Paying for Education:

How the World Bank & IMF Influence Education in

Developing Countries

By

Nancy C. Alexander
Globalization Challenge Initiative
Takoma Park, Maryland, USA

December, 1998
(updated January 2002)
Table of Contents

Introduction

I: The World Bank’s Approach to the Education Sector

A. Volume of Assistance
B. Staffing
C. Lending and Non-Lending Services
D. Monitoring and Evaluation

II. Recipes for Educational Reform

A. Overview
B. Recipes

1. Privatize
2. Recover Costs
3. Decentralize
4. Provide Demand-Side Financing
5. Reallocate budget resources from HE to BE
III: The Impact of IMF and World Bank SAPs on Education

A. Overview

B. How the IMF and World Bank Promote Economic Fundamentalism

1. IMF Seal of Approval
2. Binding Conditions attached to SAPs
3. Mechanisms for Modulating Government Access to World Bank Credit

C. Critiques of Adjustment
1. Impacts on Social Sector Budgets
2. Impacts on Incomes and Inequality

D. The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) Initiative

IV: Findings and Recommendations

A. Adjustment operations
B. Impact Assessments
C. Quantity vs Quality of Education Operations
D. Participation
E. Debt Relief and Domestic Financing

V: Bibliography

2
 Paying for Education:

How the World Bank & IMF Influence Education in

Developing Countries1

By
Nancy C. Alexander2

Introduction

The 1980s are sometimes described as a lost development decade. School enrollments
slumped. The tremendous progress toward universal primary education during the twenty
years, 1960-1980, was arrested or reversed in many countries.

In 1990, the Education for All (EFA) Conference in Jomtien, Thailand made an urgent appeal
to governments, donors and creditors to address the decline in basic education. Donor
governments and creditors, including the World Bank, made commitments to help developing
countries achieve education for all.

In June 1996, a conference was convened in Amman, Jordan to assess progress since the
Education for All (EFA) Conference in Jomtien, Thailand. UNICEF cites the findings of the
conference report:

Overall, primary enrolment was the brightest sign of progress by mid-decade, with
some 50 million more children in developing countries enrolled in primary school than
in 1990. Discouragingly, however, this figure only managed to keep pace with the
numbers of children entering the 6- to 11-year old age group over the period.3

Unsatisfactory progress was noted in some regions – south Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Progress in educating girls had also been disappointing:

During the five years following the conference, little gain was recorded in the
developing world in girls’ primary enrolment as it rose only by a fraction of a decimal
point, from 45.4% in 1990 to 45.8% in 1995. The gender gap in adult literacy actually
widened over the same period.4

1
This document was written for Oxfam America. Portions of it may be found in other publications by the author,
including: “Accountability to Whom: The World Bank and Its Strategic Allies,” published in Derde Wereld in May,
1998; various issues of “News & Notices for World Bank Watchers;” “NGOs in the International Monetary and
Financial System,” (with Charles Abugre) in International Monetary and Financial Issues for the 1990s,
published by UNCTAD; “Financing for Development,” published by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
2
The author is Director of the Globalization Challenge Initiative; former Director of the Development Bank
Watchers’ Project at Bread for the World Institute; former Director of Government Relations at Bread for the
World; former Legislative Advocate, Friends Committee on National Legislation. Her degrees are from Duke
and Harvard University.
3
UNICEF , State of the World’s Children Report, draft, 1998, p. 15.
4
Ibid., p. 15.

3
At the World Education Forum in April 2000, the international community promised to launch
a “global initiative” to mobilize resources to support national education efforts. However,
since the Dakar, Senegal Forum, there has been no headway towards launching the
initiative.

Educational progress is uphill. The world slump has hit developing countries hard. Many are
in recession or depression. Meanwhile, the donor and creditor community is increasingly
tight-fisted. However, as discussed below, more money for education is not necessarily the
answer. Even with vigorous education campaigns, there will be disappointing progress
unless creditors – especially the IMF and the World Bank – begin to support homegrown,
national development strategies and education action plans. In addition, the institutions need
to change their policy prescriptions for ailing economies, in general, and for the education
sector, in particular.

This paper provides an overview of the roles of the IMF and World Bank from 1980 to the
present. It distinguishes between two types of impacts exerted by the IMF and World Bank in
the education sector of borrowing countries: the World Bank’s direct involvement in the
education sector of developing countries and country-wide economic reforms, or structural
adjustment programs (SAPs), financed by the IMF as well as the World Bank.

Parts I and II of this paper address the World Bank direct involvement in education through
project investments (e.g. school construction, curriculum development, or textbook
publication); and reform of the education sector (e.g., school privatization, cost recovery,
decentralization).

Part III addresses adjustment programs (SAPs) financed by the IMF and World Bank. Unlike
the World Bank, the IMF does not make project investments or reform education policies; it
only engages in structural (and sectoral) adjustment lending. The impacts of IMF and World
Bank-financed adjustment programs ripple throughout a society, including households and
school systems.

Few independent analysts have attempted to evaluate the impact of adjustment on

education. This is unfortunate since adjustment policies are a more powerful influence on
the education sector than education projects. As a result of the hiatus in research, we are
significantly dependent upon the World Bank and IMF for their own evaluations of the impact
of adjustment on education.

The paper finds that the operations of the institutions have had both positive and negative
impacts. The net influence of each institution has been different in different countries; among
different groups within countries; and in different timeframes. Much of the literature about the
impact of the institutions addresses their track records in the 1980s, when even according to
their own admission, the institutions paid scant attention to the impacts of their economic
reform loans on vulnerable people.

4
This paper underscores the World Bank’s conclusion that, in many countries, adjustment
lending had negative impact upon primary education in the 1980s. During the 1990s, there
appears to be a weak, but positive, response to measures taken by the institutions and
borrowing countries to modify SAPs. That is, in some circumstances, safety nets and
education investments have helped to stem school enrollment declines or increase
enrollments.

In 2002, the World Bank Group launched a Private Sector Development (PSD) Strategy that
aims to expand the provision of educational services by private firms and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). In selected instances, this approach may have merit. In general,
however, the Strategy endangers educational progress because it expands ignores the
lessons of experience. Among other things, the Strategy ignores the fact that when
educational services are provided at cost, they will not reach poor populations even when
subsidy schemes are employed.

To analyze the influence on education of the IMF and World Bank operations, this paper
reviews the following issues:

· IMF and World Bank loans. Historically, the IMF and World Bank provide loans5 at market
rates as well as credits at concessional rates. Shortly, the World Bank will increase its
levels of grant assistance.
· The volume of resources for education. Too often, the public sees increasing amounts of
resources for education as a good thing. However, history shows that “aid” has
sometimes been used to dismantle education systems. Greater quantities of aid should
only be used to support good education policies.
· Types of loans: projects investments or adjustment loans. Over time, adjustment loans
generally have a stronger influence on educational outcomes than do investments in
education projects.
· Purposes of reform. The purpose of many adjustment programs (e.g., cutting deficits and
lowering per pupil costs) can complement or conflict with educational goals.
· Impacts of reforms. In many countries, the formulae employed by the Bank to reform the
education sector have had more negative than positive impacts. Furthermore, structural
adjustment programs (SAPs) have often sabotaged educational progress while
weakening the state. Ultimately, the state needs to be the guarantor or educational
access, quality and progress.

IMF and World Bank instruments: grants and loans. As a rule, bilateral donor governments
and United Nations agencies provide grant aid, whereas the World Bank and IMF provide
loans and credits. Hard currency debt obligations to the institutions, must be repaid.

Grants are usually more valuable to countries than foreign loans; “soft,” or concessional,
credits are more valuable than “hard,” or market rate loans. Concessional loans have a
significant grant component; they have low interest rates and long grace periods.

5
Technically, governments with active IMF programs are not “borrowers,” although the term is employed in this
paper. They are actually “purchasers” of resources, some of which they contribute to the IMF.

5
The World Bank’s has facilities, which offer both types of loans. The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), extends so-called “hard” or market rate loans. The
International Development Association (IDA), extends concessional credits to poorer
governments. IBRD and IDA, together, constitute “The World Bank.”

The U.S. is exerting tremendous pressure on IDA to provide an increasing amount of grant
financing, especially for education. Ordinarily, this would be good news. However, the U.S.
wants the World Bank to privatize education and use the grants to offset the costs of
providing education to poor populations. Experience demonstrates that efforts to offset
educational services through subsidy schemes seldom work.

Volumes of resources for education. Grant assistance has declined over the last decade.
In 1994-95, bilateral donor governments provided less support for education (both in absolute
terms and as a percentage of total aid) than they did in 1989-90 before the 1990 Education
for All (EFA) Conference in Jomtien, Thailand. The good news is that the volume and
percentage of education aid devoted to basic education has tripled.6

World Bank lending for education has increased significantly since the Jomtien Conference.
Overall lending for education doubled from the 1986-1990 period to the 1991-1998 period.
Lending for primary education has increased by 360%.

In 1995, the volume of Bank loans ($3.1 billion) represented 28% of all external finance for
education.

Of the approximately $15 billion in education loan commitments made by the World Bank
from 1991-98, two-thirds were at market rates. One-third ($5.7 billion) were for poorer
countries which borrow from IDA and which are concentrated in Africa. From the mid-1980s
to the mid-1990s, the share of education lending rose for two regions – South Asia (SAS) and
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); the share of education lending fell for four regions –
Sub-Saharan Africa (AF), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), East Asia and the Pacific
(EAP) and Europe and Central Asia (ECA).

The volume of Bank assistance to the education sector understates the institution’s influence,
since high levels of assistance provided by bilateral donors usually help finance World Bank-
financed projects and policies. Bank assistance (indeed, all external finance) represents a
tiny proportion (0.5% of 1%) of global spending for education. However, in some times and
places, it is significant in terms of volume of resources for, and/or influence on, education.
For instance, during the 1980s, Bank resources constituted 16% of the resources available to
African governments for education.

Types of loans. Project lending is very different from adjustment lending. World Bank-
financed projects take five to seven years for implementation. In contrast, adjustment loans
are quick disbursing.

6
Germany, Japan, the U.K., France, and the Netherlands shifted considerable aid into basic education.
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, and the U.S. made modest shifts. Belgium, Italy
and Norway decreased allocations to basic education.

6
Adjustment loans -- SAPs and SECALs -- influence both the demand for, and supply of,
educational services. Demand for educational services is elastic; that is, demand rises or
falls as direct and indirect costs of education rise or fall relative to a family’s income level.
Families make choices and set priorities. Often, families place a higher value on education of
boys than girls.

Purposes of reforms. In addition to influencing the incomes of households and the cost of
education, SAPs attempt to reduce the budget deficits of borrowing governments. Since
education budgets usually constitute a significant portion of the federal budget, SAPs often
change the level or composition of education spending. Such changes affect many aspects
of school systems, such as: school construction, administration and maintenance, teacher
salaries and benefits, and educational materials.

Generally, adjustment loans for the education sector or for an entire economy are more
powerful and influential than project loans. Hence, an understanding of the net impact of the
IMF and World Bank on education relies heavily on an understanding of the impact of
adjustment loans.

Adjustment loans for the education sector may attempt to privatize and decentralize
education while recovering costs through user fees. They also reorient spending from
secondary and higher education to basic education. These “recipes,” or formulaic
approaches to the education sector have often retarded educational progress. In addition,
the goals of SAPs often conflict with the goals for education.

From 1980-93, there were more than 3,000 policy conditions attached to World Bank SAPs,
but only 50 related to education. Of these 50, only six explicitly called for increased spending
on education.7 Now social conditionality is the rule rather than the exception. However,
social conditions are often discretionary. The important, binding conditions on SAPs (e.g.
“up-front conditions,” which are imposed at negotiation, pre-appraisal, and prior to release of
loan installments, or tranches) may have an adverse impact on the social sectors. Among
other things, these binding conditions usually induce governments to cut budget deficits,
which puts pressure on social sector spending.

Impacts of assistance. The “Findings and Conclusions” suggest ways to enhance positive
impacts of assistance on the education sector by addressing with problems in the following
areas: structural adjustment, impact assessments, quantity vs. quality questions,
participation, and debt relief and domestic financing.

7
Figures derived from a list provided to the author by the Poverty Reduction & Economic Management (PREM)
Network of the World Bank.

7
I: The World Bank Group’s8 Approach to the Education Sector

A. Volume of Assistance for Education

One can gauge the influence of a donor or creditor on the education sector of a developing
country by reviewing the volume of assistance, its type, purpose and impact. Too often, the
volume of assistance provided by a financier is used as a proxy for effectiveness. This is
misleading.

Forms of Assistance: Grants and Loans. Bilateral donor governments and United Nations
agencies give grants to developing country governments. Grant resources may seem more
valuable to developing country governments than loans, since grants do not need to be
repaid. However, the World Bank is considering extending grant assistance to subsidize
privatization of education in borrowing countries.

Declining grant aid for the education sector. In 1994-95, bilateral donor governments
provided less support for education (both in absolute terms and as a percentage of total aid)
than they did in 1989-90 before the 1990 Education for All (EFA) Conference in Jomtien,
Thailand. However, the percentage of education grants devoted to basic education tripled
during this period.9

In the early 1990s (1991-1994), the volume of Bank loans for education ($7.9 billion)
represented 40% of all bilateral grants ($19.8 billion).

This percentage has increased. According to UNESCO’s 1998 World Education Report, the
World Bank’s education commitments represented 46% of bilateral assistance and 28% of all
assistance in 1995.

Box 1

1995 External Expenditures for Education*

(in millions of current US dollars)

Bilateral Assistance $4,450

All Multilateral resources 2,717

World Bank (2,057)

8
“The World Bank” refers to the institution’s market rate window, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), as well as the concessional window, the International Development Association (IDA).
The IBRD is the facility for countries with per capita annual incomes exceeding $925; IDA is the facility for
poorer countries. IDA provides “soft,” or concessional, loans to the poorest countries which are concentrated in
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Affiliate members of the World Bank Group include the International
Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
9
Germany, Japan, the U.K., France, and the Netherlands shifted considerable aid into basic education.
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, and the U.S. made modest shifts. Belgium, Italy
and Norway decreased allocations to basic education.

8
 UN Programs 278
UNESCO (100)

Total 7,445

World Bank as % of Total 28%

*1998 UNESCO World Education Report, p. 112.

Technical assistance which never reaches developing countries. The Development

Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD categorizes aid as follows: investment projects,
sector aid, technical cooperation, and other. Importantly, 70-75% of all donor support since
the mid-1980s has focused on technical cooperation. Usually, most technical cooperation
monies and some project monies are spent in donor countries for purposes, such as training.
Thus, it is calculated that 60-80% of all education aid commitments is spent in donor
countries.10

Levels and Types of Bank Lending. Overall lending for education doubled from the 1986-
1990 period to the 1991-1998 period.

During the 1990s, lending levels for basic education have fluctuated wildly. In FY98, the level
of education loan commitments -- $3.1 billion – was three times the FY97 level. The $3.1
billion level represents 36 loans to 28 countries. It is 9.1% of total World Bank loan
commitments of $28,594.

Commitments are disbursed over a period of years. In FY98, education loan disbursements
totaled nearly $1.9 billion.

Basic Education Emphasis. Bank lending for primary education increased by 360% from
the 1986-1990 period to the 1991-1998 period.

During the nine fiscal years, 1990 – 1998, the average annual level of lending for basic
education has been $809 million, which is four times the annual average for the years 1986 –
1989. During the 1990s, basic education has constituted about one-third to one-half of Bank
education lending. While basic education encompasses adult literacy as well as primary
education, adult literacy is not a Bank priority. In FY96, only two projects (in Ghana and in
Indonesia) focused on this goal.

Prominence of Education Operations in the Bank’s Loan Portfolio. The World Bank’s
medium-term plan for a borrowing country, which is called the “Country Assistance Strategy”
(CAS), lays out the framework and rationale for Bank investments in a country. A CAS is

10
Bennell, P. and Furlong, D., “Has Jomtien Made any Difference?…”, p. 50.

9
prepared every few years for each borrowing country.11 The CAS describes plans for both
kinds of lending operations: economic reforms, or SAPs, and project investments in different
sectors, such as agriculture, power, education and health. The World Bank’s CASs identified
education as a priority in 77% of all CASs prepared during FY97 and the first half of FY98.
Twenty percent (20%) of the subject CASs proposed education loans; an additional 20%
proposed education research. Education loans represented 9% of all loans proposed by the
CASs, while education research represents 7% of all research proposed by the CASs.

IBRD & IDA Lending for Education. IBRD. In 1962, when the Bank began education
lending, there was controversy about whether it was appropriate to use Bank finance (rather
than grants) for education purposes. The Board considered a proposal to use IBRD net
profits for education grants in IBRD countries. However, it was decided that net profits
should be channeled to low-income, IDA countries.

Of the approximately $15 billion in education commitments made by the World Bank from
1991-98, nearly two-thirds were extended by the hard loan window, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The biggest borrowers for education are IBRD or
blend (both IBRD and IDA) countries: Mexico, India, Brazil, Indonesia, China, Pakistan,
Argentina, Korea, and the Philippines.

IDA. During this timeframe, over one-third ($5.7 billion) of the $15 billion in commitments
represent credits extended by the International Development Association (IDA).

Most IDA countries are in Africa where the ratio of enrollments to the primary school-age
population is declining. In fiscal year 1998, 11 of 35 new education loan commitments were
to IDA countries. (Seven of the 11 were in sub-Saharan Africa).

The World Bank’s financing of education feel from an average of $2 billion per year in the
1990s to $1 billion per year for the last two years. These levels continue to gyrate. Why?
First, education is increasingly a priority of powerful shareholder governments, such as the
United States Government. Hence, the Bank is under pressure to “move money” for
education. Second, there are bottlenecks in the lending pipeline because many governments
cannot or will not provide the local cost financing components of education operations.

Implementation problems also stem from factors, such as political turmoil and weak
institutions. Some Bank critics claim that SAPs, which have downsized governments, are
partly to blame for the inability of governments to efficiently process and administer education
loans.

IFC.12 The power and authority of the World Bank’s private sector affiliate, the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) is expanding.13 (The IFC has a mandate to lend to, and take

11
If country conditions change in the interim, the Bank updates the CAS by preparing a new “short CAS” or a
CAS “Progress Report.”
12
The IFC’s approach to the education sector is described in: Karmokolias, Yannis and Maas, Jacob van
Lutsenburg, “The Business of Education: A Look at Kenya’s Private Education Sector,” IFC Discussion Paper
#32, 1997.

10
equity positions in, private ventures.) 14 The IFC will increasingly team up with the Bank’s
soft loan arm, the International Development Association (IDA), which lends to low-income
governments. The Bank increased its budget in fiscal year 2002 to help finance expanded
lending to low-income borrowers,15 which is expected to reach $7 billion in FY02-04.16
Together, the IFC and IDA are aggressively promoting the privatization of education. The
World Bank has an on-line service, EdInvest, which guides investors to profitable ventures in
the education sector.

The IFC’s 2001 paper, “IFC: Strategic Directions,” targets five frontier areas for business
expansion, including the social sectors, infrastructure, small and medium-sized enterprises,
domestic financial institutions, and information technology and communications. Especially in
these areas, the IFC will increasingly take the lead in expanding private provision of
services,17 while IDA will work with governments to design subsidy and other schemes to
offset the costs of private provision to low-income consumers.

Initiatives to privatize education are being taken without regard for the needs and preferences
of citizens in borrowing countries. Indeed, the IMF and World Bank are suspending debt
relief for several countries due to their inadequate progress in privatization. Such coercive
tactics subvert efforts by citizens in borrowing countries to shape their own future through
national planning processes [e.g., the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process].

Regional Patterns. From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the share of education lending
rose for two regions – South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean; the share of
education lending fell for four regions – Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa,
East Asia and the Pacific and Europe and Central Asia. Of the six geographical regions,
Latin America & and Caribbean (LAC) and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) receive the most
education resources – about 65%.

Demand for Education Loans. Governments prefer grant financing to loan financing of
education. Historically, demand for education loans has been sluggish due to factors such
as:

· The high level of sustained, recurrent costs (e.g. teacher salaries and educational
materials) required for effective education operations. Governments prefer to borrow for
capital expenditures (e.g. construction of facilities).
13
The World Bank’s 1995 Annual Report referred to the institution’s shift to supporting private sector investment (as
opposed to direct lending to governments) “a dramatic departure from what had been Bank policy for half a
century.”
14
For the most part, the IFC would also take charge of the World Bank Group’s on-lending operations and policy
risk guarantees. That is, if the market does not provide these services to borrowing countries, the IFC/MIGA will
provide them (or refer the borrower to the IBRD and IDA).
15
The Bank’s “Strategic Directions Paper” (3/29/01) envisioned the Bank’s administrative budget growing from $1.2
billion in FY01 to about $1.3 billion in FY02. It succeeds the Bank’s FY98 to FY00 Strategic Compact.
16
IDA commitments increased to $6.8 billion for 134 projects in fiscal year 2001, compared with $4.4 billion for 126
projects in fiscal year 2000.
17
IFC investments increased four and a half times over in real terms between 1980 and 2000. The IFC’s
infrastructure department was created in 1992 and, by 2000, a fifth of IFC lending went to private sector
infrastructure.

11
· Education operations, like other operations, require that borrower’s provide counterpart
funds. Borrowers provide almost 20% of the total cost of education operations in
counterpart funds. The poorer governments have greater difficulty providing counterpart
funds.
· Returns on education are realized in the long-term. Education operations do not usually
generate a stream of revenues in the near term. Nor do they directly contribute to the
generation of foreign exchange revenues, which can help to service foreign debts and
import goods and services.

Thus, while lending for education has been expanding since the late 1980s, demand by the
poorest countries is much lower than demand by lower-middle income and middle income
countries.

Many NGOs in developing countries oppose the government practice of borrowing at market
rates for social services, which they believe their government should underwrite with their tax
dollars. Some NGOs also oppose greater World Bank provision of grants for education
where grants would subsidize the privatization of education.

Fungibility. As described below, aid and credit is sometimes diverted for other-than-
intended purposes. Once assistance reaches a government’s treasury, it is fungible or
transferable for any purpose. Education assistance is especially fungible since governments
are averse to providing sustained levels of local cost financing for purposes, such as teacher
salaries and educational materials.

In addition, where there are IMF programs, governments may divert assistance to avoid
violating IMF budget deficit targets.

B. Staffing.

The Bank has approximately 240 staff working in the education sector. Of this total, about
20% have graduate exposure in the field of education.

The World Bank’s 10,000 staff members are organized into thematic networks that provide
services to country and regional departments.

The staff of the country and regional departments hold the reins of power in the Bank. A
powerful Country Director, along with a Chief Economist staffs each Country Management
Unit. In conjunction with their client country or countries, these individuals coordinate the
design of Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) and determine the level and composition of
lending, including education lending.

The Country Management Units generate demand for the advice and services of the Bank’s
thematic networks. The Human Development (HD) Network supplies advice and services
with respect to education, health and social protection operations to the country and regional

12
departments. The HD Network is relatively powerless compared with the thematic networks
that focus on macroeconomic reform, private sector engagement, and infrastructure.

C. Lending and Non-Lending Education Services.

1. Lending Services. The principal loan instruments of the World Bank are (structural and
sectoral) adjustment loans and project investments.18 Adjustment loans are popular with the
World Bank and its borrowers because they are fast-disbursing and inexpensive to process.
In contrast, project loans disburse slowly over the course of six or more years.

As a rule, adjustment programs have a greater impact on the education sector than do
project investments. Thus, it is unfortunate that researchers that seek to understand the
influence of the World Bank on the education sector tend to focus on education projects and
overlook adjustment programs. Hence, the public tends to have a distorted view of the role of
the World Bank and the IMF in education. Education sector adjustment policies are discussed
in part II; structural adjustment programs are discussed in part III.

a. Structural adjustment programs. Adjustment loans, which aim to liberalize and

privatize economies in the context of strict budget discipline, are controversial and unpopular
for reasons described in parts II and III. Hence, the IMF and World Bank are gradually
expunging the term “adjustment” from their lexicon. At present, many World Bank adjustment
loans to low-income countries are now called “Poverty Reduction Support Credits” (PRSCs);
IMF loans to poor countries are called “Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)
Arrangements.” World Bank adjustment loans to middle income countries are being called
“Development Support Loans” (DSLs). These are “name games” are cosmetic; they are not
accompanied by any change in the institutions’ policy prescriptions.

b. Sector adjustment programs. Adjustment loans for the education sector often attempt
to privatize and decentralize education while recouping costs through various means,
including user fees.

c. Hybrid loans. Adjustment provisions are also being packaged with project investment
loans. Hybrid loan instruments, including adaptable program loans (APLs) and learning and
innovation loans (LILs), combine adjustment and project elements. The adaptable program
loan (APL) is a loan with a long-term development purpose and a phased-in implementation
process, which allows the borrower to pilot and then scale-up and replicate projects. Like the
APL, the LIL allows a “grow-as-you-go” approach to lending. However, it is smaller in scale.

These new instruments are especially well suited to education operations, which involve a
variety of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders.

18
In addition, the Bank and the IFC offer a variety of partial risk and partial credit guarantees to private
investors. The IFC also takes equity positions in ventures.

13
d. Project investments. In the early days of Bank project lending, nearly 80% of projects
involved civil works construction. The volume of construction has declined steadily and now
stands at about 23% of lending.

Most education expenditures are recurrent expenditures, such as teacher salaries and
benefits and textbooks and other educational materials. However, until the late 1980s, a
Bank policy prohibited loans to support recurrent expenditures. When this policy changed,
the composition of Bank lending changed. In 1995-7, about 60% of operations supplied
equipment and textbooks or provided technical assistance.

Bank-financed projects focus on the supply-side of education – that is, provision of buildings,
technology, and educational materials. Supply-side financing works on the “field of dreams”
theory that “if you build the school, they [the students] will come.”19 Providing a place in
school for every child is a demand-side as well as a supply-side challenge; families must be
able to afford the direct and indirect costs of educating their children.

Projects are only beginning to address issues relating to instructional quality and “demand
side” barriers to education faced by certain populations. Barriers come in many varieties:
language barriers; gender discrimination20; high direct and indirect costs; the opportunity cost
of education – that is, income foregone from children forsaking employment for school; the
location of schools in deprived rural settings; trade-offs between investing in the education of
different children within a family; cultural and religious biases with respect to the value and
type of appropriate education; and so on.

2. Non-Lending Services.

Training. In the late 1990s, six private foundations, 21 bilateral donors, and 20 multilateral
development organizations funded activities of the Economic Development Institute (EDI).

During 1998 and 1999, EDI, which is the Bank’s training and education arm, had 21 core
courses, one of which focused on education reforms.

EDI’s program on education reform is intended to “build capacity and consensus for
education reform in developing countries, focusing on three areas, education financing,
improved governance, and school and teacher effectiveness.” EDI also has a “Girls
Education Program” which is part of the Partnership for Strategic Resource Planning, a multi-
donor collaboration with African countries led by African Women Educators. (EDI 98 Annual
Report, p. 32)

19
In the 1996 movie “Field of Dreams,” a lover of baseball believed that if he built the perfect ball park, baseball
players would rise from the dead to play.
20
According to the World Bank, the average 6-year-old girl from a low or middle-income country can expect to
attend school for 7.7 years; the average 6-year-old boy can expect 9.3 years of schooling. (Patrinos and
Ariasingam)

14
In 1997, 11 companies gave substantial support for EDI’s “World Links for Development, an
electronic network for teachers and students on development issues.21 This program
reached 105 schools in 11 developing countries in FY98.

EDI also has a program in Distance Education, Technology and Networks for Education,
Health and Population, which “helps countries use distance education, technology and
networks to address problems of access and quality in their health and education sectors.”
(Ibid., 33).

Grant-giving. In late 2000, IDA may begin to provide a large volume of grants for education
in recipient countries. To date, however, IDA grant-giving has been limited to countries in
conflict or projects funded by the Bank’s Development Grants Facility (DGF), which endorsed
the first year of a multi-year program to support UNICEF’s education programs. In fiscal year
1998, a $1.2 million grant supported small-scale innovative programs at the community and
local levels to increase girl’s enrollment rates. A partnership between the U.K.’s Department
for International Development (DFID), the Rockefeller Foundation and UNICEF will study the
implementation of girls’ education projects and initiative. (Annual Report, 1998, p. 70)

The Bank’s Education Knowledge Management System is designed to provide clients,

partners and staff of the Bank with the latest information in the following areas: access and
equity in basic education; effective schools and teachers; education and technology;
economics of education; early childhood development; education system reform and
management; and post basic education and training.

Research.

Recent or forthcoming research reports include:

· Impact Evaluation of Education Projects: Decentralization and Privatization Issues
· Improving Primary Education in Kenya: A Randomized Evaluation of Different Policy
Options;
· Child Labor and Schooling in Latin America;
· When Learning Makes Reform More Productive: An Agenda for Analysis;
· El Salvador’s School-Based Management Reforms;
· Improving the Quality of Preschool Education in Kenya;
· Evaluating the Impact of Supplementary Teachers in Non-formal Education Centers;
· The Impact of Colombia’s Voucher Program: Using Randomization through a Lottery for
Program Evaluation
· Economic Analysis in Education Projects

21
Sun Microsystems, URLabs, AMP, Cisco Systems, Advanced Network Services, Intel, Apple, Lucent
Technologies, Security Storage, Microsoft and 3com.

15
D. Monitoring and Evaluation.

As of fiscal year 1995, mid-term reviews were conducted for only 12% of the World Bank’s
education loans. As noted above, the Bank’s 1997 Annual Report on Development
Effectiveness states that the Bank’s current systems for evaluating the education sector are
inadequate.

The Bank’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system has been plagued with difficulties.
Borrowers sometimes resist using project resources to collect data required for M&E.
Moreover, until the 1990s, M&E was seldom performed by client country constituencies,
which have the most intimate knowledge of the accomplishments of an operation.

In 1992, the Bank’s Portfolio Management Task Force was disparaging of Bank M&E. A
1994 OED study found that Bank managers did not satisfactorily supervise projects or report
on their outcomes at completion. The study also found that tracking project indicators did not
measurably contribute to project outcomes.

Historically, M&E has measured Bank inputs rather than outputs, or results (e.g. schools built
rather than children educated). Since 1992, the Bank has concentrated on building results-
based methodologies of M&E. By 2002, the Bank was focusing on measuring results-based
indicators and seriously neglecting medium-term indicators. Hence, the Bank and its
borrowers are learning more about outcomes without understanding what caused them.

Quality of adjustment lending. The Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED)

provides misleading assessments of the performance of adjustment programs. There are
three types of adjustment performance indicators: policy, intermediate, and outcome
indicators. Policy indicators reflect whether the government has complied with policy
conditions. Outcome indicators monitor progress toward growth and poverty reduction goals.
Intermediate indicators reflect progress toward desired outcomes.

The OED relies heavily on policy indicators in claiming that 86% of FY99-00 structural
adjustment loans and 90% of sector adjustment loans performed satisfactorily. [Sectoral
adjustment loans (SECALS) constitute roughly a third of all adjustment lending by volume.]
At the same time, OED finds that just 76% of adjustment loans during these fiscal years were
likely to sustain benefits over time. For Africa about half of its sector adjustment loans and
43% of its structural adjustment loans were expected to sustain benefits.

A closer look at adjustment programs gives a gloomier view of their performance. For
instance, the Bank found that only 45% of FY98-00 adjustment operations addressed poverty
issues adequately. Less than 20% of a sample of adjustment loans linked adjustment
policies with efforts to reduce poverty; 22% of these loans made provisions for monitoring
poverty and social indicators.

Another evaluation of adjustment loans found that:

16
 The majority of [adjustment] loans do not address poverty directly, the likely economic
impact of proposed operations on the poor, or ways to mitigate negative effects of
reform. Even where traditional subsidy and budgeting procedures are to be
dismantled, the assumption is that poverty alleviation is to be achieved through
improvements in macroeconomic stability and in improvements in public
administration, targeting, efficiency, etc...Direct efforts to address short-term impact on
the poorest are rarely considered.22

Quality of Project investment loans. The Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED)
has generally measured project success relative to three criteria: achievement of objectives,
sustainability and institutional development.

Achievement of Objectives. The Bank’s Operational Evaluation Department (OED) found

that for a cohort of projects completed in the 1973 to 1993 timeframe, over 82% achieved
their stated objectives, such as manpower development, skills training, access to and quality
of education, and institutional development.

Sustainability. An evaluation of 111 education projects the Bank since 1989, 62% were
judged as likely to sustain their gains. Disaggregated by region, we see that sustainability is
exceptionally low in African countries (56%) and Latin American and Caribbean countries
(50%), but higher in East Asian countries (85%).

Evaluation data show that project success is inversely correlated with the number of years
the Bank has been involved in the education sector. (The longer the Bank is involved in the
education sector, the less chance of project success.)

The Bank is increasingly providing support for education, health, water, and other basic
services through Social Funds (SFs), which operate in parallel to activities of borrowing
governments. Social fund projects allow local stakeholders to determine investment
decisions through subproject proposals which they, themselves, prepare. In 2001-2002, the
Bank is evaluating the relevance, efficiency, sustainability, and institutional development
impacts of Social Funds. This evaluation trivializes the extent to which Social Funds subvert
the authority and effectiveness of governments, since the SF operations are usually carried
out in parallel with federal and state programs…almost like another line ministry. In order to
make a sustainable, lasting contribution to social well-being, SF activities will need to be
integrated with mainstream social programs offered at the federal, state and local levels.

22
“Social and Environmental Aspects: A Desk Review of SECALS and SALs Approved During FY1998 and
FY1999,” Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (ESSD) Network, World Bank.

17
II. World Bank Recipes for Educational Reform

A. Overview

The level of Bank support for education generally varies depending on a borrowing
government’s willingness to undertake reforms recommended by the Bank. In principle, this
makes sense. As a lender with fiduciary responsibility, the Bank has a right to ensure that
borrowers do not waste or misuse resources. However, the Bank’s recipes for reform are
often standardized and simplistic: privatize, decentralize, recover costs, and transfer
resources from higher to primary education. Since these recipes are viewed as “goods,” then
it is often assumed that there is a linear relationship between the recipe and the outcome
(e.g. if some decentralization is good, then more must be better).

In and of themselves, these recipes are neither good nor bad. Their efficacy depends upon
the circumstances. In general, the analytical basis for Bank-proposed reforms was
developed in the industrial North. For instance, the rationale for the Bank’s 1990 primary
education policy draws largely on developed country experience as the basis for its policy
recommendations. There is a conspicuous lack of research and analysis of the impact of
reforms based upon information and experience in developing countries.

Still, the application of simple, standardized recipes has revolutionized the Bank’s education
portfolio.23

Impacts of the Bank’s formulaic approach to fiscal adjustment and education reform resulted
in the widespread imposition of user fees which, in turn, deprived generations of poor children
of an education. As many studies demonstrate, charges for basic services impose a tax on
human development.24

In October 2000, the U.S. government enacted a law requiring U.S. representatives to
international financial institutions to oppose any loan operation that would impose user fees
for primary education and basic health care. Subsequently, the Bank beat a fast retreat from
its past policies of encouraging and even requiring user fees.

As of September 2001, the Bank’s policy on user fees is ambiguous. Although the Bank
states principled opposition to user fees for primary education, it often assumes that states
will continue to impose such fees. Hence, the Bank sees a role for itself in carefully
designing user fee policies so that poor people will not be hurt.

23
According to Jones, a comparison of loans approved in 1990 with loans approved in 1980 shows that: the
percentage of projects with increased privatization and cost-sharing rose from 33% to 100%; projects aimed at
reducing recurrent costs rose from 33% to 78%; and projects to expand secondary and tertiary education
declined from 50% to 11%. In 1990, 70% of projects called for increases in primary schooling; 67% of projects
reduced subsidies for secondary and tertiary students; 56% raised tuition fees; 67% enlisted communities in
school construction and 56% contained covenants encouraging governments to support private education.
(Jones 177-178)
24
Oxfam International, “Education Charges: A Tax on Human Development,” November 12, 2001.

18
There is broad agreement among communities of educators and economists about the
importance of certain economic and social values. While many policy-makers agree on
educational values, such as quality and equity, differences arise when such values are
consistently subordinated to economic values. In addressing the qualifications of teachers,
UNESCO’s 1998 World Education Report cites the International Labor Organization’s 1996
report, Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Employment and Training of Teachers:

..No other aspect of structural adjustment programmes [than teacher compensation]

has demonstrated so clearly the increasing tendency of national development policies
to subject education to the same cost-cutting logic of market forces that is applied to
the overall system of production: if qualified people are willing to teach for less pay
than the standard rates, then why not hire them? (p. 36)

UNESCO claims that the same logic is often applied to the issue of classroom size. That is,
in seeking economic efficiency one can continue decreasing the teacher/pupil ratio, much as
a factory manager would attempt to increase output while cutting costs.

Cost containment is an important value when considered in tandem with the requisites of a
quality education. Too often, the focus on efficiency eclipses educational needs.25

Since staff with advanced degrees in education are in such short supply in the Bank, staff
deployed to the Bank’s education unit, often look for simple, standardized solutions.

Especially for weaker borrowers, the provision of simple, standard answers to complex needs
can be unhelpful. This is worrisome because governments must be able to monitor and
evaluate the policies and practices of a burgeoning number of actors in the education sector.
If such actors lack accountability to governments, the government will be unable to facilitate
achievement of education goals, such as universal primary education. If institutions in
borrower countries are challenged to design solutions to their unique circumstances, their
capacity grows.

It is possible that, if the Bank’s analysis had greater depth, the Departments of Education
would seek out Bank experts in Western countries. However, the Bank does not receive
contracts from countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).

25
Measures of internal efficiency may relate to (1) Staff efficiency: Student-teacher ratio, multi-grade teaching,
multiple shifts, lengthened school week and school year. In general, the Bank emphasizes the benefits of a
lower teacher to student ratio (fewer teachers per class) and shifting expenses from salaries to training and
educational materials. (PSE, 59); (2) Reducing repetition and drop-out rates. (3) Efficiency of Facility Use:
Percentage of time (day/week/month/year) facilities are occupied and (4) Construction costs: simplify designs,
use appropriate materials and community labor while upholding safety and building standards. In contrast,
external efficiency focuses on how education translates into jobs, promotes productivity gains, reduces poverty
and increases social mobility.

19
B. Recipes

As noted above, the Bank has five major policy prescriptions for the educational challenges
of borrowing countries:
· Privatize;
· Recover costs through user fees;
· Implement demand-side financing; and
· Decentralize
· Transfer subsidies from higher education to basic education.

The Bank packages such products in adjustment or project loans. Here are two typical Bank
policy packages:

Package #1: Increase the private costs of higher education; reduce public financing of
vocational education; finance loans for low-income students; and transfer public resources
from higher education to basic education.

Package #2: To improve resource utilization, the borrowing government should: decentralize
by establishing school-based management; offer families a choice of schools; involve the
private sector in financing and service delivery; increase class size; provide incentives for
teacher achievement; and monitor educational outcomes and achievement.

Each policy prescription is defined and described as follows:

1. Privatize

Definition:
To some, privatization connotes transfer of ownership of education facilities from government
to private or non-governmental entities. Here, the term is intended to encompass ALL
aspects of private sector and non-governmental involvement in education. Privatization can
involve the transfer from public to private hands of:

· Ownership of education facilities and other assets,

· Financing,
· Management, and
· Delivery of education services.

Some estimate that private investment accounts for a third of education spending globally
while public investment accounts for two-thirds of spending. In fact, there are insufficient
data to know this with any degree of certainty.

World Bank Group strategies. The World Bank Group [including the private sector affiliate,
the International Finance Corporation (IFC)26] emphasizes three options for public-private
collaboration in education:

26
The IFC committed to seven education projects in FY98, 5 of which are located in West Africa.

20
· Private schools subsidized by public money,
· Public schools which are privately managed, and
· Parental choice, which often involves providing parents with vouchers which permit them
to choose their children’s schools.

The share of private sector investment. The proportion of total spending from private
sources ranges widely: Haiti: 80%; Hungary: 6.9%; India: 11%; Kenya 38%; Uganda: 57%;
Venezuela 27%. However, 90% of primary school students are enrolled in public education
systems. (Priorities & Strategies, p. 53-55).

Some governments, such as India’s, have systems for supplanting private financing with
public financing. In India’s Maharashtra State, the government will absorb costs of funding
schools after they have scored high on key capacity building areas.

Boosting privatization of education through output-based aid schemes. Increasingly,

education systems will be administered through output-based aid (OBA) schemes, in which the
government delegates service provision to private (or non-profit) providers and compensates
providers only after services are delivered (e.g., after students pass standardized tests).

Output-based aid focuses on achieving measurable “results.” In education systems in the U.S.
and elsewhere, student achievement, as measured by success on standardized tests, is
considered an “output” or a “result.” But in the U.S., student achievement has not been
improved after almost a decade of obsessive focus on standardized testing. Even when school
districts use performance contracting to hire and pay private firms to produce a single output
(e.g., higher test scores), firms do no better than public schools. Hence, the growing, large-
scale resistance to the emphasis on standardized testing by parents and educators. What is
surprising at first is that outputs — massive levels of standardized testing — have not redirected
funding within education systems in any significant way. The sector has been beset with
confusion about what criteria to use in order to award funding increases to high-performing or
low-performing schools.

The chances of poor people receiving services through output-based schemes are poor for a
host of reasons, including:

· The difficulty of targeting subsidies and “leakage,” or capture, of subsidies by well-to-

do groups. For instance, the bureaucratic apparatus needed to conduct means testing in
order to target subsidies and exemptions has, in some cases, been shown to cost more than
subsidies, themselves.
· The incentives for private providers to pocket subsidies or inflate losses, (e.g., provide
low quality or no service).
· The lack of regulatory mechanisms, which can oversee and enforce OBA contracts and
ensure that services are delivered in acceptable ways.
· The lack of judicial mechanisms that permit poor users to appeal or seek recourse when a
contractor fails to deliver services in the specified manner. It is unrealistic for the PSD

21
 Strategy to assume that an arms-length relationship will exist between borrowing
governments and service providers
· The fiscal liabilities assumed by the public sector when OBA schemes fail.
· Resistance to foreign service providers. Increasingly, contractors in output-based aid
schemes will be international or foreign service providers, which will exacerbate cultural
conflicts, access, affordability and accountability problems. Usually, domestic service
providers will lack the “deep pockets” for up-front financing for health, education or water
services, as required by OBA schemes.

Social Funds. One way of devolving government responsibility for education is the Social
Fund (SF). As noted earlier, SFs channel monies to local communities for small-scale
projects to reduce poverty by, among other things, delivering social services and creating
jobs. SFs were originally designed to accompany adjustment programs in Latin America.
Because the SFs bypass government bureaucracies, they sometimes offer speedy services.
However, SF programs fail to coordinate their activities with those of government ministries.
They can also cater to special interests.

SFs have become widespread. The Bank has helped to establish Social Funds in 22
countries, including Bolivia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Honduras, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia.
Funds generally pool resources from multiple donors and creditors.

Examples:

Chile. Beginning in 1980, the government provided incentives for private schools to compete
with public schools by providing vouchers for both. The percentage of subsidized private
primary school enrollment has doubled and stands at a third (33%).

Colombia. British Petroleum, in partnership with the government and in association with a
World Bank-financed project, is setting up pilot projects in municipalities to establish
integrated family care centers. British Petroleum is involved in large-scale oil exploitation in
various parts of Colombia. Colombia has also initiated a Bank-supported program to provide
vouchers (financed by the central and municipal governments) which students can use to
attend private schools.

Pros:
· Like private education, public education is often biased against the poor. In the case of
public or private provision, access to education for disadvantaged groups can require
subsidies.

· Unlike public systems that can run deficits, private systems must exercise financial
discipline and still remain competitive.

· Teachers’ unions can sometimes protect the employment and wage interests of public
teachers at the expense of other interests (e.g. recurrent expenses, such as materials and
training).

22
· In some countries, the public sector provision of education is highly inefficient and poor in
quality. These deficiencies reduce demand for education.

Cons:
· The responsibility of federal, state and municipal governments for oversight and
supervision of the education sector can diminish when education functions are transferred
to the private sector. Output-based aid schemes and SFs often circumvent and undercut
the government. In turn, this can undercut achievement of education goals, such as
universal primary education. Jones states that:

…Fewer and fewer Bank loans by the end of the 1980s were free of the obligations
imposed by loan conditionality to promote the privatization of education through the
building up of systems of private institutions and the expansion of user charges in the
public sector. Bank-promoted subsidization of private schools increased, to questionable
levels when it was in clear danger of jeopardizing public commitments to educational
quality, in both public and private institutions. (249)

· In theory, private school systems can foster greater financial accountability. However,
where private schools are subsidized with public money, financial discipline can be
compromised. Thus, World Bank support for private school subsidies has been
controversial.

· Private sector actors, which the Bank’s affiliate, the International Finance Corporation,
calls “edupreneurs,” and non-governmental organizations are not always properly
equipped to provide high-quality formal educational services on a large-scale with
financial accountability. Their niche is usually in small-scale innovation.

· Private school systems can increase social stratification and rural/urban divisions.
Children of low-income and racial or ethnic minority families are often “ghettoized” in
public school systems that under-perform their private sector counterparts.

· Sometimes poorly functioning systems, which are intended to subsidize the direct or
indirect fees for private (or public) education via vouchers or other means, impede access
to education.27

· Private teachers are usually not able to protect their interests through collective
bargaining.

· To succeed, Social Funds require: strong project selection criteria; effective monitoring
and supervision; and integration with government-provided services. Currently, they
constitute a parallel delivery system. SF innovations, principles and technologies should
be mainstreamed into public sector programs. SFs should also address the capacity
building needs of local organizations. (Bigio, 6)

27
See description of problems with school fee exemptions in Lennock, Jean, Paying for Health: Poverty and
Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe, Oxfam Publications, 1994, p. 33.

23
2. Recover Costs

Definition: The term “cost recovery” refers to: (1) The cost of constructing educational
buildings and facilities. It is now common practice for such communities to absorb the cost of
constructing school facilities. In fact, this is the main kind of cost recovery at the primary
education level still officially sanctioned or advocated by the World Bank. The contributions of
foreign aid to the capital costs of construction are widely criticized. Aid is blamed for
excessive costs for facilities that are often inappropriate to the needs of communities. (2)
Textbook fees and the topping off of teachers’ salaries are commonplace. Formal tuition fees
are uncommon at the primary school level. (3) The less visible costs to families involve: the
costs of travel to and lodging in proximity to schools and the costs of food and uniforms, or
clothing. (4) There are also opportunity costs – namely work which children cannot perform
at home when they are at school. In general, girls contribute more significantly to work
around the home than do boys. There is also the cash income foregone by children obtaining
an education rather than working for pay. It is significant to note that families need to make
trade-offs with respect to the education of their children. Increasingly, secondary schools
impose more significant fees on families than do primary schools. Consequently, parents
who decide to pay the bill for one or more secondary school students may find the direct or
indirect costs of educating a primary school student less affordable.

Examples:

Nicaragua. In the Bank-financed project which decentralized school management (see

below, “decentralization”), parents equated decentralization, or participation, with the
imposition of fees (cuotas) on impoverished rural families. The system became highly
controversial and altered social relations inside the school (Fuller & Rivarola). Parents said:
“It is like the institution is privatizing itself. They now say education is no longer free. You
have to pay for everything.”

Oxfam International provides additional examples of how education charges constitute a tax
on human development in Tanzania, Zambia, and Ghana.28

Pros:
· In theory, cost-recovery schemes can waive fees for primary school and low-income
children.
· In theory, recovery of costs can help ensure efficient and effective spending.

Cons:
· In practice, waiver and exemption systems often fail. Thus, for low-income families, fees
can be a barrier to school enrollment and completion.

· Using both cost-recovery and demand-side financing mechanisms may be inefficient

when a majority of the students in the locale or country are poor.

28
Oxfam International, “Education Charges: A Tax on Human Development,” November 12, 2001.

24
· Many countries have limited capacity to administer cost-recovery and demand-side
financing mechanisms.

3. Implement Demand-Side Analysis and Financing

Description of the Issue: In the 1990s, Bank-financed projects still emphasize the supply-
side of education – provision of buildings, materials and technology. However, increasingly,
the Bank is conducting demand-side analysis (e.g. beneficiary or social assessment) to
identify problems that impede school attendance of girls, low-income students and other
marginalized or disadvantaged groups.

With the benefit of such analysis, education loans can be designed in ways that increase
school attendance. For instance, in Turkey, a number of measures were taken to induce
girls to attend school, including:
· Construction, extension and rehabilitation of facilities especially those that can induce
attendance of girls (e.g. secure boundary walls, lavatories and female teacher housing).
· Provision of secure transportation to and from schools in areas where school closings
have led to consolidation.
· Introduction of flexible school schedules, childcare policies allowing siblings to accompany
students, and provision of double shifts that make it easier for parents to forego girls’ help
at home.
· Incentives to increase the number of female teachers in rural areas through provision of
scholarships, housing and hardship pay.

The Bank has also undertaken strategies to compensate families for the cost of their
children’s education. Such strategies may involve: stipends (cash payments); community
financing (through monetary or non-monetary contributions); targeted bursaries (cash
payments that go directly to schools, municipalities or provinces); vouchers (usually publicly
financed cash payments); and scholarships.

In 1995, school drop-out rates in Brasilia were dramatically reduced when, Governor Buarque
established an innovative scholarship program. The program provided a stipend (or bolsa)
equivalent to a minimum wage ($128 per month per family regardless of the size of the family
or the number of children in the family) to every low-income family with children aged 7-14.
Eligible families were in the lowest quintile of the income distribution (with an income level
less than $50 per month per family member) and employed or searching for employment. A
school savings program provided a deposit of approximately $90 into a savings account for
each child of a participating family who successfully completed a school year.

Enrollment statistics often mask demand-side problems. During the late 1980s, enrollments
were declining for poor populations in Cote d’Ivoire despite the fact that net enrollments and
education expenditures were increasing. In other words, increases in enrollments of non-
poor children exceeded the decline among enrollments of poor children. The gap in
enrollment and in educational progress widened between the non-poor and the poor,

25
between urban and rural areas and between various socio-economic groups. (Grootaert,
131)

In order to achieve universal primary education, it is essential to boost the DEMAND by poor
families for education by protecting and increasing incomes while, at the same time, boosting
the SUPPLY of education services to disadvantaged regions and groups.

Even after the significant declines in primary enrollments in the 1980s, the Bank is hesitant
about embracing demand-side solutions. A recent Bank publication, School Enrollment
Decline in Sub-Saharan Africa: Beyond the Supply Constraint, notes that between 1981 and
1991, primary enrollment declined in at least 14 of 27 African countries surveyed. It
concludes that declining incomes and employment opportunities MAY impact household
decisions and, therefore, the Bank should not assume inelastic demand for education.29 It is
puzzling that the Bank is so TENTATIVE about this conclusion given the evidence about how
declining income and employment opportunities influence the decisions, including education
decisions, of poor families.

Demand-side solutions might include ensuring that: IMF and World Bank adjustment policies
do not jeopardize livelihoods and diminish incomes; user fees are eliminated; and indirect
costs of schooling are covered by stipends and scholarships.

Until recently, the Bank only considered strategies to offset the indirect costs of schooling.
To that end, it analyzed the effectiveness of funding student subsidy schemes to increase
enrollment among the rural poor in several countries, including: Bangladesh, Brazil, Pakistan
and Tanzania.

Examples: The World Bank has instituted a variety of demand-side financing schemes in:
Bangladesh (stipends for girls); Chad (Community financing); China (targeted bursary for
poor and minority children and free textbooks), Colombia (targeted bursary, voucher system);
Jamaica (student loans); Mexico (targeted bursary for poor and indigenous populations);
Pakistan (subsidies to private schools servicing low-income, rural girl students.

Pros:
· Demand-side financing can reduce or eliminate family costs for schooling and raise
enrollment rates.
· Where targeting of low-income children and/or girls is effective, demand-side financing
can enhance equity.

Cons:
· The costs of applying for a waiver may be prohibitive. In Zimbabwe, families were
required to travel long distances to apply for exemptions to fees. Furthermore, there were
often long time lags (6-9 months) in benefit payments. (Watkins, WIDER, 1997)

29
See Bredie, J.W.B. and Beeharry, G.K., School Enrollment Decline in Sub-Saharan Africa: Beyond the Supply
Constraint, World Bank Discussion Paper #395, 1998.

26
· Financing may only compensate a family for partial costs of schooling. Indirect costs of
schools (e.g. transportation, clothing, foregone income) may be prohibitive.
· Stipends may be misused or siphoned off.
· A social stigma may be attached to children in the populations targeted for assistance.
· Systems may be difficult to administer.

4. Decentralize

Definition: Decentralization entails devolving the responsibility and/or the operations of the
educational system from the federal government to subsidiary levels of government, such as
states and municipalities.

In some countries and regions, such as Latin America, centralized control over school
funding, curricula and personnel issues is seen as a remnant of colonialism.

Examples:
El Salvador: The EDUCO (Educacion con Participacion de la Comunidad) decentralizes
education by strengthening direct involvement and participation of parents and community
groups. It was conceived as a way to expand access to education for children in remote rural
areas. The program has had discouraging educational outcomes. (Jimenez, Sawada)
However, it did lead to higher teacher attendance rates. (See “Impact Evaluation of
Education Projects: Decentralization and Privatization Issues” in The World Bank Research
Program, 1998.)

In the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, decentralization shifted responsibility for decision-
making from the state capital to school boards headed by an elected principal and composed
of equal numbers of parent representatives and school staff. Educational standards have
improved and drop out and repetition rates have dramatically declined. (See UNICEF State
of the World’s Children Report, 1998.)

Nicaragua decentralized management and budget decisions to local school councils

(consejos directivos). The theory was that greater responsibility on the part of parents,
teachers and school administrators would result in greater accountability, which would raise
school achievement. Data also show that passing authority to the schools, which were unable
to squeeze sufficient fees from poor families, created conflict. Many parents resented the
imposition of fees (cuotas). In addition, there was insufficient parental participation,
confusion over who actually had the power to hire and fire teachers, poorly functioning
teacher incentive systems, and insufficient responsibility on the part of directors for improving
pedagogical methods or monitoring school repetition and drop-out rates or achievement.
When asked what decentralization meant to them, parents said:

* “We are responsible for higher cuotas [to pay] for electricity, the water, the phone…this
is what autonomy means to me.”

27
* “Now the Government is no longer sending the amount of resources the institution
needs…now the burden is on our shoulders.”

* Teachers said, “During the [decentralization] workshop we were told that we should
ask parents for a cuota of 5 cordobas, but we should say it is voluntary.” (Fuller & Rivarola,
1998)

Pros: Decentralized governments are expected to be:

· more efficient in responding to demands for the delivery of services,
· more flexible in adapting to changing local circumstances, and
· more accountable to the local population than are centralized governments.

The Bank’s Vice President and Chief Economist for the Latin America and Caribbean region
summarize the pros of decentralization this way:

Because local governments are better than national governments at recognizing the
needs and preferences of local residents, and because local governments are at least
as efficient as national governments at delivering public goods that benefit only local
residents, it will be more efficient to have local governments provide the optimal level
of public goods in each local jurisdiction. Local governments can be expected to be
more efficient than national governments because local residents may find it easier to
hold accountable local, as opposed to national, officials. (Shahid Javed Burki and
Guillermo Perry, the Vice President and Chief Economist of the Bank’s Latin
America/Caribbean Department, The Long March, p. 81)

Cons:
· The federal government’s responsibility for oversight and supervision can diminish when
functions are devolved to lower levels of government.

· Many localities lack the capacity or the resources to implement decentralized education
programs. In addition, many localities become overloaded as the federal or state
government devolves an increasing number of responsibilities.

· Decentralization cannot increase equity unless state and local governments are equitable
and transparent and possess adequate resources for expanding access to schools,
especially by children from low-income families and from ethnic and racial minorities.
Inter-American Development Bank literature acknowledges the need for such
preconditions.30

30
IDB, Latin America After a Decade of Reforms says that various circumstances that must converge in order
for decentralization to serve the people, including: (1) local officials are elected, the democratic process works
well enough to provide sufficient electoral discipline; and decisions are more visible and accountable; (2) local
governments have institutional capacity to handle their expanded responsibilities; (3) the decentralization
arrangements between different levels of government are clearly specified; and (4) there is a correspondence
between the costs and benefits of government programs. ( p. 156)

28
· In Nicaragua, decentralization was viewed as an attempt to undermine teacher rights,
wages and job security.

· It is difficult to monitor and evaluate decentralization efforts.

5. Transfer subsidies from Secondary and Higher Education to Basic Education.

The Bank places a higher priority on allocating budget resources to primary education than to
tertiary education.

Primary education can contribute to benefits at many levels: individual, family, community
and society. As described in the Bank’s 1980 World Development Report, primary education
can increase human potential and social cohesion while improving health, reducing fertility,
and boosting income generation potential.

Policy-making should emphasize basic education. In developing countries as a whole, 71%

of school age children share just 22% of public resources for education; 6% in higher
education use 39% of public resources. (PSE, 63)

The cost of primary education is low relative to tertiary education. In Tanzania, the cost of
sending one student to university is equivalent to the cost of sending 238 students through
primary education. While that statistic is telling, it is also true that a university student may
help govern the nation or become a private sector entrepreneur in the near term.

European and North American countries provided heavy subsidies for higher education,
although they also guaranteed universal education at an early date.

The world’s job market is quickly bifurcating – dividing workers into skilled and unskilled
categories. In order to compete in a global market place, developing countries must build
upon a strong primary school foundation by expanding enrollments in secondary, vocational
and higher education.

Methodologies for calculating rates of return to different levels of education are fraught with
problems. They involve dividing the benefits of education (measured in projected annual
income of a student) by the lump-sum cost of her education (tuition, expenses and foregone
earnings during school years). These “private” rate of return calculations have limited
application, e.g. setting tuition or scholarship policies. However, the methodologies are still
too primitive to use in policy making. Important factors still defy calculation, such as: variable
student abilities, variable quality of instruction, and in-kind earning potential.

“Social” rates of return attempt to measure the benefits of education to society at large.
World Bank calculations show that social rates of return are high in the primary years and
decline thereafter (PSE, Psacharopoulos, 22). These methodologies are also rife with
problems.

29
The World Bank’s researchers have studied the question of how education contributes to
growth and found that the greatest needs for expanded education at a given level varies from
country to country. (Lopez, R., Thomas, V., and Wang, Y., “Solving the Education Puzzle:
Economic Reforms and Distribution of Education,” 1998)

But, the Bank’s operations are a different story. In its operations, the Bank generally stresses
that borrowers must shift budget expenditures from higher education to basic education. At
the same time, the Bank exerts pressure on governments to institute significant user fees at
noncompulsory levels of education. Citizens in many countries feel that Bank is contributing
to a gutting of secondary and tertiary education systems. Many citizens would prefer that
their governments shift resources from other sectors (e.g. military) into primary education
sector rather than slashing spending for secondary and tertiary education.31 Many citizens
feel that the Bank oversteps its authority when it attempts to veto a domestic consensus in
favor of significant support for higher education? Even the Bank’s Board of Executive
Directors (e.g. the 1995 sector review discussion) has expressed opposition to the strong
emphasis on transferring subsidies from higher to basic education.

In a study commissioned by the Bank32, African advisors recommended that:

The Bank needs to review its policies of not making loans available for higher education.
Although higher education in Africa is expensive and not very effective, this should be an
argument in favor or reform rather than a reason for neglect. Indeed, the Bank should
investigate mechanisms for channeling resources to higher education to ensure at least the
existence of a limited network of good universities in the region. Ways should be found to
allocate resources to universities on a competitive basis. For instance, resources could be
allocated according to proposals submitted by the universities aimed at improving
performance. Preference could be shown for imaginative programs that enhance a
university’s prospects. In addition, bursaries could be provided for students to use at the
universities of their choice. The bursaries could function much like a voucher system, with
universities competing for the fee-paying students.

Social scientists and economists could try to forge methods that do not understate the real
cost of education (which is highly subsidized in most countries) and understate the benefits of
education. However, attempts to put a price on “externalities,” such as the contribution of
education to social cohesion, good citizenship, well-functioning institutions or individual
fulfillment may prove as illusive as valuing the beauty of a pristine forest instead of its value
as timber. Likewise, the types and costs of dysfunction, which arise from the lack of
education (e.g. famine, social breakdown, and war), are incalculable.

31
One Brazilian member of Congress assailed the Bank’s “short blanket” philosophy of education financing –
namely that the “blanket” can cover the head (higher education) or the feet (primary education) but not both.
32
Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa: A Report of the Working Party on the Impact of Bank Policies,
Instruments and Operational Practices on Capacity Building in Africa, October 1996, p. xiv.

30
III: IMF and World Bank Approaches to Structural Adjustment

A. Overview

The Bank has worked in the education sector since 1962. For the first eighteen years (1962-
1980), the Bank’s goal was to support construction and equipment for technical, vocational,
and secondary education in order to meet manpower needs.33 There were major
performance problems in the portfolio.34

1980 was a pivotal year. From 1980 onward, Bank-financed education operations were often
undertaken in the context of structural adjustment programs (SAPs). The conditions attached
to adjustment loans require governments to take actions intended to help achieve fiscal
equilibrium and macroeconomic stability and stimulate growth. SAPs aim at such outcomes
by restricting domestic demand and expanding production of exports. Typical SAP measures
include: downsizing or decentralizing government, devaluing the currency, removing import
barriers, providing incentives to exporters, reforming the tax or legal system and revising
labor codes.

SAPs have not generally improved economic performance. In fact, in most of the developing
world (with a few exceptions, notably China) per capita income growth in the period 1980 –
1997 (after SAPs were introduced) is much lower than per capita income growth in the 1960-
1980 period (before SAPs were introduced). From 1960 to 1980, there were increases in
primary and secondary school enrollment in nearly every country. But declines in school
enrollments began in about 1980 and grew during the decade.

SAPs exacerbated the gap in per capita income (GNP) between the countries with the richest
fifth of the world's people and those with the poorest fifth. This gap widened from 30 to 1 in
1960, to 60 to 1 in 1990, to 74 to 1 in 1995.35 There is also a disturbing pattern of widening
income inequality within countries, which among other things, spawns political and social
unrest.

Critics contend that SAPs frequently cause substantial short-term pain and hardship for poor
and vulnerable groups offset only by a promise of long-term gains that may or may not
materialize. In other words, adjustment may not always produce economic growth and, if it
does, the benefits do not always “trickle down” to poor people. In fact, many NGOs contend
that vulnerable groups, such as poor people and women, are often disproportionately hurt by
adjustment and receive no tangible benefits. Even when the costs of adjustment are widely

33
There were major problems with operations. Thus, the Bank’s first education policy paper was issued in
1971, directing that analysis of the education sector should precede investment lending. The purpose of
education lending was also expanded to include software, curriculum development, and administrative and
management support.
34
Regarding capital investment in diversified secondary schools, Haddad reported that “Completed buildings
were considered inadequate in quality and educational relevance in 40% of the projects…Similarly, almost all
projects faced problems in the acquisition of equipment….There were also major problems in the provision and
utilization of laboratories and workshops…” (Jones, 253)
35
www.challengeglobalization.org/indx.shtml

31
shared, SAPs may bring disappointment to upper-income groups, but hunger and higher
rates of mortality to low-income groups.

Incomes, especially those of low-income populations, are vulnerable due to a variety of

dynamics: competitive pressures can bid down wages; union bargaining power can diminish;
budget cuts often retrench civil servants, cut subsidies for basic staples, cut pension and
social security benefits. Tight credit can reduce consumption and investment. Privatization
of services can raise costs.

The World Bank sometimes pressures a developing country governments to accept a pace
and/or sequence of adjustment measures that exposes local enterprises to international
competitive pressures in imprudent ways. While competition is a worthy value, it is important
that the structural advantages of transnational corporations are not systematically reinforced
at the expense of local enterprises.

State-owned enterprises have often been grossly inefficient, sometimes subsidized by taxes
on low-income agricultural producers. But privatization sometimes creates private
monopolies or competitive systems that do not service regions in which the majority of poor
populations are located. In addition, when user fees are imposed to recoup costs of primary
health care and basic education, there is evidence that some poor people can no longer
afford to pay for services.

As a result of SAPs, borrowing countries are increasingly dependent on export revenues to

balance their accounts. When Northern demand plummets, as has been the case in 2001-
2002, then developing countries suffer disproportionately as described by a 2002 report by
the UN Economic and Social Affairs Department:

For the developing countries and economies in transition, global linkages have
amplified the impact of the vicissitudes in world economic growth in the past few
years...Moreover, the impact has often been asymmetric, with most developing
countries tending to benefit less than the leading developed economies in the upturns,
but suffering equally, or more so, in the downturns.

In the late 1980s, when the World Bank and IMF acknowledged that, in some countries, the
negative social impact of SAPs was not only a short-term concern, but also a medium- and/or
long-term concern, safety nets or conditions protecting social spending were sometimes
attached to SAPs.

It is taking many years for the Bank to come to grips with the social impact of adjustment
because the institution is quite schizoid. Its identity as a bank is often at odds with its identity
as a development institution. One finds this reality reflected in the Bank’s internal operations.
The “right hand” of Bank economic reform appears to be poorly informed by the activities of

32
the “left hand” of social development and vice versa. In other words, the Bank is comprised
of “worlds within worlds” that often do not intersect.36

Like education sector reforms, SAPs are often administered in a top-down way. Many
borrowing country officials accuse the IMF and Bank of undermining government capacity by
their heavy-handed, single-minded style of operating:

it could be suggested that the low morale of the civil service in many African countries
was an unintended result of structural adjustment…Furthermore, the Bank only
considers it has achieved success in its SAPs when the loan conditions result in
policies that would not otherwise have occurred. This hinders the use and
development of local capacity and results in a paradoxical outcome: key decisions are
made by donors who, at the same time, emphasize the importance of policies being
locally “owned.”37

Methodologies for detecting the impact of SAPs on education are rife with problems. Below,
we identify flaws in the methodologies used by the Bank and the Fund. However, even with
results, which appear to be biased, the Bank identifies declining primary school enrollments
as a consequence of adjustment during the 1980s.38

One of the few educators to study the impact of adjustment on education, Fernando Reimers
of the Harvard Institute for International Development, compared adjusting and non-adjusting
countries during the 1980s and found that drops in net enrollment rates were twice as likely in
adjusting countries as in non-adjusting countries. (Reimers, 127)

Increasingly, the Bank attached conditions to SAPs stipulating that social sector budgets be
protected. However, many of these conditions were discretionary, not binding, as discussed
in the next section.

Box 2

Primary Education’s Share of Public Expenditures

Declines in Many Adjusting Countries in the 1980s*

1975 1980 1985 Recent Year

36
The history of the Bank’s Social Development Task Force reflects a sharp divide between the Bank’s
economists and non-economic social scientists (NESSies). Many of the conflicts between the two groups
revolved around the question of whether economic policies should be normative or non-normative.
37
Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa: A Report of the Working Party on the Impact of Bank Policies,
Instruments and Operational Practices on Capacity Building in Africa, October 1996, p. x.
38
The 1992 Poverty Reduction Handbook citing the World Bank PRE Working Paper #467, “Structural
Adjustment and Living Conditions in Developing Countries,” 1990.

33
Argentina 46.2 10.1

Bangladesh 46.1 46.8

Bolivia 64.0 64.0
Brazil 18.4 49.0

Chile 45.7 53.0 51.1

Colombia 43.6 38.0 39.2
Costa Rica 46.0 37.0 33.0 33.0
Cote d’Ivoire 41.0 42.2

Ghana 25.0 29.0 27.0

Jamaica 38.0 35.0

Kenya 58.0 56.3

Malawi 43.0 39.0 45.1 37.9

Morocco 37.0 34.0 34.0 34.0

Philippines 84.6 86.6 84.4 59.9

Senegal 46.0 44.0

So. Korea 62.0 50.0 47.0

Togo 38.1 31.0 38.5

Turkey 44.0 46.0

Uruguay 46.2 43.1 39.3 27.5

Zambia 45.0 45.0 44.0 41.0

*From Social Dimensions of Adjustment Operations, OED, World Bank, 1995, p. 107.

B. How the IMF and World Bank Promote Economic Fundamentalism

The IMF and World Bank promote economic fundamentalism through modulating access by
borrowing governments to external assistance. As described below, borrowing governments
– especially highly indebted governments -- must be in the good graces of the institutions in
order to meet their financial obligations.

1. The IMF’s Seal of Approval. The IMF is head of a creditor “cartel” and, in this capacity, it
judges the policy performance of borrowing governments. Those governments that obey IMF
dictates usually obtain its “seal of approval.” If a government loses its “seal of approval,” it

34
risks loses access to all external assistance since most other creditors and donors follow the
lead of the IMF. Debt relief has been suspended for many countries participating in the
Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative (Nicaragua, Benin, Mali, Chad and Nigeria)
because, among other things, they failed to expedite privatization processes.

By providing or withholding the “seal,” the IMF modulates a government’s access to official
development assistance and private capital flows. Bilateral donor governments, which
provide 75% of official development assistance, rely heavily on the IMF’s signals.

The IMF “signaling,” or “gatekeeping,” function gives the institution inordinate and
inappropriate levels of power in the international financial system. A more diversified
signaling process, which draws upon the perspectives of several international actors, would
better serve the interests of developing country governments and the stability and equity of
the international system as a whole.

2. Binding Policy Conditions Attached to SAPs.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, social conditions were rarely attached to SAPs. In fact, from
1980 to 1993, only 50 of the 3,040 World Bank conditions attached to SAPs were related to
the social sectors. Only eight of these conditions called explicitly for increased allocations to
primary education and health care, or improvement of the wage/non-wage balance in the
social sectors.

In the 1990s, conditions, which would protect social sector spending, are frequently attached
to SAPs, but according to Bank analysts, such conditions are usually non-binding.39 At the
same time, SAPs often have binding conditions, which require cuts in the borrower’s
fiscal deficit. Hence, some borrowers may feel compelled to cut social sector spending in
order to comply with binding conditions.

The IMF and World Bank have a hierarchy of conditions. The binding conditions of IMF
SAPs are called “prior conditions” or “performance criteria;” non-binding conditions are called
“structural benchmarks.” Performance criteria often call for governments to achieve certain
macroeconomic and fiscal targets.

World Bank SAPs have two types of binding conditions: prior conditions and and tranche
release conditions. Prior, or up-front, conditions are imposed at the time of negotiation,
before appraisal, or before the release of the first tranche, or installment, of a loan. In the
1990s, up-front conditions were employed with increasing frequency. These conditions are
seldom documented. If a SAP has multiple tranches, governments must comply with
tranche release conditions in order to gain access to successive installments of the loan.

39
Adams and Hartnett, Cost Sharing in the Social Sectors of Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 18.

35
3. Mechanisms for Modulating Government Access to World Bank Credit.

Like any bank, the World Bank uses a “carrot” and “stick” approach with borrowers. Good
performance on the part of the borrowing government leads to greater access to credit. Poor
performance closes the money spigot. That is, the Bank modulates the access of borrowing
government to lending in ways that reward “good” performers and punish “poor” performers.

The Bank uses this approach when it prepares its business plan, or “Country Assistance
Strategy” (CAS), for each borrowing country. 40 The CAS, which describes the investments
which the Bank plans to make in the country over the medium-term, outlines three lending
scenarios (high case, base case and low case scenarios) for a 3 to 5 year timeframe. A
government in the low case scenario has relatively few loans. As a government
accomplishes “trigger” conditions, it is given access to more loans and a higher credit limit.

In the late 1990s, the most common triggers required borrowing governments to comply with
IMF performance criteria, achieve fiscal targets, and privatize enterprises. Only 15% of
triggers protected education and health spending.

Failure to accomplish triggers can diminish a government’s access to resources. For

instance, at one point, the World Bank permitted the Government of Brazil to borrow $4 billion
to $6 billion over three years. However, the Bank warned the Government that it could only
borrow $2 billion if its fiscal deficit exceeded 7.5% of GDP. In this case, control of the fiscal
deficit was a trigger condition.

In sum, the IMF and World Bank promote economic liberalization through the IMF’s seal of
approval, binding SAP conditions, and the Bank’s trigger conditions (often IMF conditions).
The Bank and Fund almost never analyze the social impact of these mechanisms.

These mechanisms are not promoted with equal vigor with all borrowing governments,
however. UNICEF’s State of the World’s Children Report (1998) cites Cote d’Ivoire’s
Economic and Finance Minister’s reaction to the outpouring of assistance in the aftermath of
the Asian financial crisis:

We have observed the speedy reaction to Asia and seen the huge sums of money
they have been able to come up with almost instantaneously, often bending the rules
pretty freely. When it comes to us, our negotiations can drag on for months while they
split hairs and act very finicky. One can easily get the impression of a double
standard.

40
This section discusses the medium term plans of the IMF, World Bank and IDB for their borrowers. It should
be noted that ALL creditors and donors have such plans. Some names of these plans are: The Country
Operational Strategy Study (COSS) of the Asian Development Bank; the Country Strategy Paper of the African
Development Bank; the Country Cooperation Framework of the U.N. Development Program.

36
As described below, the unequal treatment of borrowers has become more pronounced since
the IMF and World Bank launched the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) Initiative in 1999.

C. Critiques of Adjustment

1. Impacts on Social Sector Budgets.

SAPs attempt to cut budget deficits and modify the composition of budget expenditures.
Since education budgets can represent 10-40% of public sector outlays, SAPs usually
influence the size and nature of education budgets.

Sometimes, SAPs are successful in reallocating expenditures in ways that boost enrollments.
This is reportedly the case in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

As already noted, only 50 of the more than 3,000 conditions attached to SAPs in the 1980-
1993 timeframe were related to education and only six of the 50 conditions explicitly called for
the protection or increase of education expenditures.

The World Bank has documented impacts of SAPs on social expenditures during the years
1980-93. 41 However, there are problems with the Bank’s methodology. For instance, the
Bank worked with a sample of 53 countries for which growth data were available. But
household data were only available for a subset of 23 of the 53 countries. Small and poor
countries (primarily African) were significantly underrepresented in the subset. Hence, when
the Bank extrapolated the poverty and equity implications of adjustment based upon
household data, the results were skewed. Even skewing the results in this way, the Bank
found that:

· Per capita social spending fell in two-thirds of the countries and the composition of social
spending worsened.
· Total discretionary spending declined in 24 of 34 countries; social spending declined in 17
of 34 countries.
· mitigation of negative social impacts of adjustment had limited effectiveness due to the
reduction of social expenditures resulting from adjustment programs.42
· In many countries, expenditure cuts may have exacerbated the existing biases and
inefficiencies in public expenditure programs.

Some sectors (e.g. energy, transportation) have a large capital expenditure component for
infrastructure construction and modest levels of recurrent costs for on-going operations and
maintenance. But the education sector has high levels of recurrent costs because it is so
labor intensive. Teacher salaries make up a large share of the recurrent budget. Where
teachers’ unions exist, they work to protect teacher salaries, benefits and working conditions.
Consequently, as noted in the following World Bank finding, non-salary expenses (e.g.
textbooks, educational materials and technologies) are especially vulnerable.
41
Social Dimensions of Adjustment: The World Bank Experience 1980-1993, 1995.
42
Bullets are quotes from hand-outs provided by the Bank’s Social Development Department in October, 1998.

37
 …with a few exceptions, most countries have made little effort to shift resources into
primary education and basic health care services…nonwage recurrent spending for
supplies and maintenance has been severely underfunded. This problem which
consistently emerged from Bank country reports has worsened in most countries
during the adjustment era and all but crippled public social services in many
countries.43

The IMF compared social spending in countries with IMF programs to countries without IMF
programs in two time slices: the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. The IMF’s 1998 volume
entitled Fiscal Reforms in Low-Income Countries44 reports that, over the past decade, social
sector spending increased significantly in real terms and that, in countries with IMF-supported
programs, there are sharper increases in public spending on education and health than in
countries without IMF programs.

These are welcome findings. However, a thorough review of the IMF’s methodology reveals
three problems. First, the IMF has chosen to compare spending in the mid-1990s with
spending in the mid-1980s, when social sector budgets had been ravaged. Second, the IMF
is using GDP deflators to obtain their results. Ninety percent (90%) of education spending is
wage-related. Thus, wage deflators would give a more accurate reading of actual trends.
Third, the IMF analysis only analyzes the amount of education spending, which is a supply
side variable. A fuller analysis would take into account the elasticity of demand for services
among populations, especially vulnerable groups.

An independent analyst, Fernando Reimers of the Harvard Institute for International

Development, found that, during the 1980s, education spending as a percentage of GNP
diminished considerably more in adjusting than in non-adjusting countries. In sub-Saharan
Africa, education spending as a percentage of GNP declined in 67% of adjusting countries
and 14% in non-adjusting countries. He also reports that, as a percentage of government
expenditures, education declined in over half of adjusting and non-adjusting countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In real terms, education expenditure (as a percent of public expenditures)
declined in 44% of adjusting and 22% of non-adjusting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In
adjusting countries, per pupil expenditures declined in 81% of adjusting countries. There
were declines in only 67% of non-adjusting countries.

In Latin America, education as a percentage of GNP declined in 50% of adjusting countries

and 29% of non-adjusting countries.45 Education as a percentage of public expenditure
declined in 57% of adjusting and 17% of non-adjusting countries. In real terms education
expenditures declined in 53% of countries. (Reimers, 123)

43
Social Dimensions of Adjustment: Overview, World Bank.
44
The IMF published Fiscal Reforms in Low-Income Countries in March 1998. A summary of the findings of this
volume can be found in “Public Spending on Human Development,” Finance and Development, IMF, September
1998.
45
Reimers found that in sub-Saharan Africa the increase in non-adjusting countries averaged 0.64 of a percent
of GNP and the decline in adjusting countries averaged 0.56 of a percent of GNP. In Latin America the increase
in non—adjusting countries averaged 0.56 of a percent of GNP and the decline in adjusting countries averaged
0.66 of a percent of GNP.

38
2. Impacts on Incomes and Inequality.

Incomes can rise during adjustment, especially for exporters. Incomes can decline due
various dynamics: competitive pressures bid down wages; union bargaining power
diminishes; budget cuts retrench civil servants; subsidies for basic staples are cut; pension
and social security benefits are reduced; tight credit restricts consumption and investment
causing unemployment; and privatization of services can raise costs. In addition, currency
devaluations increase the cost of imported goods and can lead to a decline in purchasing
power, or the real value of wages, which are paid in domestic currency. Declines in the real
incomes of teachers lead to pressure for higher wages, diminished commitment to teaching
(e.g. poor attendance or moonlighting at second jobs) or exit from the profession.

Declines in income require households to cut expenditures by means such as opting against
education for one or more children or increasing income by means such as putting children to
work.

The World Bank’s review of 114 adjustment operations in 53 countries from 1980 to 1992
found that:

· The annual average poverty reduction associated with adjustment was very small; and
· Decreases in poverty were not matched by reductions in income inequality.

As mentioned earlier, these conclusions may not be reliable given the under-representation
of household data from poor countries.

Reimers shows that the growth promised by adjustment did not overcome recessionary
forces or even contributed to those forces in Africa and Latin America during the 1980s:

Sub-Saharan Africa. Sixty-four percent (64%) of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa

suffered declines in per capita income during the 1980s. These trends continued in the
1990s. Only 46% of non-adjusting countries suffered declines in income compared to 71% of
adjusting countries.

Latin America. 71% of countries suffered declines in per capita incomes, including seven
non-adjusting countries and seven adjusting countries. Four adjusting countries had rising
per capita incomes. 46

In coming to conclusions about the impacts of adjustment, Frances Stewart (Adjustment and
Poverty, Routledge, 1995) drew upon 23 studies of the effects of adjustment programs
carried out over 15 years as well as six case studies of Tanzania, Ghana, Mexico, Chile, the
Philippines, and Indonesia. Stewart concluded that adjustment processes increase poverty
as deflation effects overwhelm the benefits of liberalization that can accrue, for instance, to
peasant farms which produce tradable agricultural products, labor intensive manufacturing.
46
Reimers, Fernando, “Education and Structural Adjustment in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa,”
International Journal of Educational Development, Vol. 14, No. 2, 119-29, April 1994, p. 122.

39
In the six case studies, Stewart found the most prevalent deterioration was in educational
access and performance. Primary and/or secondary enrollment worsened in Tanzania,
Mexico, Indonesia and the Philippines and signs of worsening attainment were evident in
Chile, Mexico, and Indonesia.

Stewart concluded that the IMF and World Bank neglected and probably exacerbated the
burden of exogenous factors (commodity prices and exorbitant debt servicing) on developing
countries. At the same time, she states that adjustment contributed to adverse developments
at macro and meso-levels through expenditure cuts and deflation, reduction in food subsidies
and introduction of user charges. Stewart notes that the international financial institutions
acknowledged a need to protect the poor in the late 1980s, but their response (e.g. collecting
information on, and conducting research about, poverty; reviewing public expenditures; and
introducing social funds) was inadequate.

3. Social Safety Nets. Sometimes, when SAPs reduce social sector spending, the Bank
offers external finance for the social sectors. Sometimes, the IMF and World Bank employ
safety nets, which may target certain social expenditures to protect vulnerable populations
during adjustment.47

Unfortunately, these safety nets usually offer vulnerable populations too little, too late.48 The
Bank found that in Africa during 1979-1984, only 15 of 54 loans (4 of them in Mozambique)
mention the importance of social safety nets. In three regions safety nets were not employed
at all.49

In 1998, an IMF official stated that over the course of the last 30 years, the IMF has probably
had only ten missions go to borrowing countries to design safety nets.

D. The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) Initiative

Many champions of education welcomed the launch of a 1999 Poverty Reduction Strategy
(PRS) Initiative by the IMF and World Bank. The PRS Initiative requires that all low-income
borrowers design medium-term national development plans, called “Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers” (PRSPs) with input from citizens’ groups. Preparation of a PRSP is a
precondition for a borrower’s access to external assistance and debt relief.

47
Safety nets were small in Poland. Only $230 million of the $4.1 billion extended to Poland From 1990-96,
focused on social sectors and employment promotion. Fifty-five percent of Bank disbursements were in the
form of adjustment loans. When subsidies were cut and free social services were curtailed, the cost of living
rose and wages fell sharply. Loan failure was pronounced in several sectors, including the social sectors.
(Poland: Country Assistance Review, Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank, April 14, 1997).
48
The deficiencies of safety nets are described in detail in report of the external evaluators of the IMF’s
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).
49
Fiscal Management in Adjustment Lending, World Bank, 19 , p. 26.

40
One rationale for the Initiative was to ensure that savings from debt reduction efforts (e.g., the
Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative) were channelled into social programs, especially
education and health programs. Another rationale was to ensure country ownership of their
own development future rather than to have reforms dictated by creditors and donors. The
IMF and World Bank promised that PRSP processes would give citizens’ groups and their
governments an opportunity to design SAPs in ways that would reduce poverty.

There were great hopes that PRSPs would mark a break away from one-size-fits-all
approaches for developing countries and that, with participation of a wide group of actors,
diverse approaches to development would flourish. However, governments have a devilish
choice: either heed their citizens or heed their creditors (who have the “last word” in
endorsing the PRSP). In fact, citizens have not participated in shaping macroeconomic and
structural policies in any PRSP process. They often cannot get access to basic information
and documents that would be required for effective participation. The role of citizens is
narrow, e.g., describing budget priorities and ways to channel savings from debt reduction.

Citizens are encouraged to engage in monitoring of education and health expenditures by

their governments, so as to ensure governmental accountability.

However, the PRSP initiative has not changed basic things. As before, policy conditions for
new loans or debt relief are negotiated in secret within a small elite group of IMF and World
Bank officials and high-level officials of the finance ministries of borrowing countries.

Citizens groups which are involved so-called “participatory” processes joke that they are
learning a new conjugation of the verb “to participate” -- namely, “I participate, you
participate, he/she participates, we participate, you participate and THEY decide.

The promises of PRSP have not been realized. To the contrary, the IMF/World Bank have
gained considerable power through the PRSP/HIPC programs. Now the institutions can
influence a borrower’s entire national development strategy – not just the policies related to
their loans.

Citizens’ groups want the right to shape their countries’ future. The reject PRSP processes
which only appear to protect that right.

Citizens’ groups are supporting the Global Campaign for Education, which calls on the World
Bank to work with governments to ensure that all PRSPs include strategies to guarantee that
every Education for All (EFA) goal is met, and to eliminate all charges for basic education
within three years. The Campaign also calls for deep debt relief to countries with strong
national EFA plans.

41
IV. Recommendations

A. Adjustment operations.

Adjustment operations should be transformed and scaled down or discontinued. The

premises of structural and sectoral adjustment programs need re-thinking by a broadly
representative groups in borrowing countries and internationally. There is growing
awareness of how adjustment can undercut progress in education and development, in
general.

For the most part, sectoral and structural adjustment programs are carried out in parallel with
other development efforts. To date, there have been few efforts to design SAPs in ways that
prevent social hardship. Social programs (e.g., safety net programs, social funds) are often
add-ons to adjustment operations. Frequently, these programs offer too little protection, too
late, to too few vulnerable people.

The Bank claims to judge its programs by their poverty impact. Yet, poverty impact is not a
criterion by which the Bank judges adjustment operations, which constituted 63% of loan
approvals in fiscal year 1999. While the Bank claims that 93% of adjustment operations are
rated as "satisfactory," the Bank's own evaluators say that poverty reduction requirements
are "routinely neglected" in these operations. The Bank is clearly employing the wrong
criteria to judge the performance of its operations. Evaluators were unable to judge the
poverty impact of Bank-financed adjustment programs in the world's poorest countries. (The
evaluators looked at 21 high impact adjustment lending (HIAL) operations in 17 countries
exceeding $2 billion in FY96-98.)

Criteria by which the World Bank and IMF design and evaluate adjustment programs might
include:

a) Transparency: Are the documents which define the terms and conditions of World Bank
and IMF involvement in the country available to the elected officials and citizens of the
borrowing countries? Are they available in draft form to facilitate participation? Three points
should be emphasized:

· If broad ownership of adjustment operations is desired, the IMF and World Bank should
work with borrowing governments to disclose draft adjustment programs.

· The World Bank encourages borrowing governments to disclose documents initiating

adjustment programs (Letters of Development and Sector Policy). Such disclosure should
be mandatory, since it is inappropriate for the IMF and World Bank to work with Finance
Ministry officials beyond the public view.
· The World Bank should disclose adjustment documents after Board approval. At present,
only a few adjustment documents (e.g., some Poverty Reduction Support Credits) are
disclosed.

42
b) Social consensus relative to adjustment. Who is involved in identifying adjustment priorities
and designing adjustment operations? Elected officials? Workers? Educators? Groups of
poor people and their representatives?

As it stands, adjustment programs are sometimes geared to overcome domestic opposition to

reforms. Adjustment loans should not be implemented without popular consent.

c) Likely impacts, as indicated by factors, such as: Are adjustment reforms expanding access
to, and quality of, education? Are they reducing poverty and inequality? Are export
incentives depleting the natural resource base? Are adjustment monies being recycled to
service unpayable debt? Are labor flexibility provisions undermining the rights of workers?
(See below.)

B. Impact assessments.

The World Bank and IMF could routinely conduct assessments of adjustment operations in
order to help ensure that universal primary education goals are achieved. The institutions
could also conduct Dynamic Assessments of sector-wide and country-wide strategies,
including Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) which constitute the framework for IMF and
World Bank lending to low-income countries.

Ultimately, there is a need for independent capacity to undertake assessment, monitoring and
evaluation of operations. Academic institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs) are
developing the independent capacity to undertake impact assessments and impact
monitoring. Frontier thinking in innovative qualitative and quantitative methods of impact
assessment should be developed in collaborations among southern, northern and transition
country CSOs and think tanks.

Impact assessments can help to resolve conflicts that arise between adjustment goals and
education goals and protect educational progress. New policies should protect and advance
educational goals. Impact assessments should be conducted to determine the social
consequences of the trigger conditions associated with World Bank Country Assistance
Strategies (CAS). Such triggers should ALWAYS protect or expand education and health
budgets. In addition, The IMF and World Bank should ensure that its binding SAP conditions
support education goals.

Impact assessments can also ensure that education resources are not diverted to other
purposes. Education aid is highly fungible – more fungible than aid for most other sectors.
This is because it has such a large requirement for scarce local cost financing.50 In addition,
in countries with active IMF programs, IMF targets for reduction of budget deficits may divert
grant and concessional assistance from the education sector. In other words, if governments
exceed IMF targets for borrowing, they risk violating their agreement with the IMF and losing

50
See Agbonyitor, Albert D.K., Development Expenditures and the Local Financing Constraint. East Africa
Department, Macroeconomics II, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1907, April 1998, p. 9.

43
their IMF “seal of approval.” Many governments object to the way in which the IMF diverts
grant aid and concessional assistance.51

C. Quantity vs quality of education lending

The World Bank’s financing of education fell from an average of $2 billion per year in the
1990s to $1 billion per year for the last two years. Lending should only be scaled up in
support of homegrown strategies for educational progress.

Now, the World Bank is under tremendous political pressure from the United States and other
shareholding governments to expand loan and grant assistance for education. This is only
good news if external assistance supports good, homegrown policies and processes that will
improve educational outcomes.

External resources in support of education reform can come with too many strings attached.
For instance, in the 1980s, World Bank pressure instituted user fees for basic education that
deprived many children of their right to education. At present, creditors and donors often
administer sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) to education that lack sufficient domestic
leadership. Hence, the Bank’s formulaic approach to the education sector (e.g., privatize,
decentralize, recover costs) often prevails.

For many years, Bank critics have decried the Bank’s incentive system, which rewards
managers for “moving money” rather than getting “results on the ground.” In recent years,
the Bank has developed new incentive systems, which are intended to reward managers for
achieving results (e.g. improved enrollment or literacy rates).

However, at the same time, management incentives tend to accelerate project preparation.
Incentives to borrowing governments encourage timely and efficient procurement and
disbursement. Rapid design and implementation processes can sometimes militate against
popular participation which, in turn, can lead to poorly-performing operations.

The inverse relationship between the level of lending and the quality of lending is especially
relevant to the education sector. A Bank-financed evaluation of a major research study
(Birdsall and Bruns, “Education, Growth and Inequality in Brazil) states that if the study has a
single theme, “it is that of the quantity-quality trade-off, the thesis being that quantitative
expansion at the expense of qualitative improvement soon proves to be not only inefficient
but also extremely inequitable.” (Evaluation of Bank Research, 1996, p. 15)

D. Participation. Borrowing governments and their citizens should design their own
solutions to policy problems. The national and sector-specific strategies of borrowing
governments (e.g., PRSPs) should not be subject to endorsement by external creditors, such
as the IMF and World Bank. The institutions should determine whether they wish to invest in
homegrown solutions or continue to undermine domestic processes in borrowing countries.

51
See, for instance, Foster, Mick and Thomas, Theo, “Design of IMF Programmes in Aid Dependent Countries,”
Department for International Development, United Kingdom, March 3, 1998.

44
The Bank often assumes that decentralization of education services will enhance
participation and education outcomes. However, many federal government functions are
being decentralized and local governments frequently lack the capacity and resources to
manage education systems effectively.

In addition, the IMF and the World Bank must disclose draft documents if they wish domestic
constituencies to participate in the formulation of loan operations. (See A, above.) For
instance, the Bank should work with borrowing governments to ensure that draft Country
Assistance Strategies (CASs) are publicly disclosed and discussed and that feedback is
integrated into final CAS documents. Final CAS documents should be publicly disclosed.

Finally, the IMF and World Bank should scale down programs that undermine the
effectiveness and accountability of governments to their people (e.g., Social Funds and
Output-based Aid (OBA) schemes). Where such schemes are employed, they should adhere
to all World Bank Operational Policies. Especially in the area of basic services – health,
education and water – it is essential that the capacity of governments to guarantee universal
services is strengthened.

At present, participation is impeded by factors, such as:

Participation for validation. Approaches to participation are usually “shallow” – that is, they
extract information and opinions and stop short of giving stakeholders a voice in decision-
making. Feedback from many participatory processes (e.g., PRSPs, CASs) reveals that
citizens’ groups feel as though they are being asked to validate decisions that have already
been made. Phony participatory processes can undermine democratic processes as much
as autocratic processes do.

The pressure to lend. The culture and incentives of the Bank together with the scale and
pace of lending operations militate against meaningful participation. A Bank official describes
the pressure to lend:

The notion of national ownership is in flagrant contradiction with the contract concept
(to deliver projects) prevailing in the Bank…if the country moves too slowly under
participatory arrangements, the pipeline will become too small relative to the contract,
which triggers Management to increase it by speeding project preparation; hence Bank
staff take over at the cost of local participation/ownership. Reducing the number of
contracted projects to allow greater local participation is apparently not a viable
alternative. Countries like the loan proceeds not the policy content of the project; this
limits possible local ownership.52

Top-Down, Prescriptive Approaches to Lending. The Bank’s education reform

prescriptions are often simplified, standard recipes for education based, significantly, on
research in developed countries. In and of themselves, these recipes are neither good nor

52
Schwartz, Antoine and Sack, Richard, Sector Work and Project Performance in Education: A Review of Bank
Experience, PSP Discussion Paper Series, World Bank, January 1996, p. 35.

45
bad; it depends upon how they are implemented. The World Bank often implements these
recipes indiscriminately, as if they were “magic bullets.”

Moreover, government compliance with these recipes often determines how much access it
obtains to World Bank education resources.

The “recipe” approach can undermine the capacity of educators in developing countries to
wrestle with the complexity of their own circumstances.

Hostility of borrowing governments to Bank consultation with civil society

organizations. Most developing country governments believe that World Bank participatory
efforts overstep the institution’s mandate and pose the risk of undercutting their authority.
Ideally, the Bank would facilitate and support government-civil society dialogue rather
than supplant it. Clearly, the Bank should not undermine the accountability of borrowing
governments to their citizens.

Domestic opposition to Bank strategies which reduce the role of the state. As
developing country governments downsize, they often transfer power to the private sector
and responsibilities for social service provision to the private sector and citizens’ groups.
Experience shows that privatizing into an unregulated environment can be a disaster –
especially when it comes to basic services. Creditors, such as the Bank and Fund, should
not coerce governments into privatizing without the knowledge and consent of citizens.
Schemes, such as Social Funds and Output-based Aid (OBA) programs can undermine the
authority and effectiveness of government programs. This is especially the case when such
programs give international actors (private firms and NGOs) a dominant role in sensitive
education and health arenas.

Attitudes toward educators. Aid and creditor agencies are far more deferential to experts
in other sectors (e.g. doctors in the health sector) than they are to educators. As a result, the
economist-dominated agencies often by-pass the concerns of educators in recipient
countries. As a result, education projects and policies are often ill-suited to their
environment.

E. Debt Relief and Domestic Financing.

The Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative is inadequate. To free up resources for
education and other essential purposes, deeper debt relief and cancellation should be
provided to more countries in more expeditious ways.

After 5 years of negotiations, the HIPC Initiative has provided debt relief to 23 countries and
the debt burdens of most of those countries will, once again, become unsustainable in the
near future. Of the 23 countries, over half spent more on debt than on primary education in
2001.53

53
“Debt relief: Still failing the poor,” Oxfam, April 2001.

46
In addition, to minimize problems relating to fungibility, domestic cost financing and
implementation, Bank education resources should be concentrated in countries with strong
National Education Action Plans and a commitment to popular participation in education
system reform.

The Bank should explore ways of making education loans more affordable for low-income
countries, including providing grants for IDA borrowers, waiving counterpart funding
requirements, or permitting debt service in local currency.

As it is, demand for education loans often sags for reasons, such as the following:
(a) Investments in education do not generate foreign exchange revenue, which is needed to
service World Bank and other foreign debt and purchase imports;
(b) Most World Bank-financed projects require that the government put up about a fifth of
project costs in counterpart funds; and
(c) Most education expenditures are recurrent expenditures, such as teacher salaries,
education materials, and school maintenance, require high and sustained levels of local
financing. Governments that do borrow for education are often slow to disburse the
resources because of local cost financing constraints.

The volatile level of education loan commitments and disbursements (especially in poor
countries) can be attributed, in part, to government difficulty in providing local cost financing.
Weaknesses in local cost financing were cited in over 60% of Bank projects identified as
unsustainable in the mid-1990s. In some cases, pressure from the IMF to cut budget deficits
contributes to government failure to provide sustained support.

In particular, the IMF should reevaluate its policies on deficit management. Currently, its
ceilings on government borrowing sometimes divert assistance from the social sectors to
debt servicing. The IMF should issue a draft policy on deficit management and public
investment for review and comment by the World Bank, governments and civil society
organizations. The final policy should be piloted in several countries to determine its impact
on education and health spending.

In an ideal world, the leadership of the IMF and World Bank would infuse the institutions with
a spirit of accountability. The lending philosophy would change to embrace the goals of
equitable, participatory and sustainable development in all operations, beginning with
adjustment operations. Special care would be taken to strengthen the capacity of borrowing
governments to ensure that all citizens have access to basic services, especially education,
health and water services.

47
V. Bibliography

Alexander, Nancy C., Financing for Development, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, New York Office,
September 1998.

________, Who Shapes Your Country’s Future? A Guide to Influencing the World Bank’s
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________, News & Notices for World Bank Watchers, Globalization Challenge Initiative,
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_________, “De Nieuwe strategische allianties van de Wereldbank, Derde Wereld, JRG. 17,
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_________, “The World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Brazil,” presented to a
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Heyneman, Stephen P., “Development Aid in Education: A Personal View,” in Buchert and
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_______, “Economic Growth and the International Trade In Educational Reform,” Prospects,
Vol. XXVII, No. 4, December, 1997.

Grootaert, Christiaan, “Education, Poverty and Structural Change in Africa: Lessons from
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Ilon, Lynn, “Structural Adjustment and Education: Adapting to A Growing Global Market,”
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48
Reimers, Fernando, “Education and Structural Adjustment in Latin America and Sub-Saharan
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Stewart, Frances, Adjustment and Poverty, Routledge, 1995.

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Tilak, Jandhyala, G.G., “Effects of Adjustment on Education: A Review of Asian Experience,

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_______, Operations Evaluation Department, The Social Impact of Adjustment Operations:

An Overview, Report No. 14776, June 30, 1995.

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49
_______, Schwartz, A. and Stevenson, G., “Public Expenditure Reviews for Education: The
Bank’s Experience,” Working Paper 510, October 1990.

_______, Bredie, J.W.B. and Beeharry, G.K., School Enrollment Decline in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Beyond the Supply Constraint, Discussion Paper 395, 1998.

_______, Wolff, L; Schiefelbein, E. and Valenzuela, J., Improving the Quality of Primary
Education In Latin America and the Caribbean, Discussion Paper 257, 1994.

_______, Burki, S.J. and Perry G., The Long March, 1997.

_______, Priorities and Strategies for Education: A World Bank Review, 1995.

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________, Bray, Mark, Counting the Full Cost: Parental and Community Financing of
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Side Financing, June 1996.

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_______Working Paper Services on Impact Evlauation of Education Reforms:

No. 0: “Impact Evaluation of Education Projects Involving Decentralization and Privatization.”
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50
No. 2, “School Quality, School Cost and the Public/Private School Choices of Low-Income
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No. 4: “El Salvador’s EDUCO Program: A First Report on Parents’ Participation in School-
Based Management,” July 1997.
No. 5: “Nicaragua’s Experiment to Decentralize Schools: Views of Parents, Teachers and
Directors,” February 1998.
No. 6: “Central Mandates and Local Incentives: The Colombia Education Voucher Program,”
February 1998.
No. 8: “Do Community-Managed Schools Work? An Evaluation of El Salvador’s EDUCO
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program in Rural Balochistan,” May 1998.
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51
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52