. And, perhaps, it is only today, in global capitalism's postindustrial, digitalized form, that, to put it in
Hegelian terms, really existing capitalism is reaching the level of its notion. Perhaps, one should again follow Marx's old antievolutionist motto (incidentally, taken verbatim
from Hegel) that the anatomy of man provides the key for the anatomy of a monkey; that is, in order to deploy the inherent notional structure of a social formation, one must start with its most
developed form. Marx located the elementary capitalist antagonism in the opposition between use- and exchange-value. In capitalism, the potential of this opposition is fully realized; the
domain of exchange values acquires autonomy and is transformed into the specter of selfpropelling speculative capital that needs the productive capacities and needs of actual people only as its
dispensable temporal embodiment. Marx derived the very notion of economic crisis from this gap; a crisis occurs when reality catches up with the illusory, self-
generating mirage of money begetting more money. This speculative madness cannot go on indefinitely; it has to explode in ever
stronger crises. The ultimate root of the crisis is for him the gap between use- and exchange-value; the logic of exchange-value follows its own path, its own mad dance, irrespective of
the real needs of real people. It may appear that this analysis is particularly appropriate today, when the tension between the virtual and real universes is reaching almost palpably unbearable
proportions. On the one hand, we have crazy, solipsistic speculations about futures, mergers, and the like following their own inherent
logic; on the other hand, reality is catching up in the guise of ecological catastrophies, poverty, Third World diseases that imperil
social life, mad cow disease. This is why cybercapitalists can appear as the paradigmatic capitalists today; this is why Bill Gates can dream of cyberspace as providing the frame for
"frictionless capitalism." What we have here is an ideological short circuit between the two versions of the gap separating reality and virtuality-the gap between real production and the virtual
spectral domain of capital and the gap between experiential reality and virtual reality of cyberspace. It effectively seems that the cyberspace gap between my fascinating screen persona and the
miserable flesh that is me off the screen translates into the immediate experience of the gap between the Real of the speculative circulation of capital and the drab reality of impoverished
masses. However, is this-this recourse to "reality," which will sooner or later catch up with the virtual game-really the only way to mount a critique of capitalism? What if the problem of
capitalism is not this solipsistic mad dance but precisely the opposite, that it continues to disavow its gap with "reality," that it presents itself as serving the real needs of real people? The
originality of Marx is that he played both cards simultaneously: the origin of capitalist crises is the gap between use- and exchange-value, and capitalism constrains the free deployment of
productivity.

What all this means is that the urgent task of economic analysis today is, again, to repeat Marx's critique of political economy without
succumbing to the tempting multitude of ideologies of postindustrial societies. It is my hypothesis that the key change concerns the status of private property;
the ultimate element of power and control is no longer the last link in the chain of investments, the firm or individual who really owns the means of production. The ideal capitalist today
functions in a wholly different way: investing borrowed money, really owning nothing, even indebted, but nonetheless controlling things. A corporation is owned by another corporation, who
is again borrowing money from banks, who may ultimately manipulate money owned by ordinary people like ourselves. With Bill Gates, the notion of the private ownership of the means of
production becomes meaningless, at least in the standard meaning of the term. The paradox of this virtualization of capitalism is ultimately the same as that of the electron in elementary
particle physics. The mass of each element in our reality is composed of its mass at rest plus the surplus provided by its acceleration; however, an electron!s mass at rest is zero. Its mass
consists only of the surplus generated by the acceleration of its movement, as if we were dealing with a nothing that acquires some deceptive substance only by magically spinning itself into its
own excess. Does today's virtual capitalist not function in a homologous way? His "net value" is zero, for he operates just with the surplus, borrowing from the future.

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LINK: ATTEMPTING TO CHANGE SOCIETY
WHEN TRYING TO CHANGE THE WAY SOCIETY WORKS, THE AFF SUBJECTS THEMSELVES TO YET MORE
IDEOLOGY. THE SYMBOLIC CHANGE BECOMES “THE SOCIAL” AND ALL AGAIN ARE SUBJECTED TO THE
TYRANNY OF THE STATE.

HENNESSY, ROSEMARY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT SUNY-ALBANY, QUEER THEORY, LEFT
POLITICS, FALL 1994, RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 7 NUMBER 3, 97-8

Butler's performative queerity and Laclau and Mouffe's radical democracy share much in common, as chapter 7 of Bodies That
Matter, "Arguing with the Real," makes clears For Laclau and Mouffe (as for Slavoj Zizek [1989] whose concept of "the Real" Butler
critiques in this essay) the material is a performative discourse. Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985)
develops their version of materialist performativity against the traditions of economic determinism and party vanguardism within
marxism. Based on their reading of divisions within Marxism, Laclau and Mouffe lay claim to a concept of hegemony more linked to
mass (democratic) rather than class (Marxist) politics and whose genealogy they trace through Rosa Luxembourg and Antonio
Gramsci. But while their aim is to correct a construction of the class subject in marxism that historically closed out any consideration
of the contingent interests of the masses—women's, anticolonial and antiracist, sexuality, youth, or ecology movements—their
arguments against a reductive economic determinism end up excluding entirely any consideration of the place of labor in social life .8
This exclusion is played out in a social theory that, like Butler's normative materialism, is premised on the notion that social
organization is primarily symbolic. We see this in their understanding of class as an articulation of symbolic (subject) positions, rather
than as an effect of the organization of labor that inflects and is in turn affected by ideology and state. Above all, we see the erasure of
labor in their overriding attention to the cultural or symbolic dimensions of materiality.
This distinctive post-marxian equation of sociality with the symbolic is most evident in the way Laclau and Mouffe unhinge the
concept of hegemony from social production, one of the basic premises of historical materialism. Laclau and Mouffe claim that
repudiation of production is necessary in order to renounce the conception of society as a founding totality. They consider the
openness of the social to be its constitutive ground, an openness in which "We are dealing with contingent relations whose nature we
have yet to determine" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 96).
However, this argument against founding concepts does not acknowledge (1) that historical materialism's founding concept of social
production is not totalizing in the Hegelian sense implied by Laclau and Mouffe, but rather recognizes the (historical) openness of the
social and (2) that Laclau and Mouffe's own contingent social logic is also arldhored in a founding concept, namely, signification.
Laclau and Mouffe understand the historical materialist notion of production to be totalizing because they equate social production
with economic production which then becomes the Hegelian whole to which all aspects of social production are subsumed. This
misreading ignores all of the efforts of contemporary marxists to rewrite the base-superstructure theoretical tradition in marxism,
especially Louis Althusser's contribution to theories of ideology as productive material practice, When they do turn to Althusser, it is
to sever the logic of overdetermination that Althusser puts forth from the ensemble of social relations of production in which it is
embedded. For Laclau and Mouffe, "the concept of overdetermination is constituted in the field of the symbolic, and has no meaning
whatsoever outside it" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 97). As a result, they see the most profound potential meaning of Althusser's
statement that "everything existing in the social is over-determined" as "the assertion that the social constitutes itself as a symbolic
order" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 97-98). Clearly here in Laclau and Mouffe the symbolic is a founding conception! Detached from
other forms of social production, the symbolic is the social, and overdetermination becomes pertinent only to the discursive formation
of identities.
Althusser's conception of the social as overdetermined, however, does not understand the variations in a social formation as expressive
products of a structured unity, nor as accidental, but as concrete, historically specific articulations. Over-determination explains how
the contradictions traversing actually existing social totalities permeate specific social practices—and, I would add, in the process
foment opposition and resistance. For Althusser, the contradictory social relations that are necessary for the reproduction of social
totalities like capitalism and patriarchy register in condensed or displaced (i.e., overdetermined) practices within a social formation.
While his structuralist theory has been critiqued as overly determinist, allowing little space for resistance and change, many marxists
after Althusser have maintained that social struggle occurs precisely because contradictions persist—between capital and labor, state
and civil society, colonized and colonizer, to name a few—inflected by the complex contingencies in any historical conjuncture.10
What is most significant about Althusser's notion of overdetemiinadon for materialist analysis and left politics is that it does not forfeit
the connections between ideology and labor. For Laclau and Mouffe, however, overdetermination refers only to the surplus of
meaning that threatens to interrupt any necessary fixing of the nodal points or discursive axes for identity—for example, woman, man,
black, gay.”

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LINK: RACISM
RACE OPPRESSION STEMS FROM THE EXPLOITIVE LOGIC OF CAPITALISM AND REINFORCES ITSELF INTO THE STRUCTURE AND
IDEOLOGY OF SOCIETY. BY LETTING GO OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENT FOR A MORE SOCIALIST ONE, WE ALLOW
OURSELVES TO BE FREE FROM ALL OPPRESSION.

YOUNG, CHAIR @ NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 2006 (ROBERT, “PUTTING MATERIALISM BACK INTO RACE THEORY: TOWARD A
TRANSFORMATIVE THEORY OF RACE”, REDCRITIQUE.ORG)
<This essay advances a materialist theory of race. In my view, race oppression dialectically intersects with the exploitative logic of
advanced capitalism, a regime which deploys race in the interest of surplus accumulation. Thus, race operates at the (economic) base
and therefore produces cultural and ideological effects at the superstructure; in turn, these effects—in very historically specific way—
interact with and ideologically justify the operations at the economic base [1]. In a sense then, race encodes the totality of
contemporary capitalist social relations, which is why race cuts across a range of seemingly disparate social sites in contemporary US
society. For instance, one can mark race difference and its discriminatory effects in such diverse sites as health care, housing/real
estate, education, law, job market, and many other social sites. However, unlike many commentators who engage race matters, I do
not isolate these social sites and view race as a local problem, which would lead to reformist measures along the lines of either legal
reform or a cultural-ideological battle to win the hearts and minds of people and thus keep the existing socio-economic arrangements
intact; instead, I foreground the relationality of these sites within the exchange mechanism of multinational capitalism.
Consequently, I believe, the eradication of race oppression also requires a totalizing political project: the transformation of existing
capitalism—a system which produces difference (the racial/gender division of labor) and accompanying ideological narratives that
justify the resulting social inequality. Hence, my project articulates a transformative theory of race—a theory that reclaims
revolutionary class politics in the interests of contributing toward a post-racist society. In other words, the transformation from
actually existing capitalism into socialism constitutes the condition of possibility for a post-racist society—a society free from racial
and all other forms of oppression. By freedom, I do not simply mean a legal or cultural articulation of individual rights as proposed by
bourgeois race theorists. Instead, I theorize freedom as a material effect of emancipated economic forms. >

THE RACIAL DISCOURSE OF THE 1AC EXISTS COMPLETELY INSIDE THE LIMITS OF CAPITALISM. THIS CONCEDES THAT THERE IS NO
ALTERNATIVE RULE OTHER THAN CAPITALISM AND CULMINATES IN IDEOLOGICAL IMMUNITY FOR CAPITALISM.
YOUNG, CHAIR @ NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 2006 (ROBERT, “PUTTING MATERIALISM BACK INTO RACE THEORY: TOWARD A
TRANSFORMATIVE THEORY OF RACE”, REDCRITIQUE.ORG)
<Here, then, is one of the primary effects of the postmodern knowledge practices: class is deconstructed as a metaphysical dinosaur. In
this regard, postmodernists collude with the humanists in legitimating the sanctity of the local. Both participate in narrowing cultural
intelligibility to questions of (racial) discourse or the (black) subject and, in doing so, they provide ideological immunity for
capitalism. It is now very difficult to even raise the issue of class, particularly if you raise the issue outside of the logic of
supplementarity—today's ruling intellectual logic which provides a theoretical analog to contemporary neo-liberal political structures.
In one of the few recent texts to explore the centrality of class, bell hooks' Where We Stand, we are, once again, still left with a
reaffirmation of capitalism. For instance, hooks argues for changes within capitalism: "I identify with democratic socialism, with a
vision of participatory economics within capitalism that aims to challenge and change class hierarchy" (156). Capitalism produces
class hierarchy and, therefore, as long as capitalism remains, class hierarchy and antagonism will remain. Hence, the solution requires
a transformation of class society. However, hooks mystifies capitalism as a transhistorical system and thus she can assert that the
"poor may be with us always" (129). Under this view, politics becomes a matter of "bearing witness" to the crimes of capitalism, but
rather than struggle for its replacement, hooks call for strategies of "self-actualization" and redistributing resources to the poor. She
calls for the very same thing—collectivity—that capitalism cannot provide because social resources are privatized under capitalism.
Consequently, Hooks' program for "self-esteem" is an attempt to put a human face on capitalism.

Whether one considers the recent work by African-American humanists, or discourse theorists, or even left-liberal intellectuals, these
various groups—despite their intellectual differences—form a ruling coalition and one thing is clear: capitalism set the limit for
political change, as there is no alternative to the rule of capital. In contrast to much of contemporary race theory, a transformative
theory of race highlights the political economy of race in the interests of an emancipatory political project. Wahneema Lubiano once
wrote that "the idea of race and the operation of racism are the best friends that the economic and political elite have in the United
States" (vii). Race mystifies the structure of exploitation and masks the severe inequalities within global capitalism. I am afraid that, at
this point, many contemporary race theorists, in their systematic erasure of materialism, have become close (ideological) allies with
the economic and political elites, who deny even the existence of classes. A transformative race theory pulls back into focus the
struggle against exploitation and sets a new social priority "in which the free development of each is the condition for the free
development of all" (Marx 31).>

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LINK: IMMIGRATION
TRYING TO INTEGRATE IMMIGRANTS INOT THE SYSTEM WILL ONLY CAUSE THE IMMIGRANTS TO BECOME THE
VICTIMS OF THE CAPITALIST STATE. WE MUST USE THEM IN ORDER TO RISE AGAINST THE STATE

MCINTYRE, RICHARD, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND, 1996.
POST MODERN MATERIALISM AND THE FUTURE OF MARXIST THOERY, EDS. CALLARI AND RUCCIO, 247-8

Many of the new immigrants found employment in the burgeoning service sectors of "global cities" like New York, London, Los
Angeles, and Tokyo. These cities, restructured as command and control centers for global capitalist networks, have also given rise to a
host of jobs serving corporate managers and their style-centered consumption pattems. These jobs are characterized by "casual"
employment relations. "The intemationalization of the economies of these countries, particularly centered in their premier cities, and
the casualization of the employment relation, contribute to producing new migrations and facilitating thFir absorption" (Sassen 1991,
319).
But not all of the immigrants, and even fewer of their children, are absorbed into the ancient and quasi-feudal social relations of the
burgeoning business and personal services sectors. For the second generation, as for the second and third generations of the African-
Americans who migrated from the South, unemployment is high, and a growing share of these populations subsist as wards of the
state or in criminal enterprises (which bear many of the marks of the feudal mode) or as urban foragers, surviving by rummaging
through trash cans, tending gardens, and grabbing sustenance from the neighborhood fruit stand.
These people form part of what Marx called the fame frais of capitalist production. This is true also of those who have been ejected
from capitalist production through deindustrialization. Long-term incorporation of a large percentage of the population into capitalist
production seems to produce demands for wage increases and/or job control, which are eventually rejected by capital. While some die
quickly as a result of their new class position, many eke out an existence in a variety of noncapitalist modes. The constant creation of
self-employed and other partially proletarianized groups reinforces ancient ideology, which in turn often provides conditions of
existence for capitalism.
The victims of deindustrialization and noncapitalist forms of exploitation are often the most vocal supporters of a "free market"
system. As Gregory Pappas argued in his anthropological study of unemployment in a rubber-making community in Ohio, "The
conditions created by unemployment lead to the development of an exaggerated utilitarianism. Many of the unemployed respond to
savage conditions by developing more competitive attitudes and values. The unemployed often adopt a dog-eat-dog view of the world
that is reinforced when workers are shaken out of the other traditions that give them a'place as an individual in the world" (1989, 185).
Economic decline in the capitalist sector has, in some cases, given rise to communal provisioning, calls for workplace democracy, and
attacks against the logic of deindustrialization. On the other hand, plant closings and other large-scale economic disruptions often
destroy the thin ties that bind the individual to the community, leading to hyperindividualist strategies of self-preservation, which are
themselves validated by ancient ideology.
A detailed treatment of the growth of "informal" and "casual" employment in the new immigrant communities and their ties to the
restructuring of capital is beyond the scope of this chapter. The point of this necessarily brief discussion is to point out, once again,
that some of the most conspicuous social changes in late-twentieth-century North America can be understood through the lens of the
combination and recombination of capitalist• and noncapitalist modes of production.
To answer the question posed in the title, capitalism surely exists in late-twentieth-century North America. We can say, with some
reservations, that it is numerically prevalent. The extension of class analysis to the household has uncovered a huge number of people
who, for much of the period since World War II, were mainly engaged in feudal rather than capitalist class processes. Arguably, the
ancient class process is growing in strength, further diminishing the numerical prevalence of capitalism.
The effective prevalence of capitalism has not been established. Many of the changes and problems discussed in this section have, in
fact, emerged from the dynamics of capitalist production and circulation. Our point is not to deny the effectivity of the capitalist class
process in the contemporary United States. But capitalism seems to depend, in a contradictory fashion, on cultural conditions
produced by the ancient mode. Although I have not established the effective prevalence of the ancient mode, that is certainly one
possibility. The growth of the "informal economy" in both the rich and poor regions of a shrinking globe indicate that the future might
be ancient.

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LINK: QUEER THEORY
DESPITE WHAT BUTLER SAYS, HETERONORMATIVITY IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO CAPITALISM. IT IS EMPIRICALLY PROVEN THAT
HOMOSEXUALITY IS ACCEPTED WITHIN THE CAPITALIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM

FRASER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE @ THE NEW SCHOOL
FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, MAR-APR 1998 (NANCY, NEW LEFT REVIEW I/228)
<Actually, two different variants of the argument are discernible here, one definitional, the other functionalist. According to the first variant, (hetero)sexual
regulation belongs by definition to the economic structure. The economic structure simply is the entire set of social mechanisms and
institutions that (re)produce persons and goods. By definition, then, the family is part of this structure, being the primary site for the
reproduction of persons. So, by extension, is the gender order, which standardizes the family’s ‘products’ to conform to one of two—and only two—
mutually exclusive, seemingly natural kinds of persons: men and women. The gender order, in turn, is held to presuppose a mode of sexual
regulation that produces and naturalizes heterosexuality, while simultaneously producing homosexuality as abject. The conclusion
drawn by Butler is that the heteronormative regulation of sexuality is part of the economic structure by definition, despite the fact that
it structures neither the social division of labour nor the mode of exploitation of labour-power in capitalist society.
Sexuality and Surplus Value
This definitional argument has an air of Olympian indifference to history. As a result, it risks accomplishing too much.Stipulating that the mode of sexual
regulation belongs to the economic structure by definition—even in the absence of any discernible impact on the division of labour or
the mode of exploitation—threatens to dehistoricize the idea of the economic structure and drain it of conceptual force. What gets lost
is the specificity of capitalist society as a distinctive and highly peculiar form of social organization. This organization creates an order
of specialized economic relations that are relatively decoupled from relations of kinship and political authority. Thus, in capitalist
society, the link between the mode of sexual regulation, on the one hand, and an order of specialized economic relations whose raison
d’être is the accumulation of surplus value, on the other, is attenuated. It is far more attenuated, certainly, than in pre-capitalist, pre-
state societies, where economic relations are largely adumbrated through the mechanisms of kinship and directly imbricated with
sexuality. In the late capitalist society of the twentieth century, moreover, the links between sexuality and surplus-value accumulation have been
still further attenuated by the rise of what Eli Zaretsky has called ‘personal life’: a space of intimate relations, including sexuality,
friendship, and love, that can no longer be identified with the family and that is lived as disconnected from the imperatives of
production and reproduction. [5] In general, then, contemporary capitalist society contains ‘gaps’; between the economic order and the kinship order; between
the family and personal life; and between the status order and the class hierarchy. In this sort of highly differentiated society, it does not make sense to
me to conceive the mode of sexual regulation as simply a part of the economic structure. Nor to conceive queer demands for the recognition of
difference as misplaced demands for redistribution.
In another sense, moreover, the definitional argument accomplishes very little. Butler wants to conclude that struggles over sexuality are economic,
but that conclusion has been rendered tautologous. If sexual struggles are economic by definition, then they are not economic in the
same sense as are struggles over the rate of exploitation. Simply calling both sorts of struggles ‘economic’ risks collapsing the
differences, creating the misleading impression that they will synergize automatically and blunting our capacity to pose, and answer,
hard but pressing political questions as to how they can be made to synergize when in fact they diverge or conflict. [6]
This brings me to the functionalist variant of Butler’s second argument. Here the claim is that the heteronormative regulation of sexuality is
economic—not by definition, but because it is functional to the expansion of surplus value. Capitalism, in other words, ‘needs’ or
benefits from compulsory heterosexuality. It follows, according to Butler, that gay and lesbian struggles against heterosexism threaten
the ‘workability’ of the capitalist system.
Like all functionalist arguments, this one stands or falls with the empirical relations of cause and effect. Empirically, however, it is highly implausible that
gay and lesbian struggles threaten capitalism in its actually existing historical form. That might be the case if homosexuals were
constructed as an inferior but useful class of menial labourers whose exploitation was central to the workings of the economy, as
African Americans, for example, have been. Then one could say that capital’s interests are served by keeping them ‘in their place’. In
fact, however, homosexuals are more often constructed as a group whose very existence is an abomination, much like the Nazi
construction of Jews; they should have no ‘place’ in society at all. No wonder, then, that the principal opponents of gay and lesbian
rights today are not multinational corporations, but religious and cultural conservatives, whose obsession is status, not profits. In fact,
some multinationals—notably American Airlines, Apple Computer and Disney—have elicited the wrath of such conservatives by
instituting gay-friendly policies, such as domestic partnership benefits. They apparently see advantages in accommodating gays,
provided they are not subject to boycotts or else are big enough to with-stand them if they are.
Empirically, therefore, contemporary capitalism seems not to require heterosexism. With its gaps between the economic order and the
kinship order, and between the family and personal life, capitalist society now permits significant numbers of individuals to live
through wage labour outside of heterosexual families. It could permit many more to do so— provided the relations of recognition were
changed. Thus we can now answer one of the questions posed earlier: the economic disabilities of homosexuals are better understood
as effects of heterosexism in the relations of recognition than as hardwired in the structure of capitalism. The good news is that we do
not need to overthrow capitalism in order to remedy those disabilities—although we may well need to overthrow it for other reasons.
The bad news is that we need to transform the existing status order and restructure the relations of recognition.>

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LINK: FEMINISM
CHALLENGING PATRIARCHY IS ONLY SUBJETING ONESELF MORE TO THE STATE. FEMINISM FURHERS THE
NORMS THAT CONTINUES AND FOSTERS CAPITALISM.
HENNESSY, ROSEMARY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT SUNY-ALBANY , QUEER THEORY, LEFT
POLITICS, FALL 1994, RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 7 NUMBER 3, 90-2
Because "patriarchy" has become such a contested term—in some sense eyes too—in feminist and left analysis these days, before proceeding
further I want to pause to explain how I am using this concept and why. As I understand it; patriarchy refers to the structuring of social life—labor, state, and
consciousness—, such that social resources and value accrue to men as a group at the expense of, women as a group. Patriarchy is a historically variant form
of social organization that has been necessary to most socioeconomic systems in the world and is fundamental to capitalism. Capitalist
patriarchal formations help to secure an exploitative system of social differences by way of ideologies of gender that naturalize and
reproduce the asymmetrical social divisions that help to sustain, manage, and maximize the appropriation of surplus labor through a
variety of complex arrangements. Patriarchy is historical and so not essentially given, fixed, permanent, or universal; in other words, it
is an organization of human life that is made by people and, therefore, essentially precarious or subject to change. Because patriarchy,
like capitalism, is historical, it is continually being re-formed as the requirements of human (re)production in their varied and uneven
formations shift and change.4 While patriarchal gender hierarchies are continually being naturalized by ideology as the way things are
or should be, this "natural" order of things has historically been undermined when feminist struggles have revealed the arbitrariness of
its divisions of labor and accompanying subjectivities. Particularly as a result of patriarchy's contradictory relation to bourgeois
individualism and representative democracy, feminist opposition has been most successful in industrialized democratic states.
As I am using it here, patriarchy is one of a series of struggle concepts in postmodern and materialist social theory—others are notions of
totality, materialism, and hegemony. While my discussion of patriarchy will touch on some of these other issues, this is not the place for me to detail very fully
the political implications of each. Most of the disputes over the usefulness of patriarchy as an organizing concept have arisen from
poststructuralist or postmodern feminism. A more detailed accounting of these debates would need to address their historical relationship to the crisis of the
subject in western culture and in second-wave feminism specifically and to the widespread "postideological feminism" that has come to dominate U.S. culture in the
course of the last decade. Typically postmodern feminist critiques of the concept of patriarchy charge that it is necessarily universalizing,
explanatory (causal), and over-general. But often these charges rest on misreadings of its use in the tradition of materialist feminism.
Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson, for example, understand patriarchy as an organizing concept that relies on the "very large social theories" large historical
narratives," or "large theoretical tools" they criticize for identifying the causes and constitutive features of sexism (Fraser and Nicholson 1990, 34). In their essay,
"Social Criticism without Philosophy," a piece that has been repeatedly cited as a succinct articulation of postmodern feminism, Fraser and Nicholson argue that "very
large social theories" are problematic because "they tacitly presuppose some commonly held but unwarranted and essentialist assumptions about human beings and the
conditions for social life" (Fraser and Nicholson 1990, 27). While I would agree that a historical feminist analyses that explain all sexism as manifestations of the
patriarchy are not very useful, postmodern feminist critiques like Fraser and Nicholson's tend to confuse the universalizing of totalizing theories with materialist analyses of patriarchy as a social totality. Totalizing theories
rely on the logic of expressive causality whereby the parts of a society are each seen to emanate from one universal cause. In explaining social life as an ensemble of social practices, historical materialism explicitly contests
this totalizing approach. At the same time, however, historical materialists insist that it is politically necessary to recognize that some social relations, while always being historically and differentially inflected, have the status
of "social totalities" in that they have persistently (though never absolutely or in any monocausal way) organized people's lives across social formations and specific situations. Among these are capital's extraction of surplus
labor, imperialism's tactics of eminent domain and white supremacy, and patriarchal gender hierarchies.
One of the primary aims of Fraser and Nicholson's criticism of patriarchy is to dismiss systemic analysis of social totalities in favor of
analysis limited to specific and local contexts. However, this rejection is premised on a misreading of systemic analysis. One of the
symptomatic indicators of this misreading is evident in the repeated references to "very large" theories in their essay. "Very large" is
hardly an adequate descriptor of a systemic analysis that extends its concepts from a high level of abstraction to a conjunctural,
historically specific one. By applying this phrase to several different feminist theories, Fraser and Nicholson collapse cultural feminism's more universalist
conception of patriarchy into materialist feminism's dialectical approach to social totalities. We see this explicitly in the way Fraser and Nicholson's very brief summary
and criticism of the work of materialist feminists (Ann Ferguson, Nancy Folbre, Nancy Hartsock, and Catherine Mackinnon) is sandwiched between and equated with
conclusions drawn from their much more detailed readings of Nancy Chodorow's and Carol Gilligan's conceptions of mothering, women, and men as unitary and
crosscultural categories. Claiming that these materialist feminists use concepts "whose historical origins need not be investigated" (Fraser and Nicholson 1990, 31),
Fraser and Nicholson argue that feminist theory needs to stop looking for the causes of sexism and turn instead to "more concrete inquiry with more limited aims"
(Fraser and Nicholson 1990, 32). What is effaced in this assessment, however, is that much materialist feminism is distinguished from the work of cultural feminists
like Chodorow and Gillis precisely by its effort to historicize and investigate social hierarchies even a insists on the persistent causal force of social totalities like
patriarchy and capitalism.
This misreading of materialist feminism also overlooks postmodern, materialst feminist work from the last decade—the early books and
essays of Michelle Barrat (1980) and Rosalind Coward (1983), as well as those by Maria Mies (1986) Chandra Mohanty (1988), Mary Poovey (1988), Dorothy Smith
(1987), Gaya Spivak (1987), Sylvia Walby (1990), and others—that has begun to develop mo complex and specific understandings of the ways patriarchal formations
situate women differently across multiple axes of social domination and exploitations This work begins with the premise that the reproduction of social life takes place
historically through inter- and overdetermined spheres of production—divisions labor, state power, and consciousness—and that patriarchal structures operate
differentially and unevenly across all of them. While acknowledging that patriarchy and capitalism continue to organize social life
across the globe, materialist feminism also insists that critical analysis addresses the historically specific ways in which such
organization occurs. Materialist feminist critique need not and history fealty has not always eschewed attention to the specific cultural
articulations o1 social totalities, even though such critique is continually misread in the most reductive fashion as refusing nuanced
cultural analysis or reducing social production to the economy. At the same time that the materialist feminist tradition I arn discussing
has vociferously critiqued the equation of social life with culture, it also acknowledges that densely accumulated, cultural practices are
part of a complex ensemble of social relations that includes divisions of labor, law, and the state.

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LINK: POST-STRUCTURALISM
POST-STRUCUTURALISM ABANDONS POLITICAL STRUGGLES AT THE TIME WHEN THEY ARE NEEDED MOST—
ITS DISCURSIVE FOCUS FAILS

SAN JUAN JR., PHILIPPINES CULTURAL STUDIES CENTER IN CONNECTICUT, 2006 (E. “CRISIS AND
CONTRADICTION IN GLOBALIZATION DISCOURSE, REDCRITIQUE.ORG)
[A clue to the stark limitation of Jameson's analysis of globalization—his is not idiosyncratic but typical of well-intentioned liberal academics in
societies where popular working class mobilization is absent or rightist reaction (as in the U.S. today) is ascendant—may be found in his obsessive
concern with the "immense enlargement of world communication". Deviating from purely technological determinism, Jameson criticizes the
transnationalizing market which swallows up national cinemas and vernacular musics in the culture-ideology of consumerism (Cultures of
Globalization xv). This is the well-known problematic of subsumption of the referent in the simulacra, in the interminable chain of sliding signifiers
and vertiginous tropes. Prioritizing consumption, the psychic, agency, the body, performance, aesthetics, etc., supposedly marks the "subjective turn"
from the doctrinaire Marxist economism of the Cold War era to a new protean, flexible, eclectic, neopragmatic radicalism espoused by Jacques
Derrida, Michel Foucault, Francois Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, Richard Rorty, and their numerous disciples. By absolutizing the categories of thought
in its immediate relation with experience, intuitions, etc., this post-structuralist trend has forsaken or forfeited their relative truths in the inner
contradictory movement of the "concept", that is, capitalism as a historical system (Lefebvre).
Postcolonial theory of the Establishment kind—aside from Bhabha, Arjun Appadurai's theory of flows and multiple-scapes may be cited here—has
succumbed to nominalist metaphysics in its various manifestations as textualism, deconstructive nihilism, Foucauldean genealogy, diasporic
citizenship, and so on. Australian postcolonialist scholars such as Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin describe globalization as "a process
of the world becoming a single place" (110). This occurs through time-space distanciation, disembedding, the conflation of local and global
(Giddens), or through time-space compression (Harvey). Individual lives and local communities, territorial nations, are affected by the impact of
colonialism, imperialism, and globally disseminated knowledge and culture, so that the nation-state system (and corollary concepts of
internationalism, etc.) are dissolved by the global economy, its invasive communication system, and the world military order. They discriminate
between the affirmers and rejectionists, and seem to favor what they call "critical globalism", which ironically takes a neutral view by not blocking
out globalizing processes nor supporting them. How it is critical, we don't know. They argue that globalization "demonstrates the transmutation of
imperialism into the supra-national operations of economics, communications and culture". However, globalization is not just the domination of
finance capital at the center (via IMF/WTO/WB) on the periphery, but is essentially "transcultural", with the prefix "trans" somehow producing an
equalizing or reciprocalizing effect (see San Juan, Working Through the Contradictions).
Like orthodox postcolonialism, our Australian experts view globalization as a reciprocal process of exchange between colonizer and colonized.
Although they acknowledge the destructive effects of imperialism, they insist that "globalism is not simply a result of top-down dominance but a
transcultural process, a dialectic of dominant cultural forms and their appropriation" (113). And even though they believe that the agency of nation-
states have been practically eroded or nullified, they contend that local communities and marginal interest groups can appropriate "strategies of
representation, organization and social change through access to global systems" to empower themselves and influence those systems (114). Like the
TNCs, the nation-state seems anathema to them. Ashcroft et al have already ruled out social class or class agency beforehand, so where will the
subaltern turn to? Their belief in creative adaptation, abrogation plus assimilation, summons back the nostrums of the localists and anarchists we
have met before. Are we going back to archaic forms of groupings prior to the nation-state as safe havens from neocolonialism? Ashcroft and
colleagues cite Stuart Hall's view of homogenization by global mass culture operating through the values, tastes and decisions of local, nationality-
defined elites (for the opposite thesis on the polarization of temporal/spatial distances, see Bauman). Overall, they point to the paramount issue
underlying globalization studies and current debates in postcolonial discourse: the nature and survival of cultural identity.
This identity of the subaltern, however, is a question-begging evasion of the crisis of the system manifest in symptomatic breakdowns, collective
protests, individual criminal acts, etc. For one thing, it accepts as fait accompli the corporate control and marketized management of identity/subject
formation. The subaltern can speak, but only using the fluctuating currency of the shopping malls and ideological media apparatuses. Leaping beyond
the contradictory movement of capital, postcolonialists follow Bhabha's reified notions of ambivalence and interstitial compromises to reduce the
dialectic of use-value and exchange value at the heart of alienated labor (embodied in commodities, money, symbolic capital in the circuit of
exchange) to the question of individual identity. This only reproduces the contradictions of liberal ideals and brutalizing reality. Beginning with
multiple levels of categorizing global society, Jameson ended up also with this problem of identity. This is but a logical result of the "incredulity
toward meta-narratives"—except toward their own version, a hypostatized methodology of doubt and nihilistic cynicism. This may be viewed as a
mode of pre-emptive reconciliation of opposites (not the transitional unity of opposites that functions as a moment of the dialectic), resolving the
conflict between, say, dependent countries in Latin America and the U.S., or between "vulture capital" and exploited workers in the global export-
processing zones in favor of the status quo. It seems that dialectical inquiry as "the search for internal relations" and its movement (Ollman) has given
way to opportunist pragmatism. So much for postnational "sly civility", diasporic hybridity, and cosmopolitanesque negotiations. ]

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LINK: POST-STRUCTURALISM
POSTRUCTURALISM CREATES A LUDIC MYSTIFICATION OF HISTORY AS SOMETHING ABSTRACT AND IDEALIST.
THE “UNREALIZABILITY” OF POSTRUCRUTURLISM ULTIMATELY ALLOWS IT TO BE DOMINATED BY THE STATE
EBERT, TERESA, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT SUNY-ALBANY, THE KNOWABLE GOOD: POST-AL
POLITICS, ETHICS, AND RED FEMINISM, SUMMER 1995 RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 8 NUMBER 2, 55-8
The "poststructuralist position," according to Butler, posits "a future which is in principle unrealizable. The promise of history is one that is
destined to be broken" (1993b, 4). In making such claims, ludic theories are mystifying history as an abstract "eternal category," an eternal
present whose "future ... is in principle" (essentially "unrealizable," and whose promises—of equality, emancipation, well-being—"a destined to be broken."
Such a notion of history becomes little more than an alibhfo the status quo. It attributes the historically specific failures of patriarchal-
capital to an abstract, "essential" failure of history-in-itself, and in so doing, offers a subtle apologetics for free-market anarchism. It suppresses the "real,"
objective contradi tions and class conflicts in capitalism. This essentialization of capitalism is particular evident when Butler declares that "[i]n the
unrealizability of history resides j promise," for any effort, according to Butler, to "realize" history "would foreclo contestation, difference, alterity" (1993b, 6), Such a
logic reifies an "eternal" catego of contestation and difference that is always already necessary.
What does this mean when we leave ludic mystification—what is this etern category of "contestation, difference, alterity" that cannot be foreclosed or ended?, is, of
course, the struggles over the exploitation of other people's labor; it is clan contestation. This ludic legitimization of the "unrealizability
of the end of history, of the end of contestation, and the impossibility of emancipation, is nothing short o the legitimization of the
unrealizability of the end of capitalism—an alibi for contin uation of the existing relations of class exploitation and class privilege.
Special significant here is Cornell's position in which the "very difference, gap, incommen surability between the realizable and ideal," according to Butler, generates an
"infinit striving" (1993b, 7). Cornell substitutes the ethical—as an "unrealizable," "infini striving"—for a socially transformative politics. In so doing, this (former)
socialis feminist not only abandons the socialist revolution to overthrow existing class privi leges and relations of production but also argues against the revolution ever
arriving for that would end the "infinite striving that failure somehow motivates" (Butle 1993b, 7). This is the bourgeois hope that the revolutionary letter never arrives
atl destination—that is, the place of its own class privilege.
Ludic theory leaves us, then, with a version of history as abstract and idealise Proudhon's Hegelianism. Marx's critique of Proudhon is
just as appropriate today:fa ludic theorists: "incapable of following the real movement of history, [they] produce a phantasmagoria . . .
it is not history but trite Hegelian trash, it is not profan history—a history of man—but sacred history—a history of ideas" (Marx and
Engel 1976, 31). Comell's notion of "messianic" history and Laclau's notion of "eschato logical" history both refer, according to Butler, to "Marxist teleologies." But it
is if ludic theorists rather than historical materialists who construct a utopian, messianic "sacred" history of an "eternal" unending present of infinite striving over
difference This is an abstract, static notion of social development as multiple and diverse details but as unchanging and unchangeable in
its fundamental structure. Ludi theorists valorize the permanence of class conflict—and thus their own class prix, lege—in their claims for the necessity of
unending antagonism: the necessity, in shod; for the permanence, and inevitability of capitalism. It is not the future—specificall a nonexploitative, socialist future—that
is unrealizable; rather it is the end of capital that is, for these theorists, impossible and unthinkable and, for many, even desirable. Butler is argely approbatory of this
valorization of "unrealizability," particularly alau's argument, as she says "that certain freedoms and possibilities are opened up ty,he failure of a conventional sense of
emancipation" whose "foundations are used as contradictory and untenable (1993b, 8). For Butler, such a "postfoundantionalist sense of emancipation "will be
citational: its use will be "provisional and gable ... Indeed the writer of 'emancipation' will not know in advance for what Oses or in what direction the term will come to
signify" (1993b, 8). In her claims she will deploy emancipation" Butler seeks to "mark off the 'playful' [ludic] use of the ft. gory from the serious and foundationalist
one" (1993b, 8). She substitutes, in other ',,,Frds, a "playful" citationality of emancipation as a sliding, unlocatable, reversible e for the "serious foundationalist"
meaning of emancipation as a struggle concept ssary to the praxis of ending the exploitation of people's labor. This amounts to acid emptying of emancipation of any
concrete meaning as specific revolutionary tibility; instead it becomes an abstract, floating "impossibility." But emancipation as the historically specific project offering
people from the exploitation of the lions of production in capitalism—is neither "unrealizable" nor "impossible." It important to recall Marx's observation here:
"Mankind thus inevitably sets itself . Why such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that eproblem itself arises only when the material
conditions for its solution are already tr. sent" (1970, 21). It is the task of historical materialism to provide this "closer mimitation" that not only
shows us the problem but also how "the material conditions 'its solution are already present."
Butler, however, offers a Nietzschean-Foucauldian solution to the "valorization of realizability" which, she argues, is subject to the Nietzschean critique that "ideals,
',led as the unattainable and inapproximable, are a deformation of the will to power which turns back upon itself, defeats itself, and valorizes and romanticizes that f-
defeat as its own constitutive necessity" (I 993b, 8). Butler does not contest the nrealizability" of emancipation, with which she is largely in agreement, but rather
"romanticization" as a condition of possibility. She thus poses instead "the more Nietzchian query: how is it that the unrealizability of the Good and/or Emancipation
produced a paralyzed or limited sense of political efficacy, and how, more nerally, might the fabrication of more local ideals enhance the sense of politically cticable
possibilities?" (1993b, 10-11). Butler's solution to the "paralyzed .. . litical efficacy" of post-al politics, in short, is more of the same. In advocating "the rication of local
ideals," she is merely rehearsing and elaborating on Lyotard's little tttratives and Foucault's "eventalization." She offers her assertion of a "Foucauldian aproach" as "the
site for a certain unbridling of utopian faith post-Marx" (1993b, 11). She claims this is "a deviation from Hegel, a repetition forward" (1993b, 11). But tis is just another
re-turn to the same old bourgeois idealism, the same "old Hegelian ink," that historical materialists have been struggling against for more than a century. a Lenin has
argued,
Thousands of shades of varieties of philosophical idealism are possible and it is always possible to create a thousand-and-first shade;
and to the author of this thousand-and- first little system ... what distinguishes it from the rest may appear to be momentous.• From the
standpoint of materialism, however, these distinctions are absolutely unessential (1970, 275).
Butler's "thousand-and-first shade" of difference from the idealism of Laclau Cornell is indeed "unessential." What matters are the consequences of their post--a
politics, and these are the same: to render the emancipation of women and oth oppressed peoples from the exploitation of capitalism impossible.

In contrast, Red
Feminism is the theory and praxis of emancipation. It insists the historical reality of the "knowable good": the necessity
of ending exploitation an meeting the basic human needs of all people. Red Feminism is the struggle of international socialism in
order to transform the condition of women globally in late capitalism

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LINK: ECONOMIC COLLAPSE
THEIR “ECONOMIC COLLAPSE” IMPACT IS A MASK THAT NATURALIZES CAPITALISM, BY JUSTIFYING
CAPITALIST POLICIES EVEN UNDER THE GUISE OF LIBERALISM

ŽIŽEK, LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYST PAR EXCELLANCE, 1997 [SLAVOJ, “MULTICULTURALISM, OR, THE
CULTURAL LOGIC OF MULTINATIONAL CAPITALISM,” NEW LEFT REVIEW #224, P. 34-35]
The Logic of Capital

So, back to the recent Labour victory, one can see how it not only involved a hegemonic reappropriation of a series of motifs which
were usually inscribed into the Conservative field—family values, law and order, individual responsibility; the Labour ideological
offensive also separated these motifs from the obscene phantasmatic subtext which sustained them in the Conservative field—in
which ‘toughness on crime’ and ‘individual responsibility’ subtly referred to brutal egotism, to the disdain for victims, and other
‘basic instincts’. The problem, however, is that the New Labour strategy involved its own ‘message between the lines’: we fully
accept the logic of Capital, we will not mess about with it.

Today, financial crisis is a permanent state of things the reference to which legitimizes the demands to cut social spending, health care,
support of culture and scientific research, in short, the dismantling of the welfare state. Is, however, this permanent crisis really an
objective feature of our socio-economic life? Is it not rather one of the effects of the shift of balance in the ‘class struggle’ towards
Capital, resulting from the growing role of new technologies as well as from the direct internationalization of Capital and the co-
dependent diminished role of the Nation-State which was further able to impose certain minimal requirements and limitations to
exploitation? In other words, the crisis is an ‘objective fact’ if and only if one accepts in advance as an unquestionable premise the
inherent logic of Capital—as more and more left-wing or liberal parties have done. We are thus witnessing the uncanny spectacle of
social-democratic parties which came to power with the between-the-lines message to Capital ‘we will do the necessary job for you in
an even more efficient and painless way than the conservatives’. The problem, of course, is that, in today’s global socio-political
circumstances, it is practically impossible effectively to call into question the logic of Capital: even a modest social-democratic
attempt to redistribute wealth beyond the limit acceptable to the Capital ‘effectively’ leads to economic crisis, inflation, a fall in
revenues and so on. Nevertheless, one should always bear in mind how the connection between ‘cause’ (rising social expenditure) and
‘effect’ (economic crisis) is not a direct objective causal one: it is always-already embedded in a situation of social antagonism and
struggle. The fact that, if one does not obey the limits set by Capital, a crisis ‘really follows’, in no way ‘proves’ that the necessity of
these limits is an objective necessity of economic life. It should rather be conceived as a proof of the privileged position Capital holds
in the economic and political struggle, as in the situation where a stronger partner threatens that if you do X, you will be punished by
Y, and then, upon your doing X, Y effectively ensues.

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****LINK: BUREAUCRACY****
BUREACRACY WILL COOPT THE PLAN—THERE ARE TOO MANY ENTRENCHED INTERESTS FROM ALL LEVELS
TO ALLOW FOR ANY TRUE CHANGE TO OCCUR

COHEN, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, 1985 [STANLEY, VISIONS OF
SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND CLASSIFICATION, P. 92-95]

Like the progress model, this one has its exact counterpart in the historical literature on deviancy control. It is the closest con
temporary echo of accounts such as Rothman's of the emergence of the asylum and its early twentieth-century alternatives. The plot is
just a further twist to the old story of good intentions going very wrong. The well-intentioned plans of reformers (conscience) are
systematically transformed by the obdurate nature of social reality.. The real block lies at the organizational level. When re forms
reach the existing system, they confront a series of powerful managerial, administrative and organizational imperatives. The reform
impulse is resisted and blocked or (more frequently) it is :welcomed, only to be absorbed and co-opted (for the wrong 'reasons) and in
the process completely transformed, even in directions diametrically opposed to the original vision.

Almost every one of the sceptical evaluations I relied upon in my last chapter (those first doubts and second thoughts) draws upon one
or other version of this model. The note is a poignant one. Very frequently, these critics were, a few years earlier, the 'apostles and
apologists for these very same changes. The good intentions were their own. What could have happened, they now cry, to programmes
with, such 'impressive pedigrees' as diversion and deinstitutionalization — theoretically justified, legislatively mandated, responsive to
powerful social movements and representative of full professional consensus?4 Or,. in, a more explicit personal identification with the
original ideology, Lemert asks, what hath been wrought in my name?5 Insofar as his own writings contributed to the proliferation of
diversion programmes, he can only express 'scholarly chagrin and dismay' over the 'entrepreneurial excesses' diversion programmes
may have wrought in juvenile justice.. All sorts of things have 'gone wrong', his original conception has gone 'wide off the mark'.
There have been 'oversights', goals have been 'distorted', 'displaced' or 'perverted'. A 'paradoxical transformation' has taken place.
Instead of judicious non-intervention, diversion has turned into a happy means of ensuring a steady supply of young. clients for
treatment: 'what began as an effort to reduce discretion in juvenile justice became a warrant to increase discretion and extend control
where none existed before. If nothing else is learned from this, it is the fearsome difficulty of trying to understand how even a segment
of our highly contrived society works'.6

A 'litany of impediments' then, as Klein terms the problem. The trouble is not with the original vision. The real issue is 'programme
integrity' — strategies like diversion and deinstitutionalization, cannot even be evaluated properly, because they have not been
properly implemented, or given a chance to fulfil their promise. Somewhere in between the original or ideal programme rationale and
the eventual outcome lies the awful business of implementation — what the programmes actually do. This is where things start going
wrong: goals are displaced, manifest functions give way to latent functions, vested interests operate. As Eliot told us: 'Between the
idea and the reality, Between the notion and the act, Falls the Shadow'.

There are different ways of explaining just what this Shadow is. In the most primitive version, there is some mysterious constant force,
an organizational Murphy's law, which keeps fouling things up. Social reality is a complex business — fearsomely difficult indeed —
and what happens in `the field', is invariably more complicated than anything which the reformers could have anticipated. We must
simply learn to live with the sad knowledge that things never turn out quite as the are planned.

At the next step upwards in explicitness, the implementation problem is seen as a matter of consistent error. For all sorts of reasons —
often unexamined — the programme is implemented in a clumsy, thoughtless, over-eager or (alternatively) over-cautious way.
Mistakes are made about priorities or timing, the wrong clients are targeted, the wrong tactics are used, opponents are alienated, To
quote one analysis of the failure of the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act in England to achieve its objectives of decarceration and
diversion: 'quite simply, cumulatively, these disparate bodies of professionals made the wrong decisions about the wrong children at
the wrong time.'?

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LINK: BUREAUCRACY
The disciplines of organizational and public-policy analysis provide a more complicated conceptual apparatus with which to approach
the implementation problem: 'something happens when programs enter the implementation structure.'8 On the one hand there are-
goals, objectives, strategies, ideals and intentions. On the other, there is a series of powerful organizational constraints and constraints
on organizations —technology, budgets, inter-agency competition, public opinion, system interdependence, political interference, etc.
These all ensure that the original goals are (variously) sabotaged, undermined, distorted, manipulated, frustrated, co-opted, displaced,
neutralized or resisted. These organizational restraints, together with any vulnerable features of the goals themselves, eventually set
up impediments so powerful that the programme, to all intents and purposes, is not even tried at all.

Klein lists five such impediments to deinstitutionalization and diversion.9
(1) insufficiently developed programme rationales — the know ledge base of the theory is too vague;
(2) inappropriately selected client groups — the clients targeted are often not the ones to whom the rationales most clearly apply;
(3) development of insufficient and narrowly conceived services and agencies — the- 'service modalities' (such as individual
treatment) are not the appropriate ones for realizing the programme goals;.
(4) professional resistance to attempts at reform — traditional groups such as correctional staff, judges and police undermine the
original strategy; and
(5) placement of programmes in inappropriate settings — the programme is set up either in an unfavourable setting or where `success'
would have been likely even without it.

This is a powerful list. And if Klein is correct in his evaluation, there is indeed little 'programme integrity' in the 200 or so
programmes he examined. The 'relative non-occurrence' of deinstitutionalization and diversion is thus easilly understandable. With the
exception, however, of point 4 — professional resistance — these impediments are all results rather than causes of faulty
'implementation. The question remains why do things go so terribly wrong?

The most persuasive answer is given by those who come (knowingly or not) somewhere close to Rothman's original historical model.
The problem lies in what Austin and Krisberg call the 'dialectics of reform',10 each separate reform movement (from the liberal
direction — diversion, decarceration, due process and decriminalization; from the more conservative direction — deterrence and just
deserts) represents a series of 'unmet promises'. The criminal justice system, propelled by its own organizational dynamics, functions
to resist, distort and frustrate the original purposes of these reforms. These 'dynamics' are both internal to the system (interactive
processes by which changes in one segment trigger off changes in another or the operation of interest groups trying to expand their
sphere of power and external or 'dialectical' (contradictions in the surrounding society, ideology and political economy).

Austin and Krisberg — and other accounts like theirs — are not, then, simple proponents of the organizational model. They are well
aware of all those 'external' ideological, professional and political forces (my next three models). But their main emphasis remains on
the organizational dynamics within the criminal justice system. It is the interactive quality of the system (the complex sequence of
trigger->resistance->transformation->unintended consequences) which determines the end result. Of particular importance here is the
struggle between component parts of the system for power, influence, resources, even survival: 'agencies compete with one another
and reactions to a given reform depend on the perceived value of that reform to the agency's survival.'11

It is a Manichean view of the system: good intentions are sacrificed in this bitter struggle for survival, for resources to protect, create
or expand programmes and for budgets, prestige, and power. And the struggle is an unequal one: the old guard — police, judges,
prosecutors, custodial staff — remain the most powerful actors in the system. They are the ones that define, that call the tune. All the
others — the forces of progress and reform — have to make deals, compromises and trade-offs in order to make a few gains:
`compromises on policy and procedure may be made as temporary tactics to mitigate suspicion and fear on part of the traditional
system personnel but such compromises often become rigorously observed organizational guidelines, thereby changing the nature of,
the alternatives.'12

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THE BUREAUCRACY—UNEQUAL ACCESS
POLITICAL SERVICE WILL DROWN IN BUREACRACY AND LIMITED OPPORTUNITIES—THE GRANT PROCESS FOR
NATIONAL SERVICE EITHER GOES DIRECTLY TO THE STATE OR IS ONLY DISTRIBUTED TO 58 ORGANIZATIONS
AND ALL OF THEIR BUDGETS CAN BE CUT ON A YEAR BY YEAR BAISIS

THE CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE (WASHINGTON D.C., USA), DOWNLOADED
JULY 30, 2006 [HTTP://WWW. NATIONALSERVICE.GOV/LEARN_SERVE_AMERICA.HTM]
“Service-learning helps America pursue some of its most critical goals, from improving academic achievement to helping youth from
disadvantaged circumstances succeed in school and in life,” said David Eisner, CEO of the Corporation for National and Community
Service, which administers Learn and Serve America. “Service-learning is already practiced in one-third of America’s schools – we
want to grow that to half of all schools by the year 2010.”

In total, 109 grants were announced in four categories: competitive grants to institutions of higher education; competitive grants to K-
12 schools; competitive grants to community-based organizations; and formula grants to state education agencies. All are “new”
grants, meaning that they are for the first year of a three-year grant cycle and are renewable annually pending compliance with grant
provisions and availability of funds. For a full list of grants, please click here.

Overall, Learn and Serve America received a record 504 competitive applications, requesting a total of more than $162 million. Of the
$37.1 million in available funds, approximately $19.1 million was available for competitive grants; the remainder, by law, is granted
by formula allocation to each state education agency for school-based service-learning.

“The high quality of the applications made the selection process extremely challenging,” said Amy Cohen, director of Learn and Serve
America. “This was the most competitive round of new grants that we’ve ever seen. Many high quality service-learning programs
could not be funded or could only be funded at lower levels than in the past.” Cohen added that the decisions on which competitive
programs to fund were based on several strategic goals that Learn and Serve America had set for its grant-making over the course of
the past year. These programmatic goals, which were developed to support the Corporation’s newly adopted five-year Strategic Plan,
include:

• Raising the percentage of youth from disadvantaged circumstances who are engaged in service-learning activities supported
by Learn and Serve America from 40 percent to 60 percent.
• Engaging more than 50,000 college students in service as a catalyst for reaching the national goal of engaging 5 million
college students in their communities by 2010.
• Helping to expand service-learning to more than 50 percent of all public schools by 2010, up from the current 33 percent.

“By being as strategic as possible, we hope to get the most of our available funds,” Cohen said.

All told, grants will be awarded to 51 state education agencies; 27 institutions of higher education; 19 school-based organizations,
including 5 Indian tribes; and 12 community-based organizations. A summation of grants, by category, follows.

BUT, CORPORATIONS CAN INTEGRATE THEMSELVES INTO NATIONAL SERVICE ALL THEY WANT; THEY ARE
SEPARATE AND THEY SIMPLY HAVE MORE RESOURCES TO DO PARTNERSHIP CAMPAIGNS
THE NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE ACT OF 1990, DOWNLOADED JULY 30, 2006. [WWW.CSC.CA.GOV/
ABOUTUS/FILES/NCSA1990.PDF ]
(1) Sponsorship authorized
The Corporation may enter into agreements with persons or entities who offer to sponsor national service positions for which the
person or entity will be responsible for supplying the funds necessary to provide a national service educational award. The distribution
of these approved national service positions shall be made pursuant to the agreement, and the creation of these positions shall not be
taken into consideration in determining the number of approved national service positions to be available for distribution under this
section.

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THE BUREAUCRACY—ROLL BACK
THEIR WISHFUL HOPE FOR CONTINUED POLTIICAL SERVICE IGNORES THE HIERARCHICAL BURRACRACY
WHICH HAS TO CONSTANTLY APPROVE AND REAPPROVE THEIR ACTIVITIES—THEIR POLITICALS SERVICE CAN
BE CUT ANY STEP ALONG THE WAY

BY LAWS OF THE CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE, DOWNLOADED JULY 30, 2006
[HTTP://WWW.NATIONALSERVICE.GOV/ABOUT/ROLE_IMPACT/BYLAWS.PDF]
Section 1.01 Powers.
(a) The Corporation for National and Community Service (hereinafter referred to as the “Corporation”) shall be administered by a
Board of Directors (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”) as established by the National and Community Service Act of 1990, as
amended (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”).
(b) Without prejudice to the general powers of the Board, it is hereby expressly declared that the Board shall perform the following
functions:
(1) review and approve the strategic plan prepared by the Chief Executive Officer, and annual updates of the plan;
(2) review and approve proposals prepared by the Chief Executive Officer, with respect to grants, allotments, contracts, financial
assistance, payment, and positions;
(3) review and approve the proposal prepared by the Chief Executive Officer, regarding regulations, standards, policies, procedures,
programs, and initiatives;
(4) review and approve the evaluation plan prepared by the Chief Executive Officer;
(5)(A) review, and advise the Chief Executive Officer regarding, the actions of the Chief Executive Officer with respect to the
personnel of the Corporation, and with respect to such standards, policies, procedures, programs, and initiatives as are necessary or
appropriate to carry out the national service laws; and
(B) inform the Chief Executive Officer of any aspects of the actions of the Chief Executive Officer that are not in compliance with the
above referenced annual strategic plans, evaluation plan, or are not consistent with the objectives of the National and Community
Service Act of 1990, as amended;
(6) receive any audit reports transmitted by the Chief Executive Officer, and reports prepared by the Inspector General;
(7) make recommendations relating to a program of research for the Corporation with respect to national and community service
programs, including service-learning programs;
(8) advise the President and the Congress concerning developments in national and community service that merit the attention of the
President and the Congress;
(9) ensure effective dissemination of information regarding the programs and initiatives of the Corporation; and
(10) prepare and make recommendations to the Congress and the President for changes in the national service laws resulting from the
studies and demonstrations the Chief Executive Officer is required to carry out, which recommendations shall be submitted to the
Congress and President not later than September 30, of each calendar year.
(11) as part of the agenda of meetings of the Board, the Board shall review projects and programs conducted or funded by the
Corporation under the national service laws to improve the coordination between such projects and programs, and the activities of
other Federal agencies that deal with the individuals and communities participating in or benefiting from such projects and programs.
The ex officio Members of the Board specified in section 1.03(b) shall jointly plan, implement, and fund activities in connection with
projects and programs conducted under the national service laws to ensure that Federal efforts attempt to address the total needs of
participants in such programs and projects, their communities, and the persons and communities the participants serve.

AND, THERE ARE SEVERAL CRITERIA FOR GRANTS THAT WOULD LET THEM CUT SUBVERSIVE PROGRAMS, NOT
OF WHICH EVEN CONSIDER POLITICALITY

DOMESTIC VOLUNTEER SERVICE ACT OF 1999, DOWNLOADED JULY 30, 2006. SEC. 115. [42 U.S.C. 12527]
CONSIDERATION OF APPLICATIONS [HTTP://WWW.AMERICORPS.ORG/PDF/DVSA_DEC 99.PDF]
(a) Criteria for applications
In approving applications for financial assistance under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 12524 of this title, the Corporation
shall consider such criteria with respect to sustainability, replicability, innovation, and quality of programs under this subpart as the
Chief Executive Officer may by regulation specify. In providing assistance under this subpart, a State educational agency, Indian tribe,
or grantmaking entity shall consider such criteria.

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THE BUREAUCRACY—ROLL BACK
AND, IF PUSH COMES TO SHOVE, THE GOVERNMENT CAN SIMPLY DECLARE A CRISIS AND THE REPRESSIVE
STATE APPARATUS WILL TAKE DIRECT CONTROL OF NATIONAL SERVICE

CHOSSUDOVSKY, CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION, OCTOBER 23, 2005 [MICHEL, “NATURAL
DISASTERS AND THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA,” HTTP://WWW.WORLDPROUTASSEMBLY.ORG/
ARCHIVES/2005/10/NATURAL_DISASTE.HTML]

The Militarization of "Civil Society" Relief Organizations

The militarisation of disaster relief has also been endorsed by the American Red Cross , the Corporation for National and Community
Service and the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) These key organizations are signatories of the
National Response Plan. They have endorsed Homeland Security's definition of a national emergency. Under the NRP, these key
civilian organizations are directly under the authority of the DHS, FEMA and the Pentagon. Distinct from the Corporation for
National and Community Service, the NVOAD regroups a large number of individual non-governmental organizations. In signing the
NRP, these organizations have foregone their "civilian" mandate in disaster relief.

EMPIRICALLY, EDUCATION PROGRAMS SIMPLY GET CUT BY BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL MACHINATIONS

KLEIN, JOURNALIST AT TIME MAGAZINE, FROM THE AUG. 25, 2003[JOE, “VIEWPOINT: WHO KILLED
TEACH FOR AMERICA,” HTTP://PEACECORPSONLINE.ORG/MESSAGES/MESSAGES/2629/2015687.HTML
In Atlanta, several Bush aides approached Kopp and encouraged her to quadruple the size of the Teach for America infantry, from
1,000 to 4,000 per year. (Each TFA teacher serves for two years and receives $4,725 per year in college scholarship money.) Last
January Teach for America received a $2 million "challenge grant" to facilitate the expansion. But about that same time Kopp began
to hear that AmeriCorps' priorities had changed. Programs that encouraged voluntarism would be favored over so-called professional
corps like Teach for America. She says she was assured by John Bridgeland, the Bush voluntarism czar, that Teach for America's
annual grant from AmeriCorps—about $12.5 million in scholarship money and $1.5 million for operating expenses—was safe. On
July 11, however, a form letter arrived in the Teach for America offices from the Corporation for National and Community Service.
"We regret to inform you," it said, "that your application was not selected for funding."

"We were shocked," Kopp told me. "There had been no warning." To be sure, Kopp was aware that the rest of AmeriCorps was being
squeezed because of a bureaucratic accounting snafu and congressional reluctance to rectify the error. Most AmeriCorps programs
were facing severe cuts. But Teach for America's fate was far more drastic; it had been zeroed out, eliminated. "We are no longer an
AmeriCorps program," Kopp said.

Why has this happened? It's difficult to say. I spent much of last week having Orwellian conversations with functionaries at the
Freedom Corps and the Corporation for National and Community Service. "This shouldn't perceived as a lack of support for Teach for
America," one told me. "There's a grant process, and they didn't succeed." But it does seem that TFA was axed because it doesn't
encourage community volunteer work; its members merely teach school in poor neighborhoods.

Meanwhile, Wendy Kopp has 3,200 TFA members recruited so far who will not be receiving scholarship money this year. More
broadly, AmeriCorps itself faces a reduction from approximately 55,000 to 35,000 members. Just before the summer recess, the
Senate passed a $100 million appropriation to restore these cuts, but House majority leader Tom DeLay—who has made no secret of
his desire to kill AmeriCorps—blocked the money. The President says he wants these funds restored, but he doesn't seem to have
much control over the powerful DeLay. Even if Bush means what he says, Teach for America has been axed for 2003. I called the
First Lady's office to see what she thought about that. She was unavailable for comment.

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THE BUREAUCRACY—CAPITALIST RHETORIC
BEHIND THE EMPTY RHEOTRIC OF HUMANITARIANISM AND CHARITY, THE LANGUAGE OF CAPITALIST POST-IDEOLOGICAL
ADMINISTRATION SLIPS INTO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS. THESE ARE NOT ISOLATED SUBSETS HOWEVER,
A FEW PRINCIPLES AMONG MANY, BUT THE ONES THAT OVER-DETERMINE THE APPLICATION OF ALL THE OTHERS

THE CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE, (WASHINGTON D.C.), DOWNLOADED JULY
30, 2006. [MISSION AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES: HTTP://WWW.NATIONALSERVICE.GOV/ABOUT /ROLE_IMPACT/
MISSION.ASP]
Our Mission and Guiding Principles
The mission of the Corporation for National and Community Service is to improve lives, strengthen communities, and foster civic
engagement through service and volunteering.

Our Guiding Principles

As we pursue our goals, we are guided by the following principles:
• Put the needs of local communities first.
• Strengthen the public-private partnerships that underpin all of our programs.
• Use our programs to build stronger, more efficient, and more sustainable community networks capable of mobilizing
volunteers to address local needs, including disaster preparedness and response.
• Measure and continually improve our programs' benefits to service beneficiaries, participants, community organizations, and
our national culture of service.
• Build collaborations wherever possible across our programs and with other Federal programs.
• Help rural and economically distressed communities obtain access to public and private resources.
• Support diverse organizations, including faith-based and other community organizations, minority colleges, and disability
organizations.
• Use service-learning principles to put volunteer and service activities into an appropriate context that stimulates life-long
civic engagement.
• Support continued civic engagement, leadership, and public service careers for our programs' participants and community
volunteers.
• Exhibit excellence in management and customer service.

We envision an organization that is:
• A catalytic, coordinating, and creative force in realizing this vision for service in America.
• A valuable resource to—and a partner with—national, state and local organizations that encourage community service and
address community needs.
• Entrepreneurial, innovative, effective, and efficient in utilizing its resources, influence, and activities.
• A good steward of taxpayer dollars that operates programs in a cost-effective manner.
• An agency with a demonstrated history of nonpartisanship.

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THE BUREAUCRACY—CAPITALIST RHETORIC
THE CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE REGARDS PEOPLE AS RESOURCES AND
CAPITAL, DEPLOYING THEM FOR THE BENEFIT OF CAPITALIST, ENTREPRENEURIAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT
SUPPORT THE CORPORATION MONETARILY.

THE CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE (WASHINGTON D.C., USA), DOWNLOADED
JULY 30, 2006 [HTTP://WWW.NATIONALSERVICE.ORG/FOR_ORGANIZATIONS/HOW/INDEX.ASP ]
People Power

National service helps your organization implement those projects or ideas that require special funding or assistance. Through
programs and grants, the Corporation for National and Community Service provides human capital—people power—to help you
address emerging needs in your community. Each year, national and community service participants and grantees recruit hundreds of
thousands of volunteers, who donate millions of hours of service to their communities.

Getting Things Done
All national service programs address compelling community issues in education, public safety, health and human needs, the
environment, and more. National service participants tutor children and adults, rehabilitate housing for low-income families,
immunize children against preventable diseases, respond to natural disasters, mentor young people, help persons with disabilities and
the elderly to maintain their independence, and manage after-school programs for social and academic enrichment, to name a few.

Senior Corps, AmeriCorps, and Learn and Serve America all have a track record of mobilizing community resources, helping to
develop an ethic of service and leadership skills, and expanding and sustaining organizational capacity.

THE PEACE CORPS IS STEEPED IN CAPITALIST IDEOLOGY—IT CONSIDERS VOLUNTEERS TO BE RESOURCES.
USA FREEDOM CORPS OFFICIAL WEBSITE, DOWNLOADED JULY 29, 2006 [WWW.USAFREEDOMCORPS.GOV/
ABOUT_USAFC/PROGRAMS/PEACECORPS.ASP]
Since 1961, more than 182,000 Peace Corps Volunteers have been invited by 138 host countries to share with the world America's
most precious resource-its people. Peace Corps Volunteers serve in more than 70 countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Central and
South America, Europe, and the Middle East.

PEACE CORPS PROGRAMS ARE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO SPREAD CAPITALISM
USA FREEDOM CORPS OFFICIAL WEBSITE, DOWNLOADED JULY 29, 2006 [WWW.USAFREEDOMCORPS.GOV/
ABOUT_USAFC/PROGRAMS/PEACECORPS.ASP]
Every Peace Corps Volunteer's experience is different. From teaching English to elementary school children in Zambia to launching a
computer learning center in Moldova to promoting HIV/AIDS awareness in South Africa to working on soil conservation in Panama,
Volunteers bring their skills and life experiences to where they are needed most.

Today's Peace Corps is more vital than ever, stepping into new countries like East Timor, working in emerging and essential areas
such as information technology and business development, and committing more than 1,000 new Volunteers as a part of President
Bush's HIV/AIDS Act of 2003. Peace Corps Volunteers continue to help countless individuals who want to build a better life for
themselves, their children, and their communities.

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THE BUREAUCRACY—EXECUTIVES
THE CEO OF THE CORPORATION RUNS NATIONAL SERVICE LIKE A BUSINESS, FOCUSING ON CUSTOMER
SERVICE AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE, DOWNLOADED JULY 30, 2006.
[HTTP://WWW.NATIONALSERVICE.ORG/ABOUT/MEDIA_KIT/PHOTOS_BIOS_CEO.ASP ]
David Eisner is Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation for National and Community Service, which administers the Senior Corps, AmeriCorps,
and Learn and Serve America programs. He was appointed by President Bush and began serving in December 2003.

Eisner is a nationally recognized leader on nonprofit capacity-building, infrastructure, and organizational effectiveness, and focuses his efforts on
strengthening the organization's accountability, improving customer service, and increasing public trust. The goal of the CEO's management efforts are to
make the Corporation's programs more efficient, effective, and accountable; to ensure that national and community service programs
add value to traditional volunteering and the nonprofit world; and to bring a far greater degree of consistency, predictability, and value to the
Corporation's programs.

THE CEO OF THE CORPORATION IS A SCION OF CAPITAL—HE HAS SIMPL MOVED FROM ONE PART OF THE
SUPERSTRUCTURE TO ANOTHER
CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE, DOWNLOADED JULY 30, 2006.
[HTTP://WWW.NATIONALSERVICE.ORG/ABOUT/MEDIA_KIT/PHOTOS_BIOS_CEO.ASP]
From 1997 until 2003, Eisner
was a Vice President at AOL Time Warner, where he directed the company's charitable foundation. Before that, he was
a Senior Vice President of Fleishman-Hilliard International Communications, and prior to that he managed public relations at the Legal Services
Corporation. He started his career on Capitol Hill, serving as press secretary for three Members of Congress.

THE CHAIR OF THE CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE, WAS PREVIOUSLY MAYOR OF
INDIANAPOLIS AND WORKED TO SUPPORT CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT.
SANDY SCOTT, CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE, MAY 10, 2001 (WASHINGTON
D.C., USA), SENATE CONFIRMS STEPHEN GOLDSMITH TO NATIONAL SERVICE BOARD
[HTTP://WWW.NATIONALSERVICE.GOV/ABOUT/NEWSROOM/RELEASES_DETAIL.ASP?TBL_PR_ID=142]
Stephen Goldsmith, former Mayor of Indianapolis and a top campaign advisor to President Bush, was confirmed by the Senate yesterday for a four-
year term on the board of directors of the Corporation for National Service.

The non-partisan board sets policies and approves funding for national service programs engaging more than 1.5 million Americans in service to
meet community needs through AmeriCorps, the National Senior Service Corps, and Learn and Serve America.

"I am eager to work with the Corporation and the national service field to fulfill President Bush's vision of responsible citizens, communities of
service and a nation of character," said Goldsmith. "One of the President's great goals is to invigorate the spirit of service and citizenship in America, and national
service has a vital role to play in this effort."

In addition to serving on the Corporation's board, Goldsmith is an advisor to the President on his faith-based and community initiative.
Announcing Goldsmith's nomination, President Bush said that Goldsmith is "known as one of the most innovative mayors in America, who pioneered ways to promote
community efforts. He will continue to advise me on these issues. And I have asked Steve to serve on the board of the Corporation for National Service. This
organization has done some good work in mobilizing volunteers of all ages."

VASQUEZ DONATED $100,000 TO THE BUSH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN 2004; BUSH IS RETURNING THE
FAVOR BY NOMINATING HIM.
MIKE GOODKIND, COLUMNIST FOR THE FRIENDS OF NIGERIA NEWSLETTER ONLINE, WINTER 2002
[HTTP://WWW.FRIENDSOFNIGERIA.ORG/NEWSLETTER_FILES/VOL6_2.HTM, VOLUME 6, NO. 2]
Nominated by President Bush last July, Vasquez is a long-time Republican who helped contribute $100,000 to the Bush presidential
campaign. He served as a campaign adviser to Bush who pledged to nominate an Hispanic Peace Corps Director. Coyne's group suggested other
Hispanic candidates it deem qualified.

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IMPACT: BUREAUCRACY/AT: WE TRANSFORM SYSTEM
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM SERVES TO MAINTAIN THE RULE OF THE BOURGEOISIE, ELECTIONS AND EQUAL
PARTICIPATION ARE ONLY ILLUSIONS SYMBOLIC OF POWER, IN ORDER TO HAVE REAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE
IN CAPITALIST DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, ONE MUST HAVE WEALTH, WHICH INFLUENCES THE MEDIA AND THE
PEOPLE. ALSO, ONCE ELECTED, IN ORDER TO ‘DO’ ANYTHING, ONE MUST CONFORM TO THE PRESENT RULES
SET BY THE BOURGEOISIE WHO HAVE GREAT POLITICAL POWER AND INFLUENCE.

AVAKIAN, CHAIRMAN OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY USA, 1986 [BOB, DEMOCRACY: CAN’T WE
DO BETTER THAN THAT?,68]
Many will say: how can the political systems in a democratic country like the U.S. “serve to maintain the rule of the bourgeoisie over
the proletariat” when everyone has the right to choose the political leaders by participating in elections? The answer to this is that
elections in such a society, and the “democratic process” as a whole, are a sham – and more than a sham – a cover for and indeed a
vehicle through which domination over the exploited and oppressed is carried out by the exploiting, oppressing, ruling class. To state
it in a single sentence, elections: are controlled by the bourgeoisie; are not the means through which basic decisions are made in any
case; and are really for the primary purpose of legitimizing the system and the policies and actions of the ruling class, giving them the
mantle of a “popular mandate,” and of channeling, confining, and controlling the political masses in of the people.

In relation to all this the recent presidential election in the U.S. is highly intrusive. The consensus was obviously reached within the
ruling class, well before the election, that Reagan was the man for the times; this was transmitted and drummed into people through
the media. Again, there was the attempt to disguise it a s the popular will (people are told what to think by telling them it is what they
already do think ) . There was the incessant refrain that Reagan was “unbeatable.” All of this to set up an overwhelming “mandate” for
what Reagan personifies. And in any case, should Mondale have somehow won the election, it wouldn’t have made the slightest bit of
difference on any substantial question – above all on the cardinal question of preparing for war against the rival soviet bloc.

On the most obvious level, to be a serious candidate for any major office in a country like the U.S. requires millions of dollars– a
personal fortune or, more often, the backing of people with that kind of money. Beyond that, to become known and be taken seriously
depends on favorable exposure in the mass media (favorable at least in the sense that you are presented as within the framework of
responsible–that is, acceptable–politics). These mass media are called that because they reach and influence masses of people daily
and constantly. But they are certainly not controlled by the masses, nor do they reflect or serve their fundamental interests. They are
themselves key pillars of the power structure: they are owned by major financial interests (where they are not owned by the state) and
are in any case closely regulated by the state. By the time "the people express their will through voting," both the candidates they
have to choose among and the "issues" that deserve "serious consideration" have been selected out by someone else: the ruling class.
Small wonder they are more than willing to abide by the results!
Further, and even more fundamentally, to "get anywhere" once elected–both to advance one's own career and to "get anything done" –
it is necessary to fit into the established mold and work within the established structures. This is partially because those already
entrenched in positions of power and influence are thereby in a position to make others conform and work through the accepted
avenues, but more basically it is because, once again, the political system must serve the underlying economic system. This is not a
mere theoretical abstraction, it has concrete meaning: policies and actions which work against or undermine that economic system will
in fact cause disruption, disorder, chaos, breakdowns in the more or less orderly functioning of things–and unless you are prepared to
see the entire order overthrown, with all that implies, you can only view such disruption, disorder, and chaos as something to be
avoided or kept to the minimum where it cannot be avoided. But if you are prepared to see–and work for –the overthrow of the
existing order, and if you say so openly, you will never be allowed to hold any real posi tion of power; or, if, on the other hand, you
have this perspective but hide it and attempt to "get in the power structure and work from within," you will be swallowed up–or
chewed up and spit out–by that structure. There is an abundance of historical experience to demonstrate this–and none which
disproves it'

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IMPACT: IDEOLOGY = MATERIAL PRACTICE
IDEOLOGY IS EMBODIED IN MATERIAL PRACTICES—THE REALM OF IDEAS AND ATTITUDES IS NOT SEPARATE
FROM THE PHYSICAL WORLD OF ACTION AND CHANGE

ALTHUSSER, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE ECOLE NORMALE SUPERIEURE (PARIS), 2001 [LOUIS,
“IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES (NOTES TOWARDS AN INVESTIGATION)” (1969-1970),
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, P. 112-115]
Thesis II: Ideology has a material existence. I have already touched on this thesis by saying that the 'ideas' or 'representations, etc.,
which seem to make up ideology do not have an ideal (ideale or ideelle) or spiritual existence, but a material existence. I even
suggested that the ideal (ideale, ideelle) and spiritual existence of 'ideas' arises exclusively in an ideology of the 'idea' and of ideology,
and let me add, in an ideology of what seems to have 'founded' this conception since the emergence of the sciences, i.e. what the
practicians of the sciences represent to themselves in their spontaneous ideology as 'ideas, true or false. Of course, presented in
affirmative form, this thesis is unproven. I simply ask that the reader be favourably disposed towards it, say, in the name of
materialism. A long series of arguments would be necessary to prove it.

This hypothetical thesis of the not spiritual but material existence of `ideas' or other 'representations' is indeed necessary if we are to
advance in our analysis of the nature of ideology. Or rather, it is merely useful to us in order the better to reveal what every at all
serious analysis of any ideology will immediately and empirically show to every observer, however critical.

While discussing the ideological State apparatuses and their practices, I said that each of them was the realization of an ideology (the
unity of these different regional ideologies—religious, ethical, legal, political, aesthetic, etc.—being assured by their subjection to the
ruling ideology). I now return to this thesis: an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is
material.

Of course, the material existence of the ideology in an apparatus and its practices does not have the same modality as the material
existence of a paving stone or a rifle. But, at the risk of being taken for a Neo-Aristotelian (NB Marx had a very high regard for
Aristotle), I shall say that 'matter is discussed in many senses,' or rather that it exists in different modalities, all rooted in the last
instance in 'physical' matter.

Having said this, let me move straight on and see what happens to the `individuals' who liwe in ideology, i.e. in a determinate
(religious, ethical, etc.), representation of the world whose imaginary distortion depends on their imaginary relation to their conditions
of existence, in other words, in the last instance, to the relations of production and to class relations (ideology = an imaginary relation
to real relations). I shall say that this imaginary relation is itself endowed with a material existence.

Now I observe the following.

An individual believes in God, or Duty, or justice, etc. This belief derives (for everyone, i.e. for all those who live in an ideological
representation of ideology, which reduces ideology to ideas endowed by definition with a spiritual existence) from the ideas of the
individual concerned, i.e. from him as a subject with a consciousness, which contains the ideas of his belief. In this way, i.e. by means
of the absolutely ideological 'conceptual' device (dispositif) thus set up (a subject endowed with a consciousness in which he freely
forms or freely recognizes ideas in which he believes), the (material) attitude of the subject concerned naturally follows.

The individual in question behaves in such and such a way, adopts such and such a practical attitude, and, what is more, participates in
certain regular practices which are those of the ideological apparatus on which 'depend' the ideas which he has in all consciousness
freely chosen as a subject. If he believes in God, he goes to Church to attend Mass, kneels, prays, confesses, does penance (once it was
material in the ordinary sense of the term) and naturally repents and so on. If he believes in Duty, he will have the corresponding
attitudes, inscribed in ritual practices 'according to the correct principles'. If he believes in justice, he will submit unconditionally to
the rules of the Law, and may even protest when they are violated, sign petitions, take part in a demonstration, etc.

Throughout this schema we observe that the ideological representation of ideology is itself forced to recognize that every 'subject'
endowed with a 'consciousness' and believing in the 'ideas' that his 'consciousness' inspires in him and freely accepts, must 'act
according to his ideas, must therefore inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the actions of his material practice. If he does not do
so, 'that is wicked'.

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IMPACT: IDEOLOGY = MATERIAL PRACTICE
Indeed, if he does not do what he ought to do as a function of what he believes, it is because he does something else, which, still as a
function of the same idealist scheme, implies that he has other ideas in his head as well as those he proclaims, and that he acts
according to these other ideas, as a man who is either 'inconsistent' (`no one is willingly evil') or cynical, or pervers e.

In every case, the ideology of ideology thus recognizes, despite its imaginary distortion, that the 'ideas' of a human subject exist in his
actions, or ought to exist in his actions, and if that is not the case, it lends him other ideas corresponding to the actions (however
perverse) that he does perform. This ideology talks of actions: I shall talk of actions inserted into practices. And I shall point out that
these practices are governed by the rituals in which these practices are inscribed, within the material existence of an ideological
apparatus, be it only a small part of that apparatus: a small mass in a small church, a funeral, a minor match at a sports' club, a school
day, a political party meeting, etc.

Besides, we are indebted to Pascal's defensive 'dialectic' for the wonderful formula which will enable us to invert the order of the
notional schema of ideology. Pascal says more or less: 'Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe.' He thus
scandalously inverts the order of things, bringing, like Christ, not peace but strife, and in addition something hardly Christian (for woe
to him who brings scandal into the world!)—scandal itself. A fortunate scandal which makes him stick with Jansenist defiance to a
language that directly names the reality.

I will be allowed to leave Pascal to the arguments of his ideological struggle with the religious ideological State apparatus of his day.
And I shall be expected to use a more directly Marxist vocabulary, if that is possible, for we are advancing in still poorly explored
domains.

I shall therefore say that, where only a single subject (such and such an individual) is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief
is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves
defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject. Naturally, the four inscriptions of the
adjective 'material' in my proposition must be affected by different modalities: the materialities of a displacement for going to mass, of
kneeling down, of the gesture of the sign of the cross, or of the mea culpa, of a sentence, of a prayer, of an act of contrition, of a
penitence, of a gaze, of a hand-shake, of an external verbal discourse or an 'internal' verbal discourse (consciousness), are not one and
the same materiality. I shall leave on one side the problem of a theory of the differences between the modalities of materiality.

It remains that in this inverted presentation of things, we are not dealing ,with an 'inversion' at all, since it is clear that certain notions
have purely and ;imply disappeared from our presentation, whereas others on the contrary ;urvive, and new terms appear.

Disappeared: the term ideas.

Survive: the terms subject, consciousness, belief, actions.

Appear: the terms practices, rituals, ideological apparatus.

It is therefore not an inversion or overturning (except in the sense in which one might say a government or a glass is overturned), but a
reshuffle of a non-ministerial type), a rather strange reshuffle, since we obtain the following result.

Ideas have disappeared as such (insofar as they are endowed with an ideal or spiritual existence), to the precise extent that it has
emerged that their existence s inscribed in the actions of practices governed by rituals defined in the last .instance by an ideological
apparatus. It therefore appears that the subject acts ,insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its real
determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual,
which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief.

But this very presentation reveals that we have retained the following notions: subject, consciousness, belief, actions. From this series
I shall immediately extract the decisive central term on which everything else depends: the notion of the subject.

And I shall immediately set down two conjoint theses:
• there is no practice except by and in an ideology;
• there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects.

I can now come to my central thesis.

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IMPACT: EXTINCTION
CAPITALIST DYNAMICS LEAD TO GLOBAL EXTINCTION

COOK, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR, 2006 [DEBORAH, “STAYING ALIVE:
ADORNO AND HABERMAS ON SELF-PRESERVATION UNDER LATE CAPITALISM,” RETHINKING MARXISM,
18(3):433-447, ELECTRONIC]
Adorno and Habermas obviously disagree about the character of self-preservation under late capitalism. Where Habermas believes
that survival imperatives are now harnessed to communicative and functionalist reason, Adorno claims that self-preservation has not
yet come under rational control because reason itself is blindly impelled by this drive. Against Habermas one could certainly argue
that, even if self-preservation is rational in his procedural sense of that term, it remains destructive and self-destructive insofar as we
do not consciously attempt to satisfy the goal of preserving the species as a whole. Self-preservation is now the exclusive prerogative
of the owners of the means of production in Western countries who, in their relentless and self-interested pursuit of profit and power,
continue to threaten the material survival of everyone. In fact, given the obvious damage that continues to be inflicted on the
environment, the wars that have been fought and continue to be waged in the name of self-preservation, and the famine, disease,
poverty, and malnutrition that destroy the lives of most human beings on the planet, I would argue that Habermas's view of what is
required for self-preservation to be rational is seriously flawed and must therefore be rejected. On the one hand, even if citizens in the
West were to steer the economy toward normative ends, they could agree to act destructively and self-destructively and remain
rational on Habermas's procedural definition of rationality. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the surrender of self-
preservation to blind economic forces that currently threaten everyone's survival can plausibly be described as rational.

To give the last word to Adorno: our lives, which are really no more than a means to the end of self-preservation, have nonetheless
become “bewitched and fetishized as an end.” Our current predicament consists in an “antinomy”: the individual is debased and
liquidated while simultaneously being “thrown back on the fact that he no longer has anything but this atomized self which lives our
life” (Adorno 2001, 110). Consequently, Adorno argues, the “concept of ends, to which reason rises for the sake of consistent self-
preservation, ought to be emancipated from the idol in the mirror.” Self-preservation, which currently confuses means with ends,
obscures the fact that an end “would be whatever differs from the subject, which is a means” (1973, 349). If we were to make
conscious to ourse lves the ways in which our behavior has unconsciously been driven by survival imperatives, and win the energy of
self-preservation for more substantive ends, reason would be emancipated from its instinctual fetters and self-preservation would
finally become rational. Again, the goal of self-preservation is the preservation of humanity as a whole: to be rational in the more
emphatic sense of that term, individuals need to direct their efforts toward the preservation of the species on which their own lives
depend. To preserve the species, society must ultimately be transformed: the preservation of the species will only find “its end in a
reasonable organization of society.” Adorno adds that a society is rationally organized “solely to the extent that it preserves its
societalized subjects according to their unfettered potentialities.” If self-preservation were ever to become more fully rational,
humanity would gain “the potential for that self-reflection that could finally transcend the self-preservation to which it was reduced by
being restricted simply to a means” (Adorno 1998d, 272–3).

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IMPACT: WAR
THE ECONOMICS OF CAPITALISM MAKE WAR A NECESSITY

CARCHEDI, UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM, 2006 [GUGLIELMO, “THE FALLACIES OF KEYNESIAN POLICIES,”
RETHINKING MARXISM, 18(1):63-81, ELECTRONIC]
The other option is given by the state-commissioned production of weapons: military Keynesianism. This is, like the production of
public works, production of (surplus) value. All the results reached in the previous section concerning the unlikelihood of public
works starting an upturn apply here, too, and will not be repeated.25 But there are specific advantages and disadvantages (for Capital).
Concerning the latter, the production of weapons is even less likely to restore profitability than public works because it is usually very
technologically advanced, with a higher value composition than the rest of the economy. Also, unlike public works, weapons are
nonreproductive goods. Their production hampers the physical reproduction of the economy. And finally, weapons are commodities
that, in times of peace, are mostly not used. The labor that has gone into them (value) is thus wasted. This, too, hampers the physical
reproduction of the economy.

But there are advantages as well. First, if weapons are exported, the producers of weapons appropriate international value from other,
foreign capitalists due to the former's higher value composition (unequal exchange).26 Second, science- and technology-based
military innovations are the basic driving force in, and directly support, the development of civilian science and technology. Since
World War II, practically all the major innovations in the civilian sphere have been first generated by military research and
development. This gives the technological leaders a competitive advantage that makes possible the appropriation of international
surplus value. Third, the use of public works can become part of the goods considered to be necessary for the reproduction of labor
power and thus can lead to an increase in real wages. This danger is avoided if resources are channeled into the military industry. And
finally, military might is a necessary condition for imperialist policies, thus for value appropriation from weaker countries.

Once imperialism is introduced into the analysis, the positive effects on the ARP attributed to civilian Keynesianism in the imperialist
countries can be seen to be in fact, at least partially, the result of the appropriation of surplus value from the world working class, via
foreign capitals, thanks also to military Keynesianism. Disregard of this fundamental point gives Keynesian policies much more credit
than they deserve. There is thus no contraposition between civilian and military Keynesianism. The former is partly made possible by
the appropriation of international value inherent in the latter.

If neither civilian nor military Keynesian policies can jump-start the economy, the alternative is war. The use of weapons in time of
war is a specific, powerful method of destruction of excess capital in its commodity form, of value that cannot be realized in times of
peace. Their main contribution to an upturn is not through employment and the extra production of surplus value (which are modest
because of their high value composition) but through the destruction of surplus capital: the more commodity capital is destroyed (both
as weapons and as the other commodities that are destroyed by those weapons), the more commodity capital can be subsequently
created. At the same time, this expanded reproduction is spurred by the higher rates of exploitation, and thus of profit, induced by
wars. Wars make possible the cancellation of the debt contracted with Labor (e.g., inflation destroys the value of money and thus of
state bonds) and the extraction of extra surplus value (the laborers, either forced or instigated by patriotism, accept lower wages,
higher intensity of labor, longer working days, etc.). Wars thus create the conditions for an economic upturn. Capitalism needs
weapons and thus wars.

If capitalism needs wars, wars need enemies. The imperialist nations display great ingenuity in finding, or creating, new enemies.
Before the fall of the USSR, the pretext for the arms industry was International Communism. After the Fall, International Communism
has been replaced by Arab Fundamentalism and International Terrorism. As the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq show, the
substitution is now complete. The attacks of September 11, 2001, were a golden opportunity for the arms industry and U.S.
imperialism. This shows that political and ideological factors are of paramount importance for the modes and timing of the
conflagration, but they themselves are determined by economic factors. The notion that wars are caused by extraeconomic factors is
simply wrong. The Western world has exported (created) countless wars in many dominated countries and has engaged in military
Keynesian policies for the above-mentioned reasons.

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IMPACT: CALCULABILITY
THE FETISHISTIC IMPERATIVE OF AUTONOMOUS CAPITAL IS A SYSTEM WHICH MUST BE GIVENT THE ABILITY
TO REDUCE HUMAN LIFE, AS A HUMAR RESOURCE, TO A CALCULABLE OBJECT

HINKELAMMERT, PROFESSOR OF POSTGRADUATE PROGRAM IN ECONOMICS AT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
OF HONDURAS, 1986 [FRANZ J., THE IDEOLOGICAL WEAPONS OF DEATH, A THEORETICAL CRITIQUE OF
CAPITALISM, XVIII]
Capital Fetishism
With the advance of the capitalist system money is transformed into capital until it comes to have the characteristics evident in its
present phase of development. In the transformation of money into capital it becomes obvious that commodity relationships in their
very operation have the power of decision not only over the proportions of material goods to be produced but even over the life or
death of the producer.From the Viewpoint of the Poor
When large industrial capital buys its labor force, workers do not directly face capitalists but rather machines converted into capital.
Capital-machines in themselves are mortal; to live they need the life of the exploited. Hence they need to keep the workers alive. But
although it is capital that guarantees the life of workers, it is concerned only to the extent necessary to make sure that there will be
workers available. It is by calculating how many are needed that the number of workers who can be maintained and the means of life
assigned to them are calculated.
The survival of the exploited now depends on a decision of capital made in accordance with its needs. The misery of unneeded
workers is of no concern to capital. Hence it is that every time the production process is changed, the result is a martyrdom for those at
the base of the social pyramid: more and more work is expected of them and their life is continually threatened by the machine.
This is the struggle between capital and labor that is inseparably connected to the struggle of commodities among themselves and
between commodities and their producers. Within this kind of logic workers suffer the effects of aggression from capital in the form of
a growing tendency toward unemployment, which today is reaching frightful levels even in the countries at the center of the world
economy.
Those on the bottom are led to believe that unemployment is the result of a "capital shortage" that prevents the creation of new sources
of employment. Workers who manage to get a steady job congratulate themselves; the others continue to belong to capital but it does
not need them for its own subsistence. Capital now seems to be the great fount of life.

[INSERT CALCULABILITY IMPACT, LIKE DILLON]

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IMPACT: CRUSHES HUMANS
CAPITALISM IS ESSENTIALLY A FORM OF FETISHISM, WHICH SUBSTITUTES THE NEED FOR AN OBJECT FOR THE
NEEDS OF SUBJECTS

HINKELAMMERT, PROFESSOR OF POSTGRADUATE PROGRAM IN ECONOMICS AT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
OF HONDURAS, 1986 [FRANZ J., THE IDEOLOGICAL WEAPONS OF DEATH, A THEORETICAL CRITIQUE OF
CAPITALISM, XV]
[It is only at this point that we can finally ask, "What is the fetish?" It is the "personification" of commodities (and money and capital)
and the reification or "commoditization" of persons. The process of fetishism in the course of capitalist production follows this
sequence: commodity fetishism, money fetishism, capital fetishism. These may be taken either as historical stages within the capitalist
revolution or as existing juxtaposed in present-day capitalist society. The analysis of commodity relationships reveals that any kind of
relationship that may be found among human beings is in fact found among commodities. Of necessity the commodity is a product
that has its origin in human labor and is produced in order to obtain some benefit. The problem of commodity fetishism arises when,
on the basis of private property and in the context of the division of labor, one product becomes a means to obtain another through
exchange. From the moment when use-values (products that satisfy basic needs) are compared with one another (exchange value)
these products seem to be bewitched. That is, they begin to develop social relationships among themselves. As the forces of
production and commodity relationships progress, the social relationships among commodities become more developed, to the point
where their roles are reversed, and instead of the producer dominating commodities, what happens is exactly the opposite—the
producer is dominated by commodities. This is not because of someone's whim or a chance effect. On the contrary, it is a necessary
adaptation to conditions that the commodity producer cannot anticipate. Why? Because capitalist labor is of a "private" nature and
therefore producers cannot work out a prior agreement over the makeup of the total product over how each one will share in it. This
means that in the commodity form of production there comes a moment when there is a break between producer and product of such a
nature that the product gets beyond the control of the producer. This may not be seen but it is felt, experienced, and lived. It is the
moment when social relationships between commodities, and material relationships between producers, are forged. This all happens
through commodity relationships, independently of other aspects of the economic process. Here we find the root of fetishism. From
the moment when commodities begin to become "personified," the human being (the producer) has to become subordinated to
them in order to live. This is where the corresponding religious spirit of the capitalist system takes root. The personification of
commodities as they interrelate leads to the creation of an "other world," which intervenes in this one, but whose essence it is to
reproduce in religious fancy the social relationships that commodities establish in the commodity world. This is the polytheistic world
of commodities. It becomes monotheistic to the extent that human beings become aware that, underlying the totality of commodities
and their movements, there is a unifying principle: the collective labor of society. It will later appear mediated by money and capital.

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IMPACT: CAP BAD/AT METAPHYSICS BAD:
CAPITALISM CREATES PROBLEMS AND VIOLENCE. IT CREATES HUNGER AND PATRIARCHY VIA ITS
EVERLASTING CHARGE FOR PROFITS. THUS ONLY ONCE WE PROBLEMATIZE CAPITLISM CAN WE SOLVE THE
ROOT OF ALL THESE SOCIETAL PROBLEMS.

EBERT, TERESA, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT SUNY-ALBANY, THE KNOWABLE GOOD: POST-AL
POLITICS, ETHICS, AND RED FEMINISM, SUMMER 1995 RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 8 NUMBER 2, 44-7
Such a politics of invention no longer seeks to transform reality and rejects the possibility of social revolution, since there is no basis,
no secure knowledge of the real or notion of justice on which to act—only the continual repetition of contingent acts of judging which
invent their own idiom, their own criteria, as they go along. For historical materialists, however, justice is not indeterminate; nor is
politics foundationless. In contrast, for historical materialism the good is real but always obscured by the dominant ideology. In other
words, the "knowable good" is not simply a rhetorical effect of language games marked by the play of difference (differend), as
Lyotard claims. Rather the "knowable good" is a historical condition: it is the effect of the economic and sociocultural possibilities
opened up by human production which are, however, at the same time, restricted by the social contradictions of the existing relations
of production and obscured by the operation of ideology in global capitalism. To be more specific, capitalism has developed the means
of production and forms of technology to fulfill the basic needs of all people—for food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education—
but it does not do so because of the imperatives of profit and the priority of private property. To take one quite obvious but largely
overlooked example: thousands of tons of dairy products produced in this country are put in storage in order to artificially maintain a
certain level of profit on dairy items, rather than distribute the food to the millions of hungry and starving children in the United States
and globally.
The conflict between the priority of needs (feeding hungry children) and profits (for the dairy industry) is not simply the
incommensurable effects of conflicting speech acts and language games—although certainly speech acts are involved in this conflict,
especially in the ideological naturalization of hunger and deprivation as what "is," as inevitable. Instead this conflict is the historical
effect, as Marx says, of "the material productive forces of society" (the technological capability to produce extremely large quantities
of milk products and other foodstuffs) which have "come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or—this merely
expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the frameworkof whin they have opera-tee (Marx 1970,
21). This conflict means that the production, commodification, and distribution of milk in capitalism has not been primarily to feed as
many people as Possible but to maximize the surplus-value or profit of those who own the means of production and distribution of
milk products. It is quite true, however, as Marx argues, that it is within the "ideological forms"—"the legal, political, religious,
artistic or philosophic"—that women and men "become conscious of this conflict and fight it out" (1970, 21). However, Lyotard's
erasure of the issue of ideology and his focus instead on the singularity of phrases, speech acts, and differends greatly mystifies the
social struggles over "truth" and "justice" by confining them to the arena of language games—that is, to the superstructure—and
cutting off their dialectical connection to the relations of production (base). "Justice" in Lyotard's logic seems to be an indeterminate
competition of multiple, incommensurable, equal notions of "good" precisely because what is suppressed by his discursive localism is
material necessity: the priority of needs.

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IMPACTS: ALL THE BAD THINGS
AS LONG AS RELATIONS OF CAPITAL DOMINATE SOCIETY THE LAWS WILL REFLECT THOSE RELATIONS. THIS
IN TURN CAUSES DEHUMANIZATION, RACISM, CRIMINALIZATION OF BELIEF GROUPS, OPPRESSION, AND
VICTIMIZATION OF THE POOR, JUST TO NAME A FEW. THE ONLY WAY TO ELIMINATE SUCH MADNESS AND
DESTRUCTION IS TO CHANGE THE ECONOMIC BASE OF SOCIETY, WHICH CAN ONLY BE DONE BY A REVOLUTION
IN THE SUPERSTRUCTURE, A SEIZING OF POLITICAL POWER. IT LEADS TO IMMORAL VIOLENCE THAT IS
‘JUSTIFIED’ BY CAPITALISM.

AVAKIAN, CHAIRMAN OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY USA, 1986 [BOB, DEMOCRACY: CAN’T WE
DO BETTER THAN THAT?,75]
As we have seen, equality under the law is one of the foundation stones of the bourgeois concept of democracy. The law is presented
as a neutral force, affecting everyone equally, regardless of their place in society, and moreover as originating ultimately in the will of
the people because it is legislated by their chosen representatives. In addition to what has already been shown about elections–which
clearly refutes the notion that laws are legislated by the representatives of all the people and indicates that instead they are legislated
by representatives of the ruling class-the reality is that in any case laws must reflect and serve the underlying economic relations and
the interests of the class that is dominant in those relations. Otherwise, if the laws were in conflict with the fundamental property
relations, the economic basis of society would be completely disrupted and society could not function.
Imagine, for example, if the basic necessities of life continued to be produced as they are now in capitalist society–overwhelmingly
through a process where workers exchange their labor power for wages and are employed in facilities owned by capitalists who then
appropriate the things produced and sell them at a money-price–but at the same time the laws stated that no one had to pay for such
necessities, that anyone could just take as much of them as they needed. That such a situation immediately strikes one as absurd, as
absolutely unworkable, is an expression of the basic truth that the underlying production relations of society (the economic base) must
and will determine the nature of the ideological and political superstructure, including the laws. To have a situation where people
would actually be able. to have the things they needed without having to pay a money-price for them requires a fundamentally
different economic system, a radically different society corresponding to such a fundamental change in the economic system—a whole
new world—which can only be brought about through the international proletarian revolution. But so long as the relations of capital
continue to dominate society, the laws of that society will reflect and reinforce those relations.
That is why "in the real world" of capitalist society, it is quite legal for a company to refuse to hire people for the reason that it cannot
profitably employ them, even though it may mean that these unemployed people (and perhaps their families) will go hungry and
homeless; whereas at the same time it is completely illegal for these people to occupy part of that company's property for shelter, or to
take food or clothing from other businesses without paying for them— even though they and their families may starve or freeze
without them. That is why it is legal for a finance company to repossess someone's car if they have fallen behind in their payments,
even if they need the car to get to work to earn their livelihood; why it is perfectly legal for a utility company to shut off peoples heat
in the dead of winter if they have not paid their bills, and on and on. And all this is leaving aside the ways in which what is written
down as law is actually interpreted and applied by the police, the courts, and those in authority generally. In reality, for example, even
where the law might theoretically allow a poor Black person to carry a gun and even to use it for self-defense, he is extremely likely to
pay with his life if he encounters the police, and the odds are overwhelming that the police killing of a Black person will be declared
"justifiable homicide," regardless of the actual circumstances. In fact, police in the U.S. murder hundreds of Black people every year,
and the overwhelming majority of the victims are unarmed (even though it is a common ploy of the police to plant a weapon near the
victim after he has been killed, or to claim they thought he might have had a weapon, etc.). Nor is such legal murder of the oppressed
the exclusive province of the police: recent times have seen the state sanction and encourage "vigilantes" and other reactionaries out to
rid the streets of those they see as threats to the established order, whether they are engaging in conscious political activity or just
being generally unruly. Similarly, the bombing of abortion clinics in the U.S. can be declared by the government not to be terrorist—
and in effect the perpetrators of these bombings are not repressed but encouraged from the highest levels of government —while
people who "invade" weapons production facilities and pour blood on weapons of mass destruction are arrested and branded as
"terrorists." Finally, there is the broader sphere in which the law codifies the power of the state to force people to become part of its
armed forces, and when ordered to do so, to kill other people, in some other part of the world or in the "home country" itself. In the
final analysis, this legalized violence too is for the purpose of protecting and reinforcing the basic property relations of capital and fur-
thering capitalist accumulation—which, in this era of imperialism especially, is an international process and is battled out in a
worldwide arena.

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IMPACTS: ALL THE BAD THINGS
In sum, then, the apparatus of the state—the armed forces in particular but also the courts and the legal system, the
bureaucracy, and so forth— are in the hands of a class, the class that is dominant in the economic relations of society. This
state is not and cannot be neutral. Nor is it the instrument of particular private interests or specific powerful individuals
(though of course there are individual leaders of any class at any given time). Rather, this state apparatus is an instrument of class
rule, a machine for the oppression of the economically exploited and dominated classes: it enforces the dictatorship of the
ruling class over the exploited and oppressed classes, and will be used by the ruling class to suppress any real resistance to its
dictates, any serious challenge to its interests and to the established order which reflects and serves them, regardless of which
particular individuals are in office.' As Raymond Lotta has incisively summarized it :
The state is an objective structure of society whose character is determined not by the class origins of its leading personnel but by the
specific social division of labor of which it is an extension and the production relations which it must ultimately serve and reproduce.'

In a society based on bourgeois production relations—with the fundamental class antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat—
it is impossible for the superstructure (including the laws and the courts, the police and the army, the bureaucracy, and the whole
apparatus of government and also ideas, values, morals, etc.) not to uphold and enforce such production relations and the division of
labor that characterizes and is indispensable to this society, even though this means exploitation and oppression for the masses of
people and the massive violence that is required to defend and perpetuate such a system and the interests of its ruling class. To
eliminate such madness and destruction, to change the conditions that give rise to them, it is necessary to thoroughly transform the
production relations and the division of labor—the economic base of society. This, however, can only be done through a revolution
in the superstructure—the struggle to seize political power from the ruling class through military means—the revolutionary
warfare of the proletariat, in affiance with other oppressed masses, to defeat the armed forces of the bourgeoisie and smash and
dismantle its state apparatus, replacing it with a new and radically different state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, as a transition
to the abolition of class divisions and of the state.13.3 There can be no such thing as a "peaceful revolution." Revolution means
the transformation of the economic base and the superstructure of society; it requires the replacement of one ruling class by
another. And no ruling class has ever voluntarily "stepped down" to make way for the class that was rising up to replace it. Not
only was this true of society and its transformation in previous epochs, when revolution could only mean the replacement of one
exploiting class by another. It is all the more true of the revolution of this epoch, the proletarian revolution, which aims at the abolition
of all relations of exploitation, of all oppressive division of labor, and of all political institutions and ideological forms which reflect
the division of society into classes. To think of carrying out such a revolution peacefully—particularly when it is up against the
massive machinery of violence and destruction that is controlled by the bourgeois states in this era and up against ruling classes that
have repeatedly demonstrated their absolutely ruthless determination to remain in power regardless-of the cost in carnage and human
misery— is the height of folly, at best. To promote such a notion as a political program and to oppose it to the necessity for violent
proletarian revolution is deception of the greatest magnitude.i4

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ALT: IMMANENT REVOLUTION (AT: NO REVOLUTION)
THE REVOLUTION IS IMMANENT ONLY THE IDEOLOGICAL DENIAL OF ITS PRESENCE MAKES IT OTHERWISE

AINGER ET AL, EDITORIAL COLLECTIVE OF ACTIVISTS, EDITORS, WRITERS, TEACHERS, AND ARTISTS,
NOVEMBER 1, 2004 [KATHERINE, GRAEME CHESTERS, TONY CREDLAND, JOHN JORDAN, ANDREW STERN,
AND JENNIFER WHITNEY, WE ARE EVERYWHERE: THE IRRESISTIBLE RISE OF GLOBAL ANTICAPITALISM, ED.
NOTES FROM NOWHERE, P. HTTP://WWW.NARCONEWS.COM/PRINT.PHP3?ARTICLEID=1097&LANG=EN]
You can't predict the outcome of a carnival and neither can you predict history. The history of the twentieth century was one of utter
unpredictability - few could have predicted the Russian Revolution, the fall of the Berlin wall, the end of apartheid, the Internet. Who
could have predicted that anticapitalism would be back on the agenda at the end of the twentieth century, which has seen capitalism
touch, subsume, and subjugate everywhere and everything on the planet?

Judging from the early years of this century it seems that we are living in times that are just as unpredictable. But allow us to make
one prediction. The time of waiting for the right historical moment for revolution is over, and movements will not repeat this mistake.
This is one of the great lessons that we have learned from history, and it will influence the way political action is taken in the future.
Carnival teaches us not to wait, but to live out the future we desire now, it implores to those who follow the path of previous
repressive and ascetic struggles which postpone pleasure, along with racial and gender equality, until "after the revolution." In its
celebration of all that is moving and changing, in its hostility to everything immortal and complete, carnival reminds us to refuse the
idea that revolution is a ready-made permanent blueprint that we wait for, but a process that begins right here, right now.

In fact, the urgency of the current ecological crisis makes it impossible to wait for the future, unless we want to celebrate victory in an
uninhabitable desert. Instead of simply saying, "NO - we are against this," carnival yells, "LOOK - this is what we are for and we are
not going to ask for it. We are doing it right now." It gives us a glimpse of what is possible, igniting our imagination, our belief in
utopia - a utopia defined not as no-place but as this-place.

The revolutionary carnival may only last a few hours or days, but its taste lingers on. It is not simply a letting off of steam, a safety
valve for society, enabling life to return to normal the next day. It is a moment of intensity unlike any other, which shapes and gives
new meanings to every aspect of life. The everyday is never the same after one has tasted a moment that is ruled only by freedom.
Tasting such fruit is dangerous, because it leaves a craving to repeat the exhilarating experience again and again.

The Indian movement against the Narmada Dam says that resistance is a process for creating something new, and carnival prepares us
for this process, by changing our perceptions and behaviors, giving us confidence, and inspiring our passionate collective imagination.
In a world dictated by the rationalism of economics, a world where we are mere cogs in a market mechanism, radical imagination
becomes one of the rare human faculties that can rupture capital's curse of "realism." Realism can never be the foundation for
envisioning a new society, because it determines limits before these limits are themselves known. Hindering free creative action and
the possibility of searching for what is new, in the name of "realism" denies the fact that change is cumulative, not sequential; that the
present is always conditioned on the future. They may well call those of us who have the courage to be "unrealistic" - romantics,
dreamers, extremists. But as Herbert Read wrote: "What has been worthwhile in human history - the great achievements of physics
and astronomy, of geographical discovery and of human healing, of philosophy and of art - has been the work of extremists - of those
who believed in the absurd, dared the impossible."

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ALT: IMMANENT REVOLUTION (AT: NO REVOLUTION)
THE REVOLUTION IS ALRAEYD HERE, AND OUR ATTACK IN ITS HEART—THE EDUCATION SYSTEM—CAN
SHAKE IT TO ITS CORE

AINGER ET AL, EDITORIAL COLLECTIVE OF ACTIVISTS, EDITORS, WRITERS, TEACHERS, AND ARTISTS,
NOVEMBER 7, 2004 [KATHERINE, GRAEME CHESTERS, TONY CREDLAND, JOHN JORDAN, ANDREW STERN,
AND JENNIFER WHITNEY, WE ARE EVERYWHERE: THE IRRESISTIBLE RISE OF GLOBAL ANTICAPITALISM, ED.
NOTES FROM NOWHERE, P. HTTP://WWW.NARCONEWS.COM/ISSUE35/ARTICLE1121.HTML]
But all gods have a secret vulnerability: they cease to exist when people no longer believe in them. Trust is the fuel of power. As
corporate collapses and financial scandals rock the markets, and the democratic deficit expands as people desert the charade of
participation by voting, trust is in short supply. And failure of belief in a system spreads fast. A contagious whisper, it ripples through
the multitude, rising to a roar.

The roar was responded to by the World Economic Forum in 2003, when it chose “Rebuilding Trust” as the theme for the gathering.
As preparation for the meeting it commissioned a massive public opinion survey representing the views of 1.4 billion people spanning
every continent. The results, according to the WEF, revealed “that trust in many key institutions has fallen to critical proportions.” The
least-trusted of the 17 institutions in the survey were national governments and corporations. Two-thirds of those surveyed worldwide
disagreed that their country is “governed by the will of the people” and half distrusted the WTO and the IMF to operate in the best
interest of society. The crisis of legitimacy has hit uncontainable proportions. According to a leaked email from a writer invited to
Davos in 2003, the fear amongst the guests was palpable. “These people are freaked out,” she wrote, describing her dinner
conversations with the elite. Despite their privilege and wealth, they know that their legitimacy is waning, that we have seen through
them, that when trust has been eroded it becomes increasingly difficult to wield power.

Refusing to Cooperate

“The tap root of power lies below the surface. It is obedience, cooperation, collusion: the social glue that ensures that each day
proceeds much like the last. Every single one of us has the power to give or withhold our willing participation. To ‘reproduce’ or
reshape society.”

– Alex Begg, Empowering the Earth: Strategies for Social Change, Green Books

We are led to believe that the system of power is like a pyramid, similar to a food chain with the dominant species at the top
maintaining its control over those at the bottom through superior strength and violence. But if an avalanche swept away all at Davos
tomorrow, not much would really change because the power the Davos class accrues, through their ownership of capital, extends
everywhere.

There is a secret, however, that those on the mountaintop rarely reveal, which is that their power exists to some extent because we
allow it to. They want us to believe that they wield power over us with their weapons and armies and police forces, and although their
violence is highly effective in disrupting our movements, hurting our bodies and making us afraid, violence alone can’t guarantee their
continued existence. Ultimately, it depends upon us believing in their power, in their immutability, and failing to recognize our own.
This was the substance of Shelley’s furious ballad of 1819 when he wrote the famous lines to Manchester’s working poor after troops
fired on them in the Peterloo massacre: “Rise, like lions after slumber / In unvanquishable number/ Shake your chains to earth like
dew / Which in sleep had fall’n on you! / Ye are many, and they are few.”

In reality, the system is more like a huge wedding cake than a pyramid: multiple layers of dominance held up by many pillars – pillars
which are institutions and individuals, values and belief systems. Successful movement strategies, therefore, are those that identify the
key pillars in society, and work to weaken their compliance until they break. As we take away one pillar, others begin to wobble and
the system trembles.

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ALT: IMMANENT REVOLUTION
THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE PROLETARIAT DEPENDS ON ITS IMMANENCE WITHIN OBJECTIVE SOCIAL ORDER
WHICH IS THE PRODUCT OF CAPITALISM—THIS IS IN THE UNIVERSAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE
FORCES WHICH ALLOWS THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SUBJECT TO END THE VIOLENT CYCLE
OF POLITICS BY TRANSITIONING AWAY FROM THE CAPITALISTIC IDEOLOGY AND WITHERING A THE
GOVERNMENT INTO A ADMINISTRATING BODY

LACLAU, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX, UK AND PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE
LITERATURE AT THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, BUFFALO, 2004, [ERNESTO, “CAN IMMANENCE
EXPLAIN SOCIAL STRUGGLES?” PROJECT MUSE, ACCESSED 7/30/06]
In the same way that, with modernity, immanence ceased to be a theological concept and became fully secularized, the religious
notion of evil becomes, with the modern turn, the kernel of what we can call "social antagonism." What the latter retains from the
former is the notion of a radical disjuncture—radical in the sense that it cannot be reabsorbed by any deeper objectivity which would
reduce the terms of the antagonism to moments of its own internal movement—for example, the development of productive forces or
any other form of immanence. Now, I would contend that it is only by accepting such a notion of antagonism—and its corollary,
which is radical social division—that we are confronted with forms of social action that can truly be called political. To show why this
is so, I will consider an early text by Marx that I have discussed fully elsewhere. 4 In it, Marx opposes a purely human revolution to a
merely political one. The differential feature is that in the former a universal subject emerges in and for itself. In the words of Marx:
"By proclaiming the dissolution of the hitherto world order the proletariat merely states the secret of its own existence, for it is in fact
the dissolution of that world order." To put it in terms close to Hardt and Negri's: the universality of the proletariat fully depends on its
immanence within an objective social order which is entirely the product of capitalism—which is, in turn, a moment in the universal
development of the productive forces. But, precisely for that reason, the universality of the revolutionary subject entails the end of
politics—that is, the beginning of the withering away of the State and the transition (according to the Saint-Simonian motto adopted
by Marxism) from the government of men to the administration of things.

As for the second revolution—the political one—its distinctive feature is, for Marx, an essential asymmetry: that between the
universality of the task and the particularism of the agent carrying it out. Marx describes this asymmetry in nonequivocal terms: a
certain regime is felt as universal oppression, and that allows the particular social force able to lead the struggle against it to present
itself as a universal liberator—universalizing, thus, its particular objectives. Here we find the real theoretical watershed in
contemporary discussions: either we assert the possibility of a universality which is not politically constructed and mediated, or we
assert that all universality is precarious and depends on a historical construction out of heterogeneous elements. Hardt and Negri
accept the first alternative without hesitation. If, conversely, we accept the second, we are on the threshold of the Gramscian
conception of hegemony. (Gramsci is another thinker for whom—understandably, given their premises—Hardt and Negri show little
sympathy.)

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A REVOLUTION CANNOT BE DESCRIBED BY INDIVIDUALS AGAINST THE REVOLUTION. ONLY BY TAKING THE
REVOLUTION’S IMMANENCE SERIOUSLY CAN WE RESIST THE STRATIFICATION ENDORSED BY THE
BUREAUCRACY

MIÉVILLE, AWARD WINNING NOVELIST AND PHD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS,
JULY 1, 2005 [CHINA, INTERVIEWED BY JOHN PISTELLI & ALPHONSE VAN WORDEN, “'A TRULY MONSTROUS THING TO DO': THE
CHINA MIÉVILLE INTERVIEW, PART ONE,” LONG SUNDAY, HTTP://WWW.LONG-SUNDAY.NET/LONG_SUNDAY/2005/07/
A_TRULY_MONSTRO.HTML]

CM: We're talking about the difference between race and class, or what becomes a kind of people-class -

AvW: running up against very sort of clotted circumstance - plotty circumstance - there is always this struggle between the plot per se
and the woven implied plot in which it is embedded with varying degrees of 'freedom' for lack of a better word, leeway for
protagonist-proper-plot which then these different metaphors or models of race/ethnicity:class also elaborate, but there is a variety - no
monolithic model or explanation and so a dialogic sociology. It happens for the Vodyanoi this way; for the Remade this way - one
with 'race' imposed recent historically, the others with race of a kind given biologically but then historically developed....It's a seminar
not a lecture.

CM: I hadn't thought of that, so I'm sort of considering as I write...But that makes a lot of sense to me. I'm conscious of two different
elements, which maybe I never brought together in my mind...

AvW: its about determinism it seems to me

Because a revolution described by someone not in a revolution, let alone a post-revolutionary society so described, cannot be anything
other than the palest imitation of the Carnival of the Oppressed that it would be, the earth turned upside down, because our minds are
the minds of those living in an earth stubbornly and annoyingly the right fucking way up so if we take seriously the utter radicalism of
a revolution and after, it is unthinkable for we who aren't there. It either turns into absurdity or bureaucracy, in our telling - but with
the fantastic, *and only with it the revolution's immanence: I was, I am, I shall be.

CM: OK, well there are two things: i) the anxiety of 'plot', and ii) the anxiety of 'race'

AvW: Which are working in tandem

CM: and yes, they are both about determinism. One thing that happens not infrequently in my books is that people realise that they've
been thinking according to plot-logic, and it doesn't work. which is back to genre, narrative, etc. Plot is a constraint, and a lie, and
there are in pretty much all the books, including the one I'm writing, moments where one character or another throws up their hands
and says 'this looks like it's *plot*, but it was just *things that happened*' With race, I repeatedly talk about how characters are not
like the stereotypes of their races and i have characters like Lin [in Perdido Street Station] who have their race, of course, written on
their body, but who are rebels from that racial identity. And they have the room to do that - they can be 'atypical' (ie, non-stereotyped)
garuda, vodyanoi, whatever. Whereas the Remade don't have that option, because their Remadeness is not only written on their body,
but in their social being.*They* may be proud of themselves (those most aren't), but society *actually will not allow them not to be
'typical' Remade*. Because the 'typical' Remade is a thing without rights, and *that's what they are* So the struggle against *that*
determinism is both much harder, and vastly more radical when it is won (finally, briefly, in Iron Council).

AvW: I was meaning to say there seems to be a kind of continuous testing of the degree to which men make their own history in
conditions handed down etc...but that your portray these conditions themselves as the congealed state of these previous attempts -
again the death of Judah Lowe for example... with the third point of the triangle -you can spin that triangle around if you abandon the
pov -which then transforms Judah into a piece of histor being contronted by another striving for action - also with a set of choices - we
don't run through them but they are implied.

CM: Absolutely, absolutely. That's what I meant about being so happy with that ending - what you're talking about is the political
aspect, and that I think makes its points hard. That ending, apart from anything else, is about the perennial debate of when-do-you-act?
if people are acting at the 'wrong' time, should teh radical support them, or tell them they've got it wrong?

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ALT: REJECT EVERYWHERE
WE MUST DESTROY IDEAS THAT ARE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY OR JUST PLAIN WRONG THROUGH EXPOSURE
AND DEBATE.

AVAKIAN, CHAIRMAN OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY USA, 1986 [BOB, DEMOCRACY: CAN’T WE
DO BETTER THAN THAT?,240]
Ideas need challenging. Even wrong ideas or incorrect criticism may raise important questions, besides the fact that criticism of
prevailing ideas may be correct. The masses-as well as party members and especially the leaders of the party and the state under
socialism-need to be exposed to controversy and the struggle over conflicting ideas and criticism of and challenges to accepted ideas
and norms. This is certainly no less necessary under socialism than in capitalist society. And when we are in power we must struggle
to maintain the same willingness-no, more, eagerness-we have now to take on and demolish through exposure and debate
counterrevolutionary or just plain wrong ideas, theories, and so on….division of labor left over from capitalism and previous class-
divided societies. The radical rupture with all that could hardly be accomplished without tradition-challenging, convention-breaking
initiative and without ferment and upheaval in socialist society certainly involving the criticism of, shaking up, and in some cases the
pulling down of leading people.36

AT EACH POINT THAT CAPITALISM EVOLVES, THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS ANTI-CAPITALISM UST ALSO EVOLVE.
WE MUST REJECT CAPITALISM AT EVERY STEP IN ORDER TO HELP THE ANTI-CAPITALIST MOVEMENT EVOLV.
OUR KRITIK DOES JUST THAT.

BALIBAR, ETIENNE, PROFESSOR OF EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL PHIOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS-
I, 1996, POST MODERN MATERIALISM AND THE FUTURE OF MARXIST THEORY, EDS. CALLARI AND RUCCIO, 116-9

Eut this leads us to introduce the notion of antagonism in a new way. It seems to me that Althusser conceived antagonism as the core
of structural causality, that he read in Marx a preeminence of the category of antagonism. The difficulty comes from the fact that (very
much as in the case of "ideology") he attributed to Marx himself a concept of "antagonism" that was almost completely inverted with
respect to its original meaning. Not only the young Marx but also the mature Marx had conceived of irreconcilable contradictions in
capitalism, but they were irreconcilable only in a provisional manner, according to the law of the "negation of the negation," because
they anticipated a final "reconciliation" in communism. The future Communist society was imagined as a free, transparent
"association of humans," which means, as Althusser explained right from the beginning, that Marx never really abandoned the pattern
of alienation, even when he was producing concrete analyses of the capitalist relations of production that, de facto, contradicted this
idealist pattern. As he himself consistently maintained, Althusser's project was to get rid of the notion of alienation in a definitive
manner. Under the name of antagonism, he would think what he himself called a "process without an Origin or an End": an
irreconcilable contradiction that does not require either an originary subject (e.g., the identification of labor as the human essence) or a
final suppression of antagonism.
Hence, from the political point of view, there was an amazing contradiction in Althusser, which his critics perfectly grasped. How to
combine the idea of irreconcilable antagonism and the idea that at every moment there is in capitalism the possibility of its own
overcoming, in the form of class conflict and mass conflict? How to combine the idea that capitalism is not an "eternal" mode of
production and the idea that there is no "reconciliation," that antagonism should not be conceptualized against the background of
social unity as a universal telos?
Now, if we take some distance from Althusser's text, we might perhaps suggest the following interpretation: the root of antagonism,
first of all, is the fact that exploitation is something unbearable for individuals and, above all, for collectivities. This would mean that,
although capitalism actually succeeds in imposing the forms of "real subsumption" upon the labor force—that is, transforming labor
power into a commodity—there is an actual limit to this process. In the last analysis, the form of human labor (both individual and
collective) remains irreducible to the condition of a commodity, which is exactly what we must understand under the name of "the
unbearable."

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This would mean, then, that the capitalist mode of production can never be reproduced in an identical manner. It is impossible for
capitalism to keep the relations of production in the same form in which they existed at a certain moment in history, in a certain phase
of accumulation. I agree on this point with all those Marxists who insist on the necessity of "historicizing" the analysis of the capitalist
mode and relations of production. Capitalism is forced to transform itself, its own modes of exploiting the labor force, its mode of
socializing individuals. It is therefore impossible for capitalism not to evolve, and this is the only possible form of its "reproduction."
This is capitalism's necessity.
As a consequence, for us, too, it is impossible not to evolve. At every moment (not only in some "final" or "catastrophic" stage) the
capitalist system is moving at its edges. A basic instability is underlying its apparent stability (or in less naturalistic, more political,
Machiavellian terms, the reason for its stability is not its intrinsic coherence or its productivity; it is only its ability to gain social
strength through antagonism, its success in using antagonistic forces as its own means of reproduction in the class struggle). We must
admit, therefore, that the necessity for capitalism to continuously transform its own relations of production is also the possibility of a
social practice that is incompatible with the "system." It is the possibility for those anticapitalist forces that the Marxist tradition
identified with the working class or the proletariat, and also for other unpredictable forces or movements, .to insert themselves into the
play of the contradiction.
In other words, structural causality introduced another way of thinking about the relationships of historical time and practice, at least
in principle. Historical time can no longer remain the external, "cosmological," framework in which practice becomes inserted a
posteriori (in this respect, Althusser is probably more of a Hegelian than he thought or than he initially said). Practice, in fact, escapes
the traditional oppositions of philosophy, particularly the binary opposition with theory, because it escapes the opposition of
reproduction and transformation. The basic historical problem is never a dilemma of identity and change; it emerges always in reality
as a problem of which change becomes effective. (And we should not imagine that there exists any guarantee that the "spontaneous"
tendency of change is for the best, not even that there are only two possibilities in every situation. On the contrary, the very logic of
overdetermination and underdetermination would suggest that the alternative is never as simple as that, although it is almost always
ideologically pictured that way.)
This leads me to a final question: to what extent does such a concept of structural causality, in which antagonism is decisive and yet
escapes every totalization, imply the notion of negativity? The question is important because, from Hegel onward, this notion was a
criterion of demarcation between dialectics and positivism, with its cult of "objective tendencies" (more often than not another name
for the existing state of affairs, the reason that many critical Marxists insist on the necessity of "utopia").
I would agree that things here are probably more difficult than Althusser himself had believed, at least at first glance. I-Es critique of
Hegelian and humanistic Marxism would suggest that the Hegelian picture of negativity was inseparable from a (foundational)
category of the subject of history, whether conceived as Spirit, Humankind, or the Proletariat. In other words, it would seem
impossible to define negativity apart from alienation—the alienation of an empirical subject or the alienation of the metaphysical
subject that emerges in universal history. It seems to me that, although he probably never found the best philosophical formulations for
it, at least in his published writings, Althusser progressively realized that the concept of negativity (better said: a certain concept of
negativity) cannot be spared. Without such a concept, there is no real possibility of formulating structural antagonism as something
irreconcilable, rooted in the experience of the unbearable and taking the forms of a "radical" resistance. Therefore, the horizon of
Althusser's project is a question that, admittedly, is especially difficult (and I have no solution for it): the question of whether it is
possible (and philosophically consistent) to think of a negativity without a subject, in the sense of a constituent subject (whether
pictured in psychological, transcendental, or historical terms). I would even dare say: a negativity or an alienation without a subject. I
am thinking of the "alienated" proletariat but also of other social forces that in the history of capitalism become caught in the
movement of generalized valorization, which at the same time becomes the condition for their existence and makes life impossible for
them so that they must "find" a way out. Possibly it is this kind of problem that emerges at the end, without a clear answer, in
Althusser's political and philosophical reflection.

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ALT: MOVEMENTS
SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS ONLY SOLVE IF THEY UNIQUELY INOLVE ALL CLASSES, WHICH IS THE DEFINITION OF
THE MOVEMENT WE CREATE. OUR ALTERNATIVE GAINS THIS CONCIOUS AND THE POWER TO OVERTHROW
CAPITLISM AND THE REPRESSION IT CREATES.

BURBACH, ROGER, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE AMERICAS, THE (UN)DEFINING OF
POSTMODERN MARXISM: ON SMASHING MODERNIZATION AND NARRATING NEW SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ACTORS,
SPRING 1998, RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 10 NUMBER 1, 59-60

It is also important to realize that the complex social movements along with the working classes are not the only basis for radical
change. Here we have to look to the large and growing sector of humanity that has been variously called the underclass, the
marginalized, or the castaways of the capitalist world. Doug Henwood (1996) is wrong in his critique of postmodernism and
specifically in his criticism of Jeremy Rifkin's The End of Work (1995). Rifkin and others point to the decline of the direct
employment of workers in basic industries by corporations and big business. "Dead capital," or machines along with microchips have
assumed greater and greater importance in the era of automation and robotization. The dramatic rise of unemployment in Western
Europe in recent years is the most obvious manifestation of this tendency of capitalism. This in tum leads to a dramatic expansion of
the underclass, those who can find no regular employment and are marginalized.
While many of the manufacturing jobs are migrating to the third world, manufacturing employment in that part of the world will never
absorb the numbers it once did in the Western economies. The Intemational Labor Organization reports that 30 percent of the world's
work force is currently unemployed or underemployed. Countries like the so-called Asian Tigers and Brazil and Mexico have
developed significant industrial working classes with the growth of manufacturing, but they do not constitute a majority of the
working-age population in the third world or even within their own countries. This lack of industrial and formal, structured jobs
explains why increasing numbers of people are forced to live on the margins as part of an informal economy.
Henwood (1996) is partially right when he argues that many workers become part-time or contracted employees in this era of "flexible
employment" and flexible accumulation, but this only underscores the difficulty of organizing people against capital in the workplace
since there are fewer and fewer centralized work sites. These two interacting tendencies of late capitalism—its flexibility and its
marginalization of peoples, and even entire countries as is happening in Africa—compel us to reconceive who the antagonists of
capitalism are and how they can be organized. Certainly trade unions will continue to be important, but it is just as important to
develop viable strategies to organize the underclass and the marginalized, as well as to incorporate the social movements in the
process of radical social change.
What is lacking is any sort of common consciousness among this diverse group of economic and social actors, but this is where radical
postmodern Marxist thought, by articulating what is happening in the real world, can help narrate a new approach for social
transformation that includes the social movements as well as the growing economic underclass that is marginalized by late capitalism.
Our main task is to begin undertaking an analysis of the new social actors for change, along with showing how they can interact and
confront the dominant political and economic classes. In a certain sense we are attempting to do for the epoch of globalization what
Mail did for the era of industrial capitalism—namely, describing the political and social processes at work and presenting a coherent
approach for change that intellectuals and social activists can use to mobilize and organize, to help galvanize those at the bottom to
transform the system.

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ALT: MOVEMENTS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF VAST AND VARYING MOVEMENTS IS THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT REPRESSIVE REGIME. ALONG
WITH A GENERAL CONCEPT AND UNDERSTANDING OF POSTMODERN MARXISM, WE HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO STOP CAPITALISM
BURBACH, ROGER, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE AMERICAS , THE (UN)DEFINING OF
POSTMODERN MARXISM: ON SMASHING MODERNIZATION AND NARRATING NEW SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ACTORS,
SPRING 1998, RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 10 NUMBER 1, 62-63
The development of the ethnic and fundamentalist movements dovetails with the building of these postmodern economies. Most
nationalist movements are opposed to the dominance of Western and transnational capital; they are demanding control of their own economic resources. The.Indians of.
Chiapas, the Muslim Nation of Farrakahn, the Islamic movements in the Middle East—they are all resentful of the economic domination of their societies by foreign or
outside interests. They often preach self-reliance, which sometimes appears as a separatist or even conservative message, but this approach is necessary if they are to
break with the historic tendency of outside capital to exploit their societies and economies. To the extent that these ethnic and national movements gain
control of their lives and resources, they will be in a position to help construct a new global mode of production.
As under historic socialism, consciousness of the new project is crucial. To mobilize and consolidate the diverse group of nascent producers,
a new narrative needs to counterpose grass-roots economic development to the domination of big capital just as Marx and Engels
pitted the working class, against the bourgeoisie. The mere existence of the new economic and social formations is not a sufficient
condition for overthrowing the old order. A new approach and a new leadership is needed that roots itself firmly in the economic and
social transformations occurring in contemporary societies and that undertakes the long social struggle necessary to overwhelm big
capital and its project of modernization.
The social movements, broadly defined, could be the major protagonists of this new approach. The representatives of these movements and
organizations have the potential to understand and articulate what is going on among the ever swelling numbers of castaways of global capitalism: They already
challenge neoliberalism and globalization in many different ways. They fight to stop the destruction of the environment, they are by
and large antiauthoritarian and democratic in their structures and principles, they are generally opposed to the domination of
multinational capital, and they are based on grass-roots activity. The women's movement, the ethnic rights movements, the human rights organizations,
the gay and lesbian movements, the disabled, the Indians, the environmentalists, and others—all demand fundamental changes in the existent world so that humanity
can be liberated and freed from exploitation.
New leadership and values also are emerging from nongovernmental organizations, especially in the underdeveloped world, and from
progressive religious movements, particularly thoserooted in exploited societies or ethnic groups. The goal of these social movements
and organizations is not simply power, but the alteration of values at the level of civil society. They refuse to be controlled or
contained. They provide alternatives to the bankrupt political parties and state authority. Many of the leaders of these movements even
question whether it is appropriate to hold state power at present, understanding the need to accumulate more forces, to develop more
coherent ideas and values that can really change societies and the global economy. Communism failed in part because it was born
prematurely. The same mistake shouldn't be made again of launch- ing a project of state power that will be stillborn or aborted
because the full-blown 'elements do not exist yet for building a new society. For years to come, the new economy will develop in an
evolutionary rather than revolutionary manner. Capitalism is experiencing fundamental problems from which there may be no exit.
But this does not mean that capitalism will necessarily collapse. It could continue as the dominant economic order even in the midst of
crisis. In fact, a form of modern barbarism is a real alternative that we could face in the next millennium as societies are decimated by
neoliberalism and globalization. But it is precisely during cycles of slow growth and periodic crises that the Left can more rapidly
pursue alternative economic approaches, pushing from below for the advance of popular economic interests. At the same time, we will
need to advocate new legislation that empowers all forms of alternative production and commerce while undermining the ascendancy
of finance and monopoly capital. Capitalism will enter into a definitive crisis only when enough alternative institutions exist to
challenge it.
In another paper I use the tenn "virtually existing socialisms" because a variety of socialisms are already making their appearance at the grass roots (Burbach 1997).
We need to break with the classical Marxist approach of seeing political revolutions as the principal or sole means of transforming
societies. The transition from capitalism to socialism will occur much as the transition from feudalism to capitalism occurred: it will
be a gradual process in which radical actions and activities, economic as well as social and political, take hold in the midst of the
capitalist order. It is a socialism of place, a socialism with a purely local agenda. The genius of it is that every effort to raise consciousness or to
develop self-help projects at the local level are part of this process: all local efforts contribute to the building of new socialisms. They exist here and now, even if
capitalism retains control of the global economy and the formal political systems.
Furthermore, there is no single agent of social change in this process such as the working class. Rather, change is carried out by a variety
of social actors and movements on a continual basis, of which trade unions and workers are only one. The veryponcept of false consciousness
used by classical Marxists as an explanation for why the working class is not revolutionary has to be stood on its head. Today, those bent on carrying out fundamental
changes in our lives and our ways of thinking (such as the feminist, environmental, and gay movements) have little or no "consciousness" of socialism and Marxism.
And yet they, rather than Marxists and self-proclaimed socialists, are having a much more.profound effect on societies and peoples around the world.
The very concept of postmodern Marxism is a temporal one. It will not become a banner that people fight and die for; rather, postmodern Marxism
is a conceptual framework for viewing the diverse and different struggles that are unfolding in the era of globalization. These movements
over a period of time will have to frame and characterize their struggles from the ground up, creating local, regional, and iffernational ties to other struggles and
movements. Only they have the capacity to create a grand new narrative that is capable of challenging globalization and replacing the state socialism of the twentieth
century.

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ALT: SOLVES FEMINISM
THE AFF’S SOLVENCY OF PATRIARCHY IS A JOKE. ONLY THROUGH RED FEMINISM’S PERVASIVE AND RADICAL
CRITIQUE OF EXISITING SOCIAL STRUCTURES CAN WE EVER BEGIN TO SOLVE.

EBERT, TERESA, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT SUNY-ALBANY, THE KNOWABLE GOOD: POST-AL
POLITICS, ETHICS, AND RED FEMINISM, SUMMER 1995 RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 8 NUMBER 2, 40-1

In contrast, transformative politics—which is the project of a new Red Feminism (Ebert 1995b)—involves radical interventions in both
the prevailing relations of , production and its superstructural forms. It seeks to end the exploitation and divisions I of labor; to abolish
private property and to restructure social relations to meet the needs of all people. It is based on a historical materialist theory and praxis
and works dialectically, engaging the interconnections between base and superstructure; between relations of production and signifying
practices. I am, of course, aware that the concepts of base and superstructure, labor, needs, and the priority of class have been so
discredited by ludic postmodem and feminist theorists as to become largely , "unsayable" in these post-al times. But these are precisely
the times in which we have to reclaim the basic precepts of historical materialism: to rethink what has become unthinkable in the post-
al logic and to build a Red Feminism in the international struggle against patriarchal-capitalism. Red Feminism does not reject the
cultural or discursive as sites of political struggle but rather argues that these need to be understood in their specific historical
connections to the relations of production and in the class struggle in order to open up a space for an emancipatory politics to end the
exploitation of women and all people globally.
In order to develop a transformative politics in postmodernity, we need to radically critique the way it has been supplanted by post-al
politics and to intervene in the ludic logic that supports post-ality. The crux of all ludic postmodern and feminist theories is the rewriting
of the social as largely discursive (thus marked by die traits of linguisticdifference), local, contingent, asystematic, and indeterminate.
The consequences of this idealist move are made clear by Laclau, who develops a ludic social theory "identifying the social with an
infinite play of differences" (Laclau 1993, 39). Following Jacques Derrida, he argues that "to conceive of social relations as
articulations of differences is to conceive them as signifying relations"—that is, as discursive or semiotic processes. Not only is the
social "de-centered," according to Laclau, but social relations, like all "signifying systems," are"ultimately arbitrary" (Laclau 1993,
40-41). Asa result, they cannot be subjected to such determining relations as exploitation and thus no longer require emancipation. The
other side of this logic is the dematerialization of social relations as they are cut off from the material relations of production and
turned into a superstructural matrix of discursive processes, narratives, and the textual play of differing significations. Postmodern
reality, for ludic theorists, becomes, a "crisis of narratives," as Lyotard has called it (Lyotard 1984, xxiii). It is a crisis in which all
"texts" and signifying activities—including all social relations—can no longer provide reliable knowledge of the real. This textualized
"real" (e.g., "society," "history") becomes unreliable, indeterminate, "impossible," because meaning (signification) itself is seen as
self-divided and undecidable. Those entities we take to bethe same—that is, identical with themselves and marked by their differences
from (between) others—are shown instead to be supplementary to their others and different within themselves. Asa result, politics, for
ludic postmodernists, can no longer be grounded on clear identities and oppositions norcan itbe situated in a reality "outside"
representation as a "referent" for action. Any transformative or materialist politics—any emancipatory politics—based on the struggle
against hierarchies of differences (such as the class struggle, peasant or workers' movements, women's liberation movements,
anticolonial movements, civil-rights movements are seen as foundationless.

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COMMUNISM HAS AN ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO HELP “THE OTHER,” AND ONLY THROUGH RADICAL SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION CAN THIS GOAL BE MET

HOROWITZ AND HOROWITZ, ASHER AND GAD, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT YORK
UNIVERSITY AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, AN ETHICAL
ORIENTATION FOR MARXISWM: GERAS AND LEVINAS, APRIL 2003, RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 15 NUMBER 2,
193-4
If Geras has stopped short of Levinas's ethical revolution, Levinas, close as he may come, stops short of recognition of the necessity of
radical social transformation. He never comes over from the philosophical/phenomenological discussion to consideration of the
process of historical social change. Therefore, his work does not easily repel liberal or even conservative readings. Without radical
social transformation, the duty to bring aid, though not erased as a moral requirement by the contract of mutual indifference, will
nonetheless be projected ever forward, never to be realized as the practically effective central principle of a new form of human
civilization. As a projection ever forward, Levinas's revolution in ethics strongly risks beg appropriated as ideology.
For communists like us, nothing could be more important than taking revolutionary action, action aimed at bringing into existence "an
alternative ethical landscape" which would give "real practical force" to the obligation to bring aid to the other (Geras 1998, 57). The
insistence that without this the Levinasian texts must be inscribed among the ineffective moralisms, would be convincing to us.
Although there are frequent calls for economic justice in Levinas's writings,2 they have not prevented his recuperation by pious,
conservative Jewish and Christian clerics who endorse and exaggerate the projection ever forward of the realization of a new form of
human civilization as a wise and profound "moderation." Liberals and social democrats, like the editors of Philosophy Today
(Summer 1999, Special Issue on Levinas), have also domesticated Levinas, lining him up with Vaclav Havel and Jan Sokol, giving
him partial credit for the "fact" that "human rights, fifty years after they were enshrined in the U.N. Charter, have finally become a
primary obligation. At least ... in principle."
Curving Social Space
Communism will have to be, in the first instance, for the other. Not for me or for us as the ensemble of me's. Only in its secondary,
institutional dimensions can it be for us, for each and all of us. After reading Levinas it would be impossible not to be extremely wary
of formulations such as these by Kai Neilsen: in a classless society, insofar as we are concerned with ethics, "we would start from our
culturally speaking deeply embedded norms that go with our interlocked set of institutions." It is the cultural norms that make us
"recognizably human." Morality is a set of "social institutions" whose "principal function" is "to reconcile interests." The point of
communism is to satisfy many more interests than ever before in history, and more equitably than ever before (Nielsen 1989, 265-70).
No doubt communist society should do this, but this is not what makes a communist society. The world to be won is the world in
which the imperative to mandatory care has real practical effect because it is a world which no lohger represses my Desire continually
to give the world to you. Communism for the other, and not for all the selves, would not define the human being by membership in
any community. Community itself would be the form taken by singularity—that is, by individuality as radical responsibility to the
other. "The determinations" of the social are an "inner structure of obligation" (Srajek 2000, 240). Marx's statement that human nature
is the ensemble of social relations needs to be understood differently in the light of Levinas's ethical revolution, inasmuch as the social
relation at bottom is not reciprocal. According to Levinas the "secret of society" is a "total gratuitousness" harbored by responsibility
(1999, 30). "Like a shunt, every social relation leads back to the presentation of the Other to the same without any image or sign,
solely by the expression of the Face" (Levinas 1969, 213). Here the curvature of Marian social space is expressed by Levinas. This
would be the meaning of "the ensemble of social relations."
In this space, to use Geras's words, "shame and the foretaste of it" would be "an effective mobilizing form of social life" (Geras 1998,
57). And shame is not something foreign to Marx's outlook. As Shanin reminds us, "Marx's socialism carried an irreducible moral
component (and a related emotional one, for it was Marx who once remarked that 'shame is a revolutionary sentiment')" (1983, 265).
The shame that accompanies responsibility, basic as opposed to surplus shame, is not the shame I feel for something I am or lack; it is
not the shame pertaining to anything I am said to be (class, ethnicity). Basic shame is simply the singularizing burden of my being for
the other, and a burden that can never be decreased. The lack of "identity shame" that communist society presupposes would be a
lessening of the burden of inhuman shame historically imposed. That lessening would compel and allow me even more to take up the
better burden of shame without which, in Geras's words, I am indifferent, I "stand condemned" as a mere piece of insentient nature.
Thus my responsibility, for all its burden, is not an oppression or an impoverishment. It is "a misfortune of the happy, a luxurious
need" (Levinas 1969, 62)3

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ALT: SOCIAL CHANGE SOLVENCY
ONLY SOCIALISM CAN ALLOW INDIVIDUALS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS ON THEIR OWN BECAUSE CAPITALISM PRODUCES ONE-SIDED
INDIVDIUALS WHO ARE UNABLE TO EVEN IDENTIFY THE PROBELEMS IN OUR SOCIETY. WHEN A SOCIETY TRANSITIONS TO MARXISM,
INDIVDIDUALS ARE FINALLY ABLE TO SEE THE WHOLE AND THERE IS FINALLY THE ABILITY TO HAVE CENTRALIZED PLANNING.

AMARIGILIO AND RUCCIO, JACK AND DAVID, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT MERRIMACK COLLEGE AND PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT
NOTRE DAME , POSTMODERNISM, MARXISM, AND THE CRITIQUE OF MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT, FALL 1994, RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 7
NUMBER 3, 30-1

Finally as Althusser, Barry Hindess and Paul Hisrt Resnick and Wolff (1987a, I987b), and others have argued, there is a distinct
Marxian notion of knowledge which eschews the premises and logical consequences of classical—empiricist and rationalist—
epistemology.. We call this notion of knowledge postmodern because, in our view, it tends to demote the idea of certainty and replaces
it with forms of cognition that tend toward uncertainty (at least in the sense of indeterminism). The critique of epistemology we refer
to is known well enough, at least to readers of Rethinking MARXISM, for us not to, replicate it here (see also Amariglio 1987). But,
we do want to add the idea that this critique not only holds for the practice of economic "scientists" but is meant to describe the modes
of production and types of knowledge that are possible, fort economic agents—the objects of economic analysis—as well. The
overdetermina, Lion of all events and the basic discursivity of knowledge—knowledge is not a mirror of nature but is constituted in
and by discourse—precludes the idea that there is a relation of adequacy of correspondence between one's knowledge and the "real"
outside of it. The "relativism" that this concept of knowledge implies is not, to our mind, a statement of the impossibility of
knowledge. To the contrary, it indicates the plurality of and (often incommensurable) differences between knowledges and suggests
that the means of choosing among them is not a question of fording an interdiscursive form of truth but primarily (although not
exclusively) evaluating their perceived theoretical and social effects. The "ever-lasting uncertainty" of Marx and Engels can therefore
be attributed to the irreducible plurality of know, ledges and the fact that these knowledges can, at best, produce only contingent and
not necessarily transcendental truths.
On this point, then, the distinction between capitalism and socialism as pertaining to the differential possibilities for knowledge (or
lack thereof) is modernist in its basic premises. For modernist Marxism, the relativism that marks capitalism is attributed to the fact
that it tends to fracture and segregate individuals and groups on the basis of the division of labor and membership in different classes.
That is; capitalism produces "one-sided" individuals who lack the ability to perceive the whole and therefore to possess true
knowledge. The possibility for seeing the totality, of course, rests historically with the class-conscious proletariat, and Marxism's
conceit in this matter is that it claims to provide the working class with the "science" to turn its spontaneous perception of the many-
sided (and therefore concrete) totality into a consistent theory of that totality and to eventually transform it, In modernist Marxism,
then, socialism marks the moment of the historical transcendence of one-sidedness (abstractness) and allows potentially all of its
tierithers to see the whole. Thus, for example, planning can succeed where markets could not in discerning all of the needs underlying
the plan and in calculating all of the effects of instituting it. The relativism (one-sidedness) and uncertainty of capitalism is overcome
by rational planning whose objective basis—the victory of The proletariat, with its full appreciation of the totality—guarantees in
advance the superiority of its knowledge and practice.
Postmodern Marxist discourse regards this view as unhelpful and ultimately damaging in distinguishing between capitalism and
socialism. For it is clear, to us at ease socialism has been and will be beset with the multiplicity of knowledges and the radical
uncertainty that goes along with the contingency of events and the persistence of ideology. The destruction that has been done, we
add, to peoples jiving under socialist regimes and to the very concept of socialism as a result of the aim by the party or state to have
privileged (but not partisan) objective knowledge has been considerable. For us, socialist planning will always be marked by the
mediation of different knowledges and subjectivities, and the resulting plan, a 'contingent act if there ever was one, may need to
declare itself as partisan, provisional, and uncertain of its effects if it is to avoid the disasters that have befallen planning mechanisms
that have been infused with modernist explanations and ideals, utopian though they may be. The totalizing promise of rational central-
ized planning is a modernist one. The declared partiality, relativism, and uncertainty of planning is, in contrast, postmodern.

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OUR ALTERNATIVE COLLAPSES THE WHOLE SOCIAL SPACE THAT INHABITS CAPITALISM. THIS ALLOWS US TO FINALLY SEE THAT
SOCIALISM IS THE BEST GOVERNMENTAL FORM AS WELL AS TO RESTRUCTURE SOCIETY. WE BRING TRUE SOCIAL CHANGE.

CALLARI & RUCCIO, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE, ECONOMICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE
DAME; 1996, [ANTONIO, DAVID F.; POST MODERN MATERIALISM AND THE FUTURE OF MARXIST THEORY P. 21-23]

Such a reconstruction of the primitive narrative of Midst discourse (or, to turn it upside down, this particular identification of the
nature of the bourgeois construction of the social space as a homogeneity against which Marxist discourse must militate) has
significant consequences for the way in which the discourse would produce an imaginary of socialism and a narrative of the
process(es) of achieving it. It has significant consequences, that is, for the questions of subjectivity and historical agency. If, in fact,
capitalism is conceived as a mode of oppressive economic relations predicated not upon or not only upon a particular mode of setting
the parameters of the economic'calculus—a particular quantification of the law of the division of labor—but based on a simultaneous
cultural and political homogenization of the space of social interaction and of material production, then, in fact, the imaginary of
socialism must explode not only the capitalist parameters of the economic calculus but also, and in a deeper Foucauldean sense, the
homogeneity of that social space. (A socialist imaginary that would only replace the capitalist parameters of the economic calculus but
leave operative the space of labor and of production as a homogeneous space can—and did—become a condition of Stalinism).33 A
socialist imaginary must, in other words, be of a mode of organizing material processes of production that—rather than subsuming
again, as capitalist production attempts, the specificity of the different needs and different struggles of different communities—would
recognize and respond to those needs and struggles, or at least provide a space (of radically democratic interaction) in which those
needs and aspirations can be negotiated according to the structure of a "gift economy" and within a culture of liberatory politics in
general.
What then would be the role of the working class? As was the case with classical Marxism, the historical role of the working class
could still be discursively constructed by reference to the position the working class occupies in the structure of the capitalist economy
and in accordance with the nature of the site it fills; as such, the role of the working class—this specific horse of Marxism—would
depend on the conception of the space of labor power (the mode of being of the working class) in capitalism. But in the reformulation
of Marxism we have just suggested, the centrality of labor power is not grounded in a no longer existent ontology of labor. Instead, the
space of labor power is a location (doubtless there are many others) of confluence between alternative social states—between, on one
hand, the social "logic" of capital, which would reduce labor power simply to a commodity and, on the other, the social imaginary that
in particular circumstances can struggle to free itself from the logic of capital and create an altemative social logic. Labor power, in
other words, is not the site of a predetermined class struggle between always-already constituted economic interests, with each side
representing what the other is not—precisely the kind of unity that can be contained within the system-building strategies of classical
Marxism. Instead, labor power needs to be conceived as the site of a struggle between the existing (but not given) and a groped-for
(always possible but never predetermined) radically new alternative, between the bourgeois project of homogenization and a socialist
project of needs and community-based economic activities. Moreover, this type of reworking of economic categories can be carried
out with respect to all the other identifiable sites of confluence or condensation in the economic sphere, sites such as "the law,"
"consumption," "development policy," and so on, wherein a tension exists between the logic of the given and the imaginary of an
alternative. As the essays by Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff and by Bruce Roberts in this volume demonstrate, many of the
existing Marxian economic categories can be rescued from the modernist cast within which they have traditionally been molded. The
resulting new categories can then be set forward to reap the harvest of difficulties and challenges associated with the attempt to
conceive both open (because conjunctural) historical processes and equally open (because heterogeneous) social spaces.
This restructuring gives to the dimensions of historical agency (whether by individuals or groups, both class and nonclass) and of
ideology and consciousness a new position in the social totality. In fact, the new arrangement seems to us to revalorize these
dimensions, removing them from their position of functional dependence on a given structure of economic relations and elevating
them to full partners in the negotiation of social dynamics. As Negri (and, with him, Lock) suggests in his essay below, if in fact there
are no structurally preassigned places, if in fact the identities of social agents do not need to conform to such places but are rather
always negotiated at the margins of the given (between it and the imaginary "other"), then the role of ideology and consciousness is
implicated in the very process of constituting such places and identities. In this light, Marxist theory cannot construct an identity of
itself as merely a theory about society, a reflection of an already constituted position in that society, but must recognize its own
involvement in the process of social change, as part of the universe of competing discursive formations, in the creation of social
identities, particular forms of perception angency.

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AT: PERMUTATION/NO MOVEMENT*****
THE MOVEMENT IS ALREADY THERE, WHAT WE NEED TO UNITE IT IS TO UNIVERSALIZE THE STRUGGLE;
COOPERATION WITHIN THE EXSTING SYSTEM ONLY LEGITIMIZES IT AND STOPS THE REVOLUTION

ZIZEK, 2002 (SLAVOJ, SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE KULTURWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INSTITUT IN ESSEN
[AMONG OTHER THINGS], “A PLEA FOR LENINIST INTOLERANCE,” CULTURAL INQUIRY, WINTER, PROQUEST)

Today we can already discern the signs of a kind of general unease. Recall the series of events usually listed under the name of Seattle.
The ten-year honeymoon of triumphant global capitalism is over; the longoverdue seven-year itch is here-witness the panicked
reactions of big media, which from Time magazine to CNN suddenly started to warn about the Marxists manipulating the crowd of
"honest" protesters. The problem is now the strictly Leninist one: how to actualize the media's accusations, how to invent the
organizational structure that will confer on this unrest the form of a universal political demand. Otherwise the momenturn will be lost,
and what will remain is a marginal disturbance, perhaps organized as a new Greenpeace, endowed with a certain efficiency but also
strictly limited goals, marketing strategy, and so forth. In other words, the key Leninist lesson today is that politics without the
organizational form of the party is politics without politics, so the answer to those who want just the (quite adequately named) new
social movements is the same as the answer of the Jacobins to the Girondin compromisers: "You want revolution without a
revolution!" Today's challenge is that there are two ways open for sociopolitical engagement: either play the game of the system,
engage in the long march through the institutions, or get active in new social movements, from feminism to ecology to antiracism.
And, again, the limit of these movements is that they are not political in the sense of the universal singular: they are one-issue
movements that lack the dimension of universality; that is, they do not relate to the social totality.

Here, Lenin's reproach to liberals is crucial. They only exploit the working classes' discontent to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the
conservatives instead of identifying with it to the end.16 Is this also not the case with today's left liberals? They like to evoke racism,
ecology, workers' grievances, and so on to score points over the conservatives without endangering the system. Recall how, at Seattle,
Bill Clinton himself deftly referred to the protesters on the streets outside, reminding the gathered leaders inside the guarded palaces
that they should listen to the message of the demonstrators (a message that, of course, Clinton interpreted, depriving it of the
subversive sting attributed to the dangerous extremists introducing chaos and violence into the majority of peaceful protesters). It's the
same with all new social movements, up to the Zapatistas in Chiapas: systemic politics is always ready to listen to their demands, thus
depriving them of their proper political sting. The system is by definition ecumenic, open, tolerant, ready to listen to all; even if one
insists on one's demands, they are deprived of their universal political sting by the very form of negotiation.

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NEGOTIATION COOPTS OUR ABILITY TO RADICALLY RESTRUCTURE SOCIETY-WE MUST DOGMATICALLY STICK TO THE
REVOLUTION OR IT WILL BE DILUTED AND REARTICULATED BACK INTO CAPITALIST STRUCTURES

ZIZEK, 2002 (SLAVOJ, SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE KULTURWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INSTITUT IN ESSEN [AMONG OTHER THINGS],
“A PLEA FOR LENINIST INTOLERANCE,” CULTURAL INQUIRY, WINTER, PROQUEST)

So how are we to respond to the eternal dilemma of the radical Left? Should one strategically support center-left figures like Bill
Clinton against the conservatives, or should one adopt the stance of "It doesn't matter, we shouldn't get involved in these fights-in a
way, it is even better if the Right is directly in power, since, in this way, it will be easier for the people to see the truth of the
situation?" The answer is the variation of old Stalin's answer to the question "Which deviation is worse, the rightist or the leftist one?"
They are both worse. What one should do is adopt the stance of the proper dialectical paradox. In principle, of course, one should be
indifferent toward the struggle between the liberal and conservative poles of today's official politics. However, one can only afford to
be indifferent if the liberal option is in power. Otherwise, the price to be paid may appear much too high-recall the catastrophic
consequences of the German Communist Party's decision in the early thirties not to focus on the struggle against the Nazis, with the
justification that the Nazi dictatorship is the last, desperate stage of the capitalist domination, which will open eyes to the working
class, shattering their belief in bourgeois democratic institutions. Along these lines, Claude Lefort himself, whom no one can accuse of
communist sympathies, recently made a crucial point in his answer to Francois Furet: today's liberal consensus is the result of 150
years of the leftist workers' struggle and pressure upon the state; it incorporated demands that were one hundred or even fewer years
ago dismissed by liberals as horror.4 As proof, one should just look at the list of the demands at the end of the Communist Manifesto.
Apart from two or three of them (which, of course, are the key ones), all others are today part of the consensus (at least that of the
disintegrating welfare state): universal suffrage, the right to free education, universal health care, care for the retired, limitation of
child labor, and so on.

Today, in a time of continuous swift changes, from the digital revolution to the retreat of old social forms, this thought is more than
ever exposed to the temptation of losing its nerve, of precociously abandoning the old conceptual coordinates. The media constantly
bombard us with the need to abandon the old paradigms, insisting that if we are to survive we have to change our most fundamental
notions of personal identity, society, environment, and so forth. New Age wisdom claims that we are entering a new "posthuman" era;
postmodern political thought is telling us that we are entering a postindustrial phase in which the old categories of labor, collectivity,
class, and the like are theoretical zombies, no longer applicable to the dynamics of modernization. And the same holds for
psychoanalysis: starting from the rise of the ego-psychology in the 1930s, psychoanalysts have been losing their nerve, laying down
their (theoretical) arms, hastening to concede that the oedipal matrix of socialization is no longer operative, that we live in times of
universalized perversion, that the concept of repression is of no use in our permissive times. The Third Way ideology and political
practice is effectively the model of this defeat, of this inability to recognize how the new is here to enable the old to survive. Against
this temptation, one should rather follow the unsurpassed model of Pascal and ask the difficult question: how are we to remain faithful
to the old in the new conditions? Only in this way can we generate something effectively new.

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AT: PERMUTATION

ŽIŽEK, SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL STUDIES (LJUBLJANA), 2004 [SLAVOJ,
CONVERSATIONS WITH ŽIŽEK, P. 45]
On the one hand, I do consider myself an extreme Stalinist philosopher. That is to say, it’s clear where I stand. I don’t believe in
combing things. I hate this approach of taking a little but from Lacan, a little but from Foucault, a little bit from Derrida. No, I don’t
believe in this; I believe in clear cut positions. I think that the most arrogant position is this apparent, multidisciplinary modesty of
‘what I am saying is not unconditional, it is just a hypothesis’, and so on. It is really the most arrogant position. I think that the only
way to be honest and to expose yourself to criticism is to state clearly and dogmatically where you are. You must take the risk and
have a position.

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AT: CAPITALISM GOOD / INEVITABLE (NO ALT)
THIS IS A RUSE OF IDEOLOGY AND CAPITALISMS PROMOTION OF A POLITICS OF INGRAINED FEAR

COOK, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR, 2006 [DEBORAH, “STAYING ALIVE:
ADORNO AND HABERMAS ON SELF-PRESERVATION UNDER LATE CAPITALISM,” RETHINKING MARXISM,
18(3):433-447, ELECTRONIC]
Reification and narcissism, alienation and the loss of social solidarity are just some of the harmful effects of surrendering the task of
self-preservation to the economic system and its political ally, the welfare state. To survive under late capitalism, individuals must
obey the law of exchange. Conformity to the status quo appears to be the only option available. If we formerly lived in fear of the
power of nature, fear is now also directed toward the capitalist economic system, driven as that system is by naked profit imperatives
that falsely claim to represent the general interest. Individuals are afraid of becoming marginal or outcasts if they should fail to play
along with the economic rules of the capitalist game. According to Adorno, this fear “has become second nature.” The fear of being
cast out, which “combines the ancient dread of physical annihilation with the much later fear of being expelled from the social
community,” has now “gathered such force that, however thoroughly one might see through its irrationality, it would nevertheless take
a moral hero to cast aside” (1967, 71).

Like other Marxists, then, Adorno targets the loss of freedom that arises when the economic system operates over the heads and
through the heads of individuals. To cite Georg Lukács in “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” capitalism is
inherently irrational because the only law governing it is the “‘unconscious’ product of the activity of different commodity owners
acting independently of one another” (Lukács 1971, 102). As long as market forces are driven by their own “immanent, blind
dynamic” (181), individuals will remain in thrall to an economic system that negatively affects many aspects of their lives. For his
part, Adorno wrote that under late capitalism “freedom remains no less delusive than individuality itself” because the “law of value
comes into play over the heads of formally free individuals” who have become “involuntary executors of that law” (1973, 262). To
remedy this situation, the economy must become “transparent,” and this can happen only when everyone has a say in how it should
operate (263). Against Habermas, then, who views the “invisible hand” of the economy as functionally rational and largely benign in
both of his major works, Adorno and other Marxists argue that the capitalist economic system compromises the existence of the selves
it is meant to preserve when allowed to operate independently of rational decisionmaking processes. More generally, as Adorno
remarks in a discussion with students, democratic states have never lived up to their promise that people “themselves would make
decisions about their world” (1998c, 296).

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AT: NO ALTERNATIVE*************
THIS IS ANOTHER LINK—CAPITALISM’S PRIMARY WAY OF NATURALIZING ITSELF IS BY SAYING THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE,
THAT NYTHING BUT THE STATUS QUO IS UTOPIAN; BUT IT IS PRECISELY THIS FANTASY OF A A PERFECT AND INEVITABLE
CAPITALISM THAT IS THE MOST UTOPIAN STANCE. THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM IS INFINITELY MORE VULNERABLE, AND THERE ARE
INFINITELY MORE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES THAN JUST ONE SYSTEM, BUT EVEN IF THERE WAS NO EXISTING ALTERNATIVE, WE
SHOULD STILL REJECT CAPITALISM TO CREATE THAT ALTERNATIVE. WORKING WITHIN THE SYSTEM IS THE WORST POSSIBLE
OPTION.

ŽIŽEK, CONDENSER OF SLOVENIAN METAPHORS, 2000 [SLAVOJ, CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY, P. 324-326]
The first thing to note about this neoliberal cliché is that the neutral reference to the necessities of the market economy, usually
invoked in order to categorize grand ideological projects as unrealistic utopias, is itself to be inserted into the great modern utopian
projects. That is to say – as Fredric Jameson has pointed out – what characterizes utopia is not a belief in the essential goodness of human nature, or
some similar naive notion, but, rather, belief in some global mechanism which, applied to the whole of society, will automatically bring out the
balanced state of progress and happiness one is longing for – and, in this precise sense, is not the market precisely the name for such a mechanism
which, properly applied, will bring about the optimal state of society? So, again, the first answer of the Left to those – Leftists themselves – who bemoan the loss of the
utopian impetus in our societies should be that this impetus is alive and well – not only in the Rightist 'fundamentalist' populism which advocates the return to grass-roots democracy, but above
all among the advocates of the market economy themselves.12 The second answer should be a clear line of distinction between utopia and ideology: ideology is not only a utopian
project of social transformation with no realistic chance of actualization; no less ideological is the anti-utopian stance of those who
`realistically' devalue every global project of social transformation as `utopian,' that is, as unrealistic dreaming and/or harbouring
'totalitarian' potential – today's predominant form of ideological 'closure' takes the precise form of mental block which prevents us
from imagining a funndamental social change, in the interests of an allegedly ‘realistic’ and ‘mature’ attitude.
In his Seminar on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis,13 Lacan developed an opposition between 'knave' and 'fool' as the two intellectual attitudes: the right
wing intellectual is a knave, a conformist who considers the mere existence of the given order as an argument for it, and mocks thee
Left for its 'utopian' plans, which necessarily lead to catastrophe; while the left-wing intellectual is a fool, a court jester who publicly
displays the lie of the existing order, but in a way which suspends the performative efficiency of this speech. In the years immediately after the
fall of Socialism, the knave was a neoconservative advocate of the free market who cruelly rejected all forms of social solidarity as counterproductive sentimentalism; while the fool
was a deconstructionist cultural critic who, by means of his ludic procedures destined to 'subvert' the existing order, actually served as
its supplement.
Today, however, the relationship between the couple knave–fool and the political opposition Right/Left is more and more the inversion of
the standard figures of Rightist knave and Leftist fool: are not the Third Way theoreticians ultimately today's knaves, figures who
preach cynical resignation, that is, the necessary failure of every attempt actually to change something in the basic functioning of
global capitalism? And are not the conservative fools – those conservatives whose original modern model is Pascal and who as it were
show the hidden cards of the ruling ideology, bringing-to light its underlying mechanisms which, in order to remain operative, have to be repressed – far more
attractive? Today in the face of this Leftist knavery it is more important than ever to hold this utopian place of the global alternative
open, even if it remains empty, living on borrowed time, awaiting the content to fill it in.
I fully agree with Laclau that after the exhaustion of both the social democratic welfare state imaginary and the 'really-existing-Socialist’ imaginary, the Left does need a new
imaginary (a new mobilizing global vision). Today, however, the outdatedness of the welfare state and socialist imaginaries is a cliché
– the real dilemma is what to do with – how the Left is to relate to – the predominant liberal democratic imaginary. It is my contention that Laclau's and
Mouffe's 'radical democracy' comes all too close to merely 'radicalizing' this liberal democratic imaginary, while remaining within its horizon. Laclau, of course, would probably claim that the
point is to treat the democratic imaginary as an 'empty signifier', and to engage in the hegemonic battle with the proponents of the global capitalist New World Order over what its content will
be. Here, however, I think that Butler is right when she emphasizes that another way is also open: it is not 'necessary to occupy the dominant norm in order
to produce an internal subversion of its terms. Sometimes it is important t refuse it terms to let the term itself wither, to starve it of its
strength' (JB, p. 177). This means that the Left has a choice today: either it accepts the predominant liberal democratic horizon (democracy,
human rights and freedoms . . .), and engages in a hegemonic battle within it, or it risks the opposite gesture of refusing its very terms, of flatly
rejecting today's liberal blackmail that courting any prospect of radical change paves the way for totalitarianism. It is my firm
conviction, my politico-existential premise that the old '68 motto Soyons réalistes demandons l'impossible! still holds: it is the
advocates of changes and resignifications within the liberal-democratic horizon who are the true utopians in their belief that their
efforts will amount to anything more than cosmetic surgery that will give us capitalism with a human face.
In her second intervention, Butler superbly deploys the reversal that characterizes the Hegelian dialectical process: the aggravated 'contradiction' in which the very differential structure of
meaning is collapsing, since every determination immediately turns into its opposite, this 'mad dance', is resolved by the sudden emergence of a new universal determination. The best
illustration is provided by the passage from the 'world of self-alienated Spirit' to the Terror of the French Revolution in The Phenomenology of Spirit: the pre-Revolutionary 'madness of the
musician "who heaped up and mixed together thirty arias, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of every sort; now with a deep bass he descended into hell, then, contracting his throat, he rent the
vaults of heaven with a falsetto tone, frantic and soothed, imperious and mocking, by turns" (Diderot, Nephew of Rameau)' ,14 suddenly turns into its radical opposite: the revolutionary stance
pursuing its goal with an inexorable firmness. And my point, of course, is that today's 'mad dance', the dynamic proliferation of multiple shifting
identities also awaits its resolution in a new form of Terror. The only 'realistic' prospect is to ground a new political univeralisty by
opting for the impossible, fully assuming the place of the exception with no taboos, no a priori norms ('human rights', `democracy'),
respect for which would prevent us also from 'resignifying' terror, the ruthless exercise of power, the spirit of sacrifice … if this
radical choice is decried by some bleeding-heart liberals as Linksfaschismus, so be it!

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AT: NO MOVEMENT
THEY’VE GOT BACKWARDS; MOVEMENTS DON’T CREATE RADICAL DEMANDS, RADICAL DEMANDS CREATE MOVEMENTS

ZIZEK, 2002 (SLAVOJ, SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE KULTURWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INSTITUT IN ESSEN [AMONG OTHER THINGS],
“A PLEA FOR LENINIST INTOLERANCE,” CULTURAL INQUIRY, WINTER, PROQUEST)

The existential engagement is extreme here, and the kernel of the Leninist utopia arises out of the ashes of the catastrophe of 1914, in
his settling of accounts with the Second International orthodoxy. This includes the radical imperative to smash the bourgeois state,
which means the state as such, and to invent a new communal social form without a standing army, police, or bureaucracy, in which
all could take part in the administration of the social matters. This was for Lenin no theoretical project for some distant future. In
October 1917, Lenin claimed that "we can at once set in motion a state apparatus constituting of ten if not twenty million people." 12
This urge of the moment is the true utopia. One cannot overestimate the explosive potential of State and Revolution, for in this book,
"the vocabulary and grammar of the Western tradition of politics was abruptly dispensed with" (L, p. 152). What then followed can be
called, borrowing the title of Althusser's text on Machiavelli, la solitude de Lenine, the time when he basically stood alone, struggling
against the current in his own party. When, in his "April Theses" from 1917, Lenin discerned the Augenblick, the unique chance for a
revolution, his proposals were first met with stupor or contempt by a large majority of his party colleagues. Within the Bolshevik
party, no prominent leader supported his call to revolution, and Pravda took the extraordinary step of dissociating the party, and the
editorial board as a whole, from Lenin's theses. Far from being opportunistic, flattering and exploiting the prevailing mood of the
populace, Lenin's views were highly idiosyncratic. Bogdanov characterized the "April Theses" as "the delirium of a madman," and
Krupskaya herself concluded that "I am afraid it looks as if Lenin has gone crazy" (L, p. 86).

Lenin is for us not the nostalgic name for old dogmatic certainty; quite on the contrary, to put it in Kierkegaard's terms, the Lenin we
want to retrieve is the Lenin-in-becoming, the Lenin whose fundamental experience was that of being thrown into a catastrophic new
constellation in which old coordinates proved useless and who was thus compelled to reinvent Marxism. Recall his acerbic remark
apropos of some new problem: "About this, Marx and Engels said not a word." The idea is not to return to Lenin, but to repeat him in
the Kierkegaardian sense, to retrieve the same impulse in today's constellation. The return to Lenin aims neither to nostalgically
reenact the good old revolutionary times, nor to opportunistically-pragmatically adjust the old program to "new conditions" but to
repeat, in present worldwide conditions, the Leninist gesture of reinventing the revolutionary project in the conditions of imperialism
and colonialism. Or, more precisely, subsequent to the politico-ideological collapse of the long era of progressivism founded upon the
catastrophe of 1914. Eric Hobsbawn defined the concept of the twentieth century as the time between 1914, the end of the long
peaceful expansion of capitalism, and 1990, the emergence of the new form of global capitalism after the collapse of "really existing
socialism." 13 What Lenin did for 1914 we should do for 1990. "Lenin" stands for the compelling freedom to suspend the stale,
existing (post)ideological coordinates, the debilitating Denkverbot in which we live. This simply means that we obtain the right to
think again.

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RADICAL DEMANDS CREATE THE MOVEMENT BY ALLOWING A RALLYING POINT FOR STRUGGLE

ZIZEK, 2002 (SLAVOJ, SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE KULTURWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INSTITUT IN ESSEN [AMONG OTHER THINGS],
“A PLEA FOR LENINIST INTOLERANCE,” CULTURAL INQUIRY, WINTER, PROQUEST)

What, then, is the criterion of the political act? Success as such clearly doesn't count, even if we define it in Merleau-Ponty's
dialectical way (as the wager that the future will retroactively redeem our present horrible acts); neither do any abstract-universal
ethical norms." The only criteria is the absolutely inherent one: that of the enacted utopia. In a proper revolutionary breakthrough, the
utopian future is neither simply fully realized, present, nor simply evoked as a distant promise that justifies present violence. It is
rather as if, in a unique suspension of temporality, in the short circuit between the present and the future, we are-as if by Grace-for a
brief time allowed to act as if the utopian future were (not yet fully here, but) already at hand, just there to be grabbed. Revolution is
not experienced as a present hardship we have to endure for the happiness and freedom of the future generations but as the present
hardship over which this future happiness and freedom already cast their shadow-in it, we already are free while fighting for freedom,
we already are happy while fighting for happiness, no matter how difficult the circumstances. Revolution is not a Merleau-Pontyan
wager, an act suspended in the futur anterieur, to be legitimized or delegitimized by the long term outcome of the present acts; it is as
it were its own ontological proof, an immediate index of its own truth.

In spite of all its horrors, the great Cultural Revolution in China undoubtedly did contain elements of such an enacted utopia. Say, at
its very end, before the agitation was blocked by Mao himself (because he already achieved his goal of reestablishing his full power
and getting rid of the top nomenklatura competition), there was the Shanghai Commune in which one million workers, who simply
took the official slogans seriously, demanded the abolition of the state and even the party itself, and the direct communal organization
of society. It is significant that it was at this very point that Mao ordered the restoration of order. The (often noted) parallel between
Mao and Lacan is fully justified here; the dissolution of the Ecole Freudienne de Paris in 1979 was Lacan's great Cultural Revolution,
mobilizing his young followers (who, incidently, mostly were ex-Maoists from 1968!) in order to get rid of the inner circle of his
mandarins. In both cases, the paradox is that of a leader who triggers an uncontrolled upheaval, while trying to exert full personal
power-the paradoxical overlapping of extreme dictatorship and extreme emancipation of the masses.

Let us recall the performance of "Storming the Winter Palace" in Petrograd, on the third anniversary of the October Revolution, on 7
November 1920. Tens of thousands of workers, soldiers, students, and artists worked round the clock, living on kasha (tasteless wheat
porridge), tea, and frozen apples, and preparing the performance at the very place where the event really took place three years earlier;
their work was coordinated by the Army officers, as well as by avant-garde artists, musicians, and directors, from Malevich to
Meyerhold. Although this was acting and not reality, the soldiers and sailors were playing themselves. Many of them not only actually
participated in the event of 1917 but were also simultaneously involved in the real battles of the civil war that were raging in the near
vicinity of Petrograd, a city under siege and suffering from severe shortages of food. A contemporary commented on the performance:
"The future historian will record how, throughout one of the bloodiest and most brutal revolutions, all of Russia was acting"; and the
formalist theoretician Viktor Shklovsky noted that "some kind of elemental process is taking place where the living fabric of life is
being transformed into the theatrical."18 We all remember the infamous self-celebratory First of May parades that were one of the
supreme signs of recognition of the Stalinist regimes. If one needs proof of how Leninism functioned in an entirely different way, are
such performances not the supreme proof that the October Revolution was definitely not a simple coup d'etat by a small group of
Bolsheviks but an event which unleashed a tremendous emancipatory potential?

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AT: THEORY BAD (ALSO, AT: CHOMSKY/ZINN)
THEORY IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND HOW IDEOLOGY OPERATES, AS WELL AS TO SHOW HOW
PEOPLE CAN “KNOW THE FACTS,” YET STILL NOT CARE OR AGITATE FOR CHANGE

ŽIŽEK, SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE (UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA), 2002
[SLAVOJ, INTEVIEW WITH BAD SUBJECTS, “I AM A FIGHTING ATHEIST: INTERVIEW WITH SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK,”
BAD SUBJECTS, ISSUE #59, FEBRUARY, HTTP://ESERVER.ORG/BS/59/ZIZEK.HTML]
BS: A lot of readers of American underground publications read Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn, and the stuff coming out of small
anarchist presses. What would they get from reading your work that they might be missing?

Zizek: MartinHeidegger said that philosophy doesn't make things easier, it makes them harder and more complicated. What they can
learn is the ambiguity of so many situations, in the sense that whenever we are presented by the big media with a simple opposition,
like multicultural tolerance vs. ethnic fundamentalism, the opposition is never so clear-cut. The idea is that things are always more
complex. For example, multiculturalist tolerance, or at least a certain type of it, generates or involves a much deeper racism.] As a rule, this type
of tolerance relies on the distinction between us multiculturalists, and intolerant ethnic others, with the paradoxical result that anti-racism itself is used to dismiss IN A
RACIST WAY the other as a racist. Not to mention the fact that this kind of "tolerance" is as a rule patronizing. Its respect for the other cannot but remind us of the
respect for naive children's beliefs: we leave them in their blessed ignorance so as not to hurt them...

Or take Chomsky. There are two problematic features in his work — though it goes without saying that I admire him very much. One is his anti-
theorism. A friend who had lunch with him recently told me that Chomsky announced that he'd concluded that social theory and economic theory are of no use —
that things are simply evident, like American state terror, and that all we need to know are the facts. I disagree with this. And the second point is that with all his
criticism of the U.S., Chomsky retains a certain commitment to what is the most elemental ingredient of American ideology,
individualism, a fundamental belief that America is the land of free individuals, and so on. So in that way he is deeply and problematically
American.

You can see some of these problems in the famous Faurisson scandal in France. As many readers may know, Chomsky wrote the preface for
a book by Robert Faurisson, which was threatened with being banned because it denied the reality of the Holocaust. Chomsky claimed that
though he opposes the book's content, the book should still be published for free speech reasons. I can see the argument, but I can't support
him here. The argument is that freedom of the press is freedom for all, even for those whom we find disgusting and totally
unacceptable; otherwise, today it is them, tomorrow it is us. It sounds logical, but I think that it avoids the true paradox of freedom:
that some limitations have to guarantee it.

So[ to understand what goes on today — to understand how we experience ourselves, to understand the structures of social authority,
to understand whether we really live in a "permissive" society, and how prohibitions function today — for these we need social theory.
That's the difference between me and the names you mentioned
BS: Chomsky and people like him seem to think that if we just got the facts out there, things would almost take care of themselves. Why is this wrong? Why aren't "the
facts" enough?

Zizek: Let me give you a very naive answer. I think that basically the facts are already known. Let's take Chomsky's analyses of how the CIA
intervened in Nicaragua. OK, (he provides) a lot of details, yes, but did I learn anything fundamentally new? It's exactly what I'd expected: the CIA was
playing a very dirty game. Of course it's more convincing if you learn the dirty details. But I don't think that we really learned anything
dramatically new there. I don't think that merely "knowing the facts" can really change people's perceptions.

Chomsky's own position on Kosovo, on the Yugoslav war, shows some of his limitations, because of a lack of a proper
To put it another way:
historical context. With all his facts, he got the picture wrong. As far as I can judge, Chomsky bought a certain narrative — that we
shouldn't put all the blame on Milosevic, that all parties were more or less to blame, and the West supported or incited this explosion
because of its own geopolitical goals. All are not the same. I'm not saying that the Serbs are guilty. I just repeat my old point that Yugoslavia was
not over with the secession of Slovenia. It was over the moment Milosevic took over Serbia. This triggered a totally different dynamic. It is
also not true that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was supported by the West. On the contrary, the West exerted enormous pressure, at
least until 1991, for ethnic groups to remain in Yugoslavia. I saw [former Secretary of State] James Baker on Yugoslav TV supporting the Yugoslav
army's attempts to prevent Slovenia's secession.

The ultimate paradox for me is that because he lacks a theoretical framework, Chomsky even gets the facts wrong sometimes

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AT: STALINISM / SOVIET TERROR
ALTHUSSER’S CONCEPTION OF HISTORY AS NON-TELEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE IS CRITIQUE OF THE ROOTS OF
STALINISM

FRIEDMAN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT YALE UNIVERSITY , 1995, [GERALDINE, "THE SPECTRAL
LEGACY OF ALTHUSSER: THE SYMPTOM AND ITS RETURN" NO 88 DEPOSITIONS ON ALTHUSSER, BALIBAR,
MACHEREY, AND THE LABOR OF READING, PG 6-26]
Now, to insist, as I have done, on the Althusserian problematic as a problem in figuration might seem overwhelmingly to justify the
charge that academics have flocked to Althusserian Marxism because of what one writer calls "its evident academic nature."17 It
happens, however, that personification, as the symptom of the symptom, arises where the philosophical project articulates with one of
the strongest conjunctural pressures in Althusser's writing: "Stalinism" and the tasks it posed for later Marxists. This period in Soviet
history presents in particularly urgent form the problem of the adequate concept, which is the theoretical necessity of "call[ing] things
by their names" or "their scientific names" (FM, 240 and 247). For, in this case, the name, by virtue of having a function in a
theoretical problematic, produces political effects and is therefore not a "mere" name. Thus, in "Marxism and Humanism" in For Marx
and later in a "Note" appended to "Reply to John Lewis" in Essays in Self-Criticism, Althusser shows that the official labels, "the cult
of personality" and "Stalinism," imply interpretations possible only within the pre-Marxian problematic of humanism, centered on the
concept "Man."18 From this point of view, all the difficulties of a historical period are reduced to questions of psychology and legality,
the pathology that leads one man ruthlessly to violate the constitutional rights of others. And, since the question dictates the terms of
the answer, the solution is to be a new humanism, the "Socialist 'Humanism" that would recognize and respect Soviet legality.19
Nothing could sound more ethical than this switch from a terroristic rule to a benevolent one. Yet Althusser rejects the humanist
interpretation because it is an instance of Marxists doing an innocent reading that takes the concept as appearing not only in person but
in a person. If, in the "cult of personality " all was for Stalin, the man who on the level of immediate reading claimed to be the Spirit,
now the slogan is "All for Man" (FM, 221). To avoid this substitution of one incarnational personification for another, Althusser
contends that it is not enough for the Soviet Union to denounce the "crimes" and "deviations" of the Stalin years. The denunciation
must also be made in terms of Marxist theory, because, otherwise, Marxists themselves advance the very arguments that their enemies
have traditionally used against them. Insisting on a complete break with humanist concepts,

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AT: BUT, THE AFFIRMATIVE DOES GOOD THINGS!
OUR CRITIQUE IS IMPORTANT FOR EXACTLY THIS REASON. THE AFFIRMATIVE ASSUMES SIMPLY BECAUSE
THEIR INTENTIONS OR THE INTENTIONS OF THEIR MOVEMENT OR PLAN ARE GOOD OR PROGRESSIVE THAT
THAT NECESSARILY CHANGES THE SYSTEM. ONLY OUR ANALYSIS OF HOW SOCIETY AS A WHOLE IS
STRUCTURED CAN EXPOSE THE POINTS AT WHICH RESISTNACE CAN BE MOUNTED

POSTER, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT UC IRVINE, 1974, [MARK, “ALTHUSSER ON HISTORY WITHOUT MAN,”
POLITICAL THEORY VOL. 2, NO. 4, PG 393-409]
The manner in
The structuralists were equally opposed to what they termed historicism, or what we know as the dominant forms of historical writing.
which the historian constituted the object of his field was not, for them, scientific. Historical researchers consider man as an
active subject, effecting reality through projects that have meaning even though they can lead to unintended results.22
Denying this assumption, Althusser underlined Marx's achievement as the understanding of capitalism as "processes without
subjects."" Scientific history dealt with structures alone; one could no longer view change as a continuous succession of
human acts, as linear and homogeneous. In its present evolutionist form, history systematically overcentered the social field by locating meaning
in the subject as an "absolute reference.""
By shifting the locus of intelligibility from individuals to subject-less structures, Althusser asks the historian to concentrate
on relationships. Like Levi-Strauss, Foucault, and Lacan, he is arguing that individuals are lost in a fog of ideology and cannot
correctly perceive social reality or serve as a point of reference to it. Cartesian man, who is a captain of his soul, a maker of
his world and a conqueror of nature, is thus laid to rest.
When the historian labors to depict the continuity between the past and the present by narrating the drama of human ations,
he is, in Althusser's eyes, merely invoking an old Cartesian myth. Althusser is not merely condemning traditional narrative history
to the benefit of the new sociological-quantitative history. Even social historians like Marc Bloch and the Annales school, when measuring
long-term economic or social changes, believe they are measuring human decisions or their residues, however minutely each decision may affect the
outcome of events. For the structuralist, the object of history is neither the interiority of individual acts nor the externality of
collective behavior. What is measured is rather a system of relationships in static and dynamic articulation. Strictly speaking,
there are thus no events, only structural happenings.
For their own concept of history, the structuralists formalized what they regarded as Marx's achievement in Capital Taking over for Althusser, Balibar, a
disciple and collaborator of Althusser's, was left with the Herculean task of presenting Marx's structural history. In Reading Capital, Balibar asserted that
Marx's Capital produced a table of invariant elements in the means of production, thereby avoiding histoncism. In this "combination," there were
three constituents (workers, means of production, and non-laboring appropriators) and two rules of combination (property
connection and appropriation connection).3° The combination accounted for the economic structure of any society. It differed
somewhat from the equally atemporal "combinatory" of Levi-Strauss which indicated that "the places of the factors and their
relations change, but not their nature."31 We will leave aside the question of the universality of Balibar's concept of combination. What is important
is that Balibar defined history as changes in the combination. Structural change consisted not in the dissolution of one structure and the constitution ex nihilo
of a new one, but in "the transformation of one structure into another."32 The rules of transformation followed Freud's concept of the process of
displacement.3

In the formation of capitalism, for example, structural change meant a "displacement" within the means of production. Both
the "object of labor" (the product) and the "means of labor" (the tools) were "separated" from the laborer in two ways: in the
property relation, the worker owned nothing; m the appropriation relation, the worker became incapable of setting the means
of production in motion. In short, he had lost the skills to make the product. In each of the relations of the worker to the means of production, there was
a homology of separation,34 one that was unique to capitalism. Capitalism thus began with the introduction of the "machine-tool," since
from that point on all structures were adjusted to the new combination: the worker was separated both from the object of
labor and from the means of labor. Not at all linear, the process occurred without a subject, without anyone willing or
intending the new combination, out of the structural contradictions of the previous transitional form (manufacturing). The
recombination of the same elements was a displacement.33 More precisely, within the structure of the means of production, under the manufacturing or
handicraft system, there was a unity between the tools and the worker whereas under fully developed capitalism what unity
there was shifted to the relation between the object of labor and the means of labor.36 In plain language, under industrial
capitalism, the tool was structured to produce the product; under earlier methods, the tool was structured to the human body.
Capitalism maximized the separation of the worker and the means of production not simply by private ownership but also by
the structure of the means of production' which maximized the output of the machine disregarding the structure of the body
(or the mind) of the worker. Contradiction plagued the new structure since its effects, in the process of daily reproduction, were both stabilizing and
disruptive. The more absolute the separation between the worker and the means of production, the more perfect became the structure and the closer it came
to dissolution.

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AT: ALTHUSSER WRONG
DESPITE PERTINENT CRITICISM OF ALTHUSSER, THE PRODUCTIVENESS AND USEFULNESS OF HIS MODEL HAS
STOOD THE TEST OF TIME

BUTLER, PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC AT UC BERKLEY, 1995, [JUDITH, “CONSCIENCE DOTH MAKE SUBJECTS
OF US ALL,” YALE FRENCH STUDIES, NO. 88 DEPOSITIONS: ALTHUSSER, BALIBAR, MACHEREY, AND THE
LABOR OF READING, PG 6-26]

Althusser's doctrine of interpellation continues to structure contemporary debate on subject formation, offering a way to account for
how a subject comes into being after language, but always within its terms. The theory of interpellation appears to stage a social scene
in which a subject is hailed, the subject turns around, and then accepts the terms by which he or she is hailed. This is, no doubt, a
scene both punitive and reduced, for the call is made by an officer of "the Law" and this officer is cast as singular and speaking.
Clearly we might object that the "call" arrives severally and in implicit and unspoken ways, that the scene is never quite as dyadic as
Althusser claims, but these objections have been rehearsed, and "interpellation" as a doctrine continues to survive its critique. If we
accept that the scene is exemplary and allegorical, then it never needs to happen for its effectivity to be presumed. Indeed, if it is
allegorical in Benjamin's sense, then the process literalized by the allegory is precisely that which resists narration, that is, that exceeds
the narrativizability of events.2 Interpellation, in this account, is not an event, but a certain way of staging the call, where the call, as
staged, becomes deliteralized in the course of its exposition or Darstellung. The call itself is also figured as a demand to align oneself
with the law, a turning around (to face the law, to find a face for the law? ), and an entrance into the language of self-ascription—
"Here I am"—through the appropriation of guilt.

Why is it that subject formation appears to take place only upon the acceptance of guilt, that there is no "I" who might ascribe a place
to itself, who might be announced in speech, without first a self-attribution of guilt, a submission to the law through an acceptance of
its demand for conformity? The one who turns around in response to the call does not respond to a demand to turn around. The turning
around is an act that is, as it were, conditioned both by the "voice" of the law and by the responsiveness of the one hailed by the law.
The "turning around" is a strange sort of middle-ground (taking place, perhaps, in a strange sort of "middle-voice"3) that is determined
both by the law and the addressee, but by neither unilaterally or exhaustively. Although there would be no turning around without first
having been hailed, neither would there be a turning around without some readiness to turn. But where and when does the calling of
the name solicit the turning around, the anticipatory move toward identity? How and why does the subject turn, anticipating the
conferral of identity through the self-ascription of guilt? What kind of relation already binds these two such that the subject knows to
turn, knows that something is to be gained from such a turn? How might we think of this "turn" as prior to subject formation, a prior
complicity with the law without which no subject emerges? The turn toward the law is thus at once a turn against oneself, the
turning back on oneself that constitutes the movement of conscience. But how is it that the reflex of conscience is precisely what
paralyzes the critical interrogation of the law at the same time that it figures the subject's uncritical relation to the law as a condition of
subjectivation? The one addressed is compelled to turn toward the law prior to any possibility of asking a set of critical questions:
Who is speaking? Why should I turn around? Why should I accept the terms by which I am hailed? This means that, prior to any
possibility of a critical understanding of the law, there is an openness or vulnerability to the law, exemplified in the turn toward the
law, in the anticipation of culling an identity through identifying with the one who has broken the law. Indeed, the law is broken prior
to any possibility of having access to it, and so, "guilt" is prior to knowledge of the law and is, in this sense, always strangely innocent.
The possibility of a critical view of the law is thus limited by what might be understood as a prior desire for the law, a passionate
complicity with law, without which no subject can exist. For the "I" to launch its critique, it must first understand that the "I" itself is
dependent upon its complicitous desire for the law for the possibility of its own existence. A critical review of the law will not,
therefore, undo the force of conscience unless the one who offers that critique is willing, as it were, to be undone by the critique that
he or she performs.

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AT: TRANSITION WARS
A SOCIAL REVOLUTION WOULD NOT LEAD TO WAR- THE WORKING CLASS CAN PROVIDE THE NECESSARY
CONDITIONS FOR A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION.

TUCKER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, 1970 [ROBERT C, THE
MARXIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA, P. 141]
The notion that world communist revolution can continue under peaceful international conditions is a post-Stalinist innovation in
Soviet party doctrine. At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, the Leninist-Stalinist thesis on the inseparability of imperialism and
wars was finally revised; wars were declared to be avoidable calamities in the nuclear age; and the novel idea was put forward that
international peace and coexistence might prove propitious for the further spread of communist revolution. "Socialist revolution is not
necessarily connected with war," proclaimed the new Soviet Party Program in this connection. "Although both world wars, which
were started by the imperialists, culminated in socialist revolutions, revolutions are quite feasible without war." This proposition was
accompanied by the thesis—also promulgated at the Twentieth Party Congress—that a communist revolution can, and if possible
should, take place by a peaceful parliamentary path. Under favorable conditions, asserted the Party Program, the working class can

win a solid majority in parliament, transform it from a tool serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument
serving the working people, launch a broad mass struggle outside parliament, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces,
and provide the necessary conditions for a peaceful socialist revolution.

AT: PEACEFUL TRANSITION- A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION WOULD NOT BE PEACEFUL- WARS WOULD OCCUR.

TUCKER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, 1970 [ROBERT C, THE
MARXIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA, P. 142-143]
The new Soviet doctrine on the possibility of peaceful communist revolution has proved highly controversial in the international
communist movement and has been one of the central issues in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute that began in the aftermath of the
Twentieth Party Congress. The leader of the Chinese communist revolution, Mao Tse-tung, who had once written that "political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun"" and continued to believe it, undertook to defend Leninist-Stalinist orthodoxy on the methods of
communist revolution against Khrushchevite "revisionism." During the conference of world communist leaders in Moscow in
November, 1957, he took a stand on this issue against the effort of the Soviet party leadership to secure adoption of the twentieth-
congress line as the general line of the world communist movement. In a then secret memorandum to the C.P.S.U. Central Committee
outlining views on the question of peaceful transition, the Chinese delegation declared: "We must fully utilize the parliamentary form
of struggle, but its role is limited." Using Lenin's line of argument in The State and Revolution, the Chinese memorandum stressed
that a communist revolution necessitated the destruction of the old state machinery, for which purpose it would not be sufficient to
gain a majority in parliament. Hence the communist movement should be prepared to use armed force against the class enemy at the
critical juncture of the revolution where power changes hands. In not a single country was the possibility of peaceful transition of any
practical significance and it would not be advisable to place much emphasis upon this possibility in a document published for the
guidance of communist parties.

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AT: TRANSITION WARS
WE MUST NOT FOCUS ON THE TRANSITION: IT ONLY HOLDS US BACK FROM REVOLUTION. WE MUST DECIDE
CLASS STRUGGLE ON THE BASIS OF REJECTING IDEOLOGY IF ANY PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE.

NEGRI, POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS-VII AT SAINT-DENIS, 1996, [ANTONIO, POST
MODERN MATERIALISM AND THE FUTURE OF MARXIST THEORY P. 62-63

Struggling against these opponents, aleatory materialism offers us history as concrete historicity, it reproposes "man" himself, not as a
subject of history but as a subject in history. First of all, therefore, aleatory materialism is a "completely naked" materialism,
something that is no longer conceived as "a last instance" but as a horizon of presence, something that always exists whatever the
order or the displacement of the structurally dominant elements may be. Second, aleatory materialism presents itself as the assertion of
historicity, Geschichte against Historic. That is to say, res gestae against historia rerun' gestarum. Third, therefore, the framework is
here completely open: "man," "man" in history, as subject in history—in this opening without finality or necessity but simply available
to every aleatory occurrence and to every eventbuilds on this basis the appropriate practices. To set, therefore, in philosophy, some
"positions" ("theses"); to follow, in practice, roads that incessantly reopen themselves, tendencies that continuously fork—everything
is determined in aleatory materialism, but determined apres coup (after the fact).
In this way we reach an extraordinary philosophical definition, which takes us back to the explanation of the connection among crisis,
communist ontological content, and the absolute indeterminism of the surface. In aleatory materialism, "every determination in
progress appears as the aleatory variable of an existing tendential invariant" (Althusser 1986c).9 This assertion by Althusser becomes
perfectly understandable if the determination taking place is conceived as theoretical practice, that is to say, as the position of a thesis;
if the aleatory variable is seen as the historical act of assertion, in the open freedom of the surface; and if the tendential invariant is
understood -as Communist ontological content that nourishes the freedom of subjects in history. It is here, within this theoretical
intertwining, that we can reaffum the supremacy of philosophy and politics, after having worked—on behalf of aleatory materialism,
of its methodologies, of its openings—a dêchirante (piercing) revision of dialectics, of the concept of mediation, of the perspective of
transition, and therefore of the conception of socialism (autant de concept bdtards et nuisibles [so many illegitimate and harmful
concepts]); and it is within this choice of ours, completely antiteleological and aleatory, that we can account for the importance of the
ideological and political movement of the masses located in the interstices and/or at the margins.
Let us free ourselves from myths, from every linear conception of transition; let us draw on the supremacy of the existent—which is
the supremacy of communism because it exists as practice. This road of theoretical practice is , possible if we understand that the
rupture of the continuity of the revolutiontary process has taken place around a fundamental fact: the shift of class struggle, a final
shift, from economy and politics toward ideology. It is within class struggle in ideology that class struggle in general, the struggle
against exploitation, is going to be decided. The "linguistic turn" that philosophy has proposed with Wittgenstein and after
Wittgenstein (which French philosophers, except, to a certain degree, Derrida and Deleuze, have not understood) is a historical tum; it
shows the passage of the dominants of the productive structure from material production to immaterial production—here is where the
struggle takes place. Here lies the possibility of bringing the margins back to the center,0 as Marx had done.

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MARXIST ALTERNATIVES FAIL-THEY EMPIRICALLY DESTROY THE ENVIRONMENT, ARE LODGED IN THE
WORST FORM OF WESTERN ANTHROPOCENTRISM, AND GIVE NO FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE

LEWIS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN GEOGRAPHY AT GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, 1992 [M ARTIN
W., G REEN DELUSIONS, P . 33]

Eco-marxists might be expected to express concern if not embarrassment over the disastrous environmental records of all marxian
regimes. Indeed, many do acknowledge the environmental failings of what they often gracelessly call "really existing socialism." But
for most this remains a mere footnote to their real concern. Like other academic marxists, the green-reds devote almost all of their effort
to analyzing the failings of capitalism; the less scholarly task of devising a blueprint for a better society receives surprisingly little
attention. To these as to other marxist academics, capitalism is all-encompassing, and everything that matters is comprehensible only in
relation to the vast webs of profit and exploitation woven by the global bourgeoisie.

Not surprisingly, most radical environmentalists continue explicitly to reject key elements of the marxist approach, noting correctly
that Marx himself, in addition to being anthropocentric, supported political centralization and Western imperialism, while applauding
virtually all forms of technological advance. Moreover, few eco-marxists express concern for the loss of biological diversity (except insofar
as it might harm human communities), a stance not likely to gain much favor in a movement founded in large part on the principle of
biospheric egalitarianism.

THE MARXIST ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE REPRESSIVE AND REDUCE THE WHOLE SOCIETIES QUALITY OF LIFE

LEWIS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN GEOGRAPHY AT GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, 1992 [M ARTIN W.,
G REEN DELUSIONS , P . 166-167]

Marxian apologists will point out that the communist world has achieved some remarkable successes in the social realm. The former Soviet
Union, for example, has much less homelessness, malnutrition, illiteracy, and drug addiction than does the United States-a country of
vastly greater economic prowess. There is indeed some truth here, and the social failures of the United States should be considered a
national shame. The comparison, however, is invidious in that it singles out the industrial capitalist nation with the worst record on social
issues. No other wealthy capitalist state, for example, lacks a national health care system. If one were to contrast Japan or Sweden with the
USSR-let alone with Romania-capitalism would come out ahead on virtually every social issue as well.

The social failure of marxian socialism is probably best illustrated by examining the working and living standards of its own laborers-
the supposed beneficiaries of the whole system. Simply put, socialist workers lived in penury when compared to their counterparts in
industrial capitalism. Polish steelworkers, for example, could hope to earn roughly the equivalent of $100 a month; if one were to factor in
the loss of time entailed in queuing, their remuneration would have to be reduced still further. But such deprivation is utterly mild when
contrasted with the lot of Soviet coal miners-men who labored under such appalling conditions that their average longevity was a mere forty-
seven years (The Economist, "Dark Satanic Mills," October 13, 1990, P. 56). Indeed, industrial safety standards have been virtually
nonexistent through much of the Eastern block. Because of this failing, up to 50 percent of Polish steel workers were disabled and thus forced
to retire early (Fischoff 1991: 14),

According to marxist ideology, these Polish and Soviet workers were not exploited-even if their political leaders and party bosses were able
to live in aristocratic splendor. ("Exploitation," one will recall, is defined in terms of the surplus extraction that occurs only under a capitalisi
mode of production.) Such reasoning, evidently, held little appeal for the Polish and Russian proletariat; despite the long years in which it has
heir absolute political, social, and cultural mastery, marxism was never able to achieve intellectual hegemony in eastern Europe. What seems
inevitable now is the collapse of communism, not capitalism.

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YOUR UNIQUENESS IS THEORETICALLY BANKRUPT AND EMPIRICALLY DENIED

STEINMETZ, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 2003 [GEORGE,
“THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND THE REVIVAL OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: TOWARD AN AUTHORITARIAN
POST-FORDISM,” PUBLIC CULTURE 15.2 (2003) 323-345, P. PROJECT MUSE]

Contra such theorists as Hardt and Negri, there is little support for arguments that capitalist history has entered its final phase, that
with the coming of Empire the multitudes have reached a stage in which "pushing through to come out the other side" becomes a
realistic possibility. These authors link the rise of Fordism to the [End Page 339] "great economic crisis of 1929" (Hardt and Negri
2000: 241) and acknowledge the role of the economic crisis of the 1970s in creating the conditions for the transition to post-Fordism.
Yet they do not entertain the possibility that Empire itself could enter into a political crisis, like the one we are currently witnessing,
and give rise to a new imperialism. Nor do they consider the possibility that a more systemic economic crisis might give rise to a
mode of regulation that is neither imperial nor imperialist, but protectionist and neocolonial.

Each period of core hegemony has nurtured the illusion among enthusiasts of capitalism that it has reached its apotheosis and the
parallel fantasy among leftists that capitalism is on its last legs. Hugo Grotius ([1625] 1901), writing during the golden age of Dutch
hegemony, believed that his own world was the ultimate one. (Not surprisingly, Grotius's name is often heard in current discussions of
U.S. foreign policy.) The events leading up to the 1848 revolutions in Europe, during the era of British hegemony, famously led Marx
and Engels in the Communist Manifesto to predict "an immediately following proletarian revolution." To take a more recent example,
Ernest Mandel (1975: 125) believed that late capitalism—the title of his book, published in 1972 at the beginning of the death throes
of Fordism but written at the end of the first era of postwar American hegemony—had entered a terminal period of "overall social
crisis." The final sentence of Late Capitalism announced that "the final abolition of capitalism. . . is now approaching." Insisting that
there is something ultimate about Empire is not only theoretically indefensible but could actually be disabling for movements of
resistance, for such arguments may desensitize readers to the possibility of further mutations of capitalism and modes of social
regulation. Without pushing for a cyclical view of history, which Hardt and Negri rightly reject, one need not fall back on its inverse, a
teleological or truncated narrative.

One of the distinctive features of the condition of emergency since September 11 has been the relative inarticulateness of the
economic crisis as compared with the political one. If the current economic crisis were to deepen and create widespread panic among
the business elites, the resurgence of American hegemony described here could prove to be ephemeral. This, in fact, is how Immanuel
Wallerstein (2002) sees the present situation, but his analysis is based on what is in my view an as-yet-unproven thesis of American
economic and geopolitical decline. If the United States were to lose its overwhelming economic predominance, protectionism could
spread from the labor movement and the older Fordist sectors of capital to the post-Fordist sectors. By contrast, if the current recession
continues to be perceived as having a limited impact on business profits and if the United States continues to enjoy overwhelming
predominance in the global economy, [End Page 340] we are likely to see an extension of U.S. imperialist hegemony combined with a
deepening of economic openness and post-Fordist flexibility. 20

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THE REV HAS TO BE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL. ANYTHING ELSE IS JUST DISCOURSE THAT DOESN’T CHANGE
ANYTHING
CALLINICOS, PROF EUROPEAN STUDIES @ KING'S COLLEGE LONDON, MARCH 22, 2005 (ALEX, “WHAT
ST
DOES REVOLUTION MEAN IN THE 21 CENTURY?”, HTTP://WWW.CRASSH.CAM.AC.UK/EVENTS/ABSTRACTS/
REVOLUTION/INDEX.HTML)
<In this context, it seems sensible to consider, in as sober and objective a fashion as possible, what, if anything, revolution could mean today, in the era of neo-liberal
imperialism. Plainly this requires some thought about how the word ‘revolution’ is to be used. If one takes the great revolutions of modernity as one’s benchmark (of
course, as Toni Negri’s paper indicates, it is controversial whether or not we can still count ourselves as living in the modern era), the occurrence of a revolution
requires the coincidence of two distinct registers, social and political: that is, a revolution involves (1) the rapid and forcible
transformation of state power that contributes to (2) a decisive acceleration in a process of broader social transformation. Both these
conditions are necessary. To equate revolution merely with social transformation would be to licence banalities about ‘the IT
revolution’ and the like. Unless deeper structural conflicts give rise to a convulsive and decisive struggle over the direction of state
power that in turn contributes to the resolution (in some form or other) of these conflicts, then it seems to me that one should refuse to
apply the term ‘revolution’ to the changes under discussion. But without such structural conflicts any political transformation, however
rapid, violent, and violent dramatic it may be, does not count as a revolution. As Theda Skocpol puts it, ‘[w]hat is unique to social revolution is that
basic changes in social structure and in political structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing fashion.’ 6 I appreciate that all this is
stipulative rather than reflecting usage (particularly the kind of usage typified by the Bush administration’s proclamation of ‘democratic revolution’); it seems to me
that what makes revolution an interesting concept in social theory is that it offers a means of thinking about the interrelations between
long-term, protracted processes of social transformation and the relatively rapid changes in state power that these processes may
provoke or be shaped by. 7 >

THE NEGATIVES CALL FOR REVOLUTION DOESN’T TAKE INTO PERSPECTIVE OTHER VARIABLES OF SOCIETY.
TRANSITION COSTS COULD OUTWEIGH OR PREVENT ANY INCOME GAIN FROM A SHIFT IN SOCIETY AS BIG AS
WHAT THE NEGATIVE CALLS FOR
CALLINICOS, PROF EUROPEAN STUDIES @ KING'S COLLEGE LONDON, MARCH 22, 2005 (ALEX, “WHAT
ST
DOES REVOLUTION MEAN IN THE 21 CENTURY?”, HTTP://WWW.CRASSH.CAM.AC.UK/EVENTS/ABSTRACTS/
REVOLUTION/INDEX.HTML)
<One can, it seems to me, isolate three kinds of consideration here – roughly speaking, normative justification, structural context, and agency. The first is
straightforward enough: can revolution, in the sense gestured towards above, be morally justified today? The theoretical grounds on which revolution can be justified is,
of course, a huge subject that played its part in the very constitution of modern Western political thought. 12 I want simply to sidestep this literature. Approaching the
problem instead in a fairly crude and common-sense fashion one might seek to weigh up the undoubted evils of revolution with the evils that it would remove or
prevent. Thus contemporary socialist critiques of capitalism focus on the system’s present bodycount – 18 million preventable deaths a year caused by poverty or
poverty-related reasons – and the prospect of even greater catastrophes induced by the processes of environmental destruction driven by the global accumulation
process. In recent discussions the felicific calculus has been complicated by what is called the problem of transition costs: in other
words, the output losses resulting from the disruption caused by the transition to a new system might either eliminate the income gain
produced by the abolition of exploitation or to reduce it so low as to make participation in revolution irrational. 13 But while this argument
is undoubtedly pertinent, it seems to me that the real problem with morally justifying revolution today is essentially the same as one of the
standard requirements made of any claim to be embarking on a just war – namely, can it achieve the desirable objectives assigned to
it? In the case of socialist revolution this problem of feasibility takes a dual form: (a) Can we imagine a reproducible social system
with which such a revolution could replace the present system and that would represent an improvement according to mutually agreed
criteria – let’s say, democracy, efficiency, justice, and sustainability? There would be no point in striving for revolution if its goal
were unattainable. (b) Even if there were such a system, what is the probability of a revolution capable of installing it actually
occurring? If the probability were sufficiently low, then assuming the costs of even striving for revolution might be unjustified. 14 In the
1980s and 1990s it was problem (a) that dominated discussion as the crisis of the command economies in the East and the renaissance of economic liberalism in the
West created a climate in which it seemed that the superiority of the market over planning can been definitively established. This impression has indeed been
entrenched as a dogma that sustains the Washington Consensus and the politics of the Third Way and of American neoconservatism. For all that, it is contestable:
radical economists such as Michael Albert and Pat Devine have constructed models of democratically planned economies (called, respectively, participatory planning
and negotiated coordination) that go a long way towards showing how the requirements set out above might be met. 15 Of course, this relatively technical work isn’t
enough seriously to budge the widespread assumption, on the left as well as the right, that some kind of market economy is the inescapable material basis of any modern
society worth living in, but it has, in my view, established an intellectual bridgehead that is sufficiently robust for me to concentrate on problem (b) in the rest of this
paper: even if Albert and Devine are right, and democratic planning is feasible and would represent an improvement on capitalism, how likely is it that the necessary
socio-political transformation will occur any time soon? ‘Not very,’ would be the most charitable answer just about everyone would give. In the hope of making
addressing the reasons behind this response vaguely manageable, I want to focus on the other two kinds of consideration above, both of which bear on this particular
problem of feasibility.>

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THE REVOLUTION CAN’T HAPPEN IN THE STATUS QUO. GLOBALIZATION AND UNCONTESTED HEGEMONY OF
THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE CO-OPTION OF ANY UNWANTED MOVEMENT OR POLICY INEVITABLE

CALLINICOS, PROF EUROPEAN STUDIES @ KING'S COLLEGE LONDON, MARCH 22, 2005 (ALEX, “WHAT
ST
DOES REVOLUTION MEAN IN THE 21 CENTURY?”, HTTP://WWW.CRASSH.CAM.AC.UK/EVENTS/ABSTRACTS/
REVOLUTION/INDEX.HTML)
<There is, then, secondly, the question of the structural context that may facilitate or impede revolutions. In her classic study Skocpol isolated two
main transnational dimensions of this context – the capitalist world economy and the modern state system. 16 Since, as Skocpol emphasizes, historically
revolution has involved the seizure of control of a state within the interstate system, the critical issue here involves measuring the
impact of globalization. Have conditions decisively turned against revolutionary seizures of state power? Two main reasons are given for
thinking that they have, even though they are at least potentially in conflict with each other. First, the qualitative increase in global economic integration
over the past generation means that states have lost the degree of autonomy they previously enjoyed: more specifically, any attempt to
pursue socio-economic policies other than those mandated by the Washington Consensus will be ruthlessly punished by the financial
markets and by international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. This argument is put forward by the boosters of neo-
liberal globalization, but a version of it is to be found in Hardt’s and Negri’s argument that national sovereignty has been supplanted by
Empire, which marks the emergence of a new form of transnational network capitalism. Secondly, since the end of the Cold War the
state system has fallen under the unchallenged hegemony of the United States, which possesses resources, economic, military, and
ideological unparalleled by those enjoyed by any earlier imperial power. The effect is not simply to confront any deviant state (and
what could be more deviant than one that were the product of a socialist revolution?) with the might of the Pentagon but also to
remove the kind of space that, during the Cold War partition of the world into rival superpower blocs, gave at least some states the
room for manoeuvre to play one side off against another. These two reasons are potentially in conflict since the first implies a general weakening of states
whereas the second asserts that one state in particular has become much stronger. There are ways round this – for example, by distinguishing between the capacities
common to all states (which may have declined) and the powers the states have relative to one another (where, despite the alleged general reduction in state capacities,
the power of the US may have grown with respect to that of other states). Or one might see the US as a kind of global enforcer, imposing the conditions of neo-liberal
globalization on recalcitrant states.>

AFF: NO ALT SOLVENCY
REVOLUTIONS ARE CRUSHED BY OTHER, STRONGER STATES

CALLINICOS, PROF EUROPEAN STUDIES @ KING'S COLLEGE LONDON, MARCH 22, 2005 (ALEX, “WHAT DOES REVOLUTION MEAN
ST
IN THE 21 CENTURY?”, HTTP://WWW.CRASSH.CAM.AC.UK/EVENTS/ABSTRACTS/REVOLUTION/INDEX.HTML)
<In any case, I am not sure that either claim really stands up as a marker of a qualitative change in the structural context favouring or impeding revolutions. This is
partly because, as everyone knows, the problem of survival in a hostile interstate system has always confronted revolutionary states. They
have faced the direct threat of counter-revolution imposed by, or with the strong support of one or more Great Powers. But they have
also had to deal with the more subtle danger that consists in adapting to meet this threat and thereby increasingly reproducing many of
the characteristics of the socio-political order that the revolution was intended to destroy. It is this latter form of external pressure that, in my
view, mainly explains the tragedy of the Russian Revolution: developing the heavy industries necessary to give the USSR military capabilities comparable to those of
Britain and Germany implied an internalization of the imperative of capital accumulation and a concentration of economic and political power more extreme than in
Western capitalism. This case is particularly striking because the decisive phase in this process of adaptation/counterrevolutionary transformation – the so-called ‘Stalin
revolution’ in the ten years that began in 1927-8 – occurred during the Great Depression of the 1930s, when the world market shrank and fragmented, and in response
all states capable of doing so pursued strategies of economic autarky. The pressure to adapt to a transnational environment dominated by competing imperialist powers
made itself brutally felt even when global economic integration was at its weakest. 17>

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THEIR "THAT'S NOT OUR FORM OF M ARXISM " ARGUMENT IS BUNK - THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD
INEVITABLE LEAD TO ANOTHER BUREAUCRATIC NIGHTMARE

LEWIS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN GEOGRAPHY AT GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, 1992 [MARTIN
W., GREEN DELUSIONS , P. 165-166]

Eco-marxists often blame the sorry state of real existing socialism on the crucial mistake of bureaucratization. By vesting too much power
in the hands of central party functionaries, this line of reasoning goes, the revolutionaries betrayed their own vision of a just, democratic,
socialist future. But as Theodore Hamerow's (1990) masterful account of the "graying of the revolution" makes abundantly clear, the rise
of the buereaucratic oligarchy may have been unintended but it was nonetheless inexorable. If eco-marxists were ever to gain power in the
United States, we could expect history to recapitulate itself on this score. Still, marxist apologists will continue to inform us that
communist leaders just made a few critical errors, and that if we were once again to begin building communism, this time we could get it
right. This position might be reasonable had the world known only a single marxist state, but the sad fact is that the experiment has been just
as disastrous on every occasion and in every social environment in which it has been attempted. Scholars seeking real material and
structural explanations in history would be forced to admit that marxism's political failure has been rather more unavoidable than
accidental.

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ŽIŽEK = ⊗ LEFT COALITIONS
ŽIŽEK’S JUST CRITIQUES EVERYTHING WITH NO ARGUMENTATIVE RIGOR, WHICH ULTIMATELY DESTROYS
OUR ABILITY TO BUILD COALITIONS AND DIALOGUE ON THE LEFT
KARNAS, GRADUATE STUDENT AT MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, 2002 TODD, “RAT MAN AND WOLF-MAN,”
SYMPLOKE 10.1-2 (2002) 186-195, P. DATABASE]
Elsewhere, Zizek wants his theory to work harder than it does, such as when the misleading footnote ("See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire,"
[152 n. 2]) at the end of the Introduction implies that Zizek's plea, "What Christianity did with regard to the Roman Empire, this global polity, we should do with regard
to today's Empire" (5), strictly echoes and works in conjunction with Negri and Hardt's vast book. Moreover, Zizek always wants theory to work metonymically or [End
Page 193] even synecdochally. Theoretical arguments often appear as a series of equivalencies between figures or schools that stand-in for a
general theoretical trend. For instance, it is not uncommon for Zizek to present "deconstruction" as an event that specifically indicts everyone from Paul de Man
to Judith Butler. Certainly, things don't work so formally. Half Rat Man, half Wolf-Man, Zizek seems determined to obsessively parade in
theoretical edifice after theoretical edifice, cultural object after cultural object, adorned with all of their meanest significations, to
make his theories speak simultaneously about and against everything. Indeed, although there appears to be something very real in the
way in which Zizek's theory generates an obsessive quality in its fervor to engage concepts pluralistically, there erupts from this a
powerful abyss in the way in which Zizek's methodology oscillates between mediation and "genericization."
Zizek can indeed be brilliant. His previous, exemplary work with Lacan has certainly been groundbreaking in North America in the opportunity that it has provided
academics to re-examine from a symptomatological standpoint everything from cultural and identity politics to narrative theory—not to mention David Lynch, Monty
Python, and Alfred Hitchcock. However, if one is to take seriously this enhanced turn in Zizek's oeuvre, this re-invigorated emphasis of the
totality of the "real" act, its ability to disrupt the Symbolic constellation, its ability to produce new forms that are not simply disparate
particularizations of the old ones, then Zizek needs to operate with the sense of cohesive immediacy and rigor that something like The
Ticklish Subject did. Indeed, "urgency" can mean necessity, force, and consequence without hasty expedience. The philosophical tradition that actively engages
questions of faith, unbelief, hope, contrition, politics, and action is extraordinarily rich, diverse, complex, and tough to crack. And while there seems extraordinary
potential in Zizek's desire to chart Lacan's movement from the "utilitarianism" of Seminar VII (the "theory of fictions") to the Lacan of a perpetual creatio ex nihilo that
is simultaneously part of the frame and the excluded obstacle and condition of it (the "non-rapport" of Seminar XX), this needs assiduous elucidation and
engagement. And all the more so when Zizek performs within a mise en théorie written through his endless play of substitutions that
paradoxically serve to reinforce the exemplary position of his argument. It seems as if the Zizekian argument wants dialogue with
others, but unfortunately often excludes them simply in the way that it represents and speaks of itself.

T URN /: T HEIR CRITICISM ' S TOTALIZING POSITION SHUTS DOWN MOVEMENTS; ENDORSING BOTH
STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE CREATES SPACE FOR AN ACTIVIST POLITICS
K RISHNA , P ROFESSOR OF P OLITICAL S CIENCE AT THE U NIVERSITY OF H AWAI ’ I AT M ANOA , 1993
[SANKARAN, ALTERNATIVES, SUMMER , P. 400-401]
Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear
criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition"
or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy' choice forced upon the reader is to join
Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms.

This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective)
against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in
any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways
to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It
obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause
even as one recognizes that the coalition is compromised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of
reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling- reasons for the "failure" of
the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner
sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives.

The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial
critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic
essentialism in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of
critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

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ŽIŽEK = TOTALITARIANISM
ZIZEK’S ALTERNATIVE IS PESSIMISTIC AND AUTHORITARIAN; HIS THEORY PRECLUDES A DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS

BREGER, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF GERMANIC STUDIES AT INDIANA, 2001 (CLAUDIA, DIACRITICS 31.1
(2001) 73-90, “THE LEADER'S TWO BODIES: SLAVOJ ZIZEK'S POSTMODERN POLITICAL THEOLOGY,” P.
PROJECT MUSE)

Over the course of the last decade, Slavoj Zizek and his "Slovenian Lacanian school" have gained renown in the Western theory market. Academics are fascinated not
only by Zizek's performances as a speaker, his nondogmatic approach to issues of genre and (inter)mediality, 1 and the "literary" character of his theoretical texts
[Laclau, Preface xii], but also by the political turn given to psychoanalysis by the "Slovenian school." Already in his preface to Zizek's The Sublime Object of Ideology
(1989), Ernesto Laclau wrote that this school's work made Lacanian theory "one of the principal reference points of the so-called 'Slovenia spring'—that is to say the
democratization campaigns that have taken place in recent years" [xi]. More than ten years later—after a decade of authoritarian rule, war, and
genocide in former Yugoslavia—recent revolutionary events in Serbia once more allow one to hope for a thorough democratization of
the region. In a newspaper article evaluating the uprising, however, Zizek warned that these hopes might be premature: while Milosevic
could find his new role as "a Serbian Jesus Christ," taking upon him all the "sins" committed by his people, Kostunica and his "democratic" nationalism might represent
"nothing but Milosevic in the 'normal' version, without the excess" [Zizek, "Gewalt"]. 2

Zizek was not alone in warning that the new government in Yugoslavia might not bring an end to Serbian nationalist politics. The
pessimistic scenario Zizek evoked on this occasion, however, was not simply the result of his evaluation of the current political constellation in
Serbia. Rather, the fantasy of the necessary return of the leader is connected to his political theory—a theory that does not allow for
more optimistic scenarios of democratization and the diminution of nationalism in society. My reading of Zizek's work thus argues for
a reevaluation of his theory in terms of its implicit authoritarian politics. The need for such a reevaluation is also suggested by Laclau
toward the end of his recent exchange with Judith Butler and Zizek when he admits that "the more our discussions progressed, the
more I realized that my sympathy for Zizek's politics was largely the result of a mirage" [Laclau, "Constructing Universality" 292]. Laclau now
criticizes Zizek's radical Marxist rhetoric by suggesting that he "wants to do away with liberal democratic regimes" without specifying a
political alternative [289], and describes Zizek's discourse as "schizophrenically split between a highly sophisticated Lacanian analysis and an insufficiently
deconstructed traditional Marxism" [205]. On [End Page 73] the other hand, he also problematizes Zizek's "psychoanalytic discourse" as "not truly political" [289]. My
argument primarily starts from this latter point: the antidemocratic—and, as I will argue, both antifeminist and anti-Semitic—moment of Zizek's
theory is to be located not only in the way he performs Marxism, but also in the way he performs Lacanian psychoanalysis. While, in
other words, Zizek's skepticism vis-à-vis democracy is obviously informed by, and inseparable from, Marxist critiques of "liberal,"
"representative" democracy, his failure to elaborate alternative visions of political change towards egalitarian and/or plural scenarios
of society cannot be explained solely by his Marxist perspective. Rather, it is Zizek's reading of Lacanian psychoanalysis that does not
allow for revisions of the Marxist paradigm toward, for example, a "radical democracy" as suggested by Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in
their Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.

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ŽIŽEK’S ALTERNATIVE TO CAPITALISM IS NON-EXISTENT—NOT ONLY COULD IT LEAD TO TOTALITARIANISM
AND FASCISM, BUTENDORSING IT WOULD SET THE AGENDA OF THE LEFT BACK FIFTY YEARS
LACLAU, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL THEORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX, 2000 [ERNESTO, CONTINGENCY,
HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY, P. 288-290]
Zizek calls the reader's attention to the fact that Butler, as well as Laclau, in their criticism of the old 'essentialist' Marxism, none the
less silently accept a set of premises: they never put in question the fundamentals of the capitalist market economy and of the liberal
democratic political regime; they never envisage the possibility of a thoroughly different economico-political regime. In this way, they
fully participate in the abandonment of these questions by the 'post-modern' Left: all the changes they propose are changes within this
economico-political regime. (St, p. 223)

The reader must excuse me for smiling at the naive self-complacence this r-r-revolutionary passage reflects. For if Butler and I are not
envisaging 'the possibility of a thoroughly different economico-political regime', Zizek is not doing so either. In his previous essay
Žižek had told us that he wanted to overthrow capitalism; now we are served notice that he also wants to do away with liberal
democratic regimes – to be replaced, it is true, by a thoroughly different regime which he does not have the courtesy of letting us
know anything about. One can only guess. Now, apart from capitalist society and the parallelograms of Mr Owen, Zizek does actually
know a third type of sociopolitical arrangement: the Communist bureaucratic regimes of Eastern Europe under which he lived. Is that
what he has in mind? Does he want to replace liberal democracy by a one-party political system, to undermine the division of powers,
to impose the censorship of the press? Zizek belongs to a liberal party in Slovenia, and was its presidential candidate in the first
elections after the end of communism. Did he tell the Slovenian voters that his aim was to abolish liberal democracy – a regime which
was slowly and painfully established after protracted liberalization campaigns in the 1980s, in which Zizek himself was very active?
And if what he has in mind is something entirely different, he has the elementary intellectual and political duty to let us know what it
is. Hitler and Mussolini also abolished liberal democratic political regimes and replaced them by 'thoroughly different' ones. Only if
that explanation is made available will we be able to start talking politics, and abandon the theological terrain. Before that, I cannot
even know what Zizek is talking about – and the more this exchange progresses, the more suspicious I become that Zizek himself does
not know either.

All this brings me close to the conclusion – which was by no means evident to me when we started this dialogue – that Zizek's thought
is not organized around a truly political reflection but is, rather, a psychoanalytic discourse which draws its examples from the
politico-ideological field. In that sense, I agree with Butler when she asserts, apropos of Zizek, that in his discourse '[t]he examples
function in a mode of allegory that presumes the separability of the illustrative example from the content it seeks to illuminate' ( JB, p.
157). It is certainly true that in the process of doing so Zizek makes a myriad of insightful remarks which throw light on the
structuration of the politico-ideological field – and, a fortiori, show the fruitfulness of psychoanalysis for political thought – but this is
a far cry from the elaboration of a political perspective which, if it is truly one, has to be centered in a strategic reflection. I can discuss
politics with Butler because she talks about the real world, about strategic problems people encounter in their actual struggles, but with
Zizek it is not possible even to start to do so. The only thing one gets from him are injunctions to overthrow capitalism or to abolish
liberal democracy, which have no meaning at all. Furthermore, his way of dealing with Marxist categories consists in inscribing them
in a semi-metaphysical horizon which, if it were accepted – a rather unlikely event – would put the agenda of the Left back fifty years.
Let me give a few examples.

ŽIŽEK’S CRITIQUE GIVES NO ALTERNATIVE TO CAPITALISM—IT’S ALL JUST EMPTY TALK
LACLAU, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL THEORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX, 2000 [ERNESTO, CONTINGENCY,
HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY, P. 205-206]
Zizek takes a patently anti-capitalist stance, and asserts that the proponents of postmodernism ‘as a rule, leave out of sight the
resignation at its heart – the acceptance of capitalism as “the only game in town”, the renunciation of any real attempt to overcome the
existing capitalist liberal regime’ (SZ, p.95). The difficulty with assertions like this is that they mean absolutely nothing. I understand
what Marx meant by overcoming the capitalist regime, because he made it quite explilcit several times. I also understand what Lenin
or Trotsky meant for the same reason. But in the work of Zizek that expression means nothing – unless he has a secret strategic plan of
which he is very careful not to inform anybody. Should we underswtand that he wants to impose the dictatorship of the proletariat? Or
does he want to toscialize the means of production and abolish market mechanisms? And what is his political strategy to achieve these
rather peculiar aims? What is the alternative model of society that he is postulation? Without at least the beginning of an answer to
these questions, his anti-capitalism is mere empty talk.

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ŽIŽEK’S POLITICS ULTIMATELY RELEGATE STRUGGLE TO INDIVIDUAL CHOICE, A LOGIC OF RESISTANCE THAT
CORRESPONDS TO CAPITALISM EVEN BETTER THAN THOSE HE KRITIKS

HURLEY, DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND, 1998 [JAMES S., “REAL
VIRTUALITY: SLAVOJ ZIZEK AND "POST-IDEOLOGICAL" IDEOLOGY,” PMC 9.1, P. DATABSE]
My objection to this final move in Plague of Fantasies is not that Zizek insists on addressing the ways in which ideological forces operate at the level of the
intrapsychic; Zizek's tracing of these operations is in fact one of the appeals of his theory, providing a component that is missing from, say, Foucault's theory of power,
in which the subject's interior life is elided almost entirely. What bothers me about this move, and in this it is rather typical of Zizek's work, is its
implication that it is ultimately the intrapsychic where the ideological action is, including, presumably, the action that can problematize
and constructively modify ideology's interpellative precepts. In reframing the larger structural questions he has so frequently and
provocatively raised in Plague of Fantasies in terms of the individual subject's ethical choice, Zizek achieves a position at the end of the book that
is, curiously, a kind of "Lacanized" existentialism: what is imperative for the subject is a self-constitutive choice in the face of a
spiritually impoverished and politically disempowering life-world; but unlike the autonomous, self-identical subjectivity that is the Sartrean ideal, the
Zizekian subject's self-constitution results from an act of willing self-destitution, an acceptance of the primordial splitting that is
subjectivity's necessary condition of existence. In the context of the dropping from Zizek's discussion of the "global" issues he has raised, the famous
Lacanian symbol for this split subjectivity--$--seems, unfortunately, all too appropriate: Zizek's theorization of postmodern subjectivity may finally
accord even better with the privatizing logic of postmodern capitalism and liberal democracy than does the neo-Gramscian model of
left-alliance politics he criticizes.
But as problematic and disappointing as this position may be, Plague of Fantasies, through its very formal (dis)organization, complicates our seeing it as Zizek's final
and finalizing word. I return again to the extraordinary compression I've noted in this appendix: one of the reasons it is so dense is that Zizek insists, to an
almost feverish degree, on rephrasing, reframing, and repositioning virtually every point in his argument; favorite Zizekian tropes that
are by now familiar to us from earlier works--"that is to say," "in other words," "to put this another way," "to put this in yet another
way"--are piled atop each other here until they reach, like the bowling-shoe monolith in The Big Lebowski, higher than the eye can
see. It is in "The Unconscious Law" that Zizek seems most driven in this book to get his theory precisely right--and where getting it
right proves most elusive. In this respect, the operational logic of "The Unconscious Law" parallels that of the Symbolic Order itself as
Zizek has so often described it, the Symbolic perpetually scrambling to get to the Real, but forever doomed to under- or overshoot it.
The Real that Zizek is missing in the argumentational fury of this appendix is the one he has pointed to earlier in the book, the post-ideological Real of capitalism's
totality and class antagonism. This is a Real that works with especially disruptive force here, as though exacting payback from Zizek for his
privatizing theoretical turn.

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ŽIŽEK’S ALTERNATIVE FAILS—CAPITALISM
ŽIŽEK’S CONCEPT OF “CLASS POLITICS” AND CALLS TO “FIGHT CAPITALISM” ARE JUST UNSOPHISTICATED,
19TH CENTURY MARXISM WHICH CANNOT NEGOTIATE THE EXISTING POLITICAL CLIMATE OF TODAY

LACLAU, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL THEORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX, 2000 [ERNESTO, CONTINGENCY,
HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY, P. 296-9]
It is now time to move on to describe the articulation between universality and particularity which is compatible with hegemonic logics. In order to do so, however, I
want first to deal with the category of 'class', and with the way in which it has been present in the usual practice of many contemporary discourses. I will refer to two
very frequent language games played with the term 'class'.

I. The first tries to retain the category, while making it compatible with the proliferation of identities linked to the new social movements. The usual practice here is to
transform 'class* into one more link in an enumerative chain. Thus we frequently find that when one is arguing about new identities and their specific demands, we find
enumerations of the type: 'race, gender, ethnicity, etc., and class' – and the 'and' is usually stressed by an intonation of the voice, as if to say: 'Don't forget the old chap'.
This satisfies the speaker, because she thinks she has found the square circle between the need to assert new identities and a certain ultimate Marxism that she does not
want to abandon entirely. What the speaker does not realize is that what she has enounced is something which is radically incompatible with the Marxist theory of
classes. The Marxist notion of 'class' cannot be incorporated into an enumerative chain of identities, simply because it is supposed to be
the articulating core around which all identity is constituted. What do 'classes' mean when this articulating function is lost, and they
become part of a chain embracing a plurality of identities? Differences of wealth? Professional categories? Group belonging in terms
of differential geographical areas? It is indeterminate. The term 'class', by becoming part of an enumerative chain, has lost its
articulating role without acquiring any new precise meaning. We are dealing with something approaching the status of a `floating
signifier'.
2. A second strategy in relation to classes (to the working class in this case) consists in asserting what is commonly called the 'enlarged conception of the working class'.
I remember a conversation with a well-known American sociologist who told me that Marx's thesis about the increasing proletarianization of society had been verified,
because today there are fewer self-employed people than there were in the nineteenth century, and the vast majority of the population receives wages/salaries. To my
obvious question – 'In that case, for you, are bank managers members of the working class?' - He answered: 'Well, no, wages should not be higher than a certain level'.
To successive similar questions invariably answered by adding more descriptive sociological features until, in the end, I raised two questions to which I could give no
proper answer ”how do you know that these sets of descriptive features come together in some 'actually existing' social agents?; (b) even if you could point to empirical
agents who would correspond to the Identikit of the 'working class', is not that very plurality of criteria showing already that the working class today is smaller than it
was in the nineteenth century? As we can see, the specification of the criteria required to make the notion of an 'enlarged working class' meaningful undermines that
very notion.

We should consider a couple of distinctive features of the two discursive strategies we have just mentioned. The first is that, in both, the notion of 'class' has lost
all intuitive content. The classical Marxist concept of 'class' derived its verisimilitude from the fact that it established a correspondence
between two levels: a formal structural analysis of the tendencies of capitalist society and of the social agents resulting from them, and
an intuitive identification of those agents. Everybody knew who the workers, or the peasants, or the bourgeoisie were. And –Marxists,
at least – knew what it meant for the working class to become a 'universal class'. But the very fact that the 'enlarged conception of the
working class' discusses who the workers are means that the correspondence between the intuitive level and structural analysis no
longer obtains. Most damaging: even if the enlarged conception of the working class were correct – which it is not – it would be
impossible to derive from it any conclusion concerning 'class politics', for it speaks only about a virtual working class, corresponding
to no specifiable group. The same for the first strategy: we no longer know what class politics could be if the identity of concrete
agents is given by an enumeration of features whose mutual connections are not thought at all.
This leads me to the second and most important feature of the two discursive strategies discussed above. Whatever the shortcomings of the classical Marxist theory of
classes, one has to recognize that it never gave up about being a theory of articulation. Even in the most naive forms of vulgar Marxism, there was always the attempt to
ascribe different features of social agents to different levels of internal efficacy and articulation: the distinction base/superstructure, the triad
economic/political/ideological, and so on. The impossibility of containing different and increasingly autonomous contents within the
straitjacket of the old frameworks – class, capitalism, and so forth – led, in a first moment, to more complex and subtle mechanisms of
articulation, while maintaining the validity of the old articulating entities. Thus the Althusserian School, in the 1960s and 1970s, introduced
categories such as determination in the last instance, dominant role, relative autonomy, overdetermination, and so on. This was not, however, the end of the process. I
think that the last stage in the disintegration of the old frameworks is to be found in enumerating strategies such as the ones we have
just mentioned: they give up on articulating logics while maintaining, in some sort of phantasmic role, the old articulating entities. (To
enumerate is not to establish any connection between the enumerated entities. Incorporating a formerly articulating entity into an enumeration is one way of depriving it
of any meaning. Another is Zizek's: vociferously to proclaim the principle of class struggle, while refusing to say anything about the conditions of its validity.) In some
way, we are in a situation similar to the one described by Eric Auerbach apropos the dissolution of the orderly structure of Ciceronian classical language: with the
decline of the Roman order, the old institutional distinctions were unable to hegemonize an increasingly chaotic social reality. So the rich hypotactic structures of
classical Latin were substituted by an enumerative paratactical narrative (et ... et . . . et) which just added up fragments of a reality that one was no longer able to think
in its connections.'

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WHAT ŽIŽEK TERMS “POSTMODERNISM” IS ACTUALL AN EFFECTIVE FORM OF POLITICS

BREGER, ASS’T PROF. OF GERMANIC STUDIES AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY (BLOOMINGTON), 2001 [CLAUDIA,
“RESPONSE TO SLAVOJ ZIZEK,” DIACRITICS 31.1 (2001) 105-108, P.DATABASE]

While thus happily accepting the label "anti-dogmatic," I would like to argue with the way in which Zizek stages the choice between
the relativist "liberal democrat" and the fully engaged "fundamentalist" at the end of his paper [103]. The opposition reminds me of the
debates within gender and postcolonial studies in the course of which [End Page 105] deconstructivist positions were charged with
destroying political agency, and essentialism, or at least "strategic essentialism" [see, for example, Fuss], was defended as a political
necessity. Zizek justifies his "fundamentalism"—in quotation marks—similarly as a strategic choice. As evidence for its necessity,
however, he enlists the topical figure of a "postmodern deconstructionist" who plays his/her academic power games in the safe realm
of ironic distance from social struggles. To be sure: with a Foucauldian background, I have no difficulty in acknowledging that the
rhetoric of self-relativization is part of academic power games as well—and I do believe that these power games should be subjected
to a process of political critique. This very process, however, seems to be the crucial point: if power is omnipresent (as Foucault
argues),and no transcendental legitimation available for any of its singular performances (as not only the "anti-dogmatist" but also the
"strategic dogmatist" has to add), we need to continuously engage in the process of evaluating—and thus, at least formally,
relativizing—different claims. And while the epistemological gesture of recognizing the foundational plurality of diverging claims
may be easily performed, the political process of actually negotiating these claims, of fighting for their recognition, and of being
fought by others with their contrary claims, is no matter of peaceful serenity (unless—somewhat flippantly spoken—the postmodern deconstructivist
who envisions this process has converted to a very Habermasian world view).

MULTICULTURALISM IS NECESSARY BECAUSE IT IS THE ONLY LANGUAGE WE HAVE AVAILABLE FOR
RESISTANCE

HART, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES AT THE UNC-GREENSBORO, 2002 [WILLIAM DAVID,
“SLAVOJ ZIZEK AND THE IMPERIAL/COLONIAL MODEL OF RELIGION,” NEPANTLA: VIEWS FROM SOUTH 3.3
(2002) 553-578, P. DATABASE]
6. I have already suggested that Zizek's critique of multiculturalism, while insightful, is inadequate. If Michel Foucault moves toward liberal
notions of the self in his later work, if Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx (1994) concludes with a set of liberal proposals, if, as Zizek
himself argues in a 2001 Süddeutsche Zeitung review of Empire, the even more radical, Marxist-communist discourse of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000)
succumbs to the siren songs of human rights liberalism in its constructive proposals, then why should we expect more from
multiculturalists? Given the discursive constraints of a deeply ingrained culture of liberalism, perhaps multiculturalists express radical,
subversive, and revolutionary desires within the constraints of the only language they know

.

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ŽIŽEK’S CRITIQUE OF DEMOCRACY CREATES AN AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS—WE SHOULD INSTEAD ENDORSE
A STRATEGY OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY THAT CRITIQUES THE SYSTEM AND ENGAGES POLITICAL SYSTEMS

BREGER, ASS’T PROF. OF GERMANIC STUDIES AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY (BLOOMINGTON), 2001 [CLAUDIA,
“RESPONSE TO SLAVOJ ZIZEK,” DIACRITICS 31.1 (2001) 105-108, P.DATABASE]

In other words: challenging the proposition that serious political engagement has to rely on (more or less strategic) "fundamentalism", I would
like to—once more—plead for political strategies that renounce such rhetoric. Perhaps it is useful to explicitly comment on the (in a more narrow sense) political
dimension of Zizek's recourse to this signifier: it cannot be read outside the context of the war on terrorism and the Western construction
of "the fundamentalist" that accompanies this war. I understand Zizek's gesture of (ironic?) identification with this label as a strategy of political
protest via provocation, but I would personally prefer it to be replaced by a critical genealogy of the notion of fundamentalism and its uses—
as well as an analysis of those constructions which function, in Zizek's text, as a political opposite of this "fundamentalist" protest:
"trust that the democratic substance of honest Americans is able to break up the conspiracy" [96]. Even while accepting the implicit
proposition that the rhetoric of democracy is today implicated with the politics of war, one can obviously ask whether the "true
Master-Signifier: democracy" is entirely absorbed by this political configuration, or whether it does not function in more complex and
multiple ways within and beyond this specific field of political events.
Before eventually returning to this question of democracy, I would like to turn to a set of more specific issues that might deserve further comment: the question of
undressing the emperor and the relationship of king and leader. In his response to my text, Zizek states that the problem with "the undressing of the king" is that it "only
destroys his personal charisma, not the power of the symbolic place of the King" [92]. If this qualification was intended to suggest that we should develop strategies of
deconstructing, disempowering, or splitting that symbolic place, I could only agree—completely so. However, Zizek makes a somewhat different point. He
describes a situation in which "we" seem to be unable to touch anything but the personal charisma of the king—and are thereby
doomed to endlessly repeat the mechanism of replacing one royal individual with another. The argument I develop in my paper
questions this description as a performative act: a gesture that installs failure in the project of democracy. I ask why Zizek keeps
reiterating the negative evaluation ("we cannot undress the emperor") rather than searching for alternative options ("how could we undress him more
effectively then"), and I argue that it is Zizek's specific reading of Lacan that does not allow for this change of perspective. Thus, Zizek—as I
argue above in more detail—not only assumes [End Page 106] that a position of ("royal," that is, single, central, and superior) authority is a structural necessity within
and for the social edifice, but also claims that the social process of filling—and fantasizing about—this position of authority is marked by the intervention of "pieces of
the Real." It is in this context that, in Grimassen des Realen, he suggests that Marx's reminder to concentrate on the symbolic place of the king rather than his personal
charisma misses the inseparability of the king's two bodies, which implies the "transsubstantiation" of the body natural by virtue of its occupying the symbolic position
of the king, and its infiltration with a moment of sublimity which prevents its effective—personal as well as political—degradation.

one of the problematic aspects of this argument in Grimassen des Realen is, as I believe, that it threatens to
As discussed in detail in my paper,
collapse the difference between the king—or traditional master—and the modern leader by explaining the indestructible charisma of the
leader with recourse to the paradigm of the king and his failed deauthorization in the French Revolution. As Zizek insists in his response, this difference
between the two figures of authority is crucial for his theory, but unfortunately, the argument in Grimassen des Realen fails to substantiate the claim that they are
different. In the passage of TheSublime Object of Ideology to which Zizek refers in his response, he does develop a different argument. Here, he
claims that the "transubstantiated body of the classical Master is [simply, CB] an effect of the performative mechanism" of treating him
like one; which means that he can be deauthorized effectively: "as soon as the performative mechanism which gives him his
charismatic authority is demasked, the Master loses his power" [146]. In the context of this argument, the objet petit a that arrests the performative play
of signifiers seems to play its role on the level of ideology/fantasy only, that is, in the political theology analyzed by Kantorowicz and, in modernity, "the Stalinist
vision," in which the communist leaders are described as "people of a special mould," as "a sublime object" [145]. Rather than insisting that this ideology
shapes history by constituting its "necessary" form, as Zizek does in other passages of The Sublime Object of Ideology [for example, 61-62, as
discussed in my paper], he, in this context, discusses its paradoxical basis and thereby suggests how—both premodern and Stalinist—ideology can be
subjected to a critique. Other than the traditional master, the leader—and this is the basic feature of the difference between the two—enlists the very performative
mechanism as the resource of his power by grounding his authority in the agency of "the people." This point of reference, however, does not exist: "in reality the People
are the People because—or, more precisely, in so far as—they are embodied in the Party" [146].

[CONTINUES…]

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In this passage, we thus find a more traditional critique of ideology than in those discussed in my paper. Perhaps, a friendlier reading than mine could have given more
weight to these moments of Zizek's work. On the other hand, the political imaginary laid out in Grimassen des Realen seems to be the more consistent development of
the—problematic—epistemological claims I have been discussing. And despite the different focus, the ideas in this short chapter in The Sublime Object of Ideology are
also, in multiple ways, intertwined with the problems I have identified in other contexts. Thus, the passage concludes with a discussion of democracy that is only
partially different from the ones I have talked about. Zizek starts from the proposition that the "Lacanian definition of democracy would then be: a sociopolitical order
in which the People do not exist—do not exist in a unity" [147], and associates this nonexistence with Lefort's empty place of power. In this context, however, the
"Real" is introduced on a more-than-just-ideological level once more. This idea of an "irruption of the Real" within the "abstractions" of formal democracy is familiar
from other texts I have discussed in my paper. Whereas, in these other contexts, this "irruption of the Real" is, for example, located in the articulations of essentialist
ethnic identity and racism, here Zizek finds it [End Page 107] within the process of representative democracy itself: "elections" [147]. With Lefort, he characterizes the
latter as "an act of symbolic dissolution of the social edifice" [148]. At the moment of election, society "changes into a contingent collection of atomized individuals,"
and "the result depends on a [. . .] stochastic process: some wholly unforeseeable (or manipulated) event [. . .] can add that 'half per cent' one way or the other that
determines the general orientation of the country's politics over the next few years . . ." [148]. Having identified this "thoroughly 'irrational' character of what we call
'formal democracy,'" Zizek concludes that "democracy makes possible all sorts of manipulation, corruption, the rule of demagogy," but
that the "possibility of such deformations" can only be eliminated at the price of democracy itself—"So-called 'real democracy' is just another
name for non-democracy: if we want to exclude the possibility of manipulation, we must 'verify' the candidates in advance, we must introduce the difference between
the 'true interests of the people' and its contingent fluctuating opinion [. . .], and so on" [148]—and thus we find ourselves in a situation of totalitarianism once more.

It should be noted that despite this pessimistic scenario, Zizek concludes with the suggestion to adhere to "the universal notion of
'democracy' as a 'necessary fiction'" [148]. Nonetheless, the analysis is symptomatic for the horizon he develops. Even if—as I would
admit—the idea of a moment of irrationality within the electoral process is not without its temptations, since majorities may be very
small and the results of counting ballots occasionally disputed, I don't think that it is either necessary or helpful to credit an "irruption of the Real"
with such problems. Instead, we could decide to analyze the results of elections as a combination of discursive articulations and
factors of institutionalized power—the latter including not only the specific regulations of the electoral process and any group's chance to decide on the
modalities of their application in a situation of conflict, but also the intervention of the media, the campaign donations of companies, and so forth. This analysis,
however, points toward a notion of democracy that differs from the one used by Zizek: a notion of democracy designating not only a
system of political representation, but a plurality of struggles that extend "the egalitarian imaginary" to different social fields within
both the (heterogenous ensemble of elements constituting the) state and civil society [Laclau and Mouffe 176]. This notion of radical democracy also includes an
ongoing process of questioning its constitutive exclusions (which Zizek identifies in his response as the major problem of democracy "as a positive formal system"
[97]). I believe that such a notion of democracy, which enlists the fiction of egality—and liberty—for the development of multiple
strategies to fight a series of different, albeit intertwined forms of domination and subordination, could prevent the standstill of
analysis in Zizek's scenario of "formal vs. real democracy." And bring down the king and the leader, who would no longer, in splendid
isolation, occupy the center of both society and political theory.

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AT: MARXISM—GENERIC
MARXISM’S UTOPIAN ALTERNATIVE SIT HE VERY FANTASY THAT SUSTAINS CAPITALISM—WE MUST ABANDON
THIS NOTION TO SOLVE

PIZZINO, DEPARTMENT OF LITERATURES IN ENGLISH AT RUTGERS, 2002 [CHRISTOPHER, “A LEGACY OF
FREAKS,” PMC 12.2, P. PROJECT MUSE]

The failure of Communism, Zizek insists, was not the result of some defeat from without by the forces of capitalism. Instead,
Communism was already "a fantasy inherent to capitalism itself" (18). If capitalism struggles with the contradictions created by surplus
value and finds itself plunged again and again into crisis, then Communism is the fantasy that such crises could be abolished forever
while the productive drive of capitalism is retained. In other words, Communism is a fantasy that the "radical impossibility" of the
capitalist economy could be overcome without altering the structures of desire and enjoyment it produces. Zizek asserts not only that
the progressive/utopian idea of pushing capitalism toward some final stage into Communism is a trap, but also that there is no hope of
some return to pre-modern conditions which would do away with capitalist machinery and economics (as Tyler Durden aspires to do
in Fight Club, to mention a film that will no doubt find its way into Zizek's work in the very near future). Marxism must continue its work stripped of all
its fantasies about a past before the advent of Capital or about a future that awaits it:

The task of today's thought is thus double: on the one hand, how to repeat the Marxist "critique of political economy" without the
utopian-ideological notion of Communism as its inherent standard; on the other, how to imagine actually breaking out of the capitalist
horizon without falling into the trap of returning to the eminently premodern notion of a balanced, (self)-restrained society. (19-20)

Needless to say, this double task challenges Marxist theory far more than the business of critiquing artifacts of popular culture. Having
implicated Marxism in capitalism's "radical impossibility" in the fullest possible way, Zizek then attempts to work toward a new
means of surpassing that impossibility. It is at this point that religion reappears, this time in the role of ally.

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ALTHUSSER WAS WRONG: THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY ONLY DESTROYS MOVEMENTS

IF SCIENCE BELONGS TO THE INTELLECTUALS THEN THE CRITIQUE OF THE BOURGEOISIE IS ONLY FOR THOSE
WHO ALREADY KNOW OR THE ONLY WAY FOR STUDENTS TO CRITICIZE THEIR TEACHERS IS TO BECOME THEIR
PEERS. ALTHUSSER’S NEED TO DENY THE AUTHORITARIAN THROUGH MOVEMENTS ONLY REINFORCED THE
FUNCTION OF THE SCHOOL AS THE IDEOLOGICAL APPARATUS OF THE STATE.

ROSS, PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AT NYU, 1991, [KRISTIN, “RANCIERE AND THE PRACTICE
OF EQUALITY,” SOCIAL TEXT, NO. 29, PP.57-71]

Milner and Ranciere shared a student activist past, a friendship, a teacher — Louis Althusser — and a theoretical formation; twenty
years previously they had both belonged to the Union des Etudiants Communistes, the famous "cercle d'Ulm": the small group of
young theorists including Etienne Balibar, Pierre Macheray, Jacques-Alain Miller, and Regis Debray, who attended Althusser's early
seminars on Marx at the Ecole Normale. Ranciere and Milner were among the signatories to the first —mimeographed — issue of the
group's journal, the Cahiers MarxistesLeninistes, an issue whose title, "The Function of Theoretical Formation," reveals its authors'
early preoccupation with questions of education and the status of intellectual discourse.
A vast historical chasm separates Milner's 1984 De l' ecole from "The Function of Theoretical Formation" — a chasm filled with
the momentous political defeat of European worker movements in France, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Spain; the defeat of
Althusserianism itself on the barricades of May; the Right's recuperation of May and its anarcho-libertarian ideology for the Free
Market; and the virtual suppression of historical materialism in France after 1975 at the hands of the intellectual currents of the New
Philosophy and post-structuralism. And yet in certain of Milner's pronouncements about education, about questions of authority and
equality, for instance, an echo of the old master's voice, that of Louis Althusser, can be heard: "The function of teaching," Althusser
wrote in 1964, "is to transmit a determinate knowledge to subjects who do not possess this knowledge. The teaching situation thus
rests on the absolute condition of an inequality between a knowledge and a non-knowledge." "For Milner, as for Althusser, the
fundamental pedagogical relation is the one between knowledge and ignorance. The same historical chasm separates Ranciëre's 1987
Le Maitre ignorant from his critique of Althusser published in 1974, La Lecon d'Althusser, but Ranciere's subject — education, or
more broadly, the status of those who possess knowledge versus the status of those who don't — and orientation toward authority
remain unchanged; both books, in fact, announce themselves as "lessons."
By writing La Lecon d'Althusser, Ranciëre performed what he called "the first clearing of the terrain" for the kind of long-term
reflection that has preoccupied him ever since: the consideration of the philosophical and historical relations between knowledge and
the masses. Althusserianism, in La Lecon d'Althusser, emerges first and foremost as a theory of education. For Ranciere, Althusser's
only political — in the strict sense of the word — intervention occurred during the early moments of student unrest, when a
controversy regarding higher education arose in 1964 between the student union (UNEF) and the Communist Party. Student discontent
had begun at that point to focus on the forms of the transmission of knowledge — the pedagogical relation of magisterial professors
and docile students — as well as its ends: forming the future ranks and auxiliaries of the bourgeoisie. Already in the early 1960s,
students had begun to question the arbitrariness of examinations and the ideology of individual research. In these early, tentative
efforts — their slogan was "La Sorbonne aux etudiants" — politics appeared in a new form: in the questioning of knowledge and its
relation to political power and in the introduction of a new line of division among intellectuals, between the producers and the
consumers of knowledge. Althusser's intervention was swift and clear. In an article entitled "Problemes etudiants" (1964), he outlined
the correct priorities for Communist students. They must first develop their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, and then conduct
scientific analyses that would yield objective knowledge of the University. What should matter to Marxists was less the form — the
pedagogical relation in which knowledge was disseminated — than "the quality of knowledge itself." Their task must be that of
"discovering new scientific knowledge capable of illuminating and criticizing the overwhelming illusions in which everyone is
imprisoned," and the privileged vehicle for performing this task was individual research. The real locus of class division in the
University was not in the inequitable relations between teachers and students, but in the content of the teaching: "it is by the very
nature of the knowledge that it imparts to students that the bourgeoisie exerts...the profoundest influence over them."

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For Ranciëre the Althusserian concept of science — in fact, the science/ideology distinction itself — had ultimately no other
function than that of justifying the pure being of knowledge — and, more important, of justifying the eminent dignity of the
possessors of that knowledge. For if science (theory) forms an enclave of freedom in a world of ideological enslavement, and if
science belongs to the intellectuals — the masters —and the critique of bourgeois content is reserved for those who already know, then
there is only one way for students to criticize their masters' knowledge from the point of view of class, and that is to become their
peers. If everyone dwells in illusion (ideology), then the solution can only come from a kind of muscular theoretical heroism on the
part of the lone theorist. Ranciere recounted what was for him the most graphic illustration of this: Althusser's need to deny the
antiauthoritarian May revolt as it was happening in order to pretend later to "discover," through chance and solitary research, and to
propose as a risky hypothesis, what the mass student action had already revealed to everyone: the function of the school as an
ideological apparatus of the State."
Confronted with the events of May, the logic of Althusserianism reacts according to the predictable temporality of the one who
knows. May '68 was not the proper moment. Empirical politics and theory must be dissociated from each other, and the position that
enacted that dissociation was that of the educator — he who knows how to wait, how to guard his distance, how to take the time of
theory. The last resource of philosophy is to eternalize the division of labor that grants it its place.

IDEOLOGY IS NOT THE ONLY BASIS FOR THE STATE’S TYRANNICAL POWER. ALTHUSSER FAILS TO EXPLAIN
HOW IDEAS LEAD TO MATERIAL ACTIONS. THUS THE KRITIK IS BASED ON UNREAL POWER LINES.

TEDMAN, GARY, POLITICAL AFFAIRS WRITER, IDEOLOGY, THE STATE, AND THE AESTHETIC LEVEL OF PRACTICE,
WINTER 1999, RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 11 NUMBER 4, 59-60

Given this basis, I am going to argue that ideas alone, even ideas networked in the mutually compatible interrelations of an ideology,
cannot and do not solely provide such a fusion of superstructure with infrastructure as would truly be capable of consolidating a
society ravaged by inherent classdivisions. For it appears to me, on the face of it, to give too muchpotency to the stuff of ideology—
ideas—than a materialist should, perhaps, allow. For instance, in Althusser’s answer to the problem o the way consolidation of the
social superstructure with the base is achieved, imaginary ideology appears to only “inhabit human heads” as people go about thier
business. If we discout the Lacanian answer, the actual psychopathological mecha- nisms—how ideology is formed, and the ways and
means by which ideology leads to material actions—still remain more or less unspoken?

ALTHUSSER’S THEORY REQUIRES A POLITICS OF AUTHORITY AND SUBMISSION
LOCK, TAUGHT @ UNIVERSITIES OF LEIDNE, NIJMENGEN, AND OXFORD, 1996 (GRAHAME, , POSTMODERN
MATERIALISM AND THE FUTURE OF MARXIST THEORY: ESSAYS IN THE ALTHUSSERIAN TRADITION, EDITED
BY ANTONIO CALLARI AND DAVID RUCCIO “SUBJECT, INTERPELLATION, AND IDEOLOGY”, PAGE 81-82)
<But must it be an apparatus of submission or of subjection? Here we reach a delicate point. In one sense it must indeed, in
Althusser's account, be an apparatus of submission or subjection, since it is of the nature of ideology, as we have already seen, to
produce just such an effect. But in a "non-class" society, one in which class struggle has been abolished (or simply does not exist),
there is by definition no class subjection. Either, then, there is social subjection of a nonclass variety, or there is not. If there is, then
the question is immediately posed as to why Althusser pays no attention to it: he defines the task of the State as "ensuring class
oppression and guaranteeing the conditions of exploitation and its reproduction" (171, emphasis added). It is conceivable that he
believed that there are social formations lacking a State in which there is an anarchic form of oppression of one social group (not, of
course, a class) by another. But it is not very likely that he believed anything of this kind, because if he did, he would have said so.
Another possibility is that he believes that, while there is no oppression in nonclass social formations, there is subjection and
submission to authority. This is roughly the position defended by Engels in his "On Authority" (1872).11 Engels's claim is that "the
social organization of the future [will] restrict authority solely to the limits within which the conditions of production render it
inevitable" but that, within these limits, it is inevitable; the thing, as he puts it, is necessary, even under communism. "Wanting to
abolish authority in large-scale industry," he writes, "is tantamount to wanting to abolish industry itself." >

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ALTERNATIVE- AN ALTERNATIVE TO CAPITALISM IS A SYSTEM THAT VALUES COOPERATION AND HAS
COMPASSION FOR EVERYONE. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD DEVALUE MONEY AND WOULD HAVE EVERYONE
EQUAL. THIS ALTERNATIVE IS COMMUNISM.

WOOD, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT YORK UNIVERSITY, 2004 [NEAL, TYRANNY
IN AMERICA, P.145-146]

In very broad brushstrokes, another alternative to the tyranny of capitalist America comes to mind, in some respects its polar opposite:
a society that highly values co-operation and compassion for the weak, deprived and unfortunate, at the same time not
completely devaluing competition and conflict. Such a society takes every possible measure to safeguard the natural
environment, following the advice and precepts of modern science. Never should nature be exploited and despoiled simply
to satisfy our short-sighted cravings for gain in the present with no thought to the consequences for the future. Such a society
devalues money, moneyed interests, and the acquisition of possessions. Such a society is genuinely dedicated to the eradication of
poverty, disease and ignorance, instead of sweeping these tenacious and ever present problems under the carpet as we are so often
prone to do. Such a society aims at the mental and bodily improvement of all. Such a society places a far rater premium on a
generous, humane equality than on a thoughtless self-centered freedom. Such a society is wholeheartedly committed to
the full realization of the potentialities of each and every member, regardless of age, gender, race, creed or occupation. Such a society
is self-critical about its past, present and possible future, casting off the fetters of self-deception and self-delusion. In sum, such a
society is both reasonable and reasoning in outlook and conduct, clearly recognizing that its destiny is ultimately always in its own
hands, exercising a will and determination to change for the better.

The obvious problem is whether American capitalist society can or ever will desire to proceed along the road of this possible
alternative. The interests in not doing so may be too entrenched, too firmly established, the rot too ingrained, the inertia too
overwhelming for any substantial alteration of direction. We have suggested the ends of a society more appropriate for authentic
human beings than for the subjects of capitalism's tyranny. Ends can be easily asserted, but the crucial question is whether they
can be realized. What is the mechanism of action by which they can be fulfilled? These social goals will not be delivered as a gift
from political leaders. It will require concerted popular struggles. If there is a will for change, a way of achieving those ends will be
worked out. In this case, however, the ends are so opposed to capitalism and its tyranny that a superhuman effort seems necessary.
Supreme self-sacrifice, prodigious labor and determined, persevering co-operation over a long time are required for any major and
meaningful social transformation..

AFF: POLITICS OF RECONGITION SOLVES
CLASS IDENTITY IS AN EFFECT OF DEVALUATION OF PROLETARIAN IDENTITY. A NEW POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION WOULD SOLVE MALDISTRIBUTION

FRASER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE @ THE NEW SCHOOL
FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, MAY-JUN 2000 (NANCY, NEW LEFT REVIEW 3, “RETHINKING RECOGNITION”,
HTTP://NEWLEFTREVIEW.ORG/A2248)
<A second current of identity politics does not simply ignore maldistribution in this way. It appreciates that cultural injustices are
often linked to economic ones, but misunderstands the character of the links. Subscribing effectively to a ‘culturalist’ theory of
contemporary society, proponents of this perspective suppose that maldistribution is merely a secondary effect of misrecognition. For
them, economic inequalities are simple expressions of cultural hierarchies—thus, class oppression is a superstructural effect of the
cultural devaluation of proletarian identity (or, as one says in the United States, of ‘classism’). It follows from this view that all
maldistribution can be remedied indirectly, by a politics of recognition: to revalue unjustly devalued identities is simultaneously to
attack the deep sources of economic inequality; no explicit politics of redistribution is needed.>

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THE ARGUMENTS THAT HOMOSEXUALITY IS PURELY A SOCIAL RECOGNITION ISSUE ARE WRONG; EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE PROVES THAT HOMOSEXUALS ARE DEEPLY AFFECTED BY ECONOMIC REGULATIONS AND
PRACTICES—ANY DISTINCTION THEY PROVIDE IS FALS

BUTLER, PROF OF RHETORIC@ UC BERKLEY, JAN-FEB 1998 (JUDITH, NEW LEFT REVIEW I/227, “MERELY
CULTURAL”, HTTP://NEWLEFTREVIEW.ORG/?VIEW=1939)
<Given the socialist-feminist effort to understand how the reproduction of persons and the social regulation of sexuality were part of the very process of production and,
hence, part of the ‘materialist conception’ of political economy, how is it that suddenly when the focus of critical analysis turns from the question of how normative
sexuality is reproduced to the queer question of how that very normativity is confounded by the non-normative sexualities it harbours within its own terms—as well as
the sexualities that thrive and suffer outside those terms—that the link between such an analysis and the mode of production is suddenly dropped? Is it only a matter of
cultural recognition when non-normative sexualities are marginalized and debased? And is it possible to distinguish, even analytically, between a lack
of cultural recognition and a material oppression, when the very definition of legal ‘personhood’ is rigorously circumscribed by
cultural norms that are indissociable from their material effects? For example, in those instances in which lesbians and gays are excluded
from state-sanctioned notions of the family (which is, according to both tax and property law, an economic unit); stopped at the
border, deemed inadmissible to citizenship; selectively denied the status of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly; are denied
the right (as members of the military) to speak his or her desire; or are deauthorized by law to make emergency medical decisions
about one’s dying lover, to receive the property of one’s dead lover, to receive from the hospital the body of one’s dead lover—do not
these examples mark the ‘holy family’ once again constraining the routes by which property interests are regulated and distributed? Is
this simply the circulation of vilifying cultural attitudes or do such disenfranchisements mark a specific operation of the sexual and
gendered distribution of legal and economic entitlements?
If one continues to take the mode of production as the defining structure of political economy, then surely it would make no sense for feminists to dismiss the hard-won
insight that sexuality must be understood as part of that mode of production. But even if one takes the ‘redistribution’ of rights and goods as the
defining moment of political economy, as Fraser does, how is it we might fail to recognize how these operations of homophobia are
central to the functioning of political economy? Given the distribution of health care in this country, is it really possible to say that gay
people do not constitute a differential ‘class’, considering how the profit-driven organization of health care and pharmaceuticals
impose differential burdens on those who live with hiv and aids? How are we to understand the production of the hiv population as a class of permanent
debtors? Do poverty rates among lesbians not call to be thought in relation to the normative heterosexuality of the economy?>

ALTHUSSER’S ARGUMENT THAT IDEOLOGY IS MATERIAL PROVES THAT HOMOSEXUALITY IS GROUNDED IN
POLITICAL AND MATERIAL PRACTICES.

BUTLER, PROF OF RHETORIC@ UC BERKLEY, JAN-FEB 1998 (JUDITH, NEW LEFT REVIEW I/227, “MERELY
CULTURAL”, HTTP://NEWLEFTREVIEW.ORG/?VIEW=1939)
<Why, then, considering this fundamental place for sexuality in the thinking of production and distribution, would sexuality emerge as
the exemplary figure for the ‘cultural’ within recent forms of Marxist and neo-Marxist argument? [12] How quickly—and sometimes
unwittingly—the distinction between the material and the cultural is remanufactured when it assists in the drawing of the lines that
jettison sexuality from the sphere of fundamental political structure! This suggests that the distinction is not a conceptual foundation,
for it rests on a selective amnesia of the history of Marxism itself. After all, in addition to the structuralist supplementation of Marx, one finds the
distinction between culture and material life entered into crisis from any number of different quarters. Marx himself argued that pre-capitalist economic formations
could not be fully extricated from the cultural and symbolic worlds in which they were embedded, and this thesis has driven the important work in economic
anthropology—Marshall Sahlins, Karl Polanyi, Henry Pearson. This work expands and refines Marx’s thesis in Precapitalist Economic Formations that seeks to explain
how the cultural and the economic themselves became established as separable spheres—indeed, how the institution of the economic as a separate sphere
is the consequence of an operation of abstraction initiated by capital. Marx himself was aware that such distinctions are the effect and
culmination of the division of labour, and cannot, therefore, be excluded from its structure: in The German Ideology, he writes, for example, that
‘the division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears.’ [13] This in part drives Althusser’s effort
to rethink the division of labour in ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ in terms of the reproduction of labour power and,
most saliently, ‘the forms of ideological subjection that [provide] for the reproduction of the skills of labour power’. [14] This salience
of the ideological in the reproduction of persons culminates in Althusser’s groundbreaking argument that ‘an ideology always exists in
an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material.’ [15] Thus, even if homophobia were conceived only as a
cultural attitude, that attitude should still be located in the apparatus and practice of its institutionalization.>

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LINKING TOGETHER PARTICULAR STRUGGELES IS THE ONLY WAY TO CREATE A POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY
THAT CAN ACTUALLY CREATE CHANGE

LACLAU, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX, UK AND PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE
LITERATURE AT THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, BUFFALO, 2004, [ERNESTO, “CAN IMMANENCE
EXPLAIN SOCIAL STRUGGLES?” PROJECT MUSE, ACCESSED 7/30/06]
What are the difficulties with this rather triumphalist vision? There are several. In the first place, the assertion that "the will to be
against does not seem to require much explanation" is mere wishful thinking. Here the alternative is clear: either resistance to
oppression is some kind of natural and automatic mechanism which will spontaneously operate whatever the circumstances, or it is a
complex social construction which has conditions of possibility external to itself. For me the second is the correct answer. The ability
and the will to resist are not a gift from heaven but require a set of subjective transformations that are only the product of the struggles
themselves and that can fail to take place. What is missing in Empire is any coherent theory of political subjectivity—psychoanalysis,
for instance, is entirely absent. Largely for that reason, the whole notion of being-against does not resist the slightest examination. It is
easy to see the role that it plays in the economy of Hardt and Negri's argumentation: if one is "against" without defining an enemy, the
idea that struggles against Empire should take place everywhere finds its justification (and, a fortiori, we have the guarantee that
vertical struggles would coalesce around a single target without any need for their horizontal articulation). Unfortunately social
struggles do not follow this simplistic pattern. All struggle is the struggle of concrete social actors for particular objectives, and
nothing guarantees that these objectives will not clash with each other. Now I would agree that no overall historical transformation is
possible unless the particularism of the struggles is superseded and a wider "collective will" is constituted. But this requires the
implementation of what in our work we have called the logic of equivalence, which involves acts of political articulation—precisely
the horizontal linking that Hardt and Negri put aside. The "being-against" is, once more, a clear indicator of the antipolitical bias of
Empire. [End Page 8]>

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THE STATUS QUO PRESENTS MANY INSTANCES OF INSTITUTIONALIZED MISRECOGNITION THAT SUCCEEDS IN CONSTITUTING THESE
SOCIAL ACTORS AS LESS THAN FULL MEMBERS OF SOCIETY. THE BEST WAY TO RID SOCIETY OF THIS INSTITUTIONALIZATION IS TO
DEINSTITUTIONALIZE THE BARRIERS OF THE SOCIAL ACTORS.

FRASER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE @ THE NEW SCHOOL
FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, MAY-JUN 2000(NANCY, NEW LEFT REVIEW 3, “RETHINKING RECOGNITION”,
HTTP://NEWLEFTREVIEW.ORG/A2248)
<Let me explain. To view recognition as a matter of status means examining institutionalized patterns of cultural value for their effects
on the relative standing of social actors. If and when such patterns constitute actors as peers, capable of participating on a par with one
another in social life, then we can speak of reciprocal recognition and status equality. When, in contrast, they constitute some actors as
inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible—in other words, as less than full partners in social interaction—then we can
speak of misrecognition and status subordination. From this perspective, misrecognition is neither a psychic deformation nor a free-
standing cultural harm but an institutionalized relation of social subordination. To be misrecognized, accordingly, is not simply to be
thought ill of, looked down upon or devalued in others’ attitudes, beliefs or representations. It is rather to be denied the status of a full
partner in social interaction, as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value that constitute one as comparatively
unworthy of respect or esteem.
On the status model, moreover, misrecognition is not relayed through free-floating cultural representations or discourses. It is
perpetrated, as we have seen, through institutionalized patterns—in other words, through the workings of social institutions that
regulate interaction according to parity-impeding cultural norms. Examples might include marriage laws that exclude same-sex
partnerships as illegitimate and perverse; social-welfare policies that stigmatize single mothers as sexually irresponsible scroungers;
and policing practices, such as ‘racial profiling’, that associate racialized persons with’ criminality. In each of these cases, interaction
is regulated by an institutionalized pattern of cultural value that constitutes some categories of social actors as normative and others as
deficient or inferior: ‘straight’ is normal, ‘gay’ is perverse; ‘male-headed households’ are proper, ‘female-headed households’ are not;
‘whites’ are law-abiding, ‘blacks’ are dangerous. In each case, the result is to deny some members of society the status of full partners
in interaction, capable of participating on a par with the rest.
As these examples suggest, misrecognition can assume a variety of forms. In today’s complex, differentiated societies, parity-
impeding values are institutionalized at a plurality of institutional sites, and in qualitatively different modes. In some cases,
misrecognition is juridified, expressly codified in formal law; in other cases, it is institutionalized via government policies,
administrative codes or professional practice. It can also be institutionalized informally—in associational patterns, longstanding
customs or sedimented social practices of civil society. But whatever the differences in form, the core of the injustice remains the
same: in each case, an institutionalized pattern of cultural value constitutes some social actors as less than full members of society and
prevents them from participating as peers.
On the status model, then, misrecognition constitutes a form of institutionalized subordination, and thus a serious violation of justice.
Wherever and however it occurs, a claim for recognition is in order. But note precisely what this means: aimed not at valorizing group
identity but rather at overcoming subordination, in this approach claims for recognition seek to establish the subordinated party as a
full partner in social life, able to interact with others as a peer. They aim, in other words, to de-institutionalize patterns of cultural
value that impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster it. Redressing misrecognition now means
changing social institutions—or, more specifically, changing the interaction-regulating values that impede parity of participation at all
relevant institutional sites. Exactly how this should be done depends in each case on the mode in which misrecognition is
institutionalized. Juridified forms require legal change, policy-entrenched forms require policy change, associational forms require
associational change, and so on: the mode and agency of redress vary, as does the institutional site. But in every case, the goal is the
same: redressing misrecognition means replacing institutionalized value patterns that impede parity of participation with ones that
enable or foster it.
Consider again the case of marriage laws that deny participatory parity to gays and lesbians. As we saw, the root of the injustice is the
institutionalization in law of a heterosexist pattern of cultural value that constitutes heterosexuals as normal and homosexuals as
perverse. Redressing the injustice requires de-institutionalizing that value pattern and replacing it with an alternative that promotes
parity. This, however, might be done in various ways: one way would be to grant the same recognition to gay and lesbian unions as
heterosexual unions currently enjoy, by legalizing same-sex marriage; another would be to de-institutionalize heterosexual marriage,
decoupling entitlements such as health insurance from marital status and assigning them on some other basis, such as citizenship.
Although there may be good reasons for preferring one of these approaches to the other, in principle both of them would promote
sexual parity and redress this instance of misrecognition.>

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NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, WHILE HAVING SOME INTERACTION WITH SOCIAL ISSUES, CAN’T SOLVE 100% OF
SOCIAL ISSUES LIKE RACISM AND SEXISM THAT STEM FROM MORE SOCIAL THAN ECONOMIC ISSUES. ONLY THE
COMBINATION OF A NEW ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION ALONG WITH A NEW SOCIAL RECOGNITION CAN
COMPLETELY SOLVE THE ISSUES OF INJUSTICE.

FRASER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE @ THE NEW SCHOOL
FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, MAY-JUN 2000 (NANCY, NEW LEFT REVIEW 3, “RETHINKING RECOGNITION”,
HTTP://NEWLEFTREVIEW.ORG/A2248)

<Each dimension, moreover, is associated with an analytically distinct form of injustice. For the recognition dimension, as we saw, the
associated injustice is misrecognition. For the distributive dimension, in contrast, the corresponding injustice is maldistribution, in
which economic structures, property regimes or labour markets deprive actors of the resources needed for full participation. Each
dimension, finally, corresponds to an analytically distinct form of subordination: the recognition dimension corresponds, as we saw, to
status subordination, rooted in institutionalized patterns of cultural value; the distributive dimension, in contrast, corresponds to
economic subordination, rooted in structural features of the economic system.

In general, then, the status model situates the problem of recognition within a larger social frame. From this perspective, societies
appear as complex fields that encompass not only cultural forms of social ordering but economic forms of ordering as well. In all
societies, these two forms of ordering are interimbricated. Under capitalist conditions, however, neither is wholly reducible to the
other. On the contrary, the economic dimension becomes relatively decoupled from the cultural dimension, as marketized arenas, in
which strategic action predominates, are differentiated from non-marketized arenas, in which value-regulated interaction
predominates. The result is a partial uncoupling of economic distribution from structures of prestige. In capitalist societies, therefore,
cultural value patterns do not strictly dictate economic allocations (contra the culturalist theory of society), nor do economic class
inequalities simply reflect status hierarchies; rather, maldistribution becomes partially uncoupled from misrecognition. For the status
model, therefore, not all distributive injustice can be overcome by recognition alone. A politics of redistribution is also necessary. [3]

Nevertheless, distribution and recognition are not neatly separated from each other in capitalist societies. For the status model, the two
dimensions are interimbricated and interact causally with each other. Economic issues such as income distribution have recognition
subtexts: value patterns institutionalized in labour markets may privilege activities coded ‘masculine’, ‘white’ and so on over those
coded ‘feminine’ and ‘black’. Conversely, recognition issues—judgements of aesthetic value, for instance—have distributive subtexts:
diminished access to economic resources may impede equal participation in the making of art. [4] The result can be a vicious circle of
subordination, as the status order and the economic structure interpenetrate and reinforce each other.

Unlike the identity model, then, the status model views misrecognition in the context of a broader understanding of contemporary
society. From this perspective, status subordination cannot be understood in isolation from economic arrangements, nor recognition
abstracted from distribution. On the contrary, only by considering both dimensions together can one determine what is impeding
participatory parity in any particular instance; only by teasing out the complex imbrications of status with economic class can one
determine how best to redress the injustice. The status model thus works against tendencies to displace struggles for redistribution.
Rejecting the view that misrecognition is a free-standing cultural harm, it understands that status subordination is often linked to
distributive injustice. Unlike the culturalist theory of society, however, it avoids short-circuiting the complexity of these links:
appreciating that not all economic injustice can be overcome by recognition alone, it advocates an approach that expressly integrates
claims for recognition with claims for redistribution, and thus mitigates the problem of displacement.>

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PERM: SOCIALIST FEMINISM
OUR ENDORSEMENT OF BOTH SOCIALISM AND FEMINISM IS UNIQUELY IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT ALLOWS US TO
DECENTER BOTH SYSTEMS SIMULTANELOUSLY. WE GIVE SOCIETY AN ALTERNATIVE CLOSURE TO BOTH
CENTERS SINCE THEY FORM AN INTERSECTION AT THEIR CORE.

GIBSON-GRAHAM, J.K., FEMINIST GEOGRAPHERS OF MONASH UNIVERSITY IN MELBOURNE AND THE
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST, 1996, POST MODERN MATERIALISM AND THE FUTURE OF MARXIST
THOERY, EDS. CALLARI AND RUCCIO, 221-3

IN a different theoretical direction, some socialist feminists attempted to bre`la c out of the confines of economic monism by
theorizing an alternative economic "identity" to capitalism rather than focusing on the conditions of existence of capitalist production.
Christine Delphy, for example, has put forward a notion of patriarchy as a social system founded on a "domestic mode of production"
(Delphy 1984; Delphy and Leonard 1992).13 While this theoretical move could be seen as an attempt to fight economism with
economism—in other words, to affirm the independence of patriarchy from capitalism by providing it with an economic "base—at the
same time it operated to decenter society from capitalism and thereby to reopen the question of the "identity" of the economy and of
the totality of the social.
In theorizing the domestic mode of production, Delphy gave noncapitalism (of the economic sort) a definite identity and constituted
"the economy" as a space of difference inhabited by at least two (and possibly more) economic forms. Her theoretical vision thus
opened up the possibility of a decentered social totality in which capitalism coexisted with other forms of economy in relations of
mutual constitution and overdetermination.
But the domestic or patriarchal mode of production (Folbre uses this latter term) has encountered difficulties negotiating the twin (and
sometimes combined) perils of feminist antagonism and "capitalocentrism." Delphy has been criticized for importing class into the
household (once again Marxism is seen to be claiming the domain of gender as a space of class) and for deriving gender oppression
from relations of household exploitation. At the same time, her formulation and similar ones have often foundered on the requirement
that a mode of production take the theoretical form associated with capitalism, for example, that it operate as a system with laws of
motion and crisis tendencies (Connell 1987). In this requirement we may clearly see the analogy between capitalism and Man, the
universal subject of phallocentric discourse. Constituted within a binary system of gender that defines him in relation to woman, Man
is also the species standard. This means, on the one hand, that sexual difference is implicitly negated, since human subjectivity takes a
singular form; and on the other hand, woman is less than human since she is other to Man. In a similar fashion, capitalism, which is
actually a specific form of economy, has become the very definition of economic form. By virtue of their differences from capitalism,
all other forms of economy are seen as insufficient, as failing to conform to economic specifications. In a way that is entirely familiar
but nevertheless theoretically quite intractable, difference is rendered as "absence" or lack rather than as autonomous being.
Socialist feminist attempts to decenter "society" from its capitalist essence can also be read as attempts to give it an alternative
(multiple) center. In other words, the "dual systems" project is not to reject the idea of the primacy of certain social aspects or the idea
of an origin of social organization; it is to nominate different (or additional) primates and origins. Socialist feminism therefore has not
opened the identity of the social to incompleteness, undecidability, and overdetermination;14 instead, it has given society an
altemative closure around two centers (capitalism and patriarchy), each of which has positive being. As proponents of female equality
are now frequently reminded, such dualistic formulations are implicated in the gender hierarchy they seek to undermine. They are
always capable of being remapped onto a binary structure, in which the second term is feminized (i.e., subsumed or demoted). As long
as the Same is the same, the Other is limited and defined by the sameness.

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PERM: FEM/QUEER THEORY/ANTICAP
A MATERIALIST FEMINIST CRITIQUE IN ADDITION TO CRITIQUING HETERONORMATIVITY AT THE SAME TIME
WOULD EFFECTIVLY CHALLENGE HOW THE MODES OF PATRIARCHY AND CAPITALISM AT THE SAME TIME. THE
PERM UNIQUELY SOLVES BECAUSE IT ALLOWS ALL IMPORATNT SUBJECTS TO BE ADDRESSED.
HENNESSY, ROSEMARY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT SUNY-ALBANY, QUEER THEORY, LEFT
POLITICS, FALL 1994, RETHINKING MARXISM, VOL 7 NUMBER 3, 107-9
Recognizing that pleasure does not precede or exceed the social but is itself constituted through the often contradictory economic,
political, and ideological production of social life means that its hegemonic articulation is always precarious. Like work, pleasure
cannot be or mean or be claimed as a basis for political affirmation outside its historical organization. But, in fact, this is often how
pleasure is understood, even in the cultural politics of the postmodern Left. For example, in the anthology Formations of Pleasure,
British cultural critic Colin Mercer argues that the contradictory play of ideology can no longer be reduced to questions of meaning
and truth. You can ask whether people "believe" what they hear on the News or on Nationwide, but it's by no means clear what people
would "believe" in light entertainment or comedy. Once enjoyment and pleasure are reintroduced—those jokes in the game—we have
to change the rules and go beyond the message (1983, 85).
Picking up on his comment, Tania Modleski argues that ideology is effective because it bestows pleasure on its subjects rather than
simply conveying messages, "and so it cannot be combatted only at the level of meaning" (Modleski 1991, 57). For this reason, she
continues, "a theory and practice of the performative are crucial to a politically engaged criticism" (Modleski 1991, 57). But even if
we understand ideology as operating through pleasure, what would it mean to combat it on a level that is somehow outside of
meaning? Surely performances, like pleasures, are only intelligible through available meaning-making practices. As Modleski's own
deft cultural analyses elsewhere suggest, a theory and practice that addresses pleasures never escapes the frames of intelligibility and
the social divisions of power and labor in which they are embedded, no matter whether these pleasures take the form of sexual
practices, work, leisure, consumption, or critique. As Mercer advises, however, having embraced the potential of sexual pleasure,
avant-garde queer theory does indeed "change the rules" by founding its politics on a notion of performance that often not only implies
a division between the conceptual and the performative but disparages interrogation and critical analysis. Diana Fuss's assertion that
the essays in the anthology Inside/Out "mark an important shift away from an interrogative mode and towards a performative mode"
in queer theory signals just this sort of displacement of critical concepts (Fuss 1991b, 7).
I think it is useful to consider this displacement of theoretical concepts in light of the erasure of gender and labor in much of queer
theory. Accompanying post Fordist information technologies and the more flexible, decentered divisions 'of labor in consumer
capitalism has been an emphasis on constructing subjectivities in terms of lifestyle, taste, and culture rather than by categories of
social class (Hal1991, 58). But this does not mean that the overdetermined relations between labor and gender have disappeared. So
long as gender flexibility turns out to be mote a matter of style or consumer pleasure, the connections among gender, heterosexuality,
and the international division of labor that make possible the untraditional family, the masculinization of professional women, and
marginally legitimate gay lifestyles remain as obscure as ever. The degree to which gay and lesbian identities are allowed can also be
read as less a challenge to heterosexual hegemony than an index of the discovery of new consumer markets where pleasure can be
profitably appropriated and produced.23 When queer theory's critique of a naturalized patriarchal heterosexuality displaces an
interrogative critique with analysis of textual play, cultural nouns, or eroticized bodies, it fails to connect the re-engendering of sexual
identities in postindustrial culture and the increased visibility of lesbians and gays with new, but still unequal, divisions of labor and
work in capital's global political economy. As an exclusively cultural analysis, it risks re-enacting the ideological: effects of the
discourses of liberal tolerance it purportedly disputes. Emerging from a critical encounter with marxism's critique of capitalism and
feminism's critique of patriarchy, materialist feminism challenges and recasts liberal tolerance and avant-garde performance. It
highlights the inability of orthodox marxism's narrow class analysis to address women's oppression, the formation of subjectivities, or
sexuality. And it also pressures avant-garde queer theory to treat-; gender as well as labor in disrupting heteronormativity. The
objective of materialist feminist critique is not to eliminate the human potential for sensual pleasure but to engender, as Wittig puts it,
"a new subjective definition" (Wittig 1992, 19-20), Materialist feminism produces this new subject through a line of inquiry that does
not reduce the materiality of sexuality to libidinal pleasure or to signification. Nor does it limit its critique of sexuality to culture or
ideology. In linking the processes of meaning-making which constructs sexuality and subjectivity to other social structures, materialist
feminism potentially expands the collective subject of queer critique. A queer theory that draws on materialist feminism refuses to
forfeit the attention to social totalities that constitutes the radical traditions of marxism and feminism. In opposition to a cultural
politics that has historically been the privilege of the urban middle class, materialist queer theory can put forward a critique of
heterosexuality that does not shrink from celebrating the human capacity for sensual pleasure even as it dares to address the
overdetermined relations among identities, norms, and divisions of labor. Of course, by insisting that the more fluid boundaries of
postmodern culture have not made patriarchy or capitalism any less viable, a materialist queer, critique is not easily incorporated into
an increasingly post-ma is Left. But to my mind that excessiveness is its challenge and its strength.

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