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Thornton - S Korean Delegation on DoD CTR - Dec 2005

Thornton - S Korean Delegation on DoD CTR - Dec 2005

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Published by: Chuck Thornton on Sep 10, 2009
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My Background

Cooperative Threat Reduction: U.S. Department of Defense Implementation
2001 – Present : University of Maryland Research Fellow; Ph.D. student 2001 – Present : Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Consultant, DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

Charles L. Thornton Center for International & Security Studies School of Public Policy, University of Maryland
Presentation to: South Korean Delegation Washington Seminar on Cooperative Threat Reduction Center for Strategic and International Studies 07 December 2005
Charles L. Thornton December 2002 1

1998 – 2001 : SAIC Program Management Support, Russian Nuclear Weapons Protection, Control, & Accounting, Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 1994 – 1998 : SAIC Policy & Program Management Support, FSU Nuclear Weapons & Fissile Material Security, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Charles L. Thornton December 2002 2

Origins of CTR Program Overview Implementation Process Major Accomplishments

Origins of CTR

Contact Information: clt@umd.edu [through 2006] clthornton@yahoo.com [permanent] PO Box 60428, Potomac, Maryland 20859 USA +1 301 332 7869 [mobile] +1 202 318 7795 [fax – private line]
Charles L. Thornton

The views and data expressed in this presentation are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my university, institute, company, or other affiliated organization. Moreover, the views and data expressed in this presentation should not be construed as official U.S. Government information or policy.
December 2002 3 Charles L. Thornton December 2002 4

End of Cold War
End of Cold War, December 1991 Former Soviet Union (FSU) held largest stocks of WMD in the world Soviet Premier Gorbachev requested assistance in dismantling nuclear weapons US-Soviet legacy of arms control “New” idea: cooperation through threat reduction assistance Donor-Client Psychology Russian pride Other FSU states more willing: distancing from Moscow

The Challenge: 1991 Nuclear & Chemical
ICBMs: 94 ICBM Launcher Pads: 54 Warheads:~225


ICBMs: 258 ICBM Launchers: 176 36 HBs: ~1,984 Warhead:


ICBMs: 1,340 SLBMs: 1,924 87 HBs: Warheads::~11,296

ICBMs: 115 ICBM Launchers: 104 HBs: 40 Warhead: ~1,462


SSBN Base ICBM Base (Silo) Mobile ICBM Base

Production Facilities Non deployed ICBMs Heavy Bombers

Major Destruction & Dismantlement Site Chemical Weapons & Support Facility

Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


CTR Legislation: Defining the Mission
It is in the National Security Interests of the United States: A) To facilitate on a priority basis the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor states; and B) To assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation. (Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, PL 102-228)

DoD CTR Program Objectives
1. Assist Russia in accelerating strategic arms reduction to Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START) levels. 2. Enhance safety, security, control, accounting, & centralization of nuclear weapons & fissile material in the former Soviet Union to prevent their proliferation & encourage their reduction. 3. Assist Ukraine & Kazakhstan to eliminate START limited systems & weapons of mass destruction infrastructure. 4. Assist the former Soviet Union to eliminate & prevent proliferation of biological & chemical weapons & associated capabilities. 5. Encourage military reductions & reform, & reduce proliferation threats in the former Soviet Union.

Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


Focus on the FSU
Initially concerned with four new countries: Russia Belarus Kazakhstan Ukraine Later added additional FSU countries: Uzbekistan; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Georgia; Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Moldova Recent expansion beyond FSU: Albania

Program Overview

Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


U.S. - Russia Overview of CTR Implementation
Emergency Response Defense Conversion Export Control [Transferred] Safety & Security Solid Propellant ICBMs/SLBMs SSBN/SLBM Launcher Elimination & Low Level Radioactive Waste Volume Reduction SOAE Emergency Response Equipment Arctic Nuclear Waste [Closed Out]

Eliminating Delivery Systems

Housing MC&A [Closed Out] R&D Foundation [Closed Out] Defense & Military Contacts SNF Disposition CW Neutralization Evaluation

ISTC [Transferred]

Liquid SLBM Elimination CW Production Facility Dismantlement

Nerpa Obninsk Nenoksa St. Petersburg Tver Yedrovo Latyshskaya Bryansk Revda

Dzerzhinsk Secha

Zvezdochka SevMash Severodvinsk Pavlovsky Posad Illino Dmitrovgrad Velikoe Ozero Novocheboksarsk Luch Pibanshur Perm Mulyanka Mayak Shchuch’ye Seversky Elektrostal Moshkovo Biysk Krasnoyarsk Uzhur Zheleznogorsk

Sergiev Posad Obolensk Surovatikha Votkinsk Zlatoust

BW Proliferation Prevention

Heavy Bomber Elimination

Rada Saratov Engels Volgograd

Nizhnaya Salda Tomsk Koltsovo (VECTOR) Bolshaya Tura Turinskaya


ICBM Elimination

Fissile Material Storage Facility Weapons Dismantlement Processing CW Destruction Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium

Bolshoi Kamen

Zvezda Yuzhnorechensk

Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Liquid Propellant Disposition ICBM Silo Elimination Assistance December

Liquid Propellant Trans.

Charles L. Thornton


Liquid Propellant Trans.

• Rail Cars • Supercontainers • Movements


Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


ICBM and Silo Elimination

Bomber and ALCM Elimination

Silo Blown

Silo Site Restoration

Missile Removed

Missile Destroyed Missile Dismantled Propellant Eliminated
13 14

Charles L. Thornton

December 2002

Charles L. Thornton

December 2002

SSBN and SLBM Elimination

Nuclear Warhead Security and Elimination
Emergency Response Equipment Armored Blankets Center for Technological Diagnostics

LLRW Storage Reactor Disposition & Sub Decontamination

Nuclear Weapons Transportation & Railcar

Submarine Eliminated Infrastructure/ Equipment

Weapons Storage Security

Shipyard Preparation Launch Tubes Removed

Missile Removed
Fissile Material Container

Security Systems at Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites Inventory Management


Guard Force Upgrades


Fissile Material Storage Facility
PRP Systems

Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


Nuclear Testing Infrastructure Elimination

Implementation Process
Closed and sealed 181 test tunnels and 13 test holes (Kazakhstan)

Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


DoD CTR Implementation Process
Agreement Between USA and
ARTICLE XXV 1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, shall remain in force for 15 days unless superseded earlier by as subsequent agreement to purchase equipment and services for the purposes of eliminating silo ICBMs. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty shall be extended for a period of five years. Upon expiration of the five years, the Treaty shall be subject to review and extension for successive five year periods in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five year period of extension unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement on the elimination of silo ICBMs.

Legislative Requirements
Presidential certification or waiver each fiscal year Secretary of Defense notification to Congress 15 days prior to obligation of funds Activities and forms of assistance Amount of proposed obligation Involvement of any government department or agency or private sector firm Prohibitions Defense conversion Environmental restoration

A - SCHEDULE The Contractor shall deliver the following goods or services in accordance with the Statement of Work (Section J, Attachment #1) and the contract provisions within 90 days of sward. This contract includes the following goods and services:

Diplomatic Instruments

Contractual Agreements


Silo dismantlement construction services for elimination of the Kyrgyz site


Silo dismantlement construction services for elimination of the Zhjakev site.


Scrap salvage of usable material designated by COTR for salvage at the Kyrgyz site


Scrap salvage of usable material designated by the COTR for salvage at the Zhjakev site

2. A standing body, the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, shall periodically review the viability of this treaty in light of changing circumstances. Said review shall occur not less than five years after entry into force and every five years thereafter. .



All work called for under this contract shall be performed at the silo ICBM sites designated and within the Republic

Umbrella Agreements Implementing Agreements Requirements Definition Contracting Process


Execution/ Delivery Audits & Examinations


Conventional weapons Reports Annual report Summary of spending
19 Charles L. Thornton December 2002 20


Appropriation Certification





Charles L. Thornton

December 2002

International Agreements
Government-to-Government Agreements (Umbrella) Provide equipment, services and training to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and etc. Exemptions from taxes, customs fees, liabilities (including third party) Provide for privileges and immunities Facilitate monitoring intended use Apply U.S. contracting laws and regulations Executive agent designation Implementing Agreements Define scope of assistance Identify responsibilities Administrative Arrangements-Provide guidelines for: Audits and examinations Access for contract inspections and acceptance
Charles L. Thornton December 2002 21 Charles L. Thornton

Acquisition/Work Process
US Integrating Contractors “Stable” of experienced, capable American firms Rissian/FSU firms are sub-contractors: allows for greater flexibility and closer monitoring Direct contracting with Russian/FSU firms Often faster, cheaper More difficult to monitor; higher risk Pay for completed goods and services No funding up front

December 2002


Adjustments in CTR Focus
CTR expanding its strategic focus to support war on terrorism Biological Weapons proliferation prevention WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative Interagency review of assistance CTR role in combating WMD recognized; rationalized with US Department of Energy Acceleration of CTR chemical weapon destruction programs directed Cancelled activities not directly contributing to threat reduction/proliferation prevention Transferring more responsibility to the Russian Federation CTR legislation removed geographic restrictions

Adjustments in CTR Focus (continued)
New approach to Russian conduct Lack of commitment to BWC/CWC obligations led to non certification Waiver authority sought/exercised Global Partnership Providing lessons learned/coordinating to avoid duplication Adjusted CTR objectives and improved risk mitigation processes Recognized importance of transparency and standards of conduct Institutionalized executive reviews Phased contracts

Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


Significant Achievements
Reduction in nuclear weapon states Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine Promise of CTR assistance was instrumental Transformation of security relationships

Major Accomplishments

From treaty-based to cooperation-based Physical cooperation and relationships Treaties adversarial; virtual relationships through deterrence CTR is process of cooperation; daily interaction among military officers, government officials, and business representatives

Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


CTR Scorecard
CTR Baseline
13300 1473 831 442 233 906 728 936 48 194

7792 766 485 139 155 906 472 609 32 194

Current Cumulative Reductions

8567 1140 485 355 155 906 572 669 32 194

DoD’s focus as been on weapons and their delivery systems Importance of treaty requirements The implementation of CTR has undergone many evolutions As a new type of program, initially difficult to get underway Trial and error have taught many lessons “Scorecard” only tells part of the story Process of implementation may be most important achievement

Warheads Deactivated ICBMs Destroyed ICBM Silos Eliminated ICBM Mobile Launchers Destroyed Bombers Eliminated Nuclear ASMs Destroyed SLBM Launchers Eliminated SLBMs Eliminated SSBNs Destroyed Nuclear Test Tunnels/Holes Sealed

6809 598 485 45 152 829 436 561 28 194

Current numbers as of 04 November 2005; projections as of 31 Dec 2004
Charles L. Thornton December 2002 27 Charles L. Thornton December 2002 28


Charles L. Thornton

December 2002


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