Sergeants Distance Education Program

8014A

INTRODUCTION TO WARFIGHTING Course Introduction

Scope

This course is a complementary resource used to blend doctrine with the applications that sergeants experience and execute in the warfighting environment. The source of the course content is MCDP 1, Warfighting, and the objective is to create an initial immersion of warfighting concepts for the Marine sergeant. MCDP 1, Warfighting should be read simultaneously or upon course completion to create a greater understanding of warfighting. Mastery of the content should provide the Marine sergeant with the warfighting foundation for the professional military education building blocks. The content applies to both technical and tactical proficiency that allows sergeants to lead and manage processes throughout the Marine Corps. The following is the table of contents for this course. Topic Chapter 1 The Nature of War Chapter 2 The Theory of War Chapter 3 Preparing for War Chapter 4 The Conduct of War Chapter 5 Warfighting Applications Appendix A Review Lesson Exercise See Page 1-1 2-1 3-1 4-1 5-1 A-1 R-1
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Table of Contents

MCI Course 8014A

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Course Introduction

Course Introduction, Continued

Estimated Study Time

You will spend about 11 hours completing this course. This includes the time you will need to study the text, complete the exercises, and take the final examination. You earn four retirement credits for completing this course. You earn reserve retirement credits at the rate of one credit for each 3 hours of estimated study time. Note: Reserve retirement credits are not awarded for the MCI study you do during drill periods if awarded credits for drill attendance.

Reserve Retirement Credits

Summary

The table below summarizes all-important “gateways” needed to successfully complete this course. Step 1 2 3 When you… Enroll in the program Complete the selfpaced text Pass the final examination Then you will… Receive your program material Arrange to take the final examination Receive a course completion certificate For more information Refer to the Program Guide Refer to the Program Guide Refer to the Program Guide
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MCI Course 8014A

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Course Introduction

Course Introduction, Continued

List of References

The following material was used in the development of this course: · Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Marine Corps Capstone Concept. http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2001/PDF/C&I%202001 %20chapt%202%20EMW.pdf. Harrap, Capt William. Implicit Communication: A Warfighting Imperative. Marine Corps Gazette. (Previously appeared in the MCI 7401 Introduction to Warfighting.) Krulak, General Charles C, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War. Marines Magazine. http://www.usmc.mil/marinesmagazine/pdf.nsf/8e8afdade19e000c852565 e700807312/ba6c7b077948be1b852566e800538752/$FILE/jan99.pdf. January 1999. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1 Warfighting. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-1 Strategy Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0 Operations
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Course Introduction

Course Introduction, Continued

List of References, continued

· · · ·

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-3 Tactics. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5-1A Doctrinal References for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 6 Command and Control. Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1500.55 Military Thinking and Decision Making Exercises. 12 April 97. www.tecom.usmc.mil/utm/Military%20thinking%20 MCO%201500.55.htm. Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-0B How to Conduct Training Murray, Col Charles H., USAF, Ed. Executive Decision Making. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I. http://www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/nsdmedm@.htm.pdf. 1 Feb 2002. Scharfen, John C. Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare. Interview with Major General Alfred M. Gray, Jr. Amphibious Warfare Review. Previously used in 7401 Introduction to Warfighting with permission. Schmitt, Capt John F. Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine. Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, VA. August 1990.

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·

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Course Introduction

CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE OF WAR Introduction

Estimated Study Time

50 minutes

Scope

This chapter discusses the concepts and factors related to war and warfighting. The common concepts and factors that link war to the operational environments also provide the Marine sergeant with the tools to lead Marines and facilitate processes throughout the Marine Corps. After completing this chapter, you should be able to identify the definition of the following warfighting concepts: · · · · · · · · · · · War Friction Uncertainty Fluidity Disorder Complexity Human Dimension Violence and danger Physical, moral, and mental forces Evolution of war Science, art, and dynamic of war
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Learning Objectives

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Chapter 1

Introduction, Continued

In This Chapter

This chapter contains the following topics: Topic War Defined Warfighting Concepts Chapter 1 Exercise See Page 1-3 1-5 1-11

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Chapter 1

War Defined

Introduction

To understand the Marine Corps’ philosophy of warfighting, you first need an appreciation for the nature of war itself—its moral, mental, and physical characteristics and demands. War is defined as follows: · · · A violent clash of interests between or among organized groups The use of military force A violent struggle between two wills, each trying to impose itself on the other

Definition of War

The target of the violence may be limited to hostile combatant forces, or it may extend to the enemy population at large. War may range from intense clashes between large military forces, to subtler, unconventional hostilities that barely reach the threshold of violence.
Groups Engaging in War

Participants and groups are placed into two general categories: · · Nation-states Nonstates

Nation-States

Nation-states are the groups traditionally engaging in warfare. They generally represent countries or the modern nation as representative unit of the political unit. An example of a war between nation-states would be the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988. The participants were limited to the two nation-states. Other nations may have provided indirect support, but they did not participate in actual combat operations.
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Example of a Nation-State War

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Chapter 1

War Defined, Continued

Nonstate

A nonstate group is a group that has no direct affiliation with a nation-state. These groups can be composed of groups external to the nation state or an internal faction. Examples of a nonstate groups include international coalitions or groups that share the same ideologies. Their focus is to influence other nonstate or nation-state groups to bend to their will. Two such examples would be · · Nations assembled into the coalition forces for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Al Qaeda terrorist network that functions internationally, which is linked through ideology rather than officially supported by a nation-state.

Example of Nonstate

Conclusion

The study of war is essential to be an effective Marine sergeant. Effective leadership creates the opportunity to take the warfighting concepts and develop specific solutions that can be applied to the operating environment.

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Chapter 1

Warfighting Concepts

Introduction

This topic provides an overview of common warfighting concepts: · · · · · · · · · · Friction Uncertainty Fluidity Disorder Complexity Human dimension Violence and danger Physical, moral, and mental forces Evolution of war Science, art, and dynamics of war

Friction

Friction is the force that resists all action and saps energy. It makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible. There are four types of friction. Examples of the each are provided in the table below: Type of Friction Mental Physical External Self-Induced Examples Indecision over a course of action Effective enemy fire or a terrain obstacle Imposed by enemy action, the terrain, weather, or mere chance · Lack of a clearly defined goal · Lack of coordination · Unclear or complicated plans · Complex task organizations or command relationships · Complicated technologies
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Types of Friction

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Chapter 1

Warfighting Concepts, Continued

Minimizing Friction

The effects of friction can be minimized through effective leadership. Marine NCOs face the additional challenge in that they are the first level of leadership that has to motivate and direct Marines. It is essential that mentoring and counseling be a part of the leadership and training cycle to develop the corporals and Marines serving with them. The nature of war makes certainty impossible. All actions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even conflicting information. Uncertainties exist in battle in the form of unknowns about the enemy, about the environment, and even about the friendly situation. These uncertainties can never be eliminated. The fog of war is a term used to describe the uncertainty of war. The fog of war occurs in the execution of warfare and many other operational applications.

Uncertainty

Factors of Uncertainty

The following three factors contribute to uncertainty: · · · Nonlinearity Risk Chance

Nonlinearity

Nonlinearity refers to the system for cause and effect within warfare to allow disproportionate outcomes. In simplest terms, minor incidents or actions can have decisive effects on the outcome of a battle. Nonlinearity is an important source of uncertainty. Risk is inherent in war and is involved in every mission. Risk is equally common to action and inaction and may be related to potential gain. Greater gain often requires greater risk.
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Risk

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Chapter 1

Warfighting Concepts, Continued

Risk Management

Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk costs with mission benefits. Marines at all levels must use risk management because it applies to all missions and environments across a wide range of Marine Corps operations. Part of uncertainty is the element of chance. Chance is the turn of events that cannot be reasonably foreseen. Neither the enemy nor friendly forces have control over these unforeseen events. While nonlinearity and risk can be enhanced or minimized through the study of war, training, and experience, chance is an advantage and a disadvantage to friend and foe alike. Chance is a characteristic of war and a source of friction. Each episode in war is shaped by the episodes that come before it. Each episode also shapes the ones that follow. This creates a continuous, fluctuating flow of activity with opportunities and unforeseen events. This flow of activity is called fluidity. Disorder is created by situations where plans go awry, instructions and information are unclear and misunderstood, or communications fail. Mistakes and unforeseen events can also cause disorder. War naturally moves toward disorder. Disorder is unavoidable in war and it will never be eliminated. Complexity refers to the intricate, interrelated parts that compose the process and elements used to execute war and warfare. The level of complexity depends on the level and scope of the warfighting application. For example, a division has more elements than a regiment when evaluated in terms of companies, squads, or even individuals.
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Chance

Fluidity

Disorder

Complexity

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Chapter 1

Warfighting Concepts, Continued

Human Dimension

The human dimension is central to war itself. War is shaped by human nature, which is exemplified by the clash of wills and is subject to its complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities that characterize human behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on a disagreement, it will be shaped by human emotion. The human dimension of war is essential to get an accurate view of the nature of war. War tests the physical and mental strength of the participants, but the human effects go far beyond the measurement of strength. Consideration needs to be given to the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, and lack of the ordinary necessities in life. The cumulative effects of these and similar factors can affect individuals, groups, and operations adversely. The Marine NCO needs to understand human behavior and take action to minimize the limiting effects and optimize the positive behaviors.

Violence and Danger

Violence is inherent in warfighting and is characterized by bloodshed, destruction, and suffering. Violence and danger are interlinked because the violence makes war a dangerous undertaking. Fear is the normal human reaction to violence and danger. Fear has a significant effect on the conduct of war because it contributes to the erosion of will. The erosion of will leads directly to defeat or less than successful operations. From a warfighting perspective, the effects of fear can be minimized by courage. Courage and confidence can be fortified in many ways, which will be discussed in terms of minimizing fear.

Fear

Courage

Courage is not the absence of fear, but the strength to overcome it. Each person reacts differently to fear at each specific event, associated time and situation. Courage can produce outcomes ranging from a reasoned calculation and action to a fierce emotional reaction. The human dynamics of each individual based on reason, emotion, and experience produce the resulting act of courage.
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Chapter 1

Warfighting Concepts, Continued

Physical, Moral, and Mental Forces

War is characterized by the interaction of physical, moral, and mental forces. While the physical forces are easy to measure, the moral and mental forces are more difficult to quantify due their intangible nature. The physical characteristics are easily seen, understood, and measured. Commodities such as equipment capabilities, supplies, seized physical objectives, force ratios, losses of materiel or life, terrain lost or gained, prisoners or materiel captured are tangibles and considered physical forces. The moral forces in warfighting pertain to the psychological and intangible forces. Examples include the following: · · · · · · · · National and military resolve National and individual conscience Emotion Fear Courage Morale Leadership Espirit

Physical Forces

Moral Forces

Mental Forces

Mental forces provide individuals and groups with the ability to grasp complex battlefield situations; make effective estimates, calculations, and decisions; devise tactics and strategies; and develop plans.
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Chapter 1

Warfighting Concepts, Continued

Evolution of War

While war and warfare have essentially remained the same, the operating environments, tactics, and techniques have changed as mankind and technology have become more developed. Technology advancements and innovations are the greatest driving force in the evolution and conduct of war. The evolution of armor from hardened hide to Kevlar is an example of how a simple development evolved from the simple process of curing and tanning a hide to the highly technical process of creating synthetic body armor. Numerous other innovations have changed the process and execution of war from many perspectives: · · · Development and use of the rifled bore Conception and use of conscription to man armies Use of modern modes of transportation to support war

In order to remain effective in the operating environment, Marine leaders must continue to educate themselves and utilize the evolution process to their advantage. Sergeants must remain proactive in their efforts to develop new skills and learn to apply them in the execution of their daily duties.
Science, Art, and Dynamics of War

The various aspects of war fall into the realms of science and art. The scientific aspects like ballistics, mechanics, and technology are clearly definable. The application of the art of war requires the individual to understand the essence of a unique military situation and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. War is an extreme test of will. Friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and danger are its essential characteristics. War remains fundamentally unpredictable. Each episode is the unique product of multiple moral, mental and physical forces.

Concluding Perspective on War

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Chapter 1

Chapter 1 Exercise

Estimated Study Time

10 minutes

Directions

Complete items 1 through 14 by performing the action required. Check your answers against those listed at the end of this lesson. What is the definition of war as defined by MCDP 1, Warfighting? a. b. c. d. Armed conflict where one side is annihilated by a stronger, more dominant force that takes control of the vanquished resources. The disagreement of countries over political viewpoints and economic interests that can only be solved through military force. The action arm of organizations or countries when diplomatic resolve or methodology. A violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force.

Item 1

Item 2

The chapter places participants and groups into two general categories. What are these categories? a. Leaders and warfighters b. Combatants and non-combatants c. Nation-states and nonstate groups d. Friendly forces and opposing forces
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Chapter 1 Exercise

Chapter 1 Exercise, Continued

Items 3 Through 12

Matching: For items 3 through 12, match the common characteristics of war in column 1 with the definitions in column 2. Column 1 Characteristics of War ___ 3. ___ 4. ___ 5. ___ 6. ___ 7. ___ 8. ___ 9. Friction Uncertainty Fluidity Disorder Complexity Human dimension Violence and danger ___ 10. Physical, moral, and mental forces ___ 11. Evolution of war ___ 12. Science, art and dynamics of war Column 2 Definition a. b. c. d. e. f. Bloodshed, destruction, and suffering that can affect friend and foe alike Forces that influence warfare whether they are intangible or tangible Unknowns about the enemy and the environment experienced in battle Plans gone awry, misunderstood instructions, communication failures, mistakes, and unforeseen events The force that resists all action and saps energy Behavior exemplified by the clash of wills and the related complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities that characterize human behavior A condition that creates a continuous, fluctuating flow of activity Intricate, interrelated parts that compose the process and elements used to execute war and warfare The realms in which the various aspects of war fall Operating environments, tactics, and techniques that have changed as mankind and technology have become more developed
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g. h. i. j.

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Chapter 1 Exercise

Chapter 1 Exercise, Continued

Item 13

Nonlinearity, risk, and chance are contributing factors to which of the following concepts? a. Fear of the unknown b. Strategic corporal c. Uncertainty d. Fire and maneuver

Item 14

Which definition would best describe nonlinearity? a. b. c. d. The system for cause and effect within warfare to allow disproportionate outcomes. The descriptive of defensive strategy that increases the difficulty for the enemy to target friendly positions. The process of being unpredictable in the operating environment by managing routes and lager sites. The ability of leader to modify behavior to increase uncertainty in movement and positioning.
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Chapter 1 Exercise

Chapter 1 Exercise, Continued

Answers

The table below provides the answers to the exercise items. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item.
Item Number Answer Reference

1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

d c
e c g d h f a b

1-3 1-3
1-5 1-6 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-8 1-8 1-9

j i c a

1-10 1-10 1-6 1-6

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Chapter 1 Exercise

CHAPTER 2 THE THEORY OF WAR Introduction

Estimated Study Time

50 minutes

Scope

This chapter is designed to teach the concepts and content contained in MCDP 1, Warfighting, chapter 2. The content is the initial building block for the Marine NCO’s warfighting studies. After completing this chapter, you should be able to identify the definition of the following concepts: · · · · · · · · · · · Politics Policy Means in war Levels of war Initiative Response Attrition warfare Maneuver warfare Combat power Speed Focus
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Learning Objectives

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Chapter 2

Introduction, Continued

Learning Objectives, continued

· · · · · ·

Surprise Boldness Centers of gravity Critical vulnerabilities Creating opportunity Exploiting opportunity

In This Chapter

This chapter contains the following topics: Topic War Theory Concepts Levels of Warfighting Initiative and Response Styles of Warfare Combat Power Combat Power Concepts Gravity and Vulnerability Creating and Exploiting Opportunity Chapter 2 Exercise See Page 2-3 2-6 2-9 2-11 2-13 2-14 2-17 2-18 2-19

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Chapter 2

War Theory Concepts

Introduction

The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes.

-- Carl von Clausewitz While war is as old as mankind, the basis upon which war is waged has changed with time and technology. As noted by Carl von Clauswitz, modern warfare is waged to support politics and policies. War is an extension of both policy and politics with the addition of military force. It is important for Marine NCOs to understand the concepts that direct war and operations: · · · ·
Politics

Politics Policy Means Spectrum of conflict

Politics refers to the distribution of power through the interaction of both cooperative and competitive elements of a group or organization. Policy refers to the conscious objectives established within the political process. These objectives become what are commonly referred to as policy aims. The policy aims state what is to be accomplished and how the process of war is to be conducted. The single most important thought to understand about war and policy is that war must serve policy. War is an extension of policy and politics. War provides the means to accomplish the policy objectives, which are often driven by politics. War uses all power elements that one group can bring against another to achieve the objective. This includes the following: · · · · Economic means Diplomatic means Military means Psychological means
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Policy

War, Policy, and Politics

Means in War

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Chapter 2

War Theory Concepts, Continued

Economic Means in War

An example of economic warfare is when trade sanctions or policies are imposed on one or two groups: · · Nation-state—the United States or Russia Nonstate—an international coalition or faction within or outside of an existing state

Political Means in War

Political means in war can take place in diplomatic circles and organizations such as the United Nations. The pressure generated by diplomatic language and open discussion can apply pressure on groups, nation-states, or nonstates. The military means in war can range from the mere threat of presence to the actual commitment of combat troops to an area. The Marine operational forces have the capability and capacity to fulfill this mission, since Marine forces are always afloat and poised for deployment. Psychological means in war are planned operations to convey information to influence the emotions, motives, reasoning, and behavior of foreign audiences. Dropping leaflets in Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of psychological means in war. The spectrum of conflict ranges from military operations other than war to large-scale, sustained combat operations. The scale of the conflict is determined by · · · · Policy objectives Available military means National will Density of the fighting forces or combat power
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Military Means in War

Psychological Means in War

Spectrum of Conflict

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Chapter 2

War Theory Concepts, Continued

Marine Corps’ Role in the Spectrum of Conflict

The Marine Corps is the Nation’s force-in-readiness and must have the versatility and flexibility to deal with a situation at any intensity level across the spectrum of conflict. The Marine Corps maintains itself as a modern military force capable of waging war against a large conventional force or a small war against lightly armed guerilla force.

Warfighting Challenges

Today’s Marine NCOs will experience greater leadership and operational challenges than ever before. Understanding warfighting gives leaders the ability to · · · Understand what the higher-level mission is and how their unit fits into it. Make plans and decisions. Communicate the plans and decisions to subordinates.

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Chapter 2

Levels of Warfighting

Introduction

Marine NCOs should understand how the levels of war relate to operations that may involve the Marine Corps. This section creates an awareness of the strategies and organizational structure that drives the warfighting environment. War is planned and conducted at different levels. The three levels of warfare are listed below: · · · Strategic Operational Tactical

Levels of War

Strategic Level

The strategic level of war is the highest level of war. Activities at the strategic level focus directly on policy objectives. Strategy applies to peace as well as war and it can be subdivided into different types: · National strategy—coordinates and focuses all the elements of national power to attain policy objectives · Military strategy—secures the policy objectives; viewed as the art of winning wars and securing peace

Strategy Applications

Strategy applications involves the following: · · · · Establishing goals Assigning forces Providing assets Imposing conditions on the use of force

Strategy is developed from policy and political objectives.
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Chapter 2

Levels of Warfighting, Continued

Operational Level

The operational level of war links the strategic and tactical levels of war. The challenge of the operational level of war is deciding when, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy in battle. It also includes when, where, and under what conditions to refuse battle in support of higher aims. The tactical level of war is the lowest level of war. Tactics refer to the concepts and methods used to accomplish a mission in either combat or military operations. In war, tactics focus on the application of combat power to defeat an enemy force. This application of combat power occurs at a particular time and place. In non-combat situations, tactics may include methods used to perform other missions, such as · Enforcing order · Maintaining security during peacekeeping operations In the Marine Corps, NCOs operate at the tactical level.

Tactical Level

Overlap

The levels of war overlap. The degree of overlap depends on the application of warfare and the structure of the elements participating in the operation. The most common overlap occurs when a single commander has responsibilities at more than one level, such as when a unit is performing a military operation other than war.
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Chapter 2

Levels of Warfighting, Continued

Comparative View of the Levels of War

A comparative view of the levels of war is depicted in the diagram below:

LEVELS OF WAR
STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL TACTICAL

TACTICAL

COMPRESSED LEVELS OF WAR

Compressed Levels of War

The levels of war tend to be compressed in situations where operations are directed and executed by either a very short chain of command or smaller forces capable of carrying out operations in limited environments. Nuclear war is good example of a short chain of command since the strategic level and tactical level are almost one in the same. The strategic decisions regarding the direction of the war and the tactical decisions to employ nuclear weapons are essentially the same. Military operations utilizing a unit such as a Marine expeditionary unit to conduct a non-combatant evacuation of an embassy could be an example of compressed levels of war since the strategic and tactical levels work together.

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Chapter 2

Initiative and Response

Introduction

The clash of wills requires combinations of actions and reactions to execute warfare. These actions and reactions can be more simply classified as initiative and response. Initiative is the ability to dictate terms of the conflict and force the enemy to meet on these terms. Initiative is normally associated with offense. The most obvious way to seize and maintain the initiative is to strike first and keep striking. Marine leaders benefit by taking the opportunity to employ initiative. Some of the battlefield related benefits of initiative are as follows: · · The terms of the conflict can be dictated to the enemy. The enemy is forced to meet us on our terms.

Initiative

Benefits of Initiative

Response

Response is merely reacting to the initiative; it is how you respond to the opposition. The responding or second party must have the desire and will to resist in order to have conflict. Response is normally associated with defense. Defense has the aim of resisting the enemy’s will. It also creates the opportunity for initiative.
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Chapter 2

Initiative and Response, Continued

Example of Initiative and Response

The simplest example of initiative is when a squad leader plans and executes an ambush. The initiative occurs during the planning, developing the situation, and in executing the ambush. Each of these steps requires leadership action and an expected performance response by the Marines. When the enemy has to react or respond to the initiative, it creates a response. This is how initiative and response are related. Analysis of the anticipated enemy response increases the effectiveness of the ambush and minimizes the enemy’s opportunity to gain momentum to change the sequence of events.

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Chapter 2

Styles of Warfare

Introduction

There are two styles of warfare: · · Attrition warfare Maneuver warfare

These two styles of warfare lie at opposite ends of the spectrum. It is important to understand the philosophies and applications that form the basis of each. While maneuver warfare is the method prescribed by Marine Corps doctrine, most operational applications fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum.
Attrition Warfare

Attrition warfare pursues victory though the destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower. It is a direct approach that sees war as a straightforward test of strength. The greatest requirement for success is numerical and material superiority. Technical proficiency matters more than cunning or creativity. At the national level, war becomes an industrial as well as a military problem. Historically, nations and militaries that thought they were numerically and technically superior often used attrition warfare. Examples of attrition warfare are listed below: · · · · · · Operations of both sides on the Western Front in World War I The French defensive tactics and operations against the Germans in May 1940 The Allied campaign in Italy from 1943 to 1944 Eisenhower’s broad-front offensive in Europe after Normandy during 1944 U.S. operations in Korean after 1950 Most U.S. operations in the Vietnam War
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Chapter 2

Styles of Warfare, Continued

Maneuver Warfare

The goal of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy’s moral, mental, and physical cohesion by attacking selected enemy weaknesses. Cohesion is the enemy’s ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole. When the cohesion is destroyed, the enemy is forced to operate as separate, smaller, independent units, which can easily be destroyed. Maneuver warfare relies on speed and surprise. Examples of maneuver warfare are listed below: · Allenby’s campaign against the Turks in Palestine in 1918 · German Blitzkrieg operations of 1939 to 1941, most notably was the invasion of France in 1940 · The failed Allied landing at Anzio in 1944 · Patton’s breakout from the Normandy beachhead in late 1944 · McArthur’s Inchon campaign in 1950 · III Marine Amphibious Force’s combined action program in Vietnam · “Hail-Mary” conducted by U.S. Forces in Operation Desert Storm · The rapid advance on Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Leadership Challenges

NCOs can better manage their assets and employ tactics that support mission success if they understand each warfare style.

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Chapter 2

Combat Power

Introduction

The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps reflects the ability to project a force globally and conduct operations. The ability to execute warfare is dependent on the capacity to project and sustain combat power. Combat power is the total destructive force to bear on the enemy at a given time. Combat power is difficult to measure because many of the factors are not measurable. Examples of such factors are listed below: · · · · · · · · Effects of maneuver, tempo, or surprise Advantages conferred by geography or climate Relative strengths of offense and defense Relative merits of striking the enemy in the front, flanks, or rear Morale Fighting spirit Perseverance Effects of leadership

Definition

Measuring Combat Power

Combat Power and the Marine NCO

Identifying the major factors that influence the unit’s combat power adds depth to understanding warfighting dynamics for NCOs. The key to success is for the NCO to understand how the major factors influence warfighting.

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Chapter 2

Combat Power Concepts

Introduction

The major factors influencing combat power are crucial to achieving an understanding of combat power. It is necessary to understand that combat power is situation specific since each set of factors changes with time. Several major factors form the core of combat power. These factors are listed below: · · · · · · · · Speed Focus Surprise Boldness Centers of gravity Critical vulnerabilities Creating opportunity Exploiting opportunity

Combat Power Factors

Speed

Speed is the rapidity of action. The rapidity of action is how fast events occur. It applies to both time and space. Speed over time is tempo—the consistent ability to work quickly. Speed over space is the ability to move rapidly. Speed is a weapon and is most often overlooked as such. The ability to out maneuver or out perform the enemy is how speed becomes a weapon. Speed is a critical factor in keeping the enemy off balance or keeping the operational flow of events in a sequence.
Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.

-- Sun Tzu
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Chapter 2

Combat Power Concepts, Continued

Focus

Focus is the generation of superior combat power at a particular time and place. Focus has costs. To achieve focus at a decisive place and time, leaders must use strict economy and accept risk elsewhere and at other times. Economy is achieved by managing the scarce resources of a force. NCOs must understand the principle of economy, the mission, and the commander’s intent to effectively lead Marines within his or her unit. Acceptance of risk elsewhere means that if you concentrate your efforts at the point of decision, you will be weaker in other places. The combination of speed and focus adds punch or shock effect to your actions. You should strike with the greatest possible combination of speed and focus.

Surprise

Surprise is a state of disorientation resulting from an unexplained event or sequence of events that degrades the enemy’s ability to resist. Surprise can be achieved through one of three methods: · · · Deception Ambiguity Stealth

Deception

Deception is the ability to convince the enemy that something is going to happen other than what really happens. This is done to get the enemy to act in a manner detrimental to his own interests. In simplest terms, the intent is to give the enemy a clear picture of the situation, but the wrong picture. Ambiguity is doubt and can be created by acting in a way that the enemy does not know what to expect. This means the enemy must prepare for numerous possibilities. Stealth is to deny the enemy any knowledge of what will happen. The enemy is neither deceived nor confused, but instead is completely ignorant of future actions.
Continued on next page

Ambiguity

Stealth

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Chapter 2

Combat Power Concepts, Continued

Boldness

Boldness is the characteristic of using the natural uncertainty of war to pursue major results rather than minor ones. Boldness is not recklessness. It is important to understand that inaction can be a form of boldness. A calculating patience to remain inactive while the enemy commits himself before we strike him is a form of boldness. Situational awareness is the key to boldness. Leaders at all levels must have the ability to assess the situation and then act.

Relationship of Surprise and Boldness

There is a close connection between surprise and boldness. It is necessary to take risks to surprise the enemy. The willingness to take these risks is an example of boldness.

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Chapter 2

Gravity and Vulnerability
Introduction

To win, the Marine Corps must focus combat power toward a decisive aim. There are two concepts that focus on this: centers of gravity and critical vulnerability. Centers of gravity are any important sources of strength. If they are friendly centers of gravity—protect them; if they are enemy centers of gravity—take them away. Centers of gravity can be identified by answering the following questions: · What factors are critical to the enemy? · Which can the enemy not do without? · Which, if eliminated, will bend the enemy most quickly to our will? The U.S. Forces’ rapid advance on Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom makes Baghdad the centers of gravity.

Centers of Gravity

NCOs Relationship to Centers of Gravity

Marine NCOs must understand how their role influences and impacts the friendly forces’ capability and capacity. NCOs can conduct a situational assessment within the unit to identify targets that generate power for enemy. NCOs must take action to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy. A critical vulnerability is an opportunity that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy’s ability to resist. Long supply lines for U.S. Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of critical vulnerability. All leaders should be prepared to identify the enemy’s vulnerabilities within their battlespace or point of application. Maintaining situational awareness at all times is an integral part for leaders at the point of contact, which is where most NCOs will be employing their warfighting capabilities. Centers of gravity and critical vulnerability are related. Centers of gravity focus on of how to attack the enemy system from seeking a source of strength. Critical vulnerability evaluates the enemy by seeking a weakness. Critical vulnerabilities are the pathway to attacking the centers of gravity. The underlying purpose is to create an opportunity to target actions in such a way as to have the greatest effect on the enemy. Example: The U.S. Forces’ rapid advance on Baghdad greatly stretched supply lines.

Critical Vulnerability

NCO’s Relationship to Critical Vulnerability

Relationship of Concepts

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Chapter 2

Creating and Exploiting Opportunity

Introduction

The challenge of warfighting is to be able to assess the situation and respond properly. This assessment can create and exploit opportunity. Sometimes identifying the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities is particularly difficult, so the commander may have to exploit any or all vulnerabilities until action uncovers a decisive opportunity. A seemly routine low-level decision could change the structure of the operating environment enough to create opportunity elsewhere. Exploiting opportunity is the ability and willingness to ruthlessly exploit an opportunity to generate decisive results. Often a created opportunity is a fleeting one. It requires subordinate leaders to be aware of their environmental factors and make situational decisions intuitively and instantaneously. A source of the opportunity could be · · · A mere chance An enemy mistake A result of the fog or friction of war itself

Creating Opportunity

Exploiting Opportunity

Point of Decision

Often the point of decision in the operating environment will be at the squad or platoon level. NCOs must be able to draw parallels between warfighting and a current situation. The need for technical and tactical proficiency combined with effective leadership is essential for operational success at all levels.

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Chapter 2

Chapter 2 Exercise

Estimated Study Time

10 minutes

Directions

Complete items 1 through 19 by performing the action required. Check your answers against those listed at the end of this lesson. Politics refers to which of the following statements? a. b. c. d. The distribution of power through dynamic interaction of both cooperative and competitive elements of a group, organization, or entity. The tactics used by groups and individuals to gain the desired outcomes that benefit the individuals or the groups. The procedure to attain support for plans and processes resulting from initiatives and responses. The underlying processes by which all organizations function.

Item 1

Item 2

Policy refers to a. b. c. d. processes and procedures set by commanding officers to satisfy behavioral, performance, and operational standards. high level decisions used to navigate through international and national bureaucracy to achieve goals. the conscious objectives established within the political process. written documents that are used to lead and manage organizations.

Item 3

What is the most important relationship between war and policy? a. b. c. d. Policy supports wars. War must serve policy. War and policy are both necessary to conduct operations. Policy leads to war.
Continued on next page

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Chapter 2 Exercise

Chapter 2 Exercise, Continued

Item 4

Means in war is the a. b. c. d. use of all power elements against another to achieve the objective. purpose and function of the operation tasked to operational units. method used to engage the opposing forces. weapons and tactics employed to accomplish the mission.

Item 5

War is planned and conducted at different levels. What are these levels? a. b. c. d. Marine expeditionary force, Marine expeditionary brigade, and Marine expeditionary unit Diplomatic, coalition, and operational Strategic, operational, and tactical Joint, service, and unit

Item 6

What is the definition of initiative? a. b. c. d. Ensuring that personnel exercise action when it is opportune. The plan before it is executed within warfighting doctrine. The understanding of commander’s intent and guidance in terms of the operations. The ability to dictate terms of the conflict and force the enemy to meet on these terms.

Item 7

Merely reacting to the initiative describes which of the following terms? a. b. c. d. Reaction Reiterative Response Rebound
Continued on next page

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Chapter 2 Exercise

Chapter 2 Exercise, Continued
Item 8

What is the concept of attrition warfare? a. b. c. d. Style of warfare that quantifies the amount of materiel used in comparatively to conduct warfare Pursues victory though the destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower A type of operational planning supported by materiel usage and resource management for operational success Joins current doctrine with 21st century technology as a means of overcoming opposing forces

Item 9

What is the concept of maneuver warfare? a. b. c. d. Support the portion of the plan that describes the movement phase of the operation. Engage mechanization and supporting arms onto opposing objectives. Organize warfighting doctrine and movement by fire. Shatter the enemy’s moral, mental, and physical cohesion by attacking selected enemy weaknesses.

Item 10

Combat power is the a. b. c. d. support arms that can be delivered during each phase of the operation. difference between the offensive and defensive power factors estimated by strategic planners. total destructive force that we can pass onto the enemy at a given time. combined total estimated power projection of a expeditionary force.
Continued on next page

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Chapter 2 Exercise

Chapter 2 Exercise, Continued

Item 11

Matching: For items 11 through 18, match the common characteristics of war in column 1 with the definition in the column 2.
Column 1

Column 2 Definition a. A state of disorientation resulting from an unexplained event or sequence of events that degrades the enemy’s ability to resist Any important sources of strength The process that occurs when critical vulnerabilities are so difficult that the commander has to exploit any or all vulnerabilities until a decisive opportunity is revealed The rapidity of action An opportunity that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy’s ability to resist the exploitation The ability and willingness to act ruthlessly in exploiting an opportunity to generate decisive results The generation of superior combat power at a particular time and space The characteristic of unhesitatingly exploiting the natural uncertainty of war to pursue major results rather than minor ones
Continued on next page

Characteristics of War ___ 11. ___ 12. ___ 13. ___ 14. ___ 15. ___ 16. ___ 17. ___ 18. Speed Focus Surprise Boldness Centers of gravity Critical vulnerability Creating opportunity Exploiting opportunity

b. c.

d. e.

f.

g. h.

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Chapter 2 Exercise

Chapter 2 Exercise, Continued

Item 19

Choose the list of options that represents sources of opportunity. a. b. c. d. Mere chance, an enemy mistake, or a result of the fog or friction of war itself Operational planning, logistical support, transportation assets, or situational intelligence Tactics, combat techniques, fire support, or methods of engagement Fire and maneuver, supporting arms, tactical communications, surveillance, or intelligence assets

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Chapter 2 Exercise

Chapter 2 Exercise, Continued

Answers

The table below provides the answers to the exercise items. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item. Item Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12

Answer a c b a c d c b d c
d g a h b e c f

Reference 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-6 2-9 2-9 2-11 2-12 2-13
2-14 2-15 2-15 2-16 2-17 2-17 2-18 2-18

13 14 15 16 17 18 19

a

2-18

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Chapter 2 Exercise

CHAPTER 3 PREPARING FOR WAR Introduction

Estimated Study Time

50 minutes

Scope

The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision borne of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in the character and for the man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous.

-- Hans von Seeckt This chapter covers the preparation concepts necessary to conduct war. It provides the doctrinal basis for growth through study and learning through experience.
Learning Objectives

After completing this chapter, you should be able to identify the definition of the following preparation concepts: · · · · · · · · Force planning Organization Doctrine Professionalism Training Professional military education Personnel management Equipping
Continued on next page

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Chapter 3

Introduction, Continued

In This Lesson

This lesson contains the following topics: Topic Warfighting Preparations Lesson 3 Exercise See Page 3-3 3-9

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Chapter 3

Warfighting Preparations

Introduction

To become an effective warfighter, the following topics must be understood: · · · · · · · · Force planning Organization Doctrine Professionalism Training Professional military education Personnel management Equipping

Force Planning

Force planning is the planning that is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. Force planning requires the planner to have the ability to analyze the evolution or creation of current and future threats in order to develop countermeasure capabilities. These countermeasures come in the form of personnel, strategy, technology, ordnance, armament, and logistics. Force planning is generally handled at higher levels than the noncommissioned officer (NCO) level. However, it is important for the Marine NCO to understand that force planning takes place and produces output in terms of force structure and equipping. Force planning also provides the incentive for Marines to stay informed of changing global threats and how these changes effect how warfighting operations are executed.
Continued on next page

Force Planning and the Marine NCO

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Chapter 3

Warfighting Preparations, Continued

Organization

Organization is tailoring the composition of the operational forces to provide forward deployed forces capable of conducting expeditionary operations. Marine operating forces must maintain the capability to deploy by whatever means appropriate for the situation while maintaining their unique amphibious capability. The Marine NCO needs to understand that the mission requirements drive the size, composition, and equipping of Marine units down to the squad or section level. For example, a Marine NCO may be tasked with a mission in a mechanized environment. In order to meet the opposing threat, he or she may have to modify the weapons, equipment, and munitions load to meet the mission requirements. This is how organization influences units at the lowest levels.

Impact of Organization on the Marine NCO

Doctrine

Doctrine, as defined by Joint Publication 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, is the principles that guide military forces in their activities in support of national objectives. Marine Corps doctrine is a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps. It establishes a particular way of thinking about war and fighting. It also provides a philosophy for leading Marines in combat—a mandate for professionalism and a common language. Professionalism requires Marine NCOs to be · Experts in the conduct of war · Competent to meet the challenge of defending the Nation · Skilled at getting things done
Continued on next page

Marine Corps Doctrine

Professionalism

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Chapter 3

Warfighting Preparations, Continued

Professionalism for Marine NCOs

Maneuver warfare requires leaders with boldness and initiative down to the lowest levels. As the Marine NCO experiences a broader perspective of the Marine Corps, he or she gains a greater understanding of the military, Marine Corps, and operating environment. The NCO’s responsibility in terms of lives, material, and resources grows with each promotion. To effectively manage these scarce and precious resources, the NCOs must expand their horizons to think and act with initiative and focus. Commanders establish standards that communicate the intent of training and establish the main effort of training. These training guidelines provide subordinate leaders with what is to be accomplished. Subordinate leaders have to organize and develop training plans to support the commander’s guidelines. Training critiques are an essential part of an effective training program. They are generally opinions made by individuals monitoring or participating in the training. The purpose is to draw out the lessons of training. Critiques are conducted immediately after training before memory of events fades. Participants need to be willing to admit mistakes and discuss them. The Marine NCO is a link between the training applications and the warfighting concepts contained in doctrine. Although the commander is responsible for training Marines under their command, it is the NCOs who provide the necessary skills to assist the commander in obtaining this goal. Marine NCOs train their Marines from personal knowledge, acquired experiences, lessons learned, mentoring, and other practical application methods.
Continued on next page

Training

Training Critiques

NCOs Role in Training

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Chapter 3

Warfighting Preparations, Continued

Professional Military Education

Professional military education (PME) describes the education that Marines receive through a combination of · · · · · Resident PME Non-resident PME Military studies conducted at the unit level Individual study Experience

Professional military education is designed to develop creative, thinking leaders. All Marines should view this PME as a continuous, progressive process extending throughout their careers.
PME Triad

Professional military education is built upon a three-tiered approach: · · Education establishment—schools administered by the Marine Corps, subordinate commands, or outside agencies Commanders—development of their subordinates to include developing military judgment and decision making, and teaching general professional and specific technical subjects Individual Marines—self-directed study in the art and science of war

·
PME Goal

The goal of PME is to develop an expert in warfighting and professional leadership. In addition to the three-tier approach, a well rounded PME program should include a combination of the following elements: · · · · · · An individual professional reading program Map exercises War gaming Simulation training Battle studies Terrain studies
Continued on next page

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Chapter 3

Warfighting Preparations, Continued

PME Applications for NCOs

Marine leaders at every level should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection of themselves. Marine NCOs should not only participate in PME as students, but also develop the ability to teach their Marines the skills and information that they have mastered. Additionally, individual efforts should be made to conduct self-education through individual learning programs such as distance education and reading. Every Marine leader has a responsibility to study the profession of arms to improve themselves, their Marines, and the effectiveness of the units in which they serve. PME should assist in the development of leaders with the ability to think and act as warfighters.

Personnel Management

All Marine NCOs should understand the basic concepts of personnel management to improve the performance of the personnel and processes that they supervise. Marine NCOs have an opportunity to exercise personnel management since they manage multiple functions within their sections. They have to lead proceses and manage the skills and personnel simultaneously. Effectively manning the billets and training personnel has a direct impact on the unit’s warfighting capabilities. Remember, all Marines of a given grade and occupational specialty are not always interchangeable and should be assigned to billets based on specific ability and temperament. Strong personnel management skills are required for supervisors to assess individuals’ skills and abilities. NCOs need to understand proficiency and technical requirements in addition to the Marines’ overall performance.

Equipping

Equipping is the process of supplying the Marine Corps to meet its strategic and operational goals. To minimize research and development costs, the Marine Corps will use off the shelf technology to the greatest extent possible.
Continued on next page

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Chapter 3

Warfighting Preparations, Continued

Equipping Requirements

The selection of equipment to support the operational forces within the Marine Corps requires mission specific requirements, projections, and rigorous testing. When equipping the Marine Corps, the equipment should be as follows: · · · · · · Easy to operate and maintain Reliable and interoperable with other equipment Minimal specialized operator training Consistent with established doctrine and tactics Strategic and tactical lift capabilities Employable and supportable in undeveloped theatres of operations

Dangers of Equipping

The two dangers of equipping are listed below: · · Over reliance on technology Failure to make the most of technology

The Marine Corps must not become so dependent on equipment that it can no longer function effectively when the equipment fails. An example of this would be relying on Global Positioning Systems while neglecting basic land navigation skills.
Conclusion

The ability to transition advances in technology to battlefield requires Marines to continually upgrade their individual skills and abilities. The ability to integrate new equipment and technology into the operational environment enhances operational effectiveness and performance. Advances in technology and the development of new equipment require the Marine Corps to test, acquire, and field new equipment to meet current and projected threats. Yesterday’s technology can become tomorrow’s vulnerability, so implementing change is a challenge leader’s continuously face.

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Chapter 3

Chapter 3 Exercise

Estimated Study Time

10 minutes

Directions

Complete items 1 through 5 by performing the action required. Check your answers against those listed at the end of this lesson. What is the definition of doctrine? a. b. c. d. A theoretical approach to warfighting that is discussed at the highest levels and is approved by Congress Principles that guide military forces in their activities in support of national objectives A permanent record of warfighting studies at the joint level The process and procedure for reduction of Department of Defense plans and operational concepts

Item 1

Item 2

Marine Corps doctrine is defined as a. b. c. d. the process and procedure for developing operational plans and operations at the strategic level. a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to the preparation and conduct. the use of command and control to bring force onto the enemy and then smash his warfighting systems. a tool used by commanders to transform focus to warfighting force into a pliable form of power in the operating environment.

Item 3

What are the three tiers of the professional military education system? a. b. c. d. Sergeants, career, and advanced Initial, sustainment, and expansion Education establishment, commanders, and individual Marines Resident, non-resident, and interactive media instructions
Continued on next page

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Chapter 3 Exercise

Chapter 3 Exercise, Continued

Item 4

Understanding that ___________________________________ is an important concept for effective personnel management. a. b. c. d. officers handling personnel issues within squads and sections filling the billet is more important than proficiency and training for the billet Marines of certain grades and occupational specialties are not always interchangeable billets can only be filled by incoming personnel

Item 5

What are the dangers of equipping? a. b. c. d. Over reliance on technology and failure to make the most of technology Untrained equipment operators and hazardous materials management in the operating environment Conducting equipment specific training and operational risk assessment surveys Storage and maintenance of fragile equipment in the operating environment, and ensuring the Marines follow the procedures for use
Continued on next page

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Chapter 3 Exercise

Chapter 3 Exercise, Continued

Items 6 Through 9

Matching: For items 6 through 9, match the warfighting preparation terms in column 1 with the definitions in column 2. Column 1 Preparation Terms ___ 6. ___ 7. ___ 8. ___ 9. Force Planning Organization Professionalism Training Column 2 Definition a. Tailors the composition of the operational forces to provide forward deployed forces capable of conducting expeditionary operations Plans associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities Requires Marine leaders to be experts in conducting war and executing its policy Organizes and develops training plans that support the commander’s guidelines
Continued on next page

b. c. d.

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Chapter 3 Exercise

Chapter 3 Exercise, Continued

Answers

The table below provides the answers to the exercise items. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item. Item Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Answer b b c c a b a c d Reference 3-4 3-4 3-6 3-7 3-8 3-3 3-4 3-4 3-5

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Chapter 3 Exercise

CHAPTER 4 THE CONDUCT OF WAR Introduction

Estimated Study Time

50 minutes

Scope

Many years ago, as a cadet hoping to some day to be an officer, I was poring over the ‘Principles of War,’ listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the NCO-Major came up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. ‘Don’t bother your head about all them things, me lad,’ he said. “There’s only one principle of war and that’s this. Hit the other fellow as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him the most, when he ain’t lookin!”

-- Sir William Slim The quote shows that the conduct of war has not significantly changed in recent history; only the technology and applications of warfighting have changed. Warfighting involves understanding the nature and theory of units and then applying this understanding in the operating environment. This chapter focuses on the concepts and processes that are fundamental to the conduct of war and warfighting operations.
Learning Objectives

After completing this lesson, you should be able to identify the definitions of the following concepts: · · · · · Maneuver warfare Orienting on the enemy Philosophy of command Shaping the action Decisionmaking
Continued on next page

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Chapter 4

Introduction, Continued

Learning Objectives, continued

· · · · ·

Mission tactics Commander’s intent Main effort Surfaces and gaps Combined arms

In This Chapter

This chapter contains the following topics: Topic Maneuver Warfare Orienting on the Enemy Philosophy of Command Shaping the Action Decisionmaking Mission Tactics Commander’s Intent Main Effort Surfaces and Gaps Combined Arms Chapter 4 Exercise See Page 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-7 4-8 4-10 4-11 4-12 4-13 4-14 4-15

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Chapter 4

Maneuver Warfare

Introduction

Previous lessons have discussed the concepts and processes that are essential to understanding warfighting. The actual conduct of war demands an additional set of concepts to use in the operating environment. Maneuver warfare is defined as a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion by attacking selected enemy weaknesses. These actions create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. Maneuver warfare requires speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance. This increases the enemy’s friction. The goal is to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain. With each action the enemy’s reactions are later and later until the enemy is overcome by the events.

Definition

Goal

The goal of maneuver warfare is to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy. To accomplish the objectives as quickly and easily as possible, leaders need to consider the following dimensions of maneuver: · · · · Psychological–mind or perspective Technological–technology Temporal–limited time to exploit the situation creates urgency Spatial–positional advantage in space or time

Role of Firepower

Firepower is central to maneuver warfare and limits the enemy’s ability to respond. Firepower is used to disrupt the enemy systems. The physical destruction of an objective is not firepower’s greatest effect, but rather the cumulative effect on the enemy’s operational processes. Once the Marine NCO understands their role in the operational and warfighting environment, they can utilize maneuver to their advantage. The maneuver warfare mindset allows leaders at all levels to analyze their particular situation and utilize maneuver to assist the commander in achieving the overall mission. In simpler terms, maneuver allows leaders to perform their role and lead their unit better and faster than the opposing forces.
Continued on next page

Marine NCO Relationship to Maneuver

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Chapter 4

Orienting on the Enemy

Introduction

Maneuver warfare focuses on the enemy from many different perspectives. You can increase your effectiveness by understanding the enemy’s strategies, tactics and logistics. Orienting on the enemy is fundamental to maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare attacks the enemy system. Anything that challenges Marines within their particular sphere is called an enemy system. The sphere being the environment in which the Marines are carrying out their assigned mission or duties. Examples include the following: · · Pilot―air defense radars, surface to air missiles, and enemy aircraft Rifle company―mutually supporting defensive positions protected by obstacles and supported by crew-served weapons on the next terrain feature Electronic warfare specialist―enemy’s command and control network Marine expeditionary force―major combat formations within an area of operations as well as their supporting command and control, logistics, and intelligence organizations.

Enemy System

· ·

Understanding the Enemy

NCOs must understand the enemy in his own terms. Do not assume the enemy thinks, fights, or has the same values or objectives. Marine NCOs should understand how the enemy operates in theory and methodology. It is essential to make projections as to the enemy’s actions and counter them. NCOs must understand the concepts and reduce them to the squad or application level.

Leadership Focus

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Chapter 4

Philosophy of Command

Introduction

Marine leaders are exposed to a variety of leadership methods within the Marine Corps. Many of these methods focus on the leadership principles and traits while integrating the core values. However, commanders often provide additional guidelines based on their individual leadership styles. Philosophy of command is the general outline of principles, processes, and procedures that a commander expects to have the command operate within to accomplish tactical and administrative missions. When a commander communicates his or her philosophy of command, the Marines within the command understand how the commander expects operations to be conducted and the parameters that the operations should be conducted within. The commander’s intent is a means to generate a standard for operations that influences the organization’s tempo. Commander’s intent should reflect methodology that is designed to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat. Infusing philosophy of command throughout the command and its processes creates a situation that supports · · Decentralized command and control Implicit communications
Continued on next page

Definition

Purpose

Benefits of Decentralized Command and Control

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Chapter 4

Philosophy of Command, Continued

Decentralized Command and Control

Decentralized command and control exists when subordinate leaders must make decisions on their own initiative based on the commander’s intent. This eliminates the requirement to pass information up the chain of command and then wait for a decision to be passed down. A competent leader at the point of decision will naturally better understand the true situation than the commander some distance removed. Individual initiative and responsibility are necessary in a decentralized operating environment.

Implicit Communication

Implicit communication is communication through mutual understanding. The mutual understanding uses a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even anticipating each other’s thoughts. Implicit communication is a faster, more effective way to communicate Marine leaders should use the following principles to encourage the development of implicit communications: · · · · Establish long-term working relationships. Ensure key personnel talk directly with each other. Use oral communication. Communicate in person.

Achieving Implicit Communication

Conclusion

Marine NCOs should incorporate interpersonal communications whenever possible to assist in developing improved communications skills. Clear communications directly reflects improved performance and operational understanding.

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Chapter 4

Shaping the Action

Introduction

Commanders use warfighting strategy, tactics, and techniques to create operational conditions that support their intent. The ability to create favorable conditions is referred to as shaping the action. Shaping the action is the plan of how victory is to be achieved: · · · Establish what is to be accomplished, why, and how. Identify the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. Identify vulnerabilities from the enemy’s perspective.

Definition

These steps allow the force to shape the campaign, operation, battle, or engagement to their advantage in both time and space.
Conditions

The disorderly nature of war makes shaping an imprecise action. The focus is to shape the general conditions of war. Shaping actions can range from lethal to nonlethal actions that will assist the commander in creating favorable operating conditions. Some examples are as follows: · · · · · · Direct attack Psychological operations Electronic warfare Stockpiling of critical supplies for future operations Attacking specific enemy capabilities Using deception to shape enemy expectations

Marine NCO Applications

The importance is to understand the vision and intent of the commander. By understanding warfighting doctrine, the Marine NCO can develop a plan of action to better support the commander from the squad and platoon level.
Continued on next page

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Chapter 4

Decisionmaking

Introduction

Decisionmaking is essential to the conduct of war since all actions are the result of decisions or nondecisions. Military decisionmaking is a mental process that requires · · Situational awareness to recognize the essence of a problem Creative ability to devise a practical solution

Definition

The ability to make decisions is based on the individual’s experience, education, and intelligence.
Operational Success

The speed at which decisions are made creates decisive advantage in the operating environment. Time is often the most important factor in decision making and both time and decisionmaking are essential to generate operational tempo. Situational awareness is the perceptions of environmental factors. The primary factors are listed below: · · · · Perception―ability to be aware and process the available situational information Comprehension―ability to understand the situation and the factors involved Projection―options into which the situation could develop Prediction―determining what the opposition will do

Situational Awareness

Processes

Decisionmaking processes are classified into two larger categories: · · Intuitive decisionmaking Analytical decisionmaking
Continued on next page

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Chapter 4

Decisionmaking, Continued

Intuitive

Intuitive decision making is a decisionmaking process that relies on experience to recognize key elements of a particular problem and then arrives at an appropriate solution. The ability to use intuitive decisionmaking requires the decision maker to scrutinize the situational factors. These situational factors are selectively matched against previous experiences to develop the first best solution. A first best solution is one that achieves some level of success with minimal risks and time committed to the solution. The goal is to develop and implement the first solution in minimal time. Marine NCOs apply intuitive decisionmaking daily to meet mission objectives, solve problems, and develop solutions to leadership challenges.

Analytical

Analytical decisionmaking is an approach used to analyze a dilemma and determine the best solution. The problem solver or team of problem solvers systematically employ a process that consists of the following actions: · · · · Carefully take a problem apart. Collect and test the information required for the problem or task. Conduct a comparison of the solutions or options. Select an alternative that should be the best solution for the problem.

Analytical decisionmaking processes can be observed in their purest forms at higher organizational levels or during deliberate planning situations.
Psychological Factors

Marine NCOs face challenges making decisions. The following factors listed in the table below increase or minimize the decision-making process:
Factors Moral Courage Incomplete Information Timeliness Uncertainty Uniqueness Function Leaders make tough decisions in the face of uncertainty and accept full responsibility for those decisions. The decision process becomes very difficult because the warfighting environment is very fluid. Critical to maximizing initiative and response, which optimizes tempo. The ability to evaluate a situation and act is critical in the execution phase of operations. Decisionmaking becomes difficult because the possible outcomes can jeopardize the lives of your Marines and operational success. Incorporates experience and knowledge to develop a new solution based on the specific situation.
Continued on next page

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Chapter 4

Mission Tactics
Introduction

This section discusses and defines the use of mission tactics. A Marine NCO should not only be able to receive and execute mission tactics, but he or she should be able to utilize mission tactics to lead and manage the Marines under his or her charge. Mission tactics is the process of assigning subordinates missions without specifying how the mission must be accomplished. The mission tactics approach grants the subordinate freedom and the duty to take whatever steps are necessary to accomplish the mission. The subordinate leader is also responsible to demonstrate the ability to exercise initiative framed by proper guidance and understanding. Missions tactics benefit senior commanders: · · · Frees time to focus on higher level concerns rather than the details of subordinate execution Allows senior intervention only by exception Permits freedom of initiative to develop higher tempo of operations

Definition

Commander’s Benefits

Subordinate’s Benefits

Subordinates benefit from mission tactics in the following ways: · · Actions can be adapted to the changing situations. Permission to act is implicit and results are provided to the commander after the action is completed.

Performance Applications

Marine NCOs gain many opportunities through the use of mission tactics in the operating environment. It also provides them the opportunity to see how their actions fit into the larger situation.

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Chapter 4

Commander’s Intent

Introduction

Communications are essential to effective operations. These communications can be divided into explicit and implicit communications. Commander’s intent is clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. The purpose of commander’s intent is to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative. This opportunity is most evident when the subordinate has to depart from the original plan when the unforeseen occurs. The key to successful implementation of intent is to modify the plan of action in a manner that is consistent with the higher commander’s aims.

Definition

Mission Statement

Mission statements are composed of two parts: · · Task Intent or reason behind the task

The task describes the action to be taken or what is to be done while the intent describes the purpose or why and the desired outcome. Based on the mission, the next lower leadership level develops a concept of operations or plan that is passed on as an order that explains how the unit will accomplish the mission. The new order assigns missions to subordinates as tasks.
Capturing Intent

When the commander uses the phrase, “… in order to …” following the assigned task, it reflects the intent that is to be mentally captured by the subordinate. For example, the company commander gives you the following mission statement: “At 1400, Company C will attack to seize battalion objective 1 in order to establish a blocking position and deny the enemy the ability to reinforce.” Marine NCOs should be very familiar with commander’s intent because they may be required to fulfill the role of platoon commander or platoon NCO from time to time. Additionally, they will receive tasks to execute with intent attached. The goal of small unit leaders, such as NCOs, should be to understand commander’s intent two levels up whenever possible.
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Leadership Applications

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Chapter 4

Main Effort

Introduction

Marine Corps units are given missions that must be accomplished within the commander’s intent. Some missions are more important than others. Main effort is the action that is most critical to success at a particular moment. Main effort is assigned to the unit that is assigned to accomplishing the key mission. This unit becomes the focal point for the convergence of combat power. The main effort receives the priority of support. This priority of support can come in such forms as logistical, mobility, or fire support and/or attached personnel to fulfill special mission requirements. The designation of the main effort should make it clear to all other units that are to be supported. For example, during this phase of the operation, Company C is the main effort for the battalion. The artillery battery assigned to the battalion will give priority to all calls for fire from Company C. The battalion commander will most likely also send any attachments necessary to ensure that Company C accomplishes its mission.

Definition

Shifting Effort

As the situation changes, the commander may shift the main effort, redirecting the combat power in support of the unit that is now most critical to success. When shifting the main effort, the goal is to exploit success rather than reinforce failure.

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Chapter 4

Surfaces and Gaps

Introduction

The face of the battlefield is a combination of strengths and weakness. The ability to evaluate the opposition in its environment and determine their strengths and weaknesses is an important concept in warfighting. Surfaces are enemy hard spots or enemy strengths. Gaps are soft spots or enemy weaknesses. The goal is to avoid enemy strength and focus the efforts against enemy weakness. Putting strength against weakness reduces casualties and is more likely to yield decisive results. Whenever possible, gaps should be exploited. Failing that, gaps need to be created. For example, if the main effort has struck a surface, but another unit has located a gap, designate the second unit as the main effort and redirect the combat power in support of it.

Surfaces and Gaps

NCO Perspective

Marine NCOs may be able to identify weaknesses or strengths in the enemy forces. This is completed by comparing enemy systems to our own. Understanding how the enemy thinks, acts, and generates combat power is another step in identifying surfaces and gaps.
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Chapter 4

Combined Arms

Introduction

Generations of Marines have learned and applied the combined arms concept. Explaining the concept is often more difficult than the actual application in the warfighting environment. As you read this section, attempt to imagine that you have no operational experience and envision the operating environment from the perspective of a casual observer. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one would make the enemy vulnerable to another. The employment of the combined arms concept creates a dilemma or a no-win situation for the opposing forces. MCDP 1-3, Tactics, cites the following example of combined arms: A squad level dilemma could be created by having the squad leader position squad automatic weapons (M249 SAW) and grenade launchers (M203) to provide support by fire while the riflemen assault the position. The fire power of the automatic weapons keeps the enemy in their fighting hole while the M203 grenades make it impossible to remain in the fighting holes. The combination of fires keeps the enemy from reacting effectively to the riflemen maneuvering to the enemy position. The combination of threats puts the enemy in a no-win situation.
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Definition

Examples

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Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Exercise

Estimated Study Time

10 minutes

Directions

Complete items 1 through 11 by performing the action required. Check your answers against those listed at the end of this lesson. The goal of maneuver warfare is a. b. c. d. combined fire and movement to advance on an enemy. to generate and exploit an advantage over the enemy. transport warfighting assets to their objective and assault positions. support indirect fires with mobile direct fires to gain tactical advantage.

Item 1

Item 2

Which of the following statements describe the term, enemy system? a. b. c. d. Anything that challenges Marines within their particular sphere The offensive or defensive situation and the tactics used to conduct operations Their fire and maneuver plan as it is put into action The will to resist offensive operations and/or counterattack

Item 3

What is a commander’s philosophy of command? a. b. c. d. Standard operating procedures for the combat operations center, operational maneuver, and support functions by the staff sections Process procedures for training and operations as directed by the Training and Readiness Manual, unit training manual, and sustainment training requirements as directed by Headquarters, Marine Corps Outline of principles, processes, and procedures that the commander expects to have the command operate within to accomplish tactical and administrative missions Plan of operations to implement principles and processes that offer operational efficiency and effectiveness
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Chapter 4 Exercise

Chapter 4 Exercise, Continued

Item 4

Shaping the action is the a. b. c. d. series of offensive actions on opposing forces which develops the situation for success. plan of how victory is to be achieved. objective focusing that occurs during the planning and execution of operations. compounding effect of fire and maneuver in the battlespace.

Item 5

What does military decisionmaking require? a. b. c. d. Infusion of combat tactics and techniques to properly evaluate the possibilities and outcomes Extensive leadership and warfighting training in order to make decision within the limitations of doctrine and strategy Situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution The decision maker to be the operational leader in order to enforce accountability for action or inaction within the operating environment
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Chapter 4 Exercise

Chapter 4 Exercise, Continued

Item 6

What is mission tactics? a. b. c. d. Offensive procedures used to develop the battlespace into smaller microbattles that divide the enemy’s strength and focus Functions of assault elements in high intensity operations that utilize a variety of warfighting assets to divide the opposition’s focus and combat power Tactics used to shape the battlespace in order to support higher level operations Process of assigning subordinates missions without specifying how the mission must be accomplished

Item 7

What is commander’s intent? a. b. c. d. Clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or more tasks assigned to a subordinate Desired outcome that the unit staff uses to develop operational orders and mission tasks Resulting actions from intuitive decisionmaking used in the operating environment Action phase of philosophy of command

Item 8

Action that is critical for success at a particular moment would best define which of the following terms? a. b. c. d. Offensive action Main effort Critical action Operational focus
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Chapter 4 Exercise

Chapter 4 Exercise, Continued

Item 9

Enemy hard spots or enemy strengths describe which of the following terms? a. b. c. d. Strong points Defensive positions Reciprocal defense Surfaces

Item 10

How is a gap defined? a. b. c. d. Soft spots or enemy weaknesses Low lying areas in the battlespace Areas covered by fire only The space between the forward line of troops and the battle area

Item 11

The full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one would make the enemy vulnerable to another describes which of the following terms? a. b. c. d. Fire support planning Integration of fires Combined arms concept Fire and maneuver concept

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Chapter 4 Exercise

Chapter 4 Exercise, Continued

Answers

The table below provides the answers to the exercise items. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item. Item Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Answer b a c b c d a b d a c Reference 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-7 4-8 4-10 4-11 4-12 4-13 4-13 4-14

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Chapter 4 Exercise

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Chapter 4 Exercise

CHAPTER 5 WARFIGHTING APPLICATIONS Introduction

Estimated Study Time

30 minutes

Scope

We want our commanders to think. Go ahead and make mistakes, but do the innovative, get inside the enemy’s mind, think about what his intentions are, how he is going to react and outsmart him with your initiative in the absence of orders from a senior command.

-- General Alfred Gray 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps This chapter combines the warfighting concepts (discussed in chapters 1 through 4) with and the U.S. Marine Reading Program. Reading stimulates critical thinking, which will broaden the Marine NCO’s perspective of the operating environment as well as increase the proficiency of both individuals and units.
Learning Objectives

After completing this lesson, you should be able to · · · · Identify the method to submit a recommendation for the U.S. Marine Reading Program. Identify types of Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Identify the definition of critical reading. Critically read and analyze a professional article.
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Chapter 5

Introduction, Continued

Contents

This chapter contains the following topics: Topic Professional Reading Reading Resources Reinforcing Warfighting Chapter 5 Exercise See Page 5-3 5-6 5-11 5-13

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Chapter 5

Professional Reading

Commandant’s Reading Program

General Alfred Gray established a professional reading program in the Marine Corps called the Commandant’s Professional Reading Program. The program was designed to · · · · Develop a deeper, more penetrating perception of the operating environment. Examine the relationships between education, training, and experience. Consider current and/or future threats in the light of operational projections. Promote leadership in the context of warfighting.

The Commandant’s Reading List supported the reading program. General Jones, 32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps, restructured the current reading program as the U.S. Marine Reading Program.
U.S. Marine Reading Program

The Commandant’s vision was to create a reading program to encourage a sense of personal ownership for each Marine. He directly linked reading to the development and mastery of warfighting competencies, which require mental resources to support decisionmaking along with other tactical applications. It is amazing, but true that creating a shared awareness and organizational competency at the Corps level through reading and study of doctrine will push the warfighting capability beyond most technological improvements. General Jones stressed …the strength of the pack … (is) the strength of the wolf and the power of that metaphor. Reading creates a unified thought process created through the study and application of a common perspective such as warfighting.
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Chapter 5

Professional Reading, Continued

Program Reference

The U.S. Marine Reading Program is updated by ALMAR (All Marine message) 026/00, which was published by General James L. Jones. The ALMAR message and other sources are available online at the following Web site: http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/Reading/ReadingList.htm. This updated U.S. Marine Reading Program is structured slightly different from the previous programs. The sections of the reading program are listed below: · · · · · · · · Marine Corps Heritage Leadership, Memoir, and Biography Theory, Nature, and History of War Strategy, Policy, and Civil-Military Relations Operations, Campaigns, and Battles Doctrine, Training, and Tactics Small Wars Sinews of War

Program Structure

Each section addresses a particular area of study that is vital to developing a holistic perspective of the current operating environment and the related challenges.
Commandant’s Favorites

The Commandant’s Favorites has replaced the Commandant’s Choice on the reading list. The Commandant’s Favorites are composed of the books or a single book that have influenced the perspective and thought processes of the commandant and/or theory that supports the operational focus of the Marine Corps. The goal of the reading program is to integrate reading and critical thinking skills into the daily operations of the Marine Corps through study, discussion, and application much like physical training. Strengthening the mind–like the body–is a force and a life multiplier measured by the decision making abilities of Marines.
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Reading Program Goal

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Chapter 5

Professional Reading, Continued

Sergeant Input

The new reading program allows Marines to recommend books they have read to be considered in the reading program. Suggestions can be e-mailed to the Marine Corps University for approval via the Web page previously listed.

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Chapter 5

Reading Resources

Marine Corps Doctrine

The first level of reading resource is the Marine Corps doctrine. It is designed to provide strategic overview of the methodology and direction of operations and functions used within the Marine Corps. Reading doctrine creates an increased knowledge base, which allows Marines of all ranks and levels of experience to apply warfighting concepts more effectively.

Reading Challenge

All Marine NCOs should read core doctrinal publications such as MCDP 1, Warfighting to better understand the many dimensions of the operating environment. There are specific doctrinal resources that may apply to the NCO’s duties and or related functions within their unit and mission. Marine Corps doctrine is available online at www.doctrine.usmc.mil. The Marine Corps doctrinal publications are divided into the following types: · · · Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP) Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRP)

Types of Doctrinal Publications

MCDP

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications provide a strategic view and universal perspective. Marine Corps Warfighting Publications are more operational in nature and provide more specific guidance on processes and procedure. Marine Corps Reference Publications are generally informational in nature rather than operational.
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MCWP

MCRP

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Chapter 5

Reading Resources, Continued

Marine Corps Directives

The second level of reading resource is Marine Corps directives, which come in orders, bulletins, and messages. Directives are accessible to all Marines through the official Marine Corps Web sites at www.usmc.mil or http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/ind.nsf/publications. Marine Corps orders are listed by standard subject identification code or subject. Refer to MCI 8101, Leadership and Administration, study unit 7 for more information on SSIC. Several other reading resources to round out a Marine NCO’s individualized reading program are · · · · · Online books Periodicals Online periodicals and references Marine Corps Lessons Learned system Marine Corps doctrine and directives

Other Resources

NCOs need to take advantage of the multitude of available sources of professional military education available. The distance education and resident professional military programs only provide the foundation of military education. The opportunity to expand and develop a broader perspective of the operating environment through reading is the goal of professional development.
Online Books

A select number of professional reading books and library resources are available online via the Marine Corps University’s Web page at: http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/reading/MCOLLS/mcolls.htm. Periodicals are generally magazines and newspapers that are published on a cyclical basis. Newspapers and magazines are two examples of periodicals that Marines can read for updated information on national and international events and issues that effect their operating environment.
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Periodicals

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Chapter 5

Professional Reading, Continued

Online Periodicals and References

Online periodicals and references are available on the Internet. The challenges of the information age require that Marines of all grades have basic computer competencies. Many periodicals have online Web sites that can be accessed. The last level of reading resource is the Marine Corps Lesson Learned system. It is a database of lessons learned during operational and training evolutions. The database is part of the Combat Development Tracking System located at Web site http://deploymentlink.osd.mil/lessons_learned/marine_ll.shtml. To access the database, Marines must request permission and receive a user ID and password. Directions for receiving an ID and password are located at the Web site.
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Marine Corps Lessons Learned System

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Chapter 5

Reading Resources, Continued

Electronic Reading Resources

The table below contains instructions for locating professional reading resources on the Internet: Step 1 2 Action Log on to your personal computer (PC) using your official log in name and password. When log on is complete, locate the Internet Explorer icon on the desktop or follow the steps listed below: a. Click on Start. b. Click on Programs. c. Click on Internet Explorer. Type http//:www.usmc.mil into the address box. Click on the “Go” button to the right of the address box. When the Web page appears, two options are available: a. The button labeled, “Publications”—on the menu tool bar near the tool bar across the top of the page. b. The button labeled, “Search”—along the left side menu toolbar. Clicking on “Publications” makes a drop-down menu appear. Select the type of publication required and click on it: a. Directives are organized by standard subject identification code or subject. b. Doctrinal publications are organized by type and the options appear on the left menu toolbar. When using the “Search” option, follow the steps listed below: a. Type “Reading Program” into the box under “Search.” b. Go to the box directly below where ALMAR (All Marine Message) is set as the default. c. Click on “Search.” Utilize resource.
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3 4

5

6

7

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Chapter 5

Reading Resources, Continued

Search Engine Utilization

To use a search engine, use the address block to type in the name of a commercial search engine and find the “Search” box. All search engines work basically the same. Typing in a topic and clicking on “Search” or “Go” buttons bring up subject options that are hyperlinked to other Web pages. When using a search engine to support a professional reading development program, you should type in subjects or titles such as the following: · · · Professional military development or military thinking Warfighting Marine Corps Gazette

Sample Topics

Doctrinal Reading Support

MCRP 6-11A, A Book on Books provides doctrinal support for developing and structuring a professional reading program. This reference provides general guidelines about the types and locations of materials that could be included in a reading program. The Web site for such references is located at www.doctrine.usmc.mil. While many professional development resources exist for Marines, the sergeant is often the point of doctrinal application in the operating environment. Developing a knowledge base that supports a greater operational understanding should be the goal of professional reading for the NCO. An individual reading program should include doctrinal and warfighting publications as previously discussed. However, such books as Starship Troopers and Defense of Duffer’s Drift contain content that is not only relevant to warfighting, but can also be read for enjoyment.

Reading Challenge

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Chapter 5

Reinforcing Warfighting

Introduction

The two primary methods of reinforcing warfighting concepts is through critical reading and warfighting applications other than field training. These applications may come in the form of tactical decision games or simulations depending on occupational field and military occupational specialty requirements. Critical reading is a focused method of reading to extract meaningful information from the text. The critical reading of books recommended for the U.S. Marine Reading Program adds warfighting perspective to the Marine Corps as a whole by creating strategic focus and ethos or group perspective. Perspective building is dependent on the reader’s ability to create relationships between reading content and warfighting. On an individual level, critical reading sharpens understanding of warfighting by suggesting parallels between current situations to warfighting applications. The reader should approach professional reading with an open and inquisitive mind. Determining the value of the book depends on the reader’s purpose and perspective. Most books on the Commandant’s reading list have been chosen because they address core competencies or leadership, or they provide historical lessons to be learned that can be discussed in terms of modern tactics and warfighting applications.
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Critical Reading Definition

Reading Perspective

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Chapter 5

Reinforcing Warfighting, Continued

Developing Perspective

After choosing a professional reading source, the reader should try to understand the author’s perspective to determine how to apply it. If you are unsure of it, try looking for a summary, which is sometimes located on the back or inside cover of the book. If one is not available, you may have to do some research on the subject or author, check related material, or consider answering the following questions: · · · · · · · · · When was the book written? What was the author’s age and background? What were the author’s experience and the context of the book? Is the book a historical account or personal perspective on an issue? If the book is an historical account, what did the author attempt to prove or present? If the book is a personal perspective, what did the author want to get across to the reader? What are the lessons learned that could be derived from the book? Do they still apply to today’s operating environment? Why or why not? How does this apply to my current billet and grade?

Group Readings and Discussions

Group reading can be an effective tool when you use a professional article(s) that applies to a contemporary issue, training objective, or warfighting technique and application. An article is easier to read than a book because it is shorter and needs to be more focused than a book (which could address several issues or applications). Articles can be read in a short period of time and can be accessed online or reproduced at minimum expense. The discussion leader can approach the discussion by asking many of the same questions that are used to develop perspective. These questions can be assembled into a discussion guide, which can be used to assist the discussion leader.

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Chapter 5

Chapter 5 Exercise

Estimated Study Time

2 hours, 30 minutes

Directions

Complete items 1 through 16 by performing the action required. Check your answers against those listed at the end of this chapter. How can Marines submit books to be included on the U.S. Marine Reading Program? a. b. c. d. E-mail the Marine Corps University Refer a formal book review via the chain of command Consult with resident professional military education schools Write a letter to the Marine Corps Gazette

Item 1

Item 2

The three primary forms of Marine Corps doctrine are presented in a. b. c. d. Marine Corps Recruit Training, The Basic School, and Marine Combat Training. Marine Corps Common Skills Handbook, Marine Corps Institute courses, and associated publications. Marine Corps doctrinal publications, Marine Corps warfighting publications, and Marine Corps reference publications. professional military education courses, sustainment training at the battalion level and below, and field skills training and evaluation.

Item 3

Identify the definition of critical reading. a. b. c. d. A grammatical analysis of a book’s content and its presentation format A focused method of reading in which the reader seeks to extract meaningful information from the text The absolute minimum required to meet the performance standard for the U.S. Marine Reading Program A method of reading to maximize reading volume in the minimum of time
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Chapter 5 Exercise

Chapter 5 Exercise, Continued

Directions for Items 4 Through 16

The next section of the exercise applies to critical reading skills. It is designed to demonstrate the value of professional reading and the related learning skills derived from reading. You will have three articles to read. Test items 4 through 7 require you to read the article, “Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine.” Test items 8 through 11 require you to read, “Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare.” Finally, test items 12 through 16 require you to read, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War.” As you read the accompanying preview information followed by each articles’ introduction, try to make preliminary estimates on the author’s focus and intent. Think about the perspective building questions, reading objectives, and how they relate to the content as you read. You may have to read the article several times to fully digest the content. The first reading should consist of skimming through the content so that you can develop overview. Reread the preliminary information and the article a second time to develop a deeper understanding of the content and its relationship to warfighting. The third reading should be done after rereading the objectives, so that you can search for the content that relates to the question. It may be helpful to annotate important sections or make notes in the margin, so that the information becomes more understandable.
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Chapter 5 Exercise

Chapter 5 Exercise, Continued

Directions for Items 4 Through 7

Read the preview page for required reading 1 followed by the article, “Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine,” beginning on page 5-21 before completing this section of the chapter exercise. When you have finished reading the article, answer items 4 through 7 by writing your answers in the space provided. Check your answers against those listed at the end of the chapter beginning on 5-55. What were Winston Churchill’s observations about maneuver? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

Item 4

Item 5

What does Liddell Hart state about creating advantage and what is its relationship to orienting on the enemy? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________
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Chapter 5 Exercise

Chapter 5 Exercise, Continued

Item 6

How does the author define focus? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

Item 7

How are speed, tempo, and maneuver related in warfighting context? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________
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Chapter 5 Exercise

Chapter 5 Exercise, Continued

Directions for Items 8 Through 11

Read the preview page for required reading 2 followed by the article, “Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare,” beginning on page 5-33 before completing this section of the chapter exercise. When you have finished reading the article, answer items 8 through 11 by writing your answers in the space provided. Check your answers against those listed at the end of the chapter beginning on 5-55. Where in the spectrum of war does maneuver play a role? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

Item 8

Item 9

What is the importance of understanding commander’s intent? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________
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Chapter 5 Exercise

Chapter 5 Exercise, Continued

Item 10

What is meant by command forward? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

Item 11

What is the purpose of creating initiative in the absence of orders? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________
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Chapter 5 Exercise

Chapter 5 Exercise Continued

Directions for Items 12 Through 16

Read the preview page for required reading 3 followed by the article, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” beginning on page 5-46 before completing this section of the chapter exercise. When you have finished reading the article, answer items 12 through 16 by writing your answer in the space provided. Check your answers against those listed at the end of the chapter beginning on 5-55. What are some of the challenges and pressures in the operating environment that the 21st Marine NCO can expect to experience? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

Item 12

Item 13

What is the three block war? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________
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Chapter 5 Exercise

Chapter 5 Exercise, Continued
Item 14

What is the common thread uniting operational performance in the operating environment? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

Item 15

What is the common thread linking all aspects of the Marine Corps? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

Item 16

How does a “zero defects” mentality improve operational performance? ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

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Chapter 5 Exercise

Preview to Required Reading 1

Introduction

“Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine” by Captain John Schmidt attempts to dissect maneuver warfare and the preliminary development of our current doctrine contained MCDP 1, Warfighting. The evolution of warfighting doctrine allows for flexibility and adaptability in the operating environment. This article is designed to broaden the Marine NCO’s perspective of maneuver warfare. This article discusses the concepts and factors found in war and the warfighting environment. It further describes the common factors that link warfighting to the administrative and operational environments that sergeants operate in daily and the challenges confronting Marine NCOs. As you read “Understanding Manuever as the Basis for a Doctrine,” you should think about the following warfighting concepts: · · · · What were Winston Churchill’s observations about maneuver? What does Liddell Hart state about orienting on the enemy? How does the author define focus? How are speed, tempo, and maneuver related in warfighting context?

Scope and Perspective

Reading Concepts

Content Preview

The table below locates the warfighting concepts in previous lessons that are addressed in the following article. After reading the article, review the concepts to be able to apply critical analysis of the article content to answer items 4 through 7. Warfighting Concept Review Maneuver Warfare Orienting on the Enemy Critical Vulnerability Focus Surprise Speed See Page 2-14 4-6 2-22 2-19 2-20 2-18

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Chapter 5 Exercise

Required Reading 1

UNDERSTANDING MANEUVER AS THE BASIS FOR A DOCTRINE
Maneuver warfare is the official doctrine of the Marine Corps, but not everyone has complete understanding of the concept. This article takes it part, studies its component parts, and dispels some of the misconceptions occasionally associated with it. Studying maneuver warfare will give you a clearer insight into how the Corps intends to fight its next war. By Capt John F. Schmitt The Marine Corps now has an official doctrine called maneuver warfare – an entire way of war based on this single concept called Maneuver. Such a commitment implies a couple of things. First, it implies that this concept had better be awfully powerful and with wide utility – which implies that we had better understand this concept very well. That is our purpose here. This at first might appear a gratuitous, academic endeavor. After all, the concept of Maneuver seems pretty straight forward; does it not? Almost axiomatic; in fact Maneuver has enjoyed status as one of the principles of war for decades, and it is defined explicitly in Joint Publication 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. But experience, mine at least, shows that as a group we do not understand Maneuver as well as we ought to. Misunderstandings range from fundamental – such as equating Maneuver to simple movement – to a less than full appreciation for the practical applications of the concept. With that in mind the intent here is to develop a broader, deeper understanding of the concept of Maneuver as the foundation of a doctrine. Within that intent we will also try to clear up many of the common misconceptions about Maneuver. Point of Departure: Advantage As defined by Joint Publication 1-02; Maneuver is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire or fire potential to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. This is the classical definition of Maneuver, and it is fine as far it goes. But it is a narrow definition, one that limits application as well we will see.
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As noted in the joint definition, the conceptual starting point for Maneuver is the desire to gain and exploit advantage as the basis for defeating an adversary. Thus the principle behind Maneuver is simple enough and should not appear intellectually intimidating to anyone. It is in practice that it becomes more difficult – which explains the difference between the great commanders and everyone else. Maneuver stems from the wish to attain a desired to objective as effectively and economically as possible. By the effective and economical use of effort, maneuver implies the ability to succeed beyond the amount of energy expended. To borrow from science; Maneuver is a form of leverage, which allows us to lift a heavy object that we could otherwise not lift, allows us to get more output for the amount of energy expended – like a lever or a block and tackle that increases mechanical advantage. This point of departure is manifest in the inclination to bypass the obstacle rather than ploy through it, the willingness to follow the course of least resistance, the instinct to punch rather than absorb it, the desire to build a better mousetrap. Carried to the perfect extreme, Maneuver offers the alluring promise of defeating an enemy without actually having to close with him; the advantage gained is so decisive the enemy realizes that futility of resisting. “For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill.” A classic example of this Napoleon at Ulm in 1805, where his turning movement so mentally

overwhelmed Mack that the Austrian surrendered his army of 30,000 without a fight. Such cases are exceptional (which led Clauswitz to reject them as unworthy of consideration.), but B. H. Liddell Hart concluded that “their rarity enhances rather than detracts from their value – as an indication of latent potentialities. … Maneuver need not to gain a bloodless victory; its aim is to create leverage that makes victory easier to come by. Clearly, the greater the advantage, the better. Writing about strategy, Liddell Hard said that the true aim is not so much to bring about battle is sure to achieve this.” It “has for its purpose the reduction of fighting to the slenderest possible proportions.” Therefore, Maneuver normally consists of two parts: creating the advantage and exploiting it, or finishing the deed. Limitations The joint definition is limited in several ways. First, it refers only to the “employment of forces on the battlefield.” But Winston Churchhill observed that: …there are many kinds of maneuvre in war, only some of which take place on the battlefield. There are manuevres in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of which are removed from the battlefield, but often react decisively upon it, and the object of all is to find easier ways other than sheer slaughter, of achieving the main purpose.

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There are ways of gaining leverage other the physical employment of forces, and our understanding should appreciate this. Second, with its reference to battle and the employment of units through fire and movement, the definition clearly focuses on the tactical level. But, as Churchill implies, the idea of advantage applies at any level of conflict. While at the tactical levels the means of Maneuver may tend to be the physical components of combat power, this is not exclusively so. At higher levels, Maneuver will tend to incorporate a greater range of mental and moral components. The point is that our definition of Maneuver should not only apply at the tactical level, but at the operational level as well. Third, the joint definition is one-directional: it considers Maneuver only in a spatial dimension, describing the aim of Maneuver as gaining a positional advantage. We limit ourselves unnecessarily by looking only for positional advantage. We ought to look for any advantage that will help us accomplish the mission effectively and economically. As Churchill mentioned, there are plenty of dimensions other than spatial advantage. There is a temporal advantage, for example, gained by establishing a higher tempo than the enemy can keep up with. There is a psychological advantage: the boxer who tires to “psyche out” his opponent during the typical preflight hype is maneuvering for a psychological edge before the bell even rings. There are technological, diplomatic, economic, mental, and moral advantage, among others.

The definition describes movement in combination with fire as the vehicle for gaining positional advantage. There are valid means we ought to consider for gaining leverage other than movement. What is movement; but a change in position? The basic ingredient of Maneuver, then, is not movement, but change. We gain leverage by introducing some change, or perception of change, that improves our situation relative to the enemy. And it follows that the greater the change (real or perceived – as long as it favors us), the greater the advantage. Enemy Orientation One good aspect of the joint definition is the idea that Maneuver makes sense only “in respect to the enemy.” Advantage is by definition a relative thing. Gaining an advantage for ourselves may equally mean putting the enemy at disadvantage. Liddell Hart wrote that the most effective approach “is one that lures or startles the opposition into a false move – so that, as in jujitsu, his own effort is turned into the lever of his own overthrow.” Movement, or any action not focused on the enemy, is not Maneuver; it is simply wasted energy. Therefore, an outward or enemy orientation is integral to Maneuver. This mean far more than simply aiming at enemy forces rather than terrain objectives. It means understanding the enemy – his doctrine, tactics, and techniques; his organization; his aims; and his motives. As Sun Tzu said, “ Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you never be in peril.
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Creating Advantage If the basic aim of Maneuver is to maximize advantage, how do we do that? Exploiting Vulnerability First, we avoid enemy strength and exploit enemy vulnerability. This is not a new idea. Sun Tzu wrote: Now an enemy may be likened to water, for just as long as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so any army avoids strength and strikes weakness. And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground; so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy. In World War I, there were “soft-spot” and von Hutier tactics. Later came Liddell Hart’s theories of the “expanding torrent” and the “indirect approach.” Today, we talk of “surfaces and gaps” (from the German “Flaechen und Luekentaktik”). Classically, we think of attacking the enemy in the flanks and rear rather than the front. But in an era of fluid warfare, front, flanks, and rear are relative things than permanent aspects; if we are walking down a dark alley and an assailant jumps out at us from a side doorway, we instinctively turn to face him. So it is with military units, although normally the larger the unit the longer it takes to turn. Thus, it may become necessary to “fix” our enemy’s attention before we can get at his flank. Rather describing these terms as permanent physical directions, we might better describe them as a function of attention. The “front”

is that area in which the enemy’s attention is focused, whether it be physically before him or not. The “flanks” are on the periphery of his attention and the “rear” where he is least attentive. For that matter, these “areas” may not be areas at all in the spatial sense. The enemy’s “rear,” for example, may be any possibility for which he is unprepared. Identifying Critical Factors Second, we realize that some factors of the enemy’s makeup are more critical to him than others. Some, if attacked, he can function without, while other will cause him grievous harm. We should target those factors – be they locations, capabilities, functions, or moral characteristics – that are most critical, the ones that are most critical, the ones from which we will gain the greatest benefit by attacking. This also is not a new idea. With the revival of Clausewitz, the term “center of gravity” is the most popular, but also the most prone to misunderstanding. Jomini termed the same basic concept “decisive points” (although his discussion focused more on actual geographical points). Sun Tzu captured it very succinctly: “Seize something he cherishes, and he will conform to your desires.” The basic idea is the same. Attack the thing that will hurt the enemy most. “Attacking” in this sense need not necessarily be destructive. It may actually be a constructive act, such as the Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam. The mission was to rid rural areas of Viet Cong control. Rather than trying futilely to track down a fleeter, flitting enemy, the plan was to make the guerilla’s
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“position” untenable by attacking the popular support base that was critical to his survival. “Attacking” that base meant using combined action platoons to protect the villages. A wise enemy will protect those things that are critical to him. Thus identifying our objective becomes a two-part process that must strike a balance between what is critical to him and what is vulnerable to us. Focus Maneuver requires not only that we go after such critical vulnerabilities, but also that we focus our own efforts against them. We should point out that focus does not necessarily equate to physical concentration (although this is the classical application of the concept). Focus is the convergence effort in some way – in space, in time, in intent – so as to create a unified effect. It is possible to be physically dispersed and yet remain focused on a common objective. Consider the German blitzes into Poland and France in 1939 and 1940, both of which comprised of multiple broadly dispersed axes, but all of which were unified by a common focus – shattering the depth and cohesion of the enemy defenses. In fact, as we will see later, multiplicity and variability, when properly focused, can be significant contributors to successful Maneuver. The willingness to gang up (at least in purpose if not in mass) on critical enemy vulnerabilities demands the willingness to accept risk. Focusing in one way necessitates strict economy in others. In his

study of the decisive battles and campaigns of history, John Boyd identified a common condition of success which he called “unequal distribution.” Therefore, if we will Maneuver, it seems we must overcome the natural inclination to “fair share”; that is to spread ourselves evenly (in efforts and attention as well as resources). Selectivity The ability to identify those critical factors implies selectivity, which derives from judgment and intelligence (both the G-2 sense and the generic sense). Maneuver thus means being more intelligent than the enemy – outfoxing him, outsmarting him, outthinking him. What is the characteristic that distinguishes Great Captains of military history? It is not that they had armies, because they often bested superior foes. It is not necessarily that their armies were better equipped or trained. It is because, understanding their enemy and their capabilities, they made war more wisely. Clearly, Maneuver means “fighting smart” as FMFM 1 says, relying on the intelligent use of force rather than brute strength to gain the objective economically. Creating Disadvantage As we have seen, improving our situation relative to the enemy may be a matter of degrading his situation relative to us. We do this limiting his ability – physical, mental, and moral – to effectively counter the things we do. We seek to surprise him so that, at least temporarily, he is not working at full effectiveness.
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Surprise Surprise is a condition of disorientation that occurs as the result of some unexpected event. In its most extreme cases of surprise may take the form of shock or paralysis. But in any form, the result is a temporary loss, if only partial, of effectiveness. Why is an enemy surprised? There are three basic reasons: he can be deceived at to what is happening, he can be confused as to what is happening, or he can simply be ignorant of what is happening. It is important to remember that surprise is not something we do, but something that happens to the enemy as the result of some event. We can certainly take actions to surprise him, but success depends in the end on his susceptibility to being surprised. The first way we can try to surprise the enemy is by deception, by which we try to delude him into believing we are doing something we are not. We try to give the enemy a clear picture of the situation, but the wrong picture. He has a choice, but we convince him to choose wrong. For example, through an elaborate deception plan in 1944, the Allies succeeded in deceiving the Germans into believing the cross-channel invasion of France would take place at Calais. So complete was the deception that a full three weeks after the Normandy landings the Germans still refused to redeploy their operational reserve, the 15th Army, out of Calais, convinced the Normandy invasion was but a subsidiary landing. The second way, and one we do not appreciate as well, is through ambiguity, by

which we seek to confuse the enemy. He is faced with a choice, but cannot choose. Ambiguity depends on the multiplicity and variability, the ability to act in a way that offer us numerous option so that the enemy cannot focus against us. Sun Tzu said: The enemy does not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight any one place will be few. Another way we create ambiguity is to be with any discernable form or pattern, to appear irregular and amorphous while maintaining an effective organization, to appear purposeless while having a focused purpose. Sun Tzu again: Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace; divinely mysterious, he is inaudible. Thus he is a master of his enemy’s fate… The ultimate in disposing one’s troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you. The resulting ambiguity enabled surprise. The third way we seek to surprise the enemy is to act in such a way that the enemy has never even considered, to do something completely outside the realm of the conceivable.

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Whereas in the first two methods, the enemy is faced with choices, in the third he does not even realize there is a choice to be made. More than the others, surprise by this method relies on speed and security and on an ingenious flair for the truly creative and unexpected. We can turn one more to Sun Tzu, who said, “Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.” An example is MacArthur’s masterful stroke at Inchon in 1950, which came as completely unexpected to the overextended North Koreans and resulted in the total collapse of the North Korean army. The scheme was outlandish even to MacArthur seniors and staff, who were opposed from the start; it became a reality only as the result of MacArthur’s personal persistence. Of the three forms, deception would be seem to offer the greater payoff because it actually deludes the enemy into misplaying his hand rather than simply leaving him guessing. But deception is usually more difficult to pull off, because it requires us to actually convince the enemy of a lie as opposed to simply trying to hide the truth. Deception will have a greater effect and a greater chance of success if the delusion we try to sell reinforces what the enemy is already predisposed to believe. Finally, deception is usually more vulnerable to compromise than the other forms.

Distraction The second way we can degrade our enemy’s ability to counter us is to distract him, meaning we try to occupy his attention in one way to create an advantage in another. Certainly, a distraction may have as a part of its purpose to deceive the enemy, but even if we cannot surprise him we can still create for him a dilemma designed to force him to divide his attention and his efforts. Thus, Maneuver would seem in many cases to consist of to distinct but complementary parts, the intent of the first being to set the stage for the second – creating the advantage then exploiting it. Sun Tzu describes this as the cheng and ch’i: the cheng being the normal or direct, the fixing force; and the ch’i being the extraordinary or indirect, the decisive force. Generally, in battle use the normal force to engage: use the extraordinary force to win… In battle there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all. As BGen Samuel B. Griffin notes in his translation of Sun Tzu: “Should the enemy perceive and respond to a ch’i manoeuvre in such a manner as to neutralize it, the manoeuvre would automatically become cheng. The cheng and ch’i will be most effective if they put the enemy on the horns of dilemma, so that to react to one the enemy makes him``self more vulnerable to the other.
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The notion of distraction explains the why in our very first tactics lessons we were taught that an envelopment (which, we learned, was the superior form of maneuver) requires a base of fire while a frontal attack does not. Thus, the suppressive effect of fire (or even, as the joint definition indicates, the potential for fire), in that it prevents the enemy from effectively countering our actions, is a component of Maneuver. For that matter, the destructive effects of fire, if used to put the enemy at a specific disadvantage (such as to create a gap or knockout a machinegun position that is the backbone of the enemy defense) rather than simply to cause cumulative attrition, can be a component of Maneuver as well. The same applies for communications jamming, for example, which disrupts the enemy’s command in order to create leverage at a key moment although continuous barrage jamming that seeks to degrade the enemy’s general ability to communicate irrespective of some other, decisive action does not quality. We should point out that distraction does not require the physical application of force, such as a fixing attack or a base of fire, but can be any element that occupies the enemy’s attention. Variety and Cunning Our ability to take an enemy unprepared to put him at a disadvantage by surprise or distraction – rests in part on our ability to remain unpredictable; that is, not to conform to the enemy’s expectations. The first time we strike the enemy’s left flank it will probably constitute Maneuver. When we

repeat the action, it may or may not be Maneuver. The third time we try, it probably will not be Maneuver; it will be probably what the enemy expects. Thus, variety, as a condition of unpredictability, is an integral component of Maneuver, over time. By the same argument, novelty, originally, and creativity are components as well. If we couple this bent for the original with the ruthlessness described earlier, we see the emergence of conning and craft, a talent for artifice and wile. We get what Churchill described as “an element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten.” Speed The final key component of Maneuver is speed. To create advantage and exploit potential advantage, we must be able to act faster than the enemy can react. Because we now appreciate Maneuver not only in the spatial dimension, we should not think of speed only in terms of the ability to move fast, but also in terms of the tempo – the ability to think, decide, act and react quickly. And because Maneuver only has meaning relative to the enemy, it is not absolute speed that matters, but relative speed. As John Boyd says, we can be slow as long as the enemy is slower. We can gain an advantage by improving our own speed or by decreasing our enemy’s speed. Speed is a contributor in that it allows us to concentrate superior force against selected enemy weaknesses and that it allows us to take the enemy by unexpected action.
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But speed is also a lever in its own right in that through superior speed we can seize and maintain the initiative, allowing us to dictate the terms of conflict and shape events to our advantage. Furthermore, if change is the basic vehicle of Maneuver, speed increases the impact of change and heightens the enemy’s resulting disorientation. In other words, the faster we change the situation, the greater the consequent advantage. And since war is a fluid phenomenon, if change the situation quickly and continuously over time, our advantage compounds with each change. What Maneuver Is Not We have taken the concept of Maneuver apart, and hopefully we have discovered there is far more here than immediately meets the eye. But we are not finished. We still need to eliminate the commonly held misconceptions about Maneuver. We have analyzed what Maneuver is; we need to clarify what Maneuver is not. Movement It should be clear by now that simply movement does not equate to Maneuver. By definition, Maneuver must be oriented on the enemy; simple movement does not qualify. Furthermore, Maneuver is not necessarily simply relational movement. This may be one manifestation of Maneuver, but hardly the only one. We have seen that Maneuver exists in many dimensions, not just spatial, and that the essential means of a

Maneuver is change in whatever form rather than movement. Dependent on Mechanization Nowhere in our discussion to this point have we identified the need for mechanization or motorization. This misconception has arisen because we often equate rapid movement with mechanization. In many environments, if used properly, foot-mobile forces can generate greater mobility than mechanized forces. And it is not absolute speed that matters anyway, but relative speed. Even if we are slow, so long as the enemy is slower, we maintain the advantage. Simply Flanking Attacks or Envelopments We associate flanking attacks and envelopes flanks and rear with vulnerability. And, in fact, these options constitute Maneuver in the classic sense. But to establish a universal tactic, such as the envelopment, is to contradict the variety that is integral to Maneuver. Used exclusively, the envelopment ceases to be a tactic at all and becomes a rote procedure performed mechanically and not oriented on the enemy. The Israelis learned this in Lebanon in 1982 when they discovered they had better success attacking frontally because their enemy had become conditioned to expect flanking movements.

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Bloodless War is about fighting. War is by nature a bloody business. Many of critics of Maneuver mistakenly believe critics of Maneuver advocates units “running amok” (as a critical article in the Gazette recently put it), running circles around, bypassing, enveloping the enemy, and in the words of one general officer. “Trying to confuse him to death,” but never actually fighting him. With all due respect to Sun Tzu, only in exception cases does Maneuver eliminate the need for fighting. Rather, Maneuver seeks to arrange the situation so that when we do fight it as at an advantage. As Sun Tzu further said: “Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory form the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates.” Maneuver does not mean that we do not fight; it means that we fight selectively. Divorced From Firepower Similarly, Maneuver does not imply that firepower is unimportant. It does not even imply that firepower is unimportant. It does not even imply that firepower is only of secondary importance. And nothing in our discussion has implied that killing the enemy contradicts the concept of Maneuver. The JCS definition clearly states that firepower is a key component of Maneuver (at least in the tactical sense). At the tactical level at least, skillful Maneuver uses firepower to create or exploit advantage, not simply to grind the enemy down cumulatively. Inapplicable in Low – Intensity Conflict A recent Gazette article, “A Marine for All Seasons? Maneuver Warfare versus Low –

Intensity Conflict,” (MCG Sep 89) argues that: The basic tenets of maneuver warfare (combined arms teams running amok – sorry amidst – a fluid, violent battlefield) have no place in most forms of low – intensity conflict. The author suffers form the common malady of understanding Maneuver only in the spatial dimension. Against an irregular, unconventional enemy with no discernable front, flanks, or rear (in the spatial sense), who refuses to stand and fight a conventional battle, naturally such conventional interpretations will fail. But by now I hope interpretations will fail. But by now I hope we are beginning to see Maneuver in broader terms than these. The components of Maneuver as we have identified them – creating and exploiting advantage in any form; opportunism; superior speed or tempo; focusing ruthlessly on critical enemy factors; surprise in the form of deception; ambiguity or unpredictability; distraction; variety; creativity; and enemy orientation – would to apply quite obviously to any kind of war. Indeed, these Maneuver components would seem to apply any kind of competitive endeavor. The guerilla, with his hit-and-run tactics, his inherent ambiguity resulting from irregular and amorphous organizations, and his unwillingness to stand and fight unless at a distinct local advantage, demonstrates a keen appreciation for Maneuver in its unconventional forms. The ambush, a staple
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tactic in most types of low-intensity conflict, is a perfect example of Maneuver at its purest and most basic best: letting an unknowing enemy put himself at an overwhelming disadvantage and making him pay dearly for it. The CAP cited earlier is an excellent example of operational-level Maneuver applied to low-intensity war. Synthesis: What Maneuver Is We have taken apart to try to glean its various components, some of which are integral and some of which are merely contributors or multipliers of advantage. We have tried to dispel the various misconceptions about Maneuver as well. What are we left with now? Maneuver derives from a very simple concept; creating and exploiting advantages as a means for defeating an opponent quickly, effectively, and economically. Although simple in concept, in application Maneuver comprises a nearly countless variety of forms and methods, limited only by the imagination and the parameters of the given conflict. There is far more to Maneuver than a rapid movement around an enemy’s flank. As the basis for a doctrine, Maneuver is not captured in a single act, nor even in a consistent way of acting. Rather,

it is manifest in a certain state of mind, a mental approach to conflict. It is at its source an approach based on intelligence and all this implies: being selective, being focused, being clever, being creative, being crafty. It is an approach that ruthlessly exploits advantage. It is an approach that recognizes the inherent value of speed. Thus, if we had to offer a revised definition for Joint Pub 1 –02, it might read something like this: “Maneuver – A mental approach to conflict, born of opportunism, variety, and cunning, by which we create and exploit advantage as a means for success by creating a rapidly and continuously changing situation in which our enemy cannot effectively cope. We do this by focusing strength against critical enemy vulnerability, generating superior speed, and distracting or disorienting our foe through ambiguity or deception.” “Maneuver derives from a very simple concept: creating and exploiting advantage…”

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Introduction

John C. Scarfen’s article, “The Theory and Tactics of Maneuver Warfare” is the written narrative of an interview with General Alfred Grey. The content of the article relates to maneuver warfare and its implementation in the 2nd Marine Division. The interview appeared in the Amphibious Warfare Review, July 1984, which preceded our current doctrine. As you read the interview, you should attempt to visualize the challenges of infusing and embracing warfighting in the Marine operating forces. The evolutionary methodology of warfighting produces innovation challenges in other related areas. Improvements in technology are probably the greatest source of change for maneuver warfare and warfighting. As the warfighting applications change, the Marine Corps must modify its warfighting doctrine, tactics, and techniques to meet the challenges of the current and future operating environments.

Scope and Perspective

This interview was specifically included in the text to give a historical perspective of the origins of MCDP 1, Warfighting. Major General Gray became the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps and forged maneuver warfare into our current warfighting doctrine. The Marine amphibious force (MAF) referred to in the text has evolved into the current Marine expeditionary force. The nomenclature changed from amphibious to expeditionary during the middle to late 1980s. While the mission of the Marine Corps has been expanded to include a diversity of expeditionary missions, maneuver warfare has remained essentially the same. The interview style narrative should make it very easy to pick out the warfighting concepts, but remember that this document is included to provide historical perspective of our current doctrine.
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Reading Concepts

As you read Mr. Scharfen’s interview with General Gray, think about the similarities between maneuver warfare and our current warfighting doctrine. The article contains information on many warfighting concepts, but the following are of primary interest: · · · · Where in the spectrum of war does maneuver play a role? What is the importance of understanding commander’s intent? What is meant by command forward? What is the purpose of creating initiative in the absence of orders?

Content Preview

The table below locates the warfighting concept in a previous lesson that is addressed in the following article. After reading the article, review the concept to be able to apply critical analysis of the article content to answer items 8 through 11. Since the content of this particular article is historical rather than reflective of current doctrine, a general comparison of article and course content may be helpful. Warfighting Concept Review Commander’s Intent See Page 4-16
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TACTICS AND THEORY OF MANEUVER WARFARE
INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL ALFRED M. GRAY, JR. By John C. Scharfen SCHARFEN: General Gray, while others may theorize about the concepts and principles of maneuver warfare, you have been of the few proponents who have had the opportunity to exercise the theory in practice. Could you put the role of the Division’s initiatives on this form of warfare in the context of the overall II MAF operations program? GRAY: Certainly. Your question lets me put our Second Marine Division role into proper perspective. First, our maneuver warfare initiatives have not been in isolation of the other components of II MAF. As a matter of fact, it has been a coordinated effort with the Second Marine Air Wing, the Second Force Service Support Group, and the Headquarters of II MAF. When we embarked on this program, we had the Second concurrence and support of the commanders of each of those major Fleet Marine Force Atlantic commanders. Your question also gives me the opportunity right at the outset of our discussion to make another important point. While by virtue of the privilege I have of commanding this Division, I am, as you put it, in a position to exercise the theory in practice, I am not the only Marine doing so and I am far from the first. As we discuss the basics of maneuver warfare, it won’t be hard to recognize that it is a style that many Marine have employed over the years and that it has been at the conceptual core of some of our most successful amphibious operations. Inchon comes to mind immediately. The World War II Pacific Island campaigns offer other examples. In operations not launched from the sea. General Barrow’s A Shau Valley operation in Vietnam is a good example. There are dozens of American precedents with one of the classics being Jackson’s Valley Campaign. I would also like to mention that the other divisions, wings, and service support groups also have undertaken some very worthwhile initiatives that are compatible to the maneuver style of combat. SCHARFEN: Do you agree with Mr. Lind’s definition of maneuver warfare – and I am going to paraphrase some of his thoughts here – that it is a style of warfare that is opposed to the fire-power attrition model that seeks to destroy the capabilities of the enemy to wage war as opposed to
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relying exclusively on the destruction of his forces? GRAY: Yes, I guess I agree with that definition, but I would like to embellish it a bit. I must say that I don’t think that it goes far enough. I know Mr. Lind would agree that the concept of maneuver war is as much a state of mind as it is a theory. It emphasizes the importance of seizing and maintaining the initiative which General Trainor (our Marine Corps’ Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy, and Operations) has espoused as a foundation to his new “thoughts of war.” It is a style of warfare that encourages you to anticipate the enemy through what I might call the four “D’s”; · · · · Disorientation Disruption Dislocation, and finally Destruction of his cohesion.

heavy reliance on mechanization, to others it connotes an exclusively ground oriented concept. Neither inference is correct. Maneuver warfare has applications across the spectrum of war from air to surface, from tactics to strategy, from operations to logistics. I’m afraid that the title has generated some semantic confusion and excessive debate over definition of terms. SCHARFEN: How does the concept relate to maneuver? GRAY: First, let me say something about maneuver. Maneuver in warfare must be purposeful. Since maneuver expends the resources of your force, it must be productive. We must be careful that we don’t inculcate into a generation of junior officers the philosophy that maneuver is intrinsically desirable. You must achieve something with the expenditure of your valuable resources. Now to answer your question. If you are going to apply unrelenting pressure against your enemy to disorient him and destroy his cohesion, you must find and hit him his vital points. Movement in maneuver warfare also implies that you are consistently placing the enemy at a disadvantage in space and time, both in fact in his and your perceptions. SCHARFEN: As you have pointed out, the principles of maneuver warfare are not new. Nevertheless, it has become a very important topic of discussion in the Marine Corps within the past three years or four years. It is a regular topic addressed in the Marine Corps Gazette and even has been the subject of Marine Corps school’s
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All this accomplished with an unrelenting and increasing pressure against his vital points. It emphasizes the offensive. It implies the exercise of the initiative at the small unit. It capitalizes upon the unanticipated through the recon-pull approach rather that that of the plannerpush. It is a concept that is more psychological that physical. It is indirect rather than the direct approach to conflict. SCHARFEN: Does that term maneuver warfare really describe all that? GRAY: I’m not certain that it is the proper title. The term carries with a lot of questionable baggage. To many it implies a

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publications. What has prompted this interest in the concept? GRAY: Of course, the debate has been limited to the Marine Corps publications, but you are right, it has generated a great deal of Marine Corps interest. On its own merit, I believe that maneuver warfare is a superior way to fight. But I don’t think that this fact alone can account for the interest that has been generated in this approach. It appears to me that the genesis of the interest is the recognition of the fact that that potential enemy in a major war is likely to have superior raw combat power to pit against US forces, and particularly a deployed MAGTF. You don’t defeat such a force by relying primarily on fire power, frontal assault, and attrition. Rather, you defeat him by superior technology, maintaining the initiative, with intelligent, purposeful movement, by attacking his most vulnerable points and through the application of firepower. Such is the essence of maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is being accepted as a valid concept for the training and organization of MAGTF’s, because we have a requirement to fight this kind of war not because it is a fixation of the military intellectual. SCHARFEN: General, with that background, can we discuss maneuver warfare in the Second Marine Division? Specifically, how does the concept impact on how your train and equip for employment of your forces?

GRAY: Let’s start with training. Before the Second Marine Division, or any military organization, can capitalize on maneuver warfare, everyone in the organization must be reading off of the same OpOrder. There must be a common approach to the details of the tactics. I think that we would have one hell of a mess if we had one maneuver element working on mission type orders, operating with a great deal of aggressive independence, moving out to capitalize on the unexpected with another, supporting element operating in a more conventional, conservative mode. The commander of the two elements would be faced with a situation not unlike have a team of horses hitched up to a trace with one going at near maximum speed, while the other was going a good deal slower. The result would be a series of great circles. So we spend a lot of time indoctrinating our officers and men in the dynamics of the battlefield to insure that we all have the same mindset – that they know what to expect of me and my staff and what I expect out of them. Above all else we try to orient our training upon the cultivation of attitude that the only thing certain on the battle field will be the uncertain – the unexpected. We train them to find no recipes or formulas which will guarantee success in battle. We should think of good training not just as a prerequisite to the conduct of maneuver warfare, but as the essential ingredient to winning. SCHARFEN: Other than the basics of basics good leadership, audacity, innovative concepts, delegation, what are some of the
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military skills you believe are fundamental to maneuver warfare that require emphasis here in the Division? GRAY: There is a litany of them that I touch on every time I address the Marines of this Division and anywhere else where I speak on professionalism. Included is the requirement to exploit both strategic and tactical mobility. Flexible logistics are fundamental. We need to be lot work on the NBC. Recent combat operations in the Middle East demonstrate the important of air defense and the suppression of air defenses. If you are going to preempt the enemy with your audacity and initiative, you must have good intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to provide the kind of target acquisition that is fundamental to such operations. Deception can be a good force multiplier as we demonstrated in our World War II amphibious operations at Tinian and elsewhere. There isn’t professional who would put C3 very high in priority in the fundamental skills that are essential for successful operations. There is EW, an art which, because it is generally done behind locked doors, is often ignored to the detriment of the command. Finally, the threat of terrorism deserves our attention because it can fundamentally change our view of the enemy order of battle, giving him unconventional potential that could erode our capabilities. SCHARFEN: How does this training relate to the training and basic skills Marines bring along with them to the Division?

GRAY: It builds on them. I want to emphasize that there is nothing we are proposing under this concept that is alien to the fundamental training, operations, or administrative routines of the Marine Corps. The training and experience our get in our depots, centers, and schools equip them to participate in and contribute to the maneuver warfare objectives of this Division. What we are trying to do is raise them to the next plateau of integrated tactical concepts in this operational environment. What we are doing neither contradicts nor replaces those basic skills Marines bring to this Division from our schools and other operating units. Nor does it conflict with amphibious doctrine. I will go further to say that at the core of amphibious doctrine are the essential of maneuver warfare including the elements of strategic and tactical mobility, the element of surprise, stretching the enemy resources for the defense of multiple landing sites, deception, and flexible logistics. SCHARFEN: I have a list of fundamental precepts that I believe you subscribe to in your Division training programs. I would like to cite them one at a time and get your views on their application. First is commander’s intent. GRAY: We want our Marines to understand what their commanders are trying to accomplish on the battlefield. Knowledge of the commander’s intent is an absolute requirement, if the subordinate is going to be given the freedom of action that is implicit in mission-type orders and reconpull tactics. We insist that every Marine
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know the mission and the intent of the commander two echelons above his own. SCHARFEN: Effort? And Focus of the Main

anticipation of the purpose and the intent of the commander and it fosters espirit. SCHARFEN: Recon-pull tactics? GRAY: We indoctrinate our commanders with the necessity of recon-pull rather than command-push initiatives from subordinate units. Both mission-type orders and reconpull fundamentals imply that the commander has a great deal of trust in the judgment of his subordinate commanders. This trust requires nourishment and cultivation – it isn’t generated overnight. It is only achieved by working together for extended periods in operational environments. SCHARFEN: Infiltration tactics? GRAY: Too often we associate infiltration of the enemy exclusively with small units and with unconventional operations. In maneuver warfare we talk about infiltration as a function of conventional operations and as being within the capability of the larger unit. Infiltration on this scale requires very good command, control, and communications to insure that you properly coordinated. SCHARFEN: And what do you mean by command forward? GRAY: Let me start out by telling you what it doesn’t mean. It doesn’t mean that commanders should become point men for their units. It doesn’t mean that commanders can both ignore both what is going on in the rear and the requirement for
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GRAY: As you can see as we discuss these fundamentals, they are by no means independent considerations. As a matter of fact, there a great deal of interdependence that goes with mission-type orders. SCHARFEN: And what of the dedication to the mission type orders? GRAY: We try to impress at every level of command that it is important that, to the extent possible, we should tell our subordinate commanders what they must do rather than dwell on the details of how they should do it. We tell them who they must help and who they must support, and finally, with whom they should coordinate. This is the sense of the mission-type orders. Readers of the Amphibious Warfare Review will recognize that it is not a new approach, but it is fundamental to this concept of maneuver war. SCHARFEN: What special conditions must exist before a commander can rely upon mission-type orders? GRAY: Familiarity with the commander that can only come from experience and mutual confidence. We have been doing everything in our power to enhance this process of understanding by stabilizing personnel in units. Unit stability fosters the growth of unit cohesion, it generates the

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effective combat support. It means that the commander must focus upon and give his first priority to the accomplishment of the combat mission, and the philosophy – that is, the commander’ must be mentally in concert with his units in contact at the front edge of his operating area. Physically, he may be sitting in a bunker or flying overhead in a helicopter, but psychologically he must be with his forward units. I like Sir John Hackett’s phrase about the “smell of the battlefield” when describing the commander’s appreciation for operations within the combat arena. SCHARFEN: And finally, a fundamental which, by this time appears to be self evident; initiative in the absence of orders. GRAY: Yes, it is certainly a corollary to all the other you have cited. We want our commanders to think. Go ahead and make mistakes, but do the innovative, get inside the enemy’s mind, think about what his intentions are, how he is going to react and outsmart him with your initiative in the absence of orders from a senior command. We are serious about being committed to giving our Marines the freedom to make mistakes. It is difficult to overcome some fundamental inhibitions we have in this respect, but it is one of our priority concerns. SCHARFEN: Still on the subject of training for maneuver war, can we transition now to the exercises you may be conducting which incorporate the fundamentals of this style of war?

GRAY: Certainly. We have MAB-level free play exercise twice a year at Fort Pickett that provides plenty of latitude for our Marine to experiment with new tactics and techniques. Each unit that participates gets more than one chance to fight against an unrestrained superior force that is bent on destroying it. We emphasize that units have the freedom to maneuver within very flexible limits. Each problem is followed by a critique which not only addresses the tactics and the techniques which were employed, but also the thought that was behind them. We want to know if their scheme of maneuver was thought out, logical and supportive of the commander’s intent. We discuss the question of whether or not the maneuver brings positive decisive results. SCHARFEN: Do you have any examples of payoff to your training efforts here in the Second Marine Division? GRAY: Yes. I was afraid that you weren’t going to ask. Our BLT 2/8 conducted a classic maneuver warfare operations to achieve some very impressive results on Grenada in October 1983. This was a real “come as you are operation” that demanded the type of independent judgment and initiative without detailed prior planning that is characteristic of what expect in maneuver war. Right from the start there was a need for flexibility with the knowledge at H-2 on D-Day that the primary landing plan would have to be scrapped and that the Marines would be have to go over alternate beaches. This flexibility was further demonstrated once BLT 2/8 was ashore. Defenders were
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taken by surprise by the Marine tanks and amphibious assault vehicles that moved aggressively forward against the defenders. The Marines use of maneuver warfare tactics demoralized the Cubans and the People’s Revolutionary Army. One Cuban officer the BLT captured said that he surrendered to the Marines because they kept popping up in the most unexpected places and he figured further resistance was futile. His comments speak volumes about the psychological impact of well-executed maneuver operations. SCHARFEN: Is there anything else in the area of training in which you think area of training in which you think the readers of Amphibious Warfare Review will be interested? GRAY: I think that the Maneuver Warfare Board that has created should be of interest. This Board, chaired by Brigadier General Milligan, which is manned by select members of the Division, Second Force Service Support Group, and the Second Marine Air Wing, meets several times a month to consider books and articles which might be chosen for distribution within the Division to stimulate interest in and knowledge of these fundamentals we believe are to be at the heart of a conducting effective maneuver warfare. It fills our need for a professional forum on this subject and helps to institutionalize our training and education objectives. And by the way, just to make a parenthetical remark, I think that the controversy that has been generated on the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette over the value and feasibility

of maneuver war has been one of the healthiest things that could have possibly happened in the evolution of Marine Corps tactical doctrine. It has stimulated some controversy and potent thought on how we should fight our forces. The Board also considers how new equipment new equipment might enhance our maneuver warfare to amphibious operations and devises map problems for to use for the training of my commanders and staff. The composition of the board is constantly changing – both a good and a bad thing, but on a balance, probably good since more people become involved – as officers and enlisted Marines deploy to the LFTF and WESTPAC. SCHARFEN: Could you summarize your Division training objectives in pursuing proficiency in this style of warfare? GRAY: Yes. We have three objectives in the Division that are the overriding considerations in preparing to fight this style of war. The first is to promote better leadership, the second is better training and the third is self discipline. Now I know that these three objectives could apply to any tactical concept, but I believe they are the cornerstones of maneuver warfare. In working towards these three objectives, it is my intent to institutionalize audacity throughout the hierarchy of the Division. I want the command to know that at all levels that responsible individuals must exercise their initiative, that they be allowed to make mistakes and fail once in a while. You can’t instill these qualities without emphasizing leadership, training, and self discipline.
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SCHARFEN: General, can you be more explicit on how you relate these three objectives to maneuver warfare? GRAY: Well, let’s take better leadership first. Uncertainty is endemic to the battlefield. We can capitalize on uncertainty by developing leaders who view uncertainty as an advantage to be capitalized upon, rather than a disadvantage that inhibits their options. The best ways to make capital of uncertainty is through maneuver. SCHARFEN: And better training? GRAY: Better training is essential to maneuver warfare because it is more demanding of all the force than the alternatives. In maneuver warfare you must train to use combat information faster than your adversary. You must train to take advantage of the strategic and tactical intelligence resources that are available to you with your area of interest extended out 100 to 200 miles. You must have well exercised, flexible logistic support that is a function of available materiel. Self discipline implies a mindset or thought process to fight a style of warfare. It implies that you know your basic tactical techniques by rote before you master higher level maneuver tactics. Self discipline means that you have developed your tactical prowess to the point that maneuvering your force to gain a tactical advantage is as much instinctive as it is the result of commander’s estimate.

SCHARFEN: General, can we discuss how the Second Division forces are equipped for maneuver war? GRAY: I can answer that question very directly. We are equipped as are other divisions in the Marine Corps. We receive no special equipment because of commitment to this style of war. This doesn’t mean that we aren’t interested in new technologies. This doesn’t mean that we ignore applications to maneuver war in the equipment that is in our tables of allowances that we might overlook if we weren’t so disposed. We may use our equipment differently that would otherwise to gain greater mobility or to capitalize on surprise. I would like to go back to my major premise; however, that maneuver warfare isn’t so much a function of how you are equipped as it is a function of how you think. We do concentrate on making the maximum use of the tools that are at our disposal rather than waiting for wish-list technologies to solve our problems. Having said that, I want to assure you that we do think about and we do plan to incorporate those very promising advances that are on the near horizon such as the LAV and the LCAC which will give us another dimension of maneuver. SCHARFEN: General, could we now address some arguments that have been made against embracing against embracing maneuver warfare as a standard doctrine. One serious concern that been cited is that adopting maneuver warfare supports the position of many of “military reformers” who oppose defense spending as a matter of
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principle. The reasoning goes that some members of this believe that maneuver warfare gives you more combat power for less expenditure of resources and it is therefore a good program for them to embrace to rationalize cuts in the defense budget. Does this concern you? GRAY: Not enough to diminish my enthusiasm for promoting the concept. It’s probably true that you are going to get more combat power at less cost in maneuver warfare, because it is a superior way to fight. But the argument that adopting this philosophy justifies defense cuts is going to be very difficult to sustain. I think it lacks credibility and that it won’t be taken seriously in responsible quarters. SCHARFEN: There are those who argue that there is an inconsistency between advancing the technique of mission-type orders and the requirement to have integrated, thoroughly planned logistical support and positive control. GRAY: Not a bad point and one that every commander who is conscientious about promoting initiative in his subordinates must face. However, it simply is a matter of trade-offs between ideals. Ideally, you would like to give a capable, aggressive subordinate commander complete freedom to develop and exercise his tactical scheme of maneuver. Ideally, you would like to give your logistician a detailed scenario for exactly the operation is going to be conducted. Obviously, these two ideals are in conflict, which means that on the one hand you just can’t turn commanders loose

and let go at it without any consideration of control and coordination and, on the other hand, you must demand some flexibility from your logistician and your C3 people to insure that they aren’t driving the scheme of maneuver. SCHARFEN: What about the argument that there is an undue reliance upon mechanization of Marine forces by maneuver warfare advocates? GRAY: I can only say, from my perspective, and what I know of others who want to fight this way, that it simply isn’t true that there is an overemphasis on mechanization. Let go back to my first premise – maneuver warfare is a way of thinking and is independent of the manner in which forces are equipped or where they fight. When we talk about the need for mobility we are talking about relative mobility we vis-à-vis the enemy. It may be on foot, as well as in a mechanized column. Concepts of maneuver warfare are as relevant in mountain fighting as they are on the open plains. Now, if someone were to tell me that the Second Marine Division was about to be equipped tomorrow with a whole family of LCACs or a complement of new super fast, lightweight armor vehicles that were impervious to anti-armor systems, I would be a very happy man. I would consider that these new vehicles would greatly enhance our capability to fight a maneuver warfare style operation. However, as desirable as these systems may be, it is not essential that they be organic to this Division to embrace a concept that is
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based on a thought process and a mental discipline on to engage an enemy. SCHARFEN: And what about the complaint that there is nothing new in maneuver warfare and that it’s proponents are just making a fuss over something everyone else takes for granted? GRAY: There is some truth here. The concepts that embrace are in maneuver warfare have been around a long while. I find interesting something that Bill Lind said in a television interview last April – that there are probably no new ideas on war that have been introduced since the 18th century. The concepts that we are promoting in the Second Marine Division have been around for centuries and Marines from Generals Harry Lee to Puller to Walt to Barrow all have employed them. However, until now we in the Marine Corps really haven’t dedicated ourselves in a conceptually structured way to codify the specific tactics and techniques which are inherent in this approach to war. And this is the important point to be made. What we are proposing isn’t new. What is new is the process of codifying our manuals, training for it in our exercises and in our approach to leadership. It’s a very significant development with this Division and within the Maine Corps. It has incorporated into our Long Range Plan and other planning and training documents for future amphibious operations. SCHARFEN: What are your thoughts on areas that still need development in the evolution of maneuver warfare with Marine operating forces?

GRAY: There are a number. I think the relationship and application of maneuver warfare in a chemical or biological environment is an interesting subject. It seems to me that the tactics and techniques we espouse for maneuver warfare have particular relevance to the tactical nuclear battlefield. It’s amazing how little time we really give to preparing to fight a tactical nuclear war. I am concerned about how we increase mobility with our present and scheduled resources by taking advantage of the assets we have and lightening the load of the infantryman. I am particularly concerned about the Marine’s load in cold weather operations; such as we have in Norway. Communications are a critical consideration and we must do better in this area. We must be more concerned about how we get the most out of our communications, but we also must be concerned about how we can live without them. I think we need to do more on silent landings, day and night, surface and air. Why can’t we do silent air strikes? The problems associated with combat support in a highly mobile environment are important, particularly those associated with engineer support. We have a revolutionary aircraft in the AV-8; how do we integrate this capability into our maneuver warfare concepts? SCHARFEN: General Gray, thank you for the time that you have given to us. Is there any final, wrap-up statement that you would like to make about maneuver warfare?

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GRAY: I would like to reiterate that what we have been discussing here is a style of warfare. It is not a revolutionary concept, but a philosophy on how to fight that is based on some time-honored principles. I think that some of the discussions on the

subject have become debates on the merits of the alternative tactics and techniques. The subject is worthy of the attention and study of all Marines, at all levels.

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Introduction

The role of the Marine NCO can be debated by young, old, officer, and enlisted alike without it ever clearly being defined. The information age is redefining this role and will continue to do so as the 21st century progresses. Linking warfighting to changes in technology and the role of technology to implement these changes will be essential for the corporal’s continued success in the operating environment. General Krulak’s article, “The Strategic Corporal and the Three Block War” attempts to describe the importance of core training, leadership, and decisionmaking ability at the corporal level, which will have a profound effect in the future operating environment. The article is divided into four sections. The first section describes a probable, but fictitious scenario. The second section evaluates the conditions and opportunities created by the operating environment dynamics. The third section summarizes the role and value of NCO decision making in such an environment. The last section focuses on the actions that the corporal took and how that interaction improved warfighting capacity. As you read the article, “The Strategic Corporal and the Three Block War,” you should think about the following warfighting concepts: · · · · · What are some of the challenges and pressures in the operating environment the 21st Marine NCO can expect to experience? What is the three block war? What is the benefit of having small unit decision makers? What is the common thread linking all aspects of the Marines Corps? How does a “zero defects” mentality improve operational performance?

Scope and Perspective

Reading Concepts

Content Preview

The table below locates the warfighting concepts in previous lessons that are addressed in the following article. After reading the article, review the concepts to be able to apply critical analysis of the article content to answer items 12 through 16. Warfighting Concept Nonlinearity Uncertainty Decision Making See Page 1-11 1-10 4-11
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"The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War"
Marines Magazine, January 1999 by Gen. Charles C. Krulak Operation Absolute Agility 0611: The African sun had just risen above the hills surrounding the sprawling city and sent its already dazzling rays streaming into the dusty alleyway. Corporal Hernandez felt the sun on his face and knew that today would, again, be sweltering. He was a squad leader in 2d Platoon, Lima Company and had, along with his men, spent a sleepless night on the perimeter. For the past week his platoon had provided security to the International Relief Organization (IRO) workers who manned one of three food distribution points in the American Sector of Tugala -- the war-torn capital of Orange -a Central African nation wracked by civil unrest and famine. The situation in Orange had transfixed the world for nearly two years. Bloody tribal fighting had led first to the utter collapse of the government and economy, and ultimately, to widespread famine. International efforts to quell the violence and support the teetering government had failed, and the country had plunged into chaos. The United States had finally been compelled to intervene. A forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) was ordered to assist the efforts of the ineffective Regional MultiNational Force (RMNF) and the host of international humanitarian assistance organizations that struggled to alleviate the suffering. The MEU's arrival had stabilized the situation and allowed the precious relief supplies to finally reach the people who needed them most. The Food Distribution Point (FDP) manned by 2d Platoon serviced over 5,000 people daily. The Marines had, at first, been shocked at the extent of the suffering, by the constant stream of malnourished men and women, and by the distended bellies and drawn faces of the children. The flow of food and medical supplies had, however, had a dramatic impact. The grim daily death tolls had slowly begun to decrease and the city had begun to recover some sense of normalcy. Within a month the lives of the Marines had assumed a sort of dull routine. Corporal Hernandez removed his helmet and rested his head against the mud wall of the house in which his squad was billeted and waited for his MRE to finish heating; satisfied that he and his fellow Marines were making a difference.

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0633: The dust and rumble of a half dozen 5-Tons pulling into the market square caught the attention of Corporal Hernandez. Escorted by Marines, the convoy brought with it the food and medical supplies that meant life or death to the inhabitants of this devastated neighborhood. With it also came word of life beyond the confines of this small corner of Orange and useful intelligence concerning the disposition of the opposing factions that wrestled for its control. Today, the convoy commander had disturbing news for the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Franklin. Members of the OWETA faction, led by the renegade warlord Nedeed, had been observed congregating near the river that divided the capital in half and marked the boundary separating the turf of OWETA from that of its principal rival. Nedeed had long criticized the presence of the RMNF and had frequently targeted its personnel for attack. While he had strenuously denounced the presence of U.S. forces, he had, so far, refrained from targeting American personnel. As starvation became less a concern, however, tensions had begun to rise and there was growing fear that open hostilities would breakout again and that attack of RMNF and MEU personnel was increasingly likely. Lieutenant Franklin passed the report to his company commander and then gathered his squad leaders together to review the developing situation. 1st Squad was ordered to move about four hundred meters north and man a roadblock at Checkpoint (CP) Charlie. Corporal Hernandez returned to

his position, reluctantly disposed of his uneaten MRE, and prepared his Marines to move out. The movement to the road intersection at CP Charlie was uneventful and took less than ten minutes. The squad had manned the post before and was familiar with the routine. Pre-staged barricades were quickly moved into place to secure the street to vehicular traffic and a triple strand of concertina was strung in order to control pedestrian movement. Corporal Sley and his fire team moved a hundred meters north and established an Observation Post (OP) on the roof of a twostory building that afforded excellent fields of view. By 0700, the squad was in position. At that hour, the city was still quiet, and except for the intel report concerning OWETA activity, there was no evidence that this day would be any different from the previous. The Marines of 1st Squad settled in for another long hot day of tedious duty. 0903: By nine o'clock, the normal large crowd, mostly women and children with baskets in hand, had gathered to await passage through the checkpoint. The Marines orders were clear: they were to deny access to anyone carrying a weapon and to be alert for any indications of potential trouble. Their Rules of Engagement (ROE) were unambiguous: anyone observed with an automatic weapon was considered hostile, as was anyone who intentionally threatened Marine personnel. The MEU Commander had made this policy clear in meetings with each of the warlords in the early days of the deployment. His directness had paid dividends and to date,
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no MEU personnel had been wounded by small arms fire. His directness had paid dividends and to date, no MEU personnel had been wounded by small arms fire. The factions had kept a low profile in the American sector and had not interfered with those convoys accompanied by Marines. Such was not the case, however, in adjacent sectors, where RMNF personnel had frequently been the target of ambush and sniper fire. The Marines had stayed on their toes. 0915: Corporal Sley reported from his position on the rooftop that the crowd was especially large and included an unusually high proportion of young adult males. He sensed an ominous change in the atmosphere. Less than a mile away, he could see the vehicles of Nedeed's gang gathered at the far side of the bridge spanning the river that separated the OWETA and Mubasa factions. He passed his suspicions on to his squad leader, "Something big is about to happen." The day promised to be a break from the routine. 0921: Corporal Hernandez promptly relayed Sley's report and concerns to his platoon commander and learned from Lieutenant Franklin that Nedeed's chief rival -- Mubasa -- was moving west toward CP Charlie. Mubasa's intentions seemed clear; his route would bring him directly to CP Charlie and an ultimate collision with Nedeed. 1st Squad's position astride the two MSR's placed them squarely between the rival clans. Lieutenant Franklin directed Hernandez to extend the road block to cover

the road entering the intersection from the West and indicated that he and Sergeant Baker's 2d Squad were en route to reinforce. Corporal Hernandez could feel the tension grow. The crowd had become more agitated, aware that Mubasa's men were near and concerned that the vital food distribution might be disrupted. The young men had begun to chant anti-U.S. slogans and to throw rocks at the startled Marines. Corporal Hernandez felt the situation slipping out of control and decided to close the road completely. With great difficulty, the barriers were shifted and the concertina was drawn back across the narrow access point. The crowd erupted in protest and pressed forward. 0931: Overhead, the whirring blades of a low flying IRO UH-1 were heard, but failed to distract the crowd. Their curses and chants, however, were drowned out for an instant by the sound and shock wave of an explosion. The helo had apparently been hit by ground fire, possibly an RPG, and had burst into flames and corkscrewed to the ground several blocks east of the OP. Corporal Sley had observed the crash from his vantage atop the building and saw, to his relief, that at least two survivors had struggled from the flaming wreckage. His relief, however, was short-lived. In the distance, he could see Nedeed's men rushing across the bridge. Sley urgently requested permission to immediately move to the assistance of the downed helo crew.

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0935: While Corporal Hernandez considered the feasibility of a rescue attempt, the situation took another serious turn; three vehicles loaded with Mubasa's men and followed closely by a INN film crew arrived on the scene. Brandishing automatic weapons and RPG's, they forced their vehicles through the crowd until the bumper of the lead truck rested against the barricade. With their arrival, the already agitated crowd abandoned all restraint. The occasional rock had now become a constant pelting of well-aimed missiles. One had hit Lance Corporal Johnson in the face. The resulting wound, although not serious, bled profusely and added to the rising alarm. Somehow the sight of the bright red blood streaming down the face of the young Marine fed the crowd's excitement and heightened the panic growing within the squad. What had started out as another

routine day of humanitarian assistance was rapidly becoming something else entirely. A Molotov Cocktail crashed into the position injuring no one, but contributed further to the confusion. The Marines of 1st Squad looked from man to man and then stared questioningly at Corporal Hernandez. He reassuringly returned the gaze of each man, knowing better than any of them that the fate of the squad, of the wounded IRO personnel, and perhaps, of the entire multi-national mission, hung in the balance. In the span of less than three hours he had watched a humanitarian assistance mission turn terribly wrong and move ever closer to outright disaster. Corporal Hernandez was face to face with the grave challenges of the three block war and his actions, in the next few minutes, would determine the outcome of the mission and have potentially strategic implications.

The Three Block War The fictional mission described above -Operation Absolute Agility -- is similar to many that have been conducted around the world in recent years and represents the likely battlefield of the 21st Century. It also represents, in graphic detail, the enormous responsibilities and pressures which will be placed on our young Marine leaders. The rapid diffusion of technology, the growth of a multitude of transnational factors, and the consequences of increasing globalization and economic interdependence, have coalesced to create national security challenges remarkable for their complexity. By 2020, eighty-five percent of the world's inhabitants will be crowded into coastal cities -- cities generally lacking the infrastructure required to support their burgeoning populations. Under these conditions, long simmering ethnic, nationalist, and economic tensions will explode and increase the potential of crises requiring U.S. intervention. Compounding the challenges posed by this growing global instability will be the emergence of an increasingly complex and lethal battlefield. The widespread availability of sophisticated weapons and equipment will "level the playing field" and negate our traditional technological superiority. The lines
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separating the levels of war, and distinguishing combatant from "noncombatant," will blur, and adversaries, confounded by our "conventional" superiority, will resort to asymmetrical means to redress the imbalance. Further complicating the situation will be the ubiquitous media whose presence will mean that all future conflicts will be acted out before an international audience. Modern crisis responses are exceedingly complex endeavors. In Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia the unique challenges of military operations other-than-war (MOOTW) were combined with the disparate challenges of mid-intensity conflict. The Corps has described such amorphous conflicts as -- the three block war -- contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks. The tragic experience of U.S. forces in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope illustrates well the volatile nature of these contemporary operations. Author Mark Bowden's superb account of "The Battle of Mogadishu," Blackhawk Down, is a riveting, cautionary tale and grim reminder of the unpredictability of so-called operations other-than-war. It is essential reading for all Marines.

The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of other recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting, is that their outcome may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level. The Corps is, by design, a relatively young force. Success or failure will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and with his ability to make the right decision at the right time at the point of contact. As with Corporal Hernandez at CP Charlie, today's Marines will often operate far "from the flagpole" without the direct supervision of senior leadership. And, like Corporal Hernandez, they will be asked to deal with a bewildering array of challenges and threats. In order to succeed under such demanding conditions they will require unwavering maturity, judgment, and strength of character. Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make wellreasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress -- decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion. In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will become, as the title of this article suggests -- the Strategic Corporal

The Strategic Corporal Regrettably, the end of the Cold War global disorder, pervasive crisis, and the heralded not the hoped for era of peace, but constant threat of chaos. Since 1990, the rather, a troubling age characterized by Marine Corps has responded to crises at a
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rate equal to three times that of the Cold War -- on average, once every five weeks. On any given day, up to 29,000 Marines are forward deployed around the world. In farflung places like Kenya, Indonesia, and Albania, they have stood face-to-face with the perplexing and hostile challenges of the chaotic post Cold War world for which the "rules" have not yet been written. The three block war is not simply a fanciful metaphor for future conflicts -- it is a reality. Like Corporal Hernandez, today's Marines have already encountered its great challenges and they have been asked to exercise an exceptional degree of maturity, restraint, and judgment. Marines, of course, have always shone most brightly when the stakes were highest. The NCO's that led the bloody assaults on the German machine-gun positions at Belleau Wood intuitively understood the importance of their role. The Marines of 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, who scaled the fireswept heights of Mount Suribachi needed no one to emphasize the necessity of initiative. The Marines of the Chosin Reservoir, of Hue City, and of countless other battles through the years did not wait to be reminded of their individual responsibilities. They behaved as Marines always have, and as we expect today's Marines and those of the future to behave -- with courage, with aggressiveness, and with resolve. The future battlefields on which Marines fight will be increasingly hostile, lethal, and chaotic. Our success will hinge, as it always has, on the leadership of our junior Marines. We must ensure that they are prepared to lead.

How do we prepare Marines for the complex, high-stakes, asymmetrical battlefield of the three block war? How do we develop junior leaders prepared to deal decisively with the sort of real world challenges confronting Corporal Hernandez? The first step of the process is unchanged. Bold, capable, and intelligent men and women of character are drawn to the Corps, and are recast in the crucible of recruit training, where time honored methods instill deep within them the Corps' enduring ethos.. Those precious virtues, in fact, become the defining aspect of each Marine. This emphasis on character remains the bedrock Honor, courage, and commitment become more than mere words upon which everything else is built. The active sustainment of character in every Marine is a fundamental institutional competency -and for good reason. As often as not, the really tough issues confronting Marines will be moral quandaries, and they must have the wherewithal to handle them appropriately. While a visceral appreciation for our core values is essential, it alone will not ensure an individual's success in battle or in the myriad potential contingencies short of combat. Much, much more is required to fully prepare a Marine for the rigor of tomorrow's battlefield. An institutional commitment to lifelong professional development is the second step on the road to building the Strategic Corporal. The realignment of the Recruit Training and Marine Combat Training programs of instruction reveal our reinvigorated focus on individual training.
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Those programs remain the most important steps in the methodical process of developing capable Marines. Our Formal Schools, unit training and education programs, and individual efforts at professional education build on the solid foundation laid at recruit training and sustain the growth of technical and tactical proficiency and mental and physical toughness. The common thread uniting all training activities is an emphasis on the growth of integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility, and personal accountability. These qualities and attributes are fundamental and must be aggressively cultivated within all Marines from the first day of their enlistment to the last. Leadership, of course, remains the hard currency of the Corps, and its development and sustainment is the third and final step in the creation of the Strategic Corporal. For two hundred and twenty-three years, on battlefields strewn across the globe, Marines have set the highest standard of combat leadership. We are inspired by their example and confident that today's Marines and those of tomorrow will rise to the same great heights. The clear lesson of our past is that success in combat, and in the barracks for that matter, rests with our most junior leaders. Over the years, however, a perception has grown that the authority of

our NCO's has been eroded. Some believe that we have slowly stripped from them the latitude, the discretion, and the authority necessary to do their job. That perception must be stamped out. The remaining vestiges of the "zero defects mentality" must be exchanged for an environment in which all Marines are afforded the "freedom to fail" and with it, the opportunity to succeed. Micro-management must become a thing of the past and supervision -- that double-edged sword -- must be complemented by proactive mentoring. Most importantly, we must aggressively empower our NCO's, hold them strictly accountable for their actions, and allow the leadership potential within each of them to flourish. This philosophy, reflected in a recent Navy Times interview as "Power Down," is central to our efforts to sustain the transformation that begins with the first meeting with a Marine recruiter. Every opportunity must be seized to contribute to the growth of character and leadership within every Marine. We must remember that simple fact, and also remember that leaders are judged, ultimately, by the quality of the leadership reflected in their subordinates. We must also remember that the Strategic Corporal will be, above all else ... a leader of Marines.

Conclusion And what of Corporal Hernandez? While his predicament is certainly challenging, it is not implausible. What did he do? First, he quickly reviewed what he knew. He was certain that Lieutenant Franklin and 2d Squad would arrive within a matter of minutes. He knew that the crash site was located within the adjacent RMNF unit's sector and that it manned checkpoints astride Nedeed's route to the downed helo. He knew
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that any exchange of gunfire with Mubasa's gunmen would likely lead to civilian casualties and jeopardize the success of the humanitarian mission. Second, he considered what he did not know. He was uncertain of either Nedeed's or Mubasa's intentions, or of the feasibility of a rescue attempt. Based on these considerations and myriad other tangible and intangible factors, he completed a rapid assessment of the situation -- and acted. Corporal Sley was directed to maintain his position atop the building and continue to monitor Nedeed's progress and the status of the casualties. Hernandez then switched frequencies and contacted the Marine liaison with the adjacent RMNF unit and learned that they had already dispatched medical personnel to the helo crash site, but were unaware of Nedeed's movement and would now because of Hernandez's warning reinforce the appropriate checkpoints. By the time that transmission was completed, Lieutenant

Franklin had arrived with the additional squad. With them came a neighborhood leader who had previously acted as an interpreter and mediator. Mubasa's men, apparently uncomfortable with the shift in odds, began to slowly withdraw. The mediator, a recognizable and respected figure in the community, was handed a bullhorn and addressed the crowd. Within minutes the situation was diffused: Mubasa's men had departed, the crowd was calmed, and RMNF personnel had reached the crash site. For a few tense minutes though, the fate of both 1st Squad and the overall mission had hung in the balance and on the actions of a young Marine leader. As would be expected, our Strategic Corporal -- firmly grounded in our ethos, thoroughly schooled and trained, outfitted with the finest equipment obtainable, infinitely agile, and above all else, a leader in the tradition of the Marines of old ...made the right decision.

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Chapter 5 Exercise Solutions

Answers

The table below provides the answers to the exercise items. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item. Item Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Answer a c b See item content. See item content. See item content. See item content. See item content. See item content. See item content. See item content. See item content. See item content. See item content. See item content. See item content. Reference 5-5 5-6 5-11 5-23 5-24 5-26 5-29 5-36 5-38 and 5-39 5-40 5-40 5-50 5-51 5-53 5-51 5-53

Item 4

The content is located on page 5-23. But Winston Churchill observed that: …there are many kinds of maneuvre in war, only some of which take place on the battlefield. There are manuevres in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of which are removed from the battlefield, but often react decisively upon it, and the object of all is to find easier ways other than sheer slaughter, of achieving the main purpose.
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Item 5

The content is located on page 5-24. Liddell Hart wrote that the most effective approach “is one that lures or startles the opposition into a false move – so that, as in jujitsu, his own effort is turned into the lever of his own overthrow.” Movement, or any action not focused on the enemy, is not Maneuver; it is simply wasted energy. Therefore, an outward or enemy orientation is integral to Maneuver. This mean far more than simply aiming at enemy forces rather than terrain objectives. It means understanding the enemy – his doctrine, tactics, and techniques; his organization; his aims; and his motives.

Item 6

The content is located page on 5-26. Focus is the convergence effort in some way – in space, in time, in intent – so as to create a unified effect. It is possible to be physically dispersed and yet remain focused on a common objective.

Item 7

The content is located on page 5-29. The final key component of Maneuver is speed. To create advantage and exploit potential advantage, we must be able to act faster than the enemy can react. Because we now appreciate Maneuver not only in the spatial dimension, we should not think of speed only in terms of the ability to move fast, but also in terms of the tempo – the ability to think, decide, act and react quickly.

Item 8

The content is located on page 5-36. Maneuver warfare has applications across the spectrum of war from air to surface, from tactics to strategy, from operations to logistics.
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Item 9

The content is located on page 5-38and 37. We want our Marines to understand what their commanders are trying to accomplish on the battlefield. Knowledge of the commander’s intent is an absolute requirement, if the subordinate is going to be given the freedom of action that is implicit in mission-type orders and recon-pull tactics. We insist that every Marine know the mission and the intent of the commander two echelons above his own.

Item 10

The content is located on page 5-40. It means that the commander must focus upon and give his first priority to the accomplishment of the combat mission, and the philosophy – that is, the commander’ must be mentally in concert with his units in contact at the front edge of his operating area. Physically, he may be sitting in a bunker or flying overhead in a helicopter, but psychologically he must be with his forward units. I like Sir John Hackett’s phrase about the “smell of the battlefield” when describing the commander’s appreciation for operations within the combat arena.

Item 11

The content is located on page 5-40. We want out commanders to think. Go ahead and make mistakes, but do the innovative, get inside the enemy’s mind, think about what his intentions are, how he is going to react and outsmart him with your initiative in the absence of orders from a senior command. We are serious about being committed to giving our Marines the freedom to make mistakes. It is difficult to overcome some fundamental inhibitions we have in this respect, but it is one of our priority concerns.
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Item 12

The content is located on page 5-50. It also represents, in graphic detail, the enormous responsibilities and pressures which will be placed on our young Marine leaders. The rapid diffusion of technology, the growth of a multitude of transnational factors, and the consequences of increasing globalization and economic interdependence, have coalesced to create national security challenges remarkable for their complexity.

Item 13

The content is located on page 5-51. The Corps has described such amorphous conflicts as -- the three block war -contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks.

Item 14

The content is located on page 5-53. The common thread uniting all training activities is an emphasis on the growth of integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility, and personal accountability. These qualities and attributes are fundamental and must be aggressively cultivated within all Marines from the first day of their enlistment to the last. Leadership, of course, remains the hard currency of the Corps, and its development and sustainment is the third and final step in the creation of the Strategic Corporal.
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Item 15

The content is located on page 5-51. Success or failure will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and with his ability to make the right decision at the right time at the point of contact. As with Corporal Hernandez at CP Charlie, today's Marines will often operate far "from the flagpole" without the direct supervision of senior leadership. And, like Corporal Hernandez, they will be asked to deal with a bewildering array of challenges and threats. In order to succeed under such demanding conditions they will require unwavering maturity, judgment, and strength of character. Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress -decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion.

Item 16

The content is located on page 5-53. The remaining vestiges of the "zero defects mentality" must be exchanged for an environment in which all Marines are afforded the "freedom to fail" and with it, the opportunity to succeed. Micro-management must become a thing of the past and supervision -- that double-edged sword -- must be complemented by proactive mentoring. Most importantly, we must aggressively empower our NCO's, hold them strictly accountable for their actions, and allow the leadership potential within each of them to flourish.

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APPENDIX A Recommended Readings

Book Titles

The following books are listed as recommended readings: · Bassford, Dr. Christopher. Nonlinearity in Marine Corps Doctrine. Doctrinal Complexity at http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Complex/DOCTNEW.htm. (Article appears in F.G. Hoffman and Gary Home, eds. Maneuver Warfare Science, United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1998.) Cohen, Marvin S.; Leonard Adelman, Martin A. Tolcott, Terry A. Bresnick, and F. Freeman Marvin. Technical Report 93-1 “A Cognitive Framework for Battle Field Commander’s Situation Assessment. United States Army Research Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 7 October 1993. http://leadership.au.af.mil/sls-ref.htm. Cohen, Marvin S. and Jared T. Freeman. “Teaching and Aiding Critical Thinking Skills.” Cognitive Technologies, Inc. 4200 Lorcom Lane, Arlington, VA 22207 with Klein Associates, Inc. Naval Research and Education Symposium on C41, U.S. Naval Academy, Contract No. N61339-95-C-0107 with the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division. 8 August 1996. www.cogtech.com/papers/NavyTraining/C4I%20Naval%20Academy%2096.pdf. Coram, Robert. “John Boyd: An Architect of Modern Warfare.” Georgia Tech Alumni Magazine. Fall 2002. http://gtalumni.org/StayInformed/magazine/fall02/article3.html. Curts, Dr. Raymond, CDR/USN (Ret’d) and Dr. Douglas E. Campbell USNR-R (Ret’d). Avoiding Information Overload through the Understanding of the OODA Loops, A Cognitive Hierarchy and ObjectOriented Analysis and Design. www.dodccrp.org/6thICCRTS/Cd/Tracks/Papers/Track4/018_tr4.pdf. . Lehrer, Jim. “Online NewsHour: General Krulak.” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/ian-inne99/krulak_6-25.html. 25 June 99
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Recommended Readings, Continued

Book Titles, continued

·

Marine Corps Concept Paper: “Operational Maneuver from the Sea.” (MCCP 1:OMFTS) (Derived from White Papers: From the Sea and Forward … From the Sea.) http://www.concepts.quantico.usmc.mil/omfts.htm Marine Corps Strategy 21. https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/Strategy21.htm. McBreen, Brendan B. Maj/USMC. This is Not your Daddy’s Draftee Army!: Erasing the conscription mentality in the Marine Corps. 8 January 2002. (Provided by and used with permission from the author.) Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 6 Naval Command and Control. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/ndp6-decisions.htm. 19 May 1995. Nofi, Albert A. Defining and Measuring Shared Situational Awareness. CRM D0002895.A1/Final. Center for Naval Analysis, 4825 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1850. November 2000. http://www.cna.org/newsevents/images/crmd2895final.pdf. Ptak, MAJ Steven, USA; MAJ Charles R. Webster Jr., USA; and CDR Tony W. Wilson, USN. “Effective Decision Making Processes for the Joint Forces Commander.” Https://lad.dtic.mil/alsa/effective_decision.htm. Schmitt, John F. Maj/USMCR. “Command and (Out) of Control: The Military Implications of Complexity Theory.” http://www.dodccrp.org/comch09.html. Cowan, Maj Jeffrey L. “From Air Force Fighter Pilot to Marine Corps Warfighting: Colonel John Boyd, His Theories on War, and their Unexpected Legacy. United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat and Development Command, Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068. http://www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/boyd_thesis.htm. MPF 2010 and Beyond. Headquarters Marine Corps. http://192.156.75.102/mpf/docs/mpffinal.pdf . 30 December 97.
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Recommended Readings, Continued

Web Sites

The following Web sites are listed as recommended reading: · · · · · · · · · · Air War College, Center for Strategic Leadership Studies. http://leadership.au.af.mil/index.htm. Coalescent Technologies. Deployable Virtual Training Environment. http://www.ctcorp.com/performance15.html. Command and Control Research Program (CCRP). Located within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense). http://www.dodccrp.org. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. http://www.darpa.mil/. Defense and National Interest. http://www.defense-and-society.org/. Doctrinal Complexity. http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Complex/DOCTNEW.htm. Marine Corps University. http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/. Military Review, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev. United States Department of Defense. http://www.defenselink.mil/. War, Chaos, and Business. http://www.belisarius.com.

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INTRODUCTION TO WARFIGHTING REVIEW LESSON EXAMINATION Review Lesson

Estimated Study Time

2 hours

Introduction

The purpose of the review lesson examination is to prepare you for the final examination. It is recommended that you try to complete your review lesson without referring to the text, but those items (questions) you are unsure of review the text. Check your responses against the answers provided at the end of the review lesson examination. Select the answer that BEST completes the statement or that best answers the item. Each question will be in the form of multiple choice, so circle your response. What is the term defined by the violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force? a. b. c. d. Armed conflict Warfighting operations Operational projections War
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Directions

Item 1

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Items 2 Through 9

Matching: For items 2 through 9, match the common characteristics of war in column 1 with the definition in column 2. Column 1 Characteristics of War ___ 2. ___ 3. ___ 4. ___ 5. ___ 6. ___ 7. ___ 8. ___ 9. Column 2 Definition Bloodshed, destruction, and suffering that can effect friend and foe alike Forces that influence warfare whether they are intangible or tangible Unknowns about the enemy and the environment experienced in battle Plans gone awry, misunderstood instructions, communication failures, mistakes, and unforeseen events The force that resists all action and saps energy Behavior exemplified by the clash of wills and the related complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities that characterize human behavior An episode in war that creates a continuous, fluctuating flow of activity Intricate, interrelated parts that compose the process and elements used to execute war and warfare
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Friction a. Uncertainty Fluidity Disorder b. Complexity Human dimension Violence and danger c. Physical, moral, and mental forces d.

e. f.

g. h.

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Item 10

The total of unknowns experienced in the operational environment can be put into what three major categories? a. b. c. d. Fear, fog of war, and danger Vulnerability, risk, and criticality Nonlinearity, risk, and chance Fog of war, chance, and enemy action

Item 11

Politics as defined in MCDP 1, Warfighting is the a. b. c. d. underlying processes by which all organizations function. procedure to attain support for plans and processes resulting from initiatives and responses. distribution of power through dynamic interaction of both cooperative and competitive elements of a group, organization, or entity. tactics used by groups and individuals to gain the desired outcomes that benefit the individuals or the groups.

Item 12

Policy refers to a. b. c. d. the envisionment of Department of Defense and service actions both on and off of duty. the conscious objectives established within the political process. operational and training objectives set by commanding officers. active service members’ behavior both off and on duty.

Item 13

The single most important thought to understand about war and policy is a. b. c. d. policy must serve war. both war and policy are initiated by politics. war must serve policy. policy initiates war.
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Item 14

Which of the following terms best describe the use of all power elements against another to achieve the objective? a. b. c. d. Means in war Shock and awe strategy Mission accomplishment Combat leadership

Item 15

What are the following adjectives: strategic, operational, and tactical used to describe? a. b. c. d. Marine air ground task forces Levels of war Perspectives of the operating environment Expeditionary units

Item 16

The ability to dictate terms of the conflict and force the enemy to meet on these terms is called what? a. b. c. d. Shaping Initiative Planning Focus

Item 17

Response is defined as a. b. c. d. acting comparably to enemy action to counter his actions. counterattacking. reacting to the initiative. focusing on the results of opposition initiative.
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Review Lesson, Continued

Item 18

What type of warfare pursues victory through the destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower? a. b. c. d. Attrition warfare Expeditionary warfare Guerilla warfare “Shock and awe” warfare

Item 19

The rapid advance on Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of a. b. c. d. philosophy of command tactics warfighting objectives maneuver warfare military operations other than war

Item 20

What term defines the total destructive force that would destroy the enemy at a given time? a. b. c. d. Fire support multiplier Combat power Expeditionary fire force Combined force fires
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Review Lesson, Continued

Items 21 Through 28

Matching: For items 21 through 28, match the common characteristics of war in column 1 with its definition in column 2. Column 1 Characteristics of War ___ 21. ___ 22. ___ 23. ___ 24. ___ 25. ___ 26. ___ 27. ___ 28. Speed Focus Surprise Boldness Centers of gravity Critical vulnerability Creating opportunity Exploiting opportunity Column 2 Definition a. A state of disorientation resulting from an unexplained event or sequence of events that degrades the enemy’s ability to resist b. Any important source of strength c. The process that occurs when critical vulnerabilities are particularly difficult, so the commander may have to exploit any or all vulnerabilities until a decisive opportunity is revealed d. An opportunity that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy’s ability to resist the exploitation e. The ability and willingness to act ruthlessly in exploiting an opportunity to generate decisive results f. The convergence of effects in time and space on some objective g. The characteristic of unhesitatingly exploiting the natural uncertainty of war to pursue major results rather than minor ones h. The rapidity of action
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Review Lesson, Continued

Item 29

The principles that guide military forces in their activities in support of national objectives define which of the following terms? a. b. c. d. Joint plans Doctrine Vision statements Standard operating procedure

Item 30

A teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war from its nature and theory to the preparation and conduct defines which of the terms listed below? a. b. c. d. Marine Corps warfighting theory Role of the Marine Corps’ warfighting theory Marine Corps doctrine Marine Corps operational theory

Item 31

The three tiers of _________________ is made up of the education establishment, commanders, and individuals. a. b. c. d. Training and Education Command professional military education system unit training system educational command and control system

Item 32

Understanding that Marines of certain grades and occupational specialties are not always interchangeable is an important concept for which of the warfighting preparations? a. b. c. d. Training Education Manning requirements Personnel management
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Item 33

Over reliance on technology and failure to make the most of technology would best describe which of the following terms? a. b. c. d. Dangers of technology Dangers of equipping Dangers of information management Dangers of modernization

Item 34

Maneuver warfare is defined as a warfighting philosophy that a. b. c. d. seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion by attacking selected enemy weaknesses. focuses on in the integration of indirect fires with direct fire assets used by a mobile force to shatter the enemy’s cohesion. seeks to out maneuver the enemy so that high strategic value objectives can be taken first. focuses on terrain, tactics, and conveyance as an integrated force that can be multitasked globally.

Item 35

The enemy resources are structured into a system, which can be used against friendly resources or assets. How would the enemy system be defined? a. b. c. d. The will to resist offensive operations and/or counterattack Their fire and maneuver plan as it is put into action Anything that challenges Marines within their particular sphere The offensive or defensive situation and the tactics used to conduct operations
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Review Lesson, Continued

Item 36

The general outline of principles, processes, and procedures that the commander expects to have the command operate within to accomplish tactical and administrative missions is referred to as a. b. c. d. commander's guidance. command and control measures. philosophy of command. command and operations standards.

Item 37

The plan of how victory is to be achieved is the definition of which of the following terms? a. b. c. d. Mission tactics Operational strategy Friction of war Shaping the action

Item 38

Situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution is _________________ decisionmaking. a. b. c. d. recognitional analytical intuitive military

Item 39

The process of assigning subordinates missions without specifying how the mission must be accomplished is mission a. b. c. d. tactics. objectives. tasks. orders.
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Item 40

In MCDP 1, Warfighting, commander’s intent is defined as a. b. c. d. guidance provided to allow subordinate leaders to make decisions and act independently. a clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. the result of philosophy of command and commander’s guidance in the operating environment to develop operational success. what should be done in order to meet mission objectives in the operating environment.

Item 41

What is the definition of main effort? a. b. c. d. Concentration of combat power in ground forces Action that is critical for success at a particular moment Functions assigned to the lead assault elements during attacks Strategic focus of forces in the theatre of operations

Item 42

How does warfighting doctrine define a surface? a. b. c. d. The forward edge of friendly forces with reinforcement capability A large open spot of terrain that can accommodate heliborne insertions The enemy’s hard spots or strengths An area where high speed maneuver is possible with tracked or wheeled assets

Item 43

Soft spots or weakness in the enemy system that can be exploited by friendly forces refers to which of the following terms? a. b. c. d. Gap Opportunity Critical terrain Tactical flaw
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Item 44

As defined by MCDP 1, Warfighting, combined arms is a. b. c. d. fire planning that brings maximum effect of indirect and direct fires onto the enemy positions. the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one would make the enemy vulnerable to another. the use of indirect and direct fire weapons systems to support maneuver warfare. the combination of ground and air assets to support operational forces during combat operations.

Item 45

Where and how can Marines recommend books for the U.S. Marine Reading Program? a. b. c. d. Marine Corps Institute via e-mail Marine Corps College of Continuing Education in a book review format submitted via the chain of command Marine Corps University submitted via an e-mail link on the MCU Web site Marine Corps Enlisted Professional Military Education in book review format via the Director of EPME

Item 46

Which of the following are the primary forms of Marine Corps doctrine? a. b. c. d. Fleet Marine Force Manuals, All Marine Messages (ALMAR), and Marine Corps Operational Publications (MCOP) Marine Corps Orders, Marine Administrative Messages (MARADMIN), and white letters Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications, Marine Corps Warfighting Publications, and Marine Corps Reference Publication Marine Corps Operational Manuals, Marine Corps Warfighting Manuals, and Marine Corps Expeditionary Manuals
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Item 47

When reading a professional article, what type of reading allows the reader to extract meaningful information from the text? a. b. c. d. Analytical Critical Strategic Tactical

Items 48 Through 51

The next section of the review lesson examination focuses on critical reading skills and is designed to demonstrate the value of professional reading and the related learning skills derived from reading. Test items 48 through 51 require you to read the article, “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.” As you read the accompanying preview information followed by the article introduction, try to make preliminary estimates on the author’s focus and intent. Think about the perspective building questions and reading objectives and how they relate to the content as you read. You may have to read the article several times to fully digest the content. The first reading should consist of skimming through the content so that you can develop overview. Reread the preliminary information and the article a second time to develop a deeper understanding of the content and its relationship to warfighting. The third reading should be done after rereading the reading objectives, so that you can search for the content that relates to the question. It may be helpful to annotate important sections or make notes in the margin, so that the information becomes more understandable.
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Directions for Items 48 Through 51

You must read the preview page for required reading followed by the article, “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare” beginning on page 16 before completing this section of the review lesson examination. When you have finished reading the article, answer test items 48 through 51. As the technological advantage between the United States and other countries dwindles what will be the fundamentals of military advantage? a. As the political gap between the United States and its potential adversaries narrows, it will require for the Marine Corps to rethink the methodology and focus of leadership development. The role of the noncommissioned officer and officer alike will vastly change to meet the changes of the operating environment, since high level decisions will have impact at low levels. As the social gap between the United States and its potential adversaries narrows, the challenge will be to focus on developing new tactics to support the technology and then training qualified individuals to man the new technology based weapons and supporting systems in the battle space. As the technological gap between the United States and its potential adversaries narrows, our leadership, doctrine, and training will be fundamental to maintaining our continued military advantage. We expect potential adversaries to adapt their tactics, weaponry, and antiaccess strategies to confront us on terms of relative advantage. As the environmental gap between the United States and its potential adversaries narrows, our research and development of new munitions, weapons, and delivery systems will become more important and thus become a larger part of the defense budgeting. It is anticipated that the enemy will develop similar technologies, but less effective than out own.
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Item 48

b.

c.

d.

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Item 49

Where is expeditionary advantage derived from and why is it an advantage? a. b. c. d. The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advantage is derived from combining our maneuver warfare philosophy; expeditionary culture; and the manner in which we organize, deploy, and employ our forces. The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advantage is derived from eliminating indoctrination programs during the initial entry and sustainment training. The Marine Corps’ expeditionary is derived from extensive training and marksmanship programs during predeployment training and exercises that are used to ingrain expeditionary skills. . The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advantage is derived from the ability of Marines commitment to high operational tempos supported by adaptable and intense mission focus.

Item 50

What is the meaning of expeditionary in the article and how does it specifically apply to the Marine Corps? a. b. Expeditionary refers to the units that are designated for duty as part of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade or Marine Expeditionary Force, since they can be forward deployed aboard naval vessels. Expeditionary refers to the task organization capability of deployable forces and the related support functions to organize to meet specific mission requirements for one time or unique employment or usage. The complexity of the operation allows sub-elements to integrate within the ground combat elements and assist in ground operations that are amphibious in nature. Expeditionary strictly refers to the capability of the Marine Corps to project and maintain large numbers of forward deployed forces aboard naval vessels and forward staging areas where the forces can marry up with prepositioned materiel and equipment. Expeditionary is our ethos; a pervasive mindset that influences all aspects of organizing, training, and equipping by acknowledging the necessity to adapt to the conditions mandated by the battlespace. Expeditionary operations are typically conducted in austere environments, from sea, land or forward bases.
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d.

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Item 51

How is the definition of spatial maneuver expanded in the concept paper? a. b. Maneuver in expeditionary warfare only addresses maneuver in forward deployed areas and how its application changes from the training environment when real world events unfold. Maneuver in all dimensions—land, air, and, uniquely, operational maneuver from the sea—enables commanders to exploit enemy weakness at the time and place of their choosing through the use of the operational mobility inherent in naval forces. Maneuver embraces the amphibious maneuver from the sea since innovative tactics and techniques have expanded the over horizon capabilities. Maneuver expands to interact with the functions of commanders through expanded applications using new amphibious capabilities and naval shipping and tactics.

c. d.

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Preview to Required Reading

Introduction

“Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare” by General James L. Jones is a concept paper developed to describe the direction and focus of the Marine Corps as it faces changes in the warfighting environment. Often the global situation outpaces doctrine, so the modernization of equipment, technology, and warfighting applications is required to meet the projected threat. Under these circumstances, the Marine Corps will publish updated guidance on new mission perspectives and requirements. All Marines leaders should read such articles and documents to keep abreast of the global situation, national and military concerns, projected threats that the Marine Corps expects to encounter in the near future, and changes that will occur in the Marine operational forces. The following article discusses the advances in technology, changes in the projected operating environment, and the medications of current warfighting tactics and techniques. As you read the concept paper, try to answer these perspective building questions. · · · · What are the changes between maneuver warfare and expeditionary warfare? How will this change operations and procedures in my particular military occupational specialty and my NCO responsibilities? What changes can I expect within my occupational field or unit? Why does the Marine Corps have an expeditionary culture and ethos?

Scope and Perspective

Reading Concepts

As you read, “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare–A Marine Corps Capstone Concept,” think about the following warfighting concepts: · · · · As the technological advantage between the United States and other countries dwindles, what will be the fundamentals of military advantage? Where is expeditionary advantage derived from and why is it an advantage? What is the meaning of expeditionary and how does it specifically apply to the Marine Corps? How is the definition of maneuver expanded in the concept paper?

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Required Reading

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters, United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20308-1775

EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE Marine Corps Capstone Concept
Our new capstone concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), moves us down the path outlined in Marine Corps Strategy 21, and provides the foundation for the way the Marine Corps will conduct operations within the complex environment of this new century. EMW is the union of our core competencies; maneuver warfare philosophy; expeditionary heritage; and the concepts by which we organize, deploy, and employ forces. It emphasizes the unique capabilities the Marine Corps provides the joint force commander and the synergy created when leveraged with the complementary capabilities of other Services and agencies. These capabilities translate into power projection designed to shape the global security environment, assuring our friends and allies while dissuading, deterring, and defeating potential adversaries. The elements of EMW will guide the process of innovation, change, and adaptation to ensure the Corps continues its role as the Nation’s total force in readiness.

J. L. JONES General, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine Corps

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Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare is the Marine Corps’ capstone concept for the early 21st century. It is built on our core competencies and prepares the Marine Corps, as a “total force,” to meet the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing world. Capitalizing on our maneuver warfare philosophy and expeditionary heritage, the concept contains the enduring characteristics and evolving capabilities, upon which the Marine Corps will rely, to promote peace and stability and mitigate or resolve crises as part of a joint force. EMW focuses Marine Corps competencies, evolving capabilities, and innovative concepts to ensure that we provide the joint force commander (JFC) with forces optimized for forward presence, engagement, crisis response, antiterrorism, and warfighting. The purpose of this document is to articulate to future JFCs and contemporary joint concept developers the Marine Corps’ contribution to future joint operations. EMW serves as the basis for influencing the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Process and the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System. It further refines the broad axis of advance identified in Marine Corps Strategy 21 for future capability enhancements. Joint and Multi-national Enabling Marine forces possess the capabilities to provide the means or opportunity to make joint and multinational operations possible. Enabling operations may be as basic as establishing the initial command and control (C2) system that the assembling joint or multinational force “plugs into,” or as complex as physically seizing forward operating bases for follow-on forces. Other examples of enabling operations include defeating enemy antiaccess capabilities and serving as an operational maneuver element to exploit joint force success or open new fronts. Marine forces are ready to serve as the lead elements of a joint force, act as joint enablers, and/or serve as joint task force (JTF) or functional component commanders (i.e., Joint Force Land Component Commander, Joint Force Air Component Commander, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander). Strategic Agility Marine forces will rapidly transition from precrisis state to full operational capability in a distant theater. This requires uniformly ready forces, sustainable and easily task-organized for multiple missions or functions. They must be agile, lethal, swift to deploy, and always prepared to move to the scene of an emergency or conflict. Operational Reach Marine forces will project and sustain relevant and effective power across the depth of the battlespace.

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Tactical Flexibility
Marine forces will conduct multiple, concurrent, dissimilar missions, rapidly transitioning from one task to the next, providing multidimensional capabilities (air, land, and sea) to the joint team. For example, tactical flexibility allows the same forward-deployed Marine force to evacuate noncombatants from troubled areas, conduct antiterrorism/force protection operations, and seize critical infrastructure to enable follow-on forces.

Support and Sustainment
Marine forces will provide focused logistics to enable power projection independent of host nation support against distant objectives across the breadth and depth of a theater of operations. These capabilities enhance the joint force’s ability to reassure and encourage our friends and allies while we deter, mitigate, or resolve crises through speed, stealth, and precision. Strategic Landscape United States’ interests will continue to be challenged by an array of national and nonstate actors posing conventional and asymmetrical threats. These threats are made more complex and lethal by the increased availability of militarily-applicable commercial technologies. As the technological gap between the United States and its potential adversaries narrows, our leadership, doctrine, and training will be fundamental to maintaining our continued military advantage. We expect potential adversaries to adapt their tactics, weaponry, and antiaccess strategies to confront us on terms of relative advantage. Specifically, adversaries will seek to engage us where they perceive us to be weak. Aware of our ability to degrade complex systems, the thinking adversary will opt for the use of sophisticated but autonomous weapons. Knowing our thirst for information, they will promote uncertainty, confusion, and chaos. This is the venue where our most persistent and determined adversaries will choose to operate. Our Nation must be prepared to fight—worldwide—against adversaries who will seek to engage us with asymmetric capabilities rooted deep in the human dimension of conflict. The Marine Corps, with our philosophy of maneuver warfare and heritage of expeditionary operations, is ideally suited to succeed in this challenging landscape.

Expeditionary Advantage
The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advantage is derived from combining our maneuver warfare philosophy; expeditionary culture; and the manner in which we organize, deploy, and employ our forces. EMW capitalizes on this combination, providing the JFC with a total force in readiness that is prepared to operate with other Services and multinational forces in the full range of military operations from peacetime engagement to major theater war.

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Maneuver Warfare
The Marine Corps approach to warfare, as codified in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting, is the product of years of conceptual development, innovation, and experience. Maneuver warfare, the philosophical basis for EMW, acknowledges the timeless realities of human conflict and does not attempt to redefine war on more humane or less risky terms. The fundamental nature of war— A violent struggle between hostile, independent, irreconcilable wills characterized by chaos, friction, and uncertainty—will remain unchanged as it transcends advancements in technology. What has changed is the gradual shift in reliance from the quantitative characteristics of warfare—mass and volume—to a realization that qualitative factors (speed, stealth, precision, and sustainability) have become increasingly important facets of modern warfare. Maneuver warfare stresses proactive thought and action, elevating the operational art beyond the crude simplicity of attrition. It combines high tempo operations with a bias for action to achieve advantage—physical, temporal, or conditional—relative to an adversary. The aim is to shatter an adversary’s cohesion, succeed in other operations by rapid action to mitigate damage, or resolve a crisis on favorable terms. Maneuver warfare encourages decentralized decisionmaking, enabling Marines to exploit the chaotic nature of combat. Decentralizing decisionmaking allows Marines to compress the decision cycle, seize fleeting opportunity, and engage enemy forces from positions of advantage, which empowers us to outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight our adversary.

Expeditionary Operations
For Marines, the term expeditionary connotes more than the mere capability to deploy overseas when needed. Expeditionary is our ethos; a pervasive mindset that influences all aspects of organizing, training, and equipping by acknowledging the necessity to adapt to the conditions mandated by the battlespace. Expeditionary operations are typically conducted in austere environments, from sea, land or forward bases. They will likely require Marines and other naval forces to be brought to bear without reliance on host nation or outside support. As a tangible representation of our national interest, forward-deployed and forward-based Marines remain both a key element of America’s expeditionary advantage and are critical to the regional combatant commander’s or commander in chief’s (CINC’s) overall strategy. The regional CINC will set the broad conditions for shaping the battlespace through engagement, forward presence, and the application of a full range of response options. As a critical component of each regional CINC’s Theater Engagement Plan, forward-deployed Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and forward-based Marines execute multinational training exercises, conduct mobile training teams, and participate in military-to-military exchanges. Through these activities, Marines develop invaluable regional expertise, cultural and situational awareness, and an appreciation of the interoperability required for successful joint and multinational operations.

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Marine forces, as a part of the regional CINC’s engagement strategy, will focus on access operations or other assigned missions as a part of the right mix of joint/ multinational forces. These operations may be as basic as establishing the initial C2 system that the assembling joint or multinational force “plugs into” or as complex as physically seizing forward operating bases for follow-on forces. Throughout the conduct of operations, Marines will seek to leverage the unique and complementary capabilities of other Services and agencies in order to provide the JFC with a fully integrated force.

Seabasing
Marine forces, as an integral component of a larger naval force, will be prepared to influence events within the world’s littorals using the sea as maneuver space and as a secure “base” from which JFCs can project power to impact the early stages of a potential crisis. Seabasing supports versatile and flexible power projection. Seabasing enables forces to move directly from ship to objectives deep inland and represents a significant advance from traditional, phased amphibious operations. Seabased operations maximize naval power projection and enhance the deployment and employment of naval expeditionary forces by JFCs. More than a family of platforms afloat, seabasing will network platforms and promote interoperability among the amphibious task force, carrier battle group, maritime pre-position force, combat logistics force, and emerging high-speed sealift and lighterage technologies. Seabased operations will capitalize on the maneuver space afforded by the sea, rapid force closure through at-sea arrival and assembly, and the protection assured by the U.S. Navy’s control of the sea. C2, combat support, and combat service support capabilities will remain at sea to the maximum extent possible and be focused upon supporting expeditionary air and land operations ashore. Forward-deployed naval forces will have access to a responsive worldwide logistic system to sustain expeditionary operations. Seabasing will allow Marine forces to commence sustainable operations, enable the flow of follow-on forces into theater, and expedite the reconstitution and redeployment of Marine forces for follow-on missions.

Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
Marines typically deploy and employ as scalable, tailorable, combined-arms teams known as MAGTFs. All MAGTFs, regardless of size, share four common organizational elements that vary in size and composition according to the mission: command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), and combat service support element (CSSE). Organic to each MAGTF, regardless of size, are specialized antiterrorism and force protection capabilities that are available to support the JFC. Fully interoperable, each MAGTF will have the ability to serve as a JTF headquarters or as a functional or Service component commander of a JTF. In partnership with the Navy, Marine forces will use the capabilities of bases and stations and selected naval platforms as “launch pads” to flow into theater. During deployment, Marine forces will conduct collaborative planning and execute en route mission training and virtual rehearsals.

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They will capitalize on shared situational awareness that is developed in support of the JFC and processed and distributed by the supporting establishment. These enhancements will revolutionize the otherwise time-intensive reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) activities, allowing increased operational tempo and seizing early opportunities as the enabling force for the JFC. Forward-deployed Navy and Marine forces will continue to be the JFC’s optimal enabling force, prepared to open ports and airfields and to establish expeditionary airfields and intermediate staging bases in either benign or hostile environments.

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]), in close partnership with the Navy, will continue to be the on-scene/on-call enabler for follow-on Marine or joint forces. Operating forward-deployed from the sea, the MEU(SOC) is unconstrained by regional infrastructure requirements or restrictions imposed by other nations. Because of its forward presence, situational awareness, rapid response planning capability, and organic sustainment, the MEU(SOC) will continue to be the JFC’s immediately employable combined-arms force of choice. The MEU(SOC) initiates humanitarian assistance, provides force protection, conducts noncombatant evacuations, enables JTF C2, and facilitates the introduction of follow-on forces conducting limited forcible entry operations when required. These early actions shape the JFC’s battlespace, deter potential aggressors, defuse volatile situations, minimize the damage caused by natural disasters, and alleviate human suffering. Increasing mobility, speed, firepower, and tactical lift will enable this seabased, self-sustained, combined-arms force to conduct expeditionary operations across the depth of the battlespace, in adverse conditions, day or night.

Marine Expeditionary Brigade
The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is optimally scaled and task-organized to respond to a full range of crises. Strategically deployed via a variety of modes (amphibious shipping and strategic airlift and sealift) and poised for sustainable power projection, the MEB will continue to provide a robust seabased forcible entry capability. It will use organic combinedarms and the complementary capabilities from the other Services—such as netted sensors, seabased fires, and advanced mine countermeasures—to locate, counter, or penetrate vulnerable seams in an adversary’s access denial systems. The MEB will then close rapidly on critical objectives via air, land, and sea to achieve decisive results. It can be used to enable the introduction of follow-on forces (joint and multinational) or be employed as an independent operational maneuver element in support of the JFC’s campaign plan. The MEB constitutes a multidimensional, seabased or landbased, operational “capability in readiness” that can create its own opportunities or exploit opportunities resulting from the activities of other components of the joint force.

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Marine Expeditionary Force As a crisis escalates, smaller MAGTFs and supporting units are deployed until a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is in place to support the CINC. The MEF, largest of the MAGTFs, is capable of concurrent seabased operations and sustained operations ashore, operating either independently or as part of a joint warfighting team. The MEF can be tailored to meet multiple joint requirements with its inherent sustainability. Specialized Marine Corps Organizations and Capabilities
Special purpose MAGTFs are nonstanding organizations temporarily formed to conduct specific missions for which a MEF or other unit is either inappropriate or unavailable. They are organized, trained, and equipped to perform a specific mission such as force protection, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacetime engagement activities, or regionally focused exercises. While the MAGTF construct will remain the primary warfighting organization of the Marine Corps, not all situations will require it to operate as a combinedarms unit. Should the situation warrant, distinct MAGTF elements and capabilities may be employed separately in response to critical JFC requirements. For example, the 4th MEB (AT) is a unique organization with specialized antiterrorism capabilities. This unit consists of Marines and Sailors specifically trained to respond rapidly— worldwide—to threats or actual attacks by terrorists. The 4th MEB (AT) contains the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion (fleet antiterrorism security teams), the Marine Security Guard Battalion, the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and an infantry battalion specially trained in antiterrorism operations.

Supporting Establishment
Marine Corps bases and stations provide direct and indirect support to the MAGTF and other forward-deployed forces and are the means by which Marine forces are formed, trained, and maintained. These bases and stations are platforms from which Marines project expeditionary power while supporting the quality of life of Marines and their families.

The Way Ahead
Marine Corps Strategy 21 identifies capability enhancements required to continue the evolution of the MAGTF. These capability enhancements include joint/multinational enabling, strategic agility, operational reach, tactical flexibility, and support and sustainment, which create a Marine force that provides the JFC with expanded power in order to assure friends and allies or dissuade, deter, and defeat adversaries. In accordance with our expeditionary culture and warfighting ethos, our doctrine, organization, education, and training must contribute

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to producing Marines and organizations that thrive in the chaos of conflict by— · Producing leaders who have the experience to judge what needs to be done; know how to do it; and exhibit traits of trust, nerve, and restraint. · Developing leaders and staffs who function in an environment of ambiguity and uncertainty and make timely and effective decisions under stress. · Developing leaders by improving their capacity to recognize patterns, distinguish critical information, and make decisions quickly on an intuitive basis with less than perfect information. · Enhancing leaders’ decisionmaking skills with investments in education, wargaming/combat simulation activities, and battespace visualization techniques within a joint or multinational framework. We will see a convergence of transformation and modernization capabilities in our MAGTFs that will revolutionize expeditionary operations when currently planned programs mature. Realizing EMW’s full potential will require a developmental effort focused on improving C2, maneuver, intelligence, integrated fires, logistic, force protection, and information operations. Achieving these improvements will require integration of both Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, systems, and acquisition strategies.

Organization, Deployment, and Employment
Changes in operational and functional concepts may necessitate changes in the integrating concepts of organization, deployment, and employment. Organizationally, EMW emphasizes the MEB as the preferred mid-intensity MAGTF and the role of the supporting establishment in direct support of forward operations. Organizational structure must be mission oriented to ensure the effective deployment, employment, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of forces. The Marine supporting establishment must be postured to facilitate situational awareness of worldwide operations, leverage information technologies, and exploit modern logistic concepts in order to anticipate and respond to MAGTF requirements. Marines will deploy using any combination of enhanced amphibious platforms, strategic sealift and airlift, prepositioned assets, and self-deployment options to rapidly project force throughout the world. By virtue of their en route collaborative planning and virtual rehearsal capability, Marine forces will arrive in theater ready for immediate employment. While Marines achieve great operational synergy when employed as fully integrated MAGTFs, the Marine Corps can provide specific forces and capabilities according to the needs of the JFC. Continuing our tradition of innovation, we must strive to enhance our concepts and technologies to organize, deploy, and employ the force.

Maneuver
Maneuver in all dimensions—land, air, and, uniquely, operational maneuver from the sea— enables commanders to exploit enemy weakness at the time and place of their choosing through the use of the operational mobility inherent in naval forces. Maneuver seeks to

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achieve decisive effects during the conduct of a joint campaign. It is the means of concentrating force at critical points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and momentum, which drives adversaries into untenable situations. Maneuver can deny the enemy the initiative, reducing his choices to either defending the length and depth of the littorals, thereby dislocating his forces to the JTF’s advantage or exposing critical vulnerabilities to exploitation. Enemy forces reacting to MAGTF maneuver generate opportunities for the JFC to concentrate the complementary capabilities of other maneuver forces. Maneuver, integrated with fires, will be linked to and influenced by the JFC’s battlespace shaping operations and directed toward achieving operational effects. Innovative technologies will provide Marines enhanced mobility to cross greater distances and reduce the limitations imposed by terrain, weather, and access denial systems. The result will be an expanded maneuver space, both seaward and inland. Enhancements in our maneuver capability will compel adversaries to develop innovative antiaccess strategies and systems. Proactive joint efforts to anticipate and counter current and future antiaccess systems will be critical to ensuring freedom of action. Integrated Fires Fires involve more than the mere delivery of ordnance on a target. The psychological impact on an adversary of volume and seemingly random fires cannot be underestimated. The human dimension of conflict entails shattering an enemy’s cohesion through the introduction of fear and terror. Marines, applying the tenets of maneuver warfare, will continue to exploit integrated fires and maneuver to shatter the cohesion of an adversary. We will increasingly leverage seabased and aviation-based fires and develop shore-based fire support systems with improved operational and tactical mobility. Streamlining our fire support coordination procedures and enhancements in combat identification techniques will support rapidly maneuvering forces while decreasing the risks of fratricide. Forces afloat and ashore require the ability to immediately distinguish friendly forces from others and to then deliver lethal and nonlethal fires with increased range and improved accuracy to achieve the desired effect. Volume and precision of fires are equally important. The continuous availability of high volume, all-weather fires is essential for suppression, obscuration, area denial, and harassment missions. We will use fires to support maneuver just as we use maneuver to exploit the effects of fires. Intelligence Intelligence is a command function that optimizes the quality and speed of decisionmaking. EMW requires a thorough blending of the traditional domains of operations and intelligence. Commanders and their staffs must make decisions in an environment of chaos, uncertainty, and complexity, and they must be prepared to act on incomplete information. The goal of intelligence is to enable the commander to discern the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and exploit them. Intelligence must support decisionmaking by maintaining current situational awareness, monitoring indications and warnings, identifying potential targets, and assessing the adversary’s intent and capabilities at all levels of operations. This requires establishing an intelligence Continued on next page

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baseline that includes order of battle, geographic factors, and cultural information; all contained in universally accessible databases. Deployed Marine forces will enhance their organic capabilities by accessing and leveraging national, theater, Service, and multinational intelligence through a comprehensive intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance network. The informed judgment of well-trained, educated, and experienced Marine analysts and collectors will remain the most important intelligence asset.

Logistics
Marines must access a worldwide infrastructure of distribution systems to support expeditionary operations. The integration of naval expeditionary logistic capabilities with joint information and logistic systems will provide total asset visibility and a common relevant operating picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across Services and support agencies. Marines must explore ways to reduce the logistic footprint ashore through expeditionary support bases, seabased support, in-stride sustainment, reduction of consumables, improved packaging, better visibility over distribution, and development of alternative ordnance variants that are smaller and lighter, but retain equivalent lethality.

Command and Control
EMW promotes decentralized execution providing subordinates latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with the commander’s intent. Organic and supporting C2 systems and processes must be adapted to function in any environment, whether afloat, transitioning ashore, or on the move. C2 must facilitate decentralized decisionmaking and enhanced situational awareness at all echelons. Concurrently, C2 must provide the MAGTF commander the ability to direct joint and multinational task force operations when required. EMW requires adaptable and intuitive C2 architectures and systems that are fully interoperable with joint and compatible with multinational assets. Expeditionary forces will be able to access, manipulate, and use information in near real time, developing a common tactical and operational understanding of the battlespace. They will have connectivity to theater and national assets and the ability to disseminate information throughout the force. This will support fully integrated collaborative planning efforts during both deployment and employment. C2 initiatives must address limitations in the capabilities of all amphibious platforms. Key factors include accelerated technological advances and rapid changes in equipment and capabilities. Flexibility, adaptability, and interoperability are paramount in the design and development of systems and platforms. Particular attention must be made to providing commanders with seamless C2 capabilities throughout the battlespace.

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Force Protection
Force protection are those measures taken to protect a force’s fighting potential so that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place. Force protection will rely on the integrated application of a full range of both proactive and reactive capabilities. Multidimensional force protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of layered active and passive measures within all domains across the range of military operations—or warfighting functions—with an acceptable level of risk. We will pursue improvements in the families of technologies and doctrine to enhance force protection capabilities. Marine forces will enhance security programs designed to protect servicemembers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations. These enhancements will be accomplished through innovative technological and nontechnology-based solutions combined with planned and integrated application of antiterrorism measures, physical security, operations security, personal protection, and incident response.

Information Operations
Information operations involve actions taken to affect the adversary’s decisionmaking processes and information systems while ensuring the integrity of our own. The integrated components of information operations have always proven applicable across the full range of military operations. Information operations will be used to shape the strategic environment or impart a clearer understanding and perception of a specific mission and its purpose. Information operations will be a force multiplier—reducing the adversary’s ability to effectively position and control his forces—and prepare the way for the MAGTF to accomplish future missions. We must leverage information operations and ensure they are synchronized with the JFC’s campaign plan to achieve the desired operational effect.

Summary
EMW describes the Marine Corps’ unique contribution to future joint and multinational operations. As the Nation’s only seabased, forward-deployed, air-ground force in readiness, Marines stand ready to support the JFC. Marines, intrinsically linked with naval support, maintain the means to rapidly respond to crises and respond with the appropriate level of force. MAGTFs are the JFC’s optimized force that will enable the introduction of follow-on forces and prosecute further operations.

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EMW focuses our warfighting concepts toward realizing the Marine Corps Strategy 21 vision of future Marine forces with enhanced expeditionary power projection capabilities. It links our concepts and vision for integration with emerging joint concepts. EMW will guide the process of change to ensure that Marine forces remain ready, relevant, and fully capable of supporting future joint operations.

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Answers

The table below lists the answers to the review lesson examination items. If you have questions about these items, refer to the reference page of the course text. Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Answer d e c g d h f a b c c b c a b b c a b b d g a h b e c f Reference 1-3 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-8 1-8 1-9 1-6 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-6 2-9 2-9 2-11 2-12 2-13 2-14 2-15 2-15 2-16 2-17 2-17 2-18 2-18
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Answers, continued

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

b c b d b a c c d d a b b c a b c c b c a d b

3-4 3-4 3-6 3-7 3-8 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-7 4-8 4-10 4-11 4-12 4-13 4-13 4-14 5-5 5-6 5-11 R-19 R-19 R-20 R-24

MCI Course 8014A

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Review Lesson Examination

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