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FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO, respondents . G.R. No. 129093
FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid
HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp
TAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986 Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code
56 sq. • The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. 1986.R. Magalona. No. the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3. to wit: .Facts: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable. Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava. were not included in the plebiscite. other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte. and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province). “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. 885. Victorias. An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte. Sagay. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province). abolished. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: • The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental. 3. Taboso. municipality or barrio may be created.R. km. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. which states that — “Sec. 1985. Rather. and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO. Manapla. E. which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. divided. Executive (G. divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. Held: Whenever a province is created. (Cities of Silay.856. 3. Sec. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. 197 of LGC. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. Pursuant to and in implementation of this law. Escalante. or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Paredes vs. No province. city. merged.. Issue: WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution. filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. effective Dec. Petitioners opposed.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1964 the President of the Philippines. 1965 FACTS: During the period from September 4 to October 29. to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers. that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed. issued Executive Orders Nos. in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities. as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer. not the creation of a new municipality. creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. In the language of other courts. 124 and 126 to 129. for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction. carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or . The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province. such claim is untenable. or on November 10. likewise. for said case involved. 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez. purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. THE AUDITOR GENERAL G. however. since barrios are units of municipalities HELD: On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan. as it does.R. enforcement or administration of a law. L-23825 December 24. upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. No. against the Auditor General. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void. may partake of an administrative nature — involving. EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs. not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer. from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. it is essential. 93 to 121. but a mere transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan). it is “strictly a legislative function” or “solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power” Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution. eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners. instituted the present special civil action.“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.” SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. It is obvious. Municipality of Binañgonan ISSUE: W/N the President. that. reads: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. 2370 effective January 1. existing at the time of and prior to said transfer. 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs.” The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. whereas the power to fix such common boundary. Soon after the date last mentioned. who under this new law cannot even create a barrio. can create a municipality which is composed of several barrios. 2370. as well as his representatives and agents. to restrain him.
even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides. without the aforementioned standard. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality. consequently. MENDEZ Facts : President C. the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec.Quezon. Thus. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive. It was then attacked of its validity. petitioner had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of . without actually creating it. so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. there would be no means to determine. Hence. as well as to act in lieu of such officers. With respect to the latter. without a statutory declaration of policy. he could. with reasonable certainty.353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. and.O. the delegate would in effect. he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power. thereby. insofar as local governments are concerned. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. make or formulate such policy. Garcia. which is the essence of every law. but. set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction. except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board. and. by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress. bureaus. exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution. issued E. they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law.determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it). the President cannot interfere with local governments. remove any of its officials. The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. also — and this is worse — to unmake it. Macapagal. for his office would thereby become vacant. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him. issued by President D. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass. Hence. thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. in effect. By virtue of E. Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality. 2 of RA 1515. The power of control under the provision Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Consti implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments. Neither may he vote. the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. 174. he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres. or offices of the national government. although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. no matter how patently unwise it may be. Indeed. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. not only to make the law. in effect. undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.O.
442(d) of the LGC of 1991. except on those for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers. 5. otherwise known as the Local Tax Code was issued by former President Ferdinand E. 231. retailing. On the contrary. 2. Rizal. . 353. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code. or dealing in.Sec. Issue : Whether or not the Municpality of San Andres legally exists.O. Presidential Decree No. The Secretary of Finance issued a Circular directed to all provincial. another Circular was issued by the Secretary of Finance instructing all City Treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinances enacted before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code on the businesses of manufacturing. Thus. repackers. conducting its business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Pililla. wholesaling. and any attempt to apply Sec. as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power. and compounders of liquors. Likewise. after more than five years as a municipal district. retailing. Under Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 353. provide among others. 1515. the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years. the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating. certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Sections 19 and 19 (a) thereof. distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule listed therein. cities. that of a de facto municipal corporation. distillers. 3. municipalities and barrios of their taxing and other revenue-raising powers. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. including brewers. that the municipality may impose taxes on business. if not in fact attaining. importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature . Later. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner. Rizal. Marcos governing the exercise by provinces. which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. 4. YES Held : The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing. Executive Order No. is also curative statute. manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax.E. rectifiers. MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA Facts: 1. Granting the Executive Order No. or dealing in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC for short) is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum product. wholesaling. with its refinery plant situated at Malaya. Pililla.
wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers. 231 as amended by P. 1986 docketed as Civil Case No. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation. Issue: Whether petitioner PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC. 1158 otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted. P. any effort on the part of the respondent to collect the suspended tax on business from the petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized. storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986. The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present Constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed to have repealed Provincial Circulars issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19 (a). Enforcing the provisions of the above-mentioned ordinance. Rizal. 2673 declared as contrary to national economic policy the imposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleum products as they are already subject to specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code. Provincial Circular No. importers. (b) the above declaration covers not only old tax ordinances but new ones. as well as those which may be enacted in the future. mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on business. 8. and granting provinces. diesel fuel oil and other similar petroleum products levied under Sections 142.D. No. 057-T against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986. hence. Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. 6-77. if the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers.D.D. 74). 9. 11. Article X of the 1987 Constitution.D. (c) both Provincial Circulars (PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective. Meanwhile. 144 and 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code. But P. fees and charges is valid as it conforms with the mandate of law. The trial court rendered a decision against the petitioner. only guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments. the respondent filed a complaint on April 4. producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. etc.D. No. Respondent Municipality of Pililla enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No. or dealers in petroleum products.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products. said fee partaking of the nature of a strictly revenue measure or service charge. 7.D. gasoline. said decree did not amend Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P. PPC. 1 imposing the assailed taxes. 10. 1 otherwise known as "The Pililla Tax Code of 1974". based on Municipal Ordinance No. retailers.D. it should have been expressly stated in P. Under Section 5. wholesalers. as amended. 436. P. 426 and no exemptions were given to manufacturers. Section 153 of which specifically imposes specific tax on refined and manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels. and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Furthermore. considering Provincial Circular No. Hence. No. however. is still liable to pay (a) tax on business and (b) storage fees. Thus. except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code. in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy. have already paid the last-named fees starting 1985 (Rollo. the instant petition. bunker fuel oil. and (d) Section 2 of P. Thus: . while Section 2 of P. There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. unless and until revoked. 436 was promulgated increasing the specific tax on lubricating oils. 1. 426. Ruling: Petitioner PPC contends that: (a) Provincial Circular No.6. the former prevails. p.D. cities and municipalities certain shares in the specific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposed on petroleum products. 6-77 was also issued directing all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed under the local tax ordinance of their respective locality. were carried over into P. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products.
L-44178 Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine: Supervision of Public Market Facts: Private respondents filed a class suit before the CFI in behalf of the vendors and stall holders in Padre Rada market against the Mayor and petitioner Ricardo Cruz for the annulment of Mayor Villegas’ decision to withdraw the said market as a public market. Article 1143 of the Civil Code applies. Nos. who can make an exemption. the trial court did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative. Acting Commissioner of Customs. It is an ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority (Esso Standard Eastern.Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed in the local tax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC from the payment of storage permit fee. R. Manila for more than 25 years. Mayor Villegas allowed the withdrawal in the light of the CA’s decision in CA-G. . Cruz vs CA G. 39999-R. No. in the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees. It was only turned into a public market by virtue of Resolution No. Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor (Western Minolco Corp. 406. Thus. After several exchanges of referrals. and 40000- . 1 prescribing a permit fee is a permit fee allowed under Section 36 of the amended Code. but by petitioner PPC. the waiver cannot be recognized. a permit fee like the mayor's permit. shall be required before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or occupation under the provisions of the Code. and communications. protested such move. since the Local Tax Code does not provide the prescriptive period for collection of local taxes. 124 SCRA 121 ). indorsements. 230.R.” The respondent-vendors. 18 SCRA 488 ). both series of 1949. v. who were likewise notified of such withdrawal. and not an executive like the mayor. Inasmuch as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of Pililla. . As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees. 1970. consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy . Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. v. On May 26. it follows that a municipal mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax. Said law provides that an action upon an obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. Under Section 36 of the Code. The Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection of the tax on business of petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986. However. combustible or explosive substances. As already stated. Inc. it is the law-making body. fees. The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla's tax ordinance is a fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any flammable. as amended by Resolution No. same is obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the same Code. and from said date the withdrawn portion shall cease to function and operate as a public market. Provincial Circular No. the management of said market represent by petitioner Cruz wrote Mayor Villegas that the management was withdrawing three-fourths of the area of the market “from the direct supervision and control of the City Treasurer’s Office effective on June 15. and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. Cruz states that he and his business associates have been the owners and operators of the Padre Rada Market at Tondo. and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976. 1970.
and prohibit or permit the establishment or operation within the city limits of public markets and slaughterhouses by any person. the petitioner contends that the Padre Rada Market was not created but merely authorized to operate as a public market by the Municipal Board. among others. 230. Hence this case. The respondent Court of Appeals held that Mayor Villegas had no authority to allow such withdrawal as “it is axiomatic that only the power that created it can withdraw it. and public markets and slaughterhouses. ISSUE: WON the City Mayor may validly withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public market. and regulate public stables. operations. It is not a question of the petitioner’s right to run his market as he pleases but what agency or office should supervise its operations. 18 (cc) which provides: Subject to the provisions of ordinances issued by the Department of Health in accordance with law. allow the petitioner to withdraw the major portion of Padre Rada Market from its use as a public market. there is nothing in the said resolutions which obligates or compels petitioner Cruz and his business associates to continue operating the said market for as long as the Municipal Board desires it. It is obvious that he wants to remove the market from the control and supervision of city authorities.R upholding the right of the operators of the Elcano Market to withdraw their property from its use as a public market stating. thereby also withdrawing it from the city’s constant supervision. Motions for reconsiderations were denied. to provide for the establishment and maintenance and fix the fees for the use of. The records show that the petitioner wants to convert the major portion of the Padre Rada Market into a private market to enable him to raise the rentals for the stalls.” A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. or corporation other than the city. * its location. On appeal. both series of 1949. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Mayor had no legal authority to. The Municipal Board acted pursuant to its legislative powers vested by Republic Act No. the CA reversed the CFI’s decision. and baths. entity. 406. Since the operation of Padre Rada Market was authorized by a municipal board resolution and . opening. CA denied the withdrawal by the Manila City Mayor of government-control and supervision “until legal conditions and equitable justification for the withdrawal by private parties obtain.” On the other hand. that approval for the withdrawal by the City of Manila is not even necessary. by himself. amended by Resolution No. particularly Sec. By the very nature of a market. Accordingly. The lower court rendered the decision in favor of the City mayor holding that the decision was valid. laundries. association. and closure must be regulated by government. The Municipal Board of Manila with the approval of then Mayor Manuel de la Fuente authorized the disputed premises to be operated as a public market under its direct control and supervision as embodied in Resolution No. HELD: No. 409 (Revised Charter of the City of Manila).
a special law prevails over a general law. looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. and that the accident happened in national highway. The CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. the mayor. Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole. However. Thereafter he sued for damages under Art. resulting injuries upon him . at about 8pm. the city health officer. that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general law. the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the negligence of its officers is a general law in the . The withdrawal from the market’s public status was in fact objected to by the Manila City Treasurer and the Market Administrator in their memorandums and indorsements to the Mayor.2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila. 1968 Facts: In January 1958. by himself. it follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion from use as a public market must be subject to the same joint action of the Board and the Mayor. It is true that in case of conflict. the city engineer. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico. Issue: Whether the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. operations. WHEREFORE. The Mayor of Manila. the city treasurer. Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. cannot provide for the opening.. The Padre Rada Market is a public market and as such should be subject to the local government’s supervision and control. Upon appeal. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter. and the chief of police. and closure of a public market.approved by the City Mayor. No. that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law. G. Its conversion into a private market or its closure must follow the procedures laid down by law. the CA reversed the CFI ruling and held that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico. the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.R. Burgos. L-23052 22 SCRA 267 January 29. as provided by law. Held: Yes.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces. and municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason of the “…defective condition of roads. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo warranto which is already filed out of time. HELD: No. At any rate. the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation. Even if he did lose his US citizenship. provincial. P. In his defense. it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective conditions thereof. He cannot serve as governor when he owes allegiance to a .sense that it exempts the city from negligence of its officers in general. He lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. On the other hand. ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a governor.” The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised for the first time in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals. city. was naturalized as an American. Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections restore his Philippine citizenship. public buildings. Frivaldo. in 1983. Burgos included. Frivaldo said that he was forced to be naturalized because the then President Marcos was after him. he is not a Filipino. he has effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant to American laws. Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. streets. the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s roads. cities. the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is national. and other -public works under their control or supervision. In the case at bar. so long as it is under the City’s control and supervision. Salvador Estuye. or municipal. filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation because apparently. As far as Philippine law is concerned. even though it is a national highway. President of the League of Municipalities of Sorsogon. hence it cannot be given due weight. that did not restore his being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or repatriation proceedings. There is no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. he is a stateless person. but that participating in the Philippine elections. Juan Frivaldo vs Commission on Elections on November 26. bridges. At best. 2012 174 SCRA 245 – Law on Public Officers – Citizenship of a Public Officer In 1988.
as in this case. 15 of the Constitution. 15 of the Constitution . The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments. pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only thoseappointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. Political Law Facts: on the Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao. especially if they mistakenly believed. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. Obviously. he must owe his total loyalty to this country only. Sec. De Rama vs. done in violation of Art. CA G. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired. this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. VII.foreign state. as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position. VII. petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines. February 28. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. January 25. No. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. 2001 Sunday. Quezon. that the candidate was qualified. 131136. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. Petitioner justified his recall request allegation that the appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor. Issue: Whether forbidden under or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are Art. abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. Sec.R.
applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.Held: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments. .” specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections.
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