The 33rd Regiment - North Vietnamese Army: Their Story

Ernest Chamberlain

The 33rd Regiment

North Vietnamese Army Their Story

(and the Battle of Binh Ba)

Ernest Chamberlain

Nui Dat June 1969 Ernie Chamberlain a Vietnamese linguist, served in South Vietnam as an intelligence officer from April 1969 to November 1970. He taught the Vietnamese language for two years at Point Cook, and was the Vietnam desk officer in the Joint Intelligence Organisation from late 1972 until April 1975. Ernie Chamberlain later served as the Defence Attache in Cambodia (1991-1993) and in Indonesia (1996-1998). Following retirement from the Australian Defence Force in 1998, he served in East Timor for several years principally in United Nations appointments. He has written several books on Timor and on the Vietnam War.

The 33 Regiment
North Vietnamese Army
Their Story
(and the Battle of Bnh Ba June 1969)

rd

Ernest Chamberlain 2014 Published in Australia in 2014 by Ernest Chamberlain, Point Lonsdale VIC 3225.

Copyright Ernest Chamberlain 2014

email - chamber@pipeline.com.au

This monograph is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the author. Inquiries should be made to the publisher. The author has also published: The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor; Editions - 2003, 2004 and 2008 (ISBN 9780980562309). Perjuangan di Iliomar: Perlawanan di Pedesaan di Timor-Leste, 2004 (ISBN 0-97503501-0). Faltering Steps Independence Movements in East Timor in the 1950s and 1960s; 2005 (ISBN 0 97500350 2 9). Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor 1940s to the early 1970s; Editions 2007, 2008 and 2010 (ISBN 9780980562330). Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor; Editions - 2007 and 2009 (ISBN 9780980562316). Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations during World War II, 2010 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-2-3). The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, 2012 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-4-7). The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, 2013 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-5-4). National Library of Australia : Cataloguing-in-Publication Entry Chamberlain, Ernest, 1944 The 33rd Regiment North Vietnamese Army: Their Story. Bibliography; Index. ISBN 978-0-9750350-5-4 Vietnam. Vietnam War, 1961-1975 Regimental history. Vietnam War, 1961-1975 Participation , Australian. Binh Ba, Battle of, Vietnam, 1969. Dewey number: 959.7043322 Every effort has been made by the publisher/author to contact holders of copyright to obtain permission to reproduce copyright material. However, if any permissions have been inadvertently overlooked, apologies are offered, and should the rightful party contact the publisher, all due credit and necessary and reasonable arrangements will be made at the earliest opportunity.

PREFACE The Australian War Memorial has published a comprehensive three-volume official history of the Australian Armys involvement in the Vietnam War.1 Separately, each of the nine Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) infantry battalions that served in Vietnam has produced histories of their tour or tours, of duty. Other units have also published histories. This modest work - on a North Vietnamese Army (NVA)2 Regiment o t e ot er s e the 33rd NVA Regiment, will hopefully complement those publications and the official histories. It also complements the published histories of its fraternal Vit C ng (VC)3 units - the D445 and D440 Local Force Battalions.4 The 33rd NVA Regiment (E33)5 was a North Vietnamese Army unit that moved into South Vietnam in early September 1965 and initially engaged United States (US) and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in the Central Highlands at Plei Me and in the Ia rng valley. At the end of January 1968, during the Tt Offensive, the Regiment attacked the town of Ban M Thu t in the Central Highlands, before moving south into Ty Ninh Province in mid-1968. I Febr ary 1969, t e Reg me ts area of operations shifted eastwards and under the command of VC Military Region 7, it attacked bases at Bin Ha/Long Bnh, and briefly clashed with elements of the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF). Its activities next extended into the provinces of Long Khnh and Phc Tuy. T e A stral a s major e gageme t w t t e 33rd Regiment was the Battle of Bnh Ba on 6 June 1969, about seven k lometres ort of 1ATFs base at Ni t. 1ATFs f al e gageme t w t 33rd Regiment elements was at the Battle of Ni L/Ni Sao near the Long Khnh Province border on 21 September 1971. During the War, over 3,000 cadre and soldiers of the 33rd Regiment were recorded as killed or missing w t t e Reg me ts average stre gt be g o ly abo t 1,300.6 Following Liberation of the South on 30 April 1975, the Regiment fought in the South1

McNeill, I., To Long Tan The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, St Leonards, 1993; McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, Crows Nest, 2003; and Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, Crows Nest, 2012. All were published by Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial. 2 I t s work, t e Peoples Army of V et am (PAVN) s referre to as t e Nort V et amese Army (NVA); and the Peoples L berat o Arme Forces (PLAF), g err llas a frastr ct re are terme t e Vit C ng (VC) as the general readership is more familiar w t t e terms NVA a VC. 3 T e term Vit Cng s avo e V et amese comm st wr t gs. T e V et amese comm sts ot refer to t emselves as Vit Cng (Cng Sn Vit Nam - Vietnamese Communists) as this was a pejorative term initiated and used by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN - ie South Vietnam), the US, and its Free Worl all es. 4 See: Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011; and Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2013. 5 NVA/VC formation and unit nomenclatures included prefix letters to designat e s ze eg A for sect o /sq a ; B platoo ; C Compa y; D battalion; E regiment (also ); F and CT division; and T M l tary Reg o . B was also se as a pref x for some fro ts eg B2, B3. K was often used as a prefix designation for hospitals. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) also had a 33rd Regiment in its 21st Infantry Division. 6 For detail on casualties, see Appendix 8.

West Border War against the Khmer Rouge in both Vietnamese territory and in Cambodia. Subsequently, the Regiment also fought in Cambodia during the Vietnamese occupation and, in 1979, the Regiment was deployed to the Chinese border area. The 33rd Regime ts off c al Memor al s Bnh c hamlet of Bnh Ba village and was inaugurated on 27 July 2003. There are also active 33rd Reg me t vetera s groups t e Nort - including at Phc Th outside H N i, and reunions are held regularly. While no complete history of the 33rd Regiment has been published, this 128,000word work uses several historical monographs published by the 33rd Regiment Veterans Association as principal primary source materials and translations of those monographs are cl e amo g t s works appe ces. The history of the 5th VC Division has also proved useful. Additionally, US and Australian materials including captured documents and the debriefing of prisoners and ralliers, have been important in constructing a more complete arrat ve of t e Reg me ts service. Meetings with 33rd Regiment veterans and email exchanges of information with the veterans have been particularly helpful. As comments on the text - and to add context, a considerable number of footnotes are included to enable interested readers to readily access primary source material much of it now available via the Internet. Many of the comments are based on an examination of captured NVA and VC documents and the debriefs of prisoners and ralliers (ie defectors). During the Vietnam War, this material was collated centrally by the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CIC-V) in Si Gn with the captured documents processed by its Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC).7 A very large quantity of CIC-V material is held by The Vietnam Center and Archive (VCAT) at the Texas Tech University, Lubbock Texas, in the United States. Without access to the records held by the VCAT, it would have been quite difficult to provided meaninful comments. Accordingly, access to the records held by the Texas Tech University is gratefully acknowledged and cite t s work as VCAT mater al. Vietnamese-language histories other than 33rd Regiment monographs, have somewhat different accounts of events - including engagements with the Australian forces, and these have also been noted. As an Addendum, this 2014 work also includes several appendices including translations of 33rd Regiment historical monographs, an analysis of casualty information, organizational charts, and maps. A bibliography and a comprehensive index have been included elements that are not usually included in Vietnamese-language works. An interesting aspect is that while the combat effectiveness of NVA/VC forces was seriously hampered by high malarial rates, malaria is only occasionally mentioned in Vietnamese-language historical monographs on the 33rd Regiment. Ernie Chamberlain Point Lonsdale 11 March 2014.
7

At the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) base at Ni t, captured documents were processed by the Detachment of the 1st Divisional Intelligence Unit before on-forwarding to CDEC in Si Gn.

CONTENTS Page Introduction Sources A History Background the 33rd Regiment Central Highlands Operations 1965 - 1968 The Battles of Plei Me and the Ia rng The Plei Me Campaign a 33rd Regiment Casualty Summary After the Plei Me-Ia rng Battles Tt 1968 Operations in Nam B Ty Ninh, Bnh Dng and Phc Long Provinces The Party in the 33rd NVA Regiment Against Pacification Moving Eastward in 1969 Tt 1969 Tensions between North Vietnamese and Southern Communist Troops Morale Reports of Attacks on and Engagements with, Thai and Australian Forces Performance Reviewed 28 32 35 36 38 40 43 45 9 22 22 26 5 1

The 1969 Summer-Autumn/Long Khnh Campaign 33rd Regiment The June 1969 Country-w e H g Po ts Campa g 33rd Regiment Activities May 1969 33rd Regiment Moves Towards Bnh Ba Signals Intelligence The Plan D sr pte by A stral a Comma T e Early J e 1969 H g Po t Beg s os, a C a ge

47 50 51 53 56 60 62 67 70 71 73 74 77 82 84 85 87 90 91 92 97 98

The Battle of Bnh Ba Begins and a Failed Ambush on Route 2 ? The Battle 6 June 1969 Bnh Ba - 7 June 1969 Ha Long The Aftermath Casualties 33rd NVA Regiment at Bnh Ba A Discussion Post-script High Point Phase 2 NVA/VC Battlefield Clearance and the 33rd Regiment Operations in Late 1969 north of National Route 1 Food and Supply Shortages A Negative Appraisal Operations in Bnh Tuy Province C26 1ATF Operations Overlord (Sui Nhc) and Ivanhoe (Ni L) 1971

After the Withdrawal of the Australian Task Force Following the 1973 Paris Peace Accord 1974 - Fighting in Long t and Chu c Districts The Final Offensive 1975 Casualties in Eastern Nam B A Summary Post-Liberation Cambodia and the Vietnam-China Border T e Vetera s Assoc at o and Reunions Achievements and Losses Summarized

103 110 111 113 116

116 119 120

Addendum Appendix 1: The 33rd Regiment: An Historical Summary. Cu Chin Binh Trung on 33, Tm Tt Truyn Thng Trung on 33: n V Anh Hng Lc Lng V Trang Nhn Dn (A Summary of the Heritage of the 33rd Regiment: A Heroic Unit of t e Peoples Arme Forces), H N i, July 2010. ((T e S mmary H story)). Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh Hnh Thnh V Chin u Ca Trung on 33 Anh Hng T nm 1965-2010 (The Development and Combat History of the Heroic 33rd Regiment from 1965 to 2010), Vng Tu, 2010. ((T e Developme t H story)). L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trn nh Ngy 06/06/69 Ca Trung on 33 - X Bnh Ba, Huyn Chu c, Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu, The Background Story of the Memorial Area for the Battle of Bnh Ba on 6/6/69 by 33 Regiment at B Ba V llage, C c District, B Ra-V g T Prov ce, Vng Tu, 2011. ((T e Memor al H story)). L B L c, A Summary Report on the Combat Activities and Operations of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), 1965-2010.

Appendix 2:

Appendix 3:

Appendix 4:

Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Bo Co Tm Tt Qu Trnh Chin u v Hot ng Trung on 33 (A57) T 1965-2010, Long Khnh, 15 July 2010. Appendix 5: Appendix 6: Appendix 7: The 33rd Regiment Memorial Tablet. The 33rd Regiment: Strength Reports and Estimates. The 33rd NVA Regiment as related in the 5th VC Division History (2005) - Extracts from: Phm Quang inh, Lch S S an B Binh 5 (1965-2005) (The History of the 5th Infantry Division 1965-2005), T e Peoples Army P bl s g Ho se, H N i, 2005. The 33rd Regiment in the Histories of the D445 and D440 VC Battalions; and the Chu c, t , Long t, and Xun L c District Histories. The 33rd NVA Regiment: Casualties at the Battle of Bnh Ba and Vicinity in June 1969 and Prisoners of War (POW).

Appendix 8:

Appendix 9:

Appendix 10: Party Ca res Notebook: Critique of the 33rd Regiment. Appendix 11: Chamberlain, E. P. Brigadier (Retd), T e Battle of Bnh Ba: a baffling mystery and SIGINT failure No!, T e Br ges Rev ew, Issue 1, Canungra, January 2013, pp.91-92. Appendix 12: Organogram 33rd NVA Regiment, 3 July 1968. Appendix 13: Organogram 3rd Battalion/33rd NVA Regiment, 2 May 1971. Appendix 14: Organogram 33rd NVA Regiment, 21 September 1971. Appendix 15: Organogram 33rd NVA Regiment, 1975. Appendix 16: Past Years Orga sation - T Chc Ban Ch Huy Trung on 33 Qua Cc Thi K (33rd Reg me t Hea q arters Orga sat o Past Years in Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh Hnh Thnh V Chin u Ca Trung on 33 Anh Hng T nm 1965-2010 (The Development and Combat History of the Heroic 33rd Regiment from 1965 to 2010), Vng Tu, 2010. ((ie Appendix 2)).

Appendix 17 (Map): 33rd Regiment Headquarters Locations: 29 April 2 July 1969. Appendix 18 (Map): Military Region (MR) 3/III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), Republic of Vietnam. Appendix 19 (Map): P c Tuy Province. Appendix 20 (Map): Long Khnh and Bnh Tuy Provinces. Appendix 21 (Map): The Battle of Bnh Ba June 1969: NVA/VC Deployments. Appendix 22: Personal Accounts of the Battle of Bnh Ba by 1st Battalion Veterans: B c Phong, Nguyn Vn Dy.

Bibliography Index

Commander of the 33rd Regiment Nguyn Vn Thng issuing orders for an attack on Sui Ngh/c Thnh 1971-1972

33rd Regiment soldiers (C-18 Company) firing a 12.7mm DShK Heavy Machine Gun in an anti-aircraft role.

INTRODUCTION

In the fighting, the Regiment took part in 1,210 battles both small and large; overwhelmed one Sector, five Sub-Sectors, three Special Sectors, six Sub-SubSectors, 235 enemy posts both large and small; destroyed two convoys, 103 artillery pieces, set fire to 133 aircraft, destroyed 1,345 military vehicles (including 601 tanks and armoured vehicles); wiped out 32 enemy battalions (including an American battalion and a Thai battalion), 50 companies (including 21 American companies, two Australian companies, and two Thai companies); seized 2,454 weapons of various types, 342 radios, 20 military vehicles and other military equipment; and wiped out 30,047 enemy troops and captured 787 1 Sources To date, a discrete book2 on the history of the 33rd Regiment (E33)3 has yet to be published in Vietnam - However, several monographs have been published by the veterans of the 33rd Regiment. Sources for this publication - Their Story, have included: - A translation of the 33rd Regiments Summary History (2010) a monograph, attached as Appendix 1.4 - A brief history of the Regiment Qu Trnh (The Development History), with many photographs - produced as a monograph in 2010. An English translation is attached as Appendix 2.5
1

Hng Quc Vn, Gp g mt chin s ca Trung on 33 Anh hng (Meeting a Soldier of the Heroic 33rd Regiment), Bo Cu Chin Binh Viet Nam, 17 December 2010. The article, based on an interview with a 33rd Regiment veteran the venerable monk i c Thch Tm Vng, appeared on the website of the national War Veterans Association and included figures cited in a 2010 33rd Regiment historical monograph - Cu Chin Binh Trung on 33, Tm Tt Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (The 33rd Regiment A Summary History), see footnote 4 and Appendix 1. 2 The 33rd Regiment Veterans Association plans to publish a comprehensive history of the Regiment in November 2014 email advice from V Xun Thu (33rd Regiment Veterans Association), 20 September 2013. A proposal for that formal history was discussed at the B Ra-Vng Tu Peoples Committee on 17 June 2013, and the project was formally launched on 23 October 2013. The Writing Team includes two 33 rd Regiment veterans c a former Regimental 2ic and chief-of-staff; and V Xun Thu - a former political cadre. The History of the 5th VC Division (1995 and 2005), includes passages on the operations of the 33rd NVA Regiment Phm Quang inh, ch S S an Binh 5 (1965-2005) (The History of the 5th Infantry Division 1965-2005),The Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 2005 see footnote 9 and the extract at Appendix 7. 3 As noted in the Preface, NVA/VC formation and unit nomenclatures included prefix letters to designate the size of an element eg A for section/squad; platoon; C Company; D battalion; E regiment (also Q); F and CT division; and T Military Region. was also used as a prefix for some fronts eg 2, 3. K was often used as a prefix designator for a hospital. 4 Cu Chin inh Trung on 33, Tm Tt Truyn Thng Trung on 33 n V Anh Hng Lc ng V Trang Nhn Dn (A Summary of the Heritage of the 33 rd Regiment A Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces), H Ni, July 2010 see Appendix 1. 5 Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh Hnh Thnh V Chin u Ca Trung on 33 Anh Hng T nm 1965-

The translation of a further short 33rd Regiment monograph: L Lch (Memorial) History (2011) is also included as Appendix 3.6 At Appendix 4 is the translation of a 2010 eight-page report in a presentation format, by a senior 33rd Regiment cadre7 L B Lc.8 A translation of a 33rd Regiment Memorial Tablet is at Appendix 5. Detail on the 33rd Regiments operations is also included in the 5th VC Division History (2005) and a translated extract of that history is included as Appendix 7.9 The 33rd Regiments activities are also mentioned in the published histories of two Vit Cng local force battalions D440 and D445 (that operated in Phc Tuy10 and Long Kh nh11 Provinces), and several District histories. Translated extracts are included as Appendix 8. Martyrs ists of the 33rd Regiment have been published, and these are examined at Appendix 9 with an analysis of entries for June 1969 (The Battle of Bnh Ba) and notes on the deaths of several senior cadre. In early January 1970, a senior COSVN cadre wrote a report on the 33rd Regiments status and performance and a translation is included at Appendix 10.

2010 (The Development and Combat History of the Heroic 33 rd Regiment from 1965 to 2010), Vng Tu, 2010 - see Appendix 2. 6 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trn nh Ngy 06/06/69 Ca Trung on 33 - X Bnh Ba, Huyn Chu c, Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (The ackground Story of the Memorial Area for the attle of nh a on 6/6/69 by the 33rd Regiment at Bnh Ba Village, Chu c District, B Ra-Vng Tu Province), Vng Tu, 2011 see Appendix 3. 7 Vietnamese communist terminology does not use a term for officer or non-commissioned officer (cf the Republic of Vietnams s quan for officer etc). The communist term cadre (cn b) ie as distinct from soldier (chin s), is generally applied to personnel in leadership positions of section/squad deputy leader (and above) in armed elements; and to cell leaders (and above) in political infrastructure and front organisations. Vietnamese communists also use a unique collective term for communist troops ie b i. 8 L B Lc - Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Bo Co Tm T t Qu Trnh Chin u v Hot ng Trung on 33 (A57) T 1965-2010 (A Summary Report on the Combat Activities and Operations of the 33 rd Regiment (A57)), Long Khnh, 15 July 2010 see Appendix 4. 9 Phm Quang inh, ch S S an Binh 5 (1965-2005) (The History of the 5th Infantry Division 1965-2005),The Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 2005. 10 Phc Tuy Province was about 55 kilometres from east-to-west and about 35 kilometres from north-tosouth (an area of about 1,958 sq km about 83% of the size of the Australian Captial Territory) see the description and map at Appendix 19. The Province capital - Phc L/B Ra Town, was about 110 kilometres by road south-east of Si Gn via Route 15 (nowadays Route 51). In 1967, the population of the Province was about 103,000 - including B Ra Towns population of about 15,600; and was 112,683 in January 1970 in 22 villages (106 hamlets). 11 Long Khnh Province had a total land area of 4,000 square kilometres with a maximum length of 90 kilometres and an average width of 70 kilometres. See the map at Appendix 20 and notes at footnote 144. It comprised two Districts: Xun Lc and nh Qun its population of 131,300 (1965) lived in 18 villages (107 hamlets).

Aspects of the 33rd Regiments operations in Phc Tuy Province in early June 1969 including Australian signals intelligence (SIGINT) coverage of the 33rd Regiment, are outlined at Appendix 11.12 A map outlining the 33rd Regiments movements in the period late April to early July 1969 based on Australian SIGINT reporting, is at Appendix 17. An account of the Battle of Bnh Ba written by a soldier of the 33rd Regiments 1st Battalion who survived the Battle see Appendix 22. A short two paragraph, summary history of the 33rd NVA Regiment is included in the official Australian Army military history of the Vietnam conflict.13

In July 1968, 1ATF produced Outline Orbat Details 32 and 33 Regts14 that noted the 33rd Regiment is presently believed to be in the process of relocating into III CTZ in company with 32 NVA Regt. Its strength was cited as 530. In May 1971, 1 ATF produced a seven-page study on 3 n 33 NVA Regt15 noting its strength as 185. In late September 1971, 1ATF produced an 11-page study on the 33rd NVA Regiment.16 However, much of that document was noted as being based on material from the US 3rd Brigade (Separate) of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) - and does not include any mention of the early June 1969 Battle of Bnh Ba. On Morale, the 1ATF study noted 33 NVA Regt is considered to be one of the most capable units in GVN MR3 and as such is believed to have fairly high morale. This can be attributed to constant political indoctrination. Very few Hoi Chanhs are received from the Regiment, and it is common to find that members of 33 Regiment who have been KIA ((Killed in Action)) possess no identifying documents.17 The official history of the Australian Army in the Vietnam War notes In engagements with Australian units, 33 Regiment consistently proved aggressive, well disciplined, well equipped and ably led. It was generally considered 1ATFs most

12

Chamberlain, E.P. rigadier (Retd), The attle of nh a a baffling mystery and SIGINT failure No!, The ridges Review, Issue 1, Canungra, January 2013, pp.91 -92. 13 Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War 1968-1975, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, 2012, p.857. 14 Cameron, G.C. Major 1ATF, I-9-22, Outline Orbat Details 32 and 33 NVA Regts, Ni t, 3 July 1968 see organogram at Appendix 12. 15 Annex F to 1ATF INTSUM, No.122/71, Ni t, 2 May 1971 see Appendix 13. 16 1ATF, 33 NVA Regiment Annex F to 1ATF INTSUM No.264/71, Ni t, 21 September 1971. 17 1ATF, 33 NVA Regiment 1ATF INTSUM No.264/71, op.cit., 21 September 1971, p.6. a Hoi Chanh ie Hi Chnh, was a rallier under the Chiu Hi programme. Begun in 1963, the Chiu Hi (Open Arms) programme encouraged North Vietnamese and Vit Cng troops and infrastructure members to defect to the Si Gn Government. For Chiu Hi statistics for all provinces see VCAT Item No. 2234403020. Phc Tuy Province statistics were: 1965 77 ralliers/defectors/returnees (hi chnh); 1966 278; 1967 317; 1968 45; 1969 121; 1970 196; 1971 37: ie for the seven years: 1,071. However, in May 1972, the Province Senior Advisor in Phc Tuy Province had declared the programme was largely moribund, and was inducing few VC to defect. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.648, p.1054 endnote 33.

dangerous enemy. and the 33 NVA Regiment was the most dangerous enemy force confronted by the task force.18 As noted, in recent years, the 33rd Regiments Veterans Association also published a Martyrs ist.19 That List with some minor differences, was also published on a Vietnamese-language website in July 2013.20 In April 2013, the 33rd Regiment Veterans Association published a video: Trung on 33 (A57): Mt Thi Ho Hng ((The 33rd (A57) Regiment: An Heroic Time))21 that related the Regiments history including engagements in the Central Highlands in 1965 and in Phc Tuy Province. Videos and film on the June 1969 Battle of Bnh Ba and 33rd Regiment reunions are listed in the Bibliography.

Display in the 33rd Regiments Museum Memorial Complex, Bnh Ba Village

18 19

Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.610 and p.857. Political Department Military Region 7, Danh Sch Lit S Trung on 33 (A57) T 19681975 (Min ng Nam ) (List of the Martyrs of the 33rd Regiment (A57) From 1968-1975 (Eastern Nam B Region), H Ch Minh City, 10 April 2002. The ist includes at p.1 Tng Hp S Lit S Cc Tnh Hy Sinh Cc Chin Trng Chng M Thi Gian T Th ng 7/68 n Th ng 5/75" (Consolidated List of the Martyrs who died on the Battlefields during the Anti-American War from July 1968 to May 1975). See Appendix 9 for an analysis and commentary on the 33 rd Regiments Martyrs ists. 20 Nguyn S H, Ngi a , Danh s ch lit s thuc bin ch E33_F303 (List of Martyrs of the 33 rd Regiment of the 303rd Division) - http://teacherho.vnweblogs.com/post/9313/424599. The List was posted on the Internet site on 16 July 2013 provided by V nh ut the honorary deputy of the 33rd Regiments Veterans Ph Th- nh Phc branch (for analysis see Appendix 9). The List has minor differences if compared with the published Military Region 7 book noted above at footnote 19. 21 Trung on 33 (A57): Mt Thi Ho Hng (The 33rd Regiment (A57) An Heroic Time) 26 April 2013, 21 minutes. The video features several 33rd Regiment veterans as speakers: L B Lc, Nguyn Hu im/m, and V Xun Thu with L B Lc outlining the Regiments involvement in the Plei Me-Ia rng Campaign in the Central Highlands; and is available on You Tube as http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mqFZp42kwJE .

A HISTORY Background the 33rd Regiment In October 1964, the 270th Regiment in L Thy District of Qung Bnh Province (North Vietnam) having received reinforcements from the Military Region, was redesignated the 101st Regiment22. In November 1964, the Regiment moved to a camp (XE 649458) in B Trch District of Qung Bnh Province. Subsequently, the Regiment was formally established on 15 February 1965 in Tuyn Ha District (at XE 243700) in Qung Bnh Province and designated as the 101B Regiment23 of the 325B NVA Division (the Bnh Tr Thin Division). The Regiment reportedly also established a jungle camp for infiltration training the Din Tp camp (in the vicinity of XE 055765).24 At this time, the Regiment also reportedly used the cover designator Cng Trng 33 (Work Site 33). Its initial senior cadre were listed25 as: Lieutenant Colonel V Sc as
22

The 101st Regiment of the 325th Division was originally formed in September 1945 from Vi t Minh guerillas in the Tha Thin-Hu area. In December 1964 - as the 101A Regiment, it operated in the Central Highlands and Cambodia before deploying south to the Southern Highlands in 1965 and reportedly becoming the 16th Regiment of Military Region 6. The 101B Regiment (ie the 33 rd Regiment) departed for the Central Highlands of South Vietnam in late July 1965; and the 101C Regiment was raised in September 1965 moving into the Highlands in May 1966. In the summer of 1966, the 101C Regiment was incorporated into the 101B (ie the 33rd) Regiment. Subsequently, the 101D and 101E Regiments were also raised - see Trung on 101 Cao Vn (1945-1995), Peoples Armed Forces Publishing House, 1995. A US report notes that the original 101st Regiment (of the 325th Division) departed North Vietnam on 14 December 1964 and arrived in Kontum Province on 2 February 1965. It launched its first attacks in March 1965, and moved south to Qung c Province in southern II CTZ in mid-October 1965. MACV, North Vietnamese Army OB in RVN: January 1966, 12 February 1966, p.8 VCAT Item No.F015900210441. 23 A 33rd Regiment History (2011) relates that the Regiment comprised the 31 st Regiment of the 341st Division and the 325th Battalion of the 31st Regiment/341st Division reinforced with the 1st Battalion of the 308th Division and the 2nd Battalion of the 320th Division - L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.3 see Appendix 3. The 1st Battalion of the 101st Regiment was reportedly formed in March 1965 with 400 cadre and soldiers from the 36th, 88th, and 102nd Regiments of the 308th Division according to NVA POW Sergeant L Hng Sn, see DEC #4/0076/66/ VCAT Item No.F034600042345. According to US reports, the 101B Regiment of the new 325th NVA Division, had a cover-name of the 33rd Worksite. For the Regiments activities in North Vietnam and the Battle of Plei Me, see Military Interrogation Center/MACV Document Exploitation Centre, Report Log #3-0025-66, April 1966 (VCAT Item No.F034600051164). See also VCAT Item No. 2130615008 for data on the 101B/33rd Regiment/Sng Lam Regiment of the 325B NVA Division. For detail on the formation of the Regiment particularly its 2nd Battalion; infiltration into the South; and the Battle of Plei Me (including detailed sketch maps), see the debrief of NVA Aspirant Lai Vn C (platoon commander in the 2nd Battalion who rallied on 6 November 1965) VCAT Item No.F034600850967. 24 USMACV, Standard Report DEC Log 1-0116-66, 4 March 1966. For an account by an NVA sergeant of the101- Regiments activities from April 1965 to after the Plei Me battle, see NIC Report No.611/66, VCAT Item No.F034600380842. 25 See the Regiments senior appointment and personnel listing in T Chc Ban Ch Huy Trung on 33 Qua Cc Thi K (The Organisation of the Headquarters of the 33 rd Regiment Headquarters in Past Years at Appendix 16. This Organisation of the Headquarters is part of an i n c Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh Hnh

Regiment commander26; H Trng B as regimental political commissar; and Nguyn c Khi27 - as chief-of-staff. The cover designator of the Regiment was Sng am with its battalions (1 to 3 inclusive) designators as: X An, X Binh, and X Cong.28 Oath ceremonies were reportedly conducted by the Regiments political staff on 19 (or 22) July 1965 and National Liberation Front (NLF) flags presented to the battalion political officers. The next day 20 July 1965, the main body of the Regiment began its deployment into the South with the soldiers carrying loads of from 50 to 60 kilograms.29 After a difficult and dangerous 49-day march30, the Regiment arrived in the B3 Central Highlands Front reportedly the first fully-manned and equipped NVA regiment to be deployed into South Vietnam.31 The Regimental Headquarters and subordinate companies
Thnh V Chin u Ca Trung on 33 Anh Hng T nm 1965-2010 (The Development and Combat History of the Heroic 33rd Regiment from 1965 to 2010), Vng Tu, 2010 see Appendix 2. 26 According to the debrief of a seriously wounded prisoner, Regimental commander V Sc received the blame for heavy losses in the Plei Me Campaign - and in early February 1966 was transferred to another unit and replaced by ieutenant Colonel T nh Khm NIC Report No.598/66, 22 November 1966 ie VCAT Item No.F034600380926. 27 As chief-of-staff, on 15 December 1965, Nguyn c Khi issued instructions on troop bivouac procedures for Cng Trng 33 (33rd Regiment) CDEC Log 06-1277-66. 28 For a basic organogram of the 101 Regiment/325 Division (New), see - USMACV, Standard Report (Trn Ngc Qu) DEC Log 1-0116-66, 4 March 1966 VCAT Item No.F034600350617. Additional to the three battalions, there were eight support companies numbered from 13 to 20 inclusive. Senior cadre in mid-late 1965 included: Commander 1st Battalion Nguyt, battalion strength: 650. See also Log 30017-66, VCAT Item No.F34600310900 for the Regiments routine and infiltration into the South. For the raising and organisation of the 101st Regiment in mid-1965; the dates of the battalions departures for South Vietnam in late July 1965; and cover designators see debriefing reports of 2nd Battalion/101st Regiment ralliers (8 January 1966) in II CTZ DEC Log #2-0019-66, 4 March 1966 VCAT Item No.F03460033346. 29 A history of the 101st NVA Regiment relates that In Summer 1966, following a decision by the Central Highlands ((Ty Nguyn)) Front Headquarters, the 101B and the 101C Regiments were combined to become the 33rd Regiment which operated in the Southern Central Highlands and the Eastern Nam B area. - , Trung on 101 Cao Vn (1945-1995), Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn (Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 1995. For detail on the formation of the new 101 Regiment ie the 33rd NVA Regiment, including the incorporation of a battalion/s from the 52 nd Regiment of the 320th NVA Division; 33rd Regiment senior cadre; organisation and equipment; its movement to the South (departing in three phases: 20, 24, 28 July 1965); its route and subsequent engagements at Plei Me - see reports based on debriefs of ralliers USMACV Document Exploitation Center, Log 02-0019-66, 4 March 1966 and VCAT Item No. VA004428. As Infiltration Group 520, the Regimental Headquarters and the support companies are also reported to have departed Tuyn Ha (XE 243700), Qung Bnh Province (North Vietnam) on 21 July 1965. The 3rd Battalion left on about 17 July, the 1st Battalion departed on 19 July, and the 2nd Battalion departed last on 23 July 1965. The debriefing report of a signalman of the 16 th Company seriously wounded on 10 August 1966, included detail on the infiltration route. NIC Report No.598/66, 22 November 1966 see the debrief of the seriously wounded POW Trn Viet Nhi (signalman - C16 Company) ie: VCAT Item No.F034600380926. 30 According to a US summary, the average of earlier infiltration groups was 90 days, the 33d Regiment infiltrated from North Vietnam into the Central Highlands of RVN in about 60 days confirmed strength 2,000. - USMACV CICV: Order of Battle Study No. 66-1: Enemy Force Build Up July 1964December 1965, 18 February 1966. 31 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.3 see Appendix 3. For the raising, infiltration, early combat actions and poor morale in the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment, see VCAT Item No.F034600422516. The report includes the pre-

crossed into South Vietnam from Cambodian territory on about 7 September 1965 and established bases in Gia Lai Province32 in the Gia ai Jungle (YA 930145)33, at An Ta village (ZA 110195 - sic), and Plei Ya Bo (ZA 143228).34 Here, the cover designator Worksite 33 was reportedly adopted, and the three battalions were re-numbered H1 to H335, and the regimental support companies were numbered with a K prefix. The Regiments strength was reportedly 2,000.36 The 304th NVA Division history summarised In August 1965, the High Command reinforced the Central Highlands Front by sending it the 33rd Regiment (the 33rd Regiment was formerly the 101st Regiment of the 325th Division).37

departure signing of the individual Resolution of Combat Determination by 1 st Battalion personnel. For food, rice rations and medical supplies of the 1st Battalion to mid-1966, see VCAT Item No.F034600422505. 32 Communist Gia ai Province comprised the northern two -thirds of the Republic of Vietnams (South Vietnams) Pleiku Province and western areas of nh nh Province and most of Ph Bn Province. 33 In a debrief, a POW (3rd Battalion) stated that, having crossed into South Vietnam in early September 1965, the whole Regiment initially bivouaced for about one month at Gong y rand (vicinity of ZA [sic] 960150 but probably YA 960150) in Thanh District of Pleiku Province before deploying to attack Plei Me. USMACV DEC #3-0025-66, 12 April 1966, VCAT Item No.F034600501896. 34 During infiltration into the South, Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN - ie North Vietnamese Army) military personnel routinely physically abandoned their rank and other insignia and adopted functional titles. However, in many formations and units this was nominal, and their military ranks were used see Advanced Research Projects Agency, Basic Profile: NVA POW MR3, Summary Report No.15, Washington, 14 January 1971, VCAT Item No.2321314001. In some documentation, personnel in PAVN and PLAF units in the South still used rank designators eg: 2/2 for Lieutenant Colonel; 2/1 - Major; 4/4 and 3/4 - Senior Captain; 3/3 - Captain; 3/1 - Lieutenant; 3/5 - Aspirant; 4/3 - Senior Sergeant; 4/2 Sergeant; 4/1 Corporal; and 5/1 Private. See also footnote 407 for such hyphenated ranks. NVA ranks were illustrated in 1ATF, Vietnam Digest No.4/68, Ni t, 11-17 August 1968. 35 VCAT Item No.F034600380926. Also - according to a 33rd Regiment POW captured on 8 August 1966, on arrival in South Vietnam, the Regiment changed its unit designator from 101 to Worksite 33 and the battalions designators were: 1st Battalion: X An; 2nd Battalion: X Cng; 3rd Battalion: X Ngoc VCAT Item No.F034600380800. 36 See the debrief of NVA Aspirant ai Vn C (rallied 6 November 1965) VCAT Item No. F034600850967. His information corroborates that of the seriously wounded 33rd Regiment signalman see footnote 29 above. For detail on the organisation and activities of the ao ng Party (ie the Communist Party) including its Youth Group (on), in the 33rd Regiment (as the 101st Regiment up to October 1965), see VCAT Item No.F034600591842 and Item No.F034600401458. See also footnote 54. 37 Nguyn Huy Ton & Phm Quang nh, S on 304 (304th Division), Tp II (Vol II), Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 1990.

33rd Regiment ralliers indicating the Regiments infiltration route into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam in July-September 1965.38

Communist territorial boundaries in Northern South Vietnam

38

Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University - photograph VCAT VA04428.

CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OPERATIONS 1965 - 1968 The Battles of Plei Me and Ia rng Assigned for operations on 15 October 1965, during October and November 1965, the Regiment fought in the Plei Me (Ply Me)39 and Ia rng40 Campaigns in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. In the first phase of the Campaign directed by the B3 Front, the 33rd Regiment was to attack the CIDG base41 at Plei Me (ZA 164058) about

39

The Plei Me Campaign (conducted in part of the Dry Season: 19-25 October 1965) was followed in the same region by the Ia rng Campaign (14-18 November 1965) to the south-west. According to the 304th NVA Divisions history of the Campaign After the battle at Dak Sut ((the Dak Sut District Town and the Special Forces base was overrun on 18 August 1965)), the 101st Regiment was sent down to the B2 Front, and the newly-arrived 101B Regiment was designated the 33rd Regiment. Nguyn Huy Ton & Phm Quang nh, S on 304 (304th Division), Tp II (Vol II), Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 1990. The US After Action Report noted y the 27th ((October 1965)), the NVA regiment responsible for the siege of Plei Me was positively identified as the 101B or the 33d, the latter designation used almost exclusively thereafter. 1st Air Cavalry Division, Combat After Action Report - The Pleiku Campaign, 4 March 1966 (a comprehensive 226-page US report on the Campaign with annotated maps). See also: 1st Air Cavalry Division, Operational Report Lessons Learned 3-66: The Pleiku Campaign, 10 May 1966 (226 pages) including detailed tactical-scale maps VCAT Item No.1070422001 or DTIC Pdf URL AD0855112. For comprehensive ARVN, US and North Vietnamese perspectives, see the series of 51 articles on the battles in: Nguyn Vn Tn, Vi iu Cn N n it V Trn nh Pleime -Iadrang (A Few Things You Should Know About the Plei Me-Ia rng attles), 24 November 2009 (updated 8 March 2010) - http://nguyentin.tripod.com/pleime_thacmac-u.htm . The PAVN Military History website Dng Nc Gi Nc ( uilding and Defending the Nation) includes a discussion blog Trn Ia Drang v Playme, Sa Thy with over 30 pages of postings from June 2008 to December 2012 - see http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php/topic,2047.0.html . In November 2005, a conference was held at the Vietnam Center at the Texas Tech University (Lubbock) on the Plei Me-Ia rng Campaign 40th Anniversary Ia Drang Seminar, Washington D.C., 10-13 November 2005. Presentations are available online, including by PAVN Lieutenant General Nguyn nh c. http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/2005IaDrang/ . 40 The Ia rng sometimes as the Ya rng (rng River), is a valley in a four -sided area bounded by Plei Me, u Can, c C, and Plei The/Te. This area covers approximately 12 square kilometres and is about 45 kilometres south-west of Pleiku City. The average elevation of this area is between 400 and 500 metres. South of the Ia rng is the tall, prominent Chu Pong (Ch Prng) Mountain Range - 732 metres in height, which lies along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border see the following map. 41 At the time of the attack, the base itself was manned by a Vietnamese Special Forces element (14), 10 US advisors, and a US-advised 250-strong Montagnard (Jarai, Rhade, Bahnar) CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defence Group Dn S Chin u) force. Another 40 CIDG occupied two outposts north-east and south of the base, and elements were also on external patrols. Two Vietnamese Special Forces (Airborne Ranger) companies reinforced the base on 22 October. The armoured relief column from Pleiku arrived at 1845hrs on 25 October having been attacked by the 32nd NVA Regiment enroute. For the detailed US 5th Special Forces Group account, see CIDG in Camp Defense (Plei Me) in the 5th Special Forces Group, Quarterly Command Report, 31 December 1965 - VCAT Item No.168300010050. That report lists casualties as: US Special Forces 3 killed, seven wounded; ARVN/CIDG 30 killed, 59 wounded; NVA/VC - 141 confimed killed, 241 estimated killed, 300 estimated wounded. A copy of a US air-dropped PSYOPS pamphlet - in Vietnamese, depicting a Chinese communist advisor is included in the report your sacrifices/deaths only satiate your bellicose Chinese communist advisors.

10

50 kilometres south of Pleiku, and ARVN relief forces were to be ambushed and destroyed by the 32nd (320th) NVA Regiment.42

Plei Me Ia rng Area (Pleiku to Plei Me about 50 km, see footnote 39) Subsequently, these regiments were reportedly planned to join with the 66th NVA Regiment43 to seize Pleiku Town. Official Vietnamese accounts do not specifically name the commander of the 33rd NVA Regiment in the Plei Me-Ia rng Campaign. One

42

The 32nd Regiment comprised the 334, 635, and 966 Battalions. Its regimental base was at Plei Te/PleiThe (YA 820070). For the 32nd Regiment ambush plan dated 12 October 1965, see: http://www.generalhieu.com/why_pleime_VCA-2.htm. 43 The 66th NVA Regiment (of the 304th NVA Division) did not reach the battlefield until about 2 November 1965 see: NVA 66th Regiment in Pleime-Ia rng Campaign http://www.generalhieu.com/f304iadrang-2.htm

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prominent writer has suggested that it may have initially been Nguyn Hu An44, but prisoner/rallier debriefings and a recent 33rd Regiment monograph produced by their Veterans Association confirm that the commander was V Sc. The Regiments battalion commanders were reportedly: Nguyt 1st Battalion; Dc 2nd Battalion; and Xo 3rd Battalion.45 The 3rd attalion commanders full name was reportedly L Vn Xo.46 Prior to the beginning of the offensive phase of the Plei Me Campaign, the 33rd Regiment reportedly concentrated at its home base prior to the attack on Plei Me. This was Anta Village (an NVA designation) at YA 94001047 located at the foot of the Chu Pong Massif (also as Ch Prng 732 metres, an area of 451 sq km). It was here during early October that the 33rd Regiment conducted drills and rehearsals of its attack on the Plei Me CIDG camp.48 The rehearsals reportedly last six days.49 On 19 October 1965, in Phase I of the 3 Fronts Central Highlands Campaign, rd the 3 Battalion of the 33rd Regiment attacked the Ch Ho base a forward outpost protecting the south-western approaches to the ARVN Special Forces base at Plei Me50 (50 kilometres south of Pleiku City), and the Regiment then lay siege to Plei Me. According to the 304th NVA Division History The shots of the Plei Me Campaign were fired on 9 [sic] October 1965 when the the 200th Battalion shelled the enemy barracks at c C, and the 49th Sapper Battalion attacked Tn Lc. Then, as the enemy focused its attention on c C and Tn Lc, the 11th [sic] Battalion/33rd Regiment launched a surprise attack on Ch Ho, a forward outpost protecting the south-western approaches to Plei Me. The Regiment then began the siege of Plei Me. With a clear understanding of the
44

Nguyn Vn Tn, Commenting on General Nguyn Hu Ans Account of the Plyme Campaign, 19 August 2013 - http://www.generalhieu.com/iadrang_huuan-2.htm . Citing Ans book, Chin Trng Mi Hi c, Tn states I assume that Nguyn Hu An was the 33rd Regiment Commander during phase I of Plyme campaign and was promoted to B3 Field Front Deputy Commander entering phase II of the campaign. However see the following footnote 45 that notes the 33rd Regiment commander as V Sc. 45 T Chc Ban Ch Huy Trung on 33 Qua C c Thi K (33rd Regiment Headquarters Organisation in Past Years in Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010 see Appendix 2. See also footnote 94 a rallier reported the battalion commanders as: 1st Nguyt, 2nd Duc, and 3rd Huy (replaced by Thinh in January 1966). 46 The debriefing of a POW (3rd Battalion) provided detailed information on training in North Vietnam and infiltration including equipment issues. USMACV DEC #3-0025-66, 12 April 1966 VCAT Item No. F034600501896. 47 Some US reports note An Ta village as at ZA 110195 but YA 940010 is far more likely. 48 st 1 Air Cavalry Division, Operational Report Lessons Learned 3-66: The Pleiku Campaign, 10 May 1966, p.54 VCAT Item No.1070422001 or DTIC Pdf URL AD0855112. As noted at footnote 39, this comprehensive report includes detailed maps. See also the account at foonote 31 ie on about 7 September 1965, the 33rd Regiment bivouaced at An Ta Village (ZA 110195 - sic) and Plei Ya Bo (ZA 143228) to prepare for operations. 49 After Action Intelligence Report: Dan Thang 21, 30 October 1965 covering US air support aspects. VCAT Item No.F031100010271. 50 The Campaign tactic was vy im dit vin ie to lay siege and destroy enemy relief forces principally using the 32nd NVA Regiment (sometimes referred to as the 320th Regiment), the 33rd NVA Regiment and subsequently the 66th NVA Regiment which only arrived on the battlefield on about 4 November. For detail on the Plei Me attack including sketch maps, see the debrief of NVA Aspirant Lai Vn C (rallied 6 November 1965) VCAT Item No.F034600850967.

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requirements of our tactics, which were to besiege the enemy post and annihilate the relief force (vy im dit vin), the cadre and soldiers of the 33rd Regiment rapidly massed their forces to build siege positions and put the enemy under heavy pressure in order to force the enemy to send out a relief force.51

33rd Regiment attack on the Ch Ho Post and Plei Me Camp52 As mentioned, the 33rd Regiments commander was reportedly V Sc53, and its strength was about 2,600 including 420 Party members and 1,720 Youth Group (on) members.54

51

Nguyn Huy Ton & Phm Quang nh, 304th Division, Vol II, Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 1990, p.25. Another detailed account was written by ng V Hip who - as a Senior Lieutenant Colonel, was the deputy chairman for political affairs in the Plei Me Campaign, see - ng V Hip, Colonel General (PAVN), K c Ty Nguyn (Central Highland Memories), Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn (Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 2000. He related At 4am on the morning of the 19th October, 33rd Regiment received the order to begin its approach. Moving from its assault position at Quynh Ko La hamlet, 15 kilometres from Plei Me, the cadre and soldiers of 33 rd Regiment followed trails previously prepared by engineers to move secretly forward to Plei Me. At 1700hrs that afternoon, the Regiment was 1.5 kilometres from the outpost where it stopped to deploy into attack formation. At exactly 2255hrs that night, the soldiers of 3 rd Company/3rd Battalion/33rd Regiment reinforced by two machineguns and two 82mm mortars, attacked the Ch Ho base. At the same time, the command post of the 33rd Regiment ordered its mortars and recoilless rifles to shell Plei Me. After one night and one day of battle, we had captured the Ch Ho strong-point, our units were still at full strength, our morale was high, and our troops were ready and waiting to attack the enemy relief forces. However, in the face of the savage bombardment by enemy air and artillery that killed and wounded many of our personnel, a number of cadre and Party members wavered. They allowed the troops to withdraw from the battlefield, leading to a disorganized retreat that soon became every man for himself. The retreat was so unorganized and undisciplined that the political officer of one unit got lost for three days before finally making it back to his unit. p.45. 52 This extract is taken from a published post-War Vietnamese map, see footnote 70. 53 As noted earlier, according to the debrief of a seriously wounded prisoner, the 33 rd Regiment commander V Sc received the blame for the heavy losses in the Plei Me Campaign; and in early February 1966 was transferred to another unit and replaced by ieutenant Colonel T nh Khm NIC Report No.598/66, 22 November 1966 VCAT Item No.F034600380926. In a Campaign history, Nguyn Hu An is noted as a

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According to a detailed US report, the ground attack on Plei Me began at 1910hrs on 19 October 1965 began with probing small arms fire followed by the full scale attack launched at 2300hrs employing 57mm RC , 81mm [sic] mortars, automatic weapons, small arms. The attacking NVA ground force reportedly broke contact due to air strikes at 1300hrs on 24 October.55 During the attack, the 33rd Regiments 2nd Battalion was reportedly the reserve force.56 An ARVN armoured relief column moving south from Pleiku was ambushed north of Plei Me on 23 October by elements of the 32nd NVA Regiment (334th, 635th, 966th Battalions). The US 1st Air Cavalry Division based at An Khe, deployed elements of a brigade by helicopter on 23 October forcing the withdrawal of the 33rd Regiment westwards from Plei Me see following maps.57 The battles were the first major engagements between US and NVA formations in the Vietnam War, and the first of the major US airmobile operations in the War. The senior US Special Forces adviser in the Plei Me camp Major C.A. Beckwith, commented on the attacking enemy troops: Id give anything to have 200 of them under my command. Theyre the finest soldiers, Ive ever seen. Theyre dedicated and good soldiers theyre the best Ive ever seen.58
deputy commander of the Campaign. - Phm Vnh Phc (ed - et al), Operation Ply Me, Operations in the US Resistance War, Nh Xut Bn Th Gii, H Ni, 2009, p.16. 54 ng V Hip, Colonel General (PAVN), K c Ty Nguyn (Central Highland Memories), Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn (Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 2000, p.5. As a Senior Lieutenant Colonel, ng V Hip was the deputy chairman for political affairs in the Plei Me Campaign. The Communist Party of Vietnam had been disbanded in 1945 and re-emerged as the ao ng Party (Vietnam Workers Party - VWP) in 1951. In January 1962, it created its ostensibly separate southern arm the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP). The Peoples Revolutionary Party organisation in the South was directed locally by H Nis COSVN (The Central Office for South Vietnam) see footnote 123. Communist military units and the National Liberation Front (NLF) were directed and controlled by the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) through its organs at all levels. In 1976, the PRP of South Vietnam was merged with the VWP to reconstitute the Communist Party of Vietnam covering whole country. 55 Siege at Plei Me Chronology: 191910 thru 280660. This US Air Force report notes that NVA heavy anti-aircraft fire downed several aircraft: two B-57 Canberra bombers (one of which recovered to Pleiku airfield); two A-1E Skyraiders (propeller-driven ground attack aircraft); and at least one HU1B [sic] helicopter. 19 C-123 Provider transport aircraft and two CV-2B Caribou transport aircraft were also hit by groundfire. VCAT Item No.F031100010247. 56 Debriefing report of three ralliers from the 2 nd Battalion/33rd Regiment (rallied on 8 January 1966). The report includes detail on the raising, organisation and infiltration of the 101 st Regiment, and the operations and deployment of the 33rd Regiment before and after the Plei Me battle. Before combat, soldiers were reportedly issued with personal identity cards noting the 33 rd Regiment as Thon Can and its battalions as respectively H1, H2, and H3. II CTZ DEC og #2 -0019-66, 4 March 1966 VCAT Item No. F03460033346. A rallier also stated that Prior to going into combat, each soldier received an I.D. card with his name, unit and rank so commanders would be able to recognise their men in case they were wounded. see footnote 94. 57 Sykes, C.S. Captain (compiler) - 1st Cavalry Division Association, Interim Report of Operations 1st Cavalry Division July 1965 December 1966, Albuquerque, 1967, pp.19-29. VCAT Item No. 22030101001. 58 Columbia Broadcasting System, CBS News Special Report: The Battle of Ia Drang Valley, 29 November 1965, 27 minutes - https://archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.653177 . Major eckwiths remarks are at

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With the 33rd Regiments attacks on Plei Me repulsed by US and ARVN fire support and relief forces59, the Regiment withdrew to its bases in the Quynh La area and the Chu Pong Massif (732 metres) on 26 October and regrouped. According to a Vietnamese account: At this point, after determining that we had accomplished enough to start a chain of enemy reactions, on 26th of October we decided to end the siege of the enemys Plei Me base, and transfer the entire 33rd and 320th Regiments back to deploy at Quynh Kla [sic], Ba Bi, the southeastern banks of the Ia rng River, and Bon Ga. This was an area convenient for manoeuvre both in the direction of Plei Me and of Tn Lc. There we prepared to engage U.S. forces landing by helicopter.60 A major official Vietnamese history of the War relates that The Central Highlands Front Command decided to modify its tactical plan to lure American forces into the Ia rng Valley 25 kilometers southwest of Pleiku in order to destroy them.61 According to a principal US After-Action Report: At 2200hrs on 25 October, 33rd Regiment ordered ((a)) withdrawal to the west beginning the next day with a reinforced battalion to continue pressure on Plei Me camp to cover the withdrawal. ... to its advanced base at Kro Village (ZA 080030). ... The rear base of the 33rd Regiment was in the vicinity of An Ta village (YA 940010) - where the Regiment had conducted drills and rehearsals in October for the attack on the Plei Me CIDG camp. On 2 November 1965, the 33rd Regiment Headquarters moved to Hill 732 (YA 885106) within the Chu Pong Massif and had regrouped by 9 November. 62

6.40 minutes. The Report referred to the enemy as a guerrilla army but, in an included interview, General W. C. Westmoreland COMUSMACV, referred specifically to the enemy as NVA. 59 According to a 33rd Regiment history, the attack on Plei Me forced three US divisions to respond as relief forces the 4th Division, the 25th Division and the 1st Airmobile Division - Cu Chin Binh Trung on 33, Tm Tt Truyn Thng Trung on 33 , op.cit., July 2010 see Appendix 1. 60 ng V Hip, Colonel General (PAVN), K c Ty Nguyn (Central Highland Memories), Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn (Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 2000, p.49. 61 Pribbenow, M. (Translator), Victory in Vietnam The Official History of the Peoples Army of Vietnam 1954-1975, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2002, p.159 - for the original Vietnamese publication data, see the Bibliography. 62 st 1 Air Cavalry Division, Combat After Action Report - The Pleiku Campaign, 4 March 1966. The fighting at the Ch Prng Mountain/Massif - just east of the Cambodian border, is commonly termed the attle of the Ia rng Valley. For an analysis and maps, see Pribbenow, M. ., The Fog of War The Vietnamese View of the Ia Drang attle (also as Sa M ca Cuc Chin C i Nhn Vit Cng v Trn nh Ia rng), Military Review, January-February 2001; and, as noted earlier, for comprehensive ARVN, US and North Vietnamese perspectives, see the series of 51 articles on the battles in: Nguy n Vn Tn, Vi iu Cn N n it V Trn nh Pleime -Iadrang (A Few Things You Should Know About the Plei Me-Ia rng attles), 8 March 2010. - http://nguyentin.tripod.com/pleime_thacmac-u.htm . For two Letters of Commendation for Nguyn Vn u Section Commander of the C-20 Reconnaissance Company of Cng Trng 33 (CT33) dated 21 December 1965 and 17 February 1966 recovered at YA 982071 on 2 August 1966 by the 25th US Infantry Division, see - CDEC Log 09-1359-66; and footnote 189. See also CDEC Log 10-2272-66 for CT33s ambush plan on Ph M, Plei Me for 25 July 1966 however, that date is probably incorrect. For detail on the operations of 2 nd Battalion/33rd Regiment including following the Plei Me battles, see the rallier debriefing reports in II CTZ DEC Log #2-0019-66, 4 March 1966 VCAT Item No.F03460033346.

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According to a rallier, the 33rd Regiments combat potential was lessened remarkably because most of the VC cadre had malaria the command echelon encouraged soldiers with less than 39 degrees of fever to participate in the attack.63 On 31 October, according to a US report Contributing to the problems of the 33d was the acute shortage of food and medicines since many units could not reach their pre-stocked supply caches because of the sudden thrust of the helicopter-borne ((US)) troopers.64 On 1 November 1965, the regimental aid station of the 33rd Regiment at Quynh La (vicinity ZA 045032) was captured including maps of the Regiments withdrawal routes. On 4 November, elements of the US 12 th Regiment reportedly fought a fierce engagement with two companies of the 3rd Battalion/33rd Regiment. According to the B-3 Front, the fighting on 4 and 6 November was a great victory and, from 26 October to 9 November, five American squads had been wiped out and 385 US troops had been killed or wounded.65 However, US reports indicated that their casualties were 59 killed and 196 wounded.

US troops alighting from a CH-47 helicopter Ia rng

63

For detail, see the debrief of NVA Aspirant Lai Vn C (platoon commander, 2nd Battalion) who rallied on 6 November 1965 VCAT Item No.F034600850967. Falciparum malaria was endemic in the Central Highlands. According to a US study based principally on captured documents, the diagnostic rate for malaria in the 33rd Regiment in Pleiku in the period September to November 1965 was 300 per 1000 per month; and in Kontum in May 1966, it was 1000 per 1,000 per month - Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, Medical Causes of Non-Effectiveness among VC and NVA Troops, Technical Intelligence Study ST 67-018, 15 February 1967 VCAT Item No.F015900300918. For the seriously debilitating impact of malaria on NVA/VC units, see the Casualties appendix Appendix 9; and Chamberlain, E.P., Tougher than us International Perspectives Conference, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 16 August 2013. 64 st 1 Air Cavalry Division, Operational Report Lessons Learned 3-66: The Pleiku Campaign, op.cit., 10 May 1966, p.62. 65 Hong Phng Major General, "Lessons on Campa ign Planning and Command in the Ply Me Campaign, The Ply Me Victory ooking back after 30 Years, The Military Science Institute and the 3rd Corps), Armed Forces Publishing House, H Ni 1995, p.40.

16

Locations Map: Battle of the Ia rng including LZs Subsequently - according to US and ARVN intelligence studies, as at 8 November 1965, the 33rd Regiment had reportedly lost 890 killed and 100 missing-in-action - of its 2,200 personnel, and more were suffering from incapacitating wounds. Infantry battalion losses were estimated as: 1st 33% KIA; 2nd 50% KIA; 3rd: 33% KIA; materiel losses were also heavy.66 These included heavy casualties reportedly suffered by the
66

On 9 November, ((US)) divisional intelligence estimates indicated that 1,387 enemy personnel were lost to all causes during the 12 days of the Divisions involvement, and that the bulk o f these came from the 101-B/33rd Regiment. The Regiment was held ((ie assessed)) at that time to be ineffective, as such, with only 600-1000 personnel remaining. ... The regimental anti-aircraft company had lost 13 of its 18 guns,

17

Regiments 6th Battalion north of the Ia Meur River.67 A Phase 2 attack on Plei Me planned for 16 November 1965 and to be reinforced by the newly-arrived 66th NVA Regiment, was cancelled when US forces launched pre-emptive heliborne assaults into the area of the Chu Pong Massif about 22 kilometres south-west of Plei Me on 14 November. According to a Vietnamese account68 - of those engagements against the US forces, on 14, 15 and 16 November, the 7th and 9th Battalions of the 66th NVA Regiment defeated a US force north-east of Chu Pong. These are the battles of LZ X-Ray (YA 935010) related in the post-War US book and film We were soldiers once .69 Subsequently, on 17 November 1965 - together with elements of the 66th Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment was involved in the ambush of a US force in the vicinity of LZ Albany (YA 945043) - where the US forces suffered heavy casualties of 155 killed or missing and 124 wounded. This was reportedly the most deadly ambush of a US unit during the course of the entire Vietnam War.

and its mortar company had lost five of its nine tubes. Six more mortars were lost by the battalions, along with most of the recoilless rifles. The ammunition, food and medical supply losses had also been crippling.- 1st Air Cavalry Division, Combat After Action Report The Pleiku Campaign, 4 March 1966, p.120. See also: Nguyn Vn Tn, Tnh o, Yu T Then Cht trong Chin Thng Chin Dch Pleime (Intelligence A Key Factor in the Pleime Campaign Victory), 2 March 2012. For a Vietnamese account of NVA casualties, see the following footnotes 76, 86 and 87. 67 According to US reports, the 6th attalion reportedly lost 77 KIA ( C), and nearly 400 others estimated KIA and WIA. Heavy carpet-bombing by US -52 aircraft inflicted heavy casuatlies on NVA forces during the Campaign reportedly the first time that US strategic airstrikes were used in direct support of ground operations. US reports noted that the targets for B-52 strikes and US artillery interdictory fires were provided principally by Special Agent Reports (SPAR) a euphemism/codename for signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercept of NVA/VC radio communications and direction-finding of their locations. see: 1st Air Cavalry Division, Combat After Action Report The Pleiku Campaign, 4 March 1966. The 6th attalion was apparently a unit of the 66th NVA Regiment. 68 Phm nh y, Mobile Attacks Conducted by the 66th Regiment and 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment in the Ia rng Valley, Nhng Trn nh Trong Chin Tranh Gii Phng (Battles During the Liberation War), Vol 5 2nd Corps, Peoples Army Publishing House, 1986, pp.7 -23 ( u Hnh Ni B ie Internal Distribution Only) VCAT Item No.16900104001. This is a reference to the engagements at LZ X-Ray (YA 935010) and on 17th November in the vicinity of LZ Albany (YA 945043). According to this Vietnamese account, only 12 soldiers of the US 2nd Cavalry Battalion escaped alive to return to their base; and the US 3rd rigade casualties between 14 and 17 November were 300 killed and 246 wounded while the 66th Regiment lost 157 men killed and 239 wounded. 33 rd NVA Regiment casualties are not listed. 69 US forces comprised elements of the 3rd Brigade/1st Cavalry Division. For the battle at LZ X-Ray (YA 935010), see Moore, H.G. Lieutenant Colonel, After Action Report Ia Drang Valley Operation 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 14-16 November 1965, 9 December 1965 VCAT Item No.1710101004. This detailed and contemporary report includes sketch maps and low oblique aerial photographs. See also Moore, H.G. ieutenant General (Retd) & Galloway, J., We Were Soldiers Once And Young, Random House, 1992. According to the US 3rd Brigade report, enemy (NVA) casualties were 634 KIA ( ody Count) and 1,215 KIA (Estimated); and on 17 November (Albany) 403 KIA ( C) and 150 KIA (Estimated) 3rd Brigade/1st Air Cavalry Division, Command Operations After Action Report Operation Silver Bayonet, 4 December 1965. VCAT Item No.1710101001.

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Battle of the Ia rng Valley (Vietnamese map) November 1965 70 On 17 November, the 8th Battalion of the 66th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment had a meeting engagement with US forces in the Ba Bi (YA 995145) area. In the battle in the middle of the Ia rng valley, the 1st Battalion/33rd Regiment was led by its second-in-command Comrade un. When the commander of the 8th Battalion (L Xun Phi) was killed, Lun took command of both units. Towards the end of the eight-hour battle, Lun was also killed. A major communist history recounts that on 17 November, the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment engaged in fierce hand-to-hand fighting for eight hours ((probably in the vicinity of LZ Albany YA 945043)). A recent Vietnamese account on the Internet relates the Fourth attle At midday on 17 November, our force engaged the American troops and the largest of the battles in the Ia rng valley took place. The 8th Battalion ((66th NVA Regiment)) and a company of the 33rd Regiments 1st Battalion reinforced the attack and fought hand-to-hand with bayonets, knives, and grenades. Both sides suffered heavy casualties on the Vietnamese
70

The full-size version of this post-War Vietnamese map appears in several publications including Hong Minh Tho, Military Operation [sic] in the Central Highlands, Th Gii Publishers, H Ni, 2012, p.176; and Trn on m, The 30 Year War, Th Gii Publishers, H Ni, 2012, p.118. The map does not include a distance scale, but the extract above is about 15 kilometres from east to west. LZ X-Ray (YA 935010) is shown as Bi Tia X, Z Albany (YA 945043) as Bi Alban, and Z Columbus (YA 975035) as Bi Klm Baus. Z Falcon was located at (ZA 023032). The Vietnamese use Warsaw Pact map marking symbols (with some variations) ie not the Western NATO STANAG 2019 AAP-6A mapmarking symbols. For detailed, annotated tactical-scale US maps, see footnote 39.

19

side, both a battalion commander and a battalion deputy commander were killed. The battle ended in the evening almost all the American troops were wiped out, and only a small number escaped.71 However, Vietnamese accounts also note that initially during the night of 16/17 November The 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment became lost and was unable to execute its plan to attack into the battlefield/fire support base ((trn a pho)).72 It appears that at least a company of the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment did engage the US forces from 1440hrs on 17 November to 2000hrs on 18 November presumably in the vicinity of LZ Albany (YA 945043). A rallier from the 2nd Battalion/33rd Regiment also described an attack on US forces by a newly-formed company of the 2nd Battalion on 18 November in the vicinity of YA 975085 in which 20 communist soldiers were killed and 10 wounded.73 According to a US account: On 17 November, the other battalions of the 66th and 33rd Regiments, depleted by the vicious combat of the past four days, began their gradual movement to the northwest and Cambodian sanctuary. Due west over Chu Prong would have been faster, but the daily B-52 strikes had brought death and terror to the NVA forces, and there was no alternative but to skirt the base of the mountain.74 On 18 November 1965, Regiment 33 launched a surprise attack on the US gun position at Ia Mo stream wiping out hundreds of enemy troops and destroying three guns and seven helicopters.75 This is probably the attack depicted in the previous Vietnamese map on LZ Columbus (Bi Klm Baus) shown as involving the 33rd Regiments 2nd and 3rd Battalions. A recent Vietnamese account of NVA casualties relates that: From 19 October to 26 November 1965, the 320th Regiment ((ie the 32nd Regiment)) suffered 166 killed and 197 wounded; the 33rd Regiment lost 170 killed, 232 wounded, and 121 missing in action; the 66th Regiment suffered 208 killed and 146 wounded. Accordingly, total casualties suffered by our forces in the Campaign were 544 killed, 575 wounded, and 121 missing.
71

Saruman, Trn Iadrang v Playme, Sa Thy, Dng Nc Gi Nc (Building and Defending the Nation), op.cit., 22 June 2008. 72 Nguyn Hu An Colonel General, Chin Trng Mi - Hi c (New attlefield), op.cit., 2002. Napoleon, Trn Iadrang v Playme, Sa Thy, Dng Nc Gi Nc (Building and Defending the Nation), op.cit., 28 July 2009. 73 Debriefing reports of 2nd Battalion/33rd Regiment ralliers (rallied 8 January 1966) - II CTZ DEC Log #20019-66, 4 March 1966 VCAT Item No.F03460033346. 74 96 tactical B-52 sorties were employed - dropping 1,785 tons of bombs, beginning on 15 [ sic] November 1965 in the Chu Pong area 1st Air Cavalry Division, Operational Report Lessons Learned 3-66: The Pleiku Campaign, op.cit., 10 May 1966, p.172. B-52 missions comprised either four or six aircraft, with the usual bomb load of 51 750lb bombs per aircraft. An Arclight ie B-52, target box for a three-aircraft cell covered an area 1km x 3km. For a ground eye -witness description of the effect of a B-52 strike (in late March 1970), see Trng Nh Tng, Journal of a Viet Cong, Jonathan Cape, London, 1986, p.160. 75 Trn on m, The 30 Year War, Th Gii Publishers, H Ni, 2012, p.560 (includes a map of the battle area at p.118+). US reports noted that the remnants of the 33rd and 66th Regiments began their withdrawal north-west into Cambodian territory beginning on 17 November 1965 1st Air Cavalry Division, Combat After Action Report The Pleiku Campaign, 4 March 1966, pp.172-183. A detailed discussion of the engagements particularly at LZ Albany, is related on a Vietnamese military blogsite Trn Ia Drang v Playme, Sa Thy, Dng Nc Gi Nc (Building and Defending the Nation), http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php/topic,2047.30/wap2.html .

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So, our total casualties could be counted as 1,240. However, that is for the whole Plei Me Campaign not just the Ia rng battles.76 The deputy commander of the Campaign - Nguyn Hu An, also noted that: In addition, because food rations were poor and we were short of medicine, the troops suffered sever malnutrition and disease spread, especially beriberi and acute malaria. In some regiments, as many as 400 men were out of action because of malaria and beriberi.77 MACV 33rd NVA Regiment Order-of-Battle, 1 January 1966 78

76

See the Vietnamese military blogsite Chiangshan, Trn Ia Drang v Playme, Sa Thy, Dng Nc Gi Nc ( uilding and Defending the Nation), op.cit., 22 February 2009. http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php/topic,2047.55/wap2.html . These official figures were earlier reported in: Nguyn Hu An Colonel General, Chin Trng Mi - Hi c (New attlefield), Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 2002, p.86. VCAT Item No. 16900105001. In a Campaign history, Nguyn Hu An is noted as a deputy commander of the Campaign. - Phm Vnh Phc (ed - et al), Operation Ply Me, Operations in the US Resistance War, Nh Xut Bn Th Gii, H Ni, 2009, p.16. 77 Nguyn Hu An Colonel General, Chin Trng Mi - Hi c (New attlefield), op.cit., 2002, p.86. 78 MACV, 33rd REGT (AKA SONG AM), North Vietnamese Army O in RVN January 1966, 12 February 1966, p.4 VCAT Item No.F015900 .

21

A USMACV Study summarised the Plei Me battles: due to the rapid exploitation of intelligence and the use of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and ARVN armored reaction units, the attempted seizure of Plei Me was repulsed.79 Several US accounts cite the higher NVA/VC headquarters for the Pleiku Campaign as the Field Front or, occasionally, the 630th Division. The battles are also recounted in the history of the 304th NVA Division.80 In the Campaign - according to a recently-published Vietnamese account, communist forces killed 2,974 troops, including 1,700 Americans.81 In the Central Highlands Campaign, several of the 33rd Regiment history monographs claim that the Regiment engaged three US divisions: the US 1st Air Cavalry Division, the US 25th Division82, and the US 4th Division83. However, the US 25th and the US 4th Division arrived in the Central Highlands after the Plei Me and Ia rng battles. Several Vietnamese communist accounts also contend incorrectly, that a South Korean regiment was involved in the ((Plei Me-Ia rng)) Campaign.84 A 2002 US intelligence history related that Discussing the American ability to pin-point their locations, a 33rd Regiment staff conference held after the battle concluded that they had spies in their midst. Of course, it had not been spies that had given away their positions; rather, it was airborne direction finding that had flagged the NVA units for the airstrikes. the aircraft passed their results directly to the ASA ((Army Security Agency ie signals intelligence branch)) unit in support of the tactical commander.85

79 80

USMACV CICV: Order of Battle Study No. 66-1, op.cit., 18 February 1966. Nguyn HuyTon & Phm Quang nh, S on 304 (304th Division History), Tp II (Vol II), Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 1990. 81 Phm Vnh Phc (ed - et al), Operation Ply Me, Operations in the US Resistanc e War, op.cit., 2009, pp.15-20. 82 The 25th US Infantry Division deployed to Pleiku on 24 December 1965. 83 The US 4th Infantry Division first deployed to Pleiku on 25 September 1966. The Division engaged in fierce combat with NVA regular troops in the mountains around Kontum Town in Autumn 1967. 84 Nguyn Minh Nht, Hi p ch S Vit Nam (Questions and Answers on Vietnamese History), T p 9 (Vol 9), Nh Xut Bn Tr, TP H Ch Minh, 2013, p.35. BTS-(QDND), Chin dch Plei me, Communist Party of Vietnam On-line, 14 April 2005. 85 Hanyok, R.J., Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War (1945-1975), Center for Cryptologic History National Security Agency, Maryland, 2002, pp.305-306. The reference and detail of the intercepted 33rd Regiment message ie on suspected spies, has been redacted. The report of the NVA condernning suspected spies within the ranks is also related in the 1st Air Cavalry Division, Operational Report Lessons Learned 3-66: The Pleiku Campaign, op.cit., 10 May 1966, p.66. For US and ARVN intelligence collection and reports of Chinese communist advisors in NVA formations (and their intercepted Mandarin communications) including in the 33rd Regiment, see: Nguyn Vn Tn, Intelligence Gathering at Ia rng, 10 August 2011 - http://www.generalhieu.com/iadrang_intelligence-2.htm . A 33rd Regiment POW related the activities of a Chinese medical technician who visited the Regiments field hospital at Station 5 (YV 838979) in Pleiku in January 1966. The Chinese technician was reportedly a member of the Chinese medical team at VC Hospital 2, Region 5 (Kontum Province). VCAT Item No.F034600401345.

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The Plei Me - Ia rng Campaign a 33rd Regiment casualty summary According to a Vietnamese Internet blogsite, the 33rd Regiment lost 170 killed; 232 wounded, and 121 missing in action.86 The 33rd Regiment Martyrs ist cites 718 killed in the Central Highlands from 1965 to 1968 inclusive but, on examination, that List does not appear to include the names of any personnel killed in the period of the Plei Me-Ia rng Campaign.87 As noted earlier, according to US and ARVN intelligence studies, as at 8 November 1965, the 33rd Regiment had reportedly lost 890 killed and 100 missing-in-action of its 2,200 personnel, and more were suffering from incapacitating wounds. 88 After the Plei Me Ia rng Battles A Vietnamese communist history records that, after the battles the Front Party Committee decided to carry out a complete program to rebuild morale and discipline. The most immediate task on which we focused was to rebuild fighting spirit, revolutionary morality, and build resolve in the men to fight the Americans to the end, no matter what the cost. To carry out this decision, the Front Party Committee and the Front Headquarters held an initial political retraining class from 25 December to 5 January 1966. The class was attended by 166 mid and high-ranking cadre from throughout the Front including 13 regimental command cadre, twenty-nine battalion command cadre, and 124 regimental and staff officers.89 An article in Peoples Army newspaper by an PAVN Lieutenant General in 2005 assessed the Central Highlands Campaign as follows: After many discussions, everyone finally agreed that in the Plei Me Campaign in general, and in the Ia rng battle in particular, we had won a strategically significant and politically important victory. This was because the Battle of the Ia rng Valley was the key decisive battle of the entire Plei Me Campaign. For the American Army, the Battle of the Ia rng Valley had become a terrifying defeat - something that General Westmoreland admitted in his memoirs, when he wrote that the US 1st Air Cavalry Division had suffered serious losses in its first battle in the Central Highlands.90
86 87

See footnote 76. Nguyn Khnh Phng, List of 33rd Regiment Martyrs Sacrificed on the B3 Front, April 2002. That List only includes 96 names, and does not appear to include any casualties from the Plei Me-Ia rng Campaign. The earliest death listed is Ngoan: 394th Battalion, killed on 16 February 1961 [sic probably 1971]; followed by Nguyn Hu Hoa, 2nd Company/3rd Battalion, killed on 2 September 1964; then Hong Vn Chc, of the 20th [sic] Battalion/33rd Regiment, killed on 20 December 1965. 88 See footnote 66. 89 ng V Hip, Colonel General (PAVN), K c Ty Nguyn (Central Highland Memories), Nh Xut Bn Qun i Nhn Dn (Armed Forces Publishing House), H Ni, 2000, p.89. General Chu Huy Man was the Front Commander and the Front Political Commissar. As noted, as a Senior Lieutenant Colonel, ng V Hip was the Front Chief of Political Affairs during the Campaign. Some US reports refer to the higher headquarters for the Campaign as the Field Front and, as noted, occasionally, the 630th Division. 90 Nguyn Vn Kh nh Colonel General, The Plei Me-Ia rng Victory (from 19 October 20 November 1965) The First low Against American Troops in the Central Highlands, Peoples Army Newspaper, 13

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A major Vietnamese history of the War recounts that on 20 December 1965, the 1 Infantry Division was formed in the Central Highlands. The units making up this division were the 320th, 33rd and 66th Regiments .91 The 33rd Regiment under its cover designator Worksite 33 (Cng Trng 33)92 continued operations in the Central Highlands at the end of 1965 and through 1966 as a formation of the 1st NVA Division (Nng Trng 1).93 In January 1966, the 33rd Regiment received reinforcements from the 32nd (320th) Regiment, and its 3rd Battalion attacked the post at Ban Don (ZU 025270).94 In early February 1966, the Regiment moved to Station 4 in Cambodia (YA 660198) where the Regiment reportedly rested for about five months.95 Here, as the Regiments commander, Lieutenant Colonel T nh Khm replaced Lieutenant Colonel V Sc who as noted earlier, had reportedly been censured for the Regiments heavy casualties in the Plei Me/Ia rng battles of late 1965.96 According to a Vietnamese report, in c Lc (Darlac) Province on 21 February 1966, the 33rd Regiment attacked and destroyed
st

November 2005 - VCAT Item No.16900101001. Nguyn Vn Kh nh was the political commissar of the 304th NVA Division during the Central Highlands Campaign in late 1965. He relates that before the Plei Me-Ia rng battles, the infiltrating NVA soldiers had thrown away almost all their bayonets along the Trail from Route 9 to the 3 Front - which had to be recovered before the battles. 91 Pribbenow, M. (Translator), Victory in Vietnam The Official History of the Peoples Army of Vietnam 1954-1975, op.cit., 2002, p.156. 92 In mid-1968, a USMACV summary noted 36 cover designators/also-known-as (aka) for the 33rd Regiment and three Letter Box Numbers (LBNs) see USMACV CICV Monthly Order of Battle Summary - Vol I, 1-31 July 1968, p. III-12 VCAT Item No.2500111003. Subsequently, the Regiments principal cover designators used in the late 1960s and early 1970s were A57 and on 84C. For LBNs and cover designators, see footnote 123. 93 Nng Trng (Agricultural Worksite) was a cover designator for an NVA division, and Cng Trng (Construction Worksite) was a designator for a regiment (and later also for a division) CDEC Log 10-1964-66. In about 1967, Cng Trng became the designator for a division. These designators are also shown on the Certificate of Commendation (21 December 1965) and Letter of Appreciation (17 February 1966) of Nguyn Vn u, a section commander in the 33rd Regiments C-20 Reconnaissance Company CDEC Log 09-1359-66, see footnote 189. 94 USMACV DEC Log #5-0028-66, 15 May 1966, VCAT Item No.F034600311749. As noted, the debrief of a rallier (sergeant 20th Reconnaissance Company) noted that the Regiments original strength was 2,000, but after the Plei Me and Ia rng battles, the actual strength was cut in half. During the Plei Me -Ia rng Campaign, the 33rd Regiments battalion commanders were: 1st Nguyt, 2nd Duc, 3rd Huy (replaced by Thinh in January 1966). Prior to going into combat, each soldier received an I.D. card with his name, unit and rank so commanders would be able to recognise their men in case they were wounded. 95 According to a seriously wounded prisoner, the 33rd Regiment rested at Station 4 in Cambodia for about five months - to early July 1966, VCAT Item No.F034600380926. 96 The commander of the 33rd Regiment was heavily criticised because he had not maintained contact between his forces during the siege of Plei Me and had not personally commanded the attack on Landing Zone Columbus ((YA 974036)) and had delegated all decision-making to his subordinates. - Pribbenow, M. ., The Fog of War The Vietnamese View of the Ia rng attle (also as Sa M ca Cuc Chin C i Nhn Vit Cng v Trn nh Ia rng), Military Review, January -February 2001. Pribbenow cites: The Institute of Military Science and the III Corps, Chin Dch Tin Cng Ply Me - 1965 (The Ply Me Offensive Campaign 1965, Armed Forces Publishing House, H Ni, 1993, pp.69 -70; and Trn Ngc Sn Major General, "Mt t Cm Ngh v Chin Dch Ply Me" (A Few Impressions on the Ply Me Campaign), Chin Thng Ply Me (The Ply Me Victory), The Armed Forces Publishing House, H Ni 1995 p.205.

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the strategic hamlet at Bun Lung, wiping out two puppet platoons. On 22 February, the 33rd Regiment attacked and almost completely destroyed a battalion of the 45th Puppet Regiment. In Kontum the 6th Battalion swept away enemy commandos, killing 42 (including three Americans). Towards Bun Ma Thut, on 14 April 1966, the 33rd Regiment ambushed the enemy at un Dn; and on 15 April ambushed the enemy at Bun Cang, killing 100.97 In July 1966, the Regiment reportedly returned moved back into Vietnam from Cambodian territory and attacked the Chu Ba post (YA 796348) where the Regiment again suffered heavy losses with about 50 casualties being evacuated from the Regiments open-air dispensary to the L Li Hospital located in Cambodia a few kilometres west of Chu Pong Mountain.98 According to a 33rd Regiment medic, in mid-1966 about 500 ill and lightly wounded personnel including 33rd Regiment cadre and soldiers, were being treated at the L Li Division (ie 325th Division) Hospital across the border in Cambodia following operations in the Central Highlands. Most deaths were caused by malaria. Patients reportedly received two anti-malarial quinine tablets each week. Sometimes four paludrine or two nivaquine tablets were given as a substitute. Malaria incidence in the Division was about 90%. More deaths were caused from malaria than battle wounds.99 On 8 August 1966, the Regiment moved to Station 5 (YA 859065) near Chu Pong Mountain but was engaged by artillery enroute reportedly losing 80 persons killed and 40 wounded.100 According to a US report, US forces made contact with 33rd Regiments 1st Battalion on 9 and 10 August and its 2nd Battalion on 10 August (in the vicinity of YV 935970).101 In early August 1966, the Regiments senior cadre included: Commander - T nh Kh [sic], Chief of Staff Major Khi, Political Officer Lieutenant Colonel Ba, Commander 1st Battalion Captain ng Quang Nguyn, Executive Officer 1st Battalion First Lieutenant Nguyn, Political Officer 1st Battalion Captain Hu.102

97

Tunguska, Trn Iadrang v Playme, Sa Thy, Dng Nc Gi Nc (Building and Defending the Nation), op.cit., 13 August 2008. 98 NIC Report 514/67, L Li Division Hospital in Cambodia, 1 June 1967. The report includes a sketch map showing the locations of the L Li Division Hospital, Station 4, and Station 5. VCAT Item No. F034601482497. 99 The medic a senior non-commissioned officer from the 1 st Battalion/33rd Regiment, was captured in Kontum Province in late October 1966 VCAT Item No.F034601482497. 100 Debriefs of ralliers and POWs confidential sources including NIC Report No.598/66, 22 November 1966 VCAT Item No.F034600380926. 101 The US report notes that most of the POWs captured during the period 8-13 August were either suffering from malaria, wounded, incapable of marching with their unit, or left behind to care for the sick and wounded. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Combat After Action Report Operation Paul Revere I and II, 28 September 1966. 102 Debrief of POW Trn Vn Nghi p, 3/4/1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment captured August 1966, VCAT Item No.F034600782668.

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In October 1966, the Regiment was based just inside Cambodia about 20 kilometres west of the border with South Vietnam, with its 1st Battalion near Sinh Village 2 (YA 723033).103 In about November 1966, the 66th and 320th Regiments of the 1st NVA Division (aka 304th Division) moved to operate in the Sa Thy River area of south-western Kontum Province. The 33rd Regiment reportedly then left the 1st NVA Division and remained in Pleiku Province as a direct-command subordinate of the B3 Front.104 1967 At the beginning of 1967, the Regiment attacked the ARVN Sub-Sectors105 and positions at Qung Nhiu, Cm Ga, and Bun H reportedly wiping out the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment of the 23rd ARVN Division at c Lung and destroying a US company at c Sc.106 On 8 June 1967 according to a captured notebook, the Regiment was assigned to attack a strategic hamlet in order to liberate 7,000 inhabitants, and draw (Allied) reinforcements into an ambush. The writer noted that his company (C1) like other elements of the Cng Trng, had no experience in the attack of strategic hamlets. Subsequently, in late September, notebook entries relate poor health in the writers recently-activated company resulting from food shortages, and numerous difficulties caused by rainy weather, and a strong tendency among the troops to fear hardships, difficulties and sacrifices.107 In November 1967, the 33rd Regiment did not participate in the major communist offensive in the Central Highlands against Dak To (c T) but rather is believed to have remained across the border in Cambodian territory.108 In the period 1966-1969, the Regiment was commanded first by T nh Khm, then Ma Vn Minh.109
103

At this time, the Regiment was reportedly using the title 101 Regiment of the i Division NIC Report 517/67, 19 May 1967 - VCAT Item No.F034601532113. This report describes the medical evacuation and treatment system of the 101st/33rd Regiment in mid-1966 and includes sketch maps showing the locations of the L Li Hospital, Station 4, and Station 5. 104 Interrogation Report #4-341-68, March 1968 - VCAT Item No.2310812010. 105 A Sector (tiu khu) was the military area equivalent to a province; a Sub-Sector (chi khu) equated to a district. In the 1970s, a Sub-Sub-Sector (phn chi khu) covered a village or group of villages see footnote 554. 106 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.4 see Appendix 3. c Sc is probably a reference to the isolated Dak Sut camp that was earlier over-run by NVA/VC forces on 18-19 August 1965 and abandoned ie before the 33rd Regiment entered South Vietnam. The camp - at the Dak Sut District Town on Route 14, was occupied by CIDG and Regional Forces troops with US Special Forces advisors (A-218). For a comprehensive account of the attack by the 11th [sic] Regiment (probably the 101st Regiment) see CDEC Log 08-1688-66. 107 CDEC Log 11-1551-67, VCAT Item No.2131002127. 108 The NVA formations in that failed offensive in Kontum Province (3-22 November 1967) suffered heavy casualties: ie the 66th, 174th, 24th, and 32nd Regiments. Battered, subsequently only the 24th Regiment participated in major activity during the T t 1968 Offensive. 109 T Chc Ban Ch Huy Trung on 33 Qua C c Thi K (33rd Regiment Headquarters Organisation in Past Years) in Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010 see Appendix 16.

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Tt 1968 On 31 January 1968, as part of the Tt Mu Thn Offensive110, the 33rd Regiment attacked Ban M Thut Town in c Lc (Darlac) Province. According to a 33rd Regiment History, the Regiment occupied the Town and the Ha Bnh airfield for 14 days and captured an American major and hundreds of puppet troops.111 The MACV Command History notes that the attack on Ban M Thut (30 January to 6 February 1968) involved all three battalions of the 33rd NVA Regiment, and the E-301 VC LF Bn, and up to five provincial local force companies. All NVA/VC forces were driven from Ban M Thut Town by 6 February 1968.112 Subsequently, a US report noted that Darlac Province was the scene of large unit contacts on 5 and 6 of March ((1968)) when ARVN forces engaged the 3d Bn 33d NVA Regt 11 kilometers northnortheast of Ban Me Thuot. Enemy losses were 34 KIA, while friendly forces suffered 10 KIA and 43 WIA. On 18 March, ARVN forces contacted an enemy company 12 kilometers northwest of the province capital, killing 12 enemy and capturing one. Another battalion-sized contact occurred on 20 March when US and ARVN forces engaged the 3d Bn 33d Regt and the regimental mortar company 17 kilometers northwest of Ban Me Thuot. Thirty five of the enemy were killed and two detained. On 26 March, a Mobile Strike Force company contacted an enemy battalion 21 kilometers north of Ban Me Thuot, killing eight. Enemy units in the area included the 1st and 3d Bns, 33d NVA Regt; the probable K-39 Bn - a new element of the 33d NVA Regt .113

110

In January 1968 just before the Tt Offensive, the US MACV Headquarters in Saigon estimated that the total communist strength in the South was over 225,000 - of whom 55,744 were NVA (about 25%) USMACV, Order of Battle Summary: 1 January thru 31 January 1968, Saigon, 31 January 1968. For later strength figures, see footnotes 125 and 171. 111 Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010 see Appendix 2. The Regiment also attacked the prison and freed captured NVA/VC soldiers, held the town for seven days, and k illed hundreds of US puppet soldiers and South Korean troops - L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.4 see Appendix 3. US reports relate that Michael Benge a former US Marine sergeant (1956-1959) and the USAID deputy for Darlac Province, was captured by North Vietnamese forces. Held in Cambodia and North Vietnam, he was released on 5 March 1973. enge appears to be the captured US major mentioned in the 33 rd Regiment history monographs. 112 As noted, the attacking force reportedly comprised the three battalions of the 33 rd NVA Regiment, the E-301 ocal Force attalion, and up to five provincial local force companies. and the enemy lost 919 KIA, 186 PWs captured, and 161 individual and 10 crew-served weapons captured. USMACV 1968 Command History Volume II, 1968, Saigon, 30 April 1969, pp.891-892. Official North Vietnamese Army death certificates show 6 soldiers of the 33 rd Regiment were killed on 10 February 1968; and three on 12 February 1968 all from the 33rd Regiments D39 unit see MARIN website 30 August 2012: http://www.nhantimdongdoi.org/?mod=chitiet&subcate=3&id=3909 . 113 USMACV Command History - Volume I, 1968, Saigon, 30 April 1969. The report noted that NVA/VC documents captured in late July 1968 indicated that the K -39 Bn remained in Darlac Province when its parent 33d NVA Regt deployed to III CTZ.

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A 33rd Regiment history relates that on 17 March 1968, the Regiment attacked Ch Kne and reportedly wiped out the 2nd Battalion of the 45th Regiment of the 23rd ARVN Division and later attacked enemy positions at Qung c and c Lp.114 According to a US 4th Division report, in mid-April the 32nd and 33rd NVA Regiments had regrouped to Base Area 740 in Cambodia to conduct training and resupply. The training consisted of hit and run tactics for use in attacking friendly outposts.115 In the second and third phases of Tt Mu Thn 1968116, according to a 33rd Regiment monograph, the Regiment undertook several organisational changes that also involved the external 92nd attalion and the 39th attalion K-39.117 A 33rd Regiment history and a Martyrs ist note that - of the 3,050 (or 2,996) of the Regiments personnel killed during the Anti-American War, 718 died on the battlefields of the Central Highlands (Ty Nguyn) in the period 1965-1968.118

Nam B - its three regions

114

L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.4 see Appendix 3. 115 US 4th Infantry Division, Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ended 31 July 1968, 23 December 1968. 116 According to US intelligence staffs, the 1st Phase of the Tt 1968 Offensive concluded on 6 April; the 2nd Phase - lasting 36 days, ended on 14 June; and the 3rd Phase lasted 33 days (18 August until early September 1968). - Sorley, ., Vietnam Chronicles The Abrams Tapes, op.cit., 2004, p.173. 117 See T Chc Ban Ch Huy Trung on 33 Qua C c Thi K (The Headquarters Organisation of the 33rd Regiment in Past Years) at Appendix 16; and the following footnote 118. 118 Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010, p.11 cites a total of 3,050, see Appendix 2. See also: Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57), Danh S ch it S Trung on 33 (A57) T 19681975 (Min ng Nam ) (List of the Martyrs of the 33rd Regiment (A57) From 1968-1975 (Nam B Region), Vng Tu , 2010 footnote to p.1 (titled Tng Hp S Lit S Cc Tnh Hy Sinh Cc Chin Trng Chng M Thi Gian T Th ng 7/68 n Th ng 5/75"). When published, that Martyrs ist had a total of 2,996 martyrs (comprising: Nam B : 1,951; Ty Nguyn (Central Highlands) 1965-68: 718; SouthWest Border 1976-79: 327. Subsequently, names have been added and numbers reported in media articles eg totals of 3,050; 3,056 etc. For casualties, see Appendix 9.

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OPERATIONS IN NAM B119 Ty Ninh, Bnh Dng and Phc Long Provinces In May 1968 at the beginning of the Wet Season120, the 33rd Regiment (then commanded by Ma Vn Minh) was ordered south121, and joined the B2 Front (ie that area of South Vietnam below the Central Highlands) after a 14-day march in early June 1968.122 Initially a direct-command COSVN123 defence formation, the Regiment was retitled the A57 Regiment (its cover designators included on 84C).124
119

Nam was the communist term for Vietnam south of the Central Highlands - equating to the earlier French colonial Cochin China region. The late historian and author, Merle Pribbenow translated Nam B as Cochin China. See the map of Nam Bs three areas at p.27. 120 The Wet Season in southern Vietnam begins in April/May; and the Dry Season begins in November. The season timings are: Spring January/February, March, April; Summer May, June, July; Autumn August, September, October; Winter November, December, January. 121 According to a 33rd Regiment History On 20 May 1968, at the request of the Front, the Regiment received orders to deploy to the B2 battlefield in the eastern areas of Nam B . After a 14-day march, the Regiment reached its concentration area in Ty Ninh Province and became subordinate to the 5 th VC Division where the Regiment guarded against surprise attacks by the enemy. Here, the Regiments title was changed to A57. The titles of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions became, respectively, the 7th, 8th and 9th attalions. - Cu Chin inh Trung on 33, Tm Tt Truyn Thng Trung on 33 , op.cit., July 2010 see Appendix 1. 122 A 33rd Regiment history relates the Regiment departing the Central Highlands to move south: In March 1968, the Regiment deployed to the B2 battlefield. At this time, one third of our strength was re-assigned to the 320th NVA Division. Comrades Khi and iu, and the 3rd Battalion transferred to strengthen the 320th Regiment.- Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010 (January edition) see Appendix 2, and Appendix 16. As noted above, according to the Regiment s Summary History (2010) see Appendix 1, the Regiment changed its battalion nomenclatures to 7, 8, and 9 in late May 1968 when they moved south from the Central Highlands to the B2 Eastern Nam B battlefield. 123 The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) - directed from H Ni and located in the Cambodia/South Vietnam border area north-west of Saigon, was the communist political and military headquarters responsible for Vietnam south of the Central and Southern Highlands - an area termed Nam B (as noted, equating to the French colonial Cochin China region). Geographically, the COSVN area covered the southern 32 of South Vietnams 44 provinces reportedly containing 14 million of South Vietnams total population of 17.5 million (ie about 80%); 5 3% of its land mass; and 83% of the ricegrowing areas (in 1968) USMACV briefing, Saigon, 9 January 1970 - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968-1972 (Modern Southeast Asia Series), Texas Tech University Press, Lubbock, 2004, p.336. COSVN however, did not control the area of its geographic coverage described above. 124 In July 1968, in a significant order of battle change, the USMACV monthly report noted that the 33 rd NVA Infantry Regiment had probably changed location and was last noted in the Darlac area on 10 June 1968. That report also listed the 33rd NVA Infantry Regiment with three Letter Box Numbers (44347BK, 43190KP, 33150) and a large number of cover designators/aka Vinh Phu; on Vinh Phu; 101st Song Bac; Song Lam; 324; 520; 2th Regt/325 Div; 101B Infil Gp; Cong Truong 33; 202A; 33/50; 325B; Xa Phu; 520B; A520; 520E; 502C; 20th Regt; 542 Infil Gp; 1st Bn/32nd Regt; Xa 1; 311th Bn; Nghia Quang; 308th; Xa Cong; 270th Regt; Do An Vinh Phu; Worksite 33; Public Place; 308D; 529D; D502D; 101D; K-1. Monthly Order of Battle Summary: 1 thru 31 July 1968 Volume I, MACV J-2/JGS, CICV, Saigon, August 1968. A 1968 report on the PAVN postal and communications system noted the 33 rd Regiments Letter Box Numbers (LBN) as 86.526yk and 7,8231ZC CDEC Log 01-1367-68. The USMACV Order of

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In June 1968, USMACV estimated NVA/VC total strength in South Vietnam as 214,135 of whom 79,869 (37%) were NVA.125 At General Abrams (the MACV Commanders) weekly intelligence briefing on 28 June 1968, it was reported that The U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions each have a brigade positioned to block the 32nd and 33rd NVA Regiments from infiltrating towards Saigon.126 A 5th VC Division historical article related that after Tt 1968, the Division was strengthened by the inclusion of the 88th and the 33rd Regiments and, at the beginning of the Third Phase, had achieved battlefield successes.127 The Regiment formally joined the 5th VC Division in the K10 (ng an) area of Ty Ninh Province in July 1968128 and engaged in attacks against US forces in the Ch L, Route 22, and Bn Ci areas in the period June to mid-August 1968. In early July 1968, the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) in Phc Tuy Province published an intelligence report on the 32 and 33 NVA Regts noting that The 33 NVA Regt is presently believed to be in the process of relocating into III CTZ in company with 32 NVA Regt.129 The 5th VC Division History (2005) relates On 15 August, the 33rd Regiment was tasked by the Division to ambush US relief forces in the Bn Ci/Bn Ci area raising the curtain for the Divisions operations, creating the conditions for fraternal units to attack objectives at Trng Ln, Tr Ph, Tua Hai, and drawing out US forces to be attacked. At the same time, the Regiment coordinated with the 5th ((ie 275th)) Regiment and the 88th Regiment to destroy the Bn Ci airfield, the Ch L and G Da bases, and the enemys outposts along Routes 22 and 26. The 5th VC Divisions Memories website relates that on 19 August in a two-day engagement on Route 2 [sic] between
Battle Summary: 1-30 September 1968, 30 September 1968 reported the 33 rd NVA Regiment Headquarters, support units and its 1st Battalion (K1) were located in Ty Ninh Province at XT 425545 on 18 August 1968. For the use of the cover-designator on 84C, see CDEC og 09-1659-69. 125 The estimated 214,135 personnel comprised (with NVA numbers shown in brackets): combat/combat support - 129,391 (79,744 NVA ie 61%); administrative service 33,575 (125 NVA); Guerrillas 51,169. In addition to NVA in NVA units, 13-16,000 NVA troops were estimated to be serving in VC units in South Vietnam. USMACV, Order of Battle Summary: 1-30 June 1968, 30 June 1968, VCAT Item No.F015900030137. For other strength figures, see footnotes 110, 171 and 503. 126 Sorley, ., Vietnam Chronicles The Abrams Tapes , op.cit., 2004, p.4. 127 Nguyn Hng Phc - Major General, Truyn thng chin u ca s on 5 Anh hng (The Fighting History of the Heroic 5th Infantry Division), K c ngi lnh S on 5 2010 (Memories of the 5th Division Soldiers - 2010), H Ch Minh City, November 2005. USMACV categorised the 3rd Phase of the 1968 Offensive as lasting from 18 August until early September 1968. 128 According to the 5th Division History (2005) In July 1968, in the K10 ase (ng Ban) in Ty Ninh, the 5th Division incorporated the 33rd Regiment. The Regiments commander was Ma Vn Minh probably having replaced T nh Khm; and its political commissar was Mai Vn . The captured diary of V Nh Nng indicated that the 33rd Regiment moved to Ty Ninh Province on 11 June 1968, then to Phc Long Province on 4 January 1969, and to Bin Ha on 1 February 1969. His unit participated in an attack of the US rear logistics base at Long Bnh on 22 February 1969. CDEC Log 10-1920-69. 129 Cameron, G.C. Major 1ATF, I-9-22, Ni t, 3 July 1968. The 1ATF report included a list of the Regiments cover designators (akas) and an organogram of the 33 rd Regiment see Appendix 12. That 33rd Regiment organogram showed only two battalions (K1 and K3) and a total strength of 530 personnel - see Appendix 12.

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Bn Ci and the ng Hng Stream, the 33rd Regiment ambushed reinforcements and destroyed a battalion of the US 25th Mechanized Infantry Division.130 A more recentlypublished article on the Bn Ci engagement also relates that on 19 August 1968, the 33rd Regiment destroyed a US mechanized infantry battalion on Route 239.131 According to the official detailed US account, the US 25th Infantry Division engaged the 33rd Regiment in late August 1968 in the attle for Ty Ninh. The US After-Action Report records that a total of 477 personnel of the 33rd Regiment were killed in action.132 A US IIFFV summary report related that The 33d NVA Regiment took part in the 18 August attack against Ty Ninh, and thereafter, continued to operate in the areas west of Du Ting, sustaining heavy losses. then around the third week of September the 33d NVA Regiment fell back to the Bi Li Woods to recoup its heavy losses.133 According to the Wikipedia website On the axis of Route 22, the 33rd Regiment (5th Division) set ambushes and fought three consecutive battles with good results. Of these, the most outstanding was the engagement on 19 August when the 33rd Regiment wiped out an American mechanised infantry battalion on Route 22 and destroyed 57 armoured vehicles. With that impetus of victory, on 22/23 August, the 2nd Battalion (33rd Regiment of the 5th Division) ambushed an American military convoy at ng Hng Stream, destroying 60 military vehicles, shooting down four aircraft, and driving hundreds of soldiers from the battlefield.134 On 10 September, the 33rd Regiment together with the 88th Regiment, reportedly occupied a north-east portion of Ty Ninh City.135 Later that month, a recovered document listed the 33rd Regiments (A57s) strength as 1,468 men.136

130

Reportedly, 47 enemy tanks and armoured vehicles were set afire, more than 100 enemy were killed on the spot, and many weapons were seized. The article also mentions that following that engagement, the Divisions 275th, 88th and 33rd Regiments successfully attacked the 25th US Division at G Da, Ch L and Bn Ci see: Nguyn Hng Phc - Major General, Truyn thng chin u ca s on 5 Anh hng, op.cit. 2005 see also the earlier footnote 127. 131 V Xun Dn, nh dit ln (A large killing with little loss), Qun i Nhn Dn - Ngh Thut Qun S Vit Nam, 11 April 2011. The article relates that in this regimental-level action, 57 M113 and M41 armoured vehicles were destroyed a US mechanised infantry battalion, a 50-strong commando platoon, and many weapons and equipment of various types were seized. 132 US account: On 18 August (Bn Ci plantation), 92 KIA six AK-47s, three .50 cal machine guns and one RPG recovered; 19 August (Route 239), 76 killed three AK-47s, one RPG recovered; 21 August (Bn Ci area south, XT460440), 182 killed (body count); 22 August (B n Ci area, XT 462468), 24 killed; 23 August (FSB Schofield, XT 407440), 103 killed (body count) - 13 AK-47s, four machine guns and 11 RPGs recovered. 25th Infantry Division, Combat After Action Report of the Battle for Tay Ninh (approved draft - undated) - VCAT Item No. 2930218006; and Item No.2930218005 (7 February 1969). 133 Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1968, 26 February 1969. 134 Wikipedia S kin Tt Mu Thn (The Events of Tt Mu Thn). 135 25th Infantry Division, Combat After Action Report of the Battle for Tay Ninh (approved draft - undated) - VCAT Item No.2930218006; and Item No.2930218005 (7 February 1969). 136 The document a note dated 25 September 1968, also listed the strength of A55 (probably the 275 th VC Regiment) as 1,279; and A56 (possibly the 88 th NVA Regiment) as 1,133. A total of 6,436 in the note

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According to the 5th Division History (2005) Following the the third phase of the General Offensive, from 17 August to 3 September 1968 , the Division was awarded the Resolve to Fight and Win banner by the COSVN Military Committee as well as the Liberation Military Exploits Medal Second Class.137 The 5th, 88th and 33rd Regiments, the 22nd RCL Battalion, and the 31st Medical Battalion were all awarded the Military Feats Medal First Class.138 According to a 1971 1ATF study, in August 1968: the Regt lost a further 300 KIA. Late that month, a regimental attack on FSB Schofield in Bnh Dng Province resulted in 103 KIA. The Regiment returned to Cambodia in November 1968139, but shortly afterward returned to western Phc Long Province.140 A recovered note dated 25 September 1968 included the outline organisation of th the 5 VC Division and the personnel strengths of subordinate elements totalling 6,436. The strength of A57 ie the 33rd Regiment, was shown as 1,468; and A55 (275th VC Regiment) as 1,279.141 According to a rallier from the Regiments 3rd Battalion, the 33rd Regiment moved to Phc Long Province in October 1968 and conducted operations in that Province until moving to Bo Bnh (Long Khnh Province) in December 1968.142 A US report noted in November 1968, both the 33d NVA and 275 Regiments had begun to redeploy into War Zone D, the old AO of the 5th VC Division in preparation for the forthcoming offensive.143 At the end of November 1968, the

appeared to be the strength of the 5th VC Division including all its support elements. CDEC Log 101719-69. 137 Military Exploits Medal Second Class ie: Hun Chng qun cng hng nh. 138 Military Feats Medal First Class ie: Hun Chng chin cng hng nht see the title page. 139 Triu Minh Cm, the deputy commander of the Regiments 3 rd Battalion (D8) was killed on 26 October 1968 at Ta Keng, Ty Ninh Province - Nguyn S H, Martyrs ist, op.cit., 16 July 2013. 140 HQ 1ATF, 3 n 33 NVA Regt, Annex F to 1ATF INTSUM No.122/71, Ni t, 2 May 1971. The reported attack on FSB Schofield is probably the attack on FSB Schofield III (XT 4144) on 24 August 1968. A US report notes only 62 enemy KIA 25th Division Arty, Operational Report Lessons Learned Period ending 31 October 1968, 17 January 1969 see also the previous footnote 132. 141 CDEC Log 10-1719-69 as also noted in footnote 136 above. 142 The rallier was employed as a clerk in the headquarters of the 33rd Regiments 3rd Battalion from September 1968 until May 1969 when hospitalized for jaundice. In January 1970, he was assigned to 33 rd Regiments (A-57s) Military Personnel Section located at ng Mountain (ZT 0625) in Bnh Tuy Province until June 1970. He noted that the 33rd Regiments political officer was nh Vn at - ie inh Vn t. VCAT Item No.11270230059. 143 HQ II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report Lessons Learned, 1 November 1968 31 January 1969, VCAT Item No.3400154001.

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Regiment moved to the Bin Ha and B Ra-Long Khnh144 area as a direct-command formation of Military Region 7.145 A captured cadres notebook indicated that in mid-December 1968, the units of rd the 33 Regiment would have to coordinate in order to annihilate vital enemy elements especially the ((1st US)) Air Cav Div along the ((Cambodian)) border. Companies were to attain the following criteria during the next unspecified phase: 100 enemy personnel killed, two aircraft shot down, and two weapons captured these results were to be achieved in ambushes and raids. Notebook entries related that the 9th (ie 3rd) Battalion had achieved brilliant successes during the Third Phase ((presumably of the Tt Offensive in 1968)). However, the troops morale was lower than before. Many cadre and soldiers now lacked faith ((in a VC/NVA victory)) and were lured by peace prospects. Others tended to overestimate enemy capabilities and balked at hardships and dangers. Entries also noted that the battlefield was new to the unit, and the unit was not familiar with street fighting.146 The Party in the 33rd NVA Regiment Within the Regiment as in all Vietnamese communist military units, the Party ie the Peoples Revolutionary Party, had primacy as eadership of the Party over the Armed Forces must be absolute, direct and complete147 with only emergency
144

For information on Long Khnh Province in the mid-1960s including administration and population detail, see USOM, Information Brief: Long Khnh Province - Vietnam, December 1965 - VCAT Item No. 6850102002. Long Khnh Province had a total land area of 4,000 square kilometres with a maximum length of 90 kilometres and an average width of 70 kilometres. It comprised two Districts: Xun L c and nh Qun its population of 131,300 (1965) lived in 18 villages (107 hamlets). See map at Appendix 20. 145 The commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment L Hoa Lm, reportedly died on 24 December 1968 CDEC Log 10-1962-69. In a November 1968 Directive, Phan Lim a senior 33rd Regiment political commissar, called for all units to strictly employ code words and cover-designators during upcoming combat missions. The 5th VC Division was to be referred to as on 82C. The 33rd Regiment was to be known by its cover designator A57 with the Mortar Company as K16, the 12.7mm AA Company K17, the 75mm RCL Company K18, the Sapper Company - K19, and the Reconnaissance Company K20. The Directive had been disseminated to all units of the Regiment including J7 to J9 (ie each of the infantry battalions); K16 to K24 Companies; 1 (the Regiments military headquarters staff) and 3 (probably the Regiments rear services staff). The Directive noted that units of the Regiment had suffered eight killed and 14 injured during the recent period as a result of firearms accidents CDEC Log 10-1921-69. 146 i Vn Hin (3rd Battalion/33rd Regiment), Notebook VCAT Item No.2300811008. The strength of Hins company (C12) in late December 1968 was 37 and the company had been engaged in transporting rice and supplies. The notebook revealed that the new cover designator for the 33 rd/A57 Regiment was on 84C see also footnotes 92, 93, 124, and 129 for cover designators. Notes in the book indicated a forthcoming combat action planned for 31 December 1968 including specific orders for the move towards the objective. 147 For detail on the organisation and activities of the ao ng Party (ie the communist party) including its Youth Group (on), in the 33rd Regiment (as the 101st Regiment up to October 1965), see VCAT Item No.F034600591842, Item No.F034600401458 and footnotes 36 and 54. On military and Party relations, see: COSVN, Organization and Working Procedures Pertaining to Party Leadership in the Military Field: Basic Principles. The document was recovered by US forces on 22 April 1968 - CDEC Log 07-2228-68.

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decisions by the commanding officer.148 The Partys COSVN-directed cadre at all levels managed the War through Party committees, political commissars, political officers, Party chapters, Party members, and the Partys Youth Group (on) members. In the 33rd Regiment, in December 1968, Party cadre studied the Resolution by COSVNs Military Affairs Party Committee on future strengthening of the military Party organisations. The Resolution called for an absolute leadership by the Party committees and Party chapters in every unit so that a complete victory could be achieved in the immediate future.149 Understandably, there were tensions between the communist military and political staffs. A senior NVA defector related Regardless of the size of the organisation, the ((political)) cadre have the highest authority in every activity of the unit although their military rank is lower than the military cadre in charge of the unit. Because of this, there have been ill-feelings among the military cadre .150

Cadre and Soldiers of the 33rd Regiment Political Staff Sng Ray Base, 1973 Party membership in units was quite high at about 40 % in the NVA and VC main force units in Military Region 7 with a higher number of Party Youth Group (on) members. In August 1969, the head of the 33rd Regiments Party office noted that in the first half of 1969, 229 personnel had been admitted to the Party; the 33rd Regiment had 28 Party Chapters; and a total of 463 Party members151 indicating about 43% of the
148

COSVN Resolution No. 04/A8, 1965 COSVN Resolution No. 04/A8 - Regulations for the Party Committee System in the SVN Liberation Army ((1965)) CDEC Log 03-1316-66 ie: VCAT Items No. 23130001036, 11272106006, or 4080111007. The Resolution includes instructions for COSVN, Province, District and Unit levels. 149 i Vn Hin (3rd Battalion/33rd Regiment), Notebook VCAT Item No.2300811008. 150 Debriefing of NVA Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn (also known as aka Thanh Sn), former Acting Chief of Staff and Chief of Operations of the 5 th VC Division who defected in Bnh Thun Province on 2 August 1966. VCAT Item No.23130003016. 151 See the following footnotes 156 and 403 that examine Resolution No. 3/DU dated 13 August 1969.

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Regiments reported strength of 1,075 were Party members. There were also a larger number of Youth Group members in Group Chapters.152 Party members and the performance of the Party in committees and units was assessed and formally rated.153 Solidarity within the NVA/VC units - and cohesion and control, was assisted by the communist system of three-man cells within the military sections and the dynamic of self-criticism. These cells were intended to function as harmonious three-man cooperatives that fought, ate and quartered together. Political officers also exhorted their troops on the basis of several codes including the Code of Discipline (12 precepts), an Oath of Honour (12), the Rules of Secrecy (15), and the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points of Attention. Party Chapters were exhorted to achieve the Four Good Qualities.154 As noted earlier, a captured 33rd Regiment company-level notebook reported that in early December 1968, the Regiment was to implement the COSVN Resolution pertaining to the strengthening of military Party organisations throughout the South that called for an absolute leadership by Party committees and chapters in every NVA/VC unit so that a future complete victory could be attained. An entry at the beginning of 1969, noted that despite the units successes during the Third ((Offensive)) Phase, the troops morale was lower than before. Many cadre and soldiers now lacked faith ((in a NVA/VC)) victory and were lured by peace prospects. Others tended to overestimate the enemys capabilities and balked at hardships and dangers.155 In August 1969, the Party Committee of the Regiment issued a Resolution156 directing that during the second half of 1969: 60-65% of 33rd Regiments units should
152

In the 274th VC Regiment, 35% of its personnel were Party members and a further 40 percent were members of the Party Youth Group. For the D445 VC Local Force Battalion the bi-annual reports by its commanding officer and political officer - written a few weeks before the Battle of Long Tn in midAugust 1966 (and only recently available) indicated 30% its personnel were Party members and a further 36% were Youth Group members ie in its pre- attle strength of 392. Chamberlain, E.P., D445 Battalion: Their Story, op.cit., 2011, Annexes F and G. 153 Military Region 1 - Directive on the Rating of Party Cadre (assessing ehaviour, Capability, Personal Achievements) and also for Committees and Units see: MR1 Directive No.013/CT , 19 July 1966 CDEC Log 08-1553-66 , VCAT Item No.F034600021550. 154 The Four Good Qualities for Party Chapters (Chi B 4 Tt) required Party Chapters to be Good in ideological guidance; Good in leadership of the unit; Good in promoting solidarity between the people and the Army; and Good in the recruitment and training of Party members and improvement of Party Chapter s. 155 The owner of the notebook was a cadre i Vn Hin probably the political officer, of C12 Company of the 33rd Regiments 9th (ie 3rd) Battalion see VCAT Item No.2300811008. 156 Resolution No. 3/DU, 13 August 1969 signed by Ng for the A57 (33rd NVA Regiment) Party Committee - CDEC Log 11-1496-69. A Comrade Ng is noted as the political director (ch nhim chnh tr) of the Regiment in 1969-1973 see T Chc Ban Ch Huy Trung on 33 Qua C c Thi K (The Headquarters Organisation of the 33rd Regiment in Past Years), op.cit., 2010. The Resolution addressed the implementation of the Four-Good-Qualities Party Chapter programme in the second half of 1969, noting that in the first half of 1969: 229 personnel had been admitted to the Party; 32% of the 28 Party Chapters had qualified for the Four-Good-Qualities title, and 72% of Youth Group members attained the same title. The most outstanding Chapter in the Regiment had been the 9th Company of the 3rd (9th) Battalion whose members had surpassed the Partys criteria by 10%. On the other hand, the number of Party members in the Regiment who failed to observe unit discipline increased by 50% as compared with the figures of 1968.

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attain the Determined to Win title; 50% of all squad-level cadre and 90% of all platoonlevel cadre should acquire Party membership. Party membership in the Regiment numbered 463. In September 1969, the Regiments Party Committee forwarded a Directive to all battalion and company Party Committees providing guidance for their forthcoming Party caucuses.157 Committees were to thoroughly familiarize all Party members with the characteristics and trends of the upcoming General Offensive; to assess the performance of units in such aspects as political and unit consolidation from December 1968 to date; and to select new Party Committee members through official votes to be organized during the caucuses. Against Pacification Moving Eastward in 1969 Following a Military Region 7 Party Affairs Conference (22-24 November 1968), the Military Region assigned the 33rd Infantry Regiment (E33) to cooperate in combat actions with the armed forces in order to concentrate on the destruction of the enemys Accelerated Pacification plan.158 A recovered 33rd Regiment political cadres notebook with entries from December 1968 to late April 1969, described the Regiments tasks under COSVN Resolution 8159 for the 1969 Spring Campaign. The tasks included an attack on - and the complete destruction of, M believed to be code for the Long Bnh complex. All ammunition dumps were to be destroyed, and a major portion of the enemys potential power was to be eliminated.160
Thus, self-mutilation and desertion were commonly observed in Party Chapters 3-D7 ((ie in the 7th Battalion)), 10-D9 (9th Battalion)), 4-D8 ((8th attalion)), and Party Chapter 18. See also footnotes 192 and 206 for desertion and self-wounding incidents in the 33rd Regiment. For reports on self-mutilation, woundings, and suicides in the B3 Front (Central Vietnam) not including the 33rd Regiment, see VCAT Item No.2131308003. 157 Trn Ng, Directive 4/DU, 20 September 1969 CDEC Log 11-1489-69. 158 In early November 1968 - with significant US support, President Nguyn Vn Thiu launched the Accelerated Pacification Program/Campaign with the objective of expanding government control over 1,200 villages and eliminating the communist infrastructure. Initially, it was programmed for 90 days. The D440 History (2011- Vietnamese language) noted that in late November 1968, the Military Region 7 Conference also confirmed and directed that the important task now faced by B Ra-Long Khnh Province was the need to concentrate on the destruction of the enemys Accelerated Pacification plan. To provide support, the Military Region assigned the 33rd Infantry Regiment (E33) to cooperate in combat actions with the local armed forces. - ng y B Ch Huy Qun S Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu, ch S Tiu on 440 Anh Hng - B Ra-Long Khnh (1967-1979), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia - S Tht, H Ni, 2011, p.80 in English with commentary and additional annexed information see: Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2013, p.53. 159 COSVN Resolution 8 was drafted in September-October 1968 as a blueprint for the 1968-1969 WinterSpring Campaign. For detail on COSVN Resolutions and Directives, see MACV, Communist Strategy as Reflected in Lao ng Party and COSVN Resolutions, SRAP 1569, 5 December 1969 - VCAT Item No. F015800190717. An RVNAF JGS J2 (Intelligence) Study covering the period 1930-1970, is at VCAT Item No.11272622011. 160 CDEC Log 10-1944-69.

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A 33rd Regiment Mortar Crew

Tt 1969 In late January 1969, the Regiment moved south into War Zone D and, in February 1969161, deployed towards the Bin Ha/Long Bnh area for the 1969 Tt K Du Campaign.162 Scheduled to participate in the 26 February 1969 attack on installations at Bin Ha/Long Bnh, the Regiment was reportedly turned back by heavy B-52 airstrikes and moved eastwards to the Bo Bnh area (YT 4902) of southern Long Khnh Province.163 A Communist Party history relates that The 274th and 33rd Regiments were
161

The recovered diary of 33rd Regiment soldier V Nh Nng indicated that the Regiment moved from Ty Ninh to Phc Long Province on 4 January 1969 and then to Bin Ha Province on 1 February 1969 see footnote 128. 162 Reportedly with the 274th and 33rd Regiments under the direct command of Comrade ng Vn Nho to strike the Americans at the ong nh logistics complex and south of Route 1. - Dng Thanh Tn (ed), Lch s ng b ((ng Cng Sn Vit Nam)) tnh ng Nai (1930-2000) (The Communist Party of Vietnam - ng Nai Province Party History), Tp (Volume) II (1954-1975), Chng (Chapter) IV, 2003. For the biography of ng Vn Nho, see VCAT Item No.2360916050. 163 According to a captured document, the 33rd Regiment attacked Trng om (YT 2011) and penetrated two-thirds of the Bin Ha airbase but needed reinforcements to replace its casualties of 16 KIA and 17 WIA - 1ATF, INTSUM No.55-69, Ni t, 24 February 1969. See also 1ATF, INTSUM No.48-69, Ni t, 17 February 1969 ie a soldier (name redacted) of the 33rd Regiment - who rallied at Trng Bom, stated the strength of the 2nd Battalion was 150. According to US reporting, the heaviest enemy attacks during the 1969 Spring Offensive were against the Bin Ha/Long Bnh complex in the period 23-26

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not able to attack the Long Bnh logistics complex, but were redirected to attack the American military outposts south of Route 1, the Bu Ci area and then to attack the Thai vassals in Long Thnh together with local forces and guerrillas and to support the people to destroy pacification within Long Thnh.164 According to a US report After heavy losses at Bin Ha in late February ((1969)), the 275th and 33rd Regiments swung eastward and relocated to B Bin province.165 The 33rd Regiment moved into central B Bin province, east of the Blackhorse base camp ((11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 11ACR))166 and was last identified on 22 March in a contact at YT 4901.167 The communist ng Nai History in relating the 1969 Tt (K Du) offensive, recounts: However, just two days before the attack, Th - the deputy of the 5th Division tactical staff, wavered and surrendered to the enemy and the plans were revealed and compromised. The 274th and the 33rd Regiment were not able to attack the Long Bnh logistics complex, and deployed to attack American posts south of Route 1 and in the Bu
February in which the 274th and 275th Regiments of the 5th VC Division suffered heavy casualties. The 33rd, 95th and 174th Regiments of the Division were apparently blocked in their attempts to provide additional support and were not involved in any of the ground actions around the Complex. 1ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue 9-69, Ni t, 23 February 1 March 1969. The 33rd Regiment reportedly attempted to move towards Long Bnh from the east on 23 February 1969, but was thoroughly decimated by artillery 199th Infantry Brigade: Operational Report Lessons Learned to 30 April 1969, dated 17 September 1969. See also the diary of 33rd Regiment member V Nh Nng at footnote 128 that refers to an attack against Long Bnh on 22 February 1969 by 33 rd Regiment elements. In 2011, a Vietnamese Internet blogsite noted four 33rd Regiment personnel (of the C-18 12.7mm heavy machine gun company) had been killed at Tam Phc on 23 February 1969 during the Regiments operation against the ong nh complex see casualties at Appendix 9. 1ATFs first engagement with the 33 rd Regiment probably occurred on 22 February 1969 see footnote 195. USMACV noted that in March ((1969)), the 33 rd Regiment probably became subordinate to Military Region 7 and had an estimated strength of 1,250. Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report Lessons Learned to 30 April 1969, 10 September 1969. 164 Dng Thanh Tn (ed), ch s ng b ((ng Cng Sn Vit Nam)) tnh ng Nai (1930-2000) , Tp (Volume) II (1954-1975), Chng (Chapter) IV, op.cit., 2003. 165 The Vit Cng B Bin Province encompassing B RaLong KhnhBin Ha was first established in April 1963 see Chamberlain, E.P., D445 attalion Their Story, op.cit., 2011, Annex H. 166 The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11ACR) arrived in Vietnam in September 1966 and - beginning on 20 October 1966, established its Blackhorse base in the Sui Rm/Long Giao area on the western side of Route 2 (YS 435969) approximately six kilometres south of Xun Lc Town in southern Long Khnh Province. The 11ACR base was about 30 kilometres north of the 1ATF base at Ni t. The Regiments combat power comprised: three armoured cavalry squadrons and an air cavalry troop. Each squadron comprised three cavalry troops, a tank company and a self-propelled (SP) 155m howitzer battery. Its principal equipments were: 51 M48A3 Patton medium tanks/M551 Sheridan light tanks, 296 M113 APCs and 18 M109 155 SP howitzers. - Chesney, E.J. Major, The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam January 1969 through June 1970, Fort Leavenworth, 2002. VCAT Item No.168300010420. For its successor US formations in Long Khnh, see footnotes 399 and 434. 11ACR handed over their Sui Rm base to the 18th ARVN Division on 24 October 1969. 167 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operational Report For Period Ending 30 Apr 69, 15 May 1969. Also In the move south, the 33rd Regiment of the 5th VC Division was hit by ambushes and artillery and was forced to abort its mission and return to War Zone D. 14th Military History Detachment, The Shield and the Hammer: The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in War Zone C and Western III Corps VCAT Item No.3400158001.

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Ci area after which they attacked the Thai vassals168 in Long Thnh, and together with local troops and guerrillas supported the people in their attacks on the enemys pacification programmes in ong Thnh and Nhn Trch Districts.169 As at 27 February 1969, USMACV estimated the Regiments strength as only 170 760. Tensions between North Vietnamese and Southern Communist Troops In the South, with the increasing numbers of NVA formations and units171 as well as a growing number of senior NVA cadre and fillers in VC units, tensions and friction arose between Southerners (military, civilian cadre, and villagers), and the NVA troops.172 Much was related to cultural differences, envy, and perceived discrimination.173 An official communist directive (by Standing Committee B1 probably in Bnh Dng Province) noted regrettable mistakes in the treatment of northern troops by Southerners (military and civilian) who disparagingly called Northerners doltish,
168

The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF - the Queen's Cobras Regiment) arrived at the US Bearcat base/Camp Martin Cox (YS 1498 - about 35 kilometres south-east of Si Gn; south of the Long Thnh District capital) in September 1967. The Thai formation operated under the operational control of the US 9th Infantry Division. In August 1968, the Headquarters of the 9 th Infantry Division departed Bearcat for ng Tm (nine kilometres west of M Tho) - ie as the Divisions operations were principally in the Mekong Delta region. The strengthened RTAVF force - the Thai Black Panther Division (5,596 troops six infantry battalions) was complete at Bearcat by mid-February 1969. see Sustained pressure on enemy reaps results in Asian Allies in Vietnam, Viet-Nam Bulletin, Series No.26 (3-70), US Embassy Vietnam, March 1970, pp.6-7. 169 Dng Thanh Tn (ed), ch s ng b ((ng Cng Sn Vit Nam)) tnh ng Nai (1930-2000), Tp (Volume) II (1954-1975), op.cit., Chng (Chapter) IV, 2003. 170 USMACV, Order of Battle Summary: 1-31 May 1969, Vol I, 5 June 1969, p.IV-103 (US ID Nr - 32605) VCAT Item No.F015900060147. 171 In October 1965, NVA troops comprised about 26 percent of VC/NVA maneuver and combat support strength, while today (3 March 1969), it is 70 plus. - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, op.cit., 2004, p.134. In January 1968 just before the Tt Offensive, the USMACV Headquarters estimated that total communist strength in the South was over 225,000 - of whom 55,744 were NVA about 25%). Another 10-12,000 NVA were incorporated into VC units. 80% of the NVA were in the two northern CTZs - USMACV, Order of Battle Summary: 1 January thru 31 January 1968, Saigon, 31 January 1968. The number of NVA in the South had grown markedly by mid-1973 with the NVA having increased threefold from 55,000 to 174, 000 (ie 56% in the 311,524 total which included 44,567 VCI/political cadre) - US Defence Attache Office (USDAO), Enemy Strengths May 1973, Saigon, 4 July 1973 - VCAT Item No.2311006085. For other figures, see footnote 110. On 23 September 1969, COMUSMACV General C.W. Abrams, was briefed that In III Corps, the enemy is 82 percent NVA. In I Corps 92 percent - Sorley, ., Vietnam Chronicles The Abrams Tapes, op.cit., 2004, p.261. 172 Vietnam Document and Research Notes 43-44, Friction between Northern and Southern Vietnamese: Directives Urge Standing Shoulder to Shoulder, September 1968 see VCAT Item No.2131003113 : p.4 (Docu 43 p.3 for English, and p.4 for Vietnamese - ie SO.84/CV-BI; and English only (20 December 1967) at CDEC Log 06-1044-66. 173 USMACV closely followed reports of NVA versus VC dissension and friction. At a weekly intelligence conference on 20 September 1969, General C.W. Abrams (COMUSMACV) remarked Christ, you cant get them ((NVA and VC)) together at a free beer party, really. - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, op.cit., 2004, p.261.

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clumsy, slow-moving, made fun made of their accent174, and criticised them as lacking experience. Shopkeepers sold food to the southern brothers at 100 piastres a kilo but they charged the northern brothers 110 or 115 a kilo175 In mid-1968, a COSVN Military Committee Directive 44/H noted some improvement in relations, but cited continuing shortcomings including poor treatment of newcomers on the infiltration routes, belittling them for being brainless, and for becoming lost due to their unfamiliarity with the terrain in the South.176 In mid-1969, a USMACV report citing exploitable sources of friction between VC and NVA troops assessed The NVA officers feel that the VC officers have had inferior military training, and are tactically incompetent. However, the VC are more familiar with RVN terrain, and feel that NVA troops are of little help in planning operations. This mutual disrespect has resulted in conflicts among the enemy leadership. Also, NVA troops annoy the VC by attempting to correct their speech habits to match the North Vietnamese dialect. Finally, NVA troops dislike VC methods of food preparation, because VC troops do not always cook their vegetables.177 In Phc Tuy Province, tensions and lack of cooperation were reported between D445 and the Northern D440 attalion.178 The Northerners also reportedly had criticisms of the southern Vit Cng - ie complaining that they were disloyal, lazy, ostentatious, undisciplined and unorthodox.179 A principal NVA defector PAVN Lieutenant Colonel L Xun Chuyn, also spoke of rifts and arguments between Northerners and Southerners. He cited differences in personalities and lifestyle between Northerners and Southerners as a source of tensions characterising Northerners as

174

The Vietnamese language has five principal regional dialects with differences in vocabulary and pronunciation, but which are mutually intelligible. However, for example, differences between the Northern and the Southern dialects could be compared to the differences beween English spoken by Scots and standard English. With the North being the historical cradle of the Vietnamese civilization, Northerners consider Southerners as lesscultured. With the Norths harsher fo ur-season climate, Northerners also considered themselves more hardy and resilient than Southerners. 175 Discrimination against NVA troops in Vietnam by southern communists, 20 December 1967, CDEC Log 06-1044-68. 176 COSVN Military Affairs Committee, Directive (44/H) on Strengthening Leadership in Regard to C Category Recruits, 2 June 1968. C Category Recruits was a euphemism for infiltrated NVA troops. 177 COMUSMACV, Quarterly Evaluation report: Second Quarter 1969, 1 April 30 June 1969, Saigon, 20 August 1969, p.A-7, sub-para 5.c. 178 Appendix II to Annex A to 1ATF INTSUM No.84/70, Ni t, 25 March 1970. On North v South divisiveness, see also Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, 2013, footnotes 204 and 233 - ie: In May 1970, a rallier from 440 Battalion reported that 440 Battalion and 445 Battalion were not willing to cooperate with each other because of personnel conflict between SVN ((South Vietnamborn)) and NVA ((North Vietnamese troops)). While nominally a VC battalion, D440 was an NVA unit originally Group 211 of the 9th Regiment/304th NVA Division, that infiltrated into the South in mid-early 1967. Following heavy casualties, the 275th VC Main Force Regiment incorporated the D605 NVA Battalion as its 3rd Battalion in late May 1966 and D605 suffered heavy casualties at the Battle of Long Tn against Australian forces on 18 August 1966. 179 Taylor, K.W., The Vietnamese Civil War of 1955 -1975 in Historical Perspective, p.27 in Wiest, A and Doidge, M.J., Triumph Revisited Historians Battle for the Vietnam War, Routledge, New York, 2010.

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disciplined and mindful and Southerners as liberal and free.180 Among Southerners, there was also reportedly tensions between ex-Vit Minh who had remained in the South after the 1954 Geneva Accords and the Autumn cadre (c n b hi kt) who returned ie had infiltrated back into the South after having regrouped to the North in 1954-55.181 Not surprisingly, post-War communist unit histories assert cameraderie between Northerners and Southerners for example in the D440 Battalion History: whether Northerner or Southerner all were soldiers of 440 Battalion. We all strove together, and were of one fighting spirit for the very lofty ideals of the Revolution. There was no regionalism, localism, or factionalism.182 Morale Maintaining morale in NVA units - whose personnel far from home with no defined length of service, was a significant challenge for political officers in the 33rd Regiment. For Northerners, just getting to the battlefields in the South was often a trek of several months. They faced superior firepower, poor food at times, and often rudimentary shelter. The soldiers feared an unmarked grave in the South - and their unrecovered bodies becoming wandering souls. For political officers, appeals to nationalism were central - ie to drive out the foreign invader and occupier and defeat its puppet Saigon regime. In September 1967, entries in a company cadres notebook related poor health in the writers recently-activated company resulting from food shortages, and numerous difficulties caused by rainy weather, and a strong tendency among the troops to fear hardships, difficulties and sacrifices. Their sense of combat readiness was poor and the writer noted we face many difficulties, but the ideological problem is the most serious.183 Homesickness among Northern troops was evident in documents captured by 184 1ATF. To enhance morale, the NVA/VC operated a complex postal and courier system

180

USMACV, Item 110 - Interrogation of L Xun Chuyn, pp.11-15.VCAT Items No.4080121004, 23130003016. 181 In addition to that, the differences in regional customs and traditions between the North and the South have created a part of the difficulties in the internal activities of each separate unit. In most of the units in the Communist 9th Division, except in study meetings or daily activities, one can clearly see two main clans. The NVN-born clan and the SVN-born clan. They have conversation time, tea party [sic], and banquet separately from each other. They never sit at a common table. North South Divisiveness in PAVN/PLAF April 1974, VCAT Item No.2310513021. The source also related NVA versus VC conflict for position, conflict over women, conflict leading to fight and preventative measures in the 9th VC Division. See also: Divisiveness in Communist Ranks March 1974, VCAT Item No.2122902006. 182 Chamberlain, E.P., D440 , op.cit., 2013, p.129. 183 CDEC Log 11-1551-67, VCAT Item No.2131002127. 184 For example, among Northerners in D440 and D445 Battalions - although some had married local girls and the unit had plenty of food, they still felt homesick since all of them were natives of North Vietnam - Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No.253/71, Ni t,10 September 1971 (see also Annex B to 1ATF INTSUM No.250/71, Ni t, 7 September 1971).

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that included personal mail.185 At Tt (New Year) an important time of family for the Vietnamese, the political cadre often provided pro-forma Tt greeting cards for the soldiers to include in their personal mail. However, the soldiers letters only rarely reached their loved ones at home, and it was viewed cynically by the troops - particularly Northerners. For security, NVA/VC field units were allocated discrete Letter Box Numbers (LBNs) that were regularly changed.186 Letters were censored by political cadre, and captured 33rd Regiment letters and other documentation, rarely included any intelligence-exploitable data.187 Many cadre and soldiers also kept diaries and notebooks often beautifully illustrated and including poetry as poignant as their letters home. Morale was also bolstered by the award of titles, medals, Letters of Appreciation, Certificates of Commendation, emulation campaign certificates, and other awards both to individuals and to units.188

A Certificate of Commendation and a Letter of Appreciation Awarded to Nguyn Vn u (poor copy)189

185

A MR1 (ie T.1, later MR7) Directive on mail policy to North Vietnam (No.09/CT dated 15 July 1966 wef from 1 August 1966) directed no more than one letter a month to relatives and close friends only encouragement to addressees no classified information - see CDEC Log 08-1555-66. The B Ra Provincial Units Command Committee also directed regulations for the exchange of personal letters between North and South Vietnam and within South Vietnam (signed by the Assistant Political Officer, Nguyn Thanh Cn) - CDEC Log 09-1974-66. For detailed regulations on the postal system, see also CDEC Log 01-1367-69. 186 For 33rd Regiment Letter Box Numbers (LBNs), see footnotes 92 and 124. LBNs were used for both mail within South Vietnam and to/from North Vietnam. 187 However a letter written by a 5th VC Division rear service cadre - dated 7 April 1970, related that the 33rd Regiment had moved to a distant area but is still subordinate to the 5th Division.; and that Sn ((probably Triu Kim Sn)) had been promoted to the position of 33 rd Regiment executive officer; Chau ((probably Nguyn Vn Ch u)) was also an executive officer; Than ((probably Nguyn Huy Thn)) was the chief-of-staff; Tng ((possibly H S Tng)) was head of the Regiments rear services; and Ng was the assistant chief of the rear services section. - VCAT Item No.2131509010, CDEC Log 05-1808-70. 188 Titles were also awarded such as Valiant Killer of Americans for which there were criteria and classes, and Valiant Destroyer of Tanks. For awards to Nguyn Vn O and ng Vn i ng including Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces, medals, and other awards - see footnote 210.

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Visits by cultural groups to units also raised morale with songs, music, and folk dances.

The B Ra- ong Kh nh Cultural Group during a visit to the 33rd Regiments Sng Ray Base in 1970 (a poor quality photograph) On Morale, a 1971 study by 1ATF that also drew on US material, noted 33 NVA Regt is considered to be one of the most capable units in GVN MR3 and as such is believed to have fairly high morale. This can be attributed to constant political indoctrination. Very few Hoi Chanhs are received from the Regiment, and it is common to find that members of 33 Regiment who have been KIA ((Killed in Action)) possess no identifying documents.190 However, recovered 33rd Regiment documents also indicate problems of indiscipline. A recovered 33rd Regiment security cadres notebook included a reproduction of a on 84C (33rd Regiment) Directive that complained of misconduct and loose discipline by some 33rd Regiment cadre at supply points in Phc Tuy Province. The Directive also related that: Many personnel of C12-D3 ((12th Company, 3rd Battalion)) were seen reading enemy publications and leaflets. Many others of K10 of
189

Nguyn Vn u was a section commander in the C-20 Reconnaissance Company of the 33rd Regiment (Cng Trng 33). His Certificate of Commendation (Bng Khen) is dated 2 December 1965, and the Letter of Appreciation (Giy Khen) is dated 17 February 1966 indicating that they were awarded for his performance in the Plei Me-Ia rng Campaign, or soon after. The documents were recovered at YA 982071 on 2 August 1966 by the US 25th Infantry Division see CDEC Log 09-1359-66, VCAT Item No.F034600110774. 190 1ATF, 33 NVA Regiment 1ATF INTSUM No.264/71, op.cit., 21 September 1971, p.6. A Hoi Chanh ie Hi Chnh was a rallier under the Chiu Hi programme. Begun in 1963, the Chiu Hi (Open Arms) programme encouraged North Vietnamese and Vit Cng troops and infrastructure members to defect to the Si Gn Government. For Chiu Hi statistics and an assessment, see footnote 17.

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the 3rd attalion listened publicly to the enemys radio broadcasts and talked openly about the enemys Chiu Hi program thereby compromising the morale of the newly assigned recruits ((to K10)).191 In mid-August 1969, a political cadre reported the number of Party members in the Regiment who failed to observe unit discipline increased by 50% as compared with the figures of 1968. Thus, self-mutilation and desertion were commonly observed in Party Chapters 3-D7, 10-D9, 4-D8, and Party Chapter 18.192 Reports of Attacks on and Engagements with, Thai and Australian Forces A principal 33rd Regiment history monograph relates that: In the 1969 Spring Campaign, the Regiment was ordered - together with E4 ((ie the 274th Regiment of the 5th VC Division)), D2 ((probably a Sub-Region 4 battalion)) and sappers to attack the general logistics complex at Long Bnh, the chemical site, and the helicopter landing field. Next, we struck the enemy and reduced the American positions as well as those at Cm ng, i Du and Sui Kt, and most notably, in a battle with the Thais at Bu Ci, destroyed a Thai battalion and inflicted heavy casualties on an Australian mechanized infantry battalion at Kim Long/Bnh Ba destroying 24 vehicles and forcing the enemy to withdraw back to its base.193 Another 33rd Regiment history more briefly related defeating enemy counter-attacks at Cm ng, Sui Kt and i Du and especially noting that the Regiment wiped out a Thai battalion at Bu Ci (Bin Ha) on 16 (or 28) February 1969.194 Australian forces engaged 33rd Regiment on several occasions in Bin Ha Province in late February 1969. On 22 February, elements of 1ATFs 4RAR engaged a 20-strong NVA group at YT 155080, and wounded and captured a 33rd Regiment soldier Nguyn Xun Trng.195 On 28 February, 4RAR engaged a group of 5-6 NVA at YS 183088. Aspirant Ha Hong c and Private L Vn Dung both of the 3rd Company/1st Battalion/33rd Regiment were captured in the action.196 A regional communist history197 relates that: In ong Thnh, the 33rd Regiment attacked and wiped out a Thai battalion at Bu Ci. Following this battle, the Thais no

191 192

CDEC Log 10-1921-69. CDEC Log 11-1496-69 see also footnote 156. The report was written about nine weeks after the Battle of nh a at which the Regiments 1st Battalion (D7) had suffered heavy casualties. See also the critique by an external senior cadre at Appendix 10. 193 Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010, p.2 see Appendix 2. 194 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.5 see Appendix 3. 195 1ATF, INTSUM No.53-69, Ni t, 22 February 1969. 196 Hall, M.J., Combat After Action Report D 10/10, March 1969; 1ATF, INTSUM No.59-69, Ni t, 28 February 1969. The engagement took place about eight kilometres north-east of nh Sn hamlet in ong Thnh District. The two 33rd Regiment soldiers were captured in a defensive position at a clearing used to launch rockets on the night of 27/28 February 1969. 197 Trn Th Minh Hong (foreword), a Ch ng Nai (The ng Nai Monograph), Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2001, Vol III, Chapter VI. However, the passage in the monograph implies the action occurred in about September 1969.

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longer dared undertake sweeping operations.198 According to a communist press report in early March 1969 The P AF in B Ra Province on the night of 22-23 February repeatedly assaulted the big base of the Thai mercenaries at Nc Trong on Route 15, next to Long Bnh township. According to initial reports, the liberation fighters killed or wounded over 800 Thai mercenaries and 15 U.S. troops and destroyed three artillery pieces, six aircraft and one gasoline storage [sic]. All told, the PLAF in Bin Ha and B Ra Provinces in the six days ending February 28 put out of action 1,700 Thai mercenaries.199 On 28 February the Bin Ha PLAF penetrated the dense defensive line of the Thai mercenary troops at Bu Ci, completely annihilating a reinforcement [sic] battalion, killing or injuring more than 900 and seizing or destroying large quantities of weapons and military equipment.200 The Liberation Press Agency later reported that a iberation Military Exploits Medal, 3rd Class was awarded to the unit that annihilated one Thai battalion at Bu Ci, Bin Ha Province on the night of 28 February.201 No action at Bu Ci in late February 1969 by the 33rd Regiment is related in the 5th VC Division History (2005) see Appendix 7. However, a principal communist history of the War relates that in February 1969 The 33rd Main-Force Regiment inflicted heavy losses on a Royal Thai Armed Forces battalion at Bu Ci (south-east of Long Bnh Sub-Sector), forcing the enemy to concentrate six battalions of the Saigon strategic general reserve to deploy to break the encirclement and at the same time, urgently deploying the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade as a relief force and to hold an outer perimeter (north and south of the ng Nai River) at the Long Bnh Sub-Sector.202 None of the foregoing claimed attacks are noted in the MACV Monthly Summary for February 1969 (dated 22 June 1969) among its reported significant events; and 1ATF the RTAVFs flanking formation, did not report any such activity.203 However,

198

Most often, the term sweeping (cn qut) refers to search and destroy operations by US, Allied, and Si Gn Government forces. In January 1968, the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) changed the terminology for such operations to reconnaissance in force 1ATF, Message, G142, 24 January 1968. In April 1968, the US forces also adopted reconnaissance in force and the terms combat sweep and spoiling attack with the USMACV Commander, General W.C. Westmoreland noting that search and destroy equated in the ((American)) public mind with aimless searches in th e jungle and destruction of property. Doughty, R.A., The Evolution of US Tactical Doctrine, Leavenworth Papers, Fort Leavenworth - Kansas, August 1979. 199 Liberation Press Agency (Clandestine), 8 March 1969. 200 iberation Press Agency (Clandestine), Another appropriate punishing blow at the Thai mercenary troops, 7 March 1969. 201 iberation Press Agency (Clandestine), P AF Command Awards, 17 March 1969. 202 H Khang - Colonel/Dr (ed), Lch s Khng chin chng M cu nc 1954-1975 (The History of the Anti-American War of National Salvation), T p (Volume) 6, National Political Publishing House, H Ni, 2002. 203 1ATF noted on 28 February that Initial interrogation of two NVA PW ((captured on 28 February at YT 183088)) suggests that 1 Bn/33 NVA Regt is also located south of Route 1 and that some elements are dispersed, or lost and seeking food in the eastern area of AO elconnen. 1ATF, INTSUM No.59-69, Ni t, 28 February 1969. A NVA/VC Spring Offensive began on 23 February with all formations of the 5 th VC Division noted in activity against the i n Ha/ ong nh Complex. However, The 33 rd, 95th and 174th Regiments of the Division were apparently blocked in their attempts to provide additional support and

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on 16 March 1969, the 3rd Battalion/1st Brigade of the RTAVF Black Panther Division repelled an attack by elements of the 274th VC Regiment on a battalion base camp at Lc An (YS 167916) resulting in 160 VC reportedly killed.204 In mid-March 1969, according to the 5th VC Division History (2005): The 33rd Regiment operated to the north of Trng Bom and, over three days, engaged in seven battalion-level attacks and killed or wounded hundreds of the enemy and shot down two aircraft. Performance Reviewed Reviewing events from mid-1968 to April 1969, a 33rd Regiment political cadre related in his notebook: Since the 1968 Summer and Autumn Campaigns, the 33rd Regiment has had to conduct repeated military operations on unfamiliar battlefields with unstable conditions in its rear area. Due to continual attacks by the enemy on various lines of communication, the Regiment had to perform transport missions while coping with the enemy.205 In a somewhat later report, another political cadre noted that in the period from December 1968 to March 1969, the Regiment had fought 15 battles and J8 (the 2nd Battalion), and the 17th, 22nd and 23rd Companies had successfully preserved their personnel and weapons. However, K18 (the Recoilless Rifle Company) had talked with civilian labourers about internal matters of the unit and the 1st and 3rd attalions had failed to observe security regulations, causing 40 members of the unit to be killed by airstrikes. 1st attalion personnel had accidentally exploded grenades killing six members and wounding five others of the unit. From November 1968 to March 1969, 18 members deserted their unit, and three members wounded themselves.206 In April 1969, a recovered 33rd Regiment security cadres notebook noted that in accordance with COSVN directives, Regiment personnel were entitled to a monthly rice ration of 25 liters. The notebook also included a reproduction of a on 84C (33rd Regiment) Directive that complained of misconduct and loose discipline of some 33rd Regiment cadre at the Vit Cng (YS 4889) and Quang Minh (YS 459889) supply entry/exit points. The Directive also related that Many personnel of C12-D3 ((12th Company, 3rd Battalion)) were seen reading enemy publications and leaflets. Many others of K10 of the 3rd Battalion listened publicly to the enemys radio broadcasts and talked openly about the enemys Chiu Hi program thereby compromising the morale of the

were not involved in any of the ground actions around the Complex. 1ATF, Vietnam Digest No.9-69, 23 February to 1 March 1969, Ni t. 204 45th Military History Detachment (US), Combat After Action Report, Defense of Lc An Base Camp 16 June 1969, San Francisco, 3 July 1969, p.3. Subsequently, on 16 June 1969, the 274 th Regiment lost 212 KIA (BC) on an attack on Lc An then occupied by the RTAVF 2nd Battalion/1st Brigade, op.cit., pp.1-11. 205 CDEC Log 10-1944-69, Item 1. 206 CDEC Log 10-1940-69. The document was recovered by the 18 th ARVN Division in September 1969. The report was probably written by a 33rd Regiment Assistant Political Officer, H Minh Tng.

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newly assigned recruits ((to K10)).207 Also in April 1969, the Regiments political section issued a Directive on relations with civilians and proselytising. Personnel were directed that under no circumstances should cadre and soldiers purchase foodstuffs and goods directly from the population; but instead all purchases should be made through the intermediaries of the local ((communist)) authorities. Also no one should take vegetables or fruit without authorization of the owners.208 Soon after, in May 1969, the Directive mentioned above was recovered having been prepared for signature by the Regiments commander (citing Nguyn Vn Thng), and noting that the Regiments quartermaster cadre had failed to observe security regulations at the Quang Minh and Vit Cng entry and exit points when contacting local inhabitants and personnel were warned to avoid talking with villagers about unit activities, cover designations, and locations.209 On 17 May 1969, in an attack at An Lc (Long Khnh Province - YT 395093), Nguyn Vn O a reconnaissance section commander of the 1st Battalion of the Regiment died heroically, and was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Liberation Armed Forces.210 In this period as noted above, a short 33rd Regiment history monograph also noted inflicting heavy casualties on two Australian battalions at Kim ong on Route 2 and destroying 24 tanks.211 A more substantial 33rd Regiment history also claimed that in the 1969 Spring Campaign, the Regiment inflicted heavy losses on a mechanized Australian infantry battalion at Kim Long and Bnh Ba, destroying 24 vehicles and forcing the enemy to withdraw to their base.212 Neither 1ATF nor US records appear to have any reports of such an engagement.
207

CDEC Log 10-1921-69. The notebook also included a November 1968 Directive by a senior 33 rd Regiment political cadre Phan Lim, that called for all units of the Regiment to use codewords and coverdesignators during upcoming combat missions see footnotes 145 and 218. 208 CDEC Log 11-1489-69. 209 The captured draft Directive had been prepared for the signature of Nguy n Vn Thng - reportedly as the Commanding Officer of on 84C ie a cover designator for the 33rd Regiment - CDEC Log 101962-69. For Nguyn Vn Thng as the Regiments commanding officer, see also footnotes 232, 276, 401, 490, 491 and 495. A further photograph of Nguyn Vn Thng is also in the Contents section. 210 Nguyn Vn O (b.1946, Hi Hng) had reportedly killed 65 US troops and five Thai troops. In the attack on 17 May 1969, his unit reportedly wiped out an ARVN company and two Regional Force platoons. He was awarded the title by the Provisional Revolutionary Government on 20 December 1973. ng Vn Bing (19th Engineer Company) was also awarded the title Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces Cu Chin Binh, Tm Tt Trung on 33, op.cit., July 2010 see Appendix 1. For Nguyn Vn O, see also http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php?topic=25083.90 . 211 L B Lc - Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Bo Co Tm T t Qu Trnh Chin u v Hot ng Trung on 33 (A57) T 1965-2010 (A Summary Report on the Combat Activities and Operations of the 33 rd Regiment (A57)), Long Khnh, 15 July 2010 eight pages only; in a presentation format, see Appendix 4. 212 Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010 see Appendix 2. Subsequently, that history notes that at the attle of nh a on 6/6/1969, the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment was forced to replace the D440 VC Battalion and the Regiment lost 53 killed in the fighting. This account is also related in the Summary History ie Cu Chin Binh, Tm Tt Trung on 33, op.cit., July 2010 see Appendix 1, that claims

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The 1969 Summer-Autumn/Long Khnh Campaign and the 33rd Regiment According to a major Vietnamese history of the War During the first half of 1969, we launched two waves of operations (the 22 February-30 March Spring wave and the 11 May-25 June wave), causing a limited amount of damage to the enemy.213 A more recently published account notes that Phases X (22 February to 30 March) and H (11 May to 25 June) of the Spring-Summer Offensives sought to maintain the strategic initiative.214 In April 1969, COSVN Headquarters directed the Eastern Nam B Region ((ie equivalent to Saigons III CTZ/Military Region 3)) to concentrate its forces to destroy the pacification programme, to expand and consolidate the liberated regions, and to defeat a phase of the US-puppets clear and hold plan.215 This Summer-Autumn Campaign was launched at the beginning of May 1969216 with the principal ((ie ch yu)) area of operations in Ty Ninh and Bnh Long Provinces (involving the 9th, 7th and 1st Divisions) In the secondary ((ie th yu)) area, the 5th Division (reinforced by the newly-created 29th Regiment and a COSVN artillery battalion), had the task of wiping out one or two battalions of the puppet 18th Division and the outlying posts of the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade - and to support the movement to destroy the enemys pacification programme in areas east of Si Gn.217 These secondary operations were also termed the ong Khnh Campaign: 5 May 20 June 1969.218
the enemy were forced to withdraw to their defences at Ni t. A 33rd Regiment article available at their Memorial at Bnh Ba, similarly relates that the 1st Battalion of the Regiment replaced D440 Battalion for the attack on Bnh Ba L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, see Appendix 3. The D440 History (2011) similarly acknowledges that D440 was replaced by the 33rd Regiment in the task of occupying Bnh Ba village on 5-6 June 1969 - ng y B Ch Huy Qun S Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu, ch S Tiu on 440 Anh Hng - B Ra-Long Khnh (1967-1979), op.cit., 2011, pp.90-91; as does the Chu c History - Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh Nghia (et al), Lch s u Tranh Cch Mng Ca ng B V Nhn Dn Huyn Chu c (19302000), Nh Xut Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gi, H Ni, 2004. 213 Pribbenow, M. (Translator), Victory in Vietnam The Official History of the Peoples Army of Vietnam 1954-1975, op.cit., 2002, p.244. 214 Lien-Hang Thi Nguyen, Hanois War An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2012, p.130. That work concludes Although Phases X and H boosted the morale of the troops, communist forces could not maintain pressure on the cities, and by July the VWP ((Vietnam Workers Party)) more or less adopted Giaps more cautious strategy., p.130. 215 th 5 Division History, op.cit., 2005, Chapter 2. 216 The May 1969 Campaign series of attacks was ordered by COSVNs Thng V (Current Affairs/Standing Committee), principally in Eastern Nam and particularly in Ty Ninh-Bnh Long while, in coordination, forces in Bin Ho-Long Khnh were to cooperate by destroying routes, drawing-off enemy forces - Dng Thanh Tn (ed), ch s ng b ((ng Cng Sn Vit Nam)) tnh ng Nai (1930-2000), Tp (Volume) II (1954-1975), Chng (Chapter) IV, 2003. 217 th 5 Division History, op.cit., 2005, Chapter 2 the commander of the 5th VC Division was Trn Minh Tm. 218 An official listing of the 39 NVA/VC campaigns in the South during the War does not include a discrete nh a Campaign, but does include a ong Kh nh Campaign 5 May 20 June 1969 involving the 5th VC Division but not specifically the 33rd NVA Regiment. Further, the 33rd Regiment is not mentioned in a publication that relates the Long Khnh Campaign and lists the participating forces as:

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In May 1969, the 33rd Regiments 1st Battalion received a significant number of reinforcements (two companies) from Infiltration Group 2089 (previously the 407th Battalion of the 5th Regiment of 320B NVA Division). A week later, the 33rd Regiment reportedly attacked US and ARVN armoured vehicles to destroy armour at Tn Lp (YT 390079 near the railway line, about seven kilometres west of Xun Lc Town) in Long Khnh Province.219 During the first phase of the Summer-Autumn Campaign (to 25 May 1969), the rd 33 Regiment was hit by a B-52 strike. In mid-May, Australian signals intelligence reportedly had detected the 33rd NVA Regiment in the H t Dch region moving toward Phc Tuy Province and in response American B-52s heavily bombed the suspect area.220 From 25 May, in the second phase of the Campaign, the 5th Division forces began attacks against elements of the 18th Division in the Gia Ray-La Ng-nh Qun area of eastern Long Khnh Province (see map at Appendix 20) with the 5th Regiment and the 33rd Regiment to destroy the 52nd Regiment at Khe Giao-Sui M.221 According to the 5th Division History (2005): On 2 June, The 33rd Regiment was ordered to secretly deploy to the northeast of Gia Ray ((YT 6311)) and attack the forces of the 52nd Task Force [sic] at Sui Cao and afterwards, to ambush the enemys reinforcements to the west of Route 3 ((ie Route 333)). On 5 June, we began the attack The 33rd Regiment swiftly made a forced march and attacked its objective on time as planned. On 6 June, the 33rd Regiment ambushed and destroyed an engineer company patrolling along Route 3. ((Route 333)) The 33rd Regiment conducted a blocking
COSVNs 5th Main Force Division, the 29th Infantry Regiment, and the 1st Company of the 24th attalion. That Campaign reportedly resulted in removing more than a thousand enemy from the battlefield, destroying 47 artillery pieces, 216 military vehicles (including 32 armoured vehicles), 79 aircraft, and the seizure of 113 weapons of various types. 60 Nm Qun i nhn dn Vit Nam anh hng (hi v p), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia (National Political Publishing House), H Ni, 2004 (revised 2007), Question 206; and Phm Vnh Phc, Colonel (ed et al), Operations in the US Resistance War, NXB Th Gii, H Ni, 2009, pp.87-90 (ie an English translation of: B Quc phng - Vin Lch s Qun s Vit Nam (Vietnam Military History Institute Department of Defence), Tm tt cc chin dch trong khng chin chng M cu nc (Summary of the Campaigns in the Anti-American War of National Salvation, (1954 - 1975), NX QND (Peoples Army Publishing House), 2003. That latter publication relates that the Long Khnh Campaign was directed by Nguyn Thanh i m, the chief of the 5th Division. However, Trn Minh Tm was the 5th VC Divisions commander from November 1967 (acting) until replaced by Nguyn Vn/Huy in in July 1969 5th Division History, op,cit., 2005. Nguyn Thanh i m was possibly an aka of Phan Lim the 33rd Regiments political commissar who reportedly moved to the Headquarters of the Division in 1969 (see footnotes 145 and 207). 219 According to a POW, seven US and ARVN APCs were damaged; six VC were killed and 10 or more wounded. Epagniol, J. . Major, Interrogation Report, Det 1 Div Int Unit, Ni t, 19 June 1969. Those killed may have included Lieutenant Bi Thanh Kh (section 2ic [ sic] in 1/33rd Regiment b. 1950, Hi Hng) and Phm Vn Thi (platoon commander in 1/33rd Regiment b. 1942, Hi Hng) both killed on 27 May 1969 (based on official death certificates), see MARIN website 2 May 2012: http://www.nhantimdongdoi.org/?mod=chitiet&subcate=3&id=3767. Also II FFV PERINTREP 21-69. 220 Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.205 and Endnote 27 at p.923: citing Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) P.F. de Cure Interview, pp.17-18, 50-51, 11 February 1994. However, see also footnotes 236 and 364 for further comment on claims of the 33rd Regiment in the H t Dch. 221 The 5th Division History, op.cit., 2005, Chapter 2.

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operation and attacked, destroying 11 armoured vehicles and inflicting heavy casualties on two enemy companies. However, that 5th Division History (2005) account makes no mention at all of the 33rd Regiments operations in Phc Tuy Province in June 1969 and this seeming anomaly is addressed in the following paragraphs.222 Further, an official government summary indicates that combat activity in Phc Tuy was not part of the Long Khnh Campaign.223 In mid-late 1969, the 33rd Regiment appears not to have been subordinate to the 5th VC Division but operating as a direct command unit of Military Region 7 or COSVN.224

Reconnaissance: C-20 Company, 33rd NVA Regiment

222

See the following Discussion section. This seeming major omission - or contradiction, is also raised in Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story of the Australian War, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2012, p.447. 223 As noted above, The Campaign involved COSVNs 5th Main Force Infantry Division, the 29th Infantry Regiment, and the 1st Company of the 24th attalion. It was waged on the terrain of Tc Trng, nh Qun, Gia Lai, and Long Khnh Town and commanded by Headquarters COSVN. It was a campaign to attack and destroy the enemys accelerated pacification programme, to further defeat the search and hold tactics of the enemys Vietnamization of the War scheme. The results were: 7,153 enemy killed, 12 captured and we destroyed 47 artillery pieces (105-155mm), six 81mm mortars, nine heavy machine guns, 216 vehicles (including 32 armoured vehicles), 79 aircraft, and 60 armouries; and seized 113 weapons of various types. - Vietnam: Historical Events (1967-1969) see:http://www.thanglonghanoi.gov.vn/channel/21/2009/12/4187/#RRWLQPbdhxEn . 224 See footnote 398 in late July 1969, a letter from Military Region 7 Headquarters indicated that - for the Autumn-Spring Campaign of 1969, the 33rd Regiment was directly subordinate to a higher headquarters probably COSVN, and was only designated to cooperate with Military Regiion 7 in certain operational campaigns. CDEC Log 10-1611-69.

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The June 1969 Country-wide High Points Campaign On 20 May 1969, the planned meeting on Midway Island scheduled for 10 June between the US President Nixon and South Vietnamese President Thiu was announced in the American press.225 With the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) also scheduled for early June226, the communist leadership planned a period of high point attacks across the South from early to mid-June 1969 to emphasize the enemys ((NVA/VCs)) continuing capability to conduct offensive action.227 This required adjustments to - and an intensification of, the ongoing operations of the Summer-Autumn Campaign and ong Khnh Campaign launched in the first week of May 1969.228 To direct the high point offensive activity in their B Ra-Long Khnh Province, Military Region 7 established a Campaign Headquarters.229
225 226

Nixon to Seek Joint Policy with Thieu in Midway Talk, New York Times, Washington, 20 May 1969. The PRGs founding conference was held in the period 6 -8 June, with the PRGs formation formally announced on 10 June 1969 for background analysis , including photographs, see USOM, The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, Viet-Nam: Documents and Research Notes, Saigon, January 1972, VCAT Item No.2310913001. 227 COMUSMACV. Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 30 June 1969), MACJ3-051, Saigon, 20 August 1969, p.15. 1ATF reported On the evening of 5/6 June, the enemy opened the June action period throughout the III CTZ with attacks which were probably stated to emphasise the enemys continuing capabilities to conduct offensive action throughout South Vietnam, for the benefit of the Presidential meeting at MIDWAY. 1ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No. 22-69 (period 1st to 6th June 1969), Ni t. Sources indicated that the 5 -9 June highpoint was regarded as the second most significant offensive period of the Summer Campaign, as it was planned to coincide with the Midway Conference between Presidents Nixon and Thieu on 8 June. - see 25th Infantry Division, Operational Report Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31 July 1969, 18 December 1969 VCAT Item No.168300010477. On 18 June, Brigadier General W.E. Potts (J2 Intelligence, MACV) - briefed VIP visitors to MACV The enemy plans a three-month spring-summer offensive, May-July, with at least one high point, a brief surge of enemy activity, per month. The first occurred on the night of 11 -12 May 1969. The second was on the night of 5-6 June 1969. Attacks by fire continue to be the enemys primary method of attack This 5-6 June high point reveals to us the enemys declining effectiveness on the battlefield. Sorley, ., Vietnam Chronicles The Abrams Tapes , op.cit., 2004, p.211. 228 A US Headquarters IIFFV report later summarized that A Sum mer Offensive was launched by the enemy on 5 May, with highpoints consisting primarily of attacks by fire occurring twice during the months of May and June and once during July. Losses inflicted on the enemy during June 1969 were the highest since May 1968. II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report Lessons Learned, Period ending 31 July 1969, 17 December 1969, p.19. 229 The Campaign Headquarters is mentioned four times in the D440 History (2011) - ng y B Ch Huy Qun S Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu, ch S Tiu on 440 Anh Hng - B Ra-Long Khnh (19671979), op.cit., 2011, pp.90-92. A 33rd Regiment account also notes that the Campaign Headquarters directed the 33rd NVA Regiment to assume the major occupation task at Bnh Ba - see L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011 see Appendix 3. A Party History while not specifically mentioning a Campaign, related The Military Committee of COSVNs Headquarters directed the 33rd COSVN Main Force Regiment to coordinate with the Provinces D440 (ie 2nd attalion) and the Chu c District troops to counter-attack on Route 2. Trn Vn Kh nh (et al), an Ra-Vng Tu, ch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu, Tp II, 19541975, op.cit., 2000, (Chapter VIII). The Campaign Headquarters is not specifically titled, but it was probably an element from Headquarters Military Region 7 (although it is not mentioned in the Military Region 7 History). As mentioned, an official listing of the 39 NVA/VC campaigns in the South during

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Within Phc Tuy Province (the southern half of the VCs B Ra-Long Khnh Province), a major attack was planned against the village of Bnh Ba230 and the ambush of any 1ATF relief force, with lesser attacks on both Ha Long231 and Hi M villages. 33rd Regiment Activities May 1969 According to US technical intelligence sources, in early May 1969 the 33rd Regiment232 moved from a base just west of the My To Mountains (vicinity YS 6893) to a location (vicinity YT 3805) about nine kilometres south-west of Xun Lc Town where it remained until about 22 May.233 According to a rallier, on 17 May 1969, at about that location (11 kilometres south-west of Xun Lc YT 387020), two battalions of the 33rd Regiment were hit by a B-52 strike and suffered heavy casualties.234 On 18 May
the War does not include a discrete nh a Campaign but does include a ong Kh nh Campaign 5 May 20 June 1969 - see: Phm Vnh Phc (ed - et al), Operations , op.cit, 2009, pp.87 -90. 230 The village of Bnh a (including the hamlets of c M and c Trung, but not including Sui Ngh) with a total population of about 1,300, was centred at YS 449740 on the western side of Route 2, about 6.5 kilometres north of the 1ATF base at Ni t. The village included a large number of masonry and brick houses with tiled roofs, and many of villagers worked in the surrounding rubber plantations and in the rubber processing facility in c Trung hamlet (YS 454748 population 500) on the northern edge of the village. c Trung was a factory village centred on the installations of the Gallia rubber enterprise. The hamlet of c M (YS 445730) - a few hundred metres south of Bnh Ba, had a population of about 350. Sui Ngh (YS 430715) was a resettlement village with a population of 1,040. See also footnote 246. 231 The D440 History (2011) combines the engagements at Bnh Ba and Ha Long as one battle ie In this battle, only our thrust against the enemy in the area of p Bc hamlet (Ha Long) achieved a success close to complete. Chamberlain, E.P., D440 , op.cit., 2012, p.68. 232 y May 1969, Ma Vn Minh had probably been re -assigned to the Military Region and may have been replaced as the 33rd Regiment Commander by Nguyn Vn Thng CDEC Log 10-1962-69, and inh Vn t was the Regiments political commissar with H Minh/S Tng as an assistant political officer. However, one 33rd Regiment History indicates that Hong Cao H replaced Ma Vn Minh as the Regiment Commander in 1969 - Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57) ), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010 (Appendix 2), see footnote 276. The authors discussions in 2012 and 2013 with 33 rd Regiment veterans also indicates that Hong Cao H was the 33rd Regiment Commander in June 1969 see footnotes 276, 466, and 472. 233 The 33rd NVA Regiment was also reportedly identified south-west of Xun Lc Town on 11 May 1969 when US forces contacted 33rd Regiment elements at YS 401993, 11 kilometres south-southwest of Xun Lc resulting in 18 NVA/VC killed, one PW, and ten individual weapons recovered. - 1ATF, Vietnam Digest No.19-69, 10-17 May 1969, Ni t. 234 Earlier, in the period 8-11 May 1969 - following an engagement with the 43rd ARVN Regiment about 18km north of Xun Lc Town (YT 475275) which was supported by B-52 strikes, a total of 221 enemy bodies (unit not reported) were found, some in mass graves 1ATF, Vietnam Digest No.18-69, Ni t, 410 May 1969. According to the rallier noted above a local force guerrilla present in the area of the airstrike, the 33rd Regiment suffered 50 to 70 killed and 20 bunkers were destroyed - 1ATF, Vietnam Digest No.19-69, Ni t,10-17 May 1969. Collateral information confirmed a B-52 strike in that area at that time. As noted earlier, according to the official Australian history In mid -May, signals intelligence had detected 33 NVA Regiment in the H t Dch [sic] region moving towards Phc Tuy province. In response, American B-52s heavily bombed the suspect area and SAS patrols subsequently sighted enemy carrying away their wounded. Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.205 and Endnote 27 at p.923: citing Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) P.F. de Cure Interview, pp.17-18, 50-51,11 February 1994. However, this is not quite correct as signals intelligence (SIGINT) records indicate that the Headquarters

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1969, well-coordinated attacks on Xun Lc by the 5th VC Division - and on An Lc (YT 3909) and Tn Lp (YT 4103) by the 33rd Regiment were reported by the 11th US Armored Cavalry Regiment (11ACR).235 During the period 20-25 May, the 33rd Regiment moved about 40 kilometres from south-west of Xun Lc Town eastward to a position (vicinity YT 7506) about 30 kilometres east of the Town. On 24 May 1969, 11ACR engaged elements of 33rd NVA Regiment at YT 325024 - 12 kilometres north-west of Blackhorse (ie the major 11ACR base at YS 4396), resulting in 15 enemy KIA236 ; and the 11ACR reportedly contacted K9 attalion of the 33rd Regiment between 28 May and 2 June east of lackhorse base camp.237 In the last week of May 1969, 1ATF reported that the 33rd Regiment was located south of Xun Lc (YS 569988), with a strength 1,130.238 Summarising the end of May and the 1st of June, 1ATF noted that A large number of Main Force troops that moved through the area from west to east during the period is [sic] believed to be from 33rd NVA Regiment which has partially relocated from south-west of Xun Lc (YT 4408) to

of the 33rd Regiment moved from south-east of Xun Lc in early May to the area YT 3805 (about seven kilometres south-west of Xun Lc) in mid-May 1969 ie moving away from Phc Tuy, but in the general area of the reported B-52 strike. On 25 May, the Regiment was located 30 kilometres east of Xun Lc. For SIGINT-derived locations of the 33rd Regiments movements from late May to early July 1969, see the following map (footnote 364), Appendix 17, and footnotes 240-245. For earlier reporting on B-52 strikes in the Central Highlands in 1965 - and a published eye-witness account, see footnote 74. 235 11ACR, Quarterly Evaluation Report, 24 July 196 9. VCAT Item No.3400112001 After these attacks ((by the 5th VC Division on Xun Lc and the 33rd Regiment on An Lc and Tn Lp on 18 May 1969)), the enemy retreated to War Zone D and the jungle areas east of the Blackhorse base, respectively. The 11 th ACR contacted K9 Battalion of 33 Regiment between 28 May and 2 June east of the Blackhorse base camp. Subsequently captured medical records indicated that the 1 st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment had attacked the 411th Regional Forces Company at Tn Lp (YT 3908) on 18 May 1969 - 1ATF, INTSUM No.160-69, Ni t, 9 June 1969. 236 1ATF Vietnam Digest No.20-69, 17-24 May 1969, Ni t. Two 12.7mm heavy machine guns and two 82mm mortars were also captured - 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operational Report for Period Ending 31 July 1969, 18 August 1969 - http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/506335.pdf . 237 According to 11ACR 11ACR operations east of lackhorse between 28 May and 7 June forced elements of the 33rd Regiment from that area, easing pressure on Xun Lc. - 11ACR, Quarterly Evaluation Report, 24 July 1969. On 28 May, 18 NVA/VC of the 33 rd Regiment were reportedly killed at YT 560013; and on 29 May, 20 NVA/VC of 33 rd Regiments D9 (ie 3rd Battalion) were killed at YS 569988. 11ACR reporting summarised that in a 23-day coordinated operation with 18th ARVN Division from 15 May 1969 in the lackhorse Tactical Area of Operational Interest (TAOI), contacts with the 33 rd NVA Regiment resulted in 124 NVA/VC KIA. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operational Report for Period Ending 31 July 1969, 18 August 1969 see the preceding footnote. As noted earlier, a H Ni-based NGO has recorded Lieutenant Bi Thanh Kh (section 2ic [sic] in 1/33rd Regiment b. 1950, Hi Hng) and Phm Vn Thi (platoon commander in 1/33rd Regiment b. 1942, Hi Hng) as killed on 27 May 1969, see MARIN website 2 May 2012 : http://www.nhantimdongdoi.org/?mod=chitiet&subcate=3&id=3767 . 238 1ATF, Vietnam Digest No.21-69, 24-31 May 1969. South of Xun c appears to be in error as the cited grid reference is about 16 kilometres south-east of Xun Lc Town. This is an unusual assessment as the Headquarters of the 33rd Regiment had been fixed by technical intelligence ie signals intelligence,on 25 May 1969 in the vicinity of YT 7508 about 30 kilometres east of Xun L c Town.

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northwest of Base Area 302.239 Conclusions: The Main Force units to the north of the Province will probably utilize the next week for rest, recuperation and refit activities, while continuing to avoid 1ATF and 11ACR operations. 33rd Regiment is expected to continue to attempt to move the balance of its forces east of Route 2 into southern Long Khnh Province.240 33rd Regiment Moves Towards Bnh Ba Signals Intelligence On 25 May 1969, the headquarters of the 33rd NVA Regiment was located by signals intelligence in south-eastern Long Khnh Province - about 16 kilometres north of the My To Mountains at YS 7508.241 Through its tactical signals intelligence unit 547
239

ase Area 302 was located in eastern Phc Tuy Province north of Xuyn Mc Town. Its camps were principally around the 96 Feature (YS 6578) and the logistics focal point was north and east of the abandoned village of Tha Tch (YS 6181). 240 1ATF, Enemy Situation in Phc Tuy Province: 232400H May-012400H June 1969, 3 June 1969. When completing this report, the 1ATF intelligence staff would have received the first signals intelligence (SIGINT) indications that the 33rd Regiment was beginning to move south-east towards Phc Tuy Province. 241 At 1ATF, 547 Signal Troop a dedicated SIGINT unit, intercepted NVA/VC communications and, through airborne direction finding, was able to determine the location of NVA/VC radio transmitters. The Troop was located adjacent to Headquarters 1ATF in the Ni t base with direct reporting access to the 1ATF Commander and his principal operational and intelligence staffs. 33 rd Regiments radio communications to higher headquarters and to its subordinate units were principally in morse code (HF band) and used the Chinese 102E 15-watt radio (range 2-12 MHz) and sometimes the US-manufactured AN/GRC-9 (2-12 Mhz, 1-15 watt). The communications traffic was encrypted mostly in a code of four or five short-figure groups - Hampstead, ., 547 Signals Troop in Vietnam The Soldiers Perspective s Deployment, Early Days and the Lead-up to Long Tan, Toowoomba, July 2008. Their communications security was reportedly impeccable without any operator chatter, and used a one -time pad (OTP) system that was unsolvable Richards, T.J. Brigadier (Retd), email to author, 1 May 2012. However, when combat was imminent, the Regiments cypher clerks were reportedly sometimes withdrawn and lesser/simpler security codes used but these were still quite complex. In combat, units would often use lower-powered VHF FM radios - including captured equipment, for voice communications with subordinate elements which were less liable to interception. For equipment, procedures and techniques, see the 9th VC Division 1966 annual communications report at CDEC Log 03-2865-67, VCAT Item No.F034601031499; and a report on the 23 rd Regiment at VCAT Item No.11271007002. While the content of the 33rd Regiments HF radio communications could not normally be decrypted, the sites of transmitters could be accurately fixed by airborne and ground-based radio direction-finding operations. Reportedly, if coding material had not been delivered from COSVN, it was not uncommon for NVA/VC units to employ lower-grade ciphers for extended periods manna from heaven for the SIGINT unit at Ni t. Authors discussions with 547 Signal Troop veterans, 2011 -2013. Although messages could not be decrypted, intelligence could be gleaned from the externals of messages and other factors. Aware of Allied intercept operations, for security NVA/VC units relied principally on couriers - ie rather than radio communications, whenever possible. Since 1965, COSVN had warned formations and units to ensure radio transmitters were remoted or displaced several kilometres from the location of their h eadquarters. 9th VC Division reported that in 1966 one transmitter site had been struck five times by B-52 raids. Additional to their Chinese short-range man-pack radios (the 71B and the later K-63 range 25 kilometres), NVA/VC forces commonly used captured radio equipment for voice communications, principally the US AN/PRC-10 and its replacement, the more capable AN/PRC-25. The VHF FM PRC-25 had a range of up to eight kilometres (using the short steel-tape aerial) and up to about 17 kilometres (using the long whip aerial).

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Signal Troop, 1ATF followed the deployment of the 33rd Regiment headquarters as it moved south-west from Long Khnh Province towards Bnh Ba village in Phc Tuy Province242 - as indicated on the following map.

Movement of the 33rd Regiment and D440 Battalion towards Bnh Ba243

242

According to the Australian Official History (ie Fighting to the Finish, 2012) in a section titled The enemy mystery, that History states there seemed to be no rationale for their ((the enemy)) actions. Australian commanders and intelligence officers were baffled. During the initial occupation of Bnh Ba, 33 NVA Regiment had apparently maintained radio silence, eluding task force signals intelligence. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.237. This statement appears to cite a 2007 monograph that claimed strict radio silence enabled elements of the 33 rd NVA Regiment and D440 attalion to occupy the village of nh a without warning. - Tidey, B., Forewarned Forearmed: Australian Specialist Intelligence Support in South Vietnam 1966-1971, Canberra Papers on Strategic and Defence No.160, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, December 2007, pp.49-50. However, this is not correct as 547 Signal Troop intercepted the 33rd NVA Regiments active communications throughout May and June 1969 as the Regiment approached nh a see Chamberlain, E. rigadier (Retd), The attle of nh a a baffling mystery and SIGINT failure No!, The ridges Review, Issue 1, Ca nungra, January 2013, pp.91-92 Appendix 11. 243 The move of Chu c Districts C-41 Company to attack Ha Long on 7 June is also indicated. These deployments are also related at Appendix 11; and in Chamberlain, E.P., D440 , 2013, pp.62 -68.

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A 547 Signal Troop analyst/linguist has related244: On 30 May 1969, the 33rd NVA Regiment was located by airborne directionfinding equipment just inside Phc Tuy Province to the northwest [sic] of Xuyn Mc. On 1 June 1969, 33rd Regiment was detected in cipher communications with VC Military Region 7 and fixed just to the west of the Sng Ray ((River)), but north of Xuyn Mc. The real drama occurred on 3 June when we were able to brief the Task Force Commander and the GSO2 Intelligence that HQ 33rd NVA Regiment had crossed the Sng Ray ((River)) and was located to the north of 1ATF.245 On 4 June, 547 Signal Troop was able to locate both the HQ of 33rd NVA Regiment and its 1st Battalion at different locations north-west of the pro-Vit Cng hamlet of c Trung ((YS 453748)).246 We were unable to get the other two battalions of 33rd NVA Regiment by direction-finding because, although they were receiving traffic, they did not send any.

33rd Regiment troops crossing the Sng Ray River

244

The above comments were made in writing to the author in mid-March 2012 by a knowledgeable former 547 Signal Troop analyst/linguist who had served in the Troop throughout June 1969. 245 A 547 Signal Troop analyst also recounted reporting to the senior 1ATF intelligence officer and his staff that 33 NVA Regiment had crossed the Song Rai [sic] - Johnson, ., Operation avarack Phc Tuy Province,Vietnam 1969, op.cit., 2010, p.94. 246 The village of nh a on Route 2 was situated in the southern part of c Thnh District. In 1969, the village comprised three hamlets nh a (located centrally), c M (to the south) and c Trung (to the north). Although the Districts population was 52% Catholic, nh a village was 90% uddhist. cTrung was the site of the French-owned Gallia rubber plantations processing factory. See also footnote 230.

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On 5 June, the morning airborne direction-finding mission fixed the radio transmitter of the Headquarters of the 33rd NVA Regiment near c Trung. All of this was briefed immediately to the Task Force Commander by the 547 Signal Troop operations staff. Throughout late May to mid-June 1969, the radio transmitters of the VCs 274 Main Force Regiment247 a formation of the 5th VC Division formation, had been fixed by signals intelligence in their normal operating area far to the north-west just outside Phc Tuy Province in south-western Long Khnh Province and south-eastern Bin Ha Province, and 274 Regiments communications traffic did not indicate that it was preparing for combat.248 The Plan: Disrupted by Australian Commandos - and Changed As described in the D440 Battalion History (2011), in late May 1969 D440 was in the Xuyn Mc area and had been tasked to interdict Route 23 particularly in the area of the major bridge at Cu Trng (YS 599637). However, it was ordered by the Campaign Headquarters to abandon that task and move swiftly to the north-west to occupy Bnh Ba village and to prepare for the battle to be launched in coordination with the 33rd Regiment.249 epice

247

In early June 1969, USMACV reported 274 VC Regiment in the Hc Dch/Bnh Sn area in southeastern Bin Ha Province in the vicinity of YS 3583, with a strength of 900. However a 1ATF intelligence summary reported that sensors have detected a movement south of the 274 th VC Regiment to the northern and western borders of the Province Enemy Situation in Phc Tuy Province: 1-8 June 1969, Ni t, 10 June 1969. 6RAR/NZ had also reportedly contacted elements of the 274 th Regiment north of Bnh Ba in early June during Operation Lavarack - Johnson, ., Operation avarack Phc Tuy Province Vietnam 1969, op.cit., 2010. Throughout early June 1969, SIGINT had fixed the 274th Regiment in the far south-western corner of Long Khnh Province in the vicinity of YS 3390. However, 6RAR/NZ engaged a large group of 274th Regiment on a resupply mission eastward to the 84th Rear Service Group on 5 June 1969 near the Long Kh nh/Phc Tuy border (YS 473889). In his 2006 memoir, the commanding officer of the 274th Regiment in June 1969 Nguyn Nam Hng (Nguyn Vn Trnh) makes no mention of that Regiments activities in early June 1969 but notes that he was hospitalized for an apendectomy operation in May 1969. - Nguyn Nam Hng - Major General, Mt i Chinh Chin (A Life at War), Nh Xut bn Chnh tr Quc gia, H Ni, 2006. 248 On the basis of signals intelligence, 547 Signal Troop advised the 1ATF commander and securitycleared staff officers that 274 Regt transmitters remained in their normal locations, and traffic did not indicate it was preparing for combat. Due to the early warning time provided by the Troop, the Commander 1ATF had several days to prepare and deploy his Ready Reaction Force to any location that the 33rd might attack. - Hartley, R.W. & Hampstead, B. V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop in South Vietnam 1966-1972, Googong, 2014, p.181. Several years earlier on 18 August 1966 during the Battle of Long Tn, 547 Signal Troop had similarly advised the Task Force commander that 274 VC Regiment was inactive - emails to the author from Brigadier (Retired) T. J. Richards OC 547 Sig Tp (1966-67), 24 April 2012, 1 May 2012 (274 Regiment They appeared to be on R&R), and 12 July 2013. 249 D440 sent a reconnaissance element northward up Route 328 in company with a B Long Province group, that was ambushed by Australian forces on 29 May 1969 at Tha Tch village (YS 6180 referred to by communist elements as Bu Lm). The following day, D440s second-in-command Ba Kim, was killed by Australian forces a few kilometres farther south at YS 612725. Soon after, 440 Battalion deployed

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Describing the action in the Bnh Ba area, a 33rd Regiment monograph related that: according to the initial attack plan, 440 Battalion was to attack and seize the objectives in the strategic hamlet at Bnh Ba including the post of the 664 Regional Forces Company250, the police post, the office of the Pheonix251 quisling spies and the
northwards towards Bnh Ba, and on 3 June 1969, crossed to the west of Route 2 to its Tre ase Area (near Chu Lc hamlet of X ang village). 250 The Regional Forces (RF) were termed the Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force ( Bo An) until 1964 when they were retitled Regional Forces (a Phng Qun) and were transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defence together with the Dn V (Self-Defence Corps) which became the Popular Force (PF - Ngha Qun ). Both the RF and the lesser-capable PF collectively termed Territorial Forces, were armed and uniformed. Throughout the War and post-War, some Vietnamese communist writings continued to refer to the Regional Forces as Bo An. At the end of 1966, there were 17 Regional Force (RF) companies and 46 Popular Force (PF) platoons in Phc Tuy Province (totaling 4,500 troops) together with an understrength ARVN battalion (1/43/10 th Division) ie later retitled the 18th Division McNeill, I., To Long Tan, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1993, p.403. The locations of all ARVN including RF and PF elements, in Phc Tuy Province as at 30 November 1966 are recorded in the 1ATF report on ARVN, RF and PF Dispositions in Phc Tuy Sector, R92-1-2, Ni t, 31 December 1966 see AWM95, 1/4/20, folio 40. In mid-1967, the national strength of the RF was 253,664 and the PF 186,365 with ARVN regular strength at 455,481. The 302 nd Regional Force Battalion was formed in early 1971 and based at The Horseshoe feature from June 1971 for the larger Regional Forces Group (Lin on), see also footnote 488. For detail on the RF, PF and PSDF see Ng Quang Trng - Lieutenant General, Territorial Forces, Indochina Monographs, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C., 1981. There was no 664 Regional Force (RF) Company in the nh a area. 655 RF Company strength 106, was located in c Trung hamlet (YS 446747 - the northern hamlet of Bnh Ba village); and 626 RF Company strength 98, was located at Sui Ngh (YS 434716) about two kilometres south of Bnh Ba village. 251 The Pheonix (Phng Hong) programme see USMACV, Phung Hoang Advisor Handbook, Saigon, 20 November 1970, was targeted against the communists political infrastructure - ie termed the Vit Cng Infrastructure (VCI). The VCI h tng c s, was the covert political and administrative organisation that led the resistance movement ie distinct from armed units. It included government, Party and Front members as well as lower-level functionaries. The VCI provided military elements with funds, food, recruits, intelligence, refuge and guides. Politically, it prepared for an eventual assumption of power with an organisation to replace the government of the Republic of Vietnam. VCI were defined by South Vietnamese Presidential Decree Law 280-a/TT/SL of 20 December 1967. See also the preceding US ICEX programme: MACV Directive 381-41, 9 July 1967 (VCAT Item No.2234306060); and United States Mission in Vietnam, The Viet Cong Infrastructure, Saigon, June 1970. The VCI were monitored by the Special Collection Plan Against the Viet Cong Infrastructure and Guerrilla Forces: Nickname - BIG MACK, see MACV instruction MACJ212-2 dated 27 August 1970 VCAT Item No. 2121015002. In October 1967, the MACV J-2 Order of attle Summary removed the political category (39,175 in May 19 67) from their enemy military threat assessements and established a separate VCI category assessed as 84,000 country-wide in October 1967 (ie to include the previous Self -Defense and Secret Self-Defense categories - as these were by definition, home -guards and low-level fifth-columnists not a fighting force and are not considered a military threat MACV J-2 Monthly Order of Battle Summary, Saigon, 31 October 1967 VCAT Item No.250011006. As at 31 January 1969, MACV estimated VCI strength countrywide as 83,000 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Study Improving South Vietnams Internal Security Scene, Washington, 5 May 1970 - VCAT Item No.2121516002. On 23 January 1971, COMUSMACV was briefed that Nationally, there are 3.4 VCI per 1,000 SVN population. - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles The Abrams Tapes , op.cit., 2004, p.524. Subsequently, the MACV Summary of VCI Activities: 3-72, 9 June 1972, reported 63,295 VCI countrywide as at 15 November 1971 - VCAT Item No.F015800190914. The Summary included 830 VCI in Phc Tuy Province. For Phc Tuy Province

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defensive positions of the Peoples Self-Defence Force (PSDF)252 a company had the task to remain, hold on, and lure the enemy forces at the Long L and c Thnh SubSectors and the Australians at Ni t to come their aid and thus create the conditions for the 33rd Regiment to conduct an ambush battle from the Sng Cu hamlet [sic] up to c M hamlet. The remainder of 440 Battalion would attack the enemy in the area adjacent to Bnh Ba village.253 The Chu c local forces would have the responsibility for coordinated attacks in the area of p Bc hamlet of Ha Long Village.254 The Campaign Headquarters chose 440 Battalion principally because the cadre and soldiers of the Battalion were proficient, familiar with the terrain - and the tactic of attacking a post and destroying reinforcements was 440 attalions fort.255 However, according to the D440 Battalion History (2011) and 33rd Regiment Histories256, at dawn on 4 June, D440 was surprised by an Australian commando company that swept into D440s camp west of Route 2.257 Consequently, the Campaign Headquarters adjusted the plans for the force to attack Bnh Ba. This now involved an element of the 1st Battalion258 of the 33rd
see also 1ATFs anti-VCI Acorn operations, in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.35-39. 252 The Si Gn Governments Peoples Self-Defence Force (PSDF - Nhn Dn T V - often termed Phng V Dn S by the communist side) was established in July 1968 after the mid-year General Mobilisation (ie post-Tt 1968). Deployed in platoons in the villages and hamlets, the PSDF encompassed males aged 16-17 and 39-50 years. See the PSDF Handbook 1969, VCAT Item No.14040111001. 253 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.8 see Appendix 3. The passage in the D440 History (2011) at pp.90-91 is almost identical. The Sng Cu stream crosses Route 2 at the bridge at YS 437692 about 100 metres north of the abandoned p An Ph hamlet on the northern edge of the 1ATF base at Ni t. c M hamlet population 350, is to the north of the Sng Cu, on Route 2 at YS 445736. The distance between the Sng Cu ridge and c M hamlet is about 3.5 kilometres. 254 D440 History (2011), p.90. This sentence does not appear in L L ch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011 see Appendix 3. For the attack on Ha Long, see also footnotes 261, 320, and 323 for the account in the Chu c History (2004). 255 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, pp.8-9 see Appendix 3; the passage in the D440 History (2011), pp.90-91 is identical. 256 This event is also noted by 33rd Regiment historians in Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010, p.9 see Appendix 2 before commencing the operation, D440 had to fight against an enemy sweep into their base area, so the 33 rd Regiment assigned its 1st Battalion to replace D440 in that urgent situation.; and in ch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.9 see Appendix 3. 257 1ATFs 6RAR/NZ (Operation avarack) engaged several groups of enemy east of Rout e 2 and west and north-west of X Bang village (ie in the vicinity of D440s Tre ase Area YS 4285) in the period 31 May-5 June 1969 see 6RAR/NZ War Diary, AWM95, 7/6/22. Commandos literally bit kch, is a term used in several Vietnamese communist military histories to describe regular Australian infantry troops in small-scale operations ie as well as Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) troops (who were also reportedly called ma rng phantoms/ghosts of the jungle). 258 The 1st Battalion cover designator Vnh Ph, was also known as the 7 th Battalion and J7. Its subordinate companies also used the prefix V as a cover designator CDEC Log 09-1659-69. According to captured documents, its executive officer (2ic) in August 1969 following the Battle of Bnh Ba, was Senior ieutenant i c Nht (from 24 April 1969). According to a 1 st Battalion operations cadre Trn Vn Hp, the 1st attalions strength on 2 September 1969 (ie post- nh a) was 326 - and armed with: 103 AK-47s, 44 CKCs, nine light machine guns, two heavy machine guns, 11 B-40s, five B-41s, three

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Regiment led by Battalion commander Comrade Triu Kim Sn259, being given the task of attacking the post replacing 440 Battalion. However, because they had to repel the attack that came out of the blue, the Campaign Headquarters changed the forces at the last minute. The 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment was given the task of attacking Bnh Ba while 440 Battalion replaced the 1st Battalion and was given the task of fighting the enemy at the reinforcement blocking position on Route 2 (the area adjacent to Bnh Ba), together with the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment commanded by Comrade Quch Thi Sn.260 The Chu c History (2004) similarly makes reference to a planned ambush: On 5 June 1969, the 33rd Regiment (a main force regional unit) and the Provinces 2nd Battalion (D440) Battalion, conducted an ambush west of Inter-Provincial Route 2 from c M hamlet to Bnh Ba village and despatched a company to the centre of Bnh Ba to attack the post of the 664th Regional Forces unit with the aim or luring the Australians to provide reinforcements - and for our elements to then ambush and destroy them.261

60mm mortars, and two 82mm mortars CDEC Log 09-1636-69. A report by Senior ieutenant i c Nht also noted that the 1st Battalion also held 21 K-54 pistols - CDEC Log 09-1649-69. 259 Triu Kim Sn subsequently commanded the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment during the engagement with 1ATFs 4RAR/NZ in late September 1971 at Ni Sao/Ni L in late September 1971 in northern Phc Tuy Province. In 1972-1977, he was the deputy commander of the 33rd Regiment - Qu Trnh Hnh Thnh Trung on 33, op.cit., 2010 see Appendix 2. In 2013, Triu Kim Sn was reportedly living in Vnh Ph Province in northern Vietnam. 260 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.9. This document and the presence of the 2 nd attalion under Qu ch Th i Sn, is also cited in Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story , op.cit., 2012, pp.446-447. A passage in the D440 History (2011), p.91 is identical to that in the aforementioned ch Di Tch document (see Appendix 3) - ie including reference to the 2nd Battalion task under Qu ch Th i Sn to set an ambush on Route 2. The presence of the 2nd attalion in central Phc Tuy is also noted in an article by a former Australian 6RAR/NZ officer ie the 2nd Battalion ((of 33rd NVA Regiment)) ((was)) to secure a base for their ((33rd Regiments)) safe withdrawal afterwards. - Johnson, ., Operation avarack Phc Tuy Province,Vietnam 1969, op.cit., 2010, p.94. The official Australian account of the attle of nh a is in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.203-240. However, that account does not specifically mention the involvement in the Battle of D440 Battalion in its main text (but see Appendix 1, p.859) - nor is there any mention at all of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment and a planned ambush by that unit on Route 2. For a reported post-engagement admonishment of Qu ch Th i Sn (the 2 nd Battallion commander) by higher authorities, see footnote 385. In the period 1970-1971, he was noted as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the 33rd Regiment - Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010 see Appendix 2. Quch Thi Sn (b.1946 in Thanh Ha Province) was killed on 27 May 1972 at Vit Cng hamlet, Chu c District. 261 Chu c History (2004), pp.173-174. That History also adds However, the Australians did not enter our ambush as planned, and our company in the hamlet suffered heavy casualties consequently tens of our cadre and soldiers were killed, and we were forced to withdraw our troops. At ong Sub-Sector, the Chu c District troops entered and occupied p Bc hamlet of Ha Long village and repelled eight counter-attacks by the puppet troops.

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The Early June 1969 High Point Begins Citing US assessments262, 1ATF reported: On the evening of 5/6 June, the enemy opened the June action period throughout the III CTZ with attacks which were probably staged to emphasise the enemys continuing capabilities to conduct offensive action throughout South Vietnam, for the benefit of the Presidential meeting at MIDWAY. During the week, there were 122 enemy-initiated attacks in III Corps compared to 87 in the preceding week. Of these, there were 33 significant mortar attacks and 27 rocket attacks compared to 15 and 12 respectively the previous week. Heaviest ground attacks occurred in Ty Ninh by 272 VC Regiment and 88 NVA Regiment.263 In the early hours of 5 June 1969, 1ATFs 6RAR/NZ clashed with 33rd Regiment rear service elements near the Phc Tuy/Long Kh nh border about one kilometre west of Route 2 (YS 442888) the Regiments first reported engagement with Australian forces in Phc Tuy Province in June 1969.264 Later that morning, about five kilometres farther south-west (YS 424844), 6RAR/NZ attacked a defended bunker complex occupied reportedly by elements of the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment and support elements however, the presence of the 1st Battalion was unconfirmed.265 A 33rd Regiment history monograph has related: At about 4pm on 5 June, 33rd Regiments combat forces left their base (in the present-day Hc Dch area266) and were
262

In June ((1969)), activity continued at a high level with a high point on the night of 5 June when 62 indirect fire attacks and three significant ground attacks were launched. This period of the summer campaign was probably staged for the benefit of the Presidential meeting at Midway on 8 June to emphasize the enemys continuing capability to conduct offensive action. COMUSMACV, Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969), MACJ3-051, 20 August 1969. 263 1ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No.22-69 (period 1st to 6th June 1969), Ni t. More specifically, HQ 1ATF concluded The occupation of nh a (YS 4474) by elements of 1 n 33 NV A Regt, the Bnh Ba Guerrillas and the nh a Village Committee was instigated as part of the current enemy high point. HQ 1ATF War Diary, Enemy Situation 1-8 June 1969, 10 June 1969, para 2.e. (AWM95, 1-4-156, folio G32). However, the VC Military Region 7 History (MR7 50 years) only notes COSVN Resolution 7/1969 directing four campaigns in the Spring 1969-Spring 1970 period ie no mention of a 1969 high point campaign see Military Region 7 Headquarters (Qun Khu 7), 50 Nm c ng V Trang Qun Khu 7 - The Armed Forces of Military Region 7: 50 Years, Wattpad, 1995. A COSVN Directive 81/88 apparently refined their Summer 1969 Campaign. For NVA/VC high point attacks in Ty Ninh Province in June 1969 see US 25th Infantry Division, Operational Report , op.cit., 18 December 1969 VCAT Item No.168300010477 On 6-7 June two nights of intensive engagements at FS Crook (XT 055595) with 88th NVA Regiment resulted in 407 NVA KIA ( C). 264 1ATF, INTSUM No.160-69, Ni t, 9 June 1969; Appendix 1 to Annex A, 6RAR After Action Report - Ops 14, 3 July 1969 AWM95, 7/6/22, p.14. Earlier, in late February 1969, Australian troops (4RAR) had clashed with the 33rd Regiment in Bin Ha Province see footnotes 195 and 196. 265 Johnson, ., Operation avarack Phc Tuy Province Vietnam 1969, op.cit., 2010, pp.94-95 cites the presence of the 1st attalion, but neither the 6RAR/NZ Contact and Incidents Summary Appendix 1 to Annex A, 6RAR After Action Report - Ops 14, 3 July 1969 (AWM95, 7/6/22) nor 1ATF intelligence reports identified the NVA/VC force involved. However, it is highly probable that 6RAR/NZ had engaged a D440 Battalion camp although the D440 accounts report the engagement as occuring on 4 June - see Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2013, p.62 including analysis at footnotes 148 and 149. 266 The Hc/Ht Dch area was defined by USMACV as the area bounded by coordinates YS 1790 YS 4690 YS 2572 and YS 4572, containing the jungle area south of the nh Sn Rubber Plantation and east of Route 15 to Route 2 with the Ni Th Vi Mountains on the south. In referring to the Hc Dch area,

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led through the jungle by liaison cadres to the battle area. After four hours, our troops reached their assembly area close to their objective on the Bnh Ba battlefield and awaited their orders to attack.267 According to a captured VC document a report by the commander of the C-195 Reconnaissance and Special Delivery Company of Military Region 7 Action commenced on the night of 5 June when Tay [sic]268 attempted to fire five rockets into the village. All misfired/failed to fire. C-195 then participated in the attack with the entire regiment.269 In Phc Tuy Province about 20 kilometres south-southeast of Bnh Ba village, at 0015hrs on 6 June, 25-30 82mm mortars rounds were fired into 9RARs Fire Support Base Thrust at YS 500550 near the Long Hi Mountains. This appeared to be in support of an attack by elements of the VC D445 Battalion on a Rural Development (RD)270
33rd Regiment historians were probably only referring to the area north-west of Bnh Ba village. As noted, the 33rd Regiment had moved south-west from ong Kh nh Province into Phc Tuy Province, crossed Route 2 and established an assembly area several kilometres north-west of Bnh Ba village. As noted above, in two engagements on the morning of 5 June, 6RAR/NZ (Operation Lavarack with its support base at FS Virginia located at YS 437801) engaged A57 (33 rd Regiment) elements near the Phc Tuy-Long Khnh border, resulting in a total of four enemy killed. Appendix 1 to Annex A, 6RAR After Action Report - Ops 14, 3 July 1969 AWM95, 7/6/22, see the preceding footnotes 264 and 265. That evening (1930hrs 5 June), D Company of 6RAR/NZ reportedly engaged a 30-strong element of the 33rd Regiment moving westward at YS 473889 (about a kilometre east of Route 2, and about a kilometre south of the Province border) six NVA soldiers were killed and two wounded soldiers were captured. 1ATF, INTSUM No.157/69, Ni t, 6 June 1969. However the NVA/VC force in that engagement was later identified as elements of the 274th VC Regiment Appendix 1 to Annex A, 6RAR/NZ After Action Report - Ops 14, 3 July 1969. 267 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.9 see Appendix 3. According to the Australian official history, the 1 st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment departed its Initial Assembly Area in the vicinity of YS 4076 at 3pm on 5 June and moved to a Forward Assembly Area in the vicinity of YS 425750, departing that Forward Assembly Area at 3am on 6 June Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, Map 7.3 (Top Probable Dispositions of 1 Battalion, 33 NVA Regiment, 5-7 June 1969), p.215. This information appears to have been inferred principally from Khan, C.N. - Lieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69 Operation Hammer, p An Ph, 11 June 1969 , Annex A Intelligence Summary (9 June 1969) AWM95, 7/5/27; Map 1 - Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, Trojan Press, Thomastown, 2009, p.347; and a recovered sketch map (1:25,000 scale) 1ATF, INTSUM No.160/69, Ni t, 9 June 1969, para 7. 268 Possibly the chief-of-staff of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment. 269 According to that document as reviewed in 1ATF INTSUM No.195/69, C-195 participated in the attack on Bnh Ba - together with the entire regiment (ie 33rd Regiment), and C -195 suffered 12 killed and 11 wounded at Bnh Ba. A few weeks after the Battle, the C-195 Company commander was killed by Australian forces (5RAR) on 25 June 1969 at YS 294712 1ATF, INTSUM No.195/69, Ni t, 14 July 1969. C-195 troops had earlier been killed on 1 June 1969 at YS 409887 about 15 kilometres north-west of Bnh Ba by Australian 6RAR/NZ elements 1ATF, INTSUM No.157/69, Ni t, 6 June 1969. C195s role may have included liaison tasks between the Campaign Headquarters and the attacking force. Australian forces later killed the commander (L m Vn Doi) of C-195 the Special Sapper Reconnaissance Company, on 21 November 1969 at YS 438868 together with the Military Region 7 Deputy Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Political Staff - 1ATF, INTSUM No.326/69, Ni t, 22 November 1969. 270 The Rural Development (RD) Cadre (Cn B Xy Dng Nng Thn) - earlier termed Revolutionary Development Cadre, had been established on 4 January 1966 in New ife hamlets to train village self -

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Cadre compound (YS 512544) and an ARVN outpost (of the 2nd Battalion/52nd Regiment) in the Hi M area. However, 1ATF Confidential-level reporting on the 33rd Regiment at the beginning of the High Point was somewhat unclear. At the end of the first week of June 1969, Headquarters 1ATF reported that: the 33rd NVA Regiment was located south of Xun Lc (YS 4474), with a strength of 1,075 - 33rd Regiment is operating in a split configuration with two battalions located in base areas east of Blackhorse and a third battalion west of Route 2 in north-west Phc Tuy Province. 33 Regiment will probably remain in its base area for a time to refit and resupply after its actions in May. On 6-7 June 1ATF and RF troops engaged an enemy force at YS 440740 6.5 km north of Ni t Enemy troops were identified as belonging to 1-33 NVA Regt.271 The Battle of Bnh Ba Begins and a Failed Ambush on Route 2 ? At 0810hrs on 4 June, the Australian 6RAR/NZ liaison officer at the c Thnh District headquarters at Ngi Giao advised 1ATF Headquarters that 33rd Regiment elements were located at YS 563874 about 17 kilometres north-east of Bnh Ba village and about four kilometres south of the Phc Tuy/Long Kh nh border.272 According to a 33rd Regiment history monograph On the night of 5/6 June, the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment directly led by Comrade By Tiu273, the Battalion deputy commander; and Comrade Min - the Battalion political officer, opened fire and attacked the objectives in Bnh Ba village.274 As noted earlier, the 1st Battalion was commanded by Triu Kim Sn.275 The 33rd Regiment commander was reportedly Hong
defence elements. See VCAT Item No.13510124002 and VCAT Item No.13510123005. The 59-man RD Cadre groups (on) in the villages first deployed in May 1966, also progressed the Si Gn Governments political, social and economic programmes. The original RD Cadre group of 59 was scaled down to 30 with the Accelerated Pacification Programme (see footnote 158), and to 10 at the beginning of 1971. For RD Cadre organisation, numbers and activities in Phc Tuy Province to the end of 1966, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.420-422. For detail on support by US and Vietnamese forces to Pacification see USMACV, Handbook for Military Support to Pacification February 1968 (41 pages), Saigon, February 1969 VCAT Item No.13530108003. 271 1ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No.22-69 (period 1st to 6th June 1969), Ni t (Confidential). 272 1ATF, G (OPS) Log Sheet 22, Serial 312. This report probably resulted from a 6RAR/NZ clash. 273 By Tiu (see Appendix 22) is a nickname Seven Tiu. As with most Vietnamese, NVA/VC cadre, soldiers and infrastructure personnel usually had two-word nicknames/aliases (aka)/pseudonyms (t, b danh). Invariably, these comprised a number (from 2 to 10) or occasionally t (meaning youngest) as the first word, followed by their given name. This reflected their birth order in their fami ly (with the father consider number One). For example, the nickname Anh Hai is rother Two and T Ngha is Four Ngha. Party members often also had a secure cover -name ie an additional full Vietnamese name of three words. See the 1965-1966 Military Region 1 (later Military Region 7) staff list that shows NVA ranks, names, full cover-names, nicknames, akas, and Party status - CDEC Log 03-1341-66. 274 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.9 see Appendix 3. 275 See footnote 259. However, at a 33rd Regiment Veterans Reunion in Phc Th (H Ni) in late July 2013, Nguyn Huy Thn declared that he had been the commander of the Regiment at the time of the Battle of Bnh Ba, was present at the attle, and had directly led the 7 th (ie the 1st Battalion). See: T Tng

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Cao H.276 The D440 Battalion History (2011) related that: On the night of 5 June 1969, the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment opened fire and attacked its objectives in Bnh Ba hamlet. Surprised by our fierce attack, the enemy in Bnh Ba village quickly disintegrated with some fleeing and others huddling down to await a relief force. We took complete control of the battlefield that very night.277 A 33rd Regiment soldier from its 1st Battalion captured on 6 June, related that on the morning of 4 June he had been told that his 1st attalion was going on a proselytising mission to Bnh a, and after entering the village, the unit divided into cells to work with the local VC in the peoples houses. Just before the fighting started, he had heard local VC broadcasting propaganda.278 According to the Chu c District History (2004), local village guerrillas were also involved in the occupation of nh a village on 5 June 1969 Comrade Nguyn Th Thin the Secretary of the Bnh Ba Village Party Committee, and a number of the village guerrillas were killed - together with Comrade Bnh a member of the District Standing Committee and Commander of the District Public Security element, while holding out against the enemy.279 Early on the morning of 6 June 1969, an Australian aircraft conducted a routine low-level reconnaissance flight up Route 2 without incident.280 At 0720hrs on 6 June 1969, two Australian Centurion medium battle tanks (callsigns 20E, 8D) travelling north up Route 2 through Bnh Ba toward the 6RAR/NZ Fire Support Base (FSB) Virginia (YS

Mnh, Gp mt CC Trung on 33 anh hng ln th 3 H Ni (Hp Mt Truyn Thng Cu Chin BinhBn Chin u Trung on 33 TP H Ni, Ln Th 3, Ngy 21/7/2013), 21 July 2013, published on 6 October 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTv88UxE4pQ - 22.10 minutes. 276 There has been some confusion on who commanded the Regiment in June 1969 eg: see the preceding footnote for the claim by Nguyn Huy Thn. Captured documents also suggested that Nguyn Vn Thng may have been the Regiment commander in mid-1969 see footnotes 209 and 232. Hong Cao H is recorded as the 33rd Regiment Commander in T Chc Ban Ch Huy Trung on 33 Qua C c Thi K (The Headquarters Organisation of the 33rd Regiment in Past Years) in Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57) ), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010 see Appendix 2 and Appendix 16. In response to the authors query, V Xun Thu confirmed with c (both 33rd Regiment Veterans Association principals and members of the 2013-2014 History Writing Team see footnote 4) that Hong Cao H was the Regiments commander at the time of the Battle of Bnh Ba and that Nguyn Vn Thng was then the Regiments chief-of-staff. email advice to the author from V Xun Thu, 23 November 2013. For Hong Cao H , see also footnotes 232, 466, and 472. 277 Chamberlain, E.P., D440 , op.cit, 2013, pp.64-65; and D440 History (2011) ie Vietnamese language edition, pp.91-92. 278 1ATF INTSUM No.165/69, Ni t, 14 June 1969; Epagniol, J. . Major, Interrogation Report, Ni t, 19 June 1969. The POW stated that his unit had entered Bnh Ba village at about 0700hrs on 5 June [sic but probably 6 June] where the unit split into cells to work with the local VC in the peoples houses. About 0800hrs, the local VC began broadcasting propaganda when gunfire started in all directions . 279 Nguyn Cng Danh et al, Lch s Chu c (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004. A member of the B Long Military Proselytising Section was also killed in the Battle 1ATF, INTSUM No.160/69, Ni t, 9 June 1969. 280 A Cessna 180D aircraft from 1ATFs 161 Reconnaissance Flight flew a route-checking flight at first light every morning.

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437801) were engaged in Bnh Ba by small arms and rocket propelled grenade (RPG)281 fire.282 At 8.15am on 6 June, the 1ATF liaison officer at the c Thnh Sub-Sector/ District headquarters about four kilometres north of Bnh Ba village, reported that Vietnamese Territorial Forces (ie RF/PF) were engaging enemy elements on the southwestern edge of Bnh Ba village, and that there were an estimated two VC platoons some in Bnh a hamlet.283 At 1ATF, the Task Force Ready Reaction Force (RRF) D Company of 5RAR commanded by Major M.P. Blake, was briefed at 0900hrs and placed on stand-by.284 The RRF was to clear an estimated two enemy platoons from the village.285 At about 1000hrs286, the c Thnh District Chief Major Trn Vn Ng, requested Australian APC assistance in clearing the enemy from Bnh Ba.287 At 1000hrs, the RRF with the infantry mounted in M113A1 APCs, left the Ni t base and moved north up Route 2 in line ahead - ie a single column, at best speed.288 The column
281

The NVA/VC employed two types of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG). The RPG-2 (B40) was an 80mm (warhead), 1.84kg (warhead weight), shoulder-fired RPG with a maximum effective range against stationary targets of 150m and capable of penetrating 180mm of armour. The RPG-7 (B41) was an 85mm (warhead), 2.25kg (warhead weight), shoulder-fired RPG with a maximum effective range of 500 metres and capable of penetrating 300mm of armour. Both were also effective anti-personnel weapons ie by fragmentation. 282 The leading tank - 20E, was struck by an RPG when passing through Bnh Ba village, but drove north to the c Thnh Sub-Sector/District Headquarters (YS 464779 - about four kilometres farther north) where the tank commander reported the incident to Major Tr n Vn Ng (the Sub-Sector/District Commander) who deployed Regional Force troops to investigate. The other tank - 8D, an armoured recovery vehicle, came under fire just short of Bnh a village, returned to the 1ATF base at Ni t, and reported to the HQ 1ATF staff. Both were vehicles of B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment for detail, see Cameron, B., Canister ! On ! Fire !, Big Sky Publishing, Newport, 2012, Chapter 13 - nh a Close-in Fighting; Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.211; and Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam The Complete Story , op.cit., 2012, pp.440 -442. The incident was not recorded in the HQ 1ATF Operations Log until 0830hrs. 283 HQ 1ATF, 6 June 1969, G (Ops) Log Sheet, Sheet 38, Serial 536 (AWM95,1/4/153). The VC were engaged by Vietnamese Territorial Force elements (reportedly two platoons from the 655th Regional Force Company - based at YS 445746, 106-strong; and elements of 39th Popular Force (PF) Platoon YS 453748, 32-strong); with artillery support from the c Thnh base (YS 464779). 284 The RRF comprised: D Company 5RAR (only 65-strong due to other commitments); a small artillery forward observer group from 105th Field Battery (RAA); 13 M113A1 APCs of 3 Troop/B Squadron/3rd Cavalry Regiment; and a composite troop of tanks from B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment - initially three Centurion tanks: Callsign 21 (2LT B. Sullivan), 22 (2LT D. Ritchie), 21C (CPL G. Bennett), and subsequently joined by a fourth which had been under repair (22B - CPL B. Bennier) at Bnh Ba village. For detail see Cameron, B., Canister ! On ! Fire !, op.cit., 2012, Chapter 13 - nh a Close-in Fighting. 285 D Coy (Ready Reaction Force) under operational control CO 6RAR - 5RAR Commanders Diary Narrative, 1000hrs 6 June 1969 - AWM95, 7/5/25. 286 According to the D440 attalion History (2011) At 6am on 6 June 1969 just as we had planned, the Australian forces from Ni t sent their tanks north to relieve nh a. see Vietnamese edition, p.92. 287 HQ 1ATF, 1ATF Operations og Sheet, Sheet 39, Serial 551, Ni t, 6 June 1969. 288 The mounted infantry moved at best speed up Route 2 to c M hamlet - ie not spread out (authors correspondence with Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC, OAM (Captain in 1969) the officer commanding 3/B/3rd Cavalry Regiment, 26 July 2012. See also: Anderson, P., When the Scorpion Stings: The History of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment - South Vietnam 1965-1972, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2002, p.170.

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halted at p Sui Ngh (YS 434716 - about 2.5 kilometres south of Bnh Ba village) to await further orders - where they were joined by the RRFs three Centurion tanks.289 With the three tanks leading, the column290 continued north and although engaged briefly from the left of the road near c M hamlet (YS 445736), continued north to the southern edge of Bnh Ba village.291 As noted earlier, according to a 33rd Regiment history monograph, the initial plan was for the 33rd Regiment to conduct an ambush battle from the Sng Cu hamlet up to c M hamlet292 including on Australian forces lured north from their Ni t base. That plan was similarly described in the D440 Battalion History (2011).293 In the revised plan, the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment commanded by Quch Thi Sn and supported by elements of D440 Battalion, was to conduct the ambush. Several Vietnamese accounts relate that the planned ambush was not initiated ie:

289

The three tanks had left the 1ATF base through the western gate and did not join the RRF main body until p Sui Ngh - Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC OAM (commanding 3/B/3rd Cavalry Regiment in June 1969), email to author, 26 July 2012. 290 The order-of-march was: the tanks led by tank Callsign 21C, then the 13 APCs with the 5RAR mounted infantry: 31 Section (three M113A1s) leading, followed by vehicle 30A (including Captain R. De Vere RAAC, Major M.P. Blake RA Inf, Lieutenant J.P. Stevens RAA), 39J, 32 Section (three M113A1s), 30 , 39M, and 33 Section (three M113A1s). The length of the column was about 850 metres with the interval between vehicles about 50 metres, a bit tighter than normal road -running of 100 metres. Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC, OAM - emails to author, 26 July and 28 August 2012. The fourth tank 22B (Corporal . ennier), did not depart Ni t for Bnh Ba until about 1100hrs ie up Route 2 alone and unescorted an hour or so after the main body of the RRF, without incident email to author from Dr D. Hay (crewman Centurion tank Callsign 22B), 26 July 2012. 291 Wary of the potential for an ambush against the RRF column, Captain R. De Vere again specifically briefed the commanders of the armoured vehicles on counter-ambush action. We did encounter one major roadblock ((which we)) cleared by tank fire and rolled down the road with barely a pause; APC sections fired into the flanks as they passed the area of the minor contact/failed ambush. APC crews did report some enemy bodies as they passed the area. We proceeded without further incident until halting just short of Bnh a. - authors correspondence with Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC, OAM commander of the APC element, 26 July 2012; and Centurion tank crew members D. Ritchie, D. Hay, and K. McGuire. The tanks engaged the enemy with both machine guns and canister fire ie the twenty-pounder canister round contained about 580 large pellets (principally an anti-personnel weapon). For detail, see also: Cameron, ., Canister ! On ! Fire !, ig Sky Publishing, Newport, 2012, Chapter 13, nh a Close -in Fighting. According to one source, at c M hamlet, the RRF was fired on by a platoon-sized force from the lefthand ((western)) side of the road. the column did not stop. On reaching nh a proper, the RRF adopted a defensive position but almost immediately 15 RPG rounds directed at the nearest tank interspersed with small arms fire from the house on the corner of the village. - Anderson, P., When the Scorpion Stings: The History of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, op.cit., 2002, pp.170-171. 292 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.8 see Appendix 3. As noted earlier, the Sng Cu stream crosses Route 2 at the bridge at YS 437692 about 100 metres north of the abandoned p An Ph hamlet on the northern edge of the 1ATF base at Ni t. 293 As noted earlier, the passage in the D440 History (2011), Vietnamese edition, pp.90-91 is almost identical to that of the 33rd Regiment document ie Background Memorial History, op.cit., 2011.

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The Australian relief force was spread out in groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiments ambush so the Regiments tactical headquarters decided not to attack.294 At 6am on 6 June 1969 just as we had planned, the Australian forces from Ni t sent their tanks north to relieve Bnh Ba. However as the enemy was spread out in groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiments ambush formation, the headquarters of the Regiment decided not to initiate the ambush attack.295 the Australians did not enter our ambush formation as planned.296

In summarising the beginning of the Battle, the official Australian history noted: Many questions about the battle were left unresolved. It was unclear why the enemy had ventured so close to the task force base and remained so long in a village where they must have known their presence would be challenged; and why they had engaged with such determination an Australian reaction force supported by armour.297

294

The enemy was spread out in groups of two -and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiments ambush bn ch i ri rc tng tp 2-3 chic v khng trng vo i hnh phc kich cua Trung on. - L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.9. 295 The enemy was spread out in groups of two -and-three vehicles and did not fall into t he Regiments ambush formation. bn ch i ri tng tp 2-3 chic v khng trng vo i hnh phc kch ca trung on. - D440 attalion History (2011), Vietnamese edition, p.92; and, in English in Chamberlain, E.P., D440 , 2013, pp.65-66. 296 The Australians did not enter our ambush as planned Bn c i khng ng i hnh phc kch Chu c History (2004) - Nguyn Cng Danh et al, Lch s Chu c (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004, p.172. That brief account states that the planned ambush by the 33rd Regiment and D440 Battalion was set on the west of Route 2, in the stretch from c M hamlet up to nh a. While it refers to the Regiment, it does not specifically mention the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment - nor its commander, Quch Thi Sn ie unlike the account in L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011; and the D440 Battalion History (2011), Vietnamese edition. 297 Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.210. However, note the preceding footnotes 225-229 and 262-263 describing the early June 1969 High Point, the Nixon -Thiu conference at Midway and the Campaign. As noted, the official Australian account of the attle of nh a is in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.203-240.

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The Battle298 6 June 1969 299 On reaching the southern edge of Bnh Ba village, up to 15 RPG rounds were fired at the leading elements of the 1ATF RRF. Meanwhile, at the urging of the District Chief Major Trn Vn Ng, the inhabitants of Bnh Ba were fleeing the village. At 1120hrs, the RRF was granted clearance to enter the village from the east. According to the 5RAR After Action Report300: There was no opposition until they reached the centre of the village when heavy RPG fire and small arms fire was received from the south of the village. During the next two hours, the D Company group manoeuvred to contain heavy enemy RPG and small arms fire from the south and south-west of the village.301 In this period, three of the tanks302 were hit with RPGs and one was disabled and five crewmen were wounded. D Company consolidated in the centre of the village and used a Light Fire Team ((two UH-1H helicopter gunships))303 on the south part of the village and towards Route 2 where the District Chief had organised further evacuation ((of villagers)). At

298

Australian historians have classified 16 of 1ATFs engagements during the Vietnam War as landmark battles. In order of the highest level of violence and casualties, these can probably be listed as the Battle of Long Tn (18 August 1966) the most violent; the Battle of Coral (mid-May 1968); the Battle of Balmoral (late May 1968); and the Battle of Bnh Ba (6-8 June 1969). Hall, R. and Ross, A., andmark attles and the Myths of Vietnam, pp.186-209 in Stockings, C., ANZACs Dirty Dozen 12 Myths of Australian Military History, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2012. 299 A local Communist Party History cites the date of the attle as 20 July 1969 - when The Regions rd 33 Main Force Regiment clashed with the enemy at Bnh Ba and suffered heavy casualties with tens of cadre and soldiers killed. See: , Lch s ng b tnh B Ra - Vng Tu (1930 - 1975), History of the B Ra-Vng Tu Party Chapter, Chng VIII: nh Thng Chin Lc Vit Nam Ha Chin Tranh Ca M - Ngy (1969-1972), Chapter 8: Defeating the US and Puppet Strategy to Vietnamize the War, 2011. 300 Khan, C.N. Lieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69, op.cit., 11 June 1969. Beginning at about 1100hrs, Vietnamese and Australian forces engaged an enemy force estimated at 90strong in Bnh Ba village 1ATF, SITREP, Ni t, 6 June 1969. Major secondary Australian sources on the Battle include: Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp. 210-240; Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, Trojan Press, Thomastown, 2009; and Anderson, P., When the Scorpion Stings: The History of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, op.cit., 2002; Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam The Complete Story , op.cit., 2012; and the booklet: 40th Anniversary of the Battle of Binh Ba Vietnam 6-8 June 2009, Department of Veterans Affairs, Canberra, 2009. This armoured assault on the village was commanded by (then) Captain R. De Vere (3rd Cavalry Regiment) - ie with the infantry mounted in the APCs see 40th Anniversary , op.cit., 2009, p.11. 301 Second Lieutenant P.H.D. Rogers (Possum 22, 161 Reconnaissance Flight), flying a Bell Sioux 47G3B1 helicopter, reported that a group of about 60 enemy were withdrawing from the village toward the south-west. Cameron, B., Canister ! On ! Fire !, op.cit., 2012, Chapter 13 - nh a Close-in Fighting. The enemy group was moving swiftly, and not tactically email to author from Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) P.H.D. Rogers, DFC, 25 August 2012. 302 By this stage, Centurion tank Callsign 22B (Corporal B. Bennier) - which had been under repair at the Squadrons ight Aid Detachment when the RRF departed Ni t had moved up Route 2 to Bnh Ba and joined the initial three tanks in the RRF for the attack. 303 Offensive air support for the RRF operations at the Battle included a Heavy Fire Team (three RAAF UH-1H Bushranger gunships); and an O-2A Cessna Skymaster (Jade) fixed-wing observation aircraft fitted with 2.75 rockets.

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1150hrs, B Company ((5RAR))304 was dispatched ((from 1ATF)) to assist D Company ((and)) initially blocked to the south. D Company then moved to the west of the village and lined up for an assault. A rocket cache was located in the rubber west of the village. B Company moved to block from the east and covered the north and south approaches by fire. PF305 troops remained in a block to the north throughout the operation ((and)) cleared the church in the north of the village. At approx 1420hrs306, D Company commenced to sweep towards the east, and heavy contacts occurred immediately. The enemy were firing from the houses and then withdrawing into the tunnels.307 During this sweep, D Company suffered 1 KIA ((Private W.E. Teeling)) and 2 WIA. At 1830hrs, D Company completed this sweep and to the east of Route 2 opposite Bnh Ba. PF troops remained in blocks to the north and north-west of Bnh Ba. At approx. 1500hrs, B Company despatched one platoon to the north-east of Bnh Ba to control and screen civilians withdrawing north. Two VC were detained at this point. One Chieu Hoi with a head wound reported in. One VC was also captured attempting to escape to the east.308 According to a recent 33rd Regiment account309, it was an unequal contest against the Australians who had helicopters, tanks and armoured vehicles. Their soldiers fought hand-to-hand with hundreds of Australian troops in a 10-hour battle from 8am to 6pm. The 1st Battalion headquarters was surrounded, but villagers assisted them to escape. However, some were captured by the enemy and tortured.

304

B Company (Major R.E. Harring) - mounted in M113A1 APCs and several M577 Armoured Command Vehicles. Captain T.H. Arrowsmith a 3rd Cavalry Regiment officer, commanded the ad hoc APC/ACV group. 305 This is probably a reference to Regional Force (RF) troops as noted, both the Regional Force and the Popular Force (PF) were termed Territorial Forces. 306 y this time, Australian armoured reinforcements had moved south down Route 2 from 6RAR/NZs FSB Virginia to the north 4th Troop (comprising three Centurion tanks: 24A SGT J. Browning, 24B CPL J. Dziedic, 24C CPL R. Hanham); and the 21st APC Section (SGT G. Wilson). These tanks replaced the four Centurions that had deployed with the RRF. 307 In this phase of the operations, an enemy 75mm Recoilless Rifle (RCL) was recovered the only 75mm RCL confirmed as recovered in the Battle. This was probably a D440 Battalion equipment, see the D440 History (2011), Vietnamese edition, p.93 there was no time to collect weapons - and the enemy seized one of the two 75mm recoilless rifles, one of the attalions principal fire support weapons. 308 Khan, C.N. Lieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69, op.cit., 11 June 1969. 309 T Tng Mnh, Gp mt CC Trung on 33 anh hng ln th 3 H Ni (Hp Mt Truyn Thng Cu Chin Binh-Bn Chin u Trung on 33 TP H Ni, Ln Th 3, Ngy 21/7/2013), 21 July 2013, published 6 October 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTv88UxE4pQ . This is a video of the 33rd Regiments reunion held in H Ni on 21 July 2013. As noted, other accounts of the Battle of Bnh Ba are included in the monographs published by the 33rd Regiment veterans, see Appendices 1 to 4.

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A 33rd Regiment soldier firing a Type 56/AKM/AK-47 Assault Rifle The D440 Battalion account of the Battle included: With the difficult situation faced by our fraternal unit and as ordered by the Campaign Headquarters, the ((D440)) Battalion headquarters deployed a recoilless rifle platoon and part of an infantry company to break through the enemy blockade from the direction of Bnh Ba Xng hamlet.310 However, this force was itself decisively attacked by Australian tanks right from the edge of the hamlet, and many of our troops were wounded. Our combat troops were brave and set fire to a M.118 [sic] tank, but were unable to break through the blocking position or defeat the enemys frenzied counter-attack. Next, in the face of indications that the enemy could wipe us out on the battleground, we took the initiative to withdraw. With a breaking of the enemy blockade unsuccessful, there was no time to collect weapons - and the enemy seized one of the two 75mm recoilless rifles, one of the attalions principal fire support weapons.311 By about 6.30pm (1830hrs), the heaviest fighting had finished. The M113A1 APCs under Captain R. De Vere (3 Troop) returned to Ni t.312 D Company/5RAR and B Company/5RAR supported by tanks (4th Troop Sergeant J. Browning) and APCs (a composite group under Captain T.H. Arrowsmith now including the 21st APC Section (Sergeant G. Wilson) remained in Bnh Ba overnight.
310

This account of D440 attalions involvement is also included in a 33rd Regiment history - L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.10 see Appendix 3. 311 D440 Battalion History (2011), Vietnamese edition, pp.92-93. 312 The APCs left in the late afternoon, probably around 1700hrs, to return to Ni t, but did not enter into Ni t until well after 1800hrs as the base had come under rocket fire, and we were halted north of the base. email to the author from Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC, OAM 28 August 2012.

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In the period from 1525hrs to 1945hrs on 6 June, up to 15 rockets of unknown calibre impacted in the Ni t base some were noted as having been fired from the direction of Bnh Ba.313 Bnh Ba - 7 June 1969 At 0700hrs on 7 June, 5RARs D Company moved to link up with Company. At 0700hrs, an enemy company was observed moving towards the village at about 300 metres to the south-west. The enemy were engaged by tank and small arms fire. one enemy was KIA ( C) and 6 enemy wounded (blood trails). The western half of the village was swept by midday with no opposition. Three enemy POW were located and evacuated. D Company then stopped and waited for the PF [sic] troops to take over and complete the search of the eastern half of the village.314 According to the Australian official history: At 6am, troops from Company, occupying a blocking position in the rubber to the south of the reaction force, noticed a company in green moving towards them. Thinking they were Regional Force troops, the B Company soldiers waved casually and received an acknowledgement. A moment later, both sides recognised each other: North Vietnamese Army soldiers and Australians. The

313

1ATF Commanders Diary Narrative, and Duty Officers og (AWM95, 1/4/153). Rockets were fired into the 1ATF base at Ni t on 6 and 7 June - up to 15 107mm rockets impacted in the base and in the vicinity on the afternoon and evening of 6 June; and four or five impacted in the base on the afternoon of 7 June. According to 1ATF These rockets were probably fired by an element of 74 NVA Artillery Regiment 1ATF, Enemy situation in Phc Tuy Province, 1 Jun to 8 Jun 69, Ni t, 10 June 1969, para 2.f. As noted earlier, the rocket firings that were attempted on 5 June by Tays unit into the nh a area were reportedly unsuccessful (captured document Officer Commanding C-195 Company see footnote 269) - 1ATF, INTSUM No.195/69, Ni t, 14 July 1969. The shelling of Ni t is also related in a 33rd Regiment account At the same time ((6 June)), the 33rd Regiments firepower RCLs and 82mm mortars, attacked the artillery positions of the Australian headquarters in Ni t with the aim of degrading the enemys combat power and forcing them to recall their force and give up their intention of taking charge of the battlefield. - L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.10 see Appendix 3. As noted above, an Australian officer wrote: The APCs left (( nh a)) in the late afternoon, probably around 1700hrs, to return to Ni t, but did not enter into Ni t until well after 1800hrs as the base had come under rocket fire, and we were halted north of the base. We actually observed the flight path of the rockets and radioed the compass bearings to our Squadron Headquarters. email to the author from Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC, OAM 28 August 2012. The assessed location of the rocket-firing site was engaged by Australian artillery (105th Field Battery - RAA) from the Ni t base. The artillery also fired in support of B Company in the early evening, and fired H & I (harassing and interdiction) tasks into the Bnh Ba area throughout the night. Earlier, at 0015hrs on 6 June, 25-30 82mm mortar rounds were fired into 9RARs Fire Support ase Thrust at YS 500550 near the Long Hi Mountains. This appeared to be in support of an attack by elements of the VC D445 Battalion on a Rural Development (RD) Cadre compound (YS 512544) and an ARVN outpost (of the 2nd Battalion/ 52nd Regiment) in the Hi M area. As noted, on the afternoon of 7 June, a further five 107mm rockets impacted in the 1ATF Ni t base. A photograph of 1ATF personnel doing crater analysis of a 107mm rocket impact in June 1969 is in the Australian War Memorial collection BEL/69/0359/VN. 314 Khan, C.N. Lieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69, op.cit., 11 June 1969.

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enemy disappeared followed by a fusillade from artillery, tanks, APCs and small arms. No casualties were inflicted on either side.315 The NVA element may have been part of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd NVA Regiment that had reportedly been tasked to ambush the 1ATF Ready Reaction Force on Route 2 in the area from the Sng Cu north to the hamlet of c M on the southern edge of Bnh Ba village.316 The 33rd Regiment Martyrs list includes o Bch Kim a platoon commander of the 2nd Battalion (D8), killed at Bnh Ba on 6 June; Bi Vn n a section 2ic of the 2nd Battalion (D8), killed at Bnh Ba on 8 June; and also probably Hong Vn Dm a section 2ic of the 2nd Battalion, killed at Bnh Ba on 6 June 1969. A further two soldiers from the 2nd Battalion were killed a few kilometres north of Bnh Ba at Vit Cng i Vn Su on 8 June, and Trng Vn Thc on 9 June 1969.317 At c Trung hamlet about a kilometre north of Bnh Ba village, 50 to 80 NVA/VC were sighted and engaged initially by Popular Force troops. A Regional Force element cleared the area, but a 100-strong enemy force later returned and attacked the Popular Force killing four and wounding seven. 5RARs Company and tanks swept the southern part of the hamlet but as civilians were noted in the northern area, the task was undertaken by Territorial Forces who forced the enemy to withdraw to the northwest.318 At 1500hrs, D Company swept the eastern end of Bnh Ba and this was completed by 1715hrs. There was no activity overnight in the area. The 33rd Regiments Summary History (2010) see Appendix 1, only relates that: In attacks on hamlets at Bnh Ba, Kim Long (B Ra), the Regiment destroyed 24 armoured vehicles forcing the enemy to withdraw to its defences at Ni t.319 Ha Long Neither the 33rd NVA Regiment nor D440 Battalion elements were involved in the attack on Ha Long village - immediately south of the 1ATF Ni t base, on 7 June 1969. According to the Chu c History (2004): At ong Sub-Sector, the Chu c District troops entered and occupied p Bc hamlet of Ha Long village and repelled
315

Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., p.222. The HQ 1ATF G (Ops) Log Sheet 51, Serial 733 recorded the incident occurring at 0645hrs at YS 445737 (in the rubber on the south-western edge of the village) and involving approx. 50 enemy. This appears to be the incident recounted in the 5RAR After Action Report ie see footnote 314 above. The 5RAR History notes At O600 hrs 7 June, some of B Company ((5RAR)), blocking in the rubber to the south, noticed a force of company strength moving towards them from the south. Battle, M.R. and Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, op.cit., 2009, p.55. 316 See footnotes 253 and 292. 317 Nguyn S H, Martyrs ist, op.cit., 16 July 2013 see Appendix 9. 318 Early on 7 June, at the c Trung rubber factory about 500 metres north of nh a village, up to eighty enemy were observed from the air but soon after departed. At about 1300 hrs, an estimated 100 enemy attacked a PF platoon in c Trung and B/RAR was deployed - but the enemy force withdrew to the north-east and north-west. Battle, M.R. and Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, op.cit., 2009, pp.56-57. 319 Cu Chin inh Trung on 33, Tm Tt Trung on 33, op.cit., July 2010 see Appendix 1.

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eight counter-attacks by the puppet troops. At 2pm, the Australians deployed infantry and tank ((xe tng)) reinforcements and advanced deep into our battle positions. The firepower of our units -40s destroyed two tanks ((xe tng)) in the first volley. One of our comrades was killed and two were lightly wounded.320 1ATF reporting related that Chu c Districts C-41 Company attacked Ha Long village on 7 June 1969, and the adjacent 1ATF Ni t base was shelled with five 107mm rockets.321 The 1ATF Ready Reaction Force (C Company, 5RAR with APCs and tanks) responded to the incursion into Ha Long ie Operation Tong.322 1ATF reported six VC killed four of whom were credited to 1ATF forces.323 The Aftermath Following an early morning sweep of Bnh Ba on 8 June 1969, D Company returned to Ni t at 1100hrs, with B Company following at 1540hrs. That morning, a detachment from the 1ATF Civil Affairs Unit with medical and engineer elements, deployed to Bnh Ba to assist its inhabitants.

320

Chu c District History (2004) - Nguyn Cng Danh et al, Lch s Chu c (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004, p.175. See also the Ha Long History - ng b x Ha Long, Lch s ng b x Ha Long (19302005) The History of the Ha Long Village Party Chapter (1930-2005), 25 April 2009. According to the diary of Nguyn Hong Mai the commander of C-41 Company, on 7 June, we fought in Ha ong against six attacks. In the final attack, there were Australians and armour there were no aircraft. We killed 18 and wounded three from the Sector PF and RD Cadre. One M41 [sic] tank was burnt out and one damaged, two M113A1s were knocked out. Our casualties were two KIA, one CIA, one WIA, and one surrendered. - Annex A to 1ATF, INTSUM No.241-69, Ni t, 29 August 1969. 321 As noted earlier, rockets were fired into the 1ATF base at Ni t on 6 and 7 June - up to 15 107mm rockets impacted in the base and in the vicinity on the afternoon and evening of 6 June; and four impacted in the base on the afternoon of 7 June. According to 1ATF These rockets were probably fired by an element of 74 NVA Artillery Regiment 1ATF War Diary, Enemy Situation in Phc Tuy Province, 1 June to 8 June 1969, Ni t, 10 June 1969, para 2.f. (AWM95, 1/4/156, folio G32). As noted, other rocket firings attempted on 5 June by Tays unit in the nh a area were reportedly unsuccessful (see footnotes 269 and 313). 322 See the 5RAR History ie Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, op.cit., 2009, p.58 and pp.352-353; Anderson, P., When the Scorpion Stings, 2002, op.cit., pp.179-181; and Ekins R. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.226-227. 323 For contemporary summaries, see, HQ 1ATF G (Ops) Log Sheet 69, Serial 987, 9 June 1969 (AWM 95, 1/4/153); and also HQ 1ATF War Diary, Enemy Situation 1-8 June 1969, 10 June 1969, para 2.g., (AWM95, 1/4/156, folio G32). The 5RAR Combat After-Action Report for Operation Tong noted that: Fresh weapons pits sufficient for 56 enemy were located in the main are a of contact; and documents captured and examined at the contact site in Ha ong indicated at least three groups of enemy belonging to C-41, giving names and weapons. The three groups had 8, 11 and 16 men respectively. This total of 35 was closer to the mark that the 200 reported by the VC PW. Certain ((ie definite)) enemy casualties were 6 VC KIA and 2 VC (captured by RF) Ducker, C.H. Major (5RAR), p An Ph, 11 June 1969 (AWM95, 7/5/27). The author (Chamberlain, E.P., Lieutenant - 1969) interrogated a C-41 prisoner (Trn Vn Chin) in Ha Long on 8 June 1969. Australian records also indicate that three female members of the C-41 Company Support Cell were captured in Ha Long on 7 June 1969: L Th Nga, Nguyn Th M, and Nguyn Th Thu.

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The Australian 5RAR After-Action Report for the Battle of Bnh Ba 324 claimed 43 enemy killed (1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment). 1ATF contemporary reporting identified the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment together with the Regiments heavy machine gun and recoilless rifle elements and listed 71 enemy killed, six wounded and 12 POWs.325 Subsequently a few years after the Battle, 1ATF reported enemy casualties at Bnh Ba as 51 NVA KIA ( C), 11 POWs.326 According to a 5RAR Regimental History, the enemy casualty figure was later amended to 126 killed after Popular Forces troops reportedly found many more bodies beneath the rubble of destroyed houses in the village.327. The official Australian military history cites a total of 99 enemy killed 56 of whom were credited to Territorial Force troops (RF and PF) who lost four killed and seven wounded. The official Australian military history also notes 6 wounded/escaped, PW 8, rallier 1, detainees 28. 328 In 2009, at the 40th Anniversary of the Battle, an Australian commemorative booklet assessed: it seems that more than 100 VC and NVA, possibly many more, lost their lives in the battle.329 The US Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam reported that: One company of the 5th RAR plus Regional Forces and Popular Forces cordoned the village, while another company, supported by tanks and armored

324

Khan, C. N. ieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69, op.cit., 11 June 1969, p.3. 43 KIA (BC), 6 WIA (blood trails), 8 PW, 1 Hoi Chanh. Weapons recovered were 1 x 75mm RC , 1 x RPD machine gun, 6 x AK-47, 3 x SKS, 1 x Garand rifle, 1 x Mosin Nagant rifle, 3 x K-54 pistols, 2 x RPG-7, 1 x RPG-2, 1 x 60mm mortar tube, 1 x 82mm mortar base plate and tripod. COMUSMACV also subsequently reported 43 KIA in the attle COMUSMACV, Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 30 June 1969), MACJ3-051, Saigon, 20 August 1969. 325 1ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No. 22-69 (period 1st to 6th June 1969), Ni t. Not all 12 prisoners were necessarily processed by 1ATF. As noted in the footnote above, the report by the commander of 5RAR Lieutenant Colonel C.N. Khan, stated 8 PW, 1 Hoi Chanh. Subsequent official Australian records indicated that only the following POWs were captured at Bnh Ba by Australian forces on 7 June 1969: Nguyn Vn Dy, Pte - C2/1/A/ 57B [sic - more probably 3/2/1/A57) , NVA; i Vn ai (sometimes incorrectly as i Vn an) see also the following footnote , C2/B2/A1/D1/33 Regiment - wounded; Trn Vn Thanh - a platoon leader, K1 Battalion/33 Regiment (hospitalised died of wounds on 26 June 1969); Trn Voi, Pte C-25 Transport Coy, NVA; Lm Vn ach, nh a Guerrilla Unit; and Hong Vn Thanh, Bnh Ba Guerrilla Unit. AWM98, 493 HQ AFV (Barcode 904597). In mid-2013, Nguyn Vn Dy was living in Phc Th District, H Ni; but i Vn ai and Trn Voi had deceased in about 2011 advice to author from 33rd Regiment veterans (28 May 2013). 326 1ATF, INTSUM 268/71, Ni t, 25 September 1971. A i Vn ai - b.1937 in H Sn nh Province is also listed in the 33rd Regiments Martyrs ist as KIA at nh Ba on 6 June 1969 (see Appendix 9). 327 Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, op.cit., 2009, p.346, p.350. 328 Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, 2012, p.225 and p.736. Australian POW records show six POW captured by Australian forces at Bnh Ba: four members of the 33rd Regiment (including a platoon commander of K1 Battalion) and two members of the Bnh Ba Guerrilla Unit see footnote 325 above. In summary, NVA/VC histories, captured documents, and rallier reports indicate the following casualties 33rd Regiment 53 killed; D440 attalion possibly 1 killed, or about 60 casualties (rallier Vn Nhanh), or two WIA Annex A to de Cure, P.F. Major, D440 LF Battalion, HQ 1ATF Ni t, 29 September 1969 ; C195 Comp any 12 killed and 11 wounded ; Chu c District Committee: 1 killed; Bnh Ba Guerrilla Unit and Village Committee: about 7 killed; B Long Province cadre: one killed. 329 40th Anniversary , op.cit., 2009, p.17.

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personnel carriers, assaulted the enemy in the village. Results of the operation were 43 enemy killed, 8 prisoners and 8 small arms, 3 rocket launchers and 1 mortar captured. 330 The commanding officer of 5RAR - Lieutenant Colonel Colin Khan, reportedly continued to believe more than 30 years later that the attack on the Centurion was nothing more than the result of poor fire discipline by a wayward soldier.331 Documents recovered by Australian forces after the Battle included a 1:25,000 scale map of the Bnh Ba plantation area with a headquarters element and a mortar position shown in grid square YS 4274.332 A B Ra-Vng Tu Party History summarised the Battle and its aftermath: On 20 July [sic] 1969, the 33rd Regiment (a Regional Main Force unit) attacked the enemy at Bnh Ba and suffered heavy casualties tens of our cadre and soldiers were killed. The Australian commandos333 were deployed to ambush all the streams and reentrants to discover signs of our bases and call down artillery fire and heli-lift troops to surround us. Our elements in almost all the villages of the Province were attacked and driven out we were unable to stay with the people.334 The fighting at Bnh a in early June 1969 was not mentioned in MACVs Monthly Summary for June 1969 ie in its review of significant events in June 1969, although smaller actions - including the shelling of the Phan Rang airbase, were included in that report.335 Casualties A 2010 33rd Regiment historical monograph summarised: The enemy concentrated a large force, while at that time we were in the process of developing our
330

II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report Lessons Learned, Period ending 31 July 1969, 17 December 1969. For the Australian force, results were: 43 enemy KIA, eight prisoners, six AK-47s, three rocket launchers, two K-54 pistols, one 82mm mortar base plate and bipod see: COMUSMACV, Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 30 June 1969), MACJ3-051, Saigon, 20 August 1969, Annex E, p.63. 331 Brigadier C.N. Khan, DSO AM (Retd) see 40th Anniversary , op.cit., 2009, p.10. 332 1ATF, INTSUM No.160-69, Ni t, 9 June 1969. Captured documents included a promotion certificate for Nguyn Xun Song [sic] to company commander in 57 Regiment (ie the 33rd Regiment), dated 27 May 1969 signed by an MR7 cadre (ang Quang). The 33 rd Regiment Martyrs ist includes Nguyn Xun Sang, T, D7 (platoon commander - 1st Battalion, killed at the Battle on 6 June 1969). As noted, the recovered documents included a 1:25,000-scale sketch map of Bnh Ba village with a headquarters (no echelon indicated) and a mortar position shown at YS 4274. 33rd Regiment locations in Bnh Ba and the vicinity are also depicted at p.215 in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012. 333 For NVA/VC use of the term commandos, see footnote 257. 334 Trn Vn Kh nh (et al), an Ra-Vng Tu, Lch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu, Tp II, 1954-1975, op.cit., 2000, (Chapter VIII). 335 HQ MACV Monthly Summary June 1969 dated 4 October 1969. VCAT Item No.7390115001. The Summary noted that During the first week of June, the enemy conducted a high point consisting of a number of coordinated, widespread indirect fire attacks throughout the country and some ground attacks. In the most significant ground action, 339 enemy soldiers were killed in two abortive attacks against a U.S. 25th Infantry Division fire support base in Tay Ninh Province.

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combat strength ammunition replenishment was not possible; there was no food, and we had to eat bananas and jack-fruit in lieu of rice. Nevertheless, we still had to fight to the last breath. Not counting those wounded in the battle, 53 of our comrades were killed at that place. The enemy buried them in a large hole in the earth, and only recently have we been able to recover their bodies and inter them in a cemetery.336 The remains were disinterred and reburied in the Province martyrs cemetery in 1986.337 The Regiments Martyrs ists (see Appendix 9) include the names of 50 personnel who were killed at the Battle of Bnh Ba in the period 6-8 June 1969. On the Lists, a further four are noted as having been killed in the vicinity in that period.338 The Martyrs Lists for the Battle of Bnh Ba include the following senior cadre: Bi Quang Min - the DP (ie Battalion 2ic) of the 7th (ie 1st) Battalion; Phm Vn Khu - a Deputy Political Officer; L Vn Tr - a Company Commander; Hong Bi ng a Company 2ic; and L Vn Thc - a Company 2ic. Apart from 1st Battalion (ie D7) personnel, the Martyrs Lists also include four personnel from the 2nd Battalion (ie D8) and one from the 3rd Battalion (ie D9) as having been killed at Bnh Ba on 6 June 1969.339 Several soldiers from the Regiments support companies were also reported as killed at the Battle including: one from the C18 Air Defence Company; four from the C19 Sapper/Engineer Company; and one from the C21 Reconnaissance Company). In nh c hamlet of Bnh Ba village, the 33rd Regiment memorial (khu tng nim) includes a museum and engraved stelae (bia) to the 53 fallen soldiers of the 33rd Regiment. 33rd Regiment histories and other NVA/VC reports note 33rd Regiment personnel killed at the Battle of Bnh Ba as 50 or 53 or 55.340 For lists of those killed in the Battle produced by the Regiments Veterans Association, see Appendix 9.
336

Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010, p.9 see Appendix 2. A senior office-holder in the 33rd Regiments Veterans Association L B Lc (a former deputy commander and chief-of-staff of the Regiment), has stated that at nh a on 6-6-1969 in a fierce and unequal battle the soldiers of the 1st Battalion (33rd Regiment) fought heroically to their last breath, and 53 soldiers of the 1st Battalion died bravely. - Hu Minh, Nc mt ngy gp li, o Ra-Vng Tu in t, 10 August 2012. 337 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011 see Appendix 3. 338 In the vicinity eg at Vit Cng (vicinity YS 455749), Cao Su Ra (B Ra District/Rubber Plantation), and farther afield: the My To Mountains (possibly died of wounds on 8 June). 339 D8 Hong Vn Dm; o ch Kim; i Vn n; and probably Hong Vn Vung. D9 Xun Cc. See Appendix 9. 340 In 2009, a memorial article for the 33rd Regiment's Veterans iaison Section stated The Regiment had 3,050 martyrs - including 2,008 who bravely fell on the Eastern Nam B battlefield. In particular, in the fighting to liberate Bnh Ba in the 1969 Spring Campaign, close to 50 cadre and fighters bravely died." Thanh Tng, "L cu si u v dng hng tng nh cc anh hng lit s Trung on 33 (A uddhist Mass and Ceremony to Remember the Heroic Martyrs of the 33rd Regiment"), B Ra-Vng Tu Television, late August 2009. In a 2010 article, 33rd Regiment veterans related that at the battle of nh a on 6 June 1969 more than 50 members of the Regiment fell in an unequal battle with the en emy. nh Thn, Trung on 33 mt thi ho hng The 33rd Regiment an heroic time , Ra-Vng Tu (magazine), Vng Tu, 30 April 2010, p.18. A subsequent article related that the 33 rd Regiment suffered 50 killed at Bnh Ba, and the Regiment had destroyed two Australian companies Hng Quc Vn Gp g mt chin s ca Trung on 33 Anh hng Meeting a combatant of the heroic 33rd Regiment, o cu

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Other NVA/VC casualties reportedly included: - D440 Battalion probably several, but unclear.341 - C-195 Unit/Company 12 killed and 11 wounded.342 - Bnh Ba Guerilla Unit - about 7.343 - Chu c District Committee - 1 - B Long Military Proselytising Section - 1.344 Australian casualties were one killed (Private W.E. Teeling 5RAR) and 10 wounded (one - 5RAR, two - B/3rd Cavalry Squadron, six - B/1st Armoured Regiment).345 Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces reportedly suffered four PF killed and seven wounded in c Trung hamlet on 7 June 1969. The Australian official history notes that in the attle four or five civilians were reportedly killed caught in the cross-fire.346

chin binh online, 17 December 2010. In 2011, an Australian television programme featured the 33rd Regiment memorial at Bnh Ba, and a 33rd Regiment veteran related that 55 of the Regiments personnel had been killed in the attle, and 54 had been bull -dozed into a mass grave by the Australian forces Walker, M. (Director), Private Terrence Hippo Hippisley Vietnam, In Their Footsteps, Channel 9, Melbourne, 12 June 2011. Memorial services are conducted at the complex in nh c hamlet of Bnh Ba village with 33 veterans from North Vietnam visiting on 25 July 2012 Quang Vit, on cu chin binh trung on 33 thm chin trng xa Chu c, Ra-Vng Tu Television, 25 July 2012. A Vietnamese NGO sought further details on the circumstances of the deaths of six 33 rd Regiment personnel: Corporal i Vn (1/33 Regiment, b.1950, Hi Hng) and V Cng Chin (platoon 2ic 33rd Regiment, b.1935, Hi Phng) - killed on 6 June 1969; Phi/Ph Vn Ph (33 rd Regiment, b.1950, Thi Bnh) killed on 8 June 1969; and o ch Kim (platoon commander 33rd Regiment, b.1944, H Ty) killed on 9 June 1969. - see MARIN http://www.nhantimdongdoi.org/?mod=chitiet&subcate=3&id=3767 . 341 A D440 Battalion platoon commander ( Vn Nhanh commander 8th Platoon, 8th Heavy Weapons Company) rallied in mid-July 1969 and stated that 440 Battalion had fought at Bnh Ba on 5-6 June 1969 together with the 33rd Regiment, and that 440 attalion has suffered about 60 casualties including the commander of C2 Company and two platoon commanders and a 75mm RC . - 1ATF, INTSUM No.198/69, Ni t, 17 July 1969. The account in the D440 Battalion History (2011) is unclear on the attalions casualties an annex listing 561 of their personnel killed-in-action noted as incomplete, does not specifically indicate personnel killed at Bnh Ba in the period 6-8 June 1969. However, two members were killed in June 1969 Phm Minh Quyt (6th Company) - Serial 199; and Ng Xun Li - Serial 261. 342 C-195 Reconnaissance and Special Delivery Unit of MR 7; captured document - 1ATF, INTSUM No.195/69, Ni t, 14 July 1969. 343 According to the Chu c History (2004) On 6 September [sic but probably June] 1969, Comrade Nguyn Th Thin the Secretary of the Bnh Ba Village Party Committee and a number of the village guerrillas were killed, together with Comrade Bnh a member of the District Standing Committee and Commander of the District Public Security element, while holding out against the enemy. - Nguyn Cng Danh et al, Lch s Chu c (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004, p.174. 344 1ATF, INTSUM No.160/69, Ni t, 9 June 1969. 345 Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.224. 346 Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.227. Following subsequent allegations of an atrocity by Australian forces at nh a, the Australian Minister for the Army stated that only three civilians died and four were wounded in a population of 1,275. p.239. See also: Australian War Memorial, Rebuilding Bnh Ba, AWM Film F04344, silent, 23 MB.

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South Vietnamese and Allied347 casualties for the first High Point in the communists 1969 Summer-Autumn Campaign were reported in the H Ni media: In Eastern Nam B, just between 5 and 10 June, the army and the people of the provinces north and north-east of Si Gn wiped out nearly 8,000 men .348 33rd Regiment at Bnh Ba A Discussion There are contradictory reports on the presence of 33rd Regiment elements in the Bnh Ba area in the first two weeks of June 1969 ie ranging from no presence to the full Regiment. The Battle of Bnh Ba is only briefly mentioned in a higher Vietnamese history the B Ra-Vng Tu Province Party History349 However, it is not included at all in several others, including the Military Region 7 History350, the ng Nai Party History (1997, 2000)351, the ng Nai Monograph (2001)352 or the B Ra-Vng Tu Monograph (2005)353. The reason for such omissions in unclear perhaps the Bnh Ba engagement was not significant enough to mention, or more likely, the lack of NVA/VC success at the Battle precluded its inclusion.354 As noted earlier, the History of 5th VC Division (2005) see Appendix 7, makes no mention of 33rd Regiment elements operating in Phc Tuy Province in early June
347

Allied forces comprised US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). In mid -1969, US forces reportedly numbered 538,933 (111 infantry battalions). FMWAF reportedly comprised: Australia 7,649 (three infantry battalions); New Zealand 556 personnel (an artillery battery), Republic of Korea 50,289 (22 battalions); Thailand 11,596 (six battalions); Philippines 1,506; Republic of China 31 personnel; Spain 12 personnel. The Republic of Vietnam ARVN/Marines totalled 168 battalions. COMUSMACV, Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 30 June 1969), MACJ3-051, Saigon, 20 August 1969. Annex E. http://www.458seatiger.info/vietnam1969_report.PDF . For FWMAF, see also: Larsen, S.R. Lieutenant General & Collins J.L. Brigadier, Allied Participation in Vietnam, Vietnam Studies Department of the Army, Washington, 1975. 348 Vietnam News Agency, Dazzling Military Feats During June, Nhn Dn, H Ni, 1 July 1969, p.3. 349 Trn Vn Kh nh (et al), an Ra-Vng Tu, ch s ng b tnh B Ra-Vng Tu, Tp II, 1954-1975, op.cit., 2000, (Chapter VIII) see earlier footnotes 229 and 334. 350 The MR7 History only includes a few sentences on activities in 1969 and makes no mention of a Campaign, the ong Kh nh Campaign, high point operations in mid -1969, nor nh a see Military Region 7 Headquarters (Qun Khu 7), 50 N m c ng V Trang Qun Khu 7 - The Armed Forces of Military Region 7: 50 Years, Wattpad, 1995. 351 Trn Quang Toi (et al), ch s ng b ng Cng sn Vit Nam tnh ng Nai 1930 1995 - The History of the Communist Party of Vietnam in ng Nai Province 1930 -1995, Tp I, II , Nh Xut Bn ng Nai, Bin Ha, 1997 and 2000. 352 Trn Th Minh Hong (foreword), a Ch ng Nai (The ng Nai Monograph), Nh Xut Bn Tng Hp ng Nai, Bin Ha, 2001. However implying about September 1969, the Monograph states that: In ong Thnh, the 33rd Regiment attacked and wiped out a Thai battalion at Bu Ci. Vol III, Chapter VI, see earlier footnote 197. 353 Thch Phng & Nguyn Trng Minh (eds), a Ch B Ra-Vng Tu (The B Ra-Vng Tu Monograph), Nh Xut Bn Khoa Hc X Hi, H Ni, 2005. 354 Similarly, the failure of the 274th VC Regiments attack on a Thai battalion position at c An on 16 June 1969 is omitted from Vietnamese communist military and political histories see footnotes 204 and 388.

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1969. Rather, that History relates engagements involving the 33rd Regiment in southeastern Long Khnh Province On 2 June, The 33rd Regiment was ordered to secretly deploy to the northeast of Gia Ray ((YT 6311)) and attack the forces of the 52nd Task Force [sic] at Sui Cao and afterwards, to ambush the enemys reinforcements to the west of Route 3 ((ie Route 333)). On 5 June, we began the attack The 33rd Regiment swiftly made a forced march and attacked its objective on time as planned. On 6 June, the 33rd Regiment ambushed and destroyed an engineer company patrolling along Route 3 ((ie Route 333)). That afternoon, the enemy deployed the 2nd Armored Company and two companies of the 52nd Task Force to break through and clear Route 3. The 33rd Regiment conducted a blocking operation and attacked, destroying 11 armored vehicles and inflicting heavy casualties on two enemy companies. A 1ATF study of the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment notes In June 1969, the battalions of the Regiment split for operational tasking. 3/33 was assigned an AO around Gia Ray in Long Khnh and Bnh Tuy Provinces. Lack of logistic support from the then 84 RSG (now MR7 Rear Services) was probably the main cause for the split. Although under fairly constant pressure, the Regimental Headquarters remained in the general Xun Lc/ lackhorse area until December 1969.355 A 2010 history monograph published by the 33rd Regiment Veterans Association see Appendix 2, relates that the Regiment inflicted heavy losses on Australian mechanised infantry at Kim Long and Bnh Ba wiping out 24 vehicles and forcing the enemy to withdraw to their base. ((no date is specified)) and the Regiment had deployed D1 (ie the 1st Battalion of the Regiment) to replace D440 and had suffered 53 killed on 6/6/1969 at nh a.356 A briefer - but similar account, is related in a July 2010 Summary History357 published by the 33rd Regiment Veterans Association see Appendix 1. A contemporary account a captured C-195 Company document, stated that the Company had: participated in the June 1969 attack on Bnh Ba with the entire regiment (33 Regt). and cited the Companys casualties in that engagement.358 A Vietnamese unit history formally published in 2011 the D440 History359 and the 33rd Regiments Background Memorial History360 related that not only was the 1st Battalion of the Regiment at Bnh Ba, but the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment
355

HQ 1ATF, 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt, Annex F to 1ATF INTSUM No.122/71, Ni t, 2 May 1971. Identical to the passage in the 33rd Regiment study by 1ATF of 21 September 1971 (Annex F to INTSUM No.264/71), this 3rd Battalion study by 1ATF does not mention the Battle of Bnh Ba 5-8 June 1969. 356 Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Qu Trnh , op.cit., 2010, p.2 and p.9 see Appendix 2. 357 In attacks on hamlets at nh a, Kim ong ( Ra), the Regiment destroyed 24 armoured vehicles forcing the enemy to withdraw to its defences at Ni t. - Cu Chin inh Trung on 33, Tm Tt Truyn Thng Trung on 33 , op.cit., July 2010 see Appendix 1. 358 1ATF, INTSUM No.195/69, Ni t, 14 July 1969. 359 D440 History (2011), Vietnamese edition, p.92; and, in English in Chamberlain, E.P., D440 , 2013, pp.65-66. 360 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011 see Appendix 3.

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commanded by Comrade Quch Thi Sn was tasked to ambush the Australian RRF on Route 2 south of Bnh Ba. That ambush however was reportedly not initiated as the enemy was spread out in groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiments ambush formation, the headquarters of the Regiment decided not to initiate the ambush attack. A POW captured at Bnh Ba by 5RAR Nguyn Vn Dy, stated that while K1 ((the 1st Battalion)) was taking part in a propaganda proselytising programme in the Bnh Ba area, he heard that K2 Bn was taking part in a battle.361 An Australian account, also mentions the presence of the 2nd Battalion in the area.362 However, as noted, the presence of the 2nd Battalion is not recorded in the official Australian history, the 5RAR history, the 5RAR After-Action Report, nor 1ATF intelligence summaries. The location and the activities of the Regiments 3rd Battalion in early June 1969 remain unclear. As noted earlier, Australian SIGINT monitored the move of the 33rd Regiments principal high frequency radio transmitter363 ie presumably serving the Regimental Headquarters, from south-eastern Long Khnh Province into Phc Tuy Province and its subsequent withdrawal northward after the Battle see the following marked sketch map.

33rd Regiment communications: Two PRC-25 VHF radio sets Operator: Nguyn Trng Minh

361

Interrogation Report PW: Nguyn Vn Dy, Det 1 Div Int Unit 1ATF, 19 June 1969. See also footnotes 325 and 551. 362 The article relates that the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 33rd Regiment of the 5th Division together with the local force D440 Battalion, was engaged by battalions of the Australian Task Force in the Bnh Ba area (Phc Tuy Province) in the period 5-11 June 1969. Johnson, ., Operation avarack Phc Tuy Province 1969, Winter 2010, op.cit., pp.89-114. 363 As related at footnote 242, the Australian Armys official history states incorrectly, that: Australian commanders and intelligence officers were baffled. During the initial occupation of Binh Ba, 33 NVA Regiment had apparently maintained radio silence, eluding task force signals intelligence. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.237. That statement appears to cite a 2007 monograph that claimed strict radio silence enabled elements of the 33rd NVA Regiment and D440 Battalion to occupy the village of nh a without warning. - Tidey, B., Forewarned Forearmed , op.cit., 2007, pp.49-50. At endnote 207, Tidey cites an S03 Intelligence (captain) at HQ 1ATF in mid-1969 as his source.

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1ATF SIGINT Direction-finding (DF) Locations of 33rd Regiments Headquarters 29 April 2 July 1969 364 Based on the foregoing, the balance of probabilities suggests that while the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment was the principal NVA/VC force at the Battle of Bnh Ba and the Regimental Headquarters, the 2nd Battalion, and regimental support elements were in the Bnh Ba area in the period 5-8 June 1969. It is probable that the 3rd Battalion remained in Long Khnh Province and was involved in the engagements in the Gia Ray, Sui Cao and Route 333 areas against ARVN 52nd Regiment elements ie as related in the 5th Division History (2005).365 If 33rd Regiment elements reportedly the 2nd Battalion, had set an ambush on Route 2 south of Bnh Ba, why was an ambush not initiated ? Two Vietnamese sources have related that the Australian RRF was spread out in groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiments ambush.366 However after the RRF group (13
364

These are the DF locations of the Regiments principal HF radio (Chicom 102E 15w). The map summarises the end-of-week reporting locations. See Appendix 17 for a DF locations map covering a larger geographical area. The US 11ACR was based at Blackhorse south of Xun Lc Town see footnote 166, and footnotes 235, 236 and 237 for its operations in May and June 1969 - which ranged across seven provinces of III CTZ. The headquarters of 1ATFs 6RAR/NZ was deployed in FS Virginia north of nh Ba village with its elements deployed on Operation Lavarack, see footnotes 260, 265, 266 and 362. 365 See the 5th VC Division History (2005) extract at Appendix 7, and also the 1ATF study of the 3 rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment - footnote 355. 366 See footnotes 294 and 295.

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M113A1 APCs, three Centurion tanks a column about 850 metres in length) has passed through to Bnh Ba village, several more vulnerable 1ATF elements moved along Route 2 without incident. For example, any NVA/VC elements in possible ambush sites south of Bnh Ba did not engage the fourth Centurion tank ( Corporal B. Bennier) that followed the RRF up Route 2 as a single vehicle (departing Ni t at about 1100hrs, 6 June); 5RARs B Company mounted in APCs (Major R.E. Harring and Captain T.H. Arrowsmith - but without escorting Centurion tanks, that departed Ni t at 1150hrs, 6 June); the RRFs composite tank troop returning to Ni t (in the late afternoon hours of 6 June); nor the original RRF APCs (Captain R. De Vere) returning to Ni t (at about 1700hrs, 6 June). 33rd Regiments ambush elements either decided not to engage the Australian vehicles or may not have adequately established their ambush positions in time. However, Captain R. De Vere has related an exchange of fire south of Bnh Ba as the RRF moved north up Route 2 late on the morning of 6 June ie: We did encounter one major roadblock ((which we)) cleared by tank fire and rolled down the road with barely a pause; APC sections fired into the flanks as they passed the area of the minor contact/failed ambush. APC crews did report some enemy bodies as they passed the area. We proceeded without further incident until halting just short of nh a.367 That brief encounter may have been with elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment. Also, as noted, a minor engagement occurred subsequently at about 0600hrs on 7 June when an NVA force approached Bnh Ba from the south and Vietnamese records indicate several 2nd Battalion soldiers were killed on that day.368 Regardless, it is not yet clear why both the D440 History (2011)369 and the ackground Memorial History370 document have noted the presence of the 33rd Regiments 2nd Battalion - led by Quch Thi Sn, in the Bnh Ba area and cited its failure to initiate the ambush south of the village when all other published Vietnamese accounts appear to have omitted any mention of a planned ambush by the 2nd Battalion.371 A senior 33rd Regiment veteran L B Lc372, has stated that the 2nd Battalion was not involved in the Battle of Bnh Ba itself, but that the Regimental Headquarters and the 2nd Battalion was in the area/nearby.
367 368

See footnote 291. See footnotes 314-318. 369 D440 History (2011), Vietnamese edition, p.92; and, in English in: Chamberlai n, E.P., D440 , 2013, pp.65-66. 370 L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011- see Appendix 3. 371 As noted, the Chu c History (2004) also refers to the planned ambush but does not mention the 2nd attalion ie However, the Australians did not enter our ambush as planned, and our company in the hamlet suffered heavy casualties. op.cit., 2004, pp.173-174. 372 c was the Regiments deputy chief-of-staff in the period 1969-1971; and deputy commander/ chief-of-staff in 1972-1975 see T Chc Ban Ch Huy Trung on 33 Qua C c Thi K (The Headquarters Organisation of the 33rd Regiment in Past Years), op.cit., 2010. It is not wholly clear whether he joined the Regiment before June 1969. For some years, Lc has led the 33rd Regiment Veterans iaison Committee (see Appendix 4); and he is a member of the 2013-2014 History Writing Team see footnote 2.

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Some aspects of the account of the Battle in the D440 History (2011) are also open to question. That History notes the participation of D440 Battalion ie: Battalion Headquarters deployed a recoilless rifle platoon and part of an infantry company to break through the enemy blockade. and many of our troops were wounded With a breaking of the enemy blockade unsuccessful, there was no time to collect weapons - and the enemy seized one of our two 75mm recoilless rifles.373 However, it seems remarkable that according to the D440 History, no D440 troops were killed at Bnh Ba noting that a D440 rallier later stated that the attalion suffered about 60 casualties including the commander of C2 Company and two platoon commanders and lost a 75mm RC .374 Post-script Following the Battle of Bnh Ba, the 33rd Regiment Headquarters withdrew northwards see the earlier SIGINT DF weekly summary map. The 1ATF Commander Brigadier C.M.I. Pearson directed 6RAR/NZ to interdict the withdrawing 33rd Regiment elements, but was disappointed that no substantive engagement ensued.375 On the afternoon of 11 June 1969, B Company of 6RAR/NZ assaulted a large strongly-defended bunker system (at YS 392822) about 10 kilometres north-west of Bnh Ba village and about five kilometres north-west of 6RAR/NZs FS Virginia.376 In the fierce two-hour engagement involving artillery and air support, the Australian company commander was wounded. Soon after dark, the enemy unit believed to be elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment, withdrew northwards.377 Australian reports recorded nine NVA killed by body count378, but such casualties are not included in the 33rd Regiments Martyrs ist.379 On 12 June 1969, V Company of 6RAR/NZ observed about 200 NVA moving northward carrying about 25 casualties in litters in the area of YS 398868 - about five kilometres north of the 11 June contact described above. The NVA were engaged

373 374

Chamberlain, E., D440 Their Story, op.cit., 2013, p.67. Chamberlain, E., D440 Their Story, op.cit., 2012, p.67, footnote 169. The 440 attalion Martyrs List annexed to their History, specifically lists two members killed in June 1969, but no locations are mentioned ie: Phm Minh Quyt (6th Company) Serial 199; and Ng Xun Li Serial 261. 375 The 33rd Regiment elements a large enemy force moving northward, side-stepped the 1ATF infantry force as they were occupied with a smaller enemy group. - email advice passed to the author, early May 2012. 376 Byers, D.R., MC, B Company - 6RAR/NZ Contact After Action Report 11 June 1969, Ni t AWM95, 7/6/22. Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.232-233. Fairhead, F. Lieutenant Colonel (Retd), A Duty Done, Linden Park, 2014, pp.86-87. 377 Johnson, ., Operation avarack Phc Tuy Province,Vietnam 1969, op.cit., 2010, pp.98-99. 378 6RAR, Contacts and Incidents Appendix 1 to Annex A to 6RAR After Action Report: 1-31 June 1969, Ops 14, 3 July 1969, Serial 52 (AWM95, 7/6/22). 379 Nguyn S H, Martyrs ist, op.cit., 16 July 2013. For a summary of 2 nd Battalion casualties recorded in June 1969, see Appendix 9.

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including with artillery and armed helicopter fire.380 odies and documents identified 2nd Battalion 33 NVA Regiment supported by at least two heavy weapons companies.381 A 33rd Regiment document subsequently recovered by the 18th ARVN Division included that: on 12 June 1969, J8 ((the 2nd Battalion/33rd Regiment)), K17 ((75mm RCL Company)) and K18 ((Sapper Company)) failed to observe movement regulations, and were thus hit by airstrikes. They also suffered losses in personnel and weapons. K20 ((Reconnaissance Company)) and J9 ((3rd Battalion)) were also hit by airstrikes due to a lack of security. Six members of K20 were KIA.382 That recovered document also noted the Regiments casualties in the period from 30 April to 20 June 1969383 - that appear to have included casualties in the period of the Battle of Bnh Ba in early June1969: From 30 April 20 June, various units failed to collect information on the enemy; were ambushed nine times, and sustained 150 KIA, five MIA, one captured; and lost 12 AKs, one B-40 and two K-54 pistols. K22 ((Company)) and K16 ((82mm Mortar Company)) accidentally exploded grenades wounding 11 members. A member of K22 took a grenade to go fishing, but mistakenly caused an accident which wounded three men. some members of J7 ((1st Battalion)) headquarters and K20 ate canned fish, and were poisoned by the enemy scheme. From 30 March to 20 June ((1969)), five members of D1, D2 and K10 of J8 wounded themselves, and one member of J7 committed suicide. From 8 May to 20 June ((1969)), the Regiment suffered 72 MIA; and D1 and D3 lost two B-41s, two B-40s, five K-54 pistols and 33 AKs. These figures presumably included the Regiments losses during B-52 strikes in May 1969384, and at the Battle of Bnh Ba in the period 5-8 June 1969.

Subsequently, the commander of the 33rd Regiments 2nd Battalion was reportedly rebuked by his higher command for poor performance and withdrawing from the battlefield in daylight.385 There were also reportedly bitter recriminations between
380

1ATF, INTSUM No.164-69, Ni t, 13 June 1969. See also 6RAR, After Action Report: 1-31 June 1969, Ops 14, 3 July 1969, p.4, Serial 53. noting captured documents that identified C17, C18 and C23 companies (AWM95, 7/6/22). 381 Johnson, ., Operation avarack Phc Tuy Province, Vietnam 1969, op.cit., 2010, pp.99-100. No casualties are related in the 33rd Regiment Martyrs ist for 12 June 1969 see the summary at Appendix 9. 382 CDEC Log 10-1940-69, Item 3. The locations of the airstrikes were not indicated. The report was probably written by a 33rd Regiment Assistant Political Officer, H Minh Tng. 383 CDEC Log 10-1940-69, Item 3. The author of the report appears to use both the J and D cover designators for the battalions of the Regiment. 384 As noted earlier, B-52 missions comprised either four or six aircraft - with the usual bomb load of 51 750lb bombs per aircraft. An Arclight ie B-52, target box for a three -aircraft cell covered an area 1km x 3km. 385 Johnson, ., Operation avarack Phc Tuy Province,Vietnam 1969, op.cit., 2010, p.100 and endnote 31 referencing . Johnsons interview with D.M. utler ( ieut enant Colonel - CO 6RAR/NZ,

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Headquarters Military Region 7 and the 33rd Regiment and between Headquarters 33rd Regiment and its battalions, over the failure of the Bnh Ba operation.386 High Point Phase Two By 14 June 1969, 1ATF had received intelligence information indicating that the second phase of the NVA/VC High Point would begin on 16 June 1969.387 On 16 June, the 274th VC Regiment attacked a Thai Armed Forces battalion position at Lc An (YS 178918) in Long Thnh District of Bin Ha Province, and the 274th Regiment suffered 212 killed.388 At that time, signals intelligence indicated that the 33rd Regiment
1969) in August 2009 who cited 547 Signal Troops SIGINT intercepts. However, Major General utler also had cited captured documents as the source for the commanding officer ((implying the commander of the 2nd Battalion)) being severely censured for so dangerously exposing his battalion through his incompetence and lack of battlefield discipline. - Horner, D. & Bou, J., Duty First: A history of the Royal Australian Regiment, Allen & Unwin, Second Edition, 2008, p.357. See also author Chamberlains email discussions with a knowledgeable 547 Signal Troop linguist/analyst (27 March 2012) the original source, who cited rebukes by the 33rd Regiment Commander. The commander of the 2 nd Battalion was Qu ch Th i Sn, see footnote 260. 386 The 33rd Regiments radio communications were invariably secure ie by employing one-time-pad (OTP) encryption (using HF transmissions on 102E radios see footnote 241). However, at this time, a series of messages in a lower-grade cypher were reportedly decrypted. The 33rd Regiment reportedly believed that their operational plans had been leaked from MR7 to the ARVN. - Authors correspondence with a knowledgeable 547 Signal Troop analyst/linguist mid and late March 2012. 387 1ATF, INTSUM No.165-69, Ni t, 14 June 1969. 388 During the second VC High Point Phase, the 274 th VC Regiment launched a major night assault on the base defensive position of the Thai 2nd Battalion/1st Brigade/Black Panther Division a two-company [-] position (totalling 245 personnel) at Lc An (YS 178918) in Long Thnh District of Bin Ha Province in the early am hours of 16 June 1969. Forewarned of the impending attack by SIGINT information from 1ATFs 547 Signal Troop, the Thai unit inflicted heavy casualties on the 274th Regiment 212 VC were reportedly killed by body count - 1ATF, INTSUM No.167/69, Ni t, 16 June 1969. The Thai force had been forewarned of the VC attack by signals intelligence-based information acquired by 1ATFs 547 Signal Troop. The warning was hand-delivered to the US advisors at the Thai Army Headquarters at Bearcat by Major Robert Payne (US Army Retd, Special Security Officer, IIFFV) email advice to author, 4 January 2014. Subsequently, captured documents identified all three battalions of the 274th Regiment, the K21 Sapper/ Reconnaissance Company, and rear service elements 1ATF, Vietnam Digest 24-69, Ni t, 1421 June 1969. According to Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam (IIFFV), the enemy attack against the 2 1st Infantry resulted in 212 enemy killed and 1 prisoner, 16 small arms (AK-47s), 25 crew-served weapons, 823 grenades, and 6 mines captured. Friendly losses were 6 Thais killed and 34 wounded. - IIFFV, Operational Report Lessons Learned, Period ending 31 July 1969, 17 December 1969, p.28. The attack was reported in the H Ni media On 15 June, the P AF of Bin Ha Province destroyed a battalion-size unit of Thai troops near Long Thnh. - Vietnam News Agency, Dazzling Military Feats During June, Nhn Dn, H Ni, 1 July 1969, p.3. The ng Nai Party History records the 4th Regiment ((274th Regiment)) attacked and destroyed two Thai battalions at Bnh Sn. - Dng Thanh Tn (ed), Lch s ng b ((ng Cng Sn Vit Nam)) tnh ng Nai (1930-2000), Tp (Volume) II (1954-1975), Chng (Chapter) IV, 2003. The attack is not mentioned at all in the 2006 memoir of the commanding officer of the 274th VC Regiment - Nguyn Nam Hng - Major General, Mt i Chinh Chin (A Life at War), op.cit., 2006. A study of the Lc An engagement including detailed interviews and maps, is at: 45th Military History Detachment (US), Combat After Action Report, Defense of Loc An Base Camp 16 June 1969,

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Headquarters was probably in south-western Long Kh nh Province - about 20 kilometres east of Lc An. However, three 33rd Regiment personnel have been listed as killed in the Lc An/Bnh Sn area on 15 and 1