Borromeo v.

Descallar
Facts:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met Antonietta Descallar (respondent), a Filipina, while the former was working in the Philippines sometime in 1 !"# $he two became sweetheart, and later cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage# During their cohabitation, the two ac%uired some real properties in the Philippines composed of se&eral houses and lots which the' bought from Agro()acro De&elopment *orporation# $he deed of sale of said real properties were placed in the name of both Jambrich and Descallar as bu'ers, but were registered under the $orrens s'stem in the name of Descallar alone as Jambrich is dis%ualified to own real properties in the countr'# +t is sufficientl' established though that the funds used to bu' said properties came solel' from Jambrich, as Descallar has no sufficient source of income# After their relationship has turned sour and the two went their separate wa's, Jambrich sold his rights and interests in the Agro()acro properties to *amilo ,orromeo (the petitioner), a Filipino, e&idenced b' a Deed of Absolute -ale.Assignment# When ,orromeo, the bu'er, tried to register the properties in his name, he disco&ered that it is registered in the name of Descallar, and that it has alread' been mortgaged# ,orromeo filed a complaint for reco&er' of real propert' against Descallar#
Issues:

1# /a&ing established that the true bu'er of the disputed properties was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent Descallar0 1# Whether the sale or assignment made b' Jambrich to ,orromeo &alid considering that the former as alien is dis%ualified to own real properties in the Philippines0
Held:

1# $he registration of the properties in %uestion in the name of Descallar does not make her the owner of the said properties# 2+t is settled that registration is not a mode of ac%uiring ownership# +t is onl' a means of confirming the fact of its e3istence with notice to the world at large# *ertificates of title are not a source of right# $he mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the propert'# $hus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessaril', conclusi&el' and absolutel' make her the owner#4 (,orromeo &s# Descallar, ibid.) 1# 5i&en that aliens are dis%ualified to own real properties in the countr', 26t7herefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro()acro De&elopment *orporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would ha&e been declared in&alid if challenged, had not Jambrich con&e'ed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citi8en# +n 9nited *hurch ,oard for World )inistries &# -ebastian (5#:# ;o# <("=>?1, )arch "@, 1 !!, 1A -*:A ==>), the *ourt reiterated the

consistent ruling in a number of cases that if land is in&alidl' transferred to an alien who subse%uentl' becomes a Filipino citi8en or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered &alid#4

Benin v. Tuason Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of i!al, that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Si"to #enin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, $ugenio #enin% that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and e"clusively en&oyed the fruits harvested therefrom% that $ugenio #enin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on (arch ) and *, +,-), that during the cadastral survey by the #ureau of Lands of the lands in #arrio San Jose in +-.. Si"to #enin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land% that they declared said lands for ta"ation purposes in +-)/ under Ta" 0eclaration 1o2 3)3-% that after the outbrea4 of the last 5orld 5ar, or sometime in +-)3 and subse6uently thereafter, evacuees from (anila and other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs2 7nly defendant J2(2 Tuason 8 Co2, 9nc2 was actually served with summons2 The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections +* and +: of the ules of Court2 7nly defendant J2(2 Tuason 8 Co2, 9nc2 appeared2 The other defendants were all declared in default2

HELD: 9t will be noted that in Civil Case 1o2 .*3+ the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 19362 9n Civil Case 1o2 .*33 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 19342 9n Civil Case 1o2 .*3. the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 19312 9t will be noted that in Civil Case 1o2 .*3+ the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 19362 9n Civil Case 1o2 .*33 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 19342 9n Civil Case 1o2 .*3. the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 19312 Therefore, that the decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of ;irst 9nstance of i!al dismissing the complaint of Jose <lcantara, $lias #enin and =ascual =ili (along with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the heirs, of $lias #enin, against Jose <lcantara, and against =ascual =ili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases 1os2 .*3+, .*33 and .*3., respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases2 5e find that the plaintiffs do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by $lias #enin2 Li4ewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case 1o2 .*33 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose <lcantara in Civil Case 1o >?+@*2 <nd, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case 1o2 .*3. do not claim a right different from that claimed by =ascual =ili2

The court sited the Santiago case which states that,
(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee s predecessors!in!interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that e"isted against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, e"cept those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (#umol vs. $ivera and %i&on, '4 (hil. 1), 1* and cases cited therein). +n addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non! appearance of appellants at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.

The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE

Cayanan v. delos Santos 21 scra 1348

FaCTS: 7n (ay ./, +-@,, the title of appellee 0e los Santos to Lot 1o2 @* of the =orac Cadastre was confirmed by the Aon2 <rsenio Santos, then Judge of the Court of ;irst 9nstance of =ampanga2 7n 0ecember +*, +-@,, a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee 0e los Santos Bthrough actual fraud, through deceit and through intentional omission of factsB as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and a decree of registration obtained on <ugust ,, +-@,2 (oreover, it was stated further that a simulated 0eed of <bsolute Sale was e"ecuted in favor of the other respondent, appellee ;eli" L2 Camaya, on 7ctober 3*, +-@,, covering the said lot2 The prayer was for the opening of the decree of registration, the cancellation of the 7riginal Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the ad&udication of said lot in favor of petitioners, now appellant Cayanan and others2

This petition was denied in the order of ;ebruary -, +-@-, which is on appeal2 9t was the view of the lower courtC BSuch being the case, as admitted by the petitioners, even DifE the petition has been filed within one (+) year after entry of final decree, the same cannot be favorably acted upon for the reason that the 6uestioned lot has already been transferred to ;eli" L2 DCamayaE in accordance with section ., of the Land egistration <ct2 5hile it is true that the petition states that such transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for value and that ;eli" L2 DCamayaE is not an innocent purchaser, this 6uestion can be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action and not in a simple petition, li4e the one at bar2B 9SSF$C

whether or not the cadastral court acting as such could li4ewise in6uire into an allegation that the lot sub&ect of the decree was transferred in a simulated sale intended to avoid such a review2

HELD: 9t can and accordingly reverse the appealed order2

The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded by Section ., of <ct )-* may be sought in 'the competent Court of ;irst 9nstance' is no sufficient indication that the petition must be filed in the Court of ;irst 9nstance, e"ercising its general &urisdiction, considering the fact that it is also the Court of ;irst 9nstance that acts on land registration cases2 Fpon the other hand, it has been held that the ad&udication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the e"piration of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and ad&udicate the land to another2B

<s long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land egistration 7ffice in accordance with the law, and the period of one year fi"ed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally ad&udicated and the decision therein rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it2

In Capio v. Capio, the ruling being to the effect Bthat the adCudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontro&ertible until the e3piration of one 'ear after the entr' of the final decreeD that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one 'ear within which it ma' be re&iewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, ma' set aside the decision or decree and adCudicate the land to another part'#B $he order was -E$ A-+DE and the case remanded to the *ourt of First +nstance for a hearing on the merits of the petition of appellants for the reopening of the decree of registration in fa&or of appellee <eon de los -antos#

Bautista-Borja vs Bautista Facts:
$he spouses Pablo ,autista (Pablo) and -egundina $adiaman ,autista (spouses ,autista) died intestate in Jul' 1 !@ and April 1 @, respecti&el'# Pablo was the registered owner of se&eral agricultural lands situated in

:amon, +sabela totaling around "@ hectares and in <lanera, ;ue&a EciCa totalling 1? hectares# $he' had fi&e children, namel'F respondents +luminada and Aurea, Francisco (who died in 1 !1), -implicio (who died in 1 !>), and ;ati&idad (petitioner)# Francisco was sur&i&ed b' si3 children, namel'F respondents *larita, Florentino, Diosdado, Francisco ++, and Francisco +++, and the now deceased Arsenio, all surnamed ,autista# -implicio was sur&i&ed b' fi&e children, namel'F respondents Danilo, <orna, <u8&iminda, <u8, and Paulino, all surnamed ,autista# ,' petitionerGs claim, respondents, through fraud and deception, con&inced her to take possession and culti&ate the abo&e(stated parcels of land which would e&entuall' be partitionedD and that unknown to her, howe&er, the titles to the lands were cancelled b' &irtue of Deeds of -ale purportedl' e3ecuted on different dates b' her parents in fa&or of her siblings -implicio and Francisco, a fact which she came to know about onl' in 1 =# ISSUE: Whether or ;ot the deed of -ale is &alid# HELD: $he appellate court went on to hold that petitioner was guilt' of laches, and assuming that the transfer of the properties in fa&or of respondents was procured through fraud, still, her action should ha&e been filed within four 'ears from the disco&er' of the fraud# /ence, this petition, petitioner insisting that since her cause of action is for annulment or declaration of ine3istent contracts, the pro&isions on &oid contracts, specificall' Arts# 1" @ and 1" 1 of the *i&il *ode, appl', hence, her cause of action had not prescribed, for under Article 1=1@ of the *i&il *ode, 2the action or defense for the declaration of the ine3istence of a contract does not prescribe#4 Further, petitioner contends that e&en if there be implied trust, her cause of action has not prescribed because it is anchored on the annulment of a &oid or ine3istent contract# *orollaril', she argues that if at all, a 2resulting trust4 and not a 2constructi&e trust4 was established in the case at bar, considering that she onl' ga&e her consent to respondents upon their representation that the' were going to take possession and culti&ate the properties with the understanding that the' would later partition them among the legal heirs# -he thus contends that the rule on imprescriptibilit' of actions to reco&er propert' held in trust appl' to resulting trusts, as in this case, so long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust# Petitioner furthermore alleges that the continued assurances of respondents that partition proceedings were Cust dragging on, despite their ha&ing alread' transferred the titles in their names, is a clear indication that the' ha&e not repudiated the resulting trust, the re%uisites for which, as enunciated in Huang v. Court of Appeals, not ha&ing been met# And she maintains that while the registration of land under the $orrens s'stem operates as a constructi&e notice to the whole world, it cannot be construed as being e%ui&alent to a notice of repudiation, for the same cannot be used as a shield for fraud# From the allegations in petitionerGs complaint, it is clear that her action is one for declaration of the nullit' of the Deeds of -ale which she claims to be either falsified H because at the time of the e3ecution thereof, Pablo was alread' gra&el' ill and bedridden, hence he could not ha&e gone and appeared before the ;otar' Public, much less understood the significance and legal deeds H and.or because there was no consideration therefor# *learl', following Article 1=1@ of the *i&il *ode, petitionerGs action is imprescriptible# ,ut e&en if petitionerGs complaint were to be taken as one for recon&e'ance, gi&en that it is based on an alleged &oid contract, it is Cust the same as imprescriptible#

The petition was GRANTED. The 0ecision of the Court of <ppeals affirming the 7rder of the Trial Court dismissing the case was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. HEIRS OF ARIO ALABANAN vs. RE!"BLI# OF THE !HILI!!INES A$9 S 7; (< 97 (<L<#<1<1 vs2 $=F#L9C 7; TA$ =A9L9==91$S G 1o2 +:--,: <pril 3-, 3//en banc

egional

FA#TS: 7n 3/ ;ebruary +--,, (ario (alabanan filed an application for land registration before the TC of Cavite?Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of :+,.3) s6uare meters2 (alabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from $duardo Vela!co, and that he and his predecessors?in?interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (./) years2 Vela!co testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty?two hectare property owned by his great?grandfather, Lino Vela!co2 Lino had four sonsH #enedicto, Gregorio, $duardo and $stebanHthe fourth being <ristedesIs grandfather2 Fpon LinoIs death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves2 #ut by +-**, $stebanIs wife, (agdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Vela!co sons from their father, Lino2 <fter the death of $steban and (agdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot -,*)?<, which originally belonged to his uncle, $duardo Vela!co2 9t was this property that was sold by $duardo Vela!co to (alabanan2 <mong the evidence presented by (alabanan during trial was a Certification dated ++ June 3//+, issued by the Community $nvironment 8 1atural esources 7ffice, 0epartment of $nvironment and 1atural esources (C$1 7?0$1 ), which stated that the sub&ect property was Jverified to be within the <lienable or 0isposable land per Land Classification (ap 1o2 ./+. established under =ro&ect 1o2 3/?< and approved as such under ;<7 )?+*@* on (arch +@, +-,32K 7n . 0ecember 3//3, the TC approved the application for registration2 The epublic interposed an appeal to the Court of <ppeals, arguing that (alabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the TC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time re6uired by law for confirmation of imperfect title2 7n 3. ;ebruary 3//:, the Court of <ppeals reversed the TC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of (alabanan2

ISS"ES: +2 9n order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section +)(+) of =residential 0ecree 1o2 +@3-, otherwise 4nown as the =roperty egistration 0ecree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June +3, +-)@ or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, e"clusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June +3, +-)@ or earlierL

32 ;or purposes of Section +)(3) of the =roperty egistration 0ecree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to ac6uisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil CodeL .2 (ay a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section +)(3) of the =roperty egistration 0ecree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on ac6uisitive prescriptionL )2 <re petitioners entitled to the registration of the sub&ect land in their names under Section +)(+) or Section +)(3) of the =roperty egistration 0ecree or bothL HELD: The =ertition is denied2 (+) 9n connection with Section +)(+) of the =roperty egistration 0ecree, Section ),(b) of the =ublic Land <ct recogni!es and confirms that Jthose who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, e"clusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ac6uisition of ownership, since June +3, +-)@K have ac6uired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and 6uality of their possession2 (a) Since Section ),(b) merely re6uires possession since +3 June +-)@ and does not re6uire that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure &udicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, sub&ect to the timeframe imposed by Section ): of the =ublic Land <ct2 (b) The right to register granted under Section ),(b) of the =ublic Land <ct is further confirmed by Section +)(+) of the =roperty egistration 0ecree2 (3) 9n complying with Section +)(3) of the =roperty egistration 0ecree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recogni!ed as a mode of ac6uiring ownership of patrimonial property2 Aowever, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable2 There must also be an e"press government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under <rticle )33 of the Civil Code2 <nd only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the ac6uisition of property of the public dominion begin to run2 (a) =atrimonial property is private property of the government2 The person ac6uires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section +)(3) of the =roperty egistration 0ecree2 (b) There are two 4inds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be ac6uired, one ordinary and other e"traordinary2 Fnder ordinary ac6uisitive prescription, a person ac6uires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (+/) years, in good faith and with &ust title2 Fnder e"traordinary ac6uisitive prescription, a personIs uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (./) years, regardless of good faith or &ust title, ripens into ownership2 9t is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that (alabanan has ac6uired

ownership over the sub&ect property under Section ),(b) of the =ublic Land <ct2 There is no substantive evidence to establish that (alabanan or petitioners as his predecessors?in?interest have been in possession of the property since +3 June +-)@ or earlier2 The earliest that petitioners can date bac4 their possession, according to their own evidenceMthe Ta" 0eclarations they presented in particularMis to the year +-),2 Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section +)(+) of the =roperty egistration 0ecree2 1either can petitioners properly invo4e Section +)(3) as basis for registration2 5hile the sub&ect property was declared as alienable or disposable in +-,3, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with <rticle )33 of the Civil Code2 The classification of the sub&ect property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under <rticle )3/(3) of the Civil Code2 Thus, it is insusceptible to ac6uisition by prescription2

Manotok v. Barque FA !S: =etitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Aomer #ar6ue, filed a petition with the L < for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT 1o2 3+/+:: issued in the name of Aomer L2 #ar6ue, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the >ue!on City Aall, including the 7ffice of the egister of 0eeds of >ue!on City, sometime in +-,,2 9n support of the petition, petitioners submitted the ownerIs duplicate copy of TCT 1o2 3+/+::, real estate ta" receipts, ta" decla?rations and the =lan ;LS .+*, 0 covering the property2 Fpon being notified of the petition for administrative recon?stitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconsti?tuted title TCT 1o2 T?33),+, and alleging that TCT 1o2 3+/+:: in the name of petitionersI predeces?sors?in?interest is spurious2 ISS"E: 5hether or not irregularly issued titles can be cancelled by the L <2 Hel$: espondents levied on a portion of the (<G < to satisfy the ta" delin6uency of =17C?$0C2 Aowever, the land being levied is classified as inalienable2 9t is owned by the government and thus, cannot be sold at public auction2 Li4ewise, the machineries, e6uipment and other infrastructures in the (<G < cannot be levied and sold at public auction because it is not the property that is sub&ect to the ta"2 The personal liability for the ta" delin6uency, is generally on whoever is the owner of the real property at the time the ta" accrues% where, however, the ta" liability is imposed on the beneficial use of the real property such as those owned but leased to private persons or entities by the government, or when the assessment is made on the basis of the actual use thereof, the personal liability is on any person who has such beneficial or actual use at the time of the accrual of the ta"2

9n the case at bar, =17C?$0C is the beneficial user, however, since respondents cannot avail of the administrative remedy through levy, they can only enforce the collection of real property ta" through civil action2 =17C?$0C also claims that the real property ta" assessment is not yet final and e"ecutory2 9t avers that prior resort to administrative remedies before see4ing &udicial remedies is not necessary considering that the issue raised is purely a 6uestion of law2 Conse6uently, it need not appeal the assessment to the Local #oard of <ssessment <ppeals or to the Central #oard of <ssessment <ppeals as provided under Sections 33*3: and 33-3, of the LGC2 5e disagree2 9t is well?settled in Systems =lus Computer College of Caloocan City v2 Local Government of Caloocan City3- that all adminis?trative remedies must be e"hausted before availing of the &udicial remedies2 ThusC The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly see4 redress from the courts even on the prete"t of raising a supposedly pure 6uestion of law without violating the doctrine of e"haustion of administrative remedies2 Aence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after e"hausting all remedies provided therein2 7therwise stated, before see4ing the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes2 9f =17C?$0C was not satisfied with the assessment of its property, it should have appealed to the Local #oard of <ssessment <ppeals within */ days from receipt of the written notice of assessment2 9nstead, it waited until the issuance of a warrant of levy before it filed a petition for in&unction in the regional trial court, which was not in accordance with the remedies provided in the LGC2 5A$ $;7 $, the petition is =< T9<LLN G <1T$02 The 0ecision and 7rder of the egional Trial Court are <;;9 ($0 insofar as it declared =17C?$0C liable to pay the real property ta" accruing from its use of the (<G <2 espondents however are 09 $CT$0 to refrain from levying on the buildings, infrastructures and machineries of =17C?$0C to satisfy the payment of the real property ta" delin6uency2 HER OSILLA V. RE O%"ILLO FA#TS: =etitioners Aeirs of Salvador Aermosilla, assail the Court of <ppealsI 0ecision which reversed the trial courtIs decision in their favor and accordingly dismissed their complaint2 7n <ugust .+, +-.+, the epublic of the =hilippines ac6uired through purchase the San =edro Tunasan Aomesite2 <polinario Aermosilla (<polinario), who was occupying a lot in San =edro Tunasan Aomesite until his death in +-*), caused the subdivision of the lot into two2 7n <pril ./, +-*3, <polinario e"ecuted a 0eed of <ssignment transferring possession of Lot +- in favor of his grandson, herein respondent Jaime emo6uillo (Jaime)2 <s the Land Tenure <dministration (LT<) later found that Lot +- was still available for disposition to 6ualified applicants, Jaime, being its actual occupant, applied for its ac6uisition before the LT< on (ay +/, +-*.2 7n July ,, +-*., <polinario conveyed Lot +3 to his son Salvador Aermosilla (Salvador), JaimeIs uncle2

Salvador later filed an application to purchase Lot +3 which was awarded to him by the defunct Land <uthority on 0ecember +*, +-:+2 7n ;ebruary +/, +-:3, Jaime and his uncle Salvador forged a BOasunduan ng =aglipat 1g Oarapatan sa 9sang Lagay na Lupang SolarB (Oasunduan) whereby Jaime transferred ownership (the 6uestioned property) in favor of Salvador2 <fter <polinario died, his daughter <ngela Aermosilla filed a protest before the Land <uthority, which became the 1ational Aousing <uthority (1A<), contending that as an heir of the deceased, she is also entitled to Lots +3 and +-2 #y esolution of June +/, +-,+, the 1A< dismissed the protest2 The 1A< later awarded on (arch +*, +-,* Lot +- to Jaime for which he and his wife were issued a title, Transfer Certificate of Title 1o2 T?+@*3-*, on September +@, +-,:2* 7n (ay 3@, +--3, petitioners filed an action for <nnulment of Title on the ground of fraud with damages against Jaime and his spouse, together with the egister of 0eeds, before the egional Trial Court ( TC) of alleging that by virtue of the Oasunduan e"ecuted in +-:3, Jaime had conveyed to his uncle Salvador the 6uestioned propertyHpart of Lot +- covered by TCT 1o2 T?+@*3-* which was issued in +-,:2 The TC found the Kasunduan a perfected contract of sale, there being a meeting of the minds upon an identified ob&ect and upon a specific price, and that ownership over the 6uestioned property had already been transferred and delivered to Salvador2 Aence, the present petition for review on certiorari2

HELD: An action for recon&e'ance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten 'ears# $he ten('ear prescripti&e period a""lies onl# i$ t%ere is an actual need to reconve# t%e "ro"ert# as &%en t%e "lainti$$ is not in "ossession o$ t%e "ro"ert#. /owe&er, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the propert' also remains in possession of the propert', the prescripti&e period to reco&er the title and possession of the propert' does not run against him# +n such a case, an action for recon&e'ance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for %uieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible#11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) +t is undisputed that petitionersG houses occup' the %uestioned propert' and that respondents ha&e not been in possession thereof#11 -ince there was no actual need to recon&e' the propert' as petitioners remained in possession thereof, the action took the nature of a suit for %uieting of title, it ha&ing been filed to enforce an alleged implied trust after Jaime refused to segregate title o&er <ot 1 # Ine who is in actual "ossession of a piece of land clai'in( to )e t%e o&ner thereof ma' wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to &indicate his right#1" From the bod' of the complaint, this t'pe of action denotes imprescriptibilit'# $he Petition is Denied# #&in' v. Enrile FA#TS: 7n September @, +-,@, petitioners purchased from a certain aymunda La ;uente a .:/?s6uare meter lot2 La ;uente delivered to petitioners a duly notari!ed 0eed of <bsolute Sale2 with the 7wner's 0uplicate Certificate of Title and thereafter, petitioners too4 physical possession of the sub&ect property2

;or reasons 4nown only to petitioners, the conveyance was not registered in the egister of 0eeds as prescribed by Section @+ of =0 +@3-2 9nstead, on 1ovember 3/, +-,*, petitioners e"ecuted an <ffidavit of <dverse Claim which was , reflected in the (emorandum of $ncumbrances 9n the meantime, petitioners peacefully and continuously possessed the sub&ect property2 7n <ugust +-, +-,,, three years after they purchased the disputed property, petitioners received a Notice of Lev on Attach!ent and "rit of #xecution issued by the egional Trial Court ( TC) of =asig in favor of respondents, in Civil Case 1o2 @)*+: entitled S$s% Adolfo #nrile and Arsenia #nrile v% &a !unda La 'uente2 7n January ,, +--/, petitioners filed a Petition to &e!ove Cloud on or (uiet )itle to &eal Pro$ert asserting ownership of the disputed property2 7n (ay ++, +--., the TC rendered &udgment in favored of petitioners /E<DF

Good faith, or the want of it, is capable of being ascertained only from the acts of one claiming its presence, for it is a condition of the mind which can only be &udged by actual or fancied to4en or signs2 9t is beyond dispute that the property in 6uestion had already been sold by La ;uente to petitioners on September @, +-,@2 =etitioners immediately too4 possession thereof2 5hen the 1otice of Levy on <ttachment and when the 5rit of $"ecution and Certificate of Sale were inscribed in favor of respondents, petitioners have been, since September @, +-,@, in actual, physical, continuous and uninterrupted possession2 The law does not re6uire a person dealing with the owner of registered land to go beyond the certificate of title as he may rely on the notices of the encumbrances on the property annotated on the certificate of title or absence of any annotation2 Aere, petitioners' adverse claim is annotated at the bac4 of the title coupled with the fact that they are in possession of the disputed property2 To us, these circumstances should have put respondents on guard and re6uired them to ascertain the property being offered to them has already been sold to another to prevent in&ury to prior innocent buyers2 < person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value2 9t is a well?settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor2 espondents were not purchasers in good faith and, as such, could not ac6uire good title to the property as against the former transferee2 The petition is G <1T$02