P. 1
Opposition to Utah's request that Justice Sotomayor temporarily ban same-sex marriages there.

Opposition to Utah's request that Justice Sotomayor temporarily ban same-sex marriages there.

|Views: 4,188|Likes:
Published by nirajchokshi
This was filed on Friday morning.
This was filed on Friday morning.

More info:

Published by: nirajchokshi on Jan 03, 2014
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

07/16/2014

pdf

text

original

Þo. l3A68?

!" $%& '()*&+& ,-(*$ -. $%& /"0$&1 '$2$&3


CA!Y !. HI!II!T, COVI!ÞO! OI !TAH, IT A!.,
AµµIIcnnfs,

v.

ÐI!IK KITCHIÞ, IT A!.,
!osµondonfs.


On AµµIIcnfIon fo Sfny Judgmonf IondIng AµµonI ÐIrocfod fo fho
HonornbIo SonIn Sofomnyor, AssocInfo JusfIco of fho Suµromo Courf of fho
!nIfod Sfnfos nnd CIrcuIf JusfIco for fho Tonfh CIrcuIf


MIMO!AÞÐ!M IÞ OIIOSITIOÞ TO AII!ICATIOÞ TO
STAY J!ÐCMIÞT IIÞÐIÞC AIIIA! TO THI !ÞITIÐ STATIS
CI!C!IT CO!!T OI AIIIA!S IO! THI TIÞTH CI!C!IT




Jnmos I. MngIoby Ioggy A. TomsIc
CounsoI of !ocord AdmIssIon IondIng
MAC!IIY & C!IIÞWOOÐ, I.C. JonnIfor Irnsor InrrIsh
l?0 Soufh MnIn Sfroof, SuIfo 850 AdmIssIon IondIng
SnIf !nko CIfy, !fnh 84l0l MAC!IIY & C!IIÞWOOÐ, I.C.
ToI.· í80l¹ 359·9000 l?0 Soufh MnIn Sfroof, SuIfo 850
Inx· í80l¹ 359·90ll SnIf !nko CIfy, !fnh 84l0l
ImnII· mngIoby¸mgµcInw.com ToI.· í80l¹ 359·9000
Inx· í80l¹ 359·90ll

CounsoI for !osµondonfs

Jnnunry 3, 20l4



II

TAI!I OI COÞTIÞTS

IÞT!OÐ!CTIOÞ ................................................................................................l

IACKC!O!ÞÐ ...................................................................................................3

I. THI CASI IIIO!I THI ÐIST!ICT CO!!T ......................................3

II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S RULING .......................................................4

III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S DENIAL OF A STAY ...................................5

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ ÐIÞIA! OI A STAY ................................6

A!C!MIÞT ........................................................................................................6

I. AII!ICAÞTS MISSTATI THII! HIICHTIÞIÐ I!!ÐIÞ
WHIÞ SIIKIÞC AÞ OVI!!IÐIÞC STAY OI A CASI STI!!
IIÞÐIÞC IÞ THI CO!!T OI AIIIA!S .............................................?

II. THI CO!!T OI AIIIA!S WAS ÞOT ÐIMOÞST!AI!Y
W!OÞC IÞ ITS AII!ICATIOÞ OI ACCIITIÐ STAÞÐA!ÐS
IN DENYING APPLICANTS’ REQUEST FOR A STAY PENDING
AIIIA! .................................................................................................. l0

A. Respondents Have Challenged Utah’s Same·Sox MnrrIngo
Inn on MuIfIµIo ConsfIfufIonnI Crounds .................................... ll

I. WIndsor nnd Ofhor Irocodonfs SfrongIy Suµµorf
Respondents’ Due Process Claims ............................................... l3

C. WIndsor nnd Ofhor Irocodonfs SfrongIy Suµµorf
Respondents’ Equal Protection Claims ....................................... l6

Ð. WIndsor nnd Ofhor Irocodonfs, IncIudIng ÐocIsIons by
Mnny Sfnfo nnd IodornI Courfs, SfrongIy Suµµorf fho
ÐIsfrIcf Court’s Conclusion That the Challenged Laws
VIoInfo IqunI IrofocfIon Ivon !ndor !nfIonnI InsIs !ovIow ... 2l

I. Inkor v. ÞoIson Provides No Support for Applicants’
IosIfIon ......................................................................................... 24




III

III. THE APPLICANTS’ RIGHTS WILL NOT BE SERIOUSLY AND
I!!IIA!AI!Y IÞJ!!IÐ IY ÐIÞIA! OI A STAY .......................... 2?

A. AµµIIcnnfs Cnnnof Show IrroµnrnbIo Hnrm Insod on
IofonfInI QuosfIons !ognrdIng fho VnIIdIfy of Snmo·Sox
Couples’ Marriages ....................................................................... 28

I. AµµIIcnnfs Cnnnof IsfnbIIsh IrroµnrnbIo Hnrm Insod on
Tho Moro InjoInIng of n Sfnfo !nw ............................................. 30

IV. THI AII!ICAÞTS HAVI ÞOT SHOWÞ THAT THIS CASI IS
!IKI!Y TO II !IVIIWIÐ IÞ THIS CO!!T !IOÞ IIÞA!
ÐISIOSITIOÞ IÞ THI CO!!T OI AIIIA!S .................................... 34

V. C!AÞTIÞC A STAY WO!!Ð CA!SI !ÞÐISI!TIÐ,
I!!IIA!AI!I HA!M TO SAMI·SIX CO!I!IS AÞÐ THII!
CHI!Ð!IÞ ............................................................................................. 38

COÞC!!SIOÞ ................................................................................................... 40
























Iv

TAI!I OI A!THO!ITIIS
CASIS
Andorson v. CoIobrozzo,
460 !.S. ?80 íl983¹ .............................................................................................................. 26
Awnd v. ZIrInx,
6?0 I.3d llll íl0fh CIr. 20l2¹ .......................................................................................... 34
Inkor v. ÞoIson,
l9l Þ.W.2d l85 íMInn. l9?l¹ ..................................................................................... 26, 2?
Inkor v. ÞoIson,
409 !.S. 8l0 íl9?2¹, ............................................................................................................. 24
Inrnos v. I·Sysfoms, Inc. Crouµ Hosµ. Mod. & SurgIcnI Ins. IInn,
50l !.S. l30l íl99l¹ .............................................................................................................. ?
Inssoff v. Snydor,
Þo. 2·l2·CV·l0038 íI.Ð. MIch., fIIod Jnn. 5, 20l2¹ ...................................................... 3?
IIshoµ v. !nIfod Sfnfos,
Þo. 4·04·CV·00848 íÞ.Ð. OkIn., fIIod Þov. 3, 2004¹ ...................................................... 3?
Iond v. !nIfod Sfnfos,
l3l S. Cf. 2355 í20ll¹ .......................................................................................................... 33
IosfIc v. McÐonnoII,
Þo. 2·l3·CV·00395 íI.Ð. Vn., fIIod JuIy l8, 20l3¹ ........................................................ 3?
Iourko v. Ioshonr,
Þo. 3·l3·CV·00?50 íW.Ð. Ky., fIIod JuIy 26, 20l3¹ ....................................................... 3?
Iowors v. HnrdwIck,
4?8 !.S. l86 íl986¹ .............................................................................................................. l5
Irndncs v. HnIoy,
Þo. 3·l3·CV·0235l íÐ.S.C., fIIod Aug. 28, 20l3¹ ........................................................... 3?
Irowor v. ÐInz,
656 I.3d l008 í9fh CIr. 20l3¹, corf. donIod, l33 S. Cf. 2884 ...................................... 36
IrInkmnn v. !ong,
Þo. 20l3·CV·325?2 íCoIo. ÐIsf. Cf., fIIod Ocf. 30, 20l3¹ ............................................. 3?

v

Iurdon v. ShInsokI,
?2? I.3d ll6l íIod. CIr. 20l3¹ .......................................................................................... 29
CorfnIn Þnmod nnd !nnnmod Þon·CIfIzon ChIIdron nnd ThoIr Inronfs v. Toxns,
448 !.S. l32? íl980¹ ............................................................................................................ 35
CIfIzons for IqunI Irof., Inc. v. IrunIng,
368 I. Suµµ. 2d 980 íÐ. Þob. 2005¹ .................................................................................. 3?
CIfIzons for IqunI IrofocfIon v. IrunIng,
455 I.3d 859 í8fh CIr. 2006¹ .............................................................................................. 36
CIovoInnd Id. of Iduc. v. !nIIour,
4l4 !.S. 632 íl9?4¹ .............................................................................................................. l4
CoIomnn v. Inccnr, Inc.,
424 !.S. l30l íl9?6¹ ............................................................................................ 3, ?, 2?, 38
CommonwonIfh v. CInry,
Þo. ll·C!·3329 íKy. CIr. Cf., mofIon for InvocnfIon of mnrIfnI µrIvIIogo fIIod Juno
6, 20l3¹ .................................................................................................................................... 3?
ConkrIghf v. Irommorf,
556 !.S. l40l í2009¹ .............................................................................................................. 7
CorwoII v. CorwoII,
l?9 I.3d 82l í!fnh Cf. Aµµ. 2008¹ ................................................................................... 29
Ðonvor v. !nIfod Sfnfos,
483 !.S. l30l íl98?¹ .............................................................................................................. ?
ÐoIoor v. Snydor,
Þo. l2·CV·l0285 íI.Ð. MIch., fIIod Jnn. 23, 20l2¹ ....................................................... 3?
Ðo!oon v. Iorry,
Þo. 5·l3·CV·00982 íW.Ð. Tox., fIIod Ocf. 28, 20l3¹ ...................................................... 3?
Ðoo v. ConznIos,
546 !.S. l30l í2005¹ ....................................................................................................... 2, l0
ÐonnIdson & CuggonhoIm v. Monfnnn,
Þo. IÐV·20l0·?02 íMonf. ÐIsf. Cf., fIIod JuIy 22, 20l0, nmondod comµInInf fIIod
JuIy l5, 20l3¹ ........................................................................................................................ 38
Idwnrds v. Hoµo Mod. Crouµ for Womon,
5l2 !.S. l30l íl994¹ .......................................................................................................... 2, ?

vI

Fargo Women’s HonIfh Org. v. Schnfor,
l33 S. Cf. l668 íl993¹ ............................................................................................................ 8
IIshor·Iorno v. SmIfh,
Þo. l2·CV·00589 íM.Ð.Þ.C., fIIod Juno l3, 20l2¹ ........................................................ 3?
Iroomnn v. Inrkor,
Þo. 4·l3·CV·03?55 íS.Ð. Tox., fIIod Ðoc. 26, 20l3¹ ....................................................... 3?
Cnrdon Sfnfo IqunIIfy v. Ðow,
?9 A.3d l036 íÞ.J. 20l3¹ ..................................................................................................... 40
CoIgor v. KIfzhnbor,
Þo. 6·l3·CV·0l834 íÐ. Or, fIIod Ocf. l5, 20l3¹ .............................................................. 3?
Crny v. Orr,
Þo. l·l3·CV·08449, 20l3 W! 63559l8 íÞ.Ð. III. Ðoc. 5, 20l3¹ .................................. 40
CrIogo v. OIIvor,
Cnso Þo. з202·CV·20l3·2?5?, ÐocInrnfory Judgmonf, InjuncfIon, nnd
Ioromµfory WrIf of Mnndnmus íÞ.M. ÐIsf. Cf. Soµf. 3, 20l3¹ ........................... 39, 40
CrIogo v. OIIvor,
Cnso Þo. з202·CV·20l3·2?5?, IInInfIffs !oµor nnd Þoumnn's MofIon for
Tomµornry !osfrnInIng Ordor íÞ.M. ÐIsf. Cf. Aug. 2l, 20l3¹ ................................... 39
CrIogo v. OIIvor,
Þo. 34,306, 20l3 W! 66?0?04 íÞ.M. Ðoc. l9, 20l3¹ .................................................... l9
HnrrIs v. McÐonnoII,
Þo. 5·l3·CV·000?? íW.Ð. Vn., fIIod Aug. l, 20l3¹ ......................................................... 3?
HockIor v. !oµoz,
463 !.S. l328 íl983¹ .......................................................................................................... ?, 8
HockIor v. !oµoz,
464 !.S. 8?9 íl983¹ ................................................................................................................ 8
HoIIIngsworfh v. Iorry,
l33 S. Cf. 2652 í20l3¹ ................................................................................................... l5, 35
HoIIIngsworfh v. Iorry,
558 !.S. l83 í20l0¹ ................................................................................................................ ?
In ro !ovonson,
560 I.3d ll45 í9fh CIr. 2009¹ ............................................................................................ 20

vII

In ro MnrrIngo Cnsos,
l83 I.3d 384 íCnI. 2008¹ .............................................................................................. l6, l9
In ro MnrrIngo of J.I. nnd H.I.,
Þo. ll·0024 íTox., nrguod Þov. 5, 20l3¹ ......................................................................... 38
Indoµ. !IvIng Cfr. of S. CnI. v. MnxwoII·JoIIy,
5?2 I.3d 644 í9fh CIr. 2009¹ .............................................................................................. 3l
IÞS v. !ognIIznfIon AssIsfnnco Irojocf of fho !os AngoIos Counfy IodornfIon of
!nbor,
5l0 !.S. l30l íl993¹ ....................................................................................................... 9, 30
Jnckson v. AborcrombIo,
Þos. l2·l6995, l2·l6998 í9fh CIr., nµµonI dockofod Soµf. l0, 20l3¹, Þo. l·ll·CV·
00?34 íÐ. Hnw., fIIod Ðoc. ?, 20ll¹ ................................................................................... 3?
JornIgnn v. Crnno,
Þo. 4·l3·CV·004l0 íI.Ð. Ark., fIIod JuIy l8, 20l3¹ ...................................................... 3?
Knrchor v. Ðnggoff,
455 !.S. l303 íl982¹ ..................................................................................................... 35, 36
KorrIgnn v. Comm'r of Iub. HonIfh,
95? A.2d 40? íConn. 2008¹ .................................................................................................. l9
Ky. Equality Fed’n v. Beshear,
Þo. l3·CI·0l0?4 íKy. CIr. Cf., fIIod Soµf. l0, 20l3¹ ...................................................... 3?
!nffn v. Offor,
Þo. l·l3·CV·00482 íÐ. Idnho, fIIod Þov. 8, 20l3¹.......................................................... 3?
!nwronco v. Toxns,
539 !.S. 558 í2003¹ ............................................................................................ 4, l4, l5, 38
!oo v. Orr,
Þo. l3·cv·8?l9, 20l3 W! 64905?? íÞ.Ð. III. Ðoc. l0, 20l3¹ ....................................... 39
!ovIng v. VIrgInIn,
388 !.S. l íl96?¹ ............................................................................................................ l4, 38
!ucns v. Townsond,
486 !.S. l30l íl988¹ .............................................................................................................. ?
MnndoI v. IrndIoy,
432 !.S. l?3 íl9?9¹ .............................................................................................................. 25

vIII

MnryInnd v. KIng,
l33 S. Cf. l í20l2¹ ................................................................................................................ 32
Mnssnchusoffs v. !.S. Ðoµ'f of HonIfh & Humnn Sorvs.,
682 I.3d l ílsf CIr. 20l2¹, corf. donIod, l33 S. Cf. 288? í20l3¹ .......................... l9, 22
MIss. !nIv. for Womon v. Hognn,
458 !.S. ?l8 íl982¹ .............................................................................................................. 2l
Monfnnn v. Crow TrIbo of IndInns,
523 !.S. 696 íl998¹ .............................................................................................................. 26
Þow Mofor VohIcIo Ionrd v. OrrIn W. Iox Co.,
434 !.S. l345 íl9??¹ ..................................................................................................... 3l, 32
Þkon v. HoIdor,
556 !.S. 4l8 í2009¹ ................................................................................................... 6, l0, ll
OborgofoII v. KnsIch,
Þo. l·l3·CV·0050l íS.Ð. OhIo, fIIod JuIy l9, 20l3¹ ...................................................... 3?
OborgofoII v. WymysIo,
Þo. l·l3·cv·50l, 20l3 W! 6?26688 íS.Ð. OhIo Ðoc. 23, 20l3¹ ............... l5, l6, 2?, 39
Inckwood v. Sonnfo SoIocf Comm. on IfhIcs,
5l0 !.S. l3l9 íl994¹ .............................................................................................................. 2
InIIndIno v. Corboff,
Þo. 2·l3·CV·0564l íI.Ð. In., fIIod Soµf. 26, 20l3¹ ....................................................... 3?
Iorry v. Irown,
6?l I.3d l052 í9fh CIr. 20l2¹ ............................................................................................ l5
Iorry v. Irown,
?25 I.3d 968 í9fh CIr. 20l3¹ .............................................................................................. 40
Iorry v. Schwnrzonoggor,
?04 I. Suµµ. 2d 92l íÞ.Ð. CnI. 20l0¹ ........................................................................ l5, 20
IInnnod Inronfhood of Cronfor Tox. SurgIcnI HonIfh Sorvs. v. Abboff,
l34 S. Cf. 506 í20l3¹ ............................................................................................... l3, 2l, 32
!omnn v. SIncock,
3?? !.S. 695 íl964¹ .............................................................................................................. 35
!omor v. Ivnns,
5l? !.S. 620 íl996¹ ..................................................................................................... µnssIm

Ix

!osfkor v. CoIdborg,
448 !.S. l306 íl980¹ .............................................................................................................. ?
Snmµson v. Murrny,
4l5 !.S. 6l íl9?4¹ ................................................................................................................ 29
Snn ÐIognns for fho Mf. SoIodnd ÞnfIonnI Wnr MomorInI v. InuIson,
548 !.S. l30l í2006¹ .............................................................................................................. 9
Scoff v. !oborfs,
6l2 I.3d l2?9 íllfh CIr. 20l0¹ .......................................................................................... 30
SovcIk v. SnndovnI,
Þo. l2·l?668 í9fh CIr., nµµonI fIIod Ocf. l8, 20l3¹, Þo. 2·l2·CV·005?8 íÐ. Þov.,
fIIod Aµr. l0, 20l2¹ ............................................................................................................... 3?
SfnnIoy v. IIIInoIs,
405 !.S. 645 íl9?2¹ .............................................................................................................. 33
Sfnfo v. ÞnyIor,
Þo. ll·0ll4 íTox., nrguod Þov. 5, 20l3¹ ......................................................................... 38
Sfrnuss v. Horfon,
20? I.3d 48 íCnI. 2009¹ ........................................................................................................ 29
Tnnco v. HnsInm,
Þo. 3·l3·ll59 íM.Ð. Tonn., fIIod Ocf. 2l, 20l3¹ ............................................................ 3?
TroxoI v. CrnnvIIIo,
530 !.S. 5? í2000¹ ................................................................................................................ 33
Turnor v. SnfIoy,
482 !.S. ?8 íl98?¹ ................................................................................................................ l4
!nIfod Sfnfos v. AInbnmn,
69l I.3d l269 íllfh CIr. 20l3¹, corf. donIod, l33. S. Cf. 2022 ................................... 36
!nIfod Sfnfos v. VIrgInIn,
5l8 !.S. 5l5 íl996¹ .............................................................................................................. 20
!nIfod Sfnfos v. WIndsor,
l33 S. Cf. 26?5 í20l3¹ ................................................................................................. µnssIm
Vnrnum v. IrIon,
?63 Þ.W.2d 862 íIown 2009¹ ....................................................................................... l9, 23

x

WnshIngfon v. CIucksborg,
52l !.S. ?02 íl99?¹ .............................................................................................................. l5
Wobor v. Aofnn Cns. & Sur. Co.,
406 !.S. l64 íl9?2¹ .............................................................................................................. 24
Wosforn AIrIInos, Inc. v. Tonmsfors,
480 !.S. l30l íl98?¹ ..................................................................................................... l0, 34
WhIfowood v. WoIf,
Þo. l·l3·CV·0l86l íM.Ð. In., fIIod Juno 9, 20l3¹ ......................................................... 3?
WIndsor v. !nIfod Sfnfos,
699 I.3d l69 í2d CIr. 20l2¹ ......................................................................................... l9, 22
WrIghf v. Arknnsns,
Þo. 60CV·l3·2662 íArk. CIr. Cf., fIIod JuIy l, 20l3¹ .................................................... 3?
ZnbIockI v. !odhnII,
434 !.S. 3?4 íl9?8¹ .............................................................................................................. l4
STAT!TIS AÞÐ !IC!!ATIOÞS
28 !.S.C. § l253 .......................................................................................................................... ?
28 !.S.C. § l254 ........................................................................................................................ 35
!fnh Codo § 30·l·2 ..................................................................................................................... 3
!fnh Codo § 30·l·4.l .................................................................................................................. 3
OTHI! A!THO!ITIIS
IrIof of AmorIcnn IsychoIogIcnI AssocInfIon, of nI. ns AmIcI CurIno on fho MorIfs In
Suµµorf of AffIrmnnco,
!nIfod Sfnfos v. WIndsor, l33 S.Cf. 26?5 í20l3¹ íÞo. l2·30?¹ .................................. 22
KrIsfIn A. Mooro,
Marriage from a Child’s Perspective: How Does Family Structure Affect Children,
nnd Whnf Cnn Wo Ðo nbouf If, ChIId Tronds í2002¹ ................................................... 22
MnrIssn !nng,
Snmo·Sox CouµIos Shnffor MnrrIngo !ocords In !fnh, SnIf !nko TrIb., Ðoc. 26,
20l3, hffµ·//www.sIfrIb.com/sIfrIb/nows/5?3l095?·?8/sox·counfy·mnrrIngos·
couµIos.hfmI.csµ¨µngo=l ..................................................................................................... 28

xI

Mnry CnIInhnn,
Judge Grants Legal Recognition to Sebastopol Women’s Marriage After LegnI
InffIo, Tho Iross Ðomocrnf, Soµfombor l8, 20l3,
hffµ·//www.µrossdomocrnf.com/nrfIcIo/20l309l8/nrfIcIos/l309l9524 ...................... 39
Tom InrfIoff,
ConfrovorsInI Cny·Parenting Study is Severely Flawed, Journal’s Audit Finds,
Chron. Of HIghor Iduc., JuIy 26, 20l2,
hffµ·//chronIcIo.com/bIogs/µorcoInfor/confrovorsInI·gny·µnronfIng·sfudy·Is·
sovoroIy·fInwod·journnIs·nudIf·fInds/30255 ................................................................... 22
COÞSTIT!TIOÞA! I!OVISIOÞS
!fnh Consf. Arf. I, § 29 ............................................................................................................. 3

l

To fho HonornbIo SonIn Sofomnyor, AssocInfo JusfIco of fho Suµromo Courf of
fho !nIfod Sfnfos nnd CIrcuIf JusfIco for fho Tonfh CIrcuIf·
!osµondonfs Ðorok KIfchon, MoudI SboIfy, Knron Archor, Knfo CnII, !nurIo
Wood, and Kody Partridge (collectively, “Respondents”), by and through their
counsoI of rocord, MAC!IIY & C!IIÞWOOÐ, I.C., horoby submIf fhIs momornndum
In oµµosIfIon fo fho AµµIIcnfIon fo Sfny Judgmonf IondIng AµµonI fo fho !nIfod
Sfnfos CIrcuIf Courf of AµµonIs for fho Tonfh CIrcuIf (the “Application” or “Appl.”¹
fIIod by AµµIIcnnfs Cnry !. Horborf, In hIs offIcInI cnµncIfy ns Covornor of !fnh,
nnd Sonn Ð. !oyos, In hIs offIcInI cnµncIfy ns Affornoy ConornI of !fnh ícoIIocfIvoIy,
“Applicants”), and respectfully request that the Application be denied.
IÞT!OÐ!CTIOÞ
AµµIIcnnfs nsk fho Courf fo ovorrIdo n docIsIon by fho !nIfod Sfnfos Courf of
AµµonIs for fho Tonfh CIrcuIf ífho “Tenth Circuit” or the “Court of Appeals”)
donyIng n sfny In n cnso curronfIy µondIng boforo fhnf courf. Tho cnso Is nn nµµonI
of nn ordor of the United States District Court for the District of Utah (the “District
Court”) fIndIng that Utah’s laws barring snmo·sox couµIos from mnrrIngo vIoInfo fho
Ðuo Irocoss nnd IqunI IrofocfIon CInusos of fho Iourfoonfh Amondmonf fo fho
!nIfod Sfnfos ConsfIfufIon. Ðoc. 20, 20l3, Momornndum ÐocIsIon nnd Ordor, Ðkf.
90, Þo. 2·l3·cv·002l?·!S In fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf (“Dist. Ct. 12/20 Order”), AµµI. nf A·
l. Tho roIIof AµµIIcnnfs sook wns µroµorIy donIod by bofh fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf nnd
fho Courf of AµµonIs, whIch ordorod oxµodIfod consIdornfIon of fho nµµonI. Soo Ðoc.
23, 20l3, Ordor on MofIon fo Sfny, Ðkf. l05, Þo. 2·l3·cv·002l?·!S In fho ÐIsfrIcf
Courf (“Dist. Ct. 12/23 Order”), AµµI. nf C·l· Ðoc. 24, 20l3, Ordor ÐonyIng

2

Imorgoncy MofIon for Sfny nnd Tomµornry MofIon for Sfny, Þo. l3·4l?8 In fho
Tonfh CIrcuIf (“CA10 12/24 Order”), AµµI. nf зl· Ðoc. 30, 20l3, Ordor, Þo. l3·4l?8
In fho Tonfh CIrcuIf (“CA10 12/30 SchoduIIng Order”), nffnchod horofo ns Ix. C fo
Appendix (“App.”). Tho ChIof Ðoµufy CIork for fho Tonfh CIrcuIf InIfInIIy nskod fho
µnrfIos fo µroµoso n fIvo·wook brIofIng schoduIo. Soo Ðoc. 26, 20l3, ImnII, nffnchod
horofo ns Ix. A fo Aµµ. AµµIIcnnfs, howovor, roquosfod four wooks fo fIIo fhoIr
oµonIng brIof, nnd fho Tonfh CIrcuIf ordorod nn oxµodIfod brIofIng schoduIo fhnf
roquIros nII brIofIng fo bo comµIofod by Iobrunry 25, 20l4, moro wooks from now.
Soo CAl0 l2/30 SchoduIIng Ordor.
Ior ronsons dIscussod In fho ordors of fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf nnd fho Courf of
Appeals, and in this memorandum, this Court should also deny Applicants’ request
for n sfny µondIng nµµonI. “[W]hen a distrIcf courf judgmonf Is rovIownbIo by n
courf of nµµonIs fhnf hns donIod n mofIon for n sfny, fho nµµIIcnnf sookIng nn
overriding stay from this Court bears ‘an especially heavy burden.’” Idwnrds v.
Hoµo Mod. Crµ. for Womon, 5l2 !.S. l30l, l302 íl994¹ íScnIIn, J., In chnmbors¹
ícIfIng Inckwood v. Sonnfo SoIocf Comm. on IfhIcs, 5l0 !.S. l3l9, l320 íl994¹
í!ohnquIsf, C.J., In chnmbors¹¹. In addition, “[r]espect for the assessment of the
Courf of AµµonIs Is osµocInIIy wnrrnnfod whon fhnf courf Is µrocoodIng fo
ndjudIcnfion on the merits with due expedition.” Ðoo v. ConznIos, 546 !.S. l30l,
l308 í2005¹ íCInsburg, J., In chnmbors¹. Thoso consIdornfIons woIgh honvIIy
against Applicants’ request for n sfny horo, whoro AµµIIcnnfs moroIy ronssorf fho
snmo confonfIons fhnf woro µroµorIy found fo bo InsuffIcIonf fo wnrrnnf n sfny

3

boIow, nnd whoro fho nµµonI hns boon oxµodIfod. AµµIIcnnfs cnnnof moof fhoIr
burdon of showIng fhnf fho Courf of AµµonIs wns “demonstrably wrong in its
application of accepted standards in deciding [whether] to issue the stay,” and that
Applicants “may be seriously and irreparably injured [without] the stay.” CoIomnn
v. Inccnr, Inc., 424 !.S. l30l, l304 íl9?6¹ í!ohnquIsf, J., In chnmbors¹.
AccordIngIy, !osµondonfs rosµocffuIIy roquosf fhnf fho AµµIIcnfIon bo donIod.
IACKC!O!ÞÐ
I. THI CASI IIIO!I THI ÐIST!ICT CO!!T
Tho !fnh Inws nf Issuo In fhIs InwsuIf IncIudo fwo sfnfo sfnfufos nnd nn
nmondmonf fo fho !fnh ConsfIfufIon fhnf bnr snmo·sox couµIos from onforIng cIvII
mnrrIngo, or nny ofhor IognI unIon, nnd µrohIbIf rocognIfIon of mnrrIngos or ofhor
IognI unIons onforod Info by snmo·sox couµIos In ofhor sfnfos. Soo !fnh Consf. nrf.
I, § 29 íoffocfIvo 2005¹· !fnh Codo § 30·l·4.l íoffocfIvo 2004¹· !fnh Codo § 30·l·2
íoffocfIvo l9??¹.
On Mnrch 25, 20l3, !osµondonfs broughf fho undorIyIng ncfIon In fho
ÐIsfrIcf Court to challenge Utah’s prohibition on same·sox mnrrIngo undor bofh fho
duo µrocoss nnd oqunI µrofocfIon gunrnnfoos of fho Iourfoonfh Amondmonf fo fho
!nIfod Sfnfos ConsfIfufIon. On Ocfobor ll, 20l3, !osµondonfs nnd AµµIIcnnfs bofh
fIIod mofIons for summnry judgmonf In fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf. On Ðocombor 20, 20l3,
fho ÐIsfrIcf Court granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment, denied
Applicants’ motion for summary judgment, and entered final judgment in favor of
!osµondonfs. ÐIsf. Cf. l2/20 Ordor· Ðoc. 20, 20l3, Judgmonf In n CIvII Cnso, Ðkf.
92, Þo. 2·l3·cv·002l?·!S In fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf (“Judgmonf”), AµµI. nf I·l.

4

II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S !!!IÞC
The District Court ruled on summary judgment that Utah’s laws barring
snmo·sex couples from civil marriage violate Respondents’ rights to due process and
oqunI µrofocfIon of fho Inws undor fho Iourfoonfh Amondmonf. Tho ÐIsfrIcf Courf
rocognIzod fhnf no µrocodonf of fhIs Courf Is dIrocfIy confroIIIng, nnd, fhoroforo,
roIIod on nnnIogous ruIIngs of fhIs Courf In !nIfod Sfnfos v. WIndsor, l33 S. Cf.
26?5 í20l3¹, !nwronco v. Toxns, 539 !.S. 558 í2003¹, nnd !omor v. Ivnns, 5l? !.S.
620 íl996¹, ns woII ns cnsos In whIch fho Courf hns hoId fhnf sfnfo mnrrIngo Inws
musf comµIy wIfh fho gunrnnfoos of fho Iourfoonfh Amondmonf.
Tho ÐIsfrIcf Courf doformInod fhnf fhIs Courf hns rocognIzod fho froodom fo
marry as a fundamental right that is based upon “an individual’s rights to liberty,
privacy, and association,” ÐIsf. Cf. l2/20 Ordor nf 20, nnd “has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that individual rights take precedence over states’
rights where these two interests are in conflict,” Id. nf l3. AIfhough hoIdIng fhnf
sfrIcf scrufIny wns wnrrnnfod, fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf found fhnf AµµIIcnnfs hnd nof
presented even a rational basis for denying Respondents’ the right to marry, nnd
fhnf fho chnIIongod Inws fhoroforo vIoInfod fhoIr rIghf fo duo µrocoss. Id. nf 32.
Tho ÐIsfrIcf Courf nIso found fhnf fho chnIIongod Inws wnrrnnf hoIghfonod
oqunI µrofocfIon scrufIny bocnuso fhoy dIscrImInnfo ngnInsf !osµondonfs on fho
bnsIs of fhoIr sox. Id. nf 34·35. Howovor, fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf concIudod fhnf If nood
nof nnnIyzo why AµµIIcnnfs woro unnbIo fo moof fhnf hoIghfonod burdon bocnuso
fho Inws fnIIod ovon undor rnfIonnI bnsIs rovIow. Id. nf 35. Tho ÐIsfrIcf Courf
noted that “Plaintiffs dispute the State’s argument that children do better when

5

rnIsod by oµµosIfo·sox µnronfs fhnn by snmo·sex parents,” but concluded that “the
courf nood nof ongngo In fhis debate” because “the state fails to demonstrate any
rnfIonnI IInk bofwoon Ifs µrohIbIfIon of snmo·sox mnrrIngo nnd Ifs gonI of hnvIng
more children raised in the family structure the State wishes to promote.” Id. nf 45.
In nddIfIon, fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf found fhnf fho Inws hnrmod fho chIIdron of snmo·sox
parents in Utah “for the same reasons that the Supreme Court found that DOMA
hnrmod fho chIIdron of snmo·sex couples.” Id. nf 46.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ÐIÞIA! OI A STAY
AµµIIcnnfs dId nof roquosf n sfny In fho ovonf of nn ndvorso ruIIng In fhoIr
mofIon for summnry judgmonf In fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf. ÐIsf. Cf. l2/23 Ordor nf l.
AµµIIcnnfs fIIod n mofIon fo sfny Info In fho ovonIng on IrIdny, Ðocombor 20, 20l3.
Tho ÐIsfrIcf Courf ordorod oxµodIfod brIofIng ovor fho wookond nnd sof n honrIng
for 9 n.m. fhnf foIIowIng Mondny, Ðocombor 23, 20l3. Id. nf l·2. Ioforo fho ÐIsfrIcf
Court hearing, Applicants filed two “Emergency Motions for Temporary Stay” with
fho Courf of AµµonIs, whIch woro bofh donIod. Ðoc. 22, 20l3, Ordor nf l, 2, Þo. l3·
4l?8 In fho Tonfh CIrcuIf (“CA10 12/22 Order”). Af fho concIusIon of fho honrIng,
the District Court issued an oral ruling, denying Applicants’ motion for a stay,
whIch wns momorInIIzod In n wrIffon ordor Infor fhnf dny. Id.
The District Court denied Applicants’ motion for a stay pending appeal
bocnuso If found fhnf nono of fho four fncfors suµµorfIng n sfny hnd boon shown by
fho AµµIIcnnfs. The District Court found that Applicants’ reassertion of their
summnry judgmonf nrgumonfs wns nof suffIcIonf fo show n IIkoIIhood of succoss on
Respondents’ claims. Id. Tho ÐIsfrIcf Court found that “[i]n contrast to the

6

sµocuInfIvo hnrm fncod by fho Sfnfo, fhoro Is no dIsµufo fhnf snmo·sox couµIos fnco
harm by not being allowed to marry,” and that the delay caused by a stay would in
µnrfIcuInr cnuso IrroµnrnbIo hnrm fo couµIos, IncIudIng !osµondonfs Knron Archor
and Kate Call, “facing serious illness or other issues that do not allow them the
luxury of waiting for such a delay.” Id. nf 5. Tho ÐIsfrIcf Courf nIso found fhnf n
stay would harm the public’s interest in “protecting the consfIfufIonnI rIghfs of
Utah’s citizens.” Id. nf 6. AccordIngIy, fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf donIod n sfny. Id.
IV. THI CO!!T OI AIIIA!S’ DENIAL OF A STAY
On Ðocombor 24, 20l3, n fwo·judgo µnnoI of fho Courf of AµµonIs nIso donIod
Applicants’ request for a stay pending the appeal of the District Court’s decision.
Soo CAl0 l2/24 Ordor nf 2. Tho Courf of AµµonIs consIdorod four factors: “(1) the
IIkoIIhood of succoss on nµµonI· í2¹ fho fhronf of IrroµnrnbIo hnrm If fho sfny Is nof
grnnfod· í3¹ fho nbsonco of hnrm fo oµµosIng µnrfIos If fho sfny Is grnnfod· nnd í4¹
any risk of harm to the public interest.” Id. The Court of Appeals noted that, “[t]he
fIrsf fwo fncfors nro fho mosf crIfIcnI, nnd fhoy roquIro moro fhnn n moro µossIbIIIfy
of succoss nnd IrroµnrnbIo hnrm, respectively.” Id. ícIfIng Þkon v. HoIdor, 556 !.S.
4l8, 434·35 í2009¹). The Court of Appeals concluded that, “consider[ing] the district
court’s decision and the parties’ arguments concerning the stay factors . . . a stay is
not warranted,” and denied Applicants’ request for a stay. Id.
A!C!MIÞT
AµµIIcnnfs now nsk fhIs Courf fo Issuo n sfny fhnf wns donIod by bofh fho
ÐIsfrIcf Courf nnd fho Courf of AµµonIs. To obfnIn fhIs roIIof, AµµIIcnnfs musf
show that the Court of Appeals was “demonstrably wrong in its application of

?

nccoµfod sfnndnrds In dociding [whether] to issue the stay.” CoIomnn, 424 !.S. nf
l304. They must also show that their rights “may be seriously and irreparably
injured by the stay. . . .” Id. Finally, Applicants must show that this case “couId
nnd vory IIkoIy wouId bo rovIowod horo uµon fInnI dIsµosIfIon In fho courf of
appeals. . . .” Id. Iecause Applicants seek “an overriding stay” in a case already
pending before the Court of Appeals, they must meet “‘an especially heavy burden.’”
Idwnrds, 5l2 !.S. nf l302 íInfornnI cIfnfIons omIffod¹. AµµIIcnnfs do nof mnko nny
of fhoso roquIrod showIngs, nnd fhoIr roquosf for n sfny shouId bo donIod.
I. AII!ICAÞTS MISSTATI THII! HIICHTIÞIÐ I!!ÐIÞ WHIÞ
SIIKIÞC AÞ OVI!!IÐIÞC STAY OI A CASI STI!! IIÞÐIÞC IÞ
THI CO!!T OI AIIIA!S
Throughouf fhoIr AµµIIcnfIon, AµµIIcnnfs fnII fo ncknowIodgo or nµµIy fho
hoIghfonod burdon fhoy musf moof whon nskIng fhIs Courf fo grnnf n sfny In n cnso
sfIII µondIng boforo fho Courf of AµµonIs. AµµIIcnnfs µrImnrIIy roIy on cnsos
involving “the usual stay application,” which seek a stay while a petition for
corfIornrI Is µondIng boforo fho Courf.
l
HockIor v. !oµoz, 463 !.S. l328, l330
íl983¹ í!ohnquIsf, C.J., In chnmbors¹. Tho sfnndnrd In fhoso cnsos doos nof nµµIy
to this Application. Applicants have a heavier burden because they ask “instead
that [a Circuit Justice] grant a stay of the District Court’s judgmonf µondIng nµµonI

l
Soo AµµI. nf ? ícIfIng fo Ðonvor v. !nIfod Sfnfos, 483 !.S. l30l íl98?¹ í!ohnquIsf, C.J., In
chnmbors¹ ísookIng sfny µondIng dIsµosIfIon of n µofIfIon for corfIornrI¹· ConkrIghf v. Irommorf, 556
!.S. l40l í2009¹ íCInsburg, J., In chnmbors¹ ísnmo¹· Inrnos v. I·Sysfoms, Inc. Crµ. Hosµ. Mod. &
SurgIcnI Ins. IInn, 50l !.S. l30l íl99l¹ íScnIIn, J., In chnmbors¹ ísnmo¹¹. AµµIIcnnfs nIso cIfo fo
IrroIovnnf cnsos In whIch fhIs Courf doformInod whofhor fo grnnf n sfny In fho fIrsf Insfnnco,
µursunnf fo Ifs dIrocf rovIow of docIsIons by fhroo·judgo courfs undor 28 !.S.C. § l253. Soo AµµI. nf
? ícIfIng !ucns v. Townsond, 486 !.S. l30l íl988¹ íKonnody, J., In chnmbors¹ nnd !osfkor v.
CoIdborg, 448 !.S. l306 íl980¹ íIronnnn, J., In chnmbors¹¹. IInnIIy, AµµIIcnnfs cIfo fo
HoIIIngsworfh v. Iorry, 558 !.S. l83, l90 í20l0¹ íµor curInm¹, buf fhnf cnso InvoIvod n roquosf for n
sfny µondIng fho fIIIng nnd dIsµosIfIon of n µofIfIon for n wrIf of mnndnmus.

8

fo fho lCourf of AµµonIs¦, whon fho lCourf of AµµonIs¦ IfsoIf hns rofusod fo Issuo fho
stay.” Id. “[A] stay application to a Circuit Justice on a matter before a court of
appeals is rarely granted.” Id. íInfornnI cIfnfIons omIffod¹· soo nIso HockIor v.
!oµoz, 464 !.S. 8?9, 884 íl983¹ (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (noting that “In
such n cnso fho grnnfIng of n sfny by n CIrcuIf JusfIco shouId bo oxfromoIy rnro nnd
great deference should be shown to the judgment of the Court of Appeals”). OnIy In
cases that are “sufficiently unusual” will a Circuit Justice or this Court grant such
roIIof. HockIor, 463 !.S. nf l330· soo nIso Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer,
l33 S. Cf. l668, l669 íl993¹ (O’Connor, J., concurring).
AµµIIcnnfs do nof ncknowIodgo, much Ioss nffomµf fo moof, fhIs hoIghfonod
burdon. AµµIIcnnfs Insfond sIdo sfoµ fhoIr hoIghfonod burdon by cIfIng fo, wIfh
vIrfunIIy no dIscussIon or nnnIysIs, fhroo cnsos In whIch n CIrcuIf JusfIco grnnfod n
sfny of n cnso µondIng In fho Courf of AµµonIs. Þono of fhoso cnsos suµµorfs
Applicants’ position; rather, in each case, the unusual circumstances that
wnrrnnfod n sfny undorscoro fho nbsonco of nny bnsIs for grnnfIng n sfny horo.
AµµIIcnnfs cIfo fo HockIor, soo AµµI. at 7, but in that case, there was “serious
doubt,” 463 U.S. at 1334, that the relief ordered by the district court was within “the
remedial powers of a federal court” over a federal administrative agency, Id. nf
l336. Soo nIso Id. at 1337 (“It bears repeating that if it seemed to me that nothing
moro woro InvoIvod fhnn fho oxorcIso of n ÐIsfrIcf Courf's frndIfIonnI dIscrofIon In
fnshIonIng n romody for nn ndjudIcnfod hnrm or wrong, fhoro wouId bo no occnsIon

9

for mo ns CIrcuIf JusfIco fo grnnf n sfny whoro bofh fho Courf of AµµonIs nnd fho
District Court had refused to grant one.”). No such concern exists here.
AµµIIcnnfs nIso cIfo fo Snn ÐIognns for fho Mf. SoIodnd ÞnfIonnI Wnr
MomorInI v. InuIson, 548 !.S. l30l, l304 í2006¹ íKonnody, J., In chnmbors¹, soo
Appl. at 7, but that case reiterated that “the Court, and individual Circuit Justices,
shouId bo mosf roIucfnnf fo dIsfurb InforIm ncfIons of fho Courf of AµµonIs In cnsos
pending before it.” A stay was granted in that case onIy bocnuso n roconf ncf of
Congross nnd µondIng sfnfo courf IIfIgnfIon—bofh fnkIng µInco nffor fho Courf of
AµµonIs donIod n sfny—might have mooted the need for the district court’s
InjuncfIon. Id. nf l303·04. Nothing remotely like such “unusual” circumstances
oxIsfs In fhIs cnso. Id. nf l303.
IInnIIy, AµµIIcnnfs cIfo fo IÞS v. !ognIIznfIon AssIsfnnco Irojocf of fho !os
AngoIos Counfy IodornfIon of !nbor, 5l0 !.S. l30l íl993¹ (O’Connor, J., in
chnmbors¹, whIch nIso InvoIvod unusunI cIrcumsfnncos onfIroIy nbsonf horo. JusfIco
O’Connor, sitting as Circuit Justice, explainod fhnf fho cnso wns suffIcIonfIy
“exceptional” to warrant a stay because If wns IIkoIy fho orgnnIznfIonnI µInInfIffs In
!ognIIznfIon AssIsfnnco Irojocf “had no standing to seek the order entered by the
District Court” in the first instance bnsod on n roconf docIsIon by fho Courf
InvoIvIng n sImIInr chnIIongo. Id. nf l302·03, l305.
2
Horo, fhoro Is no dIsµufo
!osµondonfs hnvo sfnndIng fo chnIIongo fhoIr oxcIusIon from mnrrIngo nnd from

2
As oxµInIned more fully below, Applicants’ argument that !ognIIznfIon AssIsfnnco Irojocf
stands for the proposition that mere “administrative burden” can constitute irreparable harm is
morIfIoss. Soo AµµI. nf 2l. Tho hnrm nf Issuo In fhnf cnso wns nof sImµIy ndmInIsfrnfIvo burdon,
“but an improper intrusion by a federal court into the workings of a coordinate branch of the
Government.” 510 U.S. at 1306.

l0

being recognized as legally married under Utah’s laws. Nor is there any bnsIs for
quosfIonIng fho nufhorIfy of n fodornI courf fo onjoIn sfnfo Inws fhnf vIoInfo fho
Iourfoonfh Amondmonf.
AµµIIcnnfs hnvo nof cIfod fo n sIngIo cnso In whIch fho Courf hns grnnfod n
sfny of n dIsfrIcf courf ordor µondIng nµµonI whon fho nµµoIInfo courf hns nIrondy
donIod n sfny undor cIrcumsfnncos ovon romofoIy sImIInr fo fho cIrcumsfnncos horo
bocnuso fhIs cnso Is nof an “exceptional case” warranting a stay.
II. THI CO!!T OI AIIIA!S WAS ÞOT ÐIMOÞST!AI!Y W!OÞC
IÞ ITS AII!ICATIOÞ OI ACCIITIÐ STAÞÐA!ÐS IÞ ÐIÞYIÞC
APPLICANTS’ REQ!IST IO! A STAY IIÞÐIÞC AIIIA!
ThIs Courf mny nof ovorrIdo n Courf of Appeals’ order denying a stay unless
that court was clearly and “‘demonstrably wrong in its application of accepted
standards. . . .’” W. AIrIInos, Inc. v. Tonmsfors, 480 !.S. l30l, l305 íl98?¹
(O’Connor, J., in chambers) (quoting CoIomnn, 424 !.S. nf l404¹. Ðoforonco fo fho
Courf of Aµµeals’ decision “is especially warranted when,” as here, “that court is
proceeding to adjudication on the merits with due expedition.” ConznIos, 546 !.S.
nf l308.
In the District Court, Respondents challenged Utah’s marriage laws on
muIfIµIo consfIfufIonnI grounds, onch of whIch, If succossfuI, wouId bo suffIcIonf fo
roquIro InvnIIdnfIon of fhoso Inws. To obfnIn n sfny from fho Courf of AµµonIs,
AµµIIcnnfs hnd fo make a “strong showing” that they were likely to prevail on all
Respondents’ claims. Þkon, 556 !.S. nf 434. Tho Courf of AµµonIs corrocfIy found
fhnf AµµIIcnnfs fnIIod fo moof fhnf osfnbIIshod fosf, nnd AµµIIcnnfs hnvo shown no
bnsIs for fhIs Courf fo vncnfo fhnf ordor nnd Issuo nn ovorrIdIng sfny.

ll

WIndsor mndo cIonr If wns docIdIng onIy whofhor fho fodornI govornmonf
may deny recognition to “persons who are joined in same·sox mnrrIngos mndo
lawful by the State.” 133 S. Ct. af 2695. ÞovorfhoIoss, ovon fhough WIndsor doos
nof docIdo fho uIfImnfo Issuos In fhIs cnso—whofhor !fnh Is consfIfufIonnIIy
roquIrod fo Iof snmo·sox couµIos mnrry or rocognIzo fhoIr oxIsfIng mnrrIngos—fho
ronsonIng nnd nnnIysIs In WIndsor sfrongIy suµµorf fho ronsonIng of fho ÐIsfrIcf
Courf nnd fho Courf of AµµonIs In docIInIng fo Issuo n sfny. In IIghf of fho
ronsonIng In WIndsor, AµµIIcnnfs cnnnof moof fho fhroshoId roquIromonf of
showIng nof moroIy fhnf !osµondents’ claims mIghf fnII, buf fhnf onch cInIm Is
IIkoIy fo fnII. Soo Þkon, 556 !.S. nf 434. Thoro Is no bnsIs for fIndIng fhnf fho
Court of Appeals’ application of that accepted standard was “demonstrably wrong.”
A. !osµondonfs Have Challenged Utah’s Same·Sox MnrrIngo Inn
on MuIfIµIo ConsfIfufIonnI Crounds
Respondents claim Utah’s marriage laws violate their rights to due process in
muIfIµIo wnys. Soo ComµI., ¶¶ 45·4?, Ðkf. 2, Þo. 2·l3·cv·002l?·!S In fho ÐIsfrIcf
Courf. IIrsf, !osµondonfs cInIm fho mnrrIngo Inws ImµormIssIbIy doµrIvo
!osµondonfs of fho fundnmonfnI rIghf fo mnrry. Id. Socond, !osµondonfs cInIm
fhnf fho Inws vIoInfo fhoIr µrofocfod rIghfs fo µrIvncy, IIborfy, nnd nssocInfIon by
oxcIudIng fhom from mnrrIngo nnd, IndoµondonfIy, by oxcIudIng fhom from nny
fyµo of offIcInI rocognIfIon or µrofocfIon of fhoIr roInfIonshIµs. Id. ThIrd,
!osµondonfs cInIm fhnf fho Inws ImµormIssIbIy doµrIvo snmo·sox couµIos who hnvo
IognIIy mnrrIod In ofhor sfnfos of fhoIr fundnmonfnI rIghf fo romnIn mnrrIod nnd of

l2

fhoIr µrofocfod IIborfy, µrIvncy, nnd nssocInfIonnI Inforosfs In fhoIr oxIsfIng
mnrrIngos. Id.
Respondents also challenge Utah’s exclusionary marriage laws on multiple
oqunI µrofocfIon grounds. Soo ComµI., ¶¶ 52·6l. IIrsf, fhoy cInIm fho mnrrIngo
Inws wnrrnnf hoIghfonod oqunI µrofocfIon scrufIny bocnuso fho Inws oxcIudo
!osµondonfs nnd ofhor µorsons In commIffod snmo·sox roInfIonshIµs from fho
oxorcIso of n fundnmonfnI rIghf nnd cnnnof survIvo fhnf IovoI of scrufIny. Id.
Socond, fhoy cInIm fho Inws wnrrnnf hoIghfonod oqunI µrofocfIon scrufIny bocnuso
fhoy osfnbIIsh n sox·bnsod cInssIfIcnfIon nnd cnnnof survIvo fhnf IovoI of scrufIny.
Id. ThIrd, fhoy cInIm fho Inws cInssIfy bnsod on soxunI orIonfnfIon nnd fhnf such
Inws wnrrnnf nnd cnnnof survIvo skoµfIcnI scrufIny undor fho osfnbIIshod crIforIn
for doformInIng whon cInssIfIcnfIons bnsod on corfnIn µorsonnI chnrncforIsfIcs nro
IIkoIy fo rofIocf µrojudIco or bIns rnfhor fhnn IogIfImnfo gonIs. Id. Iourfh,
!osµondonfs cInIm fho mnrrIngo Inws musf bo subjocf nf Ionsf fo, nnd cnnnof
survive, “careful consideration” under the Equal Protection Clause because, like
SocfIon 3 of ÐOMA In WIndsor, fho mnrrIngo Inws sIngIo ouf snmo·sox couµIos In nn
unusunI mnnnor In ordor fo fronf fhom unoqunIIy—IncIudIng In fhIs cnso, doµnrfIng
from AµµIIcnnfs’ IongsfnndIng µrncfIco of rocognIzIng vnIId mnrrIngos from ofhor
sfnfos, ovon whon fhoso mnrrIngos would be prohibited under Utah’s own marriage
Inws. Id. IInnIIy, !osµondonfs cInIm fho mnrrIngo Inws vIoInfo fhoIr rIghf fo oqunI
µrofocfIon undor nny IovoI of scrufIny bocnuso fho Inws hnrm snmo·sox couµIos nnd

l3

fhoIr chIIdron wIfhouf µrovIdIng nny bonofIfs fo ofhors or fo fho sfnfo—fhnf Is, by
nof boIng rnfIonnIIy connocfod fo nny IogIfImnfo sfnfo Inforosf. Id.
I. WIndsor and Other Precedents Strongly Support Respondents’
Ðuo Irocoss CInIms
As Applicants note, “[t]his case squarely presents the question that this
Courf oxµrossIy Ioff oµon Insf Torm In !nIfod Sfnfos v. WIndsor,” AppI. nf l,
whofhor sfnfos mny, consIsfonf wIfh fho roquIromonfs of duo µrocoss nnd oqunI
µrofocfIon, bnr snmo·sox couµIos from cIvII mnrrIngo nnd rofuso fo rocognIzo fho
mnrrIngos of fhoso who IognIIy mnrry In ofhor sfnfos. AµµIIcnnfs suggosf fhnf
WIndsor’s omµhnsIs on fodornIIsm shows fhnf fho Court is likely to uphold Utah’s
mnrrIngo bnn ns n vnIId oxorcIso of sfnfo sovoroIgnfy. !IfImnfoIy, howovor, In
sfrIkIng down n fodornI Inw fhnf dIscrImInnfod ngnInsf mnrrIod snmo·sox couµIos,
WIndsor roIIod nof on fodornIIsm, buf on fho Ðuo Irocoss CInuso of fho IIffh
Amondmonf. l33 S. Cf. nf 2696 (holding that “ÐOMA Is unconsfIfufIonnI ns n
doµrIvnfIon of fho IIborfy of fho µorson µrofocfod by fho IIffh Amondmonf of fho
Constitution”). AµµIIcnnfs nIso suggosf fhnf fhoy nro IIkoIy fo succood on nµµonI
because all of “[t]the various opinions” in WIndsor nnfIcIµnfo fho fIIIng of fufuro
chnIIongos fo sfnfo mnrrIngo bnns. AµµI. nf 9. Iuf undor fho sfnndnrd AµµIIcnnfs
musf moof In fhIs µrocoodIng, fhnf ncknowIodgomonf shows fhnf fho consfIfufIonnI
quosfIons µrosonfod by fhIs cnso nro sorIous nnd fhnf fho Courf of AµµonIs wns nof
“demonstrably wrong” in concluding that Applicants could not make a strong
showIng fhnf fhoy nro IIkoIy fo µrovnII on nµµonI. Cf. IInnnod Inronfhood of
Cronfor Tox. SurgIcnI HonIfh Sorvs. v. Abboff, l34 S. Cf. 506, 506 í20l3¹ íScnIIn, J.,

l4

concurring) (noting that “the difficulty of a question is inversely proportional to the
likelihood that a given answer will be clearly erroneous”).
In fncf, fho ronsonIng In WIndsor—ns woII ns oIdor cnsos nddrossIng fho
consfIfufIonnIIy µrofocfod rIghf fo mnrry—supports the District Court’s conclusion
fhnf gny nnd IosbInn µorsons musf bo IncIudod wIfhIn fho consfIfufIonnIIy µrofocfod
rIghf fo mnrry. WIndsor nffIrmod fhnf sfnfo mnrrIngo laws are “subject to
[constitutional] guarantees” and must “respect the constitutional rights of persons.”
l33 S. Cf. nf 269l. In µrIor cnsos, fhIs Courf hns hoId fhnf fho fundnmonfnI rIghf fo
mnrry Is bnsod on an individual’s underlying rights to privacy, liberty, and freedom
of InfImnfo nssocInfIon. Soo, o.g., Turnor v. SnfIoy, 482 !.S. ?8, 95 íl98?¹· ZnbIockI
v. !odhnII, 434 !.S. 3?4, 384 íl9?8¹· CIovoInnd Id. of Iduc. v. !nIIour, 4l4 !.S.
632, 639·40 íl9?4¹· !ovIng v. VIrgInIn, 388 !.S. l, l2 íl96?¹. WIfhouf docIdIng
whofhor sfnfo Inws bnrrIng snmo·sox couµIos from mnrrIngo vIoInfo fho rIghf fo
mnrry, fho Courf hns hoId fhnf IndIvIdunIs In snmo·sox roInfIonshIµs hnvo fho snmo
IIborfy nnd µrIvncy Inforosfs In fhoIr InfImnfo roInfIonshIµs ns ofhor µooµIo. Soo
!nwronco v. Toxns, 539 !.S. 558, 5??·?8 í2003¹. WIndsor nffIrmod fhnf fho
Constitution protects “the moral and sexual choices” of same·sox couµIos nnd hoId
fhnf fhoIr roInfIonshIµs, IncIudIng fho roInfIonshIµs of IognIIy mnrrIod snmo·sox
couµIos, hnvo fho snmo consfIfufIonnI µrofocfIons ns ofhors nnd nro onfIfIod fo bo
treated by the government with “equal dignity.” l33 S. Cf. nf 2693·94. Thoso
µrocodonfs sfrongIy suµµorf the District Court’s determination that persons in
snmo·sox roInfIonshIµs hnvo fundnmonfnI Inforosfs In IIborfy, µrIvncy, nnd

l5

nssocInfIon fhnf nro InfrIngod by sfnfo Inws cnfogorIcnIIy bnrrIng fhom from fho
rIghf fo mnrry. ÐIsf. Cf. l2/20 Ordor nf l8·25.
AµµIIcnnfs nrguo fhnf !osµondonfs do nof hnvo n fundnmonfnI rIghf fo
“same·sex marriage” because they cannot show that such a right is “’deeply rooted
in the Nation’s history and tradition.’” AppI. nf l2 íquofIng WnshIngfon v.
CIucksborg, 52l !.S. ?02, ?20·2l íl99?¹¹. Iuf whon nnnIyzIng cnsos InvoIvIng
fundnmonfnI rIghfs, fhIs Courf hns nof hoId fhnf fho confours of n fundnmonfnI
rIghf cnn bo IImIfod bnsod on who sooks fo oxorcIso If or on hIsforIcnI µnfforns of
dIscrImInnfIon. Tho µosIfIon urgod by AµµIIcnnfs—fhnf !osµondonfs sook nof fho
same right to marry as others, but a new right to “same·sex marriage”—roµonfs fho
nnnIyfIcnI orror of Iowors v. HnrdwIck, 4?8 !.S. l86 íl986¹. In Iowors, fho Courf
erroneously framed the issue in that case as “whether the Federal Constitution
confors n fundnmonfnI rIghf uµon homosoxunIs fo ongngo in sodomy.” Id. nf l90.
As fhIs Courf oxµInInod whon If rovorsod Iowors In !nwronco, fhnf sfnfomonf
“disclose[d] the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.”
539 !.S. nf 56?. SImIInrIy horo, ns fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf concIudod, fhoro Is no
µrIncIµIod bnsIs for frnmIng fho rIghf nf sfnko ns n now rIghf sµocIfIc onIy fo gny
nnd IosbInn µorsons. ÐIsf. Cf. l2/20 Ordor nf 28·29.
3
AµµIIcnnfs hnvo nof shown

3
Ofhor courfs hnvo nIso hoId fhnf gny nnd IosbInn µorsons hnvo fho snmo fundnmonfnI rIghf
fo mnrry ns hoforosoxunI µorsons. Soo, o.g., Iorry v. Schwnrzonoggor, ?04 I. Suµµ. 2d 92l, 994
íÞ.Ð. CnI. 20l0¹ írocognIzIng fundnmonfnI rIghf fo mnrry undor fho fodornI ConsfIfufIon¹, nff'd sub
nom., Iorry v. Irown, 6?l I.3d l052 í9fh CIr. 20l2¹, vncnfod nnd romnndod sub nom., HoIIIngsworfh
v. Iorry, l33 S. Cf. 2652 í20l3¹· cf. OborgofoII v. WymysIo, l·l3·cv·50l, 20l3 W! 6?26688 íS.Ð. OhIo
Dec. 23, 2013) (“Although it is unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the fundamental right to
mnrry IfsoIf nIso ondows OhIo snmo·sox couµIos mnrrIod In ofhor jurIsdIcfIons wIfh n sIgnIfIcnnf
IIborfy Inforosf In fhoIr mnrrIngos for subsfnnfIvo duo µrocoss µurµosos, fho Courf nofos fhnf n
substantial logical and jurisprudential basis exists for such a conclusion as well.”); cf. In ro MnrrIngo

l6

that the Court of Appeals was “demonstrably wrong” in its application of the
nccoµfod sfnndnrds govornIng Issunnco of n sfny.
WIndsor’s holding that legally married same·sox couµIos hnvo n µrofocfod
IIborfy Inforosf In fhoIr mnrrIngos fhnf Is ImµormIssIbIy InfrIngod by fho fodornI
government’s refusal to recognize their marriages also supports invalidation of
Utah’s refusal to recognize the lawful marriages of same·sox couµIos who mnrrIod In
ofhor sfnfos. l33 S. Cf. nf 268l (holding that the “injury and indignity [inflicted by
SocfIon 3 of ÐOMA¦ Is n doµrIvnfIon of nn ossonfInI µnrf of fho IIborfy µrofocfod by
the Fifth Amendment”). Indood, ono fodornI dIsfrIcf courf hns nIrondy nµµIIod
WIndsor fo hold that Ohio’s refusal to recognize surviving same·sox sµousos on
donfh corfIfIcnfos vIoInfos fho roquIromonf of duo µrocoss. OborgofoII v. WymysIo,
Þo. l·l3·cv·50l, 20l3 W! 6?26688 íS.Ð. OhIo Ðoc. 23, 20l3¹. As fhnf courf
recognized, the constitutional harm inflicted by the government’s refusal to
rocognIzo nn oxIsfIng mnrIfnI roInfIonshIµ Is no Ioss whon If Is n sfnfo, rnfhor fhnn
fho fodornI govornmonf, fhnf donIos rocognIfIon. Id. nf *6·8.
C. WIndsor nnd Ofhor Irocodonfs Strongly Support Respondents’
IqunI IrofocfIon CInIms
Applicants do not address Respondents’ claims that Utah’s marriage ban
wnrrnnfs hoIghfonod oqunI µrofocfIon scrufIny bocnuso If dIscrImInnfos bnsod on
bofh soxunI orIonfnfIon nnd sox, nnd bocnuso Inws fhnf cInssIfy bnsod on soxunI
orIonfnfIon wnrrnnf hoIghfonod scrufIny. Thoso cInIms µrosonf sorIous quosfIons,

Cnsos, l83 I.3d 384, 42? íCnI. 2008¹ (“[T]he California Constitution properly must be interpreted to
gunrnnfoo fhIs bnsIc cIvII rIghf fo lmnrry fo¦ nII IndIvIdunIs nnd couµIos, wIfhouf rognrd fo fhoIr
sexual orientation.”).

l?

ns WIndsor oxµrossIy nofod wIfh rosµocf fo fho IovoI of scrufIny nµµIIod fo Inws fhnf
cInssIfy bnsod on soxunI orIonfnfIon. l33 S. Cf. nf 2683·84 ínofIng fhnf Iowor courfs
nro consIdorIng nnd dobnfIng whofhor hoIghfonod scrufIny shouId nµµIy fo such
laws). Applicants’ failure to address those claims is reason enough, alone, to deny
fhoIr AµµIIcnfIon. AµµIIcnnfs cnnnof ovorcomo fho sfrong µrosumµfIon fhnf fho
Court of Appeals’ determination was correct without showing they are likely to
prevail on all of Respondents’ claims.
As the Court of Appeals’ ruling suggests, the reasoning in WIndsor nnd ofhor
oqunI µrofocfIon docIsIons sfrongIy suµµorfs fho concIusIon fhnf !osµondonfs nro
likely to succeed on their claims that Utah’s marriage ban violates their right to
oqunI µrofocfIon of fho Inws. WIndsor hoId fhnf Inws onncfod In ordor fo dony oqunI
fronfmonf of mnrrIod snmo·sox couµIos InfIIcf InjurIos of consfIfufIonnI dImonsIons.
l33 S. Cf. nf 2694 íruIIng fhnf SocfIon 3 of fho fodornI Ðofonso of MnrrIngo Acf
“demeans” same·sex couples, and “humiliates tens of fhousnnds of chIIdron now
being raised” by those couples). As the District Court correctly held, the Court’s
nnnIysIs of fho µrofoundIy sfIgmnfIzIng Imµncf of Inws fhnf sIngIo ouf snmo·sox
couµIos for dIscrImInnfIon wIfh rosµocf fo mnrrIngo nµµIIos oqually to Utah’s laws
oxcIudIng snmo·sox couµIos from fho nbIIIfy fo mnrry. ÐIsf. Cf. l2/20 Ordor nf 50.
Thoso Inws sfIgmnfIzo nnd hnrm snmo·sox couµIos nnd fhoIr fnmIIIos, whIIo
µrovIdIng no bonofIf fo ofhors. Id. Thnf nsµocf of WIndsor’s reasoning strongly
supports the District Court’s conclusions that the challenged laws violate the Equal

l8

IrofocfIon CInuso bocnuso fhoy dIscrImInnfo ngnInsf snmo·sox couµIos nnd InfIIcf
sorIous consfIfufIonnI hnrms on fhoso couµIos nnd fhoIr chIIdron.
WIndsor also held that “‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character,’”
IncIudIng ngnInsf gny nnd IosbInn IndIvIdunIs wIfh rosµocf fo mnrrIngo, wnrrnnf
“‘careful consideration.’” 133 S. Ct. at 2693 íquofIng !omor, 5l? !.S. nf 633¹. Tho
Courf found fhnf SocfIon 3 of ÐOMA wns onncfod for nn Imµroµor dIscrImInnfory
µurµoso, ovon fhough If wns suµµorfod by Inrgo mnjorIfIos of Congross, In µnrf,
bocnuso If doµnrfod from fho fodornI govornmont’s longstanding practice of
doforrIng fo sfnfo dofInIfIons of mnrrIngo In ordor fo sIngIo ouf n µnrfIcuInr subsof of
mnrrIod couµIos for unoqunI fronfmonf. l33 S. Cf. nf 2693. Tho Courf found fhnf
ÐOMA wns onacted “to ensure that if any State decides to recognize same·sox
mnrrIngos, fhoso unIons wIII bo fronfod ns socond·cInss mnrrIngos for µurµosos of
federal law.” Id. nf 2693·94. In fhIs cnso, fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf cnrofuIIy oufIInod how
fho chnIIongod !fnh Inws íwhIch IIko sImIInr Inws In mnny ofhor sfnfos, woro
onncfod oxµrossIy In ordor fo oxcIudo snmo·sox couµIos from mnrrIngo¹ nro
unusunI. ÐIsf. Cf. l2/20 Ordor nf 39·40. Tho ÐIsfrIcf Courf uIfImnfoIy docIInod fo
roIy on fhIs nsµocf of WIndsor’s holding, concIudIng fhnf fho chnIIongod Inws fnIIod
ovon undor convonfIonnI rnfIonnI bnsIs rovIow. Id. nf 4l. ÞonofhoIoss, WIndsor
makes clear that state laws, like Utah’s, enacted in quick succossIon fo mnko suro
fhnf no snmo·sox couµIo couId bo mnrrIod, nIso wnrrnnf cIoso scrufIny.
4


4
Applicants place great weight on the District Court’s “refusal to find that Utah’s marriage
laws (in contrast with DOMA) are based on animus.” Appl. at 14. However, while the District Court
ultimately refrained from expressly finding that Utah’s marriage bnn rofIocfs nnImus fownrd gny
and lesbian persons, the District Court’s analysis strongly supports that conclusion. The District

l9

This Court’s precedents—ns woII ns n growIng numbor of docIsIons by sfnfo
nnd fodornI courfs—nIso suµµorf fho concIusIon fhnf Inws fhnf dIscrImInnfo bnsod
on soxunI orIonfnfIon, IncIudIng Inws bnrrIng snmo·sox couµIos from mnrrIngo,
wnrrnnf hoIghfonod consfIfufIonnI scrufIny. WIndsor nofod fhnf Iowor courfs ncross
the country are considering whether “heightened equal protection scrutiny should
apply to laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation.” 133 S. Ct. at 2684·85.
In nddIfIon, fho Courf Iof sfnnd fho Second Circuit’s holding that heightened
scrufIny nµµIIos fo such Inws. Id. at 2684 (noting that the Second Circuit “applied
hoIghfonod scrufIny fo cInssIfIcnfIons bnsod on sexual orientation”). Applying the
crIforIn usod by fho Courf In µrIor cnsos fo doformIno whon corfnIn cInssIfIcnfIons
wnrrnnf hoIghfonod scrufIny, mnny courfs hnvo now concIudod fhnf Inws fhnf
dIscrImInnfo bnsod on soxunI orIonfnfIon wnrrnnf cnrofuI rovIow.
5
In IIghf of fhoso
precedents and this Court’s application of “careful consideration” in WIndsor,
Respondents are likely to succeed on their claim that Utah’s discrimination against
snmo·sox couµIos wnrrnnfs, nnd cnnnof wIfhsfnnd, n hoIghfonod IovoI of
consfIfufIonnI scrufIny.

Court found that “the avowed purpose and effect of Amendment 3 is to deny the benefits and
rosµonsIbIIIfIos of mnrrIngo fo snmo·sox couµIos, whIch Is nnofhor wny of snyIng fhnf fho Inw Imµosos
inequality.” Dist. Ct. 2/20 Order at 39. The District Court also found that, because Amendment 3
went further and “held that no domestic union could be given the same or substantially equIvnIonf
legal effect as marriage,” its “wording suggests that the imposition of inequality was not merely the
law’s effect, but its goal.” Id. Thoso fIndIngs nro vIrfunIIy IndIsfInguIshnbIo, If nf nII, from fho bnsIs
of WIndsor’s conclusion that Section 3 of DOMA’s “principal purpose [was] to impose inequality.”
l33 S. Cf. nf 2694.
5
Soo, o.g., CrIogo v. OIIvor, Þo. 34,306, 20l3 W! 66?0?04, nf *l8 íÞ.M. Ðoc. l9, 20l3¹·
Vnrnum v. IrIon, ?63 Þ.W.2d 862, 896 íIown 2009¹· KorrIgnn v. Comm'r of Iub. HonIfh, 95? A.2d
40?, 432 íConn. 2008¹· In ro MnrrIngo Cnsos, l83 I.3d 384, 444 íCnI. 2008¹. Soo nIso WIndsor v.
!nIfod Sfnfos, 699 I.3d l69, l85 í2d CIr. 20l2¹· Mnssnchusoffs v. !.S. Ðoµ'f of HonIfh & Humnn
Sorvs., 682 I.3d l, 8 ílsf CIr. 20l2¹, corf. donIod, l33 S. Cf. 288? í20l3¹ íhoIdIng fhnf rovIow of
DOMA “require[s] a closer than usual review based in part on discrepant impact among mnrrIod
couples and in part on the importance of state interests in regulating marriage”).

20

This Court’s precedents also support Respondents’ claim that the challengod
Inws wnrrnnf, nnd cnnnof survIvo, hoIghfonod scrufIny bocnuso fhoy dIscrImInnfo
ngnInsf !osµondonfs bnsod on fhoIr sox. Iofh fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf In fhIs cnso nnd
fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf In Iorry v. Schwnrzonoggor, ?04 I. Suµµ. 2d 92l íÞ.Ð. CnI.
20l0¹, hoId fhnf Inws bnrrIng snmo·sox couµIos from mnrrIngo ImµormIssIbIy
dIscrImInnfo bnsod on sox. Thoso Inws cInssIfy !osµondonfs bnsod on fhoIr sox
bocnuso fho mnIo !osµondonfs wouId bo nbIo fo mnrry fhoIr µnrfnors If fhoIr
µnrfnors woro fomnIo, nnd fho fomnIo !osµondonfs wouId bo nbIo fo mnrry fhoIr
µnrfnors If fhoIr µnrfnors woro mnIo. Soo ÐIsf. Cf. l2/20 Ordor nf 35· Iorry, ?04 I.
Suµµ. 2d nf 996· soo nIso In ro !ovonson, 560 I.3d ll45, ll4? í9fh CIr. 2009¹ íIÐ!
IInn ndmInIsfrnfIvo docIsIon¹. Tho IqunI IrofocfIon CInuso µrohIbIfs such
“differential treatment for denial of opportunity” based on a person’s gendor In fho
absence of an “exceedingly persuasive” justification. !nIfod Sfnfos v. VIrgInIn, 5l8
!.S. 5l5, 532·33 íl996¹ íInfornnI quofnfIon mnrks omIffod¹. Moroovor, ns Iorry
explained, “sox nnd soxunI orIonfnfIon nro nocossnrIIy InforroInfod, ns nn
IndIvIdunI's choIco of romnnfIc or InfImnfo µnrfnor bnsod on sox Is n Inrgo µnrf of
whnf dofInos nn IndIvIdunI's soxunI orIontation.” 704 F. Suµµ. 2d nf 996. Ior fhnf
reason, a law enacted to bar gay and lesbian couples from marriage “targets them
specifically due to sex,” in addition to “target[ing them] in a manner specific to their
soxunI orientation.” Id.
In nddIfIon, IIko ofhor fyµos of sox dIscrImInnfIon, dIscrImInnfIon ngnInsf
snmo·sox couµIos Is roofod In gondor sforoofyµos, IncIudIng fho sforoofyµo fhnf n

2l

mnn shouId onIy bo nffrncfod fo, onfor Info nn InfImnfo roInfIonshIµ wIfh, nnd
mnrry n womnn, nnd vIco vorsn. Tho chnIIongod !fnh Inws ImµormIssIbIy rofIocf
fhoso gondor·bnsod oxµocfnfIons nnd µonnIIzo IndIvIdunIs who doµnrf from
“assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.” MIss. !nIv. for Womon v.
Hognn, 458 !.S. ?l8, ?26 íl982¹.
WhIIo fhIs Is nn Issuo on whIch courfs hnvo sµIIf, fho ronsonIng suµµorfIng
fho concIusIon fhnf Inws fnrgofIng snmo·sox couµIos ImµormIssIbIy dIscrImInnfo
based on sex is well founded and consistent with this Court’s precedents.
Applicants cannot show that the Court of Appeals’ was demonstrably wrong in
concIudIng fhnf AµµIIcnnfs fnIIod fo moof fhoIr burdon of showIng n IIkoIIhood of
succoss. Cf. Abboff, l34 S. Cf. nf 506 (noting that “the difficulty of a question is
InvorsoIy µroµorfIonnI fo fho IIkoIIhood fhnf n gIvon nnswor wIII bo cIonrIy
erroneous”).
Ð. WIndsor nnd Ofhor Irocodonfs, IncIudIng ÐocIsIons by Mnny
State and Federal Courts, Strongly Support the District Court’s
ConcIusIon Thnf fho ChnIIongod !nws VIoInfo IqunI IrofocfIon
Ivon !ndor !nfIonnI InsIs !ovIow
AµµIIcnnfs cnnnof show fhnf fhIs Courf Is IIkoIy fo rovorso fho ÐIsfrIcf
Court’s ruling by citing to a hodgepodge of articles that purportedly show that
snmo·sox µnronfs nro InforIor fo oµµosIfo·sox µnronfs. In nddIfIon fo boIng fnIso,
6


6
Applicants’ arguments about optimal childrearing, AppI. nf l4·l8, nro nof roIovnnf fo
whofhor fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf docIsIon wIII bo uµhoId on nµµonI, ns fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf obsorvod. ÐIsf.
Cf. l2/20 nf 45. However, Applicants’ statement that “[a]mong the wealth of social science analysis
suµµorfIng fho frndIfIonnI dofInIfIon of mnrrIngo, n subsfnnfInI body of rosonrch confIrms fhnf
chIIdron gonornIIy fnro bosf whon ronrod by fhoIr fwo bIoIogIcnI µnronfs In n IovIng, Iow·confIIcf
marriage,” AppI. nf l5, Is nof fruo. Tho scIonfIfIc consonsus of ovory nnfIonnI honIfh cnro
orgnnIznfIon chnrgod wIfh fho woIfnro of chIIdron nnd ndoIosconfs – IncIudIng fho AmorIcnn
Acndomy of IodInfrIcs, fho AmorIcnn Acndomy of ChIId nnd AdoIosconf IsychInfry, fho AmorIcnn

22

Applicants’ argumenf doos nof rosoIvo fho consfIfufIonnI Issuos µrosonfod by fhIs
cnso. As fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf cnrofuIIy domonsfrnfod, nnd ns numorous ofhor fodornI
nnd sfnfo courfs ncross fho counfry hnvo nIso found, fhoro sImµIy Is no rnfIonnI
connocfIon bofwoon bnrrIng snmo·sox couµIos from mnrrIngo nnd fho µromofIon of
“responsible procreation” or “optimal parenting” by opposite·sox couµIos. To fho
oxfonf fho bonofIfs nnd µrofocfIons of mnrrIngo oncourngo oµµosIfo·sox couµIos fo
mnrry boforo hnvIng chIIdron, fhoso Incontives existed long before Utah’s
dIscrImInnfory Inws woro onncfod, nnd fhoy wouId confInuo fo oxIsf If fhoso Inws
woro sfruck down. Cf. WIndsor v. !nIfod Sfnfos, 699 I.3d l69, l88 í2d CIr. 20l2¹
(“DOMA does not provide nny IncromonfnI ronson for oµµosIfo·sox couµIos fo ongngo
in ‘responsible procreation.’ Incentives for opposite·sox couµIos fo mnrry nnd
procreate (or not) were the same after DOMA was enacted as they were before.”);
soo nIso, o.g., Mnssnchusoffs v. !.S. Ðoµ'f of HonIfh & Humnn Sorvs., 682 I.3d l, l4
n.l0 ílsf CIr. 20l2¹ (holding that the state’s “responsible procreation” argument
failed to “explain how denying benefits to same·sox couµIos wIII roInforco

IsychInfrIc AssocInfIon, fho AmorIcnn IsychoIogIcnI AssocInfIon, fho AmorIcnn IsychonnnIyfIc
AssocInfIon, fho AmorIcnn SocIoIogIcnI AssocInfIon, fho ÞnfIonnI AssocInfIon of SocInI Workors, fho
AmorIcnn ModIcnI AssocInfIon, nnd fho ChIId WoIfnro !onguo of AmorIcn – bnsod on n sIgnIfIcnnf
nnd woII·rosµocfod body of curronf rosonrch, Is fhnf chIIdron nnd ndoIosconfs rnIsod by snmo·sox
µnronfs, wIfh nII fhIngs boIng oqunI, nro ns woII·ndjusfod ns chIIdron rnIsod by oµµosIfo·sox
µnronfs. Soo IrIof of AmorIcnn IsychoIogIcnI AssocInfIon, of nI. ns AmIcI CurIno on fho MorIfs In
Suµµorf of AffIrmnnco, !nIfod Sfnfos v. WIndsor, l33 S.Cf. 26?5 í20l3¹ íÞo. l2·30?¹. Tho buIk of fho
rosonrch on whIch AµµIIcnnfs roIy Is oufdnfod, nnd fho curronf sfudIos fhoy cIfo by Mnrk Ð.
!ognorus, AµµI. nf l5·l?, hnvo boon whoIIy dIscrodIfod by fho scIonfIfIc communIfy, IncIudIng fho
journnI whIch µubIIshod fhom. Tom InrfIoff, ConfrovorsInI Cny·InronfIng Sfudy Is SovoroIy
Flawed, Journal’s Audit Finds, Chron. Of HIghor Iduc., JuIy 26, 20l2,
hffµ·//chronIcIo.com/bIogs/µorcoInfor/confrovorsInI·gny·µnronfIng·sfudy·Is·sovoroIy·fInwod·journnIs·
nudIf·fInds/30255. Applicants’ citation to the study by Kristin A. Moore, AppI. nf l5, Is oqunIIy
mIsµIncod bocnuso fho nufhors nddod nn Infroducfory nofo fo fhoIr sfudy oxµIIcIfIy wnrnIng fhnf no
concIusIons cnn bo drnwn from fhIs rosonrch nbouf fho woII·boIng of chIIdron rnIsod by snmo·sox or
ndoµfIvo µnronfs. KrIsfIn A. Mooro, Mnrriage from a Child’s Perspective: How Does Family
Sfrucfuro Affocf ChIIdron, nnd Whnf Cnn Wo Ðo Abouf If, ChIId Tronds í2002¹.

23

heterosexual marriage”); Vnrnum v. IrIon, ?63 Þ.W.2d 862, 90l íIown 2009¹ (“[T]he
Counfy fnIIs fo nddross fho ronI Issuo In our roquIrod nnnIysIs of fho objocfIvo·
whofhor oxcIusIon of gny nnd IosbInn IndIvIdunIs from fho InsfIfufIon of cIvII
mnrrIngo wIII rosuIf In moro procreation?”) (emphasis in original).
!osµondonfs ngroo wIfh AµµIIcnnfs fhnf mnrrIngo µrovIdos onormous
bonofIfs for chIIdron. Iuf oxcIudIng fho chIIdron of snmo·sox couµIos from fhoso
bonofIfs cnusos sovoro hnrm fo fhoso chIIdron, wIfhouf µrovIdIng nny bonofIf fo fho
chIIdron of oµµosIfo·sex parents. “If anything, the State’s prohIbIfIon of snmo·sox
marriage detracts from the State’s goal of promoting optimal environments for
children.” ÐIsf. Cf. l2/20 Ordor nf 46. Tho nssorfod govornmonfnI Inforosf In
oncourngIng µrocronfIon nnd chIId·ronrIng fo occur wIfhIn n sfnbIo fnmIIy confoxf
nIso nµµIIos fo fho chIIdron of snmo·sox couµIos. “Thoso chIIdron nro nIso worfhy of
the State’s protection, yet Amendment 3 harms them for the same reasons that the
Suµromo Courf found fhnf ÐOMA hnrmod fho chIIdron of snmo·sex couples.” Id.
AµµIIcnnfs do nof dIsµufo fhnf snmo·sox couµIos nnd fhoIr chIIdron nro
hnrmod by boIng oxcIudod from mnrrIngo. Soo AµµI. nf 2l ísfnfIng fhnf snmo·sox
couples and their children “will likely suffer dignitary and financial losses from the
InvnIIdnfIon of fhoIr marriages”). Nonetheless, they argue, illogically, that it is
rnfIonnI for fho sfnfo fo µonnIIzo fhoso couµIos nnd fhoIr chIIdron by oxcIudIng fhom
from protections in order to “hold[] up and encourag[e] man·womnn unIons ns fho
µroforrod nrrnngomonf In which to raise children.” Id. nf l? íomµhnsIs In orIgInnI¹.
Applicants’ argument is remarkably similar to the justifications offered in support

24

of now·roµudInfod Inws fhnf µonnIIzod so·called “illegitimate” children by depriving
fhom of crIfIcnI IognI µrofocfIons. This Court has repudiated such laws as “contrary
fo fho bnsIc concoµf of our sysfom fhnf IognI burdons shouId bonr somo roInfIonshIµ
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.” Wobor v. Aofnn Cns. & Sur. Co., 406
!.S. l64, l?5 íl9?2¹. “Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing
fho IIIogIfImnfo chIId Is nn InoffocfunI—ns woII ns nn unjusf—wny of doforrIng fho
µnront.” Id. Those principles apply to Applicants’ argument that a state can
µonnIIzo fho chIIdron of snmo·sex couples in order to hold up “man·womnn unIons ns
fho µroforrod arrangement” for raising children. AppI. nf l? íomµhnsIs In orIgInnI¹.
Iurfhormoro, ns fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf nIso hoId, mnrrIngo In !fnh ns In ofhor
sfnfos Is fIod fo n wIdo nrrny of govornmonfnI µrogrnms nnd µrofocfIons, mnny of
whIch hnvo nofhIng fo do wIfh chIId·ronrIng or µrocronfIon. ÐIsf. Cf. l2/20 Ordor nf
26·2?. Tho fncf fhnf snmo·sox couµIos do nof ongngo In unµInnnod µrocronfIon doos
nof µrovIdo n rnfIonnI bnsIs for oxcIudIng mnrrIod snmo·sox couµIos from nII of fho
other protections provided to married couples under Utah law. “[E]ven in the
ordInnry oqunI µrofocfIon cnso cnIIIng for fho mosf doforonfInI of sfnndnrds, lcourfs¦
InsIsf on knowIng fho roInfIon bofwoon fho cInssIfIcnfIon ndoµfod nnd fho objocf fo
be attained.” !omor, 5l? !.S. nf 632. Horo, ns In !omor, “[t]he breadth of [Utah’s
dIscrImInnfory mnrrIngo Inws¦ Is so fnr romovod from fhoso µnrfIcuInr jusfIfIcnfIons
that [it is] impossible to credit them.” Id. nf 635.
I. Inkor v. ÞoIson Provides No Support for Applicants’ Position
AµµIIcnnfs Invoko fhIs Court’s 1972 summary dismissal of the appeal for
wnnf of n subsfnnfInI fodornI quosfIon In Inkor v. ÞoIson, 409 !.S. 8l0 íl9?2¹,

25

confondIng fhnf Inkor warrants vacating the Court of Appeals’ ruling because
Inkor roquIros, on fho morIfs, fhnf fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf nnd fho Courf of AµµonIs
reject Appellees’ challenges to Utah’s marriage laws. Inkor Is nof confroIIIng In
fhIs cnso for fho ronsons fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf oxµInInod, ns woII ns for fho nddIfIonnI
ronsons sof forfh boIow. AµµoIInnfs hnvo nof shown fhnf Inkor µrovIdos ronson for
this Court to conclude that the Court of Appeals was “demonstrably wrong” In Ifs
nµµIIcnfIon of fho sfnndnrds govornIng Issunnco of n sfny.
Summnry dIsmIssnI by fhIs Courf for wnnf of n subsfnnfInI fodornI quosfIon
is dispositive only on “the precise issues presented and necessarily decided.”
MnndoI v. IrndIoy, 432 !.S. l?3, l?6 íl9?9¹. Inkor wns docIdod In l9?l, docndos
boforo fho wnvo of unµrocodonfod sfnfo sfnfufos nnd consfIfufIonnI nmondmonfs
osfnbIIshIng cnfogorIcnI bnns on mnrrIngo by snmo·sox couµIos. !Iko ÐOMA, fhoso
measures are “discriminations of an unusual character,” WIndsor, l33 S. Cf. nf 2693
íInfornnI cIfnfIons omIffod¹, In fhnf fhoy woro oxµrossIy onncfod fo fnrgof snmo·sox
couµIos. Inkor dId nof InvoIvo· íl¹ nn onncfmonf sµocIfIcnIIy fnrgofod fo dony rIghfs
fo snmo·sox couµIos· í2¹ n sfnfo consfIfufIonnI nmondmonf fhnf fook fho Issuo of
mnrrIngo for snmo·sox couµIos ouf of fho ronIm of ordInnry µoIIfIcs nnd mndo If
vIrfunIIy ImµossIbIo for gny nnd IosbInn µooµIo fo uso fho ordInnry IogIsInfIvo
µrocoss fo sook chnngo· or í3¹ nn onncfmonf sµocIfIcnIIy µrohIbIfIng n sfnfo from
rocognIzIng fho IognI mnrrIngos of snmo·sox couµIos. Inkor dId nof nddross nnd
therefore does not resolve the “precise issues” presented by this case. MnndoI, 432
!.S. nf l?6.

26

Inkor nddrossod n gonornI mnrrIngo sfnfufo fhnf wns nof onncfod for fho
µurµoso of oxcIudIng snmo·sox couµIos from mnrrIngo. Tho sfnfufo nf Issuo In
Inkor dId nof rofor fo fho gondor of fho Infondod sµousos. Tho MInnosofn Suµromo
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the absence of an express statutory
µrohIbIfIon ngnInsf snmo·sox mnrrIngos ovIncos n IogIsInfIvo Infonf fo nufhorIzo
such marriages,” holding that the law “does not authorize marriage between
persons of the same sex.” Inkor v. ÞoIson, l9l Þ.W.2d l85, l85·86 íMInn. l9?l¹.
Thnf no subsfnnfInI fodornI quosfIon wns µrosonfod by such n sfnfufo doos nof
nnswor whofhor n dIfforonf kInd of sfnfufo or consfIfufIonnI nmondmonf—Infondod
fo oxcIudo snmo·sox couµIos—mIghf bo unconsfIfufIonnI ns n form of InvIdIous
dIscrImInnfIon. “‘A summary disposition affirms only fho judgmonf of fho courf
boIow, nnd no moro mny bo rond Info our ncfIon fhnn wns ossonfInI fo susfnIn fhnf
judgment.’” Monfnnn v. Crow TrIbo of IndInns, 523 !.S. 696, ?l4 n.l4 íl998¹
íquofIng Andorson v. CoIobrozzo, 460 !.S. ?80, ?85 n. 5 íl983¹¹.
Inkor nIso dId nof nddross fho vnIIdIfy of n sfnfo consfIfufIonnI nmondmonf
onncfod In ordor fo romovo fho Issuo of whofhor snmo·sox couµIos hnvo nn oqunI
rIghf fo mnrry from fho normnI µoIIfIcnI µrocoss. In !omor, fho Courf InvnIIdnfod n
sfnfo consfIfufIonnI nmondmonf fhnf bnrrod fho onncfmonf of nny sfnfo or IocnI Inws
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, concluding that “[i]t is not
within our constitutional tradition to enact such measures.” 517 U.S. at 633. Thnf
no subsfnnfInI fodornI quosfIon wns µrosonfod by fho gonornI mnrrIngo sfnfufo In
Inkor doos nof nnswor whofhor n monsuro IIko Amondmonf 3 mIghf bo

2?

unconsfIfufIonnI ns n form of InvIdIous dIscrImInnfIon fhnf sooks fo dIsndvnnfngo
nnd sfIgmnfIzo gny nnd IosbInn µorsons In fho µoIIfIcnI µrocoss.
Iurfhor, nf fho fImo Inkor wns onncfod, no sfnfo hnd yof onncfod monsuros
fo bnr nny rocognIfIon of couµIos who IognIIy mnrrIod In ofhor sfnfos. Inkor dId nof
ovon consIdor, much Ioss doformIno, fho vnIIdIfy of such n monsuro. As dIscussod
above, a state’s refusal to recognize the lawful marriages of same·sox couµIos who
mnrry In ofhor sfnfos rnIso consfIfufIonnI quosfIons dIsfIncf from fhoso rnIsod by
mnrrIngo bnns wIfhIn n sfnfo. Soo, o.g., OborgofoII, 20l3 W! 6?26688, nf *5
(holding that a state’s refusal to recognize existing legal marriages raises distinct
duo µrocoss Issuos roInfIng fo quosfIons of roIInnco, soffIod oxµocfnfIons, nnd fho
established principle that “oxIsfIng mnrIfnI, fnmIIy, nnd InfImnfo roInfIonshIµs nro
nrons Info whIch fho govornmonf gonornIIy shouId nof Infrudo wIfhouf subsfnnfInI
justification”) (emphasis in original).
III. THE APPLICANTS’ RIGHTS WI!! ÞOT II SI!IO!S!Y AÞÐ
I!!IIA!AI!Y IÞJ!!IÐ IY ÐIÞIA! OI A STAY
Iofh fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf nnd Courf of AµµonIs concIudod fhnf AµµIIcnnfs dId
nof show fhoy wouId suffor nny IrroµnrnbIo hnrm by comµIyIng wIfh fho InjuncfIon
µondIng nµµonI. ÐIsf. Cf. l2/23 Ordor nf 4·5· CAl0 l2/24 Ordor nf 2. To obfnIn n
sfny from fhIs Court, Applicants must show the Court of Appeals’ application of the
standard was “demonstrably wrong,” CoIomnn, 424 !.S. nf l304, or fhnf now
cIrcumsfnncos wnrrnnfIng roIIof hnvo nrIson. Insfond of ovon nffomµfIng fo moof
fhnf burdon, AµµIIcnnfs moroIy ronssorf fho snmo nrgumonfs fhnf woro µroµorIy
rojocfod ns Inndoqunfo by bofh fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf nnd Courf of AµµonIs. AµµIIcnnfs

28

claim that, if they prevail on appeal, they will be injured by the “administrative and
fInnncial costs” of determining “whether and how to unwind the marital status of
snmo·sex unions performed before reversal of the district court’s decision.” Appl. at
2l·22. In nddIfIon, fhoy cInIm fhnf nn ordor µrovonfIng fho onforcomonf of n sfnfo
Inw Is In itself an irreparable harm to the state’s sovereignty. Id. nf l9·2l. ÞoIfhor
of fhoso cInIms consfIfufos IrroµnrnbIo hnrm.
A. AµµIIcnnfs Cnnnof Show IrroµnrnbIo Hnrm Insod on IofonfInI
QuosfIons !ognrdIng fho VnIIdIfy of Snmo·Sox Couples’
MnrrIngos

AµµIIcnnfs nssorf fhnf µormIffIng snmo·sex couples to marry “has grave
practical consequences,” but the only specific harm they identify is the potential
“administrative and financial costs” of addressing “whether and how to unwind the
mnrIfnI sfnfus of snmo·sex unions performed before reversal of the district court’s
decision.” Appl. at 21. As an initial matter, it bears emphasis that the District
Court’s Order has been in effect since December 20, 2013. Hundreds of same·sox
couµIos In !fnh hnvo nIrondy mnrrIod. MnrIssn !nng, Snmo·Sox CouµIos Shnffor
MnrrIngo !ocords In !fnh, SnIf !nko TrIb., Ðoc. 26, 20l3,
hffµ·//www.sIfrIb.com/sIfrIb/nows/5?3l095?·?8/sox·counfy·mnrrIngos·
couµIos.hfmI.csµ¨µngo=l. The Governor’s Office has directed all state agencies to
comply with the District Court’s decision and, based upon an initial survey of
roIovnnf sfnfo offIcInIs, hns sfnfod fhnf fho Imµncf of doIng so wIII bo mInImnI. Soo
Ix. C fo Aµµ. (email from Governor’s Chief of Staff stating that based upon a survey
of Cabinet members “many agencies will experience little or no impact” and

29

providing guidance for agencies that encounter any “conflicting laws”); soo nIso ÐIsf.
Cf. l2/20 Ordor nf 4?·48 (finding that “the process of allowing same·sox mnrrIngo Is
straightforward and requires no change to state tax, divorce, or inheritance laws”).
ComµIyIng wIfh fho InjuncfIon roquIros no chnngo In fho oxIsfIng IognI sfrucfuro or
ndmInIsfrnfIon of cIvII mnrrIngo, nnd fho ovIdonco boforo fhIs Courf shows fhnf, IIko
ofhor sfnfos whIch hnvo ImµIomonfod sImIInr ruIIngs, !fnh cnn rondIIy nnd
offocfIvoIy comply with the District Court’s order.
Moreover, Applicants’ claim they will suffer irreparable harm if the marriage
bnn Is uµhoId on nµµonI hns no morIf. As AµµIIcnnfs fhomsoIvos ncknowIodgo, If Is
by no monns cIonr fhnf such n ruIIng wouId roquIro fho Sfnfo fo sook or wouId rosuIf
In fho InvnIIdnfIon of fho oxIsfIng mnrrIngos. Soo AµµI. nf 2l ínofIng fhnf If fho
marriage ban is upheld, Applicants would have to determine “whether” to seek
InvnIIdnfIon¹. Iurfhor, fodornI nnd sfnfo courfs roguInrIy nddross comµIox Issuos
rognrdIng fho vnIIdIfy of mnrrIngos In ofhor confoxfs.
?
ShouId AµµIIcnnfs docIdo fo
chnIIongo fho vnIIdIfy of snmo·sex couples’ marriages if Applicants prevail on
nµµonI, fhoy cnn do so fhrough fho normnI judIcInI µrocoss nnd wIII suffor no
IrroµnrnbIo hnrm. !ndor woII·settled law, any “administrative” or “financial costs”
fhnf mIghf nrIso from fho AµµIIcnnfs sookIng such doformInnfIons cnnnof consfIfufo
IrroµnrnbIo Injury. Soo Snmµson v. Murrny, 4l5 !.S. 6l íl9?4¹ (“Mere injuries,

?
Soo, o.g., Iurdon v. ShInsokI, ?2? I.3d ll6l íIod. CIr. 20l3¹ ídoformInIng fho nµµIIcnbIo
standard to assess the validity of an alleged marriage in a claim for veterans’ benefits); CorwoII v.
CorwoII, l?9 I.3d 82l í!fnh Cf. Aµµ. 2008¹ (determining the effect of an annulment on a party’s
nbIIIfy fo sook n µrofocfIvo ordor undor n sfnfufo fhnf IImIfod µrofocfIon ngnInsf cohnbIfnnf nbuso fo
mnrrIod nnd formorIy mnrrIod µorsons¹· Sfrnuss v. Horfon, 20? I.3d 48 íCnI. 2009¹ ídoformInIng fho
vnIIdIfy of mnrrIngos onforod Info by snmo·sox couµIos In CnIIfornIn boforo fho onncfmonf of n sfnfo
consfIfufIonnI nmondmonf bnrrIng such mnrrIngos¹.

30

howovor subsfnnfInI, In forms of monoy, fImo nnd onorgy nocossnrIIy oxµondod In
fho nbsonco of n sfny, nro nof onough.”).
8

Applicants’ nrgumonf fhnf fhIs Courf shouId Issuo n sfny bocnuso snmo·sox
couples and their children may suffer “dignitary and financial losses from the
invalidation of their marriages,” soo Aµµ. nf 2l, cufs onfIroIy fho ofhor wny.
Applicants cannot simultaneously concede that being stripped of one’s marital
sfnfus cnusos µrofound, IrroµnrnbIo hnrm nnd urgo fho Courf fo InfIIcf fhnf vory
Injury on fho mnrrIod !osµondonfs nnd ofhor mnrrIod snmo·sox couµIos. As fho
District Court noted, “the harm experienced by same·sox couµIos In !fnh ns n rosuIf
of their inability to marry is undisputed.” Dist. Ct. 12/20 Order at 50. That
ImmodInfo, confInuIng, nnd sovoro hnrm fnr oufwoIghs nny sµocuInfIvo µrobIoms
fhnf mIghf bo cnusod by fho µossIbIo InvnIIdnfIon of fhoIr mnrrIngos In fho fufuro.
I. AµµIIcnnfs Cnnnof IsfnbIIsh IrroµnrnbIo Hnrm Insod on fho
Moro InjoInIng of n Sfnfo !nw

Applicants’ argument that an order enjoining the enforcement of a state law
nIwnys InfIIcts irreparable harm, regardless of the law’s validity or invalidity, has
no morIf. Tho govornmonf doos nof suffor IrroµnrnbIo hnrm whon nn onjoInod
monsuro Is unconsfIfufIonnI. Soo, o.g., Scoff v. !oborfs, 6l2 I.3d l2?9, l29? íllfh
CIr. 20l0¹ (“[T]he public, when the state is a party asserting harm, has no interest
in enforcing an unconstitutional law.”); Indoµ. !IvIng Cfr. of S. CnI. v. MnxwoII·

8
AµµIIcnnfs’ cIfnfIon fo !ognIIznfIon AssIsfnnco Irojocf, 5l0 !.S. nf l305·06, Is Innµf. Thnf
docIsIon found fhnf, bocnuso fho µInInfIffs In fhnf cnso IIkoIy dId nof hnvo sfnndIng, fho dIsfrIcf courf
IIkoIy dId nof hnvo nufhorIfy fo Infrudo uµon fho InfornnI workIngs of n fodornI ndmInIsfrnfIvo
agency, particularly where doing so imposed a “considerable administrative burden.” Id. If dId nof
hold that, in an ordinary case, mere “administrative burden” constitutes irreparable harm.

3l

JoIIy, 5?2 I.3d 644, 658 í9fh CIr. 2009¹ (rejecting argument that “moroIy by
onjoInIng n sfnfo IogIsInfIvo ncf, ln courf¦ cronfols¦ n µor so hnrm frumµIng nII ofhor
harms”).
Applicants’ attempt to bootstrap irreparable harm based on their inability to
onforco n monsuro fhnf hns boon docInrod fo bo InvnIId by fho ÐIsfrIcf Courf, nnd
IIkoIy fo bo hoId InvnIId by fho Courf of AµµonIs, Is unnvnIIIng. If Applicants’
nrgumonf woro corrocf, fhon nny fImo n sfnfo soughf fo sfny nn ordor onjoInIng n
Inw found fo bo unconsfIfufIonnI by n Iowor courf, fho sfnfo wouId wIn. Applicants’
nrgumonf wouId unduIy fIµ fho scnIo In fnvor of fho govornmonf In nny cnso
chnIIongIng n govornmonf onncfmonf, nnd ngnInsf fho consfIfufIonnI rIghfs of fho
cIfIzonry. Cf. MnxwoII·JoIIy, 5?2 I.3d nf 658 ínofIng fhnf If hnrm fo n sfnfo whon n
Inw Is onjoInod were “dispositive,” “the rule requiring balance of competing claims of
injury would be eviscerated”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The cases to which Applicants’ cite do not stand for the proposition that a
sfnfo Is Injurod whonovor Ifs Inws nro onjoInod. AµµIIcnnfs cIfo fo Þow Mofor
VohIcIo Ionrd v. OrrIn W. Iox Co., 434 !.S. l345 íl9??¹ í!ohnquIsf, J., In
chnmbers), but that decision found that “a majority of the Court [would] likely
reverse judgment of the District Court” and uphold the challenged state law. Id. nf
l34?. Horo, fho Courf of AµµonIs ronchod fho oµµosIfo concIusIon. CAl0 l2/24
Ordor nf 2. Moroovor, unIIko AµµIIcnnfs, who cnnnof µoInf fo nny concrofo wny In
whIch µormIffIng snmo·sox couµIos fo mnrry cnusos nny IrroµnrnbIo, Iof nIono
ncfunI, hnrm, fho docIsIon In Þow Mofor VohIcIo Ionrd oxµInInod In dofnII how

32

onjoInIng fho sfnfufo, whIch roquIrod cnr donIors fo obfnIn nµµrovnI boforo
roIocnfIng, wouId cnuso IrroµnrnbIo hnrm fo oxIsfIng donIors nnd fho µubIIc. 435
!.S. nf l35l. Applicants’ citation to MnryInnd v. KIng, l33 S. Cf. l í20l2¹, nIso doos
nof suµµorf fhoIr µosIfIon. In fhnf cnso, whIch InvoIvod n consfIfufIonnI chnIIongo fo
n sfnfo Inw nufhorIzIng fho coIIocfIon of ÐÞA snmµIos from IndIvIdunIs chnrgod
wIfh buf nof yof convIcfod of corfnIn crImos, fho Courf nIso doformInod fho Inw wns
likely to be upheld and enjoining it pending appeal would cause “an ongoing and
concrete harm to Maryland’s law enforcement and public safety interests.” Id. nf
3. Horo, Aµplicants have not shown that the Court of Appeals was “demonstrably
wrong” in concluding that Applicants nro nof IIkoIy fo succood on nµµonI, nor hnvo
they demonstrated “ongoing and concrete harm” to any specific state
Inforosfs. Finally, Applicants’ citation to a concurring opinion in Abboff, l34 S. Cf.
506, is likewise unavailing. As with the other cited decisions, the opinion’s finding
of IrroµnrnbIo hnrm cnusod by onjoInIng n sfnfo Inw wns µrodIcnfod on fho Courf of
Appeals’ determination that “the State was likely to prevail on the morIfs of fho
constitutional question.” Id. nf 506.
Applicants’ invocation of the states’ “interest in controlling the definition of
marriage within their borders,” Appl. at 19, to show irreparable harm merely
roµonfs fhoIr nrgumonfs on fho morIfs of Respondents’ constitutional claims; it does
nof show IrroµnrnbIo hnrm. In nny ovonf, howovor, If Is woII osfnbIIshod fhnf ovory
state’s marriage laws “must respect the constitutional rights of persons” and nro
“subject to constitutional guarantees.” WIndsor, l33 S. Cf. nf 269l·92. WhIIo sfnfos

33

hnvo µrImnry nufhorIfy ovor fnmIIy Inw In our fodornI sysfom, fhnf doos nof InsuInfo
sfnfo mnrrIngo Inws from fho roquIromonf of comµIInnco wIfh fho commnnds of fho
Iourfoonfh Amondmonf, jusf ns If doos nof InsuInfo sfnfo Inws rognrdIng µnronfngo
or chIId cusfody from fhnf roquIromonf. Soo, o.g., TroxoI v. CrnnvIIIo, 530 !.S. 5?
í2000¹ íµIurnIIfy oµInIon¹ íInvnIIdnfIng sfnfo cusfody nnd vIsIfnfIon sfnfufo fhnf
ImµormIssIbIy InfrIngod uµon µnronfnI rIghfs¹· SfnnIoy v. IIIInoIs, 405 !.S. 645
íl9?2¹ íInvnIIdnfIng sfnfo Inw fhnf nufomnfIcnIIy donIod cusfody fo unmnrrIod
fnfhors¹.
The District Court’s decision that Utah’s marriage ban violates Respondents’
consfIfufIonnI rIghfs fo duo µrocoss nnd oqunI µrofocfIon no moro consfIfufos
IrroµnrnbIo Injury to Applicants or “breaches the principle of federalism,” soo AµµI.
nf 20, fhnn ofhor docIsIons InvnIIdnfIng sfnfo Inws fhnf ImµormIssIbIy doµrIvo
IndIvIdunIs of oqunI µrofocfIon of fho Inws or burdon fundnmonfnI rIghfs fo IIborfy,
µrIvncy, nnd InfImnfo association. As this Court has made clear, “federalism
protects the liberty of the individual”; it is “not . . . a matter of rights belonging only
to the State[].” Iond v. !nIfod Sfnfos, l3l S. Cf. 2355, 2364 í20ll¹. Applicants’
omµhnsIs on fho sovoroIgnfy of fho sfnfo nnd Ifs µooµIo ovorIooks fhnf !osµondonfs
and their families are also Utah citizens and cannot be made “stranger[s] to its
laws.” !omor, 5l? !.S. nf 635. Utah’s citizenry, which includes Respondents and
fhoIr fnmIIIos, Is nof hnrmod by n docIsIon fhnf roquIros fho sfnfo fo µrofocf
fundnmonfnI IIborfIos oqunIIy for nII Ifs cIfIzons.

34

Applicants’ exclusive emphasIs on sfnfo sovoroIgnfy nIso ovorIooks fhnf, IIko
Utah’s laws, the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were produced by a
domocrnfIc µrocoss, nnd !osµondonfs nnd ofhors hnvo n comµoIIIng Inforosf In
onsurIng fhnf fhoso rIghfs nro rosµocfod. “[I]f Is nIwnys In fho µubIIc Inforosf fo
prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Awnd v. ZIrInx, 6?0 I.3d
llll, ll32 íl0fh CIr. 20l2¹ íInfornnI cIfnfIons nnd quofnfIons omIffod¹
In sum, Applicants’ argument that a state is injured any time its laws are
enjoined, regardless of their validity or invalidity, finds no support in this Court’s
precedents, and Applicants’ reliance on that argument serves only to undorscoro
fhoIr InnbIIIfy fo show nny wny fhnf µormIffIng snmo·sox couµIos fo mnrry cnusos
nny IrroµnrnbIo, Iof nIono ncfunI, hnrm. ÞoIfhor AµµIIcnnfs nor fho µubIIc hnvo nn
Inforosf In onforcIng unconsfIfufIonnI Inws or roIognfIng snmo·sox couµIos nnd fhoIr
fnmIIIos fo n µorµofunI sfnfo of fInnncInI, IognI, nnd socInI vuInornbIIIfy. AµµIIcnnfs
cnnnof show fhnf fho Courf of AµµonIs cIonrIy orrod In concIudIng fhnf AµµIIcnnfs
dId nof domonsfrnfo IrroµnrnbIo hnrm In fho nbsonco of n sfny.
IV. THI AII!ICAÞTS HAVI ÞOT SHOWÞ THAT THIS CASI IS
!IKI!Y TO II !IVIIWIÐ IÞ THIS CO!!T !IOÞ IIÞA!
ÐISIOSITIOÞ IÞ THI CO!!T OI AIIIA!S
Ivon If AµµIIcnnfs couId show bofh fhnf fho Courf of AµµonIs wns
“demonstrably wrong” and that its “rights” will be “seriously and irreparably
injured by the stay,” they cannot show that this case is likely to be reviewed in this
Courf nffor fho Tonfh CIrcuIf ruIos on fho nµµonI. W. AIrIInos, 480 !.S. nf l305.
Applicants’ burdon on fhIs Issuo Is hIgh, bocnuso If Is nonrIy ImµossIbIo fo
demonstrate that this Court will be “likely” to review a decision and opinIon fhnf

35

hnvo yof fo bo Issuod by n Courf of AµµonIs. Soo CorfnIn Þnmod nnd !nnnmod
Þon·CIfIzon ChIIdron nnd ThoIr Inronfs v. Toxns, 448 !.S. l32?, l33l íl980¹
(Powell, J., in chambers) (noting that only in “exceptional” cases will a litigant be
nbIo fo osfnbIIsh boforo docIsIon by fho Courf of AµµonIs fhnf fhIs Courf Is IIkoIy fo
grnnf corfIornrI¹.
Applicants’ argument that this Court is likely to review this case because the
Courf grnnfod corfIornrI In Iorry, l33 S. Cf. 2652, hns no morIf. Soo AµµI. nf 8.
!osµondonfs sfrongIy concur wIfh fho Courf of AµµonIs fhnf AµµIIcnnfs hnvo nof
shown fhoy nro IIkoIy fo µrovnII on nµµonI. ÞonofhoIoss, bocnuso fho Tonfh CIrcuIf
hns nof yof Issuod nn nµµoIInfo docIsIon on fho morIfs In fhIs cnso, If Is nof µossIbIo
fo µrodIcf wIfh corfnInfy how, or on whnf bnsIs, fho Courf of AµµonIs mIghf ruIo.
Thoroforo, nny dIscussIon of fho Issuo Is µromnfuro.
Applicants suggest that this Court has a “general . . . policy” of granting
corfIornrI whon n fodornI courf InvnIIdnfos n sfnfo sfnfufo bnsod on fho fodornI
consfIfufIon. Soo AµµI. nf 8 ícIfIng Knrchor v. Ðnggoff, 455 !.S. l303 íl982¹
íIronnnn, J., In chnmbors¹ nnd !omnn v. SIncock, 3?? !.S. 695 íl964¹¹. In fncf, fho
Suµromo Courf Cnso SoIocfIons Acf wns nmondod In l988, sIx yonrs nffor Knrchor
nnd fwonfy four yonrs nffor !omnn, fo nchIovo fho oµµosIfo rosuIf. Soo 28 !.S.C. §
l254 ícommonfnry¹ ínoting rejection of “tho µromIso of oId subdIvIsIon í2¹ . . . fhnf n
federal court’s invalidation of a state law was suspect and should therefore be
guaranteed access to the highest court in the land for a final determination”).

36

Moroovor, fho cnsos cIfod fo by AµµIIcnnfs do nof suµµorf fhoIr cInIm fhnf
such n µoIIcy oxIsfs. In Knrchor, JusfIco Ironnnn found fhnf corfIornrI wouId IIkoIy
bo grnnfod, nof bocnuso n sfnfo sfnfufo wns nf Issuo, buf rnfhor bocnuso fhoro wns
confusIon In fho fhroo·judgo courf boIow ns fo fho IognI fosf fhnf shouId bo nµµIIod
fo rodIsfrIcfIng Inws bnsod on n µrIor Suµromo Courf docIsIon nnd Ifs µrogony. 455
!.S. nf l299·l300. !omnn Is n docIsIon on fho morIfs nnd doos nof IncIudo nny
dofnII rognrdIng fho µrIor ordor grnnfIng n sfny.
Moroovor, roconf docIsIons donyIng corfIornrI In cnsos whoro fodornI courfs
sfruck down sfnfo sfnfufos on fodornI consfIfufIonnI grounds boIIo fho oxIsfonco of
nny such nIIogod µoIIcy. Soo, o.g., Irowor v. ÐInz, 656 I.3d l008 í9fh CIr. 20l3¹
ínffIrmIng µroIImInnry InjuncfIon ngnInsf ArIzonn sfnfufo ns vIoInfIvo of fho IqunI
IrofocfIon CInuso¹, corf. donIod, l33 S. Cf. 2884· !nIfod Sfnfos v. AInbnmn, 69l
I.3d l269 íllfh CIr. 20l3¹ ínffIrmIng µroIImInnry InjuncfIon ngnInsf AInbnmn
sfnfufo ns µroomµfod by fodornI Inw¹, corf. donIod, l33. S. Cf. 2022. Thoso docIsIons
nro consIsfonf wIfh Suµromo Courf !uIo l0, whIch mnkos no monfIon of whofhor n
cnso InvoIvos n fodornI courf sfrIkIng down n sfnfo Inw on fodornI consfIfufIonnI
grounds ns n roIovnnf consIdornfIon In grnnfIng corfIornrI.
AµµIIcnnfs nIso suggosf fhnf n grnnf of corfIornrI Is IIkoIy bocnuso, fhoy
nssorf, n fnvornbIo docIsIon for !osµondonfs on nµµonI wouId cronfo n cIrcuIf sµIIf
due to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in CIfIzons for IqunI IrofocfIon v. IrunIng, 455
I.3d 859 í8fh CIr. 2006¹. Iuf fho µInInfIffs In IrunIng broughf dIfforonf cInIms
fhnn fhoso nf Issuo horo. In IrunIng, fho µInInfIffs nrguod onIy fhnf Þobrnskn Inw

3?

constituted an unlawful bill of attainder and raised “an insurmountable political
bnrrIor fo snmo·sex couples obtaining” the benefits of marriage; plaintiffs expressly
did “nof nssorf n rIghf fo mnrrIngo or snmo·sex unions.” Id. nf 865. Indood, ns fho
lower court made abundantly clear, the court was “not asked to decide whether a
sfnfo hns fho rIghf fo dofIno mnrrIngo In fho confoxf of snmo·sox nnd oµµosIfo·sox
relationships.” CIfIzons for IqunI Irof., Inc. v. IrunIng, 368 I. Suµµ. 2d 980, 985
n.l íÐ. Þob. 2005¹· soo nIso Id. at 995 n.11 (“[T]he court need not decIdo whofhor
and to what extent Nebraska can define or limit the state’s statutory definition of
marriage.”).
The District Court’s decision is the first post·WIndsor fodornI courf docIsIon
fo sfrIko down n sfnfo mnrrIngo bnn. Tho consfIfufIonnI Issuos µrosonfod by fhIs
cnso µInInIy nro of gronf Imµorfnnco· howovor, curronfIy fhoro nro moro fhnn
fwonfy·fIvo sfnfo nnd fodornI InwsuIfs, In nf Ionsf fIffoon sfnfos, chnIIongIng sfnfo
Inws bnrrIng mnrrIngo by snmo·sox couµIos on fodornI consfIfufIonnI grounds.
9
Tho

9
SovcIk v. SnndovnI, Þo. l2·l?668 í9fh CIr., nµµonI fIIod Ocf. l8, 20l3¹, Þo. 2·l2·CV·005?8 íÐ.
Þov., fIIod Aµr. l0, 20l2¹· Jnckson v. AborcrombIo, Þos. l2·l6995, l2·l6998 í9fh CIr., nµµonI
dockofod Soµf. l0, 20l3¹, Þo. l·ll·CV·00?34 íÐ. Hnw., fIIod Ðoc. ?, 20ll¹· Iroomnn v. Inrkor, Þo.
4·l3·CV·03?55 íS.Ð. Tox., fIIod Ðoc. 26, 20l3¹· !nffn v. Offor, Þo. l·l3·CV·00482 íÐ. Idnho, fIIod
Þov. 8, 20l3¹· Ðo!oon v. Iorry, Þo. 5·l3·CV·00982 íW.Ð. Tox., fIIod Ocf. 28, 20l3¹· Tnnco v. HnsInm,
Þo. 3·l3·ll59 íM.Ð. Tonn., fIIod Ocf. 2l, 20l3¹· CoIgor v. KIfzhnbor, Þo. 6·l3·CV·0l834 íÐ. Or, fIIod
Ocf. l5, 20l3¹· InIIndIno v. Corboff, Þo. 2·l3·CV·0564l íI.Ð. In., fIIod Soµf. 26, 20l3¹· Irndncs v.
HnIoy, Þo. 3·l3·CV·0235l íÐ.S.C., fIIod Aug. 28, 20l3¹· HnrrIs v. McÐonnoII, Þo. 5·l3·CV·000??
íW.Ð. Vn., fIIod Aug. l, 20l3¹· Iourko v. Ioshonr, Þo. 3·l3·CV·00?50 íW.Ð. Ky., fIIod JuIy 26, 20l3¹·
OborgofoII v. KnsIch, Þo. l·l3·CV·0050l íS.Ð. OhIo, fIIod JuIy l9, 20l3¹· IosfIc v. McÐonnoII, Þo.
2·l3·CV·00395 íI.Ð. Vn., fIIod JuIy l8, 20l3¹· JornIgnn v. Crnno, Þo. 4·l3·CV·004l0 íI.Ð. Ark., fIIod
JuIy l8, 20l3¹· WhIfowood v. WoIf, Þo. l·l3·CV·0l86l íM.Ð. In., fIIod Juno 9, 20l3¹· IIshoµ v.
!nIfod Sfnfos, Þo. 4·04·CV·00848 íÞ.Ð. OkIn., fIIod Þov. 3, 2004¹· IIshor·Iorno v. SmIfh, Þo. l2·CV·
00589 íM.Ð.Þ.C., fIIod Juno l3, 20l2¹· ÐoIoor v. Snydor, Þo. l2·CV·l0285 íI.Ð. MIch., fIIod Jnn. 23,
20l2¹· Inssoff v. Snydor, Þo. 2·l2·CV·l0038 íI.Ð. MIch., fIIod Jnn. 5, 20l2¹· WrIghf v. Arknnsns, Þo.
60CV·l3·2662 íArk. CIr. Cf., fIIod JuIy l, 20l3¹· IrInkmnn v. !ong, Þo. 20l3·CV·325?2 íCoIo. ÐIsf.
Cf., fIIod Ocf. 30, 20l3¹· Ky. Equality Fed’n v. Beshear, Þo. l3·CI·0l0?4 íKy. CIr. Cf., fIIod Soµf. l0,
20l3¹· CommonwonIfh v. CInry, Þo. ll·C!·3329 íKy. CIr. Cf., mofIon for InvocnfIon of mnrIfnI
µrIvIIogo fIIod Juno 6, 20l3¹· ÐonnIdson & CuggonhoIm v. Monfnnn, Þo. IÐV·20l0·?02 íMonf. ÐIsf.

38

Courfs of AµµonIs, IncIudIng fho Tonfh CIrcuIf, hnvo nof yof hnd n chnnco fo
address these issues. Therefore, while it is certainly possible that the Court “could”
grnnf corfIornrI in this case, Applicants cannot show that it “very likely would” do
so. CoIomnn, 424 !.S. nf l304.
V. C!AÞTIÞC A STAY WO!!Ð CA!SI !ÞÐISI!TIÐ,
I!!IIA!AI!I HA!M TO SAMI·SIX CO!I!IS AÞÐ THII!
CHI!Ð!IÞ
As WIndsor affirmed, marriage is a status of “immense import.” 133 S. Ct. at
2692. In nddIfIon fo subjocfIng snmo·sox couµIos nnd fhoIr chIIdron fo µrofound
legal and economic vulnerability and harms, Utah’s oxcIusIonnry mnrrIngo Inws
sfIgmnfIzo fho roInfIonshIµs of snmo·sox couµIos ns InforIor nnd unoqunI. In
WIndsor, fho Courf ochood µrIncIµIos sof forfh In !ovIng, 388 !.S. l, forfy·sIx yonrs
onrIIor, fIndIng fhnf dIscrImInnfIon ngnInsf snmo·sex couples “demeans the couple,
whoso mornI nnd soxunI choIcos fho Constitution protects. . . .” 133 S.Ct. at 2694
ícIfIng !nwronco, 539 !.S. 558¹. Tho Courf mndo cIonr fhnf fho dIscrImInnfory
treatment “humiliates tens of thousands of children now boIng rnIsod by snmo·sox
couples” and that “the law in question makes it even more difficult for the children
fo undorsfnnd fho InfogrIfy nnd cIosonoss of fhoIr own fnmIIy nnd Ifs concord wIfh
other families in their community and in their daily lives.” Id. “In confrnsf fo fho
State’s speculative concerns, the harm experienced by same·sox couµIos In !fnh ns
a result of their inability to marry is undisputed.” Dist. Ct. 12/20 Order at 50.

Cf., fIIod JuIy 22, 20l0, nmondod comµInInf fIIod JuIy l5, 20l3¹· In ro MnrrIngo of J.I. nnd H.I., Þo.
ll·0024 íTox., nrguod Þov. 5, 20l3¹· Sfnfo v. ÞnyIor, Þo. ll·0ll4 íTox., nrguod Þov. 5, 20l3¹.


39

Cnsos ncross fho counfry hnvo nIrondy domonsfrnfod fhnf fho InnbIIIfy fo
mnrry, or hnvo nn oxIsfIng mnrrIngo rocognIzod by fho sfnfo, subjocfs gny nnd
IosbInn couµIos nof onIy fo cnfnsfroµhIc nnd µormnnonf hnrm, buf nIso fo fho
InfoIornbIo fhronf of such hnrm. A dIsfrIcf courf In IIIInoIs, for Insfnnco, grnnfod n
fomµorary restraining order to “medically critical plaintiffs” who, if not permitted to
marry immediately, would “be deprived of significant federal rights and
benefits.” !oo v. Orr, Þo. l3·cv·8?l9, 20l3 W! 64905??, nf *3 íÞ.Ð. III. Ðoc. l0,
20l3¹. The stay of the Northern District of California’s ruling in Iorry µondIng
nµµonI cosf CnIIfornIn couµIo Sfncoy Schuoff nnd !osIy Tnbondn·HnII fho
oµµorfunIfy fo Iogally marry before Lesly’s death just sIx dnys boforo fhIs Courf
issued its decision, leaving her partner’s status a widow in legal limbo. Soo Mnry
CnIInhnn, Judge Grants Legal Recognition to Sebastopol Women’s Marriage After
!ognI InffIo, Tho Iross Ðomocrnf, Soµfombor l8, 20l3,
hffµ·//www.µrossdomocrnf.com/nrfIcIo/20l309l8/nrfIcIos/l309l9524.
l0

In fhIs cnso, AµµoIIoos Knron Archor nnd Knfo CnII fnco n sImIInr fnfo If n
sfny Is Issuod µondIng rosoIufIon of fhIs nµµonI. If Is undIsµufod fhnf Knron CnII Is
sufforIng from n formInnI IIInoss fhnf mny vory woII µrovonf hor from survIvIng fho
Insfnnf nµµonI. ÐIsf. Cf. l2/20 Ordor nf 5·6. IorcIng snmo·sox couµIos nnd fhoIr

l0
Soo nIso OborgofoII v. WymysIo, Cnso Þo. l·l3·cv·50l, 20l3 W! 6?26688 íS.Ð. OhIo Ðoc. 23,
20l3¹ íhoIdIng fhnf IncorrocfIy cInssIfyIng µInInfIffs ns unmnrrIod on n donfh corfIfIcnfo wouId rosuIf
In sovoro nnd IrroµnrnbIo hnrm IncIudIng donInI of sfnfus ns survIvIng sµouso wIfh Ifs nffondnnf
bonofits and inability to comply with decedent’s final wishes); CrIogo v. OIIvor, Cnso Þo. з202·CV·
20l3·2?5?, ÐocInrnfory Judgmonf, InjuncfIon, nnd Ioromµfory WrIf of Mnndnmus, sIIµ. oµ. nf *4
íÞ.M. ÐIsf. Cf. Soµf. 3, 20l3¹ íhoIdIng donInI of rIghf fo mnrry consfIfufos IrroµnrnbIo hnrm nffor
formInnIIy III µInInfIff movod for fomµornry rosfrnInIng ordor nIIowIng hor fo mnrry hor µnrfnor
boforo dyIng¹· CrIogo v. OIIvor, Cnso Þo. з202·CV·20l3·2?5?, IInInfIffs !oµor nnd Þoumnn's
MofIon for Tomµornry !osfrnInIng Ordor íÞ.M. ÐIsf. Cf. Aug. 2l, 20l3¹ ídofnIIIng IrroµnrnbIo hnrms
snmo·sox couµIo wIfh formInnIIy III µnrfnor wouId suffor If unnbIo fo IognIIy mnrry In Þow MoxIco¹.

40

fnmIIIos fo wnIf nnd hoµo for fho bosf durIng fho µondoncy of fhIs nµµonI Imµosos nn
InfoIornbIo nnd dohumnnIzIng burdon fhnf no fnmIIy shouId hnvo fo onduro.
ll

COÞC!!SIOÞ
Ior fho forogoIng ronsons, fho AµµIIcnfIon shouId bo donIod.

!osµocffuIIy submIffod fhIs 3
rd
dny of Jnnunry, 20l4.



JAMIS I. MAC!IIY

CounsoI of !ocord for !osµondonfs


ll
AµµIIcnnfs nofo fhnf fho ÞInfh CIrcuIf In fho CnIIfornIn IroµosIfIon 8 IIfIgnfIon grnnfod n
sfny µondIng nµµonI. Yof ns soon ns fhIs Courf Issuod Ifs docIsIon In WIndsor, fho ÞInfh CIrcuIf
ImmodInfoIy IIffod Ifs sfny. Soo Iorry v. Irown, ?25 I.3d 968, 9?0 í9fh CIr. 20l3¹ (“The stay in the
above matter is dissolved effective immediately.”). In addition, courts that have consIdorod fhIs
Issuo sInco WIndsor hnvo rofusod fo sfny fhoIr ruIIngs or fo sfny Iowor courf ruIIngs nIIowIng snmo·
sox couµIos fo mnrry µondIng nµµonI. Soo, o.g., Cnrdon Sfnfo IqunIIfy v. Ðow, ?9 A.3d l036 íÞ.J.
20l3¹ íÞow Jorsoy Suµromo Courf ordor donyIng sfny¹· CrIogo v. OIIvor, Cnso Þo. з202·CV·20l3·
2?5?, ÐocInrnfory Judgmonf, InjuncfIon, nnd Ioromµfory WrIf of Mnndnmus, sIIµ. oµ. nf *2·*3 íÞ.M.
ÐIsf. Cf. Soµ. 3, 20l3¹ íordorIng counfy cIorks In IornnIIIIo nnd SnndovnI CounfIos fo bogIn IssuIng
mnrrIngos IIconsos fo qunIIfIod snmo·sex couples based on court’s determination that any exclusion of
fhoso couµIos from mnrrIngo wns unconsfIfufIonnI¹· Crny v. Orr, Þo. l·l3·CV·08449, 20l3 W!
63559l8 nf *6 íÞ.Ð. III. Ðoc. 5, 20l3¹ ígrnnfIng InjuncfIon µormIffIng n snmo·sox couµIo fo mnrry
before the effective date of recently enacted Illinois statute eliminating the state’s ban on marriage
by snmo·sox couµIos¹.

4l

CI!TIIICATI OI SI!VICI

I corfIfy fhnf n coµy of fhIs Momornndum In OµµosIfIon fo AµµIIcnfIon fo Sfny
Judgmonf IondIng AµµonI fo fho !nIfod Sfnfos CIrcuIf Courf of AµµonIs for fho
Tonfh CIrcuIf, nnd nccomµnnyIng AµµondIx, wns sonf vIn oIocfronIc mnII nnd
!nIfod Sfnfos mnII on Jnnunry 3, 20l4, fo·

IhIIIµ S. !off
µhIIIoff¸ufnh.gov
Sfnnford I. Iursor
sµursor¸ufnh.gov
!TAH ATTO!ÞIY CIÞI!A!
l60 Insf 300 Soufh, SIxfh IIoor
I.O. Iox l40856
SnIf !nko CIfy, !fnh 84ll4·0856

Monfo ÞoII Sfownrf
Sfownrf¸STM·!nw.com
CrnIg C. TnyIor
STIWA!T TAY!O! & MO!!IS I!!C
l2550 W. IxµIoror ÐrIvo, SuIfo l00
IoIso, Idnho 83?l3

CounsoI for AµµIIcnnfs
!nIµh Chnmnoss
rchnmnoss¸sIco.org
Ðnrcy Coddnrd
dgoddnrd¸sIco.org
SA!T !AKI CO!ÞTY ÐIST!ICT ATTO!ÞIYS
200l Soufh Sfnfo Sfroof, S3500
SnIf !nko CIfy, !fnh 84l90·l2l0

CounsoI for ShorrIo Swonson







JAMIS I. MAC!IIY

CounsoI of !ocord for !osµondonfs





Appendix

DECLARATION OF PEGGY A. TOMSIC
Counsel for Respondents

I, Peggy A. Tomsic, declare and state as follows:
1. I am an attorney with the Salt Lake City, Utah, law firm of Magleby &
Greenwood P.C. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar, and have
been since my admission in 1982. I am counsel of record for Respondents in the
underlying action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and have an application
pending before this United States Supreme Court. I make this Declaration on the
basis of my personal knowledge.
2. A true and accurate copy of the email from the Chief Deputy Clerk of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Doug Cressler, (“Chief
Deputy Clerk”), to counsel for Applicants and for Respondents, dated December 26,
2013, and proposing a five week briefing schedule, is attached as Exhibit “A.”
3. On December 27, 2013, I had a telephone conversation with
Applicants’ counsel, who requested that Applicants be given four weeks to prepare
their opening brief. I agreed to that request. Attached as Exhibit “B” is a true and
accurate copy of the briefing schedule ordered by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on December 30, 2013, consistent with what the
parties had proposed to the Chief Deputy Clerk.
App.1

4. A true and accurate copy of the Press Release from Derek Miller, Chief
of Staff for the Governor of Utah, dated December 24, 2013, is attached as Exhibit
“C.”
I hereby declare under penalty of perjury based on my personal knowledge
that the foregoing is true and accurate.
Dated this 3
rd
day of January, 2014.


PEGGY A. TOMSIC


App.2










Exhibit “A”
App.3
Redacted
App.4










Exhibit “B”
App.5
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
DEREK KITCHEN, individually, et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
GARY R. HERBERT, in his official
capacity as Governor of Utah, et al.,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
SHERRIE SWENSEN, in her official
capacity as Clerk of Salt Lake County,
Defendant.
No. 13-4178
(D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00217-RJS)
_________________________________
ORDER
_________________________________
This matter is before the court to set an expedited briefing schedule. The schedule
set here overrides the minute entry on the docket dated December 27, 2013.
The appellants’ opening brief and appendix shall be filed on or before January 27,
2014. In this regard we strongly encourage the parties to confer on the materials to
include in the appendix. See generally Fed. R. App. P. 30 and 10th Cir. R. 30.1.
The appellees’ response brief shall be filed on or before February 18, 2014. Any
reply brief shall be filed on or before February 25, 2014. Requests for extension of time
EALS
___ __
EEEEEE
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 30, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
Appellate Case: 13-4178 Document: 01019178943 Date Filed: 12/30/2013 Page: 1
App.6
2
are very strongly discouraged, and will be considered only under extraordinary
circumstances.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
Appellate Case: 13-4178 Document: 01019178943 Date Filed: 12/30/2013 Page: 2
App.7










Exhibit “C”
App.8

For Immediate Release
December 24, 2013



Governor's Office gives direction to state agencies on same sex
marriage issues

SALT LAKE CITY - (Dec. 24, 2013) The Governor's Office sent the following
email to Cabinet Members today in regards to issues stemming from the recent
federal court rulings on Amendment 3 to the Utah State Constitution:

Dear Cabinet,
Thanks to each of you for providing an analysis of the impacts to the
operations in your respective agencies based on the recent federal
district court ruling on same sex marriage. As indicated in your
responses, many agencies will experience minimal or no impact.

For those agencies that now face conflicting laws either in statute or
administrative rule, you should consult with the Assistant Attorney
Generals assigned to your agency on the best course to resolve those
conflicts. You should also advise your analyst in GOMB of the plans
for addressing the conflicting laws.

Where no conflicting laws exist you should conduct business in
compliance with the federal judge's ruling until such time that the current
district court decision is addressed by the 10th Circuit Court.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Derek B. Miller
Chief of Staff
Governor's Office
State of Utah
# # #
Contact: Nate McDonald
Public Information Officer
801.538.1509 desk
801.694.0294 cell
nmcdonald@utah.gov
App.9

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->