Family
Relation
Compliled Case Digest
Bautista, Bryan, Bautista, Paulo, Bilas, Gelliane Christine, Bogbog, Aleli,
Bolide, Rouelli Gift, Corres, Kaiser John, De Guzman, Mageryl Shay, Diaz,
Charina, Donggayao, Bryan Christopher Gironella, Jsa Noble, Mabitazan,
Tedd, Macarimpas, Raihanah Sarah, Narag, Janro, Reyes, Jareed, Rosario,
Keouh, Savellano, Michael Nio Jesus, Solda, Ace Aries
Case Title
EFFECTIVITY
Lara v. Del Rosario
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
Tanada v. Tuvera
Philippines International Trading Corp. v. Angeles
National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga
Basa v. Mercado
Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives
Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission
COMPUTATION OF TIME
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown
People v. Del Rosario
G.R./SCRA No.
94 Phil 778
136 SCRA 27
G.R.
108461
No.
G.R.
158761
No.
G.R.
LNo.
42226
G.R.
192717
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
162155
L-7234
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
137873
168445
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales
Laureno v. Court of Appeals
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee v. V.P.
Eusebio Construction Inc.
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals
Bernabe v. Alejo
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders
of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.
Montanez v. Cipriano
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
Guy v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
L55960
114776
140047
112193
140500
181556
181089
188056
163707
1
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
187521
129295
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
162215
5
138823
G.R.
No.
165835
STARE DECISIS
Ting v. Velez-Ting
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
166562
110398
G.R.
No.
141600
OBITER DICTUM
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals
Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development
Corporation
DURA LEX SED LEX
People v. Veneracion
CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
142947
146486
134284
L55960
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L30642
G.R.
No.
L24170
G.R.
No.
124371
112170
INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION
Miciano v. Brimo
G.R.
No.
L22595
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L16749
L23768
L27860
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L68470
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
132344
17
RENVOI
Aznar v. Garcia
Bellis v. Bellis
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, WILLS
Van Dorn v. Romillo
Bank of America NT and SA v. American Realty Co.
133876
156841
164703
180764
184315
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
116100
156168
G.R.
No.
154259
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
165842
167546
G.R.
No.
L17396
G.R.
No.
L14628
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L17248
97336
L20089
143130
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Shinryo Company Inc. v. RRN Inc.
Car Cool Philippines v. USHIO Realty and Development
Corporation
Elegir v. Philippine Airlines
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
172525
138088
181995
G.R.
No.
L56168
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals
Padalhin v. Lavina
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
120706
183026
G.R.
No.
125704
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
107152
150758
177751
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
102007
133978
108395
G.R.
No.
150256
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
130362
L45404
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
141309
119398
182976
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
48006
165732
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
City of Pasig v. COMELEC
Beltran v. People
Merced v. Diez
Donato v. Luna
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY
Geluz v. Court of Appeals
RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO
ACT
Catalan v. Basa
Domingo v. Court of Appeals
Mendezona v. Ozamis
Oposa v. Factoran Jr.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
165732
125646
L15315
L53642
150758
2 SCRA 801
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
159657
127540
143370
101083
KINDS OF DOMICILE
Marcos v. COMELEC
G.R.
No.
119976
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
112193
140500
Ancheta v. Ancheta
Abadilla v. Tabiliran
145370
MTJ92-716
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
155733
85140
83598
LEGAL CAPACITY
Silverio v. Republic
Republic v. Cagandahan
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
174689
166676
A.M.
No.
Aranes v. Occiano
A.M.
No.
MTJ991211
MTJ021390
MARRIAGE LICENSE
Alcantara v. Alcantara
Republic v. Court of Appeals
Carino v. Carino
Sy v. Court of Appeals
Sevilla v. Cardenas
Abbas v. Abbas
G.R.
167746
No.
477 SCRA 277
G.R.
132529
No.
330 SCRA 550
G.R.
167684
No.
G.R.
183896
No.
A.M.
No.
MTJ001329
6
Ninal v. Badayog
Cosca v.Palaypayon
G.R.
No.
A.M.
No.
133778
MTJ92-721
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
Morigo v. People
G.R.
No.
145226
A.M.
No.
A.M.
No.
MTJ94-963
MTJ96-963
G.R.
No.
135216
THREE-FOLD LIABILITY
Moreno v. Bernabe
Navarro v. Domagtoy
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals
FOREIGN DIVORCE
Republic v. Iyoy
Republic v. Obrecido III
Van Dorn v. Romillo
San Luis v. San Luis
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
Garcia-Recio v. Recio
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
152577
154380
L68470
133743
186571
138322
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
Atienza v. Brillantes
A.M.
No.
MTJ92706
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
A.C.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
183622
124862
150758
164435
6148
L53703
181089
7
No.
VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES
Republic v. Nolasco
Republic v. Court of Appeals
Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals
Manuel v. People of the Philippines
Republic v. Bermudes
Calisterio v. Calisterio
Republic v. Granada
G.R.
94053
No.
477 SCRA 277
G.R.
111717
No.
G.R.
165842
No.
G.R.
160258
No.
G.R.
136467
No.
G.R.
187512
No.
G.R.
No.
A.M.
No.
108481
8
MTJ92706
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
119190
112019
126010
184063
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
108763
130087
157610
136490
161793
170729
178741
Aurelio v. Aurelio
Republic v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
175367
159594
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
170022
157649
168796
167459
185286
165321
168796
164493
170925
174451
164817
165424
147824
141917
162368
155800
158896
167206
127358
149498
9
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
151867
109975
136921
G.R.
No.
141528
G.R.
No.
112597
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
169766
173614
167109
133778
179922
158298
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
A.M.
No.
155409
139676
137590
116607
RTJ-041861
G.R.
No.
L53880
G.R.
No.
G.R.
138509
127406
10
No.
EFFECTS
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes
Dino v. Dino
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
122749
178044
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
132955
L27930
47101
G.R.
No.
A.C.
No.
G.R.
No.
132955
6148
L-3561
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
174451
132955
L12790
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
15320
79284
82606
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
96602
L10033
L-3047
L13553
L11
People v. Schneckenburger
People v. Sensano
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
11766
48183
37720
G.R.
No.
1056
G.R.
No.
L13553
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L10699
L13553
L29138
DEFENSES, COLLUSION
De Ocampo v. Florenciano
DEFENSES, PRESCRIPTION
Brown v. Yambao
De Ocampo v. Florenciano
Contreras v. Macaraig
ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, PROCEDURE
Banez v. Banez
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
132592
L30977
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L-9667
L34132
L53880
G.R.
No.
L53880
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
106169
115640
L30977
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L18008
169900
12
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
129295
114791
17014
139789
11263
L-7231
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
146683
L28771
12707
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
153788
143286
187023
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
124642
120594
G.R.
No.
149615
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
187490
169584
G.R.
No.
188305
13
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
157537
170166
169900
165803
178902
G.R.
No.
163744
G.R.
No.
176556
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
178044
L45870
132529
122749
127358
155409
159521
152716
Juaniza v. Jose
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
132529
137650
151967
154645
150611
L5012714
28
Adriano v. Court of Appeals
COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS
Guerrero v. Regional Trial Court
SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY
Hiyas v. Acuna
Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court
Vda. De Manalo v. Court of Appeals
Santos v. Court of Appeals
PROHIBITED COMPROMISE
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals
FAMILY HOME
Trinidad-Ramos v. Pangilinan
Modequillo v. Breva
Josef v. Santos
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Product, Inc.
Gomez v. Sta. Ines
Manacop v. Court of Appeals
Taneo v. Court of Appeals
Fortaleza v. Lapitan
G.R.
No.
124118
185920
86355
165060
172263
132537
97898
108532
178288
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
108532
143256
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
123450
153798
L49162
138493
15
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
138961
142877
G.R.
No.
125901
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals
Eceta v. Eceta
Alberto v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
124814
157037
86639
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
Rivero v. Court of Appeals
People v. Bayani
People vs. Manahan
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
141273
120894
128157
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY
Nepomuceno v. Lopez
Rivera vs. Heirs of Villanueva
Cruz v. Cristobal
Perla v. Baring
G.R.
181258
No.
496 SCRA 135
G.R.
140422
No.
G.R.
172471
No.
G.R.
125901
No.
460 SCRA 315
460 SCRA 197
G.R.
144656
No.
G.R.
171713
No.
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
Guy v. Court of Appeals
Marquino v. Itermediate Appelaye Court
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
163707
72078
16
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor
G.R.
No.
174680
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
156343
133054
159785
129248
122906
111455
114742
111180
G.R.
105619
No.
249 SCRA 448
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
100835
94147
95551
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
A.M.
No.
168992
164948
105308
RTJ-961362
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
117209
103695
148311
17
No.
G.R.
No.
L18753
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
Lahom v. Sibulo
G.R.
No.
143989
G.R.
No.
131286
SUPPORT
Lam v. Chua
WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
Briones v. Miguel
Quimiging v. Icao
Francisco v. Zandueta
Santero v. Court of Appeals
Gotardo v. Buling
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
156343
L26795
43794
L61700
165166
WHEN DEMANDABLE
Lacson v Lacson
G.R.
No.
150644
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
163209
159785
125041
156013
G.R.
No.
150644
G.R.
No.
118671
G.R.
No.
L48219
G.R.
No.
114742
18
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
122906
133323
140817
116773
111876
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
174485
154994
113054
124724
111180
115640
118870
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
70890
85044
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
184202
182353
143363
L47745
L70458
84698
19
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
169202
94986
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
People v. Estrada
Ursua v. Court of Appeals
148311
159966
L51201
164368
112170
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
189476
118387
159966
174689
166676
181174
EFFECTIVITY
LARA vs. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-6339
April 20,
1954
Facts:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi
cabs or cars, operated a taxi business under the name of Waval Taxi. He
20
21
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
LORENZO M. TAADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24,
1985
Facts:
Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public
officials to publish and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this
case has no legal personality or standing. Further, they argued that the
publication in the Official Gazette in necessary for the effectivity of the law
where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.
Issue:
Whether or not the presidential decrees in question which contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect still need to be
published in the Official Gazette.
Ruling:
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where
the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the
date of publication is material for determining the date of the effectivity
which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Article 2
does not prevent the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all
presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on
the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The
Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
22
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs.HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES
G.R. No. 108641
October
21, 1996
Facts:
PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which
applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic of China
must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of
Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing
products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with
the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in
which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being
unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and
approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations
pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on
February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of
the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order;
nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the
New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all
statues including those of local application and private laws shall be
published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under
consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity since it is punitive in character.
23
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO
B. GONZAGA
G.R. No. 158761
December 4, 2007
Facts:
On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for membership in the Board of Directors of
Zamboanga Del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO).
Later that day, the screening committee resolved to disqualify respondent
because his spouse was an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election
Code (ECEC), promulgated by petitioner National Electrification
Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse occupies an elective
government position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited to run as
director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECOs by-laws, however, do not
provide for such ground for disqualification. Respondent averred that the
ECEC was null and void because it had not been published. NEA, on the
other hand, failed to prove whether the ECEC was indeed published in a
newspaper of general circulation as required by the New Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue:
24
Whether or not Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void
for not complying with the publication requirement.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Electric Cooperative Election Code was
null and void for not complying with the publication requirement. It
observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of filing
the code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no
proof of publication neither in the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of
general circulation. Without compliance with the requirement of
publication, the rules and regulations contained in the ECEC cannot be
enforced and implemented. Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that
laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose
is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere
internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to
subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO
G.R. No. L-42226
26, 1935
July
Facts:
Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and
probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge
also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him
the only heir, and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et
al., filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked
jurisdiction because there was failure to comply with the requirements as to
the publication of the notice of hearing.
They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days
after the date of first publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, the
25
Ing Katipunan where the notice was published was not a newspaper of
general circulation as contemplated by law.
Issues:
a) Whether
or
not
there
was
compliance
with
the
publication requirement
b) Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation
Ruling:
The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does
not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three
full weeks before the date set for the hearing of the will. In other words, the
first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day
appointed for the hearing.
The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general
circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of
local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list
of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the
trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely
because it was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC. vs. ENERGY REGULATROY COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192117
September 18, 2012
26
Facts:
Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon I Electric
Cooperative, Inc., Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Pampanga Rural
Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. are rural electric cooperatives established
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269 or the National Electrification
Administration Decree. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are
members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc.
PRESCO is a member of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives
Association, Inc. Petitioners are engaged in the distribution of . On 8
December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 was enacted. The law imposed a limit on the
recoverable rate of system lossthat may be charged by rural electric
cooperatives to their consumers. The Implementing Rules and Regulations
of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative to file with the
Energy Regulatory Board on or before 30 September 1995, an application
for approval of an amended PPA Clause incorporating the cap on the
recoverable rate of system loss to be included in its schedule of rates. On 8
June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the
Energy Regulatory Commission. The powers and functions of the ERB not
inconsistent with the provisions of the EPIRA were transferred to the ERC,
together with the applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment,
property and personnel of the ERB. All electric cooperatives were directed
to implement the PPA in the manner the then Energy Regulatory Board had
prescribed. Subsequently, the ERC issued policy guidelines on the treatment
of discounts extended by power suppliers. Petitioners attack the validity of
the 22 March 2006 Order, 16 February 2007 Order, 7 December 2005
Order, and 27 March 2006 Order of the ERC directing the refund of overrecoveries for having been issued pursuant to ineffective and invalid policy
guidelines. Petitioners assert that the policy guidelines on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of
publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their retroactive
application.
Issue:
Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of
publication, non-submission to the University of the Philippines (U.P.) Law
Center, and their retroactive application.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that publication is a basic postulate of
procedural due process. Article 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section
1 of Executive Order No. 200, states that "laws shall take effect after fifteen
27
28
COMPUTATION OF TIME
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN
PROPERTY GROUP, INC.
G.R. No. 162155
August
28, 2007
Facts:
On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final
adjusted return. On March 11, 1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown
Property Group. Inc., filed for the refund or tax credit of income tax paid in
1997. However, it was not acted upon. Thus Primetown filed a petition for
review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed
beyond the two-year reglementary period provided by section 229 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. The Court of Tax Appeals further argued
that in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson the Supreme Court ruled that a
year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap
year.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents petition was filed within the two-year
reglementary period.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the twoyear reglementary period because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that
provides that a year is composed of 365 years is repealed by Executive
Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under Executive
Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
29
COMPUTATION OF TIME
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-7234
May 21, 1955
Facts:
On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical
injuries. The information was filed on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused
filed a motion to quash the information to ground that the offense charged
had already prescribed in accordance with Article 90 and 91 of the Revised
Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the
case. Thus, this appeal of dismissal is made directly to the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had
already prescribed.
Ruling:
The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the
Revised Penal Code does not provide the computation of month therefore it
must be supplied by Article 13 of the Civil Code which provides for the
computation of years, months, days and nights. According to Article 13 of
the Civil Code a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month.
Further, the Supreme Court held that the case took effect on May 28, 1953
after the New Civil Code take effect so the new provisions should apply.
30
31
Ruling:
No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the
Civil Code although she has already availed the benefits of the State
Insurance Fund. The respondents case is an exception because private
respondent was not aware of petitioners negligence when she filed her
claim for benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant
of the facts, but of her rights as well. The decision of the court is affirmed.
32
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES
G.R. No. L-55960
24, 1988
November
Facts:
33
34
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 114776
2, 2000
February
Facts:
Menandro Laureano was employed with the Singapore Airlines
Limited on 1979. However because of the recession that hit the Airline
Industry sometime in 1982, Defendant Company initiated cost-cutting
measures such as terminating its A-300 pilots including the plaintiff.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed a case of illegal dismissal against defendant.
Laureano then cited Singapore Laws to his case since he was employed in
the Singapore Airlines Ltd.
Issue:
a) Whether or not Singaporean Laws shall be applied in this case.
b) Whether or not there was illegal dismissal on the part of Singapore
Airlines Ltd.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that foreign laws must be proved as fact in
order to employ them. The plaintiff was not able to prove the applicability of
the laws of Singapore that he cited to his case. Under the principle of
processual presumption, if foreign laws are not proved as facts it will be
presumed as the same as ours. Hence, Philippine Laws should apply.
Further, under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the
petitioners action for damages due to illegal dismissal has already
prescribed having been filed on January 8, 1987, or more than four (4) years
after the effective date has prescribed.
35
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE
CORPORATION vs. V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 140047
July
13, 2004
Facts:
On November 8, 1980, State Organization of Buildings, Ministry of
Housing, and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the
Institute of Physical TherapyMedical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in
Baghdad, Iraq, to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company, a firm duly
licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce.
On March 7, 1981, in behalf of Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada
Santos, 3-Plex International, Inc a local contractor engaged in construction
business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal. However since
it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, it
had to assign and transfer all its right to VPECI and entered into an
agreement that the execution of the project will be under their joint
management. To comply with the requirements of performance bond, 3-Plex
and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee with Philguarantee, a
government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for
qualified Filipino contractors to secure the performance of approved service
contracts abroad. Subsequently, letters of guarantee were issued by
Philguarantee to the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was
engaged to provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank, but it required a
similar counter-guarantee in its favor from the Philguarantee. The Surety
Bond was later amended to increase the amount of coverage and to change
the bank in whose favor the petitioner's guarantee was issued, from
Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait. SOB and the joint venture VPECI
and Ajyal executed the service contract for the construction of the
project. However, they were not able to start the project on schedule
because of that surety bond was also extended and the Advance Payment
Guarantee was extended three times more until it was cancelled
for reimbursement.
36
37
38
January
21, 2002
39
Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary,
Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981and was named
Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe died as well as his legitimate wife,
leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.
Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be
declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share
of Bernabes estate. Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint and said
that the death of the putative father had barred the action. Further, under
the law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an
opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the rights of Adrian are governed
under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to
be filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and
that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right.
Issue:
Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son.
Ruling:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still
a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new
code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children
are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for
the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation
of spurious children. Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision
was affirmed.
40
41
42
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted. Even the accused eventually secured a
declaration that his first marriage is a void ab initio, the first and second
marriage was subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Also, Art.
40 should be applied retroactively because it does not prejudice or impair
the right of anyone. The petition is thereby granted.
January 8,
Facts:
Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles,
Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded
through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check
payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for the return
of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for
syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of
Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State
Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all
cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the
DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Thereafter, the
petitioners directly went to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice
grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOES No 182. They further argued that
43
DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against
enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of DOJ Order No. 182 should cover only
future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being
investigated.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, laws shall have no
retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception
concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial
statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not
create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in
furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights.A
statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.
All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises
from procedural laws. Therefore DOJ Order No. 182 can be applied
retroactively in the cases the petitioners filed against Delos Angeles.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 163707
September 15, 2006
Facts:
On October 29, 1992, Sima Wei died in Makati City leaving an estate
valued 10 million more or less. His known heirs are his spouse Shirley Guy
with their children five children. On June 13, 1997, private respondents
Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their mother
Remedios filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional
Trial Court alleging that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of
44
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
45
March 14,
2012
Facts:
Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the construction of
the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan Development Project.
On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement
with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor,
equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the
said project called the East Bank Levee and Cut-Off Channel in accordance
with the specifications of the main contract. Pursuant to the Subcontract
Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which
the latter would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days
from receipt thereof.
The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should
include progress accomplishment of its completed works as approved by
FFCCI. Additionally, they agreed to conduct a joint measurement of the
completed works of HRCC together with the representative of DPWH and
consultants to arrive at a common quantity. Thereafter, HRCC commenced
the construction of the works pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement.
However, before the project was completed, HRCC pursuant to the
arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement filed with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission a complaint praying that FFCI pay the
overdue application plus legal interests they have not paid. FFCCI
maintained that HRCC failed to comply with the condition stated under the
Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the latters progress billings, i.e.
joint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was justified in
not paying the amount stated in HRCCs progress billings.
Issue:
Whether or not FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCCs
valuation of the completed works having waived its right to demand the
joint measurement requirement.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that FFCCI had waived its right to demand
for a joint measurement of HRCCs completed works under the Subcontract
Agreement. Further, on account of its failure to demand the joint
measurement of HRCCs completed works, had effectively waived its right
to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to HRCCs
submission of its monthly progress billings. Basically, the instant issue calls
for a determination as to which of the parties respective valuation of
accomplished works should be given credence. FFCCI claims that its
46
valuation should be upheld since the same was the result of a measurement
of the completed works conducted by it and the DPWH.
On the other hand, HRCC maintains that its valuation should be
upheld on account of FFCCIs failure to observe the joint measurement
requirement in ascertaining the extent of its completed works. FFCCI
admits that in all three instances where it paid HRCC for its progress
billings, it never required compliance with the aforequoted contractual
provision of a prior joint quantification. Such repeated omission may
reasonably be construed as a waiver by FFCCI of its contractual right to
require compliance of said condition and it is now too late in the day to so
impose it. Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides that rights may be
waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs. The tribunal cannot see any such violation in this
case.
47
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
PEOPLE vs. MORIAL
G.R. No. 129295
August
15, 2001
Facts:
Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted
of Robbery with Homicide. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo
Morial made an extrajudicial confession admitting to the crime. However,
later on, he recanted his confession saying that the police tortured him into
admitting the crime. On appeal, Morial moved to quash the extrajudicial
confession claiming that such confession was made without the assistance
of counsel given him by the police was not present during the whole
interrogation. He left to attend some personal matters while the
interrogation of Morial was still going on. However, said attorney claimed
that he was present when Morial signed the admission.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession can be used as evidence
against the accused.
Ruling:
The extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the accused. An
excused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start until the termination of such investigation.
An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the
lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until
the signing of the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
Section 2A of RA No 7438 requires that any person arrested, detained or
48
49
The SC affirmed the CA's reversal but ruled that the basis for the
reversal is EO 292 of the Administrative Code of 1987, a more recent law,
which provides that a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
Section 31 provides that a year shall be understood to be 12
calendar months. Both article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter the
computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to
365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar
months and the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a
manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, the
Supreme Court held that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods.
Using this, the petition was filed on the last day of the 24th month
from the day the taxpayer filed its final adjusted return.
50
109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for
the past 39 years.
On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain
lots at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National
Housing Authority (NHA) was named Administrator of the Bagong Barrio
Urban Bliss Project with the former to take possession, control (sic) and
disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition.
During the Census survey of the area, the structure built by the plaintiff was
assigned TAG No. 0063. After conducting studies of the area, the NHA
determined that the area where plaintiffs structure is located should be
classified as an area center (open space). The Area Center was determined
in compliance with the requirement to reserve 30% open space in all types
of residential development.
Plaintiff, together with Mr.& Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr.& Mrs. Rey
Pangilinan, through counsel, filed an appeal from the decision to designate
the area where the plaintiff and the two other spouses have erected
structures, as an Area Center. The said appeal was denied by the NHA. In a
letter, dated August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to
plaintiff recognizing the latter as a Censused Owner of a structure with TAG
No. 0063-04 which was identified for relocation.
51
Issue:
Whether or not the demolition or relocation of the petitioners
structure will violate the vested rights of the petitioner over the acquired
property under the social justice clause of the constitution.
Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the
property subject of this case on the ground that she had been in possession
of it for forty (40) years already. Thus, to order her relocation and the
demolition of her house will infringe the social justice clause guaranteed
under the Constitution.
P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the power to immediately take
possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the
power of demolition. Clearly, the NHA, by force of law, has the authority to
order the relocation of petitioner, and the demolition of her structure in
case of her refusal as this is the only way through which the NHA can
effectively carry out the implementation of P.D. No. 1315.
52
June
22, 2005
53
Facts:
This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife or retired Major General
Carlos F. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief in order issued by the
Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying the motion to quash or dismiss
Civil Case No. 0193. This is a suit for the forfeiture commenced by the
Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.
The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and
properties that the Garcias allegedly acquires and amassed. Then Republic
then filed the Sandiganbayan through the OMB a petition for forfeiture of
those alleged unlawfully acquires properties of the Garcias. The case was
docketed as civil case 0193(forfeiture I) and subsequently another case of
forfeiture involving the same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case
0196(forfeiture II). Thus the two cases were consolidated for convenience
and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but subsequent to the filing of
Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA
7080(plunder) and the case raffled to the second division of SB. The plunder
charge covered substantially the same properties identified in both
Forfeiture I and II.
Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the
Forfeiture I case, that the plunder case and the Forfeiture I case should be
consolidated in the second division of SB pursuan to R 8249. On May 20,
2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the
forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the criminal case of plunder.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for
forfeiture under RA 1379.
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings
pursuant to RA 1379. Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and civil in
nature. It is a divestiture of property without compensation in consequence
of an offense.
54
STARE DECISIS
TING vs. VELEZ-TING
G.R. No. 166562
2009
March 31,
Facts:
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen
filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the
time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC
gave credence to Dr. Onates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin
in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the
trial courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been realized
Ruling:
No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36,
it is logical and understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished
by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedent, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
highly advisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In
fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any
other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not
solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality
of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
55
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to
present professional and expert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root
cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity,
then such expert opinion should be presented and according, be weighed
by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted.
STARE DECISIS
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110398
November
7, 1997
Facts:
In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from
the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412,
74413 and 74414) for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to
Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were for Voyage No.
457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980.
The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule.
At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided
off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker
owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don
Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The
bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four
members of private respondents families were never found.
Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of
Ardita de la Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V.
Miranda, Jr., 16, and Elfreda de la Victoria, 26. In its answer, petitioner
admitted that private respondents purchased ticket numbers 74411, 74412,
74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in the passenger
manifest; and that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April
22, 1980 and sank that night after being rammed by the oil tanker
M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result of the collision, some of the
56
passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied that the
four relatives of private respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown
by the fact that their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further
averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the
crew of the M/T Tacloban City.
On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co.,
Inc. entered into a compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full
responsibility for the payment and satisfaction of all claims arising out of or
in connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC and the PNOC/STC
from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the trial
court to be binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private
respondents did not join in the agreement.
Issues:
a) Whether the members of private respondents families were actually
passengers of the Don Juan;
b) Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew
members of petitioner to be grossly negligent in the performance of
their duties, is binding in this case;
c) Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioners
liability; and
d) Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive,
unreasonable and unwarranted.
Ruling:
First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were
passengers of the M/V Don Juan was sufficiently proven by private
respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he purchased tickets
numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the
Makati office of petitioner for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which
was leaving Manila on April 22, 1980. This was corroborated by the
passenger manifest (Exh. E) On which the numbers of the tickets and the
names of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la Victoria appear.
Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to
exercise the extraordinary diligence required of it in the carriage of
passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on the
findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which
case was brought for the death of other passengers. In that case it was
found that although the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence
of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally
57
negligent as it found that the latters master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was
playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior
Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of
Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This Court found that
Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to
prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise
the abandoning of the ship.
Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages
notwithstanding the total loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first
impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the
exclusively real and hypothetic nature of maritime law if fault can be
attributed to the ship-owner.
Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case
applies, private respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14
each as moral damages because in the Mecenas case, the amount
of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas
couple. Under petitioners formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43,
857.14, while the De la Victoria spouses should receive P97, 714.28.
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OBITER DICTUM
VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142947
2002
March 19,
Facts:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto
Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed
that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said that
he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired
the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him.
Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant
hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia
prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys allegations and
she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she
showed 14 letters that shows Orlys affection and care towards her.
Issue:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is
untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his
marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case to be
dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of fear was not
concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a
reasonable and well-grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by
the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party. Orly
is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat
he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him
from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His
allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is
incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the
part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file an
action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely cohabited
with her after the marriage.
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OBITER DICTUM
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 146486
March 4,
2005
Facts:
The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is
exclusive. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies.
Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors,
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an
investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual
harassment against Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential
employees: James Alueta and Eden Kiamco and (3) oppression against all
employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB- Visayas
employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-finding
investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report
was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers which
initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for
purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by
the Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the
Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are
not removable through impeachment. On 18 December 2000, despite the
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62
OBITER DICTUM
AYALA CORPORATION vs. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134284
December
1, 2000
Facts:
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Issue:
Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala
Corporation.
Ruling:
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law
between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, they must be complied
with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of restrictions may
only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its
obligation, that is, for the payment of damages.
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65
CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS
YAO KEE vs. SY GONZALES
G.R. No. L-55960
24, 1988
November
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind
properties here in the Philippines.Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed
by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased
whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the
opposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying
the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been
proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties
moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in
accordance with Philippine laws.
Ruling:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of marriage, the existence
of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence.For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom and consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee
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April
30,
Facts:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex
Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working
at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of
government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to
take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant
to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation
Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex
for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued
because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.
Issue:
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Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time
sue.
Ruling:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for
benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a
civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil
courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the
WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then
they may have not availed of such a remedy. However, if in case theyll win
in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to
them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they
would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may
be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the
human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him.
As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.
April
Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA
No. 142, as amended by RA 6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate
the Use of Aliases by the RTC of Davao City which was affirmed by the CA.
Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of request
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to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger Oscar
Perez had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote
the name Oscar Perez when he was requested to sign. However, Loida
Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able to know through
Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter
to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be
accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC
as he reasserts his innocence.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the
ground that he was charged under the wrong law.
Ruling:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time
and again the SC has decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the
light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied.
Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the
statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.
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December
Facts:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time
and again the SC has decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the
light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied.
Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the
statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.
Issue:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the
high seas is valid on the contention that the seizure was affected outside
our territorial waters.
Ruling:
The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a
state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its
own territory but extending to the high seas. The Revised Penal Code leaves
no doubt as to its application and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its
jurisdiction while on Philippine ship.
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NATIONALITY/CITIZENSHIP THEORY
LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124371
23, 2000
November
Facts:
Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted
serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22,
1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen
on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945),
Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and
found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzos brother Ceferino. In
December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate
saying that the child was illegitimate, and the fathers name was left blank.
On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement,
dissolving their marital union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving
his authority to file a case of adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to
the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952.On
January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; after
which, they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo
executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children.
Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.
On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for
letters of administration over Lorenzos estate, contending that she was
Lorenzos surviving spouse.In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating
that Lorenzos divorce decree was void and inapplicable in
the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC
entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the
estate the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate
children. Paula was appointed as legal administrator of the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate
of Lorenzo Llorente.
Ruling:
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case
are governed by foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the for the renvoi
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doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents
domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the
domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determining the
validity of Lorenzos will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling
on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
November
Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the
estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a
scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for
which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil
Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern
his testamentary disposition.
Ruling:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that
Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must
not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testators
national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil
Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said
that it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine Island, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall
be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in
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RENVOI
AZNAR vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
31, 1963
January
Facts:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to
California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he
instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that
under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be
applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of
the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the
national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being
entitled to anything under California law.
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Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights of his heirs.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to
Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the
internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the
conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen
being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed.
The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.
RENVOI
BELLIS vs. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678
1967
June
6,
Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United
States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children,
by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and
three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing
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of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In
both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate
children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of
their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to
be applied.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the
successional rights of the illegitimate children.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their
legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there
are no legitimes.The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions,
with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed.
Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
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RENVOI
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ESCOLIN
G.R. No. L-27860
March 29, 1974
Facts:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA,
was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the moment of her death. With
respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made in
favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of
Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one
group contended that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group
contended that no renvoi was possible).
Issue:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter,
is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented
in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at
any other time).
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October 8, 1985
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were married in
Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they established their residence in the
Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982,
and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City,
stating that petitioners business in Ermita, Manila is their conjugal
property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business
and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is
barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The denial now is the subject of
the certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to
the alien spouse.
Ruling:
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
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29,
Facts:
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international
banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines. As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several
occasions granted three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans
to the following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation,
S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., all of
which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of
Panama and are foreign affiliates of private.
As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines
owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor executed
two real estate mortgages, dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over
its parcels of land including improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto.
Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.
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79
80
81
legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the
complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is
deleted.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
GF EQUITY, INC. vs. VALENZONA
G.R. No. 156841
June 30,
2005
Facts:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer, W. Steven
Uytengsu, hired Valenzona as head coach of the Alaska basketball team in
the PBA under a contract of employment. He was tasked to coach at all
practices and games scheduled for the Alaska team, coach exhibition
games, coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending every
event conducted, play-off games, etc.
He was also tasked to comply with all requirements respecting to the
conduct of its team and players, to implement. He also agreed to report
from time to time as fixed by the corporation in good physical condition,
give his best services, loyalty, to be neatly and fully attired in public and to
conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest standards of
honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship, and not to do anything
detrimental to the best interest of the corporation.
He also agreed to endorse the corporations products in commercial
advertising, promotions, will allow himself to be taken pictures with others
for still photographs, motion pictures or TV. For his services, he will be paid
P35, 000.00 monthly, net of taxes, provide him with a service vehicle and
gasoline allowance. The contract was for two (2) years starting January 1,
1988 to December 31, 1989, with the condition that if at any time during
the contract, the coach fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability
to coach the team, the contract can be terminated by the corporation.
(Paragraph 3)
Before signing the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who
pointed out that the contract was one-sided, but still, Valenzona acceded to
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the terms of the contract as he had trust and confidence in Uytengsu who
recommended him to GF Equity.
Alaska placed third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA Conference
in 1988, he was advised of the termination of his services by way of a letter
dated September 26, 1988, invoking their right as specified in paragraph 3
of the contract and to return the service vehicle no later than September
30, 1984. He will still be paid the balance of P75, 868.38 for his services.
Six (6) years after or on July 30, 1994, Valenzonas counsel demanded from
GF Equity payment of compensation arising from the
arbitrary and
unilateral termination of his employment. But GF Equity refused the claim.
Valenzona filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for breach of contract
with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness and to
the rights of the plaintiff by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the
contract without just cause and legal and factual basis. He prayed award
for damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost
of the suit. He challenged the condition in paragraph 3 as lacking the
elements of mutuality of a contract, a clear transgression of Art. 1308 of the
NCC and reliance thereon did not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary
dismissal.
GF Equity maintained that it merely exercised its right under the
contract to pre-terminate Valenzona due to incompetence, and that he was
guilty of laches, in any event, complaint should be instituted before a labor
arbiter. The trial court dismissed the complaint on June 28, 1997 and it
declared Valenzona as fully aware of the bargain. The CA reversed the
RTCs decision and ordered GF Equity to pay him damages. The CA
concluded that GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily terminating
Valenzonas employment, finding Valenzonas claim for damages as valid.
The court ordered GF Equity to pay compensatory damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CA concluded wrongly from established facts in a
manner violative of applicable laws and established jurisprudence.
Ruling:
83
May 4,
2010
Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana
Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing
inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry
manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an
Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
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85
86
In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran
vessels in the Philippines.
In that capacity as exclusive distributor,
petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding
Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with
contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for
which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable.
Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable
for the balance of petitioner Corderos commission from the sale of the first
SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which
AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship
agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998
until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral
damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
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January
Facts:
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy
Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the
Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from
that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria MacapagalArroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew
her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she
had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera
(Valera) to respondent Rosquetas position. Challenging such appointment,
Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction
against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of
Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance
challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the
implementation of the RTCs injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60
days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.
But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosquetas complaint, stating that
petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that
entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and
legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the
Bureaus centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTCs decision,
holding instead that petitioner Villanuevas refusal to comply with the
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preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for
Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in
damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction
order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539),
thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the
Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.
Ruling:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil
Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good
faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to
prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers
because of such abuse of right or duty.
But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice
that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know
that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be
obeyed, especially since the question of Valeras right to replace respondent
Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva
ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who
remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE
PUBLISHING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184315
November 25, 2009
Facts:
In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last
quarter of 1994, Chronicle Publishing Corporation ("Chronicle Publishing"
for brevity) published in the Manila Chronicle a series of defamatory
articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10 and 12,
1993 issues), he was imputed to be a "Marcos crony" or a "MarcosRomualdez crony," which term according to him is commonly used and
understood in Philippine media to describe an individual who was a
recipient of special and underserving favors from former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez due to special and extra-ordinary closeness to either or both,
and which favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and dishonorable
business activities.
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90
91
February 9,
Facts:
Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment
was erected. Said property was surrounded by other immovables owned by
petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses Santos. As an access to P. Burgos
Street from the subject property, there are two possible passageways. The
first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters
distant from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in
between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is
about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P.
Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less
than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in
length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the
first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along
the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and
even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no
longer a permanent access to the public street. Respondents then filed an
action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial court ordered
the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the public street
and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the
petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On
appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper?
Ruling:
No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to
the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong,
does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a
material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results
from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
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legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In
order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of
duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it.
In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal
injury. Contrary to the claim of respondents, petitioners could not be said to
have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of
abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should
have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to
the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is
a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by
law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence
their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very owner
may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to
any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private
respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that respondents had no
existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of
the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after
payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private
respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the
compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to
interfere in the exercise of said right. The proper exercise of a lawful right
cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act
may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One
may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the
means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in
the latters favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum
absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual
resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.
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94
95
February 28,
2005
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing
decision of the Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus,
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making the petitioners liable for damages through the abusive conduct of
petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages,
P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorneys fees.
Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko
Hotel lobby on October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr.
Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a party
at the penthouse where the hotels former managers birthday was being
celebrated. He consented and carried the latters present. At the party,
when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the
petitioners, approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough
to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman
accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.
Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not
in the manner he claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his
food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be intimate,
and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay
Bisayas claim that she invited him to the party.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lims conduct was abusive enough to make the
petitioners liable for damages caused to plaintiff.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might
have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within
the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was
from his confession that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very
close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of
defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party,
it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there
could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It
was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests
aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party
as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore,
we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code.
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November 29,
2005
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court
of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus
Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with
estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him
after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the
latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got
married through a civil wedding in BaguioCity without Gandaleras
knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the course of their marriage,
things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy
against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of
single in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not
know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first
marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him
sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years,
and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he
was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private
complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The
CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs decision.
Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary
reward for moral damages was affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of
law when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed
dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial
declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
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99
100
May 30,
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the
time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and
unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla
Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying
with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a
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Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances under which
defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion
than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the
fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of
his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was
a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs
not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio
school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of
her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even
from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his
love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home.
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than
that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having
illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily,
he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the
new Civil Code.
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plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day
of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four
thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory
damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages;
and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for
plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the
Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to
P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for
breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present
case thus the petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because
he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when
she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy." Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of
damages.
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bus and took them to the house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino
agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in said house, Maximino to pay
P5.00 daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements
for their wedding in Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that after making
these arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo remained in
Dagawan's house where they lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on
May 7, appellee and Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to
secure a marriage license but failed because Rodrigo did not have a
residence certificate, although both prospective contracting parties signed
the corresponding application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he going
to their hometown to get his residence certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado
Falls and never returned; that when appellee returned to their hometown
(Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him
away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory.
The Court of First Instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the
Court of Appeals considered her evidence unworthy of credence, and,
hence, absolved Maximino Quinit.
Issues:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages
due to the alleged breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the reason that mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong.In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body
not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral
damages made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.
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108
December
26, 1964
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise
of love, decided to get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On
Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be saying that he wants to
postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But
the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has
changed, that he is returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not
appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez
filed no answer and was declared in default.
Issue:
Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As
stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
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July
Facts:
Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up
together in Barangay Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective
parents resided. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers. One day,
Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get
the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for
employment. Upon arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there.
Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once inside, started
kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the
loss of her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her.
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant
sometime in June 1992. Ronald reassured her, again promising her
marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and his parents,
accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's
house and asked her parents for the hand of their daughter.The two families
agreed to have the wedding in January 1993 but Elsa's sister had gotten
married that year so they postponed it. Meanwhile, Elsa started living with
Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to be
born. Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature
baby which died after five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge
from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa should go back to her
parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal period.
During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house.
It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's
attitude towards the former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads
confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed Elsa that he no
longer wanted to get married to her. Petitioners succinctly contend they are
suing respondents not merely because Elsa became pregnant but because
Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her after their agreement had
already been much publicized in their town.
Issue:
Whether or not Ronald performs moral seduction.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by
Ronald, much less by his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the
evident conclusion is that the two became lovers before they engaged in any
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UNJUST ENRICHMENT
CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. v. USHIO Realty and Development
Corporation
G.R. NO. 138088
January 23, 2006
Facts:
On December 19, 2005, USHIO Realty and Development Corporation
filed an ejectment case against CAR COOL Philippines Inc., to recover the
possession of a parcel of land at Quezon Avenue. USHIO Realty contends
that despite several and repeated demands and notices from the former
owners of the land, spouses Lopez, and also from the new owners, USHIO
Realty, CAR COOL still failed to vacate the property. On December 3, 1995
USHIO Realty sent the final demand to CAR COOL, giving a non extendable
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15 days within which to vacate the property. CAR COOL refused to vacate
the property, hence the ejectment case.
The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered in the ejectment case in favor
of USHIO Realty. CAR COOL appealed to the Regional Trial Court which
rendered a decision affirming the decision of the MeTC. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification, granting
rentals to USHIO Realty.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by
way of rentals and attorneys fees in favor of USHIO Realty
Ruling:
USHIO Realty as the new owner of the property has a right to physical
possession of the said property. Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of
its property, CAR COOL should pay USHIO Realty rental as a reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Contrary to CAR
COOLs contention the payment of damages in the form of rentals for the
property does not constitute unjust enrichment.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
ELEGIR vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 181995
July 16, 2012
114
Facts:
Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL)
as a commercial pilot, specifically designated as HS748 Limited First
Officer, on March 16, 1971. In 1995, PAL embarked on a refleeting program
and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts. Subsequently, PAL
posts a bid for the opening of slots for the crew of the new aircrafts. Elegir
was one of those awarded with the opportunity.
Elegir, along with 7 other pilot, were sent for training in Seattle,
Washington, United States of America on May 8, 1995 for the necessary
training of his skills and knowledge to handle the new aircraft. He
completed his training on September 19, 1995. On November 5, 1996 after
rendering 25 years, 8 months, and 20 days of continuous service, the
petitioner applied for an optional retirement authorized under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline Pilots Association
of the Philippines (ALPAP). PAL asked him to reconsider his retirement in
that the company has yet to recover the cost of his training. In the event
that he finally decides to leave, PAL will deduct the unrecovered cost of his
training from his Retirement Pay. He decided to leave thereafter. Elegirs
counsel sent PAL a letter of correspondence stating that the cost of training
should not be deducted from his retirement pay.
Issue:
Whether or not PAL had the right to reimburse themselves from
Elegirs retirement pay the amount unrecovered from his training.
Ruling:
PAL had the right to be reimbursed. According to Article 22-23 of the
New Civil Code, they had the right to demand payment since Elegir will
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of PAL. Unjustly enriching is unduly
profiting ones self on something which does not meritoriously belong to
him, this is well enshrined in the Latin maxim, Nemo cum
alteriusdetrimentolocupletaripotest. Elgir has the right to retire since he
has reached a certain number of flight hours which is considered a long stay
in PAL, but his bid for the vacancy and his subsequent training sponsored by
PAL was put to waste when he decides to have an early retirement from PAL
after his training. It would be unfair for PAL if Elegir has gained new skills
for the service of PAL but then leave even after PAL has still not even
recovered the cost of training.
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Facts:
Carlos Telosa is a farmer and a fisherman. He had very limited
education. Telosa initiated a loan with the Rural Bank of Lucena with a
contract of mortgage. The mortgage covered a parcel of land measuring
50,000 square meters. Several months later the Rural Bank of Lucena
experienced financial distress. The Central Bank appraised Rural Bank of
Lucians shareholders. It was found out in its investigation that key officers
of the bank had certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound banking
practices which were prejudicial to the government, the public, and its
creditors.
Rural Bank of Lucena has then undergone liquidation. It had received
orders to turn its non-monetary assets into cash to satisfy claims. Among
one of the accounts it decides to liquidate was the Telosa account in the
amount of Php 5000.00. Rural Bank of Lucena sent for a demand letter
asking for the payment of the account. Carlos Telosa thought that he owes
the bank only Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00, so Telosa filed a protest on
the demand received. Meanwhile Carlos Telosa died in January 13, 1968.
The rural bank claiming that the payment was not fully paid petitioned the
foreclosure the Telosas land to satisfy the claim. The lot was then sold to
the highest bidder and was consequently registered in the Registry of Deeds
on September 11, 1972. Telosa now pray for the annulment of the land back
to them because they have already paid the loan of Php 300.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can intervene via parenspatriae for the
return of the Telosas land.
Ruling:
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The state can protect its citizens; it is a supreme power the state can
exercise at any time the rights of its citizen is being prejudiced. The bank
took advantage of the Telosas by making a document that was not the
contract that they have agreed upon. Needless to state in this regard the
particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous
transactions involving the officer of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The state
can intervene because there has been a preponderance of proof that the
loan only amounts to Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00. By virtue of the
power of the state the bank was ordered to return the land it extra judicially
settled.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120706
January 31, 2000
Facts:
Sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas are
living in an apartment being leased to them by Florence Bing Concepcion,
who also resides in the same compound where the apartment was located.
Nestor was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and
private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a
cash or credit basis. Bing joined the venture and contributed capital on the
condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit
earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion the
brother of the deceased husband of Bing accosted Nestor at the latters
apartment and accusing him of having adulterous relationship with Bing.
Rodrigo threatened that should something happen to Rodrigos sick mother,
in case the latter learned of the affair, he would kill Florence.
As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and
shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence
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118
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Facts:
Lavina and Nestor were both diplomats assigned in Kenya as
Ambassador and Consul General, respectively. In the course of their stay at
Kenya , the residence of Lavina was raided twice. Prior to the raids,
BienvenidoPasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in
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120
121
122
reasonable doubt. The parents of the Ruben Nicolas now seek for the
enforcement of civil liability against Manantan. Manantan argues that he
can be held no longer be civilly liable since he was acquitted of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not a suit for civil action for damages is barred by the
acquittal of an accused.
Ruling:
The answer at the case at bar is in the affirmative. The acquittal of
Manantan was due to reasonable doubts therefore civil action can prosper.
There exist two types of acquittal, the first is acquittal because the accused
was not the author of the crime or there is no crime while the second is the
acquittal due to reasonable doubts. In the former the criminal and civil
liability is extinguished while in the latter the criminal aspect is the only one
extinguished since civil liability merely requires preponderance of evidence.
The case prospers in pursuance of article 29 of the New Civil Code.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY BY ACUITTAL
NUGUID vs. NICDAO
G.R. No. 150785
September 15,
2006
Facts:
The accused, Clarita Nicdao is charged with fourteen counts of
violation of Batas PambansaBilang 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law. Sometime 1996 from April to August thereof, Clarita Nicdao
and her husband went to Emma Nuguid. The petitioner asked if they could
borrow money to settle some obligations. Due to their close relationship,
Nuguid lent the Nicdao spouses money.
Nuguid released the loan in installment of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos until the amount reached to an aggregate of One Million One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos. Nuguid, to show good faith in her part,
issued Hermosa Saving Bank open-dated check in the same amount as the
loan. The checks are to be deposited in Nuguids account upon non-payment
of the amount within one year. In June 1997, Nuguid, together with Samson
Ching, demanded payment of the loan but Nicdao refused to acknowledge
the indebtedness. Nuguid then decided to deposit the checks in her account
123
in Chings account since it was Ching whom Nuguid got the money to loan
to Nicdao. The checks were all dishonored because of it being drawn
against insufficient funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written notice of dishonor was sent to Nicdao. This was
to give them chance to make good on their loan as represented in the
checks. The notice was for naught. Hence, a complaint was brought against
Nicdao for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. In the Regional Trial
Court Nicdao was found guilty of and was sentenced to pay the principal
plus interest and suffer imprisonment of one year per bouncing check for a
total of 14 years. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision due to
substantial fact that was overlooked by the trial court. Nuguid now filed for
a petition to the Supreme Court raising the issue for civil liability.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the
acquittal of Nicdao of the violation of B.P. 22.
b) Whether or not interest is enforceable in the contract.
Ruling:
The civil liability was extinguished due to the findings of the Supreme
Court that Nicdao has already made overpayments of the amount due. The
acquittal was due to the reason that the crime was non-existent already
since payment were made over and above what was agreed upon. The
criminal and civil liability will not persist since there the checks were only
to be deposited upon non-compliance of the payment of the principal debt
Interest was being enforced by the Nuguid in the case. It was one of
the reasons why the debt of Nicdao was continually rising as payment are
applied first to interest. The interest was unconscionable. The Court ruled
that since the interest was not stipulated in writing, the debt remained in its
principal amount. The principal was actually paid in full already as per
Article 1956 of the Civil Code.
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January 7,
2013
Facts:
The victim, CesarioAgacer, was clearing and preparing the soil
bedding section of his farm in preparation for the rice seedlings intended
for the coming planting season. Genesis Delanter, his brother Andy, Rafael,
125
and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field harvesting the palay that
Cesario had raised.
Suddenly, Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, and Eric, all surnamed
Agacer, came out of the nearby banana plantation and went in the direction
of Cesario. The group of men then surrounded Cesario and intimidated him.
Cesario felt the hostilities and tried to get away. But the accused started fire
on Cesarios harvest which prompted Cesario to return for his burning
crops. While Cesario was trying to put the fire out, Florencio ordered to go
near Cesario. Eddie did what was told and pulled out a shotgun from the
rice sack that he was holding and shot Cesario on the left portion of his
chest. As Cesario fell, they fired then another shot inflicting mortal wounds
on Cesario. The gang of men then fled the scene. The Supreme Court
affirmed the guilt of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the brothers arose upon the final
judgment of the Supreme Court of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found them guilty and since the civil action for
damages was deemed instituted in the criminal action then their civil
liability has also been proven. According to Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Also
Article 20 of the Civil Code states that every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter
for the same. And the same is strengthened finally by Article 1161 of the
Civil Code which states that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses
shall be governed by the penal laws. Underlying this principle is that a
person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the
standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character; First, as an offense
against the state because of the disturbance of the social order, and second
as an offense against the private person injured by the crime.
126
September 2,
1994
Facts:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually
convicted on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay.
Pending appeal of his conviction the accused died. The findings of the
National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4, 1992.
The Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed
the criminal aspect of the appeal but then required the Solicitor General to
file its comment on Bayotas civil liability arising from the crime. In the
Solicitor Generals comment the civil liability hasnt yet expired. The
solicitor general based its judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego.
The counsel of the accused-appellant had a different view; where the death
occurred after final judgment the criminal and civil liability shall be
extinguished.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and
civil liability.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the
Supreme Court, the controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code. The provision states that death extinguishes the criminal aspect. In
the case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent civil action
against the accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered
as instituted in the criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with
the criminal case then it follows that the death dissolves both civil and
criminal liability.
The Solicitor Generals dependence on the Sendaydiego case was
misplaced. What was contemplated in the Sendaydiego case was the civil
liability arising from other sources of obligation other than delicts. It is
therefore safe to say that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and
civil liability arising from delict only.
127
November 12,
2002
Facts:
The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of
B.P. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One
of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it being deposited before 90 days
from the date written on the check. The other two cases of B.P. 22 were filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then
dismissed due to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime.
Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga. After failing to present its second witness, the
prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The prosecution reserved its right to
file a separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The court granted
the reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without
prejudice to the civil action. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the
instant case for the collection of the sum of money, seeking to recover the
amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Respondent then filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already
barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action
regardless of the dismissal of the criminal case of estafa.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The
reservation for civil action was made by the prosecution on time. According
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to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that civil
liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual.
The cause of action was the breach of the respondents breach of the
contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was seeking to make good
the value written on the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not
anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa
contractual. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case
filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the
criminal proceedings.
129
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based
on reasonable doubt, which means that the civil case for damages was not
barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi-delict. Even
if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the
acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the
acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on
reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that the judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist.
Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain
relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability
does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the
accused was acquitted.Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the
proceedings for the civil case of the said incident must continue for the
recovery of damages of the victims heirs. The case was remanded to the
trial court to determine the civil liability of the accused.
130
131
132
133
134
135
contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation
of malice or bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not an independent civil action under Article 32 of the
Civil Code would prosper against the petitioner.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner can be subject to a civil
action under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The general rule is that a public
officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the
just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned
tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of
the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic,
which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope
of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for
official actions. Under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability
may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part
of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil
liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence.
The decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which
prevails over a general law, the Administrative Code. A quasi-delict has
been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person,
property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil
liability in quasi-delict is determined by the conduct and not by the mental
state of the offender, and there are circumstances under which the motive
of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes
given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged
wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was
wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers
legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that
defendant acted without evil intent.
136
July 2,
Facts:
Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several
racehorses which he entered in the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to
137
September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates,
landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes
together with the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the
winnings were being withheld on the advice of Presidential Commission on
Good Government Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz.
The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O.
Carrascoso, offered to give back the winnings but it was refused by the
petitioner for the reason that the matter is already in court. The trial court
held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings since there
was no writ of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso
feared that if he did not withhold the winning he would be liable for neglect
of duty. Carrascoso maintained that bad faith did not attend his acts
therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso stated that he
returned the principal amount of the winning evidencing his good faith.
Petitioner begs to differ.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the violation of
his constitutional rights to due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in
accordance with Article 32 of the Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code
provides that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages, in this case the right against deprivation of
property without due process of law.
Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be
characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or
malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent
and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the properties of
petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not be liable by way
of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official
duties, the Court nevertheless states that bad faith is not necessary in
praying for damages in Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under the Article, it is
not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.To be
liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of
138
139
January
Facts:
Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal
fabrication under the name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing
Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter
Legaspi , Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect
Permanent Lights electric meter. Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an
employee of Permanent Light, proceeded to check the electric meter. Upon
inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the electric meter was
tampered and right there and then took down the meter. It was found out
that indeed the meter has been tampered with.
Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills. MERALCO installed
a new electric meter. The respondents alleged that the electric meter
registered unusually high readings. The petitioners are now requesting that
the old electric meter be re-installed since it shows a more accurate
reading. The respondents also pray for damages since the electric meter
was allegedly removed without following the required procedure. The RTC
ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision stating that the petitioner abused its rights when it
disconnected the electricity of Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the
issue of damages to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of
the constitutional rights of the respondent.
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Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to
exemplary damages for the violation of their constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of Republic Act 7832 which
provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board. MERALCO failed to show
evidence that there was an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that the
meter is tampered and they have no right to disconnect the electric meter.
Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity,
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 provides that even if flagrante delicto,
there must be still be a written notice or warning to the owner of the house
or the establishment concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court
awards exemplary damages to Permanent Light for the recompense of their
injured rights. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for awards of damages
in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against
deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)
BARREDO vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. 48006
July 8, 1942
Facts:
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a
horse-drawn carriage thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia.
Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their
right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After
the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo, the owner of the
taxi and the employer of Fontanilla. The suit was based on Article 1903 of
the civil code which provides that negligence of employers in the selection
of their employees can be civilly liable. Barredo assailed the suit arguing
that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should
have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
Issue:
Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed
by his employee.
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Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Barredo can be civilly liable. He is
primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He
reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious
because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his
sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent
in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had
multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him, something he failed
to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a
separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable.
Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act,
but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee under Article
1903.
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deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with
his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for
negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasidelicts.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It
ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised
care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no
sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's
evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and
seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that
supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions
designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of
their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such
regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC
143
144
suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely
interrelated/linked to the first.
A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial
jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. Primarily becauseterritorial jurisdiction is
an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such issue is
resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed
barangays would only be an exercise in futility.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 137567
June 20,
2000
Facts:
Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24
years of marriage and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for
nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the
other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and
his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case
on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their
marriage is a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under
psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of
concubinage.
Ruling:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two
conflicting issues. Its requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action and 2) the
resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will
proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the
criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a final
judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
competent courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
145
Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being
prosecuted for concubinage.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
MERCED vs. DIEZ
G.R. No. L-15315
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth
Ceasar alleging that he married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and
intimidation upon his persons by Elizabeths relatives. Elizabeth on the
other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been
previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the
suspension of the criminal case on grounds of prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial
question.
Ruling:
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the
subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid
marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. One of the
essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a
146
marriage would be illegal and void. Since the validity of the second
marriage is in question, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be
determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not
lie unless all the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a
civil action must first be secured.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
DONATO vs. LUNA
G.R. No. L-53642
April 15,
1988
Facts:
An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is
alleged that petitioner married Rosalindo Maluping on June 30, 1978, he
however married for the second time with Paz Abayan on September 26,
1978. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case
for the nullity of his second marriage is a prejudicial question.
Issue:
147
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758
February 18,
2004
Facts:
148
149
150
July 20,
1961
Facts:
Peitioner and Nita Villanueva were lovers. Before they were married
Nita got pregnant to which she had got an abortion from private respondent
Oscar Lazo. After Nitas marriage with plaintiff, she again became pregnant
but due to her work priorities, she again had again had abortion with the
same doctor. She had a third abortion done by the same. The plaintiff now
sues an award for damages against Doctor Oscar alleging that he did not
know of, nor gave his consent to the abortions. He is suing for damages for
the unborn child.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for damages can be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child.
Ruling:
No action for damages could be instituted in behalf of the unborn
child on account of the injuries it received; no such action could derivatively
accrue to its parents. No transmission of rights can take place from on due
to the lack of juridical personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code limits the
application of the presumptive civil personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive. However, moral damages
could be awarded for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the
fetus on account of distress and anguish attendant to is lost, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations. The records do not bear such
case. It is clear that the husband is only intent on recovering money from
the doctor.
July 31,
2007
Facts:
Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his
psychological incapacity of schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married
Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June 1951 he donated a parcel of
land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano was
declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes
sold the properties to herein respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as
Felicianos guardian filed an action or declaration of nullity od documents
and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the donation to
Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he
effected the donation, ipso facto, the sale to herein respondents are void ab
initio.
Issue:
Whether or not Felicianos donation is void for lack of consent due to
incapacity.
Ruling:
In order for a donation to be valid, the donors capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation is existing. There lies no doubt that
insanity impinges on consent freely given. However the burden of proving
such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof to
this effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by
petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
competent when he donated the property in question. A study of the nature
of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of
attending to his rights.
October 17,
2001
Facts:
Paulina Rigonan owns three parcels of land. She allegedly sold them
to spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan who claim to be her relatives. In
1966, herein petitioners who claim to be her closest surviving relatives
allegedly took possession of the properties. Petitioners claim that the sale
was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void.
Ruling:
At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan
was already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian. The
general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because
of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However when such
age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the
person from properly , intelligently and firmly protecting her property
rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony
shows that at the time of the execution of the deed, Paulina was already
incapacitated physically and mentally. She played with her waste and
urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is sufficient reason to
seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her
parcels of land.
February 6,
2002
Facts:
Petitioners own a parcel of land and to remove a cloud on their said
respective titles caused by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens
initiated a suit. They ultimately trace their ownership to a deed of sale
executed by Carmen Ozamiz. Respondents are now impugning the deed of
sale, alleging that Carmen Ozamiz was incapacitated at the time of the
execution of the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is void due to the incapacity of the
seller.
Ruling:
The testimonies on record all made sweeping statements which failed
to show the true state of mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the
execution of the disputed document. It has been held that a person is not
incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of
physical infirmity. Only when such age or infirmity impair her mental
faculties to such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently and
fairly protecting her property rights is she considered incapacitated.
Respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the
sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz has allegedly lost control of her
mental faculties.
July 10,
1993
Facts:
Petitioners are all minor duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. The minors further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. They seek to cancel all
existing timber license agreements and restrain the Secretary of DENR
from issuing anymore TLAs in the protection of our forest reserves and
nature in general.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have the requisite standing and capacity to
sue.
Ruling:
Petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn. The court finds no difficulty in ruling that they
can, for themselves, for other of their generations and for succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
KINDS OF DOMICILE
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 119976
September
18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner filed for the candidacy of the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte. Private respondent who was then the incumbent
representative filed a petition for the cancellation and disqualification
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner satisfies the residency requirement or not.
Ruling:
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
ARUEGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112193
March
13, 1996
Facts:
Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian out of
this were born two children. Jose died on March 30 1982. After his death
private respondents filed a case for declaration of acknowledgement as
illegitimate children. Petitioners herein are challenging such action
interposing that under the Family code the method by which respondents
can prove their filiation has already prescribed, that his while the putative
parent is alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the
case.
Ruling:
Respondents are establishing their filiation by open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under the Civil Code which
provides for four years before the attainment of age of majority. The Family
Code on the other hand provides that such manner of establishing filiation
can only be brought within the lifetime of the parent. The Family Code
cannot be applied in the case. Retroactive application cannot be applied if a
vested right is impaired or prejudiced in the process. The right of action of
the minor child for recognition has been vested by the filing of complaint in
court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior effectively of the Family
Code.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
BERNABE vs. ALEJO
G.R. No. 140500
January 21,
2002
Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary
Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 1981. The Fiscal died on
August 1993. On May 1994, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed a complaint
for Adrian to be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and such entitled to his share in the estate. Petitioners are
challenging the petition on grounds that the action has prescribed on
ground that the Family code has retroactive application and hence, the
manner of proving filiation by open and continuous possession of a status
of a legitimate child must have been brought within the lifetime of the
putative parent.
Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the
case.
Ruling:
The right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article
285 of the Civil Code has already vested to Adrian prior the enactment of
the Family Code. A vested right is one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.
Certainly the retroactive effect of the family code finds no application in this
case.
March 4,
2004
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. They had eight
children. On December 1992, respondent left the conjugal home and
abandoned petitioner and their children. On January 1994, petitioner filed a
separate case for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial
separation of property with a plea for support and pendent lite. On April
1994 the parties executed a compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to
marry again filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage with petitioner on
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner was never served the
summons because of misrepresentation. She was declared in default and
the marriage declared void and null. Petitioner now seeks a new trial and
nullification of the decision declaring the marriage void on ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not there is basis for a new trial.
Ruling:
Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court never gained
jurisdiction of her, hence the decision null and void. Article 48 of the Family
Code states that in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage the court shall order the appearance of the prosecuting attorney
to avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, it is
expressly stated that there can be no defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or legal separation. The court just did the opposite as mandated
by the aforementioned provisions of law. Our Constitution is committed to
the basic policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The motion for a
new trial is granted.
October 25,
Facts:
Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein
respondent Judge. Respondent stands charged with gross immorality,
deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a Judge. It is alleged that
he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during
the existence of a previous marriage, represented himself as single in the
marriage contract with Priscilla. He also caused the registration of his three
illegitimate children as legitimate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.
Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and
openly cohabited with said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his
marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It makes mockery of the inviolability and
sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not only a civil
contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently every intendment of the law
leans towards legalizing matrimony. Respondent Judge is dismissed from
service.
Facts:
Herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging
that their sister, Vitaliana, was forcibly taken from her residence sometime
in 1987 and was confined by herein petitioner in his residence in Misamis
Occidental. Unknown to respondents, Vitaliana has died and petitioner
refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana reasoning that the corpse cannot
be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings. As her common law husband,
petitioner now claims custody over Vitalianas body.
Issue:
Whether or not the common law husband has custody over Vitalianas
body instead of the immediate relatives.
Ruling:
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for years as husband and wife may
be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. Notwithstanding, such relationship produces a community of
property and interest and there is authority in case law that exists to the
effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
Herein petitioner had a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from legally marrying Vitaliana. Custody
of the dead body must be awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters
pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code.
March, 7, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal
who died intestate. They had an older brother named Gavino but he died
predeceasing their parents. Private respondents on the other hand are the
alleged children of Gavino with Catalina Ubas and as such are entitled to
inherit from the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners aver that Gavino
did not marry hence barring respondents from inheriting from the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not there the presumption of marriage between Gavino
and Catalino was successfully overcome.
Ruling:
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This
presumption is rebutted only by cogent proof of which the petitioners failed
to do so. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage the failure to present it is no proof that no marriage took place.
Private respondents proved through testimonial evidence that Gavino and
Catalina were married and that their children were recognized as legitimate
children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of marriage because the
State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a
matter of constitutional concern.
LEGAL CAPACITY
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689
October 22,
2007
Facts:
Petitioner avers that he is a male transsexual. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation
culminating with sex reassignment surgery in Thailand. From then on,
petitioner deposed himself as female and got engaged. He now seeks to
have his name in his birth certificate changed and his sex from male to
female.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can change the entry of sex in his birth
certificate.
Ruling:
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his
sex reassignment. However a change of name does not alter ones legal
capacity or civil status. R.A. 9048 does not sanction such change of name
under such cause. It is further a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment. A persons sex is an essential
requisite in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. To grant the changes sought by the petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment.
LEGAL CAPACITY
REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676
2008
September
12,
Facts:
Petitioner was born on January 1981 and was registered as a female
in the birth certificate. While growing up she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which is a condition where a person thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. While maturing it was the male characteristics that
continued to develop and be pronounced and hence, he deposed himself as
a male person. He now seeks to alter his name of Jennifer to Jeff.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name can be effected.
Ruling:
Respondent undisputedly has CAH which involves intersex anatomy.
The court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reasons thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
The petition is granted.
January 28,
Facts:
Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by
herein respondent Judge. After the wedding herein petitioner was
abandoned by her husband hence prompting her to check with the Civil
Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was found
out that the marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative
complaint against herein respondent Judge alleging that the marriage was
solemnized outside of his jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage.
Ruling:
Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a
marriage within the court jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent
Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize the
marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARAvs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and
COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 167746
August 28,
2007
Facts:
On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto
Alcantara (petitioner) went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of
looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person fixer who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage
was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license.
The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC
BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained in Carmona,
Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they
never went to the said place to apply for a license with its local civil
registrar. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage
ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila on March
26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license number
7054133 is not identical with the marriage license number which appears
in their marriage contract. There is also a case filed by the respondent
against herein petitioner before the MTC of Mandaluyong for concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is
void.
Ruling:
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of Family Code, the applicable law would be the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license
The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.COURT OF APPEALS and
ANGELINA M. CASTRO
GR No. 103047
September
2, 1994
Facts:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil
marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and
it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided
to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months.
Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her
brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to
follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving
for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her
marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license
issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to
by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to
the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage?
Rulings:
The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the
certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any
circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a
marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the
testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground
to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case.
Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings,
which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
SUSAN NICDAO CARIOvs.SUSAN YEE CARIO
GR No. 132529
February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted
two marriages; the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cario, with whom he had two children. And the second was on November
10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario with whom he had no children
in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In
November 23, 1992, SPO4 Santiago Cario passed away under the care of
Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner
and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against the petitioner praying that petitioner be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license confirmed by the marriage certificate of the deceased and
the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila
stating that they have no record of marriage license of the spouses Santiago
Cario and Susan Nicdao Cario who allegedly married in the said
municipality on June 20, 1969.
Issue:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4
Santiago S. Cario are valid in determining the beneficiary of his death
benefits?
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar,
there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does
not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. The
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and as certified by the Local Civil
registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data to the issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased having been solemnized
without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the said requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership
of property, but rather, is governed by the provisions of articles 147 and 148
of the Family Code, wherein, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. By intestate
succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs and respondent, not being the legal wife is not one of them.
Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a coownership, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. There is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case; both parties of the first marriage
are presumed in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits
under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property
regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
FILIPINA SYvs.COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 127263
April 12, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two
children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the
custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for
legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later
amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered
MARRIAGE LICENSE
JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684
July 31, 2006
Facts:
On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation
employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired
Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, Jaime and
Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On
the said date, the father of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a
marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to
Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.
On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before
the RTC. In its Decision dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the
nullity of the marriage of the parties for lack of the requisite marriage
license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial
court. Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which
the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
Issue:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance
with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in
question?
Ruling:
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that
utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage
License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity
of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of nonissuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed
true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence
MARRIAGE LICENSE
SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS
G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013
Facts:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the
Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December of
1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila,
when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for
his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later.
He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their
marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.
The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus their marriage on January 9, 1993
was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal.
It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married
and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but
the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008 hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting
aside the decision of the RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage?
Ruling:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the
effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and
that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear
in the document.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it
may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a
bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of
the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a
formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void
ab initio.
The petition is therefore granted.
March 14,
Facts:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot
by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage
would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to
the requirement of a Marriage license?
b) Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Ruling:
The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio
because of the absence of such element. In this case, at the time of Pepito
and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in
the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito
had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence
of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".Only
the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution,and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment is legitimate.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT
JUVY N. COSCA vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721
September 30,
1994
Facts:
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with
the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of
an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages
even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, these couples were able
to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. It is alleged
that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7)
marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at
most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it
appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but
the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents
reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact
they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court,
respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel
Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised
when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21,
1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed
because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by
law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt
was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme
Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were
responsible of the complaints charged?
Ruling:
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every
employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. It
applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the
least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of
ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently
provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily,
it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity
in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
The Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge
Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same
or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with.
Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby dismissed from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment
in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 145226
February 6, 2004
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4)
years (from 1974-1978). After school year 1977-78, LucioMorigo and Lucia
Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, LucioMorigo was surprised to
receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia
returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came
back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30,
1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On
September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario
Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the
court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On
THREE-FOLD LIABILITY
MARILOU NAMA MORENO vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE
A.M. No. MJT-94-963
July
14, 1995
Facts:
On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married
before respondent Judge Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge
assured her that the marriage contract will be released ten (10) days after
October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the Respondent
Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the
marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to
issue a marriage license. She claims that Respondent Judge connived with
the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.
In his comment,Respondent denied that he conspired with the
relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of
deceiving the complainant.The Respondent Judge contends that he did not
violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law
when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a
desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind
of assurance or security due to her pregnant condition. In order to pacify
complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage
ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was
definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete.
In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct
for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the
appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct
and gross ignorance of the law by solemnizing the marriage without the
required marriage license?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own
admission that he solemnized the marriage between complainant and
Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has dismally failed
to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence"and to his promise to be "faithful to the law."
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian
motives which, at most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not
exonerate him completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of
THREE-FOLD LIABILITY
RODOLFO NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTAY
A.M. No. MJT-96-1088
July 19,
1996
Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his first wife. It is also alleged that he
performed a marriage ceremony between FlorianoDadorSumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel Norte. The wedding was
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte.
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed
a complaint respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy for exhibiting gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance
of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our
attention are elementary and uncomplicated; prompting us to conclude that
respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the
law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.
G.R. No. 135216
August
19, 1999
Facts:
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased
Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various
estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract
between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on the other hand,
claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose
L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by
deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, the defendant-appellee
Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds
estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro
questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his
adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for
Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages questioning
appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision in favor of Pedro Pilapil and against TomasaGuison.
Such decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff TomasaVda. De
Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid?
b) Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of
Alfredo E. Jacob?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid marriage is
established. It has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this
effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriage
was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under
Article 76 of the Civil Code.The Civil Code governs this case, because the
questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the
effectivity of the Family Code.
On the second issue some considerations cast doubt on the claim of
respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his
Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions
in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal
cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.Moreover, Judge Moya insisted
that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his
decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this
information. Furthermore, Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he
signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In the same vein, no
proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child.
Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications
that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob.
Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption
of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do.
Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged
adoption is a sham.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577
September 21, 2005
Facts:
FOREIGN DIVORCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380
October
5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an,
Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as
an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of
the Family Code?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent
herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended
by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner
had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied
the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the
parties?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. The case involved a
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien
spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo
was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998
Issues:
a) Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case
b) Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as
per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition
was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would
qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with
him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both
of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts
and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven. The case therefore is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings on the evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-ininterest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. In its October 30, 2008 decision,
the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not
the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.
Issue:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with
the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert
attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles
(11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris
that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that there is absolutely
no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the following
exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit "A" Complaint;(b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C"
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;(d) Exhibit
"D" Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recio;(2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;(b)
Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia;(c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(d) Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution
of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;and Exhibit "5"
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio
and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. Based on the records, the
Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner
on January 12, 1994. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage. The case is thus remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES,
JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706
March 29, 1995
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro,
who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati,
Metro Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he
saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Thereafter, respondent
prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of
his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one
Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986
and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to
De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to
complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De
Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although
he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and
Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town
mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a
marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent
went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5,
1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko
abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in
Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith
and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first
marriage was solemnized without a license.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by
the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in
1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second
marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of
the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure.
Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. Respondent made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a
woman, who beget him five children. Respondent passed the Bar
examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. It is
evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must
be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of
his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is
no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the
performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial
guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater
BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALANLEE
G. R. No. 183622
February
8, 2012
Facts:
BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
FE D. QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN
G.R. No. 124862
December 22,
1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on 18 May 1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. On July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for
the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On April 16, 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters
of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida
and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of
the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino
Castillon. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother
of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On the scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of
the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The
prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
On November 27, 1987 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the
intestate heirs of Arturo.
BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758
February 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by
Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage,
them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious
living conditions. After hearing during which both complainant and
respondent took the witness stand, the Investigating Commissioner
rendered a Report and Recommendation that the said respondent is
suspended for three months for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on
the moral norms of the profession.
The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before
this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo is guilty of gross
misconduct.
Ruling:
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,then the
judgment of annulment of respondent's marriage does not also exonerate
him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof
- clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.
The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment
of his first two marriages and is in the process of procuring the annulment
of his third bears noting. Contrary to the finding of the Investigating
Commissioner, respondent, by his own admission, contracted a third
marriage.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions
of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing
of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and
well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived
to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage,
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community.
There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a
consequence of his grossly immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law.
Facts:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his
marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian
Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's
previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having
been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage
claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband
Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.
Issue:
Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition devoid of merit.There is no need
for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the
marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80,
Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for
then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
The petition is dismissed.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally
married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution
for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second
marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated
in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or
declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy
were alleged in the Information. Here, at the time respondent contracted
the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet
been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of
the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged
were sufficiently alleged.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The petition is granted.
all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet
Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of
the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null
and void.The trial court granted Nolasco's petition.The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is
already dead.
Ruling:
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41
of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted. As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4)
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
December
9, 2005
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. On May 28, 2001,
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Motion to Dismissthe petition, which was, however, denied by
the court.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on
January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6,
1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being
always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work
the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later
in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.However, Lea did not return to
their house anymore.Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to
look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of
Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. He failed to find
out Leas whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided
to work as a part-time taxi driver. On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas
disappearance to the local police station.
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On
January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to
prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting
the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to
elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth.
Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions,
attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the
conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends
to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their
intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a
great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of
the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
present spouse.In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent
failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition
in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.
VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES
NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA
CAMACHO and LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO
G.R. No. 111717
October
24, 1994
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3,
1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being
dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent
Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953 and
by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho
(Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan
where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when,
because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long
periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various
times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner
Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis
Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from
June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last
time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito,
who lived with them for about a year in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado
Street in which they were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and
Suzette Infante-Moozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his
name, Aurelio was described as single.On November 26, 1984, Aurelio
executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in
consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner's name on January
11, 1985. Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each
other. On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan
and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral
arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with
respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of
Aurelio in order to look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could
follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her
son Chito came home on May 30, 1988. She had the remains of Aurelio
transferred from the Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius
Church and later to the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid for the
funeral services.
Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed
ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita
had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts
to settle their dispute failed.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale
of the property to petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita
alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was
On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the
sale of the property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It
found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to be genuine and respondents
Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988
despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented
himself to be single. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial
court denied their motion. On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4,
1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute.
Issue:
Whether or not Aurelios marriage to respondent Luisita is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court findsthe petition to be meritorious. This Court
finds that the presumption of the validity of the marriage between Aurelio
and Luisita has not been successfully assailed by appellee. Art. 83 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news
went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they
went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in
having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions,
assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to
Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son
was still single.Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first
week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge
Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.
It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married
life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in
Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started
making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year.
Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would
slap her.Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and
did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries
from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that
Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of
the marriage contract.She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she
learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged
their own vows.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding
Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the
CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification
as to the penalty of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead
under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of
presumptive death as provided under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.The reason why bigamy is
considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because
the drafters of the law were of the impression that "in consonance with the
civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a
number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment
of marriage should be a justification for bigamy."
1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having
been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed
valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having
been adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses,
pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions
one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the
estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a
surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased, concurring with
legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces,
however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of
uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can
succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude
nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their
parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate
court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion
of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their
own mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the
estate of her deceased brother.
It is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's
estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code/By express provision of law,
the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be
had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals
in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if
the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From
the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in
the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon,
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate
the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family
Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented. The belief of
the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not
the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner
points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to
locate her absent husband. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the
Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to
prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead
prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is
already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing
is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his
appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of
cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the
judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private
individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by
his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.
These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary.
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family
Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared
with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures
the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and
private respondent. That is a shared feeling which between husband and
wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed
by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who
view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July
1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos,
Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the
young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to
work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the
first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got
a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up
to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity
of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in
its report to the court).
Issue:
Whether or not Leouels marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.
Ruling:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs.
Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee did not
give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Regional Trial Courts decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just difficulty,
refusal or neglect. Second, the personality disorder or psychological
incapacity of the respondent must be grave enough to bring about her
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third, there was
no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the
psychological incapacity considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage obligations must
correspond to the management of the household and the provision of
support for the family. Fifth, marital obligations must not only include the
spouses obligation to the spouse but also that to her children. No evidence
was shown that the respondent was negligent in the rearing and care of her
children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although, the
respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was no
evidence to prove that, indeed, the respondent was incapacitated or
incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Issues:
a) Whether or not personal medical or psychological evaluation is a
requirement for the declaration of psychological incapacity.
b) Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the respondents
determine psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated
even if the root cause be medically or clinically identified. What is most
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination is not necessary.
No. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, these do
not necessitate psychological incapacity. The evidence presented do not
zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on psychological incapacity.
The behaviors can be attributed to the respondents loss of employment for
a period of more than six years. It was from this that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support and leave the
family home. Therefore, his psychological incapacity can be traced to this
certain period and not before the marriage nor during the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, the condition was not proven to be incurable,
especially now that he is again gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
TE vs. TE
G.R. No. 161793
February 13, 2009
Facts:
In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court
Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese
association in their college. He decided to court Rowena after learning that
her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst towards their
families and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena
asked Edward that they elope despite being bickering about being young
and jobless. Edward eventually gave in to Rowenas plans, left Manila, and
sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He provided the traveling
money and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house
accommodation, daily sustenance and joblessness, their pension lasted for
only a month. After Edward proceeded to his parents home, Rowena kept
on telephoning him and threatening him that she would commit suicide.
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to court to get
married. He was 25 years old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her
uncles place but he Edward was being treated like a prisoner. In one
instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live
independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted
that Edward go home else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward
escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle and stayed with his parents. His
family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996, Edward was
able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edwards persistence that they live
together, she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an
investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties and therefore, recommended trial on the
merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena
(narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court
declared the marriage null and void. However, the Appellate Court reversed
and set aside the Trial Courts decision on the ground that the clinical
psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the
testimony of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity given the petitioners totality of evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties. The psychological assessment adequately,
sufficiently and decisively points to Edwards dependent personality
disorder and Rowenas narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder.
Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed, at first-hand, the witnesses
deportment. With Edwards affliction of dependent personality disorder, he
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing
love and respect and rendering help and support because he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make
most of his important decisions, tends to agree with people even when he
believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers
to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated to
him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has
no goals and clear direction in life.Rowenas affliction with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations.
This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others,
her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April
23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the
decision of the appellate court.
illness, and (c) non-compliance of marital obligations. First, the root cause
of the psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The
root cause being their family backgrounds, as determined by a competent
and expert psychologist. Second, the petition establishes that the
respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features as well as the petitioner suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly
grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, the Court also finds that the
essential marital obligations were not complied with. Petition for dismissal
is denied.
Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological
incapacity therefore rendering the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
No. First, Catalinas supposed behavior was not corroborated by
others and, therefore, was not established. Eduardos testimony was selfserving. Second, Dr. Reyes neuro-psychiatric evaluation was ostensibly
vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr. Reyes
merely established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her
immaturity and childishness could no longer be treated due to Catalinas
reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly, Dr. Reyes had only one interview
with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity which would have
been achieved if her report corroborated not only with Eduardos
statements but also with interviews by other persons. Fourth, no proof was
made to establish the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively
incapacitated Catalina from complying with her basic marital functions. In
this case, the Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or
standards to dispute psychological incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that
Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She insisted that
she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home
because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law. At the trial,
Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent
abandonment of the family home. He testified that he continued to provide
financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her
illicit affair with Alvin.
Issue:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage
to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations", not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden
of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the
errant spouse.Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolitas
alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his
continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned
of the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolitas alleged affair with
Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.Sexual infidelity and
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; simply grounds for legal separation. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness
and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations.No evidence on record exists to support Cesars
allegation that Lolitas infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of
any psychological illness.
Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas interpersonal problems with coworkers does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was
at the time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated to enter into a
marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wifes
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities
are poles apart from their marital counterparts. Dr. Flores further belief
that Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work
out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by
facts.
cars insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found
out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-inlaw to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after
he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally
charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he
was arrested and incarcerated. She and her mother bailed him out of jail,
but discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were
even threatening her, her mother and her sister.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the
declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. In the RTC, petitioner
presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume
Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not
appear during trial and presented no evidence. On August 18, 2000, the
RTC found all characteristics of psychological incapacity gravity,
antecedence, and incurability as set forth in Molina and declared the
marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity. On March 19,
2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of
the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondents
psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondents
psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated incidents,
not recurring acts. Psychological incapacity must be more than difficulty,
refusal or neglect. It is essential that he or she must be shown to
be incapable of complying with the responsibility and duty as a married
person because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words,
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse
integral
element
in
the
personality
structure
that
effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown. The psychological
test was uncorroborated and one-sided; therefore, biased towards Juvys
negative traits. First, the psychologist did not identify the types of
psychological tests to determine the root cause of Juvys psychological
condition. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys
condition. Lastly, the report failed to prove incurability. The psychologists
testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvys early
life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage,
and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put,
the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys psychological condition
and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various
parts of the country, Bona had illicit relations with other men. Bona
entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their
living quarters at Fort Bonifacio. On one occasion, Bona was caught by
Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver,
Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the
military community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a
military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.During their
confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who
also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their
living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.In 1994,
Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking to
nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.In a Decision dated
11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified the
parties marriage. The OSG appealed with the CA which granted the appeal,
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects (sexual
disloyalty with Jose, sexual promiscuity with other men) were already
present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her
alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite
of juridical antecedence. Verily, Dr. Elizabeth E. Rondain evaluated
Bonas psychological condition (Histrionic Personality Disorder) indirectly
from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This
factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the
psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient
corroboration. It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona,
contrary to Joses assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the
beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most
part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her
away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows
that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his
military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for
Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts
of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas
in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later
be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in
Fort Bonifacio during the following decade. In view of the foregoing, the
badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity
and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time
after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
August 3,
2010
Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo P. Toring was introduced to Teresita M. Toring in
1978 at his aunts house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousins teacher in
Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunts house. They
became sweethearts after three months of courtship and eloped soon after,
hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo
to marry her.
psychologically
Ruling:
No. Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo
and Richardsons testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of
Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological
tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not constitute
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come
from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or
even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouses condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already
present at the time of marriage. Richardson, the spouses eldest son, would
not have been a reliable witness as he could not have been expected to
know what happened between his parents until long after his birth. He
merely recounted isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not
just the manifestations during the marriage described as refusal,
difficulty or neglect.
April 15,
2012
Facts:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed
with four children. Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00
oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had watched a video
program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her
Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for
her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and
the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from
her. He still wanted to reconcile with her. May was back again to her old
ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and
learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found
her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover. Later, May
confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.
Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological
evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the
incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after
marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. On October 22,
1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. The
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess jurisdiction.
(b)Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public
respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright
dismissal.In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the
public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to
lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.
These were not proven in the close scrutiny of the records.
No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity
March 10,
2010
Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June
1985; they were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of
courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having
been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and
after finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter,
Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married
on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived
with Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped
schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as
household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most
of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels
often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found
another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed
with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship,
she alleged in her complaint that from the start of their marriage until their
separation in July 1987, their relationship has been marred with bitter
quarrels that caused unbearable physical and emotional pain inflicted upon
by Angelito; that one of the main reasons for their quarrels was Angelitos
refusal to work, his indolence and excessive drinking; and that Angelitos
psychological incapacity started at the time of their marriage and proves to
be continuous, permanent and incurable.
October
26, 2009
Facts:
Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they
were students at the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of
the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo courted her and five months later, they
became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese
culture, literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora
maintained communication.
In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got
married. They begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was
tumultuous. He described Aurora as domineering and frequently
humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained that Aurora was
a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial family
decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless,
suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latters filing
against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an administrative case. He
left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of Aurora. He averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her
a plane ticket to Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a
university for a period of three months. In August 1991, upon her return
to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into
their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his
concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfos cohabitation with her cousin led
to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In
May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with
Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.
Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Eduardo Maaba revealed that both
parties suffered psychological handicaps traced from unhealthy
maturational development. Both had strict, domineering, disciplinarian role
models. However, respondents mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships
resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of
marriage. RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated. The CA
reversed and set aside the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity is not mere difficulty, refusal, or
neglect. Noteworthy, as aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo
and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union for several years. They
married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in 1983,
showing love and contentment with one another after a year of
marriage. The letter of petitioner dated April 1, 1990 addressed to
respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued
during their marriage for about eight years from the time they married each
other.
From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply
with their obligations to each other and to their children. Aurora was
shown to have taken care of her children and remained faithful to her
husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities to augment the
family income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled a
lot and pursued studies here and abroad. It was only when Rodolfos acts of
infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to fail. While
disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects
October
Facts:
Petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that
she was married to respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 2000 by Rev.
Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their
wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the
newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner
at
the
latters
abode
at 2601-C
Jose
Abad
Santos
Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. On 23
October
2000,
respondent
left
for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in
a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not
communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call
respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and
a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that
respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was
surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent
arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C
Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to
his parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her
brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not
aware of respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been
living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in
the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with
her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between
petitioner and respondent.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita
Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag)
as witnesses. The psychologist diagnosed the respondent to have
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied petitioners complaint for
annulment of her marriage. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but
was denied. The CA affirmed RTCs decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Rey is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of
marriage on the ground ofincapacity to consummate specifically denoting
the permanent disability on the spouses to perform and complete the act of
sexual intercourse. What petitioner was actually seeking was the
declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of the Family
Code. Nevertheless, Article 36should refer, rather, to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers testimonies, merely
established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work
in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year
and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that
respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for
abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into
respondents psychological state. Tayag, in evaluating respondents
psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner.
Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in
her evaluation of respondents psychological condition, since her source of
information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial. The psychologist
failed to trace Reys experiences in childhood, did not describe the pattern
of behavior that led her to conclude that, indeed, Rey was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality disorder; and did not relate how this rendered him
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in
the performance of some marital obligations.
July 3, 2009
Facts:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal
Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente
Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.Petitioner alleged that she and
respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married
on January 31, 1988. They are childless. Petitioner claimed that at the time
of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the
marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Orderterminating the pre-trial
conference after the parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which
stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains
and divide equally their conjugal properties.Psychologist Cristina Gates
testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological
disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established
organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the
composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and
uncontrollable impulses.Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the
PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a
complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the
influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part,
and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the
police blotter.
Issue:
June 9, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner and the respondent married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall
of Manila. After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective
parents and never lived together but maintained their relationship
nonetheless.Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a
petition for the nullity of their marriage on the ground that the respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations.
He also pointed out that they never lived together as husband and wife and
they never consummated their marriage. On April 17, 1998, the Regional
Trial Court declared thatthe marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is null and void. The respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals, on January 26, 2004. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court on the ground that totality of
the evidence presented failed to established petitioner's psychological
incapacity. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for
reconsideration. On June 9, 2009, the Supreme Court set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove
that the petitioner suffered from psychological incapacitywhich effectively
prevented him to comply from his essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
Yes, because ultimately the psychologist sufficiently established that
petitioner had psychological condition that was grave andincurable and had
a deeply rooted cause and that already existed at the time of the celebration
of his marriage to the respondent.
August 2, 2007
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J.
Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely:
Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine
(29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the Regional Trial
Court a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article
36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a
student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently
spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved
her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the
"most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter
Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her
medication. Also in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was
in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to
bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the
rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the
United States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and
left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked
to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed
without her consent a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted
the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of
charge. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child
was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that
after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching.
Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a babygirl, Cyndee Rose,
obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose
Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He
maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and
Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the
banks authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United
States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as
municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to
the Philippines. He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented
supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides,
their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He
admitted though that there were times he failed to give them financial
support because of his lack of income. What caused the inevitable family
break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him during his birthday
celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When
confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This
convinced him of her lack of concern. This was further aggravated when she
denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he
alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law
Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain GrelleLeccioness.
Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision
upholding the validity of the marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the
evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law
to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged defects
oridiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa
contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 fordisbarment
are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed
the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
a) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are
conclusive on the present case;
b) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert
testimony on the root cause of Justos alleged psychologicalincapacity
is necessary; and
c) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological
incapacity on the part of Justo.
Ruling:
A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no
reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court evenassumed that her
charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the
marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their
family home are true,such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to
become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these
grounds areinsufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable
psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do
notmanifest that he was truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that he must assume and discharge as a married person. Whilethey may
manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do
not necessarily show incurability, such that while hisacts violated the
covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an
irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him
from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.
February 7,
2007
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City.
After their marriage, they lived together at No. 50-AGorordo Avenue, Cebu
City. The union did not produce any child. In 1972, private respondent left
for the United States to work as anurse. She returned to the Philippines for
a few months, and then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic
visits to Cebu Cityuntil 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on
thealleged "psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for
under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position,he alleged that
his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced
by the fact that she had not bornepetitioner a child. Furthermore, he also
alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United
States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout
their marriage they lived together for not more than three years.
Respondentdenied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as
one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that shewould
from time to time borrow her husbands niece and nephews to care for
them. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage,
alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two affairs with
different women, and he begot at leastthree children with them. On June 22,
1995, the trial court rendered its decision. The plaintiff consented
to defendants trip to theUnited States in 1974. She [defendant] wanted to
earn money there because she wanted to help her husband build a big
house at theBeverly Hills, Cebu City. The plaintiff himself admitted that he
has a
child,
and
the
court
is also
convinced
that
he
has
two children.However, nothing in the evidence of plaintiff shows that
the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed
tocomply with her essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of
psychological incapacity on the part of defendant so that shecould not carry
out the ordinary duties required in married life. Neither has it been shown
that there was an incurable defect on thepart of defendant.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and
substance affecting the result of the present case;
b) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists
is still desirable, if evidence in this case already showsthe
psychological incapacity of private respondent;
July 17,
2006
Facts:
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couples relationship
before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year
or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, Armida
was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida even
admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems
began when Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw
into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital
obligations. Brix could not understand Armidas lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not
relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological
expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and
avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brixs leaving-the-house attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks,
the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family.
Issue:
How shall psychological incapacity be proven?
Ruling:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to aserious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanentas to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies,
or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders,
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this
reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the rootcause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must
be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.Quite
apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioners evidence showed that
respondents alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was
not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and
Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of
age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at
Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in
December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did
not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her
husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August
1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his
marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Issue:
Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for
declaring their marriage null and void.
Ruling:
Facts:
Juanita Carating-Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their
marriage did not produce children however, the adopted a boy. Manuel,
after being married for 24 years filed a petition to the court seeking the
nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity
exhibited through over domineering attitude and causing him
embarrassment and humiliation. The lower court denied his petition. The
CA on the other hand reversed the decision relying on the doctors findings
that both parties are psychologically incapacitated.
Issue:
Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically
incapacitated sufficient to warrant the nullification of their marriage.
Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. Manuels relationship with another
was caused merely by his sexual infidelity which does not fall within the
purview of psychological incapacity. This action caused by his desire to have
children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the doctor failed to
show that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is
necessary that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be
completely unable to perform his marital obligations. With regard to
Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions constitute psychological
incapacity that would render her unable to perform her marital obligations
and that a doctor has in fact stated otherwise. The evidence adduced failed
to show sufficiently that the couple or either of the spouse were
psychologically incapacitated, rather it showed that they were merely
having the marital trouble of becoming strangers to each other and wanting
to get out of it. The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void
November 18,
Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917
and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his
marriage.On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answerdenying
petitioners allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage to
petitioner has been fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and
hopes for more growth in their relationship and that their marital
squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioners success
in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father,
and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioners commitment to his
paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to
testify on his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan described the
said disorder as a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and
occupational functioning with main symptoms of grand ideation about
oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be
the one followed, the I personality. A person afflicted with this disorder
believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and
thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova
Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one
relationship to another.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision which was denied in an order dated October 28, 2004. Thus,
petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting
that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Villalon is null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity of the husband.
Ruling:
No, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding
that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital
obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a
good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the
family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions,
the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological
disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal
obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction
with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners
personal history. The petition has no merit.
by
one
spouse
tantamount
to
Ruling:
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no
other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no
showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. It cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
January
29, 2004
Facts:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996
and May 20, 1967 in a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four
children. David instituted a case for the nullity of their marriage on account
of Sharons psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations.
He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including
a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command, and
a Jordanian national. Despite the treatment by a clinical psychiatrist,
Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian, whom she
married and with whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national
left the country, Sharon returned to David bringing along her two children
by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and even considered the
illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned David to join
the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon would only
return to the country on special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan testified
that she conducted a psychological evaluation of David and found him to be
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks
and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in
whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of
infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse even bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian to live
with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage
like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of the said disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial court declared their
marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of
Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of
Appeals set aside the trial courts judgment and ordered the dismissal of the
petition. Davids motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Sharons infidelity is equivalent to psychologically
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Sharons infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The law intended to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Sharons sexual
infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated
with psychological incapacity.
It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality, which make the respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon
by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code not for declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation,
which need not be rooted in psychological incapacity, include physical
violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed.
Petition is denied.
February 9,
2001
Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino
Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church
in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda
and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started
leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months,
suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the
times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with
friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to
sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to
her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that
they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some
crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July
1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by
publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On
the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only
witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor
until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present
controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said
manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The
Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there
was no collusion between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of
evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutors manifestation,
the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under
Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since
he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting
controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is
not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to
the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino
Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to
perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.
Issue:
Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on
September 7, 1975. They begot two children. A week after the wedding,
Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would from time
to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always
drunk and would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict
physical injuries on her if she refused. On October 1993, he left his family
and was never heard from him again. Erlinda was forced to work and
learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail. Erlinda
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds
of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons
was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented Virginia Dagdag
who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the
prosecutors manifestation. The Court of Appeals affirmed trials court
decision. The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with guideline
No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a
fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating
prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controversy
evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.
April
Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court
of
Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four
children. She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligations starting 1988.
His true color of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was
a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon until 1:00 oclock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at
least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At
one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill
her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not
spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house
of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways.
Two months later, she returned home to give him a chance to change. But,
to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the morning of 22
March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was
imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
The trial court declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio on the
basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, which in turn reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the
marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of
the trial court.
b) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not
mandatory in nature.
Ruling:
The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was
absolutely no evidence showed and proved by petitioner the psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity,
as laid down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further
explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted
and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the
old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. The petition was denied.
April 2, 1996
Facts:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the
judgment of the lower court. It was shown that she was married to the
private respondent and they had three kids. While her husband was
studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This
prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her
husband in return filed a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts,
contending that their marriage was void for absence of valid marriage
certificate. The Swiss Court held infavour of the private respondent.
Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of
the marriage certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his
petition and denied Petitioners appeal. The Petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same. She filed this
petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CAs decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null
and void?
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondents contention is
untenable. The Court explained that the Rule only applies to cases
concerning typographical or other clerical errors in the marriage contract.
It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children
shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner
contending that A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at
all.
March
Facts:
Around
11
months
before
his
death,
Sen.
Tamano
married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on
May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In
their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as
divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole
world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own
behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with
Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for
being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
Issue:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano
was bigamous.
Ruling:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano
subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in
force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims
alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the
Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to
Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that
codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita.
Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is
September
Facts:
Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were
married on June 14 1962. They had seven children, herein respondents.
Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august 26 2004, Eulogio marries
petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two
grounds:
1) that the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage
license and
2) lack of a marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's illness.
Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years
hence exempt from getting a marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family
Code. More importantly, she sought the dismissal of his action on the
ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02-11-10 SC
which provides in sec. 2 (a) that the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of a void marriage may be filled solely by the husband or the wife.
The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs. Bayadog.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt
from securing marriage license.
b) Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said
marriage after the death of Eulogio.
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal impediments are
exempt from securing a marriage license. The said exemption cannot
possibly apply because the second marriage contracted by Eulogio with
Enrico took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the
respondent heirs have no standing to assail the validity of the second
marriage even after te death of their father, Eulogio.
While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file
a petition for the declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after
the death, the court held that the same rule cannot be applied for the
reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the family code.
Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still
protect their successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio
by questioning the validity of his second marriage with Enrico, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.
February 6,
Facts:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June
4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United
States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After
38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June
16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope
had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City
against Orlando and Merope.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of
bigamy?
Ruling:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have the
personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage
even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the
petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American
citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree.
It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando
was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted
the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos
remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio.
March
Facts:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to
her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license.
After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of
the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license.
Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should
be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license
being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void
ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted
that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without
any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest;
and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the
death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother
Ruling:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil
Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having
the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of
descendants,
ascendants,
or
illegitimate
children
of
the
deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to
the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to
bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano
had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate),
and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico
Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation
between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She
averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and
they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such
marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an
extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted.
Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the
court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the
hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court
rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision.
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In
case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for
the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is
more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of
the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must
in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of
the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off
period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is
further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action
for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS
MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509
July 31, 2000
Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one
Maria Dulce Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled the same
respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda MarbellaBobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain
Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint a n information for
bigamy was files against respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent
initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his
first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Respondent filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case as a prejudicial
question.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity
of the marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case of respondent
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered the Trial Court to immediately proceed
with the Criminal Case. A pending civil case is not a prejudicial question. A
prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
civil marriage to petitioner, Ofelia Ty, null and void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required
before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly
Ruling:
The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before the case of Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in
Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, wherein there was no need for judicial
declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before
such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of private
respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case therefore, the Court concluded that private
respondents second marriage to Ofelia Ty is valid.
Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied where to do so would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her
children. As held in Jison versus Court of Appeals, the Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there is impairment of vested rights.
Petition
subsisting.
granted,
judgment
and
resolution
declared
valid
and
EFFECTS
VALDES vs. RTC AND VALDES
G.R. No. 122749
July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971.
Begotten during their marriage were five children. In a petition dated June
22, 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant
to article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing the parties following the
EFFECTS
ALAIN M. DIO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO
dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although incidentally
involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case and led up to the final conclusion and to any
statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated. Hence, in the
instant case, the pronouncement of the appellate court is not an obiter
dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores
in his petition assailing the admission of the amended informations.
Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva was the offended party was,
thus, clearly raised by respondent. The body of decision contains the
discussion on that point and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.
Facts:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December
4, 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the
marriage on January 7, 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation. Fernando had divulged to Aurora that
several months prior to their marriage he had a pre-marital relationship
with a close relative of his; and that the non divulgement to her of the
aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of the defendant that
definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even
before it had hardly commencedPlaintiff herein from going thru the
marriage that was solemnized between them constituted FRAUD in
obtaining her consent, She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and
for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his premarital relationship with anither woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage
Ruling:
Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another
woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a
ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of
April
Facts:
On March 1938, Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat
first met, then they came engaged September of the same year. After few
months later, on November 26, 1938, they got married.However, after 89
days of their marriage dated February 23, 1939, Luida gave birth to a son.
After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life
with her. On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on
the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that
she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on
the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
Ruling:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage,
a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society
rests.In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It
was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect
anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced
stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged
stomach ) when they got married.
SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.
Respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz 111 were dismissed by the City
Prosecutors Office.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in failing to appreciate that Francisco
Villanueva Jr. was in fact an aggrieved party.
Ruling:
Francisco Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases. It must
be underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for
the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an adverse judgment of the
labor case filed by Villanueva. We see no reason how Villanueva could have
sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the surety appeal bond
and its confirmation letter when it could have redounded to his own benefit
if the appeal would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be
anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased a fake surety
bond.
February 27,
2004
Facts:
May 23,
1951
Facts:
This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent
per annum payable in advance, made by Dr. Ceasar Reyes to Agripino
Zaballero on October 1, 1942. Zaballero secured the payment with a first
mortgage on ten parcels of land.
The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum of P1,300
plus interest were paid in Japanese Military Script and the Payments were
unreservedly accepted. On November 30, 1944, Zaballero offered to pay the
third installments and its interests which fell due on October of the same
year, but Reyes refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and
unjust that the payment be made in Japanese Military notes which had
considerably devaluated, and that he had an option according to the
contract to have the payment in Philippine or United States currency.
Zaballero announced that the next day he would tender the whole balance.
Reyes, acting upon advice given by his attorneys to whom he had
meanwhile resorted for guidance, received the money and executed the
notarial deed of release of the real estate mortgage. On the same day, he
received payment, the mortgagee (Reyes), executed an affidavit in secret,
without defendants knowledge, before a Notary Public stating that he had
accepted under protest the payment of P5,200 plus interest in the sum of
P612, and that he had deposited the whole amount paid by the debtors.
Issue:
What constitutes Duress or Intimidation?
Ruling:
According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or intimidation when one
of the contracting parties is inspired by a rational and well-grounded fear or
suffering an imminent and serious injury to his person or property, of his
spouse, descendants and ascendants. Mere reluctance does not detract
from the voluntariness of ones acts. There is a distinction between a case
where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good
sense and judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as
where he executed a contract or performs an act against a pressure which
he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in
the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he
acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and
freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when
he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference
in law.
October
13, 2009
Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that
the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January
9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the
surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his
death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person,
himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano,
due to the marriage being void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother
Ruling:
`Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil
Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having
the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent
Ruling:
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to
his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he
was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a
bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the
proper way to keep himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even doubtful if
threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he
never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the
police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And
neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing
their marriage.
August
Facts:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez in a complaint prays for a decree annulling his
marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares upon the ground that the
office of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a
male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as
described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and
that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after
they had been married.
October
23, 2006
Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were
married on July 13, 1975 They have three children: Kingston, Charleston,
and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority. Thereafter, Lucita filed
a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William was
marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive
conduct; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of
their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William
from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on
December 9, 1995, William hit her on the stomach and she bent down
because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and
asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sisters house in Binondo
where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents
house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parents doctor, Dr.
Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.
William for his part denied all the allegations. While he admits that he
and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house at Tondo, he
claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and
only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below.
Both the lower courts and the appellate court issued a decree of legal
separation due to the repeated physical abuses felt by both Lucita and their
children. William on the other hand maintains that the real motive of Lucita
and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of
properties belonging to the conjugal partnership which were acquired
through his sole efforts also, William reiterated that Lucita cannot file the
petition since it Lucita who abandoned their conjugal dwelling.
Issue:
Whether nor not the defenses of William are valid.
Ruling:
William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal
separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the
conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by
filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could
control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning
hard to believe. What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for
her parents and siblings financial interests at the expense of her marriage?
What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal
separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the
courts. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not
elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his
reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek relief
from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first
place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted,
following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does
not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts erred in finding that the judicial separation
of property was not allowed.
Ruling:
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has
left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse
who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed
within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts
shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the
conjugal dwelling.Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may
petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment
by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to
comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if
she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had
already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal
home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact
that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no
intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968
until the determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the
private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed
by Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply
with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart from refusing
to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has
freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children by
them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that
prompted her to file the actions against him for support and later for
separation of the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even
denied being married to her. The private respondent has not established any
just cause for his refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful
husband.
CONDONATION/PARDON
EDUARDO ARROYO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96602
November 19,
1991
Facts:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his
wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982
in the City of Baguio. Both defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the
RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery. According to
the facts of the case, the accused Ruby Neri in the company of a friend went
to Baguio City and proceeded at Mines View Park Condominium. At 7:00 in
the evening, co-accused Eduardo Arroyo entered the unit and thereafter
proceeded inside the master's bedroom where Ruby Neri and her friend was
waiting. Ruby Neri's friend was thereafter instructed to leave the room.
After 45 minutes, both Ruby Neri and Eduardo Arroyo came out from the
room and joined Ruby Neri's friend at the living room.
Both Ruby Neri and Eduardp Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that a pardon has been extended by Ruby Neri's husband and
that her husband had later contracted marriage with another woman. As
proof of this, Ruby Neri showed the Affidavit of Desistance made by Dr.
Neri.
Issue:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Desitance executed by Dr. Neri
signifies pardon.
Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides: "ART. 344. The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not
be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The
offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both
parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders."
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in
the sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is
given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to
benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only
on 23 November 1988 while the compromise agreement was executed only
on 16 February 1989, after the trial court had already rendered its decision
dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code
provides that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the
offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control
of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on
adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of
the private honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of
personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to
protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the
preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy
here involved is of the most fundamental kind.
The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the
Philippines in Article 149: "The family, being the foundation of the ration, is
a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects."
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice
or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.
CONDONATION/PARDON
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033
28, 1956
December
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was
married to defendant Leonila Ginez. Immediately after their marriage, the
couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After
some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed
her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in
Asingan, Pangasinan.
Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from some
anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife.
Benjamin Bugayong then went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his
wife. Both husband and wife then proceeded to the house of Pedro
Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights
and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they returned to the plaintiff's house
and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the third day,
Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he
received that she had committed adultery but, instead of answering his
query, she merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the
acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff
exerted efforts to locate her.
Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the
complaint and stating than she was condoned by her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in this case.
Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation. A detailed examination of the testimony of the
plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of
the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to adultery"
committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a
reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the
latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went
with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro
Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day
and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept
together in their house likewise as husband and wife all these facts have
no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation
between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by
the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came
to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.It has been held in a
long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the different states of
the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent
spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute
condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the facts
testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted,
and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that
there is condonation.
CONDONATION/PARDON
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA
G.R. No. L-3047
16, 1951
May
Facts:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against
Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for
cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from
the year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14, 1947 whereby
Dalmacio Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The
defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four
months which penalty she served. In the same court, on September 17,
1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts
committed by his wife and her paramour from March 1947 to September
1948. Each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the
ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and
quashed the second complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint be quashed for double jeopardy.
Ruling:
A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not
included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double
jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second complaint places
the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the
CONDONATION/PARDON
JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553
February
23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot
several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff
discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year.
Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going
out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of
June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left
plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff
October
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943. For
failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple
agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained
the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she
becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of
the wrong. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as
subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.
The Court reiterate that the agreement should be misconstrued as
legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view
must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into
between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and
manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the
offense. If there is anything morally condemnatory in a situation of his
character, the remedy lies not with us but with the legislative department of
the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of
our authority.
CONSENT AND FORMS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. URSULA SENSANO
G.R. No. L-37720
March 27, 1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919.
They had one child. Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his
wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years
without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of
herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she
could call, she struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal
day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child
to live with him.
On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his
wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four
months and one day. The court, in its decision, stated the following: "In the
opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel
in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After
completing her sentence, the accused left her wife. She thereupon appealed
to this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for her
husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At
the house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a
faithful wife if he would take her back.
He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where
she wished, that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could
do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went
back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and they
have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed
living with her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their
relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the
Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven years completely
abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he
presented the second charge of adultery here involved with the sole
purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband is still entitled to his relief
Ruling:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose
when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to
the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the
inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the
accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding.We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the
seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is
explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it
was impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is no
merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any
action against the accused during the said seven years.
RATIONALE OF RECRIMINATION/MUTUAL GUILT
BENEDICTO vs. DE LA RAMA
G.R. NO. L-1056
December
8, 1903
Facts:
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 1891.Both were happily
living together until August of 1892 when the defendant without any
previous warning, took his wife to the house of her parents and left her
there. It was found out that in plaintiffs complaint for separation, she
charges defendant of committing adultery with Gregoria Bemejo. The lower
courts believed such adulterous acts committed by the defendant.
On the part of the defendant however, he stated that the reason why
he left his wife was because he received a letter made by the plaintiff
herself, addressed to a Spanish civil guard named Zabal who was her lover.
When the defendant asked plaintiff regarding the said letter, she admitted
the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and implored him to
pardon her. That same day he took her to the home of her parents, told what
had occurred, and left her there. The mother testified that about a year
after her daughter was returned to her she heard that the defendant
believed that illicit relations existed between Zabal and the plaintiff on
account of a certain letter.
Issue:
Whether or not mutual guilt was committed by both parties in this
case
Ruling:
It is expressly provided in Law 8, title 2, partida 4, as follows: For the
sin of each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the
other.The Courts conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to
a divorce. Section 497authorizes us in cases of this kind "to make such
findings upon the facts and render such final judgment as justice and equity
require." The judgment below is reversed, and we find from the evidence
the following facts: The allegations of the complaint as to the marriage of
the parties and as to the acts of adultery committed by the defendant are
true as therein stated except as to the date of the adultery committed with
Gregoria Bermejo. The plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the
Province of Occidental Negros, committed adultery with one Zabal, a
corporal of the civil guard.
As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither
party is entitled to judgment of divorce against the other; that judgment be
entered that the plaintiff take nothing by her action or the defendant by his
cross demand, and that neither party recover of the other any costs either
in this court or the Court of First Instance.
COLLUSION
JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553
February
23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot
several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff
discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year.
Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going
out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of
June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left
plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff
signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a
petition for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not collusion existed in this case.
Ruling:
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between
husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to
be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to
suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other
to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the
acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to
make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it
was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation
even in the absence of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of adultery had
really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have
falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send
her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She
could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred
from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus
enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it
PRESCRIPTION
WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO
G.R. No. L-10699
October 18, 1957
Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita
Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese
invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment
camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of
whom she begot a baby girl. Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in
1945, upon his release from internment. Thereafter the spouse lived
separately. Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown lived
martially with another woman and had begotten children by her.
The court denied the legal separation filed on the ground that Browns
action had already prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the action had already prescribed.
Ruling:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's
action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal
separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's
adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under
Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of
the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause
occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such
findings and conclusion.
The courts can take cognizance of prescription as a defense because
actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage,
involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be
issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
PRESCRIPTION
JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553
February
23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot
several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff
discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year.
Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going
out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of
June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left
plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff
signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a
petition for legal separation. Both lower and appellate courts denied the
petition on the ground that there was confession of judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not there was confession of judgment.
Ruling:
Art. 100 of the Civil Code do not exclude, as evidence, any admission
or confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely
prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession
of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and
confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly
agreeing to the plaintiff's demand. This is not present in this case. Yet, even
supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a
confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery
independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted,
since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented
by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso
facto, any defendant who opposesthe separation will immediately confess
judgment, purposely to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like
also" to be legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the
successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the
complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does
not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes
precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of
opposition to the agreement.
PRESCRIPTION
ELENA CONTRERAS vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG
G.R. No. L-29138
29, 1970
May
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952. Out of their
Marriage, three children were born. All the children are in the care of
plaintiff wife.In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car,
told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with one Lily Ann
Alcala. Defendant would be away for a month, and would be home for three
days. During these times defendant was home, plaintiff refrained from
verifying Lubos report in her desire not to anger defendant.
Plaintiff also heard rumors that Lily Ann Alcala gave birth to a baby.
Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with
defendant and to convince him to return to his family. Defendant however
told his father that he could not do anything. Thereafter, plaintiff met with
Lili Ann Alcala. The latter informed that former that she was willing to give
defendant but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her.
In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff went to talk to defendant
at his place of work where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily
Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was
willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer
leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.On December
14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not prescription has already set in
Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be
filed within one year after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause
is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause of action. It
is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social
institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a
disruption of its status.The only question to be resolved is whether the
period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be
counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or
from December 1963. After a careful review of the record, We are
persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant really
became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of
December 1963 when plaintiff pleaded the defendant to give up Lily Ann
Alcala.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion
mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her
that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his
legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to
decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only
then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.
The one year prescriptive period is thus followed in this case.
PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
AIDA P. BAEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ
G.R. No. 132592
23, 2002
January
Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20,
decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal
separation between petitioner Aida Baez and respondent Gabriel Baez on
the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal
property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture
of respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the
common children.
Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal before the appellate court.
Petitioner however contends that an action for legal separation is among
the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. She concludes that
respondents appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the
record on appeal within the reglementary period.
Issue:
Whether or not multiple appeals form part of the procedure for legal
separation cases.
Ruling:
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may
allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of
action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee
relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case
would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues
involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship
between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to
live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the
decree of legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that
may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the
decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal
separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
civilly on 21 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and
wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they
had no child; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about
March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation,
which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio however counter-claimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to
Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. On May 31,
1969, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Respondent moved to dismiss
the case on the ground that the death abated the action for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an
action for legal separation, abate the action
Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the
bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code
of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop
or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of
one party to the action causes the death of the action itself ... When one of
the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is
dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the
spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3).
The action is absolutely dead
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction
of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of
effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal
nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the
parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has
settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the
court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and
of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are
almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce
proceeding, before final decree, abates the action.
However, it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of
right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from
the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and
disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent,
such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not
thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the
Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of
the deceased party.
the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the
six-month period.The court where the action is pending according to Article
103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is
precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view
of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary
mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would
be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the
law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial
power to assert itself are discernible from what is set forth in the following
article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the
spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their
respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal
partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint
another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have
the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose
of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the
court."There would appear to be then recognition that the question of
management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even
during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for
the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute
limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is
thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is
justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court.
There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge,
considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an
attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the
management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an
assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD
ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.
G.R. No. L-53880
March 17, 1994
Facts:
In Concepcion Alanis complaint, she averred that she was married to
Pacete on 30 April 1938; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that she learned of such
marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the
latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds
and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with
Clarita and other dummies.
matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone
dictate.
tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,
obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or
underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for
legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order
to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE
SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES
G.R. No. 106169
February
14, 1994
Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries
during his successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to
his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration
of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired as
ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife
and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial
authorization to sell a building and lot located at #17 Eisenhower St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership.
He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone
without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray
the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment. In her
answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a
counterclaim for legal separation.
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject
properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on
the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her
administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he
merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be
renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the
rentals.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal
separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with
forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also
prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the
occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering
any of the conjugal properties. The petitioner now assails this order,
arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued
against one or the other because no right will be violated. In support of this
contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the injunction ha permanently installed the
respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.
Ruling:
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of
the parties and finds that the petition has no merit. We agree with the
respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the
whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in
allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct,
taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the
petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution
of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the
conjugal properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the
Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a
petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the
absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of
the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has
been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court
denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect
approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent
wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
January
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934
and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and
wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner
then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go
Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence.
However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled
to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on
May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio
moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided
in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for
legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved
property rights.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree
of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing
a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of
Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and
academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
March
18, 2010
Facts:
Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The
property involved in this case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is
registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of the couple is
conjugal partnership of gains.Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a
notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal
separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with
Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took possession of the
property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and
liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty spouse, did not receive his share in the net
profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled
land in Malabon as conjugal property. Alfred executed a Deed of Donation
over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the
name of Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and
Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then,
through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot.
Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued
to Inter-Dimensional Realty. Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property
was in Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to InterDimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land. Malabon
RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo
and declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional.
However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is
void because (1) it was entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredos
wife; and, (2) Alfredos undivided share has been forfeited in favour of
Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC.
Issue: