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BACKGROUNDER

No. 2824 | JULY 11, 2013

James Jay Carafano, PhD, and James Phillips

Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back

E

gypt’s army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi, just as it removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011, to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges within the state. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down. By taking steps to preserve public order, the military could help to salvage Egypt’s chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy. Clearly, Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of a surging rebellion against Morsi’s increasingly authoritarian rule. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible, attach tighter strings to U.S. aid, and recalibrate the U.S. aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. He ruled in a secretive, authoritarian, and exclusionary manner that derailed Egypt’s democratic experiment and alienated far too many Egyptians, even some of his former supporters. During his year in office, he focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic, social, and political problems. When challenged, he arrogantly ignored, marginalized, and demonized

Key Points
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Egypt’s army was justified in ousting President Mohamed Morsi, whose increasingly authoritarian rule was leading Egypt into a civil war. The army, however, is sitting on a volcano and knows it. The U.S. must recognize that Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. Washington should attach tighter strings to U.S. aid and recalibrate the aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypt’s deep economic problems, but the U.S. can encourage Cairo to undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its economy.

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Morsi’s Threat to Democracy

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This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2824 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

a coalition of 1. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court. a new Islamist group. Matt Bradley. http:/ / online.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940. July 6.” The Wall Street Journal. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). social. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime.000 injured. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. Similar organizations in Libya. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December.” Badie warned. mr. 2824 JULY 11.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. 2 . at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. 2013 opposition political parties. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. The next day. Under these conditions. Tamer El-Ghobashy. On July 3. 2013). leftist and liberal parties. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. a hotbed of Islamist extremism. and youth activists. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. 2013. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. and political problems. Mohammed Badie.BACKGROUNDER | NO. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes.wsj. As a judge. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. During his year in office. had been sworn in as interim president. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections.html (accessed July 8. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. political leaders. the provincial capital. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. On Monday. and Reem Abdellatif. Baradei. Yemen.

angry that the Obama Administration uncritically supported the Morsi regime. which was headed for dictatorship. Foreign Operations. The fact that Egyptians resent the Obama Administration’s courting of the Muslim Brotherhood should be a wake-up call for the White House. The Obama Administration failed to publicly criticize Morsi’s excesses.S. Yet once in office. 2012. the United States should: ■■ Press Egypt’s army to hold elections and step aside as soon as possible.5 billion in annual U. the rising persecution of Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. In any event. Military coups have advanced the prospects for democracy at least two times in the past: Portugal in 1974. It remains to be seen whether Egypt’s latest coup will succeed in salvaging Egypt’s dim democratic prospects. General el-Sissi reportedly was a student at the U. bars “any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree or. the crackdown on pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that the Mubarak regime formerly tolerated. Washington should urge the interim government to adhere to this timetable. Morsi. The interim government established by the army has a better chance of laying the groundwork for a democratic transition than did Morsi’s regime. 2824 JULY 11. 2012. democratic. aid. The lack of a shared understanding of the rules of the game enabled Morsi to stage a power grab. The United States should support freedom in Egypt to advance its own interests as well as those of the Egyptian people. 2013 embraced Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood–dominated government and was surprised that Egypt’s people so quickly became violently opposed to Islamist rule. Egypt’s military leaders are much more likely than Morsi’s cronies to advance freedom in Egypt. The Administration has called for a transparent and inclusive political transition process.BACKGROUNDER | NO. freedom of speech.S. and Egypt in 2011. General el-Sissi’s “road map” for a democratic transition included no dates. power grabs. a coup d’état or decree ■■ 4 . Egyptian advocates of freedom should know that Americans support their efforts and do not side with an Islamist authoritarian leader who is hostile to American values and policies. This led Egypt’s secular and liberal opposition to turn to Egypt’s army in despair.S. and freedom of religion. The Obama Administration’s enthusiasm for the Muslim Brotherhood led it to turn a blind eye to Morsi’s power grabs. Section 7008 of the Department of State. in which case he may have absorbed the professional standards and nonpartisan apolitical tradition of the U.S. Should Do In addressing Egypt’s deepening crisis. It is a sad sign that U. support economic reforms to revive the economy. as contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act. The Administration gambled that the practical responsibilities of governing would dilute the hostile anti-Western ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. after the date of enactment of this Act. policy toward Egypt has gone off the rails. Attach tight strings to any U. and play a stabilizing role in the volatile Middle East. Many protesters demonstrating against Morsi before the coup also carried signs protesting President Obama’s support for the Morsi regime. Morsi relentlessly expanded his own power in a winner-take-all manner while neglecting Egypt’s festering economic problems.S. felt no need to compromise with the opposition or temper his Islamist ambitions because the Administration was reluctant to use the leverage afforded by $1.S. The Obama Administration has stopped short of calling the army’s intervention a coup to avoid triggering an aid cutoff. Army. and abuses. aid to Egypt. and Related Programs Appropriations Act. It should also find an inclusive way of writing a new constitution to establish the rules of the political competition before elections. What the U. not leading a backlash against American policy.S. Secular. and liberal Egyptians opposed to an Islamist takeover should be natural allies of the U. Army War College in 2006. and the restrictions that the Morsi government placed on freedom of the press. However.. President Mansour has laid out a vague timetable for a constitutional referendum in four and a half months and parliamentary elections in six months. but the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties should be allowed to participate only if they publicly choose a path of nonviolence. for his part.

offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. including various forms of media. Instead. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. 3 . from the context to the biases. and exhaustion in an opponent. however. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. employing all the tools of communications. undermining their positions. or winning a piece of ground. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. and similar outlets. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. including the “Great Firewall of China. Finally. and tactics. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). 14. between military and civilian. p. anxiety. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. Guo. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. doubt. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. Ideally.BACKGROUNDER | NO. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. “When one defeats the enemy. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. To be effective. regret. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. 2821 JULY 11. In addition. can create a strong psychological impact. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. it is not solely by killing the enemy. and leaders. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. fear. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. operations. but once the conflict is concluded. All the while. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. At the same time. In wartime. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. and among strategy. population. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. influencing the course of the conflict.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. including diplomatic efforts. terror. By employing various forms of strategic communications. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict.

Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday. http:/ / online. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. July 6.html (accessed July 8. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. 2013. the provincial capital. Tamer El-Ghobashy. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). social. The next day. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. mr. Similar organizations in Libya. had been sworn in as interim president. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. and youth activists. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. During his year in office.” Badie warned. Mohammed Badie. 2013 opposition political parties. 2 . “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. leftist and liberal parties. a hotbed of Islamist extremism. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. As a judge. Matt Bradley. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. Yemen. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. Baradei. 2013).”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. and Reem Abdellatif.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. 2824 JULY 11. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. Under these conditions. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. political leaders. On Monday.000 injured. a new Islamist group. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. a coalition of 1. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently.wsj.” The Wall Street Journal. On July 3. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. and political problems.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended.BACKGROUNDER | NO.

including strategic communications. 2013 Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge Dean Cheng Abstract Beijing hopes to win future conflicts without firing a shot. . The “three warfares” represent the PRC’s commitment to expanding potential areas of conflict from the purely military (i. the PLA is not only planning for operations on the physical battlefield. involving the direct or indirect use of military forces) to the more political. the PRC released “political work regulations” for the People’s Liberation Army addressing the importance of waging “the three warfares”: public opinion warfare.e. Psychological warfare is in some ways the most far-reaching of the “three warfares. including through intimidation and coercion. and legal warfare. ■■ ne of the elements distinguishing the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from many of its counterparts is its continued role as a Party army.heritage. alienation. in its entirety.” It involves the application of specialized information and media in accordance with a strategic goal and in support of political and military objectives.BACKGROUNDER No. Indeed. To this end. How? By using psychological warfare to manipulate both a nation’s leaders and its populace—affecting the thought processes and cognitive frameworks of allies and opponents alike. public diplomacy. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. legal warfare.S. This distinction both obligates the PLA to help maintain the CCP’s grip on power and gives it an additional set of tools with which to defend the CCP and the Chinese state. the PRC’s psychological warfare operations are already underway despite the fact that there is no active conflict. Such expansion will be supported by manipulation of an enemy’s leadership. NE Washington. psychological warfare.. first and foremost. O ■■ ■■ ■■ This paper. 2821 | JULY 11. it is also preparing to conduct “political warfare. must strengthen its own psychological warfare capabilities. and deception. the U. the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).” including what is termed the “three warfares”: public opinion warfare. The PLA is. Key Points ■■ Over the past decade. It is therefore essential that the United States counter such psychological operations now while preparing to use its own arsenal of political warfare weapons should a conflict ever arise. the People’s Republic of China has exhibited growing interest in waging asymmetrical warfare. as well as dedicated psychological operations units. To avoid being psychologically outmaneuvered by a PRC intent on winning without firing a shot.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. can be found at http://report.1 Such efforts are aimed at a variety of potential audiences and usually involve operational missions against an opponent’s psychology and cognitive capacities. At the moment.org/bg2821 Produced by the Asian Studies Center The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. and psychological warfare. and media outreach capabilities.

One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. terror. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. operations.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. between military and civilian. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. In wartime. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. it is not solely by killing the enemy. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. employing all the tools of communications. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. regret. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. and tactics. 3 . anxiety. All the while. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. and among strategy. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. including the “Great Firewall of China. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. and leaders. “When one defeats the enemy. or winning a piece of ground. and exhaustion in an opponent. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. can create a strong psychological impact.BACKGROUNDER | NO. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. however. Guo. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. population. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. influencing the course of the conflict. p. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. but once the conflict is concluded. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. In addition. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. By employing various forms of strategic communications. including diplomatic efforts. At the same time. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. Ideally. doubt. Instead. 14. and similar outlets. 2821 JULY 11. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. undermining their positions. including various forms of media. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. Finally. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). especially among senior military and civilian leaders. from the context to the biases. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. To be effective. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. fear.

population. including various forms of media. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. but once the conflict is concluded. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. it is not solely by killing the enemy. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. 3 . This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. and tactics. including the “Great Firewall of China. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. By employing various forms of strategic communications. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. and leaders. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. anxiety. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. operations. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. including diplomatic efforts. can create a strong psychological impact. At the same time. Ideally. between military and civilian. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. 14. employing all the tools of communications. “When one defeats the enemy.BACKGROUNDER | NO. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. and exhaustion in an opponent. p. and among strategy. influencing the course of the conflict. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. or winning a piece of ground. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. Guo. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. regret. from the context to the biases. 2821 JULY 11.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. and similar outlets. undermining their positions. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. To be effective. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. Instead. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. All the while. Finally. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. doubt. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. however. In addition. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. terror. In wartime. fear. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making.

emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. At the same time. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. To be effective. and exhaustion in an opponent.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. including various forms of media. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. Ideally. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. Finally. between military and civilian. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. can create a strong psychological impact. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. 2821 JULY 11. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. including diplomatic efforts. All the while. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. however. regret. terror. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. but once the conflict is concluded. 3 . 14. doubt. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. and similar outlets. In addition. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. and leaders. influencing the course of the conflict. p. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. anxiety. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. Instead. In wartime. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. undermining their positions.BACKGROUNDER | NO. including the “Great Firewall of China. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. or winning a piece of ground. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. population. it is not solely by killing the enemy. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. Guo. “When one defeats the enemy. from the context to the biases. employing all the tools of communications. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. By employing various forms of strategic communications. fear. operations. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. and among strategy. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. and tactics.

2013 opposition political parties. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. a hotbed of Islamist extremism. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster.000 injured. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. July 6. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. mr. 2 . but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. http:/ / online. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. During his year in office.html (accessed July 8. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control.wsj. Baradei. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently. On Monday. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. a coalition of 1.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. leftist and liberal parties. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. and Reem Abdellatif. On July 3. 2013). Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. 2824 JULY 11. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. had been sworn in as interim president. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. Tamer El-Ghobashy. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). Yemen. 2013. Similar organizations in Libya. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. Mohammed Badie. a new Islamist group. political leaders. The next day. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak.” Badie warned. Matt Bradley. and youth activists.BACKGROUNDER | NO. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. the provincial capital. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. As a judge. and political problems.” The Wall Street Journal. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. social. Under these conditions.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers.

is a bellwether for the Arab Middle East. and symbols of “foreign conspiracies” such as the U. which provide nearly half of Egypt’s food consumption.BACKGROUNDER | NO. Egypt’s army is sitting on a volcano and knows it. and government facilities. Nearly one-quarter of Egypt’s workers are unemployed. anti-Morsi political groups. a focal point for sectarian violence. preventing the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state.000 lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an Islamist election victory in 1991. Left unchecked. Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle fought amid economic collapse. Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. American companies. The Nour Party. which will make it difficult to pay for wheat imports. The United States has a national interest in stabilizing Egypt. and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on the scale of Algeria’s in the heart of the Arab world.S. Foreign currency reserves are nearly exhausted. Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once again to undermine the new government. particularly Islamist extremism. There will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks. Islamists charge that Egypt’s ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. it could devolve into an even bloodier version of Algeria’s civil war. widespread unemployment. it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypt’s social fabric continues to unravel. embassy. and rising sectarian tensions. joined non-Islamist opposition parties in pushing for early elections. symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as Tahrir Square. about 10 percent of Egypt’s more than 80 million people. and other Western companies. will likely become even more of a lightning rod for terrorist attacks. The army can only do so much to repair Egypt’s dysfunctional political system. which formerly generated the bulk of Egypt’s foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of every seven workers. the largest Arab country. labor strikes. 2013 Islamist militants will likely soon expand their attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army. It eagerly 3 U. and the figure is much higher for young men. Moreover. It inevitably will lose popular support the longer it rules. who form the shock troops for street protests. The army cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. which has consumed more than 100. surging crime rates. which will require considerable American and international support. Morsi further sabotaged the tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997—not exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits. particularly in southern Egypt. Help Needed in the Struggle for Freedom . The Obama Administration has been asleep at the switch for much of the past two years. An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypt’s unfinished revolution. and political stability will likely be elusive until the country’s worsening economic situation is reversed. 2824 JULY 11. which will require considerable American and international support. and growing political polarization. The army needs to put Egypt’s house in order quickly and then get out of the way. a Salafist movement that favors the immediate imposition of Sharia law and resented Morsi’s high-handed efforts to monopolize political power. social turmoil. police. The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the past two years have severely hurt tourism. The splintered Islamist movement is by no means unified in support of Morsi. The imminent bankruptcy of Egypt’s state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic food shortages. Egypt’s economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the siren call of radical ideologies. Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and ostracize the Nour leaders.S. Sitting on a Volcano Egypt. bread riots. falling standards of living. as it did between Mubarak’s fall in February 2011 and Morsi’s purge of top army leaders in August 2012. who supported the military intervention.

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