AIR FORCE REVIEW

Vol 1, No 3
COMMANDER'S CORNER

Choosing to be Champions
Nothing will top the feeling of an Air Force, finally turned fully modern and fully capable
and empowered to bring the war to the enemy, day or night.

---LT GENERAL BENJAMIN P DEFENSOR, JR AFP

As far as military arts is concern, the international dateline separating the past century
and the new millennium may have been the eleventh of September, or more precisely in
that words of U.S President Bush, "the tick of the clock at the 46th minute of the eight
hour of the eleventh day" of September 2001.

Since that fateful moment, the world has never been the same. Business and commerce,
international relations, government policies and programs, social consciousness, security
systems and military strategy - have all turned as one to face a common enemy: terror.

The great American resolve to strike back and smoke out the terrorists and "all those
who harbor them" has inexorably reshaped how today's and tomorrow's fighting will be
done. And one thing has become evidently clear: there is no substitute for airpower and
for modern equipment. A little over three months after the twin towers of the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon were brought down by hijacked planes, the last stronghold of the
Talibans succumbed, mainly to precise air assaults, and Afghanistan was liberated
through a definitive bomb-and-bread strategy.

Even as the hunt for terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden continues, the United States has
already invested heavily in the development of new technologies and cyber warfare
systems that would ride on the capabilities of the Air Force. These include low-observable
technologies, nanotechnologies, parallel processing, quantum computing and biometrics
that can track all adversaries and destroy their remotest facilities.

In our case, the way to fight has not drastically changed. Doctrine and Strategy have not
been adjusted yet to the demands of the new battlespace. And real appreciation for
airpower has remained on a footmarch.

Fortunately, the Philippine Air Force has always risen to the challenge. Last year,, in a
show of dominant precision, the planes of the Air Force smashed the majority of the
camps of the MILF and scattered the Abu Sayyafs. And this year, our story just got better.

Driven hard by maintenance problems, we still increased our operational readiness

rates by reconfiguring former training planes into combat assault aircraft. PAF research
and innovation turned the traditional side firing helicopters into forward-firing gunships.
And result once validated our faith.

Our trainer-turned-combat planes blasted Nur Misuari's house in Silangka, Jolo and
other camps and quickly decided the outcome of the latest misadventure of the MNLF.
And the accuracy and courage of our pilots had been evident all over Mindanao, from
Cotabato to Cabatangan.

Away from the battlefield, limitations notwithstanding, our C-130s flew to the aid of our
OFWs in the Pacific islands and demonstrated commitment to peacekeeping East Timor.
Our workaholic Hueys proved age does not really matter. Our search and rescue
capabilities heroically matched many life-and-death situations.

The point is: we haven't had the best of everything. But we have been making the best
of everything we have. This has made the huge difference. The key has been our desire to
deliver no matter what. The key has been our commitment to excel and create a culture of
champions.

Our strategic vision for the Air Force, really, is to define victory in peace and in war. No
matter where you look nowadays, there aren't many successes in battle not connected to
the capabilities of the Air Force, to the advantages of stealth, radar or satellite technology.

This is the reason I have been preaching the gospel of the first force. This is also the
reason I have painted the vision of champions in service, for champions defy the odds and
triumph. Champions exert their best and triumph. Champions innovate and triumph.

In the recent AFP-PNP Olympic Games, the Air Force emerged champions once more,
but champions in record-breaking fashion, winning 17 golds, 9 silvers, and 4 bronzes, and
registering no fourth-place finishes in any events. Army, the closest rival came with 6
golds. The gold medals of the army, Navy, and PNP combined, in fact, still fell four gold
medals short of our golden haul. In short, the Air Force, the Air Force dominated.

The record back-to-back championship in the 29-year old Games is a rousing yearender.

Still nothing feels quite like the role of a real champion in battle, for our country and
people. Nothing will top the feeling of an Air Force, finally turned fully modern and fully
capable and empowered to bring the war to the enemy, day or night.

Time and again, we have proven we have the best airmen warriors and athletes. But the
best cannot rely on skill and guts alone. The best always act with the times, with new
power-enhancing capabilities.

We know our choice.

 A CAMPAIGN STRATEGY TO MODERNIZE THE

PHILIPPINE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

LTC ELDON NEMENZO

The Philippines is like a blind beggar sitting on

a mountain of gold. Within the country’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are
potential recoverable hydrocarbon deposits worth an estimated US $ 26.3 Trillion. More
than enough to lift the country from the centuries long morass of poverty and
underdevelopment. But no sensible foreign investor would come in, because the
government cannot guarantee a climate of security to underwrite their investments. The
Philippines does not have a credible external defense capability to protect her own
interests and territorial integrity.

th
This need was recognized by the 9 Congress of the Philippines. Republic Act No.
7898 was signed into law on 23 February 1995. It mandated the modernization of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and appropriated P 164.553 B. Congressional Joint
Resolution No. 28 became a law on 19 December 1996. It approved the AFP Modernization
Program and decreed that the priority shall be development by a credible air and naval
defense capability.

The legislative mill has laid the foundations of the AFP modernization program five
years ago. The ball is now on the hands of the Department of National Defense and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to do its part. The Philippine Air Force should adopt a
strategy, parallel to legislation, to pump prime the implementation process, Such strategy
aims on the sideline, to promote awareness in society of the opportunities lost in each day
the modernization is delayed. On the other hand, it presents alternative courses of action
other than those specifically mentioned in our laws to improve and enhance the
modernization program.

The strategy of indirect pressure negates the use of combat force. It rather
employs psychological pressure, mainly through propaganda and diplomatic maneuvers,
with sufficient intelligence support, to achieve political objectives. Unlike a direct
strategy, force is not a decisive factor. For a better perspective of this strategy, it is
necessary to define campaign and strategy in greater deal.

Raoul Henri Alcala defines campaign as a plan that establishes a path to the
strategic goal. The U.S. Army FM 100-5 sees it as a series of joint actions designed to
attain a strategic objective in a theater of war. Joint Publication 1-02 defines campaign
plan as a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective,
normally within a given time and space.

Strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and

circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty and ambiguity dominate. It is a
complex decision-making process that connects the ends sought with the ways and
means of achieving those ends. Strategy is an abstract interplay which springs from the
clash between two opposing wills.

The aim of strategy is to fulfill the objectives laid down by policy, making the best
use of resources available. Its desired outcome is to force the enemy to accept the terms
one wish to impose on him. The means could be material or moral. The art of strategy
consists in choosing the most suitable means from those available and so orchestrating
their results that they combine to produce a psychological pressure sufficient to achieve
the moral effect required.

Strategic Assumptions

Assumption 1. National Security, particularly the survival interests of the

Philippines and of the Filipino nation, is a primordial concern of the national leadership
(President and Congress). The grinding weight of poverty in the country suggests that
food security and national economic development are higher in the national security
agenda than defense preparedness. What the civilian decision-makers fail to realize is the
vital role of a modern Philippine Air Defense System (PADS) in securing our sources of
marine food supply and hydrocarbon products. Contrary to popular misperception, a
modern PADS creates the atmosphere for the attainment of both concerns.

Assumption 2. The channels of mass media are powerful shapers of public

opinion and national consensus. Various researches on the informative and persuasive
powers of media suggest that they are 100% effective in conveying knowledge, 60%
effective in changing attitudes and 30% effective in changing behavior. “Some of the most
important combat of tomorrow will take place in the media battlefield,” wrote Alvin Toffler.
In his book Wars and Anti-wars, he premised that, “at strategic level, adroit propaganda
can actually help make or break alliances. He even proposed the use of meta-propaganda,
a form of media tactics to discredit the other side’s propaganda, the aim of which is to
produce wholesale disbelief and to generate maximum sympathy or hatred for each set of
viewers.

Assumption 3. Our public policy decision-makers (the President and Congress)

are politicians who are sensitive to public opinion. Survival in Philippine politics rests on
popularity. The mathematics of voter addition means that our politicians must always
cater to the needs and clamor of the greater majority of the voting population.

Assumption 4. The average Filipino is not aware of the hydrocarbon and marine
resources in our EEZ. Likewise, they do not know the need for a modern PADS in relation
to the protection and exploitation of these resources. They do not know that a judicious
development strategy on the use of these resources has the potential to lift the country
from the centuries-long quagmire of poverty. Filipinos do not know that beyond
enhancing national defense and security, the PADS directly benefit their lives due to its
civilian and joint-use applications.

Characteristics of the Strategy

Cumulative, Coordinated Strategy. This strategy is a collection of individual,

coordinated actions that can eventually create significant results. The various units and
offices of the PAF contribute their resources and efforts so that the psychological
pressure would become wide ranging and compelling.

Sustained Strategy. The methodology is to keep the pressure going without any
respite. The PAF should be able to back staff the legislative effort through all its phases.
This requires close coordination with critical personalities in both chambers of Congress.
Likewise, a favorable climate for the consideration of the bills must be generated through
the use of inter-personal and media channels of communication and persuasion.

Moral Ascendancy Strategy. The PAF, as the proponent of the PADS, must be
viewed as having moral ascendancy over the other interest groups. All actions must be
consistent with the accepted norms of behavior. The benefit moral ascendancy
[supported by media] could give was articulated by Dr. Segundo E. Romero: “The media
can encourage a balance of power among unequal parties where appropriate, or where the
claims of parties are not equally just, strengthen the hand of the party with the more
compelling moral claim.”

Elements of the Strategy

Psychological Ploys. This strategy employs propaganda through the mass media
to dish out deliberated information that could, in the long run, persuade or pressure rival
interests to concede that modernization of the PADS serve higher national strategic
objectives. The aim of this approach is to attack the mind of opponents by issuing
carefully constructed propaganda statements, and to achieve psychological advantage
over them. It is beneficial to seize every opportunity to gain public sympathy or positive
public opinion for the PAF legislative agenda. The dangers of not modernizing the PADS
should be propagated.

The supporting communication campaign should highlight foreign intrusions into

our territory and the EEZ and the country’s powerlessness against such transgressions
due to the lack of a modern PADS. It can likewise inform the public of the consequent
losses for the continuing inaction: Filipino fishermen deprived of livelihood; More
expensive but less marine protein supply for everyone; Continued non-exploitation of vast
natural hydrocarbon reserves, thus chaining the Philippines to a perpetual state of poverty
and underdevelopment.

Diplomatic Maneuvers. This strategy requires diplomacy with key personalities to

actively promote the greater interest served by fast-tracking the PAF legislative agenda.
Opinion leaders and media practitioners are vital targets. They must write and speak
about the issue, in sustained and deliberate effort, to inform and persuade the decision-
makers and the Filipino public. They must put up a campaign to produce compelling
pressure.

Interpersonal diplomacy play a key role in policy adoption. Studies suggest that
personal channels of communication are often more effective in changing beliefs,
attitudes and behavior than the mass media. PAF liaison officers and back staffers must
develop strong rapport with pinpointed Congressional supporters and their staff. This
salience, coupled with the positive atmosphere generated by the media campaign,
facilitate decision-making in favor of the PAF agenda.

Intelligence Support. Policy made without intelligence support, or inadequate

support can succeed only by accident. “Knowing the adversary” is critical. Discovering
enemy intentions is as important as discovering his capabilities. It is a sad commentary
that the DND-AFP does not know exactly how much BCDA is making out of the AFP
reverted base lands. The DND-AFP likewise have not kept close tabs at the intended
utilization of these lands and how these could affect the remaining military reservations
within BCDA areas. Until this author’s research on Mactan, the PAF did not know how
much MCIAA-MEPZA were making from the lease of the area. Hence, the PAF could not
countercheck the validity of the argument that MCIAA-MEPZA did not have the funds to
honor their commitments in the Tri-partite MOA.

The selected campaign strategy is based on the strategy of indirect pressure.

This strategy avails largely of psychological means to pressure decision-makers and key
personalities to accept the PAF legislative agenda as their own. Psychological ploys,
diplomacy and intelligence support are combined with appropriate interpersonal and mass
media channels of communications to generate an atmosphere conducive for the passage
of PAF sponsored bills into laws.

The development of a credible air defense capability is the primordial aim of the
Philippine Air Force (PAF) Modernization Program. Central to this goal is the build up of a
robust and modern Philippine Air Defense System (PADS). As conceptualized, the PADS
shall be an integrated system consisting of the following core components:

1. Air Surveillance System. A network of land-based air-to-ground

radar system shall be strategically located at various sites around the country. These
sites shall provide 24-hour monitoring of the Philippine airspace and detection of any
intruding enemy/hostile aircraft. These radar sites shall be electronically linked with each
other and to centralized command and control centers. At the primary and alternate Air
Defense Operations Centers (ADOC), the different plots are interfaced into a single, one-
sky radar picture covering the entire Philippine airspace. In case of unidentified and/or
hostile intrusions, the ADOC scrambles fighter/interceptor aircraft to meet the aerial threat
as far out of Philippine territory as possible.

In addition to its air defense surveillance function, plots from the military
radar system can also be extracted by the Air Transportation Office (ATO) for a real time
civil airways management. The resulting civilian Philippine airways one-sky picture will
allow the ATO to optimize civil and commercial air traffic volume in the country's territorial
airspace while enhancing the safety of air navigation. Since the government earns
revenues from all overflight, the system will result to a more efficient, accurate and
automated billing of all overflight charges.

2. Surface Surveillance System. In addition to the land-based

network, a fleet of Long Range Patrol Aircraft (LRPA) shall provide surface surveillance on
the country’s internal waters and the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The LRPA
shall monitor hostile naval intrusions, foreign poaching, dumping of toxic wastes, and
other illegal activities within the Philippine maritime domain. A host of sensors are to be
fitted aboard the LRPA, allowing these aircraft to meet various mission requirements. The
LRPA shall also be electronically linked to the command and control centers, allowing the
decision makers real-time information on the events transpiring within the country’s
surface domain for a timely and appropriate response.

As with the military radar system, the LRPA can have civil defense, police,
environmental, and other civilian applications. Surface surveillance data can also be
shared with the appropriate agencies – say, with the Philippine National Police (PNP) and
the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) for anti-smuggling operations or with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for pin-pointing and combating oil leaks or
even illegal logging activities. Since the LRPA will allow the Philippines to keep a close
watch of its maritime domain, fishing activities can be monitored and fishing licenses for
trawlers can be strictly enforced, allowing the government to increase its revenue
collection from these activities.

3. Interceptor Squadrons. A number of Multi-Role Fighter (MRF)

aircraft shall provide the critical response capability against hostile aerial and naval
targets. The MRF are to be geographically dispersed in various forward operating air
bases for prompt response to any threat. The requirements of the modern battlespace
dictate that the MRF must have all-weather, day and night operational capability.

4. Search and Rescue System. Endemic to the entire system is a

built-in Search and Rescue (SAR) capability. A fleet of SAR helicopters capable of
extended ranges will conduct rescue missions on downed friendly aircraft and vessels
during combat situations. Peacetime utilization of SAR helicopters include rescue of
distressed vessels and crafts within the Philippine area of responsibility. These assets
can likewise be used as air ambulances in cases of road mishaps and similar
emergencies.

These four core capabilities form the foundation upon which the entire Philippine
Air Defense System is built. The System is intrinsically weak and unbalanced if one or
more capabilities are wanting. It must be underscored that the PADS has both military and
civilian applications. The one-sky radar picture is a vital cog of national defense
preparedness. However, it also allows efficient civil airways management and will
tremendously enhance the safety of civil and commercial air traffic in the country from its
present level. Its surface mirror will substantially upgrade the country’s maritime and
forest management capability, resulting in better maritime safety enforcement,
environmental protection, and higher revenues for the government.

The importance of a modern Philippine Air Defense System (PADS) cannot be

understated. The Philippine Air Force (PAF) is the first line of our country’s military
defense. The vital cog of our national defense capability is the PADS. The PADS forms
the core of the Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) network of the
entire Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The PADS connects the President (as
Commander-in-Chief) and the AFP Chain-of-Command with the deployed, operational
units, allowing a timely and coordinated defense response in times of war. The PADS
makes possible the real time monitoring of unfolding scenarios within the country’s
territorial and defense battlespace, allowing the execution of efficient defense campaigns
and operations. The PADS is an indispensable instrument for securing vital national
interests -- the patrimony, territorial and sovereign integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and the welfare, way of life and survival of the Filipino nation.

As a plan of action to operationalize this campaign strategy, the author proposes

the following: (1) Creation of the Directorate for Legislative-Executive Affairs at A-5 to
back-staff the legislative effort; (2) Crafting of a communications/public relations
campaign plan to complement the legislative initiatives; (3) Synchronize current
negotiations and Command decisions with the desired objective; and (4) Conduct
Seminars on Negotiations among Commanders and Project Managers of air bases/air
stations which are vulnerable to real estate speculations by other interests groups.

As part of the proposed campaign strategy, this author recommends the following

action plan for the PAF:

 1. Create the Directorate for Legislative-Executive Affairs (DLEA) under the

Office of the ACofAS for Plans, A-5. This office shall have the primary responsibility of

advancing the PAF Legislative Agenda. Its creation is needed since the Liaison Office for

Legislative Affairs (LOLA), AFP and the AFP Technical Working Group for Legislative

Affairs (AFPTWGLA) have been found to be inadequate organizational mechanisms for

bringing about the desired policy changes.

It must be underscored though, that the problem cannot be addressed merely by

adding another organizational box in A-5. This office must be adequately staffed and

properly supported to attend to its functions. It is necessary to have some competent

lawyers, proficient in the drafting of bills, under this office. To fill this need, the PAF may

need to tap its reservist base of human resource. Close liaisoning functions with the

policy decision-makers necessitate a dedicated Director (not necessarily a lawyer),

embued with high emotional and cognitive intelligence. D, LEA should be empowered and

should have the commensurate resources needed to back-staff the legislative effort,

including a) The drafting of proposed bills; b) The drafting of Committee Reports; and c)

Providing needed information to key players in the policy environment.

2. Make a Communication/Public Relations (PR) Campaign Plan to

complement the modernization agenda. This Campaign Plan may be generated internally

or may entail the hiring of PR Consultants. Nevertheless, a strong inter-office

coordination may be needed during the campaign plan implementation, particularly among

A-5, PIO and A-7. It is essential that this campaign plan should be implemented in a

coordinated, sustained and timely fashion. PR Campaign need not be expensive to

implement since with good planning, the PAF can tap its reserve of goodwill and other

government informational agencies such as the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), PTV-

4 and the like. Radio talk show programs offer the cheapest alternative, with the widest

audience base.
 3. Synchronize current negotiations and Command decisions with the desired

end-state. It is asinine for the PAF to continuously surrender real estate it still controls to

BCDA and other agencies while it is pursuing a legislative agenda that would generate

income from these land holdings. The various seemingly attractive offers being dangled

before the Command are designed precisely to complete the land alienation process

before the attendant legislative remedies are adopted. If the PAF falls into this trap, it will

be presented with a fait accompli by the time the bills are scheduled for public hearing.

The negotiating spectrum is wide enough to allow various stalling techniques, provided

the Command keeps its eyes on the objective – continuing sources of funds to modernize

the PADS.

4. Conduct Seminars on Negotiations for Commanders/Project Managers of

bases/air stations that are being eyed for conversion/alternative uses. The current mess

in inter-agency agreements involving PAF real estate is a reflection of how poor AFP/PAF

decision makers are (or were) in negotiations (past Commanding Generals, PAF not

exempted). Military officers are supposed to be experts in strategy and in the art of

warfare. And yet, civilians running other agencies have succeeded in extracting

concessions on the use of some military reservations which are patently disadvantageous

to the interests of the PAF and the AFP.

A unique window of opportunity exists with the incoming Congress for the PAF to
advance its legislative agenda. To generate a more favorable climate for the passage of
these initiatives into laws, the adoption of this campaign strategy means that the PAF can
influence the climate of decision-making. Our decision-makers, being politicians, will be
highly sensitive to public opinion. But media shall have educated the public on the merits
of the issues, and the policy makers will be compelled to ride on the issue and adopt the
PAF legislative initiatives to modernize the PADS.
 UTILIZATION OF FOREIGN TRAINED PAF OFFICERS

AT THE AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

By LTC LARRY S GUMBA PAF (GSC)

For the past decades, the education and training of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines have continuously developed the human resources toward excellence,
competence, and professionalism. The education and training programs have vigorously
pursued to strengthen, upgrade, and enhance the efficiency of the AFP units and
personnel in maintaining a high state of discipline, professional competence, and
technical proficiency in response to the required roles that the AFP performs. As a
strategic concern, the AFP personnel should be well trained to perform its tasks
effectively and efficiently, as the individual soldier remains the most potent weapon
system and most important asset of any armed forces.

With the onset of the new millennium, the Department of National Defense, in its
memorandum to the AFP, had provided fresh directions and guidance to the AFP foreign
education and training program in order “to derive maximum benefit from it
commensurate to its cost and to systematize its planning and implementation.”
Considering the cost-benefit that the military organization will derive, the memorandum
rationally stressed on the correct attitude as basic ingredient in understanding that the
capability building for education and training needs more than expertise and resources.
Such attitude should manifest itself, among others, in a nationalistic spirit which
considers indigenous training equal to or comparable to foreign training; a correct
appreciation of the crucial role to the accomplishment of the AFP mission of the training
institutions and the personnel who man them, such that only the most suited, those who
know what to teach and how to impart what they know, are assigned to training
institutions; and the effective utilization of foreign graduates, especially those sent abroad
on studies which are not or only partially available in-country, in order that the maximum
practical benefit can be derived from their training. The primary purpose of foreign
education and training therefore is to keep abreast of developments and trends.

Strategically, the AFP must be well trained to perform its assigned tasks effectively
and efficiently, as an individual soldier remains the most potent weapon system in any
armed forces. Considering the cost-benefit that the AFP will derived the primary purpose
of foreign education and training is to keep abreast of the developments and trends
worldwide and help develop our in-country training capabilities. Categorically, our local
schools must be the regular schools of the AFP and not the schools abroad.

On the other hand, however, the general policy guidance on the utilization of
foreign trained students to the local schools and training institutions, particularly in the
Philippine Air Force has not been very effective. The vagueness and gray areas of this
guidance resulted to its non-compliance, unwillingness of the foreign graduates to be
assigned at the training institutions, and became the main reason in creating vacuum in
the in-house capability building for education and training in the PAF.

The Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), the only premier school in the PAF
that educates and prepares officers to "assume positions of higher responsibility", should
further enhance its in-house training capability standard at par or even excel the schools
of other branches of service through effective utilization of foreign trained officers.

From 1996 to 2000, 4 or 11% out of 36 PAF officer graduates from foreign countries
in various career courses were not assigned at the ACSC. Only 6 or 16.6 were assigned at
the college with less than the required one-year assignment period. Military politics
(militics) played the main reason followed by lack of positions in the UMD of the ACSC.

Several solutions are recommended to once and for all answer the problems on
foreign graduated utilization at the college. Analysis and studies revealed that existing
policy on the utilization of foreign trained military personnel needs revision. The Circular
10, GHQ AFP dated 21 June 1993 must address the utilization of foreign-trained military
personnel in the local training schools and institutions giving strict measures to
counterbalance the problem of militics.

Likewise, the Unit Manning Document of the ACSC must be amended to allocate
positions for foreign-trained graduates commensurate to their ranks. For instance, the
Army Command and Staff College has 16 positions for Colonels. This will optimize
utilization trained officers and at the same time establishing adequate, competent core of
faculty and instructors at the college.

To update the resource and reference materials at the ACSC library as well the
knowledge and ideas of the faculty and students, a PAF Letter Directive must be issued
that all graduated of foreign schooling, training, seminars, symposia and other related fora
will submit a formatted After-Foreign Training Reports within a time period including the
Programs of Instruction, course curricula, manuals, pamphlets and other reference
materials to ACSC, free of charge to photocopies. These materials will provide current
educational trends and developments worldwide, which are basis for curriculum
development and review as well as doctrines.

With the proper utilization of foreign-trained PAF officers, the ACSC could attain its
grand vision of becoming one of the best air power educational institutions in Asia.
 Accreditation Process of
Philippine Air Force Reserve Units
By LT COL ANTONIO L BAUTISTA

The defense of our country and protection of its territorial integrity/national

sovereignty is the primary mission of the military establishment. Additionally, multi-
faceted tasks such as relief and rehabilitation, search and rescue, medical-dental missions
and manning of agencies/entities vital to public interests are also being delegated to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in times of calamities and emergencies. With these,
the government views the AFP as a reliable partner and ready to act whenever called
upon.

Officially, The Philippine Air Force started to coordinate rescue efforts among
civilian entities tasked or required to do on 24 April 1969 when the RATSS was organized
pursuant to Executive Order 176. The efforts concentrated mostly in conducting medical -
dental mission to underprivileged Filipinos. However civilian entities who were joining
these missions were not properly accredited and have activated their stations including
their equipment for humanity sake. This relationship lasted for about 22 years.

In 1987, the current constitution of the Philippine was approved. Sec. 4., Article II
of such Constitution provides that the Government may call upon the people to defend the
State, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens maybe required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal, military or civil service.

Then, on June 27 1991 Republic Act 7077, otherwise known as the Citizen Armed
Force or Armed Forces of the Philippines Reservist Act was approved. The law provides
the development, administration, training, maintenance, and utilization of the Citizen
Armed Force (CAF) of the AFP. Further, the Act also provides that the CAF shall be
provided maximum opportunity to participate in socio economic development. The Law
likewise provides that as the President shall approve upon the recommendation of the
SND, certain private and government entities, corporations, establishments, and
organizations who shall be organized as affiliated units of the Reserve Force. These
affiliated units shall be constituted by appropriate orders to be issued by the SND, given
unit designation and assigned to the appropriate reserve components of the AFP. These
units shall be utilized in times of war or emergency to ensure continuous and
uninterrupted provision of the essential services they are rendering.

Moreover, the passage of Republic Act 7898 otherwise known as AFP

Modernization Law further strengthened the basis for the existence of affiliated Reserve
units. The law provides that the AFP shall be composed of 20% regular forces and 80%
reserve component which can be developed into an effective, efficient and responsive
citizen-based force. With the reserve component as nucleus, the AFP can expand in times
of war, invasion, rebellion and times of calamities, for socio-economic development and in
the operation and maintenance of the essential private and public utilities.

Particularly, the PAF can form affiliated units in the following areas; 1) Government
and private airports, 2) Warehouse facilities at NAIA, 3) Aircraft manufacturing companies,
4) Government and private hospitals closest to air bases, 5) Government and private air
transport entities, 6) Government and private aerospace, maintenance and service
facilities.
 Additionally, Circular Number 6, GHQ, AFP, dated 3 June 1995 was published. The
circular provides general procedures concerning affiliated Reserve Units especially on
organization, training, commission/ enlistment in the Reserve Force, call to active duty,
removal and separation, and evaluation.

However, it is sad to note that until today, the PAF has not yet come up with a
written and detailed document to implement Circular Number 6, GHQ, AFP dated 3 June
1995. Despite this handicap, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Retirees and
Reservist Affairs, A-10 had already processed 18 applications for PAFARUS affiliation; 17
of which are already approved. The 18 companies underwent an accreditation process
which can be considered acceptable. However, it was found to be full of loopholes and
lapses. In the absence of written document to support the process, the probability of short
circuiting the process or disregarding some of the steps are highly possible. Based on
interviews with some personnel assigned at OA-10, and ARC, they told this writer that
their basis in coming up with this flow chart is Circular Number 6, GHQ, AFP, dated 3 June
1995 which has general applications and provisions, resulting to numerous and different
interpretations.

To discuss the present process, the solicitation of PAFARUS applicants are being
conducted not only by the ARC specifically RATSG but also by A-10, a supposed non-
operating coordinating staff of the CG, PAF. Target companies are briefed on the
requirements and advantages they can derive by being a PAFARU. Then, RATSG should
complete the supporting documents of the applicant company such as profile,
organization, air assets, equipment, employees and their skills. A draft of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the applicant company and the PAF will also
be prepared by RATSG. A Background Investigation Check (BIC) of the applicant company
and its employees is also to be conducted by ARC. The complete supporting papers of the
company will be forwarded to CG, PAF (Attn: A-10) for processing. With regards to the
companies solicited by A-10, the papers are directly being processed at OA-10 with the
RATSG having no knowledge about it. All draft MOAs will be forwarded to Air Judge
Advocate for legal opinion. The Director, RFD, OA-10 assigns a unit designation to the
company. After the legal opinion, A-10 prepares a MOA for signature of the Head of the
Company and CG, PAF. It will be sent to the Chief of Staff, AFP thru J-10 for proper Staff
action and then recommended to the Secretary of National Defense for notation. Then, it
will be recommended to the President approval/disapproval. If approved, the Adjutant
General will issue orders of the approval of the affiliation. A-10 thru ARC will inform the
newly affiliated unit of the approval. Then, PAFGH will conduct limited physical
examination to the employees of the PAFARUS. EP rank shall be conferred to the
employee and ARC will schedule the conduct of Military Orientation Training (MOT) to the
personnel of the company. After the completion of the MOT, the TO & E of the PAFARU
will be validated by A-3. Supporting papers for commission of PAFARU officers will be
submitted to higher headquarters for approval. Resultantly, some behavioral problems
among OA-10 and RATSG personnel came out since A-10, who is an HPAF Staff got
involved in directly soliciting applicant companies. Some personnel of ARC specifically
RATSG are adamant and lack aggressiveness in soliciting entities that would be members
of PAFARUS because they felt insulted with the soliciting initiatives of OA-10 personnel.
There were instances when some RATSG personnel were directed to perform PAFARU
related activities. However, they replied that since their Office is only an extension of A-10
and some of their activities are being undertaken by OA-10 personnel, then, A-10 will be in
better position to undertake the instruction. Unless a written publication is published by
HPAF detailing the accreditation process, then, it is expected that the same level of
disenchantment of RATSG personnel will continue.

In addition, the military unit designation assigned to PAFARUS was not in

accordance with the existing policies in organizing units as prescribed by PAF Manual 17-
3 dated April 1982 because A-3 was not involved in this activity. A-10 through the Director,
Reserve Force Development issued military unit designation to PAFARUS applicants
without any coordination with A-3. Recently, A-10 requested A-3 for revalidation of the
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Table of Organization & Equipment (TO & E) of the 4443 Rescue Light Airlift Squadron, a
PAFARU. Said TO & E will be used in determining the rank distribution for the personnel of
the Unit. Unluckily, after a thorough revalidation of the TO&E by the Management
Engineering Team (MET) from the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, OA-3, it was
found out that the PAFARU can not even be considered a squadron due to its limited
aircraft and manpower inventory. Hence, its present designation should be downgraded to
a flight instead of being a squadron. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7077 clearly provides
that organization, structure, manning and equipment of reserved units shall confirm to the
organization of the regular force. It is safe to assume that this shortcoming had happened
because of pressure, inaccurate/hasty initial validation of its personnel/equipment prior to
its accreditation or for lack of clear cut policy or procedure on the accreditation.

In reality, Circular Number 6 does not provide any provisions with respect to
Background Investigation Check (BIC) of PAFARUS applicants including its employees.
However, it provides that security clearance for the employees of PAFARUS cannot be
waived. The strict conduct of BIC to an applicant is a must that should be conducted
accordingly and cannot be done half haphazardly. Personnel who can pose threat to
national security should be barred from entering the military service. Based from the
interviews I conducted with some personnel of the ACCS for Intel, C-2, ARC, they revealed
that only limited BIC was conducted to these companies before they were accredited as
PAFARUS. The Command can only hope that nobody from the roster of employees of
these PAFARUS are members of any underground movement or espousing instability.
Nowadays, many companies and corporations have been infiltrated by members of the
underground movement in disguise of being members of cause-oriented groups.
Remember the saying “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”. At least if BIC
was conducted properly, the possibility of having infiltrators through the PAFARUS will be
reduced.

Another problem besetting the process is the long, tedious and bureaucratic
procedures in conferring officer rank. The current accreditation process provides that the
commissionship papers of the officers of PAFARUS applicants will be sent to the
President through proper channels and this can only be done after the completion of the
MOT unlike the enlisted personnel where ranks can immediately be conferred to them after
the completion of the MOT. Consider the amount of time these company officers will
spend waiting for the approval of their commissionship, the enthusiasm sometimes wears
off. The ultimate loser will be the Command because of the amount of resources and
initiatives the PAF has already invested into these officers. There was even a company
where only the CEO was commissioned and none of the personnel in the company was
conferred the military rank. In case of mobilization, said officers of the PAFARU will not
have any control personnel to command and the command cannot impose its orders.

Another short fall of the current practice is the failure of the employees of the
PAFARUS to undergo a Physical Examination (PE) that will qualify them into the military
service. Interviews revealed that PAFARU employees only underwent very limited physical
test before they undertook the MOT. Since the PE conducted to them was not stringent,
chances are that some of the PAFARU employees are not physically fit for military
training. It is quite a luck that until today, nobody from PAFARU personnel who had
undergone MOT had perished during the training.

With the PAF motto “One Mission Many Roles”, the Command expects plenty of
activities which may not be accomplished by the PAF using its active personnel and its
dwindling resources. In this situation, the Command will really feel the need for the help
from the PAFARUS be it in terms of manpower, equipment, supplies, and other resources.
Relatedly, our records will show that for the last 6 years, an average of 17 typhoons
passed though our country yearly. Normally, destruction of properties and human
sufferings as an aftermath of typhoons are severe and damages. The destructive effects of
the typhoons and earthquakes, airplane crashes and other calamities may compel the
regular PAF component to be too pre-occupied with the conduct of search and rescue,
relief and rehabilitation and possible medical-dental missions to the affected population
and take their time off to the real mandate of the Command. Experience will tell us that
whenever something goes wrong and becomes uncontrollable, specially during times of
calamities, the government usually calls up the AFP, to conduct immediate actions in as
much as the AFP is the only entity that is well organized and ready to respond at a
moment’s notice. During these times of emergency, the AFP can further utilize the
PAFARUS and perform missions related to relief and rehabilitation in the calamity affected
area. Based on records on file at RATSG, the PAFARUS had already conducted 13
Medical-Dental civac missions, treated 14,032 patients and rescued 10 people in two
daring rescue operations since 1998. With this downloading of task to PAFARUS, the
regular component of the PAF can concentrate on its primary mission of air defense and
support to surface forces. The author honestly feels that with these realities, the PAF
really needs an unlimited number of PAFARUS; provided that these companies will
successfully passed the stringent accreditation requirements and process of PAFARUS
affiliation.

The situation at HPAF today in as far as the PAFARUS accreditation is concerned

is similar to a law that has been enacted but waiting for the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR). This resulted to confusion and varied interpretations since Circular No.
6, GHQ, AFP, contains general provisions. The provisions were interpreted differently by
different Heads of offices and personnel working on the process. In these aspects,
personality and subjectivity were very prevalent. In our regimented organization where
completeness, objectivity and preciseness are requisites in our day to day activities,
doubts and assumptions must be reduced to the minimum. This is the reason why at any
level of Command, Operation Plan, Implementing Plan, Fragmentation Order, Addenda,
and Radio Messages are written, transmitted and published very clearly so that the order,
instructions, procedures will be understood and implemented correctly. Little elbowroom
can be given for personnel interpretation. Likewise, in the field of education, a written, well
discussed and defined Program of Instructions (POI) will be a good basis for the conduct
of the course. Subjectivity if not eliminated will be reduced at barest minimum and
hopefully better output will be produced.

It can be deduced that in the absence of a written document as basis for PAFARUS
accreditation of HPAF, personality of the implementers maybe always subjective. It is
about time, HPAF must solve this shortcoming since the avalanche of applications from
PAFARUS applicants is still about to come. Unless HPAF comes out with a written
document in accrediting PAFARU applicants, the degree of objectivity will always be
sacrificed in favor of the wealthy, corrupt and the powerful. In this case, professionalism
in the military service will not be achieved since the PAFARUS that are not properly
accredited will already become part and parcel of the military service.

Finally, there is really a need for HPAF to publish a written Letter Directive to
govern the process of accreditation of PAFARUS applicants.
ATTACK TALE

SF- 260TP Blasted Nur’s House

By MAJOR JESS D MADLANGBAYAN PAF

When the Jaguars are set foot at ACP Zamboanga on the morning of 21 November
2001 on its first deployment mission under a new guise as the SF-260TP Warriors (coined
as the multi-cab), the Edwin Andrew Air Base fightline was heaving like a combat zone.
Piles of iron bombs were seen on the backside of the parking ramp, 2 OV-10s were being
uploaded with 4 Mk-82 (500lb) bombs each, 2 MG-520s loaded with rockets and machine
guns were flying over the area, 1 C-130 had just landed carrying reinforcement troops, and
scores of high ranking Army and Air Force officers were boarding the 4 UH- 1Hs bound for
Jolo.

rd
Just after the 3 TPs completed their engine shutdown, BGEN NELSON ENSLAO, 3
TOW Commander, approached the pilots and enthusiastically welcomed them to the “war
zone”.

Be ready for an airstrike anytime, we need you here… go! Go! Go! As he pumped
his first in assurance.

Meanwhile, the O-10s and the MG-520s were conducting airstrikes in succession
for 3 straight days in the hinterlands of Jolo, Sulu against the MNLF rebels loyal to
outgoing ARMM Governor Nur Misuari. The chaos started when MNLF rebels began
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pounding the 104 Bde, PA and the TOG 9, Jolo with mortars at the dawn of 19 Nov 2001.
Although the damage done was minimal, such incident signaled the counter- strike by the
military. Three MNLF strongholds were blasted with rockets and bombs for the past 3 days
leaving heavy casualties on the rebel side. From their original strongholds, the rebels were
forced by the combined aerial bombardment and ground assault to withdraw to the
mountainsides.

The TP pilots, fresh from a weeklong gunnery-training mission at Crow Valley

Range were so eager to test their mettle in real combat scenario. While the OV-10 and MG-
520 pilots were throttling along with successive airstrike missions. The TP pilots waited in
th
earnest on when their first combat mission will begin. The good news came when the 15
Strike Wing attack pilots were called upon to report at SOUTHCOM HQS for target briefing.
The primary target came out to be the house of Nur Misuari in Silangka, Sulu, about 20
miles from Jolo town. Since the target is situated within the populated area, rocket (2.75”
FFAR) is decided to be the most appropriate ordnance for such to avoid hitting nearby
houses, hence a perfect chance for the TP.

On 1030H 22 Nov, flight of 3 SF-260TP took off for Sulu Island with the mission:
“destroy the house of Nur Misuari in Silangkan”. Coursing the route through GPS-195
Tracker, the Jaguars reached the target area after about 35 minutes of flight. “Jaguars,
check your sight” the leader ordered as the flight circled the target for positive
identification. The Wingmen radioed “Tally ho! The target”, that is the bungalow type
house painted in blue in the middle of row of houses along the shoreline. The pilots knew
that they only have a couple of chances for a high angle delivery and a very low release
altitude before the enemy’s. 50 Cal Machine Gun gets active.
 Pumping high with adrenalin, the lead pilot descends to 1,500ft pattern altitude and
initiates roll-in to target. “It must be a sure hit… it must be”, the pilot muttered as he
tracked the pipper onto the target. The altitude countdown began… 1,200 ft… 1000 ft… 800
ft… fire! Then “kaboom!” 4 K223 rockets blasted out from the launcher and smacked right
into the target. Four gaping holes appeared on the center of the roof. With that the
remaining rocket propellant and warhead explosions are sure enough to penetrate the soft
roof and start the fire. Seconds later, thick smoke and traces of flame billowed from the
holes. The Wingmen (2 TPs) fired their shots on the immediate vicinity of the house to
ensure that nothing of the target left untouched.

The Jaguars then proceeded to their next target: a cluster of nipa houses at the
foot of Mt Tukay reported to be a rallying point of the withdrawing rebel forces. To say the
least, the targets were totally destroyed after a series of precision rocketry by the Jaguars.
As they headed home, the Jaguars saw from a distant a towering smoke from the House of
Nur, still burning.

With that, the maiden combat mission flight of the SF-260TP was concluded
successfully and, indeed, very fulfilling as regards to the value of the target hit. The
precision targeting and pilot’s bravery proved once again the professionalism of PAF
pilots.

In the aftermath of these clashes, the Air Force blasted several Misuari’s hideouts
in 4 Sulu towns leaving 113 killed, including 100 rebels while the ground troops captured
at least 5 MNLF camps in Jolo.
 National Search and Rescue Plan
- An imperative
By CPT IAN DC VIVES PAF

Search and Rescue (SAR) is a very delicate and dangerous undertaking. As

such, for SAR to be safe and successful it must be governed by universal rules and
principles, it must have methods, and it must have order. SAR as a system must be
embodied into a set of well defined documents to guide all players in a SAR system.

International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual

In 1998, two agencies of the United Nations devoted to aeronautical and maritime
transportation safety, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) respectively, came up with the International
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual). “The primary
purpose of the three volumes of the IAMSAR manual is to assist States in meeting their
own Search And Rescue (SAR) needs, and the obligations they accepted under the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, the International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS)”- The Philippine Government is a signatory to these conventions. Any
commitment made by the government in the conventions is expected by the international
community to be fulfilled.

The manual provides guidelines to a “common approach” and “harmonization” of

states toward SAR: it is the accepted standards on SAR efforts worldwide. Evidently, the
manual aims to professionalize global SAR services.

Search and Rescue as a System

The Philippines being a signatory to international air and maritime organization

conventions is tasked to set-up a SAR system. The major component of the global SAR
system is the Rescue Coordination Center (PRCC) responsible for SAR services within its
Search and Rescue Region (SRR), which incidentally is the Flight Information Region (FIR)
of each state, as part of a global SAR system; ICAO’s Annex 12 and the International
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue require that SAR providers establish an RCC
for each SRR. RCC is on top of the SAR organizational hierarchy.

Other organizational components are the following:

1. Rescue Sub-center (RSC) – support an RCC within its SRR.

2. SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC) – responsible in handling a SAR

incident

3. On-scene Coordinator (OSC) – coordinates the on-scene activities of

all participating facilities.
 4. Search and Rescue Unit (SRU) – Unit with specialized equipment and
trained personnel, as well as other resources which can be used to
conduct SAR operations.

Present Philippine SAR System Set-up

The Philippine Rescue Coordination Center (PRCC), as mandated internationally, is

the lead agency when aeronautical and maritime disasters occur. While the National
Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) through the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) is
responsible with regard to natural or man-made disasters. Through NDCC has the
mandate to take charge of disaster management in the entire country, it does not have the
competence possessed by PRCC when it comes to aeronautical and maritime disasters. In
many cases however OCD takes over aeronautical and maritime disasters even if they are
not the experts in this field. Usually, PRCC people help in the SAR effort behind the scene
as it is being overshadowed by NDCC people. Both agencies do not have the resources to
mount an effective SAR effort because both depend primarily on the AFP on the
operational aspects remotely direct the operation with people from the AFP, usually the
designated Task Force Commander (an SMC) calling the shots.

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Usually the Philippine Air Force through 505 Search and Rescue Group is first on
the scene as they are the only unit with specialized equipment, trained personnel and air
assets to react immediately. But when NDCC steps in and assigns it own SMC or Task
th
Force Commander and OSC, 505 SRG people give way.

The reluctance of PRCC to assert its mandate during aeronautical and maritime
situations is incomprehensible. PRCC personnel in this aspect are trained well to handle
the situation than NDCC personnel; They are trained on how to “direct” SAR operations
following international procedures – procedures espoused by ICAO and IMO. Air and sea
mishaps have “technical and legal” aspects that SAR players have to deal with, that is why
designated SMC and OSC must be from PRCC.

th
As defined by the IAMSAR Manual, 505 SRG is a mere Search and Rescue Unit
(SRU) which can be directed by higher agencies like the PRCC and NDCC through the
Office of Civil Defense (OCD) to perform search and rescue missions. In reality however,
th th
the 505 SRG can be described as a SAR System in its own right; 505 SRG possess all
the components of a SAR System and performs the roles of any SAR player – it can ably
perform the function of NDCC, RCC, RSC, SMC, OSC, and SRU at the same time as
experience would show. The Unit most of the time is first on the disaster site and
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therefore, assumes the role of an on-scene-commander (OSC). The 505 SRG personnel
aggressively pursue the OSC and SMC role in many cases inasmuch as its resources are
used extensively in the SAR effort. They take orders from immediate superiors of their
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unit. Orders however, should come from PRCC or NDCC. The 505 SRG people could not
be blamed on their apparent one-man-army attitude as sometimes orders are vague and
confusing because of too many people wanting to join the fray – local government units,
local personalities, political personalities and even kibitzers are sometimes meddling. The
intention to help is noble, however, it just makes the situation more complicated.

Initial confusion is evident during the early stages of the SAR. Disorganization
result in miscoordination of SAR operations miscoordination. Swift reaction suffers
because of delays in the decision making process. The problem has been going on for too
long and up to the present.
 NIGHT SURFACE ATTACK OF OV-10 PILOTS

By 1LT ARNOLD P TAPIA PAF

The recent Mindanao crisis and the recurring Abu Sayyaf problem
revealed time and again the enemy's foremost advantage in protracted warfare knowledge
of terrain. They very well knew all avenues of approach leading to their camps and
strongholds making it difficult for the government forces to infiltrate and wipe their
defenses. Furthermore, they exploit this advantage to operate under the cover of darkness
by moving troops, logistics and other supplies. Thus, at the onset of dawn, our own troops
are left confounded where their next positions would be. As evident on the Mindanao
campaign last year, targets given the night before by ground forces are often changed the
following morning as soon as the sun rises.

Unknown to many, this dilemma was partly solved by the introduction of the
Night Surface Attack (NSA) tactics first tested in March 1995. It employed OV-10A aircraft
to illuminate a 3-mile zone representing a target after which airstrikes were conducted
using conventional tactics. One tactic employed is the use of a "Low level/Skip" bombing
considered one of the most accurate methods of delivering fall-away ordnance. Another is
the use of "Dive Attack" at an angle of 60 degrees, which is the most widely used daylight
delivery technique. The "Pop Up" technique was also applied simulating delivery on a
heavily defended encampment. Lastly, the so-called "Fighting Wheel" technique used for
flexibility and continuity of delivery was employed. All these sorties were conducted using
no-moon, half-moon and full-moon condition despite the absence of night surveillance
equipment.

Yearly after that, proficiency for pilots were conducted to further hone their skills
and adaptation towards this new tactics. It involves an academic phase where a review on
topics like spatial disorientation, instrument flying, cockpit lighting system, night
operation procedures, and night proficiency maneuvers are being thoroughly discussed.
During the initial flying phase, Instrument Approach Touch and Go and Formation
Navigation are conducted prior to an advance flying phase involving target acquisition,
Forward Air Control (FAC) procedures, and different delivery techniques.

The most recent and useful training for NSA was with the US Marines during the
Balikatan 2000 where the pilots of the OV-10A were introduced to Night Vision Goggles
(NVGs) eliminating the need for flares at no-moon condition. Furthermore, it was during
this exercise that the efficacy of the OV-10As for night mission operations were solidly
established due to its inherent attributes such as: navigational equipment (GPS, VOR,
TACAN IFF, ADF); communication package (VHF-AM, VHF-FM, UHF, HF); sufficient cockpit
lighting; endurance of 5 ½ hours; 300 nautical miles combat radius; paradrop capability
(five fully equipped paratroopers); and a wide variety of payload (2.75 FFAR, 110-750 lbs
Bx, .50 cal & M60 machineguns).

Although not yet applied on any formal conflict here in the Philippines, the OV-
10As were already being used for NSA during the 60's and early 70's in the war-torn
Vietnam. Its utilization proved successful in disrupting the supply flow of the famous Ho-
Chi Minh Trail, and supporting beleaguered outposts almost overrun by the Vietcongs.

In today's setting, we can apply this tactic when the enemies thought that they
have complete control of the night. In terms of reach, where conventional artillery could
not, NSA could. First, it can soften formidable defenses prior to a lightning assault by our
ground forces. During siege operation, re-supply and reinforcement at nighttime could be
spotted and bombed thereby isolating them from outside world. And whenever the enemy
decides to preposition their troops for the next day or simply leave their posts and
regroup elsewhere under the cover of darkness, our eyes in the sky would catch them
unaware with nowhere to hide.

Its implementation in the way we conduct war would redefine our own battlefront.
No longer will darkness be an enemy's ally. No longer will "rest and recuperation" be a
part of their vocabulary when the night comes. Constant bombardment striking from the
different positions would disorient them and give them second thoughts on their next
move. When there is chaos, individual morale will weaken. And all this would lead to their
eventual downfall.
 THE SURFACE ATTACK AIRCRAFT:

JET, PROPELLER OR ROTARY?

By CPT CHITO G MAYUGA PAF

BACKGROUND

Paragraph 2, section 5B of the AFP Modernization Law states that the Philippine
Air Force (PAF) must have the capability to provide air support to ground and naval
forces. The envisioned acquisition of the Surface Attack Aircraft (SAA) was deemed
essential to address this. However, because of the diversity of air support missions, which
include close air support, tactical strike, maritime attack and air interdiction among others,
the best platform type, that is jet, propeller or rotary driven aircraft has yet to be decided.

TERMS

Air Interdiction- air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the

enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly
forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission
with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. An action to divert, disrupt,
delay or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively
against friendly forces.

Air Munitions- air launched weapons, such as missiles, bombs, rockets, and other
ordnance required to conduct offensive and defensive military operations.

Close Air Support- air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to
friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of friendly surface forces.

Surface Attack Aircraft- a combat airplane designed primarily to carrying out

attacks on surface targets normally referred to as medium-value, such as hostile ships,
enemy defense installations and tactical targets. The aircraft will also be used as a lead-in
aircraft for fighter training.

DISCUSSION

Assessment of Threats
 The best angle of approach to determine which platform type the envisioned SAA
would be to address the PAF’s ground and naval air support role is to determine and study
the present threat and the perceived threat. The present threat revolves around internal
security operations. These include, in the recent past, close air support missions against
the MILF, the Abu Sayyaf, and through the years against the NPAs. The targets in CAS are
generally tactical in nature and of low value, which comprise bunkers, nipa huts and
highly mobile enemy troops. The threats to air assets that arise from CAS missions are 50
caliber machine guns and small arms fire. However, PAF strike units received intelligence
reports of shoulder borne surface to air missile possessed by the MILF during the Camp
Abu Bakar air campaign. This report, although not confirmed prompted strike aircraft to
release air munitions at higher altitude levels.

Besides CAS, air support also encompasses air interdiction under the present
threat. This particular mission was markedly demonstrated when the F-5s made the initial
strike against the heart of Camp Abu Bakar, without forward air control and when ground
troops are still far-off the premises of the camp.

The perceived threat arises from the tension at the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)
brought about by opposing claimant countries, which includes the Philippines. The
tension particularly heightened in 1995 when China erected structures at Mischief, a shoal
within R.P.’s 200nm EEZ. An armada of military vessels that were sighted northwest of
Pag-asa in 1996 hinted the threat of a foreign military take-over of the runway-laden island.
The threat to air assets in the KIG are ship borne long range surface to air missiles and
carrier borne fighter aircraft.

The Surface Attack Aircraft vis-à-vis the Threat

The envisaged SAA, in order to be effective must be able to address the present
tactical threat and the perceived strategic threat in order for it to satisfy the PAF’s role of
providing air support to ground and naval forces as required in the AFP Modernization
Program. Therefore the SAA must possess certain specific attributes and capabilities
consistent to the two-fold threat unique in R.P.’s defense landscape. The following
attributes are deemed essential in a tactical and strategic SAA:

a. Payload – the platform must have the capability to carry a large number of
conventional air-munitions i.e. Bombs, rockets and guns.

b. Range – the platform must have range and loiter to KIG.

c. STOL- short take-off and landing capable in unpaved runways

d. Sub-sonic – to negate the difficulty in visual targeting

e. Small turn radius – to negate the difficulty in visual targeting

f. Speed – the platform must have a respectable speed to travel the expanse
of the South China Sea and to survive surface to air fires

g. Less turn around time – to assure continuous combat operation

h. Survivability features – i.e. ejection features, armor plates etc.

i. Low operating cost – i.e. low fuel consumption, availability of spares etc.
 j. Upgrade possibilities – the platform must have the potential to be
interfaced with precision-guided munitions, anti-ship and anti-submarine munitions.

k. Limited air-to-air capability – must be capable of carrying air-to-air

missiles.

MATRIXED PLATFORM TYPE VS CAPABILITY

CAPABILITY JET PROPELLER ROTARY

Huge payload 4 4 7
Range 4 4 7
STOL 4 4 4
Sub-sonic 4 4 4
Small turn radius 4 4 4
Speed 4 7 7
Less turn around time unknown unknown unknown
Survivability features 4 unknown 7
Low operating cost 4 4 4
Upgrade possibilities 4 7 7
Limited air-to-air capability 4 7 7

The PAF’s role of providing air support to ground and naval forces as based on the
present threat and perceived threat implies that the SAA must have tactical and strategic
attributes and potential. As based on above matrix, it is the jet driven platform that is more
resilient to both potential. The jet SAA has both speed and limited air to air capability
essential in providing air support and cover to naval forces in the expanse of the South
China Sea. Likewise, it also has CAS potential because it is subsonic, has payload, has
range and endurance and is capable of take-off and landing in short, unpaved runways.

A propeller driven platform and a rotorcraft is more akin to tactical operations

only. Their potential in providing air support to naval forces is in question due to their lack
of speed. Furthermore, a rotorcraft has no range to KIG. Both platforms have no air to air
capability and the possibility of interfacing them with precision-guided munitions, anti-
ship and anti-submarine weapons appears to be in doubt.
There are however exceptions to these. The Argentine IA 58 PUCARA, although prop
driven, has air-to-air and anti-ship strike capabilities. Its maximum airspeed is Mach 1.
Nonetheless, the PUCARA is an exception rather than the rule. The weakness of the
PUCARA is its very long take-off roll of 3,500 ft. Moreover, the problem with prop driven
SAAs is its limited number of choices for selection. There are not many aircraft companies
that manufacture prop driven platforms in the strike role.

The acquisition and operating cost of both the prop driven SAA and the rotorcraft
is much less than the acquisition and operating cost of the jet SAA, therefore its use in the
tactical environment wherein targets are generally of low value appears to be more
suitable and feasible. The employment of a jet SAA in tactical situations targeting mere
bunkers and nipa huts seems to be incongruently costly. However this cost can be
negated as it can double-up as MRF lead-in trainer.

Additionally, it must also be assumed that in the future, the enemies of the state
will have the potential to destroy PAF air assets. It is no secret that a foreign country is
supplying the Abu Sayyaf arms and high caliber weapons. The possibility of shoulder
borne surface to air missile getting into its hands is very real and slow and low flying
aircraft are susceptible to these.

Considering above discussions, the PAF has the following options:

PAF OPTIONS

1. Option I: Acquisition of one squadron (12 aircraft) of Jet SAA

Advantages

Can address both tactical and strategic roles

Can double-up as MRF lead-in trainer

Numerous choices in the world market

Numerous using countries

Resilient to PGM interface

Disadvantages

Higher acquisition cost

Cost of operation may not be proportional to cost of targets in

the tactical scenario

2. OPTION II: Acquisition of one squadron of Prop driven SAA

Advantages

Not very costly to acquire and maybe to operate

 Can land in unprepared surfaces

Cost of operation in the tactical role is proportionate with costs

of target

Disadvantages

Not very many choices in the world market today

Lesser number of using countries

Only few are specifically designed in the strike role, others

are primarily trainers

No smart weapons kit

3. OPTION III: Mixed acquisition of both types

Advantages

Solves the problem of first two options

Aircraft specific missions: Prop SAA will be employed in CAS and

other tactical scenarios, Jet SAA will be employed at South China Sea for naval operations
support and will double up as lead in to MRF

Disadvantages

Cost of maintaining two types of aircraft

Problem of spares of two types aircraft

CONCLUSION:

1. The SAA must have the capability to address a two-fold threat: the present
threat, which is internal and tactical in nature, and the perceived threat, which revolves
around KIG claims, which are external and strategic in nature.

2. A Jet driven SAA is the most resilient and adaptable platform to address
both threats in that it has tactical capabilities in ISO; speed, range and limited air to air
capability in the strategic environment of naval support in the expanse of the South China
Sea. Its cost of operation against low value hostile targets may at times be not feasible,
however, this cost is negated as it has lead-in trainer potential to the MRF.

3. A propeller driven SAA is most suitable in the close air support and
counter-insurgency role in ISO. Its cost of operation is proportional to low value hostile
targets and its flight characteristics of low airspeed and small radius of turn is tailor made
in the environment of visual targeting. However, its naval support in the external
environment of the South China Sea and KIG has weaknesses because of airspeed
insufficiency and lack of air-to-air capability. Moreover, there are a limited number of
selection choices in the world market and few countries utilize this platform type
specifically in the attack role.
 4. A rotary aircraft is suitable and feasible in close air support and counter-
insurgency operations in ISO. However, it has a weakness in free fall bombs delivery as it
has no airspeed. It also has no speed and range in the expanse of the South China Sea for
naval support.

5. Of the three options cited, option three, that is mixed acquisition of a jet
and propeller driven platform appears to be the most acceptable, suitable and feasible
because the combination of both addresses the weaknesses of the other. However, a
deeper study must be delved into the cost of maintaining two types of aircraft against the
cost of maintaining just one type.

RECOMMENDATION:

A Jet driven SAA is the most adaptable and resilient platform for the PAF to
accomplish its air support role for ground and naval forces, however it has options to
acquire a combination of the jet type and the propeller type if deemed more feasible.
 410TH MAINTENANCE WING
STRATEGIC PLAN

By BRIG GEN RICARDO A FAUSTINO AFP

The main goal of the 410th Maintenance Wing strategic plan is the development of
the Depot Level Maintenance capabilities and the expansion of its coverage to serve at
least the major islands of the country through the Forward Area Maintenance Center
(FAMC) concept. The concept is envisioned to provide Non Destructive Inspection,
structural repair, oil analysis and other depot level services such as refill of firex to PAF
units in Visayas and Mindanao. This will entail deployment of personnel and equipment
but this has been considered and are incorporated in our plan.

The plan also envisions a single facility for Depot Level Maintenance for all aircraft
in the PAF inventory including repair and overhaul of engines and other major
components. One should be able to understand the levels of maintenance before he
appreciates why Depot level maintenance has to exist as a central unit. DLM requires
numerous man hours, highly trained technical work force and special equipment in order
to overhaul major and minor aircraft and engine components. With these jobs done by
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410 MW, the flying units can now concentrate on their flying operations and perform only
regular maintenance to their fleet.

At present, we are capable of performing structural repair and Non-Destructive

Inspection to all PAF aircraft. Our engine rehab capability is limited however to the T-53
engine. In the future we hope to cater to the different types of engines existing in the PAF
inventory together with the other aircraft components such as gear boxes, governors, and
hydraulics system of other types of aircraft in the PAF inventory.

We are optimistic that we can do this because we have the manpower skills that
can be utilized for the purpose. We have the technical expertise and in order to cater to
other aircraft types. We will only need the necessary manuals and special tools in order to
perform this job. Although this endeavor might entail a considerable amount as a whole,
we are slowly acquiring what we need in small quantities. We are also fortunate that we
were given the SF-260 M recovery project which served to refresh the minds of our
mechanics and specialist on the work to this type of aircraft.

All of these actions are geared towards the ultimate aim of the unit – the
centralization of Depot Level Maintenance. The realization of this goal however depends
on several factors over which this unit has no control. The foremost of these factors
involves the command policies and direction which will greatly affect the existence of the
unit, followed by the personalities of the different Commanders of flying units and equally
important are the funds that will keep our output as a constant figure at least. All these
factors are interrelated since Policies and direction taken by the Command may be
influenced by the personalities of the Commanders of different flying units which in turn
affects the distribution of funds for aircraft maintenance. A specific case is the funding
required for reparable cycle assets (RCA’s). Funds for RCA’s should be handled and
managed by this unit through the Air Logistics and Support Command. Funds are
essential factor in maintenance together with Technical expertise and skills of personnel
to do the job. The absence of one undermines the capabilities that we possess. It can also
affect our output in terms of the number of overhauled/ repair aircraft components.

The depot level maintenance plays a vital role in the acquisition of air assets via
the aircraft recovery program in the absence of the modernization fund. In fact it is the
only way to increase our aircraft fleet as of the moment.
 An Interview with the Vice Commander

QUIET ACHIEVER
MAJOR GENERAL NESTOR R SANTILLAN O-5591 is a member of the
Philippine Military Academy Class of 1970. He is also a graduate of various local and
international courses such as the Turbofan Engine Maintenance Course, Allied Officer
Course, Security Intelligence Officer Course, Advanced Security and Intelligence Course
and Squadron Officer Course in Maxwell, Alabama, USA. He was a recipient of the CG,
PAF award for exemplary performance when he completed his CGSC in 1986. He finished
his Master of Defense Studies at the University if New South Wales, Australia, in 1993.

A veteran pilot and well-decorated officer, MGEN SANTILLAN held different command and
staff positions in the Air Force. Among them were as Assistant Chief of Air Staff for
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Personnel (A-1), and Chief of Intelligence (A-2), Vice-Commander of 2 Air Division,
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Commandant of Air Command and Staff College, Wing Commander of 410 Maintenance
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Wing, Wing Commander of 220 Airlift Wing, and Commander of the Tactical Operations
Command.

In his two last positions of major responsibility, GEN SANTILLAN outstandingly

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pushed up unit readiness and operational achievements. As 220 Airlift Wing Commander,
he posted the highest OR rates for C-130s and N-22B Nomads in the last five years. And as
commander of the TOC, based in Mactan, he reinforced further the character of the Air
Force as a tactical force multiplier, especially in Mindanao.

He assumed the position Vice Commander, PAF, last 12 November 2001, succeeding
GENERAL GUILLERMO LORENZO. He is concurrently the Chairman of PAF Modernization
and Doctrines Boards. People close to him dub him as PAF’s “Quiet Achiever.”

<THE INTERVIEW>
AFR: How do you see your role as the new Vice Commander of the Philippine Air Force?

VC: My role essentially is to serve as the “spare tire” of the CG, PAF. But I clarified that in
my assumption speech also month. I said that a spare tire is used only when one of the
vehicle’s tires get busted. My job is to ensure that no tires actually get busted. A better
analogy would be that of a co-pilot or co-driver. I’ve got to to make sure I assist the CG in
all his activities and thrust for the Air Force. I’m glad that more or less I know his style. We
worked together at HPAF before and, more than that, I inherited his post as TOC
Commander in Mactan last year. I’m proud to say I was able to build on his kind of
command legacies.

AFR: How do you relate your assignment as TOC Commander to your present
responsibility?

TOC: Like I said, it afforded me the chance to build on something the CG,PAF did in
Mindanao. Familiarity with the CG, PAF’s work ethic is crucial for any commander, and I
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got that in Mactan, when I was yet the 220 AW Commander, who shared official
neighborhood with him. Knowing how the CG would react or treat certain issues or
approach a particular problem is definitely something I can use everyday as his Vice and
official alter ego. But over and beyond that, knowing how things fit and match in my higher
level is an advantage. You see, as TOC Commander, I implemented policy and led in
operations, I saw things from the ground up, I became personally acquainted with the PAF
problems in the field, I knew the pilots and mechanics and their families, and I developed
positive relations with the media and the communities we served. Today, as Vice
Commander, I see the big picture. What’s good about it is that I know hidden details
because of my exposure as TOC Commander.

AFR: There are five components of the PAF Modernization Program, do you think that
there should be a re-prioritization in its implementation?

VC: Let’s briefly review the program. The doctrines development, human resource
development, and force restructuring and organizational development have been actually
started. However, our objectives in these areas have not been fully realized due to several
constraints. The remaining two pillars-capability and material development and bases
support and systems development have been influenced heavily by the availability of
modernization money. While the Air Force or the AFP has not come up with any official
position yet, I personally believe that, yes, a reprioritization of objective must be done to
address new challenges. For the past few months, we have all witnessed the necessity of
modern technology with which to fight the terror. While other countries have now invested
heavily in platforms and systems that enhance target acquisition and ID from 30,000 feet
above sea level, and able to see and hit the enemy at night, we have mostly focused on the
other pillars. Changing the priorities is the reason our CG, PAF has been stressing the
importance of beefing up our capability through non-traditional sources.

AFR: As Chairman of various Committee of the Command, what are your plans in the near
future?

VC: As far as my Committee Chairs are concerned, I don’t see any drastic or dramatic
reforms that need to be undertaken. I believe my predecessors welfare of the airman. For
instance, our housing program is in full swing, the career development program of officers
is being rigidly implemented, and our projects management teams have their hands full.
What I can initiate perhaps is the creation of an Oversight Committee for the simultaneous
programs of the Air Force, but that would be adding another layer. Another thing that I can
pursue is the monitoring program started by General Lorenzo. With a no-nonsense
monitoring system covering the command and staff of the PAF, the top leadership can
better control and manage resources and build on the amount of valuable feedback from
the rest.
 LTCOL ELMER R AMON PAF (GSC), a new addition to the staff of the Commanding
General, PAF, is a graduate of Master of Development Administration (2001) from the
Asia Pacific School of Economics and Management at the Australian National
University (ANU); and a graduate of Master in Management Degree (1998) from the
Asian Institute of Management (AIM).

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He was formerly assigned as a tactical attack pilot with the 15 Strike Wing,
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PAF; S-211 aircraft combat-ready pilot and Wing Inspector General of the 5 Fighter
Wing, PAF; an instructor at the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC); Director for
Operations for the PAF Aviation Officers Candidate Scholl (PAFAOCS); Chief, Air
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Operations Center of the 3 Air Divisions; Chief Wing Operations Center and Squadron
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Commander with the 530 CTW in Zamboanga (now 3 TOW) before being nominated
for a NEDA sponsored scholarship in Australia in 1999 – 2001.