Mind Association

Computing Machinery and Intelligence Author(s): A. M. Turing Reviewed work(s): Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 236 (Oct., 1950), pp. 433-460 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251299 . Accessed: 24/11/2011 09:18
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No. 236.]

1950 [October,






Game. 1. The Imitation I PROPOSE tO considerthe question, 'Can machinesthink? of the meaningof the terms This shouldbeginwith definitions be framed 'machine' and 'think'. The definitions so as to might reflect so far as possiblethe normaluse of the words,but this attitudeis dangerous. If the meaningof the words'machine' and 'think'are to be found howtheyare commonly by examining used it is difficult to escape the conclusionthat the meaning to tlie question,' Can machines and the answer think? ' is to be such as a Gallup poll. But thisis soughtin a statistical survey sucha definition I shallreplace absurd. Insteadofattempting the whichis closely relatedto it and is expressed question by another, in relatively words. unambiguous The new formof the problemcan be describedin termsof a game whichwe call the 'imitationgame'. It is playedwith a man (A), a woman(B), and an interrogator threepeople, (C) who may be of eithersex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from two. The objectofthe game forthe interrogator the other is to determine whichof the othertwo is the man and whichis the woman. He knowsthemby labels X and Y, and at the end ' X is A and Y is B ' or ' X is B and Y ofthe gamehe says either is A'. The interrogator is allowedto put questions to A and B thus: C: Will X pleasetell me the length ofhis or herhair 2 Now suppose X is aetually A, then A must answer. It is A's
28 433

Q: Add 34957to 70764 A: (Pause about 30 secondsand thengive as answer)105621. but it willavail nothing as the man can makesimilar remarks. I nevercouldwrite poetry. one may ask.The ideal arrangeimaent is to have a teleprinter communicating between the two rooms. Critique oftheNew Problem. Thus: Q: Please write me a sonnet on the subject of the Forth Bridge. The form whichprevents the interrogator reflects thisfactin the condition or hearingtheir fromseeingor touching the othercompetitors. . Some otheradvantagesofthe proposed criterion may be shownup by specimen questionsand answers. Q: Do you play chess? A: Yes. 'Can machines think? 2.The objectofthegamefor thethird player(B) is to help the interrogator. We now ask the question.434 A.typewritten.The best strategy forher is probablyto give truthful answers.don't listento him! ' to heranswers. thereby cutting regress. M. or betterstill. The new problem has the advantageof drawing a fairly sharp line between and theintellectual thephysical capacitiesofa man. No engineer or chemistclaims to be able to producea material fromthe human skin.'What willhappenwhena machine takes thepartof A in thisgame ? ' Will the interrogator decide wrongly as oftenwhen the game is played like this as he does whenthe game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replaceour original. As well as asking. Alternatively the questionand answerscan be repeated byan intermediary. She can add such things as I am the woman. 'Is this new questiona worthy one to investigate ? ' This latter question we investigatewithout further shortan infinite ado. voices. His answermight therefore be 'My hair is shingled. have set the problem suchartificial flesh.but evensupposing that at sometimethismight thisinventionavailable we shouldfeeltherewas littlepointin trying it up in to make a 'thinking machine' morehumanby dressing in whichwe. and the longeststrandsare about nine incheslong..' In orderthat tones of voice may not help the interrogator the answersshouldbe written. A: Countme out on thisone.'What is the answerto thisnewform ofthe question'. It is possible whichis indistinguishable be done. TURING: objectin the game to tryand cause C to make the wrong identification.

You have only K at K6 and R at RI. and no otherpieces. answers thatwouldnaturally 3.but I thinkit is unlikely that thereis any greateffect of this kind. If the man wereto tryand pretend to be the machine he wouldclearly make a verypoorshowing. a machinecan be constructed to play the imitation game satisfactorily. He wouldbe given awayat oncebyslowness and inaccuracy in arithmetic. What do you play ? A: (After a pause of 15 seconds)R-R8 mate. wish It is natural thatweshould to permit kindofengineering every to be used in ourmachines. In any case thereis no intention to investigate herethe theory of the game.COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 435 Q: I have K at my Ki. The game may perhapsbe criticised on the groundthat the odds are weighted too heavilyagainstthe machine. we need not be troubled by thisobjection. Thismaybe. but the interrogator cannotdemandpracticaldemonstrations. The question and answer method seems to be suitable for introducing almostany one ofthe fields ofhumanendeavour that we wish to include. We also wishto allowthe technique or team of engineers than an engineer possibility may construct a machinewhichworks. One might for instance insist that the team of . concerned The questionwhichwe put in ? 1 will not be quite definite untilwe have specified what we mean by the word 'machine'. but whosemannerof operation cannot be satisfactorily described becausetheyhave by its constructors applied a methodwhich is largelyexperimental. The conditions of our game make thesedisabilities irrelevant. May notmachines carry out somethingwhichoughtto be described as thinking but whichis very different from whata man does ? This objection is a verystrong one.nevertheless. We do not wish to penalisethe machine for its inability to shinein beautycompetitions. wishto excludefrom themachines It is difficult the definitions so as to satisfy to frame thesethree conditions. if they consider it advisable. we menbornin theusual manner.as much as theyplease about their charms.strength or heroism. norto penalise a man forlosingin a race againstan aeroplane. and it will be assumed that the best strategy is to tryto provide be givenby a man. The 'witnesses' can brag.Finally. but at least we can say that if. It mightbe urged that when playingthe 'imitationgame' the best strategy for the machinemay possiblybe something other thanimitation ofthebehaviour ofa man. The Mlachines in theGame. It is yourmove.

of machineswith It may also be said that this identification like our criterion for 'thinking'. will only digital computers. digitalcomputers in working There are already a numberof digital computers and it maybe asked. This prompts abandon the requirement that everykind of techniqueshould be permitted. for it is probablypossible to rear a complete individualfrom a singlecell of the skin (say) of a man. M. and additions as a definition If we use the above explanation we shall be in .but thisis not important. He has also an unlimited supplyof paper on which he doeshiscalculations.but whether answer. and statistics A number compiled theright identification was given.'Why nottrythe experiment order. straight of the game. To do so would be a feat of biologicaltechniquedeserving of the very highestpraise.it turnsout that are unableto give a good showing in the game. Followingthis suggestion we onlypermit digitalcomputers to take part in our game. But this is onlythe short' in a diflerent We shall see thisquestion lightlater. if (contrary be unsatisfactory to my belief). To do this necessitates a shortaccountofthe natureand properties ofthese computers. The idea behinddigitalcomputers maybe explained by saying that these machinesare intendedto carryout any operations whichcouldbe donebya human computer. He mayalso do hismultiplications on a 'desk machine'. puterswhichwould do well.whichis alteredwhenever he is put on to a new job.usually called an ' electroniccomputer' or 'digital computer'. Thehumancomputer fixedrules. I shall attempt to showthat it is not so in reality. the conditions away ? It would be easy to satisfy of interrogators could be used. We may supposethat these to deviatefrom rulesare suppliedin a book.but we would not be inclinedto regardit as a a thinking case of 'constructing us to machine'. This restriction appears at first sightto be a verydrasticone. TURING: engineers should be all of one sex. he has no authority is supposedto be following themin any detail. but this would not really be satisfactory.' Theshort to showhow often all digitalcomputers answeris that we are not askingwhether the computers at present woulddo wellin the game norwhether thereare imaginablecomavailable would do well.436 A. 4. We are the moreready to do so in view of the in 'thinkingmachines' has been fact that the presentinterest aroused by a particularkind of machine. DigitalComputers.

a packet often decimaldigits. We have mentioned that the ' book of rules-'suppliedto the is replacedin the machineby a part of the store. The information in the storeis usuallybroken up intopackets of moderately small size. . Usually fairly lengthy operations can be done such as 'Multiply 3540675445by 7076345687' but in some machinesonly very simpleonessuchas 'Write down0 ' are possible.. The control is so constructed thatthisnecessarily happens. Numbers mightconsist are assigned to the parts of the storein whichthe various packets of information are stored. It is the dutyof the control to see that theseinstructions are obeyedcorrectly and in theright order. . 'Add the number. Here 17 says whichof variouspossibleoperations is to be performed on the two numbers. and corresponds to thehuman computer's paper.in some systematic manner. What these individualoperationsare will vary frommachineto machine. The executiveunit is the part whichcarriesout the various individual operationsinvolved in a calculation.COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 437 danger of circularity of argument.whether thisis the paper on whichhe does his calculations or that on whichhis book of rulesis printed. It computer is then called the 'table of instructions'. Needless to say it would not occurin the machineexpressed in English.but occasionallyan instruction such as . viz. forinstance. We avoid this by giving an outlineof the means by whichthe desiredeffect is achieved. (iii) Control. veryconveniently. It would more likelybe coded in a formsuch as 6809430217. In this case the operation is that describedabove. In one machine. (ii) Executiveunit. The storeis a storeofinformation. A typical instruction mightsay'Add the number storedin position6809 to that in 4302 and put the resultback into the latterstorageposition'. A digitalcomputer can usuallybe regarded as consisting ofthree parts: (i) Store.' It will be noticedthat the instruction takes up 10 digits and so forms one packetofinformation. In so faras the humancomputer does calculations in his head a partof the storewillcorrespond to his memory.The control will normally take the instructions to be obeyedin the orderof the positionsin whichthey are stored.

and then translate the answerinto the formof an instruction table.' Throw thedie process.438 A. instructions but the same to obey. Actual human comremember puters really whattheyhavegotto do. onesuchinstruction might such and put the resulting number into store1000'. Of courseonly a finite amountcan have been at any one time. is a An interesting varianton the idea of a digital computer element'. It is not normally possibleto determine fromobserving it has a random element. There Most actual digitalcomputers is no theoretical in the idea of a computer withan undifficulty part can have been used limitedstore.not fresh onesoverand overagain. Sometimes a machineis described as havingfreewill (thoughI would not use thisphrasemyself). have onlya finite store.Thesehaveinstructions 'digitalcomputer witha random involving the throwing of a die or some equivalentelectronic for instance be. according and that they can in fact we have described. but in doingso and over again until some condition on each repetition. and continuefrom there' or again may be encountered. Constructing instruction tables is usually describedas 'proto carryout the operagramming'. she can ask him she can stick up a notice afresheverymorning.otherwise on. M. a machinewhether fora similareffect can be producedby such devicesas making the choicesdependon the digitsof the decimalforw. To take a domestic analogy. Likewiseonly a finite . Suppose on MotherwantsTommyto call at the cobbler'severymorning his way to schoolto see if her shoes are done. mimic the actionsof a humancomputer we have described ourhumancomputer The bookofruleswhich as usingis of coursea convenient fiction.' continue straight becausethey Instructions oftheselattertypesare veryimportant make it possiblefora sequenceof operations to be repeatedover is fulfilled. to the principles veryclosely. TURING: ' Now obey the instruction storedin position5606. and indeed have been constructed. stored 'If position4505 contains0 obey next the instruction in 6707. Alternatively once and forall in the hall whichhe will see whenhe leaves for theshoes. To 'programme a machine table into the tion A' meansto put the appropriate instruction machineso thatit willdo A. can The readermustacceptit as a factthat digitalcomputers be constructed. and also to destroy schooland which tellshimto call for the noticewhenhe comesback ifhe has the shoeswithhim. If onewantsto make a machinemimicthe behaviourof the human computer in somecomplex operation one has to ask himhowit is done.

and sinceall digitalcomputersare in a senseequivalent.but for about them. Universality ofDigitalComputers. If we wish to find such we should look rather similarities formathematical analogiesof function.COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 439 constructed. The speedwhichwouldhave been available wouldbe definitely faster than a humancomputer but something like 100 timesslowerthan the Manchester machine. As an example of a most purposeswe can forget discretestate machinewe mightconsidera wheel whichclicks . and thatthenervous system also is electrical. Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambiidgefrom1828 to 1839. we see thatthisuse ofelectricity cannotbe oftheoretical importance. In certaincomputers the storagesystem is mainly acoustic. Charles Babbage. Strictly the possibility ofconfusion speakingthereare no such machines. but we can imaginemoreand morebeingadded as required. comes in wherefast signalling so that it is not surprising that we find it in both these connections. For for a lighting the switches instancein considering systemit is on or a convenient fiction that each switchmust be definitely off. Babbage's machinewas not electrical. The featureof using electricity is thus seen to be only a very superficial similarity.But thereare many kindsof machinewhichcan be thought profitably of as being discretestate machines. There must be intermediate definitely positions. Ofcourseelectricity usually is concerned. 5. itselfone of the slower of the modernmachines.tition. Everything reallymoves continuously. Such computers have special theoretical interest and will be called infinitive capacitycomputers.called the AnalyticalEngine. his machinewas not at that time such a very attractive prospect. usingwheelsand cards. planned such a machine. The factthat Babbage's AnalyticalEnginewas to be entirely willhelpus to ridourselves mechanical ofa supers. In the nervous systemchemicalphenomenaare at least as important as electrical. The idea ofa digitalcomputer is an old one. These are the state machines classified the ' discrete amongst one quite machineswhichmove by suddenjumps or clicksfrom for different definite stateto another. AlthoughBabbage had all the essentialideas. but it was never completed. in the last sectionmay be considered The digital computers '. Sinc'. The storage was to be purelymechanical. Thesestatesare sufficiently between themto be ignored. Importance is often attachedto the factthat modern digitalcomputers are electrical.

They can be number described by suchtablesprovided theyhave onlya finite ofpossiblestates. the only externallyvisible indicationof the internal state (the light)are described by the table State q1 Output 00 q2 0? q3 01 This exampleis typicalof discrete state machines.but may be stopped by a leverwhichcan be operatedfrom outside. The displacement single electronby a billionthof a centimetre at one moment mightmake the difference betweena man being killed by an avalanche a year later.or escaping. Even whenwe considerthe actual physicalmachinesinstead of the idealised machines.reasonablyaccurate knowledgeof the state at one momentyields reasonablyaccurate knowledgeany numberof stepslater. The internalstate of the machine(whichis described by the position of thewheel)maybe of lever). This is reminiscent of Laplace's view that fromthe complete state of the universe at one moment oftime. It will seem that given the initial state of the machineand all future the inputsignalsit is alwayspossibleto predict states. q2 or q3. however. rather than that considered nearerto practicability by Laplace. .as described by the it should be possibleto positionsand velocitiesof all particles.440 A. M. in additiona lamp is to lightin one ofthe positions ofthe wheel. It is an essentialproperty of the mechanicalsystems whichwe have called 'discrete state machines' that thisphenomenon does notoccur. The predictioil is. TURING: round through120? once a second. Thereis an inputsignali0 or i1 (position The internal stateat any moment is determined by the last state and inputsignalaccording to the table Last State q1 i0 q2 q2 q3 q2 q3 q1 q3 Input ?i q1 The output signals. The systemof the 'universe as a whole' is such that quite small errorsin the initial conditionscan have an of a overwhelming effectat a later time. ql. we are considering predict all future which states. This machine could be describedabstractlyas follows.

' to about 300 making amounts to a discretestate machineit Given the table corresponding is possibleto predictwhat it will do. If their capacitiesmust be added two machinesare put together to obtain the capacityof the resultant machine.000 and the wheel machineof our example about 1-6.e. i. Miscellaneous a total of 174. Providedit could be carriedout sufficiently could mimicthe behaviour of any discrete the digitalcomputer the statemachine. about 1505?. There is no reason why this calculationshouldnot be carriedout by means of a digital quickly computer. They can all. The logarithm of statesis usuallycalled the 'storage capacity' of the machine. i. machinehas a storagecapacity of about Thus the Manchester 165.it is unnecessary to designvariousnew derations machinesto do various computing processes. to see whythe number of states shouldbe so It is not difficult includesa store corresponding to the immense. The imitation gamecouldthenbe playedwith machinein question(as B) and the mimicking digitalcomputer wouldbe unable to distinguish them. For such a machine is capable is usually enormously at Manchester instance. 10150. be .000. For simplicity suppose mighthave been written 0 to 9 are used as symbols. The existenceof machines that they are universal has the important with this property consequencethat. is described by saying machines. Suppose the computer is allowed 100 handwriting 50 lines each withroomfor30 sheetsof paper each containing digits. Then the numberof states is 10100X5OX30. it must capacity as well as working sufficiently foreach new machinewhichit is desired afresh be programmed to mimic. digitalcomputers of discretestate machines. This leads to of statements such as 'The Manchester machine the possibility contains64 magnetic trackseach witha capacityof 2560. But the numberof states of which large. Moreover.000. It mustbe possibleto write of symbolswhich into the store any one of the combinations on the paper. that they can mimic any discrete state machine.e.??. (as A) and the interrogator must have an adequate storage Of coursethe digital computer fast. This special propertyof digital computers. Variations in that onlydigitsfrom are ignored.380. Compare of the clicking wheel describedabove. the number forthemachine nowworking thiswithourexample it about 2165. of statesof threeManchester This is about the number machines to the base two of the number put together.COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 441 fall within the class As we have mentioned. The computer paper used by a humancomputer. which had three states. eight storage electronic tubes with a capacityof 1280. consiof speed apart.

We may now consideragain the pointraisedat the end of ?3. Nevertheless theendofthecentury theuseofwords andgeneral educated opinion willhavealtered so much thatonewillbe able to speakofmachines without thinking expecting to be contradicted.chanceofmaking the rightidentification afterfiveminutesof questioning. its suitably increasing speedofaction. and providing it withan appropriate programme. TURING: done with one digital computer. suitablyprogrammed foreach case. The popularview that scientists proceedinexorably fromwellestablishedfact to well-established fact. Consider beliefs form first themoreaccurate ofthe question. no harm can result. It was suggested tentatively that the question. to make themplay the imitation game so well that an average interrogator willnothave more than70 percent. witha storagecapacityof about 109. for opinionswill differ as to the appropriateness of the substitution and we must at least listento what has to be said in this connexion. Providedit is by any unprovedconjecture. It willsimplify matters forthe readerif I explainfirst my own in thematter. M. Conjectures are of greatimportance since linesof research. C can be madeto play satisfactorily thepartofA in theimitation game.neverbeing influenced is quite mistaken. I believefurther that no useful purpose is served by concealingthese beliefs. We cannotaltogether abandonthe original form ofthe problem.'Can machinesthink ? ' I believe to be too to deserve I believethat at meaningless discussion. 'Let us fix our attention on oneparticular digitalcomputer C. It willbe seenthatas a consequence ofthisall digitalcomputersare in a senseequivalent.442 A. Contrary Viewson theMain Question. I believe thatin a-bout fifty years'timeit willbe possible to programme computers. The originalquestion. theysuggest useful . 'Can machines think? ' and thevariantofit quotedat the endofthelast section. We may now consider the groundto have been clearedanldwe are readyto proceed to thedebateon ourquestion.'Can machines think? ' should be replaced by 'Are there imaginabledigital computerswhich would do well in the imitationgame ? ' If we wish we can make this superficially more generaland ask 'Are there discrete state machines which would do well? ' But in view of the universality property we see that eitherof these questionsis equivalentto this. Is it truethatbymodifying this computer to have an adequate storage.the partof B beingtakenby a man ? 6. made clear whichare proved facts and whichare conjectures.

How do Christians regard theMoslemview that womenhave no souls? But let us leave this point aside and return to the main argument. I am unable to accept any part of this. An argument ofexactlysimilar form maybe madefor thecase ofmachines.anymorethan we are in the procreation of children: ratherwe a-re. . inanimatethan there is betweenman and the other animals. It appears to me that the argument quotedabove impliesa seriousrestriction of the omnipotenceof the Almighty. It is admittedthat thereare certain thingsthat He cannotdo such as makingone equal to two. " And the sun stood still . cumstances In attempting to constructsuch machineswe should not be irreverently usurping His powerofcreating souls. quoted by Bertrand Russell. and hasted not to go down about a whole day " (Joshuax. But this reallyonly means that we thinkit would be less likelythat He would consider the circumstances suitableforconferring a soul. but will attemptto reply in theological terms. Hence no animal or machine can think. Such arguments in the past. but only a resultof the fact that men's souls are immortal. 1Possibly thisviewis heretical. have often beenfound unsatisfactory In the time of Galileo it was arguedthat the texts. betweenthe typical animate and the difference. However. instruments ofHis willproviding mansions for the souls that He creates.this is mere speculation. Thomas Aquinas(Summa Theologica.but should we not believethat He has freedom a soul on to confer an elephantif He sees fit? We mightexpectthat He would only exercise this powerin conjunction with a mutationwhich providedthe elephantwith an appropriately improvedbrainto minister to theneedsofthissoul. But thismaynotbe a realrestriction onHis powers. I am not veryimpressed withtheological arguments whatever theymaybe usedto support. I should findthe argument more ifanimalswereclassedwithmen. (1) The Theological Objection. Godhas givenan immortal soul to every manand woman. .p.COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 443 I now proceedto consider opinions opposedto my own. in either case. The cirin questionare discussedin the rest of this paper.forthereis a greater convincing to my mind. .St.but not to any otheranimal or to machines. The arbitrary character of the orthodox view becomesclearerif we consider how it mightappear to a memberof some other religious community. Thinking is a function of man's immortal soul. It mayseemdifferent because it is moredifficult to " swallow". and therefore indestructible. 13) and " He laid the foundations of the earth. 480) statesthat God cannotmake a man to have no soul.

Let us hope and of machinesthinking believethattheycannotdo so. resultsdue to Church. to givean answer at all however Theremay.Rosser. Consolation ofsouls. The result and machines interms machines. is clearly argument position.' statements logicalsystem powerful showsthat in any sufficiently be provednor disproved whichcan neither can be formulated is inconsistent. of course.and are more inclinedto base theirbelief ofMan on thispower. The popalarityof the theological in inwiththisfeeling. Withour present ofthe Copernican adequate refutation appears futile. The to the powersof discrete-state are limitations and best knownof these resultsis knownas G6del's theorem. in the superiority substantial is sufficiently I do not thinkthat this argument would be moreappropriate: to requirerefutation. The latterresultis the most conwhereas to machines. in the transmigration perhapsthisshouldbe sought ofresults Objection. itself thesystem unlesspossibly within the system.and questions whichcannotbe answered by one machinemay be satisfactorily 1Author's to the Bibliography. If it is rigged up to thatsucha machine certain things game.and Turing. Kleene. indirect argument: can onlybe used in a comparatively the others is to be used we need in addition if G6del'stheorem forinstance logical systemsin termsof to have some means of describing in oflogicalsystems.or fail givea wrong it willeither to which somequestions muchtimeis allowedfora reply. It is likelyto be quite strong connected more tellectualpeople. Thereare a number (3) The Mathematical of mathematical logic which can be used to show that there machines. 5) were an theory.therewill be as in the imitation to questions giveanswers answer. a digital whichis essentially refers to a typeof machine question capacity. When that knowsuch an argument knowledge impression. It states that there are computerwith an infinite cannotdo. M." is seldomexpressedquite so openlyas in the This argument mostof us who thinkabout it at all. TURING: that it should not move at any time" (Psalm cv. in some respects Thereare other. similar. But it affects to the We liketo believethatMan is in somesubtleway superior rest of creation. It is best if he can be shownto be necessarily his commanding ofhimlosing is no danger for thenthere superior. namesin italicsrefer .be many such questions. ledgewas notavailableit made a quitedifferent (2) The 'Heads in theSand' Objection. since they value the power of thinking highlythan others. form above. directly sinceit refers venientto consider. " The consequences would be too dreadful.444 A.

" Consider specified as follows. We are ofcoursesupposing that the questionsare of the kind to whichan answer 'Yes ' rather than questionssuch as 'What do or 'No' is appropriate.buitI do not thinktoo much importanceshould be attached to it. and so on. No mechanism it had written . would probablynot be interested is very Consciousness. But I do not thinkthis view can be dismissed Whenever one of these machines is asked the appropriate we knowthat this answer. " Not untila machinecan writea sonnet or composea concertobecause of thoughtsand emotionsfelt. to result: it is arguedthat it proves a disabilityof machines is not subject. Those who believe in the two previousobjections in any criteria.COMPUTING MACHINEkY AND INTELLIGENCE 445 for thepresent answered by another. and givesa definite criticalquestion. be no questionof triumphing simultaneously In short..Thisargument (4) The Aryumentfrom Jefferson's Lister Orationfor 1949.could we agree that machineequals brain-that is. . thatno such limitations quite so lightly. you think of Picasso ?-' The questions that we know the the machine machinesmust fail on are of this type. and not by the chance fall of symbols. not onlywriteit but Inow that could feel (and not merely it.it has only been stated. I think.there mightbe men clevererthan any given but thenagain theremightbe othermachinescleverer machine. again. wouLld. whichthe humanintellect The short answer to this argumentis that although it is establishedthat there are limitationsto the powers of any particularmachine. Will this machineever answer'Yes' to any question? " The dots are to be replaced by a deswhich could be criptionof some machinein a standardform. When the machinedescribed something simple relationto the machine bears a certaincomparatively it can be shownthat the answer whichis underinterrogation. like that used in ? 5. apply to the human intellect.then. withoutany sort of proof. There would over all machines. argument Those whoholdto the mathematical game as a basis for mostlybe willingto accept the imitation discussion. well expressedin Professor from whichI quote.Is this feelingillusory? It is no doubt quite genuine. . This is the mathematical is eitherwrongor not forthcoming.and this gives us a certainfeelingof superiority. We too oftengive wronganswersto questions in beingverypleased at suchevidenceof ourselves to be justified our superiority fallibility on the part ofthe machines. to theonemachine can onlybe felt on suchan occasionin relation over whichwe have scored our petty triumph. answer must be wrong. Further.

Jefferson does not wish to adopt I am sure that Professor and solipsist the extreme pointof view. is a winter'sday. to a winter's Witness: Yes. Pickwickwould mindthe comparison. It is in factthe solipsist pointofview. What wouldProfessor say ifthe sonnet? I likethis in the vivavoce was able to answer machine writing he would regardthe machineas 'merely do not knowwhether . According to the mostextreme form ofthisview the only way by whichone could be surethat a machinethinksis to be the machineand to feel oneself thinking. TURING: artificially signal. be made miserableby its mistakes. Probablyhe would be to accept the imitation quite willing game as a test. griefwhen its valves fuse. Let understands something us listenin to a partofsucha vivavoce: Interrogator: In the firstline of your sonnet which reads ' Shall I comparethee to a summer's day '. One could then describe these feelings to the world. and I do not Interrogator: Yet Christmas thinkMr. but nobodywantsto be compared day. Would you say Mr. be angryor depressedwhenit cannot -getwhat it wants.but of course no one would be justified in taking any notice. Insteadofarguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite conventionthat everyone thinks. Likewise accordingto this view the only way to know that a man thinksis to be that particular man. rather Christmas. be warmed by flattery. By a winter'sday one than a special one like means a typicalwinter's day. M. The game (with the player B omitted) is frequently used in practice someone really underthe name of viva voceto discover whether or has ' learntit parrotfashion'. would not ' a spring day ' do as well or better? Witness: It wouldn'tscan.446 A. Witness: I don't thinkyou're serious. be charmedby sex. A is liable to believe 'A thinksbut B does not' whilst B believes' B thinks but A does not '. Jefferson And so on. Interrogator: How about ' a winter'sday' That would scan all right.tor: ? Christmas Witness: In a way. It may be the mostlogicalview to hold but it makes communication of ideas difficult. Pickwickremindedyou of Interroga.an easy contrivance) pleasureat its successes." This argument appears to be a denial of the validityof our test.

Thereis. (5) Argumentsfrom Disabilities. 456 f. 449). each is designedfor a very limitedpurpose. I think. 448). make mistakes (p. do all the but you will neverbe able to make thingsyou have mentioned one to do X". fallin love. Fromwhat he sees ofthemhe drawsa number ofgeneral conclusions.etc.).when requiredfora minutely different purposethey are useless.COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 447 ' theseanswers. Naturallyhe concludesthat these are necessaryproperties of machinesin general. 448). but if the answerswere as artificially signalling and sustainedas in the above passage I do not satisfactory think he would describeit as 'an easy contrivance'. do something reallynew (p.enjoystrawberries and cream(p. Many of these limitations are associated withthe verysmall storagecapacityof most machines. appropriate switching In shortthen.make some one fall in love with it. I believe founded on the principle theyare mostly of scientific induction. resourceful. in the machineof a recordof someonereadinga sonnet. mystery something of a paradox connected withany attemptto localiseit. be the subjectof its own thought(p. beautiful..have initiative. forinstance. friendly (p. NumerousfeaturesX are suggestedin this a selection: connexion. have a sense of humour. 448). A manhas seenthousands ofmachines inhislifetime. 450).I thinkthat most of those who supportthe could be persuadedto abandon it from consciousness argument rather thanbe forced intothe solipsist position. I do not wishto give the impression that I thinkthereis no about consciousness. They willthen probably be willing to accept ourtest. (Someofthesedisabilities are givenspecial as indicatedby the page numbers. use words properly. learnfrom experience (pp. (I am assumingthat the idea of storagecapacityis extendedin some way to cover machines other than discrete-state machines.with to turnit on from timeto time.the varietyof behaviour of any one of themis verysmall. have as much diversity of behaviouras a man. .) consideration No supportis usually offered for these statements. I offer Be kind. etc. This intended to coversuchdevicesas theinclusion phraseis. But I do notthink thesemysteries need to be solved before necessarily we can answerthe question with which we are concernedin this paper. tell rightfromwrong. Thesearguments Various take " I grantyou that you can make machines the form. They are ugly.

Even this interpretation the space to go sympathetic. One is tempted and attitude. or betweenblack man and black man. When a burnt child fears the fireand showsthat he fearsit by avoidingit. for The reply to this is simple. curiousone. The inability of the disabilities and cream may have struckthe reader as enjoy strawberries frivolous. forthat ? " But let us adopt a moresympathetic can be try to see what is really meant. I thinkthis criticism ofthe imitation gamne. " seems a The claim that " machinescannot make mistakes " Aretheyany theworse to retort. But we cannotafford sufficiently depends intoit muchfurther. and that it is silly to decide that everybody learnFrench. to that have been mentioned. TURING: accuracy as no mathematical doesnotmatter The exactdefinition discussion. however. when is claimed in the piresent it was possible verylittlehad been heard of digitalcomputers.g.if one mentioned concerning to elicit much incredulity their propertieswithout describingtheir construction. What is important ofthe e. The machine (programmed answers playingthe game) would not attemptto give the right problems. It would deliberatelyintroduce to the arithmetic the interrogator.) A few years ago. A very large part of to which to apply scientific if reliable resultsare to be space-timemust be investigated. The machine would be unmaskedbecause of its deadly accuracy.A calculatedto confuse mistakesin a manner an unsuitshow itselfthrough faultwouldprobablymechanical able decision as to what sort of a mistaketo make in tbe of the criticismis not arithmetic. I shouldsay that induction. Otherwise speaks English.448 A.That due to a similarapplicationof the principle was presumably are induction. to someoftheother tributes as man and machine between occurring same kindoffriendliness betweenwhiteman and whiteman. Possibly a machine might be made to enjoy this deliciousdish. These applicationsof the principle of scientific of course largelyunconscious. them. (I could of course also he was applyingscientific describehis behaviourin many otherways.) The worksand customsof mankinddo not seem to be very suitable material induction. we may (as most English childrendo) obtained. M. It seemsto me thatthiscriticism . but any attemptto make one do so would be is that it conabout this disability idiotic. It is claimedthatthe explainedin terms the man simply the machinefrom could distinguish interrogator by settingthem a numberof problemsin arithmetic. to be made about many special remarks Thereare.to thedifficulty disabilities.

COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 449 betweentwo kinds of mistake. more effectively. In this sortof sense a machineundoubtedly be its own subject matter. Neverthe machine has some thought ' does theless. Until fairlyrecentlya storage capacity of even a thousanddigitswas veryrare. We may call on a confusion ' and ' errors '. By observing so as to achievesomepurpose its ownprogrammes it can modify These are possibilitiesof the near future.40x .for instance. ratherthan Utopiandreams. one is therefore ignore the possibility are mathematical 'abstract machines'. or sentences in English. one will not make 29 .1 '. By definition of functioning.it mighthave some induction. at least to the peoplewho deal withit. tainsthat a machine kind of methodthat the machinecould use. -cannot have much diversity The criticism that a machine of behaviouris just a way of sayingthat it cannothave much storage capacity. The claim that a machinecannot be the subject of its own if it can be shownthat thoughtcan of courseonlybe answered withsomesubjectmatter. ofits ownbehaviour theresults its ownstructure.the machinewas tryingto finda solutionof the equationx2 . for instance.type out mathematicalequations. We method for drawingconclusionsby scientific must expect such a methodto lead occasionallyto erroneous results. Errorsof conclusion can only arise when some meaningis attached to the output signals from the machine.11 0 one woald be temptedto describethis equationas part of the machine'ssubject matterat can that moment. It mightdo nothing ' 0 . Theseabstractmachines they are fictions ratherthan physical objects. In philosophical discussions one likes to discussing of such errors. To take a less perverse example. hereare often The criticisms disguised that we are considering consciousness. If. When a false propositionis typed we say that the of conclusion.In this sense we can truly incapable of errors say that 'machinescan nevermake mistakes'. Usuallyifone mainfrom forms ofthe argument the and describes can do one ofthesethings. Errors ofconclusion offunctioning them' errors are due to some mechanicalor electricalfault of functioning which causes the machine to behave otherwisethan it was designed to do. 'the subject matterof a machine's operations seemto meansomething. Thereis clearly an error machinehas committed no reason at all for saying that a machinecannot make this but type out repeatedly kind of mistake. The machine might. It may be used to help in making in of alterations the effect or to predict up its own programmes.

one could set up a conditioned reflex.if its storagecapacityand speed were adequate. I am in thorough agreement withHartreeover this. Whether this is possiblein principleor not is a stimulating and excitingquestion. It is quite possiblethat the machinesin questionhad in a sense gotthisproperty. theparenthesis in Jefferson's Compare statement quotedon p. Our mostdetailedinformation of Babbage's Analytical -Enginecomesfrom a memoirby Lady Lovelace. (6) Lady Lovelace's Objection. . 21. TURING: muchofan impression. for it must be mechanical)is really ratherbase. in biological terms. A bettervariantof the objectionsays that a machinecan never 'take us by surprise'. I do a calculation. I do it in a hurried. A variantof Lady Lovelace's objectionstatesthat a machine can ' neverdo anything reallynew'. It can do whatever we know how " (her italics). Who can be certainthat 'original work' that he has done was not simplythe growth of the seed plantedin him by teaching. It will be noticedthat he does not assertthat the machines in question had not got the property.orrather because. PerhapsI say to myself. This statement toorderit to perform is quoted by Hartree(p.suggested by some of these recentdevelopments. although slipshod fashion. In anycase therewas no on themto claim all that could be claimed. 70) who adds: " This does not imply that it may not be possible to constructelectronic equipmentwhich will 'thinkforitself '. 'There is nothingnew under the sun'. or the effectof following well-known general principles. ' I suppose the voltage takingrisks. but rather that the evidenceavailable to Lady Lovelacedidnotencourage herto believethattheyhad it. It is thought thatthemethod(whatever it may be." The AnalyticalEngine has no pretensionsto originate anything. so that. M. whichwould serve as a basis for 'learning'. For supposethatsomediscrete-state machine has the property. This statement is a moredirectchallenge and can be met directly. Machinestake me by surprise with greatfrequency. This may be parried fora momentwith the saw. it could by suitableprogramming be made to mimic the machine in question. This is largelybecause I do not do sufficient calculation to decidewhatto expectthem to do. But it did not seem that the machines or projectedat the timehad thisproperty constructed ". The Analytical Engine was a universal digitalcomputer. or in which. In it she states. hereoughtto be the same as there: anywaylet's assumeit is '. Probably this argumentdid not occurto the Countessor to Babbage. obligation This wholequestion willbe considered again undertheheading of learning machines.450 A.

but it would be quite capable of if asked to give givingthe rightsort of answer. from back to the argument we must considerclosed. A naturalconsequence one then assumesthat thereis no virtuein the mere working principles. A analyser differential analyserwill do very well. This leads us on mypart.The situation if we consider some other simpler continuousmachine. It may be arguedthat.COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 451 forme for is a surprise and theresult wrong. For instance. whether else. The view that machinescannotgive rise to surprises and mathematicians I believe. a book. one cannot expect to be able to mimicthe behaviourof the system. data and general from out of consequences in the Nervous System. machineor anything is due.) Some of these provide their answersin a typed form. to the surprises whenI testify credibility I do not expectthis replyto silencemy critic.and reflect the idea and farfrom consciousness. of surprise.to a fallacyto whichphilosophers that as soon as subject. ofdoingso is that forgets thatit is false. impinging of the outgoing impulse. (A differential type used is a certainkind of machinenot of the discrete-state for some kinds of calculation. I am often Naturally have been is done theseassumptions by the timethe experiment forgotten. It is a line of argument of somethatthe appreciation remarking but it is perhapsworth requiresas much of a ' creativementalact ' thingas surprising froma man. It would not be possible for a digital computer analyser to predict exactly what answers the differential would give to a problem. witha discrete-state nervoussystem from machinemustbe different It is truethat a discrete-state of the machine. a event originates the surprising.this beingso. This is the assumption are particularly a fact is presentedto a mind all consequencesof that fact withit.These admissionslay me open to lectureson the subjectof my viciousways. the interrogator can be made clearer advantageofthisdifference. A nervous systemis certainlynot a discrete-state impulse about the size ofa nervous in theinformation smallerror to the size may make a large difference on a neuron. It is a veryusespringinto the mind simultaneously but one too easily ful assumptionunder many circumstances.but do not throwany doubt on my I experience. the value of r (actually about 3. But ifwe adhereto the conditions a continuous will not be able to take any imitationgame.and so are suitable for taking part in the game. The from Contitnuity (7) Argument machine. He will promentalact are due to somecreative bablysay that suchsurprises no crediton the machine.1416) it would be reasonable .

of conduct' I meanprecepts on whichone can act.452 A. With all arisingfromtraffic this I agree. M.' The undistributed is everput quite middleis glaring. From this it is arguedthat we cannot be machines.finding .and to go if one sees a greenone. implies being regulatedby such laws.we cannot laws of so easily convinceourselvesof the absence of complete behaviouras of completerules of conduct. It is not fromInformality (8) The Argument to describewhat possible to producea set of rules purporting a man should do in every conceivableset of circumstances. know of no circumstances certainly 'We have searchedenough. 'If each man justice. 019. 0. However. Thereare no such laws. But some further to thisdecisionlater. so men cannot be machines. I do notthink the argument used nevertheless. TURING: to choose at randombetweenthe values 3*12. I shall but I fear I shall hardlydo it the argument. like this. For supposewe could be sure of. The only way we such laws is scientific and we observation.' moreforcibly that any such statement We can demonstrate would be unjustified. lights. of Behaviour. To attempt may well arisefrom difficulty even those providerulesof conductto cover everyeventuality. and of whichone can be conscious.3*14. try to reproduce like this.appears to be impossible. If we substitute whichregulatehis life' for'laws of conduct 'laws of behaviour his life' in the argument quoted the unby whichhe regulates middle is no longer insuperable. but I believe this is the argument between'rules of There may howeverbe a certainconfusion ' to cloudtheissue.3-15.55. know of forfinding underwhichwe could say. of 005. But thereare no such rules.3*13. One mightforinstancehave a rule that one is to stop when light. 0O15. It seems to run something his set of rulesof conductby whichhe regulated had a definite life he would be no betterthan a machine. 006 (say). For we believe distributed by laws ofbehaviour thatit is not onlytruethat beingregulated a impliesbeing some sort of machine (thoughnot necessarily butthatconversely discrete-state beingsucha machine machine). By 'laws of behaviour' I mean laws ofnatureas appliedto a man's bodysuchas ' ifyoupinchhimhe willsqueak '. one sees a red traffic ? One may but what if by some fault both appear together perhaps decide that it is safest to stop. 3 16 with the probabilities for the it would be very difficult Under these circumstances analyser fromthe the differential to distinguish interrogator digital computer. By ' rules conduct' and ' laws ofbehaviour suchas ' Stop ifyou see redlights'.

about it to predict able time. programme supplied with one sixteenfigurenumberreplieswith another these withintwo seconds. The is good as a telepathicreceiver. one. whereE.would be one of the first to go.. and psycho-kinesis.Perhaps this psycho-kinesis cause the machineto guess rightmore oftenthan would be calculation. Supposethedigitalcompossibility interesting puter containsa random numbergenerator.P. I would defyanyoneto learn from to be able to predictany about the programme repliessufficient repliesto untriedvalues. But this does not seemto be a small computer the case. statistical one's ideas so as to fitthesenew facts to rearrange verydifficult in. One can say This argument is to mymindquite a strong in replythat many scientific theoriesseem to remainworkable in practice..COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 453 machine such laws if theyexisted."Thereis an makesthe right so the interrogator whichopenshere.P. Perception. can ask such questionsas ' What suitdoes the card interrogator or clairin my right hand belongto ? ' The man by telepathy voyancegivesthe rightanswer130 timesout of400 cards. may be especially phenomenon runas follows: based on E.and perhapsgets 104 right. at least fortelepathy. Then givena discrete-s. evidence.telepathy. I assume fromExtra-Sensory (9) The Argument perthat the readeris familiarwith the idea of extra-sensory ception. This is rather can get alongverynicelyif one forgets is just the kind of and one fearsthat thinking cold comfort.ate sufficent to discover by observation be possible it shouldcertainly a reasonand thiswithin its future behaviour.These disturbprecognition clairvoyance.viz.say a thousandyears. identification. Then it will be naturalto use thisto decidewhatanswerto give. that in fact one about it.S. Onceone has acceptedthemit does not seema verybig step to believein ghostsand bogies. But thenthe will be subjectto the psycho-kinetic randomnumber generator might powersof the interrogator.and the meaningof the fouritemsof it.S. The idea that our bodiesmove with simplyaccordingto the knownlaws of physics.usingas witnesses "Let us play the imitation and a digitalcomputer.so that the interrogator expectedon a probability .P.S. ing phenomenaseem to deny all our usual scientific the How we should like to discreditthem! Unfortunately It is is overwhelming. ideas. I have set up on the Manchester themachine whereby usingonly1000unitsofstorage. might A morespecific argument a man who game.together some othersnot yet discoveredbut somewhatsimilar. The machinecan onlyguess at random.in spite of clashingwith E. relevant.

7. This we say whichwe can explainin purelymechanical does not correspond to the real mind: it is a sortof skinwhich we muststripoff if we are to findthe real mind.he might may happen. rise to a whole 'theory' consisting moreremoteideas.i. M. simile would be an atomic pile of less than criticalsize : an the pile to a neutronentering injected idea is to correspond willcausea certain disturbance from without.P. however. by clairvoyance.454 A. If I had I of a positivenatureto support arguments should not have taken such pains to point out the fallaciesin contrary views. Another struck likea piano string intoquiescence. An idea presented proportion give rise to less than one idea in reply.An idea presented to such a mindmay give and tertiary of secondary. 'Can a machine sub-critical. and so on. whicheventually causedbysuchan incoming the disturbance sufficiently increased. The majority ' sub-critical'.and is there one for machines of themseem to be be one forthe humanmind. whichstatedthat the machinecan onlydo whatwe tell it to do. Such evidenceas I have I shall now give. was listening and one ofthe competitors room' would into a 'telep-thy-proof To put the competitors satisfyall requirements. Is there a corresponding ? There does seem to minds. LearningMachines. to correspond in this analogyto piles of subto such a mindwill on average criticalsize. A smallish are super-critical. If. The situationcould be regardedas analogousto that weretalkingto himself which would occur if the interrogator withhis ear to the wall. Each suchneutron the size of the pile is dies away. Adhering ?' be made to be super-critical The 'skin ofan onion' analogyis also helpful. whatremains we find skinto be stripped a further . But then in off. Let us returnfor a momentto Lady Lovelace's objection. With E. thatI have no veryconvincing The readerwillhave anticipated myviews. and that it will respond to a certain extent and then drop by a hammer. One could say that a man can ' inject' an idea intothe machine. TURING: mightstill be unable to make the rightidentification.On the without anyquestionbe able to guessright other hand.e. untilthe whole neutron will verylikelygo on and on increasing for phenomenon pile is destroyed. Animalsmindsseem to be very definitely to this analogywe ask. anything If telepathyis admittedit will be necessaryto tightenour test up. ing.S. In considering the functions ofthe mindor the brainwe findcertainoperations terms.

) A storagecapacityof 107 Britannica. I inclineto the lowervalues and believe is used forthe highertypes of that only a very small fraction used forthe retention thinking. will be thatprovided by forthe end ofthe century and thendoingthe experiment waiting described. We may notice three components. Ourproblem thenis to find outhowto programme thesemachines to playthegame. (a) The initialstate ofthe mind. (It would not be a discrete-state machinehowever. so that about sixty workers.) These last two paragraphsdo not claim to be convincing arguments. At mypresent rateofworking I produceabout a thousanddigitsof programme a day. whichit has been subjected.say at birth. even by presenttechwould be a very practicablepossibility niques. As I have explained.COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 455 in thisway do we ever come to the 'real' mind. They should rather be describedas 'recitations tendingto producebelief'. to whichit has been subjected. Most of it is probably of visual ifmorethan 109was required impressions.11thedition. This shouldprovidea ' which could cover losses of speed arising ' marginof sa. Some more expeditiousmethod seems desirable. . but it seems Advances' in engineering unlikelythat these will not be adeqaate forthe requirements. (b) The education not to be describedas education. Estimatesof the storagecapacity of the brain vary from1010 to 1015binarydigits. Parts of modernmachines which can be regardedas analogues of nerve cells workaboat a thousandtimesfasterthan the latter. willhave to be made too. But what can we say -in the meantime ? What steps should be taken now if the experimentis to be successful ? is mainly theproblem oneofprogramming. working steadilythroughthe fifty years the job. In the processof trying to imitatean adult hiuman mindwe are bound to thinka good deal about the process whichhas broughtit to the state that it is in. I shouldbe surprised oftheimitation forsatisfactory playing game. The onlyreallysatisfactory support that can be givenforthe view expressed at the beginningr of ? 6.fety in manyways. It is probablynot necessary to increasethe speed of operationsof the machinesat all.at anyrateagainst a blind man.to (e) Other experience. (Note-The capacity of the Encyclopaedia is 2 X 109. We have discussedthis. if nothing wentinto the waste-paper mightaccomplish basket.or Proceeding do we eventually cometo the skinwhichhas nothing in it ? In the latter case the whole mind is mechanical.

however. for instance. . buys it from our pointof are from and writing of blank sheets. We have thus divided our problem into two parts. assume. makingexcessivefunof it. But howeverwell these deficiencies to school one could not send the creature by cleverengineering.as a first human child. These two remain child-programme verycloselyconnected. = ofthe experimenter Judgment Natural selection willbe moreexpeditious thatthisprocess Onemayhope. Rather littlemechanism. to randommutations.456 A. etc. so that it could not be asked to go out and fillthe coal scuttle. is a slow methodfor than evolution. (Mechanism view almost synonymous. Changes . connection cations material Structure ofthe childmachine= Hereditary = Mutations . It will not be possible to apply exactly the same teaching processto the machineas to a normalchild. The example of Miss Helen Keller shows that education can take place provided that communication in both directions betweenteacherand pupil can take place by some means or other... eyes. Equally important intelligence. We need not be too concernedabout the legs. It must without the otherchildren be given some tuition. Possiblyit mightnot have mightbe overcome eyes.be providedwith legs. There is an obvious by the identifibetweenthis processand evolution. is shouldbe able to speedit up. Onemustexperiment thefirst machine-at one such machineand see how well it learns. Prelike a note-bookas one is something sumablythe child-brain and lots the stationers. TURING: to simulatethe Instead of tryingto produce a programme tryto produceone whichsimulates adult mind. The amount of work in the education we can to be muchthe same as forthe approximation. We cannotexpectto finda good childwith teaching attempt. M. The and the educationprocess. The experimenter. The survivalof the fittest by the exerciseof measuringadvantages.) Our hope is that thereis so little likeit can be easily that something mechanism in the child-brain programmed. It willnot. If he the fact that he is not restricted thinkofthe he can probably can tracea cause forsomeweakness whichwillimprove kindofmutation it.why not rather the child's? If this were then subjected to an appropriate course of education one would obtain the adult brain. One can thentry anotherand see if it is betteror worse.

conjectures. mathematicallyprovedtheorems. These definitions do not presuppose any feelings on the part of the machine. a symbolic language.g. This may cause " Teachersays 'Do yourhomework now ' " to be included amongst the well-established facts.If theseare available it is possible to teach a machineby punishments and rewards to obey orders givenin somelanguage. Roughlyspeaking. one might havea complete system oflogicalinference In the lattercase the storewould be largelyoccupiedwithdefinitions and propositions. Alternatively ' builtin '. These orders are to be transmitted throughthe 'unemotional' channels. I have done some experiments with one such child-machine. The machine has to be so constructed that eventswhichshortly preceded the occurrence of a punishment-signal are unlikelyto be repeated.'Do your homework now'.but the teachingmethodwas too unorthodox forthe experiment to be considered reallysuccessful.COMPUTING AMACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 457 We normallyassociate punishments and rewardswith the teaching process. One mighttry'to make it as simple as possibleconsistently withthe generalprinciples. The use of this language will diminish greatlythe numberof and rewardsrequired. 1Or rather 'programmed in' forourchild-machine willbe programmed in a digitalcomputer. . and succeeded in teachingit a few things. It is necessarytherefore to have some other 'unemotional' channelsof communication. punishments Opinionsmay vary as to the complexity whichis suitablein the child machine.e. The propositions wouldhave various kinds of status. By the time a child has learntto repeat 'Casabianca' he would probablyfeel very sore indeed.supposetheteacher says to the machine.e. But the logicalsystem willnothave to be learnt.if the teacherhas no other means of communicating to the pupil.every 'NO' takingthe formof a blow. expressions havingthe logicalform ofproposition but not beliefvalue. Some simple child-machines can be constructed or programmed on this sortof principle. the amount of information whichcan reachhimdoes not exceedthe total number of rewardsand punishments applied..if the text could only be discovered by a 'Twenty Questions' technique. Another suchfactmight be. well-established facts.g. The use of punishments and rewardscan at best be a part of the teachingprocess. The machineshould be so constructed that as soon as an im' the appropriate perativeis classed as 'well-established action automatically takesplace. To illustrate this. Certain propositions may be described as 'imperatives'. whereas a reward-signal increasedthe probability of repetition of the eventswhichled up to it. statements given by an authority.

Some quickerthan another. any of which one is to apply.althoughhe may still be able to some extentto predict his pupil's behaviour.but the effect is very satisfactory. any more than we are bound to fall over unfencedcliffs. Thesechoicesmakethe difference system between a brilliant and a footling reasoner. as in the example(doing homework) givenabove. How can the rules of operationof the machine how the machine change? They should describe completely will react whateverits historymight be. use the syllogism in Barbara " or " If one method has been provedto be ". There mightfor instancebe no hierarchy of types.g. not forming part of the rules of the system)such as ' Do not use a class unless it is a subclass of one whichhas been mentioned by teacher' can have a similar effect to 'Do not go too near the edge'. willmeanthatthehomework actually gets started. not the difference betweena soundand a fallacious one. by the construction ofthemachine. Propositions leadingto imperatives of this kind mightbe " When Socrates is mentioned. thereis a very large numberof alternativesteps.do not use the slowermethod of these may be 'given by authority'. The readermay draw a parallelwiththe Constitution of the United States. e. The rules are thus quite time-invariant. 'Do yourhomework now'. feature machineis that its teacher Alnimportant of a learning will oftenbe very largelyignorantof quite what is going on inside. and this.The processesof inference used by the machineneed not be such as would satisfy the most exactinglogicians. But thisneed not mean that type fallacieswill occur.but othersmay be produced by the machineitself. The imperatives that can be obeyed by a machinethat has no limbsare boundto be of a rather intellectual character. The idea of a learningmachinemay appear paradoxical to some readers. being included amongst the well-established facts.458 A. The explanationof the paradox is that the rules whichget changedin the learning processare of a rather less pretentious kind. This is quite true.claiming onlyan ephemeral validity. TURING: "Everythingthat teachersays is true". Suitable imperatives(expressed within the systems. Important amongst such imperatives will be ones whichregulatethe orderin which the rules of the logical systemconcernedare to be applied. Combining thesemay eventuallylead to the imperative.so faras obedienceto the rulesofthe logical permitted is concerned. whatever changes it might undergo. This should apply most strongly to the . by scientific induction. M. For at each stage whenone is usinga logical system.

Thismethod has theadvantagethatit is unnecessary to keep track of the valaes that have been tried.e.whichdoes not contain the word'only'. 438).we might start at 51 thentry52 and go on untilwe got a number that worked. Intelligentbehaviourpresumably consists in a departurefromthe completely disciplinedbehaviourinvolved in computation. whichdoes not loops. . It shouldbe noticedthat it is used in the analogous process of evolution. This is in clear contrast whenusinga machine withnormal procedure to do computations: one's object is thento have a clearmentalpicture ofthe state of in the computation. but a ratherslightone. The viewthat'themachine can only do what we know how to orderit to do '. A randomelement is ratherusefulwhen we are searching fora solutionof some problem. i. give rise to randombehaviour. wise to includea randomelement It is probably in a learning machine(see p. 24. Most of the programmes put into the machinewill resultin its doingsomething that we cannot make sense of at all.) Processesthat are learnt do not producea hundredper cent.or to pointlessrepetitive ourmachine forits partin Another important resultofpreparing is that the imitation and learning game by a processof teaching ' is likelyto be omittedin a rathernatural 'human fallibility way. (The readershouldreconcile this withthe point of view on pp. The systematic very important methodhas the disadvantagethat theremay be an enormous block withoutany solutionsin the regionwhichhas to be investigated first. Since thereis probablya verylarge number of satisfactory solutions the random method seems to be better thanthe systematic.but the disadvantagethat one may trythe same one twice.but this is not if there are several solutions. we might Alternatively choosenumbers at random untilwe got a a good one.1 appears whichwe can strangein face of this. 25. iftheydid theycould notbe unlearnt. 450).COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 459 later educationof a machinearisingfroma child-machine of well-trieddesign (or programme). without special'coaching'. or whichwe regardas completely random behaviour. This object the machineat each moment can onlybe achievedwith a struggle. How could one keep track 1 Compare Lady Lovelace's statement (p. Suppose for instancewe wantedto finda number between50 and 200 which was equal to the square of the sum of its digits. But there the systematic methodis not possible. certainty of result. Now the learningprocess may be regarded as a searchfora form of behaviour whichwillsatisfy theteacher (or some othercriterion).

" An Unsolvable Problem of ElementaryNumber Theory ". G. Philosophy. Again I do not know what the rightansweris. G6del. R. BritishMedical Journal. Many people thinkthat a very abstract activity. Lister Oration for 1949. Jefferson. Calculating Instrumentsand Machines. We can onlysee a shortdistanceahead. 42 (1937). The Book of the Machines. Alonzo Church.so as to avoid trying themagain ? We mayhopethat machines will eventually compete withmen in all purelyintellectual fields. vol. Taylor). 25. American J. V7ictoria Universitty of Manchester. History of Western A. But whichare the best ones to start with? Even this is a difficult decision. K. I ". by R. but I thinkbothapproachesshouldbe tried. 173-189. 691-731. S. ' Translator's notes to an article on Babbage's Analytical Engire'. " The Mind of Mechanical Man ". Soc. 1949. 3 (1842). 58 (1936). Kleene. " Vber formalunentscheidbareSatze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme. Monatsheftefuir Math. (2). M. Scientific Memoirs (ed. M. Hartree. C. Bertrand Russell... of Math. 345-363. Turing. D. would be best.London. It can also be maintainedthat it is best to providethe machinewiththe best sense organsthat moneycan buy.. Proc. Erewhon. BIBLIOGRAPHY Samuel Butler.like the playing of chess. New York. London. but we can see plenty therethat needs to be done. TURING: COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE of the different geneticalcombinations that had been tried. This process could followthe normalteaching of a child. London Math.460 A. Countess of Lovelace. i (1949). 57 (1935). vol. American J. 1105-1121. of Math. and then teach it to understand and speak English. etc. 24. 153-173 and 219-244. with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem". 1940. 230-265. . Things would be pointed out and named. und Phys. " On Computable Numbers. (1931). Chapters 23. 1865. " General Recursive Functions of Natural Numbers ".

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