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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

File No. 3

4. GOVERNMENT

a) Definition, distinguished from administration

Government - is the agency of instrumentality through which the


will of the State is formulated, expressed and realized.

Administration – is distinguished from government, as the aggregate


the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reigns of government are
for the time being (the Chief ministries or heads of departments. But
the terms are often interchanged.

Government of the Republic of the Philippines - is the corporate


governmental entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines, including the various arms which
political authority is made effective, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city or barangay subdivisions or
other forms of local government (Sec. 2 (10, E.O. 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987).

CASES

• We understand, in modern political science... by the term


“government”, that institution or aggregate of institutions by which
an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action
which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or
which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those
who possess the power or authority of prescribing them.
Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society.
By “administration” , we understand... the aggregate of those
persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time
being (the chief ministers or heads of departments. But the Court
adds that the terms “government” and “administration” are often
used interchangeably (US vs. Dorr, 2 Phil 332).

• The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its


purpose is akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the
system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in
the military service. Its enabling law further mandates that the
System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP
through an agency, group, committee or board, which may be
created and organized by him and subject to such rules and
regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval
of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to
time. Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be
decided by the Chief of Staff of the AFP with the approval of the
Secretary of the Secretary of the National Defense. While it may
be true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution
of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from
later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional benefits
to the men in uniform. These above considerations indicate that
the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with
public interest. As such, the Court held that the same is
government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds
(People vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 145951, August 12, 2003).

• Issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or


proprietary functions. The Court held that ACA is a government
office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary
functions. These functions may not be strictly what President
Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from
"ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace
and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and
property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and
the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating
to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional
classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State
as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter
functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the
part of the government. The growing complexities of modern
society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and
which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and
only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals"
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed
within activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges
of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is
undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces
(ACCFA vs. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649).
• An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in
political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and
the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital
to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution.
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of
the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to
information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can
become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the
power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a
public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1)
to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would
certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of
public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by
implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. As
stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to
"matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy
of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public
interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law."As observed in Legaspi: In determining whether or not a
particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a
term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it
relates to or affects the public (Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256).

b) Classification

i) de jure or de
facto

De Jure - has a rightful title but no power or control, either because


the same has been withdrawn from it or because it has not yet actually
entered into the exercise thereof.

De Facto - actually exercises power or control but without legal


title (Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, GR No 73748, May 22,
1986).
i. De facto proper – government that gets possession and control
of, or usurps, by force or by the vice of the majority, the rightful
legal government and maintains itself against the will of the
latter,

ii. Government of paramount force – established and


maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory
of the enemy in the course of war; and

iii. Independent government – established by the inhabitants of


the country who rise in insurrection against the parent state (Ko
Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113).

ii) unitary or federal

Federal government – is formed when a group of political units, such


as states or provinces or together in a federation, surrendering their
individual sovereignty and many powers to the central government.
While retaining or reserving other limited powers. As a result, two or
more levels of government exist within an established geographic
territory. The body of law of the common central government is the
federal law. Federal law is a body of law created by the federal
government of a country.

iii) monarchy, oligarchy, theocracy,


democracy

Monarchy – is a form of government in which supreme power is


absolutely or nominally lodged with an individual, who is the head of
state, often for life or until abdication, and “is wholly set apart from all
other members of the state.” The person who heads a monarchy is
called Monarch.

Oligarchy – is a form of government where power effectively rests


with a small elite segment of society distinguished by royal, wealth,
family, military or religious hegemony. The word oligarchy is from the
Greek words for “few” and “rule. Such states are often controlled by
politically powerful families whose children are heavily conditioned and
monitored to be heirs of the power of the oligarchy. Oligarchies have
been tyrannical throughout history, being completely a public
servitude to exist.

Theocrary – is a form of government in which a god or deity is


recognized as the State’s supreme civil rules, or in a broader sense, a
form of government in which a state is governed by immediate divine
guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided. For
believers, theocracy is a form of government in which divine power
governs a earhy human state, either in a personal incarnation or more
often, via religious institutional representatives (i.e. church), replacing
or dominating civil government. Theocratic government enact
theonomic laws.

Democracy – is a form of government in which state power is held by


the majority of citizens within a country or a state. It is derived from
the Greek “popular government”, which was coined from “people” and
“rule, strength” in the middle of the fifth-fourth century BC to denote
the political systems then existing in some Greek City – states.

iv) Presidential or Parliamentary

Presidential form of Government

 It is first adopted under the 1935 Constitution and borrowed from


American system.
 Its principal identifying feature is what is called the “separation
of powers.” Legislative power is given to the Legislature;
executive power is given to a separate Executive; and judicial
power is held independent Judiciary.
 The system is founded on the belief that, by establishing
equilibrium among the three power holders, harmony will result,
power will not to concentrated, and thus tyranny will be avoided.
 Because of the prominent position, however, which the system
gives to the President as chief executive, it is designated as a
presidential form of government.

Parliamentary form of Government

 It is the original 1973 Constitution that has adopted a still-born


parliamentary system.
 The difference lies in certain essential features which are found in
all varieties of the parliamentary form, such as the following:

1. The members of the government or cabinet or the


executive arm are, simultaneously members of the legislature.
2. The government or cabinet, consisting of the political
leaders of the majority party or of a coalition who are also
members of the legislature.
3. The government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure at
the apex of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent.
4. The government or cabinet remains in power only for as
long as it enjoy the support of majority of the legislature.
5. Both government and legislature are possessed o
control devices with which each can demand of the other
immediate political responsibility.

 In the hands of the legislature is the vote of non-confidence


(censure) whereby the government may be ousted. In hands of the
government is the power to dissolve the legislature and call for new
elections.

 Briefly, therefore, while the presidential system embodies


interdependence by separation and coordination. Parliamentarism
embodies interdependence by integration.

v) Others

CASES

• The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable


matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of
the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country
so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a
de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government (In re:
Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160).

• It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts


and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
department of a de facto government are good and valid.

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or


government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government
that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the
voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains
itself against the will of the latter, such government of England
under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by
Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and
maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of
the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine,
which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and of
Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the
troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an
independent government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt
against the Union during the war of secession (Co Kim Chao vs. Valdez
Tan Keh, 75 Phil 113).

c) Historical survey of Philippine government

CASES

• Under the American Regime: The Government of the


Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and
organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of
the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories
into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is
derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however,
operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the
Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States,
acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power
from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its
powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the
Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress
acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic
laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the
President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign
constituency which lies back of American constitutions. The power
to legislate upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily
in Congress, and when it exercises such power its act is from the
viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment
of a constitution in the United States.

Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines


is a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative,
and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly
assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as
complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State
governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract
statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government
the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some
extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the
governor is not a member of the legislative body, but the veto
power enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The
Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the
Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission,
but as executive he has no veto power. The President and
Congress framed the government on the model with which
Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the
advancement of the public interests and the protection of
individual rights and privileges (US vs. Bull, 15 Phil 259).

• It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities,


that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,
except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has
been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provision. (16 C. J.S 431.) This doctrine is predicated on
the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well
known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty
lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political
question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and
precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the
scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle
with the actions of the political departments of the government
(Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1).

• Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the
validity of Presidential Decree 73.Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73
purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the
issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the
authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has
passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the
Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of
Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly
provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases
involving said issue.

Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73


to submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the
Convention. Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to
issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on
January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for
the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite
ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should
the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper
parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify.

Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a


submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for
amendment of the Constitution. Held [3]: Said question has not
been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it
would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question
without the most thorough discussion possible under the
circumstances (Planas vs. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105).

• It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute —


Presidential Decrees are of such nature — may be contested by
one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement
of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. The interest of the petitioners as
taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public
money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the
validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds.

The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a


judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power
of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,
Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the
interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of
amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite
on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution
sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are
assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is
plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to
pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides:
"All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten
Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized
in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited
power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged within its
limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy
refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is
definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the
Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional
authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on
the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a
downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed


or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial
review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves
vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have
been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a
posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the
people.

As to the question on whether or not the Pres. Marcos may propose


amendments to the Constitution in the absence of a grant of such
constituent power to the President, the Court held that he could. If
the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he
cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is an adjunct, although
peculiar, to its gross legislative power (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA
333).

• Pres. Marcos’ term was supposed to end on June 30, 1987.


However, he submitted a letter of conditional resignation claiming
that he would vacate his position effective only when election’s
held & after winner’s proclaimed & qualified as Pres by taking his
oath of office 10 days after his proclamation. He claims that he is
calling for the new elections to seek a new mandate to assess his
policies & programs as demanded by the opposition. He further
stressed that his term will be shortened but in the name of public
accountability he believes that the final settlement of these issues
can only be done thru a presidential election.

B.P. Blg. 883: enacted by the Batasang Pambansa calling for


special national elections on Feb. 7, 1986 for Pres & VP.

Different sectors were against the special elections. Among the


contentions are:

1. Such is unconstitutional because there was no vacancy in the


presidency thus there’s no need to call for a special election. This is
pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which requires an
actual vacancy before an special election can be called and in such
cases, the Speaker of the House will be the Acting Pres until a new
one has been elected.

2. Unconstitutional because it allows the Pres to continue holding


office after calling of the special election. Cutting his term short is
valid but he should actually vacate the office. The Supreme Court
voted 7 to dismiss petitions and deny prayer for issuance of
injunction restraining respondents from holding election and 5
declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant the injunction.
Since there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883
unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed & writs prayed
for denied. Justices filed separate opinions since only a resolution
was issued.

The Supreme Court voted 7 to dismiss petitions & deny prayer for
issuance of injunction restraining respondents from holding
election and 5 declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant
the injunction. Since there are less than the required 10 votes to
declare BP 883 unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed
& writs prayed for denied. Justices filed separate opinions since
only a resolution was issued (PBA vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455).

• The lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 – a


supervening event – would have normally rendered this case moot
and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal
acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there
is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be
issued. The transcendental issues raised by the parties should not
be “evaded;” they must now be resolved to prevent future
constitutional aberration.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar


as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant
jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws
even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires
and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order
issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief –
addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP
1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard – that the
military and the police should take only the “necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O.
No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by
Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O.
While “terrorism” has been denounced generally in media, no law
has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts,
to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this
portion of G.O. No. 5 (David vs. Macapagal – Arroyo, GR 171396, May 3,
2006).

d) Democratic and republican


government

Republican State – it is one wherein all government authority


emanates form the people and is exercised by representatives chosen
by the people.

Democratic State – this merely emphasizes that the Philippines has


some aspect of direct democracy such as initiative and referendum.
i) Nemo est supra
leges – “No one is above the Law”

CASES

• The primary question is: Shall the judiciary permit a government


of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the
Philippine Islands? The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had
been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.
Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably,
during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to
Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. The women were given no
opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under
the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a
life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart
from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
consent to the deportation. With this situation, a court would next
expect to resolve the question. By authority of what law did the
Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress
these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the
Philippine Islands? One can search in vain for any law, order, or
regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of
Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands and these women, despite their being in a sense
lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes
any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or
regulation, compels any person to change his residence (Villavicencio
vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778).

ii) Universal
suffrage (right and duty), popular
election, rule of
the majority

iii) Bill of rights


Bill of Rights – is a set prescriptions setting forth the fundamental
civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on
the powers of the government as a leans of securing the enjoyment of
those rights.

Classification of Rights:

1. Political rights – granted by law to members of community in


relation to their direct or indirect participation in the establishment
or administration of the government.
2. Civil rights – rights which municipal law will enforce at the
instance of private individuals for the purpose of securing them the
enjoyment of their means of happiness;
3. Social and economic rights; and
4. Human rights.

iv) Accountability of
Public Officials

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and


employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of


the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the


exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any


Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House


shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment


is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House,
the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the


same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further


than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,
and punishment, according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to


effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of


the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each
for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the
military establishment may likewise be appointed.
Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the
Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by
the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law.

Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known


as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to
function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the
Ombudsman created under this Constitution.

Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-


born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their
appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity
and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and
must not have been candidates for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have,
for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines.

During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same


disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2
of Article 1X-A of this Constitution.

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be


appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of
three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such
appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall
be filled within three months after they occur.

Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the
rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the
Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same
salary which shall not be decreased during their term of office.

Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a
term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be
qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of


the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form
or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the


following powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any


person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any


public official or employee of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of
any government-owned or controlled corporation with
original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse
or impropriety in the performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate


action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate


case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to
contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving
the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and
report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and


information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when


circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,


mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government
and make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law.

Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal


autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.

Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties


unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them
or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel.

Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial


accommodation for any business purpose may be granted,
directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled
bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the
Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have
controlling interest, during their tenure.

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon


assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with
general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law.

Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and
this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer
or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law.

v) Legislature cannot pass irrepealable


laws

vi) Separation of
Powers
Purpose of the separation of powers: to prevent the concentration
of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to
irreparable error or abuse in the exercise to the detriment of
republican institution.

CASES

• The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our


system of government. It obtains not through express provision but
by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that
this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a
vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the
National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the
Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive
in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers;
and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to
the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine
what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to
define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support,
the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

The Court held:

1. That the government established by the Constitution follows


fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into the
legislative, the executive and the judicial.
2. That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of
functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the
powers granted.

3. That in cases of conflict between the several departments and


among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

4. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in


actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power
and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

5. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional


creation with specific powers and functions to execute and
perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than
to any of the other two departments of the government.

6. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests


relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly.

7. That under the organic law prevailing before the present


Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.

8. That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers


previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members,
to the Electoral Commission.

9. That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral


Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules
and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

10. That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral


Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass
upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence
or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
11. That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed
not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the
Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section
478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the
election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix
the costs and expenses of contest.

12. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the


election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.

13. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the


election of any member against whom no protest had been filed
prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the
Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time
within which protest against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil 139).

• Issue: Is Pres. Nixon's right to safeguard certain information,


using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely
immune from judicial review? No. The Court held that neither the
doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can
sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court
granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of
military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the
subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned
shortly after the release of the tapes (US vs Nixon, 418 US 683).

 Principle of Blending of Powers

Instance when powers are not confined exclusively within one


department but are assigned to or shared by shared by several
departments.

 Principle of Checks and Balances


Allows one department to resist encroachments upon its
prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other
departments.

CASES

• Issue: Did President Truman have the constitutional authority to


seize and operate the steel mills? In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court
held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an
order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that
authorized the President to take possession of private property. The
Court also held that the President's military power as Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The
Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker
(Youngstown Co, vs. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 96 L.Ed. 1153).”

• The Congress cannot control the execution of its laws; since it


doesn’t possess this power, it can’t delegate it to its agents. The CG
is an agent of the Legislature because Congress can remove him by
a process other than impeachment. The CG exercises executive
power. Thus, the Act is unconstitutional.The CG’s function under
the Act is the “very essence” of execution of the laws since (1) it
entails interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of
budgetary calculations are required and (2) the CG commands the
President to carry out, without variation, the CG’s directive
regarding the budget resolutions. Interpreting a law enacted by
Congress is the “very essence” of executions of the laws. Once
Congress passes legislation, it can only influence its execution by
passing new laws or through impeachment. The Constitution only
explicitly provides Congress the power to remove executive officers
by impeachment. Also, the Constitutional Convention explicitly
rejected language that would have permitted impeachment for
“maladministration,” with Madison arguing that “so vague a term
will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.” Thus,
Congress can only remove a member of the executive branch
through impeachment (Bowsher vs. Synar, 478 US 714).

• Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the


executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it
is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464,
however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient
of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For
what republican theory did accomplish?was to reverse the old
presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings
and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity,
based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Resort to any means
then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to
divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall
not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into
the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value ? our right as a people to take
part in government (Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), GR 169777).

vii) Non-delegation of
powers

• The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When he


issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative
power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when
he issued P.D. NO. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the
power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the
power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it
became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it
through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President
did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate
the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific
instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D.
No. 857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe,
increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the services
rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a
Port District (Philippine Interisland Shipping Ass'n vs. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22,
1997).”

 General Rule: Potestas delegate non potest delegare


Premised on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not
only a right but also a duty to be performed by the delegate through
the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.

 Permissible Delegation
• The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 which provides for a system of
probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are
convicted of crime is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That
said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2)
that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3)
that it denies the equal protection of the laws.

As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power


exclusively in the Chief Executive. But, probation and pardon are
not coterminous; nor are they the same. In probation, the
probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not
finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire
punishment which the law inflicts. The Court held that the
Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the
Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their
probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the
Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet
pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the
court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.

The power to make laws or the legislative power is vested in a


bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral
National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution
of the Philippines. The Philippine Legislature or the National
Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by
delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt
to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle
that potestas delegata non delegare potest. The rule, however,
which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by
immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to
delegate legislative powers to local authorities. In testing whether a
statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it
is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms
and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate
of the legislature (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56).

a. Tariff Powers to the President (Sec.


28 (2), Art. VI;

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix


within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

b. Emergency Powers to the President


(Section 23 (2), Art VI)

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the


Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,
to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon
the next adjournment thereof.

• Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its
nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved,
and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution
provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a
limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted;
bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in
duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used in
the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive
in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of
emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be
an emergency."

The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would
not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and
different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the
period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would
be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was
intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent
law,"; for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would,
the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the
Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this
would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its
powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not
right and is not, and ought not to be, the law.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the
Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its
authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies
operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the
emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended
while Congress was in session and be revived after each
adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a
two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the
President during congressional recess, and the President in turn
could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress,
laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in
two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only
by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former
President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals
after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and
the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export
control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.

What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the


same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer.
He said he issued the call for a special session of the National
Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely
helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the
Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was
to open on January 1, 1942." It is our considered opinion, and we
so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief
Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended,
and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in
contravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legal
principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no
pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to
issue such executive orders as those under review.

After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved


if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was
desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of
the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of
total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble
referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the
Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization
of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National
Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for
immediate action and with which the National Assembly would
would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos
and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the
National Assembly been in a position to operate (First Emergency
Powers Cases, 84 Phil 368).

• As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional


provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly
intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that
the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary
to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President,
the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never
be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so,
the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken
place when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing
all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress
and the President or either as the principal authority to determine
the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, ? in
palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant
thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in
the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of
either the Congress or the President.

Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and
did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be
considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally
declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend
that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect,
would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while
Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might
not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words,
it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take
them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the
law."

Insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on


a given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President
had been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546
must be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take
judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation
repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the
operation of the Government, public works, and many others
purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the
Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the
corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the
President. Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the
President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the
sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of
the people, because we have the Constitution, designed to
establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy. In line with such primordial objective, our Government
is democratic in form and based on the system of separation of
powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have to
abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared to
accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in
disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative
and executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases
to have prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of
democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of powers
in any one man or group of men for obvious reasons. The framers
of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in
allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a
limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They
had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty
of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient
procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself
cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope
and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism
of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution (2nd
Emergency Powers Cases, 92 Phil 603).

c. Delegation to the People (Sec. 32,


Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art X; Sec. 2, Art.
XVII; RA 6735);

Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide


for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact
laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed
by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration
of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters thereof.

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be


created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be


directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the


exercise of this right.

d. Delegation to Local Government Units (Art. X; RA 7160);

e. Delegation to the Administrative Bodies

1.1.1 Power of Subordinate


Legislation

CASES

• The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and


regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited
only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment. The questioned administrative orders are reasonably
directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under
which they were issued and were intended to secure the
paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and
welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order
Nos. 57 and 82 are sustained, and their force and effect upheld
(Miners Assn vs. Factoran, GR 98332, Jan. 16, 1995).

1.1.2 Principle of Sub-delegation of Powers

1.1.3 Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or Alter Ego


Principle
• Acts of the Secretaries of Executive departments when
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business or
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive (Villena v. Sec’y of
Interior, 67 Phil 451).

f. Tests for valid delegation

1.1.1 Completeness Test

• Law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions so


that there is nothing for the delegate to do except to enforce it.

1.1.2 Sufficient Standard Test

• Maps out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority by defining the


legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is
to be pursued.

CASES

• The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing


which may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying
commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this
country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our
fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. This
is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case
for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions in view
of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to
protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. The
protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the
police power which both restraints and is restrained by due
process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent
in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of
the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the
great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the
least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent
powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain
(Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659).
1.1.3 Legislative standard need
not be expressed

CASES

• Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to


the military authorities discriminate against Americans and
resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth
Amendment which restrains discriminatory legislation by Congress
as amounts to denial of due process? The Court found the
President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be
constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court,
took into account the great importance of military installations and
weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the
"solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their
motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actions
served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny
relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court
viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that
racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents
having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater
source of danger than those of a different ancestry (Hirabayashi vs US,
320 US 81).”

• The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative


regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted
to him by law. The choice of the President as delegate is logical
because the division of the country into regions is intended to
facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also
the direction of executive departments which the law requires
should have regional offices. The regions themselves are not
territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes."

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative


power in conferring on the President the power to merge
administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has
provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be
guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any
event the grant of power to him is included in the subject
expressed in the title of the law. On the question of standard. A
legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be
gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged
because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject
as that of the challenged legislation.

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions,


the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant
to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the
Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs
consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of the
public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative
regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical
to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the
withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now
constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was
to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of
administrative regions (Chionbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253).