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Civlaw Digests - Batch 1

Civlaw Digests - Batch 1

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW - BALANE Allarey, Arnesto, Azis, Badi, Bayalan, Mendoza, M. Article 2 (CC) NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION V.

COA September 8, 2004 Facts: The National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the president, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members. After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, the NAC resident auditor disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. The National Government Auditing Office upheld the auditor‟s order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued. The NAC filed the present petition, contending that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code. Issue: WON the publication required by NCC, Art. 2 is needed for the validity and effectivity of COA Memorandum No. 97-038. Held: No. Ratio: The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members‟ official representatives. Contrary to petitioner‟s claim, COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code. We clarified this publication requirement in Tañada vs. Tuvera: “[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. “Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. “Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.” (Emphasis supplied.) COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not, in any manner or on its own, rule against or affect the right of any individual, except those provided for under the Constitution. Hence, publication of said Memorandum is not required for it to be valid, effective and enforceable.



This Tañada case is not the one assigned in our syllabus. This was promulgated 29 December 1986. Fn.10 of the case: 146 SCRA 446, 453-454 [1986].

to the abortion. the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof. she again became pregnant. she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. his right to life and physical integrity. Less than two years later. Bayalan.CIVIL LAW REVIEW .000. 2230). of a two-month old foetus. Because the parents cannot expect either help. if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received. since he sued for P50. was clearly exaggerated. she again became pregnant. But in this case. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event. It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code.00 damages and P3. Ratio: Article 2206. i.00 for the death of a person. since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). CA July 20. Issue: W/N the husband of a woman.000. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them. and acting on the advice of her aunt. 2217). 2 . In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband Oscar Lazo before they were legally married. Mendoza. could recover damages from physician who caused the same Held: NO. After her marriage with the plaintiff. an "indemnity" claim that. evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife. The lower court expressly found that the appellee was aware of the second abortion. he did not know of.00 attorney's fees. both the trial court and the CA have not found any basis for an award of moral damages. and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code. also caused by the appellant. Philippine currency. and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Even after learning of the third abortion. as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased. The plaintiff Lazo was at this time in the province of Cagayan. under the circumstances of record. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing the action and award of damages. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient.. Azis. Nita was again aborted. support or services from an unborn child. clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. In the present case. Arnesto. nor gave his consent. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. M. no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. Gomez streets in Manila. she had herself aborted by the defendant. On February 21. 1961 Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know defendant Antonio Geluz for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. who voluntarily procured her abortion. there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. In fact. on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss. Article 40 (CC) GELUZ v. 1955.e. The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3.000. in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos. even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child.000. accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida. Badi. because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus. in fixing a minimum award of P3. the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death. as well as to exemplary damages. if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner.BALANE Allarey. campaigning for his election to the provincial board. where the three met the defendant and his wife. Code Art.

.. were between 23 and 25. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. the spouses Joaquin Navarro.. and Angela Joaquin. and the latter's wife. NAVARRO May 29.. Adela Conde. and so Joaquin Navarro. By hypothesis. known or knowable.. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them. Jr. 3rd. . with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro. from which a rational conclusion can be made. as their language plainly implies. died before his mother. M. Sr. the latter was declared to have survived his mother. . namely: that Joaquin Navarro. the building was packed with refugees. Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin. killing Joaquin Navarro.. Azis. and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls. Angela Joaquin de Navarro. dashed out of the burning edifice. . Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. about 30. presumably including Angela Joaquin. while the other sisters. "the situation which it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. The main question related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro. . shells were exploding around. . Joaquin Navarro. Only the witness Lopez survived. Mendoza. his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old. W/N the statutory presumption on survivorship (NCC 43 or the Rules of Court then) is applicable to the case. a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. Most provisions. Pilar. together with their three daughters. During their stay. Jr. it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club.CIVIL LAW REVIEW . Jr. and their children." Ratio: It is our opinion that the testimony of Lopez contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro. Joaquin Navarro. all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. No it is not applicable. Joaquin Navarro. the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building. Badi. Joaquin Navarro. there is no specific evidence as to the time of death . Concepcion and Natividad. As they came out. Francisco Lopez. . Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street. already on fire. It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct. or inferential. and their son Joaquin Navarro. Jr. 2nd. and the latter's wife. Simultaneously.. are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts. Angela Conde. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Sr. Jr. Sr. his wife.. While the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that. the presumption does not step in. collapsed. Bayalan. 1953 Facts:     3        Issue: 1. but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols. and 4th. Held: 1. and a friend and former neighbor. who fired at the refugees. especially those who were trying to escape. Jr. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez.. trapping many people inside. and Natividad. Sr. . . and the Club was set on fire. Mrs. Jr. At the time of the masaccre. it may be indirect. Sr. was aged 70. Sr. Sr. Where there are facts. Arnesto. Minutes later. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123. The Navarro girls." . named Pilar.. the stayed there about three days They flied toward the St. Article 43 (CC) JOAQUIN v. his son. . Joaquin Navarro. Joaquin Navarro. Jr. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance. Joaquin Navarro. Joaquin Navarro. Jr. Since the facts are unknown and unknowable. the German Club. Concepcion. Sr. and Joaquin Navarro. and his daughter-in-law.BALANE Allarey.. the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises. circumstantial.

as stated. were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building. while running. Sr. She could have perished within those five or fewer seconds. While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out. it will be recalled. in the light of the known facts. she could not have kept away form protective walls. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her family. All these are speculative . the old lady was alive and unhurt. are against them. Arnesto. 30. he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less. and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. 4 . This determination of Mrs. people in the building were also killed but these. Badi.CIVIL LAW REVIEW . according to Lopez. the perils of death from staying were not so imminent. Joaquin Navarro. Bayalan.BALANE Allarey. As to fumes. but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. so much so that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband. as the situation looked to her. in front of. made an attempt to escape. Joaquin Navarro. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea. Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the clubhouse. and daughter-in-law left her. M. long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. was sudden. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire. True. was killed. Navarro could have been killed. when Joaquin Navarro. and the probabilities. Besides. And it lends credence to Mr. more likely than not. Angela Navarro. and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the building was made of concrete and its collapse. Still in the prime of life. It was not very likely that Mrs. son. and 15 meters from.. at the same time. Even so. certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death. it must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. the German Club. the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside. besides the collapse of the building. Mendoza. Azis. Now. Jr. by which Mrs. The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a question of law. it was much longer than five seconds. these do not cause instantaneous death. It strongly tends to prove that. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes.

Romualdez-Marcos possesses the necessary requirement of residency. it is decided that the term „residence‟ is synonymous with the term „domicile‟. Bayalan. This was illustrated in Ong v. Republic that this means one‟s personal home. Pres. Marcos did not seem to have chosen either Batac or San Juan to be the family home. whenever absent for business or for pleasure. In absence of any of the foregoing. In relation to this. "a place to which." Based on the foregoing. the fact of residence and not is indicated in the forms is controlling. which in this case is Tacloban. The foregoing however. A domicile once acquired is retained until a new one is gained. 2. To successfully effect a change of domicile.BALANE Allarey. The SC then outlined the different modes of acquiring a domicile: 1. one must demonstrate: 1. the domicile of a natural person is his habitual residence.CIVIL LAW REVIEW . that which is acquired by a child from his parents. Badi. Issue: W/N Romualdez-Marcos satisfies the recidency requirement for purposes of her candidacy. the wife may choose a different domicile when the circumstances so dictate. Arnesto. Domicile of origin which is acquired by operation of law. 4.    . A domicile of origin is not easily lost. In the present case. Marcos died and by her acts it is clear that she intended her domicile to be Tacloban CIty. Marcos then filed an amended certificate where the date of residency was changed from seven months to “since childhood”. the domicile is deemed to continue. domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi. is can be said that the entry of the word „seven‟ is really an honest mistake. As to the allegation that Romualdez-Marcos is domiciled in Manila evidenced by the fact that she has been elected there. or the intention of returning there permanently. The amended certificate was not accepted for being filed out of time. Marcos is still deemed to have not changed her domicile of origin. Mendoza. 3.in view of Art 110 of the CC that the husband fixes place of the family home. In view of this. aspiring for a Congressional position for the First District of Tarlac. so that Mrs. 2. She consequently filed the amended COC in the COMELEC‟s head office in Intramuros alleging that the entry of the word “seven” was an honest misrepresentation.  Article 50 CC dictates that for purposes of the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligation. she acquired the right to either revert to her domicile of origin or choose a new one after Mr. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one. In addition. and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. For purposes of electoral matters. HELD/RATIO: YES. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile. does not apply in election cases. and thus she is allowed to run. Even if it can be said that Romualdez-Marcos acquired a new domicile by virtue of marriage. Article 50 (CC) ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. Acts which correspond with the purpose. and 3. COMELEC 18 September 1995 Facts:  5   Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed a certificate of candidacy on 8 March 1995. Azis. MOntejo opposed the said candidacy because the 1year residency requirement was not satisfied in view of the statement of having resided in Leyte for seven months in her Certificate of Candidacy and Voter‟s Registration. M. the SC reasoned that a person can have several residences at certain times but those are not necessarily his domicile. Domicile attained by operation of law through marriage. one intends to return. The COMELEC denied the same and its MR and disqualified Romualdez-Marcos mainly due to her “lack of intention to reside in Tacloban”.

None of the parties was a resident of S. and another house in connection with his business in the City of Manila.  2 SEC. whenever absent for business or pleasure. Venue could be at place of his residence. w/n RTC-Leyte is the proper venue? YES Ratio: For purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile. in the sense that they disclose intent. Venue of personal actions. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio. Core. 2006 Facts: Ancieto Saludo (Congressman of S. referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.2 ) SC: reversed CA and AFFIRMED RTC 6 ISSUE: 1. .BALANE Allarey. Mendoza. on the other hand. AMEX raised affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. there be an intention to stay there permanently. Under RA 7160. wrongful charged for late payment. as indicated in his CNFS was issued at Pasay City. the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place. CA. (head office in Legaspi.domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence. and (2) personal or physical presence in that place. Makati) for alleged wrongful dishonour of Saludo‟s credit card with RTC Maasin. Leyte. he would have residence in all three places. Azis. the term means merely residence. . therefore. Leyte." When parsed. domicile can exist without actually living in the place. Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint? YES 2. Thus. Cause of action stemmed from the stalleged wrongful dishonor of Saludo's credit card and the supplementary card (1 during his daughter‟s purchases in nd US and 2 paying his hotel while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines).  Deemed Judicial admission that Saludo‟s residence in Pasay: (Community tax certificate. Badi. is synonymous with domicile. Inc. but said choice is not left to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant 2 of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court (R4. the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. but he may have numerous places of residence. and depends on the facts and circumstances.ctc shall be paid in the place of residence of an individual. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. A person can have two or more residences.  Choice of venue is given to plaintiff. M. Leyte evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate he presented CNFS was issued at Pasay and that his law office is located in Pasay. of S. For purposes of venue. Leyte his residence can be taken judicial notice of  Core v. AMEX asserts that Saludo is not a resident of S. his credit card and its supplementary cards were cancelled. actual residence or place of abode. 2. not legal residence or domicile. even if residence is also established in some other place. once residence has been established in one place. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time. A person can have but one domicile at a time. personal residence.. CA: reversed RTC (improper venue)  Koh vs. or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. VS. for purposes of fixing venue of an action. that is. Thus. Leyte) filed damages against AMEX. the place to which.All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides. Saludo‟s law office is also in Pasay City. it is understood to mean as "the personal. This is defined as the permanent home. one intends to return. Subsequently. at the election of the plaintiff. while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place. he would have his domicile in Quezon City. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL (AMEX) April 19. actual or physical habitation of a person. for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. Residence is acquired by living in a place. In this popular sense. Arnesto. w/n Saludo was a resident of S. RTC: In favour of SALUDO (Leyte is a proper venue)  Being the incumbent Cong.CIVIL LAW REVIEW . Bayalan. The important thing for domicile is that. Residence in civil law is a material fact. such as a country residence and a city residence. SALUDO JR. or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found.residence. if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City.

Arnesto. Mendoza. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time. as congressman of Leyte without also recognizing him as actually. Badi. when such residence is required by law. Leyte. The fact then that Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein. personally and physically residing thereat. In CAB. M. personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Jr. for election purposes where he also lives or stays physically.CIVIL LAW REVIEW . Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize Saludo.BALANE Allarey. Saludo has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession and also a house in Macrohon. Azis. one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected. petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. 7 . but he may have numerous places of residence. S. the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. under the Constitution. It is bound to know that. Further. Bayalan.

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